Market case analysis

Read this ZARA’s case, and write a 6 pages MLA format case analysis paper, this is the same format of my upload Linen’s N thing’s case.

LET’S TAKE THIS PRIVATE: LINENS ‘N THINGS VERSUS BED BATH & BEYOND

I. Situation Analysis

Chief executive officer of Linens ‘N Things, Robert DiNicola, decided in 2006 that his company was in need of a turnaround plan. Their major competitors were Bed Bath & Beyond, Target, and Walmart. Linens ‘N Things realized that they had to improve their systems in order to beat their competitors and stay in business.

Houseware is a sector of the retail industry that in 2002, the five-year sales growth was 4.8 percent. Companies within the houseware sector all have their own niche to appeal to certain demographics. For example, Walmart dominates the low end of the market because they offer everything from groceries to furniture at a low price. Target has a similar niche but is known to be slightly better quality but still at a lower cost. Macy’s and Bloomingdale’s have a higher quality of product and service. Williams Sonoma companies sell high end house and homeware goods. Pier 1 describes themselves as sellers of native crafts and imported goods. Then we have stores such as IKEA, Bed Bath & Beyond, and Linens ‘N Things who have found niches that target customers who are willing to pay for quality but also recognize the value of a good deal.

Linens ‘N Things was founded by Eugene Kalkin in the year 1975. Ironically, Bed Bath & Beyond was founded just four years before and only 16 miles away. LNT had loyal customers because of their good value on an assortment of merchandise as well as exemplary customer service.

Bed Bath & Beyond is the #1 superstore in the United States. They have over 740

stores throughout the country as well as Puerto Rico. They sell private-labels as well as brand name merchandise that attracts customers looking for good quality merchandise at an affordable price. BBBY strives to use their customer service skills and be a “customer’s first choice”.

LNT and BBBY clearly offer similar merchandise at a similar price. BBBY was able to expand and have no debt and this company tends to promote within. Analyst Hunt stated, “They stress service, every retailer tries to do that, but they are better at it than most.”

DiNicola thought it would be a good idea for LNT to operate at a higher level and offer high-quality products. He found it difficult to work within the company’s current structure. It was very hard to reach out to new customers because they did not have the advertising funds to do so. They had a reduction in employees which made it challenging to execute proficient customer services skills that would encourage customers to return to the store.

Cleary, LNT is not as established as its competitors. They do not have their own unique niche. They’re very similar to BBBY but BBBY has more funds for expansion, advertising, and they created the store before LNT did. DiNicola had trouble restructuring the company because they did not have the means to so but could have tried just redoing the current structure and improving on it.

II. SWOT Analysis

Strengths
· #2 home goods chain
· Commitment to everyday low prices
· Own private label
· Created loyal customers by offering an appealing array of merchandise and through bridal registry and online shopping services
· Centralized operations
· Invested heavily in infrastructure to support inventory management
· Web based sales and marketing

Weaknesses
· Limited advertising budget and product offerings
· Weakened customer service due to reductions in full time employees
· No international presence like BBBY
· Founded right after & nearby to the founding of BBBY
· The profitability decreased.
· Lower stock price.

Opportunities
· New concept of cheap, stylish home decor that would be replaced before it wore out
· The increasing number of new stores
· Growth of international market
· Changes in real estate purchases, remodeling trends & marriage/wedding trends

Threats
· New concept of cheap, stylish home decor that would be replaced before it wore out
· Changes in real estate purchases, remodeling trends & marriage/wedding trends
· Fragmented and intensely competitive housewares segment
· Maturity of U.S. market
· Price sensitive consumers
· Varying demand for housewares merchandise
· Reversal of financing trend
· Consumer demand for housewares was generally declining.
· Purchasing habits of consumers (small but frequent purchases)

III. Problem Statement

Linens ‘N Things was purchased by a private equity firm and needs to be restructured to work towards becoming an industry leader.

IV. Development of Alternatives

One alternative solution would be for Linens ‘N Things to introduce new merchandise that they are currently lacking but their competitor Bed Bath & Beyond offers. If Linens ‘N Things adds hampers, artificial plants and flowers, gift wrap, serveware and wall art to their inventory, they will have a better chance at not only increasing sales but becoming an industry leader over Bed Bath & Beyond. Adding these items to their inventory also has the possibility of bringing in new customers who may have shopped at Bed Bath & Beyond or other competitors like Target or Walmart. A weakness of this solution would be the risk that they stock their inventory with these items for them to not sell and only sit on the shelves. Another weakness would be the possibility of having to reformat the stores in order to store and merchandise the additional new products.

A second alternative would be for Linens ‘N Things to expand into a new international market, such as Korea or China. Similar brands in the U.S. have been popular in many Asian countries and the demand for houseware in the U.S has been declining in recent years. Entering the Asian market now would benefit Linens ‘N Things since their biggest competitor, Bed Bath & Beyond, has not yet entered this market. BBBY has not recently entered into any new international markets in the last few years. Another strength of this solution is that LNT would be able to attract more new customers in the Asian market, later leading their profitability to increase over the next few years. A weakness of this solution would be the unknown risk of the foreign market. The different culture will have different consumer behaviors and LNT does not have any past experience in foreign markets. Their managers will also face many unknown problems that they have never seen before, and they may make some wrong decisions during this process.

A third and final solution would be for Linens ‘N Things to invest more into their advertising and marketing budget. In the past, Linens ‘N Things used low cost promotions like newspaper circulars and mailings to reach consumers. They can start by updating their website and creating an email list to increase online sales. They can also either start a catalog along with their newspaper circulars or invest in commercials to increase their outreach. The strengths of this solution is that their advertising will stand out above Bed Bath & Beyond’s low cost ads and their visibility among consumers across the country will increase. If they choose to implement a mailing or email list, they will not only gain new customers but also increase their loyalty among regular customers. The weaknesses of this solution would be the cost of the budget increase as well as the time and focus put into finding a skilled advertising team.

V. Evaluation of Alternatives and Recommendations

DiNicola wants Linens ‘N Things to become the leading company in the houseware industry. As a final recommendation, the best way for Linens ‘N Things to reconstruct themselves is to invest more into advertising and update there website. They can continue to use newspapers while creating catalogs to give prices and further present their merchandise. For their online customers, Linens ‘N Things should revamp their website and use emails to connect with their shoppers. Making online shopping easier and more interactive will create and increase loyal customers. Other ways to improve the companies outreach is to put focus on making commercials that are enticing and relatable to their target market. By doing so, Linens ‘N Things will give customers a better visual understanding of what they have to offer. Advertising is an important part of the business and a great marketing tactic. With stronger advertising, Linens ‘N Things will be able to target their ideal customers while at the same time informing them about new products and promotions. Overall, by putting time and money towards ecommerce and advertisement, DiNicola well be able to give consumers a better experience and improve brand awareness.

Select one set of national curriculum standards in a content area that you will use for the rest of the assignments in this course, including the Differentiated Curriculum Unit Plan. The standards should be in a content area that you could or do teach. The FIVE choices of content standards are:

The Common Core State Standards in English Language Arts (Includes the Literacy Standards for History, Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects)

http://www.corestandards.org/ELA-Literacy/

The Common Core State Standards in Mathematics (Includes the Standards for Mathematical Practice)

http://www.corestandards.org/Math/

The College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies State Standards

https://www.socialstudies.org/c3

The Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS)

https://www.nextgenscience.org/

The National Core Arts Standards https://www.nationalartsstandards.org/

Part 1. Analyze the Standards

Analyze background information about standards to determine why, how, and by whom they were developed and the ways in which they differ from or improve upon what preceded them. Explain the long-term goals of the standards and their organizing principles.

