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The Lego case is one we won’t formally discuss in class, but it’s the case for which you will conduct and write your individual case analysis. Complete details on the guidelines for this written analysis can be found in the PDF attached below.
This is the capstone course of your entire MBA journey. Therefore, LSU, the Flores MBA Program, and the E.J. Ourso College of Business look carefully at this project to assess your overall level of learning in the program. Therefore, it’s imperative that you give your absolute best effort toward this project.
Again, as this is the final project in the capstone class of this program, your case analysis will be evaluated primarily on the following criteria:
Demonstrates a strong understanding of the case
Demonstrates a strong knowledge of core subject areas
BADM 7190 – Written Case Analysis Guidelines
The written case analysis project is designed to allow you to grapple with real world business situations &
decisions, and to allow you to make and justify recommendations to improve an organization. The
structure of a written case analysis is, essentially, a written version of your decision-making process. An
organizational analysis is like a puzzle, where the challenge is to take different pieces of information and
logically connect them together to develop a clear picture of the business, its challenges, and the potential
responses to those challenges. As this is the capstone course of you MBA journey, it is through this
project that you’ll be able to demonstrate the knowledge you’ve gained from all courses and experiences
leading up to this point.
The lone case in your Harvard Coursepack that we don’t formally discuss in class will be the focus for
this final project. Your written analysis of the case can be submitted via Moodle at any point
throughout the semester up to the April 30th hard deadline. Please note: there isn’t a “page
requirement” for this project. I’m more concerned with the quality of what you write rather than an
arbitrary page count. Considering this, below are some guidelines to help you craft your written case
analysis:
Style & Grammar
The analysis is a formal document. It should be written from the perspective of an outside consultant who
is writing to the organization’s top management team. Proper grammar and sentence structure are
paramount to writing any case analysis. Therefore, please ensure that you’ve proofread and edited your
document multiple times before submitting.
Separate sections must have headings, and all pages should be numbered (and references cited) using the
APA (American Psychological Association) guidelines: https://apastyle.apa.org/. The paper must be
double-spaced (except for the Executive Summary) and use a standard Times New Roman or Calibri
12pt. font. In addition to the content of the paper, part of your grade will reflect the paper’s grammar,
spelling, and style.
Cover Page
The first page of your analysis should be a professional-looking cover page per the APA guidelines
(https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/paper-format/title-page). This will include the title of
the case, your name, the name of your program/department and university, the name and number of this
course, the name of your professor, and the date on which you completed the analysis.
Executive Summary
The second page of your analysis is a one-page (single-spaced – the only section of the analysis that is
single-spaced) executive summary. Here, you will craft a clear and concise overview of your analysis that
highlights the major points of the case, the central issue(s) at hand, your proposed solution, and your logic
to support this solution. You’re welcome to utilize bullet points if you deem it to be necessary at any part
of your summary. However, this is the only time during your analysis where bullet points are allowed.
Keep in mind, the executive summary was initially created to provide executives – who are short on time
and, sometimes, attention – with a clear picture about what’s important in the document and analysis that
follows it. Therefore, focus on the key highlights and resist the temptation to provide every little detail.
Problem Statement
This section should address the most important issues confronting the firm. First, you should provide a
clear and concise background of key, relevant information pertinent to the case study. Second, you should
directly state the central issue or problem facing the organization. What is the significance of the issue?
The statement should be clear and actionable in a manner whereby the organization should be compelled
to take action to solve the problem. The issue should be strategically focused in nature. One way to help
you determine whether an issue is strategic or not is to ask yourself: “what happens to the organization
within the next 3-5 years if the issue is not addressed?” If your answer is: “not much” – then it’s probably
not a major strategic issue.
Subsequently, describe the best case, likely case, and worst-case scenarios if the strategic issue/problem
is not addressed (i.e., no action is taken). This helps establish a sense of urgency with the top management
team that something needs to be done.
Environmental Analysis – External
Which external environmental forces are most likely to influence the firm’s actions and future
performance: international competition, local competition, economic, political, cultural, technological, or
legal forces or actors? Who are the firm’s present/future/primary customers, competitors, and key
stakeholders? Be sure to include:
• Porter’s Five Forces (focus industry of the org in the case if it operates in multiple industries)
• SWOT Analysis (specifically, the OT portion – at least 3 for each)
• Industry Issues (key success factors, life cycle, governmental influences, consolidation, etc.)
Environmental Analysis – Internal
What are the firm’s sources of competitive advantage? Has the firm approached strategic management in
a way that leverages its competitive advantage and/or potential for success? Is the firm’s leadership
effective? Is the firm structured in a manner that aligns with its stated objectives and goals? Is the firm
currently engaged in actions that align with its mission and vision? Be sure to include:
• SWOT Analysis (specifically, the SW portion – at least 3 for each)
• Financial Analysis (liquidity, leverage, profitability, activity, etc.)
Strategic Alternatives & Options
Offer three well-developed, viable strategic alternatives that the company can take that address the central
problem/issue that the organization currently faces. Make use of headings and sub-headings (where
needed) to help with the readability and flow of this section. The alternatives should be strategic and
mutually exclusive. For example, two alternatives for an issue could be to: (1) buy a competitor, or (2) not
buy the competitor – obviously, the organization cannot do both. What are the major arguments for and
against each of the alternatives? Be sure to state your assumptions and the impact of constraints on each
alternative.
Recommended Strategic Choice
Based on the analyses and exploration of alternative recommendations above, which alternative do you
recommend for the organization to select? The final recommendation should ideally be challenging, yet
achievable – creative, yet feasible. It should fit well with the organization’s mission, vision, and goals –
and it should also be economically viable. The final recommendation should be documented in detail as to
why it was the final choice and the best option out of all the alternatives.
Implementation & Action Plan
Every recommendation you make needs to have a plan for it to be implemented. This section describes
the actions that the organization should take to implement your recommendation. Therefore, you should
outline a plan of action that will lead to effective implementation of the decision. This section should be
described in as much detail as possible, and you may consider including – but are encouraged to go
beyond including – the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A description of the specific actions that need to be taken
An assignment of responsibilities for the various activities
An estimated cost for these activities
Time frames for each of these actions (i.e., can the organization afford to wait? Should it be
implemented immediately? Should it be phased in over time?)
