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For their newsletter covering hazard analysis and risk reduction techniques, as well as the importance of management commitment and building a sound safety culture. Include the following: The appropriate uses of a preliminary hazard analysis.
The process to perform a risk assessment of an ergonomic hazard at a workplace.
Use an example of an ergonomic hazard in your discussion based on the provided scenario.
Determine which regulations/standards/guidelines apply to ergonomic hazards at a workplace.
Recommend abatement strategies to reduce the risks associated with the identified ergonomic hazard.
Discuss how management can promote safety by example. Explain the process of creating a participative safety culture. Use the scenario below.
Scenario: One ergonomic hazard you could consider if you have not come up with one on your own is one with which most people are somewhat familiar: airline baggage handling. Moving heavy baggage of all different shapes and sizes around all day can take a real toll on their rotator cuffs, often resulting in surgery. Removing them from the conveyor, placing them on carts, then onto the loading conveyor, and into the cargo hold of the plane requires all sorts of awkward shoulder motions while under load. This is a significant hazard that has been well-documented in the industry.
Qualitative Risk Assessment in Water Bottling Production: A Case Study of Maan Nestlé
Pure Life Factory
Diana Rbeht* , Mohammed S. El-Ali Al-Waqfi , Jawdat Al-Jarrah
Fire and Safety Engineering Department, Prince Al-Hussein Bin Abdullah II Academy of Civil Protection, Al-Balqa Applied
University, P.O. Box 206, Al Salt 19117, Jordan
Corresponding Author Email: diana.rbehat@bau.edu.jo
Copyright: ©2023 IIETA. This article is published by IIETA and is licensed under the CC BY 4.0 license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
https://doi.org/10.18280/ijsse.130605 ABSTRACT
Received: 27 August 2023
Revised: 8 October 2023
Accepted: 31 October 2023
Available online: 25 December 2023
A comprehensive qualitative risk assessment (QRA) was conducted at the Maan Nestlé
Pure Life factory, encompassing its production, storage, and bottling sections. Through a
meticulous review of records, analysis of activities, and examination of work procedures,
potential hazards within the factory were identified and subsequently categorized using
the risk matrix technique. In total, seventeen hazards were identified, of which seven were
deemed high risk, eight medium, and two low. This assessment underscores the
imperative for measures aimed at risk control, reduction, or elimination. The QRA’s
qualitative approach, while effective in broad hazard identification, may have led to an
incomplete hazard inventory. Nonetheless, it proved instrumental in pinpointing
safety
hazards and informing the development of robust safety policies. These policies integrate
considerations of human behavior and equipment failure, focusing on preserving product
quality while safeguarding the business and its operators. Despite the presence of an
unsafe workplace, the study revealed that the need for new infrastructure is non-essential.
Instead, a series of modifications are recommended, including the replacement of
defective roofs, installation of electrical rolls and lifts, segregation of chemical storage,
personnel training, and various ergonomic and procedural adjustments. The study further
advocates for a subsequent phase of analysis utilizing quantitative techniques such as fault
tree analysis. This is particularly pertinent for hazards requiring specific root cause
identification, enabling the determination of necessary safety controls to address these
root causes and prevent hazard occurrence.
Keywords:
hazard, risk, risk matrix, QRA, risk rating
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Basics and definitions
In industrial facilities, safety is a paramount concern,
primarily due to the risks of workplace fatalities and injuries
resulting from inadequate safety measures and the absence of
robust Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems.
In the Jordanian labor market, as reported by Jordan Labor
Watch, occupational injuries are recorded every 25 minutes,
with a work-related death occurring every two days. Estimates
from the Social Security Corporation indicate approximately
20,000 work accidents annually, equating to a rate of 11.7
injuries per 1,000 individuals. The industrial sector accounts
for approximately 25.3% of all work-related fatalities, with the
wholesale and retail trade sector contributing to 17.7%.
Furthermore, the industrial sector experiences 31.6% of total
work injuries, followed by the health and social work sector at
22.0%. Notably, almost half of all occupational injuries befall
workers under 30 years of age, underscoring the imperative for
heightened awareness and specialized training to safeguard the
health and safety of younger workers [1].
Safety, as a discipline, aims to minimize the loss of life and
property attributable to accidents as much as possible [2].
Workplace incidents not only affect workers but also have
adverse financial implications for employers. The costs
associated with an accident can manifest in various forms,
including salary expenditures, productivity losses, retraining,
compensation payments, repairs, and medical expenses.
Like any industrial sector, the water bottling industry faces
occupational hazards at various stages, including production,
storage, and distribution. The industry predominantly employs
automated processes, supplemented by some manual handling
and repetitive tasks performed by workers. Consequently, this
environment presents multiple workplace hazards, including
ergonomic challenges, mechanical design issues, physical
activity demands, chemical exposures, and psychosocial
stressors. As a result, factory workers in this sector are more
vulnerable to occupational morbidities and fatalities due to
these heightened
workplace risks.
Globally, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
estimates that approximately 2.78 million individuals
succumb annually to occupational diseases or job-related
accidents. Furthermore, around 374 million non-fatal injuries
occur each year, leading to a minimum of four days of work
missed per injury. The economic implications of substandard
workplace safety and health practices account for about 3.94
percent of the global gross domestic product annually [2]. Yet,
International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering
Vol. 13, No. 6, December, 2023, pp.
1025
–
1038
Journal homepage: http://iieta.org/journals/ijsse
1025
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2479-8630
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7368-0789
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4249-0840
https://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.18280/ijsse.130605&domain=pdf
the human toll of this frequent adversity is incalculable.
Risk, in this context, is the possibility or likelihood of harm
resulting from exposure to a hazard. However, Kaplan and
Garrick [3] describe risk as uncertainty coupled with potential
damage or loss, while safety is defined as being protected from
possible harm. The Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) [4]
characterizes risk as “The potential for realization of unwanted,
adverse consequences to human life, health, property, or the
environment”. Conversely, risk assessment involves the
identification, analysis, and evaluation of hazards [3].
The risk assessment process is integral to occupational
health and safety management plans, serving to heighten
employee awareness of potential workplace hazards and risks
[5]. This process is methodical and recurring, commencing
with the identification of risks and risk factors capable of
causing harm. It then progresses to the analysis and assessment
of the risks associated with these identified hazards,
culminating in the determination of appropriate measures for
risk elimination or control. The selection of strategies to
minimize or eradicate these risks is contingent upon the nature
of the risk in question [6].
Effective risk management begins with risk
assessment.
When a company employs five or more individuals,
conducting and documenting a risk assessment becomes a
legal obligation [7]. In response to this requirement,
companies often develop informative tools to facilitate
risk
assessments. According to HSE [8], the fundamental
components of successful risk management systems include
policy, organization, planning and implementation,
performance measurement, and review. The techniques
employed in risk assessment are pivotal in establishing
priorities and setting objectives for the elimination of hazards
and the reduction and control of risks in health and safety
management [9].
1.2 More on the concepts
Comprehending risk assessment necessitates a clear
understanding of the concepts of hazard, risk, and safety. A
hazard is defined as any potential source of harm; it may pose
a threat to people, organizations, or the environment. For
instance, a wet floor constitutes a hazard. Hazards are diverse
and can encompass physical hazards, which are factors
capable of causing harm (like a spill on the floor or constant
loud noise), and chemical hazards, which include harmful
chemical substances in any form (such as cleaning products or
asbestos) [8]. When conducting risk assessment, various
methods are employed to identify hazards and assess their
potential effects [3]. Statistics from social security reveal that
falls constitute the most common type of work injury,
accounting for 28.03 percent of total injuries. This is followed
by incidents involving manual labor tools, which represent
11.9 percent of injuries, and injuries resulting from falling
objects at 9.68 percent. Additionally, the data indicate that
road accidents are the leading cause of injury-related deaths,
responsible for 46.8 percent of total fatalities, followed by
incidents involving explosions, fires, and falls [1].
Risk is defined as the likelihood of the occurrence of a
harmful event and the severity of the resultant harm. For
example, the risk associated with slipping on a wet floor
encompasses both the probability of the slip occurring and the
potential consequences of such an event [9]. The interplay
between probability and consequences can significantly
impact individuals’ daily activities, as well as their
professional and personal decision-making processes [10]. An
alternate perspective on risk considers it as the probability that
a hazard will adversely affect individuals, organizations, or the
environment, coupled with the potential outcomes of the
hazard’s occurrence. A risk is deemed low when the likelihood
of the event happening is minimal, and its impact is considered
mild. Conversely, the risk is considered high if there is a high
probability of the event occurring and the potential effects are
severe. It is important to note that while a hazard is a
prerequisite for risk, the presence of a hazard invariably
implies some level of risk [9].
Safety involves determining whether a risk is sufficiently
low to be considered safe or high enough to be deemed
harmful. Safety assessments, which may vary in their
conclusions, can be conducted either individually or by
governmental organizations [9]. Risk assessment, therefore, is
a process enabling safety teams to identify hazards, assess the
likelihood and severity of hazardous events, and then
determine necessary actions. As a distinct concept, risk
management is a dynamic, continuous process encompassing
hazard identification, analysis, mitigation measures, and
response to risk factors. While risk assessment is focused on
detecting hazards and analyzing all potential hazards and risks
in the workplace, it is a component of risk
management.
Essentially, risk assessment involves hazard identification,
analysis, and evaluation. The responsibility for hazard
identification typically lies with managers and senior
employees who possess knowledge about various workplace
hazards and risks. These hazards might include fires, chemical
exposures, data breaches, and other incidents capable of
harming people and property. The associated risks could
pertain to health, safety, or quality. Risk analysis, a crucial part
of risk assessment, delves into the consequences of identified
hazards and their impact on work sustainability. Following this,
risk evaluation involves categorizing risks based on their
severity and likelihood. To facilitate this, risks can be ranked
using a risk assessment matrix.
1.3 Types of risk assessments
In any workplace, the types of risk assessments conducted
should be proportionate to and aligned with the operational
activities being carried out. The choice of risk assessment
method depends on the frequency of occurrence and the
factors that trigger the need for such assessments [7].
Generally, risk assessments can be categorized into two
primary types based on these considerations [4]. The first type
is the standard risk assessment, which is routinely conducted
at regular intervals. This form of assessment is a foundational
element of ongoing safety management, providing a consistent
review of potential risks within the workplace. The second
type, known as dynamic risk assessment, serves to address any
gaps identified in the standard risk assessment. It is typically
implemented when new hazards are introduced or identified in
the workplace, ensuring that emerging risks are promptly and
effectively managed [11].
Standard risk assessment encompasses five prevalent types.
The first is a fire risk assessment, which systematically
evaluates factors related to fire hazards, the likelihood of a fire
occurring, and the potential consequences should one arise
[12]. Manual handling assessments are crucial in sectors like
healthcare, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction,
recognized for high-risk manual handling activities due to
their frequency and nature. Display Screen Equipment (DSE)
1026
assessments are required in workplaces where employees use
computers, LCDs, etc. [5], and are also applicable to tablets,
smartphones, and laptops [7]. COSHH (Control of Substances
Hazardous to Health) assessments focus on hazards and risks
from hazardous substances in the workplace. Lastly, complex
risk assessments are necessary for larger-scale systems, such
as nuclear power plants or meteorological systems, which
involve intricate interactions between mechanical, electronic,
nuclear, and human elements [11]. In contrast, dynamic risk
assessment is utilized to address any gaps left by standard risk
assessments or in response to the introduction of new hazards
in the workplace [11]. Dynamic risk assessment involves
analyzing workplace risks and hazards and implementing
controls to reduce or eliminate them. However, sudden
changes in the work environment, such as the introduction of
new hazards, necessitate this form of assessment [12].
Dynamic Risk Assessments enable safety professionals to
quickly evaluate risks in changing environments, ensuring
continued safe work practices. While standard risk
assessments are prepared in advance, recorded, and regularly
monitored, dynamic risk assessments are conducted on the
spot by individuals as they encounter new environments or
changes within them.
Furthermore, the implementation of a dynamic risk
assessment does not negate the necessity for a standard risk
assessment. Rather, the dynamic risk assessment serves as a
complement to the standard risk assessment, addressing any
unforeseen gaps or nuances that the latter may not have
anticipated [11]. It is incumbent upon those responsible for
safety to conduct a dynamic risk assessment prior to
encountering any new situation or environment. Essentially, as
circumstances evolve, it is imperative for the safety team to
continually reassess risks and hazards, adapting their approach
to ensure the utmost safety and hazard mitigation.
1.4 The implementation of risk assessment
The risk assessment process is designed to evaluate the
likelihood and severity of potential harm. This process
encompasses five sub-processes: hazard identification, risk
analysis, risk evaluation, risk control, and assessment review,
with the provision for reassessment if necessary.
Hazard
identification involves scrutinizing processes and work
procedures to identify conditions that could potentially harm
people. In the stages of risk analysis and risk evaluation,
assessors determine the probability of each hazard occurring
and the severity of its potential consequences. Risk evaluation
also facilitates the ranking of hazards based on their risk
ratings. Risk control, on the other hand, focuses on identifying
measures to eliminate hazards, either by preventing their
occurrence or, if that is not feasible, by controlling the risk.
This stage includes documenting the findings of the
assessment. The final stage involves revising control plans,
making improvements, and implementing administrative
actions to ensure a healthy and safe working environment [6].
The ISO-IEC 31010:2019 standard outlines the steps involved
in hazard identification and risk assessment. Published as a
dual-logo standard with ISO, it offers guidance on the
selection and application of various techniques for assessing
risk in diverse situations. These techniques aid decision-
making in scenarios with uncertainty, provide insights about
specific risks, and are part of a broader risk management
process. The standard provides a framework for organizations
to identify, assess, and manage risk, applying to various
contexts and industries. It aims to assist organizations in
making informed decisions about risk management and in
developing risk management strategies tailored to their unique
needs and circumstances [12].
Several categories of risk evaluation methods exist to
estimate individual components of risk accurately, aiming to
reflect reality more effectively. These categories include
qualitative, quantitative, and semi-quantitative risk
assessments. The choice among these types depends on the
specific circumstances and the availability of data. In
certain
situations, it is feasible to implement more than one type of
assessment.
QRA is the most prevalent among these types. In QRA,
either an individual or a team can collect the necessary
information to conduct the assessment. This method is
particularly useful when numerical data are scarce or when
resources and records are limited.
QRA is primarily utilized for workplace risk assessments.
In this approach, the experience and knowledge of the assessor
play a pivotal role. The process involves not only reviewing
relevant data but also consulting employees and laborers who
are directly involved in the work activities. This consultation
is critical for making informed decisions about the potential
and severity of risks, followed by categorizing these risks into
levels such as high, medium, or low. A key feature of QRA is
its assignment of numerical values to different levels of risk,
enabling the computation of a risk rating. This rating is
typically calculated as the product of the severity and
likelihood of a given risk. Consequently, QRA is particularly
suited for workplace environments, where it aims to determine
the likelihood of someone being at high, medium, or low risk
of injury. The assessment involves an evaluation of the
severity of potential consequences and the probability of their
occurrence, without relying on quantitative tools. QRA is a
systematic examination of workplace factors that may cause
harm. It facilitates decision-making regarding the adequacy of
existing precautions and controls, and whether additional
measures are necessary to mitigate identified risks [13].
QRA does not inherently involve numerical data, qualitative
expressions are often quantified to estimate the Risk Rating
(RR), which represents the product of severity and potential.
In QRA, numbers are typically assigned to the severity and
likelihood or potential of a consequence, ranging from 1 to 5.
The five levels of severity are categorized as insignificant,
minor, moderate, major, and catastrophic. Similarly, the
likelihood of consequences is classified into five categories:
rare, unlikely, possible, likely, and certain [8].
Constructing a risk assessment matrix involves placing the
likelihood or potential on the abscissa and the severity on the
ordinate. This yields a 5×5 matrix, with each element
representing the product of severity and likelihood. The
magnitude of these elements reflects the risk rating. The
ratings are classified into three categories: low (RR ranging
from 1 to 5), medium (RR ranging from 6 to 12), and high (RR
ranging from 15 to 25). Risks with a high rating necessitate
immediate action, while those with a medium rating may allow
for delayed measures, and a low rating might not require
further action. Ultimately, QRA is descriptive and heavily
relies on the competency and experience of the assessors.
Their expertise is crucial in accurately interpreting and
applying the qualitative data to the risk assessment process,
ensuring that the assessments are reflective of the actual
workplace risks.
Semi-quantitative risk assessment employs a methodology
1027
that combines qualitative and quantitative elements to
articulate the relative scale of risks. This approach utilizes
numerical values, primarily in the form of frequency ranges or
levels of consequence, to provide a more defined assessment
of risk. The use of consequences-likelihood matrices, with
consequences plotted on the x-axis and likelihood on the y-
axis, enables the classification of risks. This classification
leverages expert knowledge, often in scenarios where
quantitative data is limited [13]. The foundational aspect of
semi-quantitative risk assessment is categorical labeling. This
process involves describing the probability, impact, and/or
severity of a risk as Very Low, Low, Medium, High, or Very
High. Alternatively, a scaling system such as A-F may be used,
with each term having a clear and distinct definition [14].
In the semi-quantitative risk assessment approach, various
scales are employed to characterize the likelihood of events
and their consequences or severities. This method does not
necessitate precise mathematical data for analyzing
probabilities and their outcomes. Instead, the goal is to
establish a hierarchy of risks relative to their quantification,
identifying which risks require further review without
implying a direct relationship between them.
Conversely, quantitative risk assessment assigns numerical
values to risks based on realistic and measurable data. Rather
than categorizing risks as high, medium, or low, they are
assigned specific numerical values, such as 3, 2, and 1,
although the scale can be broader. This type of risk assessment
is particularly applicable to industries with significant hazards,
such as aviation, chemicals, and nuclear power plants.
Quantitative measurements may encompass a variety of
factors, including hazards associated with equipment,
chemicals, design, and modeling
techniques.
Quantitative risk assessment necessitates specialized
instruments and procedures for hazard identification, severity
consequence estimation, and likelihood determination of
hazard actualization. These tools include event trees,
sensitivity analysis, simulation software, and others. The use
of these tools enables a more detailed and precise assessment
of risks, especially in scenarios where high-risk factors are
present.
Based on the aforementioned discussion, it can be
concluded that each category of risk assessment—qualitative,
quantitative, and semi-quantitative—has its own set of
advantages and disadvantages. QRA is advantageous in its
speed and ease of implementation, as it does not rely on
numerical measurements. This simplicity allows for prompt
execution. However, it is inherently descriptive and heavily
reliant on the competency and experience of the assessors. As
a result, there is a degree of subjectivity involved, with the
potential for variability in determining probabilities and
consequences.
In contrast, QRA is more objective and offers detailed
decision-making. However, this method is time-intensive and
can be complex, as quantitative data are often challenging to
collect or measure. This complexity may limit its applicability
in certain situations.
Semi-quantitative risk assessment serves as an intermediary
approach, balancing the qualitative and quantitative methods.
By evaluating risks on a scale, it mitigates some of the
limitations found in purely qualitative or quantitative
assessments. This approach offers a more nuanced evaluation,
combining the ease of qualitative assessments with the
specificity of quantitative methods.
Ideally, a risk assessment should commence with a
straightforward qualitative evaluation, incorporating any
relevant and applicable good practices. In certain
circumstances, it may be necessary to supplement a qualitative
assessment with a more precise semi-quantitative or
quantitative evaluation [8]. This combined approach allows
for a comprehensive assessment that leverages the strengths of
each method while addressing their individual limitations.
In risk assessment, the analyst estimates the probability of
occurrence of identified hazards, which can be numerous and
complex, especially in scenarios involving novel processes
and operational parameters. For instance, in large chemical
process plants or nuclear installations, detailed and
sophisticated risk assessments are necessary. In such cases, it
is appropriate to conduct a detailed quantitative risk
assessment in addition to a simpler qualitative assessment [7].
Quantitative risk assessment involves obtaining a numerical
estimate of risk based on a quantitative analysis of event
probabilities and consequences. This process requires the use
of specialized quantitative tools and techniques for hazard
identification and to estimate the severity of potential
consequences as well as the likelihood of hazard realization
[7]. Given the complexity of these techniques, which are
sometimes supported by software, the assessments need to be
carried out by suitably qualified and experienced assessors.
These techniques are particularly relevant for assessing risks
related to business objectives and analyzing the adverse
financial effects of incidents on the company. The outcomes
of quantitative risk assessments are numerical estimates of risk,
which can then be compared to numerical risk criteria during
the risk evaluation stage. This quantitative approach provides
a measurable and objective basis for comparing and evaluating
risks, thereby facilitating informed decision-making in the
management of these risks.
In quantitative risk assessment, the focus is on estimating
the probability of occurrence of an undesirable top event. This
estimation is achieved by accurately sequencing the sub-
events that lead to the top event, which is responsible for
releasing the hazard. Each of these sub-events is assigned a
probability of occurrence. These probabilities are then
logically combined to derive the overall probability of the top
event occurring [8].
This quantitative risk assessment procedure is greatly aided
by the use of logic diagrams, which provide graphical
representations of the sequence of events. The most commonly
utilized diagrams in this context are the Event Tree Analysis
(ETA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) techniques [15]. Fault
Tree Analysis is a method that seeks to identify the root causes
of a specified final event. It employs deductive reasoning,
working backward from the final event to trace its origins.
Event Tree Analysis, in contrast, uses inductive reasoning. It
starts with an initiating or primary event and works forward to
define the subsequent events and paths that result from this
initial occurrence [8]. Both these techniques are invaluable in
pinpointing specific events or parameters that should be
monitored or measured periodically. This regular monitoring
is crucial for the effective implementation of the quantitative
risk assessment method, as it provides ongoing data and
insights necessary for accurate risk estimation and
management.
Despite its significance, risk assessment in water bottling
factories often faces a dearth of resources. However, the
increasing concern over water scarcity and the quality of
drinking water is driving more investments towards water
treatment and bottling processes. Water-related risks, which
1028
can potentially impact production, health, safety, and income,
necessitate a tailored assessment to identify and effectively
address specific risks associated with drinking water
production [16].
In an effort to enhance the bottling process for spring waters,
a study team conducted a comprehensive analysis of
Monopolis SA’s adherence to environmental and occupational
health and safety standards. The team synthesized a risk
assessment focusing on occupational diseases and injuries
across all the company’s workplaces. This synthesis included
an array of control measures designed to either eliminate or
significantly reduce risks to an acceptable level for all
workplaces within the organization [17].
2. METHODOLOGY
The following sections discuss the methodology adopted for
this case study. Investigation of both quantitative and
qualitative aspects of occupational and health risks is essential
to this work because the workplace must be safe, and
employees must also believe it is secure.
2.1 The case study background
Nestlé Pure Life Jordan Factory in Maan City was chosen
as a case study to conduct a risk assessment. Jordan, which has
been ranked as the second water-scarce country in the world.
It is primarily arid. About half of its 11 million residents are
not Jordanians. Ma’an City is the home of Jordan’s Nestle Pure
Life water bottling factory.
Ma’an City is located in the southern Jordanian desert, 218
kilometers from Amman, the country’s capital. Ma’an City has
about 50,350 residents, according to Worldometer.
The city is an important transportation hub on the current
Desert Highway and the historical King’s Highway. Most of
its population work in trade. Ma’an experiences long, hot
summers that are dry and clear, as well as chilly winters that
are typically clear. It is 1,000 meters above sea level. It serves
as Ma’an Governorate’s administrative hub.
The objective of this study was to conduct a comprehensive
risk assessment of Nestlé’s (Pure Life’s) Jordan factory in
Maan city. Nestlé Pure Life brand started in 1860 when
pharmacist Henry Nestle developed specialized food for
infants whose mothers could not breastfeed. Soon, the recipe
he formulated was sold throughout Europe [18]. Nowadays, it
is one of the world’s largest food and beverage companies. It
has over 2000 brands ranging from global icons to local
favorites and is present in 187 countries worldwide [18]. In
1998, Nestle launched the Pure Life water brand to help meet
the global need for safe drinking water with a pleasant taste at
an affordable price. Currently, Pure Life bottled water is
available in more than 20 countries.
Nestle’s Jordan factory was established in 1995 under the
name “Nestle Jordan Trading Company” in Ma’an, Al-
Husayniyah [18]. This factory specializes in water bottling
(Pure Life). The factory has 111 employees, with an area of
4683 m2.
The current study investigates the occupational health and
safety status at the Nestlé Pure Life Jordan Factory by
applying the semi-quantitative risk assessment. The facility
comprises three distinct areas; production, storage, and
bottling. The assessment followed the standard technique that
starts with identifying hazards and their causes, determining
how and who is affected, hazard evaluation, and determining
control measures. Identifying hazards involved their detailed
description. Further, risk evaluation and analysis aimed to
assign the identified hazards a risk rating based on their
likelihood and severity. Finally, a risk matrix constructed to
summarize the factory’s safety status followed by the proposed
risk
controls.
2.2 Risk assessment
In the current research, the ability to estimate the likelihood
and the severity of the impact of a hazard was a significant
drawback of the risk assessment process. The interviews with
workers and safety officers, incident records, and observations
formed the basis of this estimation. The associated
uncertainties of risk may lead to underestimates. Therefore,
the factory’s safety department must continually validate and
update these estimates by comparing them to event logs and
considering new controls and modifications to processes. Data
verification, uncertainty analysis, and simulations may also
improve estimates. Furthermore, employee training can have
a profound effect on risk estimation. Identifying potential
hazards and assessing associated risks requires adequate
expertise and knowledge.
Figure 1. Risk management flowchart (adapted from ISO-
IEC 31010) [12]
A standard risk assessment began with hazard identification
using various techniques to identify the existing hazards and
their potential causes, then assessing them according to their
expected effects, and ending with developing a list of control
measures and precautions to eliminate or mitigate each
hazard’s effects and reduce its risk. Usually flow charts are
used to standardize risk assessment, a flowchart adapted from
ISO-IEC 31010 [12] shown in Figure 1 illustrates the risk
management process used in the current study.
1029
The flow chart outlines the necessary steps that are required
to carry out the risk assessment properly. The five steps of risk
assessment are presented in this chart and can be performed in
three stages. The first stage includes hazard identification step,
in this stage several methods and ways can be conducted to
highlight and recognize the existed hazards. The second stage
is risk analyzing, in this stage the assessor should understand
the nature, sources and causes of the identified hazard then
determine the impacts and estimates the potentials of the risk
needed for evaluation step. The last stage includes risk
evaluation followed by proposing control plans,
administrative actions, incident resolution and risk mitigation
techniques required to recover the identified hazards then
revising these controls to ensure that safe environment is
achieved. Figure 2 represents a diagram explains the sequence
of how to perform each of these steps.
Figure 2. Steps of risk assessment
2.2.1 Hazard identification
Hazard Identification is a proactive process that aims to
identify hazards and eliminate or minimize/reduce the risk of
injury/illness to workers and damage to property, equipment,
and the environment. It also allows commitment and due
diligence to a healthy and safe workplace [9]. Because of that,
it is the first step of any risk assessment process which includes
observation, investigation, inspection, record examination and
process analysis. The assessor should carefully look around
the workplace and vigilantly observe what may cause harm.
One should verify how people work, operate the plant, use
equipment, what and handling chemicals and materials, and
work S.O.Ps and practices.
