Ryan v. U.S. Department of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1991)

5. Case briefs will be written in the following format (mandatory):

a. Title and Citation (e.g. Jones v. Smith, 123 F.3d 456 (11th Cir. 2004))

b. Type of Action (e.g. civil suit for money damages for violation of free speech rights under the First Amendment.)

c. Facts of the Case (Discuss relevant facts; what happened? Why is this matter in court?)

d. Contentions of the Parties (What are the best arguments favoring each party?)

• Smith argues that:

• Jones argues that:

e. Issue(s) (The issue relevant to the subjects studied in the module in which it is assigned, e.g. Were Jones’ rights under the First Amendment violated when he was fired for speaking at a political rally?)

f. Decision (How did the court rule on that issue?)

g. Reasoning (Why did the court rule the way it did? This is the most important part of the case.)

h. Rule of Law (What one legal point do we take from this case?)

6. Length: Should not exceed 2 pages.

7. Do not post a brief without checking your spelling and grammar. You will lose points for errors.

8. Important Point: Each time you brief a case, remember why the case is selected at this point in the course. Some cases address multiple issues. You do not need to discuss all of the issues. Focus on the point of law where the case is assigned in the course.

CRJ 550

Legal Issues in Criminal Justice Administration

Case Brief Example

This is an example of a well-written case brief. Note the compliance with the required format and how the student gets right to the important points in plain language. If legal terms are encounter which are not understood, chances are that other students will not understand them, so it is best not to use them unless defined within the brief.
Assignment sub-heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
TITLE AND CITATION: Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984)
TYPE OF ACTION: Review by the U.S. Supreme Court of a lower court ruling that evidence should be suppressed as a result of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The state (Nix) sought to overturn the motion to suppress that was upheld by the U.S. District Court of Appeals.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On December 24, 1968, ten year old Pamela Powers was kidnapped from an Iowa YMCA and her body was later found in a ditch, which was within an extensive area that was being searched by volunteers and law enforcement. The defendant was observed “carrying a large bundle wrapped in a blanket…two legs in it and they were skinny and white.” Williams’ car, which contained clothing items belonging to the victim, was found the next day approximately 160 miles from the incident. Based on this information, an extensive search was started that extended from Des Moines to Davenport, Iowa.
Law enforcement obtained a warrant for Williams’ arrest, and he subsequently turned himself into the authorities in Davenport. Williams was arraigned and had obtained and spoken with an attorney. Des Moines police detectives agreed to transport Williams and not interview him during the drive between Davenport and Des Moines. During the drive, one of the detectives on the case began to speak to Williams regarding the need to find the child’s body before it snowed so that her parents could give her a proper, “Christian” burial. The detective did not ask Williams any specific questions during this conversation. At that point, Williams provided statements to the detectives that led them to the child’s body.
Williams was then tried in state court and was found guilty of first degree murder. Williams filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the body and all related evidence concerning the body’s location based on illegally obtained testimony. When the conviction was affirmed by the Iowa state Supreme Court, Williams sought relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The U.S. District Court, U.S. Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with Williams and determined that he was denied the right to counsel and his statements, which led to the child’s body, could not be introduced into evidence.

Williams was tried in state court a second time, without the use by the prosecution of the statements he had given to detectives. Prosecutors introduced evidence of the child’s body under the premise of “inevitable discovery”, as the child’s body was in an area that was within the designated search area. Williams was convicted a second time and the conviction was upheld by the Iowa Supreme Court again. Appeals by the parties brought the case back to the U.S. Supreme Court a second time.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Nix: The state (Nix) contends that the evidence of the child’s body and all related evidence concerning the body as to its location should be admissible in spite of the denial of right to counsel because the body would have been discovered in any event due to the wide-ranging search in the area which was not the result of anything that Williams said to the detectives. In the second trial, the defendant’s statements were not introduced, but the body evidence should still be admissible because it would have been discovered and in the same condition anyway even if there was no violation of the Sixth Amendment. The child’s body was found well within the extensive search area and would have been located by one or more of the over two hundred searchers nearly the same time that the defendant took the detectives to the child’s body. This argument is called the “inevitable discovery rule.”
Williams: Williams contends that were it not for the illegally obtained statements from Williams by law enforcement, the evidence would not have been discovered or used against the defendant. The evidence obtained is considered the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and therefore should not be admitted at trial.
ISSUE: Once a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has occurred, can evidence obtained from the illegally-obtained statements be admitted at trial based on the fact that the evidence would have been discovered anyway?
DECISION: Yes, because the prosecution was able to prove that the same physical evidence would have been discovered even if the constitutional rights violation did not occur.

