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Due Monday July 8th at 11PM-Use attachments for answers
1-How did the rules related to elections change between 1890 and 1913? What were the positive and negative consequences of the change?
2-What changes occurred in the rules related to Southern elections beginning in 1890, and what impact did these changes have on Southern politics?
3-What determines a voter’s selection (choice) on Election Day?
4-How does rational choice theory and expressive choice theory help us to understand voter behavior?
5-What are some of the causes of low voter turnout in the United States? Which do you believe are the most likely culprits for this problem? Is it fair to blame political parties for the problem?
6-Are today’s youth less politically active than previous generations? Does the type of political activity that today’s youth participate in matter?
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Week 2
Progressive Era Reforms
The Progressive Era (1890 – 1913) was a period of United
States (US) history that sought to curb many of the excesses of the
patronage period, including the institution of major government
reforms such as civil service. Progressives wanted to clean up
government, use government to advance human welfare and apply
scientific management theories to government.
Famously, during this era (1906), Upton Sinclair wrote The
Jungle chronicling abuses in the meat packing industry, which led
President Theodore Roosevelt to press Congress to pass laws
regulating the meat industry. In addition, Progressives had many
other successes: They attacked voting allegiances between US
Senators and the railroad industry; introduced the direct primary
(to avoid party conventions); obtained more equitable taxes;
obtained regulation of railroad rates; secured the passage of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act; and secured the passage of the Pure Food
and Drug Law.
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Progressives were also successful at introducing the
Australian ballot, which was a secret ballot printed by the state.
Previously, parties had made the ballots and there were charges of
invasion of privacy and multiple voting. For those opposed to
machine politics, the democratic virtues of secret balloting seemed
obvious. But, the reform had the unintended consequence of
becoming an obstacle to voting for many illiterate foreign-born
voters in the North and uneducated African-Americans in the
South. In some states, this problem was remedied by having
illiterate voters assisted or by attaching party emblems next to the
names of candidates.
The situation in Southern states, however, deteriorated for
African-Americans during this era. The year 1890 marked the
beginning of efforts by southern states to disenfranchise African-
American voters. Faced with recurring electoral challenges,
annoying expense of buying votes and epidemics of fraud and
violence, Southern Democrats chose to solidify their hold over the
region by amending the state voting laws so as to exclude African-
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Americans without overtly violating the Fifteenth Amendment.
Mississippi led the way by imposing a stricter residency
requirement, a two-dollar poll tax and a literacy test that required
voters to demonstrate that they understood the Constitution. Other
southern states soon followed by including some combination of
these requirements, and eventually Democratic primaries were
restricted to only white voters. Laws were also adopted to
disenfranchise men convicted of minor offenses, such as vagrancy
and bigamy: The goal was to keep poor and illiterate minorities (in
Texas this included Mexican Americans) from the polls.
Importantly, local election officials were given a great deal of
discretion in implementing the requirements, which often worked
to the benefit of “gentlemen” whites but was harmful to the poor
and for minorities.
Sadly, these state laws worked. In Mississippi after 1890,
less than 9,000 out of 147,000 voting-age African-Americans were
registered to vote. In Louisiana, where more than 130,000
African-Americans were registered in 1896, as little as 1,342 were
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registered by 1904. Consequently, the African-American
population remained disenfranchised until the 1960s, electoral
participation was low and one-party rule by Southern Democrats
dominated southern politics.
Vote Determinants
What determines the choice a voter will select on election
day is an important question asked by many political scientists.
The most widely accepted view of what drives vote choice is party
identification. Campbell et al. (1960), in their famous work titled
The American Voter, note that “partisan preferences show great
stability between elections.” The strength and direction of party
identification are of central importance in explaining political
attitudes and behaviors (such as voting). Campbell et al., however,
caution that party identification does not fully explain vote choice,
stating “party identification could not account for all aspects of the
image formed by the public of the elements of national politics; but
it gives to this image a central partisan coherence.” Thus, other
facts likely also influence vote choice albeit to a minor extent than
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party identification, and I suggest that such factors may vary for
individuals depending on the nature of any given election.
Niemi and Weisberg draw our attention to many other factors
that can partly explain vote choice. These include the role of
incumbency, media influence, the state of the economy and group
attachments.
Achen and Bartels (2004) present a creative argument that
natural disasters, including drought, flu and shark attacks, also can
influence voter choice. The 1916 New Jersey example, involving
shark attacks, clearly included an economic harm component.
Query whether the true driver of vote choice is the voters’
assessment that the political leaders should have done more to
avoid the damage or is it the damage itself and the economic
consequences that follow from the damage. Achen and Bartels
suggest that a community’s pain and pleasure are key determinants
regardless of how much influence the incumbent really has over
the disaster.