The factory’s production, storage, and bottling areas all
underwent hazard identification. This technique is analogous
to safety or a loss prevention review [19, 20]. Table 1 describes
the methods used for hazard identification. The research team,
therefore, conducted walkthroughs, checks, and visits to
factory premises to look for any actions, circumstances, or
sources that could pose a risk. The inspections accompanied
by safety officers, discussions with department heads, and
verifying and listening to employee concerns revealed several
hazards. The implemented measures were documented and
considered when classifying risks and proposing further
controls.
Table 1. Methods for hazard identification
Method Description
1 Walkthroughs and visits of all factory premises
2 Inspections accompanied by safety officers
3 Examination and verification of worker’s concerns
4 Discussions with heads of factory departments
5 Gathering information about the number of workers in the
factory and the nature of the works
6 Use brainstorming to decide whether the workers are more
likely to be exposed to a hazard
2.2.2 Risk evaluation
The development of risk tables for the recognized hazards
in the three areas was made possible by the use of a qualtitative
risk assessment. Once the risks have been prioritized and
arranged according to how hazardous they were,
recommendations for what should be controlled, corrected,
modified, or improved could be made.
Risk evaluation is not a random process. It must comply
with specified risk criteria to classify the consequences and
probabilities of the hazards in a qualtitative method, as per ISO
31000 and ISO 45001 [21, 22]. The risk criteria are terms of
reference used to evaluate the significance of an organization’s
risks and determine their risk ratings [17, 19, 23].
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the risk criteria used as a guide
to help rank the risk of hazards. Depending on the severity, the
consequences are classified into five categories, from
“insignificant” to “catastrophic” for the greatest severity.
There are also five levels of likelihood, from “rare” to “almost
certain” for the highest probability.
Table 2. Severity-consequence levels
Level
Level
Name
Level Description
1 Insignificant
Minor injury- First aid treatment, low
financial loss
2 Minor
Minor injury- Medical treatment,
medium financial loss
3 Moderate Over 7-day injury, high financial loss
4 Major
Significant injuries, loss of production,
major financial loss
5 Catastrophic
Death, permanent disabilities, substantial
financial loss
Table 3. Probability (likelihood) levels
Level Level Name Level Description
1 Rare
may occur only in exceptional
circumstances
2 Unlikely could occur at some time
3 Possible might occur at some time
4 Likely
will probably occur in most
circumstances
5
Almost
certain
expected to occur in most
circumstances
•Hazard identification
Step 1
•Risk evaluation: establishing severity and
likelihood tables
•Calaculating the risk rating for each hazard in
the proposed area indicate who moght be
harmed
Step 2
•Establishing risk matrix for each area
•Creating a risk assessment table for each area
Step 3
•Decision making according to the priority of the
hazard as assigned in the risk matrix
•Control measures are proposed to eliminate,
mitigate, isolate, or reduce the impact of the
hazard under control
Step 4
•Revise the control plans, actions for
improvement and administrative actions to
ensure healthy and safe environmnet of work is
reached
Step 5
1030
Based on interviews with workers and safety officers as
well as records’ examination and observations, a table of
likelihood and severity was developed. The likelihood and
severity of hazards were evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5. A risk
rating (RR), which ranged from 1 to 25, was computed by
multiplying the hazard’s severity by its likelihood. The hazards
were then ranked according to their risk rating using a 5×5 risk
matrix and grouped using a traffic light analogy (see Table 4).
The medium-risk (RR 6-12) hazards in the orange zone require
action soon, while those in the red zone (RR 15-25) demand
immediate action. The green area, however, contains low-risk
hazards (RR 1 to 5), which might allow for delayed control
actions [6].
Table 4. Proposed risk matrix
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
S 1 2 2 3 4 5
Insignificant 1 1 1 3 4 5
Minor 2 2 2 6 8 10
Moderate 3 3 3 9 12 15
Major 4 4 4 12 16 20
Catastrophic 5 5 5 15 20 25
3. RESULTS
This section presents, analyzes, and discusses the study’s
findings about its goal of enhancing workplace health and
safety at the Nestle Pure Life water bottling plant. The risks
found in the factory areas are discussed in the first section,
followed by a risk assessment utilizing the risk matrix
technique and the derived risk ratings (i.e., risk quantification).
Risk rating (RR) is the multiplication of likelihood with the
severity. Assigning values to likelihood and severity has
considered the present safety controls. Each area is then
assigned a list of new safety measures. These safety controls
included both administrative and engineering ones.
3.1 Identified hazards
The hazard identification process took into account events,
incidents, and conditions that may introduce hazards into the
workplace. Therefore, this section aims to compile a thorough
list of all hazards, their assessment, severity, control measures,
and all factors or conditions that may cause harm. Upon the
completion of hazard identification, the implemented controls
were documented and considered when classifying the risk.
3.1.1 Hazards identified in the production
area
In addition to the piping system, storage tanks, and
cleaning-in-place (CIP) tanks, the factory’s production area
comprises several units, including (CIP), reverse osmosis
(R.O.), filtration, and U.V. Table 5 describes the identified
hazards in the production
area.
3.1.2 Hazards identified in the storage area
The factory has three main stores: final products, chemicals,
and general stores (e.g., labels, packaging rolls, and cartoons).
Hazards identified in these areas are listed and described in
Table 6.
3.1.3 Hazards identified in the bottling area
This area consists of four main lines; bottles blowing line,
filling line, labeling line, and palletizing line.
Hazards
identified in these lines are listed and described in Table 7
below.
Table 5. Hazards identified in the production area
Hazard Hazard Description
Water
spillage
Water is pumped from a well through a
piping
system to different stages of the production
process. This high flow rate may experience
leaks and form slippery areas in many locations.
U.V.
radiation
Many U.V. points are distributed along the
production line; these points are used in the
disinfection of the micro-organisms. Over
exposure to UV can harm humans in many
ways, such as eye and skin damage. It also may
cause damage to materials.
Chemicals
usage
Some chemicals are used in the production
process, such as:
Chemical in R.O. unit: R.O. membrane cleaning
chemicals, detergents, scale inhibitors and
corrosion inhibitors, biocides, antifoulants, de-
chlorinators, and flocculants.
Chemicals in the CIP unit: Nitric acid,
phosphoric acid, sodium hydroxide, chlorine,
and hydrogen peroxide.
Hot water
The last stage of the CIP is to rinse the inside of
the pipe with hot water from the CIP process.
Cleaning storage tanks.
Pressure
build-up in
the piping
system
That could happen due to a closed valve,
blocked filter, or any clog in the pipes. That
could result in a pipe rupture and releasing of
high-pressure water, which poses many hazards
to the workers and property, such as exposure to
a high-pressure water jet, creating electrically-
conducting areas, and slipping. This hazard has
been experienced many times in the factory.
Pressurized
air
A high pressure exists in the pneumatic valve
system, which operates at 7 to 40 bar.
Work in
confined
spaces
The interior of storage tanks is cleaned regularly
to prevent the development of bacteria; this
cleaning is performed by the worker using hot
water and chlorine at low concentrations.
Table 6. Hazards identified in the storage area
Hazard Hazard Description
Tripping
As a result of many obstructions in the
storage
area.
Noise
High noise levels resulting from trucks’
engines, conveyor belts, and other equipment
could lead to hearing problems for workers
within the storage area.
Fragile
roofs
The ceiling of the storage area is fragile
(metallic) and about to collapse, primarily
upon exposure to a strong wind.
Improper
chemical‟
storage
areas
The team noticed some hazardous
chemicals
being stored in an old, deserted workshop
containing sharp instruments and unused
equipment that fills the place.
Fire
Fire hazard is one of the major concerns.
Further analysis of this hazard, considering the
existing fire protection systems, is needed.
3.2 Risk assessment
In the current research, the ability to estimate the likelihood
and the severity of the impact of a hazard was a significant
drawback of the risk assessment process. The interviews with
workers and safety officers, incident records, and observations
formed the basis of this estimation. The associated
uncertainties of risk may lead to underestimates. Therefore,
1031
the factory’s safety department must continually validate and
update these estimates by comparing them to event logs and
considering new controls and modifications to processes. Data
verification, uncertainty analysis, and simulations may also
improve estimates. Furthermore, employee training can have
a profound effect on risk estimation. Identifying potential
hazards and assessing associated risks requires adequate
expertise and knowledge.
Because of the lack of data, qualntitative risk matrix of
likelihood and severity was used to determine the proper
controls to eliminate or mitigate each safety hazard to an
acceptable level. Based on the risk matrices developed for the
three areas, risk evaluation tables were then created for each.
It allowed for classifying hazards as high, medium, or low risk.
3.2.1 Risk matrix for the production area
A risk matrix for the production area was created based on
the hazards identified in that area, as illustrated in Table 8. The
hazards were then arranged in descending order according to
their risk rating (R.R.), as exhibited in Table 9.
Table 7. Hazards identified in the bottling area
Hazard Hazard Description
Robotic
palletizer
A robotic palletizer is a machine configuring pallets and warping the pallets by multiple layers of packaging roll. For
safety, the palletizer is isolated by a cage, but when the worker needs to reload a packaging roll, he must enter and
reload a new one. It looks safe, but the problem is that it depends on the worker’s behaviour, as if the machine is
operated while the worker is still inside the cage, the worker could receive a stroke by the palletizer arm.
Heavy weights
lifting
The manual reloading of the packaging roll in the robotic palletizer requires lifting a roll weighing (50 Kg) and then
installing the packaging roll on the rolling cylinder.
Poor house
keeping
Obstructions are observed in this area, such as waste from the bottle formation process, deformed bottles, cartoon
boxes, and more. These could introduce a hazard.
Unreachable fire-
fighting
systems
During the walk-through, team noticed that many fire extinguishers and hose reels were surrounded by different
obstacles that made them difficult to be reached in emergencies.
Noise
Continuous exposure to high levels of sound results from machines, belts and equipment in the workplace during the
operation.
Table 8. Risk matrix for production area
Likelihood Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
Severity 1 1 2 3 4 5
Insignificant 1
Minor 2
Moderate 3 Hot water
Major 4 Water Spillage chemicals
Catastrophic 5
U.V. radiation
Pressure build-up in the piping system Pressurized air
Work in confined spaces
Table 9. Hazards ranking for production area
Risk Hazard
1 High (15-25)
Chemicals use (R.R. 16)
Pressure build-up in the piping system (R.R. 15)
U.V. (R.R. 10)
2 Medium (6-12)
Pressurized air (R.R. 10)
Hot water (R.R. 9)
Water spillage (R.R. 8)
3 Low (1-5) –
Table 10. Risk matrix for storage area
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
S 1 1 2 3 4 5
Insignificant 1 Tripping
Minor 2
Moderate 3 Improper chemicals storage
Major 4 Noise
Catastrophic 5
Fragile roofs
Fire
Table 11. Hazards ranking for storage area
Risk Hazard
1 High (15-25)
Noise (R.R. 20) Pressure
Fragile roofs (R.R. 15)
Fire (R.R. 15)
2 Medium (6-12) Improper chemicals storage (R.R. 9)
3 Low (1-5) Tripping (R.R. 5)
1032
Table 12. Risk matrix for bottling area
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
S 1 1 2 3 4 5
Insignificant 1
Minor 2
Moderate 3 Poor house keeping Noise
Major 4 Heavy weights lifting
Catastrophic 5 Robotic palletizer Unreachable fire-fighting systems
Table 13. Hazards ranking for bottling area
Risk Hazard
1 High (15-25) heavy weights lifting (R.R. 16)
Noise (R.R. 15)
Poor housekeeping (R.R. 12)
2 Medium (6-12) Unreachable fire-fighting system (R.R. 10)
3 Low (1-5) Robotic palletizer (R.R. 5)
3.2.3 Risk matrix for the bottling area
The bottling area contains several hazards and shown in the
risk matrix presented in Table 12. The hazards were then
arranged in a descending order as per their R.R.s as exhibited
in Table 13.
The reviewed literature revealed the use of risk assessment
methods in the absence of data; this circumstance also
occurred in thses studies [24-30]. Factors that influenced the
approach used in the current risk assessment included time,
funds, human resources, and corporate perceptions of
occupational health and safety. Altenbach [30] made similar
observations. In addition, the number and competency of the
employees involved in the evaluation were crucial factors [8].
These factors may significantly affect the identification of
hazards and the associated risk rating (R.R.). As a result, other
methods for identifying hazards and evaluating risks may be
necessary. Hazard indices, HAZOP studies, fault tree analysis,
etc., are additional techniques for identifying hazards.
Most qualtitative assessments relate to water and food
industries [28, 29]. These assessments often use a 5×5 matrix
technique, with the likelihood at the y-axis and the
consequences on the x-axis [31, 32]. The risk assessment
matrix permits management and executives to make
operational decisions that mitigate or eliminate hazards.
Moreover, the quantitative approach may serve as a reliable
tool to reveal the potential occupational health and safety risks,
but only from an overall perspective [33-36]. However, the
demand for greater precision in risk assessment and hazard
identification necessitates the application of other approaches
as mentioned earlier. Besides, the qualtitative approach is
easier to use than the quantitative one and allows one to
compare and evaluate multiple scenarios at the same time [28].
Furthermore, it is easily interpreted.
3.3 Hazard risk ratings
Table 14 compares the percentages of the risk rating groups
for the three areas. As can be seen, most hazards are medium-
risk, followed by high- and low-risk hazards in the production
and bottling areas. The storage area is the most hazardous as
the high-risk hazards make about 60% of the identified ones.
As shown in Table 15, the high-risk hazards were about
41% of the identified hazards in the entire factory, implying
the existence of an unsafe situation that could lead to
catastrophic consequences of property damage, injuries, or
even fatalities. Therefore, the corporation’s top management
must take immediate action to reduce or eliminate such risks.
Likewise, the medium-risk hazards, which need solving soon,
were about 47% of the total hazards. However, low-risk
hazards were only about 12% of the identified hazards. In
storage and bottling areas, the noise risk rating (R.R.) was
high, with the storage area being the most hazardous. The
noise level was above the eight hours-permissible
exposure
limits. Overall, occupational health and safety need great and
urgent attention. Similarly, earlier studies assert that water
industry workers are at risk of hot water, noise, chemical spills
and exposure, slippery walkways, working in confined spaces,
and other factors [37-39].
Table 14. Percentages of the risk rating (R.R.) groups for the
three areas
High-
Risk
Hazards
Medium Risk
Hazards
Low-Risk
Hazards
Production 29% 71% 0%
Storage 60% 20% 20%
Bottling 40% 40% 20%
Table 15. The risk rating (R.R.) groups for the three areas
Area
High-Risk
Hazards
Medium Risk
Hazards
Low-Risk
Hazards
Production 2 5 0
Storage 3 1 1
Bottling 2 2 1
Total 7 8 2
3.4 Risk control revise steps
Risk assessment tables have been created for the factory
sections, as shown in Tables 16, 17, and 18. A risk assessment
was conducted for each of the hazards identified in the
preliminary stages of the investigation. The tables include the
following details for each hazard: who might be harmed,
existing controls, a description of the impact, severity (S),
probability (P), risk score, and risk rating (R.R.). In addition
to identifying control measures based on risk ranking, the
hierarchy of controls was also considered [21].
The elimination of hazards from the workplace is the first
step in the control hierarchy. Then comes substitution,
mitigation (engineering and administrative controls), and
personal protective equipment. The administrative control, for
instance, training programs, policies, and regulations, provide
1033
the framework for a department’s risk control program,
thereby ensuring workplace safety.
According to the hierarchy of control, personal protective
equipment (PPE), which includes clothing and equipment
worn by employees for protection against health and safety
hazards, is the lowest control measure [40].
The risk assessment tables for the studied areas include a
summary of the recommended controls for the identified
hazards. The proposed controls shown in Tables 15, 16, and
17 range from hazard elimination, isolation, and mitigation to
using personal protective equipment (PPE), while some
hazards (2 hazards) require further investigation.
Exposure to
hot water in the production area, fragile roofs in the storage
area, and heavy weight lifting in the bottling area could all be
eliminated. Regular reviewing of control plans and
reevaluating existing controls are recommended for improved
safety.
In addition to implementing the new risk controls, the
factory’s safety management department should continuously
analyze, monitor, and review risks since hazards change as
work circumstances and requirements change. Such
conditions may include adopting new technologies and S.O.Ps,
hiring new employees, etc. The safety management
department must continuously assess risks and evaluate
control measures to ensure that evolving hazards are mitigated
or eliminated.
Table 16. Risk assessment for the production area
Hazard
Who Might
be
Harmed
Current
Controls
Impact S P
Risk
Score
Risk
Rating
Needed Controls
Water
spillage
Production
line
operators
None
Slipping, exposure to water
containing acids or bases
which could cause bone
fracture, skin irritation.
4 2 8
Medium
risk
Enlarge the drainage manhole to
avoid flooding in case of spillage,
regular leak checks of tanks, pipes,
valves, joints, chemical supply
connections, corroded areas. Ensure
workers wear proper PPE including
safety shoes with non-skid soles,
googles, chemical resistant gloves,
chemical resistant coats. Warning
signs of potential hazards what type
of precautions must be taken. Safety
precautions in S.O.Ps
U.V.
radiation
Production
line operators
U.V.
units
casing
Long-term exposure could
cause cancer, hair-loss and
genital disorder
5 2 10
Medium
Risk
Trained workers should only operate
UV units. Restrict access of others
to avoid accidental exposure. Using
work shifts system. Operators
should keep a safe distance from any
U.V. point Use of appropriate PPE,
which include gloves, lab coat with
no gap between the cuff and the
glove, and a UV resistant face
shield. Work procedural safety
measures. Use of plastic shielding
and fail-safe interlocks. The distance
from which workers operate the
equipment must be assessed as well
as the duration of exposure. The area
is evacuated before starting
operation. No person in line of sight
of the device during operation.
There should be warning labels on
all UVC disinfection devices
accordance with the IEC 61549-310-
1. A. UV-resistant eyewear
(goggles/face shields/safety glasses).
Protective wear/clothing, which
covers exposed skin. Make sure the
UV device is shut off when the
protective enclosure is open.
Ventilation may be required to
exhaust ozone and other airborne
contaminants produced by UVC
radiation from nearby of UV device.
Chemicals
R.O. unit
Production
line operators
PIPE
Severe irritations,
burns, …
etc.
4 4 16
High
Risk
Trained workers should only operate
RO units. Follow the manufacturer’s
safety instructions and handling
procedures. Regularly inspect and
maintain the RO system to prevent
leaks. Chemicals should be dealt
with as in MSDSs. Train operators
on proper emergency response
1034
procedures in the event of a leak.
Follow the manufacturer’s safety
instructions and handling procedures
of RO units. Use proper
PPE.
Hot water
Disinfection
(CIP)
operators
PIPE severe burns
3 3 9
Medium
Risk
Trained workers should only operate
(CIP). Use automated water nozzles
to clean the interior of tanks to
eliminate human exposure. Propper
PPE including face shields, aprons,
etc.
Pressure
build-up in
piping
system
Production
line
operators
None
High-pressure water jet
could push the operator on
a solid surface or energized
equipment, in worst case;
death and extensive
injuries could be expected
5 3 15
High
Risk
Regularly inspect and maintain all
high-pressure equipment to ensure
safe operation. Train operators on
the proper use and maintenance of
high-pressure equipment. Install
pressure relief valves to prevent
over-pressure incidents. Use proper
protective equipment, such as steel-
toed shoes, when working near high-
pressure equipment. Further analysis
is
needed using one of the QRA
techniques.
Pressurized
air
Production
line
maintenance
operators
None
Could cause a severe eye
injury, hand penetration or
cut during maintenance
5 2 10
Medium
Risk
Regularly inspect and maintain all
high-pressure equipment to ensure
safe operation. Wear proper PPE
during operations near pneumatic
valves, shut off air valve, and vent
all accumulators and lines during
maintenance. Use proper protective
equipment, such as steel-toed shoes,
when working near high-pressure
equipment. Further analysis is
needed using one of the QRA
techniques.
Work in
confined
spaces
Disinfection
operators
PIPE
Asphyxiation, excessive
heat, irritations, lack of
communication…etc.
5 2 10
Medium
Risk
Prevent working in a confined space
without permit-to-work procedure;
keep communications, properly
trained people. Keep space well-
ventilated. Use of respiratory
protective equipment beside other
PPE.
Table 17. Risk assessment for storage area
Hazard
Who
Might be
Harmed
Current
Controls
Impact S P
Risk
Score
Risk
Rating
Needed Controls
Tripping
Storage
area
operators
None
Could cause
moderate injuries
1 5 5
Low
Risk
Remove the obstructions from the pathways,
increase lighting. Clear signs to alert to changes
in level, Regular and proper maintenance of
floor paving. Proper drain covers. Avoidance of
the use of extension cables. No loose clothing
is permitted. Use non-skid shoes.
Noise
Storage
area
operators
None
Tinnitus and noise-
induced hearing
loss on
long-term
exposure
4 5 20
High
Risk
Lubricate the equipment regularly, wear
earplugs or alternative PPE. Warning signs of
high-level noise (above 85 dB). Appropriate
work schedules with adequate rest times.
Restrict access of other employees to high
noise level. Regular hearing medical check.
Fragile
roofs
Storage
area
operators
None
Falling roof parts
could cause in
severe injuries and
even death
5 3 15
High
Risk
Replace defected roofs. Wear resistant helmets
and safety shoes against falling objects.
Improper
chemicals
storage
areas
Storage
area
operators
None
Exposure to
chemicals and sharp
edges could result
in burns, irritations,
injuries…etc.
3 3 9
Medium
Risk
Isolate chemicals, handle and store as per the
related MSDSs, regular housekeeping. Proper
PPE.
Fire
Storage
area
Sprinkler
system and
Could result in
asphyxiation, severe
5 3 15
High
Risk
Ensure designated smoking area is distant from
flammable materials. Flammable chemicals are
1035
operators smoke
extraction
system
burns, and death totally isolated. Proper housekeeping, such as
preventing materials and dust from
accumulation. Regular servicing of electrical
equipment and network to prevent sparks.
Proper electrical earthing to prevent static
sparks. Further analysis of this hazard is
recommended.
Table 18. Risk assessment for bottling area
Hazard
Who Might
be Harmed
Current
Controls
Impact S P
Risk
Score
Risk
Rating
Needed Controls
Robotic
palletizer
Palletizer and
maintenance
operators
System’s
safety
functions
(integrated
locks)
Robotic motion
and Palletizers
arm stoke could
cause in skull
crush and death.
Crushing due to
accidental
release or
expulsion of a
box.
5 1 5
Low
Risk
Provide operators, maintenance and
other key stakeholders with
comprehensive training on equipment
hazards, safety features, safe operation,
entry into the robot cell. Regular
training, use shift working system. Use
PPE. Regular check that system safety
features are functioning. Monitor robot
speed to avoid associated risks of robot
kinetic energy and of the pallet objects.
Area scanning system that will monitor
the presence of humans and slow or
stop the robot cell if someone is too
close. Signs to warn employees from
approaching robot area. Fences to
prevent the operator from entering a
dangerous area. A mechanism to stop
the palletizing robot when the
safeguard is opened.
Heavyweights
lifting
Palletizer
reloading
operators
None
Back injuries
and may lead to
permanent
disabilities
4 4 16
High
Risk
Use of electrical roll lifting equipment
Poor
housekeeping
Bottling area
operators
None
Could result in
several accidents
which lead to
severe injuries
3 4 12
Medium
Risk
Remove obstructions, set a specific
places to dispose the defected bottles
Unreachable
fire-fighting
systems
Bottling area
operators
None
Could lead to
asphyxiation,
severe burns,
and death
5 2 10
Medium
Risk
Remove obstructions, ensure easy
access to any firefighting equipment
Noise
Bottling area
operators
None
Hearing
impairment,
hearing loss on
long-term
exposure
3 5 15
High
Risk
Regular lubrication of machines, use
ear muffs, ear plugs…etc.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are made based on the case
study’s findings. A suggestion for future research also follows
these conclusions:
● By implementing a qualtitative risk assessment,
workplace hazards may be eliminated or mitigated.
The qualtitative risk assessment is a methodical
approach to examining and rating pre-identified
hazards, many of which were determined using a
purely qualitative approach that may have resulted in
an incomplete inventory of them. Based on that, it
may serve as a reliable tool to reveal the potential
occupational health and safety risks, but only from a
general perspective. Some hazards remain almost
concealed, making it difficult for the safety officer to
identify them.
● Nestlé Pure Life Jordan does not need new
infrastructure; instead, several modifications are
required, including the replacement of defective
roofs, the use of electrical roll and lifting, the
segregation of chemical storage, and personnel
training. It is also necessary to make quite a few
ergonomic and procedural changes.
● The risk assessment of the identified hazards revealed
the existence of an unsafe workplace that requires the
corporation’s top management to take immediate
action to reduce or eliminate the hazards.
● Nestlé Pure Life Jordan employees face many
physical, chemical, and ergonomic risks. The related
risks range from high (41%), moderate (47%), and
low (12%). Further, there is an association between
the working environment and exposure to risks and
hazards. Minimizing risk exposure may, therefore,
enhance the working environment.
● In addition to reviewing safety indicator records,
1036
other approaches, such as fault tree analysis and
HAZOP analyses, should be utilized to ensure that
the safety officer identifies every hazard.
As a future work, it is recommended to study and
investigate the potential psychological and social hazards, and
the impact they may have on workers of Nestlé Pure Life
Jordan factory.
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Journal of risk research
2024, Vol. 27, no. 1, 85–107
Improving workplace safety through mindful organizing:
participative safety self-efficacy as a mediational link
between collective mindfulness and employees’ safety
citizenship
Matteo Curcurutoa, Michelle Renecleb, Francisco Graciab, James I. Morganc and
Ines Tomasb
aDepartment of human sciences, european university of rome, rome, italy; bresearch institute on Personnel
Psychology, organizational Development, and Quality of Working life (iDocal), university of Valencia, Valencia,
spain; cleeds school of social sciences, leeds Beckett university, leeds, uk
ABSTRACT
Mindful organizing is a team-level capability that allows teams in high-risk
environments to anticipate when something can potentially go wrong
and adapt their operations just in time to protect the organizational
system from negative consequences. This study aimed to extend our
understanding of how mindful organizing affects employees’ propensity
to engage in a broad range of safety citizenship behaviours through the
mediation of participative safety self-efficacy. Participative safety
self-efficacy is a psychological state that enables individuals to have
confidence in their capability to engage in constructive behaviours that
go beyond the formal requirements of their job description. A multilevel
mediation model was tested using data collected from a large sample
of chemical workers (N = 443) operating in fifty work teams. The findings
showed that mindful organizing on a team level fosters both individual
safety citizenship (helping; voice; initiative) and prescribed safety com-
pliance through enhancing individual participative self-efficacy. This
mediation relationship is significantly stronger for safety citizenship than
for safety compliance.
