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Cyberspace and Identity
Author(s): Sherry Turkle
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), pp. 643-648
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2655534
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– = –
Looking Toward Cyberspace:
Beyond Grounded Sociology
Cyberspace and Identity
SHERRY TURKLE
Program in Science, Technology, and Society
Massachusetts Institute of Bechnolo We come to see ourselves differently as we catch Over the past decade, I have been engaged in Virtual Personae online life and its impact on identity: the cre-
For a fuller discussion of the themes in this essay, ation and projection of constructed personae The online exercise of playing with identity For many people, joining online communi- 643
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 644 Symposium
experience when, for example, one wakes up as Identity, Moratoria, and Play a range of psychological effects. For some people, Erikson developed these ideas about the charged territory. Some feel an uncomfortable The creation of site-specific online personae The development of the windows metaphor The self no longer simply plays different roles This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Symposium 645
culture no longer offers an adolescent moratori- Erikson’s ideas about stages did not suggest Expanding One’s Range in the Real ly married to a female co-worker, describes his Case describes his Katharine Hepburn per- to my question “Do you feel that you call upon Yes, an aspect sort of clears its throat and In some ways, Case’s description of his inner An Object to Think with for Thinking In the late 1960s and early 1970s, I was first This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 646 Symposium
In my lack of personal connection with these When, 20 years later, I used my personal Appropriable theories ideas that capture For example, the popular appropriation of the idea that slips and dreams betray an uncon- In Freud’s work, dreams and slips of the Within the psychoanalytic tradition, many But today, the pendulum has swung away This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Symposium 647
through new social practices of identity as multi- chat rooms or MUDs or the option to declare In thinking about the self, multiplicity is a Increasingly, social theorists and philoso- rists in efforts to think about healthy selves From a Psychoanalytic to a Computer Having literally written our online personae As a culture, we are at the end of the This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 648 Symposium
Living Networked On and Offline University of Toronto
our relationship to the computer culture and . .
cltlzens Alp.
References Some Reflections on Dissociation, Reality, and Dennett, Daniel. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Erikson, Erik. [1950] 1963. Childhood and Society, 2nd Haraway, Donna. 1991. “The Actors are Cyborg, Gergen, Kenneth. 1991. The Saturated Self: Dilemmas Lifton, Robert Jay. 1993. The Protean Self: Human Martin, Emily. 1994. Flexible Bodies: Tracking Minsky, Martin. 1987. The Society of Mind. New York: Turkle, Sherry. [1978] 1990. Psychoanalytic Politics: . 1984. The Second Self: Computers and the . 1995. Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of We are living in a paradigm shift, not only in the Members of little-box societies deal only with Although people often view the world in l In the words of Malvina Reynolds’s great song flatter and more recursive. The change from We focus here on the matters that we know Communities are clearly networks, and not This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.52.68 on Wed, 28 Nov 2012 23:32:32 PM http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp p. 643 Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 28, No. 6 (Nov., 1999), pp. i-viii+643-773 Reviews Responses to Reviews [pp. 754-755]
sight of our images in the mirror of the machine.
Over a decade ago, when I first called the com-
puter a “second self” (1984), these identity-
transforming relationships were most usually
one-on-one, a person alone with a machine.1
This is no longer the case. A rapidly expanding
system of networks, collectively known as the
Internet, links millions of people together in
new spaces that are changing the way we think,
the nature of our sexuality, the form of our com-
munities, our very identities. In cyberspace, we
are learning to live in virtual worlds. We may
find ourselves alone as we navigate virtual
oceans, unravel virtual mysteries, and engineer
virtual skyscrapers. But increasingly, when we
step through the looking glass, other people are
there as well.
the ethnographic and clinical study of how peo-
ple negotiate the virtual and the “real” as they
represent themselves on computer screens
linked through the Internet. For many people,
such experiences challenge what they have tra-
ditionally called “identity,” which they are
moved to recast in terms of multiple windows
and parallel lives. Online life is not the only fac-
tor that is pushing them in this direction; there
is no simple sense in which computers are caus-
ing a shift in notions of identity. It is, rather,
that today’s life on the screen dramatizes and
concretizes a range of cultural trends that
encourage us to think of identity in terms of
multiplicity and flexibility.