Part 2. Differentiate the Standards

According to the National Association for Gifted Children (NAGC), grade level content standards should be differentiated for advanced and gifted and talented students: “Although the new content standards are considered to be more rigorous than most current state standards, they fall short in meeting the specific needs of gifted learners, and if held strictly to the standard, could actually limit learning.” (

https://www.nagc.org/common-core-state-standards-national-science-standards-and-gifted-education

Select one content standard that is in grade band and domain of interest. (The standards have different domains; for example, the ELA has reading, speaking, writing, listening, the CCSS for mathematics has domains such as algebra and geometry, etc.)

Using the list of ten curriculum design principles defined in Stephens & Karnes (Chapter 3), explain how you could modify the standard to expand learning for gifted and talented students. Choose four different principles and give specific examples of how they could be applied to differentiate the standard.

___________

Professor Zey
developed sol
or ineffective m

Z E Y N E P T O N

E L E N A C O R

V I N C E N T D E

Zara:

In July
retailer gr
company
way its re
ever-chan
received f
near bank

Findin
refining in
could, fro
deliveries
possibiliti
managers
he had to
constantly
in the sto
changes to

Inditex:

In 1975
Spain, sell
Gaona cre
acquire an
2001, Indi
group wo
80% of Ind

The he
functions
at the cou

_______________

ynep Ton and ERC
ely as the basis for
management.

2009, 2010 Presiden
d Business School
or otherwise reprod

S I

E S S A I N

Manag

y 2009, Pablo
roup Industr
whose larges

esponsive sup
nging custome
from Inditex’s
kruptcy. You w

ng little to cha
nvestment p
m the distrib
. Now he w
es included
were compe

o be careful.
y took the pu
ores with the
o store operat

: History a

5, Amancio O
ling fashion c
eated a corpo
nd develop n
itex went pub
rth €10 billion
ditex’s emplo

eadquarters i
such as HR, I
untry level, s

_______________

C Research Associ
class discussion. C

nt and Fellows of H
Publishing, Boston

duced, posted, or t

ging St

Isla Álvarez
ia de Diseño
st and most p

pply chain cou
er demand. W
s founder, Am
will find a lot

ange in the co
riorities and

bution networ
as wonderin
outsourcing
nsated, and c
The stores w
lse of custom
customers. M

tions, what el

and Struct

Ortega Gaona
clothes at low
orate group, I
new brands (s
blic and in 20
n, with 4,26

oyees and 80%

n A Coruña
IT, transporta
supervising a

_______________

ate Elena Corsi an
Cases are not intend

Harvard College. T
n, MA 02163, or g
ransmitted, withou

tores fo

de Tejera ha
o Textil S.A.
popular bran
uld quickly d

With such cont
mancio Orteg
t of things to c

ompany’s unu
objectives a

rk and merch
g how to im
certain store

creating form
were at the h

mer demand. E
Most of Zara
lse might chan

ture

a, a Spanish
w prices.1 New

Inditex. In th
see Exhibit 1
05, Isla becam
stores and 89

% of its manag

set Inditex’s
ation, and rea
and coordina

________________

nd ERC Executive
ded to serve as end

To order copies or
go to www.hbsp.h
ut the permission o

or Fast F

ad been First
(Inditex) for

nd, the chai

deliver collect
tinuous succe

ga Gaona, “On
change.”

usual but suc
and on impro
handise-plann

mprove efficie
e operations

mal operating
heart of Zara
Eighty-nine p
a’s inventory
nge?

entrepreneur
w store openin
he 1990s, Indi
for the histo

me CEO. By 2
9,112 employe
gement were

strategy, coo
al estate. Indit
ating the ope

_______________

e Director Vincent
dorsements, source

request permission
arvard.edu/educa

of Harvard Business

Fashion

Deputy Cha
four years.
of Zara fash

tions of highl
ess, it wasn’t e
nce a month,

ccessful busin
oving operat
ning systems
encies in man

to third pa
procedures fo

a’s business m
percent of Zar

was in the s

r, opened the
ngs followed
itex started to
ory and descr
2008, Inditex
ees (see Exhib
women.

ordinated the
tex country o
erations of th

R E V

_______________

Dessain prepared
es of primary data,

n to reproduce mat
tors. This publicat
s School.

airman and C
He had inhe

hion stores, w
ly fashionable
easy to heed t
come here th

ness model, Is
tional efficien
to factory op

naging the st
arties, changin
or store opera
model. They
ra’s employee
stores. If Isla

e first Zara s
and, only

o expand out
riptions of In
had grown in

bit 2 for detail

e brands, and
ffices represe

he various In

9-610-
V : J A N U A R Y 1 9

_______________

d this case. HBS ca
or illustrations of e

terials, call 1-800-5
tion may not be d

CEO of the fa
erited a succ

was famous fo
e products to
the advice Isl

hinking that w

sla had focus
ncies wherev
perations and
tore network
ng the way
ations. But Is
were where

es were right
made even

store in A Co
years later, O
tside Spain a

nditex’s brand
nto an eight-b
ls). Approxim

d managed sh
ented headqu
nditex brands

-042
, 2 0 1 0

ases are
effective

45-7685,
digitized,

ashion
essful
or the

o meet
la had
we are

ed on
ver he
d store
k. The

store
la felt
Zara
there
small

oruña,
Ortega
and to
ds). In
brand

mately

hared
arters
s (see

For the exclusive use of Y. Yeh, 2017.

This document is authorized for use only by Yi Wen Yeh in Executive Decision Making Winter 2017-18 taught by McCrohan , Johnson & Wales University from November 2017 to February
2018.

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

Exhibit 3a for country office structure). Country managers were given considerable autonomy, provided
that they complied with the Inditex code of conduct, which was “expressed in three principles: all of the
activities of Inditex are undertaken in an ethical and responsible manner, all of the persons who maintain
directly or indirectly, any employment, economic, social or industrial relation with Inditex will receive
fair and honorable treatment and all Inditex’s activities will be carried out in a manner that is highly
respectful to the environment.”2 Country managers were also expected to be proactive in social issues.
Inditex was involved in many educational and human rights activities, which the company believed
would strengthen the human capital of the communities in which it operated. Inditex also stressed that, in
addition to getting the right product to the right place at the right time and with the right price, the
product should be made under the right social conditions. To this end, the company had conducted more
than 3,000 social audits to measure compliance with the Inditex code of conduct for manufacturers and
reserved the right to visit a supplier’s factory at any time and talk to the workers.

Aside from the central management described above, each Inditex brand was managed independently,
with its own network of stores, logistics centers, and production facilities. At the headquarters, a brand’s
collections were designed by in-house designers. Product flow was managed by commercials, as they were
called, who were organized into teams to analyze and interpret the sales figures for around 40 stores in a
geographical area. Commercials received an annual bonus, based on sales at the stores for which they
were responsible.

Each Inditex brand had regional networks of Dirección de Tiendas, equivalent to regional managers and
known internally as DTs, who oversaw all aspects of operations and performance for about 15 stores and
were evaluated on how well those stores performed. A DT’s annual bonus was based on sales, labor
productivity, shrink, and team motivation. The DTs were headed by a DT country head.

Inditex brands also had HR directors who supported the stores on all HR issues that were not linked
to operations and who were organized by geographical area. The DTs and HR directors frequently
collaborated to match the right store manager with the right store. Jean-Jacques Salaün, Inditex country
manager for France, explained:

In France, we have four levels of stores and type of managers. The stores are classified with the
letters from A, the highest, to D, the lowest, according to their importance in terms of sales,
location, strategic relevance, and employees. For each store level, we define the qualities that a
manager must have, such as a certain level of managerial capacity and knowledge of the product.
Every season, the manager will be evaluated on these qualities. The qualities required, as well as
their responsibilities and what we expect from them, are in their contract. When managers do not
perform well, the DT or HR directors will first try to help them. When we ask managers to change
store because their performance is not good, they are not surprised. Other countries in the group
have a similar approach.