1. Introduction
High-reliability Organizations (acronym: HROs) are ‘organizations in which errors can have cat-
astrophic consequences but which consistently seem to avoid such errors’ (Roberts et al. 2005,
216) in an environment where accidents can be expected due to risk factors and complexity
(Perrow 1984). Examples of such organizations are nuclear power plants and air traffic control
centres. Although there are some well-known classical models that describe what these orga-
nizations do to be reliable (Bierly III & Spender, 1995; LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Roberts 1993,
1990; Roberts and Bea 2001; Roberts and Rousseau 1989), during the last two decades, the
HRO literature has focused on mindful organizing as being responsible for almost error-free
operations (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, and
© 2023 informa uk limited, trading as Taylor & francis Group
CONTACT Matteo curcuruto Matteo.curcuruto@unier.it Department of human sciences, european university of
rome, Via degli aldobrandeschi, 190, 00163, rome, italy.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 13 June 2022
Accepted 1 December
2023
KEYWORDS
Mindful organizing;
high-reliability
organizations;
self-efficacy; safety
citizenship behaviour;
multi-level analysis
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043
mailto:Matteo.Curcuruto@unier.it
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2024-4-1
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043
http://www.tandfonline.com
86 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Obstfeld 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Mindful organizing refers to a team’s capability to
discern discriminatory details about emerging risks and threats and act swiftly in response to
these details (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). In its essence, mindful organising is seen in
the actions and interactions of teams, where team members collectively anticipate potential
threats and work together to quickly recover from these threats (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane
2016). Studies conducted in other HROs argue that the absence of appropriate levels of mindful
organizing can be associated with severe negative consequences for organizations and their
stakeholders, such as death as a consequence of medical errors (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) or
high-profile disasters in the aerospace industry (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015).
The existing studies in the literature provide evidence about the relevance of mindful
organizing to the creation of safer organization. Firstly, previous studies have found significant
associations between mindful organizing and individual safety behaviours. In the chemical
industry, Renecle et al. (2021) found a positive association between mindful organizing and
safety citizenship behaviours (voice, initiative, and helping). These authors also found a positive
relationship between mindful organizing and individual safety compliance, and a negative
relationship with safety violations. In addition, longitudinal and multilevel studies conducted
in the nuclear sector by Gracia et al. (2020) found that mindful organizing positively affects
safety compliance and safety participation. In another study conducted in the same industry,
Renecle et al. (2020) extended these results showing that mindful organizing was able to
predict safety compliance and safety participation above and beyond other team safety-related
variables, such as safety culture, team safety climate, and team learning. Secondly, individual
safety behaviours are considered to be immediate antecedents of safety outcomes for teams
and organizations (e.g. accidents, incidents, etc.) (Christian et al. 2009, Griffin and Neal 2000).
Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence of a negative association between mindful
organizing and safety outcomes in the healthcare sector, such as medication errors and patient
falls (Ausserhofer et al. 2013, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007b). Finally,
other studies have focused on the role of mindful organizing as a mediator in the relationship
between other group safety-related variables and individual safety behaviours. Particularly,
empirical evidence exists about the mediator role of mindful organizing in the relationship
between team safety climate and safety behaviours (Renecle et al. 2021), and in the relation-
ship between team empowering leadership and safety behaviours (Gracia et al. 2020). All
together these studies are contributing to extending the nomological network of mindful
organizing, providing quantitative empirical evidence that was absent only a few years ago
(Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016). Team safety climate and team empowering leadership are
predictors of mindful organizing, and mindful organizing contributes to individual safety
behaviours and, eventually to safety outcomes.
However, although the existing studies offer us an insightful framework of the multileveled
factors at play that support the overall reliability of organizational systems, to our best under-
standing, there is currently a general lack of studies that take into account the psychological
mechanisms through which mindful organizing affects individual safety -behaviour. Very little
is known about how and why a collective phenomenon such as mindful organizing ends up
affecting individual safety behaviours. This is a significant deficiency in the existing literature,
considering that if we only consider the contextual antecedents of individual behaviour (e.g.
safety climate, empowering leadership), we end up treating the individual as a passive agent
within the system, wholly influenced by the social expectations and desired behavioural models
of their organization (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010). On the other hand, there is a great body
of research that studies the individual as an active element of the system, able to initiate
changes and drive improvement, development and resilience (Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani
2016; Hollnagel 2014). This research stream shows that multiple psychological mechanisms
that drive individuals to act as proactive agents for the promotion of safety in their
organization.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 87
In our study we will shed some light on the psychological mechanisms responsible for the
association found in previous studies between mindful organizing and individual safety
behaviours. Drawing on proactive motivation theory (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010) we
introduce the construct of participative safety self-efficacy, that refers to employees perceived
capability of carrying out a broader and more proactive, interpersonal and integrative set of
work tasks and goals to do with safety beyond individual prescribed requirements (Curcuruto,
Mearns, and Mariani 2016). We aim to investigate how mindful organizing affects participative
safety self-efficacy, introduced in our study as a psychological condition that could motivate
individuals to engage in constructive behaviours of relevance for safety critical contexts, with
special attention to the proactive forms of individual contribution to the promotion of safety
in the workplace, like safety citizenship behaviours (acronym: SCBs), such as: (1) personal
initiatives for the improvement of workplace safety, (2) helping coworkers with safety related
responsibilities included in their job, or (3) voicing personal safety concerns about workplace
issues that can represent (or create) potential threats for the safety of individuals teams and
their organizational system. Specifically, we develop and test a model where participative
safety self-efficacy is proposed as a mediating variable in the relationship between mindful
organizing and individual safety behaviours (see Figure 1). These proposals will be studied
by conducting a multilevel structural equation model using data from 50 teams and 443
chemical plant workers.
There are at least two main contributions of our study to the advancement of literature on
SCBs. Traditionally, the emergence of safety citizenship is explored in relation to constructs like
safety climate, organizational support, leader-member-exchange, constructs that refer to the
existing vertical relationships between the employees and their superiors, and/or between the
employees and the organization itself (Curcuruto and Griffin, 2018). Mindful organizing refers
to a set of teamwork processes that are developed at a group level of analysis and that are
developed through daily peer-to-peer social interactions among coworkers. Investigating SCBs
as the outcome of within-group interactions between colleagues is something relatively new
in safety literature (Curcuruto et al. 2019a; 2019b). By investigating the role of mindful organizing
in the emergence of safety citizenship, we aim to extend the research on safety citizenship to
incorporate the analysis of group processes that go beyond the ones usually explored in liter-
ature. For example, organizational rules and norms (i.e. safety climate), or social exchange
processes between their employees with their supervisors or the overall organization (i.e.
leader-member-exchange and organizational support).
Figure 1. research model.
88 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
We believe that in literature the investigation of the psychological mediators that are usually
analysed by the researchers to explain the emergence of safety citizenship behaviour is usually
limited to the examination of the role of constructs like safety knowledge and safety motivation.
Consequently, by investigating the role of participative safety self-efficacy we aim to enlarge the
focus of the research on the psychological mediators facilitating the emergence of safety citizen-
ship. This contribution appears particularly relevant because employees’ proactive role in safety
promotion is currently well recognised in literature as a reliable predictor of positive risk man-
agement in organizations (Curcuruto et al. 2019a; Hollnagel 2014). Therefore, we aim to contribute
to filling this gap by exploring how the teamwork processes of mindful organizing influence the
emergence of safety citizenship through the mediation of employees’ participative safety self-efficacy.
In the next sections, we will present a review of the conceptual foundations of mindful orga-
nizing, and how it is supposed to facilitate individual and team reliability and commitment in
workplace safety management. Then, a set of research hypotheses will be discussed for the
advancement of our understanding of how mindful organizing affects a broad range of individual
work behaviours of relevance for the maintenance of safety in daily operations and for the con-
stant improvement of the organizational safety system. Thereafter, we present our empirical study
where we run a multilevel structural equation model to examine the relationship between mindful
organizing self-efficacy and safety outcomes in a sample of fifty teams operating in a large chem-
ical plant. We then discuss the implications of our study results for research advancement and
the practical implications of these findings for decision makers in high-risk industries.
2. Conceptual background: mindful organizing and workplace safety
The concept of mindful organizing is linked to the work of karl Weick and colleagues, and their
research into how HROs managed to achieve almost error-free performance under such trying
conditions (Weick and Roberts 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe
2007). In the next lines, we will summarize the main contributions of this work. These authors
observed that HROs had a different social and relational infrastructure to other kinds of orga-
nizations. They discovered that teams in effective HROs engaged in ‘heedful interrelating’. This
‘heedful interrelating’ meant that teams were highly attentive in their actions and interactions
with one another. Further research into these highly attentive actions and interactions showed
that it allowed teams to have an expanded understanding of the system in which they operated.
This expanded understanding of the system was also linked to a wider range of possible
responses to novel or unexpected situations. This meant teams were able to manage the unex-
pected and contain errors far more effectively than teams operating in other high-risk environ-
ments. They called this team phenomenon mindful organizing. Mindful organizing was then
defined as the collective capability to detect discriminatory details about emerging issues and
act swiftly to respond to such details. The detection of discriminatory detail about emerging
issues allowed teams on the front line to anticipate potential errors, anomalies, or unexpected
events. The ability to act swiftly in responding to these errors, anomalies, or unexpected events
allowed these teams to recover from, or contain, these possibly problematic events. These
definitions appear to conceptualise mindful organizing as a two-factor variable, with the ability
to anticipate errors, anomalies, and unexpected events as the first factor and the ability to act
swiftly to contain these events as the second factor. However, the analysis of this collective
capability through case study analyses of effective HROs showed that mindful organizing was
enacted by five interrelated practices and attitudes. They are: (1) a preoccupation with error,
(2) a reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) a sensitivity to operations, (4) a commitment to
resilience and (5) deference to expertise. It appeared that the first three processes underpinned
a team’s capability for anticipation and the last two processes underpinned a team’s capability
for containment and recovery.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 89
2.1. The five characteristic processes of mindful organizing
In this section, we conceptually delve into each one of the five processes that constitute mindful
organizing. Although mindful organizing first appeared in the article by Weick, Sutcliffe, and
Obstfeld (1999), the most elaborated description of the five characteristic processes of mindful
organizing comes from the three editions of the book ‘Managing the Unexpected’ written by
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007, 2015). These dimensions are explained below.
2.1.1. Preoccupation with error
Teams that engage in mindful organizing are preoccupied with errors. This means that teams
are always concerned about potential or actual mistakes that they can generate. This concern
is manifested through observable activities enacted by the team members, such as spending
time and effort trying to anticipate everything that could go wrong, or emphasizing the impor-
tance of detecting and reporting errors (Rochlin, 1993)), or taking any error or near-error very
seriously as it could indicate any larger problem underlying the surface of work operations.
Overall, this sort of chronic concern with errors is an essential practice for anticipating potential
threats and unexpected events within a system, and strongly influence both safety attitudes
and behaviours of team members, leading the team to remain cautious and attentive at all
times (Schulman 1993), always treating small deviations and mistakes seriously, as they could
potentially mean a bigger problem elsewhere in the system (LaPorte and Consolini 1991).
2.1.2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations
This concept means that the team tries to actively avoid simple analyses of complex phenomena
as it could lead to incorrect conclusions. Mindful organizing encompasses team activities such
as: refraining from making assumptions or drawing conclusions too quickly when interpreting
and diagnosing what is happening in their environment (Schulman 1993); paying attention to
new evidence or information that a situation has changed, rather than relying on old explana-
tions when making sense of something new or unexpected at work; encouraging rich exchanges
of points of view to be able to have a more complete picture of the situation; or reinforcing
a questioning attitude in all the members of the team when interpreting what is happening
in their workplace (Rochlin, 1993). Overall, this component of mindful organizing helps teams
to gain as much information about what is going on in their work, especially regarding unex-
pected events or errors (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). This safeguards teams, to a certain extent,
from coming to incorrect conclusions about the causes or consequences of unexpected events
that can lead to wrong decisions, errors and mistakes with potentially catastrophic
consequences
2.1.3. Sensitivity to operations
Teams that organize mindfully are also sensitive to operations. This means that teams and
leaders strive to remain aware of the reality of what is happening in their work operations at
any given moment (Rochlin, 1993). In showing sensitivity to operations, teams constantly engage
to be updated on the details of current operations and the big picture status of their work,
constantly communicating with the higher organizational management levels about the intri-
cacies of current operations. At the same time, sensitivity to operations is also sustained by
leaders’ actions, where leaders are committed to remaining in touch with the reality of operations
happening on the front-line. This has similarities with the concept of ‘work as done’ versus ‘work
as imagined’ discussed by Hollnagel (2014) as workers will constantly update management on
the realities of how work is actually done. Thanks to the efforts deployed by both the team
members and their leader, sensitivity to operations allows teams to remain aware of the import-
ant intricacies of operations within the system that affect their work (Weick, Sutcliffe, and
90 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Obstfeld 1999). The connectedness of the team with others in the system coupled with an
awareness of what is happening elsewhere, allows team members and leaders to quickly detect
and communicate any important information as it happens (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Sensitivity
to operations is made observable by team communication practices and entails regular contact
and communication exchanges with the team leader.
2.1.4. Commitment to resilience
Teams that engage in mindful organizing are committed to resilience. Resilience means being
able to bounce back from adverse events and continue to operate normally. This is seen in
teams being able to quickly recover and maintain the stability of the system through flexibly
using a wide range of responses. Therefore, commitment to resilience has to do with essential
actions and practices that help teams in recovering from mishaps, errors or unwanted surprises
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). Among these practices, there is a further distinction
between ‘preparing for resilience’ and ‘acting resiliently’. Work practices aimed to ‘prepare for
resilience’ include training, simulations and learning from errors. These practices are carried out
to expand team members’ knowledge, skills and capabilities to better deal with unexpected
events so that they are better equipped to correct and contain these events before they desta-
bilize the system (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). On the other side, ‘acting resiliently’ has to do with
teams having the capability to deploy adequate resources and flexible strategies that allow
them to recover from mistakes and unexpected events as they arise, assuring the maintenance
of the stability within the system (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The concept of commitment to
resilient action in safety-critical industries and HROs has been well documented and has been
a central feature of both the engineering and human resources discourse in high-risk industries.
2.1.5. Deference to expertise
Engaging in mindful organizing means that teams defer to expertise. This entails that when
facing unexpected events, decision-making migrates to those in the team with the best exper-
tise rather than those with the highest rank. Deference to expertise is primarily developed
through the production of mutual knowledge among the members of the team of each
member’s knowledge and capabilities, so they know who to call on to help make decisions
when facing an unexpected event or novel situation. This entails that when these situations
happen, ‘experts’ within the system are called upon to help make decisions, independently
from the role in the organizational hierarchy. In other words, deference to expertise refers to
the practice of decisions migrating to those with the best expertise, rather than the highest
rank, in the face of unexpected events or crises, empowering them to make decisions during
unexpected events (Roberts, Stout, and Halpern 1994; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). In
practice, sometimes the workers who are closest to the potential problem take on the respon-
sibility of the decision-making (e.g. air-traffic controllers), interpreting and managing the
unexpected event in reason of their first-hand knowledge and local understanding of the
causes and implications of the problem. Some other times, expert decision-making is driven
by networks of people with a diversity of expertise making decisions together. This expertise
could come in from the previous experience and educational backgrounds of the team mem-
bers, or even pooling of various capabilities in networks, allowing the team to make better
decisions.
Since its inception, these five processes of mindful organizing have been validated and
applied in various studies across different sectors. The model has been explored in theoretical
articles (e.g. Gajda 2018; Gebauer 2013; Martínez-Córcoles and Vogus 2020; Vogus 2011; Vogus
and Sutcliffe 2012) and empirical studies (e.g. Dernbecher, Risius, and Beck 2014; Ndubisi and
Al‐Shuridah 2019; Renecle et al. 2020; Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a). For example, Gebauer (2013)
explored how the principles of mindful organizing could be used in management development
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 91
programs to encourage self-observation and high reliability seeking. Gajda (2018) proposed a
theoretical framework in which mindful organizing (directly) and organizational mindfulness
(indirectly) enhance individual talent management outcomes(e.g. motivation to work, organi-
zational commitment and extra-role behaviours) resulting in better company performance.
Examples of empirical research on mindful organizing include the study conducted by Dernbecher,
Risius, and Beck (2014), who define mindful organizing as a bottom-up construct emerging
from the employees and organizational mindfulness as a top-down strategic process enacted
by top management. When operationalising these definitions according to hierarchical job role,
they found a significant positive influence of a differentiated effect of both, mindful organizing
and organizational mindfulness, as well as a highly significant positive effect of the combination
of both on the job performance of workers in a mobile work environment. In a later study by
Ndubisi and Al‐Shuridah (2019), they also defined mindful organizing and organizational mind-
fulness as two separate constructs. Their analysis of data collected from 92 Saudi firms within
the oil and gas industry suggested that mindful organizing is significantly related to environ-
mental and resources sustainability, and it fully or partially mediates in the relationship between
some of the dimensions of organizational mindfulness and these sustainability outcomes. Other
empirical work has focused on the adaptation and validation of measurement scales to oper-
ationalise mindful organizing to specific industrial and national contexts. For example, Renecle
et al. (2020) validated a unidimensional Spanish version of the Mindful Organizing Scale utilising
nuclear power plant workers.
However, recently, Martínez-Córcoles and Vogus (2020) provide a contemporary overview of
the topic area noting criticisms concerning the mixed views on what distinguishes mindful
organizing, conceptually from the related concept of organizational mindfulness, and the con-
sequent difficulties that derive from this conceptual ambiguity in creating and sustaining it in
practice. This specific conceptual aspect is addressed in the next two subsections of conceptual
background.
2.2. Mindful organizing, individual mindfulness and organizational mindfulness
Mindful organizing is different from individual mindfulness and from organizational mindfulness.
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) stress the importance of distinguishing mindful organizing from
related mindfulness concepts such as organizational mindfulness and individual mindfulness,
as they may seem similar but are theoretically and operationally different.
Individual mindfulness is the most widely studied and best understood of all the mindfulness
constructs. It refers to a state of consciousness where attention is focused on events occurring
in the present moment: both internally and externally (Dane, 2011). It is a mental activity or a
state of concentration that occurs in one’s mind. However, the term ‘mindful’ in mindful orga-
nizing follows Langer’s (1989) conceptualisation of mindfulness on an individual level. Langer
(1989) posits that a mindful state comes from actively differentiating and clarifying existing
categories and distinctions which creates new disconnected categories out of the connected
series of events that happen in one’s work or life. From this, a more nuanced appreciation of
context and alternative ways of dealing with one’s context arises. This conceptualization of
mindfulness argues that mindfulness is just as much about what we do with what we notice
in our ‘state of concentration’ as it is about the act of noticing itself. Mindful organizing found
in HROs is characterised by noticing weak signals before critically analysing and reframing such
signals leading to an enlarged understanding of what is noticed (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld
1999). This enlarged understanding of what is noticed is closely linked to a repertoire of action
capabilities which is a defining feature of what makes HROs effective (Westrum, 1988).
The key difference between mindful organizing and individual mindfulness is that mindful
organizing is not an intra-psychic process that occurs in the minds of individuals (Morgeson
92 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
and Hofmann 1999); rather, it is an emergent, collective process that is seen in the actions and
interactions of team members (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a). Mindful organizing is a social process
of organizing in such a way that sustains attention to salient stimuli that may pose a threat to
the operation of the organization, sparking corrective action (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012). It can
be seen and recorded in the conversations, interactions, and actions of team members. Mindful
organizing is also different from organizational mindfulness (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012).
Organizational mindfulness is more similar to mindful organizing than individual mindfulness
as it is also a collective capability to anticipate and recover from unexpected events. However,
organizational mindfulness is a strategic top-down construct which is more enduring in an
organization as it is brought about through the practices, strategies, and structures put in place
by top management (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012). In contrast, mindful organizing is a bottom-up
collective process enacted mainly but not only by those on the front line; it is fragile and needs
constant reinforcement (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
In our paper, we focus on mindful organizing (not on individual or organizational mindful-
ness). As it is a team process, and a collective construct, it is valuable to study mindful orga-
nizing at the team level, rather than at the individual level (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007b). However,
it is important to understand how mindful organizing emerges from individual properties and
their implications for operationalization.
2.3. The nature of the emergence process and operationalization of mindful organizing
Multilevel models in organizational and social sciences frequently involve higher-level (e.g. team)
constructs that have their origin in lower-level (e.g. individual) properties. To fully understand
the nature of higher-level constructs (i.e. mindful organizing), it is of utmost importance to
explain the processes through ‘which lower-level properties emerge to form collective phenom-
ena’ (kozlowski and klein 2000, 15).
Mindful organizing is a shared unit property, meaning that it1) represents phenomena that
span two or more levels, 2) originates at lower levels (i.e. individuals) but are manifest as
higher-level phenomena (i.e. team), 3) emerges from the characteristics, behaviours, or cognitions
of unit members, and their interactions-to characterize the unit as a whole, and 4) is, essentially,
similar across levels (that is, isomorphic), representing composition forms of emergence.
The literature on mindful organizing suggests it only exists to the extent that it is collectively
enacted (Levinthal and Rerup 2006; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a, 2007b; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
One way to assess the extent to which a set of behaviours is customarily enacted is whether
there are shared perceptions regarding the prevalence of the behaviours (Morgeson and Hofmann
1999). Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) argue that behaviours and perceptions about mindful orga-
nizing are likely to converge and coalesce among team members for at least two reasons. First,
bottom-up attraction–selection–attrition processes (Schneider 1987) can improve the similarity
in members’ mindful organizing by favouring the attraction, selection and retention of new
members that express similar attitudes and behaviours to those exhibited by the older members.
Second, task interdependence and time working together can increase the homogenizing effects
of social influence and social learning by creating continual opportunities for work-related
interactions.
In the operationalization of mindful organizing, we have followed the two general recom-
mendations for the measurement of shared unit properties, that is, to focus respondents on
description as opposed to evaluation of their feelings and, to use items that reference the
higher level, not the level of measurement. Therefore, the subject and content of all mindful
organizing scale items refer to team level practices and behaviours but they are rated by indi-
viduals. Because mindful organizing is conceptualised as a shared unit property, an essential
part of creating empirical evidence to back up the theoretical understanding of mindful orga-
nizing is to show that individual team member’s mindful organizing scores can be aggregated
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 93
to the group level (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016). Aggregating individual responses about
team level practices and behaviours to create a team score is meaningful provided that adequate
consensus is found between individual scores. We will provide empirical evidence about this
issue in the method section.
3. Research hypotheses: self-efficacy as a mediational link between mindful
organizing and individual safety behaviour
Recent studies (Gracia et al. 2020; Renecle et al. 2020, 2021) showed how mindful organizing
positively influences employees’ engagement in safety participation and extra-role behaviours
supporting workplace safety. These studies provide evidence that mindful organizing serves as
a teamwork level mechanism that enables the team to translate managerial safety values and
priorities into observable safety behaviours (Renecle et al. 2021). On the other hand, what is
still relatively under-investigated is the nature of the psychological mechanisms that translate
team mindful organizing in these extra-role behaviours. In order to contribute to filling this
conceptual gap in the safety research literature, we referred to the theory of proactive motiva-
tion (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010). This conceptual framework explains which kinds of psy-
chological states support individuals’ propensity to engage in proactive behaviours which are
also known as safety citizenship behaviours (Conchie 2013), and that are not part of the
employees’ formal job description (Griffin and Curcuruto 2016),
According to proactive motivation theory, a prominent psychological driver of proactive
behaviour is an individual’s perceived capability to achieve short term, proactive goals. In
high-risk contexts rife with unexpected events, it can be daunting to engage in safety citizen-
ship behaviours such as initiating changes, voicing concerns or taking the lead in managing
safety by helping or guiding others to be safer in the moment. Believing in one’s own ability
to be able to successfully carry out these daunting activities is likely to be a powerful moti-
vator for engaging in these activities. Therefore, the present study wanted to examine whether
individual capability drivers such as self-efficacy played a role in facilitating individual safety
citizenship behaviours in a context where teams engage in mindful organizing. In particular,
we wanted to examine whether self-efficacy played an important role in mediating the rela-
tionship between team mindful organizing and individual safety behaviours.
Participative safety self-efficacy refers to ‘employees perceived capability of carrying out
a broader and more proactive, interpersonal and integrative set of work tasks and goals to
do with safety beyond prescribed requirements (Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani 2016). An
important distinction to make is that this safety-specific form of self-efficacy does not merely
refer to an individual’s capability, knowledge and skills to comply with the safety prescrip-
tions in place in the organization. Rather, it refers to an individual’s confidence to perform
extra-role behaviours such as analysing safety issues to propose solutions, coming up with
new methods to improve safety, helping to facilitate safety goals in team, or discussing
with others how to improve safety conditions in the workplace (Curcuruto et al. 2019a).
Engaging in the five processes of mindful organizing boosts a team’s ability to understand
and diagnose the risks they face (through the anticipation processes) as well as enhances a
team’s ability to successfully navigate unexpected events and contain errors (through the con-
tainment processes) (Vogus 2011). We believe that individuals who form part of a team that is
able to collectively manage unexpected events and small errors effectively are likely to develop
more confidence in their individual ability to fulfil their extra-role tasks to enhance safety. This
increased participative safety self-efficacy is likely to lead to higher proactivity to carry out safer
practices in the organization such as engaging in helping, voice and initiative.
We posit that the anticipation processes of mindful organizing (preoccupation with error,
reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to operations) will lead to higher participative safety
94 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
self-efficacy to voice safety concerns to others. Preoccupation with error entails teams contin-
uously searching for, detecting and voicing concerns about potential errors and anomalies
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Reluctance to simplify entails challenging assumptions and trying
to uncover blind spots in operations through rich discussions about possible categories and
labels (Schulman 1993). Sensitivity to operations means teams make sure to be aware of the
realities of operations on the front line and communicate these challenges and realities to one
another and leaders (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). These three actions and activities increase the
range of situations that each individual team member becomes more self-assured to address
and discuss, increasing their confidence to correctly identify, and voice, a wide range of safety
issues. This increased participative safety self-efficacy is likely to motivate these team members
to engage in voicing safety concerns to others on their own accord, over and above mindful
organizing and what is required by their formal job description. Therefore, the following is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
voice so that the relationship is positive and significant.
We argue that the containment processes of mindful organizing (commitment to resilience
and deference to expertise) will lead to an increased individual safety self-efficacy to start
safety related initiatives on an individual level, like initiating changes to ensure safer practices.
On one side, commitment to resilience has to do with growing team capabilities to quickly
recover from unexpected events so teams can act swiftly and make changes to bounce back
from errors (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). This group capability may stimulate employees’
self-confidence to engage in initiatives to improve the current work practices to make them
safer. On the other side, deference to expertise has to do with the shared knowledge in the
workgroup about the expertise of each member of the team, which ensures that the best
expertise available in the team is utilised to cope with problems that may threaten safety
within the workplace (Roberts, Stout, and Halpern 1994). We hypothesized that when such
team dynamics exist, where the members of the group feel their expertise is valued by their
peers and superiors, employees will develop a stronger sense of participative safety self-efficacy.
Through this empowered self-confidence, they will be more motivated to engage in personal
initiatives to improve the safety conditions in the workplace, like proposing suggestions to
the organizations to improve the work practices and the work procedures to achieve better
management of safety problems. This might be particularly relevant for organizations, because
work operators are those who see most of the reality of operations and are the closest to the
potential sources of problems for workplace safety, therefore, they are the ones with the best
expertise in the matter (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). In summary, we believe that mindful orga-
nizing, through its containment processes of commitment to resilience and deference to expertise
is likely to increase an individual’s confidence in their own ability to initiate changes to ensure
a safer workplace, and this increased confidence in their capability to initiate these actions,
will then lead to them engaging in initiating changes to increase safety. Therefore the following
is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
initiative so that the relationship is positive and significant.
Mindful organizing creates a broader awareness of the work and knowledge of others in a
team (through sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise),
which is likely to enhance each individual’s understanding of which team members are likely
to need support or help with safety protocol and practices. This, coupled with the knowledge
and experience in managing safety that comes from engaging in mindful organizing continu-
ously as a team is likely to build individuals perceived confidence in successfully helping the
less experienced to follow and achieve safety goals. The enhanced participative safety self-efficacy
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 95
to engage in extra role helping will increase an individual’s propensity to actually reach out to
less experienced or knowledgeable colleagues to assist them with safety related matters.
