The Art and Science of Persuasion

Week 3 – Assignment

The Art and Science of Persuasion

Read

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

(Cialdini, 2001). Consider this source as you complete the Assignment.

Part I: Examples

Assemble advertisements, commercials, or personal experiences/observations that illustrate each of the six fundamental principles identified in Cialdini (2001). Do not use examples from your textbook.

Submit “Part I”, a separate document with the examples you located. Preferably, copy and paste print media examples, along with proper citation information; links are acceptable for broadcast or electronic media (television, internet, etc.). If neither images nor links are available (e.g., in the case of a personal observation or experience), a brief description will suffice. Label your examples clearly and provide a one paragraph explanation for each.

Part II: A Social Psychological Analysis of _______

Explain in-depth how social psychological principles of persuasion are relevant for one of your selected advertisements, citing relevant research. Relate characteristics of the communicator, the message, and the target audience.
Formulate a plan to intentionally enhance persuasiveness. What are various alternative techniques one might employ effectively?

Submit “Part II”, structured as a paper and written in APA style.

The Art and Science of Persuasion paper

Must include Parts I and II.
Must be 3 to 5 double-spaced pages in length (including Part I, but not including title and references pages from Part II) and formatted according to APA style (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. as outlined in the Ashford Writing Center (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site..
Must include a separate title page (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. with the following:
A header
Title of paper
Student’s name
Course name and number
Instructor’s name
Date submitted
Must begin with an introductory paragraph (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. that has a succinct thesis statement (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site..
Must utilize academic voice (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site..
Must address the topic with critical thought.
Must end with a conclusion (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. that reaffirms the thesis.
Must use at least five peer-reviewed scholarly sources. Additional scholarly sources are encouraged.
Be sure to integrate your research (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. smoothly rather than simply inserting it.
In general, paraphrase (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. material rather than using direct quotes.
The Scholarly, Peer Reviewed, and Other Credible Sources table offers additional guidance on appropriate source types. If you have questions about whether a specific source is appropriate for this assignment, please contact your instructor. Your instructor has the final say about the appropriateness of a specific source for a particular assignment.
Must document all sources in APA style as outlined here (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. and here (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site..
Must include a separate reference page (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. that is formatted according to APA style.
Must be submitted to Grammarly (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. for review and correction prior to submitting.

Submitting to Grammarly:
Grammarly is your personal editor that can act as that second set of eyes and catch those errors before you submit your assignment. It takes approximately 5 minutes to set up an account and after that, you simply download your written submission and wait for the magic. This service is open 24/7, for you night owls hoping for a final proofread before submitting your work. Grammarly will then provide you with a detailed roadmap for improvement.

Grammarly Resource:
Before you submit your written assignment, review the

The Grammarly Guide: How to Set Up & Use Grammarly (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

tutorial, set up a Grammarly account (if you have not already done so), and use Grammarly to review a rough draft of your assignment. Then carefully review all issues identified by Grammarly and revise your work as needed.

To use Grammarly:

Go to https://app.grammarly.com/ (and log in if needed).
Click on “Upload” (located under “New”) and upload your paper.
Grammarly will scan your paper for errors and issues.
To read about the errors Grammarly found, click on the ▼expand button.
To accept Grammarly’s suggestion, click on the green wording suggestion (if applicable).
To ignore Grammarly’s suggestion, click on the “x” or the “ignore” button.
Finally, once you have made all of your corrections, click on the ↓ downward arrow icon in the left navigation pane and select “Download.” This will create a Word document with your corrections. Note: You might have to remove or delete any lingering track changes or comment bubbles before submitting your paper.

Need writing help? The Writing Center offers 24/7 live chat and paper review to all students! Just click on the Writing Center tab in the left column of the classroom to access these services.

You can also email the Writing Center directly!

writing@ashford.edu

We look forward to hearing from you!

The Learning Services Writing Center

Carefully review the

Grading Rubric (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

for the criteria that will be used to evaluate your assignment.

Harnessing the Science
of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini

A LUCKY FEW HAVE IT; most of US d o not. A handful
/ \ of gifted “naturals” simply know how to cap-

/ \ ture an audience, sway the undecided, and
convert the opposition. Watching these masters of
persuasion work their magic is at once impressive
and frustrating. What’s impressive is not just the easy
way they use charisma and eloquence to convince
others to do as they ask. It’s also how eager those
others are to do what’s requested of them, as if the
persuasion itself were a favor they couldn’t wait
to repay.

The frustrating part of the experience is that
these bom persuaders are often unahle to ac-
count for their remarkable skill or pass it on to
others. Their way with people is an art, and
artists as a rule are far hetter at doing than at
explaining. Most of them can’t offer much
help to those of us who possess no more
than the ordinary quotient of charisma
and eloquence but who still have to wres-
tle with leadership’s fundamental chal-
lenge: getting things done through oth-
ers. That challenge is painfully familiar
to corporate executives, who every day
have to figure out how to motivate
and direct a highly individualistic
workforce. Playing the “Because I’m
the boss” card is out. Even if it
weren’t demeaning and demoraliz-
ing for all concerned, it would be
out of place in a world where
cross-functional teams, joint ven-
tures, and intercompany part-
nerships have blurred the lines
of authority. In such an en-
vironment, persuasion skills
exert far greater influence
over others’ behavior than
formal power structures do.

72 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW

Jo leader can succeed without mastering the art of persuasion.

But there’s hard science in that skill, too, and a large body

3f psychological research suggests there are six basic laws of

rinning friends and influencing people.

OCTOBFR 2001

H a r n e s s i n g t h e S c i e n c e o f P e r s u a s i o n

Which brings us back to where we started. Persuasion
skills may be more necessary than ever, but how can ex-
ecutives acquire them if the most talented practitioners
can’t pass them along? By looking to science. For the past
five decades, behavioral scientists have conducted exper-
iments that shed considerable light on the way certain
interactions lead people to concede, comply, or change.
This research shows that persuasion works by appealing
to a limited set of deeply rooted human drives and needs,
and it does so in predictable ways. Persuasion, in other
words, is governed by basic principles that can be taught,
learned, and applied. By mastering these principles, exec-
utives can bring scientific rigor to the business of securing
consensus, cutting deals, and winning concessions. In the
pages that follow, 1 describe six fundamental principles of
persuasion and suggest a few ways that executives can
apply them in their own organizations.

THE PRINCIPLE OF

Liking:
People like those who like them.

THE APPLICATION:

Uncover real similarities and offer
genuine praise.

The retailing phenomenon known as the Tupperware
party is a vivid illustration of this principle in action.
The demonstration party for Tupperware products is
hosted by an individual, almost always a woman, who in-
vites to her home an array of friends, neighbors, and rel-
atives. The guests’ affection for their hostess predisposes
them to buy from her, a dynamic that was confirmed by
a 1990 study of purchase decisions made at demonstra-
tion parties. The researchers, Jonathan Frenzen and
Harry Davis, writing in the Journal of Consumer Research,
found that the guests’ fondness for their hostess weighed
twice as heavily in their purchase decisions as their re-
gard for the products they bought. So when guests at a
Tupperware party buy something, they aren’t just buy-
ing to please themselves. They’re buying to please their
hostess as well.

What’s true at Tupperware parties is true for business
in general: If you want to influence people, win friends.
How? Controlled research has identified several factors
that reliably increase liking, but two stand out as espe-

Robert B. Cialdini is the Regents’ Professor of Psychology
at Arizona State University and the author of Influence:
Science and Practice (Allyn & Bacon, 2001), now in its fourth
edition. Further regularly updated information about the in-
fluence process can be found at www.influenceatwork.com.

cially compelling-similarity and praise. Similarity liter-
ally draws people together. In one experiment, reported
in a 1968 article in the Journal of Personality, participants
stood physically closer to one another after learning that
they shared political beliefs and social values. And in a
1963 article in American Behavioral Scientists, researcher
F. B. Evans used demographic data from insurance com-
pany records to demonstrate that prospects were more
willing to purchase a policy from a salesperson who was
akin to them in age, religion, politics, or even cigarette-
smoking habits.

Managers can use similarities to create bonds with a re-
cent hire, the head of another department, or even a new
boss. Informal conversations during the workday create
an ideal opportunity to discover at least one common
area of enjoyment, be it a hobby, a college basketball
team, or reruns of Seinfeld. The important thing is to es-
tablish the bond early because it creates a presumption
of goodwill and trustworthiness in every subsequent
encounter. It’s much easier to build support for a new
project when the people you’re trying to persuade are al-
ready inclined in your favor.

Praise, tbe other reliable generator of affection, both
charms and disarms. Sometimes the praise doesn’t even
have to be merited. Researchers at the University of
North Carolina writing in the Journal of Experimental So-
cial Psychology found that men felt the greatest regard for
an individual who flattered them unstintingly even if the
comments were untrue. And in their book Interpersonal
Attraction (Addison-Wesley, 1978), Ellen Berscheid and
Elaine Hatfieid Walster presented experimental data
showing that positive remarks about another person’s
traits, attitude, or performance reliably generates liking in
retum, as well as willing compliance with the wishes of
the person offering the praise.

Along with cultivating a fruitful relationship, adroit
managers can also use praise to repair one that’s damaged
or unproductive. Imagine you’re the manager of a good-
sized unit within your organization. Your work frequently
brings you into contact with another manager-call him
Dan – whom you have come to dislike. No matter bow
much you do for him, it’s not enough. Worse, he never
seems to believe that you’re doing the best you can for
him. Resenting his attitude and his obvious lack of trust
in your abilities and in your good faith, you don’t spend
as much time with him as you know you should; in con-
sequence, the performance of both his unit and yours is
deteriorating.

The research on praise points toward a strategy for fix-
ing the relationship. It may be hard to find, but there has
to be something about Dan you can sincerely admire,
whether it’s his concern for the people in his department,
his devotion to his family, or simply his work ethic. In
your next encounter with him, make an appreciative
comment about that trait. Make it clear that in this case

74 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

at least, you value what tie values. I predict that Dan will
relax his relentless negativity and give you an opening to
convince him of your competence and good intentions.

THE PRINCIPLE OF

Reciprocity:
People repay in kind.

THE APPLICATION:

Give what you want to receive.

Praise is likely to have a wanning and softening effect on
Dan because, ornery as he is, he is still human and subject
to the universal human tendency to treat people the way
they treat him. If you have ever caught yourself smiling at
a coworker just because he or she smiled first, you know
how this principle works.

Charities rely on reciprocity to help them raise funds.
For years, for instance, the Disabled American Veterans
organization, using only a well-crafted fund-raising letter,
garnered a very respectable 18% rate of response to its ap-
peals. But when the group started enclosing a small gift in
the envelope, the response rate nearly doubled to 35%.
The gift – personalized address labels – was extremely
modest, but it wasn’t what prospective donors received
that made the difference. It was that they had gotten any-
thing at all.

What works in that letter works at the office, too. It’s
more than an effusion of seasonal spirit, of course, that
impels suppliers to shower gifts on purchasing depart-
ments at holiday time. In 1996, purchasing managers ad-
mitted to an interviewer from Inc. magazine that after
having accepted a gift from a supplier, they were willing
to purchase products and services they would have oth-
erwise declined. Gifts also have a startling effect on re-
tention. I have encouraged readers of my book to send me
examples of the principles of influence at work in their
own lives. One reader, an employee of the State of Ore-
gon, sent a letter in which she oftered these reasons for
her commitment to her supervisor:

He gives me and my son gifts for Christmas and gives
me presents on my birthday. There is no promotion for
the type of job I have, and my only choice for one is to
move to another department. But I find myself resist-
ing trying to move. My boss is reaching retirement age,
and I am thinking 1 will be able to move out after he re-
tires….[F]or now, I feel obligated to stay since he has
been so nice to me.
Ultimately, though, gift giving is one of the cruder

applications of the rule of reciprocity. In its more sophis-
ticated uses, it confers a genuine first-mover advantage
on any manager who is trying to foster positive attitudes

and productive persona! relationships in the office:
Managers can elicit the desired behavior from cowork-
ers and employees by displaying it first Whether it’s a
sense of trust, a spirit of ctwperation, or a pleasant de-
meanor, leaders should model the behavior they want to
see from others.

The same holds true for managers faced with issues of
information delivery and resource allocation. If you lend
a member of your staff to a colleague who is shorthanded
and staring at a fast-approaching deadline, you will sig-
nificantly increase your chances of gefting help when you
need it. Your odds wil! improve even more if you say,
when your colleague thanks you for the assistance, some-
thing like, “Sure, glad to help. I know how important it is
for me to count on your help when I need it.”

THE PRINCIPLE OF I

Social Proof:
People follow the lead of similar others. ,

THE APPLICATION:

Use peer power whenever it’s available.

Social creatures that they are, human beings rely heav-
ily on the people around them for cues on how to think,
feel, and act. We know this intuitively, but intuition has
also been confirmed by experiments, such as the one first
described in 1982 in the Journal of Applied Psychology. A
group of researchers went door-to-door in Columbia,
South Carolina, soliciting donations for a charity cam-
paign and displaying a list of neighborhood residents who
had already donated to the cause. The researchers found
that the longer the donor list was, the more likely those
solicited would be to donate as well.

To the people being solicited, the friends’ and neigh-
bors’ names on the list were a form of socia! evidence
about how they should respond. But the evidence would
not have been nearly as compelling had the names been
those of random strangers. In an experiment from the
1960s, first described in the Journal of Personality and 50-
ciat Psychology, residents of New York City were asked to
retum a lost wallet to its owner. They were highly likely
to aftempt to return the waUet when they !earned that an-
other New Yorker had previous!y aftempted to do so. But
!eaming that someone from a foreign country had tried
to retum the wallet didn’t sway their decision one way or
the other.

The lesson for executives ftom these two experiments
is that persuasion can be extremely effective when it
comes from peers. The science supports what most sales
professionals already know: Testimonials from satis-
fied customers work best when the satisfied customer

OCTOBER 2001 75

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

and the prospective customer share similar circum-
stances. That lesson can help a manager faced with the
task of selling a new corporate initiative. Imagine that
you’re trying to streamline your department’s work
processes. A group of veteran employees is resisting.
Rather than try to convince the employees of the move’s
merits yourself, ask an old-timer who supports the initia-
tive to speak up for it at a team meeting. The compatriot’s
testimony stands a much better chance of convincing the
group than yet another speech from the boss. Stated sim-
ply, influence is often best exerted horizontally rather
than vertically.

THE PRINCIPLE OF

Consistency:
People align with their clear commitments.

THE APPLICATION:

Make their commitments active,
public, and voluntary.

Liking is a powerful force, but the work of persuasion in-
volves more than simply making people feel warmly to-
ward you, your idea, or your product. People need not
only to like you but to feel committed to what you want
them to do. Good turns are one reliable way to make peo-
ple feel obligated to you. Another is to win a public com-
mitment from them.

My own research has demonstrated that most people,
once they take a stand or go on record in favor of a posi-
tion, prefer to stick to it. Other studies reinforce that find-
ing and go on to show how even a small, seemingly triv-
ial commitment can have a powerful effect on future
actions. Israeli researchers writing in 1983 in the Person-
ality and Social Psychology Bulletin recounted how they
asked half the residents of a large apartment complex to
sign a petition favoring the establishment of a recreation
center for the handicapped. The cause was good and the
request was small, so almost everyone who was asked
agreed to sign. T\vo weeks later, on National Collection
Day for the Handicapped, all residents of the complex
were approached at home and asked to give to the cause.
A little more than half of those who were not asked to
sign the petition made a contribution. But an astounding
92% of those who did sign donated money. The residents
of the apartment complex felt obligated to live up to their
commitments because those commitments were active,
public, and voluntary. These three features are worth con-
sidering separately.

There’s strong empirical evidence to show that a choice
made actively – one that’s spoken out loud or written
down or otherwise made explicit – is considerably more

likely to direct someone’s future conduct than the same
choice left unspoken. Writing in 1996 in the Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, Delia Cioffi and Randy Gar-
ner described an experiment in which college students in
one group were asked to fill out a printed form saying
they wished to volunteer for an AIDS education project
in the public schools. Students in another group volun-
teered for the same project by leaving blank a form stat-
ing that they didn’t want to participate. A few days later,
when the volunteers reported for duty, 74% of those who
showed up were students from the group that signaled
their commitment by filling out the form.

The implications are clear for a manager who wants to
persuade a subordinate to follow some particular course
of action: Get it in writing. Let’s suppose you want your
employee to submit reports in a more timely fashion.
Once you believe you’ve won agreement, ask him to sum-
marize the decision in a memo and send it to you. By
doing so, you’ll have greatly increased the odds that he’ll
fulfill the commitment because, as a rule, people live up
to what they have written down.

Research into the social dimensions of commitment
suggests that written statements become even more pow-
erful when they’re made public. In a classic experiment,
described in 1955 in the Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, college students were asked to estimate the
length of lines projected on a screen. Some students were
asked to write down their choices on a piece of paper, sign
it, and hand the paper to the experimenter. Others wrote
their choices on an erasable slate, then erased the slate im-
mediately. Still others were instructed to keep their deci-
sions to themselves.