Zara

Inditex’s oldest brand, Zara, was the pioneer of a new fashion category, called “fast-fashion”—trendy
catwalk-inspired items manufactured quickly and sold at affordable prices. Other fashion retailers, such
as the Swedish Hennes & Mauritz (H&M) and the American Forever 21, had followed Zara’s fast-fashion
example. The Japanese Uniqlo, which had recently started an aggressive expansion strategy outside
Japan, was also known for offering fashionable clothes at cheap prices.

Zara was able to produce new items and deliver them to its stores in less than three weeks rather than
the average six months needed for luxury brands. This allowed the firm to react to customer demand
within the season. In a typical season, Zara produced about 11,000 different items while key competitors

For the exclusive use of Y. Yeh, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Yi Wen Yeh in Executive Decision Making Winter 2017-18 taught by McCrohan , Johnson & Wales University from November 2017 to February
2018.

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

would typically produce 2,000-4,000.3 Jesús Echevarría Hernández, Chief Communications Officer of
Inditex, explained:

We have a triangle of information: the store managers, the DTs, and the commercials. The
commercials receive sales figures daily and communicate with the store managers and the DTs
daily to capture trends and interpret those figures. Store managers often ask to change a model
(e.g., colors and sizes), introduce variations (e.g., short pants from long pants), or even design new
clothes from scratch. If a lot of stores ask for similar changes, the commercials communicate these
to the design team who will try to design the item and send it to all the stores.

By 2008, Zara was by far Inditex’s largest brand. At the end of January 2009, it operated 1,520 stores
and generated €6.8 billion in revenues. Zara ran three independent product lines: women’s, men’s, and
children’s. Each was managed by a separate team of DTs, commercials, and designers (see Exhibit 3b for
brand structure). At each store, the three product lines were managed by three independent section
managers, each with a team of sales people and cashiers; the women’s section manager was also the
overall store manager. The women’s line was Zara’s core business and was further organized into three
collections: Women, Basic, and TRF. Echevarría explained, “The Women collection is more fashion and is
moving at a very high speed. These items are placed in the front of the store, in the most important places.
Basic also has a touch of fashion, but with more attractive prices. TRF is the young concept with denim
and tee shirts.”

Autonomy

The culture at Zara encouraged fast decision-making, continuous improvement, and an emphasis on
retaining the best people both at the stores and at headquarters. Isla explained:

We take small decisions and improvements every day. Everything in our company is bottom-
up. This has a lot to do with our entrepreneurial spirit. The first person with a big entrepreneurial
spirit is the store manager. One of the characteristics that the managers mention is the autonomy
they have. Store managers feel like the owners of their stores. In particular, they value the freedom
they have with the orders. We value this autonomy because it is crucial for us to retain talented
people who like the business.

Giving autonomy to store managers was particularly important because Zara operated in many
locations with different local needs. For example, although Zara stores primarily offered a self-service
shopping environment, customers in one of Paris’ most chic areas expected the security guard to keep
their shopping bags while they browsed and expected personalized help from the staff—as if they were in
a luxury shop. In Japan, customers expected to be greeted as they entered and exited the stores.

The store managers’ autonomy also allowed Zara to generate ideas for improvement. For example,
from the Japanese stores, Zara took the practice of having a five-minute staff meeting before opening time
to discuss the day’s objectives. This practice became known elsewhere as “the Japanese meeting.”
Echevarría commented, “You’ll get great ideas from the stores if you have the ability to hear them.”

Corporate Control

Despite Zara’s dedication to store managers’ autonomy, the firm made sure its brand was presented in
a similar way to customers anywhere in the world and that all stores shared the Zara culture. Many store
managers and DTs had experience in multiple locations. Cyril Boudarel, the head DT for Zara in France,
had also worked at Zara locations in Turkey, Hong Kong, the United States, and Malaysia. Twice a year,
Inditex country managers met to discuss the company’s culture and their own performance, expansion
plans, and best practices. Zara DTs within a country met regularly to exchange information.

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion
4

In each country, Zara section DT heads (women’s, men’s, and children’s) and Zara HR directors held
weekly “brand meetings” with Inditex’s country manager and country HR director to discuss store
performance and best practices. Salaün explained, “We cover the sales, the budget, the appointments, the
sanctions, and all the operational points and make sure that Inditex’s culture and the law is respected at
the local level. We also decide if we need to move a store manager and who needs to be promoted. If
someone does not agree, it is like a veto.”

DTs, HR directors, and country managers constantly visited stores to explain the culture directly to the
staff and to monitor store performance. The DTs, in particular, were the transmitters of unwritten rules
and policies. Stores received manuals that included information about the chain and its management,
human resource practices, information systems, and the environment. But for most store processes, there
were no process manuals. Instead, there was a common way of doing things within each country. For
example, all Zara stores in France managed replenishment from backrooms similarly. Cashiers were not
supposed talk to each other while ringing up customers and section managers were not supposed to take
breaks at the same time. If DTs, who spent 80% of their time visiting stores, observed deviation, they were
not shy about letting the store manager know and asking him or her to work on it.

Isla also visited the stores frequently. He explained:

My main objective is to make sure that there is no disconnection between the store and
headquarters and that what the store is feeling is transmitted. When I visit a store I usually ask,
“What are you missing? What should you have that you don’t have? How is your relation with the
commercials? What support are you getting from the country structure? What HR problems do you
have?” We are a very store-driven organization but, as we grow, to avoid becoming a bureaucratic
company, we need to make efforts. I also want to know if store managers are knowledgeable about
the products. I usually ask them to show me the newest products they received and tell me what
they think about them.

Zara’s Supply Chain

Zara’s two main selling seasons were autumn/winter and spring/summer. Six months before the
beginning of each selling season, Zara’s design teams presented the first designs and Zara committed
about 30% of its production to its suppliers. For the less fashion-oriented collections, the commitments
were larger. During the season itself, Zara’s proximity factories with short lead times allowed it to
introduce new designs based on fashion trends and customer needs. For more basic products, which were
easier to forecast, Zara used cheaper suppliers with longer lead times (see Exhibit 4 for details on
locations and lead times).

All products, regardless of their origin or destination, came to logistics centers in Spain before being
sent to the stores. Even for stores in Asia, a product produced in an Asian factory would first come to
Spain and then be distributed by air. Airfreight cost was about 1% of the selling price. The Arteixo
logistics center in A Coruña managed 50% of the women’s and men’s merchandise and served Spain,
Portugal, the Americas, and the Middle East. The Zaragoza center managed the remaining 50% and also
served non-Iberian Europe, Russia, and Asia (see Exhibit 5 for Zara store locations). The Meco center in
Madrid managed children’s wear for all Zara stores. Most countries also had small warehouses for extra
or returned merchandise and for inter-store transfers.

The Ordering Cycle

At the beginning of each season, the new collections were sent to the stores in quantities decided by
the commercials. Each store received about 25,000 units within a two-week period. But once new

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

products arrived at the stores, it was up to section managers to order replenishments. Twice a week, each
section manager received a morning “offer” through his or her PDA. The offer listed the products that the
logistics centers had in stock, with descriptions, photos, and a history of how many of that product the
store had already received and sold. Section managers used these data along with their own forecasts of
customer demand and their knowledge of store inventory to decide how many units of each item to
order. The IT systems did not provide store-inventory data; section managers knew their inventory by
spending most of their time on the selling floor. Section managers sent their orders by the end of the day.