Therefore, the following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
helping so that the relationship is positive and significant.
The anticipation processes entailed by mindful organizing (i.e. preoccupation with failure;
reluctance to simplify interpretations; sensitivity to operations) support the collective capability
of the workgroup to anticipate unexpected events that can jeopardize employees’ health and
safety. As discussed above, mindful organizing enforces the confidence of team members to
engage in a course of actions that promote a safer workplace, through the mediation of safety
self-efficacy. While at the individual level of analysis this mediational influence is expressed by
the emergence of safety citizenship behaviours (i.e. helping, voice, initiative), we propose that
at the group level this mediational influence will result in a higher compliance with safety
standards and a minor level of violations. Assuming the anticipatory nature of mindful orga-
nizing, we expect that groups characterised by high levels of mindful organizing will be char-
acterised by a stronger awareness of the risks associated with the lack of compliance with safety
standards and procedures, like accidents or injuries. Part of the construct of participative safety
self-efficacy refers to individual self-confidence to support the workgroup in achieving the safety
goals of the team. We expect that workgroups characterised by high levels of mindful organizing
will be characterised as well by higher levels of safety compliance and lower levels of safety
related violations. We hypothesize that these relationships will be mediated by the employees’
feelings of safety-specific self-efficacy, as we expect that employees presenting higher levels of
participative safety self-efficacy will be more motivated to contribute to achieving the team
goal of reducing the accident rates in the work activities. In other words, in a group context
where its members develop high participative safety self-efficacy from engaging in mindful
organizing, individuals will be highly committed to upholding safety procedures and rules. We
therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between mindful organizing and safety compliance is mediated by partici-
pative safety self-efficacy, and this mediated relationship is positive and significant.
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between mindful organizing and safety violations is mediated by participative
safety self-efficacy, and this mediated relationship is negative and significant.
4. Method
4.1. Sample and procedure
The data used in this research was collected within a large sample of Ukraine-based chemical
plant workers (N = 443) identifying 50 teams. All participants were employed in a single large
chemical industrial facility deputed to the manufacturing, treatment, refinement and storage of
vegetable fibres. A significant part of the production processes in this kind of facility is auto-
mated, and the functioning of the machinery and manufacturing lines contemplated a design
of the work activities allocated to work teams composed of a variable number of employees,
with many teams working simultaneously at different points of the manufacturing lines, and
under a periodic shift rotation schedule. The members of each workgroup reported to a single
team leader, who in turn reported directly to a middle manager of the department division. In
terms of risks for health and safety of the workforce, different sources of hazards include per-
sonal exposure to biological agents (bacteria, viruses, parasites), exposure to chemical agents
(nicotine, ammonia, dehydrogenated alcohol), fire risk and exposure to flammable products, as
well as injury risks in the usage of the machinery.
96 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Participation was voluntary and all workers were informed that the data would be used for
scientific research and to gain insight into safety culture improvements in each plant. The
majority of participants (60%) had been working in the company for more than 10 years, 33%
had been working in the company for 5 to 10 years, 3% had been working in the company for
2 to 5 years, 2% had been in the company for less than 5 years and 2% did not indicate their
tenure in the company. Participants were employed in primary and secondary production (30%),
the filter production workshop (12%), the warehousing department (15%), quality assurance
department (13%), the engineering department (8%) and 22% came from other departments.
The questionnaire was administered in Russian using the same scales created and translated
through back-translation.
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Mindful organizing
Mindful organizing is a team’s collective capability to anticipate and contain errors and unex-
pected events. Mindful organizing was measured using a nine-item scale (α = .94) taken from
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007b). Participants were asked to report their personal agreement with a
set of statements referring to complimentary team-working aspects supporting the five mindful
organizing processes. Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree;
5 = strongly agree). Example items are ‘We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them’,
‘We spend time identifying activities we do not want to go wrong’, ‘When attempting to resolve
a problem, we take advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues’, ‘We have a good “map”
of each other’s talents and skills’, ‘We discuss alternatives as to how to go about our normal
work activities’. The suitability of the content of the items with the group activities performed
in the plant was verified with a group of workers’ representativeness before the administration
of the survey.
4.2.2. Participative safety self-efficacy
Participative safety self-efficacy is the confidence individuals have in their own ability to carry
out a more participative and broader set of safety tasks beyond formalised role requirements.
In the present study, it was measured using a 5-item safety-specific scale of role breadth
self-efficacy (α = .93) adapted to safety specific contents by Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani
(2016) from the original scale developed by Parker (1998). Participants were asked to report
their personal judgement about the extent they perceived themselves confident with engaging
in a set of extra-role actions supporting the promotion of workplace safety. Responses were
collected on a five-point Likert scale (1 = not confident at all; 5 = highly confident). Examples of
the content of the items are ‘Feeling confident in devising new methods to improve safety in
my work area’, ‘Feeling confident in setting up and achieving safety objectives of my group’,
and ‘Feeling confident in analysing recurring problems regarding safety in order to suggest
solutions’.
4.2.3. Safety citizenship behaviours
Safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs) are discretionary and prosocial activities essential for man-
aging risk in safety critical industries (Curcurutoet al 2019b). For the present study, we analysed
three SCBs, namely: voice, initiative and helping. These forms of safety citizenship were assessed
with three scales originally created by Hofmann, Morgeson, and Gerras (2003). Participants were
asked to rate the frequency to which they engaged in these three forms of safety citizenship.
Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (0 = never; 4 = very frequently). More spe-
cifically, voice was measured using a 4-item scale (α = .92). An example of item is ‘voluntarily
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 97
raising safety concerns in planning sessions’. Initiative was measured using a 4-item scale (α =
.87), and an example of an item is ‘voluntarily trying to make policies and procedures safer’.
Finally, helping was measured using a 6-item scale (α = .90). An example item is ‘voluntarily
helping with teaching safety procedures to newest crew members’.
4.2.4. Safety compliance and safety violations
Safety compliance is the degree to which an individual complies with the safety protocol of
the chemical plant. Safety violation refers to the extent to which an individual deliberately
violates safety protocol. Both scales were taken from Hansez and Chmiel (2010), and participants
were asked to report the frequency they had recently engaged in examples of safety compliance
and violation of safety standards. Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (0 = never;
4 = very frequently). More specifically, safety compliance was measured using a 5-item scale (α
= .82). An example item is ‘using protection devices, even if it is hard to find them’. Safety
violation was measured using a 5-item scale (α = .94). An example item is ‘neglecting some
safety rules when performing familiar or routine work’.
4.3. Analyses
To test our proposed model, we ran a multilevel structural equation model (MSEM). Mindful
organizing was analysed on the team level while participative safety self-efficacy, safety com-
pliance, safety violation and the SCBs were analysed on the individual level. First, confirmatory
factor analyses (CFA) of the seven scales (mindful organizing, participative safety self-efficacy,
safety compliance, safety violation, voice, initiative, and helping) were carried out in order to
gain evidence of the discriminant validity of these measures. A seven-factor model with all the
items loading onto seven separate factors using individual level data was run with Mplus
(Muthén and Muthén 2017). Thereafter, four alternative CFA models were conducted, and the
fit of these models was compared with the seven-factor model. The alternative models are: (1)
a one factor model with all the items of the seven scales loading onto one single factor, (2) a
six factor model with mindful organizing and role breadth self-efficacy both loading onto the
same single factor and all the other items loading onto their corresponding factors, (3) a five
factor model with the three SCBs (voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single
factor and all the other items loading onto their corresponding factors, (4) a six factor model
with safety compliance and safety violation both loading onto the same single factor and all
the other items loading onto their corresponding factors and (5) a four factor model with the
three SCBs (voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single factor, safety compliance
and violation loading on to the same factor and mindful organizing and participative safety
self-efficacy loading onto their corresponding factors. Model fit was evaluated by calculating
the chi-square statistic, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger 1990), the
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; Tucker and Lewis
1973). RMSEA values below .05 indicate good fit, values of between .08 and .05 show a rea-
sonable error of approximation and values of .10 or more indicate poor fit, (Browne and Cudeck
1993; Browne and Du Toit 1992). For the CFI values, values above .90 are considered acceptable
fit and values close to 1 indicate good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). TLI values near 1 indicate
good fit, with the conventional cut off being .90 for acceptable fit (Tucker and Lewis 1973).
When comparing alternative models, we used the following criteria: (1) whether the differences
between TLI and CFI values of the competing models were larger than .01 (Cheung and Rensvold
2002), and (2) whether the differences between RMSEA values were larger than .015 (Chen et
al. 2008). These criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity between the models and
when these differences in practical fit indices are detected, the model showing better fit will
be selected. Additionally, the difference in chi-square statistics along with the difference in
98 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
degrees of freedom was also used as a criterion to check for statistically significant differences
among competing models. If the difference is significant, the model with the smaller chi-square
value is argued to have better fit to data.
Second, the aggregation indices (average deviation indices (ADIs), Rwg values, intraclass
correlation coefficient ICC(1)) and ANOVAs, were calculated for mindful organizing to evaluate
the within group agreement and between group discrimination, respectively.
Third, we ran a multilevel structural equation model to assess our proposed mediation model
and the pathways between our variables. Monte Carlo (MC) confidence intervals were used for
testing the significance of the indirect effects, as it is argued to be a more viable and robust
method for calculating confidence intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when working
with a multilevel model.
5. Results
Descriptive statistics and the correlations between the measures of the study variables can be
found in Table 1. As expected, the measure of participative safety self-efficacy presented sig-
nificant relationships with all the three forms of safety citizenship (voice, initiative and helping),
a moderate, but positive, correlation with safety compliance, and finally a moderate negative
correlation with safety violation. Following previous research conducted by Curcuruto et al.
(2019b) across various multi-national samples using these same measures, we kept them as
separated indicators of distinct forms of safety citizenship. Finally, in the present sample, the
measure of safety compliance showed significant correlations with the three forms of safety
citizenship, and as expected, a substantial negative correlation with safety violation.
5.1. Confirmatory factor analysis
Before testing our research hypotheses, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were carried out to
evaluate the goodness of our measurement factor model in the present sample. Table 2 shows
the goodness of fit indices for alternative models tested in our analyses. We examined the
distinctiveness of the seven study variables through a seven-factor model (with all seven vari-
ables in the study loading onto seven separate factors) and compared the fit of this model
with five alternative models.
The differences between the theorised seven-factor model and the alternative model 1
(ΔRMSEA = .07, ΔCFI = .39, ΔTLI = .41), alternative model 2 (ΔRMSEA = .02, ΔCFI = .08, ΔTLI =
.09), and alternative model 4 (ΔRMSEA = .01, ΔCFI = .04, ΔTLI = .04) were notable, indicating
that the seven-factor model had a better fit to the data. The differences between the theorised
seven-factor model and alternative model 3 (where initiative, voice and helping loaded onto a
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations among observed variables (N = 488).
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Mindful
organizing
4.01 .66 —
2. safety
self-efficacy
4.10 .70 .61** —
3. safety
compliance
4.69 .48 .37** .39** —
4. safety Violation 1.36 .73 −0.24** −0.20** −0.48** —
5. Voice (scB) 3.36 .96 .54** .59** .27** −0.10* —
6. initiative (scB) 3.29 .93 .50** .55** .26** −0.04 .78** —
7. helping (scB) 3.52 .96 .59** .56** .30** −0.15* .81** .72**
note. * p < .05, **p < .001.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 99
single factor) were notable for the CFI and TLI values (ΔCFI = .02, ΔTLI = .02), however, there
were no relevant differences in the RMSEA values (.06). Therefore, we examined the difference
in chi-square values for the theorised seven-factor model and the alternative model 3, and we
found a statistically significant difference (Δχ2 = 153.96, Δdf = 11, p < .001). Given that the
theorised seven-factor model had a smaller chi-square value, we concluded that it was the best
fitting model. Thus, the evidence above supported the discriminant validity of the seven scales.
5.2. Aggregation indices
The results of the within-team agreement and inter-rater reliability analyses for mindful orga-
nizing provided adequate justification for aggregating the data at the team level. The average
ADI value was .50 (SD = .19), which is below the .83 cut off for a 5-point Likert-type scale
(Burke and Dunlap 2002). The rwg(J) value was .94, indicating strong within team agreement
(LeBreton and Senter 2008). The ICC(1) value was .09, which is above the recommended .05
cut-off (Bliese 2000). Additionally, ANOVA results for mindful organizing (F (49,379) = 1.80, p <
.05) indicated adequate between-team discrimination.
5.3. Multilevel analysis of the study model
The results of the MSEM analysis indicated that the hypothesized multilevel mediation model
showed a satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.61, df = 5, p >.05; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within
= .001; SRMR-between = .015). All hypothesized pathways were significant (see Figure 2).
Regarding the multilevel mediation, at the team level (between level), mindful organizing
had a positive statistically significant indirect effect (IE) on voice (IE = 0.84, p < .001, MC CI =
0.09, 2.14), initiative (IE = 0.68, p < .001, MC CI = 0.16, 1.18) helping (IE = 1.00, p < .001, MC
CI = 0.20, 2.31) and safety compliance (IE = 0.31, p < .001, MC CI = 0.11, 0.55) through partic-
ipative safety self-efficacy. As expected, the indirect between relationship from mindful organizing
to safety violation through self-efficacy was negative and significant (IE = −0.65, p < .001 MC
CI = −1.09, −0.17).
To further examine full vs partial mediation, we tested an alternative model that included
the direct paths from mindful organizing to the five outcomes. The extra paths were not
Table 2. confirmative factor analysis: hypothesized and alternative factor solutions (N = 488).
Model description χ2 (df ) p rMsea cfi Tli srMr
Hypothesized seven-factor model: seven variables loading onto seven
separate factors
1226.57 (506) .000 .06 .92 .91 .04
Alternative model 1 (method bias): seven variables loading onto a
single factor
4691.99 (527) .000 .13 .53 .50 .14
Alternative model 2: six factor model with mindful organizing
organizing and participative safety self-efficacy loading onto the
same single factor, and with initiative, helping, voice, safety
compliance and safety violation each loading onto separate factors
1938.84 (512) .000 .08 .84 .82 .06
Alternative model 3: five factor model with the SCBs (initiative,
helping, voice) loading onto the same single factor and mindful
organizing organizing, participative safety self-efficacy, safety
compliance and safety violation each loading onto separate factors
1380.53 (517) .000 .06 .90 .89 .04
Alternative model 4: six factor model with safety compliance and
safety violation loading onto the same single factor and mindful
organizing organizing, participative safety self-efficacy, initiative,
helping and voice each loading onto separate factors
1581.56 (512) .000 .07 .88 .87 .08
Alternative model 5: four factor model with the three SCBs (voice,
initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single factor, and
safety compliance and violation loading on to another single factor.
Mindful organizing and participative safety self-efficacy loading onto
their corresponding separated factors
1728.95(521) .000 .07 .86 .85 .09
100 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
statistically significant (p > .05). The partial mediation model was a complete model (with no
degrees of freedom) that showed satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.45, df = 0, p <.01; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI
= 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within = .000; SRMR-between = .006). However, the difference between
the chi-square statistics provided by the hypothesized full mediation model and the partial
mediation model was not statistically significant (Δχ2 = 0.16, Δdf = 5, p > .05). Considering all
together, and according to the parsimony principle, the full mediation model was selected
against the alternative partial mediation model. These results confirmed that participative safety
self-efficacy fully mediated the relationship between mindful organizing and SCBs and individual
safety behaviours.
At the within (individual) level, participative safety self-efficacy showed a positive and sig-
nificant relationship with voice (b = .76, p < .001), initiative (b = .70, p < .001), helping (b =
.71, p < .001) and safety compliance (b = .26, p < .001). However, at the individual level,
self-efficacy was not related to safety violation (b = −0.15, p > .05).
6. General discussion
This study aimed to investigate the influence of mindful organizing on a broad range of safety
behaviours in the context of a safety-critical work environment. Furthermore, we intend to
explore the mediational role of a safety-specific form of self-efficacy in translating the positive
influence of mindful organizing into a range of desired behaviours with a positive impact on
the promotion of workplace safety. The construct of participative safety self-efficacy presented
in the article was derived from the concept of role-breadth self-efficacy, originally proposed by
Parker (1998) to describe the feeling of self-confidence experienced by employees when under-
taking initiatives in the workplace that are not formally contemplated in their formal job
description. In the context of workplace safety, we primarily proposed that this kind of
participation-oriented self-efficacy motivates employees to take on the responsibility of engaging
in discretional forms of safety citizenship behaviours (SCB) that can contribute to the creation
of a safer workplace. Furthermore, we also proposed that, at a group level of analysis, partici-
pative safety self-efficacy can also mediate the influence of mindful organizing on safety com-
pliance and safety violations. From this perspective, mindful organizing would stimulate the
individual feeling of confidence in being able to contribute to the achievement of the safety
Figure 2. Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model. *p <.05, **p <.001.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 101
goals of the team (i.e. reduction of accident rates) by complying with the safety standards and
safety procedures, and by reducing violations of these safety standards as much as possible.
Our statistical analyses provided general support for a model where mindful organizing was
proposed as a predictor of participative safety self-efficacy, which in turn would result in pos-
itively stimulating safety behaviours expected by the organization (safety citizenship and safety
compliance), and reducing undesirable behaviours (safety violations). Overall, statistical support
was obtained for all our research hypotheses. Furthermore, the magnitude of the resulting
statistical effects led us to conclude that mindful organizing presents a stronger influence on
safety citizenship behaviours, such as initiative, voice and helping, which are voluntary in nature,
rather than expected aspects of safety-critical roles, like safety compliance.
6.1. Conceptual contributions for literature advancement
Overall, our study contributes to the advancement of safety research literature in several ways,
and they are of particular relevance to understanding the positive influence of mindful orga-
nizing on workplace safety from a multilevel perspective of analysis. In particular, our research
is one of the few studies in the literature that analyses the relationship between mindful orga-
nizing and self-efficacy in the domain of workplace safety. This contribution is significant for
several reasons.
First, to our best understanding, this was the first study to introduce the construct of par-
ticipative safety self-efficacy in safety research. We derived this construct from the more general
concept of role breadth self-efficacy (RBSE) originally introduced by Parker (1998). In her seminal
work, the author intended to explain why employees choose to engage in behaviours that are
not prescribed by their job description, focusing on how individuals develop a specific psy-
chological experience of self-efficacy in undertaking extra-role behaviours. Variables such as
co-worker support and job enrichment are two examples of facilitating contextual factors
identified by the author that support the development of this kind of self-efficacy (Parker,
Bindl, and Strauss 2010). Previous studies had already showed how mindful organizing can be
associated with a broad range of safety behaviours, including safety compliance and discretional
safety actions like safety citizenship behaviours (Gracia et al. 2020; Renecle et al. 2020; Renecle
et al. 2021). In addition to the existing literature on mindful organizing, our study offered new
insights about one of the psychological mechanisms that can positively affect the relationship
between mindful organizing and individual safety related work conduct.
Second, even if the positive influence of mindful organizing on safety behaviour is currently
well established in safety research literature, our study helped to understand which kind of
safety behaviour is most likely affected by mindful organizing. Said differently, our study tried
to investigate if the positive influence of mindful organizing mediated by participative safety
self-efficacy affects in the same way different forms of safety related behaviours. In accordance
with our expectations, the mediated effect was significant and positive for both safety compli-
ance, and extra-role safety citizenship behaviours (i.e. safety voice, safety helping, and safety
initiative). However, the relationship was significantly higher for the three kinds of extra-role
safety behaviours, rather than safety compliance. This result is particularly indicative of how the
mechanisms expected by mindful organizing affect dimensions of individual behaviour at work
that go beyond the normative management of workplace safety through safety compliance, by
embracing a broader and more flexible approach for ‘managing the unexpected’ (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007) Given that these actions require going beyond one’s ‘comfort zone’ and what is
usually expected, the higher mediation effect of participative safety self-efficacy on safety cit-
izenship behaviour seems to reiterate how mindful organizing plays an integrative function for
the management of risks that exceed merely complying with the organizational procedures and
protocol.
102 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
However, while this evidence seems to suggest that mindful organizing and participative
safety self-efficacy are particularly crucial for the emergence of extra-role safety behaviours
(rather than safety compliance), we need to recognize that other mechanisms not included in
the present investigation need to be taken in account in order to clarify the conditions for
which higher levels of mindful organizing are associated with higher levels of safety compliance
(i.e. alternative mediation variables – like safety knowledge or safety training – or moderation
variables related to job design, team composition or the typology of risks and hazards).
A third contribution offered by our research concerns the level of analysis of safety behaviour.
Our study results help to understand if mindful organizing and participative safety self-efficacy
affect safety behaviours in the same way when these behaviours are analysed at the group level,
rather than the individual level of analysis. Our findings revealed two importance differences. On
the one hand, all the positive behavioural outcomes examined in the present study (safety com-
pliance and safety citizenship behaviours) emerged from mindful organising through self-efficacy
both at the individual and group levels. However, the relationship showed a more differentiated
and articulated trend at group level, rather than at the individual level of analysis, where the
regression indices resulted quite similar for all the three forms of safety citizenship. This particular
result seems to suggest the importance of studying safety citizenship behaviours as the expression
of collective dynamics that mainly occur at the group level of analysis (rather than individual), in
order to identify and explain the drivers of safety initiative, safety voice and helping behaviours.
In addition, safety violations appeared to be statistically influenced by mindful organizing
and participative safety self-efficacy only at the group level of analysis, and in a negative direc-
tion. Conversely, there was no relationship between these two variables and safety violation
was verified at the individual level of analysis. These results confirmed our research hypotheses,
and they also suggest the relevance of investigating the beneficial influence of mindful orga-
nizing at a group level of analysis, in order to understand how mindful organizing contributes
to the reduction of unsafe behaviour at work (i.e. safety violations) that can be more difficult
to explore and explain at an individual level of analysis.
6.2. Limitations and future research avenues
This study presents several strengths, such as the inclusion of a broad range of safety-specific
behavioural indicators, and the usage of sophisticated multi-level mediation analysis. However,
like all the studies, there are notable limitations to the present research. In this section, these
limits will be addressed, together with suggestions for future replications and/or extensions of
the present study.
First, we introduced the concept of mindful organizing as a group level multidimensional
process comprehensive of five distinct team-working processes. However, the measurement of
mindful organizing was provided only at a general holistic level, and it was not possible to
take into account the specific influence of the five single mechanisms. Unfortunately, a well
validated, general multidimensional questionnaire assessing the five dimensions of mindful
organizing is not yet available in the literature. Therefore, it is not currently possible to examine
the specific influence of each one of the five mechanisms of mindful organizing on the various
safety behaviours included in our study, nor it is possible to examine the mediation effect of
participative safety self-efficacy for each of the five dimensions. Future research should look to
address this gap in literature, by providing a general multi-dimensional questionnaire with sound
psychometric properties so researchers can investigate the sub-measures of each component
of mindful organizing in more depth.
Second, even if this study relies on the usage of a broad set of safety behavioural indicators,
all the variables investigated in the present study were assessed with self-reported measures,
and given the sensitive topic of safety, the results could be affected by social desirability bias.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 103
However, the confidentiality of the scores was clearly communicated to participants and strictly
adhered to in order to promote honesty. Furthermore, pre-existing studies have shown evidence
of external validity of the behavioural assessment of safety behaviour at work through the
usage of self-report measures in various safety critical industries (Curcuruto et al. 2015).
Third, the present research design is cross sectional. A longitudinal study would have been
preferable as it would have allowed for a more robust study of the nature and direction of our
study variables. In addition, it would have offset the potential for common method bias to
inflate the relationships between the variables studied. Future replications of the present study
should adopt a longitudinal research design allowing the assessment of all the independent
and dependent variables at the different times of data collection, in order to compare the
alternative hypotheses about causal relationships among research variables.
Fourth, the present study did not include any objective safety outcomes (like accident or
injury rates, or like near miss indices). However, past studies conducted with the same measures
of safety citizenship behaviours found significant associations of these SCB measures with rel-
evant objective safety outcomes collected at a later time (Curcuruto et al. 2015, 2019a). Future
replications of the present study should consider including alternative, more objective safety
indicators (e.g. organizational data, manager ratings, department key performance indicators
for safety) as part of the research model included in this study to further validate this model.
6.3. Practical implications for managerial programs
This study shows the importance of mindful organising as a starting point for safer operations.
For this reason, besides traditional safety training aimed to enable individual to safely perform
their individual tasks in the workplace, complimentary learning and development initiatives
could focus on enhancing the five processes of mindful organizing: preoccupation with error,
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, deference to expertise.
To do so, organizations could implement several strategies.
First, organizations could design safety training programs that focus on the five team-working
processes of mindful organizing (rather than only individual compliance with safety standards
and rules). To train teams in ‘sensitivity to operations’ organizations could develop team members
to have a broader awareness of different operations that are proceeding in parallel with their
work, and to understand the details of the interdependence of their work, and how an error
or change in another area may impact them.
Second, organizations can consider designing training programs that enable managers and
team leaders to facilitate and support teams to speak up and empower them to take ownership
of important decisions where they are closest to the information or problem. This will help to
stimulate ‘deference to expertise’ – where leaders’ willingness to delegate responsibilities to their
subordinates is essential – but also in relation to ‘reluctance to simply the operations’, a dimen-
sion that can strongly benefit from leaders’ willingness to listen to their subordinates, and from
leaders’ ability to stimulate and integrate different elements that can emerge from the group
discussion about the activities of the team.
Third, managers could consider designing post-accident investigation activities involving all
the group members after an accident or a near-miss event has occurred in the company, even
if the critical event happened in a different department of the organization, and it did not
involve members of their department. This kind of activity can foster mindful organizing dimen-
sions such as ‘preoccupation with failure’ and ‘commitment to resilience’. Post-accident analyses
can enable the members of the group to recognize and identify those circumstances in the
future that caused a critical event in the past. In addition, this kind of post-accident analysis
can enable group members to identify alternative ways to carry on their activities in a
safer manner.
104 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
All the practical intervention strategies listed above can also support the development
of higher safetyself efficacy, the psychological mediator at the centre of our investigation,
and through it, contributing to the expression of positive work behaviour contributing to
the promotion of safety. For instance, by fostering work-team potential to engage in the
anticipation processes of mindful organizing (preoccupation with error, reluctance to simplify
and sensitivity to operations), the range of situations that team members become more
self-assured to address and discuss is increased, growing their confidence to correctly identify,
and voice, a wide range of safety issues. This, in turn, makes them more likely to perform
the SCB of voicing safety concerns on their own. Furthermore, engaging in the containment
processes of mindful organizing boosts an individual’s confidence in their own ability to
initiate changes in the moment to quickly act to ensure a safer workplace. This increased
confidence in their capability to initiate these actions, will then lead to them engaging in
initiating changes to increase safety. The processes of sensitivity to operations and deference
to expertise will lead team members to identify colleagues who may need support or assis-
tance with safety protocols and practices. This, coupled with knowledge and experience of
how to manage safety that comes from engaging in mindful organizing, is likely to build
team members’ perceived confidence in successfully helping less experienced colleagues
achieve safety goals. This belief in their ability to mentor or assist others is likely to lead
these team members to reach out to their colleagues that need help with safety related
issues when the situation arises.