The experimenters then presented all three groups
with evidence that their initial choices may have been
wrong. Those who had merely kept their decisions in their
heads were the most likely to reconsider their original es-
timates. More loyal to their first guesses were the students
in the group that had written them down and immedi-
ately erased them. But by a wide margin, the ones most re-
luctant to shift from their original choices were those who
had signed and handed them to the researcher.

This experiment highlights how much most people
wish to appear consistent to others. Consider again the
matter of the employee who has been submitting late re-
ports. Recognizing the power of this desire, you should,
once you’ve successfully convinced him of the need to be
more timely, reinforce the commitment by making sure it
gets a public airing. One way to do that would be to send
the employee an e-mail that reads, “1 think your plan is
just what we need. I showed it to Diane in manufacturing
and Phil in shipping, and they thought it was right on tar-
get, too.” Whatever way such commitments are formal-
ized, they should never be like the New Year’s resolutions
people privately make and then abandon with no one the
wiser. They should be publicly made and visibly posted.

76 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

More than 300 years ago, Samuel Butler wrote a cou-
plet that explains succinctly why commitments must be
voluntary to be lasting and effective: “He that complies
against his will/Is of his own opinion still.” If an undertak-
ing is forced, coerced, or imposed from the outside, it’s not
a commitment; it’s an unwelcome burden. Think how you
would react if your boss pressured you to donate to the
campaign of a political candidate. Would that make you
more apt to opt for that candidate in the privacy of a vot-
ing booth? Not likely. In fact, in their 1981 book Psycho-
logical Reactance (Academic Press), Sharon S. Brehm and
Jack W. Brehm present data that suggest you’d vote the
opposite way just to express your resentment of the boss’s
coercion.

This kind of backlash can occur in the office, too. Let’s
return again to that tardy employee. If you want to pro-
duce an enduring change in his behavior, you should
avoid using threats or pressure tactics to gain his compli-
ance. He’d likely view any change in his behavior as the
result of intimidation rather than a personal commitment
to change. A better approach would be to identify some-
thing that the employee genuinely values in the work-
place – high-quality workmanship, perhaps, or team
spirit-and then describe how timely reports are consis-
tent with those values. That gives the employee reasons
for improvement that he can own. And because he owns
them, they’ll continue to guide his behavior even when
you’re not watching.

THE PRINCIPLE OF

Authority:
People defer to experts.

THE APPLICATION:

Expose your expertise; don’t assume
it’s self-evident

T\vo thousand years ago, the Roman poet Virgil offered
this simple counsel to those seeking to choose correctly:
“Believe an expert.” That may or may not be good advice,
but as a description of what people actually do, it can’t be
beaten. For instance, when the news media present an ac-
knowledged expert’s views on a topic, the effect on pub-
lic opinion is dramatic. A single expert-opinion news story
in the New York Times is associated with a 2% shift in pub-
lic opinion nationwide, according to a 1993 study de-
scribed in the Public Opinion Quarterly. And researchers
writing in the American Political Science Review in 1987
found that when the expert’s view was aired on national
television, public opinion shifted as much as 4%. A cynic
might argue that these findings only illustrate the docile
submissiveness of the public. But a fairer explanation is

that, amid the teeming complexity of contemporary life,
a well-selected expert offers a valuable and efficient short-
cut to good decisions. Indeed, some questions, be they
legal, financial, medical, or technological, require so much
specialized knowledge to answer, we have no choice but
to rely on experts.

Since there’s good reason to defer to experts, execu-
tives should take pains to ensure that they establish their

Surprisingly often, people mistakenly

assume that others recognize and

appreciate their experience.

own expertise before they attempt to exert influence. Sur-
prisingly often, people mistakenly assume that others rec-
ognize and appreciate their experience. That’s what hap-
pened at a hospital where some colleagues and I were
consulting. The physical therapy staffers were frustrated
because so many of their stroke patients abandoned their
exercise routines as soon as they left the hospital. No mat-
ter how often the staff emphasized the importance of
regular home exercise-it is, in fact, crucial to the process
of regaining independent function – the message just
didn’t sink in.

Interviews with some of the patients helped us pin-
point the problem. They were familiar with the back-
ground and training of their physicians, but the patients
knew little about the credentials of the physical therapists
wbo were urging them to exercise. It was a simple matter
to remedy that lack of information: We merely asked the
therapy director to display all the awards, diplomas, and
certifications of her staff on the walls of the therapy
rooms. The result was startling: Exercise compliance
jumped 34% and has never dropped since.

What we found immensely gratifying was not just how
much we increased compliance, but how. We didn’t fool
or browbeat any of the patients. We informed them into
compliance. Nothing had to be invented; no time or re-
sources had to be spent in the process. The staff’s exper-
tise was real -all we had to do was make it more visible.

The task for managers who want to establish their
claims to expertise is somewhat more difficult. They can’t
simply nail their diplomas to the wall and wait for every-
one to notice. A little subtlety is called for. Outside the
United States, it is customary for people to spend time in-
teracting socially before getting down to business for the
first time. Frequently they gather for dinner the night be-
fore their meeting or negotiation. These get-togethers can

OCTOBER 2001 77

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

Persuasion Experts, Safe at Last

Thanks to several decades of rigorous empirical
research by behavioral scientists, our understand-
ing of the how and why of persuasion has never
been broader, deeper, or more detailed. But these
scientists aren’t the first students of the subject.
The history of persuasion studies is an ancient
and honorable one, and it has generated a long
rosterof heroes and martyrs.

A renowned student of social influence,
William McCui re, contends in a chapter of the
Handbook of Social Psychology, 3rd ed. (Oxford
University Press, 1985) that scattered among the
more than four millennia of recorded Western
history are four centuries in which the study of
persuasion flourished as a craft. The first was the
Periclean Age of ancient Athens, the second oc-
curred during the years of the Roman Republic,
the next appeared in the time of the European
Renaissance, and the last extended over the hun-
dred years that have just ended, which witnessed
the advent of large-scale advertising, mformation,
and mass media campaigns. Each of the three
previous centuries of systematic persuasion study
was marked by a flowering of human achieve-
ment that was suddenly cut short when political
authorities had the masters of persuasion killed.
The philosopher Socrates is probably the best
known of the persuasion experts to run afoul of
the powers that be.

Information about the persuasion process is a
threat because it creates a base of power entirely
separate from the one controlled by political au-
thorities. Faced with a rival source of influence,
rulers in previous centuries had few qualms
about eliminating those rare individuals who
truly understood how to marshal forces that
heads of state have never been able to monopo-
lize, such as cleverly crafted language, strategi-
cally placed information, and, most important,
psychological insight.

It would perhaps be expressing too much faith
in human nature to claim that persuasion experts
no longer face a threat from those who wield politi-
cal power. But because the truth about persuasion
is no longer the sole possession of a few brilliant,
inspired individuals, experts in the field can pre-
sumably breathe a littie easier Indeed, since most
people in power are interested in remaining in
power, they’re likely to be more interested in ac-
quiring persuasion skills than abolishing them.

make discussions easier and help blunt disagreements-
remember the findings about liking and similarity – and
they can also provide an opportunity to establish exp)er-
tise. Perhaps it’s a matter of telling an anecdote about
successfully solving a problem similar to the one that’s on
the agenda at the next day’s meeting. Or perhaps dinner
is the time to describe years spent mastering a complex
discipline-not in a boastful way but as part of the ordi-
nary give-and-take of conversation.

Granted, there’s not always time for lengthy introduc-
tory sessions. But even in the course of the preliminary
conversation that precedes most meetings, there is almost
always an opportunity to touch lightly on your relevant
background and experience as a natural part of a sociable
exchange. This initial disclosure of personal information
gives you a chance to establish expertise early in the
game, so that when the discussion turns to the business at
hand, what you have to say will be accorded the respect it
deserves.

THE PRINCIPLE OF

Scarcity:
People want more ofwhat they can have less of.

THE APPLICATION:

Highlight unique benefits and
exclusive information.

Study after study shows that items and opportunities are
seen to be more valuable as they become less available.
That’s a tremendously useful piece of information for
managers. They can harness the scarcity principle with
the organizational equivalents of limited-time, limited-
supply, and one-of-a-kind offers. Honestly informing a
coworker of a closing window of opportunity-the chance
to get the boss’s ear before she leaves for an extended va-
cation, perhaps-can mobilize action dramatically.

Managers can learn from retailers how to frame their
offers not in terms of what people stand to gain but in
terms ofwhat they stand to lose if they don’t act on the in-
formation. The power of “loss language” was demon-
strated in a 1988 study of California home owners written
up in the Journal of Applied Psychology. Half were told
that if they fully insulated their homes, they would save
a certain amount of money each day. The other half were
told that if they failed to insulate, they would lose that
amount each day. Significantly more people insulated
their homes when exposed to the loss language. The same
phenomenon occurs in business. According t o a 1994
study in the journal Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, potential losses figure far more heavily
in managers’ decision making than potential gains.

78 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW

Harnessing the Science of Persuasion

In framing their offers, executives should also remem-
ber that exclusive information is more persuasive than
widely available data. A doctoral student of mine, Amram
Knishinsky, wrote his 1982 dissertation on the purchase
decisions of wholesale beef buyers. He observed that they
more than doubled their orders when they were told that,
because of certain weather conditions overseas, there was
likely to be a scarcity of foreign beef in the near future.
But their orders increased 600% when they were in-
formed that no one else had that information yet.

The persuasive power of exclusivity can be harnessed
by any manager who comes into possession of informa-
tion that’s not broadly available and that supports an idea
or initiative he or she would like the organization to
adopt. The next time that kind of information crosses
your desk, round up your organization’s key players. The
information itself may seem dull, but exclusivity will give
it a special sheen. Push it across your desk and say, “I just
got this report today. It won’t be distributed until next
week, but I want to give you an early look at what it
shows.” Then watch your listeners lean forward.

Allow me to stress here a point that should be obvious.
No offer of exclusive information, no exhortation to act
now or miss this opportunity forever should be made un-
less it is genuine. Deceiving colleagues into compliance is
not only ethically objectionable, it’s foolhardy. If the de-
ception is detected-and it certainly will b e – i t will snuff
out any enthusiasm the offer originally kindled. It will
also invite dishonesty toward the deceiver. Remember the
rule of reciprocity.

Putting It All Together
There’s nothing abstruse or obscure about these six prin-
ciples of persuasion. Indeed, they neatly codify our intu-
itive understanding of the ways people evaluate informa-
tion and form decisions. As a result, the principles are
easy for most people to grasp, even those with no formal
education in psychology. But in the seminars and work-
shops I conduct, I have learned that two points bear re-
peated emphasis.

First, although the six principles and their applications
can be discussed separately for the sake of clarity, they
should be applied in combination to compound their im-
pact. For instance, in discussing the importance of ex-
pertise, I suggested that managers use informal, social
conversations to establish their credentials. But that con-
versation affords an opportunity to gain information as
well as convey it. While you’re showing your dinner com-
panion that you have the skills and experience your busi-
ness problem demands, you can also learn about your
companion’s background, likes, and dislikes – informa-
tion that will help you locate genuine similarities and
give sincere compliments. By letting your expertise sur-
face and also establishing rapport, you double your per-

suasive power. And if you succeed in bringing your din-
ner partner on board, you may encourage other peopie
to sign on as well, thanks to the persuasive power of so-
cial evidence.

The other point I wish to emphasize is that the rules
of ethics apply to the science of social influence just as
they do to any other technology. Not only is it ethically
wrong to trick or trap others into assent, it’s ill-advised in
practical terms. Dishonest or high-pressure tactics work
only in the short run, if at all. Their long-term effects are
malignant, especially within an organization, which can’t
function properly without a bedrock level of trust and
cooperation.

That point is made vividly in the following account,
which a department head for a large textile manufacturer
related at a training workshop I conducted. She described
a vice president in her company who wrung public com-
mitments from department heads in a highly manipu-
lative manner. Instead of giving his subordinates time
to talk or think through his proposals carefully, he would
approach them individually at the busiest moment of
their workday and describe the benefits of his plan in
exhaustive, patience-straining detail. Then he would
move in for the kill. “It’s very important for me to see
you as being on my team on this,” he would say. “Can I
count on your support?” Intimidated, frazzled, eager to
chase the man from their offices so they could get back
to work, the department heads would invariably go along
with his request. But because the commitments never
felt voluntary, the department heads never followed
through, and as a result the vice president’s initiatives all
blew up or petered out.

Tliis story had a deep impact on the other participants
in the workshop. Some gulped in shock as they recog-
nized their own manipulative behavior. But what stopped
everyone cold was the expression on the department
head’s face as she recounted the damaging collapse of her
superior’s proposals. She was smiling.

Nothing I could say would more effectively make the
point that the deceptive or coercive use of the principles
of social infiuence is ethically wrong and pragmatically
wrongheaded. Yet the same principles, if applied appro-
priately, can steer decisions correctly. Legitimate exper-
tise, genuine obligations, authentic similarities, real so-
cial proof, exclusive news, and freely made commitments
can produce choices that are likely to benefit both parties.
And any approach that works to everyone’s mutual ben-
efit is good business, don’t you think? Of course, I don’t
want to press you into it, but, if you agree, 1 would love it
if you could just jot me a memo to that effect. ^

Reprint R0109D
To order reprints, see the last page of Executive Summaries.

To further explore the topic of this article, go to
www.hbr.org/explore.

OCTOBER 2001 79

Harvard Business Review Notice of Use Restrictions, May 2009

Harvard Business Review and Harvard Business Publishing Newsletter content on EBSCOhost is licensed for

the private individual use of authorized EBSCOhost users. It is not intended for use as assigned course material

in academic institutions nor as corporate learning or training materials in businesses. Academic licensees may

not use this content in electronic reserves, electronic course packs, persistent linking from syllabi or by any

other means of incorporating the content into course resources. Business licensees may not host this content on

learning management systems or use persistent linking or other means to incorporate the content into learning

management systems. Harvard Business Publishing will be pleased to grant permission to make this content

available through such means. For rates and permission, contact permissions@harvardbusiness.org.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 1/16

Chapter 8

Conformity and Obedience

8.1

Conformity

Norms

Norma�ve and Informa�onal Influence

Minority Influence

8.2 Obedience to Authority

8.3

Leadership

Chapter Summary

Jupiterimages/Thinkstock

Learning Objec�ves

A�er reading this chapter, you should be able to:

Explain Solomon Asch’s study of conformity

Differen�ate injunc�ve norms from descrip�ve norms and norma�ve influence from
informa�onal influence

Describe how conformity may result in either acceptance or compliance

Explain the power of minori�es

Describe Milgram’s study of obedience and the factors that make obedience more or less likely to occur

Explain factors that predict disobedience

Describe the ethical issues with Milgram’s study and Milgram’s response to those concerns

Define leadership and differen�ate the three main types of leadership

Define implicit leadership theories

Chapter Outline

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 2/16

What Predicts Obedience?

Disobedience

Ethics of Obedience Research

* * *

In 1956, Jim Jones, an untrained but charisma�c pastor, started the “People’s Temple,” a racially integrated, socially minded church in Indiana. Ten
years later, he and his congrega�on moved to California and grew in size and power. Here, pressures toward conformity helped align individuals’
behavior with group expecta�ons. Jones used social influence in services to punish members for undesirable behavior, bringing members up during
gatherings and publicly shaming them for their ac�ons. Church members were expected to obey Jones’ edicts without ques�on. Feeling persecuted
for the good work he was doing Jones moved his en�re church to Guyana, in South America, to a se�lement he named Jonestown. He dreamed of
crea�ng a utopian community, where young and old were treated with dignity and respect and the color of one’s skin did not ma�er. But Jones
became increasingly paranoid and controlling. Members worked long days, o�en listening to Jones speak over the loudspeaker, and were not
allowed to leave. Concerned families back home asked U.S. Representa�ve Leo Ryan to check out the situa�on.

In November 1978, Ryan, some of his staff, and a news crew traveled to Guyana to meet with Jones and members of the People’s Temple. Some of
the Jonestown residents decided to leave with the congressman and as they waited for the planes to be readied other members of Jonestown
a�acked the group, killing the congressman and several others. Fearing retalia�on Jones asked his followers to commit suicide in what he called a
revolu�onary act. They mixed up vats of flavored drink laced with cyanide and gave it to the children first, then the adults. Those who refused were
encouraged by guards with guns. In the end, 918 people died, either in the a�ack at the airport or in the mass suicide. Jones died of a gunshot to
the head (Hall, 1987). The People’s Temple relied on pressure from the group and obedience to authority to do its work and to grow. The story of
Jonestown is a drama�c example of the power of conformity and obedience, forces we will explore in greater depth in this chapter.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 3/16

Figure 8.1: Visual percep�on test

Asch used this visual percep�on test. Par�cipants
were asked which comparison line was the same
length as the standard line. The par�cipants were
unknowingly mixed with confederates. The
confederates purposefully agreed on the wrong
answer. Asch measured how many par�cipants
agreed with the confederates (even though they
were wrong) and how many did not.
From Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scien�fic
American, 193, 31–35. doi: 10.1038/scien�ficamerican1155-31

Figure 8.2: Par�cipant conformity rates
with confederate(s)

8.1 Conformity
You have been invited to be a par�cipant in a research study. When you show up, you find that seven other par�cipants have already arrived. All of you are
seated around a table and are asked to be part of a study that, at least by appearances, is inves�ga�ng visual percep�on. You are shown a line, called the
s�mulus line, and are asked which of three other lines the s�mulus line matches. This looks to be a simple task; you expect to be a li�le bored. For the first
couple of rounds, the study goes as expected, with each person around the table choosing the line that obviously matches the s�mulus line. Then something odd
happens. The first person chooses the wrong line. You are surprised; the line the person chooses is obviously not the right one. You wait for the second person
to choose the right line. But the second person agrees with the first person. The third and fourth also agree. The fi�h person chooses the same wrong line and
then the sixth. Finally, it is your turn. You need to decide whether to go along with the group, a group that is unanimous, or trust your eyes and choose what
you perceive is the right line. What do you do?