European stores received their deliveries within 24 hours; those in Asia and the Americas received
deliveries within 40 hours. Each week, stores received about 12,000 units (8,000 for women’s, 2,000 for
men’s, 2,000 for children’s). But they almost never received exactly what they had ordered. Because
inventory at the logistics centers was limited, it was allocated to stores according to their orders and their
previous sales. For this reason, section managers tended to over order. Julien Lancelin, the store manager
of Zara Opera, a store based in a fashionable area of Paris, said:

In theory, you can order twice a week so you only need to order for three or four days’ of sales.
But if the item is successful, by the time you order it again, it might already be out of stock. For
example, one month ago I received 20 items of a new jacket. I sold them in one day. In my first
order, I asked for 150, which I sold in less than four days. Then I ordered 200, but I received only
100. When I ordered it again, it was out of stock. As it was a bestseller and several shops asked for
the same item, the commercials decided to produce it again. Yet, I had to wait for almost three
weeks, which is the time it takes to re-produce an item. I have ordered it again but I am not sure I
will receive it.

Ordering was especially challenging for new products. Lancelin explained:

I just received these new items in the morning and, by 10 p.m., I need to pass my order. I do not
have much time to decide if I want to order the new items or not and in which volumes. So I’ll
immediately put these new clothes in an area where people will see them. If the deliveries are late
or the product is not well placed, I will need to pass the order without observing customers’
reactions.

Recent Improvements

Isla had introduced several improvements to Zara’s logistics and merchandise planning. For example,
he reduced transportation costs by consolidating transportation across Zara’s different brands and
invested €100 million to open a state-of-the-art logistics center for children’s merchandise in Madrid in
2007.

Several improvements involved shifting time-consuming work away from store employees. For
example, when new merchandise was delivered to Zara stores, store employees had been unloading the
trucks themselves. Isla had the third-party logistics providers who were making the deliveries bring the
packed merchandise off the truck and onto the selling floor. Employees had also been attaching alarm
tags to newly delivered products, which ate up considerable time and kept the products in the backrooms
for an extra day. Isla had this task shifted to the factories.

In 2006, Zara introduced automatic replenishment for basic products (10-15% of all products) that
were easier to forecast. Although some store managers were initially hesitant to give up control of their
inventory, they realized that the change allowed them to dedicate more time to fashion products. Besides,
they could always communicate any problems they saw to the commercials. Working with academics in
operations management, Zara developed an algorithm for allocating inventory at logistics centers to
stores and was now trying to optimize clearance pricing. Isla explained:

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

We tend to internally design our systems to fit our needs. Everything in our company is a
combination of good systems and maintaining the human touch. It’s impossible to think that we
are just going to follow what the program or the formula suggests. We are managing so many
thousands of references that we need these tools, but they will never replace the essence of our
decision-making process. Some people think that this model is risky, but it is not. That is because
Inditex is based on thousands of people taking thousands of small decisions. Orders happen twice
per week. The store manager doesn’t take a decision with a 10% impact on total sales. Commercials
can easily spot if a manager is making mistakes and the software would help them detect this.

Zara Stores

Zara stores were in prime locations. An average store was 1,200 m2 in size and carried about 40,000
units of inventory. But stores varied greatly in size and layout. Zara put a lot of emphasis on creating
attractive interior designs that conveyed freedom and quiet comfort to the customer,4 but also on ensuring
that merchandise and shop windows were presented similarly in all Zara stores. Teams of merchandisers
created displays at the test store in A Coruña, decided on the look, took photos of how they wanted the
items to be displayed, and sent the photos to stores (see Exhibit 6 for a sample photo). The shop windows
were changed every three to four weeks by regional window dressers responsible for about four stores.

Store displays were managed by section managers and store merchandisers who tried to keep as
close as possible to the photos sent by headquarters. Cyril Boudarel, DT head of Zara France and Zara
Women France, explained:

The merchandise moves fast and the shop changes every day. The section manager receives a
layout picture but they might not have all the items; they could have sold out an item or may never
have ordered it. We have regional merchandisers who tell the section managers and store
merchandiser, “You cannot present this item like that,” and together they try to come up with an
alternative.

If the section managers disagreed with headquarters’ guidelines, they could take a picture of the changed
layout and send it to the regional and central merchandisers for approval. The changes sent by the section
managers were tested in the A Coruña store. Boudarel said, “We want people with ideas. If a store has a
good one, I let them do it. I’ll come and check first. They cannot do it alone because if it works I want to
share it with other stores. This is also good for brand consistency. We want Zara stores to be recognized
as such everywhere in the world.”

Store Management

An average Zara store had 70 employees, 60% of whom were part-time sales associates. The key
positions were the three section managers, who managed all aspects of store operations; the women’s
section manager was also the overall store manager. Section managers recruited and managed staff,
worked with merchandisers on store layout, and managed in-store logistics and customer service. They
were constantly on the selling floor working with merchandise, observing customer needs, and helping
staff. In fact, a section manager did not have an office or even a chair on the selling floor. A few section
managers were specialists in HR, replenishment, or management; they were part of the DT team and were
sent to other stores to advise colleagues who were having problems. Newly appointed section managers
did not necessarily receive any formal training; many had already learned the job as assistant managers
(segundas) receiving constant feedback from DTs.

Section managers were evaluated by HR directors and DTs. This evaluation was based on sales,
employee productivity (measured as sales divided by employee hours), shrink, store atmosphere,

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

merchandising, knowledge of the merchandise, staff image, recruitment, training, employee turnover and
absenteeism, and how well the section manager evaluated his or her own staff’s performance. (DTs
visited the stores so often that they were familiar enough with the employees to gauge how well the
sections manager was evaluating them.) Section managers received a competitive salary, determined by
HR at headquarters, and a bonus based solely on how well they achieved sales targets. Boudarel
commented:

To achieve sales, managers need an efficient and trained team and have to manage the store
well. Yet, when we open a new store in a new country, customers will come for the product and the
brand. The manager can just cover the bases. But in mature markets and in a moment of crisis, the
managers have to adapt to the situation and do everything well—the merchandising, the orders,
and so on.

Sales associates were organized by section (women’s, men’s, and children’s). Those working in the
women’s section were also organized by collection. Section managers tried to match the sales associates
with the right collections. Within the women’s section, for example, they often had more fashion-oriented
employees working in Women, faster employees working in Basic (the largest department with the most
folding to do), and younger employees working in TRF.

Retaining Store Staff

Zara’s business model relied on experienced and committed store employees. It was important to keep
turnover low and, in fact, Zara enjoyed lower turnover (on average, around 15% for sales associates and
much lower for store managers) than most other large retailers. Employee turnover varied greatly across
countries and locations, however, going over 15% in large cities and reaching around 30% in Russia.

Sales associates’ compensation was set by HR at headquarters. Overall, the starting wages were higher
than those in other retail stores. All store employees, including the part-timers, also received a
commission. A percent of each store’s monthly sales was divided among the store’s employees according
to the number of hours each had worked and his or her position.

Ninety percent of the store managers had been promoted from within. It was not uncommon for a
part-time employee to rise through the ranks and become a section manager in only two years, then go on
to become a DT or a commercial. But stores in mature areas such as Paris had started losing their part-
time employees because there were not enough opportunities for them to become full-timers. Although
part-timers had the same benefits as full-timers, they could not accumulate responsibilities and be
promoted. In France, stores came up with a way to reduce part-time employee turnover by allowing some
part-timers to work full-time hours but in two stores. By summer 2009, 370 employees had that contract.
One corporate initiative to reduce employee turnover was to provide employees their work schedules one
month in advance. But as of summer 2009, stores tended to follow local legislation or common practices
on the matter. In France, for example work schedules had to be provided two weeks in advance by law.
In the United States, there was no such law so Zara adopted the common practice of providing schedules
one week in advance.

