Leadership In Organizations-Case Study

This paper will have three parts:

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Part 1

Select a diverse organization with powerful leadership and follow the guidelines below:

* I would like to write about Amazon or Delta Airlines* If you think another topic is better just let me know.

Briefly describe the organization and the main leadership.

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Describe how the leadership is developed for cultural shifts and organizational changes.

Analyze how the leadership influences performance in the diverse organization

Examples: Tesla, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Disney, General Motors, WhatsApp

Note: you are not limited to choosing from this list.

Part 2

Select a charismatic leader and a transformational leader of your choice, and follow the guidelines below.

Include the following information about the leaders:

Describe the five qualities of your selected charismatic leader (self-confident, inspirational, articulate,

revolutionary/disruptor, supportive).

Describe any four of the six qualities that your selected leader possesses using the framework for analysis for a

transformational leader, which was discussed in Van Wart’s (2015) article (attached)

Predict the possible drawbacks of being a charismatic or transformational leader.

Reflect on why you selected your leaders.

Examples of charismatic leaders include General George Patton, John F. Kennedy, Nelson Mandela, and Moses;

Examples of transformational leaders include Ross Perot, John D. Rockefeller, Attila the Hun, Walt Disney, and Julius

Caesar

Note: you are not limited to choosing from these lists

Part 3

Conclude with an evaluation: Does (do) the key leader(s) in the organization you presented in Part 1 charismatic or transformational leadership qualities? Explain your answer.

