Well intended HR performance appraisal

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Complete an article synopsis/summary and critique on a strategic human resource management topic.

After choosing one of the sample formats, prepare a synopsis. The final section of the paper is a critique of the information from the article.

A critique should include the following topics:

What was done poorly (e.g., relevant information omitted)?

What was done well in the article (e.g., new insights identified)?

What specific questions need to be answered to help make the article information relevant for practicing managers in business?

CAUTION: This synopsis must be a paraphrased report. You may NOT use quotations of more than 5 consecutive words from the article in preparing the report. The only exception is reporting the study hypotheses (i.e. H1, etc.) if it is a reviewing of an empirical article. When quoting 5 or fewer words or the hypotheses (if an empirical article), you would put quotation marks around the material quoted and put the page number in parentheses.

Are human resource practices linked to employee misconduct?
A rational choice perspective

James Werbel a,1, David B. Balkin b,c,!
a College of Business, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50010, United States
b Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, United States
c Institute for Labor Studies (IEL), ESADE Business School, Barcelona, Spain

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

This paper explains how well intended HR practices associated with performance appraisal and
compensation can be linked to employee misconduct. Based on a rational choice perspective to
ethical behavior, different types of HR con!gurations are likely to either increase the perceived
costs or bene!ts of employee misconduct. This paper links speci!c HR con!gurations with both
perceived costs and bene!ts of employee misconduct. Finally, this paper concludes with
recommendations that are designed to promote both effective job performance and minimize
problems of employee misconduct.

© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Performance appraisal
Compensation
Ethics
Employee misconduct

“The Road to Hell is paved with good intentions” Samuel Johnson, 1775

1. Introduction

The breadth of high pro!le cases of criminal behavior and misconduct in contemporary American, European (Knights &
O’Leary, 2005), and Asian (Sang-Hun, 2007) businesses has received signi!cant attention in both the academic literature and the
popular press (Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Baucus & Near, 1991). The court convictions of executives engaged in criminal behavior
that occurred at companies such as Enron, Adelphia, Parmalat, and Samsung have broad social impacts associated with the collapse
or decline of these !rms. The more recent cases in the collapse of !nancial giants such as AIG and Merrill Lynch, suggest that
misconduct persists and appears to be a chronic problem. The misconduct can adversely affect numerous stakeholders such as
employees, stockholders, creditors, and customers (Hooker, 2009).

The issue of misconduct within companies leads to the question, “Why do employees engage in misconduct?” The typical white
collar person who engages in misconduct is a middle aged white male. White collar, middle aged white males would not normally
fall into your stereotypes of people who engage in illegal behavior. Furthermore, these actions occur in spite of control systems
such as codes of ethics, toll free numbers to anonymously report inappropriate actions, managerial oversight, and sophisticated
internal auditing practices that are intended to reduce illegal behavior. Previous research suggests that individual differences (see
O’Fallon & Butter!eld, 2005 for a recent literature review) including demographic variables such as gender (McCabe, Ingram, &
Dato-on, 2006), personality traits (Greenberg, 2002), and stages of moral development (Greenberg, 2002) in”uence misconduct.
Research also suggests that organizational contexts such as codes of ethics (Schwartz, 2001; Beu & Buckley, 2004), leadership and

Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

! Corresponding author. Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, United States. Tel.: +1 303 492 5780.
E-mail addresses: jwerbel@iastate.edu (J. Werbel), david.balkin@colorado.edu (D.B. Balkin).

1 Tel.: +1 515 294 8423.

1053-4822/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.hrmr.2009.10.002

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Human Resource Management Review

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/humres

management (Grojean, Resick, Dickson, & Smith, 2004), and organizational culture or norms (Ashforth & Anand, 2003) in”uence
misconduct.

While acknowledging the signi!cance of earlier research as both individual differences and organizational contexts shape
misconduct, this paper proposes a model of misconduct that focuses on human resource management practices as a seldom
examined antecedent of misconduct. Accordingly, the primary contribution of this paper is to link speci!c and well intended HR
practices associated with both performance appraisal and compensation as an organizational context that shapes misconduct. This
goes beyond existing approaches that link the generic importance of HR functions with misconduct (James, 2000; Buckley et al.,
2001; McDevitt, Giapponi, & Tromley, 2007) by suggesting that !rms need to carefully examine the potential effects of different HR
compensation and performance appraisal practices. For example, it has been suggested that certain reward systems such as sales
commission plans and large cash bonuses may encourage people to engage in misconduct (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992). This
statement is overly simplistic because reward systems vary signi!cantly. Perhaps, different design features of incentive systems
are likely to create misconduct.

This paper !rst examines the construct of employee misconduct. It then demonstrates how HR practices can in”uence the
perceived costs and bene!ts of actions that lead to employee misconduct. Finally, it discusses alternative ways to structure HR
practices to minimize the potential of employee misconduct.

2. Employee misconduct

Numerous terms have been used to describe unethical behavior in organizations. A broad category of literature on unethical
behavior focuses on organizational deviance (Robinson & Bennet, 1995; O’Leary-Kelly, Grif!n, & Glew, 1996; Robinson & O’Leary-
Kelly, 1998) or organizational misbehavior (Vardi & Weitz, 2004). This includes severe behaviors such as aggressive, violent, or
passive aggressive behaviors such as bullying, assault, and harassment. They may also include behaviors such as embezzlement.