Measures of success (or failure) for each activity/the implementation
Any anticipated coordination issues
Any potential obstacles or impediments that need to be considered and rectified to ensure that the
implementation is successful
Any potential impact that this implemented strategy might have on customers, employees, other
stakeholders, etc. (i.e., can we foresee any potential unintended consequences as a result of this
strategic choice being implemented?)
Conclusion
End your analysis with a straight-forward, concise rationale for why your analysis and recommendation is
valid. This is your final opportunity to be persuasive to the top management team.
References
You should include a list of any references used in the development of your analysis. Again, the APA
(American Psychological Association) formatting is the required formatting method here
(https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/references).
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
Version:
BL0015
08/25/2023
Case
LEGO:
ISSN: 2470-7899
A Game of Tensions
and Paradoxes
In the 2020 annual report, Niels Christiansen, CEO of the LEGO Group, expressed his satisfaction
with the results achieved. After a difficult year for the many companies that were unable to
overcome the economic effects caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the LEGO Group’s sales had
reached an all-time high (see Exhibit 1). In the past two years, the LEGO Group had stepped
up investments to drive expansion into other regions and had bet on innovations in play, the
LEGO brand, and retail ecosystem innovation. The LEGO Group was the largest of the four units
grouped under the LEGO Brand Group umbrella. It generated 70 % of the revenue from the
LEGO® Brand business and was the main source of revenue for Kirkbi, the Kristiansen family
holding company (see Exhibit 2).
While everything seemed right to accelerate the LEGO Group’s expansion, for some leaders there
were pieces that did not fit into the corporate strategy. Jørgen Vig Knudstorp, who prevented the
bankruptcy of the LEGO Group in 2004, was now the head of the LEGO Brand Group, which
directed the corporate strategy for the LEGO® brand-based businesses. Knudstorp felt that
profound changes needed to be made to a “machine” that had long been exploiting the same
product: LEGO bricks.
Although they had reached their highest sales ever in 2020, the LEGO Group had been unable to
diversify its revenues from the traditional brick after several attempts. Nearly ninety years after its
founding, the LEGO Group was still based on the world-famous LEGO® brick and the philosophy
of learning by playing. For some consultants, over the past ten years, the LEGO Group had become
AUTHORSHIP
CREDITS
This case was prepared by professor Aramis Rodríguez from Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración – IESA. Teaching
cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion and are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations
of effective or ineffective management. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact coleccion.cladea@gmail.com.
Copyright © 2023 BALAS. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted
in any form or by any means –electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise– without the permission of the copyright holder.
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
more agile and faster in managing its machinery, but did not know how to “change that machine”.
For others, there was no point in changing the machine when it could still be operated. For
Knudstorp, the long history of success linked to the LEGO® brick was a double-edged sword. On
the one hand, having a structure, system, and culture adapted to a proven business model allowed
for continued growth in the short term, but on the other hand, in an increasingly dynamic and
complex industry such as gaming, such gearing based on past successes could detract from the
flexibility to take advantage of opportunities in the medium and long term.
In 2020, the LEGO Group’s management was uncomfortable thinking about “touching” the brick
or giving equal importance and attention to other businesses that would generate new growth
drivers. However, the future of toys was becoming increasingly technological and uncertain. New
consumer habits were trending towards online video games and the LEGO Group had not been
able to carve out a relevant niche in this market.
In the midst of this “game” of tensions, Knudstorp had to propose fundamental changes in strategy
or continue on the current trajectory of business growth. Should the LEGO Group devote more
attention and effort to finding new growth drivers? If this was the decision, how should this be
done and what should Niels Christiansen’s role be? Knudstorp reviewed the LEGO Group’s track
record to understand, among the passages in its history, what might stand in the way of a change
in corporate strategy, and whether or not it was timely. Knudstorp was convinced that, whatever
the decision, a vision of the LEGO® business for the future had to be established, and then shaped
with the other strategic pieces of the Group.
FOUNDATION PIECES: 1932–1992
LEGO was founded in Denmark in 1932 by Ole Kirk Kristiansen, a humble carpenter who began
making wooden toys to diversify his product line, which was furniture. Together with his son
Godtref, he started the factory specialized in toys. In 1958, prompted by customer demands,
Godtref began to look at the LEGO business model as a play-system that encouraged learning
and imagination, rather than as a stand-alone toy factory.1 After this introspection, and after an
unfortunate fire in its warehouses, Godtref went for plastic blocks over wooden ones. He pushed
a new concept and, by 1967, the company was producing LEGO bricks in 218 different shapes,
interconnectable and all compatible with each other, making them a play-system that allowed the
value of playing to expand the more bricks one had. In 1961, LEGO brought its product to North
America (USA and Canada) through the luggage manufacturer Samsonite, but in 1974, it set up
its own subsidiary in Connecticut to manufacture bricks in the early 1980s.2
Inspired by his father, Godtref had preserved and promoted a culture of creativity in the
organization, which favored the launch of new products such as DUPLO bricks (larger bricks
aimed at children under five years of age) and LEGO Technic for teenagers. Godtref’s son, Kjeld,
who was already working at the company, introduced the “system-within-a-system” concept in
p. 2
1970, which would lead to thematic novelties: pirates, cowboys, astronauts, and castles. While
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
Kjeld was preparing to take over the management of the company, Vagn Holck Andersen, a nonfamily member, served as director for six years.3
From the 1970s to the 1980s, three activities were key to LEGO’s business model.4 (1) Molding:
mass production of plastic elements, which depended on innovative capabilities in material
science and production technology. (2) Decoration: painting played a key role as all massproduced blocks were painted at this stage. Only five colors were used: black, blue, yellow, red,
and white. (3) Packaging: the bricks were sorted by product and placed in a box, along with an
instruction manual.
The Godtref era was characterized by industrial excellence and innovation in materials and
production. Production control was tight, so tight that no new product, brick, or color could be
added without his approval.