W. Henry Lambright, Editor
Montgomery Van Wart
California State University, San Bernardino
Administrative
Profile
Montgomery Van Wart is professor
in the Department of Public Administration
at California State University, San
Bernardino. He has served as chair of his
department and dean of the College of
Business and Public Administration. He has
authored nine books, including Dynamics
of Leadership in Public Service,
Leadership in Public Organizations,
The Business of Leadership (with
Karen Dill Bowerman), Administrative
Leadership in the Public Sector
(with Lisa A. Dicke), and, most recently,
Leadership and Culture: Comparative
Models of Top Civil Servant Training.
E-mail: mvanwart@csusb.edu
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 75, Iss. 5, pp. 760–769. © 2015 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12393.
760
Evaluating Transformational Leaders: The Challenging Case
of Eric Shinseki and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
Abstract: Evaluating less than fully successful transformational leaders is difficult. One common method of assessing
leadership is to focus on a single temporal narrative. A second approach uses a particular theory, such as transformational leadership, to frame the analysis. The latter, less common strategy is used with the example of Eric Shinseki, who
served as both chief of staff of the U.S. Army and as secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The
analytic framework used here has six major elements that are specified by 22 factors. Using those factors to evaluate
Shinseki’s tenure at the VA, he is found to be very poor in only 2 factors but poor in 11, adequate in 6, good in 1, and
excellent in only 2. While using a list of factors does not eliminate subjectivity or the challenges of reaching a single
assessment, it does clarify the elements of judgment and weighting.
E
valuating individual leaders using a biographical approach can be done in many ways. One
method that is common in the public administration literature is to focus on a single temporal
narrative. Done well, it provides examples of a leader’s
successes and failures with a case-based, non-theorydriven presentation, focusing on special contributions,
challenges, and values. The narrative method is useful
for context-rich, heuristic, and/or celebratory examples (Dodge, Ospina, and Foldy 2005). While this
method is likely to enhance “the story,” it is less likely
to produce generalizable and replicable analysis.
This article demonstrates the latter, less common,
analytic strategy. It uses the example of Eric Shinseki,
who served as both chief of staff of the U.S. Army,
where he was largely successful (Kolenda 2003),
and as secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), where he was largely unsuccessful and
forced to resign after a scandal involving widespread
falsified medical appointment wait lists. The article
focuses primarily on his tenure as secretary of the
Department of Veterans Affairs, where analysis and
evaluation of his record as a transformational leader is
most difficult.
A second approach is to use a particular theory or
recognized model, such as transformational leadership, to frame the evaluation; this superimposes a
predefined framework on the chronology. A variety of
scholars have urged the use of theory-driven analysis
for administrative profiles (DiIulio 1990; Lambright
and Quinn 2011; Van Wart 2011). For example, Van
Wart noted the underutilization of this method in his
leadership literature review: “There is great opportunity for comparative biography using a more rigorous
standardized framework. This has . . . yet to occur
with explicit leadership frameworks” (2013, 538). A
more theory-driven biographical approach has the
advantage of being an extended example of theoretical
types and concepts, being more easily integrated into
the literature, and being more likely to be relatable to
other biographies. Attractive as these advantages are,
challenges arise that must be dealt with, including
access to sufficient data to flesh out the theory being
used, space limitations when using an article format,
and the adequacy of a single theoretical model.
How Do You Define Transformational
Leadership for Applied Settings?
Perhaps the most widely known and best respected
transformational leadership theory is the full-range
leadership theory of Bernard Bass, which was first proposed in his book Leadership and Performance Beyond
Expectations (1985). It has stood the test of time
well as a high-level theoretical model that has been
customized for various uses in the public administration literature (Oberfield 2014). It asserts that while
transactional leadership is critical for basic organizational performance, transformational leadership
provides an important additive quality that is necessary for keeping organizations at the high-performing
end of their production. Bass identifies two transactional and four transformational characteristics that
contribute to high performance. However, the model
as it is typically articulated tends to focus on internal
organizational change (because it relies on employee
perceptions) over external political forces and nonemployee sources of data, neglects crisis management,
Public Administration Review • September | October 2015