This scenario was experienced by par�cipants in Solomon Asch’s (1958) study of conformity. Conformity can be
defined as going along with a group’s ac�ons or beliefs. The study was designed to pit individuals against a
unanimous group to see whether people would go along with the group or s�ck with what their senses were
telling them was right. In this study, one third of judgments made by par�cipants went along with the majority
opinion. Looking at how likely individual par�cipants were to conform, Asch found that one quarter of all
par�cipants never went along with the majority. On the other side, one third of par�cipants conformed 50% of
the �me or more. The rest of the par�cipants showed at least occasional conformity. Altogether, three quarters
of par�cipants conformed to the group judgment at least once. See Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for more on the specific
test Asch used and the results.

Par�cipants who did not go along with the group were not unaffected by the fact that their judgments were
going against the group. Some seemed confused or hesitant in their answers, but persevered anyway. Even those
who were more certain of their judgments were chagrined at their own deviance. Of those who went along with
the group, some thought that the answers they and the group were giving were wrong, but nevertheless went
along with the group. Others came to believe that the group was right.

Asch followed up his original study with a few varia�ons. When he varied the size of the group, he found that a
unanimous group of one or two others was not as persuasive as three, but there were only minimal gains a�er
adding the third person. He also had a varia�on in which another person in the group gave an accurate
judgment. The presence of another person who went against the group and gave the right answer decreased
conformity. Even when it goes against the majority opinion, having one other person around who agrees with us
gives us more confidence to express what we believe is right.

Conformity occurs in all cultures, although rates may be slightly different. In independent cultures, we generally
find less conformity than in interdependent cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996). One caveat to this is the rates of
conformity in Japan. In a study using a similar conformity task to Asch’s, rates of conformity were lower in Japan
than in the United States, a surprising finding given that Japanese culture is more interdependent than U.S.
culture (Frager, 1970). Later researchers found that in Japan, when the group was made up of friends,
conformity was much higher (Williams & Sogon, 1984). It seems that in an interdependent culture, people
conform more to the ingroup but less to the outgroup. Conformity has declined slightly since Asch did his study
in the early 1950s, perhaps because of a cultural shi� increasingly emphasizing individuality and the ques�oning
of authority (Bond & Smith, 1996).

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 4/16

When par�cipants were grouped with a single
confederate in Asch’s study, they were generally as
accurate as if they had been alone. When they were
grouped with four confederates, they agreed with the
incorrect confederates more than 30% of the �me.
Adapted from Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure.
Scien�fic American, 193, 31–35. doi: 10.1038/scien�ficamerican1155-
31

Both injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms can influence
our behavior.

Norms

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

What is an example of an injunc�ve norm and a
descrip�ve norm?

Which type of norm do you think influences your
behavior more?

If recycling is a norm in your neighborhood, you might be more likely to recycle.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Did all of the par�cipants in Asch’s study go along with the group?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

No. About a quarter of the par�cipants never went along with the group. The rest conformed at least once.

What effect did the presence of someone else who went against the group have on the par�cipants in Asch’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

When there was another person who did not conform, conformity of the par�cipant declined as well.

Norms

Even though most of us do not find ourselves in a room with a group of people answering targeted ques�ons, we can s�ll develop ideas based on what the
collec�ve group is thinking or doing. For example, you might believe that the majority of people brush their teeth at least twice a day, and that most people are
against removing educa�onal services for children with disabili�es. These beliefs about what the group is thinking or doing are called norms.

Two types of norms may influence our behavior. Norms for what is approved or disapproved of are
called injunc�ve norms. Norms describing what most people do are descrip�ve norms (Cialdini,
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Some�mes these two types of norms are in conflict; for example, a high
school student may believe that the majority of people are not in favor of underage drinking
(injunc�ve norm) but may also believe that the majority of teens engage in underage drinking
(descrip�ve norm). O�en the injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms are similar. Most people agree that we
should not steal from one another (injunc�ve norm) and that most people do not steal (descrip�ve
norm). We can also be wrong about one or both of these norms. The high school student may be
right that most people disapprove of underage drinking but wrong that most students engage in it
(Borsari & Carey, 2003).

One place we get informa�on about norms is the environment itself. For example, if you are in a
public place and see trash all around, the descrip�ve norm the environment is providing is that

everyone li�ers. This may lead you to li�er as well (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). If the injunc�ve norm against li�ering were more prominent, for example, if
there were signs asking you not to li�er and easily accessible trash cans were available, you may not li�er (Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993).
Norms that come from the environment will differ from place to place and culture to culture.

Telling people about descrip�ve norms can be helpful in encouraging posi�ve
behaviors. In a study of energy consump�on, households that used more than the
average amount of energy reduced energy consump�on when informed of the
descrip�ve norm. However, households that were below the average for energy
consump�on actually increased consump�on when told about the descrip�ve norm,
crea�ng a boomerang effect. This can be moderated by including the injunc�ve norm
along with the descrip�ve norm. Households that were told they were lower than
average in energy consump�on (told of the descrip�ve norm) and then praised for
their conserva�on (indica�ng an injunc�ve norm) maintained their low rate of energy
consump�on (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). An adver�sing
campaign in Montana that targeted drinking and driving among 21-to-34-year-olds
used informa�on about social norms to encourage this age group to reduce drinking
and driving, and encourage the use designated drivers (Perkins, Linkenbach, Lewis, &
Neighbors, 2010).

General descrip�ve norms about posi�ve behaviors are helpful for encouraging those
behaviors, but more specific norms are even more helpful. If you have stayed in a
hotel recently, you have probably seen a sign about towel reuse. The hotel will replace your towel but, if you want to save water and electricity, you can choose
to reuse your towel. Does it ma�er if you know what others do in this situa�on? When told that the majority of other guests in the hotel reuse their towels,

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 5/16

guests were more likely to reuse their towels. But this can be strengthened with greater specificity. When told that 75% of people who stayed in their specific
room (e.g., Room 201) reused their towels, guests were more likely to reuse their towels than if they were told 75% of people staying in the hotel reused their
towels (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Greater specificity of a norm leads to greater conformity to that norm.

Social Psychology in Depth: Drinking Norms

Drinking on college campuses is an epidemic. Nearly 80% of college students report drinking. Despite a minimum legal drinking age in the United
States of 21, almost 60% of students aged 18 to 20 report drinking. Much of this drinking is binge drinking, which involves consuming at least
four drinks (for women) or five drinks (for men) in a 2-hour period. More than 40% of college students report binge drinking at least once in a 2-
week period (Na�onal Ins�tute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2011). In addi�on to alcohol poisoning, such behavior contributes to injuries,
assaults, unsafe sex and sexual assault, academic problems, and vandalism (Centers for Disease Control and Preven�on, 2010; Na�onal Ins�tute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2011).

Alcohol use for college students depends, in part, on perceived injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms (Park, Klein, Smith, & Martell, 2009). Approval of
drinking is an injunc�ve norm; the percep�on of how much drinking is being done is a descrip�ve norm. Not all norms are created equal.
Researchers have found that people closer to a student are more likely to influence that student’s behavior. Perceived approval for drinking
(injunc�ve norm) by close friends and parents is more important than the approval for drinking of typical students, even same-sex students (Lee,
Geisner, Lewis, Neighbors, & Larimer, 2007; Neighbors et al., 2008). Similarly, students’ beliefs about how much their friends drink has more of
an impact than the perceived behaviors of others (Cho, 2006; Lee et al., 2007). Descrip�ve norms seen on social media (Facebook) predicted
alcohol-related thinking pa�erns that are related to alcohol use (Li� & Stock, 2011). In other words, believing that others in one’s social network
are drinking makes you more willing to drink, have more posi�ve a�tudes toward drinking, and perceive your own use of alcohol as more likely.

Norms involve what we believe others approve of or are doing, but beliefs are not always accurate. In the case of norms about drinking, U.S. and
Canadian students overes�mate the quan�ty and frequency of drinking by other students. Along with this, personal alcohol use is more
influenced by the inaccurate norm than by the real norm for drinking on campus (Perkins, 2007; Perkins, Haines, & Rice, 2005).

Does correc�ng these mispercep�ons reduce drinking? Overall, yes. At schools where the perceived norm is more in line with the lower actual
norm, there is less problema�c drinking (Perkins et al., 2005). Campaigns to change social norms tend to change perceived norms and bring
down problema�c drinking behaviors (Perkins et al., 2010). For binge drinkers, the descrip�ve norms for friends influence behavior more than
descrip�ve campus norms or injunc�ve norms. People who were not binge drinkers were more influenced by campus descrip�ve norms (Cho,
2006). Unfortunately, interven�ons with those most at risk, high binge drinkers, can backfire if students perceive the messages as restric�ng their
freedom to do as they like (Jung, Shim, & Mantaro, 2010).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

When a friend tells you everyone is doing it so you should too, that friend is talking about what kind of norm?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Descrip�ve norm. Descrip�ve norms are norms that describe what most people are doing.

What is the difference between an injunc�ve and a descrip�ve norm?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Injunc�ve norms focus on what people think you should do–what is approved of, while descrip�ve norms focus on what most people are
actually doing.

Norma�ve and Informa�onal Influence

Why do we conform? Conformity may occur because we believe that a group has some knowledge we do not. Imagine yourself at the zoo. You walk up to the
lion enclosure and no�ce there are a lot of people standing over on the right side, and no one is on the le�. If you want to see the lion, where do you go? Your
best bet is to the right, where all the people are. It’s likely that no one is on the le� because the lion not there. The crowd knows something you do not–where
the lion is–and so by following the crowd you are more likely to see the lion. When we conform because we believe the crowd knows something, we are
experiencing informa�onal influence (Castelli, Vanze�o, Sherman, & Luciano, 2001). Conformity may also occur because we want to be liked and accepted by the
group. In high school, you might have worn a certain style of clothing or acted in a par�cular way not because you believed it was the right thing to do but
because you wanted to be liked and accepted. When we conform because we want to be liked and accepted by others, we are experiencing norma�ve influence
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 6/16

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Informa�onal influence might compel you to join a crowd of onlookers—these
people may know something you don’t.

These different forms of influence can lead to different types of persuasion. If you
believed the group knew informa�on, you would likely act as the group does, as well
as come to believe as the group does. If you were in a theater and suddenly everyone
started running for the exits yelling “Fire!,” you may follow the crowd, truly believing
there is a fire somewhere, even if you have not seen any evidence of it. When we
both behave and believe as the group does we have experienced acceptance of the
social norm. We more o�en find acceptance in the case of informa�onal influence. On
the other hand, if you were in that theater following everyone as they rushed toward
the exits but you did not believe there was a fire, you would be ac�ng in a way that
goes along with the group norms while privately disagreeing. Such ac�on without
belief is called compliance. We find more compliance in the case of norma�ve
influence. In the case of the tragedy at Jonestown it seems both of these were at
work. Based on recordings made during the mass suicide in Jonestown it appears
many of Jim Jones’ followers truly believed in him and in his dire predic�ons, readily
and willingly drinking the poisoned beverage. These people accepted the social norm.
Others seem to have drunk the cyanide while not truly believing that such an act was
necessary (Federal Bureau of Inves�ga�on, 1978).

Adver�sers use conformity to their advantage. By telling us how many people switched their car insurance, an insurance company is sugges�ng that these other
people know something we do not. If everyone else discovered cheaper insurance, perhaps we should join them and switch too; informa�onal influence is at
work. Another adver�ser might show us a lot of happy people wearing a par�cular brand of jeans, sugges�ng that if we want to fit in we should buy and wear
these jeans. When we buy what others do to be liked or accepted, we are conforming due to norma�ve influence. There are �mes when we are more
suscep�ble to conformity pressures. For example, individuals are more likely to go along with the crowd when they are in a good mood (Tong, Tan, Latheef,
Selamat, & Tan, 2008) and are more involved with the topic at hand (Huang & Min, 2007). Norma�ve influence can help self-managed teams in businesses to
manage themselves. Team members who feel they belong and are commi�ed to the team can show greater produc�vity (Stewart, Courtright, & Barrick, 2012).

Test Yourself

Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How are acceptance and compliance related to norma�ve and informa�onal influence?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

When we conform because of informa�onal influence we are more likely to show acceptance, not just compliance. Compliance is more
likely with norma�ve influence because we are going along with the crowd to be accepted, but not necessarily because we believe the
crowd is right.

Minority Influence

So far, this chapter has discussed the ways in which norms can have a powerful influence on the individual, causing them to go along with what everyone else is
doing. But individuals are not powerless. When an individual goes against the majority, that ac�on can influence the majority. In the 1957 film 12 Angry Men,
one juror persuades the other 11 jurors to his side of thinking. While, at the beginning of the film, he is the only one who believes in the innocence of the
accused, by the end they all believe the young man accused of the crime is not guilty. The majority is more likely to find a minority viewpoint persuasive if the
minority viewpoint is dis�nct and the posi�on is held consistently. When a minority holds one point of difference from the group but agrees with the majority on
other points, this creates dis�nc�veness. If a friend shares your beliefs concerning school reform except for the use of student achievement for teacher
evalua�on, you might be more willing to entertain that friend’s perspec�ve and poten�ally be convinced by his arguments (Bohner, Frank, & Erb, 1998).
Consistently held posi�ons are also more persuasive. If your friend waivered in his beliefs about teacher evalua�ons, you would be less willing to hear his
arguments (Moscovici & Lage, 1976). Minori�es can also become more persuasive when there are defec�ons from the minority. If your friend were to convince
someone who used to agree with you to now agree with his line of thinking, you would be more likely to also change your opinion (Clark, 2001).

Whether or not minori�es actually lead the majority to change beliefs, minori�es do create greater crea�vity and complexity in the thinking of the majority
(Legrenzi, Butera, Mugny, & Perez, 1991; Nemeth, Mayseless, Sherman, & Brown, 1990). The alterna�ve perspec�ve of the minority causes the majority to
consider other viewpoints and approaches to an issue. The minority viewpoint allows them to think about their ideas from other angles they may not have
accounted for before. When minori�es do change the opinion of the majority, that changed belief tends to be more stable and more resistant to future change
(Mar�n, Hewstone, & Mar�n, 2008). In this way, minori�es perform a service for the majority, even if they do not convince anyone in the majority to their way
of thinking.

Having a group move from agreeing with you on an issue to disagreeing with you is an unse�ling experience. Individuals who began in the majority and maintain
their opinion as the rest of the group joins the minority opinion tend to have hos�le feelings toward the group. On the other hand, those who began in the
minority and have a group adopt their opinion tend to like the group more and expect posi�ve interac�ons with the group in the future (Prislin, Limbert, &
Bauer, 2000). Being in the minority is an uncomfortable experience that can improve if others come to see things as we do.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 7/16

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

When are minori�es more persuasive? In other words, what quali�es in the minority make it more likely to persuade the majority to
change?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Minori�es who offer a dis�nc�ve viewpoint, are consistent in their viewpoint, and gain defec�ons from the majority are most persuasive.

Without convincing members of the majority to their side do minori�es do anything to or for the majority by holding a minority view?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Minori�es create more crea�vity and complexity in the majority, even when the majority does not change its viewpoint.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 8/16

The impact of Stanley Milgram’s experiment.

Stanley Milgram

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

What mo�vated Stanley Milgram’s famous
experiment?

What is a contemporary example of how authority
influences behavior?

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

We are required to display obedience on a daily basis. For example, drivers are
expected to stop at red lights and pedestrians must wait for a signal before
crossing an intersec�on.

8.2

Obedience to Authority

It began like many other research studies. Having answered a newspaper adver�sement, male research par�cipants entered the research laboratory and were
told they were going to be part of a study of performance and punishment. Each par�cipant was paired with another par�cipant, and both were told they would
each be taking on the role of teacher or the role of learner. These roles were chosen randomly, from li�le slips of paper in a hat. The learner was brought to a
separate room. Electrodes were connected to the learner’s arm and the learner was strapped to a chair. Learners were told, in the presence of the teacher, the
shocks would be painful but they would cause no permanent damage. The teachers returned with the experimenter to the other room and were told they would
be teaching the learner a series of words, using electrical shocks to punish the leaner for wrong answers.