Another category of research on unethical behavior focuses on employee misconduct (Kidder, 2005). Employee misconduct
includes a more limited range of unethical behaviors that are related to corporate wrongdoing that often gets highlighted in the
media. Examples of these were mentioned earlier. Thus, this type of unethical behavior commonly involves actions that entail
violations of socially prescribed behavior. It includes practices such as accounting irregularities, churning customer accounts,
inappropriate management of overtime policies, having obvious con”icts of interests such as giving inappropriate gifts to a client,
or using company property for personal purposes. Employee misconduct can often occur when employees are aiming at meeting
expected performance objectives but decide to use questionable means to achieve those objectives. Therefore, we differentiate
employee misconduct from other forms of organizational deviance by limiting it to behaviors that an employee enacts while
performing his or her job without intending malice to other parties or the organization.

Thus, employee misconduct is different from ethical actions linked to social responsibility that entails a broader range of
proscriptive actions to manage the needs of different stakeholders. In contrast, employee misconduct relates to how people ought
to behave in light of professional standards for doing business (Buckley et al., 2001). This can involve committing an infraction of a
company rule such as committing dishonesty when booking the date of a sales transaction in order to achieve a sales quota. It can
also involve violating a federal customs rule such as attempting to sneak through U.S. customs some contraband Cuban cigars in
order to please clients that one is trying to impress. In these situations, an employee is focused on performance and in the process
breaks a company rule, a law or ethical principle leading to misconduct.

While the broader scope of organizational deviance and the narrower focus of employee misconduct are both important, we
focus on employee misconduct in this paper for two reasons. In particular, we believe that HR and its performance management
system may devote too much emphasis of an employee’s attention on one goal such as sales revenues and too little attention on
other goals such as good customer service, so that misconduct results when customers complain about how they are treated by
aggressive sales people.

Secondly we focus on misconduct because it is often subjected to media attention. Acts of misconduct often violate social
expectations in the name of greed or self-interest. The public disclosure of employee misconduct may harm an organization’s
goodwill with customers, suppliers and other important parties (Vogel, 2005). Bankers who sold sub-prime loans for houses to
customers with poor credit histories and who later had their home foreclosed have harmed the bank’s reputation for being a good
standing member of the community that it serves. The bankers in this example did not seek to harm the customers who were sold
the sub-prime loans and had their houses foreclosed, rather they were seeking pro!ts for the bank and the pay incentives that
were linked to bank pro!ts.

This paper assumes that employee misconduct is a multilevel construct (see Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008). That
is, misconduct occurs in an organizational context and it shapes individual behavior. Both individual and organization factors
contribute to the occurrence of misconduct. Thus, we believe a cross level analysis is important to investigate at both the
organizational and individual levels of analysis. Additionally, we assume that performance criteria are set at reasonable levels and
employees are given some discretion in the ways they choose to achieve pre-established performance goals. Our focus is on the
choices that employees make in how they perform under different performance appraisal and compensation practices.

3. Performance management systems and misconduct

Fig. 1 indicates the HR practices and the organizational and individual intervening variables that contribute to employee
misconduct. Certain types of compensation practices make misconduct more likely to occur at an individual level. On an

318 J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

organizational level, the rewards provided to those who engage in misconduct while exceeding their performance goals send a
symbolic message to other employees that legitimate the misconduct and make it more attractive to other individuals.
Furthermore, the legitimation process may also spill over to reduce the fear of being caught as the organization has communicated
at best an indifferent attitude towards misconduct. A vivid example of the organizational effects of rewarding employee
misconduct is provided by Andrew Fastow, the CFO of Enron, who at one time was considered to be a hero within the Enron
culture for developing innovative !nancial deals that enriched the !rm as well as himself. Unfortunately, other Enron executives
were in”uenced by Fastow, who eventually received a prison sentence for his misconduct.

Performance appraisal practices that focus on outcomes exclusively (with little attention given to behaviors) can intensify the
information asymmetry between supervisors and subordinates. Supervisors may have minimal knowledge of how subordinates
achieve their performance outcomes since they are not required to monitor employee behavior and provide behavioral feedback in
an outcome based performance appraisal system. Subordinates can take advantage of their greater level of job knowledge by
engaging in questionable work practices that lead to desired work outcomes. Information asymmetry is likely to create
dysfunctions within a social system as feedback loops are incomplete (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The incomplete feedback loop is
likely to promote this disparity.

Fig. 1 suggests that at the individual level of analysis, employees approach misconduct rationally by considering the
opportunities to be gained from misconduct (rewards/incentives) compared to the fear of being caught (performance
assessment). When the expected bene!ts exceed the expectations of being caught, individuals will be prone to engage in
misconduct. This is compatible with others who have also proposed that rational choice perspective pervades both ethical
behavior (Kidder, 2005; Chiou, Huang, & Lee, 2005; Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007) and criminal behavior. This perspective
assumes that individuals will weigh the costs and bene!ts of an action that entails misconduct and that misconduct is likely to
occur when it serves the self-interest of the perpetrator (Beu & Buckley, 2004). Both incentives and deterrence are important
elements to this perspective (Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007). It should be pointed out that the model presented in Fig. 1 does not
attempt to indicate all the potential uses of performance appraisal and other HR practices such as employee development. Rather it
aims to explain links between HR practices such as compensation and performance appraisal and employee misconduct.

From an individual level of analysis, misconduct re”ects a rational choice theory of ethics and overlooks employee individual
differences associated with moral integrity. The rational choice perspective is largely a consequentialist perspective that re”ects
the self-serving advantages and disadvantages of some behavior (Morrell, 2004). We acknowledge that individuals with higher
moral integrity are less likely to engage in misconduct despite the organizational context (Ashkanasy, Windsor, & Trevino, 2006).
Nonetheless, many employees with less developed awareness of their moral values are likely to be in”uenced by the ethical
context. Therefore, the proposed model is mostly applicable to employees who are inclined to take a consequentialist perspective
to misconduct and moral choices. Based on the frequency and persistence of misconduct over time, lower levels of moral integrity
appear to be relatively common in business.

