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A terrorist threat has been made via phone against the water system. The caller stated that they would be releasing Tularemia into the water system in the next 4-6 hours. We are not certain of where this action may take place, but we must protect the citizens of our city. Your task is to identify what steps should be taken to counter this biological attack. I am looking for specific steps with regards to physical security, preparing for any impact and a communications process. Assume you are the mayor.
Do not spend words explaining the case and re-stating facts about the situation unless they are important to your explanation.
Water and terrorism
Peter H. Gleick
Pacific Institute, 654 13th Street, Oakland, California, USA. www.pacinst.org. Tel: 510 251 1600. Fax: 510 251 2203.
E-mail:pgleick@pacinst.org
Received 31 July 2006; accepted in revised form 14 August 2006
Abstract
The importance of freshwater and water infrastructure to human and ecosystem health and to the smooth
functioning of a commercial and industrial economy makes water and water systems targets for terrorism. The
chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real; indeed, there is a long history of such attacks. Water
infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be contaminated through the introduction of poison or disease-
causing agents. The damage is done by hurting people, rendering water unusable, or destroying purification and
supply infrastructure. More uncertain, however, is how significant such threats are today, compared with other
targets that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective such attacks would actually be. Analysis and
historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from attacking water systems are difficult to produce, although
there may be some significant exceptions. At the same time, the risk of societal disruptions, disarray, and even
overreaction on the part of governments and the public from any attack, may be high. This paper reviews the
history of past attacks on water systems and the most pressing vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water
systems. Suggestions of ways to reduce those risks are
also presented.
Keywords: Biological warfare; Chemical warfare; Distribution systems; Eco-terrorism; Environmental
terrorism; Water and terrorism; Water supply
Introduction
Water is a fundamental resource for human and economic welfare and modern society depends
on complex, interconnected water infrastructure to provide reliable safe water supplies and to remove
and treat wastewater. This infrastructure is vital for human welfare and economic development
and it is vulnerable to intentional disruption from war, intrastate violence and, of more recent
concern, terrorism.
doi: 10.2166/wp.2006.035
Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503
q IWA Publishing 2006
There is a long history of using water as a political or military target or tool, going back over 2,500
years (Gleick, 2004). Water resources and systems are attractive targets because there is no substitute for
water. Whether its lack is due to natural scarcity, a physical supply interruption or contamination, a
community of any size that lacks sufficient fresh water will suffer greatly. Furthermore, a community
does not have to lack water to suffer. Too much water at the wrong time can also lead to death and
great damage.
The chance that terrorists will strike at water systems is real but poorly understood by water managers
and the public. This paper reviews the history of past attacks on water systems and the most pressing
vulnerabilities and risks facing modern water systems. Suggestions for ways to reduce those risks are
also presented.
Water infrastructure can be targeted directly or water can be contaminated through the intentional
introduction of poison or disease-causing agents. The damage is done by hurting people, rendering water
unusable, or destroying purification and supply infrastructure. Some important water facilities, such as
dams, reservoirs and pipelines, are easily accessible to the public at various points and there are new
worries that computer control systems may be accessible to hacking. Many large dams are tourist
attractions and offer tours to the public, while many reservoirs are open to the public for recreational
boating and swimming. Pipelines are often exposed for long distances. Water and wastewater treatment
plants dot our urban and rural landscape.
What is less clear, however, is how significant such threats are today, compared with other targets
that may be subject to terrorist attack, or how effective such attacks would actually be. Analysis
and historical evidence suggest that massive casualties from attacking water systems are difficult to
produce, although there may be some significant exceptions. At the same time, the risk of societal
disruptions, disarray, and even overreaction on the part of governments and the public from any attack,
may be high.
As an example of the economic and human chaos even moderate disruption or contamination might
cause, an outbreak of Cryptosporidium in Milwaukee in 1993 killed over a hundred people, affected the
health of over 400,000 more (MacKenzie et al., 1994; Smith, 1994) and cost millions in lost wages and
productivity. That outbreak, completely unrelated to terrorism, gives some sense of the vulnerability of
modern water systems to similar undetected, intentionally caused, contamination events.
This article will not offer any new information for those hoping to harm water systems and all
information used here is derived from open sources and readily accessible materials. The purpose is to
identify where productive and protective efforts to reduce risks would be most useful on the part of water
managers and planners and to reduce unnecessary fear and worry. Proper and appropriate safeguards can
reduce the risks identified here significantly and reduce the consequences should an event occur.
The worry
The typical scenario for a terrorist attack on domestic water supplies involves putting a chemical or
biological agent into local water supplies or using conventional explosives to damage basic
infrastructure such as pipelines, dams and treatment plants. This is not as straightforward as it sounds.
The number of casualties that would result from such an attack depends on the system for water
treatment already in place, the type and dosage of poison ingested, individual resistance, the timing of an
attack and the speed and scope of discovery and response by local authorities.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503482
Most biological pathogens cannot survive in water and most chemicals require very large volumes
to contaminate a water system to any significant degree. Many pathogens and chemicals are
vulnerable to the kinds of water treatment used to make it potable for human use. Indeed, the whole
purpose of municipal water systems is to destroy biological pathogens and reduce the concentration of
harmful chemicals through chlorination, filtration, ultraviolet radiation, ozonation and many other
common treatment approaches. Many contaminants are also broken down over time by sunlight and
other natural processes. Most infrastructure has built-in redundancy that reduces vulnerability to
physical attacks.
Because of these safeguards, one early commentator noted: “it is a myth that one can accomplish
[mass destruction] by tossing a small quantity of a ‘super-toxin’ into the water supply. . .it would be
virtually impossible to poison a large water supply: hydrolysis, chlorination and the required quantity of
the toxin are the inhibiting factors” (Kupperman & Trent, 1979).
It is important to note, however, that terrorist attacks that fail to kill or injure large numbers of people
may still have important political repercussions by affecting public perception, reducing confidence in
institutions and forcing inappropriate political responses. Society reacts differently to natural and
human-caused disasters: we often accept large casualties from natural disasters with a degree of
sanguinity not matched by our response to intentional acts of violence (Wardlaw, 1989). Terrorism
destroys our sense of safety and normality and introduces new and often substantial stress and
uncertainty in individuals and communities (Ursano et al., 2003).
Even a plausible public threat has the potential to cause fear and anxiety. The best defenses against
such threats are public confidence in water management systems, rapid and effective water quality
monitoring, and strong and effective information dissemination. While many water districts and
providers have regular mechanisms for communicating with customers, new tools may be valuable in
countering the threat of water-related terrorism and ensuring public confidence and calm.
As we have seen in the past several years, responses to the threat of terrorism can often be ineffective
or ill-considered. Even governmental and public responses to natural disasters, for which planning – in
theory – is well advanced, are often inadequate when actual disasters occur. As a result, the adverse
reactions resulting from an intentional effort to contaminate or damage public water systems may be
both significant and underestimated. The solution to this must include efforts both to prevent such
attacks and to educate the public and media about actual risks and consequences.
Defining terrorism: the context of water systems
As many previous observers have noted, defining “terrorism” is problematic (Hoffman, 1998;
Wardlaw, 1989; Schmid, 1997; Martin, 2006) A detailed review of the challenges of defining
“terrorism”, especially in the context of water systems, is provided by Gleick (2006: Chapter 1).
No
standard or consistent definition is used by federal or state agencies in the United States, although most
follow the form of that adopted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): “the unlawful use of
force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (US Code of Federal
Regulations (28 CFR Section 0.85)). Similarly, Title 22, Section 2656 of the US Code states, “Terrorism
means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by
sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 483
Both of these definitions focus on motive – the “furtherance of political or social objectives”. Such
motives can also include religious, cultural, economic or psychological factors. Increasingly important,
however, is the question of targets. In traditional discussions about terrorism, targets are usually
governments, political figures, objects of economic or social significance, or random civilians. But both
motives and targets can include environmental and ecological resources such as water and built
water systems.
The social and cultural value and importance of water systems also make them attractive targets. By
calling attention to the inability of governments to protect vital symbols of civilization, terrorists can
raise doubts about controlling authorities. As Thornton (1964) noted: “The relatively high efficiency of
terrorism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a
demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value.” There are few natural
resources with more symbolic power than water.
Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, and environmental warfare
Important distinctions should be made between two different categories: environmental terrorism
and eco-terrorism. The focus of this article is on the first of these, but I discuss the second to provide
some perspective.
In recent years, US law enforcement agencies have had to deal with a range of concerns and
activities increasingly defined as “terrorism” with an environmental or ecological context. For example,
in 2006 the FBI announced arrests in several cases of property destruction thought to have been
caused by extreme animal rights or groups with “environmental” agendas. Indeed, FBI Director Mueller
said one of the Bureau’s “highest domestic terrorism priorities” is prosecuting people who commit
crimes “in the name of animal rights or the environment” (Janofsky, 2006). This kind of activity,
however, should be considered “eco-terrorism”, not “environmental terrorism” (Schwartz, 1998;
Schofield, 1999).
There is an important distinction between the two. The term “environmental terrorism” should
exclusively refer to the unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems with the intent
to harm individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social
objective. This distinguishes it from “eco-terrorism”, which should only be considered the unlawful use
of force against people or property with the intent of saving the environment from further human
encroachment and destruction. The professed aim of eco-terrorists is to slow or halt exploitation of
natural resources and to bring public attention to environmental issues (see Lee, 1995; Chalecki, 2001).
Simply put, environmental terrorism involves targeting natural resources for a political, social or
economic objective. Eco-terrorism involves targeting social, political or economic resources for an
environmental objective. The former is the subject of this article.
History of water-related terrorism
There is a long history of the use of water resources as both a target and tool of war and terrorism
(Gleick, 1993, 2004). Water resources or systems can be used as delivery vehicles to cause violence to a
human population. Water supplies can be poisoned; dams can be destroyed to harm downstream
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503484
populations. Table 1 lists examples from the Water and Conflict Chronology that can be described as
terrorism. Even popular culture reflects public interest and concern over these issues. Box 1 lists some
popular novels and films that use water-related terrorism in the plot or theme.
The recorded history of attacks on water systems goes back 4,500 years ago, when Urlama, King of
Lagash from 2450 to 2400 BC, diverted water from this region to boundary canals, drying up boundary
ditches to deprive the neighboring city state of Umma of water. His son Il later cut off the water supply to
Girsu, a city in Umma. In an early example of biowarfare (or bioterrorism, depending on one’s
understanding of “states” and “governments” at the time) Solon of Athens besieged Cirrha around 600
BC for a wrong done to the temple of Apollo and put the poison hellebore roots (or rye ergot – reports
differ) into the local water supply. This reportedly caused the Cirrhaeans to become violently ill and
facilitated the subsequent capture of the city (Eitzen & Takafuji, 1997).
Many of the recorded instances of violence by individuals and non-state groups concerning water
focus on perceived inequities associated with water development projects or controversial decisions
about allocations of water. Often, marginalized groups faced with the construction of water systems that
appropriate local water resources have responded by threatening or attacking those systems. This
violence may be related to both absolute deprivation, where access to the most basic of needs is denied to
a group or region, and to relative deprivation, where basic needs are met, but water allocations or control
are perceived to be unfair or inequitable. Examples of violence related to both absolute and relative
deprivation of water can be found in Table 1. In one of the earliest reported acts, an angry mob in New
York in 1748 burned down a ferry house on the Brooklyn shore of the East River, reportedly as revenge
for unfair allocation of East River water rights (Museum of the City of New York (MCNY), no date). In
the 1840s and 1850s, groups attacked small dams and reservoirs in the eastern and central USA because
of concerns about threats to health and to local water supplies (Table 1). In a now famous case, between
1907 and 1913, farmers in the Owens Valley of California repeatedly dynamited the aqueduct system
being built to divert their water to the growing city of Los Angeles (Reisner, 1993).
Box 1. Environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, water and popular culture.
