Managing Conflict the introduction of crystal methedrine

Read the attached Multi-Jurisdictional Drug case study starting .Note:this is the first attachment.

Write a  paper answering the questions right at the end of the case study. Emphasize strategies that could have prevented much of the conflict that occurred in the scenario. Use the questions in “Think like an Administrator” in the attachment file for possible topics to cover but you DO NOT answer these questions in your paper.

Case Study: MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL DRUG UNITS
Warren County was a thriving municipality that enjoyed a broad base of political and economic support
due to its manufacturing growth, diverse population, and low crime rate. In fact, the low crime rate was
attributed to stable families, steady employment, and, for the most part, a good school system. The
county had over fifteen cities, each of which had fairly stable communities. This positive perception of
the county changed with the introduction of crystal methedrine (crystal meth) and its proliferation in
the county through secret laboratories. County officials, in coordination with city officials, decided to
pursue a strategy to combat this new drug and its production and distribution. The plan involved the
creation of a multi-jurisdictional drug unit specifically directed toward crystal meth.
The unit was to be composed of officers from all fifteen municipalities in the county, yet problems
surfaced at initial discussions and deliberations on how the unit was to be organized. Some cities did not
like the ways the unit was going to be supervised and budgeted. Others felt that the bigger cities were
forcing themselves onto the small cities and sought greater control over the unit. The three largest cities
in the county did desire a much larger role in how the unit was to operate, and this was due, in large
part, because they had more immediate resources to devote to the unit, and they were promised more
federal pass-through monies that were being distributed to the state as part of a larger joint
collaboration between the federal government and the state government directed toward drug
enforcement.
In spite of some initial organizational problems, the unit began its work in earnest, resulting in ten
cities agreeing to be part of this collaborative approach to drug enforcement. Early in the deliberations
among the municipalities, there were many issues on which agreement was difficult to achieve. One
issue that did not raise the concerns of governmental officials was the operation of the tactical unit. It
was decided that if raids were going to be conducted on homes within the county, they would be done
by a coordinated use of officers from each city. Each city was to designate two to three officers who
would be part of a tactical response team, only to be used under specific circumstances. The supervisors
learned from their experiences that raids were not that common and pulling the team together at short
notice would not be difficult to accomplish.
For eighteen months, the multi-jurisdictional unit functioned with full authority to investigate,
apprehend, and arrest drug suspects. The original purpose of the unit to “seek out and destroy
laboratories producing crystal meth and arrest perpetrators” became a difficult mission to achieve. One
problem was that most officers really did not have the kind of training to understand what was involved
in a laboratory and how the crime scenes were to be managed. Only after some costly errors and
mistakes did the unit’s command realize that to properly raid these types of laboratories there was a
need to coordinate with fire departments and their hazardous materials personnel. As one of the
officers realized early in their raids, the police were becoming the “blue canaries” for the fire
department.
To facilitate communication with the many fire departments within the county, the unit’s commander
suggested that the police chiefs represented in the collaboration approach their respective fire chiefs to
begin a dialogue on how best to accomplish the mission of pursuing crystal meth laboratories. For the
police chiefs, this meant opening up communications with other city departments with which they had,
at best, limited relations. In fact, in some cases, the police were in direct competition with their fire
departments for resources, and many of the police chiefs did not want to begin discussions with the fire
chiefs due to a long history of complaints and disagreements. In addition, the unit was getting bad
commentary from the local press.
The major paper in the county produced data to show that the unit was actually doing very little
investigation and arrests for crystal meth production and distribution in its first eighteen months of
operation. Instead, most of the arrests were for simple possession and distribution of small quantities of
marijuana among teenagers. The paper jokingly suggested that if this was going to be the purpose of the
unit it would be better served by simply paying police to attend high school dances! Moreover, the unit
was responding to more and more crimes that were clearly outside its mandate. Not only were they
investigating drug-related criminal activities, albeit in small numbers, but in addition, they were being
asked to back up other specialized units that were effectuating home search warrants for violent
criminals. This mission “creep” brought out even more critics. Some even called for the disbanding of
the unit because it really served no useful purpose. Rumblings also were heard among the unit’s
members who thought they were pursuing crystal meth laboratories but now became adjuncts to their
own departments. Many considered going back to regular patrol in their home communities.
The issue came to a head when the unit executed a search warrant for a suspect involved in crystal
meth production and raided the wrong establishment, killing the owner of the house. To compound
matters, the owner was an elderly gentleman who was a veteran and the former coach of a local high
school football team. As soon as the tragedy unfolded, the collaborative cities each pulled their officers
from the unit and admitted no wrongdoing in the tragedy. An ensuing investigation by the district
attorney’s office found no criminal responsibility on the part of the officers but did comment on what it
viewed to be a poor organizational structure to accomplish its mission. The investigation revealed poor
supervision of officers, the lack of a clear chain of command, the tendency for officers to listen to their
“home” supervisors as opposed to unit supervisors, and poor definition of authority in the
memorandum of understanding that created the unit regarding roles and responsibilities.
The decision by the district attorney’s office to not prosecute anyone for the killing did not resonate
well with the family of the victim and many members of the community. The family brought forward a
multimillion-dollar lawsuit against all ten municipalities involved in the collaboration and functioning of
the unit. The lawsuit claimed gross negligence by those in charge of the unit leading to the wrongful
death of an innocent citizen. Each municipality sought to fight the lawsuit by separating itself as the
primary agent responsible for the unit’s management, supervision, and operations, even though there
was clear evidence that specific persons made management decisions on behalf of the unit. A jury
awarded the victim’s family $200,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages,
citing what they believed to be poor communications among the cities on how the unit was to be
managed and administered. The jury, somewhat begrudgingly, placed the blame for the wrongful death
on the municipality whose officer actually shot the citizen. The jury foreman told a reporter that jurors
could not believe how the cities did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the unit in the
beginning. In the words of the jury foreman, the “unit spent more time bickering and fighting among
themselves and between themselves and other law enforcement agencies; it is a wonder that they
accomplished anything.”
CASE STUDY QUESTIONS
1. What type of conflict is described in the case study?
2. Multi-jurisdictional drug units are common across the country. What issues should be discussed and
by whom before such a unit is created? How much of the impetus for the creation of these units can be
attributed to increased federal funding and the irrational fear of drugs?
3. Suggest ways in which the conflict described in this case study could have been managed more
effectively. Should the unit have ever existed?
Think like an Administrator
Conflict is common within criminal justice organizations. Criminal justice administrators have recognized
that the best they can do is manage conflict; eradication of organizational conflict is not only impossible
to achieve, it also may be counterproductive. So, the best strategy is to appropriately manage conflict
within organizations. Because we know that eradication of conflict is not possible within criminal justice
organizations, how do we best manage organizational conflict?
1. Can you harness conflict by encouraging competition among groups within the organization?
2. How much conflict centers on the distribution of resources in the organization?
3. How does the desire for critical information create an atmosphere of conflict across criminal justice
organizations?
4. How does a poor reward system create conflict within criminal justice organizations?
5. Describe “de-confliction” within police agencies, especially those agencies focused on multijurisdictional drug investigations.
6. How can conflict be used to initiate change within criminal justice organizations?
7. How do you know when conflict is both productive and/or nonproductive?