It should also be pointed out that misconduct can occur from a bottom up perspective or a top down perspective (Pinto, Leana,
& Pil, 2008). Furthermore, Pinto et al. suggest the processes in”uencing misconduct are quite different between these two models.
One of the biggest distinctions occurs with intentionality from upper management. This paper focuses on a bottom up perspective
where management unintentionally creates an organizational context that allows an individual to make a rational choice to
pursue misconduct.

Fig. 1. A rational choice model of HR practices and misconduct.

319J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

3.1. Compensation practices and misconduct

As per Fig. 1, we suggest that the con!guration of HR practices (see Lepak & Snell, 2002) may increase or decrease the perceived
costs and bene!ts of misconduct. The more prevalent certain practices, the greater the potential rewards to be gained from the
misconduct. We begin by focusing on compensation systems as they may create situations that make misconduct to be rationally
more attractive.

Different types of compensation systems may unintentionally increase the bene!ts of employee misconduct. Many
compensation plans are intended to reward a high performer with increased levels of compensation. However, a basic
assumption is that misconduct may lead to increased performance. Misconduct may be seen by some employees as a short term
tactic to achieve higher levels of performance that trigger desired rewards. If employees use misconduct to achieve higher levels of
performance, then performance contingent compensation systems may unwittingly reinforce misconduct. As Jansen and Von
Glinow (1985) suggest, incentive pay may lead to instances of employee misconduct. This seems to be compatible with others who
have linked incentive pay to misconduct (Church, Gaa, Nainar, & Shehata, 2005). Studies that report links between incentive pay
and misconduct have not given speci!c details about the “awed features of the incentive pay policies. Some companies use pay
incentives and have few problems with misconduct, while others use pay incentives and report incidents of misconduct. These
mixed !ndings suggest that perhaps certain forms of performance contingent compensation may be more likely to in”uence
misconduct than others so that the overall use of pay incentive systems should not be condemned.

One of the basic design features of performance contingent compensation is the proportion of individual pay incentives to base
pay. In most cases individual pay incentives are administered on an ex ante basis so that the employees anticipate the reward in
advance. A bonus in the range of 10 to 15% of annual base salary is large enough to provide a motive for misconduct (Lazear, 2000;
McAdams & Hawke, 1994; Varadarajan & Futrell, 1984; Krefting & Mahoney, 1977). A pay incentive of this magnitude would
represent a six to ten thousand dollar payoff for an employee with an annual salary of 60 thousand dollars. Assuming that the
compensation system emphasizes performance contingent incentive pay, then the perceived bene!ts of misconduct (if it leads to
performance gains) are likely to increase. Individual incentive plans focus an employee’s attention on individual behaviors that
trigger rewards. This can focus individual efforts on self-serving behaviors that may produce wealth for the individual at the
expense of the organization or other parties. Incentive pay plans may also distract an employee’s attention on how they achieve
their performance goals which may lead to unintentional violations of a company code of ethics or norms of professional conduct.
A well known example of the unintended consequences of individual performance contingent pay occurred when Sears Roebuck
lowered hourly wages of its auto mechanics and put them on a commission pay plan that required that they generate a quota of
$147 per hour of auto repair work from customers. Consequently, Sears auto mechanics over-billed customers for unneeded parts
and services which ultimately led to a class action legal suit on behalf of overcharged customers and damaged the reputation of the
company (Applegate, 1992).

On theother hand, employers that only offer base pay with modest levels of individual performance contingent pay are not aslikely
to have employees engaged in misconduct. For example, managers at Continental Airlines give out $50 “spot cash” rewards when they
discover an employee doing good work such aspleasing a customer and doing more than is expected on the job. A spot cash reward is a
small amount of cash allocated to an employee on an ex post basis and paid out immediately. Logically, with a modest sized pay
incentive there are fewer bene!ts to be gained from misconduct and only the potential downside risks of being caught. While there are
likely to be signi!cant individual variations in the amount of perceived gain that it takes to make misconduct attractive, the greater the
size of the performance based reward relative to the base pay, the greater the likelihood of misconduct.

Proposition 1. The greater the proportion of performance contingent individual incentive compensation in relation to base pay, the
greater the likelihood of misconduct.

Even within individual incentive plans, there are different design features that could lead to a higher or lower likelihood of
employee misconduct. In particular, individual pay incentives may be continuous or discontinuous. Continuous incentives mean
that the level of performance and the amount of the incentive are directly linked. Continuous incentives are on a continuous
reinforcement schedule. Sales commissions and piecework used in manufacturing environments are the most well known
examples of continuous pay incentives. Discontinuous individual pay incentives occur when incentives are linked to a platform of
performance such as a quota. The incentive is given when the platform of performance is attained. If the platform or quota is not
attained (regardless of the distance from the platform) no incentive is provided to an employee. Thus, the incentive pay is earned
on an “all or nothing” basis.

While both types of incentives may make the perceived bene!ts of misconduct more attractive, discontinuous incentives are
likely to increase the likelihood of employee misconduct more than continuous incentives. The central point is that as one gets
closer to the platform of performance, there may be increasing attraction to engage in misconduct in order to attain the desired
level of performance.

Furthermore, the size of a bonus can make a relatively minor form of misconduct seem plausible. However, misconduct may be
seen as a slippery slope. Once one has bene!ted from a relatively minor or trivial form of misconduct, then one may consider
performing a more serious form of misconduct in order to attain a performance hurdle at a later period of time. It is analogous to
going from telling a small lie to the boss and getting away with a minor infraction such as tardiness to fabricating a bigger lie to
give to the supervisor in order to get away with a gross violation such as stealing company property.