Popular culture often portrays terrorism in dramatic ways that either influence perceptions of
threats (Jenkins, 2000) or reflect public fears and concerns. Environmental and eco-terrorism
involving water have long been included among those threats. Kurt Vonnegut’s classic book Cat’s
Cradle (1963) describes an amoral genius who creates “ice-nine” – a chemical that freezes water at
room temperature and ends up destroying the world. Edward Abbey’s (1975) novel The Monkey
Wrench Gang and Johnson and Bent’s film Christie Malry’s Own Double Entry featured blowing up
dams, poisoning water supplies and attacking resources for political or environmental purposes.
Wilson and Leeson’s 2002 movie The Tuxedo starring Jackie Chan features a power hungry bottled-
water mogul trying to destroy the world’s natural water supply to force everyone to drink his bottled
water. The movie Batman Begins, released in 2005, portrayed a terrorist attempt to destroy Gotham
by introducing a vapor-borne hallucinogen into the water system and releasing it throughout the city.
In early 2006, an independent feature film, Waterborne, was released, which follows the fictional
aftermath of a bio-terrorist attack on the water supply of Los Angeles. And V for Vendetta (2006)
features corrupt government leaders contaminating London’s water supply to kill people, spread fear
and consolidate power.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 485
Table 1. Water and terrorism chronology
1
.
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
1748 United States Yes Ferry house on Brooklyn shore of East River burns down. New Yorkers accuse
Brooklynites of having set the fire as revenge for unfair East River water rights.
1841 Canada Yes A reservoir in Ops Township, Upper Canada (now Ontario) was destroyed by neighbors
who considered it a hazard
to health.
1844 United States Yes A reservoir in Mercer County, Ohio was destroyed by a mob that considered it a hazard
to health.
1850s United States Yes Attack on a New Hampshire dam that impounded water for factories downstream, by local
residents unhappy over its effect on water levels.
1853–1861 United States Yes Repeated destruction of the banks and reservoirs of the Wabash and Erie Canal in southern
Indiana by mobs regarding it as a health hazard.
1887 United States Yes Dynamiting of a canal reservoir in Paulding County, Ohio by a mob regarding it as a health
hazard. State militia called out to restore order.
1890 Canada Yes Partly successful attempt to destroy a lock on the Welland Canal in Ontario, Canada either
by Fenians protesting against English Policy in Ireland or by
agents of Buffalo NY grain handlers unhappy at the diversion of trade through the canal.
1907–1913 Owens Valley,
Los Angeles, California
Yes The Los Angeles Valley aqueduct/pipeline suffers repeated bombings in an effort to prevent
diversions of water from the Owens Valley to Los Angeles.
1965 Israel, Palestinians Yes First attack claimed by the Palestinian National Liberation Movement Al-Fatah is on the
diversion pumps for the Israeli national water carrier. Attack fails.
1970 United States No: threat The Weathermen, a group opposed to American imperialism and the Vietnam war,
allegedly attempt to obtain biological agents to contaminate the water supply systems
of US urban centers.
1972 United States No: threat Two members of the right-wing “Order of the Rising Sun” are arrested in Chicago with
30–40 kg of typhoid cultures that are allegedly to be used to poison the water supply in
Chicago, St. Louis and other cities. It was felt that the plan would have been unlikely to
cause serious health problems owing to chlorination of the water supplies.
1972 United States No: threat Reported threat to contaminate water supply of New York City with nerve gas.
1973 Germany No: threat Threat by a biologist in Germany to contaminate water supplies with bacilli of anthrax and
botulinum unless he was paid US$8.5 million.
1977 United States Yes Contamination of a North Carolina reservoir with unknown materials. According to Clark:
“Safety caps and valves were removed, and poison chemicals were sent into the reservoir….
Water had to be brought in.”
1978–1984 Sudan Yes Demonstrations in Juba, Sudan in 1978 opposing the construction of the Jonglei Canal led
to the deaths of two students. Construction of the Jonglei Canal in the Sudan was forcibly
suspended in 1984 following a series of attacks on the construction site.
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Table 1. (continued)
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
1980s Mozambique, Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe, South Africa
Yes Regular destruction of power lines from Cahora Bassa Dam during fight for independence
in the region. Dam targeted by RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance).
1982 United States No: threat Los Angeles police and the FBI arrest a man who was preparing to poison the city’s water
supply with a biological agent.
1983 Israel No The Israeli government reported that it had uncovered a plot by Israeli Arabs to poison
the water in Galilee with “an unidentified powder”.
1984 United States Yes Members of the Rajneeshee religious cult contaminate a city water supply tank in
The Dalles, Oregon, using Salmonella. A community outbreak of over 750 cases occurred
in a county that normally reports fewer than five cases per year.
1985 United States No: threat Law enforcement authorities discovered that a small survivalist group in the Ozark
Mountains of Arkansas known as The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord
(CSA) had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide, with the apparent
intent to poison water supplies in New York, Chicago and Washington, DC. CSA members
devised the scheme in the belief that such attacks would make the Messiah return more
quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners. The objective appeared to be mass murder in the
name of a divine mission rather than to change government policy. The amount of poison
possessed by the group is believed to have been insufficient to contaminate the water
supply of even one city.
1991 Canada No: threat A threat is made via an anonymous letter to contaminate the water supply of the city of
Kelowna, British Columbia, with “biological contaminates” [sic]. The motive was apparently
“associated with the Gulf War”. The security of the water supply was increased in
response and no group was identified as the perpetrator.
1992 Turkey Yes Lethal concentrations of potassium cyanide were reported discovered in the water tanks of a
Turkish Air Force compound in Istanbul. The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) claimed credit.
1993 Iran No A report suggests that proposals were made at a meeting of fundamentalist groups in
Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to poison water supplies of
major cities in the West “as a possible response to Western offensives against Islamic
organizations and states”.
1994 Moldavia No: threat Reported threat by Moldavian General Nikolay Matveyev to contaminate the water supply
of the Russian 14th Army in Tiraspol, Moldova, with mercury.
1998 Tajikistan No: threat On November 6, a guerrilla commander threatened to blow up a dam on the Kairakkhum
channel if political demands were not met. Col. Makhmud Khudoberdyev made the threat,
reported by the ITAR-Tass News Agency.
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Table 1. (continued)
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
1998 (1994) United States No The Washington Post reports a 12-year old computer hacker broke into the SCADA
computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam, giving him complete control of the
dam’s massive floodgates. The cities of Mesa, Tempe and Phoenix, Arizona are downstream
of this dam. No damage was done. This report turns out to be incorrect. A hacker did break
into the computers of an Arizona water facility, the Salt River Project in the Phoenix area.
But he was 27, not 12, and the incident occurred in 1994, not 1998. And while clearly
trespassing in critical areas, investigators concluded that the hacker never could have had
control of any dams and that no lives or property were ever threatened.
1998 Democratic Republic
of Congo
Yes Attacks on Inga Dam during efforts to topple President Kabila. Disruption of electricity
supplies from Inga Dam and water supplies to Kinshasa.
1999 Lusaka, Zambia Yes Bomb blast destroyed the main water pipeline, cutting off water for the city of Lusaka,
population 3 million.
1999 South Africa Yes A home-made bomb was discovered at a water reservoir at Wallmansthal near Pretoria.
It was thought to have been meant to sabotage water supplies to farmers.
1999 Angola Yes 100 bodies were found in four drinking water wells in central Angola.
1999 East Timor Yes Militia opposing East Timor independence kill pro-independence supporters and throw
bodies in water well.
1998–1999 Kosovo Yes Contamination of water supplies/wells by Serbs disposing of bodies of Kosovar Albanians
in local wells. Other reports of Yugoslav federal forces poisoning wells with carcasses
and hazardous materials.
2000 Belgium Yes In July, workers at the Cellatex chemical plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of
sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River when they were denied workers’ benefits.
A French analyst pointed out that this was the first time “the environment and public
health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an unheard-of situation until now”.
2000 Australia Yes In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April, 2000, police arrested a man for using a computer
and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire wastewater system and release
sewage into parks, rivers and property.
2001 Israel, Palestine Yes Palestinians destroy water supply pipelines to West Bank settlement of Yitzhar and to
Kibbutz Kisufim. Agbat Jabar refugee camp near Jericho was disconnected from its water
supply after Palestinians looted and damaged local water pumps. Palestinians accuse Israel
of destroying a water cistern, blocking water tanker deliveries and attacking materials for
a wastewater treatment project.
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Table 1. (continued)
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
2001 Pakistan Yes Civil unrest over severe water shortages were caused by a long-term drought. Protests began in
March and April and continued into summer, with riots, four bombs in Karachi (June 13), one
death, 12 injuries and 30 arrests. Ethnic conflicts arose as some groups “accuse the government
of favoring the populous Punjab province [over Sindh province] in water distribution”.
2001 Macedonia Yes Water flow to Kumanovo (population 100,000) was cut off for 12 days in conflict between
ethnic Albanians and Macedonian forces. Valves at plants on Glaznja and Lipkovo Lakes
were damaged.
2001 Philippines No Philippine authorities shut off water to six remote southern villages after residents
complained of a foul smell from their taps, raising fears Muslim guerrillas had contaminated
the supplies. Abu Sayyaf guerrillas, accused of links with Osama bin Laden, had threatened to
poison the water supply in the mainly Christian town of Isabela on Basilan island if the
military did not stop an offensive against them.
2002 Nepal Yes The Khumbuwan Liberation Front (KLF) blew up a hydroelectric powerhouse of 250 kW
in Bhojpur District on January 26. The power supply to Bhojpur and adjoining areas was
cut off. Estimated repair time was six months; repair costs were estimated at 10 million
Rs. By June 2002, Maoist rebels had destroyed more than seven micro-hydro projects as
well as an intake of a drinking water project and pipelines supplying water to Khalanga
in western Nepal.
2002 Rome, Italy No: threat Italian police arrest four Moroccans allegedly planning to contaminate the water supply
system in Rome with a cyanide-based chemical, targeting buildings that included the
United States embassy. Ties to Al-Qaida were suggested.
2002 United States No: threat Papers seized during the arrest of a Lebanese national in Seattle included “instructions on
poisoning water sources” from a London-based Al-Qaida recruiter. The FBI issued a
bulletin to computer security experts around the country indicating that Al-Qaida terrorists
may have been studying American dams and water-supply systems in preparation for new
attacks. “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies have received indications that
Al-Qaida members have sought information on supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems available on multiple SCADA-related websites” reads the bulletin,
according to SecurityFocus. “They specifically sought information on water supply and
wastewater management practices in the US and abroad.”
2002 Colombia Yes The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) detonated an explosive device
planted on a German-made gate valve located inside a tunnel in the Chingaza Dam, which
provides most of Bogota’s water.
2002 United States No: threat Earth Liberation Front threatens the water supply of the town of Winter Park. Previously,
this group claimed responsibility for the destruction of a ski lodge in Vail, Colorado that
threatened lynx habitat.
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Table 1. (continued)
Date Parties involved
Violent conflict
or in the context
of violence? Description
2003 United States No: threat Al-Qaida threatens US water systems via a call to a Saudi Arabian magazine. Al-Qaida does
not “rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in American and Western cities”.
2003 United States Yes Four incendiary devices were found in the pumping station of a Michigan water-bottling plant.
The Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claimed responsibility, accusing Ice Mountain Water
Company of “stealing” water for profit. Ice Mountain is a subsidiary of Nestle Waters.
2003 Colombia Yes A bomb blast at the Cali Drinking Water Treatment Plant killed three workers May 8. The
workers were members of a trade union involved in intense negotiations over privatization
of the water system.
2003 Jordan No: threat Jordanian authorities arrested Iraqi agents in connection with a failed plot to poison the
water supply that serves American troops in the eastern Jordanian desert near the border
with Iraq.