7. Conclusions
This study aimed to investigate the role of mindful organizing on the psychological state of
participative safety self-efficacy, a motivational capability that supports personal engagement
in a broad range of safety related work conducts, with a special focus on safety citizenship
behaviours, described in literature like constructive and discretional actions undertaken by the
employees to improve safety in the workplace. Adopting a multi-level statistical approach, the
results of our study showed a significant function of participative safety self-efficacy in mediating
the beneficial influence of mindful organizing on the behavioural safety criteria stemming from
the existing literature. The study advocates for the importance of investigating the link between
the teamwork processes contemplated by mindful organizing and the psychological experience
of individuals, in order to better understand the factors that facilitate the emergence of con-
structive safety behaviours that can help organizations to improve the flexibility and the reliability
of their safety management.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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- Improving workplace safety through mindful organizing: participative safety self-efficacy as a mediational link between collective mindfulness and employees safety citizenship
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual background: mindful organizing and workplace safety
2.1. The five characteristic processes of mindful organizing
2.1.1. Preoccupation with error
2.1.2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations
2.1.3. Sensitivity to operations
2.1.4. Commitment to resilience
2.1.5. Deference to expertise
2.2. Mindful organizing, individual mindfulness and organizational mindfulness
2.3. The nature of the emergence process and operationalization of mindful organizing
3. Research hypotheses: self-efficacy as a mediational link between mindful organizing and individual safety behaviour
4. Method
4.1. Sample and procedure
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Mindful organizing
4.2.2. Participative safety self-efficacy
4.2.3. Safety citizenship behaviours
4.2.4. Safety compliance and safety violations
4.3. Analyses
5. Results
5.1. Confirmatory factor analysis
5.2. Aggregation indices
5.3. Multilevel analysis of the study model
6. General discussion
6.1. Conceptual contributions for literature advancement
6.2. Limitations and future research avenues
6.3. Practical implications for managerial programs
7. Conclusions
Disclosure statement
References
Journal of risk research
2024, Vol. 27, no. 1, 85–107
Improving workplace safety through mindful organizing:
participative safety self-efficacy as a mediational link
between collective mindfulness and employees’ safety
citizenship
Matteo Curcurutoa, Michelle Renecleb, Francisco Graciab, James I. Morganc and
Ines Tomasb
aDepartment of human sciences, european university of rome, rome, italy; bresearch institute on Personnel
Psychology, organizational Development, and Quality of Working life (iDocal), university of Valencia, Valencia,
spain; cleeds school of social sciences, leeds Beckett university, leeds, uk
ABSTRACT
Mindful organizing is a team-level capability that allows teams in high-risk
environments to anticipate when something can potentially go wrong
and adapt their operations just in time to protect the organizational
system from negative consequences. This study aimed to extend our
understanding of how mindful organizing affects employees’ propensity
to engage in a broad range of safety citizenship behaviours through the
mediation of participative safety self-efficacy. Participative safety
self-efficacy is a psychological state that enables individuals to have
confidence in their capability to engage in constructive behaviours that
go beyond the formal requirements of their job description. A multilevel
mediation model was tested using data collected from a large sample
of chemical workers (N = 443) operating in fifty work teams. The findings
showed that mindful organizing on a team level fosters both individual
safety citizenship (helping; voice; initiative) and prescribed safety com-
pliance through enhancing individual participative self-efficacy. This
mediation relationship is significantly stronger for safety citizenship than
for safety compliance.
1. Introduction
High-reliability Organizations (acronym: HROs) are ‘organizations in which errors can have cat-
astrophic consequences but which consistently seem to avoid such errors’ (Roberts et al. 2005,
216) in an environment where accidents can be expected due to risk factors and complexity
(Perrow 1984). Examples of such organizations are nuclear power plants and air traffic control
centres. Although there are some well-known classical models that describe what these orga-
nizations do to be reliable (Bierly III & Spender, 1995; LaPorte and Consolini 1991; Roberts 1993,
1990; Roberts and Bea 2001; Roberts and Rousseau 1989), during the last two decades, the
HRO literature has focused on mindful organizing as being responsible for almost error-free
operations (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012; Weick, Sutcliffe, and
© 2023 informa uk limited, trading as Taylor & francis Group
CONTACT Matteo curcuruto Matteo.curcuruto@unier.it Department of human sciences, european university of
rome, Via degli aldobrandeschi, 190, 00163, rome, italy.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 13 June 2022
Accepted 1 December
2023
KEYWORDS
Mindful organizing;
high-reliability
organizations;
self-efficacy; safety
citizenship behaviour;
multi-level analysis
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043
mailto:Matteo.Curcuruto@unier.it
http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2024-4-1
https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2023.2293043
http://www.tandfonline.com
86 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Obstfeld 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Mindful organizing refers to a team’s capability to
discern discriminatory details about emerging risks and threats and act swiftly in response to
these details (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). In its essence, mindful organising is seen in
the actions and interactions of teams, where team members collectively anticipate potential
threats and work together to quickly recover from these threats (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane
2016). Studies conducted in other HROs argue that the absence of appropriate levels of mindful
organizing can be associated with severe negative consequences for organizations and their
stakeholders, such as death as a consequence of medical errors (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007) or
high-profile disasters in the aerospace industry (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2015).
The existing studies in the literature provide evidence about the relevance of mindful
organizing to the creation of safer organization. Firstly, previous studies have found significant
associations between mindful organizing and individual safety behaviours. In the chemical
industry, Renecle et al. (2021) found a positive association between mindful organizing and
safety citizenship behaviours (voice, initiative, and helping). These authors also found a positive
relationship between mindful organizing and individual safety compliance, and a negative
relationship with safety violations. In addition, longitudinal and multilevel studies conducted
in the nuclear sector by Gracia et al. (2020) found that mindful organizing positively affects
safety compliance and safety participation. In another study conducted in the same industry,
Renecle et al. (2020) extended these results showing that mindful organizing was able to
predict safety compliance and safety participation above and beyond other team safety-related
variables, such as safety culture, team safety climate, and team learning. Secondly, individual
safety behaviours are considered to be immediate antecedents of safety outcomes for teams
and organizations (e.g. accidents, incidents, etc.) (Christian et al. 2009, Griffin and Neal 2000).
Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence of a negative association between mindful
organizing and safety outcomes in the healthcare sector, such as medication errors and patient
falls (Ausserhofer et al. 2013, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a, Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007b). Finally,
other studies have focused on the role of mindful organizing as a mediator in the relationship
between other group safety-related variables and individual safety behaviours. Particularly,
empirical evidence exists about the mediator role of mindful organizing in the relationship
between team safety climate and safety behaviours (Renecle et al. 2021), and in the relation-
ship between team empowering leadership and safety behaviours (Gracia et al. 2020). All
together these studies are contributing to extending the nomological network of mindful
organizing, providing quantitative empirical evidence that was absent only a few years ago
(Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016). Team safety climate and team empowering leadership are
predictors of mindful organizing, and mindful organizing contributes to individual safety
behaviours and, eventually to safety outcomes.
However, although the existing studies offer us an insightful framework of the multileveled
factors at play that support the overall reliability of organizational systems, to our best under-
standing, there is currently a general lack of studies that take into account the psychological
mechanisms through which mindful organizing affects individual safety -behaviour. Very little
is known about how and why a collective phenomenon such as mindful organizing ends up
affecting individual safety behaviours. This is a significant deficiency in the existing literature,
considering that if we only consider the contextual antecedents of individual behaviour (e.g.
safety climate, empowering leadership), we end up treating the individual as a passive agent
within the system, wholly influenced by the social expectations and desired behavioural models
of their organization (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010). On the other hand, there is a great body
of research that studies the individual as an active element of the system, able to initiate
changes and drive improvement, development and resilience (Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani
2016; Hollnagel 2014). This research stream shows that multiple psychological mechanisms
that drive individuals to act as proactive agents for the promotion of safety in their
organization.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 87
In our study we will shed some light on the psychological mechanisms responsible for the
association found in previous studies between mindful organizing and individual safety
behaviours. Drawing on proactive motivation theory (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010) we
introduce the construct of participative safety self-efficacy, that refers to employees perceived
capability of carrying out a broader and more proactive, interpersonal and integrative set of
work tasks and goals to do with safety beyond individual prescribed requirements (Curcuruto,
Mearns, and Mariani 2016). We aim to investigate how mindful organizing affects participative
safety self-efficacy, introduced in our study as a psychological condition that could motivate
individuals to engage in constructive behaviours of relevance for safety critical contexts, with
special attention to the proactive forms of individual contribution to the promotion of safety
in the workplace, like safety citizenship behaviours (acronym: SCBs), such as: (1) personal
initiatives for the improvement of workplace safety, (2) helping coworkers with safety related
responsibilities included in their job, or (3) voicing personal safety concerns about workplace
issues that can represent (or create) potential threats for the safety of individuals teams and
their organizational system. Specifically, we develop and test a model where participative
safety self-efficacy is proposed as a mediating variable in the relationship between mindful
organizing and individual safety behaviours (see Figure 1). These proposals will be studied
by conducting a multilevel structural equation model using data from 50 teams and 443
chemical plant workers.
There are at least two main contributions of our study to the advancement of literature on
SCBs. Traditionally, the emergence of safety citizenship is explored in relation to constructs like
safety climate, organizational support, leader-member-exchange, constructs that refer to the
existing vertical relationships between the employees and their superiors, and/or between the
employees and the organization itself (Curcuruto and Griffin, 2018). Mindful organizing refers
to a set of teamwork processes that are developed at a group level of analysis and that are
developed through daily peer-to-peer social interactions among coworkers. Investigating SCBs
as the outcome of within-group interactions between colleagues is something relatively new
in safety literature (Curcuruto et al. 2019a; 2019b). By investigating the role of mindful organizing
in the emergence of safety citizenship, we aim to extend the research on safety citizenship to
incorporate the analysis of group processes that go beyond the ones usually explored in liter-
ature. For example, organizational rules and norms (i.e. safety climate), or social exchange
processes between their employees with their supervisors or the overall organization (i.e.
leader-member-exchange and organizational support).
Figure 1. research model.
88 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
We believe that in literature the investigation of the psychological mediators that are usually
analysed by the researchers to explain the emergence of safety citizenship behaviour is usually
limited to the examination of the role of constructs like safety knowledge and safety motivation.
Consequently, by investigating the role of participative safety self-efficacy we aim to enlarge the
focus of the research on the psychological mediators facilitating the emergence of safety citizen-
ship. This contribution appears particularly relevant because employees’ proactive role in safety
promotion is currently well recognised in literature as a reliable predictor of positive risk man-
agement in organizations (Curcuruto et al. 2019a; Hollnagel 2014). Therefore, we aim to contribute
to filling this gap by exploring how the teamwork processes of mindful organizing influence the
emergence of safety citizenship through the mediation of employees’ participative safety self-efficacy.
In the next sections, we will present a review of the conceptual foundations of mindful orga-
nizing, and how it is supposed to facilitate individual and team reliability and commitment in
workplace safety management. Then, a set of research hypotheses will be discussed for the
advancement of our understanding of how mindful organizing affects a broad range of individual
work behaviours of relevance for the maintenance of safety in daily operations and for the con-
stant improvement of the organizational safety system. Thereafter, we present our empirical study
where we run a multilevel structural equation model to examine the relationship between mindful
organizing self-efficacy and safety outcomes in a sample of fifty teams operating in a large chem-
ical plant. We then discuss the implications of our study results for research advancement and
the practical implications of these findings for decision makers in high-risk industries.
2. Conceptual background: mindful organizing and workplace safety
The concept of mindful organizing is linked to the work of karl Weick and colleagues, and their
research into how HROs managed to achieve almost error-free performance under such trying
conditions (Weick and Roberts 1993; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe
2007). In the next lines, we will summarize the main contributions of this work. These authors
observed that HROs had a different social and relational infrastructure to other kinds of orga-
nizations. They discovered that teams in effective HROs engaged in ‘heedful interrelating’. This
‘heedful interrelating’ meant that teams were highly attentive in their actions and interactions
with one another. Further research into these highly attentive actions and interactions showed
that it allowed teams to have an expanded understanding of the system in which they operated.
This expanded understanding of the system was also linked to a wider range of possible
responses to novel or unexpected situations. This meant teams were able to manage the unex-
pected and contain errors far more effectively than teams operating in other high-risk environ-
ments. They called this team phenomenon mindful organizing. Mindful organizing was then
defined as the collective capability to detect discriminatory details about emerging issues and
act swiftly to respond to such details. The detection of discriminatory detail about emerging
issues allowed teams on the front line to anticipate potential errors, anomalies, or unexpected
events. The ability to act swiftly in responding to these errors, anomalies, or unexpected events
allowed these teams to recover from, or contain, these possibly problematic events. These
definitions appear to conceptualise mindful organizing as a two-factor variable, with the ability
to anticipate errors, anomalies, and unexpected events as the first factor and the ability to act
swiftly to contain these events as the second factor. However, the analysis of this collective
capability through case study analyses of effective HROs showed that mindful organizing was
enacted by five interrelated practices and attitudes. They are: (1) a preoccupation with error,
(2) a reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) a sensitivity to operations, (4) a commitment to
resilience and (5) deference to expertise. It appeared that the first three processes underpinned
a team’s capability for anticipation and the last two processes underpinned a team’s capability
for containment and recovery.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 89
2.1. The five characteristic processes of mindful organizing
In this section, we conceptually delve into each one of the five processes that constitute mindful
organizing. Although mindful organizing first appeared in the article by Weick, Sutcliffe, and
Obstfeld (1999), the most elaborated description of the five characteristic processes of mindful
organizing comes from the three editions of the book ‘Managing the Unexpected’ written by
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001, 2007, 2015). These dimensions are explained below.
2.1.1. Preoccupation with error
Teams that engage in mindful organizing are preoccupied with errors. This means that teams
are always concerned about potential or actual mistakes that they can generate. This concern
is manifested through observable activities enacted by the team members, such as spending
time and effort trying to anticipate everything that could go wrong, or emphasizing the impor-
tance of detecting and reporting errors (Rochlin, 1993)), or taking any error or near-error very
seriously as it could indicate any larger problem underlying the surface of work operations.
Overall, this sort of chronic concern with errors is an essential practice for anticipating potential
threats and unexpected events within a system, and strongly influence both safety attitudes
and behaviours of team members, leading the team to remain cautious and attentive at all
times (Schulman 1993), always treating small deviations and mistakes seriously, as they could
potentially mean a bigger problem elsewhere in the system (LaPorte and Consolini 1991).
2.1.2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations
This concept means that the team tries to actively avoid simple analyses of complex phenomena
as it could lead to incorrect conclusions. Mindful organizing encompasses team activities such
as: refraining from making assumptions or drawing conclusions too quickly when interpreting
and diagnosing what is happening in their environment (Schulman 1993); paying attention to
new evidence or information that a situation has changed, rather than relying on old explana-
tions when making sense of something new or unexpected at work; encouraging rich exchanges
of points of view to be able to have a more complete picture of the situation; or reinforcing
a questioning attitude in all the members of the team when interpreting what is happening
in their workplace (Rochlin, 1993). Overall, this component of mindful organizing helps teams
to gain as much information about what is going on in their work, especially regarding unex-
pected events or errors (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). This safeguards teams, to a certain extent,
from coming to incorrect conclusions about the causes or consequences of unexpected events
that can lead to wrong decisions, errors and mistakes with potentially catastrophic
consequences
2.1.3. Sensitivity to operations
Teams that organize mindfully are also sensitive to operations. This means that teams and
leaders strive to remain aware of the reality of what is happening in their work operations at
any given moment (Rochlin, 1993). In showing sensitivity to operations, teams constantly engage
to be updated on the details of current operations and the big picture status of their work,
constantly communicating with the higher organizational management levels about the intri-
cacies of current operations. At the same time, sensitivity to operations is also sustained by
leaders’ actions, where leaders are committed to remaining in touch with the reality of operations
happening on the front-line. This has similarities with the concept of ‘work as done’ versus ‘work
as imagined’ discussed by Hollnagel (2014) as workers will constantly update management on
the realities of how work is actually done. Thanks to the efforts deployed by both the team
members and their leader, sensitivity to operations allows teams to remain aware of the import-
ant intricacies of operations within the system that affect their work (Weick, Sutcliffe, and
90 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Obstfeld 1999). The connectedness of the team with others in the system coupled with an
awareness of what is happening elsewhere, allows team members and leaders to quickly detect
and communicate any important information as it happens (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Sensitivity
to operations is made observable by team communication practices and entails regular contact
and communication exchanges with the team leader.
2.1.4. Commitment to resilience
Teams that engage in mindful organizing are committed to resilience. Resilience means being
able to bounce back from adverse events and continue to operate normally. This is seen in
teams being able to quickly recover and maintain the stability of the system through flexibly
using a wide range of responses. Therefore, commitment to resilience has to do with essential
actions and practices that help teams in recovering from mishaps, errors or unwanted surprises
(Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). Among these practices, there is a further distinction
between ‘preparing for resilience’ and ‘acting resiliently’. Work practices aimed to ‘prepare for
resilience’ include training, simulations and learning from errors. These practices are carried out
to expand team members’ knowledge, skills and capabilities to better deal with unexpected
events so that they are better equipped to correct and contain these events before they desta-
bilize the system (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). On the other side, ‘acting resiliently’ has to do with
teams having the capability to deploy adequate resources and flexible strategies that allow
them to recover from mistakes and unexpected events as they arise, assuring the maintenance
of the stability within the system (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The concept of commitment to
resilient action in safety-critical industries and HROs has been well documented and has been
a central feature of both the engineering and human resources discourse in high-risk industries.
2.1.5. Deference to expertise
Engaging in mindful organizing means that teams defer to expertise. This entails that when
facing unexpected events, decision-making migrates to those in the team with the best exper-
tise rather than those with the highest rank. Deference to expertise is primarily developed
through the production of mutual knowledge among the members of the team of each
member’s knowledge and capabilities, so they know who to call on to help make decisions
when facing an unexpected event or novel situation. This entails that when these situations
happen, ‘experts’ within the system are called upon to help make decisions, independently
from the role in the organizational hierarchy. In other words, deference to expertise refers to
the practice of decisions migrating to those with the best expertise, rather than the highest
rank, in the face of unexpected events or crises, empowering them to make decisions during
unexpected events (Roberts, Stout, and Halpern 1994; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld 1999). In
practice, sometimes the workers who are closest to the potential problem take on the respon-
sibility of the decision-making (e.g. air-traffic controllers), interpreting and managing the
unexpected event in reason of their first-hand knowledge and local understanding of the
causes and implications of the problem. Some other times, expert decision-making is driven
by networks of people with a diversity of expertise making decisions together. This expertise
could come in from the previous experience and educational backgrounds of the team mem-
bers, or even pooling of various capabilities in networks, allowing the team to make better
decisions.
Since its inception, these five processes of mindful organizing have been validated and
applied in various studies across different sectors. The model has been explored in theoretical
articles (e.g. Gajda 2018; Gebauer 2013; Martínez-Córcoles and Vogus 2020; Vogus 2011; Vogus
and Sutcliffe 2012) and empirical studies (e.g. Dernbecher, Risius, and Beck 2014; Ndubisi and
Al‐Shuridah 2019; Renecle et al. 2020; Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a). For example, Gebauer (2013)
explored how the principles of mindful organizing could be used in management development
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 91
programs to encourage self-observation and high reliability seeking. Gajda (2018) proposed a
theoretical framework in which mindful organizing (directly) and organizational mindfulness
(indirectly) enhance individual talent management outcomes(e.g. motivation to work, organi-
zational commitment and extra-role behaviours) resulting in better company performance.
Examples of empirical research on mindful organizing include the study conducted by Dernbecher,
Risius, and Beck (2014), who define mindful organizing as a bottom-up construct emerging
from the employees and organizational mindfulness as a top-down strategic process enacted
by top management. When operationalising these definitions according to hierarchical job role,
they found a significant positive influence of a differentiated effect of both, mindful organizing
and organizational mindfulness, as well as a highly significant positive effect of the combination
of both on the job performance of workers in a mobile work environment. In a later study by
Ndubisi and Al‐Shuridah (2019), they also defined mindful organizing and organizational mind-
fulness as two separate constructs. Their analysis of data collected from 92 Saudi firms within
the oil and gas industry suggested that mindful organizing is significantly related to environ-
mental and resources sustainability, and it fully or partially mediates in the relationship between
some of the dimensions of organizational mindfulness and these sustainability outcomes. Other
empirical work has focused on the adaptation and validation of measurement scales to oper-
ationalise mindful organizing to specific industrial and national contexts. For example, Renecle
et al. (2020) validated a unidimensional Spanish version of the Mindful Organizing Scale utilising
nuclear power plant workers.
However, recently, Martínez-Córcoles and Vogus (2020) provide a contemporary overview of
the topic area noting criticisms concerning the mixed views on what distinguishes mindful
organizing, conceptually from the related concept of organizational mindfulness, and the con-
sequent difficulties that derive from this conceptual ambiguity in creating and sustaining it in
practice. This specific conceptual aspect is addressed in the next two subsections of conceptual
background.
2.2. Mindful organizing, individual mindfulness and organizational mindfulness
Mindful organizing is different from individual mindfulness and from organizational mindfulness.
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) stress the importance of distinguishing mindful organizing from
related mindfulness concepts such as organizational mindfulness and individual mindfulness,
as they may seem similar but are theoretically and operationally different.
Individual mindfulness is the most widely studied and best understood of all the mindfulness
constructs. It refers to a state of consciousness where attention is focused on events occurring
in the present moment: both internally and externally (Dane, 2011). It is a mental activity or a
state of concentration that occurs in one’s mind. However, the term ‘mindful’ in mindful orga-
nizing follows Langer’s (1989) conceptualisation of mindfulness on an individual level. Langer
(1989) posits that a mindful state comes from actively differentiating and clarifying existing
categories and distinctions which creates new disconnected categories out of the connected
series of events that happen in one’s work or life. From this, a more nuanced appreciation of
context and alternative ways of dealing with one’s context arises. This conceptualization of
mindfulness argues that mindfulness is just as much about what we do with what we notice
in our ‘state of concentration’ as it is about the act of noticing itself. Mindful organizing found
in HROs is characterised by noticing weak signals before critically analysing and reframing such
signals leading to an enlarged understanding of what is noticed (Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld
1999). This enlarged understanding of what is noticed is closely linked to a repertoire of action
capabilities which is a defining feature of what makes HROs effective (Westrum, 1988).
The key difference between mindful organizing and individual mindfulness is that mindful
organizing is not an intra-psychic process that occurs in the minds of individuals (Morgeson
92 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
and Hofmann 1999); rather, it is an emergent, collective process that is seen in the actions and
interactions of team members (Vogus and Sutcliffe, 2007a). Mindful organizing is a social process
of organizing in such a way that sustains attention to salient stimuli that may pose a threat to
the operation of the organization, sparking corrective action (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012). It can
be seen and recorded in the conversations, interactions, and actions of team members. Mindful
organizing is also different from organizational mindfulness (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012).
Organizational mindfulness is more similar to mindful organizing than individual mindfulness
as it is also a collective capability to anticipate and recover from unexpected events. However,
organizational mindfulness is a strategic top-down construct which is more enduring in an
organization as it is brought about through the practices, strategies, and structures put in place
by top management (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2012). In contrast, mindful organizing is a bottom-up
collective process enacted mainly but not only by those on the front line; it is fragile and needs
constant reinforcement (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
In our paper, we focus on mindful organizing (not on individual or organizational mindful-
ness). As it is a team process, and a collective construct, it is valuable to study mindful orga-
nizing at the team level, rather than at the individual level (Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007b). However,
it is important to understand how mindful organizing emerges from individual properties and
their implications for operationalization.
2.3. The nature of the emergence process and operationalization of mindful organizing
Multilevel models in organizational and social sciences frequently involve higher-level (e.g. team)
constructs that have their origin in lower-level (e.g. individual) properties. To fully understand
the nature of higher-level constructs (i.e. mindful organizing), it is of utmost importance to
explain the processes through ‘which lower-level properties emerge to form collective phenom-
ena’ (kozlowski and klein 2000, 15).
Mindful organizing is a shared unit property, meaning that it1) represents phenomena that
span two or more levels, 2) originates at lower levels (i.e. individuals) but are manifest as
higher-level phenomena (i.e. team), 3) emerges from the characteristics, behaviours, or cognitions
of unit members, and their interactions-to characterize the unit as a whole, and 4) is, essentially,
similar across levels (that is, isomorphic), representing composition forms of emergence.
The literature on mindful organizing suggests it only exists to the extent that it is collectively
enacted (Levinthal and Rerup 2006; Vogus and Sutcliffe 2007a, 2007b; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007).
One way to assess the extent to which a set of behaviours is customarily enacted is whether
there are shared perceptions regarding the prevalence of the behaviours (Morgeson and Hofmann
1999). Vogus and Sutcliffe (2012) argue that behaviours and perceptions about mindful orga-
nizing are likely to converge and coalesce among team members for at least two reasons. First,
bottom-up attraction–selection–attrition processes (Schneider 1987) can improve the similarity
in members’ mindful organizing by favouring the attraction, selection and retention of new
members that express similar attitudes and behaviours to those exhibited by the older members.
Second, task interdependence and time working together can increase the homogenizing effects
of social influence and social learning by creating continual opportunities for work-related
interactions.
In the operationalization of mindful organizing, we have followed the two general recom-
mendations for the measurement of shared unit properties, that is, to focus respondents on
description as opposed to evaluation of their feelings and, to use items that reference the
higher level, not the level of measurement. Therefore, the subject and content of all mindful
organizing scale items refer to team level practices and behaviours but they are rated by indi-
viduals. Because mindful organizing is conceptualised as a shared unit property, an essential
part of creating empirical evidence to back up the theoretical understanding of mindful orga-
nizing is to show that individual team member’s mindful organizing scores can be aggregated
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 93
to the group level (Sutcliffe, Vogus, and Dane 2016). Aggregating individual responses about
team level practices and behaviours to create a team score is meaningful provided that adequate
consensus is found between individual scores. We will provide empirical evidence about this
issue in the method section.
3. Research hypotheses: self-efficacy as a mediational link between mindful
organizing and individual safety behaviour
Recent studies (Gracia et al. 2020; Renecle et al. 2020, 2021) showed how mindful organizing
positively influences employees’ engagement in safety participation and extra-role behaviours
supporting workplace safety. These studies provide evidence that mindful organizing serves as
a teamwork level mechanism that enables the team to translate managerial safety values and
priorities into observable safety behaviours (Renecle et al. 2021). On the other hand, what is
still relatively under-investigated is the nature of the psychological mechanisms that translate
team mindful organizing in these extra-role behaviours. In order to contribute to filling this
conceptual gap in the safety research literature, we referred to the theory of proactive motiva-
tion (Parker, Bindl, and Strauss 2010). This conceptual framework explains which kinds of psy-
chological states support individuals’ propensity to engage in proactive behaviours which are
also known as safety citizenship behaviours (Conchie 2013), and that are not part of the
employees’ formal job description (Griffin and Curcuruto 2016),
According to proactive motivation theory, a prominent psychological driver of proactive
behaviour is an individual’s perceived capability to achieve short term, proactive goals. In
high-risk contexts rife with unexpected events, it can be daunting to engage in safety citizen-
ship behaviours such as initiating changes, voicing concerns or taking the lead in managing
safety by helping or guiding others to be safer in the moment. Believing in one’s own ability
to be able to successfully carry out these daunting activities is likely to be a powerful moti-
vator for engaging in these activities. Therefore, the present study wanted to examine whether
individual capability drivers such as self-efficacy played a role in facilitating individual safety
citizenship behaviours in a context where teams engage in mindful organizing. In particular,
we wanted to examine whether self-efficacy played an important role in mediating the rela-
tionship between team mindful organizing and individual safety behaviours.