Motivation was important. There was a lot of physical work to do and there was constant monitoring
by section managers, DTs, and HR directors to put up with. Echevarría explained:

It’s a really tough but rewarding job. When you have a very busy store, it’s really hard to keep
the tables with the folded clothes in neat piles while customers are taking and looking at the items
every second. We say that the store must never fall apart, which happens when the tables are a
mess, or we have sweaters where the pants are. If you are not motivated in this group, this is too
much work. Yet if you love the job you will be amazingly loved: It is absolutely rewarding to see

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

so directly the consequences of your work when, for example, a customer leaves the store satisfied
with purchases that you have helped him or her to find.

To meet these demands, section managers tried to hire sales associates with a strong interest in fashion
and a strong capacity to learn. These were the employees who would be motivated by the frequent arrival
of new merchandise and the opportunity to perform different functions. Many Zara employees also felt
proud to be part of an organization that took action on social issues. Sales associates were usually hired
under a part-time contract and then promoted to full-time and other roles. When they first started, they
often received a one week on the job training.

Managing Customer Service

Zara’s target customers were young, fashion-conscious people who were interested in buying
inexpensive clothes. These customers came frequently to see the new products. When they liked
something, they often bought it immediately because they knew it might not be there next time. Most
customers did not expect personalized attention from sales associates. In fact, sales associates were taught
as a first rule not to bother customers and to offer assistance only if directly approached or if they noticed
that someone needed help. Boudarel explained, “Customers come to Zara for the product and usually
they do not have time. We can help them to choose a fitting, but it is very quick.”

Good customer service at Zara meant presenting the merchandise well for customers, being available
when customers needed help, and making sure customers didn’t have to wait long for a cashier.i As
Boudarel put it, “Our staff is more involved in managing products than managing customers. Therefore,
we need sales associates who can fold and talk at the same time.”

Ensuring this kind of customer service depended heavily on having enough staff. Staffing levels at the
stores were determined by DTs and HR directors in collaboration with section managers. HR directors
budgeted hours for each store and section every month based on historical data, sales forecasts prepared
by DTs and section managers, and any adjustments that were necessary. Boudarel explained, “When we
prepare the sales budget, I ask the managers how much they think they will make. Then we adjust the
budget together. The managers always tend to underestimate how much they will sell.” Section managers
used these monthly payroll budgets to decide on daily staffing levels and employee schedules, taking into
account daily workload, employee availability, and labor contracts (Exhibit 7 shows how sales and labor
hours vary over time. Exhibit 8 shows how labor hours vary within a given day). But knowing how
important sufficient staffing was for customer service, Zara did not put too much emphasis on meeting
monthly payroll budgets.

Customers with complaints, questions, and comments could call, email, or send a letter to
headquarters. In 2008, Zara received about 21,800 electronic queries. Other than this count, Zara did not
track measures of customer service. Instead, it focused on one metric: sales.

Managing In-store

Logistics

Much of a sales associate’s work was managing in-store logistics, which consisted of (1) processing
deliveries, (2) managing product flow between the backroom and the selling floor, (3) managing display
areas and fitting rooms, and (4) conducting physical audits.

Processing Deliveries

i Every section had several sales associates trained as cashiers. In the women’s section of Zara Opera, for example, 22 of the 38
associates could operate a cash register.

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

At least twice a week, stores received early-morning deliveries from third-party logistics companies.
Store employees arriving at work around 7 a.m. would typically find the new merchandise on the selling
floor, either in sealed boxes or else on hangers and each item wrapped in plastic.

These deliveries were then processed by section managers (or assistant section managers), the
merchandising coordinator, and the sales associates. They had to move the boxes and hangers to where
there was room to open them, remove the plastic covers from items on hangers or in boxes, and move
some items from the lightweight hangers on which they were shipped to sturdier hangers for display. The
boxes and hangers held mixed products; the same tee shirt, for example, might turn up in four different
boxes along with pants, shorts, and other tee shirts. Products were sorted for shelving. The merchandising
coordinator and section managers decided where to place the new designs; everything else was shelved
by sales associates.

The night before a delivery, headquarters sent each store a list of items it would receive. Section
managers were responsible for checking the accuracy of the shipment. For products that arrived in boxes,
they checked the number of boxes received against the number they were supposed to have received. For
products that arrived on hangers, they checked the quantity of each reference (regardless of the color or
size).

Each section manager had his or her own way of managing the delivery processing. But the rule for
everyone was that, by the time the store was ready to open, the selling floor had to be ready for
customers. Section managers also had productivity targets. In France, for example, they were encouraged
to process at least 85 units of new merchandise per hour per person; if they consistently fell below that,
the DTs intervened.

Managing Backroom Replenishment

There was not enough selling space to keep all units on the floor. In an average store, 30% of inventory
was kept in the backroom. Boudarel explained:

Inditex’s policy is “big store, small backroom.” If we had everything on the shop floor, we
would need around 1,600 square meters. But we probably don’t want to display all units anyway.
We don’t want our stores to look crowded. And in many countries, it is hard to find big spaces in
good locations and with nice backrooms. In France, 60% of the merchandise is in the backroom and
occasionally we have backrooms outside the store. External backrooms are also used in other
countries, like Japan, where the floor is very expensive.

The backrooms had another function. The company policy was not to keep a product on the selling
floor unless all sizes were available. But with Zara’s frequent product changes, stores usually had
products for which they didn’t have all sizes. In such cases, sales associates put the item in the backroom
until the store received the missing sizes. If production had stopped for that item, it might remain in the
backroom until the clearance period. But if production had stopped and the item was a bestseller, most
countries would centralize the remaining units in a warehouse and send them to the stores with the
highest sales for that item.

Ensuring accurate in-store logistics was labor-intensive. In France, for example, sales associates
checked the selling floor each morning to see if they had all the sizes for each item on display. If not, they
replenished the missing sizes from the back room if the sizes were there. Different sections used different
rules for how many units of each size should be displayed. A Zara Opera sales associate explained, “For
jeans, we should have two units per size for the more common sizes and one unit for the others. In
another Zara store in Paris, which has a lot of traffic and an external backroom, we keep more units on the
shop floor.” Because sales associates were so familiar with the store, they generally knew how many units

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion
10

of each size were appropriate and where to find them in the backroom. If they consistently made
mistakes, section managers intervened.

The first replenishment from the backroom each morning was important because it was the reference
for the following ones. For the rest of the day, Zara sales associates performed the so-called “24.” Every
hour, one sales associate from the women’s department and one from the men’s department would collect
from all the cashiers in the store a list of all sales in the last hour and replenish sold items from the
backroom. This was also done in the children’s department, but less frequently.

Managing Display Areas and Fitting Rooms

Associates constantly folded the products to keep the display tables looking orderly, spotted
misplaced products on the selling floor and put them back where they belonged, and checked the fitting
room areas to collect products that belonged to their own areas. They also kept an eye on what was
selling and what the customers were looking for, communicating any trends they observed to their
section managers. During busy periods, section managers in some stores assigned sales associates to stay
near the fitting rooms to help customers and manage products in those areas.

Physical Audits

Every three weeks, the sales associates conducted a partial inventory which would take around 40
minutes. The main objective was to monitor shrink rather than to ensure the accuracy of inventory data.
Boudarel explained, “We scan what goes out but not what comes in, as we do not have time during the
deliveries. Thus, every three weeks we scan a part of the store by model, color, and size.” Staff would also
conduct an audit of the store’s physical inventory one to three times per season. Boudarel explained:

We start the physical audit in the backroom before the store closes and do the selling floor once
we close. In total, it takes around two and a half hours and the whole store works on this. If, the
first time that we do the physical audit, all is fine, we only do one audit per season. With the
inventory and the physical audit we discover, on average, 1% shrink, which is calculated over the
total volumes, not by model.