As the teacher and learner worked through the word list, the teacher increased the shock level by 15
volts for every wrong answer, as instructed by the experimenter. At first the experiment was
uneven�ul, but at 75 volts the learner u�ered an “Ugh!” a�er the shock. A�er several more of these
sorts of verbaliza�ons from the learner at the 150-volt level, the leaner said “Ugh! Experimenter!
That’s all. Get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s star�ng to bother me now.
Get me out of here please. My heart’s star�ng to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out”
(Milgram, 1974, p. 56). When the teacher asked the experimenter what to do, the experimenter
replied that he should go on. A�er that, if the teacher con�nued the learner protested un�l the 330-
volt level. A�er the 330-volt level the learner fell silent, not providing any further protests, but also
not answering any ques�ons. The highest shock level possible was 450, a level denoted with XXX,
past the denota�on of Danger: Severe Shock.

Before the study began, psychology undergraduates, adults, and psychiatrists were asked to predict how far on the shock generator the teachers would go. They
predicted that only 1 in 1,000 would go all the way to the end of the shock generator, with about 4% even making it to the 300-volt level (Milgram, 1974). In the
study, 62.5% of the par�cipants (25/40) went to the end. Many teachers protested along the way, showing signs of extreme stress, but con�nued to the end.
None of the teachers dropped out before the 135-volt level, and 80% con�nued to give shocks un�l the 285-volt level, having given 18 shocks and heard 14
separate protests by the learner. What the par�cipants did not know was that the learner was not ge�ng any electrical shocks; he was working with the
experimenter, his “random” assignment as learner was rigged, and his verbaliza�ons throughout the study were recordings. The study was designed to inves�gate
obedience, and the primary interest of the researcher was whether the par�cipant (the teacher) would obey, even when it meant harming another person.

Milgram undertook his study, in part, to try to be�er understand the events that
occurred in Nazi Germany, where many ordinary people went against their own moral
codes and their own ethics and par�cipated in the degrada�on, imprisonment, and
killing of Jewish civilians and other innocent people (Milgram, 1963). Milgram argued
that one reason for that behavior was obedience. But could obedience be so
powerful? Milgram’s study suggests it is. Even given immoral orders to con�nue to
hurt another person, people tend to obey. Many, including Stanley Milgram, the
researcher, found these results surprising (Milgram, 1963). The findings of this study
suggest that people are willing to harm another person if told to do so by an
authority. They may protest, express disapproval, and ask the authority figure to let
them stop, but when the authority figure says they should con�nue, they will.

Obedience is a deeply engrained tendency–one that we are taught early on in life.
Most of the �me, obedience is a posi�ve behavior. Driving your car through an
intersec�on at a green light, you hope that those stopped for the red light on the
cross street will obey traffic laws and stop. Obedience to authority prevents many
the�s, murders, and kidnappings. In fact, we may wish for more obedience in regards
to violent and nonviolent crimes. But, as Milgram showed, and as history has taught
us, there is also a dark side to obedience. This dark side can be clearly seen in the
events at Jonestown. Jim Jones demanded obedience from his followers and, in the end, received ul�mate obedience from many–they killed themselves on his
command.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

In Milgram’s study, did most of the par�cipants obey or did most disobey?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

In Milgram’s original study more than half, 62.4% or 25/40, obeyed and gave powerful electrical shocks to an innocent vic�m.

Were the findings of Milgram’s study expected by people asked to predict the results?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 9/16

Expand Your Knowledge: Zimbardo on Evil

Phillip Zimbardo described the social psychological factors in
destruc�ve behaviors in his book The Lucifer Effect. Although
obedience is only a part of the explana�on, if you are interested in
learning more about why people act in ways that hurt others, read
this book. Zimbardo also wrote two shorter pieces on this topic: a
chapter in an edited book �tled The Social Psychology of Good and
Evil: Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty and a
short ar�cle for the magazine Eye on Psi Chi. The book chapter
explores what Zimbardo calls a situa�onist perspec�ve on evil.

Zimbardo, P. G. (2008). The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good
people turn evil. New York: Random House. Informa�on on the
Lucifer Effect is available here (h�p://www.lucifereffect.com) .

No. People told about the study but not the results predicted very few would obey to the end.

Social Psychology in Depth: Bad Apples or Vinegar Barrels?

When we hear about some of the bad events that happen in our world, we o�en describe the perpetrators as “bad people.” Yet prominent
psychologist Philip Zimbardo argues that we apply such terms too liberally, failing to recognize the capacity for evil that we all hold, given the
right set of circumstances (Zimbardo, 2004; 2008).

Take, for example, the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal. In 2004, pictures began to emerge of U.S. prison guards (Army reservists) at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq abusing the Iraqi prisoners. The images were graphic. Prisoners were shown naked, in humilia�ng poses, on leashes, and
being threatened by dogs. Our ini�al ins�nct is to say the guards were bad people–bad apples who should never have been allowed into the
Army (Shermer, 2007). In making such a conclusion we make a fundamental a�ribu�on error, ignoring situa�onal factors and blaming
disposi�onal factors for behavior.

Milgram’s experiment shows us how powerful situa�onal factors can be. Normal, ordinary Americans were willing to inflict great harm on
another person simply because of the orders of a man in a white lab coat. If such behavior can be elicited in a rela�vely short period in a largely
innocuous psychology laboratory situa�on, might even more brutal behavior be expected over a longer period in a frightening and unfamiliar
scenario?

Despite focusing on the situa�on in explaining evil events, Zimbardo does not advocate excusing bad behavior. Understanding the situa�on that
brought about the behavior does not condone it. Those who do bad things should be punished for what they have done. But without some
a�en�on to the situa�on, more people will engage in the behaviors, crea�ng more pain and suffering in the world.

Zimbardo (2004) writes:

‘While a few bad apples might spoil the barrel (filled with good fruit/people), a barrel filled with vinegar will always transform
sweet cucumbers into sour pickles–regardless of the best inten�ons, resilience, and gene�c nature of those cucumbers.’ So, does it
make more sense to spend our resources on a�empts to iden�fy, isolate, and destroy the few bad apples or to learn how vinegar
works so that we can teach cucumbers how to avoid undesirable vinegar barrels? (p. 47)

What Predicts Obedience?

Milgram (1974) completed a variety of related experiments to learn what factors contribute to obedience. Unlike many studies in social psychology, Milgram used
community members for his research, not college undergraduates. His par�cipants were from a variety of educa�on levels, ranging from not comple�ng high
school to having obtained doctoral degrees, and varied from age 20 to age 50. Milgram’s original studies used only male par�cipants; when Milgram expanded
his study to include women, though, he found no appreciable differences between men and women (Shanab & Yahya, 1977). Age does not seem to ma�er in
level of obedience in this type of study either. Children aged 6 to 16 years were about as obedient in a replica�on of Milgram’s study, with no differences based
on age (Shanab & Yahya, 1977).

Proximity of the Vic�m

Milgram found that the proximity between the learner (the vic�m) and the
teacher (the par�cipant) was an important factor in obedience. In one study, the
learner was in another room and had no communica�on with the teacher, except
in providing answers and, at the 300- and 315-volt level, banging on the wall. In
this instance, obedience was raised only to 65% (26 out of 40 par�cipants) from
62.5% in the first study. In another study, the learner was in the same room as the
teacher. In another, the learner and teacher were next to one another. In this
second experiment the learner had to touch a shock plate every �me he got an
answer wrong. He eventually refused to touch the plate and the teacher had to
physically move his hand and force it down on the shock plate. In these studies,
Milgram found that the closer the learner was to the teacher, the lower the
obedience. When the learner was far removed, obedience was very high; more
than half of the par�cipants obeyed the experimenter. When the learner was in
the same room as the teacher, obedience declined to 40%, and it further declined
to 30% when physical contact was required. When someone is ordered to hurt
another, the closer the vic�m is the lower the likelihood of obedience.

Would we harm those we know well? In one of Milgram’s studies, par�cipants brought a friend along. The friend was enlisted as the experimenter’s helper and
fulfilled the role of learner, including giving all the protests the confederate learner had offered in the original study. The researchers found much lower

http://www.lucifereffect.com/

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 10/16

Expand Your Knowledge: Video Clips of Obedience

The Heroic Imagina�on project (h�p://heroicimagina�on.org/research
/situa�onal-awareness/social-influence-forces /obedience-to-authority/)

provides an interes�ng set of clips on obedience. The collec�on
includes some archival footage from Milgram’s study and videos of
obedience in situa�ons where the authority figure had li�le
authority, including an amusing Candid Camera clip asking people
at a lunch counter to follow the direc�ons of a light for when they
could and could not eat.

obedience in this condi�on. Only 15% (3 out of 20) of par�cipants were willing to go all the way to the end of the shock generator when their friend protested
(Rochat & Modigliani, 1997).

Proximity of the Authority

In another set of studies, the distance between the experimenter (the authority figure) and the teacher was varied. In one study, the experimenter provided
direc�ons by telephone or through a prerecorded message. When the authority figure was distant, the par�cipants were less likely to obey. The legi�macy of the
authority was also varied. Milgram moved the study to an office building in Bridgeport, Connec�cut, out of the Yale University laboratory he had been using.
Par�cipants believed they were par�cipa�ng in a study for the “Research Associates of Bridgeport” and saw no connec�on of the study to pres�gious Yale
University. In this study obedience declined some, from 65% to 48%. Other researchers found similar results with an authority figure without legi�mate authority
(Mantell, 1971; Rosenhan, 1969). The implica�ons are frightening: nearly half of par�cipants s�ll obey immoral orders from authority figures who have very li�le
legi�macy.

The appearance of authority can be enough to convince us to obey. Outside of the
laboratory se�ng, this concept was demonstrated in a study of nurses in a
hospital in the 1960s. In this study, a physician, who the nurses on duty were not
familiar with, called on the phone and asked them to give a pa�ent what they
would have known to be an unsafe level of a drug. The study found 95% of the
nurses obeyed before being intercepted on their way to give the drug (Hofling,
Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966). If a security guard asked you to
stand on the other side of a bus stop sign, would you do it? Even though the
request was not part of the security guard’s domain, most people asked by a
uniformed person to do a simple act, did so (Bickman, 1974).

Compliant or Defiant Others

When groups of people were part of the study, Milgram found that compliant
others led to compliant par�cipants, and defiant others led to defiant par�cipants. In these studies Milgram had confederates who appeared to be other
par�cipants do a variety of teaching tasks. In one study the par�cipant watched as a confederate gave shocks. In this study 90% of par�cipants were fully
obedient. In another study two confederates and one par�cipant were assigned to give shocks. At the 150-volt level, when the learner makes his first long
protest, the confederate giving the shocks refused to con�nue. The second confederate was then given the job of giving shocks. At the 210-volt level this second
confederate joined in the protest, ge�ng up from his chair near the shock generator and refusing to con�nue the study. At that point the actual par�cipant was
asked to con�nue the study on his own. When the two other teachers (the confederates) quit, obedience declined significantly, to 27.5% (Milgram, 1965).

Culture

Culture can also contribute to obedience. In the United States, independence is a dominant value and parents tend to pass on those values to children through
childrearing. For example, researchers found that when mothers encourage their children to recount a story, U.S. children are encouraged to describe events that
illustrate their own opinions and quali�es, while Chinese children are encouraged to describe ac�vi�es that they did with others or that relate them to others
(Wang, 2006). Because social harmony is highly valued in interdependent cultures like Chinese culture, children are more socialized to be obedient (Xiao, 1999).
Even within cultures there are varia�ons in the value of obedience. Researchers find that middle-class parents in the United States are more likely to be
concerned with emphasizing independence in their children, while working-class parents tend to focus more on obedience (Gecas & Nye, 1974; Xiao, 2000). In
cultures where authority is highly valued, we are more likely to see the kind of destruc�ve obedience that Milgram studied–obedience without cri�cal
examina�on–that is evidenced in genocide and other violent human acts (Staub, 1999).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What effect did the closeness of the learner/vic�m have on obedience in Milgram’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

The closer the teacher was to the learner/vic�m the lower the obedience.

In situa�ons of obedience do we conform to the ac�ons of others in their obedience to authority?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Yes. In studies where confederates posing as par�cipants also obeyed, the par�cipant obeyed as well. In studies where confederates posing
as par�cipants disobeyed, fewer par�cipants obeyed the authority figure.

Disobedience

http://heroicimagination.org/research%20/situational-awareness/social-influence-forces%20/obedience-to-authority/

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 11/16

William Warren/Science Fac�on/SuperStock

In an act of civil disobedience, Vietnam veterans protest against the war.

In Milgram’s original study, 35% of par�cipants disobeyed the authority figure and discon�nued the study. There are �mes in life when disobedience is a more
just and moral choice than obedience. Can we predict who will disobey? In many ways, obedient and disobedient par�cipants are indis�nguishable. In later
studies on obedience, no difference in stress levels were found–all par�cipants showed physical and psychological markers of stress as the study con�nued. As
par�cipants con�nued to be obedient, they tended to reach a point of compliant resigna�on, offering fewer and shorter disagreements and con�nuing to engage
in the behavior. However, when the amount of �me people were part of the study was taken into account (disobedient par�cipants obviously finished more
quickly), the number of disagreements were no different between those who con�nued to be obedient and those that disobeyed. No differences in personality
were found between obedient and disobedient par�cipants (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010; Bocchiaro, Zimbardo, & Van Lange, 2012).

Disobedience tends to occur at a cri�cal juncture. In studies using Milgram’s
paradigm, par�cipants who disobeyed tended to do so when the confederate first
protested or when the confederate’s protests changed in content or tone (Meeus &
Raaijmakers, 1986; Packer, 2008). A�er disobeying, most par�cipants believed they did
what others would have done. In other words, they did not see their behavior as
unusual, showing false consensus, and were surprised that anyone would have
con�nued to obey. Par�cipants reported they made a quick decision when they chose
to disobey; for some it was a moral or an ethical decision. These par�cipants
men�oned that it would not be right or fair to con�nue when the other person is
clearly suffering. Other par�cipants worried about the other person, or felt empathy
for his/her suffering. Others simply did not see the point of con�nuing within the
situa�on (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010). Overall, it is difficult to predict who will
disobey and who will obey authority in these types of situa�ons. It appears decisions
are made quickly at cri�cal points within a situa�on, and are made for a variety of
reasons. These reasons are not reflec�ve of personality differences, or differences in
reac�vity to stress. Future research on obedience is needed to help us be�er predict
disobedience.

One type of disobedience that occurs in response to poten�ally illegi�mate authority
is legal disobedience. Legal disobedience may take the form of conscien�ous
objec�on, civil disobedience, or outright rebellion against a government or leader
(Herr, 1974; Raz, 1975). This form of disobedience occurred as people in communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe overthrew their governments in 1989 and in a
variety of Arab countries in 2011, which came to be known as the Arab Spring.

Conscien�ous objec�ons and civil disobedience helped free India from rule by the Bri�sh Empire, bring about civil rights in the United States in the 1960s, and
help end the Vietnam war in the 1970s. In such circumstances, people may feel an en�tlement or a responsibility to disobey as an act of ci�zenship (Ra�ner,
Yagil, & Sherman-Segal, 2003). In fact, people most commi�ed to democracy are o�en those who are most likely to disobey in the face of poten�ally illegi�mate
authority (Passini & Morselli, 2011). For these people democracy provides both an opportunity and a responsibility to disobey when democracy is threated. This
disobedience prevents authoritarian governments to take hold, preserving or bringing about democra�c rule.

Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How are those who disobey different from those who obey authority?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

For the most part they are not different. There is no difference in personality or in the distress they show or the protests they make.

Ethics of Obedience Research

The par�cipants in Milgram’s studies underwent an experience that was very stressful. According to an observer of the study:

I observed a mature and ini�ally poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching,
stu�ering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and twisted his hands. At one
point he pushed his fist into his forehead and mu�ered: “Oh God, let’s stop it.” And yet he con�nued to respond to every word of the
experimenter, and obeyed to the end (Milgram, 1963, p. 377).

When entering into an experimental situa�on, research par�cipants put themselves into the hands of the experimenter. A�er Milgram’s study, other researchers
asked if placing unsuspec�ng people into these kinds of situa�ons was ethical. The main problems iden�fied were that par�cipants had a very stressful
experience, and that they would have to live with the knowledge of the lengths to which they would obey, all within a situa�on based on trust (Baumrind, 1964).

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 12/16

Milgram (1964) responded to these cri�cisms by no�ng that the findings of his studies and the reac�ons of the par�cipants were unexpected. When he asked
psychologists and others what to expect, they did not believe par�cipants would go all the way to the end of the shock generator and be as obedient as they
were. At the end of the experimental session, the experimenter reunited the confederate with the par�cipant so the par�cipant could see that he was not
harmed in any way. The experimenter was suppor�ve of whatever decision the par�cipant made in terms of obedience.

The study involved a great deal of decep�on. The par�cipants were lied to about the purpose of the study, about the complicity of the other par�cipant, and
about what was actually happening. Cri�cs of the study argued that this type of decep�on may have an impact on the par�cipants themselves, as they feel
duped by the researcher. This form of decep�on in psychological experiments can poten�ally impact the general public’s view of psychological research. When
researchers use decep�on a great deal, the public may become suspicious of all research studies, and wary of par�cipa�ng in research, even research that does
not in fact involve decep�on. Milgram (1974) contacted par�cipants a�er their par�cipa�on to ask how they felt about the study. The vast majority said they
were glad or very glad to have been part of the study (83.7%). Only 1.3% of the par�cipants reported being sorry or very sorry to have par�cipated. Almost
three fourths of par�cipants reported learning something of personal importance.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What were some ethical issues with Milgram’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Par�cipants in Milgram’s study experienced a great deal of distress and were deceived about the nature of the study in a situa�on of
trust. In the end, they may have learned something unpleasant about their own tendencies that they would have to live with.