Participative safety self-efficacy refers to ‘employees perceived capability of carrying out
a broader and more proactive, interpersonal and integrative set of work tasks and goals to
do with safety beyond prescribed requirements (Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani 2016). An
important distinction to make is that this safety-specific form of self-efficacy does not merely
refer to an individual’s capability, knowledge and skills to comply with the safety prescrip-
tions in place in the organization. Rather, it refers to an individual’s confidence to perform
extra-role behaviours such as analysing safety issues to propose solutions, coming up with
new methods to improve safety, helping to facilitate safety goals in team, or discussing
with others how to improve safety conditions in the workplace (Curcuruto et al. 2019a).
Engaging in the five processes of mindful organizing boosts a team’s ability to understand
and diagnose the risks they face (through the anticipation processes) as well as enhances a
team’s ability to successfully navigate unexpected events and contain errors (through the con-
tainment processes) (Vogus 2011). We believe that individuals who form part of a team that is
able to collectively manage unexpected events and small errors effectively are likely to develop
more confidence in their individual ability to fulfil their extra-role tasks to enhance safety. This
increased participative safety self-efficacy is likely to lead to higher proactivity to carry out safer
practices in the organization such as engaging in helping, voice and initiative.
We posit that the anticipation processes of mindful organizing (preoccupation with error,
reluctance to simplify and sensitivity to operations) will lead to higher participative safety
94 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
self-efficacy to voice safety concerns to others. Preoccupation with error entails teams contin-
uously searching for, detecting and voicing concerns about potential errors and anomalies
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). Reluctance to simplify entails challenging assumptions and trying
to uncover blind spots in operations through rich discussions about possible categories and
labels (Schulman 1993). Sensitivity to operations means teams make sure to be aware of the
realities of operations on the front line and communicate these challenges and realities to one
another and leaders (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). These three actions and activities increase the
range of situations that each individual team member becomes more self-assured to address
and discuss, increasing their confidence to correctly identify, and voice, a wide range of safety
issues. This increased participative safety self-efficacy is likely to motivate these team members
to engage in voicing safety concerns to others on their own accord, over and above mindful
organizing and what is required by their formal job description. Therefore, the following is
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
voice so that the relationship is positive and significant.
We argue that the containment processes of mindful organizing (commitment to resilience
and deference to expertise) will lead to an increased individual safety self-efficacy to start
safety related initiatives on an individual level, like initiating changes to ensure safer practices.
On one side, commitment to resilience has to do with growing team capabilities to quickly
recover from unexpected events so teams can act swiftly and make changes to bounce back
from errors (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). This group capability may stimulate employees’
self-confidence to engage in initiatives to improve the current work practices to make them
safer. On the other side, deference to expertise has to do with the shared knowledge in the
workgroup about the expertise of each member of the team, which ensures that the best
expertise available in the team is utilised to cope with problems that may threaten safety
within the workplace (Roberts, Stout, and Halpern 1994). We hypothesized that when such
team dynamics exist, where the members of the group feel their expertise is valued by their
peers and superiors, employees will develop a stronger sense of participative safety self-efficacy.
Through this empowered self-confidence, they will be more motivated to engage in personal
initiatives to improve the safety conditions in the workplace, like proposing suggestions to
the organizations to improve the work practices and the work procedures to achieve better
management of safety problems. This might be particularly relevant for organizations, because
work operators are those who see most of the reality of operations and are the closest to the
potential sources of problems for workplace safety, therefore, they are the ones with the best
expertise in the matter (Weick and Sutcliffe 2015). In summary, we believe that mindful orga-
nizing, through its containment processes of commitment to resilience and deference to expertise
is likely to increase an individual’s confidence in their own ability to initiate changes to ensure
a safer workplace, and this increased confidence in their capability to initiate these actions,
will then lead to them engaging in initiating changes to increase safety. Therefore the following
is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 2: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
initiative so that the relationship is positive and significant.
Mindful organizing creates a broader awareness of the work and knowledge of others in a
team (through sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise),
which is likely to enhance each individual’s understanding of which team members are likely
to need support or help with safety protocol and practices. This, coupled with the knowledge
and experience in managing safety that comes from engaging in mindful organizing continu-
ously as a team is likely to build individuals perceived confidence in successfully helping the
less experienced to follow and achieve safety goals. The enhanced participative safety self-efficacy
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 95
to engage in extra role helping will increase an individual’s propensity to actually reach out to
less experienced or knowledgeable colleagues to assist them with safety related matters.
Therefore, the following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 3: Participative safety self-efficacy mediates the relationship between mindful organizing and
helping so that the relationship is positive and significant.
The anticipation processes entailed by mindful organizing (i.e. preoccupation with failure;
reluctance to simplify interpretations; sensitivity to operations) support the collective capability
of the workgroup to anticipate unexpected events that can jeopardize employees’ health and
safety. As discussed above, mindful organizing enforces the confidence of team members to
engage in a course of actions that promote a safer workplace, through the mediation of safety
self-efficacy. While at the individual level of analysis this mediational influence is expressed by
the emergence of safety citizenship behaviours (i.e. helping, voice, initiative), we propose that
at the group level this mediational influence will result in a higher compliance with safety
standards and a minor level of violations. Assuming the anticipatory nature of mindful orga-
nizing, we expect that groups characterised by high levels of mindful organizing will be char-
acterised by a stronger awareness of the risks associated with the lack of compliance with safety
standards and procedures, like accidents or injuries. Part of the construct of participative safety
self-efficacy refers to individual self-confidence to support the workgroup in achieving the safety
goals of the team. We expect that workgroups characterised by high levels of mindful organizing
will be characterised as well by higher levels of safety compliance and lower levels of safety
related violations. We hypothesize that these relationships will be mediated by the employees’
feelings of safety-specific self-efficacy, as we expect that employees presenting higher levels of
participative safety self-efficacy will be more motivated to contribute to achieving the team
goal of reducing the accident rates in the work activities. In other words, in a group context
where its members develop high participative safety self-efficacy from engaging in mindful
organizing, individuals will be highly committed to upholding safety procedures and rules. We
therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between mindful organizing and safety compliance is mediated by partici-
pative safety self-efficacy, and this mediated relationship is positive and significant.
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between mindful organizing and safety violations is mediated by participative
safety self-efficacy, and this mediated relationship is negative and significant.
4. Method
4.1. Sample and procedure
The data used in this research was collected within a large sample of Ukraine-based chemical
plant workers (N = 443) identifying 50 teams. All participants were employed in a single large
chemical industrial facility deputed to the manufacturing, treatment, refinement and storage of
vegetable fibres. A significant part of the production processes in this kind of facility is auto-
mated, and the functioning of the machinery and manufacturing lines contemplated a design
of the work activities allocated to work teams composed of a variable number of employees,
with many teams working simultaneously at different points of the manufacturing lines, and
under a periodic shift rotation schedule. The members of each workgroup reported to a single
team leader, who in turn reported directly to a middle manager of the department division. In
terms of risks for health and safety of the workforce, different sources of hazards include per-
sonal exposure to biological agents (bacteria, viruses, parasites), exposure to chemical agents
(nicotine, ammonia, dehydrogenated alcohol), fire risk and exposure to flammable products, as
well as injury risks in the usage of the machinery.
96 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
Participation was voluntary and all workers were informed that the data would be used for
scientific research and to gain insight into safety culture improvements in each plant. The
majority of participants (60%) had been working in the company for more than 10 years, 33%
had been working in the company for 5 to 10 years, 3% had been working in the company for
2 to 5 years, 2% had been in the company for less than 5 years and 2% did not indicate their
tenure in the company. Participants were employed in primary and secondary production (30%),
the filter production workshop (12%), the warehousing department (15%), quality assurance
department (13%), the engineering department (8%) and 22% came from other departments.
The questionnaire was administered in Russian using the same scales created and translated
through back-translation.
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Mindful organizing
Mindful organizing is a team’s collective capability to anticipate and contain errors and unex-
pected events. Mindful organizing was measured using a nine-item scale (α = .94) taken from
Vogus and Sutcliffe (2007b). Participants were asked to report their personal agreement with a
set of statements referring to complimentary team-working aspects supporting the five mindful
organizing processes. Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree;
5 = strongly agree). Example items are ‘We talk about mistakes and ways to learn from them’,
‘We spend time identifying activities we do not want to go wrong’, ‘When attempting to resolve
a problem, we take advantage of the unique skills of our colleagues’, ‘We have a good “map”
of each other’s talents and skills’, ‘We discuss alternatives as to how to go about our normal
work activities’. The suitability of the content of the items with the group activities performed
in the plant was verified with a group of workers’ representativeness before the administration
of the survey.
4.2.2. Participative safety self-efficacy
Participative safety self-efficacy is the confidence individuals have in their own ability to carry
out a more participative and broader set of safety tasks beyond formalised role requirements.
In the present study, it was measured using a 5-item safety-specific scale of role breadth
self-efficacy (α = .93) adapted to safety specific contents by Curcuruto, Mearns, and Mariani
(2016) from the original scale developed by Parker (1998). Participants were asked to report
their personal judgement about the extent they perceived themselves confident with engaging
in a set of extra-role actions supporting the promotion of workplace safety. Responses were
collected on a five-point Likert scale (1 = not confident at all; 5 = highly confident). Examples of
the content of the items are ‘Feeling confident in devising new methods to improve safety in
my work area’, ‘Feeling confident in setting up and achieving safety objectives of my group’,
and ‘Feeling confident in analysing recurring problems regarding safety in order to suggest
solutions’.
4.2.3. Safety citizenship behaviours
Safety citizenship behaviours (SCBs) are discretionary and prosocial activities essential for man-
aging risk in safety critical industries (Curcurutoet al 2019b). For the present study, we analysed
three SCBs, namely: voice, initiative and helping. These forms of safety citizenship were assessed
with three scales originally created by Hofmann, Morgeson, and Gerras (2003). Participants were
asked to rate the frequency to which they engaged in these three forms of safety citizenship.
Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (0 = never; 4 = very frequently). More spe-
cifically, voice was measured using a 4-item scale (α = .92). An example of item is ‘voluntarily
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 97
raising safety concerns in planning sessions’. Initiative was measured using a 4-item scale (α =
.87), and an example of an item is ‘voluntarily trying to make policies and procedures safer’.
Finally, helping was measured using a 6-item scale (α = .90). An example item is ‘voluntarily
helping with teaching safety procedures to newest crew members’.
4.2.4. Safety compliance and safety violations
Safety compliance is the degree to which an individual complies with the safety protocol of
the chemical plant. Safety violation refers to the extent to which an individual deliberately
violates safety protocol. Both scales were taken from Hansez and Chmiel (2010), and participants
were asked to report the frequency they had recently engaged in examples of safety compliance
and violation of safety standards. Responses were collected on a five-point Likert scale (0 = never;
4 = very frequently). More specifically, safety compliance was measured using a 5-item scale (α
= .82). An example item is ‘using protection devices, even if it is hard to find them’. Safety
violation was measured using a 5-item scale (α = .94). An example item is ‘neglecting some
safety rules when performing familiar or routine work’.
4.3. Analyses
To test our proposed model, we ran a multilevel structural equation model (MSEM). Mindful
organizing was analysed on the team level while participative safety self-efficacy, safety com-
pliance, safety violation and the SCBs were analysed on the individual level. First, confirmatory
factor analyses (CFA) of the seven scales (mindful organizing, participative safety self-efficacy,
safety compliance, safety violation, voice, initiative, and helping) were carried out in order to
gain evidence of the discriminant validity of these measures. A seven-factor model with all the
items loading onto seven separate factors using individual level data was run with Mplus
(Muthén and Muthén 2017). Thereafter, four alternative CFA models were conducted, and the
fit of these models was compared with the seven-factor model. The alternative models are: (1)
a one factor model with all the items of the seven scales loading onto one single factor, (2) a
six factor model with mindful organizing and role breadth self-efficacy both loading onto the
same single factor and all the other items loading onto their corresponding factors, (3) a five
factor model with the three SCBs (voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single
factor and all the other items loading onto their corresponding factors, (4) a six factor model
with safety compliance and safety violation both loading onto the same single factor and all
the other items loading onto their corresponding factors and (5) a four factor model with the
three SCBs (voice, initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single factor, safety compliance
and violation loading on to the same factor and mindful organizing and participative safety
self-efficacy loading onto their corresponding factors. Model fit was evaluated by calculating
the chi-square statistic, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA; Steiger 1990), the
comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker Lewis index (TLI; Tucker and Lewis
1973). RMSEA values below .05 indicate good fit, values of between .08 and .05 show a rea-
sonable error of approximation and values of .10 or more indicate poor fit, (Browne and Cudeck
1993; Browne and Du Toit 1992). For the CFI values, values above .90 are considered acceptable
fit and values close to 1 indicate good fit (Hu and Bentler 1999). TLI values near 1 indicate
good fit, with the conventional cut off being .90 for acceptable fit (Tucker and Lewis 1973).
When comparing alternative models, we used the following criteria: (1) whether the differences
between TLI and CFI values of the competing models were larger than .01 (Cheung and Rensvold
2002), and (2) whether the differences between RMSEA values were larger than .015 (Chen et
al. 2008). These criteria indicate whether there is a notable disparity between the models and
when these differences in practical fit indices are detected, the model showing better fit will
be selected. Additionally, the difference in chi-square statistics along with the difference in
98 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
degrees of freedom was also used as a criterion to check for statistically significant differences
among competing models. If the difference is significant, the model with the smaller chi-square
value is argued to have better fit to data.
Second, the aggregation indices (average deviation indices (ADIs), Rwg values, intraclass
correlation coefficient ICC(1)) and ANOVAs, were calculated for mindful organizing to evaluate
the within group agreement and between group discrimination, respectively.
Third, we ran a multilevel structural equation model to assess our proposed mediation model
and the pathways between our variables. Monte Carlo (MC) confidence intervals were used for
testing the significance of the indirect effects, as it is argued to be a more viable and robust
method for calculating confidence intervals for complex and simple indirect effects when working
with a multilevel model.
5. Results
Descriptive statistics and the correlations between the measures of the study variables can be
found in Table 1. As expected, the measure of participative safety self-efficacy presented sig-
nificant relationships with all the three forms of safety citizenship (voice, initiative and helping),
a moderate, but positive, correlation with safety compliance, and finally a moderate negative
correlation with safety violation. Following previous research conducted by Curcuruto et al.
(2019b) across various multi-national samples using these same measures, we kept them as
separated indicators of distinct forms of safety citizenship. Finally, in the present sample, the
measure of safety compliance showed significant correlations with the three forms of safety
citizenship, and as expected, a substantial negative correlation with safety violation.
5.1. Confirmatory factor analysis
Before testing our research hypotheses, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) were carried out to
evaluate the goodness of our measurement factor model in the present sample. Table 2 shows
the goodness of fit indices for alternative models tested in our analyses. We examined the
distinctiveness of the seven study variables through a seven-factor model (with all seven vari-
ables in the study loading onto seven separate factors) and compared the fit of this model
with five alternative models.
The differences between the theorised seven-factor model and the alternative model 1
(ΔRMSEA = .07, ΔCFI = .39, ΔTLI = .41), alternative model 2 (ΔRMSEA = .02, ΔCFI = .08, ΔTLI =
.09), and alternative model 4 (ΔRMSEA = .01, ΔCFI = .04, ΔTLI = .04) were notable, indicating
that the seven-factor model had a better fit to the data. The differences between the theorised
seven-factor model and alternative model 3 (where initiative, voice and helping loaded onto a
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations among observed variables (N = 488).
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Mindful
organizing
4.01 .66 —
2. safety
self-efficacy
4.10 .70 .61** —
3. safety
compliance
4.69 .48 .37** .39** —
4. safety Violation 1.36 .73 −0.24** −0.20** −0.48** —
5. Voice (scB) 3.36 .96 .54** .59** .27** −0.10* —
6. initiative (scB) 3.29 .93 .50** .55** .26** −0.04 .78** —
7. helping (scB) 3.52 .96 .59** .56** .30** −0.15* .81** .72**
note. * p < .05, **p < .001.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 99
single factor) were notable for the CFI and TLI values (ΔCFI = .02, ΔTLI = .02), however, there
were no relevant differences in the RMSEA values (.06). Therefore, we examined the difference
in chi-square values for the theorised seven-factor model and the alternative model 3, and we
found a statistically significant difference (Δχ2 = 153.96, Δdf = 11, p < .001). Given that the
theorised seven-factor model had a smaller chi-square value, we concluded that it was the best
fitting model. Thus, the evidence above supported the discriminant validity of the seven scales.
5.2. Aggregation indices
The results of the within-team agreement and inter-rater reliability analyses for mindful orga-
nizing provided adequate justification for aggregating the data at the team level. The average
ADI value was .50 (SD = .19), which is below the .83 cut off for a 5-point Likert-type scale
(Burke and Dunlap 2002). The rwg(J) value was .94, indicating strong within team agreement
(LeBreton and Senter 2008). The ICC(1) value was .09, which is above the recommended .05
cut-off (Bliese 2000). Additionally, ANOVA results for mindful organizing (F (49,379) = 1.80, p <
.05) indicated adequate between-team discrimination.
5.3. Multilevel analysis of the study model
The results of the MSEM analysis indicated that the hypothesized multilevel mediation model
showed a satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.61, df = 5, p >.05; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within
= .001; SRMR-between = .015). All hypothesized pathways were significant (see Figure 2).
Regarding the multilevel mediation, at the team level (between level), mindful organizing
had a positive statistically significant indirect effect (IE) on voice (IE = 0.84, p < .001, MC CI =
0.09, 2.14), initiative (IE = 0.68, p < .001, MC CI = 0.16, 1.18) helping (IE = 1.00, p < .001, MC
CI = 0.20, 2.31) and safety compliance (IE = 0.31, p < .001, MC CI = 0.11, 0.55) through partic-
ipative safety self-efficacy. As expected, the indirect between relationship from mindful organizing
to safety violation through self-efficacy was negative and significant (IE = −0.65, p < .001 MC
CI = −1.09, −0.17).
To further examine full vs partial mediation, we tested an alternative model that included
the direct paths from mindful organizing to the five outcomes. The extra paths were not
Table 2. confirmative factor analysis: hypothesized and alternative factor solutions (N = 488).
Model description χ2 (df ) p rMsea cfi Tli srMr
Hypothesized seven-factor model: seven variables loading onto seven
separate factors
1226.57 (506) .000 .06 .92 .91 .04
Alternative model 1 (method bias): seven variables loading onto a
single factor
4691.99 (527) .000 .13 .53 .50 .14
Alternative model 2: six factor model with mindful organizing
organizing and participative safety self-efficacy loading onto the
same single factor, and with initiative, helping, voice, safety
compliance and safety violation each loading onto separate factors
1938.84 (512) .000 .08 .84 .82 .06
Alternative model 3: five factor model with the SCBs (initiative,
helping, voice) loading onto the same single factor and mindful
organizing organizing, participative safety self-efficacy, safety
compliance and safety violation each loading onto separate factors
1380.53 (517) .000 .06 .90 .89 .04
Alternative model 4: six factor model with safety compliance and
safety violation loading onto the same single factor and mindful
organizing organizing, participative safety self-efficacy, initiative,
helping and voice each loading onto separate factors
1581.56 (512) .000 .07 .88 .87 .08
Alternative model 5: four factor model with the three SCBs (voice,
initiative, and helping) loading onto the same single factor, and
safety compliance and violation loading on to another single factor.
Mindful organizing and participative safety self-efficacy loading onto
their corresponding separated factors
1728.95(521) .000 .07 .86 .85 .09
100 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
statistically significant (p > .05). The partial mediation model was a complete model (with no
degrees of freedom) that showed satisfactory fit (χ2 = 0.45, df = 0, p <.01; RMSEA = 0.00; CFI
= 1.00; TLI = 1.00; SRMR-within = .000; SRMR-between = .006). However, the difference between
the chi-square statistics provided by the hypothesized full mediation model and the partial
mediation model was not statistically significant (Δχ2 = 0.16, Δdf = 5, p > .05). Considering all
together, and according to the parsimony principle, the full mediation model was selected
against the alternative partial mediation model. These results confirmed that participative safety
self-efficacy fully mediated the relationship between mindful organizing and SCBs and individual
safety behaviours.
At the within (individual) level, participative safety self-efficacy showed a positive and sig-
nificant relationship with voice (b = .76, p < .001), initiative (b = .70, p < .001), helping (b =
.71, p < .001) and safety compliance (b = .26, p < .001). However, at the individual level,
self-efficacy was not related to safety violation (b = −0.15, p > .05).
6. General discussion
This study aimed to investigate the influence of mindful organizing on a broad range of safety
behaviours in the context of a safety-critical work environment. Furthermore, we intend to
explore the mediational role of a safety-specific form of self-efficacy in translating the positive
influence of mindful organizing into a range of desired behaviours with a positive impact on
the promotion of workplace safety. The construct of participative safety self-efficacy presented
in the article was derived from the concept of role-breadth self-efficacy, originally proposed by
Parker (1998) to describe the feeling of self-confidence experienced by employees when under-
taking initiatives in the workplace that are not formally contemplated in their formal job
description. In the context of workplace safety, we primarily proposed that this kind of
participation-oriented self-efficacy motivates employees to take on the responsibility of engaging
in discretional forms of safety citizenship behaviours (SCB) that can contribute to the creation
of a safer workplace. Furthermore, we also proposed that, at a group level of analysis, partici-
pative safety self-efficacy can also mediate the influence of mindful organizing on safety com-
pliance and safety violations. From this perspective, mindful organizing would stimulate the
individual feeling of confidence in being able to contribute to the achievement of the safety
Figure 2. Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model. *p <.05, **p <.001.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 101
goals of the team (i.e. reduction of accident rates) by complying with the safety standards and
safety procedures, and by reducing violations of these safety standards as much as possible.
Our statistical analyses provided general support for a model where mindful organizing was
proposed as a predictor of participative safety self-efficacy, which in turn would result in pos-
itively stimulating safety behaviours expected by the organization (safety citizenship and safety
compliance), and reducing undesirable behaviours (safety violations). Overall, statistical support
was obtained for all our research hypotheses. Furthermore, the magnitude of the resulting
statistical effects led us to conclude that mindful organizing presents a stronger influence on
safety citizenship behaviours, such as initiative, voice and helping, which are voluntary in nature,
rather than expected aspects of safety-critical roles, like safety compliance.
6.1. Conceptual contributions for literature advancement
Overall, our study contributes to the advancement of safety research literature in several ways,
and they are of particular relevance to understanding the positive influence of mindful orga-
nizing on workplace safety from a multilevel perspective of analysis. In particular, our research
is one of the few studies in the literature that analyses the relationship between mindful orga-
nizing and self-efficacy in the domain of workplace safety. This contribution is significant for
several reasons.
First, to our best understanding, this was the first study to introduce the construct of par-
ticipative safety self-efficacy in safety research. We derived this construct from the more general
concept of role breadth self-efficacy (RBSE) originally introduced by Parker (1998). In her seminal
work, the author intended to explain why employees choose to engage in behaviours that are
not prescribed by their job description, focusing on how individuals develop a specific psy-
chological experience of self-efficacy in undertaking extra-role behaviours. Variables such as
co-worker support and job enrichment are two examples of facilitating contextual factors
identified by the author that support the development of this kind of self-efficacy (Parker,
Bindl, and Strauss 2010). Previous studies had already showed how mindful organizing can be
associated with a broad range of safety behaviours, including safety compliance and discretional
safety actions like safety citizenship behaviours (Gracia et al. 2020; Renecle et al. 2020; Renecle
et al. 2021). In addition to the existing literature on mindful organizing, our study offered new
insights about one of the psychological mechanisms that can positively affect the relationship
between mindful organizing and individual safety related work conduct.
Second, even if the positive influence of mindful organizing on safety behaviour is currently
well established in safety research literature, our study helped to understand which kind of
safety behaviour is most likely affected by mindful organizing. Said differently, our study tried
to investigate if the positive influence of mindful organizing mediated by participative safety
self-efficacy affects in the same way different forms of safety related behaviours. In accordance
with our expectations, the mediated effect was significant and positive for both safety compli-
ance, and extra-role safety citizenship behaviours (i.e. safety voice, safety helping, and safety
initiative). However, the relationship was significantly higher for the three kinds of extra-role
safety behaviours, rather than safety compliance. This result is particularly indicative of how the
mechanisms expected by mindful organizing affect dimensions of individual behaviour at work
that go beyond the normative management of workplace safety through safety compliance, by
embracing a broader and more flexible approach for ‘managing the unexpected’ (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2007) Given that these actions require going beyond one’s ‘comfort zone’ and what is
usually expected, the higher mediation effect of participative safety self-efficacy on safety cit-
izenship behaviour seems to reiterate how mindful organizing plays an integrative function for
the management of risks that exceed merely complying with the organizational procedures and
protocol.
102 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
However, while this evidence seems to suggest that mindful organizing and participative
safety self-efficacy are particularly crucial for the emergence of extra-role safety behaviours
(rather than safety compliance), we need to recognize that other mechanisms not included in
the present investigation need to be taken in account in order to clarify the conditions for
which higher levels of mindful organizing are associated with higher levels of safety compliance
(i.e. alternative mediation variables – like safety knowledge or safety training – or moderation
variables related to job design, team composition or the typology of risks and hazards).
A third contribution offered by our research concerns the level of analysis of safety behaviour.
Our study results help to understand if mindful organizing and participative safety self-efficacy
affect safety behaviours in the same way when these behaviours are analysed at the group level,
rather than the individual level of analysis. Our findings revealed two importance differences. On
the one hand, all the positive behavioural outcomes examined in the present study (safety com-
pliance and safety citizenship behaviours) emerged from mindful organising through self-efficacy
both at the individual and group levels. However, the relationship showed a more differentiated
and articulated trend at group level, rather than at the individual level of analysis, where the
regression indices resulted quite similar for all the three forms of safety citizenship. This particular
result seems to suggest the importance of studying safety citizenship behaviours as the expression
of collective dynamics that mainly occur at the group level of analysis (rather than individual), in
order to identify and explain the drivers of safety initiative, safety voice and helping behaviours.
In addition, safety violations appeared to be statistically influenced by mindful organizing
and participative safety self-efficacy only at the group level of analysis, and in a negative direc-
tion. Conversely, there was no relationship between these two variables and safety violation
was verified at the individual level of analysis. These results confirmed our research hypotheses,
and they also suggest the relevance of investigating the beneficial influence of mindful orga-
nizing at a group level of analysis, in order to understand how mindful organizing contributes
to the reduction of unsafe behaviour at work (i.e. safety violations) that can be more difficult
to explore and explain at an individual level of analysis.
6.2. Limitations and future research avenues
This study presents several strengths, such as the inclusion of a broad range of safety-specific
behavioural indicators, and the usage of sophisticated multi-level mediation analysis. However,
like all the studies, there are notable limitations to the present research. In this section, these
limits will be addressed, together with suggestions for future replications and/or extensions of
the present study.