and poorly articulates transformation as a process rather than as a
set of leader characteristics. The model can be adapted, however, by
embedding the change management literature. In doing so, multiple
sources of information, such as performance statistics, public opinion data, and event analysis, are more readily incorporated.
In order to use a theory-based approach in a biographical case study,
indicators were chosen to reflect the six factors.
The first transactional characteristic is called management by exception; this aspect of leadership occurs when management reacts to
various problems or exceptions. Such problems include dealing
with low-performing employees, avoiding future technical mistakes
and blunders, addressing performance issues, and stabilizing the
organization in a crisis. The second transactional element is called
contingent reward; this aspect of leadership is based on the exchange
and contractual relationship that exists between employers and
employees. The foremost factor in this relationship is pay, but life–
work balance is also important.
One of the four transformational factors is individualized consideration, which is supportiveness of employees. This can be demonstrated by coaching, delegation, and training opportunities, among
other things. A second transformational factor is idealized influence,
which is a result of trusting the leader as well as the persuasiveness
of the leader. This is demonstrated by the leader modeling exemplary behavior, avoiding personal scandal, and the use of charismatic
communication through symbols, evocative language, and personal
dynamism. A third factor is inspirational commitment, which results
in employees bonding as a group and transcending self-interests.
This is demonstrated by pride in the shared work, on one hand, and
teamwork, on the other. The final factor is intellectual stimulation,
or the vision, planning, and implementation of change. This critical
role of transformational leaders is well articulated in the change management literature. The basics of change management (Fernandez
and Rainey 2006) include establishing the need for change, providing a plan, building internal support, ensuring top management
support, arranging external support, providing resources, and institutionalizing change. In sum, then, 22 items can be used to critique a
leader and arrive at the basis for a holistic assessment. The expanded
framework, based on Bass, is summarized in table 1.
Table 1 Framework for the Analysis of Transformational Leaders
• Deal with low-performing employees
• Avoid technical mistakes and blunders
• Deal with performance lapses
• Stabilize organization if needed
Contingent reward
• Pay
• Life–work balance
Individualized consideration • Coaching
• Delegation
• Training opportunities
Idealized influence
• Model exemplary behavior
• Avoid personal scandal
• Use of charismatic communication
Inspirational commitment
• Gain commitment to the work and the profession
• Teamwork
Intellectual stimulation
• Ensure the need for change
• Provide a plan
• Build internal support
• Ensure top management support
• Ensure external support
• Provide resources
• Institutionalize changes
• Pursue comprehensive change
Management by exception
contextual factor that should be noted, but that is beyond the
bounds of this venue to fully explore, is the role of others, as even
transformational leaders do not act alone. To what degree was
President Barack Obama culpable in selecting a leader who may
have been past his prime and out of his area of expertise? To what
degree was the senior leadership in the VA to blame, a number of
whom focused more on bonuses than on professionalism? Although
the focus here is narrowly on Shinseki, a broader analysis would
highlight the shortcomings of others more sharply.
The evaluation of Secretary Shinseki at the VA illustrates not only
the importance of systematically analyzing and comparing a leader’s
record but also the challenge of making final judgments when many
obstacles are not overcome and when crises overshadow accomplishments or leave an agency in disarray.
Background on the Department of Veterans Affairs
Today, the Department of Veterans Affairs is among the largest
agencies in the federal government, with approximately 300,000
employees, a discretionary budget of $63.5 billion in 2014, and
$87.5 billion in mandatory benefits. The department comprises 152
hospitals (124 of which are affiliated with medical schools), 800
How Transformational Does a Leader Need or Try to Be? community-based outpatient clinics, 126 nursing home care units,
Not all jobs are equally difficult, and this is critically true when transand 35 domiciliaries. The clinics and hospitals process 230,000
formational efforts are undertaken. If general management is hard
veterans a day and deliver 85 million appointments a year to 6.5
(Van Wart and Berman 1999), transformational leadership is very
million patients. The Department of Veterans Affairs also provides
hard. While transformational leaders may reap
many nonmedical benefits, such as educagreater “glory,” they also increase the likelitional grants, pensions based on service-related
While transformational leaders
hood of failure. But not all transformations are
disability, and home loans. A total of 8.5