REASONING: The court applied the reasoning of the independent source doctrine to that of inevitable discovery. “The independent source doctrine teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred” (quoting from Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984)).
RULE OF LAW: Evidence that may have been obtained in violation of a constitutional protection may still be admissible if it can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it was inevitable that the evidence would have been discovered even if the violation had not occurred. This is known as the “inevitable discovery” rule.

Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (1991)

57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

950 F.2d 458
United States Court of Appeals,

Seventh Circuit.

John C. RYAN, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 91–1467.
|

Argued Oct. 15, 1991.
|

Decided Dec. 9, 1991.

Synopsis
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent sought review of decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
upholding his discharge. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Danville Division, Harold
Albert Baker, Chief Judge, denied relief, and agent appealed. The Court of Appeals, Easterbrook, Circuit Judge, held that
substantial evidence supported MSPB’s conclusion that discharge of agent was an appropriate response to his refusal,
on religious grounds, to investigate groups that destroyed government property to express their opposition to violence.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (3)

[1] Public Employment Exercise of rights; retaliation

Substantial evidence supported Merit System Protection Board’s (MSPB) conclusion that discharge of Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent was an appropriate response to his refusal, on religious grounds, to
investigate groups that destroyed government property to express their opposition to violence; even though
the agent had a good record and would have been eligible to retire with immediate pension in nine months,
he declined to swap assignments and would not promise to carry out similar orders in the future. 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 7703(c).

9 Cases that cite this headnote

[2] Constitutional Law Public employment

Failure to accommodate Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent’s religiously motivated refusal to
investigate groups that destroyed government property to express their opposition to violence did not infringe
agent’s free exercise rights; FBI treated agent no more severely than it would have treated agent who refused a
direct order for secular reasons. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

4 Cases that cite this headnote

[3] Civil Rights Beliefs and activities protected; sincerity

Civil Rights Harassment; work environment

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Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (1991)
57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

Religiously motivated selectivity in the work one is willing to perform is an aspect of religious observance and
practice that the employer must disregard unless it demonstrates that it is unable to reasonably accommodate
without undue hardship. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701(j), 717(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e–
16(a).

10 Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms

*459 Arthur G. Greenberg (argued), Jeremy H. Heiple, Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, Peoria, Ill., for plaintiff-
appellant.

David Hoff, Asst. U.S. Atty., Danville, Ill., James A. Lewis, Asst. U.S. Atty. (argued) Springfield, Ill., for defendant-
appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, WOOD, Jr., and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Incidents of vandalism at military recruiting facilities in October 1986 were accompanied by messages linking the
destruction to pacifist groups. The next month the FBI issued a memo identifying the groups “Veterans Fast for Life”
and “Plowshares” as potentially responsible and instructing agents “to contact logical law enforcement departments
and other sources deemed appropriate to determine any similar incidents.” A copy came to John C. Ryan, who was in
charge of domestic security and terrorism investigations at the FBI’s office in Peoria, Illinois. Ryan replied with a memo
of his own:

Because of writer’s personal, religious, and human beliefs concerning the issues that appear to be involved, writer is
not willing to conduct this lead or be involved in this case and feels the FBI is ill-advised to be so involved in this case
as a Domestic Security/Terrorism; Sabotage case based on the following reasons:

1. The acts performed by the “PLOWSHARES” Group, although clearly involving Destruction of Government
Property, have been consistently nonviolent symbolic statements against violence….

Agent James Swinford volunteered to swap assignments with Ryan. He declined. An agent had taken off Ryan’s hands
an earlier order to investigate a group of peace activists including nuns and priests; this time Ryan chose confrontation.
Thomas Jones, then the agent in charge of the Springfield, Illinois, office (of which the Peoria office is a branch), expressly
instructed Ryan to carry out the order, adding that refusal “would leave me no choice but to initiate insubordination
proceedings against you.” Ryan replied: “Writer’s stance remains as set forth”.