First, we introduced the concept of mindful organizing as a group level multidimensional
process comprehensive of five distinct team-working processes. However, the measurement of
mindful organizing was provided only at a general holistic level, and it was not possible to
take into account the specific influence of the five single mechanisms. Unfortunately, a well
validated, general multidimensional questionnaire assessing the five dimensions of mindful
organizing is not yet available in the literature. Therefore, it is not currently possible to examine
the specific influence of each one of the five mechanisms of mindful organizing on the various
safety behaviours included in our study, nor it is possible to examine the mediation effect of
participative safety self-efficacy for each of the five dimensions. Future research should look to
address this gap in literature, by providing a general multi-dimensional questionnaire with sound
psychometric properties so researchers can investigate the sub-measures of each component
of mindful organizing in more depth.
Second, even if this study relies on the usage of a broad set of safety behavioural indicators,
all the variables investigated in the present study were assessed with self-reported measures,
and given the sensitive topic of safety, the results could be affected by social desirability bias.
JOURNAL OF RISk RESEARCH 103
However, the confidentiality of the scores was clearly communicated to participants and strictly
adhered to in order to promote honesty. Furthermore, pre-existing studies have shown evidence
of external validity of the behavioural assessment of safety behaviour at work through the
usage of self-report measures in various safety critical industries (Curcuruto et al. 2015).
Third, the present research design is cross sectional. A longitudinal study would have been
preferable as it would have allowed for a more robust study of the nature and direction of our
study variables. In addition, it would have offset the potential for common method bias to
inflate the relationships between the variables studied. Future replications of the present study
should adopt a longitudinal research design allowing the assessment of all the independent
and dependent variables at the different times of data collection, in order to compare the
alternative hypotheses about causal relationships among research variables.
Fourth, the present study did not include any objective safety outcomes (like accident or
injury rates, or like near miss indices). However, past studies conducted with the same measures
of safety citizenship behaviours found significant associations of these SCB measures with rel-
evant objective safety outcomes collected at a later time (Curcuruto et al. 2015, 2019a). Future
replications of the present study should consider including alternative, more objective safety
indicators (e.g. organizational data, manager ratings, department key performance indicators
for safety) as part of the research model included in this study to further validate this model.
6.3. Practical implications for managerial programs
This study shows the importance of mindful organising as a starting point for safer operations.
For this reason, besides traditional safety training aimed to enable individual to safely perform
their individual tasks in the workplace, complimentary learning and development initiatives
could focus on enhancing the five processes of mindful organizing: preoccupation with error,
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, deference to expertise.
To do so, organizations could implement several strategies.
First, organizations could design safety training programs that focus on the five team-working
processes of mindful organizing (rather than only individual compliance with safety standards
and rules). To train teams in ‘sensitivity to operations’ organizations could develop team members
to have a broader awareness of different operations that are proceeding in parallel with their
work, and to understand the details of the interdependence of their work, and how an error
or change in another area may impact them.
Second, organizations can consider designing training programs that enable managers and
team leaders to facilitate and support teams to speak up and empower them to take ownership
of important decisions where they are closest to the information or problem. This will help to
stimulate ‘deference to expertise’ – where leaders’ willingness to delegate responsibilities to their
subordinates is essential – but also in relation to ‘reluctance to simply the operations’, a dimen-
sion that can strongly benefit from leaders’ willingness to listen to their subordinates, and from
leaders’ ability to stimulate and integrate different elements that can emerge from the group
discussion about the activities of the team.
Third, managers could consider designing post-accident investigation activities involving all
the group members after an accident or a near-miss event has occurred in the company, even
if the critical event happened in a different department of the organization, and it did not
involve members of their department. This kind of activity can foster mindful organizing dimen-
sions such as ‘preoccupation with failure’ and ‘commitment to resilience’. Post-accident analyses
can enable the members of the group to recognize and identify those circumstances in the
future that caused a critical event in the past. In addition, this kind of post-accident analysis
can enable group members to identify alternative ways to carry on their activities in a
safer manner.
104 M. CURCURUTO ET AL.
All the practical intervention strategies listed above can also support the development
of higher safetyself efficacy, the psychological mediator at the centre of our investigation,
and through it, contributing to the expression of positive work behaviour contributing to
the promotion of safety. For instance, by fostering work-team potential to engage in the
anticipation processes of mindful organizing (preoccupation with error, reluctance to simplify
and sensitivity to operations), the range of situations that team members become more
self-assured to address and discuss is increased, growing their confidence to correctly identify,
and voice, a wide range of safety issues. This, in turn, makes them more likely to perform
the SCB of voicing safety concerns on their own. Furthermore, engaging in the containment
processes of mindful organizing boosts an individual’s confidence in their own ability to
initiate changes in the moment to quickly act to ensure a safer workplace. This increased
confidence in their capability to initiate these actions, will then lead to them engaging in
initiating changes to increase safety. The processes of sensitivity to operations and deference
to expertise will lead team members to identify colleagues who may need support or assis-
tance with safety protocols and practices. This, coupled with knowledge and experience of
how to manage safety that comes from engaging in mindful organizing, is likely to build
team members’ perceived confidence in successfully helping less experienced colleagues
achieve safety goals. This belief in their ability to mentor or assist others is likely to lead
these team members to reach out to their colleagues that need help with safety related
issues when the situation arises.
7. Conclusions
This study aimed to investigate the role of mindful organizing on the psychological state of
participative safety self-efficacy, a motivational capability that supports personal engagement
in a broad range of safety related work conducts, with a special focus on safety citizenship
behaviours, described in literature like constructive and discretional actions undertaken by the
employees to improve safety in the workplace. Adopting a multi-level statistical approach, the
results of our study showed a significant function of participative safety self-efficacy in mediating
the beneficial influence of mindful organizing on the behavioural safety criteria stemming from
the existing literature. The study advocates for the importance of investigating the link between
the teamwork processes contemplated by mindful organizing and the psychological experience
of individuals, in order to better understand the factors that facilitate the emergence of con-
structive safety behaviours that can help organizations to improve the flexibility and the reliability
of their safety management.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
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- Improving workplace safety through mindful organizing: participative safety self-efficacy as a mediational link between collective mindfulness and employees safety citizenship
ABSTRACT
1. Introduction
2. Conceptual background: mindful organizing and workplace safety
2.1. The five characteristic processes of mindful organizing
2.1.1. Preoccupation with error
2.1.2. Reluctance to simplify interpretations
2.1.3. Sensitivity to operations
2.1.4. Commitment to resilience
2.1.5. Deference to expertise
2.2. Mindful organizing, individual mindfulness and organizational mindfulness
2.3. The nature of the emergence process and operationalization of mindful organizing
3. Research hypotheses: self-efficacy as a mediational link between mindful organizing and individual safety behaviour
4. Method
4.1. Sample and procedure
4.2. Measures
4.2.1. Mindful organizing
4.2.2. Participative safety self-efficacy
4.2.3. Safety citizenship behaviours
4.2.4. Safety compliance and safety violations
4.3. Analyses
5. Results
5.1. Confirmatory factor analysis
5.2. Aggregation indices
5.3. Multilevel analysis of the study model
6. General discussion
6.1. Conceptual contributions for literature advancement
6.2. Limitations and future research avenues
6.3. Practical implications for managerial programs
7. Conclusions
Disclosure statement
References
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Ergonomic Risk Assessment and Mitigation Strategies for Retail
Workers: Insights from a Case Study in Dungun
Wan Farahiyah Wan Kamarudin1*, Northaqifah Hasna Mohamed Khir1,
Nur Irdina Huda Mohd Zulkifli1, Yasmin Maisarah Azman1,
Qhairani Asywaqi Ruslan1
1 Faculty of Business, Multimedia University, Melaka. Malaysia
*Corresponding Author: wfarahiyah@uitm.edu.my
Received: 1 July 2024 | Accepted: 15 August 2024 | Published: 1 September 2024
DOI: https://doi.org/10.55057/ijbtm.2024.6.3.6
_______________
___________________________________________________________________________
Abstract: Manual handling activities contribute to 40% of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs),
leading to long-term discomfort, disability, medical costs, and financial hardships for workers,
while employers face lower productivity and compensation costs. An ergonomic assessment
was conducted among employees at ABC Hardware in Dungun to identify ergonomic risk
factors, determine the likelihood of harm affecting workers’ musculoskeletal health, and
recommend control measures to improve workers’ health and well-being. Utilizing a
combination of interviews, observations, and questionnaires based on established ergonomics
guidelines, the research highlights the prevalence of MSDs among workers engaged in manual
handling tasks, emphasizing the need for ergonomic interventions and awareness to enhance
workplace safety and employee well-being. Findings from the ergonomic assessment revealed
significant discomfort and risk factors related to awkward postures, repetitive motions, forceful
exertion, and static positions. Specific ergonomic issues identified include discomfort in the
upper back, thighs, and knees among storekeepers, and neck and lower back pain among
warehouse workers. Service desk representatives were found to experience discomfort related
to static postures and repetitive motions. The study recommends advanced ergonomic
assessments such as Rapid Entire Body Assessment (REBA), Occupational
Repetitive
Assessment (OCRA), and Rapid Upper Limb Assessment (RULA), along with improvements in
ergonomic practices and tools. Implementing job rotation, providing ergonomic equipment,
and conducting training on proper lifting techniques are essential to address the identified
risks. This research highlights the critical role of ergonomic practices in preventing MSDs and
improving overall workplace safety.
Keywords: Ergonomic Risk Assessment, Risk Factors, control measures, Retail Workers
___________________________________________________________________________
1. Introduction
Ergonomics, as defined by the International Ergonomics Association (IEA), is the profession
that applies theory, principles, data, and methods to design for optimizing human well-being
and overall system performance. It focuses on understanding interactions between humans and
other elements of a system (Pan et al., 1999). An ergonomic assessment was conducted at ABC
Hardware in Dungun, Terengganu. The hardware store was selected due to its physically
demanding tasks, such as moving and stacking large objects, posing a high risk of injury.
mailto:musmuliadi@uitm.edu.my
mailto:musmuliadi@uitm.edu.my
https://doi.org/10.55057/ijbtm.2024.6.3.6
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Hardware stores face unique challenges as their products must be handled manually, varying
in weight and size, increasing the risk of occupational injuries and impacting workers’ well-
being and productivity. Despite the busy and noisy environment, these risks are often
overlooked, necessitating identification and strategic improvements for workplace safety
(Widodo et al.,2019). The study is crucial as hardware stores deal with tangible tools essential
for business operations, requiring effective management to ensure system integration,
performance maintenance, and meeting business needs.
Previous studies focused on identifying ergonomic risks in a hardware store, particularly when
lifting heavy objects like power tools, lumber, and cement bags. The objective was to identify
potential ergonomic hazards and suggest improvements in line with DOSH standards. Manual
handling activities are associated with 40% of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs), primarily
causing strains and sprains to the upper limbs, shoulders, and lower back, resulting in long-
term discomfort, disability, medical costs, and financial burdens. Employers often face lower
productivity and compensation costs. According to the Social Security Organization (SOCSO),
the number of MSD cases related to manual handling activities increased from 2009 to 2014,
contributing to rising compensation costs for employees (DOSH, 2017).
Several studies highlighting the significant impact of manual handling activities on workers’
musculoskeletal health across diverse industries. Mgbemena et al. (2020) underscored the
prevalence of work-related musculoskeletal disorders (WMSDs), emphasizing manual
handling as a leading cause of injuries and absences in industrialized nations. Deros et al.
(2015) found moderate ergonomic awareness among workers performing manual material
handling tasks, suggesting a need for improved ergonomic training and workstation design.
Basahel (2015) linked specific manual tasks in supermarket warehouses to increased incidences
of musculoskeletal pain. Glock et al. (2019) and Loske et al. (2021) highlighted health risks
associated with manual order picking and warehouse logistics, advocating for ergonomic
improvements to mitigate lumbar spine injuries. Markova et al. (2023) discussed ergonomic
technologies to reduce physical strain in industrial settings, emphasizing their role in enhancing
productivity and worker health. Kim et al. (2008) identified ergonomic risk factors in
wholesale/retail sectors, focusing on repetitive tasks and manual material handling as primary
contributors to musculoskeletal disorders.
Recent literature has explored diverse aspects of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs), ergonomic
interventions, and manual handling practices across various occupational settings. Smith et al.
(2023) investigated the efficacy of ergonomic interventions in retail environments, focusing on
training programs and workstation modifications to mitigate MSDs among employees. Jones
et al. (2022) examined the impact of technological innovations like exoskeletons and automated
lifting aids on reducing physical strain and MSDs in warehouse operations. Nguyen et al.
(2021) conducted a longitudinal study on manual material handling, highlighting cumulative
trauma disorders and the sustained benefits of ergonomic interventions over time.
Other than that, Patel et al. (2022) analysed the economic implications of MSDs and the cost-
effectiveness of ergonomic programs, providing insights into the financial rationale for
investing in workplace ergonomics. Fernandez and Diaz (2023) explored digital ergonomics
and Industry 4.0 integration, showcasing how digital technologies can optimize workflows and
reduce physical strain in modern workplaces. Additionally, Garcia et al. (2021) investigated
gender-specific differences in biomechanical stressors and MSD risks during manual handling
tasks, proposing gender-sensitive ergonomic solutions for effective workplace interventions.
These studies collectively contribute valuable insights into improving worker health,
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enhancing productivity, and reducing the incidence of MSDs through targeted ergonomic
approaches in diverse occupational settings.
By addressing these ergonomic issues, the study aims to reduce the risk of injuries and enhance
the overall working environment for employees in the retail industry. The primary objectives
of this assessment are to improve workplace safety at the retail location. The first aim is to
identify ergonomic risk factors that may harm employees, focusing on tasks and environments
that could lead to injury or physical strain. The second objective is to determine the likelihood
of harm from these ergonomic risks, assessing the frequency and severity of potential impacts
on employees. Lastly, the assessment aims to suggest suitable control measures to mitigate
these risks, offering practical actions and approaches to reduce the risk of injury and enhance
overall workplace safety and well-being
2. Materials and Method
An ergonomic assessment was conducted at ABC Hardware in Dungun, Terengganu. This
assessment included all nine employees present: three service desk representatives, two
warehouse workers, and four storekeepers. The process for conducting of Ergonomic Risk
Assessment was using
Musculoskeletal Assessment
and Ergonomic Risk Factor assessment.
This study employs three main approaches: interviews, observation, and a questionnaire survey
to identify ergonomic risks and their impacts on hardware store workers.
2.1 Ergonomic Risk Factors Assessment: Interviews
One-on-one interviews were conducted to gather subjective experiences and insights from
employees handling heavy materials. Respondents were asked about their working hours and
questions related to ergonomics to obtain valid information on their experiences and the
challenges they face.
2.2 Musculoskeletal Assessment: Questionnaire Survey
Musculoskeletal Assessment has been conducted for all type of risk factors to identify and
validate the effected body part. All workers have been given Cornell Musculoskeletal
Questionnaire. A questionnaire survey based on Appendix 3 (Cornell Musculoskeletal
Questionnaire) from Guidelines on Ergonomics Risk Assessment at Work 2017 was
administered.
2.3 Ergonomic Risk Factors Assessment: Observation
This ergonomic risk assessment involves a process from planning, assessing to controlling as
illustrated in Figure 1. For this assessment, proactive approach B has been used to initiate
Ergonomic Risk Assessment which is a walkthrough inspection. Observations were conducted
using checklist from Ergonomics Risk Assessment at Work 2017 (Appendix 6). This method
identified potential factors influencing physical discomfort among hardware store workers.
Observations focused on daily activities, including lifting, carrying heavy items, and repetitive
motions. Additionally, working postures, equipment placement, and material handling were
documented. These observations were recorded and captured using a camera for further
analysis.
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Figure 1: Framework for Ergonomic Risk Assessment (Source: Guidelines of Ergonomic Risk Assessment
at Workplace 2017, Department of Safety & Health, DOSH)
3. Result and Discussion
3.1 Musculoskeleta
l Assessment
The musculoskeletal assessment revealed that upper back, thigh, and knee discomforts were
the most prevalent among the workers, with six instances each as shown in Figure 2. This can
be attributed to the heavy lifting of items such as paint cans and cement bags.
Lower back,
lower leg, and foot discomfort, reported by five workers, likely results from prolonged
repetitive tasks and standing. The least discomfort was observed in the neck, shoulders,
forearms, and wrists, indicating these areas are less affected by static or awkward postures. The
high incidence of discomfort in the upper back, thigh, and knee suggests a need for ergonomic
interventions focusing on lifting techniques and mechanical aids. Lower discomfort in neck
and shoulders suggests less strain from static positions, though overall ergonomic
improvements are still beneficial.
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Figure 2: Discomfort and pain reported workers
3.2 Ergonomic Risk Factors Assessment
The assessment showed significant ergonomic risks related to awkward postures, with frequent
overhead work and bending. Static postures were observed in tasks requiring prolonged
standing. Repetitive motion was prominent in tasks involving lifting and arranging items.
Forceful exertion was evident in lifting heavy weights, and vibration risks were identified with
power tool use. The analysis indicates that addressing awkward and static postures, repetitive
motions, and forceful exertion through ergonomic training and workspace adjustments is
crucial. Providing proper personal protective equipment (PPE) to mitigate vibration risks is
also necessary. Table 1 shows the primary responsibility and ergonomic risk for different tasks
among workers at ABC Hardware.
Table 1: List of responsibility and ergonomic risk factors for different tasks among workers at ABC
Hardware
Task Responsibility
Ergonomic Risk Factors
Storekeeper • Manual Handling: Move and organize
bulky items such as paint cans, cement
bags, and other hardware supplies. This
involves lifting, carrying, and placing
heavy items to ensure proper stock
arrangement and accessibility.
• Stock Management: Maintain inventory
levels by arranging products on shelves,
checking stock levels, and replenishing
items as needed.
• Receiving Deliveries: Unload and
organize new shipments, ensuring that
items are stored correctly and safely.
• Repetitive Lifting: Frequent lifting of
heavy objects can lead to
musculoskeletal strain.
• Awkward Postures: Lifting and carrying
items often involves bending and
twisting, which can contribute to
discomfort and injuries.
• Forceful Exertion: Handling large,
heavy items exerts significant physical
force, increasing the risk of strain and
injury
Store helper • Unloading and Stacking: Assist in
unloading bricks and other materials
from delivery vehicles and stack them in
the storage area. This requires lifting
and carrying heavy items.
• Material Handling: Move cement bags
and other supplies using forklifts or
manual methods, ensuring that items are
• Forceful Exertion: Lifting and carrying
heavy materials places significant
physical demands on the body.
• Repetitive Motion: Frequent handling
of bricks and cement involves repetitive
movements that can lead to muscle
fatigue and strain.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Shoulder
Upper back
Upper arm
Lower back
Forearm
Wrist
Hip
Thigh
Knee
Lower Leg
Foot
Musculoskeletal Assessment
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safely transported to the designated
areas.
• Customer Assistance: Help customers
with their purchases, including loading
large items into their vehicles.
• Temperature Exposure: Working in
varying temperatures, especially during
hot weather, can contribute to heat-
related discomfort.
Service desk
representative
• Customer Service: Assist customers
with inquiries, process transactions, and
manage service requests. This involves
prolonged periods of sitting at a desk
and using a computer.
• Stock Management: Organize and
manage inventory from the service desk,
ensuring that products are properly
accounted for and accessible.
• Administrative Tasks: Handle various
administrative duties, including filing
documents, preparing reports, and
maintaining records.
• Static and Sustained Posture: Extended
periods of sitting with poor posture can
lead to discomfort and musculoskeletal
issues.
• Repetitive Motion: Continuous use of a
keyboard and mouse can strain the
upper limbs and wrists.
• Environmental Factors: Inadequate
lighting and noise can affect comfort
and productivity.
The storekeeper is primarily responsible for moving and organizing bulky items such as paint
cans, cement bags, and various hardware supplies. This role involves significant manual
handling, including lifting, carrying, and placing heavy objects to ensure proper stock
arrangement and accessibility. Additionally, the storekeeper manages inventory by arranging
products on shelves, checking stock levels, and replenishing items as necessary. The role also
includes receiving deliveries, where the storekeeper unloads and organizes new shipments,
ensuring items are stored correctly and safely. Ergonomic risks factors associated with this
position include repetitive lifting, awkward postures from bending and twisting, and forceful
exertion from handling large, heavy items, all of which can contribute to musculoskeletal strain
and injury.
The store helper assists with unloading and stacking bricks and other materials from delivery
vehicles, requiring frequent lifting and carrying of heavy items. This role also involves moving
cement bags and other supplies using forklifts or manual methods, ensuring that these items
are safely transported to designated areas. Additionally, the store helper helps customers with
their purchases, including loading large items into their vehicles. Ergonomic risks factors for
the store helper include forceful exertion from handling heavy materials, repetitive motion from
frequently moving and stacking items, and temperature exposure, particularly in hot weather,
which can lead to heat-related discomfort.
The service desk representative handles customer service tasks, such as assisting customers
with inquiries, processing transactions, and managing service requests. This role involves
prolonged periods of sitting at a desk and using a computer, which requires maintaining a static
posture. The representative also manages inventory from the service desk and performs various
administrative duties, including filing documents, preparing reports, and maintaining records.
Ergonomic risk factors for this role include static and sustained posture from extended sitting,
repetitive motion from continuous use of a keyboard and mouse, and environmental factors
such as inadequate lighting and noise, which can affect comfort and productivity.
Table 2 shows the overall evaluation of ergonomic risks across different tasks and the
discomfort found in Musculoskeletal Assessment. The visual data highlights that ergonomic
risks are significant, particularly for tasks involving heavy lifting and prolonged standing. The
most common risks are related to awkward postures and repetitive motions, with vibration and
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environmental factors being less prevalent. Addressing ergonomic risks through
comprehensive interventions and improvements can significantly enhance worker well-being.
Recommendations include ergonomic assessments, task adjustments, and proper PPE usage to
create a safer and more comfortable work environment.
Table 2: Summary of Initial Ergonomic Risk Assessment across different tasks.
No Task
Ergonomic Risk Factors
Pain or
discomfort
found in
Musculoskeleta
l Assessment
Awkward
posture
Static and
Sustained
Posture
Forceful
Exertion
Repetitive
motion
Vibration
Environmental
Factor
(Lighting,
Temperature,
Vibration,
Noise)
1 Store-keeper / x / / x
x
Upper back,
Lower back,
Forearm, Wrist,
Hip, Thigh,
Knee, Lower
leg, Feet
2 Store helper
x
x
/
/
x /
Neck, Shoulder,
Upper back,
Upper arm,
Lower back,
Forearm, Wrist,
Hip, Thigh,
Knee, Lower
leg, feet
3
Service desk
representative
x / x / x x
Neck, Shoulder,
Upper back,
Thigh, knee,
lower leg, feet
3.3 Mitigation Strategies
This initial Ergonomic Risk Assessment (ERA) reveals that employees in the storekeeper
department face significant ergonomic risks, including repetitive tasks, forceful exertion, and
awkward postures. To address these issues, it is crucial to conduct advanced ERAs using tools
such as Rapid Entire Body Assessment (REBA), Occupational Repetitive Assessment
(OCRA), and Manual Handling Assessment Chart (MAC). To address the ergonomic risks
faced by storekeepers, several strategies should be implemented. First, providing
comprehensive ergonomic training is crucial. This training should focus on proper lifting
techniques, such as using the legs for lifting, keeping loads close to the body, and avoiding
twisting movements to reduce strain. Additionally, mechanical aids such as forklifts, pallet
jacks, and trolleys should be introduced to minimize manual lifting. Ensuring these tools are
well-maintained and regularly inspected will further enhance safety. Job rotation is another
important strategy, as it helps to reduce repetitive strain by varying tasks among different
employees. Adjusting workstations and storage areas to ensure that items are within easy reach
can prevent excessive bending and stretching. Regular breaks should be encouraged to alleviate
muscle strain and prevent fatigue, with designated areas for rest and recovery provided. Finally,
ergonomic equipment like adjustable height workbenches and anti-fatigue mats should be used
to improve comfort and reduce physical strain.
For employees in the store helper department, the risks identified include forceful exertion,
repetitive motions, and exposure to temperature extremes. Advanced ERAs such as Rapid
Upper Limb Assessment (RULA) and Assessment of Repetitive Tasks (ART) are
recommended to better assess these risks. For store helpers, addressing ergonomic risks
involves several key strategies. To reduce forceful exertion, mechanical aids such as hydraulic
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lifts and ergonomic hand trucks should be utilized for moving heavy items. Implementing job
rotation can help manage repetitive motions by varying tasks and providing rest periods.
Additionally, managing temperature conditions is essential; adequate ventilation and cooling
systems should be installed in work areas to prevent heat-related discomfort, and hydration
stations should be provided. Training employees on proper body mechanics and posture is also
important, emphasizing the use of both hands and maintaining a neutral spine while lifting.
Regular maintenance of lifting and handling equipment ensures its ergonomic efficiency and
safety.
Service desk representatives primarily face static and sustained postures along with repetitive
motions. Advanced ERAs such as Rapid Office Strain Assessment (ROSA) and Occupational
Repetitive Assessment (OCRA) should be employed to evaluate these risks comprehensively.
Service desk representatives face ergonomic challenges that can be mitigated through several
strategies. An ergonomic workspace design is crucial; workstations should be arranged to
promote good posture, with adjustable chairs and desks ensuring proper alignment and comfort.
The monitor should be positioned at eye level, and the keyboard and mouse should be placed
to minimize wrist strain. Implementing sit-stand desks can allow employees to alternate
between sitting and standing, reducing the strain from static postures.
To address repetitive motion, ergonomic input devices such as keyboards and mice should be
used, and keyboard shortcuts or voice recognition software should be encouraged.
Environmental enhancements, including proper task lighting and noise reduction measures, can
further improve comfort. Regular breaks and stretching exercises should be promoted to
alleviate repetitive strain injuries and eye strain. Lastly, offering ergonomic training that
includes exercises and workstation adjustments can help maintain musculoskeletal health and
promote overall well-being. Table 3 summarizes the identified ergonomic risks, associated pain
areas, and recommendations for each role.
Table 3: Summary of Ergonomic Risks and Recommendations
Task
Ergonomic Risk
Factors
Pain Areas Recommendations
Storekeeper Awkward Postures,
Forceful Exertion
Upper Back, Lower
Back, Thigh
REBA, OCRA
assessments
Store Helper Awkward Postures,
Forceful Exertion
Neck, Shoulder, Lower
Back
RULA, ART
evaluations
Service Desk
Representative
Static Postures,
Vibration
Neck, Shoulder, Lower
Leg
ROSA, OCRA
evaluations
Ultimately, this research underscores the integral role of ergonomic interventions in preventing
MSDs and promoting a safer, healthier work environment. By addressing these ergonomic
challenges proactively, organizations can not only safeguard the health and productivity of
their workforce but also mitigate financial costs associated with workplace injuries. Continued
efforts in ergonomic research and implementation are essential for fostering sustainable
improvements in workplace safety and employee well-being.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, this study underscores the significant impact of manual handling activities on
the prevalence of musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) among employees at ABC Hardware in
Dungun. MSDs not only contribute to long-term discomfort and disability among workers but
also impose substantial financial burdens on both employees and employers. Through a
comprehensive ergonomic assessment, this research has identified prevalent ergonomic risk
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factors such as awkward postures, repetitive motions, forceful exertions, and static positions.