may reap greater “glory,” they
equivalent. Therefore, when evaluating leaders,
million veterans receive treatment or benalso increase the likelihood
it is necessary to get a clear sense of (a) just how
efits annually, out of a veteran population of
of failure.
transformational they need or try to be and
nearly 22 million. This population has been
(b) in comparison to what? One factor is the
augmented by the post–September 11 conbreadth of task. A second element is the radiflicts, but a voluntary military and multiple
calness of change. A third factor is the complexity of change. A fourth deployments have meant that the numbers have not entirely offset
factor is demand on followers. Finally, there is the speed of change.
the number of veterans dying who were in former conflicts (and
peacetime service). While the veteran population has been decreasAnother question that must be raised in evaluating transformaing slightly in recent years as a large share of World War II and
tional leaders has to do with their comparison groups. Still another
Korean War vets have died, the needs of veterans have increased as a
Evaluating Transformational Leaders: The Challenging Case of Eric Shinseki and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 761
result of fewer battlefield fatalities but higher injury rates and official
acknowledgment of a variety of conditions (labeled “presumptive”
conditions by the VA) such as post-traumatic stress disorder.
Quality of care issues have had a roller-coaster history in the
Department of Veterans Affairs and its predecessors (Moore 2014).
In the twentieth century, while there have been a number of times
when the agency allowed quality of care to disintegrate and mismanagement was rife and sometimes appalling, there have also been
substantial highlights, too. One important event was when the VA
aligned itself with medical schools across the country after World
War II, creating a highly synergistic effect for both veteran care
and the medical training of the bulk of American doctors. Another
great era for the VA was during the second half of the 1990s, when
Kenneth Kizer, a medical doctor, was named to head the Veterans
Health Administration. In his five years as medical director of the
VA health system, Kizer introduced quality of care metrics, systemic
feedback loops to reduce error rates, and computerized patient
records, and he also rationalized service imbalances (Edmondson,
Golden, and Young 2008; Kizer and Dudley 2009). The effects were
dramatic, leading some to assert that VA health care was second
to no other health maintenance organization (Longman 2007) by
2000 and that the effects have been relatively lasting (Glastris 2010;
Pear 2014). While health care issues of significance have occasionally occurred in its more than 1,000 facilities, systematic health care
lapses generally have been minor and oversight rigorous with a current well-staffed Inspector General’s office of more than 600, as well
as a separate Office of the Medical Inspector that assesses quality of
care problems or concerns.
Access to the VA system as a new enrollee (commonly known as
“patient wait times”) and receipt of timely payments for benefits
have long been issues. In 2001, the General Accounting Office
issued a report about appointment time issues, and subsequent
reports have confirmed the ongoing problem. Benefits payment
problems seemed to start after the 1988 decision to allow federal
court appeals of VA decisions, which, in turn, made the adjudication of veterans’ claims far more litigious and extensive (veterans
can appeal decisions numerous times without penalty); routine
payments have lagged ever since, and complex cases frequently take
years to resolve.
As administrator in charge of the army, Shinseki largely designed its
relatively radical reorganization (Moran 2007), and he was occasionally the subject of controversy. On the more successful side, he helped
move the army from a conventional warfare army relying on large,
heavily equipped divisions to one composed of “modular” brigades
that could move independently, with some that could be lightly
armored for strategic deployment as needed (Johnson et al. 2012).
His most unpopular decision in terms of soldiers was his order to
expand the use of the elite Rangers’ black beret for all army personnel.
His interactions with his political superiors while he was chief of
staff were equally important. Within a year after the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States, the George W. Bush administration was preparing for the possibility, and perhaps likelihood,
of a war with Iraq based on allegations of ties to the terrorist group
al-Qaeda and the belief that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Hersh 2003). With significant tension between Shinseki and
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over philosophical differences regarding the size of the military footprint necessary for army
incursions, Shinseki announced his retirement nearly a year before it
was to become effective, and Rumsfeld, with unusual haste, named
his replacement soon thereafter. Later, when asked to testify before
the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2003, Shinseki
stated that it would take “several hundred thousand soldiers” to
