SUNY at Stony Brook Sutton v United Airlines Inc Case Study

case brief: (See attached document for explanation of what each area encompasses for case brief) Must be thorough/ no plagiarism

1 Citation

2 Facts

3 Issue

4 Decision

5 Reason

Case: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. case. – See attached

Cite as: ____ U. S. ____ (1999)
1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 97–1943
_________________
KAREN SUTTON AND KIMBERLY HINTON,
PETITIONERS v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[June 22, 1999]
JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or
Act), 104 Stat. 328, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq., prohibits
certain employers from discriminating against individuals
on the basis of their disabilities. See §12112(a). Petitioners challenge the dismissal of their ADA action for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We
conclude that the complaint was properly dismissed. In
reaching that result, we hold that the determination of
whether an individual is disabled should be made with
reference to measures that mitigate the individual’s impairment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and
contact lenses. In addition, we hold that petitioners failed
to allege properly that respondent “regarded” them as
having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
I
Petitioners’ amended complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, we accept
the allegations contained in their complaint as true for
purposes of this case. See United States v. Gaubert, 499
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
U. S. 315, 327 (1991).
Petitioners are twin sisters, both of whom have severe
myopia. Each petitioner’s uncorrected visual acuity is
20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in
her left eye, but “[w]ith the use of corrective lenses, each
. . . has vision that is 20/20 or better.” App. 23. Consequently, without corrective lenses, each “effectively cannot
see to conduct numerous activities such as driving a vehicle, watching television or shopping in public stores,” id.,
at 24, but with corrective measures, such as glasses or
contact lenses, both “function identically to individuals
without a similar impairment,” ibid.
In 1992, petitioners applied to respondent for employment as commercial airline pilots. They met respondent’s
basic age, education, experience, and FAA certification
qualifications. After submitting their applications for
employment, both petitioners were invited by respondent
to an interview and to flight simulator tests. Both were
told during their interviews, however, that a mistake had
been made in inviting them to interview because petitioners did not meet respondent’s minimum vision requirement, which was uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or
better. Due to their failure to meet this requirement,
petitioners’ interviews were terminated, and neither was
offered a pilot position.
In light of respondent’s proffered reason for rejecting
them, petitioners filed a charge of disability discrimination
under the ADA with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). After receiving a right to sue letter,
petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, alleging that respondent had
discriminated against them “on the basis of their disability, or because [respondent] regarded [petitioners] as
having a disability” in violation of the ADA. App. 26.
Specifically, petitioners alleged that due to their severe
myopia they actually have a substantially limiting im-
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Opinion of the Court
pairment or are regarded as having such an impairment,
see id., at 23–26, and are thus disabled under the Act.
The District Court dismissed petitioners’ complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
See Civ. A. No. 96–5–121 (Aug. 28, 1996), App. to Pet. for
Cert. A–27. Because petitioners could fully correct their
visual impairments, the court held that they were not
actually substantially limited in any major life activity
and thus had not stated a claim that they were disabled
within the meaning of the ADA. Id., at A–32 to A–36.
The court also determined that petitioners had not made
allegations sufficient to support their claim that they were
“regarded” by the respondent as having an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity. Id., at A–36
to A–37. The court observed that “[t]he statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates . . . that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her
ability to work by finding the employee’s impairment to
foreclose generally the type of employment involved.”
Id., at A36 to A37. But petitioners had alleged only that
respondent regarded them as unable to satisfy the requirements of a particular job, global airline pilot. Consequently, the court held that petitioners had not stated a
claim that they were regarded as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working. Employing similar logic,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s judgment. 130 F. 3d 893 (1997).