2003 Iraq Yes Sabotage/bombing of main water pipeline in Baghdad. The sabotage of the water pipeline
was the first such strike against Baghdad’s water system, city water engineers said. An
explosive was fired at the six-foot-wide water main in the northern part of Baghdad,
according to the chief engineer for the city’s water treatment plants.
2003–2004 Sudan Yes The ongoing civil war in the Sudan has included violence against water resources. In 2003,
villagers from around Tina said that bombings had destroyed water wells. In Khasan
Basao they alleged that water wells were poisoned. In 2004, wells in Darfur were reportedly
contaminated as part of a strategy of harassment against displaced populations.
2004 Pakistan Yes In military action aimed at Islamic terrorists, including Al Qaida and the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan, homes, schools and water wells were damaged and destroyed.
2004 India, Kashmir Yes Twelve Indian security forces were killed by an IED planted in an underground water pipe
during “counter-insurgency operation in Khanabal area in Anantnag district”.
2006 Sri Lanka Yes Tamil Tiger rebels cut the water supply to government-held villages in northeastern
Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan government forces then launched attacks on the reservoir, declaring
the Tamil actions to be terrorism.
Sources: complete source information for each event is available at www.worldwater.org and in Gleick (2006).
1
This table is a subset of water-related conflicts reported in the Pacific Institute’s Water Conflict Chronology (www.worldwater.org). Only included are those
incidents that fall under the broad definition of environmental terrorism, defined here as: “the unlawful use of force against environmental resources or systems
with the intent to harm individuals or deprive populations of environmental benefit(s) in the name of a political or social objective”. Please remember the
caution, described in the text, that one person’s “terrorist” is another person’s “freedom fighter”. As a result, some of these events as “terrorism” will be
controversial to some of the parties involved. My objective is not to offend. Also, because of the evolution of the concept of nations and states, I’ve excluded
from this list all water and conflict events before the mid-1700s. I’ve also excluded numerous development disputes where individuals or sub-national groups
take violent action as a result of water disputes, shortages or allocation controversies, i.e. where people fight over water for the sake of water. I note, however,
the difficulty of defining “terrorism” (as opposed to military target, tool, or goal or other category) and caution readers to use care in applying these categories.
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The first reported attack of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Al-Fatah, was in 1965 on
the diversion pumps of the Israeli national water carrier (Naff & Matson, 1984) and the region has seen
many more examples. In 2001, Palestinians attacked and vandalized water pipes leading to the Israeli
settlement of Yitzhar to try to force the Israelis out of the settlement. Around the same time, Palestinians
accused Israel of destroying a water cistern, blocking water tanker deliveries and attacking materials for
a wastewater treatment project (Israel Line, 2001a,b; ENS, 2001).
Rivers and water supply infrastructure such as reservoirs can be especially vulnerable to this type of
terrorism, since they are publicly accessible in many places. In July 1999, engineers discovered an
unexploded bomb in a water reservoir near Pretoria, South Africa. The bomb, which had malfunctioned,
would have been powerful enough to deprive farmers, a nearby military base and a hydrological research
facility of water (Pretoria Dispatch Online, 1999). In 2000, a simulated terrorist attack on the Lake
Nacimiento Dam caused some local panic in central California until the media was belatedly notified
that the situation was merely a disaster preparedness drill (Gaura, 2000).
Motives for such attacks can be economic as well as political. In July 2000, workers at the Cellatex
chemical plant in northern France dumped 5000 liters of sulfuric acid into a tributary of the Meuse River
when they were denied workers’ benefits. Whether they were trying to kill wildlife, people, both or
neither is unclear, but a French analyst pointed out that this was the first time “the environment and
public health were made hostage in order to exert pressure, an unheard-of situation until now” (Christian
Science Monitor, 2000).
More recently, a series of events in India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East have
reaffirmed the attractiveness of water and water systems as targets for terrorists in a wide range of
unrelated conflicts and disputes. The major water pipeline to Baghdad was attacked in 2003. The same
year, Al-Qaida threatened US water systems in a call published in a Saudi Arabian magazine: “Al-Qaida
does not ‘rule out. . .the poisoning of drinking water in American and Western cities’” (Associated Press,
2003; Waterman, 2003). In 2004, twelve Indian security forces were killed by an explosive device
planted in an underground water pipe during a “counter-insurgency operation in Khanabal area in
Anantnag district” (TNN, 2004). In an unusual twist to this problem, the United States responded to a
Palestinian attack on US diplomatic personnel in the Middle East by canceling plans for a water-
development project in the Gaza Strip (Associated Press, 2004).
Vulnerability of water and water systems
Infrastructure attacks
The most traditional form of water-related terrorism involves physical attacks on water infrastructure –
specifically water-supply dams and pipelines. One such attack might target a large hydroelectric dam on a
major river or a major water supply system for a city. Terrorists equipped with a relatively small
conventional explosive might not be able to cause serious structural damage to a massive dam, which is,
after all, usually a giant block of rock, earth or concrete. But the adverse consequences of a major dam
failure make the risk worth both assessing and reducing. A major dam failure can kill thousands of people
and even more modest damage might interrupt power generation or affect some other important water-
system operation.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 491
Some natural disasters involving water infrastructure offer insights into the risks of water-related
terrorism. In 1975, the Banqiao and Shimantan dams on tributaries of the Huang He (Yellow) River in
China failed in sequence, contributing to the subsequent destruction of dozens of lower dams and the
deaths of 85,000 people (Yi, 1998). The famous Johnston Flood of 1889 killed more than 2,200 people
when the collapse of a poorly built dam sent a massive wall of water through the poor steel town of
Johnston, Pennsylvania. At least 400 people died in California in 1928 when the Saint Francis dam failed
in San Francisquito Canyon. Worldwide, millions of people live in the floodplains below large dams and
reservoirs. In addition to the potential loss of life, there are also secondary impacts including water
quality problems, loss of freshwater supply and hydroelectric power, damage to property and
commercial fisheries, and recreation losses.
While many municipal water systems are built with redundancy and backup systems, others have
particularly vulnerable points, such as single large pipelines, pumping plants or treatment systems. The
bombing of the major water pipeline entering Baghdad in 2003 highlights such vulnerabilities (Tierney
& Worth, 2003).
A more modern infrastructure concern is the use of remote computers to attack valves, pumps
and chemical processing equipment though computer-based controls. If a group or individual could
gain control over the automated operations of water facilities, water supplies or quality could be
seriously compromised. These control systems were typically developed with no attention to security.
As a result, many of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks used by water
agencies to collect data from sensors and control equipment “may be susceptible to attacks and misuse”
(Heilprin, 2005).
There is growing recognition of this risk (Littleton, 1995). In 1990, the United States issued National
Security Decision Directive 42, which states in part:
Telecommunications and information processing systems are highly susceptible to interception,
unauthorized access and related forms of technical exploitation as well as other dimensions of the
foreign intelligence threat. The technology to exploit these electronic systems is widespread and is
used extensively by foreign nations and can be employed, as well, by terrorist groups and criminal
elements. (National Security Directive, 1990).
These risks are more than academic and theoretical. In Queensland, Australia, on 23 April 2000,
police arrested a man for using a computer and radio transmitter to take control of the Maroochy Shire
wastewater system and release sewage into parks, rivers and property. This is one of the first documented
cases of cyber-terrorism in the water industry (Gellman, 2002). Fears that Al-Quaida were seeking
information on SCADA systems materialized in 2002: “US law enforcement and intelligence agencies
have received indications that Al-Qaida members have sought information on supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems” (McDonnell & Meyer, 2002; MSNBC, 2002).
Chemical and biological attacks
Of growing concern is the risk of chemical and biological attacks on water systems. This type of attack
is often portrayed as follows. Terrorists introduce water-soluble biological or chemical contaminants
into a publicly accessible city water supply. In the best-case scenario, the contaminant is detected as it
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503492
enters the water treatment plant and the plant is shut down while the contaminant is neutralized. This can
result in interruption of potable water service to the city and a “boil water” alert for city residents. In the
worst-case scenario, the contaminant is undetected and people begin to get sick, panic ensues and health
and economic damages soar.
Chemical and biological attacks on water may not be as easy as often portrayed. In order to be
effective as a tool of water-related terrorism, a chemical or biological weapon must be:
. (Weaponized: it must be produced and disseminated in quantities sufficient to have the intended
effect.
. (Appropriate for water dissemination: it must be viable, dissolvable, stable and transportable in water.
. (Infectious, virulent or toxic: it must be effective at causing illness or death, with no widespread
immunity in the target population.
. (Effective over time and treatment: it must maintain its effectiveness in water long enough to reach
and affect humans and it must not be negated by standard water treatment systems likely to be in place.
According to easily available open literature, a wide range of chemical and biological agents could be
used in water. Table 2, described in a recent US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) review of
water-related threats, should be considered illustrative of the relevant contaminant classes. As noted,
some of these substances are only likely to be found in military stockpiles; others may be produced by
sub-national terrorist groups; others may have more mundane industrial or even household applications
(US National Research Council 1995; Hickman, 1999; US EPA 2003a). All the listed agents have
strengths and weaknesses, especially in their usefulness as weapons for use in water. These details will
not be described here.
While some of the biological and chemical contaminants listed in Table 2 have been produced for
military use, military-grade chemical weapons are far more difficult to produce, handle and disseminate.
Commercial chemicals that are commonly produced, distributed and used throughout the world are more
likely to be used by terrorists to contaminate water supplies. Of particular concern are pesticides and
related chemicals used to kill insects, rodents and plants. These include organophosphate pesticides,
chlorinated pesticides and rodenticides. Organophosphates affect the nervous system, as do
organochlorine pesticides. Rodenticides like sodium fluoroacetate, strychnine and thallium sulfate are
all capable of incapacitating or killing humans in appropriate doses (Hickman, 1999).
Several inorganic chemicals are also widely available and potential threats to water systems, including
various forms of arsenic and cyanide. Both are soluble in water and can be lethal. Hickman (1999)
discusses the challenge posed by a material like sodium cyanide (NaCN) for a small water system.
Sodium cyanide is relatively plentiful and accessible because of use in the mining and metals industry. It
is an odorless white salt, which is stable and highly soluble in water.
A conference, Early Warning Monitoring to Detect Hazardous Events in Water Supplies, held in
May 1999 in Reston, Virginia, concluded that terrorist use of bio-weapons can, under some
circumstances, pose a significant threat to drinking water. While most biological warfare agents were
developed for the purpose of aerial dissemination, some can be effective if digested, and some of these
are stable and soluble in water. There are two main types of biological threats: pathogens and toxins.
Pathogens are live organisms, including bacteria, viruses and protozoa. Toxins are chemicals that are
derived from biological processes (Valcik, 1998). Table 3 shows a subset of known biological threats
to water supplies including at least four that were reported in the public literature to have been
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 493
Table 2. Chemical and biological contaminants of water: classes, availabilities and restrictions.
Class Examples (not exhaustive) Sources Limited access?