secure Iraq after an invasion because of the size of the territory
and ethnic tensions; this was strongly contradicted by Secretary
Rumsfeld. Ultimately, Shinseki’s recommendation to plan on a
larger ground force for longer-term peacekeeping was considered
prescient (Ricks and Tyson 2006).
Shortly after Shinseki’s retirement as army chief of staff, he published a book (as second author) with Frances Hesselbein titled
Be-Know-Do: Leadership the Army Way (2004), which was published
in conjunction with the Leader to Leader Institute. In the book,
Shinseki and Hesselbein assert that the “Army’s record for developing leaders is superb” (xv) and that “all leaders can benefit” (xviii)
from the way the army teaches leadership, and they provide lessons
from the army for civilian organizations in all chapters. The book
is consistent with the contemporary mainstream leadership literature emphasizing leader character, empowerment, being a model,
teamwork, focusing on change management, and providing the
tools and support to be a learning organization. However, there are
Eric Shinseki’s Background and Rise to Chief of Staff of
several ironies. First, Shinseki frequently was unable to live up to
the Army
his own advice when he was given the chance at the VA, as quotes
Eric Shinseki was born on November 28, 1942, in Hawaii, where he
from the book will indicate. Second, his fundamental assumpgrew up. In high school, he was a Boy Scout and served as class presi- tion that the leadership found in the army is easily transferred to
dent. He attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduat- civilian organizations with very different missions and cultures is
ing in 1965. Among his early assignments, he served two combat
highly suspect. Army leadership draws on extensive basic training,
tours in Vietnam. During that time, as a forward artillery observer, he and thus inculcation, in a hierarchical setting that is not present in
stepped on a land mine, which blew off the front of one of his feet.
most civilian organizations outside public safety. Although the VA
Although it took him nearly a year to recover,
may have former soldiers as its clientele (but
he returned to active duty, which was unusual.
who seek services as civilians), it is primarily a
Army leadership draws on
He rotated among various commands, among
professional organization that tends to value
extensive basic training, and
which was a 10-year period in Europe. In
professional over bureaucratic discipline.
thus inculcation, in a hierarchi1997, he became a general after 32 years of sercal setting that is not present
vice. In 1998, he assumed the important role
Eric Shinseki as Secretary of the VA
of chief of staff of the U.S. Army, reporting
As a senator, Barack Obama served on the
in most civilian organizations
directly to the secretary of defense. In 2003, he
Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and
outside public safety.
retired from military service.
thus knew the veterans policy area well. As a
762
Public Administration Review • September | October 2015
candidate for president, he spoke regularly about the importance of
improving the Department of Veterans Affairs, stressing “comprehensive reform” and the poor service and care at some facilities that
was “totally unacceptable,” often calling the situation “a betrayal”
and, even occasionally, “an outrage” (Obama 2008; see also
Kaczynski 2014). Obama advocated expanding benefits, eliminating means testing, and adding funding to help eliminate homelessness among veterans. He also asserted that his “Secretary of the
Veterans Administration will be just as important as my Secretary of
Defense” (Obama 2007). When President-Elect Obama announced
his intention to nominate Shinseki on December 7, 2008, it was
with the expectation that Shinseki would institute major reforms
and get more attention from the president than is common. In making his selection, Obama chose a former military man rather than a
health or other social service administrator.
During his nomination hearing on January 14, 2009, Shinseki was
closely, but politely, interrogated about how he would deal with
many issues, among them wait time problems in receiving benefits
and initial appointments (U.S. Senate 2009). Shinseki’s Senate
nomination was uncontroversial, and he was unanimously confirmed
on January 20. Upon taking office, he acknowledged the challenges
that he would face as he and the president committed to expanded
service for veterans while having to deal with “budgetary pressures,
given the state of the economy” (Shinseki 2009). In the Veterans
Health Administration and elsewhere, Shinseki called for a culture of
change. Under his leadership, the VA “adopted three guiding principles to govern the changes under way, namely being people-centric,
results driven, and forward-looking. These principles are reflected in
the 16 major initiatives that serve as a platform from which transformation is being executed,” according to the agency’s website.
By the end of his first year, Shinseki had done his initial outreach,
put his senior executive team in place, and provided the goals for
transformation to the agency. After this, his style was to rely on
briefings from his direct reports; his contact with the field and even