Moreover, one common problem in the sales domain happens when sales representatives are given a sales quota based on sales
revenues that are measured over a period of time such as a quarter during the business cycle. Meeting or exceeding the sales quota

320 J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

triggers a performance bonus. However, due to the variability of the business cycle, client purchases are asymmetrical and depend
on their economic prosperity as a precursor to buying a product such as a capital good. Sales representatives are often tempted to
buffer their booked sales revenues by withholding sales in excess of a quota and reporting the sale in a future period in order to
smooth out their potential for earning quarterly bonuses. These poorly timed sales bookings can result in inaccurate aggregate
sales performance data reported to shareholders and the investment community who may under- or over-value the stock based
on false growth and revenue information.

In contrast, the incremental gain for misconduct should be less for continuous incentives. This seems to be supported by
research that suggests that employees who fail to achieve their discontinuous goals by a small margin are more likely to engage in
misconduct (Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004).

Proposition 2. Discontinuous incentives are likely to increase the likelihood of misconduct in comparison to continuous incentives.

It is important to understand that reward systems in”uence organizational dynamics as well as individual behavior since
rewards can strengthen (or weaken) organization culture. In this situation, we view reward systems to be linked with symbolic
legitimation of misconduct. To convey this point, we need to digress into legitimation.

Legitimation is concerned with the social construction of desired or appropriate actions within an organization (Suchman,
1995). This perspective implies that what can be labeled as misconduct (in this case inappropriate actions) is socially constructed
to be desired.

A second point is that legitimation is frequently seen as a means to justify actions (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Galang, Elsik, &
Russ, 1999). That is, people act or are about to act and wish to couch their actions with the organization’s support. Thus, a common
justi!cation for misconduct is that a supervisor endorsed it. If a supervisor approves an action, the checks and balances within a
system are likely to symbolically convey legitimacy to the misconduct. Reward systems that are under control of management
convey an explicit managerial support of misconduct if misconduct leads to organizational rewards.

This suggests that individuals who commit an act of misconduct may justify their actions for the “good of the organization.”
They are likely to rely on reward systems as a symbolic means to rationalize the appropriateness of misconduct. The opportunity to
justify one’s actions for the “good of the organization” is likely to increase the viability of misconduct. Incentive systems can be
used to socially construct managerial support of misconduct.

Proposition 3. The greater the proportion of incentive pay to base pay and the use of discontinuous incentives are likely to convey
legitimacy of misconduct to increase the perceived acceptability of misconduct.

3.2. Performance appraisal practices and misconduct

Performance management systems include HR practices tied to performance appraisal and compensation. Performance
appraisal is a part of the performance management system because it !rst speci!es performance standards and then assesses
employees against those performance standards. Many administrative decisions are fully or partially determined by the perfor-
mance evaluation. These decisions have a direct bearing on an employee’s job security, future employment opportunities, status,
and pay within an organization.

Performance appraisal is most closely linked to deterrence of misconduct. Fear of being caught and disciplined can be an
important deterrent of misconduct in organizations (Chiou, Huang, & Lee, 2005; Manrique de Lara, 2006). Performance appraisal
systems commonly entail supervisory monitoring of employee performance. Thus, supervisors may play an important role in
in”uencing employees’ perceptions of the cost of engaging in misconduct. However, there is often information asymmetry in
performance appraisal as a supervisor has less information about employee performance than employees themselves (Aguinis,
2007). Thus, it is possible for employees to hide aspects of their performance from their supervisors.

There are likely to be many reasons for the performance information asymmetry. Supervisors may not be motivated to search for
misconduct as supervisory monitoring of employee behavior may be perceived negatively as micromanaging by subordinates and
undermine the quality of supervisor–subordinate relationships. To some extent close monitoring also con”icts with employee
empowerment efforts. Supervisors may also have dif!culties monitoring performance as spans of control have increased in many
organizations due to mergers, acquisitions, and the use of electronic communication technologies that permit supervisors and
subordinates to operate in different geographical locations. Regardless of the reasons for information asymmetry, greater information
asymmetry reduces employee perceptions of being caught and disciplined for misconduct. From a rational choice perspective, this
would be tied to perceived costs of misconduct. Thus, it is important to discern how HR practices in”uence information asymmetry.

As per Fig. 1, one of the ways to classify performance appraisal practices is based on the criteria used to assess job performance.
Kowtha (1997) suggests that performance appraisal systems may be classi!ed as either behavior based or outcome based
performance appraisal systems. Behavior based systems are concerned with evaluating employees based on the way they do their
jobs. It may include contextual job performance or it may include general work processes. Thus, propensity to cooperate with
others, product knowledge, or behaviors listed in a job description would be examples of criteria used in behavior based
performance appraisal. Behavior observation scales and behaviorally anchored rating scales are representative of methods used
within behavior based performance systems. The greater the frequency or quality of desired behaviors, the higher the rating.

Behavior based performance measures require that the source of the evaluative feedback have ample opportunity to observe
the ratee and judge him or her fairly. Thus, a supervisor is given a motive to observe each subordinate’s work behaviors in order to
gather enough performance information to provide an evaluation of job behaviors for each subordinate. When supervisors are

321J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

engaged in observing employee job behaviors and documenting examples of positive and negative job behavior, the employee
perception of the cost of misconduct is likely to be high.