In this essay, I focus on one key element of
see Turkle ( 1995).
into virtual space. In cyberspace, it is well
known, one’s body can be represented by one’s
own textual description: The obese can be slen-
der, the beautiful plain. The fact that self-pre-
sentation is written in text means that there is
time to reflect upon and edit one’s “composi-
tion,” which makes it easier for the shy to be
outgoing, the “nerdy” sophisticated. The relative
anonymity of life on the screen one has the
choice of being known only by one’s chosen
“handle” or online name gives people the
chance to express often unexplored aspects of
the self. Additionally, multiple aspects of self
can be explored in parallel. Online services offer
their users the opportunity to be known by sev-
eral different names. For example, it is not
unusual for someone to be BroncoBill in one
online community, ArmaniBoy in another, and
MrSensitive in a third.
and trying out new identities is perhaps most
explicit in “role playing” virtual communities
(such as Multi-User Domains, or MUDs) where
participation literally begins with the creation of
a persona (or several); but it is by no means con-
fined to these somewhat exotic locations. In bul-
letin boards, newsgroups, and chat rooms, the
creation of personae may be less explicit than on
MUDs, but it is no less psychologically real. One
IRC (Internet Relay Chat) participant describes
her experience of online talk: “I go from channel
to channel depending on my mood…. I actu-
ally feel a part of several of the channels, sever-
al conversations…. I’m different in the
different chats. They bring out different things
in me.” Identity play can happen by changing
names and by changing places.
ties means crossing a boundary into highly
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a lover, makes breakfast as a mother, and drives
to work as a lawyer. The windows metaphor sug-
gests a distributed self that exists in many worlds
and plays many roles at the same time. The
“windows” enabled by a computer operating sys-
tem support the metaphor, and cyberspace raises
the experience to a higher power by translating
the metaphor into a life experience of “cycling
through.”
Cyberspace, like all complex phenomena, has
it is a place to “act out” unresolved conflicts, to
play and replay characterological difficulties on
a new and exotic stage. For others, it provides an
opportunity to “work through” significant per-
sonal issues, to use the new materials of cyberso-
ciality to reach for new resolutions. These more
positive identity effects follow from the fact that
for some, cyberspace provides what Erik Erikson
([1950]1963) would have called a “psychosocial
moratorium,” a central element in how he
thought about identity development in adoles-
cence. Although the term moratorium implies a
“time out,” what Erikson had in mind was not
withdrawal. On the contrary, the adolescent
moratorium is a time of intense interaction with
people and ideas. It is a time of passionate
friendships and experimentation. The adoles-
cent falls in and out of love with people and
ideas. Erikson’s notion of the moratorium was
not a “hold” on significant experiences but on
their consequences. It is a time during which
one’s actions are, in a certain sense, not counted
as they will be later in life. They are not given as
much weight, not given the force of full judg-
ment. In this context, experimentation can
become the norm rather than a brave departure.
Relatively consequence-free experimentation
facilitates the development of a “core self,” a
personal sense of what gives life meaning that
Erikson called “identity.”
importance of a moratorium during the late
1950s and early 1960s. At that time, the notion
corresponded to a common understanding of
what “the college years” were about. Today, 30
years later, the idea of the college years as a con-
sequence-free “time out” seems of another era.
College is pre-professional, and AIDS has made
consequence-free sexual experimentation an
impossibility. The years associated with adoles-
cence no longer seem a “time out.” But if our
sense of fragmentation, some a sense of relief.
Some sense the possibilities for self-discovery. A
26-year-old graduate student in history says,
“When I log on to a new community and I cre-
ate a character and know I have to start typing
my description, I always feel a sense of panic.
Like I could find out something I don’t want to
know.” A woman in her late thirties who just got
an account with America Online used the fact
that she could create five “names” for herself on
her account as a chance to “lay out all the moods
I’m in all the ways I want to be in different
places on the system.”
depends not only on adopting a new name.