with his 22 regional directors was extremely limited. Despite the
employee uptick in confidence when Shinseki initially took office,
he began to decline in all categories except fairness, a trend that continued throughout his tenure, as reported by agency employees in
annual surveys (see table 2 for employee perceptions over time). His
communication style was consistently formal and stiff. The culture
that was established was considered hierarchical and top-down and,
over time, intolerant of dissent (Office of the Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2014) and “toxic” (Pear 2014).
While he was involved in disciplining senior employees during his
first year in response to a widespread scandal involving colonoscopies inducing dangerous infections, he rarely was involved in discipline thereafter. Indeed, this was in contrast to the issue of executive
bonuses, which frequently cropped up in critical news pieces (e.g.,
Shinn, Moore, and Rich 2013).
Over his tenure, Shinseki was very successful at getting higher
levels of funding (in concert with the president and with Office of
Management and Budget support). However, the vast bulk of the
funding went to benefits expansion (mandatory expenditures) and
new initiatives. The discretionary increases (administrative infrastructure) became largely focused on keeping up with the increased
workload.
Administratively, the major goals of reductions of benefits wait
times and patient wait times were challenging. The 125-day goal for
benefits payments improved and deteriorated multiple times over
his tenure as the new armies of benefits clerks were overwhelmed by
the new demands placed on them. While there are many contributing factors to the backlog, one aspect of conspicuous weakness was
the delay in making veterans’ files electronic, as had been done successfully with medical records in the 1990s. This has been projected
to be completed by 2016, and pilot programs have shown considerable increased efficiencies.
A quietly momentous event was when Shinseki signed off on an
order to decrease patient wait times from 30 to 14 days (to be
implemented in 2011), tying performance bonuses to improvements in meeting this goal (Brunker 2014). In retrospect, this was
widely perceived as an enormous management error that was unrealistic, causing unsustainable pressure on the system (Kesling and
Nissenbaum 2014). Sadly, the data used for this decision were woefully inaccurate, and Shinseki ignored recurring, successive reports
about the continuing problem in this area (Philpott 2014).
Although Shinseki was good at working with Congress in the technical budget authorization process, he was unsuccessful at keeping
the agency from becoming a political proxy leading up to President
Table 2 Employee Perceptions in the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, 2009 and 2014 (percentage of those rating the category satisfactory or highly satisfactory)
Category
Employee satisfaction and commitment
Effective leadership and empowerment
Effective leadership and fairness
Effective leadership: Senior leaders
Employee skills–mission match
Pay
Strategic management
Teamwork
Training and development
Work-life balance
Performance-based rewards and advancement
2014 Rank among Largest Agencies*
2014 Score**
2009 Score
18 of 19
18 of 19
18 of 19
17 of 19
7 of 19
19 of 19
12 of 19
18 of 19
11 of 19
17 of 19
18 of 19
54.6
39.2
48.7
38.2
76.4
44.9
52.0
58.8
56.1
54.9
38.2
66
46.4
48.9
44.9
82
55.4
61.6
70.5
63.9
60.5
44.3
*The responses of employees were being collected while the scandal was unfolding, thus likely affecting some categories such as senior leadership effectiveness
and strategic management, in which larger drops were recorded.
**The overall perceptions of federal employees declined in the 2009–14 period, but the VA has outstripped this trend.
Source: Partnership for Public Service.
Evaluating Transformational Leaders: The Challenging Case of Eric Shinseki and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 763
Obama’s second midterm election in 2014. The Democrats, led
by independent Senator Bernie Sanders, pushed for an enormous
benefits expansion bill in February 2013, virtually blocking all
Republican input. The Republicans, feeling forced to successfully vote down a bill that they perceived to be “budget busting”
(Ponder 2014), were soon able to use the revelation of hidden wait
lists at VA medical facilities to get their revenge and improve their
position for the upcoming election (Fram 2014). Shinseki’s insensitivity to political issues, previously seen in the 2003 surge debate,
left him vulnerable when he would have needed nimble reflexes and
public relations acumen.
The scandal began when a whistle-blower reported a patient wait
time cover-up in the Phoenix VA facility in which 40 patients died
while waiting for appointments. The story was immensely popular
with the media, was proof to many Republican lawmakers of the
bad management they had been alleging, and drew great public
outrage. The president himself called for an investigation of the
Phoenix medical care system and an assessment of the scope of
the problem on April 28, 2014. The “scandal” ultimately was not
simply about the wait times, which had been problematic for years,
but, more importantly,