In order to further raise awareness of the concept and boost sales, in 1968 they created a theme
park called LEGOLAND in the small town of Billund (Denmark). In addition, to make it easier for
international businessmen and buyers to visit the city of Billund, LEGO opened its own private
airport in the early 1960s.
By the late 1970s LEGO was the European market leader: about 70 % of Western European
families with children under the age of fourteen owned LEGO bricks.5 From 1980 onward, Kjeld
took over the reins of what was already known as the LEGO Group, becoming its new CEO. One
of his main objectives was to exploit the company’s sales potential internationally, expanding into
Eastern Europe and Asia, while maintaining a strong position in America and a leading position
in Western Europe.
DIVERSIFICATION PIECES: 1993–1998 (KJELD)
In the 1990s LEGO enjoyed gradual growth and profitability. In this decade, LEGO faced changes
in consumer lifestyles (mainly children) and the toy industry. Market research suggested that
children were beginning to look for electronic and instant gratification games, and would spend
less time on games that required a lot of effort to learn.6 Mainstream channels (family stores)
were closing and retailers and discounters were aggressively introducing other toys, including
private labels (Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and so forth). In addition, LEGO’s main competitors (Mattel
and Hasbro) began to manufacture in the Far East to reduce production costs.
In the midst of these changes, the goal now was to grow in order to reposition the LEGO Group
among the top 10 brands for families and children in the world. Inspired by the management of
the Disney and Nike brands, LEGO executives came to the conclusion that their brand should
have enormous potential outside the play-system. So, they expanded the brand and explored
opportunities in new areas. They experimented with new processes to launch new products,
p. 3
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
regardless of the profit margin.7 They conducted studies on how to grow in untapped markets
(Southern Europe) and concluded that they had to adapt products to these markets.
In 1996 sales and profitability were stagnant (see Exhibit 1 and 3), but they diversified beyond
the plastic brick and, inspired by their family entertainment park in the small town of Billund, they
opened LEGOLAND Windsor in the UK. The same year, they launched the website and began to
develop video game software related to their products. In addition, they created LEGO Media to
produce movies, TV shows, and books. Also during that period, they launched children’s apparel:
watches, robotic bricks (LEGO Mindstorm), all this gradually until 1998. The strategy consisted
of expanding into different markets without allies or partners,8 “only LEGO could because it knew
its brand, therefore, its expression could not be outsourced”, commented the directors.
They also made changes within the LEGO concept. Designers built pieces and systems so that
children could more easily and quickly get to the playful part of the experience. In this way, they
also increased the number of different components, many of which were not combinable with
other pieces.
Despite the efforts of Kjeld and his executive team to increase revenues, sales stagnated. In 1998
the LEGO Group faced the first financial loss in its history (see Exhibit 3).
REPLACEMENT PIECES: 1999–2004
(KJELD AND PLOUGMANN)
The goal now was to restore profitability and continue to pursue growth. For this, Kjeld brought
in a new CFO, Poul Plougmann, who became head of operations and day-to-day management (his
pseudonym was Mr. Repair because of his experience in radical turnarounds).
The LEGO Group launched a USD 140 million cost-cutting restructuring program and laid off
1,000 employees (10 % of the staff). Sixty percent of senior executives were asked to resign. A
conditioning program was launched: it included measures to streamline production, increase
accountability, and focus on customers.
The design process was moved from rural Billund (Denmark) to global centers such as Milan,
London and San Francisco. Production was streamlined and adapted to meet sales forecasts. To
increase cash flow, tool production plants were sold, and manufacturing plants for difficult-toautomate parts were moved to a new plant in the Czech Republic.
In order to recover sales, incentives were created for salespeople who exceeded the sales forecasts.
Additionally, in 1999, they decided to sell directly to consumers through an online store and
through LEGO-owned retail stores in Europe and the US. That same year, LEGO launched bricks
based on the film Star Wars, although an ethical dilemma had to be overcome because many
p. 4
directors felt it contradictory to place “war” themes in an education system. In 2002, the company
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
positioned LEGO Duplo again in the preschool sector. This was because it was trying to emphasize
child development and make the product learning-centered. The expansion of the theme parks
kept going in California (in 1999) and in Germany (2002). The video game project continued to
thrive, but, in 2000, they cut back on lifestyle initiatives such as wristwatches and the publishing
industry.
In those years, and in the midst of the restructuring plan, a LEGO consultant named Jørgen Vig
Knudstorp realized that there was a high level of complexity in the supply chain.9 In 2004 it was
discovered that the number of bricks in existence had doubled since 1993[10] (see Exhibit 4, to
understand nomenclature, and Exhibit 5, to get an idea of the complexity of the sets over time).
Complexity meant that order fulfillment rates did not reach the expected levels. Customers
complained about not receiving their orders, and there were cancellations and obsolescence.
Moreover, it was a logistical challenge to keep LEGO’s own stores operational.
In 2004, 35 % of the company’s total revenue came from the Star Wars line, and the other goodselling products, such as LEGO Duplo, were not successfully replenished, causing many customer
complaints.11 Senior leaders observed that managers attributed the negative results to, for example,
the good weather causing people not to buy indoor games.
In 2003, sales fell by 26 %–30 % and by a further 10 % in 200412 (see Exhibit 1). The company
was making the biggest losses in its history when profit margins stood at –30 percent13 (see
Exhibit 3). It was estimated that the company was destroying 250,000 euros (USD 337,000)
of value every day.14
Management recognized that the expansion of the product portfolio, and consequent cost
increases, had not paid off. Analyses showed that some of the new products cannibalized the
core products. Kjeld stepped down as CEO and handed over his position to another Dane, but not
related to the family. Now the new CEO would be Jørgen Vig Knudstorp, who had joined LEGO
in 2001 as director of strategic development.