In contrast, outcome based performance appraisal systems are concerned with evaluating the outputs of job performance
without taking employee job behaviors into consideration. Performance outcomes can be evaluated in terms of quantity as well as
quality of performance. Thus, the amount of sales in dollars (quantitative) and level of customer satisfaction (qualitative) are
examples of outcome based performance evaluation for a sales representative. Goal setting performance appraisal processes
(Knight, Durham, & Locke, 2001) are types of outcome based performance appraisals. Management-by-objectives (MBO) is a
popular example of outcome based performance appraisal that relies on a set of mutually agreed upon goals that become the
criteria that an employee is judged on for purposes of performance evaluation. Outcome based performance evaluation systems
are attractive to organizations that lack the opportunity to closely monitor the behaviors of employees when accurate behavioral
performance data are not available. For example, store managers in a large supermarket chain can be evaluated by district
managers on outcomes such as store revenues, employee safety record, and store pro!t margin. District managers may use these
outcomes to evaluate store managers without traveling to each store to observe how the managers perform their jobs. Employees
may also !nd outcome based performance systems attractive because they are given more discretion to achieve performance goals
as they see !t.

It is our contention that outcome based performance appraisal systems are more prone to incidents of misconduct than
behavior based performance appraisal systems due to the greater discretion given to employees to achieve performance outcomes
that is linked with information asymmetry. With outcome based performance appraisal, less emphasis is placed on the means that
employees use to achieve outcomes, and supervisors devote less time on monitoring employee behavior as a consequence. Thus,
outcome based performance appraisal systems are associated with both perceived bene!ts of misconduct as goals become
increasingly more dif!cult to achieve over time, and a perceived reduction in costs of misconduct, as employees are given more
discretion to select their own means to achieve outcomes.

In terms of perceived costs of misconduct, outcome based performance appraisal offers inducements for employees to engage
in misconduct for two reasons. First, outcome based performance appraisals give employees the freedom to decide how they wish
to achieve the outcomes. This can be positive in that it may encourage employees to develop innovative strategies to meet the
goals. However, in some cases these strategies may entail misconduct if employees have dif!culties attaining the desired outcomes
(Schweitzer, Ordonez, & Douma, 2004). If inappropriate means are successfully used to achieve the performance outcomes, then it
could be relatively easy to incrementally cross over and engage in misconduct in order to achieve the outcomes. Thus, a !nancial
broker may encourage customers with low tolerance for risk to purchase highly volatile stocks as opposed to more appropriate and
less volatile conservative stocks to increase total sales or generate larger sales commissions. Volatile stocks may require more
buying and selling activities timed to market movements that generate more frequent commissions for a broker and which reduce
a client’s investment returns. The outcome based performance criteria may encourage a !nancial broker to sell to clients a product
they do not want in order to satisfy expected performance standards. The borderline between this illustration and churning
accounts eventually becomes grey.

Managed health care companies have recently denied legitimate medical claims from customers who had to take the
companies to court to receive a !nancial settlement for the medical costs that they expected to be covered. In court documents it
was discovered that these medical insurance !rms gave substantial !nancial bonuses to claims adjusters in their employment who
were given quotas for rejecting claims based on total number of claims that were !led. The incentives were established to
encourage claims adjusters to look for reasons to deny claims for medical coverage to a customer in order to generate higher
pro!ts. Initially this practice may have lead to some good decisions in denying claims; however, over time this practice is likely to
lead to choices involving misconduct for personal gain.

Second, outcome based performance appraisal may put pressure on employees to take risks associated with misconduct by making
it more rewarding to take those risks. With outcome based performance appraisal, there is a tendency for supervisors to expect
continuous improvements in subordinate performance each year (Welch, 2001). If this tendency occurs, it is important to consider
that the performance curve is asymptotic with relatively easy gains being realized initially, but as performance improves, the
opportunity for gainsdecreases and requires a lot more effort. Withthe risingexpectations, employees need to !nd ways to meet those
increasing expectations. One of the ways to achieve those expectations occurs with misconduct. For example, Columbia HCA had
expectations to increase hospital revenues over previous years. This practice appears to have motivated some general managers to
engage in Medicaid and Medicare fraud as it became more dif!cult to meet the rising performance outcome expectations.

Outcome based performance appraisal is also likely to minimize the perceived costs of employee misconduct as its focus on
outcomes reduces the chances of being caught. Outcome based performance appraisal is saturated with performance information
asymmetry. It appears to be more commonly used when supervisors have fewer opportunities to directly observe behaviors
(Tremblay, Cote, & Balkin, 2003). Outcome based performance appraisals have supervisors focusing on data associated with the
outcomes of performance rather than the way performance was attained. While a supervisor could hypothetically gather behavior
based performance, there could be high transaction costs associated with monitoring each employee’s behavior which would be a
deterrent to gathering behavioral information. In other words, as long as the outcomes are being met, the supervisor may be
unaware of the methods used by an employee to achieve those outcomes. Thus, an employee knows what is done to achieve the
ends but the supervisor is not informed. Information asymmetry provides fertile conditions for an agency problem, and tempts an
employee to behave in opportunistic ways that can lead to misconduct. When employee behavior is not monitored employees are
likely to lower their expectations that they will be caught for misconduct. Thus, employees with outcome based performance
evaluations are likely to perceive reduced costs of misconduct.

322 J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

In contrast, behavior based performance evaluations should be less prone to instances of employee misconduct. They are
intended to promote consistency in prescribed behavior. Employees are likely to be motivated to engage in the socially
appropriate prescribed behaviors that are valued by the organization. Furthermore, to assess performance, supervisors are
expected to actually observe employees at work and keep records of these work observations. This heightened supervisory
vigilance is likely to minimize information asymmetry.

Proposition 4. Organizations that use outcome based performance evaluations are likely to have employees who perceive higher
bene!ts of misconduct and lower perceived costs of misconduct, compared to organizations that use behavior based performance
evaluations.