Microbiological contaminants
Bacteria Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia
spp., Campylobacter spp., Clostridium perfringens,
E. coli O157:H7, Francisella tularensis, Salmonella
typhi, Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae
Naturally occurring, microbiological
laboratories, state-sponsored programs
Yes for select
agents
Viruses Caliciviruses, Enteroviruses, Hepatitis A/E, Variola Naturally occurring, microbiological
laboratories,
1
state-sponsored programs
Yes for select
agents
Parasites Cryptosporidium parvum, Entamoeba histolytica,
Toxoplasma gondii
Naturally occurring, microbiological
laboratories
1
No
Inorganic chemicals
Corrosives and caustics Hydrochloric acid, sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide Retail, industry No
Cyanide salts or cyanogenics Sodium cyanide, potassium cyanide, amygdalin,
cyanogen chloride, ferricyanide salts
Supplier, industry (esp. electroplating)
Yes
Metals Mercury, lead, osmium, their salts, organic compounds
and complexes (even those of iron, cobalt, copper are
toxic at high doses)
Industry, supplier, laboratory
Yes
2
Non-metal oxyanions, organo
non-metals
Arsenate, arsenite, selenite salts, organoarsenic,
organoselenium compounds
Some retail, industry, supplier, laboratory Yes
3
Organic chemicals
Fluorinated organics Sodium trifluoroacetate (a rat poison), fluoroalcohols,
fluorinated surfactants
Supplier, industry, laboratory Yes
Hydrocarbons and their oxygenated
and/or
halogenated derivatives
Paint thinners, gasoline, kerosene, ketones, alcohols,
ethers (e.g. methyl tert-butyl ether or MTBE),
halohydrocarbons (e.g. dichloromethane, tetrachloroethene)
Retail, industry, laboratory, supplier No
Insecticides Organophosphates (e.g. Malathion), chlorinated organics
(e.g. DDT), carbamates (e.g. Aldicarb) some alkaloids
(e.g. nicotine)
Retail, industry, supplier (varies with
compound)
Yes
Malodorous, noxious, foul-tasting,
and/or lachrymatory chemicals
4
Thiols (e.g. mercaptoacetic acid, mercaptoethanol), amines
(e.g. cadaverine, putrescine), inorganic esters
(e.g. trimethylphosphite, dimethylsulfate, acrolein)
Laboratory, supplier, police supply,
military depot
Yes
Organics, water-miscible Acetone, methanol, ethylene glycol (antifreeze), phenols,
detergents
Retail, industry, supplier, laboratory No
Pesticides other than insecticides Herbicides (e.g. chlorophenoxy or atrazine derivatives),
rodenticides (e.g. super-warfarins, zinc phosphide,
a-naphthyl thiourea)
Retail, industry, agriculture, laboratory Yes
Continued
P
.
H
.
G
le
ic
k
/
W
a
te
r
P
o
lic
y
8
(2
0
0
6
)
4
8
1
–
5
0
3
4
9
4
Table 2. (continued)
Class Examples (not exhaustive) Sources Limited access?
Pharmaceuticals Cardiac glycosides, some alkaloids, antineoplastic
chemotherapies, anticoagulants (e.g. warfarin). Illicit drugs
such as LSD, PCP and heroin.
Laboratory, supplier, pharmacy,
some from a natural source
Yes
Chemical warfare agents
Chemical weapons Organophosphate nerve agents (e.g. sarin, tabun, VX),
vesicants, [nitrogen and sulfur mustards (chlorinated alkyl
amines and thioethers, respectively)], Lewisite
Suppliers, military depots, some
laboratories
Yes
Biotoxins
Biologically produced toxins Biotoxins from bacteria, plants, fungi, protists, defensive
poisons in some marine or terrestrial animals. Examples
include ricin, saxitoxin, botulinum toxins, T-2 mycotoxins,
microcystins
Laboratory, supplier, pharmacy,
natural source,
5
state-sponsored
military programs
Yes
Radiological contaminants
Radionuclides Does not refer to nuclear weapons. Radionuclides may be
used in medical devices and industrial irradiators
(cesium-137 iridium-192, cobalt-60, strontium-90). Class
includes both metals and salts.
Laboratory, state sources, waste
facilities
Yes
2
Source: modified from US EPA, 2003 a,b and US NRC, 1995.
1
The quantity of bacteria, viruses or parasites needed for widespread contamination of a water system is not typically available in a typical clinical laboratory,
although the seed cultures could be available. For viruses, vaccine production-grade volumes would be needed, requiring special equipment and facilities,
perhaps with state sponsorship.
2
Availability may be commercially limited for the more toxic materials, especially the heavy metals, which can be quite expensive. Iron and copper are readily
available, but not usually in soluble (bio-available) forms.
3
Availability of arsenicals and selenium compounds in the retail sector has been reduced owing to environmental regulations, but such products can
occasionally be found as part of older inventories of merchandise. Supplies of such materials may generally be too small to cause concern.
4
This grouping includes riot-control agents and other mucous membrane irritants.
5
The quantity available from laboratories, suppliers and pharmacies needed for widespread contamination of a water system is typically not available from
these sources. Many biotoxins that occur naturally would need to be purified or prepared to be of significant concern to water, which could make production
beyond the capabilities of most individuals or small groups.
P
.
H
.
G
le
ic
k
/
W
a
te
r
P
o
lic
y
8
(2
0
0
6
)
4
8
1
–
5
0
3
4
9
5
produced as biological weapons. Table 4 shows known biological toxins that pose a water threat,
including three known to have been turned into weapons. Both tables also describe the ability of
chlorine – commonly used in municipal water systems – to neutralize these toxins or pathogens. Less
information is available on how these threats may be affected or neutralized by some of the newer,
non-chlorine based water-treatment systems including advanced filtration, ultraviolet disinfection
and ozonation.
In 1970 (sometimes dated “early 1970s”), the US radical group the Weather Underground reportedly
attempted to blackmail a homosexual officer at the US Army’s bacteriological warfare facility in
Fort Detrick, Maryland, into supplying organisms that could then be used to contaminate urban
water supplies (Mullins, 1992; Berkowitz et al., 1972, citing the New York Times of 21 November
1970). According to one source, the terrorists apparently succeeded in gaining the cooperation of the
officer in question but “This plot was discovered when the officer requested issue of several items
unrelated to his work” (Purver, 1995). Another reported incident was the arrest by Los Angeles police
and FBI agents of a man “who was preparing to poison the city’s water system with a biological poison”
(Livingstone, 1982).
Individual and groups have been known to plan and carry out chemical attacks on water systems
in the belief that they can be effective. A few cases of actual chemical contamination of water
Table 3. Biological pathogens considered to be water threats.
Pathogen Type Weaponized Stable in water Chlorine tolerance
Anthrax B Yes 2 years spores Spores resistant
Brucellosis B Yes 20–72 days Unknown
C. perfringens B Probable Common in sewage Resistant
Tularemia B Yes ,90 days Inactivated, 1 ppm, 5 min
Shigellosis B Unknown 2–3 days Inactivated, 0.05 ppm, 10 min
Cholera B Unknown Yes “Easily killed”
Plague B Probable 16 days Unknown
Q Fever R Yes Unknown Unknown
Hepatitis A V Unknown Unknown Inactivated, 0.4 ppm, 30 min
Source: modified from Valcik (1998).
B – bacteria; R – rickettsia; V – virus.
Table 4. Biological toxins considered to be water threats.
Toxin Weaponized Stable in water Chlorine tolerance
Botulinum toxin Yes Stable Inactivated at 6 ppm, 20 min
T-2 mycotoxin Probable Stable Resistant
Aflatoxin Yes Probably stable Resistant
Ricin Yes Unknown Resistant at 10 ppm
Staph enterotoxins Probable Probably stable Unknown
Microcystins Possible Probably stable Very resistant at 100 ppm
Anatoxin A Unknown Inactivated in days Unknown
Tetrodotoxin Possible Unknown Inactivated, 50 ppm
Saxitoxin Possible Stable Resistant at 10 ppm
Source: modified from Valcik (1998).
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503496
supplies, or confirmed plans to conduct such attacks, have been reported in the open literature.
In 1972, a right-wing, neo-Nazi group known as the “Order of the Rising Sun”, “dedicated to creating
a new master race”, acquired 30–40 kg of typhoid bacteria cultures to use against water supplies in
Chicago, St. Louis and other midwestern cities (Kupperman & Trent, 1979; Purver, 1995). According
to Ponte (1980), those arrested had “in their possession detailed plans for dumping the deadly germs
into the water supplies”. It is likely that typhoid bacteria, even if introduced into an urban
water supply, would have been destroyed by normal chlorination (US Office of Technology
Assessment, 1991).
In a case of criminal extortion, in 1973 a German biologist threatened to contaminate water supplies
with bacilli of anthrax and botulinum unless he was paid a financial ransom US$8.5 million (Jenkins &
Rubin, 1978; Kupperman & Trent, 1979). The Israeli government reported in 1983 that it had uncovered
a plot by Israeli Arabs to poison the water supply of the city of Galilee with “an unidentified powder”
(Douglass & Livingstone, 1987). In 1985, federal law enforcement authorities discovered that The
Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) – a survivalist group in the Ozark Mountains of
Arkansas – had acquired a drum containing 30 gallons of potassium cyanide. Their goal was to poison
water supplies in New York, Chicago and Washington in the belief that this would make the Messiah
return more quickly by punishing unrepentant sinners (Monterey Institute for International Studies
(MIIS), 2004).
A chemical poisoning attempt was reported in March 1992 when lethal concentrations of potassium
cyanide were found in the water tanks at a Turkish Air Force base Istanbul. The Kurdish Workers’ Party
(PKK) claimed credit (Chelyshev, 1992). The media reported that proposals were made at an early
February 1993 meeting of fundamentalist groups in Tehran, under the auspices of the Iranian Foreign
Ministry, to poison the water supplies of major cities in the West “as a possible response to Western
offensives against Islamic organizations and states” (Haeri, 1993).
Responding to the threat of water-related terrorism
No easy estimate of the true risk of water-related terrorism is possible. The fact that there are
numerous examples of actual and planned attacks on water systems in the past suggests that the
risk is real. What is more challenging is evaluating both the probability of future attacks and their
consequences – the separate components of calculating risk. In the absence of any definitive
assessment of risk, however, it is vital to both understand vulnerabilities and to put in place
measures to reduce those vulnerabilities and ultimately the overall risk. This can be done by
reducing the probability of water-related terrorism, the consequences of an attack should one occur,
or both.
Addressing the probability requires a wide range of actions, from reducing the fundamental
motivation for terrorist attacks (not addressed here) to limiting the vulnerability of water resources and
systems through selective and focused efforts of protection and detection. Addressing the
consequences of attacks requires putting in place an array of responses suitable for different kinds
of events. This can include responses like rapid repair teams to fix infrastructure, the development of
redundant delivery and treatment systems, and preparing the health system promptly to detect and treat
water-related illnesses.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 497
Denying physical access
Perhaps the most fundamental action that can be taken to protect water systems is to limit or deny
physical access to vulnerable points. Sometimes this may be as easy as locking gates or buildings, or
reducing public access to sensitive locations. As examples of new activities put in place since September
11 2001, the Coast Guard increased patrols in the area of Chicago’s water intakes from Lake Michigan.
New York City increased the number of daily water samples it takes. California has reduced access to
some dams and pumping plants and blocked off some roads close to water reservoirs. Many water
agencies have stationed guards at “critical sites” (Center for Defense Information, 2002).
Among the recommendations for reducing the physical risk to infrastructure are:
. (Facilities (treatment plants, reservoirs, dams, storage facilities, pumping plants, intake facilities and
control systems) should be identified and inventoried. Physical access to those most critical to
operations, or most vulnerable to attack, should be controlled.
. (Access to water distribution maps and facility plans should be controlled when there is a clear
security risk.
. (Lighting, surveillance cameras and motion detectors should be installed in appropriate places.
. (To prevent hacking, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) for monitoring and
controlling water should not be connected to the Internet or should be connected to appropriate
electronic security, firewalls and passwords.
. (On-site water treatment chemicals should be kept in secure facilities and they should be inventoried
on a regular basis.
Often, however, this approach is not possible, given the vast exposed length of pipelines or aqueducts,
or the public uses of lakes, reservoirs, rivers and land. As a result, limiting physical access is an
important, but not sufficient approach.
Detection and protection challenges
Unlike more traditional weapons used by terrorists, water-related threats pose some special challenges
in the areas of detection and response. As noted above, an attack on a water system may be done
surreptitiously through the introduction of a chemical or biological agent. In this case, unless immediate
publicity is an objective of the attack, the first evidence may be increased incidences of sickness and
death. Identifying the nature of the illness, the source of the contamination and then identifying and
quantifying the specific threat could take a substantial amount of time.