TRANSFORMATION PIECES: 2005–2011
(KNUDSTORP)
Knudstorp told the board that, if they wanted the business to survive in the long term, a quick
fix was not an option. To try to pull out of the slump, Knudstorp and his team developed a
strategy called “shared vision,” which was a seven-year agreement with the board to restructure
and stabilize the business, boost sales, and reduce debt. The plan had three stages: (1) cash
management (2004–2005), to achieve business survival and gain control by focusing on core
processes; (2) value and profit-seeking management (2006–2008); and, (3) growth management
(2009 onwards).15
p. 5
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
Stage 1 was all about cash flow. Here, the purpose was to survive. Banks were pressuring the
company to pay debts, so it was necessary to generate cash. In 2005 they sold buildings, factories
and businesses.16 The LEGOLAND parks were sold to the Blackstone group for EUR 375 million,
but retaining a 22 % equity stake in the operator of the new theme park Merlin Entertainment.
The equity stake in the theme-parks’ operator gave LEGO some control over the brand.
After several interviews with people inside and outside LEGO, Knudstorp understood that
the company lacked identity and an understanding of the business model, including the value
proposition. That “journey” of discovery allowed Knudstorp to understand that the essence of
LEGO was related to a creative building system that was unlike any other in the world.17 This led
him to establish some core priorities: (a) the LEGO brand, (b) the LEGO brick, (c) the unique play
system, and (d) the loyal community.18 These priorities became the basis of the shared vision, but
Knudstorp knew that to achieve them, supply chain decisions had to be made (see Exhibit 6).
From that moment on, any initiative beyond the LEGO brick was immediately restricted.19 The
video game unit was closed, and it was decided to return the LEGO Duplo brand to its original
positioning.20 This allowed them to reinvent the preschool line which, although not profitable,
was close to the essence of what Knudstorp called “the core.”21 Additionally, they discontinued
everything related to buildable fashion accessory lines (LEGO Clickits) for being too distant from
the core.
During Stage 1, Knudstorp did not take his eyes off one of LEGO’s main weaknesses: the supply
chain. “From my perspective, the supply chain is the circulation system of a company (…). You
have to fix it to keep the blood flowing” (Knudstorp, as cited in Oliver et al., 2007).22
In 2004, he put creating a robust new operating system to address supply chain issues on his
priority list. In 2000, the “LEGO Light” initiative had been carried out to implement SAP and the
common technology infrastructure throughout the company.23 However, it had not been put to
the expected use. Knudstorp appointed a transition team of logistics, sales, IT, and manufacturing
managers to work together for a year to revamp operations and add value from the SAP platform.
The interdependencies between each process in the supply chain was identified: between the
development (design), sourcing, manufacturing, and distribution processes (see Exhibit 6). They
created a “war room” where the team met every day to prioritize tasks and deal with obstacles.
The process began with an analysis of the complexity of the supply chain and its impact on
productivity, planning, and control. The changes began to be treated as programs, and the
pilot was related to the sourcing process. They wanted to make this supply chain process more
strategic.24 They placed CFO Jesper Ovesen in charge of the program, signaling the importance of
the initiative. The results made production much easier to plan and this early success created the
momentum to move forward with other changes. From that point on, the transition team applied
a new philosophy to their respective supply chain cost center, which was captured in the following
sentence: “constraints do not destroy creativity or product excellence, but rather can enhance
it.”25 The next step was to reduce complexity in product development. The recommendation was
p. 6
to cut the color palette roughly in half and to reduce the thousands of figures in production.26
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
This initiative, along with the sourcing pilot, helped the LEGO Group cut its material costs in
half and reduce its supplier list by 80 % percent. That year, LEGO reduced the number of brick
components, which was initially frowned upon by production and development managers, and
made a lot of noise in the organization. Designers complained that it was an attack on their
creativity, and some of them did not believe that complexity was a problem and continued to
challenge this. The tension led to the firing of some senior executives and to the British Bali Padda
taking over as VP of supply chain.
Soon after, the transition team began to work hand in hand with the designers.27 They created
a process to help them make more cost-effective decisions, using ground rules for creating new
colors and shapes, as well as ordering new materials. They taught designers by using a cost matrix
and analyzing the price associated with each change that they made.
Cost transparency gave developers a new way to define their achievements. “The best cooks are
not the ones who have all the ingredients in front of them. They are the ones who go to any
kitchen and work with what they have,” wrote a senior manager in a memo to the Lego Group’s
“kitchen.”28 The development group gradually realized that the restrictions could allow them to
become even more creative.
Reducing the number of elements and colors in production facilitated the move toward
streamlining production cycles. For Knudstorp and his team, LEGO had lost the edge in
manufacturing and supply chain management in the 1990s, when competitors began to outsource
processes.29 Therefore, it was decided to outsource any non-core operational processes, looking
for professional manufacturers willing to operate the factories better than LEGO. Since then, the
company Flextronics took over the manufacturing process of the parts and announced that, in
three years, 80 % of the employees at the Billund factory would be laid off.30
The LEGO Group also needed to bring its distribution channels closer to the customer and reduce
its high distribution costs. In this regard, the commercial strategy returned to the retailers.31 This
decision generated conflicts among many LEGO leaders, who said that, as long as they were in the
company, they would focus on the end consumer.32 During this period, the number of its logistics
providers was reduced from twenty-six to four.33 This measure made it possible to take advantage
of economies of scale and fostered competition among suppliers. It generated above 10 percent
savings in transportation costs, which was more or less standard in the industry at the time.34
Improvements in supply chain processes helped generate an 11 percent increase in revenue, more
than doubling the gains from 2005 to 2006. In the 2006 annual report, Knudstorp stated that
one of the most important reasons for the growth was that inventories held by retailers at the
beginning of 2006 were extraordinarily low.
On the consumer side, LEGO focused on the brand’s fan communities. The organization targeted
AFOLs (Adult Fans of LEGO) and some of them were hired as designers.35 LEGO improved
p. 7
the relationship with them and clubs were created to organize exhibitions.36 LEGO launched its
This document is authorized for use only by Aran Teixido Garcia in Spring 2024 – BADM 7190 (MBA Strategy) taught by Jake Smith, Louisiana State University from Mar 2024 to May 2024.
For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Case:
BL0015
ambassador program in 2005, and in 2006, the first workshop to recruit designer-fans.37 Many
of the great LEGO designers of the 80s and 90s had skills, but lacked a real understanding of the
company’s history.38
LEGO adopted more disciplined processes for product development innovation because designers
were working on the wrong projects and the new product development pipeline could not be
managed. The most disruptive designers would now have to use market research information
and tie it to costs. Innovations would now come from four distinct areas:39
1.