A second HR con!guration of performance appraisal that can have misconduct implications is derived from the
interdependence that often occurs between supervisory and subordinate performance outcomes. Since there are different
types of performance appraisal systems used for different hierarchical levels within a !rm, this structural issue suggests that it is
important to integrate supervisory and subordinate performance standards to ensure a continuity of goals across levels in an
organization (Kaplan & Norton, 2001). This alignment may entail an aggregation of subordinate performance outcomes as an
indicator of supervisor performance outcomes. However, this continuity in goals has the potential for supervisory con”ict of
interest, especially with outcome measurements. If a high performing employee is engaging in misconduct to achieve that high
level of performance outcomes, and if subordinate performance directly and materially contributes to supervisory performance,
then the supervisor has a potential con”ict of interest in terms of addressing the misconduct. If a supervisor investigates the
problem and corrects the misconduct, then that supervisor’s performance is likely to be reduced. To some extent, this
interdependence between supervisor and subordinate performance may undermine supervisory motivation to investigate
subordinates who engage in misconduct. Misconduct may lead to higher levels of subordinate performance and ultimately bene!t
the supervisor’s performance rating. A supervisor’s self-interest for achieving high performance ratings is likely to diminish a
supervisor’s motivation to punish misconduct and is likely to reduce an employee’s perceived risks of misconduct as the supervisor
may provide tacit or in some cases direct support for misconduct.

Proposition 5. When a supervisor and subordinate’s performance outcomes are closely linked, a subordinate’s perception of perceived
risk of engaging in misconduct is reduced.

A third aspect of the performance appraisal function addresses the types of people involved in performance assessment. The
wide diffusion of the practice of three hundred sixty degree performance appraisal has encouraged employers to consider using
multiple raters of performance that can include peers, other managers besides the supervisor, subordinates, and customers
(Aguinis, 2007). It acknowledges that there may be information asymmetry between the supervisor and the subordinate since
supervisors have limited opportunities to observe subordinates in many work environments and may not understand the
technical aspects of the job they are expected to supervise. In order to manage this gap in a supervisor’s knowledge of what a
subordinate does on the job, it is important to gather performance assessment information from those who can most closely
observe a subordinate’s performance as well as understand the job itself. For example, customers or peers are likely to have direct
and sometimes regular contact with a target employee. Gathering inputs from more than one source is likely to reduce the job
performance information gap in comparison to relying on only the supervisor to gather information about job performance. While
three hundred sixty degree performance appraisal has its limitations, by having more people observing and monitoring behavior
that can reveal instances of misconduct, this practice is more likely to increase an employee’s fear of being caught. For example,
trucking !rms often have 800 telephone numbers displayed on the back of the truck so that other drivers can report some type of
driving misconduct. This means that employees being monitored by multiple raters should be aware that they are more likely to be
exposed for committing misconduct. By including peers and customers and other observers as sources of feedback in the
performance appraisal process an employee is likely to have a heightened sense of fear of being caught in an act of misconduct
which raises the perceived costs of misconduct to them.

Proposition 6. The more performance appraisal assessments are gathered from multiple and diverse sources, the greater will be an
employee’s perceived costs of engaging in misconduct.

4. Discussion

In summary, we link rational choice theory and the architecture of HR performance management systems as factors that shape
organizational routines associated with misconduct. In particular, we suggest that performance appraisals that (1) are outcome
based, (2) have supervisors’ performance closely linked to subordinate performance, and (3) rely exclusively on a supervisor as
the source of assessments of subordinate performance are more likely to provide an impetus for employee misconduct.
Furthermore, compensation systems that emphasize incentive pay in relation to base pay, provide pay incentives with all-or-
nothing payout schemes, and offer pay incentives with sizeable payouts, are more likely to present conditions fertile for employee
misconduct to occur.

This paper makes several important contributions to the literature on employee misconduct and human resource management.
First and perhaps most importantly, this paper moves beyond generalized ideas that organizational culture or defective reward
systems shape employee misconduct and highlights some speci!c HR practices that increase the likelihood for misconduct to
occur. This suggests that pay incentives are not an inherently dysfunctional motivational tool that some critics of pay incentives

323J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

have argued (Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985). However, some speci!c features of a performance management system that incorporate
rewards as described previously in this paper are more likely to contribute to misconduct than other features that could be
selected with forethought. For example, the use of group pay incentives rather than individual pay incentives is likely to diminish
the prevalence of misconduct. Group pay incentives facilitate social cohesion and more pervasive mutual monitoring of behavior
within a group which increases the risk of getting caught associated with employee misconduct.

This paper links HR practices, organizational legitimacy, and employee misconduct as part of an emerging trend to provide
systematic explanations for employee misconduct. Some initial work has linked HR practices and organizational routines (Galang,
Elsik, & Russ, 1999) and others have linked legitimacy and ethics (Jose & Thibodeaux, 1999). This paper then links HR practices,
organizational legitimacy and employee misconduct together using a rational choice theory approach. The important implication
here is that when employee misconduct becomes institutionalized, there is a sense of legitimacy to the action. Employees are likely
to rationalize their misconduct as the organization unwittingly supports the misconduct through inappropriate application of HR
practices by both HR staff and line managers.

From a theoretical perspective, this paper links HR practices with misconduct within a rational choice perspective. It assumes
that employees make choices to engage in behavior based on costs and bene!ts of the outcomes consistent with a consequentialist
or utilitarian approach to ethics. Most of the research on employee misconduct focuses on individual differences or employee
perceptions of situations. There is evidence that employee misconduct is in”uenced by situational factors as well as individual
differences (Kidder, 2005). Furthermore, a meta-analysis suggests that general perceptions of ethical climate are important
predictors of ethical behavior (Martin & Cullen, 2006). HR practices have been linked to ethical climate (James, 2000). Unlike
previous research, this paper highlights the importance of speci!c situational factors associated with HR practices. Selecting a
situational approach to misconduct, this paper takes a cross level of analysis that recognizes that different organizational factors
affect individual propensity to engage in misconduct and this has important implications for research.