Shifting of personae happens with a change of
virtual place. Cycling through virtual environ-
ments is made possible by the existence of what
have come to be called “windows” in modern
computing environments. Windows are a way to
work with a computer that makes it possible for
the machine to place you in several contexts at
the same time. As a user, you are attentive to
just one of the windows on your screen at any
given moment, but in a certain sense, you are a
presence in all of them at all times. You might be
writing a paper in bacteriology and using your
computer in several ways to help you: You are
“present” to a word processing program on
which you are taking notes and collecting
thoughts, you are “present” to communications
software that is in touch with a distant comput-
er for collecting reference materials, you are
“present” to a simulation program that is chart-
ing the growth of bacterial colonies when a new
organism enters their ecology, and you are “pre-
sent” to an online chat session whose partici-
pants are discussing recent research in the field.
Each of these activities takes place in a “win-
dow,” and your identity on the computer is the
sum of your distributed presence.
for computer interfaces was a technical innova-
tion motivated by the desire to get people work-
ing more efficiently by “cycling through”
different applications, much as time-sharing
computers cycled through the computing needs
of different people. But in practice, windows
have become a potent metaphor for thinking
about the self as a multiple, distributed, “time-
sharing” system.
in different settings something that people
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um, virtual communities often do. It is part of
what makes them seem so attractive.
rigid sequences. His stages describe what people
need to achieve before they can move ahead eas-
ily to another developmental task. For example,
Erikson pointed out that successful intimacy in
young adulthood is difficult if one does not come
to it with a sense of who one is, the challenge of
adolescent identity building. In real life, howev-
er, people frequently move on with serious
deficits. With incompletely resolved “stages,”
they simply do the best they can. They use what-
ever materials they have at hand to get as much
as they can of what they have missed. Now vir-
tual social life can play a role in these dramas of
self-reparation. Time in cyberspace reworks the
notion of the moratorium because it may now
exist on an always-available “window.”
Case, a 34-year-old industrial designer happi-
real-life (RL) persona as a “nice guy,” a “Jimmy
Stewart type like my father.” He describes his
outgoing, assertive mother as a “Katharine
Hepburn type.” For Case, who views assertive-
ness through the prism of this J immy
Stewart/Katharine Hepburn dichotomy, an
assertive man is quickly perceived as “being a
bastard.” An assertive woman, in contrast, is
perceived as being “modern and together.” Case
says that although he is comfortable with his
temperament and loves and respects his father,
he feels he pays a high price for his own low-key
ways. In particular, he feels at a loss when it
comes to confrontation, both at home and at
work. Online, in a wide range of virtual commu-
nities, Case presents himself as females whom he
calls his “Katharine Hepburn types.” These are
strong, dynamic, “out there” women who remind
Case of his mother, who “says exactly what’s on
her mind.” He tells me that presenting himself as
a woman online has brought him to a point
where he is more comfortable with confronta-
tion in his RL as a man.
sonae as “externalizations of a part of myself.” In
one interview with him, I used the expression
“aspects of the self,” and he picked it up eagerly,
for his online life reminds him of how Hindu
gods could have different aspects or subpersonal-
ities, all the while being a whole self. In response
your personae in real life?” Case responded:
says, “I can do this. You are being so amaz-
ingly conflicted over this and I know exact-
ly what to do. Why don’t you just let me do
it?” . . . In real life, I tend to be extremely
diplomatic, nonconfrontational. I don’t like
to ram my ideas down anyone’s throat.
[Online] I can be, “Take it or leave it.” All
of my Hepburn characters are that way.
That’s probably why I play them. Because
they are smart-mouthed, they will not sugar
coat their words.
world of actors who address him and are able to
take over negotiations is reminiscent of the lan-
guage of people with multiple-personality disor-
der. But the contrast is significant: Case’s inner
actors are not split off from each other or from
his sense of”himself.” He experiences himself
very much as a collective self, not feeling that he
must goad or repress this or that aspect of him-
self into conformity. He is at ease, cycling
through from Katharine Hepburn to Jimmy
Stewart. To use analyst Philip Bromberg’s lan-
guage (1994), online life has helped Case learn
how to “stand in the spaces between selves and
still feel one, to see the multiplicity and still feel
a unity.” To use computer scientist Marvin
Minsky’s ( 1987 ) phrase, Case feels at ease
cycling through his “society of mind,” a notion
of identity as distributed and heterogeneous.