Did Milgram find any long-term nega�ve effects in the par�cipants who were part of his study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

For the most part, no. In follow-up work he found that most people were happy to have been part of the study.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 13/16

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Leaders can use different strategies and tac�cs to achieve goals.

8.3 Leadership
The influences of conformity and obedience sway our beliefs and ac�ons. Cult leader Jim Jones expected obedience from his followers and used conformity to
keep his followers in line. Leaders–good and bad–make a difference in what people think and do, contribu�ng to or breaking from conformity. Obedience to
leaders has led to some of the most inspiring and heartbreaking events in history. Leadership involves influencing a group and its members to contribute to the
goals of the group and coordina�ng and guiding those efforts (Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008). If leaders are good leaders who make good decisions, then
obedience is appropriate.

What makes a good leader? When are leaders most effec�ve? A number of models for describing types of leadership exist. One model offers two main
categories of leadership: transac�onal and transforma�onal leadership. In transac�onal leadership, leaders can lead by offering an exchange of rewards for effort
from followers. By contrast, some leaders offer their followers a common purpose and ask that individual interest be put aside so the group can work together
toward that goal. This leadership style is called transforma�onal leadership (Bass, 1985). An addi�onal type of leadership, called laissez-faire leadership, is
characterized by a hands-off approach, with the leader simply allowing the followers to do what they would like without substan�al input from the leader
(Yammarino, Spangler, & Bass, 1993).

Transac�onal leaders focus on con�ngent rewards and ac�ve management. These leaders work out agreements with their followers that will sa�sfy both par�es.
People obey transac�onal leaders because they desire the rewards the transac�onal leader can provide. Con�ngent rewards are provided once the followers have
fulfilled their end of the bargain.

This type of leadership may also involve ac�ve management, where the leader
monitors what the follower is doing to redirect, if needed, and enforce the rules that
have been agreed upon. Transac�onal leaders do not always ac�vely manage their
followers. At �mes, they take a passive management approach, intervening when
problems are brought to their a�en�on (Bass, 1997). These leaders do not necessarily
inspire their followers, but they do get the job done. Many leaders of businesses,
coaches of sports teams, and poli�cians would best be described as transac�onal
leaders.

Transforma�onal leaders are characterized by charisma, inspira�onal mo�va�on,
intellectual s�mula�on, and individualized considera�on. Charisma, in this context,
means influence toward an ideal that can be accomplished through the leader
displaying convic�on about the goal, presen�ng and taking stands on important
issues, and emphasizing trust. When leaders clearly ar�culate a vision, provide
encouragement, and show op�mism, they display inspira�onal mo�va�on. Nelson
Mandela, an�-apartheid leader and former president of South Africa, was such a
transforma�onal leader, as was Winston Churchill, prime minister of the United
Kingdom during World War II. Intellectual s�mula�on within transforma�onal leadership is modeled by leaders in their welcoming of new ideas and perspec�ves.
Finally, transforma�onal leaders tend to focus on individual gi�s, abili�es, and needs, offering individual considera�on for followers (Bass, 1997). Along with these
quali�es, transforma�onal leaders are generally self-confident and are able to handle pressure and uncertainty well. Op�mis�c and self-determined, such leaders
are able to cast a vision for their followers (van Eeden, Cilliers, & van Deventer, 2008). Not all transforma�onal leaders bring about peace and reconcilia�on. Jim
Jones would likely fit in the category of transforma�onal leadership. Jones a�racted his followers to his vision for a color-blind world where people worked
together to create a modern-day utopia.

People differ in what they consider to be ideal in a leader. Because of past experiences, values, and personality differences, people develop schemas for what
they consider good leadership quali�es and these schemas are rela�vely stable over �me (Epitropaki & Mar�n, 2004; Keller, 1999; Keller, 2003; Kriger & Seng,
2005). These schemas are called implicit leadership theories. Individuals who show quali�es that people expect in leaders–those that fit the implicit leadership
theories people hold–are more likely to be viewed as leaders (Melwani, Mueller, & Overbeck, 2012). Interac�ons between a follower and a leader will be largely
impacted by the follower’s implicit leadership theories (Epitropaki & Mar�n, 2005; Fraser & Lord, 1988). Some leaders may be considered bad leaders not
because they intend to do any harm to their followers or because they are inherently bad leaders, but because the implicit leadership theories of the followers
do not match the leadership quali�es and ac�ons of the leader (Peus, Braun, & Frey, 2012).

Success of a leader can be defined in a variety of ways. Successful leaders might be those who have helped their followers to reach a goal (Kaiser & Hogan,
2007). Even without reaching or moving toward obtaining a goal, leaders might be defined as successful if their group is sa�sfied or mo�vated or, simply, if
followers rate the leader as successful (Tsui, 1984). Looking from a strict monetary perspec�ve, 14% of the variance in the financial results of a business is due to
the leadership provided by the CEO (Joyce, Nohria, & Robertson, 2003). Although we o�en think of transforma�onal leaders as be�er leaders, generally there are
no overall differences in effec�veness of transforma�onal versus transac�onal leaders (Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 14/16

A leader who seeks to inspire followers and cast a vision for where those followers might go is using what type of leadership?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)

Transforma�onal leadership.

Joe believes a leader should be kind and compassionate to followers. Marcus thinks leaders should be clear about expecta�ons but
uninvolved in the lives of their followers. Joe and Marcus are different in what way?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)

Joe and Marcus are different in their implicit leadership theories, they have different schemas regarding the appropriate quali�es of
leaders.

Conclusion

Conformity affects our everyday behavior. We might follow what everyone else is doing or what we think others would like us to do. We might follow because
the crowd seems to know something we do not know, or because we want acceptance from the crowd. But minority groups can also influence behavior,
par�cularly when they maintain a consistent, dis�nc�ve posi�on. Overall, people tend to be obedient, a posi�ve tendency that allows for a well-ordered and safe
society. But rates of obedience are o�en s�ll high even when it involves harming others, as found in Stanley Milgram’s famous study of obedience. Obedience is
even more common when the authority figure is close, the vic�m is distant, and others are also obeying. Milgram’s studies were a�acked for being unethical, as
his par�cipants were put under extreme stress and were deceived within a context where trust is important. Authority figures or leaders come in a variety of
styles, showing effec�veness in their roles depending on expecta�ons of followers and the situa�on in which they lead.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 15/16

Chapter Summary

Conformity

When we do as others do, we are conforming to the behavior of the group. At �mes our conformity is due to what we believe others want us to do. In this
instance we are influenced by injunc�ve norms. Descrip�ve norms refer to what most people do, not necessarily what most people approve of. When we
conform we may do so to be liked or accepted by the group. Norma�ve influence produces this type of conformity. When we conform to be liked or accepted
we may act as others do without believing that ac�on is right; we show compliance to the social norm. Informa�onal influence brings about conformity because
we believe the group knows something we do not. At such �mes we may act and believe as the group does, showing acceptance of the social norm. Majori�es
are powerful, but minori�es can have an influence too. Minori�es with dis�nc�ve posi�ons, that are consistent in their posi�on, and that gain defec�ons from
the majority are most persuasive.

Obedience to Authority

Stanley Milgram completed a study of obedience where par�cipants were asked to follow the orders of an experimenter despite the protests of a vic�m. In his
study, 62.5% of par�cipants were fully obedient. When Milgram varied the distance of the authority figure from the par�cipant, obedience declined as the
authority figure’s presence was less prominent. The vic�m’s presence led to a decrease in obedience. When the legi�macy of the authority figure was lessened,
obedience was lower, although s�ll quite high. More recent research has shown that obedience has not declined significantly. Disobedience is hard to predict on
the individual level, although some situa�onal factors do predict when people are likely to disobey. Milgram’s study of obedience placed par�cipants in a
situa�on of great stress in an environment of trust. Milgram’s follow-ups with his par�cipants indicated that most were happy to have par�cipated and had no
long-term ill effects from the study.

Leadership

Leadership styles may involve a transac�on of rewards for effort, known as transac�onal leadership, or inspira�on toward a common goal and purpose, known as
transforma�onal leadership. Laissez-faire leadership involves leadership without substan�al input from the leader. Followers have par�cular ways of thinking
about leadership, influencing how they evaluate leaders. Generally, leaders do ma�er and a variety of leadership styles are poten�ally effec�ve.

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

1. Have you been in a situa�on where you changed your behavior, or observed others changing their behavior, due to conformity? What was that situa�on
like?

2. In your own life, where might you have seen injunc�ve norms and descrip�ve norms?

3. If you held a minority opinion in a group and wanted to convince the rest of the group to join you in that opinion, what might you do to convince them?

4. Milgram inves�gated the closeness and legi�macy of the authority figure, the closeness to and iden�ty of the vic�m, and the ac�ons of others in rela�on to
degree of obedience. What other factors might influence obedience?

5. If you had been part of Milgram’s study of obedience, what do you think you would have done?

6. What do you think about the ethics of Milgram’s studies of obedience? Do you think they should have been done, or are the ethical implica�ons too great?

7. How might you describe your own implicit leadership theories? What effect have these had on your interac�ons with leaders?

8. The chapter begins with a discussion of the mass suicide of the people at Jonestown. Based on what you now know about conformity and obedience what
do you think could have been done to prevent this tragedy or others like it?

Key Terms

Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.

acceptance
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

When both ac�ons and beliefs are in line with the social norm.

compliance
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

When ac�ons are in line with the social norm, but belief remains dis�nct.

conformity
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch08,sec8.1,sec8.2,sec8.3,ch08summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 16/16

Going along with a group in ac�ons or beliefs.

descrip�ve norms
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Norms describing what most people do.

dis�nc�veness
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

That which gives minori�es power despite their minority status. This occurs when one point of differences from the group is held by a minority, but the minority
agrees with the majority on other points.

implicit leadership theories
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The schemas people have for good leadership quali�es.

informa�onal influence
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A type of social influence toward conformity that occurs when the individual believes the crowd possesses knowledge that the individual does not.

injunc�ve norms
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Norms for what is either approved of or disapproved of.

laissez-faire

leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Characterized by a hands-off approach, with the leader simply allowing the followers to do what they would like without substan�al input from the leader.

leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Influencing a group and its members to contribute to the goals of the group and coordina�ng and guiding those efforts.

norma�ve influence
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A type of social influence toward conformity that occurs when the individual conforms to avoid social rejec�on and to be liked or accepted by the group.

transac�onal leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Leadership involving offering an exchange of rewards for effort from followers.

transforma�onal leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Leadership where the leader offers followers a common purpose and asks that individual interests be put aside so the group can work together toward that goal.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 1/18

Chapter 9:

Groups

9.1 Group Ac�ons

What Is a Group?

Social Facilita�on

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

Deindividua�on

9.2 Group Cogni�on

9.3 Social Dilemmas

Commons Dilemma

Resource Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Chapter Summary

Corbis/Photolibrary

Learning Objec�ves

By the end of the chapter you should be able to:

Define “group” and describe the various types of groups

Explain the posi�ve and nega�ve effects of social facilita�on

Differen�ate social loafing from the Köhler effect

Explain what deindividua�on is and when it occurs

Explain brainstorming techniques that increase or decrease the number of ideas developed

Describe the effect of group polariza�on on group decisions

Explain the antecedents, characteris�cs, and consequences of groupthink

Explain factors in group decision making

Differen�ate the following social dilemmas: tragedy of the commons, resource dilemma, prisoner’s dilemma

Chapter Outline

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 2/18

Brainstorming

Group Polariza�on

Groupthink

Group Decision Making

* * *

Jury trials were adopted by the United States in 1791, with the 14th Amendment to the Bill of Rights. Jury trials were seen as a way for ci�zens to
be part of the decision-making process and to prevent poli�cal leaders or others who might be in power from unfairly or unjustly prosecu�ng
ci�zens. About 154,000 jury trials take place every year in the United States (Graham, 2009). Almost 30% of Americans have served as a trial juror
in their life�me, with about 32 million Americans being summoned each year to serve on a jury (Burne�, 2009; Read, 2009). Jury trials occur in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many other countries around the world. They usually consist of a small group of people,
typically, between 6 and 12 jurors. When juries make decisions, they take about 4 hours for delibera�on (Burne�, 2009).

Juries are just one example of a small group working together to make a decision or accomplish a goal. Every day, groups of people engage in
ac�ons, large and small, that affect their own lives and the lives of others. A family may jointly decide what restaurant to eat at that night. A
group of execu�ves may decide to engage in a hos�le takeover of a rival company. Ci�zens of a na�on may rise up together to overthrow their
leaders, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February of 2011. Understanding how groups think and act together is important to
understanding their influence on us.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 3/18

Hemera/Thinkstock

This group of golfers enjoying each other’s company would likely be an in�macy
group.

Expand Your Knowledge: Triple�

You can read Triple�’s classic study of social facilita�on at
h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm
(h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm) . Triple� offers a number
of possible explana�ons for his observa�ons, including theories like
the suc�on theory, the brain worry theory, and the theory of
hypno�c sugges�ons.

9.1

Group Ac�ons

In life, we engage with groups in a variety of se�ngs. A child jumping rope may do so with an audience of other children. A basketball player shoo�ng a free
throw may be affected by the presence of the crowd. A team on a factory floor may produce different amounts of product than would be expected based on
each member’s individual produc�on. A mob of angry protesters may act in ways uncharacteris�c of its individual members. Groups can affect individual behavior
in posi�ve and nega�ve ways. In this sec�on, we inves�gate these types of situa�ons, focusing primarily on the way individuals act, think, and interact.

What Is a Group?

A jury is a fairly clear example of a group. Would a dozen people standing at the bus stop qualify as a group? What about three students studying at the same
library table? A group can be defined as at least two people interac�ng and forming some kind of coherent unit (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Dasgupta, Banaji, &
Ableson, 1999). According to this defini�on, those bus riders or the studying students might qualify as a group if they are doing something together. If the
students are interac�ng and quizzing one another on class material, they would qualify as a group. If the bus riders are simply standing together as they wait for
the bus, they are unlikely to qualify.

We can also differen�ate various types of groups. Rela�ves or friends—that is, groups
of individuals who are related to one another or enjoy one another’s company—are
in�macy groups. In�macy groups help fulfill one’s need for affilia�on. Groups that
engage in tasks together, like juries or work groups, are task groups. Achievement
needs are met by par�cipa�on in task groups. Social categoriza�on, like being a
woman or a Japanese American, can be the basis of a group and provide us with a
sense of iden�ty. Groups might also be described by loose associa�ons, like those
who like hiphop music or football (Johnson et al., 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman,
2001). When people think about each of these types of groups, they think about
them differently. In�macy groups are assumed to be small and long-lived, involve a lot
of interac�on, and be rela�vely impermeable to outsiders. Social categories, on the
other hand, are likely to be large and involve less interac�on, but, like in�macy
groups, be long-lived and rela�vely closed to outsiders. Because task groups work
together on tasks, we see them as having common goals and interac�ng to meet
those goals, but they are less likely to be of long dura�on. Loose associa�ons are
likely to be short-lived and open to outsiders, with li�le interac�on (Lickel et al.,
2000).

Social Facilita�on

When people are together and interac�ng with one another, they may act differently than if they are alone. In the 1890s, Norman Triple� no�ced that bicycle
riders clocked different �mes depending on whether they were bicycling alone or with others. He saw that when bicyclists competed against the clock and there
were no other bicyclists cycling with them, they went slower than when other bicyclists were there. Triple� began by looking at the records of cyclists, but
discovered that a large number of other variables, extraneous variables, might affect the findings. For example, when bicyclists race together they dra� one
another, allowing the group to go at a faster pace than an individual might be able to achieve. To focus in on the impact of the group and to control extraneous
variables, Triple� looked at the behavior of 40 children. He asked these children to wind up a modified fishing reel. Some�mes the children were alone and
some�mes other children were present, winding up their own fishing reels. On average the children wound most quickly when other people were there. Triple�’s
study is considered by many to be one of the first studies in social psychology.

Later researchers found results similar to Triple�’s. Par�cipants performed be�er when others were present. For example, when people engaged in tasks like
doing easy mul�plica�on problems or crossing out all the vowels in a wri�en passage, they did be�er when others were present (Allport, 1920; 1924). But these
findings were not consistent; some researchers found that the presence of others caused problems. In one study par�cipants did worse on a memory task when
others were present than when they performed the task alone (Pessin, 1933). This le� researchers ques�oning what determined whether the presence of others
actually helped performance or hindered it.