The Next Step

Although Inditex had never come near to bankruptcy, Isla had—as founder Ortega Gaona had
predicted—found a lot of things to change. This year, the need to improve efficiency had never been more
urgent. Although Inditex had suffered less than other retailers in the 2008 world economic crisis, its
growth had slowed down. It had opened 145 stores in the first quarter of 2008, but only 95 in the first
quarter of 2009.

Labor was the largest operating expense at the stores and any change to improve labor productivity
would have significant profit implications. Isla thought several changes might help improve labor
productivity. For example, store managers could be encouraged to find ways to improve labor
productivity if part of their bonus depended on it. Standardizing store processes, especially for in-store
logistics processes, could also help. Alternatively, processing of deliveries, which took approximately 5%
of all the time employees spent at the stores, could be outsourced to third parties. Isla had already
outsourced the unloading of new merchandise from the trucks into the stores because third-party logistics
companies could do this work more quickly and with cheaper labor. He had no doubt that outsourcing
process delivery would save even more time and money. But he knew he had to be careful. Could an
emphasis on improving labor productivity hurt other aspects of store operations?

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

Exhibit 1 Inditex’s Brands

Year of
creation/
acquisition

Brand name Description Sales in
2008

(€ million)

Number
of stores
in

2008

Total
store m2
as of Jan

2009

Net store
openings

2008

Operating
countries

1975 Zara Mid-quality, very
fashionable, low prices.

6,824 1,520* 1,447,313 159 72

1991 Pull and
Bear

Internally developed brand.
14 to 28 age range, more
sporty and for daily wear,
competitive price, very
young fashion language.

720 583 158,927 64 39

1991 Massimo

Dutti

Acquired. For age 25 and
up, more expensive than
Zara.

722 470 130,618 44 38

1998 Bershka Internally developed. More
trendy and radical, casual
nightwear.

1.026 591 211,436 81 40

1999 Stradivarius Acquired. Only women’s
wear, for age 25 and up,
fashionable but more
traditional.

633 456 116,835 75 31

2001 Oysho Internally developed.
Underwear for women.

242 374 51,925 84 23

2003 Zara Home Internally developed.
Textiles and home
decoration items.

222 239 59,655 35 24

2008 Uterqüe Internally developed.
Fashion accessories.

17 31 4,180 31 3

Source: Case writers, from company data and Inditex S.A., Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, available at
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009.

* At year end, the number of Zara stores included 228 Zara Kid Stores

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

Exhibit 2 Inditex Information

a) Key Figures

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Results (€ millions)
Net sales 5,670 6,741 8,196 9,435 10,407
Cost of merchandise 2,636 2,953 3,589 4,086 4,493
Gross profit 3,034 3,788 4,607 5,349 5,9

EBITDA 1,240 1,459 1,790 2,149 2,187
EBIT 925 1,094 1,356 1,652 1,608
Net income 628 811 1,010 1,250 1,253

Inventory (€ millions)
Raw materials 37.9 35.7 38.7 46.4 45.6
Work In process 16.9 17.1 18.1 23.8 17.1
Finished goods 463.0 631.6 767.2 937.0 991.5

Stores and Employees
Selling surface (m2)* 1,175,070 1,434,752 1,657,299 1,914, 493 2,180,889
Number of stores at year end 2,244 2,692 3,131 3,691 4,264
Total staffing costs (including social
security contributions by Inditex)

840 1,037 1,251 1,473 1,703

Number of employees 47,046 58,190 69,240 79,517 89,112

Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Reports 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, available at
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009.

* Selling surface as of January 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009.

b) Information by Geographic Region in 2008

European
Union

Non-EU
Europe

America Asia Africa

Stores 3,322 234 338 358 12
Units manufactured* 326 >81 >13 >255 >35
Number of employees 71,000 7,000 >8,000 >2,500 N/A

Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Report 2008, available at
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009.

c) Percentage of Employees by Function in 2008

Stores Logistics Headquarters Manufacturing
% of employees 89.3 5.8 3.5 1.3

Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Report 2008, available at
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009.
For the exclusive use of Y. Yeh, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Yi Wen Yeh in Executive Decision Making Winter 2017-18 taught by McCrohan , Johnson & Wales University from November 2017 to February
2018.

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

Exhibit 3 Zara Country and Brand Organizational Structure

a) Country Office Structure

Source: Case writers, based on field interviews.

Inditex Country Head
(based in the region)

DT
Zara

HR Directors for each
brand in a geographical

area

HR Country
Head

Communications

DT Pull
and
Bear

DT
Massimo

Dutti

DT
Berschka

DT
Stradivarius

DT
Oysho

DT
Zara

Home

DT
Uterqüe

Expansion

Logistics

Finance Corporate Social
Responsibility

Real Estate

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion
14

Exhibit 3 (Cont.)

b) Brand Structure (excluding HR directors)

Source: Case writers, based on field interviews.

Zara Brand
Manager

Zara DT
Children

DT Zara Country Head (also DT
country Head for Women)

Zara DT Men

Zara Store Men
Section

Managers

Zara Women
Commercials

Zara Women
Designers‘

Sections

Zara Men
Designers‘

Sections

Zara Children
Designers’

Sections

Zara DTs
Women

organized by
geographical

area

Zara DTs Men
organized by
geographical

area

Zara DTs
Children

organized by
geographical
area

Zara Store
Women Section

Managers

Zara Store
Children Section

Managers

Zara Men
Commercials

Zara Children
Commercials

Zara
Merchandisers

Zara Shop
Window Dressers

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

Exhibit 4 Inditex’s Suppliers by Geographical Area, 2008

Areas Number of
suppliers

% production Lead time

Proximity (Spain, Portugal,
Morocco)

516 49% 17 days on average;
minimum 48 hours

Other Europe (mainly Turkey,
also Bulgaria and Romania)

91 14% 5-6 weeks

Americas (Mexico, Peru)

3-8 months

Asia (China, India, Cambodia,
Bangladesh)

417 35% 3-8 months

Source: Case writers, based on field interviews.

Exhibit 5 Zara Store Locations

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Europe N/A N/A 761 1,092 1,188
Asia-Pacific N/A N/A 50 65 96
Americas N/A N/A 130 149 173
Middle East & Africa N/A N/A 49 55 63
Total 723 852 990 1,361 1,520

Source: Inditex S.A., Annual Reports from 2004 to 2008, available at
http://www.inditex.com/en/shareholders_and_investors/investor_relations/annual_reports, accessed in June 2009.

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

Exhibit 6 Example of a Merchandising Photo, Women’s Section, Zara Opera Store, Paris, France.

Source: Company data.

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

Exhibit 7 Percentage of Sales and Labor Hours Used during a 12-Day Period in Women’s, Children’s
and Men’s Sections at a Zara Store.

Source: Company data.

610-042 Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion

Exhibit 8 Total Scheduled Time (in Minutes) for Sales Associates in the Women’s Section at one Store in
a Representative Week.

Source: Case writers’ analysis of the schedules created by the store manager at one Zara store.

Note: These hours do not include any salaried employee hours. This Zara store is closed on Sundays.