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Week 3
Rational and Expressive Choice
Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Voter Model (P = B > C; or
Participation or voter choice (P) = perceived benefits of participation or
choice (B) > perceived costs of participation or choice (C)) became popular
in the 1970s. Pursuant to this theory and model, voters decide whether to
vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis, usually on the
basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits. The model lends
itself more than others to predicting what effects changes in external
conditions will have on the vote. A major contribution of the model was to
emphasize the role of issues in voter choice.
The paradox of participation calls into question this theoretical
perspective. The paradox theorizes that the rational individual will not
waste resources by bearing the costs of taking part in the voting process but
will instead take a free ride on the efforts of others. This is known as the
free rider problem. The problem is especially acute when the individual
does not perceive their vote as being decisive to the election outcome.
Some have used rational choice theory to argue that those in a high
socio-economic class would be less active “because they have the education
and intellectual sophistication to comprehend the free-rider problem and
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because their high salaries raise the opportunity cost of participation” (Verba
1995, 284). The facts however suggest this hypothesis is false. In fact,
strong empirical evidence demonstrates that those in a high socio-economic
class are actually the most likely to be active.
Other rational choice proponents, including Anthony Downs, have
argued that lower information and transaction costs for the well educated
imply that it is actually easier for them to participate in politics. Verba
(1995) notes “[t]his approach has the virtue of fitting the facts but seems
somewhat post hoc” (284).
Overall, rational choice theory must be praised for its theoretical
elegance. But, the theory has done a poor job of predicting political
participation. More specifically, the theory has failed to predict how much
political activity and who will take part.
Some have argued that expressive choice theory can provide a more
compelling explanation of voter behavior. According to Schuessler in A
Logic of Expressive Choice (2000), individuals do not necessarily participate
in collective action in order to produce outcomes but instead often do so in
order to express who they are by attaching themselves to such outcomes.
Because under Schuessler’s perspective the value of participation
emerges not from the outcome but from the process of participation itself,
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the free-rider problem is no longer a concern. Participation therefore is not a
form of investment but rather a form of consumption. Schuessler wrote,
“Consumption benefits are inextricably tied to expression: the sports fan’s
expression of team support is required for him to enjoy his participation.
Similarly, participation in politics, under a consumption-benefit regime, is
inextricably tied to the expression of partnership, or the expression of
preference toward one of the candidates” (46) (emphasis in original). So
while participation was often seen as a cost under the rational choice
perspectives, expressive choice theorists see participation as a huge benefit
logically driving the individual voter when making voting choices.
Mobilization
Mobilization is the process by which candidates, parties, activists and
groups induce other people to participate. Two types of mobilization: (1)
Directly – leaders mobilize people directly when they contact citizens
personally and encourage them to take action and (2) Indirectly – leaders
mobilize people indirectly when they contact citizens through mutual
associates (family, friends, neighbors or colleagues).
Political leaders do not try to mobilize everyone, and not all the time.
For maximum effect, they target their efforts on particular people, and they
time them for particular occasions. When targeting, political leaders are (1)
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more likely to mobilize people they already know; (2) more likely to
mobilize people who are centrally positioned in social networks; (3) more
likely to mobilize people whose actions are most effective at producing
political outcomes; and (4) more likely to mobilize people who are likely to
respond by participating. Thus, political leaders are more likely to mobilize
(1) people who are employed, especially in large workplaces; (2) people
who belong to associations; (3) leaders of organizations, businesses and
local government; and (4) the wealthy, educated and partisan. Timing
becomes critical when we consider that (1) people participate more when
salient issues top the agenda; (2) people participate more when other
concerns do not demand their attentions; (3) people participate more when
important decisions are pending; (4) people participate when outcomes hang
in the balance; and (5) people participate more when issues come before
legislatures rather than before bureaucracies and courts.
Social Capital
Social capital is the features of social life – networks, norms and trust
– that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared
objectives. Putnam (2000) in his famous work Bowling Alone advances a
theory of social capital that presumes that generally speaking the more we
connect with others the more we trust them. Social trust and civic
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engagement are strongly correlated. Significantly, education is the strongest
correlate of civic engagement. However education has increased with time
but yet, civic engagement has declined.
Putnam (2000) examined a number of potential factors to explain the
decline in social capital, social trust and civic engagement. These factors
included pressure of time and money; mobilization and suburbanization; the
changing role of woman; marriage and family; the rise of the welfare state;
the race and civil rights revolutions; age; and television. Putnam concluded
that television and generational effects are the most likely culprits to explain
the decline.
Life-cycle effects are differences attributable to a stage of life. Period
effects affect all people who live in a given era. With generational effects
individuals do not change, but society does; like life cycle effects,
generational effects show up as disparities among age groups at a single
point in time, but like period effects they produce real social change.
Citizen Engagement
Scholars debate whether the general decline in civic participation
since the 1960s represents a disengagement from political activity, including
voting. Niemi et al. (2010) note that academics have become concerned
about the decline in voter turnout and other forms of political participation.
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Signs of disengagement appeared in the 1960s, and at a time when trust in
the American government lessened. Disengagement was also observed in
other nations (2010).