The Tenth Circuit’s decision is in tension with the decisions of other Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New
York State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156 F. 3d 321, 329 (CA2
1998) (holding self-accommodations cannot be considered
when determining a disability), cert. pending, No. 98–
1285; Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F. 3d 626, 629–
630 (CA7 1998) (holding disabilities should be determined
without reference to mitigating measures); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F. 3d 933, 937–938
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
(CA3 1997) (same); Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
136 F. 3d 854, 859–866 (CA1 1998) (same); see also Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F. 3d 464,
470–471 (CA5 1998) (holding that only some impairments
should be evaluated in their uncorrected state), cert.
pending, No. 98–1365. We granted certiorari, 525 U. S.
___ (1999), and now affirm.
II
The ADA prohibits discrimination by covered entities,
including private employers, against qualified individuals
with a disability. Specifically, it provides that no covered
employer “shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U. S. C. §12112(a); see also
§12111(2) (“The term ‘covered entity’means an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labormanagement committee”). A “qualified individual with a
disability” is identified as “an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires.” §12111(8). In turn,
a “disability” is defined as:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual;
“(B) a record of such an impairment; or
“(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” §12102(2).
Accordingly, to fall within this definition one must have an
actual disability (subsection (A)), have a record of a disability (subsection (B)), or be regarded as having one
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Opinion of the Court
(subsection (C)).
The parties agree that the authority to issue regulations
to implement the Act is split primarily among three Government agencies. According to the parties, the EEOC has
authority to issue regulations to carry out the employment
provisions in Title I of the ADA, §§12111–12117, pursuant
to §12116 (“Not later than 1 year after [the date of enactment of this Act], the Commission shall issue regulations
in an accessible format to carry out this subchapter in
accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5”). The
Attorney General is granted authority to issue regulations
with respect to Title II, subtitle A, §§12131–12134, which
relates to public services. See §12134 (“Not later than 1
year after [the date of enactment of this Act], the Attorney
General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible
format that implement this part”). Finally, the Secretary
of Transportation has authority to issue regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of Titles II and III.
See §12149(a) (“Not later than 1 year after [the date of
enactment of this Act], the Secretary of Transportation
shall issue regulations, in an accessible format, necessary
for carrying out this subpart (other than section 12143 of
this title)”); §12164 (substantially same); §12186(a)(1)
(substantially same); §12143(b) (“Not later than one year
after [the date of enactment of this Act], the Secretary
shall issue final regulations to carry out this section”). See
also §12204 (granting authority to the Architectural and
Transportation Barriers Compliance Board to issue minimum guidelines to supplement the existing Minimum
Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design).
Moreover, each of these agencies is authorized to offer
technical assistance regarding the provisions they administer. See §12206(c)(1) (“Each Federal agency that has
responsibility under paragraph (2) for implementing this
chapter
may
render
technical
assistance
to
individuals and institutions that have rights or duties
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
under the respective subchapter or subchapters of this
chapter for which such agency has responsibility”).
No agency, however, has been given authority to issue
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, see §§12101–12102, which fall outside
Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated
authority to interpret the term “disability.” §12102(2).
JUSTICE BREYER’S contrary, imaginative interpretation of
the Act’s delegation provisions, see post, at 1–2 (dissenting
opinion), is belied by the terms and structure of the ADA.
The EEOC has, nonetheless, issued regulations to provide
additional guidance regarding the proper interpretation of
this term. After restating the definition of disability given
in the statute, see 29 CFR §1630.2(g) (1998), the EEOC
regulations define the three elements of disability: (1)
“physical or mental impairment,” (2) “substantially limits,” and (3) “major life activities.” See id., at §§1630.2(h)–
(j). Under the regulations, a “physical impairment” includes “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.”
§1630.2(h)(1). The term “substantially limits” means,
among other things, “[u]nable to perform a major life
activity that the average person in the general population
can perform;” or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.” §1630.2(j). Finally, “[m]ajor [l]ife
[a]ctivities means functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” §1630.2(i).
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Opinion of the Court
Because both parties accept these regulations as valid,
and determining their validity is not necessary to decide
this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference
they are due, if any.