New security measures – such as more extensive monitoring of pipelines, water supplies or more
guards at power plants – will be expensive and mean higher costs for consumers. Nevertheless, it seems
clear that some such measures will be required. In 2002, the US Congress passed the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act), which
President Bush signed into law on 12 June 2002. Among other things, the Bioterrorism Act established
requirements that community water systems serving more than 3,300 individuals perform a system-
specific vulnerability assessment for potential terrorist threats, including intentional contamination
(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/community.html). This sort of assessment, if properly done, can
provide valuable information for planning and protection.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503498
Early warning systems (EWS)
“Early warning” monitoring systems can help to identify contamination events early enough to permit
an effective response. An EWS must be reliable: it should minimize the potential for significant numbers
of both false negatives (missing a true event) and false positives (reporting a false event). It must be easy
to install and operate, provide continuous monitoring and result in rapid notification of an event.
Continuous monitoring reduces the likelihood that contamination events will be missed. The
development of standard monitoring systems would reduce cost, permit sharing among users and
facilitate repair and replacement (Foran & Brosnan, 2000).
New and developing technologies are being developed rapidly to detect pathogens in real time, both in
source water and water distribution systems (US EPA, 2005). Included among these technologies are
DNA microchip arrays (Betts, 1999a), immunologic techniques (Betts, 1999b), microrobots (Hewish,
1998) and a variety of optical tools, molecular probes and other techniques (Pelley, 1999; Sobsey, 1999).
Such technology would be useful for a wide range of purposes, including regular water-quality
monitoring at municipal systems, but wide development and dissemination of such systems is moving
forward slowly. Most of these technologies are not yet commercially available, nor have they been tested
in large drinking water systems. Some organizations are now working to improve both available
technology and knowledge about tools useful for detection and response. The American Water Works
Association (AWWA), for example, offers seminars on these topics for water managers. In 2003 and
2004, the US Environmental Protection Agency published a series of guides for water utilities to help
them identify and respond to contamination attacks (US EPA, 2003b). Similarly, in 2003 the World
Health Organization updated and released a comparable international planning document (WHO, 2003).
Public and governmental responses
It is extremely unlikely that physical barriers, early warning systems and other preventative measures will
be adequate to prevent all attacks. It is also possible that threats alone will trigger reactions. A threat to a
drinking water system, whether real or a hoax, may cause as much of a problem as an actual terrorist act. As
a result, it is vital to develop tools and advanced plans to respond to both real and threatened events.
Responses may include public advisories, temporary shutdown of the system, identification and use of
alternative water supplies, chemical and biological treatment and disinfection, additional data gathering
or monitoring, epidemiologic studies, health interventions or some combination of these actions.
Responses to actual events will depend on the nature of the attack, the population affected and
characteristics of the water system itself.
A key component to the success of any response will be the advance preparation of a process or plan
that provides guidelines for all appropriate stakeholders, including water users, emergency responders
and law enforcement agencies, water utility staff and community leaders and local media. Such a plan
should be considered part of comprehensive emergency planning for a variety of threats to public health,
both waterborne and non-waterborne.
There is already extensive experience of emergency response plans developed in different
communities, although recent experience with Hurricane Katrina has revealed gaping holes in those
plans. The US Environmental Protection Agency, American Water Works Association, American
Society of Civil Engineers, US Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Infrastructure
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503 499
Protection Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Emergency Management and
Emergency Preparedness Office of the US Health and Human Services all offer some guidelines for
water plans and some effort has been made to develop post-event responses (Simon, 1997; Macintyre
et al., 2000; Waeckerle, 2000; US EPA, 2003a,b; American Water Works Association, 2006). Local,
regional and national planning, however, are still inadequate.
Water security policy in the United States
Even prior to 11 September 2001, analyses were prepared evaluating the risks and threats of terrorism
(see, for example, Gilmore Commission, 1999, 2000). The focus of US security policy, however,
underwent a fundamental shift in 2001, toward domestic security and challenges. Title IV of the
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 pertains to drinking water security and safety requiring vulnerability
assessments and emergency response plans for most community water systems. Water systems must
certify to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) within six months of the
completion of the vulnerability assessment that they have completed an emergency response plan.
According to the EPA in February 2006, all large- and medium-size systems had completed their
assessments; 97% of small systems had completed assessments (Johnson, personal communication, 6
February 2006). No separate information is available on the adequacy or comprehensiveness of the
assessments, or whether actual response plans have been put in place.
In early 2006, the US EPA announced a new effort called the WaterSentinel Initiative to design, deploy
and evaluate a water contamination warning system. This program was called for by the Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 9, which charges the EPA to develop surveillance and monitoring systems
to provide early detection and awareness of water contamination events. HSPD-9 also directs the EPA to
develop a network of integrated federal and state water testing laboratories (US EPA, 2006).
Conclusions
There is a long history of water-related violence and conflicts, including what must be categorized as
environmental terrorism targeting water resources and infrastructure. The threat of future attacks is real,
and the plans for responding to such attacks appear to be inadequate. The actual risks of serious human
health consequences are less clear, given the complex nature of our developed water systems,
protections already put in place to identify and eliminate biological and chemical contaminants and the
attractiveness and vulnerability of other targets.
These protections must be strengthened in areas where clear risk assessments indicate high
vulnerability, especially where critical infrastructure is exposed or where rapid monitoring can provide
time for effective response. It is vital that sensitive water systems be protected through a combination of
improved physical barriers, more extensive real-time chemical and biological monitoring and treatment
and the development of smart and integrated response strategies at all levels.
Among the best defenses against terrorist threats to water systems are public confidence in water
management systems, rapid and effective water quality monitoring, and strong and effective information
dissemination. New tools for communicating with water users may be valuable in countering the threat
of water-related terrorism and ensuring public confidence and calm. Such tools will also have value
during natural disasters and accidents.
P. H. Gleick / Water Policy 8 (2006) 481–503500
It is equally important, however, that the risks not be exaggerated, so that limited financial resources
can be spent efficiently and effectively, and so that the public is not made fearful of risks that are low or
manageable. The best approaches will require careful assessment of both the probability and the
consequences of attacks. By evaluating both, it will be easier to identify vulnerabilities and put in place
appropriate and measured responses to those vulnerabilities.
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- Outline placeholder
Bibliography
1
Security Vulnerability
Self-Assessment
Guide for Small
Drinking Water
Systems Serving
Populations Between
3,300 and 10,000
Association of State Drinking Water
Administrators
National Rural Water Association
November 13, 2002
2
This document contains sensitive
information about the security of your
water system. Therefore, it should be
treated as Confidential Information and
should be stored in a secure place at your
water system. A duplicate copy should
also be stored in a secure off-site
location.
Acknowledgments
This document is the result of collaboration among the Association of Drinking Water Administrators
(ASDWA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), the U.S. EPA Drinking Water Academy,
and the National Rural Water Association (NRWA).
3
Contents
SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT GUIDE FOR SMALL WATER SYSTEMS ……………. 4
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
How to Use this Self-Assessment Guide ………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
Before Starting this Assessment ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT ……………………………………………………………………….. 6
Record of
Completion ………………………………………………………….. 6
Inventory of Small Water System Critical Components …………………………………………………………………….. 7
SECURITY VULNERABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT FOR SMALL WATER SYSTEMS ………………………..
8
General Questions for the Entire Water System………………………………………………………………………………. 8
Water Sources …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
11
Treatment Plant and Suppliers ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Distribution ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..
13
Personnel ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
14
Information/Storage/Computers/Controls/Maps………………………………………………………………………………
15
Public Relations …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
16
ATTACHEMENT 1. PRIORITIZATION OF NEEDED ACTIONS ……………………………………………………….
18
ATTACHEMENT 2. EMERGENCY CONTACT LIST……………………………………………………………………….
19
Section 1 System Identification ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 19
Section 2 Notification/Contact Information……………………………………………………………………………………..
20
Section 3 Communication and Outreach ……………………………………………………………………………………….
24
ATTACHMENT 3. THREAT IDENTIFICATION CHECKLISTS………………………………………………………….
25
Water System Telephone Threat Identification Checklist ………………………………………………………………… 25
Water System Report of Suspicious Activity…………………………………………………………………………………..
27
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLETION……………………………………………………………………………………………. 29
4
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment
Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems
Serving Populations Between 3,300 and
10,000
Introduction
Water systems are critical to every community. Protection of public drinking water systems should be a
high priority for local officials and water system owners and operators to ensure an uninterrupted water
supply, which is essential for the protection of public health (safe drinking water and sanitation) and safety
(fire fighting).
Adequate security measures will help prevent loss of service through terrorist acts, vandalism, or pranks.
If your system is prepared, such actions may even be prevented. The appropriate level of security is best
determined by the water system at the local level.
This Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide is designed to help small water systems determine
possible vulnerable components and identify security measures that should be considered in order to
protect the system and the customers it serves. A “vulnerability assessment” (VA) is the identification of
weaknesses in water system security, focusing on defined threats that could compromise its ability to
meet its various service missions – such as providing adequate drinking water, water for firefighting,
and/or water for various commercial and industrial purposes. This document is designed particularly for
systems that serve populations of 3,300 up to 10,000. This document is meant to encourage smaller
systems to review their system vulnerabilities, but it may not take the place of a comprehensive review by
security experts. Completion of this document will meet the requirement for conducting a Vulnerability
Assessment as directed under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002. Community Water Systems (CWSs) serving more than 3,300 and fewer than 50,000 people
must submit their completed vulnerability assessment to the Administrator of U.S. EPA no later than June
30, 2004 in order to meet the provisions of the Act.
The Self-Assessment Guide has a simple design. Answers to assessment questions are “yes” or “no,”
and there is space to identify needed actions and actions you have taken to improve security. For any
“no” answer, refer to the “comment” column and/or contact your state drinking water primacy agency.
How to Use this Self-Assessment Guide
This document is designed for use by water system personnel. Physical facilities pose a high degree of
exposure to any security threat. According to the Bioterrorism Law, vulnerability assessments should
include, but not be limited to, a review of pipes and constructed conveyances, physical barriers, water
collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage and distribution facilities, electronic, computer or other
automated systems which are utilized by the public water system, the use, storage, or handling of various
chemicals, and the operation and maintenance of such system. This self-assessment should be
conducted on all components of your system (wellhead or surface water intake, treatment plant, storage
tank(s), pumps, distribution system, and other important components of your system).
The Assessment includes a basic emergency contact list for your use; however, under the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, all systems serving a population
greater than 3,300 must complete or revise an emergency response plan based on their vulnerability
assessment. Systems must certify to the U.S. EPA Administrator that incorporates the results of the VA
5
that have been completed or revised within six months of submitting their vulnerability assessment to U.S.
EPA. The list included as Attachment 2 will not meet the requirements of the Bioterrorism Act, but it will
help you identify who you need to contact in the event of an emergency or threat and will help you
develop communication and outreach procedures. You may be able to obtain sample Emergency
Response Plans from your state drinking water primacy agency. Development of the emergency
response plan should be coordinated with the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC).
Security is everyone’s responsibility. This document should help you to increase the awareness of all your
employees, governing officials, and customers about security issues. Once you have completed the
questions, review the actions you need to take to improve your system’s security. The goal of the
vulnerability assessment is to develop a system-specific list of priorities intended to reduce risks to threats
of attack. Make sure to prioritize your actions based on the most likely threats to your system. Once you
have developed your list of priority actions, you have completed your vulnerability assessment. Please
complete the Certificate of Completion on page 29 and return only the certificate to your state drinking
water primacy agency. Unless your state has its own requirement that the vulnerability assessments be
submitted to the state for review (e.g. New York) do not include a full copy of your self-assessment with
the certification submitted to the state primacy agency. Please check with your state drinking water
primacy agency to find out what is required for your state. In addition, under the Bioterrorism Act all
systems serving a population greater than 3,300 and less than 50,000 must submit their completed
vulnerability assessment and a Certificate of Completion to the U.S. EPA Administrator by June 30, 2004.