Product and marketing development (PMD): responsible for the development of innovations within existing products and themes.
2.
The concept laboratory: responsible for developing fundamentally new products based on
physical play and development of new concepts that would serve to develop the core ones.
3.
Community, education, and Direct group (CED): responsible for digital innovations in
online gaming experience.
4.
The commercial group: responsible for the new business models.40
By 2008, LEGO had a new business system in place to manage operations. This system allowed
LEGO to synchronize supply and demand. In this way, they improved relationships with retailers
by developing excellence with key account management. They added value propositions for
different types of retailers: Target wanted exclusivity, Wal-Mart wanted pricing, and Toys R’ Us
wanted to have a broad assortment.
After all these changes, in 2010 sales soared 37 % with a net profit increase of 69 % 41 (see Exhibits
1 and 2). Knudstorp attributed 50 % of the success to the role played by the optimization of LEGO’s
complex operating system: the factory system, distribution centers, inventory management,
packaging and shipping.42 They molded 30,000 bricks per minute, 24 hours a day. They were
assigned to the 350 retail SKUs that had to be packed in their boxes and delivered with precision
because, for example, if they didn’t arrive in stores like Wal-Mart in the 7:00 am block, they would
be returned to the store.43
However, the fundamental tension between controlling complexity and giving developers the
autonomy to create new concepts persisted. Product portfolio planning generated tensions: Balli
Padda sought minimal complexity, and Mad Nipper (VP of markets and products) pushed for
more innovation and a better consumer experience, which could trigger complexity. Both wanted
the best for LEGO, and Knudstorp understood both visions. The new projects under consideration
consisted of a line of playsets for girls, products to expand into China and India, and a line of
buildable sets that emerged from the concept lab and was tentatively named LEGO Games,44 with
good market opportunities and low margins, but in a very competitive sector.
While Nipper’s team, designers and managers supported the launch, Padda and his operational
team remained skeptical: the number of components was again approaching 9,000; a number
p. 8
never seen after the 2004 crisis (see Exhibit 5).
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ENTREPRENEURIAL PIECE: 2005–2012
LEGO’s business system was paying off by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of daily
operations. In 2009, the LEGO Group reported an increase in profits in the midst of a global
recession.45 Starting in 2011, the company accelerated the ability to bring products to market with
a new product life cycle management. LEGO’s business system now allowed for better master
data management in the supply chain and process automation.
While LEGO’s business system continued to oil up, the company was unable to develop a new
growth engine. To this end, in 2005, they had revisited the idea of online video games, following
consumer trends. At the end of 2010, they launched LEGO Universe, the first massively multiplayer
online game (MMOG), but it failed to become LEGO’s second business, as expected. In January
2012, it was discontinued.46 47 The LEGO Group wanted to create a disruptive business model,
as well as create a new platform for the organization’s growth, as it was anticipated that children
were becoming more and more digital. The initial ambition was that 10 % of LEGO’s total sales
would come from this new business. But it couldn’t beat Minecraft,i a MMOGii designed by a startup, later bought by Microsoft.48
It had been more than five years since the LEGO Group conceived the idea of LEGO Universe,
for which they brought in U.S. developer NetDevil.49 But LEGO, at the time considered the world
leader in games, with a unique experience for children, and one of the most powerful brands in the
world, could not beat a garage start-up (the creator of Minecraft). This was an invitation for the
company directors to consider a different way to develop new businesses, specifically the digitalbased kind. The LEGO mindset was that everything had to be perfect. Jesper Vilstrup (VP of Lego
Universe) hinted in some interviews that the quality of LEGO’s physical brick is also the quality
they expected to achieve in the digital world and in everything they do. But this meant that the
development time would be very long.50 51 52
LEGO Universe was managed following the same logic as the company’s business system.
The LEGO Group wanted to control the entire “digital” value chain: game idea generation,
development, production, marketing, and distribution.53
The LEGO Universe development team had to be subordinated to the brand’s classic game themes
and ensure that children could play online in a “safe environment.” These restrictions increased
the time and resource costs of LEGO Universe.54 The game had to feel like LEGO (i.e., it couldn’t
have violence). The development team was very careful not to scare children and to stick to the
LEGO DNA.55
Minecraft was created by Markus Alexej Persson, aka Notch; one of the founders of Mojang, a start-up specialized in video games. Notch and
his teammates saw Minecraft as a “fun project”. They had no ambition to create a global blockbuster and had no idea that this would later be
of interest to developers like Microsoft. The idea was simply to develop a game “just for the sake of developing a game” and to be recognized by
others as a cool team of developers. It was not aimed at children’s communities, but at young adults in their early twenties.
i
p. 9
ii
MMOG: massively multiplayer online game.
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The LEGO Universe team followed a traditional product development approach: a concept phase
with a clear product definition, followed by a development phase in which the product was fully
designed. This was in turn followed by testing (alpha and beta), before the product was finally
released to the market.56 NetDevil was never allowed to act independently from the LEGO Group,
and its developers spent a lot of time trying to keep in alignment with the LEGO managers’
requirements. They were not allowed the freedom to develop based on customer feedback or
their own intuition after years of experience in the video game industry.57 To mitigate some risk
of spillover and to improve communication and trust between the parties, in February 2011, the
LEGO Group acquired the NetDevil development team.58
The “LEGO style” influenced the product and the development process, and determined the
pricing policy.iii To access LEGO Universe, parents had to order a DVD for USD 40, install it, and
then sign up for a USD 10 monthly subscription.59 When it was launched, the audience perceived
that LEGO Universe was incomplete and that there was no way to play for free, a standard model
employed by many video game startups to attract new users.60
In January 2012, LEGO Universe was closed. Its executive Jesper Vilstrup said that they had
almost two million players and received very positive feedback from them, but, unfortunately,
they had not been able to build a satisfactory business model and, therefore, decided to close it.61
EXPANSION PIECES: 2012–2020
In 2015, LEGO ranked first on Forbes’ list of most valuable brands, which rates companies
based on intangible assets related to marketing, including names, signs, symbols, logos, and
designs.62 Later, in 2017, a Brand Finance report noted that LEGO’s cross-generational appeal
and the creative freedom it gave children were the reasons it became the world’s most valuable
toy company, surpassing rivals Mattel and Hasbro.63 At that time, LEGO was outselling and
outperforming its two main competitors, making the company one of the most important players
in the toy industry (see Exhibit 7).