Jones charged Ryan with insubordination, and the FBI commenced a lengthy *460 process of recommendations and
responses by multiple layers of the bureaucracy. In August 1987 the file reached John D. Glover, the Executive Assistant
Director of the FBI and its highest authority in personnel matters. Glover fired Ryan, concluding (as he later testified)
that refusal to carry out a lawful direct order is unpardonable—especially as Ryan would not promise to conduct future
investigations into the activities of antiwar groups and expressed doubt whether he could arrest persons unlawfully
demonstrating at a local military facility. Ryan, an agent with 21 years of exemplary service, was sacked only nine months
before his 50th birthday, when he would have been eligible to retire with immediate pension. Ryan now must wait until
he turns 62 before beginning to receive a (smaller) pension. The present value of the loss is approximately $500,000.

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Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (1991)
57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

Ryan pursued his administrative remedies. First an administrative law judge, and then the Merit Systems Protection
Board, concluded that discharge is an appropriate response to refusal to investigate, and that the FBI is not obliged
to accommodate religious beliefs that interfere with its mission. The district court, reviewing the administrative record
under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2), concluded that the MSPB’s decision is consistent with law and supported by substantial
evidence. Next the court held a trial de novo on Ryan’s complaint of religious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The district court concluded that the FBI did not discriminate against Ryan on account of his beliefs
but instead had enforced a neutral, reasonable rule. Glover testified at the trial that he had agonized over the decision
in light of Ryan’s good record and proximity to eligibility for retirement but concluded in the end that the Bureau could
not tolerate agents who insisted, for any reason, on being able to choose among assignments. Never in the history of the
FBI had an agent flatly refused to carry out an investigation; Glover decided not to allow the camel’s nose inside the
tent. The district court wrote: “[T]he sincerity of the witness Glover and his reluctance to do what he did was evident.
Nothing in the record describing the actions of Mr. Ryan’s fellow agents suggests that they were motivated in any way
by religious discrimination.”

Ryan, a Roman Catholic, believes that the U.S. Bishops’ Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, issued May 3, 1983, shows
the impropriety of conducting investigations into groups that destroy governmental property to express their opposition
to violence. The Pastoral Letter states in part:

Peacemaking is not an optional commitment. It is a requirement of our faith. We are called to
be peacemakers, not by some movement of the moment, but by our Lord Jesus. The content and
context of our peacemaking is set not by some political agenda or ideological program, but by the
teaching of His church.

In the fall of 1983 Ryan told his immediate superior that this letter might affect his ability to handle particular
assignments. Ryan’s sincerity is unquestioned. He did not, however, ask to be relieved of his assignment in domestic
security and terrorism. That put him on a collision course with the FBI, for it was inevitable that he would from time
to time receive assignments relating to persons opposed to military activities. Ryan’s religious beliefs prevent him from
investigating anti-military activity that is not characterized by violence. Ryan believes that the persons and groups he
was asked to investigate in November 1986 are committed to nonviolent (albeit illegal) acts. When Ryan replied to the
directive with formal disobedience rather than a request to be relieved of the assignment, he invited a formal reply. He
did not expect the reply he received and contends that dismissal is too severe—indeed, that any discipline is too severe.

[1] Ryan submits that discharge is a brutal response to a religiously motivated refusal to accept a single assignment.
Judicial review of the MSPB’s decision is deferential, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c), and we agree with the district judge that
substantial evidence supports its decision. Ryan repeatedly refused to carry out a lawful order to investigate an unsolved
federal offense; he declined to swap assignments; *461 he would not promise to carry out similar orders in the future
and implied that he would refuse to participate in related matters (such as arrests of persons engaging in illegal, but
nonviolent, protests). A law enforcement agency is entitled to insist that its agents follow orders. Obedience is a high
value in such an organization. Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986).

Whether tolerating Ryan’s disobedience and that of other agents with sincere religious claims would contribute to a
breakdown in discipline, and whether transferring such an agent to an assignment where nonviolent protests are not a
potential issue would hinder the efficient operation of the FBI, are subjects about which reasonable persons can and
do differ. The MSPB is entitled to accept the FBI’s views on such matters; once the Board did so, the district court
properly enforced its decision. Ryan argues as if we were the MSPB, considering the twelve factors identified in Douglas
v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305–06 (1981). We are not. The Board considered its own
criteria and did not transgress any legal rule in reaching its conclusion.