Identity, from the Latin idem, has been used
habitually to refer to the sameness between two
qualities. On the Internet, however, one can be
many, and one usually is.
About Identity
exposed to notions of identity and multiplicity.
These ideas most notably that there is no such
thing as “the ego,” that each of us is a multiplic-
ity of parts, fragments, and desiring connec-
tions surfaced in the intellectual hothouse of
Paris, they presented the world according to
such authors as Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze,
and Felix Guattari. But despite such ideal condi-
tions for absorbing theory, my “French lessons”
remained abstract exercises. These theorists of
poststructuralism spoke words that addressed the
relationship between mind and body, but from
my point of view had little to do with my own.
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ideas, I was not alone. To take one example, for
many people it is hard to accept any challenge to
the idea of an autonomous ego. While in recent
years, many psychologists, social theorists, psy-
choanalysts, and philosophers have argued that
the self should be thought of as essentially
decentered, the normal requirements of every-
day life exert strong pressure on people to take
responsibility for their actions and to see them-
selves as unitary actors. This disjuncture
between theory (the unitary self is an illusion)
and lived experience (the unitary self is the most
basic reality) is one of the main reasons why
multiple and decentered theories have been slow
to catch on or when they do, why we tend to
settle back quickly into older, centralized ways
of looking at things.
computer and modem to join online communi-
ties, I had an experience of this theoretical per-
spective which brought it shockingly down to
earth. I used language to create several charac-
ters. My textual actions are my actions my
words make things happen. I created selves that
were made and transformed by language. And
different personae were exploring different
aspects of the self. The notion of a decentered
identity was concretized by experiences on a
computer screen. In this way, cyberspace
becomes an object to think with for thinking
about identity an element of cultural brico-
lage.
the imagination of the culture at large tend to
be those with which people can become active-
ly involved. They tend to be theories that can ke
“played” with. So one way to think about the
social appropriability of a given theory is to ask
whether it is accompanied by its own objects-to-
think-with that can help it move out beyond
intellectual circles.
Freudian ideas had little to do with scientific
demonstrations of their validity. Freudian ideas
passed into the popular culture because they
offered robust and down-to-earth objects-to-
think-with. The objects were not physical but
almost-tangible ideas, such as dreams and slips of
the tongue. People were able to play with such
Freudian “objects.” They became used to look-
ing for them and manipulating them, both seri-
ously and not so seriously. And as they did so,
scious began to feel natural.
tongue carried the theory. Today, life on the
computer screen carries theory. People decide
that they want to interact with others on a com-
puter network. They get an account on a com-
mercial service. They think that this will
provide them with new access to people and
information, and of course it does. But it does
more. When they log on, they may find them-
selves playing multiple roles; they may find
themselves playing characters of the opposite
sex. In this way, they are swept up by experi-
ences that enable them to explore previously
unexamined aspects of their sexuality or that
challenge their ideas about a unitary self. The
instrumental computer, the computer that does
things for us, has revealed another side: a sub-
jective computer that does things tO us as people,
to our view of ourselves and our relationships, to
our ways of looking at our minds. In simulation,
identity can be fluid and multiple, a signifier no
longer clearly points to a thing that is signified,
and understanding is less likely to proceed
through analysis than by navigation through vir-
tual space.
“schools” have departed from a unitary view of
identity, among these the Jungian, object-rela-
tions, and Lacanian. In different ways, each of
these groups of analysts was banished from the
ranks of orthodox Freudians for such sugges-
tions, or somehow relegated to the margins. As
the United States became the center of psycho-
analytic politics in the mid-twentieth century,
ideas about a robust executive ego began to con-
stitute the psychoanalytic mainstream.
from that complacent view of a unitary self.