However, at the top of the directors’ minds remained the threat of children’s changing habits due
to digital games. Like rival Mattel Inc., the LEGO Group had been grappling with competition
from smartphone apps and video games for several years. After the failure of LEGO Universe,
the company did not abandon the idea of a LEGO-themed online multiplayer game. In 2015 they
created LEGO Minifigures Online with developer Funcom, but it met the same fate as LEGO
Universe, it was shut down in October 2016.64 Without giving up, they tried once again, but
this time with TT Games Publishing,iv a developer company acquired by Warner Bros. in 2007.
The idea was to develop LEGO Worlds, a game that would provide the “one-on-one” gaming
Most MMOG publishers appealed to consumers by allowing some levels of play at no charge, with the idea that, once they were hooked on the
game, people would pay to move on to more challenging levels.
iii
p. 10
iv
TT Games, based in London. Its co-founder and managing director was Tom Stone, a former Lego designer. In 2007 this company was
acquired by Warner Bros. to gain a stake in the video game industry.
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Case:
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experience, while avoiding the pitfalls of online co-creative gaming, where unscrupulous people
could build obscene things. “The world of online multiplayer games is tremendously profitable,
but tremendously dangerous for LEGO”, commented David Robertson (Wharton professor).65
While LEGO was looking for a space in the video game market, in 2014, it also ventured into the
movie industry. In partnership with Warner Bros., it had a blockbuster hit with The Lego Movie,
which grossed more than USD 469 million worldwide and became the fifth highest-grossing movie
of the year in the U.S.66 This success encouraged the LEGO Group to produce more movies and
TV series. In 2016, David Robertson (innovation specialist and LEGO advisor) predicted that, in
the next five years, the main non-brick-based initiative that would generate the most revenue for
LEGO would be its films.67
During those years, there was a change at the helm of the company. Jørgen Vig Knudstorp was
nominated to become chairman of the board of the LEGO Brand Group in May 2017 and, for this
reason, he stepped down as CEO of the LEGO Group on December 31, 2016. The LEGO Brand
Group was created in 2016 in order to strategically govern all activities related to the LEGO brand
(LEGO Group, LEGOLAND® attractions operated by Merlin Entertainments Group, and all brand
right; see Exhibit2).68 The LEGO Brand Group would report to Kirkbi A/S,v a private holding
created in 1996 to manage the Kirk Kristiansen family assets69 (see Exhibit 2).
Before leaving the leadership of the LEGO Group, Knudstorp expressed concern about the things
that plague large companies, which could affect LEGO as well: “It is bureaucracy, it’s because you
are getting bigger, the pressure of scaling, of finding the right talent, of having the entrepreneurial
spirit despite being a very big company.”70
In January 2017, Bali Padda took over as CEO of the LEGO Group, but this didn’t last long.
After eight months, he was replaced by Niels Christiansen, a former CEO of Danfoss, a Danish
manufacturing and technology company.71
In 2017, sales fell for the first time since 2004, and 8 % of the payroll was fired (see Exhibits
1 and 9). However, the decrease in sales and profits was associated with the investments in
infrastructure and human capital that had been made in advance to complement the expansion
strategy, so the alarms were not raised.72 73
After three years of sticking to an expansion plan, in 2021 Niels Christiansen expressed his
satisfaction with the results obtained in 2020. Despite facing a difficult year due to the Covid-19
pandemic, sales reached an all-time high (see Exhibit 1). Christiansen reported that the good
results were due to the long-term strategic investment program they had defined years ago. Over
the past two years, the LEGO Group intensified investments to drive growth by focusing on
KIRKBI, name that refers to the acronym of the family that owns the company and to the place of origin in Denmark. Kirkbi focuses on
investments in bonds, corporate debt, listed equities, private equity, real estate, long-term equities and renewable energy. Kirkbi serves clients
in Denmark and Switzerland.
v
p. 11
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Case:
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innovations in play, building the LEGO brand, innovating the retail ecosystem, and expanding
into new markets to reach more children around the world (especially Asia and Latin America).
In 2020, we saw the first benefits of these investments. A strong and diverse portfolio
attracted builders of all ages. The launch of LEGO® Super Mario™ introduced a whole
new way to play and was one of our most successful new themes. Our global brand
campaign “Rebuild the World” resonated with families around the world. Investments
in our e-commerce platforms allowed fans to continue shopping while stores closed. And
we reached more children in China by opening 91 new stores and launching LEGO®
Monkie Kid™, the first theme inspired by a local legend.74
STRATEGIC PIECES
Niels Christiansen and the directors of the LEGO Group were wondering what strategies to adopt
to maintain their position in the industry and ensure strong financial performance going forward.
Since 2017, the company had been meeting demand in Europe and the U.S. while expanding
into new markets around the world (see Exhibits 9 and 10). For some analysts these continued
expansion plans could be at best aggressive and at worst unsustainable. Since 2017, LEGO was
again adjusting its supply chain, as it was not responding to growth.75 The supply chain problem
faced in 2020 was reminiscent of the past: evolving consumer interests brought complexity and
put pressure on the supply chain’s ability to respond to changes in demand76 (see complexity
increase in Exhibits 5, 11 and 12).
In addition to supply chain adjustments to embrace expansion, brick diversification was another
pending issue for LEGO Group leaders. The vast majority of the company’s revenue came from
games and products directly related to brick (see Exhibit 10).
They are not making as much money as they could because of their connection to the
brick. There are experiments they won’t do. They won’t allow side businesses (video
games, etc.) to take away from the core business. Mads Nipper told me, “The brick is
so important that there has to be a balance, otherwise the culture would break down.”