Day Time

Total
# of

Minutes Day Time

Total
# of

Minutes Day Time
Total
# of
Minutes Day Time
Total
# of
Minutes Day Time
Total
# of
Minutes Day Time
Total
# of

Minutes
6-7am 60 6-7am 0 6-7am 0 6-7am 60 6-7am 0 6-7am 0
7-8am 370 7-8am 0 7-8am 0 7-8am 360 7-8am 0 7-8am 0
8-9am 420 8-9am 50 8-9am 20 8-9am 360 8-9am 40 8-9am 30
9-10am 480 9-10am 355 9-10am 195 9-10am 455 9-10am 335 9-10am 255

10-11am 790 10-11am 500 10-11am 440 10-11am 800 10-11am 680 10-11am 500
11-12pm 840 11-12pm 600 11-12pm 540 11-12pm 900 11-12pm 780 11-12pm 620
12-1pm 945 12-1pm 610 12-1pm 540 12-1pm 900 12-1pm 850 12-1pm 740
1-2pm 780 1-2pm 765 1-2pm 680 1-2pm 745 1-2pm 970 1-2pm 880
2-3pm 745 2-3pm 795 2-3pm 725 2-3pm 740 2-3pm 975 2-3pm 980
3-4pm 855 3-4pm 835 3-4pm 695 3-4pm 740 3-4pm 1015 3-4pm 1005
4-5pm 660 4-5pm 915 4-5pm 705 4-5pm 760 4-5pm 895 4-5pm 1010
5-6pm 695 5-6pm 715 5-6pm 660 5-6pm 830 5-6pm 730 5-6pm 955
6-7pm 610 6-7pm 720 6-7pm 660 6-7pm 785 6-7pm 665 6-7pm 845
7-8pm 600 7-8pm 720 7-8pm 660 7-8pm 670 7-8pm 660 7-8pm 840
8-9pm 545 8-9pm 665 8-9pm 660 8-9pm 605 8-9pm 605 8-9pm 730

9-10pm 360 9-10pm 440 9-10pm 440 9-10pm 400 9-10pm 400 9-10pm 720
10-11pm 60

TU
ES

W
ED

N
ES

D
AY

TH
U

RS
D

FR
ID

SA
TU

RD
AY

M
O

N
D

AY
For the exclusive use of Y. Yeh, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Yi Wen Yeh in Executive Decision Making Winter 2017-18 taught by McCrohan , Johnson & Wales University from November 2017 to February
2018.

Zara: Managing Stores for Fast Fashion 610-042

Endnotes

1 Angela Saini, “Business: New kids on the high street cut a dash with fast fashions: As M&S and Next lose
ground, the winners are the style-savvy stores pushing cheap, cutting-edge clothes to a new level: Zara: on top of
style,” The Observer, June 5, 2005, accessed via Factiva in June 2009.

2 2007 Inditex Annual Report.
3 Andrew McAfee, Vincent Dessain, and Anders Sjöman, “Zara: IT for Fast Fashion”, HBS Case No. 604-081

(Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing, 2004), p. 7.
4 2008 Inditex Annual Report, p. 39.