• The fact that the problem had been “covered up,” with false
information provided to both the public and Congress
• The vast scope of the problem at facilities across the country
• The apparent lack of concrete action by Shinseki and his
administration, even though official reports of “gaming” the
system had been intermittently issued since 2001 (Office of the
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 2014)
Shinseki took a series of disciplinary actions, including pressing the
early retirement of the VA’s undersecretary of health, Robert Petzel,
forcing some resignations, and putting the director of the Phoenix
facility on leave because she refused to resign. While Obama initially
stood by Shinseki, after the VA Inspector General issued its interim
report, the president called him to the White House, and Shinseki
resigned on May 30, 2014. In his last speech before resigning,
Shinseki said, “I was too trusting of some, and I accepted, as accurate, reports that I now know to have been misleading with regard
to patient wait times.” He apologized to veterans, their families,
members of Congress, and veterans service organizations and took
responsibility (Shinseki 2014).
landed on the Government Accountability Office’s high-risk list for
the first time in 2015.
Evaluating Shinseki’s Record as a Transformational
Leader at the VA
We can now apply the expanded Bass framework to Shinseki’s
record to get a balanced picture of his success and failure as a transformational leader. Then we can use the contextual analysis to place
his performance in a broader perspective.
The following is an assessment of Shinseki’s performance based on
the six factors and 22 competencies identified earlier. Summative
evaluations in each area use five qualitative standards: very poor, poor,
adequate, good, and excellent. Adequate is equivalent to acceptable,
and scores of very poor and excellent are meant to be unusually high
or low praise.
Management by Exception (Maintain or Restore
Organizational Operations)
Deal with low-performing employees. Shinseki handled the
colonoscopy scandal in 2009 with firmness, but thereafter he took a
hands-off approach to disciplining unacceptable performance. The
agency has never been good in this dimension; under Shinseki, it
deteriorated dangerously, as performance-based rewards and
advancement data from employees indicate. On average, he was very
poor in dealing with low-performing employees.
Avoid technical mistakes and blunders. Shinseki had been good as
a manager in organizing competent systems and arranging the
elements of transformation when he was in the army, but by being
out of his expertise in the VA and out of touch with frontline
executives, his competence in this area plummeted. In particular, his
decision to implement a 14-day wait time requirement for physician
appointments was an enormous mistake. He had an opportunity to
correct this important blunder but did not. Additionally, having no
experience in the major systems of the Department of Veterans
Affairs—medical and social services—he was unable to anticipate
problems or personally know best practices. On average, he was very
poor at avoiding technical errors.
Deal with performance lapses. Shinseki did a good job of
expanding the use of performance metrics early in his tenure to
drive improvements in quality and timeliness. However, by the end
of his tenure, the use of performance metrics had become
overwhelming and unfocused (Kizer and Jha 2014). Furthermore,
Subsequent to Shinseki’s resignation, additional allegations were
he did only an adequate job of addressing the organizational
raised related to vacancy tracking gaps (Giblin 2014), loss of public
deficiency in benefits wait times because of how long it took him to
and veteran support (Pew Research Center 2013), inattention
fix the problem. Surprisingly, he did a very poor job of addressing
to numerous management issues, and incompetence in change
patient appointment wait times because of manipulated data.
management and transformational leadership practices. Shinseki’s
Intellectually, he knew better. Years before, Shinseki had warned
successor, Robert McDonald, a former private sector chief executive
transformational leaders that “just because a
officer, was appointed to address the problems
leader sets a good ethical example doesn’t
a few months after Shinseki’s resignation.
Leaders must constantly pay
necessarily mean subordinates will follow it.
McDonald’s “honeymoon” was short-lived,
careful attention to the team’s
Some of them may feel that circumstances
as his ability to fire senior VA executives
current ethical climate and take
justify unethical behavior. Therefore, leaders
under new legislation was found to be overprompt action to correct any
must constantly pay careful attention to the
stated and insufficient by some members of
Congress (Zoroya 2015), and the agency has
discrepancies between it and the team’s current ethical climate and take
prompt action to correct any discrepancies
yet to be able to provide documentation of
highest standards.
between it and the highest standards”
improvement in management, as the agency
764
Public Administration Review • September | October 2015
(Hesselbein and Shinseki 2004, 99). On average, he was poor at