(Robertson in an interview)77
According to some experts, they had not yet come up with a new growth engine, as Apple did when
it moved the core of profitability from the big screen to the small screen of the iPhone.78 Moreover,
beyond finding a new core of profitability, for some specialists and executives the company has
been lagging behind with respect to online sales.79
Christiansen was known at Danfoss for accelerating the power of execution. “[At LEGO] they
became more agile and quicker to manage; it was about optimizing the machine. That was
something LEGO was missing. But I’m afraid we need to change the machine,” commented Drejer
p. 12
(LEGO’s Senior Creative Manager) in an interview.
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In 2018, the LEGO Brand Group created LEGO Ventures, a unit to explore investment
opportunities leveraging the original LEGO® idea.
This unit had The LEGO Ventures Incubation Studio, an incubation studio for new businesses
focused on learning and play beyond the LEGO® brick (see Exhibit 8). By 2021, LEGO
Ventures represented the corporate venture capital arm of the LEGO® brand and had made
investments in new businesses. The most recent was on September 30, 2020, when it made a
bet on the startup BEGiN.vi LEGO Ventures was an organization that was interested in investing
in Early Stage Venture and Late Stage Venture. It was small, inexperienced, and not among the
top 500 venture capital firms in the industry.80
In the midst of the expansion of the LEGO Group, the LEGO Brand Group’s most productive
business unit (see Exhibit 2), Jørgen Vig Knudstorp had a new challenge, now viewed from a
corporate strategy perspective: should his agenda focus on designing and supporting strategies
to maintain the LEGO Group’s position in the industry, or should he prioritize the development
and investment of future business exploration units, such as LEGO Ventures? Should he focus
on diversifying the LEGO Group brick, rather than expanding the traditional business model?
What role should Niels Christiansen and the LEGO Group directors play in this decision? What
relationship should Christiansen have with LEGO Ventures?
p. 13
vi
BEGiN is an award-winning educational technology company that creates learning products to provide children with the highest quality
education.
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Exhibit 1. LEGO Group Income
from 1932 to 2020
Exhibits’
Section
BmDDK
43.6
40
34.9
30
20
10
1932 1978
1993 1998 2003 2007
2017
2020
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO Annual Reports
Exhibit 2. Family’s Ownership
Structure (until 2019)
Kirk Kristiansen
Family
100%
KIRKBI
GROUP
LEGO BRAND
GROUP
75%
50%
100%
100%
p. 14
In 2019, 57 % of KIRKBI Group’s
operating profit came from LEGO Brand
Group activities, and 43% came from
investment activities.
Initiation
Revenues
(%) of total
KPI
100%
Fundación
LEGO
KIRKBI
Investments
THE LEGO GROUP
1932
70 % of total
revenues
Good
sold
RENEWABLES
MERLIN
ENTERTAINMENTS
1968
27 % of total
revenues
Visitors
INVESTMENT
Real State
Private Equity
Quoted Equity
Bonds & Corporate debts
TRADEMARKS
1980
03 % of total
revenues
Royalties
LEGO
VENTURES
2018
00 % of total
revenues
New
business
,
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO and Kirkbi’s official information
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Exhibit 3. LEGO Profitability
since 1994
Exhibits’
Section
mDDK
10.000
9,9
8.000
7,8
6.000
4.000
2.000
0,00
-2.000
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO Annual Reports
Exhibit 4. Nomenclature of
the Complexity of LEGO Sets
Product
Some of them are books, accessories, promotional items,
mini-figures. Others: the games are the most important.
Game
The games come in sets.
Set
It is made up of a group of parts.
Pieces
They can be of various types, which include the famous LEGO bricks.
Blocks
Fundamental and original LEGO piece.
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO nomenclature
p. 15
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Exhibit 5. The Growth of LEGO Sets
Exhibits’
Section
Millennium Falcon (75192)
2017 – 7,541 pieces
8,000
Taj Mahal (10189)
2008 – 5,922 pieces
7,000
Última edición coleccionista Halcón
milenario (10179) – 2007 – 5,197 pieces
6,000
SAMSONITE (14-1252)
Motorized Basic Set
1971 – 1,252 pieces
Town Plan
(842-2) 1969
799 pieces
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
Estrella de la muerte II (10143)
2005 – 3,441 pieces
Destructor estelar (10303)
2002 – 3,096 piezas
Estatua de la libertad (3450)
2000 – 2,882 pieces
Basic Building
(080) Set With
Train- 1967
718 pieces
Camión gigante (5571)
1996 – 1,757 pieces
Town Plan
(725-3) 1961
711 pieces
Super coche (8880)
1994 – 1,343 pieces
1,000
1960
1970
1980
Source: Modified from Brickset https://brickset.com/
article/44726/the-growth-of-lego-sets
Estimates obtained from the Brickset LEGO site
1990
2000
2010
2020
LEGO sets have become increasingly
substantial and ambitious in their design,
particularly over the last decade.
Note: The table shows the increase in the number of pieces per set. Fewer sets, but with more pieces
p. 16
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Designers often dream of
new toys without taking
into account the price of
materials or production
costs.
Greater appreciation for
design and disregard for
the costs of innovation.
Great attention to detail,
reflecting the craft culture
of the company.
The company’s product development lab was a point
of corporate pride.
Engineers establish ad hoc
relationships with suppliers
due to lack of procurement
compliance procedures
Each engineer had his or
her own favorite vendors.
The numbers gradually
increased over the years,
as
product
developers
searched for new materials.
A wide variety of suppliers
were employed, more than
11,000 in all.*
Sourcing
Manufacturing
Day-to-day
operations
were often chaotic. Operators routinely responded to
last-minute demands, readily implementing costly
changeovers.
They have an overall capacity utilization of just 70
percent.
In its Danish factory, yet
the production teams operated as hundreds of independent toy shops.
The company ran one of
the largest injection-molding operations in the world,
with more than 800 machines.
Source: own elaboration
*That’s nearly twice as many suppliers as Boeing uses to build its airplanes
p. 17
To serve its many small customers, it has a multi-level
inventory system with local
centers; a challenge that
contributed to lost sales
and high inventory levels.