Through the fragmented selves presented by
patients and through theories that stress the
decentered subject, contemporary social and
psychological thinkers are confronting what has
been left out of theories of the unitary self. It is
asking such questions as, What is the self when
it functions as a society? What is the self when it
divides its labors among its constituent “alters?”
Those burdened by post-traumatic dissociative
disorders suffer these questions; I am suggesting
that inhabitants of virtual communities play
with them. In our lives on the screen, people are
developing ideas about identity as multiplicity
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. . . pllclty.
With these remarks, I am not implying that
multiple user names on America Online are
causally implicated in the dramatic increase of
people who exhibit symptoms of multiple-per-
sonality disorder (MPD), or that people on
MUDs have MPD, or that MUDding (or online
chatting) is like having MPD. I am saying that
the many manifestations of multiplicity in our
culture, including the adoption of online per-
sonae, are contributing to a general reconsidera-
tion of traditional, unitary notions of identity.
Online experiences with “parallel lives” are part
of the significant cultural context that supports
new theorizing about nonpathological, indeed
healthy, multiple selves.
term that carries with it several centuries of neg-
ative associations, but such authors as Kenneth
Gergen (1991), Emily Martin (1994), and
Robert Jay Lifton (1993) speak in positive terms
of an adaptive, “flexible” self. The flexible self is
not unitary, nor are its parts stable entities. A
person cycles through its aspects, and these are
themselves ever-changing and in constant com-
munication with each other. Daniel Dennett
(1991) speaks of the flexible self by using the
metaphor of consciousness as multiple drafts,
analogous to the experience of several versions
of a document open on a computer screen,
where the user is able to move between them at
will. For Dennett, knowledge of these drafts
encourages a respect for the many different ver-
sions, while it imposes a certain distance from
them. Donna Haraway (1991), picking up on
this theme of how a distance between self states
may be salutory, equates a “split and contradic-
tory self” with a “knowing self.” She is optimistic
about its possibilities: “The knowing self is par-
tial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply
there and original; it is always constructed and
stitched together imperfectly; and therefore able
to join with another, to see together without
claiming to be another.” What most character-
izes Haraway’s and Dennett’s models of a know-
ing self is that the lines of communication
between its various aspects are open. The open
communication encourages an attitude of
respect for the many within us and the many
within others.
phers are being joined by psychoanalytic theo-
whose resilience and capacity for joy comes from
having access to their many aspects. For exam-
ple, Philip Bromberg (1994), insists that our
ways of describing “good parenting” must now
shift away from an emphasis on confirming a
child in a “core self” and onto helping a child
develop the capacity to negotiate fluid transi-
tions between self states. The healthy individual
knows how to be many but to smooth out the
moments of transition between states of self.
Bromberg says: “Health is when you are multiple
but feel a unity. Health is when different aspects
of self can get to know each other and reflect
upon each other.” Here, within the psychoana-
lytic tradition, is a model of multiplicity as a
state of easy traffic across selves, a conscious,
highly articulated “cycling through.”
Culture?
into existence, they can be a kind of Rorschach
test. We can use them to become more aware of
what we project into everyday life. We can use
the virtual to reflect constructively on the real.
Cyberspace opens the possibility for identity
play, but it is very serious play. People who cul-
tivate an awareness of what stands behind their
screen personae are the ones most likely to suc-
ceed in using virtual experience for personal and
social transformation. And the people who
make the most of their lives on the screen are
those who are able to approach it in a spirit of
self-reflection. What does my behavior in cyber-
space tell me about what I want, who I am, what
I may not be getting in the rest of my life?
Freudian century. Freud after all, was a child of
the nineteenth century; of course, he was carry-
ing the baggage of a very different scientific sen-
sibility than our own. But faced with the
challenges of cyberspace, our need for a practical
philosophy of self-knowledge, one that does not
shy away from issues of multiplicity, complexity,
and ambivalence, that does not shy away from
the power of symbolism, from the power of the
word, from the power of identity play, has never
been greater as we struggle to make meaning
from our lives on the screen. It is fashionable to
think that we have passed from a psychoanalyt-
ic culture to a computer culture that we no
longer need to think in terms of Freudian slips
but rather of information processing errors. But
the reality is more complex. It is time to rethink
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BAR1RY WELLMAN and KEITH HAMPTON
psychoanalytic culture as a proudly held joint
Bromberg, Philip. 1994. “Speak that I May See You:
Psychoanalytic Listening.” Psychoanalytic Dialogues
4 (4): 517-47.