<< /ASCII85EncodePages false /AllowTransparency false /AutoPositionEPSFiles true /AutoRotatePages /None /Binding /Left /CalGrayProfile (Gray Gamma 2.2) /CalRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CalCMYKProfile (U.S. Web Coated \050SWOP\051 v2) /sRGBProfile (sRGB IEC61966-2.1) /CannotEmbedFontPolicy /Error /CompatibilityLevel 1.3 /CompressObjects /Off /CompressPages true /ConvertImagesToIndexed true /PassThroughJPEGImages true /CreateJDFFile false /CreateJobTicket false /DefaultRenderingIntent /Default /DetectBlends true /DetectCurves 0.0000 /ColorConversionStrategy /LeaveColorUnchanged /DoThumbnails true /EmbedAllFonts true /EmbedOpenType false /ParseICCProfilesInComments true /EmbedJobOptions true /DSCReportingLevel 0 /EmitDSCWarnings false /EndPage -1 /ImageMemory 1048576 /LockDistillerParams true /MaxSubsetPct 99 /Optimize true /OPM 1 /ParseDSCComments true /ParseDSCCommentsForDocInfo true /PreserveCopyPage true /PreserveDICMYKValues true /PreserveEPSInfo true /PreserveFlatness true /PreserveHalftoneInfo false /PreserveOPIComments false /PreserveOverprintSettings true /StartPage 1 /SubsetFonts false /TransferFunctionInfo /Preserve /UCRandBGInfo /Remove /UsePrologue false /ColorSettingsFile () /AlwaysEmbed [ true /AgencyFB-Bold /AgencyFB-Reg /AgfaRotisSemiSerif /AgfaRotisSemiSerif-Bold /AgfaRotisSerif /AgfaRotisSerif-Bold /AgfaRotisSerif-Italic /AllegroBT-Regular /AmerTypewriterITCbyBT-Medium /Arial-Black /Arial-BlackItalic /Arial-BoldItalicMT /Arial-BoldMT /Arial-ItalicMT /ArialMT /ArialNarrow /ArialNarrow-Bold /ArialNarrow-BoldItalic /ArialNarrow-Italic /ArialRoundedMTBold /ArialUnicodeMS /AvantGardeITCbyBT-Book /AvantGardeITCbyBT-BookOblique /AvantGardeITCbyBT-Medium /AvantGardeITCbyBT-MediumOblique /BankGothicBT-Medium /Batang /BatangChe /BenguiatITCbyBT-Bold /BernhardFashionBT-Regular /BernhardModernBT-Bold /BernhardModernBT-BoldItalic /BlackadderITC-Regular /BodoniMT /BodoniMTBlack /BodoniMTBlack-Italic /BodoniMT-Bold /BodoniMT-BoldItalic /BodoniMTCondensed /BodoniMTCondensed-Bold /BodoniMTCondensed-BoldItalic /BodoniMTCondensed-Italic /BodoniMT-Italic /BookAntiqua /BookAntiqua-Bold /BookAntiqua-BoldItalic /BookAntiqua-Italic /BookmanOldStyle /BookmanOldStyle-Bold /BookmanOldStyle-BoldItalic /BookmanOldStyle-Italic /BookshelfSymbolSeven /BradleyHandITC /BremenBT-Bold /CalisMTBol /CalistoMT /CalistoMT-BoldItalic /CalistoMT-Italic /Castellar /Century /CenturyGothic /CenturyGothic-Bold /CenturyGothic-BoldItalic /CenturyGothic-Italic /CenturySchoolbook /CenturySchoolbook-Bold /CenturySchoolbook-BoldItalic /CenturySchoolbook-Italic /CharlesworthBold /ComicSansMS /ComicSansMS-Bold /CopperplateGothic-Bold /CopperplateGothicBT-Bold /CopperplateGothic-Light /CourierNewPS-BoldItalicMT /CourierNewPS-BoldMT /CourierNewPS-ItalicMT /CourierNewPSMT /CurlzMT /DauphinPlain /Dotum /DotumChe /EdwardianScriptITC /Elephant-Italic /Elephant-Regular /English111VivaceBT-Regular /EngraversMT /ErasITC-Bold /ErasITC-Demi /ErasITC-Light /ErasITC-Medium /EstrangeloEdessa /FelixTitlingMT /ForteMT /FranklinGothic-Book /FranklinGothic-BookItalic /FranklinGothic-Demi /FranklinGothic-DemiCond /FranklinGothic-DemiItalic /FranklinGothic-Heavy /FranklinGothic-HeavyItalic /FranklinGothic-Medium /FranklinGothic-MediumCond /FranklinGothic-MediumItalic /FrenchScriptMT /FuturaBlackBT-Regular /FuturaBT-Bold /FuturaBT-BoldItalic /FuturaBT-ExtraBlack /FuturaBT-Light /FuturaBT-LightItalic /Garamond /Garamond-Bold /Garamond-Italic /Gautami /Georgia /Georgia-Bold /Georgia-BoldItalic /Georgia-Italic /Gigi-Regular /GillSansMT /GillSansMT-Bold /GillSansMT-BoldItalic /GillSansMT-Condensed /GillSansMT-ExtraCondensedBold /GillSansMT-Italic /GillSans-UltraBold /GillSans-UltraBoldCondensed /GloucesterMT-ExtraCondensed /GoudyHandtooledBT-Regular /GoudyOldStyleBT-Bold /GoudyOldStyleBT-BoldItalic /GoudyOldStyleBT-Italic /GoudyOldStyleBT-Roman /GoudyOldStyleT-Bold /GoudyOldStyleT-Italic /GoudyOldStyleT-Regular /GoudyStout /Gulim /GulimChe /Gungsuh /GungsuhChe /Haettenschweiler /Helvetica /Helvetica-Bold /Helvetica-BoldOblique /Helvetica-Narrow /Helvetica-Narrow-Bold /Helvetica-Narrow-BoldOblique /Helvetica-Narrow-Oblique /Helvetica-Oblique /Humanist521BT-Bold /Humanist521BT-BoldItalic /Humanist521BT-Italic /Humanist521BT-Roman /Impact /ImprintMT-Shadow /KabelITCbyBT-Book /KabelITCbyBT-Ultra /Kartika /Latha /Lithograph-Bold /LithographLight /LucidaConsole /LucidaSans /LucidaSans-Demi /LucidaSans-DemiItalic /LucidaSans-Italic /LucidaSans-Typewriter /LucidaSans-TypewriterBold /LucidaSans-TypewriterBoldOblique /LucidaSans-TypewriterOblique /LucidaSansUnicode /MaiandraGD-Regular /Mangal-Regular /MicrosoftSansSerif /MingLiU /MonotypeCorsiva /MS-Gothic /MS-Mincho /MSOutlook /MS-PGothic /MS-PMincho /MSReferenceSansSerif /MSReferenceSpecialty /MS-UIGothic /MT-Extra /MVBoli /NSimSun /OCRAExtended /OzHandicraftBT-Roman /PalaceScriptMT /Palatino-Bold /Palatino-BoldItalic /Palatino-Italic /PalatinoLinotype-Bold /PalatinoLinotype-BoldItalic /PalatinoLinotype-Italic /PalatinoLinotype-Roman /Palatino-Roman /Papyrus-Regular /Perpetua /Perpetua-Bold /Perpetua-BoldItalic /Perpetua-Italic /PerpetuaTitlingMT-Bold /PerpetuaTitlingMT-Light /PMingLiU /PosterBodoniBT-Roman /Pristina-Regular /Raavi /RageItalic /Rockwell /Rockwell-Bold /Rockwell-BoldItalic /Rockwell-Condensed /Rockwell-CondensedBold /Rockwell-ExtraBold /Rockwell-Italic /ScriptMTBold /SerifaBT-Bold /SerifaBT-Italic /SerifaBT-Roman /SerifaBT-Thin /Shruti /SimHei /SimSun /SouvenirITCbyBT-Demi /SouvenirITCbyBT-DemiItalic /SouvenirITCbyBT-Light /SouvenirITCbyBT-LightItalic /Staccato222BT-Regular /Swiss911BT-ExtraCompressed /Sylfaen /SymbolMT /Tahoma /Tahoma-Bold /TimesNewRomanPS-BoldItalicMT /TimesNewRomanPS-BoldMT /TimesNewRomanPS-ItalicMT /TimesNewRomanPSMT /Trebuchet-BoldItalic /TrebuchetMS /TrebuchetMS-Bold /TrebuchetMS-Italic /Tunga-Regular /TwCenMT-Bold /TwCenMT-BoldItalic /TwCenMT-Condensed /TwCenMT-CondensedBold /TwCenMT-CondensedExtraBold /TwCenMT-Italic /TwCenMT-Regular /TypoUprightBT-Regular /Verdana /Verdana-Bold /Verdana-BoldItalic /Verdana-Italic /Vrinda /Webdings /Wingdings2 /Wingdings3 /Wingdings-Regular /WP-ArabicScriptSihafa /WP-ArabicSihafa /WP-BoxDrawing /WP-CyrillicA /WP-CyrillicB /WP-GreekCentury /WP-GreekCourier /WP-GreekHelve /WP-HebrewDavid /WP-IconicSymbolsA /WP-IconicSymbolsB /WP-Japanese /WP-MathA /WP-MathB /WP-MathExtendedA /WP-MathExtendedB /WP-MultinationalAHelve /WP-MultinationalARoman /WP-MultinationalBCourier /WP-MultinationalBHelve /WP-MultinationalBRoman /WP-MultinationalCourier /WP-Phonetic /WPTypographicSymbols ] /NeverEmbed [ true ] /AntiAliasColorImages false /CropColorImages true /ColorImageMinResolution 150 /ColorImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK /DownsampleColorImages false /ColorImageDownsampleType /Average /ColorImageResolution 600 /ColorImageDepth -1 /ColorImageMinDownsampleDepth 1 /ColorImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000 /EncodeColorImages false /ColorImageFilter /DCTEncode /AutoFilterColorImages false /ColorImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG /ColorACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/ColorImageDict << /QFactor 0.76 /HSamples [2 1 1 2] /VSamples [2 1 1 2] >>
/JPEG2000ColorACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/JPEG2000ColorImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/AntiAliasGrayImages false
/CropGrayImages true
/GrayImageMinResolution 150
/GrayImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleGrayImages false
/GrayImageDownsampleType /Average
/GrayImageResolution 600
/GrayImageDepth -1
/GrayImageMinDownsampleDepth 2
/GrayImageDownsampleThreshold 1.00000
/EncodeGrayImages false
/GrayImageFilter /DCTEncode
/AutoFilterGrayImages false
/GrayImageAutoFilterStrategy /JPEG
/GrayACSImageDict << /QFactor 0.15 /HSamples [1 1 1 1] /VSamples [1 1 1 1] >>
/GrayImageDict << /QFactor 0.76 /HSamples [2 1 1 2] /VSamples [2 1 1 2] >>
/JPEG2000GrayACSImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/JPEG2000GrayImageDict << /TileWidth 256 /TileHeight 256 /Quality 15 >>
/AntiAliasMonoImages false
/CropMonoImages true
/MonoImageMinResolution 1200
/MonoImageMinResolutionPolicy /OK
/DownsampleMonoImages false
/MonoImageDownsampleType /Bicubic
/MonoImageResolution 600
/MonoImageDepth -1
/MonoImageDownsampleThreshold 1.50000
/EncodeMonoImages false
/MonoImageFilter /CCITTFaxEncode
/MonoImageDict << /K -1 >>
/AllowPSXObjects false
/CheckCompliance [
/None
]
/PDFX1aCheck false
/PDFX3Check false
/PDFXCompliantPDFOnly false
/PDFXNoTrimBoxError true
/PDFXTrimBoxToMediaBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXSetBleedBoxToMediaBox true
/PDFXBleedBoxToTrimBoxOffset [
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000
]
/PDFXOutputIntentProfile (None)
/PDFXOutputConditionIdentifier ()
/PDFXOutputCondition ()
/PDFXRegistryName ()
/PDFXTrapped /False
/Description << /CHS
/CHT
/DAN
/DEU
/ESP
/FRA
/ITA (Utilizzare queste impostazioni per creare documenti Adobe PDF adatti per visualizzare e stampare documenti aziendali in modo affidabile. I documenti PDF creati possono essere aperti con Acrobat e Adobe Reader 5.0 e versioni successive.)
/JPN
/KOR
/NLD (Gebruik deze instellingen om Adobe PDF-documenten te maken waarmee zakelijke documenten betrouwbaar kunnen worden weergegeven en afgedrukt. De gemaakte PDF-documenten kunnen worden geopend met Acrobat en Adobe Reader 5.0 en hoger.)
/NOR
/PTB
/SUO
/SVE
/ENU ()
>>
>> setdistillerparams
<< /HWResolution [600 600] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice

Turn in your highest-quality paper
Get a qualified writer to help you with

“ Market case analysis ”

Get high-quality paper

NEW! AI matching with writer

Still stressed with your coursework?

Get quality coursework help from an expert!

Order now