An explana�on for this difference was provided by Robert Zajonc (“Zajonc” rhymes
with “science”). He proposed that the presence of others increases arousal.
Increased arousal, he argued, increases the dominant response tendency, which is
related to the nature of the task. For simple, easy, or well-learned tasks our most
likely (dominant) ac�on (response tendency) is to do the task well. For difficult,
new, or complex tasks, our most likely ac�on is to do the task poorly. If the
presence of others increases our arousal, and arousal increases our dominant
response tendency, then we should do simple or easy tasks par�cularly well in the
presence of others. On the other hand, if the presence of others increases our
arousal and arousal increases our dominant response tendency, then we should do
difficult or new tasks poorly (see Figure 9.1). If you were a star basketball player in

high school and shoo�ng a free throw is a well-prac�ced response, you should be more likely to make the basket in a packed gym because your increased

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triplett/index.htm

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 4/18

arousal due to the audience would drive your dominant response of free-throw shoo�ng behaviors. Alterna�vely, if you have played basketball rarely and making
a basket is a rela�vely new and difficult task for you, an empty gym would provide you with the best chance to make that basket because your arousal would be
lower.

Figure 9.1: Social facilita�on

The presence of others can affect a person’s task performance.
Photo credits: Hemera/Thinkstock;

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

When the presence of others affects task performance, social facilita�on has occurred. Evidence of this can also be found in animal as well as human behavior.
Zajonc and colleagues set up an experiment using cockroaches (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). They created both complicated and simple mazes for the
cockroaches, and provided �ny Plexiglas audience boxes for observer cockroaches. When other cockroaches were in the audience boxes, the cockroach in the
maze completed the simple maze faster but completed the complicated maze more slowly. Similar effects have been found with rats and chickens (Tolman, 1967;
Wheeler & Davis, 1967; Zentall & Levine, 1972). People show social facilita�on just like these insects and animals. Good pool players play be�er when watched,
but poor players tend to do worse with an audience (Michaels, Bloommel, Brocato, Linkous, & Rowe, 1982).

Zajonc (1980) argued that social facilita�on could occur simply because others are there, what he called mere presence, not because of other factors. Other
researchers suggested that the presence of others creates distrac�on or concern about being evaluated and it is this distrac�on or concern that is the true cause
of the social facilita�on effects (Co�rell, 1972). There is some support for these alternate explana�ons. In one study par�cipants completed a task in a room
where another person was present. The other person either quietly observed or was blindfolded, presumably because the person was wai�ng for a study of
vision to begin soon and needed to have his or her eyes adapt to darkness. If social facilita�on occurs simply because of the presence of others, there should be
no difference in how well the par�cipant completes the task because in both condi�ons the “mere presence” of another exists. This study, however, showed no
social facilita�on effects when the other person was blindfolded (Co�rell, Wack, Sekerak, & Ri�le, 1968). Although this study suggests that social facilita�on
requires more than the mere presence of others, later studies showed that mere presence is enough; the effect of apprehension about evalua�on remains a
ques�on (Platania & Moran, 2001).

Some researchers have ques�oned whether arousal is the mechanism behind social facilita�on (Aiello & Douthi�, 2001). More recent ideas have proposed
cogni�veneuropsychological mechanisms—the presence of others seems to put demands on the frontal lobes of the brain and the cogni�ve system that manages
the other systems (execu�ve system), diminishing the capacity to process new or difficult tasks (Wagstaff et al., 2008). The frontal lobes of the brain are
par�cularly important for planning for the future, a�en�on in the present, and ini�a�on of ac�ons, so such an explana�on makes logical sense.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Of the types of groups discussed, which is most likely to be small, have a long life, and largely be closed to outsiders?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

In�macy groups are o�en small, have longevity, and are not very open to new members.

When learning how to perform tricks with a yo-yo for the first �me would you be be�er off with an audience or without?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to research on social facilita�on,when learning to do something new or doing a difficult task, people do be�er when others are
not present, so you would likely do be�er without an audience.

How are the frontal lobes of the brain involved in the performance issues found with social facilita�on?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

The frontal lobes of the brain are important for our engagement in new or difficult tasks, and the presence of others also puts demands
on our frontal lobes.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 5/18

Cultura Limited/SuperStock

Individuals tend to socially loaf when they do not expect their contribu�ons to
lead to something they value.

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

In studies involving social facilita�on, the individual performing the ac�on was simply in the presence of others, with the others either doing an ac�on at the
same �me or observing. What happens when the others are working with the individual doing the ac�on? When a group performs ac�ons together to
accomplish a goal, do the members of the group act differently than if they were engaging in that ac�on alone? At about the same �me as Triple�, Max
Ringelmann completed a set of early studies in social psychology to answer these ques�ons. Ringelmann, a French agricultural engineer, inves�gated the amount
of work individuals versus groups put into tasks. He suggested that two or more individuals working together did not accomplish as much as one individual alone
because of a difficulty in coordina�ng their efforts, termed coordina�on loss. Even though, he suspected there might be issues with the mo�va�on of the
members of a group, he le� it to later researchers to inves�gate this possibility (Kravitz & Mar�n, 1986).

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with
others is called social loafing. Social loafing occurs when individuals are working
together toward a shared goal and their efforts are pooled. When our work is
combined we tend to have less mo�va�on or show less effort. In one study of this
phenomenon, par�cipants were asked to pull a rope as hard as they could in a
simulated tug-of-war exercise (Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974). The
researchers measured how hard par�cipants pulled when they were pulling alone and
knew it, as opposed to when they thought they were pulling with others. To separate
coordina�on loss from issues involving mo�va�on, researchers had par�cipants do the
work alone, although they believed they were working with others. In the tug-of-war,
par�cipants completed the task blindfolded so they would not know they wethe only
one pulling. When par�cipants thought a number of other people were pulling, they
pulled with less force than if they thought the task was theirs alone.

If your efforts toward a group goal, like a class project, were pooled, but you knew
that each person’s piece could be clearly iden�fied, would you engage in social
loafing? One key factor in social loafing is the iden�fiability of individual effort. When
one’s work is pooled with others but one’s effort can be iden�fied individually, social
loafing declines or disappears. To determine if iden�fiability was important, research
par�cipants were asked to yell as loud as they could under three condi�ons: when

they were yelling alone and knew they were alone, when they thought they were yelling with one other person, and when they thought they were yelling with
five other people (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). The par�cipants had headphones and blindfolds on so they could not actually see or hear what others
were doing. The researchers found that when people thought they were yelling with one other person, they produced 69% as much sound as when they were
yelling alone. When par�cipants thought they were part of a group of six, they produced 63% as much sound. The researchers were able to eliminate this
reduc�on in sound produc�on by pu�ng individual microphones on par�cipants and telling them that when they were yelling with others their individual efforts
were iden�fiable.

When individuals do not expect their contribu�ons to ma�er, they are most likely to socially loaf. This could occur either because they perceive that their
contribu�ons are not going to be meaningful, or because they do not value the outcome of the group. In a tug-of-war, you might feel that your addi�onal effort
is not going to add much to the group, so you would pull less when the group is pulling with you. You might also feel that any praise you would get would be
quite small in the tug-of-war, because it would be divided amongst your group members. It follows, then, why individual iden�fiability is important. When your
contribu�on can be recognized, it becomes meaningful and the outcome more valued. When people engage in social loafing while in a group, they are called
free riders. Free riders do not put as much energy or work into a group task, gaining the rewards of the group’s outcome without inves�ng.

Social loafing is partly determined by the nature of the group and the types of task. We engage in less social loafing when we know the other people in our
group and we have a cohesive group. Perhaps knowing your friends are relying on you is different from having strangers rely on your contribu�ons. We loaf less
when the outcome depends on us in some way (e.g., the project will not be completed without our contribu�on) or the task is meaningful, important, or
enjoyable to us in some way (Hoigaard, Safvenbom, & Tonnessen, 2006; Karau & Hart, 1998; Karau & Williams, 1993; Shiue, Chiu, & Chang, 2010; Smith, Kerr,
Markus, & Stasson, 2001). If you know your group cannot finish the class project without you or you simply enjoy inves�ga�ng the topic or pu�ng together a
report, you may not loaf.

Social loafing varies depending on gender and culture. In general, men are more likely to socially loaf than women (Karau & Williams, 1993; Kugihara, 1999).
Women tend to show more equal inputs whether working alone or with a group. Individuals from more interdependent cultures are also less likely to socially
loaf than those from independent cultures (Gabrenya, Wang, & Latane, 1985; Klehe & Anderson, 2007). Within each culture, though, women are less likely to
loaf than men (Kugihara, 1999). In men and women, social loafing is less likely in people who are high in the personality trait of conscien�ousness (Ferrari &
Pychyl, 2012)

In some instances, groups can posi�vely affect performance by elici�ng mo�va�on to work harder (rather than engage in social loafing). Imagine you were
recruited to be part of a basketball team. Though you know the rules and have played before, your background in basketball is limited. When you are playing
with a team of great players, will you try as hard as you can or not as hard as you can? Most likely you would be mo�vated to work hard and would put a great
deal of effort into your play, hoping you will not let your team down. The tendency for individuals to work harder when they are less capable than the other
group members has been called the Köhler effect (Hertel, Kerr, & Messe, 2000; Kerr, Seok, Poulsen, Harris, & Messe, 2008). That increased mo�va�on may come

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 6/18

from comparing oneself to other group members and realizing that one’s performance is lacking. It could also come from a realiza�on that the group’s outcome
will only be as good as one’s weaker performance allows (Kerr, Messe, Park, & Sambolec, 2005; Kerr et al., 2008; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996).

The weakest players on a team gain the most from the Köhler effect. For example, on a swim team, the members with the slowest �mes in individual trials show
the greatest declines (and so, the greatest improvement) in their �mes when swimming with their team in the finals (Osborn, Irwin, Skogsberg, & Feltz, 2012).
The effect is also strongest for tasks that are conjunc�ve, where the en�re team can only do as well as its weakest member, rather than addi�ve, where the
weakest team member contributes less to team output than other members (Kerr & Hertel, 2011). Weaker group members tend to do be�er when a group is
con�nually changing rather than when it remains stable, perhaps because the weaker member con�nues to compare his or herself to others and does not simply
get used to being outperformed (Lount, Kerr, Messe, Seok, & Park, 2008).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What factors make social loafing less likely to occur?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Social loafing is less likely when people are individually iden�fiable, when members of a group are cohesive and know one another, when
members are women or from a more interdependent culture, and when members perceive the task as being meaningful, valuable, or
interes�ng.

A�er joining a pub quiz team you discover you are the weakest member of the team. What is likely to happen to your performance as a
result of this situa�on?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to the Köhler effect being the weakest member of a team provides people with the mo�va�on to try harder and work to live up
to the level of the other members of the team.

Deindividua�on

Have you ever a�ended a spor�ng event and found yourself yelling at the top of your lungs in a way you would not ever do if you were alone? If you have ever
been in a crowd and found yourself ac�ng in a way you would not act alone, you may have experienced deindividua�on. Deindividua�on is the tendency for
awareness of one’s individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs, o�en leading to engagement in behaviors with a group that one would not engage in alone.
Yelling insults, throwing objects onto the field at a spor�ng event, or loo�ng have all been behaviors par�cipated in when people feel deindividuated.

Researchers have proposed a variety of factors that could lead to deindividua�on. A reduced sense of individual responsibility for ac�on, high physiological
arousal, a lower awareness of personal values and beliefs, novel situa�ons, and a sense of anonymity have all been suggested as factors that increase
deindividua�on (Pren�ce-Dunn & Rogers, 1982; Zimbardo, 1969). Imagine the types of situa�ons where such things are true. When a mob is involved in loo�ng,
individuals know their own behavior is unlikely to be traced back to them. At a spor�ng event people are excited and may be distracted from awareness of their
inner thoughts by the ac�on on the court/field/rink. At a rock concert, low ligh�ng and wearing a band t-shirt like many others may allow one to feel
anonymous. Researchers further inves�gated the factors that may lead to deindividua�on using a technique called meta-analysis. Meta-analysis involves looking
at as many studies as possible on a par�cular topic and using a sta�s�cal technique to summarize those findings. When researchers did this for factors that
promote deindividua�on, they found that feelings of individual responsibility were most important (Postmes & Spears, 1998). This means that, while a novel
situa�on or high physiological arousal might have a small impact on tendency to engage in deindividua�on, feeling like one is not accountable for one’s ac�ons is
essen�al.

Deindividua�on o�en leads to nega�ve behavior, such as stealing and chea�ng (Postmes & Spears, 1998). For example, one Halloween, trick-or-trea�ng children
were told that they were supposed to take only one piece of candy. When the adult who had given the children these instruc�ons le�, researchers watched from
a hidden loca�on to see how many pieces of candy the children actually took. Children who were more anonymous and were in a group were more likely to
steal candy than those who were more iden�fiable or trick-or-trea�ng alone (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). In another study, Halloween masks that hid
children’s iden��es led to greater stealing of candy (Miller & Rowold, 1979).

Most examples you will find of deindividua�on evaluate behaviors such as yelling insults, stealing, or chea�ng, but this sort of behavior is not inevitable. In a
study by Johnson and Downing (1979) par�cipants were placed either in a situa�on to induce deindividua�on or in a situa�on where their ac�ons were clearly
iden�fied as their own. The par�cipants were asked to put on one of two costumes. For half of the par�cipants, a nurse’s uniform was provided, with the
explana�on that the costumes had been borrowed from the hospital for the study. The other half were asked to put on a robe that the researcher had
supposedly made himself. He said “I’m not much of a seamstress so these ended up looking kind of Ku Klux Klannish” (Johnson & Downing, 1979, p. 1534). The
idea was that the costumes might provide par�cipants with different cues toward behavior. The researchers believed the nurse’s uniform would provide people
with an environmental cue to be helpful, because we generally think of nurses as helpful. The robe could provide people with an environmental cue toward
nega�ve, aggressive behavior, because the KKK is and has been a violent organiza�on.

Par�cipants were asked to select an electrical shock level when another par�cipant responded incorrectly. They had the op�on of either raising the shock level,
up to a posi�ve 3, or reducing it, down to minus 3. By raising the shock level par�cipants were engaging in an ac�on that inflicted addi�onal harm on the other

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 7/18

par�cipant. By lowering the shock level they were helping the other par�cipant by making the shock less painful. The other par�cipant, who was allegedly being
shocked, did not really exist; no one received a shock in this study. The researchers wondered if deindividua�on could actually create helpful behavior, if the
environmental cues were right, or if anonymity always leads to nega�ve behavior. Table 9.1 shows the results of the study.

Table 9.1: Average shock level increase or decrease of par�cipants in different groups in Johnson and
Downing’s (1979) study of deindividua�on

Individuated Deindividuated

Cue for helpfulness – 0.35 – 1.47

Cue for aggression 0.76 0.95

From Johnson, R. D. & Downing, L. L. (1979). Deindividua�on and valence of cues: Effects on prosocial and an�social behavior. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 37(9), 1532-1538. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.37.9.1532 Copyright © 1979 by the American Psychological Associa�on.

As you can see from the table, deindividuated individuals with the aggressive cue showed more aggressive behavior: They increased the shock level. Those who
had something in their environment that suggested helpfulness tended to do what they could to reduce the pain someone else would experience, par�cularly
when they were deindividuated. Therefore, deindividua�on has the poten�al to create posi�ve behavior if the environment supports it.

Overall, deindividua�on increases the individual’s responsiveness to the situa�on or the group norms (Postmes & Spears, 1998). The person will take on the
norms of the group, the group iden�ty, and engage in behavior that goes along with those norms, good or bad. You can think of the impact individual iden�ty
and group iden�ty has on our behavior as working like a teeter-to�er. When one side of a teeter-to�er goes down, the other goes up; when our reliance on our
individual iden�ty goes down, the iden�ty of the group becomes more important. On the other hand, when we are very aware of our own individual iden�ty,
the group is less of a determinant for our behavior. This is the idea behind the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on effects. As people lose a sense of their
own iden�ty, they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Does deindividua�on always lead to nega�ve behavior?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Deindividua�on tends to lead to nega�ve behavior but, given posi�ve cues in the environment, it is possible for deindividua�on to lead to
prosocial behavior.

Because you are wearing your favorite team’s colors and are in the stands with hundreds of others in that color, you lose some sense of
your unique iden�ty. According to the social iden�ty model, what is likely to occur?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

According to the social iden�ty model, when you lose some of your own iden�ty you take on the iden�ty of the group.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 8/18

9.2

Group Cogni�on

In the previous sec�on we explored how groups affect the ac�ons of individuals. When in groups, people do not simply act differently, they also think differently.
Individuals in groups may think together to generate ideas or make decisions. The number and quality of ideas and the quality of the decisions may be
influenced by the group. Group discussions can also affect individual a�tudes.

Brainstorming

When groups think together, coming up with ideas as a group, it is called brainstorming. Brainstorming has been proposed as a way to develop a wide variety of
solu�ons or new and crea�ve ideas (Osborn, 1957). Common brainstorming prac�ces include trying to generate as many ideas as possible, with encouragement
to combine, improve, or expand on previous ideas. Brainstorming seems, to many, to generate more ideas than the same individuals would generate working
alone (Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993). In fact, overall, brainstorming actually provides fewer ideas per person than the same number of individuals
would provide on their own. This may be because of issues related to produc�on within a group. Individuals might interrupt one another or spend �me in social
conversa�ons unrelated to the task at hand (Diehl & Strobe, 1987). As groups get bigger and there are more people to interrupt or get off topic, groups show a
greater loss of produc�vity (Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). Brainstorming groups also tend to become fixated on par�cular realms of ideas, leading to lower
diversity of ideas (Kohn & Smith, 2009).