The agencies have also issued interpretive guidelines to
aid in the implementation of their regulations. For instance, at the time that it promulgated the above regulations, the EEOC issued an “Interpretive Guidance,” which
provides that “[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be
made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices.” 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. §1630.2(j) (1998) (describing §1630.2(j)). The Department of Justice has issued
a similar guideline. See 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, §35.104
(“The question of whether a person has a disability should
be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modification or auxiliary
aids and services”); pt. 36, App. B, §36.104 (same). Although the parties dispute the persuasive force of these
interpretive guidelines, we have no need in this case to
decide what deference is due.
III
With this statutory and regulatory framework in mind,
we turn first to the question whether petitioners have
stated a claim under subsection (A) of the disability definition, that is, whether they have alleged that they possess a
physical impairment that substantially limits them in one
or more major life activities. See 42 U. S. C. §12102(2)(A).
Because petitioners allege that with corrective measures
their vision “is 20/20 or better,” see App. 23, they are not
actually disabled within the meaning of the Act if the
“disability” determination is made with reference to these
measures. Consequently, with respect to subsection (A) of
the disability definition, our decision turns on whether
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
disability is to be determined with or without reference to
corrective measures.
Petitioners maintain that whether an impairment is
substantially limiting should be determined without regard to corrective measures. They argue that, because the
ADA does not directly address the question at hand, the
Court should defer to the agency interpretations of the
statute, which are embodied in the agency guidelines
issued by the EEOC and the Department of Justice.
These guidelines specifically direct that the determination
of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity be made without regard to mitigating
measures. See 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. §1630.2(j); 28 CFR
pt. 35, App. A, §35.104 (1998); 28 CFR pt. 36, App. B,
§36.104.
Respondent, in turn, maintains that an impairment
does not substantially limit a major life activity if it is
corrected. It argues that the Court should not defer to the
agency guidelines cited by petitioners because the guidelines conflict with the plain meaning of the ADA. The
phrase “substantially limits one or more major life activities,” it explains, requires that the substantial limitations
actually and presently exist. Moreover, respondent argues, disregarding mitigating measures taken by an individual defies the statutory command to examine the effect
of the impairment on the major life activities “of such
individual.” And even if the statute is ambiguous, respondent claims, the guidelines’ directive to ignore mitigating
measures is not reasonable, and thus this Court should
not defer to it.
We conclude that respondent is correct that the approach adopted by the agency guidelines— that persons
are to be evaluated in their hypothetical uncorrected
state— is an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.
Looking at the Act as a whole, it is apparent that if a
person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a
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Opinion of the Court
physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures— both positive and negative— must be taken into
account when judging whether that person is “substantially limited” in a major life activity and thus “disabled”
under the Act. The dissent relies on the legislative history
of the ADA for the contrary proposition that individuals
should be examined in their uncorrected state. See post,
at 10–18 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Because we decide that,
by its terms, the ADA cannot be read in this manner, we
have no reason to consider the ADA’s legislative history.
Three separate provisions of the ADA, read in concert,
lead us to this conclusion. The Act defines a “disability” as
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities” of an individual.
§12102(2)(A) (emphasis added). Because the phrase “substantially limits” appears in the Act in the present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read as
requiring that a person be presently— not potentially or
hypothetically— substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A “disability” exists only where an
impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity, not
where it “might,” “could,” or “would” be substantially
limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. A person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by
medication or other measures does not have an impairment that presently “substantially limits” a major life
activity. To be sure, a person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has
an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does
not “substantially limi[t]” a major life activity.
The definition of disability also requires that disabilities
be evaluated “with respect to an individual” and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially
limits the “major life activities of such individual.”
§12102(2). Thus, whether a person has a disability under
the ADA is an individualized inquiry. See Bragdon v.
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, ____ (1998) (declining to consider
whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the
ADA); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. §1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment
the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment
on the life of the individual”).