Moreover, political knowledge also appears to be declining. The
quality of news coverage has worsened. The development of many
specialized cable channels and web sites gives individuals the ability to
either fully pay attention to politics or avoid it entirely. It is expected that
these developments will widen the knowledge gaps between those who
regularly follow political news and those who merely use new technology
for entertainment (Niemi et al. 2010).
As noted above, Putnam concluded that the observed decline was
“generational in nature” (Niemi et al. 2010, 23). For example, it was
observed that the decline in participation and political knowledge is
especially acute in young people (2010).
Niemi et al. (2010) also acknowledge that other academics see
disengagement as a myth. These scholars agree that cable channels and the
internet are replacing network television as the primary news source. But,
they also argue a change in values has occurred, which young people were
eager to adopt. Prior to the 1960s, the World War II generation placed an
emphasis on civic duty. Later generations focused instead on engagement,
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which emphasizes individual autonomy and non-electoral behavior such as
community service and directly helping others (2010). “These changes in
modes of communication, news dissemination, and values have naturally
caused changes in some kinds of political behavior” (2010, 30).
Niemi et al. (2010) also make an important point about the difference
in calculating voter turnout. Historically, the base was calculated using the
VAP (voting age population). Since the 1970s, however, many individuals
in the voting age population have become ineligible to vote, including large
numbers of legal or illegal non-citizens and felons or ex-felons who were
denied the voting franchise by state laws. A more accurate measure appears
to be the VEP (voting eligible population), which actually shows that after
1972, the decline in voting turnout was much smaller than previously
observed (2010). A challenge with using the VEP, however, is that each
state’s laws must be taken into account so as to capture the most accurate
picture of the voting eligible population.
Putnam (2000) acknowledged that it was too early to tell the true
impact of the internet on social capital and citizen engagement. Even if we
accepted the arguments from the academics that believe disengagement is a
myth, the quality of the experience is ultimately very important to political
participation. The time spent viewing cable channel news and web sites is
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increasingly becoming an individual activity. This contemporary experience
contrasts with the pre-1960s experience of families listening to the radio
together and individuals enjoying face-to-face bridge games where they
would discuss the issues of the day collectively (2000). As Putnam (2000)
states, “More and more of our time and money are spent on goods and
services consumed individually, rather than those consumed collectively”
(245).
Civic engagement is subject to criticism. Some scholars have argued:
(1) the lack of involvement may signal widespread satisfaction with the
status quo rather than a crisis of democracy; (2) participation sparks feelings
of powerlessness and frustration; (3) citizen participation may encourage
unwise decisions (due to lack of expertise); and (4) highly engaged
majorities may repress minorities and produce other injustices. In response,
others have argued: (1) there has never been non-self-interested elites who
could be trusted to advance the common good; (2) those who are active do a
poor job of representing the interests of the inactive; (3) through institutional
design, it may be possible to reconcile tensions between just and good
government and enhanced participation; (4) civic debate is the best way to
discern the truth; and (5) higher turnouts produce electorates less dominated
by extremes.
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Regardless of one’s position with respect to civic engagement, most
agree political participation in the United States is dangerously low. I do not
argue that extremely high rates of participation must be achieved, but when
government legitimacy is perceived as low and indifference to government
and collective life too common, then increased engagement is needed. We
must remember that the amount, quality and distribution of political and
civic engagement are mostly the product of our political choices.
Youth Participation
Regardless of whether youth participate as much as older individuals,
the nature of their participation is clearly different. Instead of traditional
political activity such as working for a campaign and voting, youth are
engaging in activities such as boycotting and protesting (Niemi et al. 2010).
However the quality of these political activities may not yield the same
benefit to the newer generations that more traditional political activity had
for previous generations.
Verba et al.’s work only deepens the concern. Verba et al. (1995)
argue that resources such as time, money and skills are required for political
participation. The origins of such resources were traced back to the
involvement of individuals in major social institutions such as the family,
school, workplace, voluntary associations and religious institutions (1995).
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“Socially structured circumstances and the constrained choices affect the
stockpile of time, money and civic skills available for politics” (271). If
individuals choose to engage in activities either alone or in non-traditional
organizations and groups, then they may not have the same quality of access
to the resources that are necessary for effective political engagement.
Newer generations may prefer to engage in contemporary forms of
non-electoral political activity, choosing not to vote. But, evidence exists
that government rewards those who vote (Griffin and Newman 2005).
Elections can be “successful in refocusing public officials’ attention to the
electorate’s desires” (Bennett and Resnick 1990, 800).
If decline in voting continues, even prolonged slight declines using a
VEP measure, a shift in the voting model may be warranted so as to better fit
this important democratic activity to the non-traditional paradigm embraced
by newer generations. Compulsory voting or voting via a secure internet
platform or a platform provided by another technology may eventually be an
essential change (Niemi et al. 2010). Additional research on the quality of
contemporary participation may help inform our electoral policy options.