Some people are anxious in social situa�ons and may put a damper on group brainstorming interac�ons. Researchers have found that people who find
interac�ng with others a stressful and anxiety-provoking experience were not as helpful in brainstorming sessions because they were unwilling to par�cipate
orally. When highly anxious people were in a group with those who were not anxious, the low-anxiety individuals tended to show poorer performance as well
(Camacho & Paulus, 1995). Feeling anxious in interac�ons puts a damper on both those who feel the anxiety and those with whom they interact.

To maximize the poten�al of brainstorming, the standard technique of ge�ng all members of the group into a room and speaking their minds may not be most
effec�ve. Combining individual ideas and group brainstorming can be helpful. Studies show that the greatest number of ideas are developed when the group
brainstorms together, and then each person brainstorms alone (Brown & Paulus, 2002). The group may prompt individuals to think in direc�ons the individuals
would not have thought about on their own. Following a group session with an individual session allows individuals to come up with a number of ideas without
the loss of produc�vity due to interrup�ons by other members of the group, and without the social anxiety of the group context. Talking over other group
members can also be avoided by having members write down their ideas and read rather than speak the ideas of others, or by using a computer to type up
one’s ideas and sending them electronically to other group members (Brown & Paulus, 2002).

Group Polariza�on

Do group discussions change the way people think? When the opinions of individuals are surveyed before and a�er a group discussion of opinion-related topics,
opinions tend to shi� farther toward an extreme. If we think of opinions on a con�nuum, with strong agreement on one pole and strong disagreement on the
other pole, people tend to polarize. Polariza�on involves a shi� closer to whichever pole people were ini�ally leaning toward.

There are a variety of possible reasons why this occurs. During a group discussion, individuals might hear arguments in favor of their own posi�on that they had
not heard or thought of before (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). People might also realize that their opinion is more common than they thought (Myers & Lamm,
1976). Such a realiza�on may lead us to make our own a�tude more extreme as we strive to be dis�nc�ve from the group. Thus, group discussion may provide
us with more arguments bolstering an already held opinion and the mo�va�on to make that opinion stronger.

In general, people are more persuaded by their ingroups than by an outgroup, par�cularly when the ingroup and outgroup are in conflict, and are more
persuaded by unanimous groups than by groups with a dissenter (Kunovich & Deitelbaum, 2004; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Williams & Taormina, 1993). Greater
polariza�on occurs during deindividua�on (Lee, 2007). According to the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on, people take on the iden�ty of the group when
personal iden�ty is lowered, leading to greater iden�fica�on with the a�tudes of the group and therefore greater polariza�on.

Polariza�on can occur not only within group discussion, but also as a result of repeated exposure to an a�tude, or with dedicated �me spent thinking about the
a�tude (Brickman, Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972; Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992; Tesser, 1978). Part of the effect of polariza�on may, therefore, come not
because of the group but because the interac�on allows individuals to state their own opinion and �me to think about their a�tude (Van Boven, Judd, &
Sherman, 2012). Polariza�on also occurs with juries. In general, individuals who ini�ally want to be lenient have a greater slant toward leniency a�er some jury
delibera�on. Those whose ini�al leaning is toward a severe punishment have an even more severe stance a�er discussion (Bray & Noble, 1978). When juries
deliberate, the first vote o�en predicts the outcome of the delibera�on, par�cularly when the ini�al vote favors acqui�al rather than convic�on (Kalven & Zeisel,
1966; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Do group members come up with more ideas collec�vely in a group brainstorming session or individually?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Combining the efforts of many individuals outside of a group usually leads to more ideas being generated than a group brainstorming
session.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0c… 9/18

Universal Images Group/SuperStock

In the Challenger space shu�le incident, the push to launch
overrode the warnings of concerned engineers.

A�er group discussion do people’s a�tudes tend to remain the same, become less extreme, or become more extreme?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Individual a�tudes tend to become more extreme a�er group discussion than they had been before, a phenomenon called group
polariza�on.

Groupthink

In 1961 a group of 1,600 U.S. funded and trained Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The mission was to lead a popular movement to overthrow Fidel
Castro and his communist regime. The mission failed en�rely, and the exiles were captured or killed. The world was outraged that the United States invaded a
sovereign country. Far from being overthrown, Castro remained in power for nearly 50 years, and only ceded power to his brother in 2008 because of ill health.

Groups are o�en involved in decision making. With the adage “two heads are be�er than one,”
many of us believe that a decision made with others is be�er than a decision made by an individual.
President Kennedy and a small group of advisors made the decision to move forward with the
invasion plan, hatched during the Eisenhower administra�on. Neither Kennedy nor his advisors
seemed to have understood the hazards of invading with such a small force. The tac�cs, the
numbers, the weapons, and even the intelligence from Cuba added up to a flawed plan doomed to
failure (Sidey, 2001). Despite the characteriza�on of Kennedy’s group of advisors as “the best and
brightest” (Halberstam, 1972), Kennedy later described their ac�ons as stupid (Sorensen, 1966).

The Bay of Pigs Invasion shows that groups can and do make bad decisions. Similarly, disastrous
decisions were made by various groups in the failure of the United States to prepare for the a�ack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the escala�on of the Viet Nam war, and even in the Challenger space
shu�le disaster. Many of these group decisions share common characteris�cs. Researcher Irving Janis
studied these types of group decisions, and developed a model to describe how groups could make
such poor choices (Janis, 1972; 1982). Janis’s model involves a process including the antecedents,
characteris�cs, and consequences of this type of group decision making. He named it groupthink, a
decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group
interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking, and leads to bad decision making.

According to this model, the antecedents are the condi�ons that must be in place for groupthink to
occur. The group needs to

be highly cohesive,

be insulated from other viewpoints,

have a direc�ve leader,

have poor procedures for searching out and evalua�ng alterna�ves, and

be under high stress or feel threatened.

No�ce that these condi�ons revolve around an insular, cohesive group that follows a leader with a certain plan. The group does not seek outside input, but looks
into itself for answers.

The antecedents lead to a group decision-making process with par�cular characteris�cs. These characteris�cs are the natural outgrowth of such an insular group,
where the group

feels invulnerable;

assumes the moral correctness of its viewpoint;

stereotypes outsiders, par�cularly opponents;

engages in self-censorship, not sharing concerns, doubts, or disagreements;

pressures dissenters to conform to group opinion;

has an illusion of unanimity; and

has members who act as mindguards—individuals who protect leaders from hearing a viewpoint contrary to their own.

When a group is showing characteris�cs of groupthink, that group supports its own viewpoint and dismisses or ignores those of others. Even those within the
group who disagree are silenced. Because of mindguards, the leader never hears about dissen�ng opinions. For example, had Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon appointed at least one person whose job it was to challenge proposed decisions, historical courses of ac�on may have been different.

The consequences of such a process can be devasta�ng, as the historic examples illustrate. The par�cular consequences of groupthink for the group are that the
group does not

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 10/18

fully consider its true objec�ves,

consider alterna�ves to the proposed course of ac�on,

fully examine risks of the proposed course of ac�on,

thoroughly search for informa�on, and

develop appropriate con�ngency plans.

Because the group does not consider alterna�ves, risks, or develop a con�ngency plan, when things go wrong the group is surprised and le� scrambling for
answers.

Though we would expect to find groupthink when the antecedents for groupthink are present, this does not always happen. The antecedents set the stage, but a
group might s�ll avoid groupthink. Not all antecedents are necessary for groupthink to occur. Cohesive groups that are insulated from other viewpoints and have
direc�ve leaders are the most vulnerable (Ahlfinger & Esser, 2001; McCauley, 1989). Since the Bay of Pigs and Janis’ work, these insulated cohesive groups have
con�nued to make poor decisions in circumstances, such as in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, the space shu�le Challenger accident, and a series of
decisions a group of NBC execu�ves made regarding Jay Leno and The Tonight Show (Moorhead, Ference, & Neck, 1991; Neck, 1996; Post, 2011).

Although a decision-making process characterized by groupthink does not use the best decision-making strategies, decisions made this way are not always
disastrous. It is possible for a groupthink decision to turn out well if the group happens to stumble on a good solu�on or gets lucky in the outcome of its ac�ons.
Groups making decisions without groupthink do not always make the best decisions either (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992). However, a decision
made when groupthink is in play is more likely to turn out badly than one made by a group not involved in groupthink.

Social Psychology in Depth: The Wisdom of Crowds

Want to know what movie will be big at the box office this weekend?

Want to know the answer to that tough ques�on on the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?

Want to know how many jelly beans are in the jar?

All these ques�ons are best answered by combining the answers of many rather than relying on the response of one person. The average
es�mate for the group is usually closer to the real number of jelly beans in a jar than any individual es�mate. The studio audience picks the right
answer 91% of the �me on Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? Friends give correct answers only 65% of the �me (Surowiecki, 2004).

Predic�on markets use the wisdom of the group to predict events. Within these markets, individuals use real or fake money to bet on the
likelihood of an event (though other types of predic�ons are also used, see Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) and their collec�ve wager is o�en quite
accurate. The Iowa Electronics Market (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/ (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/) ) correctly predicted Obama’s presiden�al
victory in 2008 with closer accuracy than any of the major polling companies (Rowe, 2010). This was not a fluke; such markets have been more
accurate than polls for a variety of poli�cal races (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, & Reitz, 2001).

According to James Surowieci, author of The Wisdom of Crowds, groups are helpful with three types of problems: cogni�ve, coordina�on, and
coopera�on. Cogni�ve problems are those that require judgment. If you poll 100 people about the month and year humans first set foot on the
moon, the group will get closer than almost all of the members of that group. This holds true for predic�on as well as facts. Want to know who
will be awarded an Oscar? Take a look at the Hollywood Stock Exchange (h�p://www.hsx.com/ (h�p://www.hsx.com/) ) to find out (Pennock,
Lawrence, Giles, & Nielsen, 2003).

Groups also show wisdom in their coordina�on. Walking down a sidewalk, you might find yourself dri�ing to the right side while the foot traffic
coming toward you inhabits the le�. Because of this coordinated ac�on, you rarely crash into another pedestrian. Finally, crowds show
coopera�on. At the beach, the group may collec�vely watch over one another’s possessions and the small children playing the waves, all without
talking about the task or knowing one another.

Not all crowds are wise. The key to good collec�ve decision making is independence (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Surowiecki, 2004). Each
member of a group needs to make an independent judgment for the collec�ve response to be accurate. Solomon Asch, who performed his
classic studies of conformity, would agree. In comments about Asch’s work, Levine (1999) wrote,

[T]he bo�om line is that, because people are involved in coopera�ve efforts to understand the world, they have a responsibility
both to assert their own viewpoint, which involves independence, and to pay a�en�on to others’ viewpoints, which can lead to
conformity. (p. 360)

Group Decision Making

Research on juries, as well as other groups, has revealed that a variety of factors can affect the process and the outcome of group decisions. Beyond the
decision-making defects of groupthink, groups that make decisions together are affected by the informa�on individuals bring to the table and whether or not

http://tippie.uiowa.edu/iem/

http://www.hsx.com/

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 11/18

Stock Connec�on/SuperStock

The U.S. Congress illustrates how group size and majority rules can affect decision
making.

they share that informa�on, the size of the group, and if the group is required to make unanimous decisions.

Unique Knowledge

When a group comes together, each member brings a unique perspec�ve. For example, if your work group was making a decision and you were the only one
who knew about a new product the rival company was developing, it would be useful to your group if you shared that informa�on. For many group decisions,
each member could help the group most by clearly and concisely sharing his or her unique knowledge. Yet o�en �mes group members focus on what all of them
know or hold in common, ignoring the unique, poten�ally useful, informa�on they possess as individuals (Stasser & Titus, 1985). For example, a commi�ee might
primarily discuss the aspects of a situa�on they all best understand. Commi�ee members who have other exper�se or knowledge that could help the group are
less likely to bring those up, at least ini�ally. Because they do not readily share unique informa�on, some groups fail to find a solu�on to the problem they face
(Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012).

Unique informa�on is more likely to come up later in a group discussion, sugges�ng that longer discussions are more likely to yield diverse informa�on (Fraidin,
2004; Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbo�, 1998). People also tend to bring up informa�on when they know it is their task to do so. By giving different members
of the group different tasks and asking them to report on those tasks, groups can amass a greater depth of informa�on (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996;
Stasser, 2000). Groups that are persuaded of the value of diverse opinions are also more likely to share diverse informa�on amongst themselves (Homan, van
Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007). When members of a group are in a good mood, they tend to broaden the focus of their informa�on search and share
more unique informa�on (Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008). Happy groups, therefore, are less likely to rely on shared informa�on to make decisions and are more
likely to use the unique knowledge that various members bring to the group.

Unanimous Versus Nonunanimous Decision Rules

Groups that are required to come to a unanimous decision act differently than those
who can quit delibera�on when a majority agrees. With majority rule, group members
who hold alterna�ve opinions can be outvoted. Tradi�onally, unanimous decisions
were required of juries. In research on juries, a nonunanimous verdict is associated
with taking less �me to reach a verdict (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Foss,
1981; Has�e, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Given that longer group delibera�on is
more likely to include discussion of informa�on unique to par�cular members, it is
likely that these nonunanimous juries are making decisions having not fully explored
the knowledge of all members. Nonunanimous juries are more likely to be able to
come to a decision because they do not need to convince those final few people to
agree with the majority (Nemeth, 1977; Padawer-Singer, Singer, & Singer, 1977).

Group Size and Diversity

Both small groups and large groups have their advantages. When groups get too big,
unanimous decisions can be virtually impossible (Romme, 2004). In general, smaller
groups tend to share more informa�on (Cruz, Boster, & Rodriguez, 1997; Waller, Hope,
Burrowes, & Morrison, 2011). Small groups are also more efficient, and members may
have more chance to par�cipate. However, larger groups offer more diversity of opinion and are more likely to include people with a diversity of backgrounds or
ideas (Cummings, Huber, & Arendt, 1974). For example, larger juries are more likely to contain members of ethnic and racial minori�es (Saks & Mar�, 1997).

How does diversity affect decision making? Overall, diverse groups tend to have less group cohesiveness and lower morale (Jackson, 1991; O’Reilly, Cadwell, &
Barne�, 1989). At �mes, diverse groups do not perform as well as less diverse groups (Ancona & Cadwell, 1992; Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, diverse
groups tend to do be�er with complex decisions, or decisions that require crea�ve thinking as opposed to decisions that require se�ling on one answer or
performing a simple task (Levine & Moreland, 1998). One important factor in this dis�nc�on is the ways individuals from different backgrounds share informa�on
and in their willingness to share. When diverse groups are encouraged to share diverse informa�on, they can make good decisions (Kooij-de Bode, van
Knippenberg, & van Ginkel, 2008). Going back to jury research, juries with minority members were found to spend more �me delibera�ng, discussed a wider
range of informa�on, and made fewer errors in their discussion of the case. This was not solely due to the contribu�ons of the minority members of the groups.
Majority members brought up more informa�on and made fewer errors in the diverse groups than similar members in homogeneous groups (Sommers, 2006).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What are some characteris�cs of groups that make them vulnerable to groupthink?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups that are cohesive, insulated from outside influences, and have direc�ve leaders are par�cularly vulnerable to groupthink.

What characteris�cs of group discussions make it more likely that group members will bring up informa�on they know uniquely?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 12/18

When groups meet for a longer �me, members are more likely to bring up unique informa�on. Groups in which individuals know it is their
task to bring their unique knowledge and value diverse opinions are also more likely to have unique informa�on brought out in discussion.

What are one posi�ve and one nega�ve about the requirement that a group reach a unanimous decision?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups required to come to unanimity tend to talk longer and listen to all members to a greater degree but they are also more likely to
encounter an inability to come to a final decision.

How is diversity within a group helpful to decision making?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups with diverse members spend more �me digging into complex ques�ons, discuss a wider range of informa�on, and make fewer
errors in their discussions.

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 13/18

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Ocean pollu�on is one example of a commons dilemma. What other examples can
you think of?

9.3

Social Dilemmas

A�er emptying a can of soda, what do you do with the can? Throwing it in the trash might be easiest. The trash bin is right there, and you are taking out the
trash soon anyway. But if you throw it in the trash, you know that the can will end up in a landfill. The recycling bin might be harder to get to and require a
special trip; however, recycling is be�er for the environment, saves energy and landfill space, and reduces pollu�on. Do you do what is best or easiest for you, at
least in the short term, or do what is best for the larger group? You are facing a social dilemma.

When individuals face decisions whose outcomes create a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the collec�ve (or group), they are
facing a social dilemma. For these dilemmas, what is best for the individual is not what is best for the group. The individual would be best served by being
selfish. But those individual behaviors are harmful to the collec�ve and may, in the end, come back to harm the individual.

Commons Dilemma

Imagine you live in a village with a common grazing field. Each person in your village could graze one cow on that common green space. As you evaluate the
space, you realize that adding one more cow would harm the field only a small amount. You need the milk to get you through the winter, so you add one or two
more cows. Your neighbor comes to the same conclusion, as do a number of other villagers. With the addi�on of many animals the common field becomes a
field of mud and no cows are able to graze. In situa�ons like these, the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource, but if
too many in the group take advantage of the resource, it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This phenomenon is called the commons
dilemma or tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).