Before Starting this Assessment
Systems should make an effort to identify critical services and customers, such as hospitals or power
facilities, as well as critical areas of their drinking water system that if attacked could result in a significant
disruption of vital community services, result in a threat to public health, or a complete shut down of the
system (e.g. inability to provide an adequate supply of water for fire prevention, inability to provide safe
potable water, or release of hazardous chemicals that could cause catastrophic results). When
prioritizing the potential water system vulnerabilities and consequences factor into the decision process
the critical facilities, services, and single points in the system that if debilitated could result in significant
disruption of vital community services or health protection. To help identify priorities for your system, the
table on page 7 provides a column where you can categorize the assets that you consider critical into one
of three categories – high (H), medium (M), or low (L).
When evaluating a system’s potential vulnerability, systems should attempt to determine what type of
assailants and threats they are trying to protect against. Systems should contact their local law
enforcement office to see if they have information indicating the types of threats that may be likely against
their facility. Systems should also refer to the U.S. EPA “Baseline Threat Information for Vulnerability
Assessments of Community Water Systems” to help assess the most likely threats to their water system.
This document is available to CWSs serving greater than 3,300 people. If your system has not yet
received instructions on how to receive a copy of this document, then contact your Regional U.S. EPA
Office immediately. You will be sent instructions on how to securely access it via the Water Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) website or obtain a hard copy that can be mailed directly to you.
Some of the typical threats to your facility may be vandalism, an insider (i.e. disgruntled employee), a
terrorist, or a terrorist working with a system employee.
Keep this Document
This is a working document. Its purpose is to start your process of security vulnerability assessment and
security enhancements. Security is not an end point, but a goal that can be achieved only through
continued efforts to assess and upgrade your system. This is a sensitive document. It should be stored
separately in a secure place at your water system. A duplicate copy should also be retained at a secure
off-site location. Access to this document should be limited to key water system personnel and local
officials as well as the state drinking water primacy agency and others on a need-to-know basis.
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment
Record of Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Completion
The following information should be completed by the individual conducting the
self-assessment and/or any additional revisions.
Name:
Title:
Area of
Responsibility:
Water System
Name:
Water System
PWSID:
Address:
City:
County:
State:
Zip Code:
Telephone:
Fax:
E-mail:
Date Completed:
Date Revised: Signature:
Date Revised: Signature:
Date Revised: Signature:
Date Revised: Signature:
Date Revised: Signature:
6
Inventory of Small Water System Critical Components
7
Component Number &
Location (if
applicable)
Description Critical Asset
or
Single Point of
Failure (H/M/L)
Source Water Type
Ground Water
Surface Water
Purchased
Treatment Plant
Buildings
Pumps
Treatment Equipment (e.g., basin, clear well, filter)
Process Controls
Treatment Chemicals and Storage
Laboratory Chemicals and Storage
Storage
Storage Tanks
Pressure Tanks
Power
Primary Power
Auxiliary Power
Distribution System
Pumps
Pipes
Valves
Appurtenances (e.g., flush hydrants, backflow
preventers, meters)
Other Vulnerable Points
Offices
Buildings
Computers
Files
Transportation/
Work Vehicles
Personnel
Communications
Telephone
Cell Phone
Radio
Computer Control Systems (SCADA)
Critical Facilities Served
Power Plant Facilities
Hospitals
Schools
Waste Water Treatment Plants
Food/Beverage Processing Plants
Nursing Homes
Prisons/Other Institutions
8
The first 15 questions in this vulnerability self-assessment are general questions designed to apply to all components of your system (wellhead or surface
water intake, treatment plant, storage tank(s), pumps, distribution system, and offices). These are followed by more specific questions that look at
individual system components in greater detail.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
1. Do you have a written
emergency response plan
(ERP)?
Yes “ No “ Under the provisions of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 you are required to
develop and/or update an ERP within six months after completing
this assessment. If you do not have an ERP, you can obtain a
sample from your state drinking water primacy agency. As a first
step in developing your ERP, you should develop your Emergency
Contact List (see Attachment 2).
A plan is vital in case there is an incident that requires immediate
response. Your plan should be reviewed at least annually (or more
frequently if necessary) to ensure it is up-to-date and addresses
security emergencies including ready access to laboratories capable
of analyzing water samples. You should coordinate with your LEPC.
You should designate someone to be contacted in case of
emergency regardless of the day of the week or time of day. This
contact information should be kept up-to-date and made available to
all water system personnel and local officials (if applicable).
Share this ERP with police, emergency personnel, and your state
primacy agency. Posting contact information is a good idea only if
authorized personnel are the only ones seeing the information.
These signs could pose a security risk if posted for public viewing
since it gives people information that could be used against the
system.
2. Have you reviewed U.S.
EPA’s Baseline Threat
Information Document?
Yes “ No “ The U.S. EPA baseline threat document is available through the
Water Information Sharing and Analysis Center at
www.waterisac.org. It is important you use this document to
determine potential threats to your system and to obtain additional
security related information. U.S. EPA should have provided a
certified letter to your system that provided instructions on obtaining
the threat document.
3. Is access to the critical
components of the water
system (i.e., a part of the
physical infrastructure of the
system that is essential for
water flow and/or water
quality) restricted to
authorized personnel only?
Yes “ No “ You should restrict or limit access to the critical components of your
water system to authorized personnel only. This is the first step in
security enhancement for your water system. Consider the following:
Issue water system photo identification cards for employees, and
require them to be displayed within the restricted area at all times.
Post signs restricting entry to authorized personnel and ensure
that assigned staff escort people without proper ID.
General Questions for the Entire Water System
http://www.waterisac.org/
9
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
4. Are all critical facilities
fenced, including wellhouses
and pump pits, and are gates
locked where appropriate?
Yes “ No “ Ideally, all facilities should have a security fence around the
perimeter.
The fence perimeter should be walked periodically to check for
breaches and maintenance needs. All gates should be locked with
chains and a tamper-proof padlock that at a minimum protects the
shank. Other barriers such as concrete “jersey” barriers should be
considered to guard certain critical components from accidental or
intentional vehicle intrusion.
5. Are all critical doors,
windows, and other points of
entry such as tank and roof
hatches and vents kept
closed and locked?
Yes “ No “ Lock all building doors and windows, hatches and vents, gates, and
other points of entry to prevent access by unauthorized personnel.
Check locks regularly. Dead bolt locks and lock guards provide a
high level of security for the cost.
A daily check of critical system components enhances security and
ensures that an unauthorized entry has not taken place.
Doors and hinges to critical facilities should be constructed of heavy-
duty reinforced material. Hinges on all outside doors should be
located on the inside.
To limit access to water systems, all windows should be locked and
reinforced with wire mesh or iron bars, and bolted on the inside.
Systems should ensure that this type of security meets with the
requirements of any fire codes. Alarms can also be installed on
windows, doors, and other points of entry.
6. Is there external lighting
around all critical
components of your water
system?
Yes “ No “ Adequate lighting of the exterior of water systems’ critical
components is a good deterrent to unauthorized access and may
result in the detection or deterrence of trespassers. Motion
detectors that activate switches that turn lights on or trigger alarms
also enhance security.
7. Are warning signs
(tampering, unauthorized
access, etc.) posted on all
critical components of your
water system? (For example,
well houses and storage
tanks.)
Yes “ No “ Warning signs are an effective means to deter unauthorized access.
“Warning – Tampering with this facility is a federal offense” should be
posted on all water facilities. These are available from your state
rural water association.
“Authorized Personnel Only,” “Unauthorized Access Prohibited,” and
“Employees Only” are examples of other signs that may be useful.
8. Do you patrol and inspect all
source intake, buildings,
storage tanks, equipment,
and other critical
components?
Yes “ No “ Frequent and random patrolling of the water system by utility staff
may discourage potential tampering. It may also help identify
problems that may have arisen since the previous patrol.
All systems are encouraged to initiate personal contact with the local
law enforcement to show them the drinking water facility. The tour
should include the identification of all critical components with an
explanation of why they are important. Systems are encouraged to
review, with local law enforcement, the NRWA/ASDWA Guide for
Security Decisions or similar state document to clarify respective
roles and responsibilities in the event of an incident. Also consider
asking the local law enforcement to conduct periodic patrols of your
water system.
10
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
9. Is the area around all the
critical components of your
water system free of objects
that may be used for
breaking and entering?
Yes “ No “ When assessing the area around your water system’s critical
components, look for objects that could be used to gain entry (e.g.,
large rocks, cement blocks, pieces of wood, ladders, valve keys, and
other tools).
10. Are the entry points to all of
your water system easily
seen?
Yes “ No “ You should clear fence lines of all vegetation. Overhanging or
nearby trees may also provide easy access. Avoid landscaping that
will permit trespassers to hide or conduct unnoticed suspicious
activities.
Trim trees and shrubs to enhance the visibility of your water
system’s critical components.
If possible, park vehicles and equipment in places where they do not
block the view of your water system’s critical components.
11. Do you have an alarm
system that will detect
unauthorized entry or
attempted entry at all critical
components?
Yes “ No “ Consider installing an alarm system that notifies the proper
authorities or your water system’s designated contact for
emergencies when there has been a breach of security. Inexpensive
systems are available. An alarm system should be considered
whenever possible for tanks, pump houses, and treatment facilities.
You should also have an audible alarm at the site as a deterrent and
to notify neighbors of a potential threat.
12. Do you have a key control
and accountability policy?
Yes “ No “ Keep a record of locks and associated keys, and to whom the keys
have been assigned. This record will facilitate lock replacement and
key management (e.g., after employee turnover or loss of keys).
Vehicle and building keys should be kept in a lockbox when not in
use.
You should have all keys stamped (engraved) “DO NOT
DUPLICATE.”
13. Are entry codes and keys
limited to water system
personnel only?
Yes “ No “ Suppliers and personnel from co-located organizations (e.g.,
organizations using your facility for telecommunications) should be
denied access to codes and/or keys. Codes should be changed
frequently if possible. Entry into any building should always be
under the direct control of water system personnel.
14. Do you have an updated
operations and maintenance
manual that includes
evaluations of security
systems?
Yes “ No “ Operation and maintenance plans are critical in assuring the on-
going provision of safe and reliable water service. These plans
should be updated to incorporate security considerations and the
on-going reliability of security provisions – including security
procedures and security related equipment.
11
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
15. Do you have a neighborhood
watch program for your
water system?
Yes “ No “ Watchful neighbors can be very helpful to a security program. Make
sure they know whom to call in the event of an emergency or
suspicious activity.
Water Sources
In addition to the above general checklist for your entire water system (questions 1-15), you should give special attention to the following issues,
presented in separate tables, related to various water system components. Your water sources (surface water intakes or wells) should be secured.
Surface water supplies present the greatest challenge. Typically they encompass large land areas. Where areas cannot be secured, steps should be
taken to initiate or increase law enforcement patrols. Pay particular attention to surface water intakes. Ask the public to be vigilant and report suspicious
activity.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
16. Are your wellheads sealed
properly?
Yes “ No “ A properly sealed wellhead decreases the opportunity for the
introduction of contaminants. If you are not sure whether your
wellhead is properly sealed, contact your well drilling/maintenance
company, your state drinking water primacy agency, your state rural
water association, or other technical assistance providers.
17. Are well vents and caps
screened and securely
attached?
Yes “ No “ Properly installed vents and caps can help prevent the introduction
of a contaminant into the water supply.
Ensure that vents and caps serve their purpose, and cannot be
easily breached or removed.
18. Are observation/test and
abandoned wells properly
secured to prevent
tampering?
Yes “ No “ All observation/test and abandoned wells should be properly capped
or secured to prevent the introduction of contaminants into the
aquifer or water supply. Abandoned wells should be either removed
or filled with concrete.
19. Is your surface water
source secured with fences
or gates? Do water system
personnel visit the source?
Yes “ No “ Surface water supplies present the greatest challenge to secure.
Often, they encompass large land areas. Where areas cannot be
secured, steps should be taken to initiate or increase patrols by
water utility personnel and law enforcement agents.