5. Recommendations

From a practical perspective, this paper suggests performance driven HR practices may have some unintended negative
consequences on an organization as employees !nd ways to take performance shortcuts that in the long term can undermine
organizational effectiveness through employee misconduct. We would like to suggest that the HR practices discussed in this paper
are not inherently positive or negative and the HR practices may have links to both intended performance outcomes and
unintended employee misconduct. The question becomes how can one have both performance driven systems and reduce the
chances of employee misconduct?

We offer several suggestions to reduce the likelihood of misconduct. First, HR practices need to minimize the gap in
performance information available between what an employee and his or her supervisor knows. Organizations need to combine
several of the following suggestions to minimize this information gap.

First, assigning multiple evaluators for the performance appraisal process is one of the critical ways to assess performance and
reduce performance information asymmetry between a supervisor and subordinate. However, the burden of identifying and
correcting misconduct falls on the supervisor. It is evident that supervisors often have a propensity to focus on the performance
management of poor performers, a practice referred to as “management by exception.” However, for misconduct, it is also
important to focus supervisory attention on high performers as well. For example, the NCAA monitors winners and not losers in
intercollegiate athletics.

Next, supervisors may need to scrutinize high performers as well as low performers for information on how they perform their
jobs, just as a teacher might check up on a student with a perfect score on an exam to !nd evidence of cheating. For example, many
universities require that all the faculty undergo periodic peer teaching evaluations where a peer sits in and observes the teaching
done by a faculty member. These peer class visits are done to provide additional evidence of effective teaching performance
beyond the data gathered from student course evaluations since student evaluations may be gamed by faculty such as by being
overly lenient in allocating grades to students. An important aspect of supervisory monitoring and evaluation is to include
behavioral indicators of performance in addition to outcome indicators for both the supervisor and the subordinate. If only
outcomes are used as a basis for evaluating subordinate performance, then supplemental behavioral indicators of performance
should also be required and linked to performance outcomes.

Additionally, the use of pay incentives should be based on having reliable measures of performance outcomes and behaviors. The
balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001) provides examples of !rms that attempt to integrate both outcome and behavioral
indicators of performance. In the balanced scorecard, behaviors are !rst assessed. Next, hard performance outcomes such as
!nancial success are collected at a later time. Pay incentives are provided based on a composite assessment of the behavioral and
performance outcomes.

Finally, we suggest that a mix of pay incentives across organization performance levels may be more appropriate than the
exclusive use of individual incentives. Individual pay incentives, a departmental or team based pay incentive, and an organi-
zational based pay incentive are likely to diminish the overall attractiveness of employee misconduct while still providing
incentives for performance gains. The group pay incentives intensify the process of peer monitoring behaviors and make employee
misconduct more noticeable and costly to enact. A supervisor can provide feedback and rewards on individual job behaviors and
outcomes, and then can provide pay incentives based on collective outcomes. Therefore, we do not propose doing away with
individual pay incentives. Rather we are proposing a more balanced reward system that balances individual pay incentives with
group pay incentives in order to reduce the temptation to engage in opportunistic behavior that may be unintentionally rewarded.

324 J. Werbel, D.B. Balkin / Human Resource Management Review 20 (2010) 317–326

It should be mentioned that our model and propositions only cover one contextual aspect of organizational misconduct related
to HR practices. We acknowledge that leadership in an organization is also a signi!cant contextual in”uence on employee
misconduct independent of the HR context. Paralleling this logic is the notion that leadership plays a critical role in the
institutionalization of any practice (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). We assume the same would be valid for employee misconduct. We
focused on HR practices and excluded leadership to provide greater clarity on an under-examined contextual factor.

This raises some important issues that need greater clari!cation and should be subject to empirical investigation. We suggest
there is a need to examine the relationship between HR practices and leadership. HR practices are likely to in”uence the perceived
costs and bene!ts of employee misconduct for all employees regardless of managerial status. To what extent do HR practices
in”uence leader behaviors towards employee misconduct? Are leaders more or less prone to misconduct than employees? For
example, leaders have more discretion over their performance than other employees and face greater temptations to abuse their
power in order to satisfy their own personal interests at the expense of the collective interests of others. It would be useful to know
which HR practices encourage leaders to behave in the service of others and which ones encourage leaders to act in self-serving
and inappropriate ways.

In future research that examines the link between HR policies and employee misconduct models that are more complex
than the rational choice model that we present could be developed that take into consideration other variables that affect
employee misconduct such as emotion. For example, negative emotions could explain other reasons for employee misconduct
to occur as a form of retribution when an organization underpays an employee for contributions that it received (Greenberg,
1990).

To sum up, HR practices can unintentionally provide a context for employee misconduct to take root. Prior to implementing an
HR practice such as a new performance management procedure, managers should study the behavioral consequences of the HR
practice in question, which goes beyond applying the administrative ef!ciency and legal criteria that are so often used. Managers
should ask themselves whether the HR practice could encourage some employees to engage in misconduct and be able to provide
a negative response to the question. If possible, managers should roll out a new HR practice on a small scale on a subunit of their
organization before fully committing to the new HR practice within the organization. In this way HR practices can be !ne tuned so
that there is a reduced likelihood for employee misconduct linked to HR.

Acknowledgments

The research work of David Balkin has been funded by an AGAUR grant # (2008PIV 0083) with the support of the Commission
for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Innovation, Universities and Enterprise of the Government of Catalonia while he
was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Labor Studies at IEL/ESADE in Barcelona, Spain.

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Introduction

Early research into the emergence, persistence and influence of social norms indicates that conformity and norms are closely interrelated. A norm, as a social uniformity, is an emergent product of social interaction which appears to transcend the existence of specific individuals. Conformity is affected by the size, attractiveness, and unanimity of the group. The authors suggest three major sources of influence upon conformity.