Commons dilemmas are a part of a variety of social problems: overfishing, pollu�on,
overpopula�on, forest deple�on, and overuse of energy. For each of these scenarios,
what is best for the individual, at least in the short term, is to act in a self-interested
way. A fisherman needs to make a living, so making a large catch is important. If only
a few individuals took advantage of a collec�ve resource, the outcomes might not be
as good for the collec�ve but the resource would be sustained. If only a few
fishermen take large catches, there will s�ll be fish to reproduce and provide future
fishing opportuni�es. The tragedy occurs when large numbers act in a self-interested
way. This depletes the resource. For a commons dilemma, fairness means equal
outcomes for all (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Even if a fishing resource could sustain
some addi�onal catches by some fisherman, what we view as fair is for each
fisherman to have equal access or take an equal amount of fish from that resource.

O�en �mes decisions can be win-lose situa�ons. For example, if you buy the house
on the corner that I was looking at, you win and I lose because we cannot both have
the house. Many of the games we play, everything from Monopoly to Jeopardy, are
zero-sum games—games where the gains or losses of the one person are balanced
out by the gains or losses of another. So if I win $100 dollars, you lose $100 dollars.
Social dilemmas are of a different type. Social dilemmas like the commons dilemma are non-zero-sum games. Within a social dilemma, played as a game or lived
out in real life, the outcome does not need to sum to zero. If everyone cooperates, everyone can win, but if everyone competes, everyone will lose.

Resource Dilemma

With the tragedy of the commons, individuals have the op�on of gaining from a collec�vely owned resource that will naturally renew itself. A related social
dilemma is called the resource dilemma. With the resource dilemma, individuals contribute to a resource from which all may benefit. Public television and public
radio in the United States are funded, to a large extent, by those who watch or listen, but everyone with a radio or television within range has access to PBS and
public radio, regardless of their contribu�ons. The best individual strategy would be to not contribute and take advantage of the resource. Blood banks also
encounter a resource dilemma. We all hope that blood is available when we need it, but what is best for us as individuals is to avoid the �me and discomfort
associated with blood dona�on. The dilemma is that if no one were to contribute, the resource would not exist. For resource dilemmas, we view fairness in
terms of equity. Those who benefit most from a resource should contribute the most and those who benefit li�le can contribute li�le and be seen as being fair
in their contribu�ons (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).

Prisoner’s Dilemma

The commons dilemma and the resource dilemma involve groups of people, whereas the prisoner’s dilemma only involves two people. The prisoner’s dilemma is
a scenario that demonstrates that two individuals might not cooperate, even when it is in their collec�ve best interest to do so (Axelrod, 1984). To understand
how this dilemma works, imagine you are a thief. The police caught you and your partner engaging in a minor crime. The police take the two of you into
separate interroga�on rooms and offer you this deal: If you confess to a major crime they suspect you of and implicate your partner, you will go free and your
partner will spend 20 years in jail. The police tell you they are offering the same deal to your partner: If your partner confesses to the major crime, you will go
to jail for 20 years and your partner will go free. If you both confess to the major crime, you will both spend 5 years in jail. If neither one of you confesses to the
major crime, you will both be charged with the minor crime you were arrested for and spend a year in jail. (See Table 9.2.) What do you do?

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 14/18

Table 9.2: Prisoner’s dilemma matrix

Partner

Confess
(does not cooperate with you)

Do not confess
(cooperates with you)

You

Confess
(do not cooperate with partner)

Partner 5 years
You 5 years

Partner 20 years
You 0 years

Do not confess
(cooperate with partner)

Partner 0 years
You 20 years

Partner 1 year
You 1 year

It would be best for you if you confessed and your partner did not. Collec�vely, it would be best if the two of you cooperated and spent only a year in jail each.
If you both try to get the good deal, both of your sentences will be appreciably longer than if you had cooperated with one another.

When the prisoner’s dilemma is played by two players several �mes in a row, called the “iterated prisoner’s dilemma,” players can use a number of different
strategies. One strategy would be to always cooperate with one’s partner no ma�er what the partner did. If the partner always cooperates this is a good
strategy. By always coopera�ng the two of you are able to, collec�vely, get the best outcome. The drawback comes if the partner realizes you always cooperate
and is willing to take advantage of that. If so, you will get the worst outcome while your partner gets the best. Another strategy would be to always compete.
Such a strategy would avoid the danger that you will be taken advantage of and may get you the best outcome (0 years) if your partner cooperates. If your
partner is willing to cooperate consistently, compe��on prevents the best collec�ve outcome.

Another strategy for the prisoner’s dilemma game is the �t-for-tat strategy. With �t-for-tat you would use whichever strategy your partner did on the previous
turn. If your partner cooperated on turn 2 you would cooperate on turn 3. If your partner competed on turn 3 you would compete on turn 4. If your partner
cooperated on every turn you would also cooperate on every turn. If your partner consistently competed you would also compete. A problem with the �t-for-tat-
strategy is that if both members are using it and compe��on becomes the norm, each side reciproca�ng with compe��on, you have a nega�ve outcome,
individually and collec�vely. Because �t-for-tat can result in this nega�ve cycle of responding, some have proposed a generous �t-for-tat strategy, where the
individual cooperates more than would be strictly done in response to a partner’s compe��on (Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Another strategy where you change depending on what your partner does is called the win-stay, lose-shi� strategy. With this strategy, you would con�nue with
whatever strategy is providing you with the best outcome. If coopera�ng is ge�ng you the best outcome, you would con�nue to use it un�l it starts to be a
problem, then you shi� to compe��on (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). Other strategies exist, but overall, the generous �t-for-tat and win-stay, lose-shi� strategies
have consistently had the best outcomes (Axlerod, 1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What is the difference between a commons dilemma and a resource dilemma?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

A commons dilemma occurs when collec�vely owned resources are destroyed because everyone takes more than their fair share; whereas,
a resource dilemma occurs when everyone must contribute for the resource to exist. One relies on the group’s good stewardship of a pre-
exis�ng resource to con�nue, the other relies on the group’s collec�ve generosity for the resource to exist.

How is a zero-sum game different from a non-zero-sum game?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

With a zero-sum game one person wins in propor�on to what the other person loses, so the total sums to zero. With a non-zero-sum
game it is possible for all par�es to win or for all par�es to lose.

If you were to play the prisoner’s dilemma game what would be the danger of coopera�ng with your partner?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Coopera�ng with your partner is a good idea if your partner cooperates with you, but if your partner competes you will end up with a
much worse outcome than if you had also competed.

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Pi�ng self-interest against collec�ve interest, social dilemmas are difficult to solve. There are some factors, however, that make coopera�on more likely. One
factor that increases coopera�on most of the �me is communica�on (van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986). Individuals playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game or engaging in a laboratory simula�on of the tragedy of the commons are more likely to cooperate with one another if they can communicate
with one another. There is some evidence that communica�on does not even need to take place for coopera�on to be increased. When people simply thought
about the kinds of things that might be said concerning a social dilemma during a group discussion, they showed more coopera�on than without the imagined
discussion (Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2012).

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 15/18

Coopera�ve behavior is more likely when payoffs make coopera�on more a�rac�ve, either through punishment for selfish behavior or through rewards for
coopera�ve behavior (Dawes, 1980; Shaw, 1976; van de Kragt et al., 1986). Changing payoffs to punish self-interested behavior or reward coopera�on may
involve oversight by a government or other organiza�on. For example, most states issue a limited number of hun�ng and fishing licenses to make certain
overhun�ng and overfishing do not occur. The problem with oversight is that it can cost resources to implement, police, and maintain; socie�es need to be sure
such oversight does not cost more resources than it saves. Even when authori�es impose regula�ons in service of the common good, if the people do not trust
the authority or feel like the authority is not listening to their concerns, they are unlikely to follow the regula�on (Van Vugt, 2009).

Social dilemmas con�nue because we do not see the effect our behavior is having on the collec�ve, or do not know the people our behavior would impact. In a
tragedy of the commons, if people see that the common resource is likely to soon be depleted, they will typically diminish their use of that resource (Messick et
al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Ru�e, & Wilke, 1984). If fishermen were able to see how many fish were in the sea, they might reduce consump�on of fish when
supplies were low. Accurate informa�on shared with all of the stakeholders is important for encouraging coopera�on (Van Vugt, 2009). In addi�on, if we know
the people that may be affected by our self-interested behavior, we are less likely to compete. Therefore, we tend to find more coopera�on in social dilemmas
that involve smaller groups (Seijts & Latham, 2000). We might iden�fy with the group more when the group is small, which is important for our coopera�on (Van
Vugt, 2009); we are more likely to cooperate with friends than with strangers (Majolo et al., 2006).

If people are unable to engage in a behavior for reasons beyond their control, they may be unlikely to engage in coopera�ve behaviors. If one’s recycling is only
sporadically picked up or if the transporta�on system keeps changing the bus route, one may cease to recycle or take public transporta�on (Brucks & Van Lange,
2008). Difficulty in ac�ng posi�vely in an earlier situa�on can lead to less coopera�on in a later situa�on, even when the barriers are gone. Encountering
problems seems to lower mo�va�on to act in posi�ve ways. However, when prosocial behavior is difficult social forces can be powerful in encouraging
coopera�ve behavior. Individuals might recycle, despite the trouble, if it becomes a norm. Knowing one’s friends and neighbors would be disappointed or
disapproving may mo�vate the individual to do what is best for the collec�ve and make a personal sacrifice (Dawes, 1980).

Is there any reason to do what is best for the collec�ve, despite the costs to oneself? Some people put greater value on minimizing differences in outcomes
between themselves and others and maximizing collec�ve outcomes. These individuals are described as having a high prosocial value orienta�on. Others put
greater value on maximizing their own outcomes, even at the expense of others. Those high in prosocial value orienta�on are more likely to engage in
coopera�ve behavior, such as carpooling or taking public transporta�on, par�cularly when their trust in others is high and others have also shown coopera�ve
behavior. (Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998).

Individuals who always cooperate may be taken advantage of, gaining li�le self-benefit for their ac�ons (Deutsch, Epstein, Canavan, & Gumpert, 1967; Solomon,
1960). However, their ac�ons as consistent contributors may influence their fellow group members toward be�er behavior. When their coopera�ve ac�ons tell
the rest of the group that coopera�on is valued and expected, it may spark reciprocal coopera�on and, in the end, lead the en�re group to be�er behavior
(Weber & Murnighan, 2008). Crea�ng a norm of coopera�on can be powerful. Even when social sanc�ons, such as expressions of disapproval from the group,
are removed, people tend to con�nue their prosocial behavior well beyond what they do when financial sanc�ons encouraged prosocial behavior (Nelissen &
Mulder, 2013). Our strongest mo�vators for coopera�on are other people.

Test Yourself

Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How might a business encourage more carpooling among its employees?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

If the company makes carpooling parking spots more available or allows carpoolers to come a li�le later to work, thus changing payoffs,
that may encourage coopera�on. Encouraging communica�on among employees, making carpooling the norm, and helping employees see
the effect of their driving alone may also have a posi�ve impact on behavior.

Conclusion

Although groups are made up of individual people, groups are qualita�vely different from individuals. We cannot predict group behavior by simply combining
individual behavior. Groups need to be studied as en��es in and of themselves. Groups affect how the individual acts and thinks. In some instances, the person
needs to sort out group interests from individual interests to determine behavior. Given the amount of �me most of us spend in groups and how the decision of
groups affect our lives, understanding groups is important.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 16/18

Chapter Summary

Group Ac�ons

A group is a collec�on of at least two individuals who are interac�ng in some way. A group can affect individual performance posi�vely or nega�vely depending
on the task. This is called social facilita�on. Being in a group can also affect a person’s produc�on. When individual inputs cannot be iden�fied, people tend to
engage in social loafing, that is, not pu�ng in full effort. The group can have posi�ve effects on individual performance, as proposed by the Köhler effect, when
an individual a�empts to rise to the level of performance common in their group. Groups may also induce individuals to act in ways they normally would not.
When individuals feel they cannot be iden�fied they tend to take on the iden�ty of the group and engage in ac�ons with the group.

Group Cogni�on

Although some believe that brainstorming as a group can provide the greatest number of ideas, in actuality, a combina�on of both individual and group
brainstorming is best for idea genera�on. When groups discuss a�tudes, the a�tudes of individual members tend to polarize. With polariza�on, individuals
become more extreme in their a�tudes a�er a discussion than they were before. When groups get together to make a decision, specific weaknesses in decision
making can be iden�fied amongst cohesive groups with strong direc�ve leaders. Group decision making in general is affected by the willingness of individual
members to share unique knowledge, by the decision rules imposed on the group, by the size of the group, and by the diversity within the group.

Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas pit individual self-interest against the interest of the group. In the commons dilemma, a common resource can sustain a minimal amount of
selfish behavior, but too much self-interest will destroy the resource. When individuals can contribute to a common resource that all, regardless of contribu�on,
benefit from, a resource dilemma might develop. It is advantageous to the individual to take advantage of the resource without contribu�ng, but the resource
disappears without some individual contribu�ons. The prisoner’s dilemma involves a situa�on where coopera�on yields the best collec�ve outcome, but
compe��on can provide the individual with a be�er outcome, provided that coopera�on is present on the other side. Mutual compe��on results in a poor
outcome for both. Social dilemmas can be tamed by allowing for communica�on among the par�es by: making coopera�on more a�rac�ve and self-interested
behavior more costly, making individuals aware of their effect on a common resource, and by using norms that encourage coopera�ve behavior.

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

1. If you were assigned to do a group project for a class, how might the research on social loafing help you encourage equal par�cipa�on in your group?

2. Have you experienced deindividua�on? What forces lead you to deindividua�on? Were the effects posi�ve or nega�ve?

3. When might group polariza�on have a posi�ve effect? When might group polariza�on have a nega�ve effect?

4. If you were concerned a group was likely to engage in groupthink, what might you do to combat that?

5. Social dilemmas are common in a variety of venues, from friendships to interna�onal rela�ons. Where have you seen social dilemmas at work? How might
they be sa�sfactorily resolved?

Key Terms

Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.

brainstorming
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A strategy for developing ideas as a group involving genera�ng as many ideas as possible, with encouragement to combine, improve, or expand on previous
ideas.

commons dilemma
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource; however, if too many in the group take
advantage of the resource it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This is also called the tragedy of the commons.

coordina�on loss
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The loss of produc�on that occurs in groups because of difficulty in coordina�ng efforts.

deindividua�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 17/18

The tendency for awareness of one’s individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs.

free rider
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

An individual who does not put as much �me or energy into a group task, relying on others to invest in the ac�vity.

group
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Two or more people who are interac�ng to form some type of coherent unit.

groupthink
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking and leads to
poor decision making.

in�macy group
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of rela�ves or friends, that is, people who are related to or who enjoy one another’s company. In�macy groups are viewed as small, long-lived,
having a great deal of interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

Köhler effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for individuals who are less capable than their group to work harder in a group context than they would if they were working alone.

loose associa�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of individuals who are connected by common a�tudes, experiences, or apprecia�ons (such as an affinity for dogs). Loose associa�ons are
viewed as large, poten�ally short-lived, having li�le interac�on, and being very open to outsiders.

mindguards
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Individuals who protect the leader of a group from hearing a viewpoint contrary to his or her own, resul�ng in the leader never hearing about dissen�ng
opinions.

non-

zero-sum games
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Games or situa�ons where the outcome is not a win-or-lose scenario but one where everyone could win or everyone could lose. The tragedy of the commons
and resource dilemmas are both non-zero-sum games.

polariza�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for people to move toward more extremes in their opinions a�er group discussion or more a�en�on to a topic. It involves a shi� closer to
whichever pole they were ini�ally leaning.

prisoner’s dilemma
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma involving two individuals in which if both individuals compete, both lose. If both cooperate, they have the best collec�ve outcome. The best
individual outcome comes when one competes and the partner cooperates.

resource dilemma
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource without contribu�ng, but the collec�ve does
best if everyone contributes.

social categoriza�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group made up of individuals with similar characteris�cs (such as Army veterans). Social categoriza�on is characterized as large, long-lived, poten�ally having
li�le interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

social facilita�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 18/18

The tendency for the presence of others to increase the dominant response tendency. For an easy or well-learned task the dominant response tendency is to do
well. For a difficult or new task the dominant response tendency is to do poorly.

social iden�ty model
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A model for deindividua�on that proposes that as people lose their individual iden�ty they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

social loafing
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with others.

task group
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group that engages in a task together. Task groups are typically small and short-lived, and have a great deal of interac�on.

�t-for-tat strategy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner’s dilemma game that involves adop�ng the strategy used by one’s partner on the previous turn.

win-stay, lose-shi� strategy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner’s dilemma game that involves using whatever strategy is providing the best outcome. If coopera�on is providing the best outcome,
the individual stays with that and changes when that strategy is no longer helpful.

zero-sum games
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Games where the outcome must sum to zero. One individual or group will gain in propor�on to the amount another loses.

Turn in your highest-quality paper
Get a qualified writer to help you with

“ The Art and Science of Persuasion ”

Get high-quality paper

NEW! AI matching with writer

Still stressed with your coursework?

Get quality coursework help from an expert!

Order now