The agency guidelines’directive that persons be judged
in their uncorrected or unmitigated state runs directly
counter to the individualized inquiry mandated by the
ADA. The agency approach would often require courts
and employers to speculate about a person’s condition and
would, in many cases, force them to make a disability
determination based on general information about how an
uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather
than on the individual’s actual condition. For instance,
under this view, courts would almost certainly find all
diabetics to be disabled, because if they failed to monitor
their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they
would almost certainly be substantially limited in one or
more major life activities. A diabetic whose illness does
not impair his or her daily activities would therefore be
considered disabled simply because he or she has diabetes.
Thus, the guidelines approach would create a system in
which persons often must be treated as members of a
group of people with similar impairments, rather than as
individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and the
spirit of the ADA.
The guidelines approach could also lead to the anomalous result that in determining whether an individual is
disabled, courts and employers could not consider any
negative side effects suffered by an individual resulting
from the use of mitigating measures, even when those side
effects are very severe. See, e.g., Johnson, Antipsychotics:
Pros and Cons of Antipsychotics, RN (Aug. 1997) (noting
that antipsychotic drugs can cause a variety of adverse
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Opinion of the Court
effects, including neuroleptic malignant syndrome and
painful seizures); Liver Risk Warning Added to Parkinson’s Drug, FDA Consumer (Mar. 1, 1999) (warning that a
drug for treating Parkinson’s disease can cause liver damage); Curry & Kulling, Newer Antiepileptic Drugs, American Family Physician (Feb. 1, 1998) (cataloging serious
negative side effects of new antiepileptic drugs). This
result is also inconsistent with the individualized approach of the ADA.
Finally, and critically, findings enacted as part of the
ADA require the conclusion that Congress did not intend
to bring under the statute’s protection all those whose
uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities. Congress
found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.”
§12101(a)(1). This figure is inconsistent with the definition of disability pressed by petitioners.
Although the exact source of the 43 million figure is not
clear, the corresponding finding in the 1988 precursor to
the ADA was drawn directly from a report prepared by the
National Council on Disability. See Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. Civ.
Rights–Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 413, 434, n. 117 (1991) (reporting,
in an article authored by the drafter of the original ADA
bill introduced in Congress in 1988, that the report was
the source for a figure of 36 million disabled persons
quoted in the versions of the bill introduced in 1988). That
report detailed the difficulty of estimating the number of
disabled persons due to varying operational definitions of
disability. National Council on Disability, Toward Independence 10 (1986). It explained that the estimates of the
number of disabled Americans ranged from an overinclusive 160 million under a “health conditions approach,”
which looks at all conditions that impair the health or
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
normal functional abilities of an individual, to an underinclusive 22.7 million under a “work disability approach,”
which focuses on individuals’reported ability to work. Id.,
at 10–11. It noted that “a figure of 35 or 36 million [was]
the most commonly quoted estimate.” Id., at 10. The 36
million number included in the 1988 bill’s findings thus
clearly reflects an approach to defining disabilities that is
closer to the work disabilities approach than the health
conditions approach.
This background also provides some clues to the likely
source of the figure in the findings of the 1990 Act.
Roughly two years after issuing its 1986 report, the National Council on Disability issued an updated report. See
On the Threshold of Independence (1988). This 1988
report settled on a more concrete definition of disability.
It stated that 37.3 million individuals have “difficulty
performing one or more basic physical activities,” including “seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs,
lifting or carrying, getting around outside, getting around
inside, and getting into or out of bed.” Id., at 19. The
study from which it drew this data took an explicitly
functional approach to evaluating disabilities. See U. S.
Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Disability, Functional Limitation, and Health Insurance Coverage:
1984/85, p. 2 (1986). It measured 37.3 million persons
with a “functional limitation” on performing certain basic
activities when using, as the questionnaire put it, “special
aids,” such as glasses or hearing aids, if the person usually
used such aids. Id., at 1, 47. The number of disabled
provided by the study and adopted in the 1988 report,
however, includes only noninstitutionalized persons with
physical disabilities who are over age 15. The 5.7 million
gap between the 43 million figure in the ADA’s findings
and the 37.3 million figure in the report can thus probably
be explained as an effort to include in the findings those
who were excluded from the National Council figure. See,
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Opinion of the Court
e.g., National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation
Research, Data on Disability from the National Health
Interview Survey 1983–1985, pp. 61–62 (1988) (finding
approximately 943,000 noninstitutionalized persons with
an activity limitation due to mental illness; 947,000 noninstitutionalized persons with an activity limitation due to
mental retardation; 1,900,000 noninstitutionalized persons under 18 with an activity limitation); U. S. Dept. of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 106 (1989) (Table 168) (finding
1,553,000 resident patients in nursing and related care
facilities (excluding hospital-based nursing homes) in
1986).
Regardless of its exact source, however, the 43 million
figure reflects an understanding that those whose impairments are largely corrected by medication or other
devices are not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.
The estimate is consistent with the numbers produced by
studies performed during this same time period that took
a similar functional approach to determining disability.
For instance, Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., drawing
on data from the National Center for Health Statistics,
issued an estimate of approximately 31.4 million civilian
noninstitutionalized persons with “chronic activity limitation status” in 1979. Digest of Data on Persons with
Disabilities 25 (1984). The 1989 Statistical Abstract
offered the same estimate based on the same data, as well
as an estimate of 32.7 million noninstitutionalized persons
with “activity limitation” in 1985. Statistical Abstract,
supra, at 115 (Table 184). In both cases, individuals with
“activity limitations” were those who, relative to their agesex group could not conduct “usual” activities: e.g., attending preschool, keeping house, or living independently.
See National Center for Health Statistics, U. S. Dept. of
Health and Human Services, Vital and Health Statistics,
Current Estimates from the National Health Interview
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Opinion of the Court
Survey, 1989, Series 10, pp. 7–8 (1990).
By contrast, nonfunctional approaches to defining disability produce significantly larger numbers. As noted
above, the 1986 National Council on Disability report
estimated that there were over 160 million disabled under
the “health conditions approach.” Toward Independence,
supra, at 10; see also Mathematica Policy Research, supra,
at 3 (arriving at similar estimate based on same Census
Bureau data). Indeed, the number of people with vision
impairments alone is 100 million. See National Advisory
Eye Council, U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
Vision Research— A National Plan: 1999-2003, p. 7 (1998)
(“[M]ore than 100 million people need corrective lenses to
see properly”). “It is estimated that more than 28 million
Americans have impaired hearing.” National Institutes of
Health, National Strategic Research Plan: Hearing and
Hearing Impairment v (1996). And there were approximately 50 million people with high blood pressure (hypertension). Tindall, Stalking a Silent Killer; Hypertension,
Business & Health 37 (August 1998) (“Some 50 million
Americans have high blood pressure”).
Because it is included in the ADA’s text, the finding that
43 million individuals are disabled gives content to the
ADA’s terms, specifically the term “disability.” Had Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number of
disabled persons in the findings. That it did not is evidence that the ADA’s coverage is restricted to only those
whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures.
The dissents suggest that viewing individuals in their
corrected state will exclude from the definition of
“disab[led]” those who use prosthetic limbs, see post, at 3–
4 (opinion of STEVENS, J.), post, at 1 (opinion of BREYER,
J.), or take medicine for epilepsy or high blood pressure,
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Opinion of the Court
see post, at 14, 16 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). This suggestion is incorrect. The use of a corrective device does not,
by itself, relieve one’s disability. Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwithstanding the use of a
corrective device, that individual is substantially limited
in a major life activity. For example, individuals who use
prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable
of functioning in society but still be disabled because of a
substantial limitation on their ability to walk or run. The
same may be true of individuals who take medicine to
lessen the symptoms of an impairment so that they can
function but nevertheless remain substantially limited.