The findings reveal specific areas of discomfort among different job roles, including upper
back, thigh, and knee discomfort among storekeepers, as well as neck and lower back pain
among warehouse workers and service desk representatives. These insights highlight the
critical need for targeted ergonomic interventions tailored to mitigate these risks and improve
workplace safety and employee well-being. Recommendations stemming from this study
advocate for the implementation of advanced ergonomic assessment tools such as REBA,
OCRA, and RULA to further refine risk management strategies. Additionally, the adoption of
ergonomic practices such as job rotation, provision of ergonomic equipment, and training on
proper lifting techniques are crucial steps in reducing MSDs and enhancing overall workplace
ergonomics.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to acknowledge Universiti Teknologi MARA Cawangan Terengganu
Kampus Bukit Besi management for providing support for this research work. The authors also
would like to acknowledge workers from the ABC Hardware in Dungun who were involved as
respondents in this study.
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S I L E S I A N U N I V E R S I T Y O F T E C H N O L O G Y P U B L I S H I N G H O U S E
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF SILESIAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 2023
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT SERIES NO. 179
http://dx.doi.org/10.29119/1641-3466.2023.179.3 http://managementpapers.polsl.pl/
OCCUPATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE POSITION
1
OF AN OPERATIONALEMPLOYEE ON THE EXAMPLE 2
OF A SELECTED ENTERPRISE
3
Patrycja DUL1, Mateusz GAWLIŃSKI2, Katarzyna ŁYP-WROŃSKA³*
4
1 AGH University of Krakow; patrycjadul70@gmail.com 5
2 Freelance researcher; mateusz.gawlinski.rozprawa@gmail.com
6
³ AGH University of Krakow; klyp@agh.edu.pl, ORCID: 0000-0003-1076-1236
7
* Correspondence author
8
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to conduct a detailed analysis of occupational risk using
9
the methods of Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and the Five-Step Method. The paper aims 10
to estimate the level of risk associated with specific operations performed by automotive sheet 11
metal workers in a selected research facility. 12
Design/methodology/approach: The objectives are achieved by employing two main methods
13
for assessing occupational risk: the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and the Five-Step
14
Method. The approach involves applying these methods to evaluate the potential risks 15
associated with the tasks performed by automotive sheet metal workers. The theoretical scope 16
of the paper covers the field of occupational risk assessment and the practical application of 17
risk assessment techniques in a specific work environment. 18
Findings: In the course of the study, it was determined that the calculated risk values for the 19
selected operations were within acceptable limits. The analysis revealed that both the PHA and 20
the Five-Step Method were effective in identifying and assessing potential risks, providing 21
insights into the level of risk associated with the tasks performed by automotive sheet metal 22
workers.
23
Research limitations/implications: The research process was limited to a specific research 24
facility and focused on a subset of operations performed by automotive sheet metal workers. 25
Future research could expand the scope to other work environments and investigate a broader 26
range of tasks to enhance the generalizability of the findings. Additionally, further investigation 27
could explore the effectiveness of risk mitigation measures and their impact on reducing 28
potential hazards. 29
Practical implications: The research outcomes have implications for enhancing occupational 30
safety in the automotive repair industry. The findings suggest that the selected operations pose 31
an acceptable level of risk, validating the effectiveness of current safety measures. Practitioners 32
and managers can utilize these findings to make informed decisions regarding task assignments, 33
employee training, and the allocation of safety resources. 34
Social implications: The research contributes to the broader social goal of promoting worker 35
safety in the automotive repair sector. By providing evidence-based insights into the level of 36
risk associated with specific tasks, this research may influence industry practices and policies 37
related to employee safety and well-being. 38
52 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
Originality/value: This paper introduces a comprehensive analysis of occupational risk using 1
the PHA and Five-Step Method, specifically applied to automotive sheet metal workers. 2
The value of the paper lies in its practical application of established risk assessment methods to 3
a specific work context, addressing the occupational safety concerns of a critical industry sector. 4
Keywords: Occupational Risk Assessment, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Five-Step 5
Method, Ergonomics, WCM. 6
Category of the paper: Case study. 7
1. Introduction 8
Risk accompanies us at every moment of our lives, in every profession, and during every 9
activity we undertake. Its nature, level, and consequences may differ, but it is present 10
nonetheless. There are various methods available to assess and minimize risk to the lowest 11
possible level. These can be categorized into, among others, objective risk, subjective risk, pure 12
risk, speculative risk, static risk, dynamic risk, fundamental risk, specific risk, individual risk, 13
and collective risk (Ergonomia i ochrona…, 2009). Risk is closely tied to Occupational Health 14
and Safety (OHS), as it involves identifying, evaluating, and managing potential hazards and 15
risks in the workplace. The overarching goal of any OHS program is to create the safest possible 16
work environment and to reduce the risk of accidents, injuries, and fatalities in the workplace. 17
Proper adherence to OHS procedures can aid in preventing accidents, reducing the risk of 18
employee injuries and illnesses, and mitigating costs such as sick leave, medical care, 19
and disability benefits (Alli, 2008). There are two main components to the OHS system in 20
Poland: the legal system and the organizational system. These together form the framework of 21
occupational protection in the country. The legal system pertains to labor laws, applicable legal 22
norms, and their placement within the appropriate hierarchy of health and safety laws. 23
On the other hand, the organizational OHS system focuses on controlling workplace safety and 24
health at a national level, within establishments, and among organizations involved in its 25
creation (System BHP w Polsce, 2021). In Poland, the organizational OHS system outlines the 26
institutions and associations responsible for formulating and executing tasks related to safety 27
and health. The organizational system can be classified into two levels: national and 28
establishment-specific. Two main standards define the occupational health and safety 29
management system in Poland: 30
PN-N-18001:2004 “Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems – 31
Requirements”. 32
PN-N-18004:2001 “Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems – 33
Guidelines” (Model systemu zarządzania BHP…, 2021). 34
Every enterprise should adhere to all OHS principles to prevent unwanted accidents in the 35
workplace. Many companies set specific goals and principles and implement them. The model 36
for such management and workplace safety is presented in Figure 1. 37
Occupational risk assessment… 53
1
Figure 1. Deming Cycle in the management and occupational safety system. 2
Source: Model systemu zarządzania BHP…, 2021. 3
The Deming Cycle describes the various elements of continuous improvement. It begins 4
with the active participation of management and adherence to safety and health principles. 5
The next steps involve establishing operating procedures, and goals, and preparing specific 6
plans for the future. Risk assessment and familiarization with the applicable laws for the 7
enterprise to follow. The next stage is the implementation of the planned new rules, which 8
involves aligning the entire organization, ensuring the necessary capital for the system to 9
function properly, maintaining documentation for the occupational health and safety 10
management system, effective communication, and providing special training to educate 11
employees. Checking and implementing corrective actions is the subsequent step. The final 12
element of the Deming Cycle is the review of management and continuous improvement of the 13
company (Model systemu zarządzania BHP…, 2021). 14
Occupational health and safety (OHS) are closely linked to ergonomics, creating 15
a comprehensive system for safeguarding the health and safety of employees in the workplace. 16
Ergonomics is the science focused on adapting work to human physical and psychological 17
requirements. It combines technical, biological, medical, psychological, sociological, and 18
physiological aspects related to work, hygiene, law, and environmental protection. The main 19
focus of ergonomics is the employee, ensuring that equipment, tools, and machinery are 20
selected in a way that meets all their needs while causing moderate biological losses but 21
maintaining high productivity and efficiency. These conditions have a positive impact on safety 22
during work (Identifying and Addressing…, 2021). The primary goal of ergonomics is to 23
eliminate discomfort and the risk of injuries during work, specifically reducing fatigue and 24
injuries while increasing comfort, productivity, job satisfaction, and safety. Workplace injuries 25
are not inevitable, and well-designed work should not lead to any harm. The employee is 26
a priority in the workplace analysis (Ergonomia i ochrona…, 2009). Ergonomics can be divided 27
into three categories: conceptual, corrective, and product ergonomics. Conceptual ergonomics 28
54 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
focuses on the creation of appropriate devices, machines, tools, and entire industrial halls. 1
It is the most important of all categories because allowing errors at this stage can lead to long-2
term adverse effects affecting a large number of people. An example could be construction that 3
is not adapted for disabled individuals, due to a lack of ramps. This way, a portion of society is 4
excluded from social and professional life (Szlązak, Szlązak, 2010). Product ergonomics 5
mainly deals with selecting machinery, tools, and devices to match human profiles, 6
and the operation of these objects, including productivity, repair, regulation, and ensuring the 7
safety of the person working with the given object. An example could be a car seat specially 8
designed to match human dimensions (Szlązak, Szlązak, 2010). Corrective ergonomics focuses 9
on fixing technical objects that have been incorrectly realized and designed. However, 10
the feasibility of such corrections is sometimes limited, and in such cases, an analysis of the 11
entire equipment and its fixtures is conducted (Szlązak, Szlązak, 2010). Asimplified diagram 12
of the concept of ergonomics is shown in Figure 2. 13
14
Figure 2. Simplified diagram of the concept of ergonomics. 15
Source: Own work. 16
It’s also worth noting that ergonomics encompasses concepts such as law, economics, 17
management, toxicology, industrial design, operations research, environmental medicine, 18
and engineering, which, when combined, enable the creation of a safe work organization, 19
appropriate system designs, production, and artificial intelligence while adhering to ergonomic 20
principles. There are many definitions related to ergonomics created by different institutions, 21
including the Polish Ergonomics Society, the International Ergonomics Association, 22
and the International Labour Organization (ILO), which, along with their member groups, have 23
created theirconcepts (Wykowska, 1994). 24
Occupational risk assessment… 55
One of the main principles of ergonomics is to maintain a neutral posture, where the body 1
is in a straight position, both while sitting and standing, with minimal pressure on the body and 2
keeping the joints and spine on the correct axis. A neutral posture minimizes the strain on 3
muscles, tendons, nerves, and bones, allowing for maximum control and energy production, 4
working in the power/comfort zone, movement, and stretching – reducing excess energy 5
expenditure, limiting excessive movements, contact stress, minimizing excessive vibrations, 6
and providing appropriate lighting (https://ergo-plus.com/…, 2021). 7
Transitioning from OHS and ergonomics to risk management involves identifying potential 8
hazards and implementing preventive actions to minimize risks. Risk, which accompanies every 9
activity, is usually associated with negative consequences (Wykowska, 1994). It represents the 10
possibility of a specific event occurring that could lead to the emergence of a threat and have 11
specific consequences (Romanowska-Słomka, Słomka, 2014). Occupational risk involves 12
examining the possibility of unwanted events occurring while performing work. 13
The loss of health is an undesirable effect that can result from occupational hazards 14
(Norma PN-N-18001:2004…). Risk assessment involves identifying hazards and harmful 15
factors that have the potential to cause harm. Risk analysis focuses on three key tasks: risk 16
assessment, risk management, and risk communication (Norma PN-N-18002:2000…). 17
It involves recognizing potential obstacles and assessing risk by identifying risk that 18
encompasses specific objects (Romanowska-Słomka, Słomka, 2014). A hazard is a potential 19
harm that, in practice, is often associated with a condition or action that, in the absence 20
of control, could result in injury or illness (Hazard, 2002). Hazard identification is the process 21
of recognizing the existence of hazards and determining their characteristics 22
(Norma PN-N-18001:2004…). Occupational exposure is a state in which employees are subject 23
to the influence of hazardous, harmful, or burdensome factors related to their work (Hazard, 24
2002). Protective measures can be collective, individual, technical, or organizational and aim 25
to minimize occupational risks (Pietrzak, 2007). “The primary goal of risk assessment is to 26
determine the measures required by the organization to maintain and ensure the safety of 27
employees, protect their health, and eliminate hazards leading to accidents at specific 28
workplaces”. It should also be noted that if there is no possibility of providing a 100% guarantee 29
of eliminating risk in practice, the employer should reduce it to a minimum. “Risk assessment 30
is intended, among other things, to prevent the effects of occupational hazards”. The aim of 31
writing method descriptions and risk assessments is to encourage the employer to plan 32
occupational health and safety management, minimize and control risk appropriately, adhere to 33
OHS principles, and protect employees and those who may be exposed. It is also important to 34
present to employees and relevant authorities that the conditions at specific positions have been 35
thoroughly considered. The goal is to demonstrate the appropriate selection of materials, 36
workstation equipment, cleanliness during work, and a guarantee of continuous improvement 37
in work sterility and safety (Romanowska-Słomka, Słomka, 2014). The result of the assessment 38
should be a decision on whether the occupational risk can be acceptable in the specific position 39
through appropriate monitoring. It may turn out that the occupational risk is high, in which case 40
56 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
one of the assessment outcomes will indicate the safety measures to be taken to eliminate or 1
reduce the risk (Pietrzak, 2007). 2
Occupational risk assessment should be conducted by the employer for each workstation, 3
especially when dealing with a new job position or when the assessment has never been carried 4
out before (Romanowska-Słomka, Słomka, 2014). In chemical plants, laboratories, etc., where 5
the main work factors involve biological, chemical, carcinogenic, mutagenic substances, 6
and various types of preparations, risk assessment is mandatory. It’s also required during the 7
setup of a workplace, changes in protective measures, and in case of an accident at work. 8
If there is any change in workplace conditions, an occupational risk assessment must be 9
conducted (Pietrzak, 2007). Risk assessment can be divided into five stages. The first step is 10
hazard identification. It’s important to consider possibilities that could negatively impact the 11
employees’ health or cause harm. Conducting interviews with employees aids in risk analysis. 12
Reviewing accident documentation and health records contributes to identifying less obvious 13
hazards. The next step is assessing the likelihood, i.e., which employees are more or less 14
exposed to harm. This involves selecting employees divided into different job positions. 15
Each position has specific associated hazards. This way, injuries, and health issues associated 16
with a particular job position can be predicted. The third step is risk assessment and deciding 17
on precautionary measures. Controlling risk in an enterprise is crucial; access to hazards must 18
be prevented, personal protective equipment must be provided, work should be organized to 19
reduce exposure to hazards, and first aid equipment should be organized. Then, all steps need 20
to be documented and implemented, providing better peace of mind for employees. The final 21
and equally important step is updating the risk assessment. Every enterprise introduces various 22
changes, and with them, hazards change too. 23
There are various methods available for occupational risk assessment that allow for accurate 24
estimation of potential work-related hazards. Some of the most commonly used methods 25
include Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), the Five Steps Method, the Risk Matrix, 26
quantitative methods of occupational risk assessment, and the Gibson Method. The choice of 27
an appropriate risk assessment method depends on the specific work environment and the 28
analysis objectives. Among these methods, Preliminary Hazard Analysis allows for a precise 29
determination of risk level at a given job position and an assessment of whether the risk is 30
acceptable. If the analysis indicates unacceptable risk, immediate actions to minimize the 31
hazard are necessary. This method is applicable both in service facilities and the manufacturing 32
sector. Its simplicity allows for a quick assessment of accident likelihood or other dangerous 33
events during work and for determining their potential consequences. The Five Steps Method, 34
while based on different assumptions, is also a useful tool, enabling a quantitative assessment 35
of occupational risk and considering additional parameters that influence the assessment 36
outcome. 37
The article aims is to analyze occupational risk using the Preliminary Hazard Analysis 38
(PHA) and Five Steps Method for an operational employee performing a selected repair 39
operation on a car within a chosen research facility. 40
Occupational risk assessment… 57
2. Methods 1
The research subject is an automobile service center. Throughout the year, they repair 2
between 700 and 1000 vehicles. The technological process, in terms of continuous 3
improvement, depicted in Figure 3, concerns specific tasks performed by an automotive panel 4
beater during their work. Each procedure requires the correct body posture, adherence to 5
occupational health and safety (OHS) rules, as well as caution when using the provided tools 6
and equipment. 7
8
Figure 3. Simplified diagram of Deming Cycle about the technological process. 9
Source: Own work. 10
11
58 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
The technological process consists of various repair operations on the vehicle, starting from 1
the customer’s request and repair order to the final handover. During the execution of each task, 2
the employee faces multiple hazards, making it crucial to adhere to OHS and ergonomic 3
principles. The car repair process begins with disassembling the front part of the vehicle, 4
followed by the replacement of the front reinforcement and hood. The hood undergoes 5
operations like straightening, puttying, priming, sanding, and painting. It is essential to use 6
proper protective clothing and paint masks during sanding and painting to prevent inhalation of 7
harmful substances contained in the dust. Subsequent steps involve disassembling and painting 8
the front and rear bumpers, straightening the right front headlight mount, and fitting the 9
headlight. Straightening operations are also performed on the fender, followed by puttying and 10
painting. The right front door is disassembled and painted. The repair process then continues 11
with the replacement of the right front wheel hub and suspension arm, as well as the installation 12
of the rear bumper. Afterward, the dashboard, airbags, and seat belts are disassembled and 13
reinstalled, all within a continuous improvement cycle. 14
An automotive panel beater performs various production, repair, modernization, 15
and prototype tasks involving shaping and processing sheet metal and profile sections for the 16
automotive industry. They use specialized machinery, tools, and equipment, both manually and 17
mechanically operated, often with control mechanisms and measurement devices (Kopańska, 18
Chmieliński, Wierczuk, 2002). 19
Physical Hazards: 20
Poor lighting can lead to deteriorated vision, fatigue, and headaches. 21
Noise from using electric and pneumatic tools, such as a pneumatic sander. 22
Infrared and ultraviolet radiation during the finishing process, particularly during drying 23
and curing. 24
Vibrations are generated by using sheet metal equipment, like a mechanical compressor. 25
Electric current poses a risk of shock when using electric tools. 26
Chemical Hazards: 27
Chemical substances present in paints, solvents, and mixtures can negatively affect 28
health, leading to poisoning, allergies, and potentially severe conditions like cancer or 29
skin diseases. 30
Dust, including hydrochloric acid fumes and zinc oxide, is produced during sheet metal 31
processing, depending on the materials used. 32
Ergonomic Hazards: 33
Work posture is often forced into a bent position due to the nature of tasks, such as 34
welding. 35
Musculature strains from lifting heavy vehicle parts. 36
Hazards Leading to Accidents: 37
Malfunctioning electric hand tools, lack of concentration on routine tasks, or using 38
defective electrical equipment. 39
Welding fragments without protective eyewear and gloves. 40
Occupational risk assessment… 59
Crushing risks due to faulty car frame pulling equipment. 1
Burns caused by inappropriate protective clothing while using electric welders and 2
grinders (Centralny Instytut Ochrony Pracy, 2021). 3
The analysis focuses on specific workstations within the automotive repair process, 4
as depicted in Figures 4 and 5. 5
6
Figure 4. Paint Booth. 7
Source: Own work. 8
9
Figure 5. Car Preparation Zone for Painting. 10
Source: Own work. 11
60 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
In Figures 6-9, devices used during the repair of motor vehicles are presented. Before using 1
any of them, it is important to ensure that the respective machine is in working order, 2
as even a minor malfunction can lead to undesirable consequences. 3
4
Figure 6. Car Frame Straightening Machine. 5
Source: Own work. 6
7
Figure 7. Computer Operating the Car Frame Straightening Machine. 8
Source: Own work. 9
Occupational risk assessment… 61
1
Figure 8. Sheet Metal Welder. 2
Source: Own work. 3
4
Figure 9. Welding Machine. 5
Source: Own work. 6
62 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
3. Results 1
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) – A semi-quantitative analysis conducted to identify all 2
potential hazards and dangerous incidents that could lead to an accident. Subsequently, 3
these hazards are prioritized according to their severity, and follow-up actions are developed. 4
During this analysis, several variations of PHA are employed, including Rapid Risk Ranking 5
and Hazard Identification (HAZID) (Ergonomia i ochrona…, 2009). PHA is a matrix-based 6
method aimed at qualitatively determining risk associated with serious events, unforeseen 7
situations, and hazards. This method allows for assessing the possibility of an accident 8
occurring during a specific task and the consequences of an undesirable event. PHA results are 9
used to compare major concepts, focus on critical risk issues, and provide input for more 10
detailed risk analyses. 11
The magnitude of risk in the PHA method can be determined using the formula: 12
R = S · P (1) 13
where: 14
R – the magnitude of risk, 15
S – determining the magnitude of possible starts and damages, 16
P – determining the probability of damage or loss occurring as a result of an accident 17
(https://ergo-plus.com/…). 18
The characteristics of damages and probabilities in the PHA method can be determined 19
using six levels as described in Table 1. 20
Table 1. 21
Determination of Damage Magnitude (S) (Alli, 2008) 22
Level Description of Damage
1. Minor damage, minor injuries
2. Severe injuries, measurable damage
3. Severe injuries, significant damage
4. Individual fatal accidents, severe damage
5. Mass fatal accidents, extensive damage on the facility premises
6. Mass fatal accidents, extensive damage on a large scale off-site
23
Table 2 presents the probability of damage occurrence. 24
Table 2. 25
Probability of Damage Occurrence (P) (Alli, 2008) 26
Level Description of the Probability of Damage Occurrence
1. Very unlikely
2. Unlikely, occurring once every 10 years
3. Occasional events, happening once a year
4. Fairly frequent events, happening once a month
5. Frequent, regular events happening once a week
6. High likelihood of occurrence
27
Occupational risk assessment… 63
Table 3 presents the risk assessment matrix using the PHA method. 1
Table 3. 2
Risk Assessment Matrix using the PHA Method (Alli, 2008) 3
P – Probability of Damage Occurrence
S
–
D
a
m
a
g
e
Level 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1 2 3 4 5 6
2 2 4 6 8 10 12
3 3 6 9 12 15 18
4 4 8 12 16 20 24
5 5 10 15 20 25 30
6 6 12 18 24 30 36
4
Values 1-3 – Acceptable – only actions based on the regulation and management principles 5
of critical and safety-related systems are considered. Values 4-9 – Acceptable – the application 6
of regulation and management principles of critical and safety-related systems and 7
consideration of further research. Values 10-25 and higher – Unacceptable – risk-reduction 8
measures are required. Risk assessment using the PHA method for an automotive sheet metal 9
worker during the process of pulling the car onto the repaired frame involves the potential threat 10
of chain breakage. 11
1. Calculating the risk magnitude using formula (Alli, 2008), using data from tables 12
(Identifying and Addressing…, 2021) and (Szlązak, Szlązak, 2010). 13
R = S · P 14
S = 4 (Individual fatal accidents, severe damage). 15
P = 3 (Occasional events, happening once a year). 16
Risk Magnitude: 17
R = S · P = 4 · 2 = 8 18
2. Evaluation of Risk Level. 19
The risk assessment yielded a score of 8, indicating an acceptable level of risk. 20
If the risk were to exceed the acceptable threshold in this case (9<), additional training for 21
the workers would be necessary. Operating such equipment is one of the fundamental tasks in 22
sheet metal work, so considerations extend to interns and those who are new to the profession. 23
Five-Step Method 24
The five-step method is a qualitative and index-based risk assessment approach. 25
Using formula 2, it is possible to calculate risk in the Five-Step Method: 26
R = P · S · F · L (2) 27
where: 28
R – risk magnitude, 29
S – determination of the magnitude of potential losses and damages, 30
P – probability of occurrence of damage or loss following an accident, 31
64 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
F – frequency of exposure, 1
L – number of exposed individuals. 2
3
The data provided in Tables 4-8 allow for the determination of risk magnitude. 4
Table 4. 5
Determination of the Probability of Damage or Loss Occurrence (Alli, 2008) 6
Value Characteristic
0,033 Almost impossible
1,0 Very unlikely but possible
1,5 Very unlikely but possible
2,0 Possible but uncommon
5,0 Even chance
8,0 Likely
10,0 Occurs
15,0 Certain
Table 5. 7
Determining the magnitude of potential losses and damages (S) (Alli, 2008) 8
Value Characteristic
0,1 Scratches, bruises
0,5 Cuts, minor injuries
2,0 Simple fractures, mild illness
4,0 Complicated fractures, serious illness
6,0 Loss of one limb, loss of an eye, permanent hearing loss
10,0 Loss of two limbs, loss of both eyes
15,0 Death
Table 6. 9
Exposure Frequency (F) (Alli, 2008) 10
Value Characteristic
0,5 Once a year
1,0 Once a month
1,5 Once a week
2,5 Once a day
4,0 Hourly
6,0 Continuous
Table 7. 11
Number of Exposed Individuals (L) (Alli, 2008) 12
Value Characteristic
1 1-2 individuals
2 3-7 individuals
4 8-15 individuals
12 16-50 individuals
13
By utilizing the data provided in the tables and appropriately assigning them to the formula, 14
one can determine the magnitude of risk. 15
16
Occupational risk assessment… 65
Table 8. 1
Risk Magnitude (R) (Alli, 2008). 2
Value Characteristic
0-5 Negligible
5-50 Low, but negligible
50-500 High
Above 500 Unacceptable
3
Risk Assessment Using the Five-Step Method for an Automotive Sheet Metal Worker 4
During Welding of Components That May Lead to Battery Short-Circuiting. The Potential 5
Hazard Is a Vehicle Fire. 6
1. Calculating the risk magnitude using formula (2), taking data from tables 4-8. 7
R = P · S · F · L (2) 8
where: 9
P = 1 (Event possible but not daily), 10
S = 15 (Battery short-circuit could lead to an explosion and result in death), 11
F = 1.5 (Welding might be performed several times a week but not daily due to the 12
nature of the damage), 13
L = 2 (Applies to all individuals in the service area). 14
2. Risk Magnitude. 15
R = 1 · 15 · 1,5 · 2 = 45 16
4. Assessment of Risk Level 17
The risk assessment yielded a score of 45, indicating that the risk is negligible. 18
In this case, the risk falls below the threshold, signifying that the risk is negligible. However, 19
it’s important to remember that during each welding operation, protective devices must be 20
connected to shield the vehicle’s electronics from localized power surges. 21
All of these tasks involve various hazards, including poisoning, joint stress, injury, or even 22
crushing of body parts. Therefore, it’s crucial to exercise extreme caution and remain focused 23
while performing each of these operations. 24
5. Discussion & Summary 25
This work focused on a detailed analysis of occupational risk using two methods: 26
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) and the Five-Step Method. These methods were used to 27
assess the risk levels for selected operations in the role of an automotive panel beater. Based on 28
66 P. Dul, M. Gawliński , K. Łyp-Wrońska
the results, the risk level was determined to be acceptable in both cases, with a risk score 1
of 8 in the first example and 45 in the second. If the risk level were to exceed the acceptable 2
threshold, immediate risk reduction measures, including the implementation of new safeguards 3
and protective measures, would be necessary. 4
Every employer should prioritize occupational risk assessment, as they bear the highest 5
responsibility for human lives. Adhering to workplace safety and hygiene principles, as well as 6
ergonomic principles, is crucial and the responsibility of the employer. If the risk during a job 7
reaches a high level, employees have the right to refuse to perform their assigned tasks and to 8
leave the workplace without facing any consequences. It’s also essential to remember that while 9
the employer is responsible for workplace safety and hygiene, employees must follow all 10
regulations for their well-being. Therefore, reminding employees of all applicable rules at each 11
step in the workplace is essential. 12
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) allows for precise result development and risk level 13
determination, making it one of the most frequently used methods for occupational risk 14
assessment, well-documented in the literature. 15
References 16
1. Alli, B.O. (2008). Fundamental Principles of Occupational health and safety. Geneva: ILO, 17
p. 7. 18
2. Ergonomia i ochrona pracy (Ergonomics and Occupational Safety) (2009). Skrypty 19
uczelniane wydawnictwa AGH Kraków. Uczelniane Wydawnictwa Naukowo-20
Dydaktyczne. 21
3. Grzenkowicz, N., Kowalczyk, J., Kusak, A., Podgórski, Z., Ambroziak, M. (2008). 22
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