67 percent of all orders
consist of “selective packaging”, which is labor intensive at the distribution
center.
The
disproportionate
amount of time invested in
serving small stores raises
compliance costs substantially.
Equal attention is paid to
the thousands of stores
that together generate only
one-third of revenue as to
the 200 largest chains that
account for two-thirds of
revenue.
Distribution
Customer
Experience
AFTER-SALE
Exhibits’
Section
Known as the “kitchen.”
Product
Development
PRE-SALE
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Exhibit 6. Some Characteristics
of the LEGO Supply Chain
(Year 2003–2004)
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Exhibit 7. Toy Companies’
Annual Net Profit
Exhibits’
Section
$ Billion
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
Time
Source: own elaboration based on Hadjiyski (2019)
Exhibit 8. Lego Brand Group
Group Structure
LEGO BRAND GROUP
Jørgen Vig Knudstorp
p. 18
THE LEGO
GROUP
MERLIN
ENTERTAINMENT
S
Niels Christiansen
Nick Varney
Founded by Ole
Kirk Kristiansen
in 1932. Based
on the LEGO®
brick, the
company offers
unique play
experiences for
children of all
ages.
The leading visitor
attraction operator in
Europe and the second
largest in the world. It
owns the
LEGOLAND® parks
that were founded by
Godtfred Kirk
Christiansen in 1968
and the LEGOLAND®
Discovery Centers,
among other activities.
TRADEMARKS
LEGO VENTURES
Cecilia Qvist
The LEGO®
and
LEGOLAND®
trademarks.
LEGO Ventures explores
investment opportunities at the
intersection of Play, Learning
and Creativity to leverage and
develop the original LEGO®
Idea and support the LEGO®
brand mission “to inspire and
develop the builders of
tomorrow.” It contains The
LEGO Ventures Incubation
Studio, which is a corporate
startup and incubation studio
that builds businesses centered
around learning and play
beyond the LEGO® brick.
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO and Kirkbi’s official information
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Exhibit 9. LEGO Diversification
(Geography)
Exhibits’
Section
Money (mDKK)
2020
2019
2018
2017
Americas
16,345
14,328
13,769
13,457
Europe, Middle East
& Africa
19,060
17,089
16,644
15,898
Asia & Pacific
7,857
6,676
5,469
5,028
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO’s Annual Reports
Exhibit 10. LEGO Diversification
(revenue streams)
Money
(mDKK)
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
Sales of goods
43,262
38,093
35,882
34,383
37,379
35,359
28,141
24,929
License income
394
451
509
612
555
421
437
365
Source: own elaboration based on LEGO’s Annual Reports
Exhibit 11. Evolution of the Number
of Pieces Sold per Year
Year
2008 2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Sets
designed
05
07
08
07
08
08
09
09
10
11
Sets
(sold)
182
201
194
219
240
259
296
336
339
332
70,873 67,500 70,582 68,639 76,494 89,659 104,480
116,532
Pieces
(sold)
132,220 154,080
Note: The table shows the increase in the number of pieces per set. Fewer sets contained more pieces
p. 19
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For the exclusive use of A. Teixido Garcia, 2024.
Exhibit 12. Average Number
of Pieces
Exhibits’
Section
500
464
450
400
389
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
00
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Source: own elaboration
p. 20
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Case:
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NOTES
1
The Lego Group (2021). The LEGO Group History. https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/lego-group/
the-lego-group-history/
Reid, S. (2020). Life at the world’s largest toymaker. Creagham McConnell Group. https://cmgpartners.
ca/lego/
2
Reid, S. (2020). Life at the world’s largest toymaker. Creagham McConnell Group. https://cmgpartners.
ca/lego/
3
Compendido, R. (2018). Top LEGO set from the year you were born. Stacker.com. https://stacker.com/
stories/1673/top-lego-set-year-you-were-born
4
The Lego Group (2021). The LEGO Group History. https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/lego-group/
the-lego-group-history/
5
6
Hadjiyski, L. (2019). Block by Block: How LEGO came to dominate its market. Business Today Online
Journal. https://journal.businesstoday.org/bt-online/2019/block-by-block-how-lego-came-to-dominateits-market
Hadjiyski, L. (2019). Block by Block: How LEGO came to dominate its market. Business Today Online
Journal. https://journal.businesstoday.org/bt-online/2019/block-by-block-how-lego-came-to-dominateits-market
7
The Lego Group (2021). The LEGO Group History. https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/lego-group/
the-lego-group-history/
8
9
Feloni, R. (2014). How Lego Came Back From The Brink Of Bankruptcy. Business Insider. https://www.
businessinsider.com/how-lego-made-a-huge-turnaround-2014-2?IR=T
10
Barthneck, Ch. (2018). LEGO products have become more complex. PLoS One, 13(1), e0190651. NCBI.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5749839/
Ramblingbrick (2021). What Are The Most Popular LEGO® Themes? Annual Report Review. The Rambling Brick. https://ramblingbrick.com/2021/03/14/what-are-the-most-popular-lego-themes-annual-report-review/
11
12
The LEGO Group (2004). LEGO Annual Report 2004. https://www.lego.com/cdn/cs/aboutus/assets/
blt07abb4b8a3da3f39/Annual_Report_2004_ENG.pdf
Bochenski, M., & Kurland, A. (2012). Executive Insight: Mads Nipper. Think with Google. https://www.
thinkwithgoogle.com/future-of-marketing/digital-transformation/executive-insight-mads-nipper/
13
14
Oliver, K., Samakh, E., & Heckmann, P. (2007, Autumn). Rebuilding LEGO, Brick by Brick. Strategy+Business, 48. https://www.strategy-business.com/article/07306?gko=813c3
15
Thomke, S. (2020). Jorgen Vig Knudstorp. Reflections on LEGO’s Transformation (Interview). Harvard
Business School.
Thomke, S. (2020). Jorgen Vig Knudstorp. Reflections on LEGO’s Transformation (Interview). Harvard
Business School.
16
Thomke, S. (2020). Jorgen Vig Knudstorp. Reflections on LEGO’s Transformation (Interview). Harvard
Business School.
17
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Case:
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