Treatment Plant and Suppliers
Some small systems provide easy access to their water system for suppliers of equipment, chemicals, and other materials for the convenience of both
parties. This practice should be discontinued.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
20. Are deliveries of chemicals
and other supplies made in
the presence of water
system personnel?
Yes “ No “ Establish a policy that an authorized person, designated by the
water system, must accompany all deliveries. Verify the credentials
of all drivers. This prevents unauthorized personnel from having
access to the water system.
12
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
21. Have you discussed with
your supplier(s) procedures
to ensure the security of
their products?
Yes “ No “ Verify that your suppliers take precautions to ensure that their
products are not contaminated. Chain of custody procedures for
delivery of chemicals should be reviewed. You should inspect
chemicals and other supplies at the time of delivery to verify they are
sealed and in unopened containers. Match all delivered goods with
purchase orders to ensure that they were, in fact, ordered by your
water system.
You should keep a log or journal of deliveries. It should include the
driver’s name (taken from the driver’s photo I.D.), date, time,
material delivered, and the supplier’s name.
22. Are chemicals, particularly
those that are potentially
hazardous (e.g. chlorine
gas) or flammable, properly
stored in a secure area?
Yes “ No “ All chemicals should be stored in an area designated for their
storage only, and the area should be secure and access to the area
restricted. Access to chemical storage should be available only to
authorized employees. Pay special attention to the storage,
handling, and security of chlorine gas because of its potential
hazard.
You should have tools and equipment on site (such as a fire
extinguisher, drysweep, etc.) to take immediate actions when
responding to an emergency.
23. Do you monitor raw and
treated water so that you
can detect changes in water
quality?
Yes “ No “ Monitoring of raw and treated water can establish a baseline that
may allow you to know if there has been a contamination incident.
Some parameters for raw water include pH, turbidity, total and fecal
coliform, total organic carbon, specific conductivity, ultraviolet
adsorption, color, and odor.
Routine parameters for finished water and distribution systems
include free and total chlorine residual, heterotrophic plate count
(HPC), total and fecal coliform, pH, specific conductivity, color, taste,
odor, and system pressure.
Chlorine demand patterns can help you identify potential problems
with your water. A sudden change in demand may be a good
indicator of contamination in your system.
For those systems that use chlorine, absence of chlorine residual
may indicate possible contamination. Chlorine residuals provide
protection against bacterial and viral contamination that may enter
the water supply.
24. Are tank ladders, access
hatches, and entry points
secured?
Yes “ No “ The use of tamper-proof padlocks at entry points (hatches, vents,
and ladder enclosures) will reduce the potential for of unauthorized
entry.
If you have towers, consider putting physical barriers on the legs to
prevent unauthorized climbing.
25. Are vents and overflow
pipes properly protected
with screens and/or grates?
Yes “ No “ Air vents and overflow pipes are direct conduits to the finished water
in storage facilities. Secure all vents and overflow pipes with heavy-
duty screens and/or grates.
13
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
26. Can you isolate the storage
tank from the rest of the
system?
Yes “ No “ A water system should be able to take its storage tank(s) out of
operation or drain its storage tank(s) if there is a contamination
problem or structural damage. Install shut-off or bypass valves to
allow you to isolate the storage tank in the case of a contamination
problem or structural damage.
Consider installing a sampling tap on the storage tank outlet to test
water in the tank for possible contamination.
Distribution
Hydrants are highly visible and convenient entry points into the distribution system. Maintaining and monitoring positive pressure in your system is
important to provide fire protection and prevent introduction of contaminants.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION/NEEDED TAKEN
27. Do you control the use of
hydrants and valves?
Yes “ No “ Your water system should have a policy that regulates the
authorized use of hydrants for purposes other than fire protection.
Require authorization and backflow devices if a hydrant is used for
any purpose other than fire fighting.
Consider designating specific hydrants for use as filling station(s)
with proper backflow prevention (e.g., to meet the needs of
construction firms). Then, notify local law enforcement officials and
the public that these are the only sites designated for this use.
Flush hydrants should be kept locked to prevent contaminants from
being introduced into the distribution system, and to prevent
improper use.
28. Does your system monitor
for, and maintain, positive
pressure?
Yes “ No “ Positive pressure is essential for fire fighting and for preventing
backsiphonage that may contaminate finished water in the
distribution system. Refer to your state primacy agency for minimum
drinking water pressure requirements.
29. Has your system
implemented a backflow
prevention program?
Yes “ No “ In addition to maintaining positive pressure, backflow prevention
programs provide an added margin of safety by helping to prevent
the intentional introduction of contaminants. If you need information
on backflow prevention programs, contact your state drinking water
primacy agency.
14
Personnel
You should add security procedures to your personnel policies.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
30. When hiring personnel, do
you request that local police
perform a criminal
background check, and do
you verify employment
eligibility (as required by the
Immigration and
Naturalization Service,
Form I-9)?
Yes “ No “ It is good practice to have all job candidates fill out an employment
application. You should verify professional references. Background
checks conducted during the hiring process may prevent potential
employee-related security issues.
If you use contract personnel, check on the personnel practices of
all providers to ensure that their hiring practices are consistent with
good security practices.
31. Are your personnel issued
photo-identification cards?
Yes “ No “ For positive identification, all personnel should be issued water
system photo-identification cards and be required to display them at
all times.
Photo identification will also facilitate identification of authorized
water system personnel in the event of an emergency.
32. When terminating
employment, do you require
employees to turn in photo
IDs, keys, access codes,
and other security-related
items?
Yes “ No “ Former or disgruntled employees have knowledge about the
operation of your water system, and could have both the intent and
physical capability to harm your system. Requiring employees who
will no longer be working at your water system to turn in their IDs,
keys, and access codes helps limit these types of security breaches.
33. Do you use uniforms and
vehicles with your water
system name prominently
displayed?
Yes “ No “ Requiring personnel to wear uniforms, and requiring that all vehicles
prominently display the water system name, helps inform the public
when water system staff is working on the system. Any observed
activity by personnel without uniforms should be regarded as
suspicious. The public should be encouraged to report suspicious
activity to law enforcement authorities.
34. Have water system
personnel been advised to
report security vulnerability
concerns and to report
suspicious activity?
Yes “ No “ Your personnel should be trained and knowledgeable about security
issues at your facility, what to look for, and how to report any
suspicious events or activity.
Periodic meetings of authorized personnel should be held to discuss
security issues.
35. Do your personnel have a
checklist to use for threats
or suspicious calls or to
report suspicious activity?
Yes “ No “ To properly document suspicious or threatening phone calls or
reports of suspicious activity, a simple checklist can be used to
record and report all pertinent information. Calls should be reported
immediately to appropriate law enforcement officials. Checklists
should be available at every telephone. Sample checklists are
included in Attachment 3.
Also consider installing caller ID on your telephone system to keep a
record of incoming calls.
15
Information/Storage/Computers/Controls/Maps
Security of the system, including computerized controls like a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, goes beyond the physical
aspects of operation. It also includes records and critical information that could be used by someone planning to disrupt or contaminate your water
system.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
36. Is computer access
“password protected?” Is
virus protection installed and
software upgraded regularly
and are your virus definitions
updated at least daily? Do
you have Internet firewall
software installed on your
computer? Do you have a
plan to back up your
computers?
Yes “ No “ All computer access should be password protected. Passwords
should be changed every 90 days and (as needed) following
employee turnover. When possible, each individual should have a
unique password that they do not share with others. If you have
Internet access, a firewall protection program should be installed on
your side of the computer and reviewed and updated periodically.
Also consider contacting a virus protection company and subscribing
to a virus update program to protect your records.
Backing up computers regularly will help prevent the loss of data in
the event that your computer is damaged or breaks. Backup copies
of computer data should be made routinely and stored at a secure
off-site location.
37. Is there information on the
Web that can be used to
disrupt your system or
contaminate your water?
Yes “ No “ Posting detailed information about your water system on a Web site
may make the system more vulnerable to attack. Web sites should
be examined to determine whether they contain critical information
that should be removed.
You should do a Web search (using a search engine such as
Google, Yahoo!, or Lycos) using key words related to your water
supply to find any published data on the Web that is easily
accessible by someone who may want to damage your water
supply.
38. Are maps, records, and
other information stored in a
secure location?
Yes “ No “ Records, maps, and other information should be stored in a secure
location when not in use. Access should be limited to authorized
personnel only.
You should make back-up copies of all data and sensitive
documents. These should be stored in a secure off-site location on a
regular basis.
39. Are copies of records,
maps, and other sensitive
information labeled
confidential, and are all
copies controlled and
returned to the water
system?
Yes “ No “ Sensitive documents (e.g., schematics, maps, and plans and
specifications) distributed for construction projects or other uses
should be recorded and recovered after use. You should discuss
measures to safeguard your documents with bidders for new
projects.
16
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
40. Are vehicles locked and
secured at all times?
Yes “ No “ Vehicles are essential to any water system. They typically contain
maps and other information about the operation of the water system.
Water system personnel should exercise caution to ensure that this
information is secure.
Water system vehicles should be locked when they are not in use or
left unattended.
Remove any critical information about the system before parking
vehicles for the night.
Vehicles also usually contain tools (e.g., valve wrenches) and keys
that could be used to access critical components of your water
system. These should be secured and accounted for daily.
Public Relations
You should educate your customers about your system. You should encourage them to be alert and to report any suspicious activity to law enforcement
authorities.
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
41. Do you have a program to
educate and encourage the
public to be vigilant and
report suspicious activity to
assist in the security
protection of your water
system?
Yes “ No “ Advise your customers and the public that your system has
increased preventive security measures to protect the water supply
from vandalism. Ask for their help. Provide customers with your
telephone number and the telephone number of the local law
enforcement authority so that they can report suspicious activities.
The telephone number can be made available through direct mail,
billing inserts, notices on community bulletin boards, flyers, and
consumer confidence reports.
42. Does your water system
have a procedure to deal
with public information
requests, and to restrict
distribution of sensitive
information?
Yes “ No “ You should have a procedure for personnel to follow when you
receive an inquiry about the water system or its operation from the
press, customers, or the general public.
Your personnel should be advised not to speak to the media on
behalf of the water system. Only one person should be designated
as the spokesperson for the water system. Only that person should
respond to media inquiries. You should establish a process for
responding to inquiries from your customers and the general public.
43. Do you have a procedure in
place to receive notification
of a suspected outbreak of a
disease immediately after
discovery by local health
agencies?
Yes “ No “
It is critical to be able to receive information about suspected
problems with the water at any time and respond to them quickly.
Written procedures should be developed in advance with your state
drinking water primacy agency, local health agencies, and your local
emergency planning committee and reviewed periodically.
17
QUESTION ANSWER COMMENT ACTION NEEDED/TAKEN
44. Do you have a procedure in
place to advise the
community of contamination
immediately after discovery?
Yes “ No “ As soon as possible after a disease outbreak, you should notify
testing personnel and your laboratory of the incident. In outbreaks
caused by microbial contaminants, it is critical to discover the type of
contaminant and its method of transport (water, food, etc.). Active
testing of your water supply will enable your laboratory, working in
conjunction with public health officials, to determine if there are any
unique (and possibly lethal) disease organisms in your water supply.
It is critical to be able to get the word out to your customers as soon
as possible after discovering a health hazard in your water supply.
In addition to your responsibility to protect public health, you must
also comply with the requirements of the Public Notification Rule.
Some simple methods include announcements via radio or
television, door-to-door notification, a phone tree, and posting
notices in public places. The announcement should include
accepted uses for the water and advice on where to obtain safe
drinking water. Call large facilities that have large populations of
people who might be particularly threatened by the outbreak:
hospitals, nursing homes, the school district, jails, large public
buildings, and large companies. Enlist the support of local
emergency response personnel to assist in the effort.
45. Do you have a procedure in
place to respond immediately
to a customer complaint
about a new taste, odor,
color, or other physical
change (oily, filmy, burns on
contact with skin)?