Boston: Little, Brown.
Ed. New York: Norton.
Nature is Coyote, and the Geography is Elsewhere:
Postscript to ‘Cyborgs at Large.”‘ In Technoculture,
edited by Constance Penley and Andrew Ross.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
of Identity in Contemporary Life. New York: Basic
Books.
Resilience in an Age of Fragmentation. New York:
Basic Books.
Immunity in America Culture from the Days of Polio
to the Days of AIDS. Boston: Beacon Press.
Simon & Schuster.
Jacques Lacan and Freud’s French Revolution. 2nd
Ed. New York: Guilford Press.
Human Spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.
the Internet. New York: Simon & Schuster.
way we perceive society, but even more in the
way in which people and institutions are con-
nected. It is the shift from living in “little box-
es”1 to living in networked societies.
fellow members of the few groups to which they
belong: at home, in the neighborhood, at work,
or in voluntary organizations. They belong to a
discrete work group in a single organization;
they live in a household in a neighborhood; they
belong to a kinship group (one each for them-
selves and their spouse) and to discrete volun-
tary organizations: churches, bowling leagues,
professional associations, school associations,
and the like. All of these appear to be bodies
with precise boundaries for inclusion (and there-
fore exclusion). Each has an internal organiza-
tion that is often hierarchically structured:
supervisors and employees, parents and children,
pastors and churchgoers, the union executive
and its members. In such a society, each interac-
tion remains in its place: one group at a time.
terms of groups (Freeman 1992), they function
in networks. In networked societies boundaries
are more permeable, interactions occur with
diverse others, linkages switch between multiple
networks, and hierarchies (when they exist) are
(1963).
groups to networks can be seen at many levels.
Trading and political blocs have lost their
monolithic character in the world system.
Organizations form complex networks of
alliance and exchange rather than cartels, and
workers (especially professionals, technical
workers, and managers) report to multiple peers
and superiors. Management by network is
replacing management by (two-way) matrix as
well as management by hierarchical trees
(Berkowitz 1982; Wellman 1988; Castells
1996).
best: the development of networked communi-
ties, both online and oSine. Even before the
advent of compueer-mediated communication,
it became clear that when you define communi-
ties as sets of informal ties of sociability, support,
and identity, they rarely are neighborhood soli-
darities or even densely knit groups of kin and
friends (Wellman 1999a). To look for commu-
nity only in localities and groups has always
been the wrong game focusing on territory
rather than on social relationships and institu-
tions and it is becoming even more wrong with
the growth of relationships in cyberspace.
neatly organized into little neighborhood boxes.
People usually have more friends outside their
neighborhood than within it: Indeed, many peo-
ple have more ties outside their metropolitan
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p. 644
p. 645
p. 646
p. 647
p. 648
Volume Information [pp. 760-773]
Front Matter [pp. i-vi]
Erratum: Review [pp. v]
Editors’ Note [pp. vii-viii]
Symposium
Looking Toward Cyberspace: Beyond Grounded Sociology
Cyberspace and Identity [pp. 643-648]
Living Networked On and Offline [pp. 648-654]
Who Needs Politics? Who Needs People? The Ironies of Democracy in Cyberspace [pp. 655-661]
Silver Bullets or Land Rushes? Sociologies of Cyberspace [pp. 661-664]
Cyberspace: Sociology’s Natural Domain [pp. 664-667]
Inequalities
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Close Relationships, Family, and the Life Course
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Work, Organizations, and Markets
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Cognitions, Emotions, and Identities
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Ideology and Cultural Production
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Community, Environment, and Population
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Politics, Social Movements, and the State
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Social Control and the Law
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Health, Illness, and Medicine
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Theories and Epistemology
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Methodology and Research Techniques
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Review: untitled [pp. 753]
Publications Received [pp. 756-759]
Back Matter