[2] [3] After Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), any argument
that failure to accommodate Ryan’s religiously motivated acts violates the free exercise clause of the first amendment is

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Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (1991)
57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

untenable. Smith holds that rules neutral with respect to religion satisfy that clause. The FBI did not hold Ryan’s faith
against him; it judged his deeds, not his beliefs, and treated him no more severely than it would have treated an agent
who refused a direct order for secular reasons. Title VII requires of the FBI more than the Constitution in its own right.
An employer may not discriminate on account of religion—that is to say, may not use an employee’s religion as a ground
of decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16(a). Section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), provides that religion “includes all aspects of
religious observance and practice … unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to
an employee’s … religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
See generally Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 97 S.Ct. 2264, 53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977). Religiously motivated selectivity in the work
one is willing to perform is an “aspect of religious observance and practice” that the employer must disregard unless it
demonstrates that it is “unable to reasonably accommodate … without undue hardship”. See Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d
701 (7th Cir.1986).

Reallocation of work between agents is the most obvious accommodation, one that Ryan’s fellow agents had arranged
for him before. Because Ryan refused Swinford’s offer to arrange for a swap this time, we need not decide whether a
series of swaps—potentially calling for training a different agent in the techniques of domestic security investigations
—would create “undue hardship” for the FBI as Hardison defines that term: “To require [the employer] to bear more
than a de minimis cost … is an undue hardship.” 432 U.S. at 84, 97 S.Ct. at 2277 (footnote omitted). Accord, Ansonia,
479 U.S. at 67, 107 S.Ct. at 371. Ryan proposed no course other than discontinuing investigations of the sort to which
he is opposed, which would be capitulation rather than accommodation. Ansonia tells us, however, that the employee’s
proposals are not the measure of the employer’s obligation, 479 U.S. at 68–69, 107 S.Ct. at 371–72, and Ryan blames the
FBI for the lack of strategies to accommodate his beliefs. He insists that Title VII requires the FBI to negotiate with him
about accommodation. There are two problems with his argument: first, Title VII requires employers to act, not talk (it
is not a collective bargaining law); second, the disciplinary process that stretched from December 1986 through August
1987 included many opportunities for Ryan to state his views orally and in writing—which he did, at length. That he did
not use this opportunity to propose a concrete method of accommodation is his own choice.

*462 Assistant Director Glover testified that he considered six options: (1) doing nothing; (2) sending Ryan a letter
of censure; (3) suspending Ryan for 14 days, as agent Jones recommended; (4) moving Ryan to the Springfield office
and assigning him to different work; (5) demoting Ryan to a lower grade; (6) discharging Ryan. (He did not consider
reassigning Ryan to different work at Peoria because that office, with only five agents, is so small.) Only options (1)
and (4) could be called accommodations. A mild penalty is not accommodation of any kind, because it implies that the
conduct may be forbidden and, if continued, will end in discharge.

Glover rejected “doing nothing” because he thought disobedience inconsistent with the mission of the FBI. He rejected
reassignment because of the costs of transfer, including its effect in undermining the authority of the special agent in
charge and potential effects on morale. The district judge summarized Glover’s reasoning: “[I]t is difficult to create special
work within a field office where other agents are required to handle all work that is assigned to them.” Moving an agent
to another office entails “more than a de minimis cost”. If transfers of work shifts at one place of business are undue
hardship to the employer, as the Court held in Hardison, then transfer to another city and retraining for different work
also pose undue hardship.

Sympathy for a dedicated agent trapped between his career and his faith comes easily. Perhaps the FBI would have
shown greater forbearance had Ryan promised to retire when he turned 50. But he did not want to retire. Even now he
seeks reinstatement. It is difficult for any organization to accommodate employees who are choosy about assignments;
for a paramilitary organization the tension is even greater. Conscientious objectors in the military seek discharge, which
accommodates their beliefs and the military’s need for obedience. Ryan received discharge but does not want it. He wants
to be an agent and to choose his assignments too. With good will all around, and flexibility on the part of Ryan’s fellow
agents, it just might be possible to make a go of it. Title VII does not, however, compel the FBI to attempt this. Legal

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Ryan v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 950 F.2d 458 (1991)
57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

institutions lack the sense of nuance that will tell an experienced agent how far the rules may be bent without injury to
the FBI’s mission. Compelled, as it is by Title VII, to have one rule for all of the diverse religious beliefs and practices in
the United States, the FBI may choose to be stingy with exceptions lest the demand for them overwhelm it.

AFFIRMED.

All Citations

950 F.2d 458, 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 854, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,113, 60 USLW 2451

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