Yes “ No “
It is critical to be able to respond to and quickly identify potential
water quality problems reported by customers. Procedures should
be developed in advance to investigate and identify the cause of the
problem, as well as to alert local health agencies, your state drinking
water primacy agency, and your local emergency planning
committee if you discover a problem.
Now that you have completed the “Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Water Systems Serving Populations Between 3,300 and
10,000,” review your needed actions and then prioritize them based on the most likely threats. A Table to assist you in prioritizing actions is provided
in Attachment 1.
Once you have completed the “Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems
Serving Populations Between 3,300 and 10,000,” review the actions you need to take to improve your system’s
security. Note the questions to which you answered “no” on this worksheet. You can use it to summarize the
areas where your system has vulnerability concerns. It can also help you prioritize the actions you should take to
protect your system from vulnerabilities. You can rank your priorities in numerical order or based on the
categories of high, medium, and low.
Use the following information and the information you have generated by completing this assessment to prioritize
and rank the most important security vulnerabilities to your system:
1. Any information from local law enforcement office about the likelihood of a terrorist attack or other threats.
2. The U.S. EPA “Baseline Threat Document” to determine the most likely types of threats to protect against.
3. The primary mission of your system (i.e. serve potable water, sufficient water for fire protection, etc.).
4. Single points of failure (i.e. disabling pump) that severely limit your capability to conduct your primary mission.
5. Critical customers – such as hospitals, power plants, schools or waste water treatment facilities.
6. The vulnerabilities identified by completing this assessment.
Question
Number
Needed Action Scheduled
Completion
Priority/
Ranking
18
All community water systems serving populations greater than 3,300 and less than 10,000 must adopt an
emergency response plan (ERP) based on their vulnerability assessment. Emergency response plans are action
steps to follow if a primary source of drinking water becomes contaminated or if the flow of water is disrupted. You
can obtain sample ERPs from your state drinking water administrator, or from your state primacy agency.
This sample document is an “Emergency Contact List.” Although, it can be an essential part of your ERP, this will
not satisfy the Bioterrorism Act requirement to develop or update your emergency response plan based
on your vulnerability assessment. It contains the names and telephone numbers of people you might need to
call in the event of an emergency. This is a critical document to have at your disposal at all times. It gives you a
quick reference to all names and telephone numbers that you need for support in the case of an emergency.
Filling out this Emergency Contact List reminds you to think about all of the people you might need to contact in
an emergency. You should also talk with these people about what you and they would do if an emergency were to
occur.
Section 1. System Identification
Public Water System (PWS) ID Number
System Name
Town/City
Telephone Numbers
System Telephone Evening/Weekend Telephone
Other Contact Information
System Fax Email
Population Served and Number of
Service Connections People Served Connections
System Owner (The owner must be listed
as a person’s name)
Name, title, and telephone number of
person responsible for maintaining this
emergency contact list Name and title Telephone
19
Section 2. Notification/Contact Information – Update regularly and display clearly next to telephones
Responders
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY) PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Fire Department
Police Department
FBI Field Office (for terrorism or
sabotage)
Emergency Medical Service
Local Health Department
National Spill Response Center 24 Hour Hotline 1 (800) 424-8802
State Spill Hotline 24 Hour Hotline
Local Hazmat Team (if any)
Local/Regional Laboratory
Water System Operators
20
Local Notification List
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY) PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Government Officials
Emergency Planning Committee
Hospitals
Pharmacy
Nursing Homes
Schools
Prisons
Neighboring Water Systems
Critical Industrial/Commercial
Water Users
Others
21
Service/Repair Notification List
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY) PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Electrician
Electric Utility Company
Gas Utility Company
Sewer Utility Company
Telephone Utility Company
Plumber
Pump Specialist
“Dig Safe” or local equivalent
Soil Excavator/Backhoe Operator
Equipment Rental (Power
Generators)
Equipment Rental (Chlorinators)
Equipment Rental (Portable
Fencing)
Equipment Repairman
Equipment Repairman
(Chlorinator)
Radio/Telemetry Repair Service
Bottled Water Source
Bulk Water Hauler
Pump Supplier
Well Drillers
Pipe Supplier
Chemical Supplier
22
State Notification List
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY) PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Drinking Water Primacy Agency
Department of Environmental
Protection (or state equivalent)
Department of Health
Emergency Management Agency
Hazmat Hotline
Media Notification List
ORGANIZATION CONTACT NAME/TITLE PHONE (DAY) PHONE (NIGHT) E-MAIL
Designated Water System
Spokesperson
Newspaper – Local
Newspaper – Regional/State
Radio
Television
23
Section 3. Communication and Outreach
Communication
Communications during an emergency poses some special problems. A standard response might be to
call “911” for local fire and police departments. But what if your emergency had disrupted telephone lines
and over-loaded cell phone lines? Talk with your local Emergency Management Agency, Health
Department representative, or your Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC) about local emergency
preparedness and solutions to these problems. Increasingly, state emergency agencies are establishing
secure lines of communication with limited access. Learn how you can access those lines of
communication if all others fail.
Outreach
If there is an incident of contamination in your water supply, you will need to notify the public and make
public health recommendations (e.g., boil water, or use bottled water). To do this, you need a plan.
How will you reach all customers in the first 24 hours of an emergency?
Appoint a media spokesperson—a single person in your water system who will be authorized to
make all public statements to the media.
Make arrangements for contacting institutions with large numbers of people, some of whom may
be immuno-compromised:
– Nursing homes
– Hospitals
– Schools
– Prisons
24
Water System Telephone Threat Identification Checklist
In the event your water system receives a threatening phone call, remain calm and try to keep the caller on the line.
Use the following checklist to collect as much detail as possible about the nature of the threat and the description of
the caller.
1. Types of Tampering/Threat:
� Contamination
� Biological
� Chemical
� Threat to tamper
� Bombs, explosives, etc.
� Other (explain)
2. Water System Identification:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
PWS Owner or Manager’s Name:
3. Alternate Water Source Available: Yes/No If yes, give name and location:
4. Location of Tampering:
� Distribution
Line
� Other (explain):
� Water Storage
Facilities
�Treatment Plant � Raw Water Source � Treatment Chemicals
5. Contaminant Source and Quantity:
7. Date and Time of Tampering/Threat:
8. Caller’s Name/Alias, Address, and Telephone Number:
9. Is the Caller (check all that apply):
� Male � Female � Foul � Illiterate � Well Spoken � Irrational � Incoherent
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10. Is the Caller’s Voice (check all that apply):
� Soft
� Slurred
� Deep
� Old
� Calm
� Loud
� Nasal
� High
� Angry
� Laughing
� Clear
� Cracking
� Slow
� Crying
� Lisping
� Excited
� Rapid
� Normal
� Stuttering
� Young
� Familiar (who did it sound like?)
� Accented (which nationality or region?)
11. Is the Connection Clear? (Could it have been a wireless or cell phone?)
12. Are There Background Noises?
� Street noises (what kind?)
� Machinery (what type?)
� Voices (describe)
� Children (describe)
� Animals (what kind?)
� Computer Keyboard, Office
� Motors (describe)
� Music (what kind?)
� Other
13. Call Received By (Name, Address, and Telephone Number):
Date Call Received:
Time of Call:
14. Call Reported to: Date/Time
15. Action(s) Taken Following Receipt of Call:
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Water System Report of Suspicious Activity
In the event personnel from your water system (or neighbors of your water system) observe suspicious activity, use
the following checklist to collect as much detail about the nature of the activity.
1. Types of Suspicious Activity:
“ Breach of security systems (e.g., lock cut, door forced
open)
“ Unauthorized personnel on water system property.
“ Presence of personnel at the water system at unusual
hours
“ Changes in water quality noticed by customers (e.g.,
change in color, odor, taste) that were not planned or
announced by the water system
“ Other (explain)
2. Water System Identification:
Name:
Address:
Telephone:
PWS Owner or Manager’s Name:
3. Alternate Water Source Available: Yes/No If yes, give name and location:
4. Location of Suspicious Activity:
� Distribution Line
� Other (explain):
� Water Storage
Facilities
�Treatment Plant
� Raw Water Source
� Treatment
Chemicals
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5. If Breach of Security, What was the Nature of the Breach?
� Lock was cut or broken, permitting unauthorized entry.
Specify location
� Lock was tampered with, but not sufficiently to allow unauthorized entry.
Specify location
� Door, gate, window, or any other point of entry (vent, hatch, etc.) was open and unsecured
Specify location
� Other
Specify nature and location
6. Unauthorized personnel on site?
Where were these people?
Specify location
What made them suspicious?
� Not wearing water system uniforms
� Something else? (Specify)
What were they doing?
7. Please describe these personnel (height, weight, hair color, clothes, facial hair, any distinguishing
marks):
8. Call Received By (Name, Address, and Telephone Number):
Date Call Received:
Time of Call:
9. Call Reported to: Date/Time:
10. Action(s) Taken Following Receipt of Call:
28
A final step in completing the “Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Guide for Small Drinking Water Systems Serving Populations
Between 3,300 and 10,000” is to notify the state drinking water primacy agency that the assessment has been conducted. Please fill in the
following information and send this page only to the appropriate state drinking water primacy agency contact so that this certification can be
included in the records that the state maintains on your water system.
• DO NOT send the completed vulnerability assessment (VA) to your state primacy agency unless your state requires VA submittals.
• DO send the completed VA to the U.S. EPA Administrator by June 30, 2004 to satisfy the requirements of the Federal Bioterrorism
Act. You must also certify to the U.S. EPA Administrator that you have developed or updated your emergency response plan
based on your VA within six months of submitting your VA to the U.S. EPA. The Agency will be providing instructions to water
systems to follow when submitting your VA and certification. Please follow these U.S. EPA procedures when released.
Public Water System
(PWS) ID: Number:
System Name:
Address:
Town/City: State:
ZIP Code:
Phone: Fax:
Email:
Person Name:
Title:
Address:
Town/City: State:
ZIP Code:
Phone: Fax:
Email:
24 Hour Emergency Contact Information for Your System:
Contact Person: First Name: Last Name:
Daytime Phone: Fax:
Emergency Phone :
E-mail :
Cell Phone:
I certify that the information in this vulnerability assessment has been completed to the best of my knowledge and that the appropriate
parties have been notified of the assessment and recommended steps to be taken to enhance the security of the water system.
Furthermore, a copy of the completed assessment will be retained at the public water system, in a secure location, for state review as
requested.
Signed____________________________________________________ Date_______________________
29
30
DISCLAIMER
This document contains information on how to plan for protection of the
assets of your water system. The work necessarily addresses problems in a
general nature. You should review local, state, and Federal laws and
regulations to see how they apply to your specific situation.
Knowledgeable professionals prepared this document using current
information. The authors make no representation, expressed or implied, that
this information is suitable for any specific situation. The authors have no
obligation to update this work or to make notification of any changes in
statutes, regulations, information, or programs described in this document.
Publication of this document does not replace the duty of water systems to
warn and properly train their employees and others concerning health and
safety risks and necessary precautions at their water systems.
Neither the Association of State Drinking Water Administrators, the National
Rural Water Association, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, or the
Drinking Water Academy assume any liability resulting from the use or
reliance upon any information, guidance, suggestions, conclusions, or
opinions contained in this document.
- Introduction
How to Use this Self-Assessment Guide
Keep this Document
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment
Record of Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment Completion
Inventory of Small Water System Critical Components
Component
General Questions for the Entire Water System
Security Vulnerability Self-Assessment for Small Water Systems
Water Sources
Distribution
Attachment 1. Prioritization of Needed Actions
Attachment 2. Emergency Contact List
Section 1. System Identification
Section 2. Notification/Contact Information – Upd
State Notification List
Media Notification List
Section 3. Communication and Outreach
Communication
Attachment 3: Threat Identification Checklists
Water System Telephone Threat Identification Checklist
Certification of Completion of Assessment