Three Major Sources of Influence

The normative clarity and relevance of the group; that is the extent to which the behavior of the group conveys a distinct and reliable group norm which distinguishes it from other groups. The second source of conformity resides in the individual’s relationship to the group, which determines whether he chooses to respond to the group as a source of influence. The third influence on conformity stems from the individual’s relationship to the stimulus. Being in a situation where one would tend to expect a degree of agreement with others concerning the stimulus, or how to behave, and yet encountering disagreement, creates a feeling of subjective uncertainty concerning the objective validity or appropriateness of one’s perceptions, judgements, opinions, or behaviors.

Traditional Model

The traditional model of conformity is a two process dependence formulation, which is considered to explain all variables involved in conformity. It treats people as dependent on each other for social acceptance and approval, and for validation of beliefs, perceptions, and judgements which cannot be tested against physical reality. One limitation of the two process model is that conformity can still occur under conditions in which neither normative nor informational influence would be expected to operate.

Two Approaches

The social identity approach makes a qualitative distinction between group and individual at the level of overt behavior, self-conceptualization and underlying psychological processes, and employs a cognitive definition of the social group as ‘two or more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or … perceive themselves to be members of the same social category’.

Intragroup consensus, agreement and uniformity are generated by distinct form of social influence responsible for conformity to group norms, called referent informational influence. This occurs in three stages: first, individuals categorize and define themselves as members of a distinct social category or assign themselves a social identity; second, they form or learn the stereotypic norms of that category. Finally, they assign these norms to themselves and thus their behavior becomes more normative as their category membership becomes salient.

Empirical Studies

The authors lend empirical weight to referent informational theory through several experiments. Taken together, they show that conformity represents private acceptance of a norm which defines or is stereotypic of a group with which the individual identifies on the basis of explicit categorization, or implicit categorization based on self-inclusion in the group’s response distribution. Conformity appears to represent true change rather than behavioral compliance, because it persists in the absence of surveillance by the group or feedback of the group’s responses. Group polarization is the tendency for individuals’ attitudes, judgements, decisions, etc. to shift, following group discussion, in the direction already favored by the group so that the post-discussion consensus is more extreme than the mean of the individual pretest responses.

Conclusion

The research described in this chapter represents a gradual accumulation of evidence favoring referent informational influence theory as an explanation of conformity. Identification seems to be an important precondition for conformity, as is the existence of a distinct ingroup norm. Although referent informational influence theory still needs to accumulate more empirical support to swell its data base, this deficiency is not due to the accretion of antagonistic findings. Rather, it is simply that there are, to date, only a relatively small number of studies which have systematically put the theory to the test.

Watson, W.E., Johnson, L., & Merritt, D. (1998). Team Orientation, Self-Orientation, and Diversity in Task Groups. Group & Organization Management, 23, 161-188.

Introduction

The success of group effort is a complex issue, and research has demonstrated tasks on which an individual’s effort is superior to group effort. The likelihood of the group performing better than the best individual increases when the problem has multiple parts, no one member has all the information necessary, the problem is at least moderately complex, interdependence is necessary, and there is enough time for members to process information.

Self-oriented behaviors (SOBs) are those that individuals exhibit as mechanisms for the defining and redefining roles in a group.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship of interpersonal processes, diversity, and team performance. Research to aid our understanding of the complexity of diversity and its impact on team performance is in the very early stages, and the examination of work-group processes, diversity, and performance over time has been investigated very little.

Hypotheses

· (H1) Early on, culturally diverse teams will perform more effectively on complex, longer-duration tasks than will culturally nondiverse teams.

· (H2) Later in a team’s life cycle, after periodic feedback regarding team and self-issues, the culturally diverse teams will not perform more effectively than culturally nondiverse teams.

· (H3) Over time, culturally diverse groups will report TOBs and SOBs similar to that of culturally nondiverse teams.

Method

Two samples of students were used, taken from different semesters at the same university in the Southwestern US. Each sample comprised students involved in an upper level basic management course in which students were members of the same team throughout the semester. Both samples attended classes in which a significant portion of their final evaluation was calculated from team project performance.

Sample 1

· 226 participants (125 males, 101 females)

· Work groups consisted of 4 or 5 members.

· Projects involved four realistic case studies of business problems.

Sample 2

· 449 participants (234 males, 215 females)

· Work groups consisted of 4 to 6 members.

· Used different types of team projects.

Measures

The instrument administered was the Group Style Instrument (GSI), which is a 26-item survey describing critical group member process activities that affect team productivity. Participants were asked to complete the GSI according to observations that they have made about their team in this class. Data were gathered from three group tasks given at approximately 5-week intervals.

Dependent Variables

· The team’s score for that particular 5-week time period.

Independent Variables

· Demographic variables

· Type of team diversity

· Group-style dimensions of TOBs and SOBs.

Results

The finding that diverse teams did better over the first two time periods supported H1. H2 was also supported, because the culturally nondiverse teams performed better at Time 3. At Time 1, diverse groups and their team orientation predicted team performance. By Time 2, members in groups that reported high self-orientation in Time 1 predicted team performance. By Time 3, nondiverse groups who reported significant team orientation did better. Clearly, there are cyclical effects and significant relations among the elements of team orientation, self-orientation, diversity, and team performance.

Conclusion

This study contained several limitations; first, student groups were used and therefore could operate differently than ongoing teams in organizations. In addition, even though the project extended across 4 months, that is not enough time to evaluate the more lengthy cycles that teams will experience. An even longer time frame should be researched. For future extensions of this type of research, the authors encourage the examination of a broader spectrum of task types and team types.