Alternatively, one whose high blood pressure is “cured” by
medication may be regarded as disabled by a covered
entity, and thus disabled under subsection C of the definition. The use or nonuse of a corrective device does not
determine whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting.
Applying this reading of the Act to the case at hand, we
conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly resolved the
issue of disability in respondent’s favor. As noted above,
petitioners allege that with corrective measures, their
visual acuity is 20/20, App. 23, Amended Complaint ¶36,
and that they “function identically to individuals without
a similar impairment,” id., at 24, Amended Complaint
¶37e. In addition, petitioners concede that they “do not
argue that the use of corrective lenses in itself demonstrates a substantially limiting impairment.” Brief for
Petitioners 9, n. 11. Accordingly, because we decide that
disability under the Act is to be determined with reference
to corrective measures, we agree with the courts below
that petitioners have not stated a claim that they are
substantially limited in any major life activity.
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Opinion of the Court
IV
Our conclusion that petitioners have failed to state a
claim that they are actually disabled under subsection (A)
of the disability definition does not end our inquiry. Under subsection (C), individuals who are “regarded as”
having a disability are disabled within the meaning of the
ADA. See §12102(2)(C). Subsection (C) provides that
having a disability includes “being regarded as having,”
§12102(2)(C), “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual,” §12102(2)(A). There are two apparent
ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory
definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a
person has a physical impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered
entity entertain misperceptions about the individual— it
must believe either that one has a substantially limiting
impairment that one does not have or that one has a
substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. These misperceptions often
“resul[t] from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative
of . . . individual ability.” See 42 U. S. C. §12101(7). See
also School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 284
(1987) (“By amending the definition of ‘handicapped individual’ to include not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a
major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society’s
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease
are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment”); 29 CFR pt. 1630, App.
§1630.2(l) (explaining that the purpose of the regarded as
prong is to cover individuals “rejected from a job because
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Opinion of the Court
of the ‘myths, fears and stereotypes’ associated with
disabilities”).
There is no dispute that petitioners are physically impaired. Petitioners do not make the obvious argument
that they are regarded due to their impairments as substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. They
contend only that respondent mistakenly believes their
physical impairments substantially limit them in the
major life activity of working. To support this claim,
petitioners allege that respondent has a vision requirement, which is allegedly based on myth and stereotype.
Further, this requirement substantially limits their ability
to engage in the major life activity of working by precluding them from obtaining the job of global airline pilot,
which they argue is a “class of employment.” See App. 24–
26, Amended Complaint ¶38. In reply, respondent argues
that the position of global airline pilot is not a class of jobs
and therefore petitioners have not stated a claim that they
are regarded as substantially limited in the major life
activity of working.
Standing alone, the allegation that respondent has a
vision requirement in place does not establish a claim that
respondent regards petitioners as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working. See Post-Argument
Brief for Respondent 2–3 (advancing this argument); PostArgument Brief for the United States et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6 (“[U]nder the EEOC’s regulations, an employer
may make employment decisions based on physical characteristics”). By its terms, the ADA allows employers to
prefer some physical attributes over others and to establish physical criteria. An employer runs afoul of the ADA
when it makes an employment decision based on a physical or mental impairment, real or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life activity.
Accordingly, an employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
level of an impairment— such as one’s height, build, or
singing voice— are preferable to others, just as it is free to
decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting,
impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for
a job.
Considering the allegations of the amended complaint in
tandem, petitioners have not stated a claim that respondent regards their impairment as substantially limiting
their ability to work. The ADA does not define “substantially limits,” but “substantially” suggests “considerable”
or “specified to a large degree.” See Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining “substantially” as “in a substantial manner” and “substantial” as
“considerable in amount, value, or worth” and “being that
specified to a large degree or in the main”); see also
17 Oxford English Dictionary 66–67 (2d ed. 1989) (“substantial”: “[r]elating to or proceeding from the essence of
a thing; essential”; “of ample or considerable amount,
quantity or dimensions”).
The EEOC has codified
regulations interpreting the term “substantially limits” in
this manner, defining the term to mean “[u]nable to perform” or “[s]ignificantly restricted.”
See 29 CFR
§§1630.2(j)(1)(i),(ii) (1998)
When the major life activity under consideration is that
of working, the statutory phrase “substantially limits”
requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are
unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Reflecting this
requirement, the EEOC uses a specialized definition of the
term “substantially limits” when referring to the major life
activity of working:
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not consti-
Cite as: ____ U. S. ____ (1999)
19
Opinion of the Court
tute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.” §1630.2(j)(3)(i).
The EEOC further identifies several factors that courts
should consider when determining whether an individual
is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, including the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and “the number and types of
jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within the geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified.” §§1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B). To be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working,
then, one must be precluded from more than one type of
job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs
utilizing an individual’s skills (but perhaps not his or her
unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a
substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a
broad range of jobs.
Because the parties accept that the term “major life
activities” includes working, we do not determine the
validity of the cited regulations. We note, however, that
there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining “major
life activities” to include work, for it seems “to argue in a
circle to say that if one is excluded, for instance, by reason
of [an impairment, from working with others] . . . then
that exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you’re asking is, whether the exclusion itself is by
reason of handicap.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in School Bd. of
Nassau Co. v. Arline, O. T. 1986, No. 85–1277, p. 15 (argument of Solicitor General). Indeed, even the EEOC has
expressed reluctance to define “major life activities” to
include working and has suggested that working be
viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last
resort, only “[i]f an individual is not substantially limited
with respect to any other major life activity.” 29 CFR pt.
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SUTTON v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC.
Opinion of the Court
1630, App. §1630.2(j) (1998) (emphasis added) (“If an
individual is substantially limited in any other major life
activity, no determination should be made as to whether
the individual is substantially limited in working” (emphasis added)).
Assuming without deciding that working is a major life
activity and that the EEOC regulations interpreting the
term “substantially limits” are reasonable, petitioners
have failed to allege adequately that their poor eyesight is
regarded as an impairment that substantially limits them
in the major life activity of working. They allege only that
respondent regards their poor vision as precluding them
from holding positions as a “global airline pilot.” See App.
25–26, Amended Complaint ¶38f. Because the position of
global airline pilot is a single job, this allegation does not
support the claim that respondent regards petitioners as
having a substantially limiting impairment. See 29 CFR
§1630.2(j)(3)(i) (“The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working”). Indeed, there are a
number of other positions utilizing petitioners’skills, such
as regional pilot and pilot instructor to name a few, that
are available to them. Even under the EEOC’s Interpretative Guidance, to which petitioners ask us to defer, “an
individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but who can be a
commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier service,
would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working.” 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. §1630.2.
Petitioners also argue that if one were to assume that a
substantial number of airline carriers have similar vision
requirements, they would be substantially limited in the
major life activity of working. See Brief for Petitioners
44–45. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the
adoption of similar vision requirements by other carriers
would represent a substantial limitation on the major life
Cite as: ____ U. S. ____ (1999)
21
Opinion of the Court
activity of working, the argument is nevertheless flawed.
It is not enough to say that if the physical criteria of a
single employer were imputed to all similar employers one
would be regarded as substantially limited in the major
life activity of working only as a result of this imputation.
An otherwise valid job requirement, such as a height
requirement, does not become invalid simply because it
would limit a person’s employment opportunities in a
substantial way if it were adopted by a substantial number of employers. Because petitioners have not alleged,
and cannot demonstrate, that respondent’s vision requirement reflects a belief that petitioners’vision substantially limits them, we agree with the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming the dismissal of petitioners’ claim
that they are regarded as disabled.
For these reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.