dealing with performance lapses and failed to follow his own
advice.
Stabilize organization if needed (crisis leadership) and deal with
crises that emerge. Although the VA that Shinseki inherited was
underfunded and low performing in many categories, it was not in a
state of crisis. It had largely recovered from the terrible reputation it
had acquired in the 1970s as a result of the outstanding work of
Kenneth Kizer in the quality of health care arena. Shinseki did a
good job of dealing with modest crises initially. However, he
completely failed in anticipating the emergence of the patient wait
time crisis and was slow to respond, leaving the agency in turmoil.
On average, he did a poor job of managing crises because he failed
when it mattered most.
Contingent Reward
levels (Kizer and Jha 2014). Despite his own observation that “many
organizations claim to have flattened the hierarchy and empowered
employees . . . but in our experience, there is a large amount of
wishful thinking in these claims” (Hesselbein and Shinseki 2004,
21), he seems to have fallen into the trap he warned others about.
On average, Shinseki did a poor job in terms of delegation at the VA
over time.
Training opportunities. This had been one of the agency’s relative
strong points, according to employee perceptions. Given the
technical nature of the work of the agency the and amount of
change in legal requirements and professional standards, a robust
training environment is important. This dimension declined
somewhat during Shinseki’s tenure; on average, he was poor in this
dimension.
Idealized Influence (Trust and Charisma)
Pay. Shinseki failed to acknowledge pay as a critical factor in the VA Model exemplary behavior. While perceptions of fairness had not
system. Because of low pay standards, reliance on bonus pay was
been a past strength of the agency, they increased during his tenure,
critical to morale. Used properly, differential bonus pay can be a
only declining after the wait time scandal broke. Even so, he
powerful tool for increasing performance standards and rewarding
modeled the values of integrity that he asserted were critical in
high-performing individuals. However, the employee opinion data
transformational leadership (Hesselbein and Shinseki 2004), and his
indicate that base pay was consistently problematic relative to other
integrity was relatively unchallenged, even in the depths of the
federal agencies and that bonus pay was not used effectively to
scandal that pushed him out of office. While overwhelmed by other
discriminate among employees. The disbursement of bonus pay was factors, on average, Shinseki was excellent in modeling exemplary
regularly pointed out when agency shortcomings were reported by
ethical behavior.
the media. Of course, changing pay levels is exceptionally difficult
in government systems, and even cost-of-living adjustments were
Avoid personal scandal. Although federal agency executives are less
reduced or eliminated in the aftermath of the recession of 2008, so
prone to personal scandal than their political cousins, they are
his maneuverability in this regard was limited.
hardly immune. Alexander Hamilton stepped
Nonetheless, despite his own advice to “take
down from his powerful office at the Treasury
Although federal agency
care of your people” (Hesselbein and Shinseki
because of an extramarital affair, as did the
executives are less prone to
2004, 65), on average, Shinseki was poor in
highly popular former military man David
personal scandal than their
handling the pay issue because he refused to
Petraeus at the Central Intelligence Agency in
even acknowledge it.
2012. Shinseki was never involved in any
political cousins, they are
issues that impugned his propriety and, on
hardly immune.
Life–work balance for employees. Although
average, was excellent at avoiding personal
Shinseki brought many resources to the
scandal.
agency, he expanded the scope of work even faster, and employees
felt hard-pressed to keep up. Life–work perception data from
Use of charismatic communication: Symbols, evocative language,
employees declined significantly during his tenure, and he did little
dynamism. As Bennis and Nanus (1985) noted, charisma is not
to address the issue. On average, he was poor at handling the life–
required to have idealized influence, but it is a contributing factor.
work balance because he stayed in “emergency mode” for too long.
Shinseki was never praised for his magnetism or motivational talks.
Indeed, his speeches tended to be devoid of symbols, evocative
Individualized Consideration (Supportiveness of Employees)
language, and dynamism; he was thought to be aloof, stubborn, and
haughty by many (but not all) people who observed him. On
Coaching. Shinseki did set up opportunities for the executive team
average, in terms of personal presence, he was poor.
to learn about the transformational plan that he had created with
the aid of the White House in the beginning of his tenure. After the Inspirational Commitment (Transcending Self-Interests)
Commitment to the work and professionalism, even under
first year or so, however, there is little indication that an environadverse conditions. The strongest aspect of the agency from
ment of coaching existed at any level. On average, Shinseki did a
employees’ perspective is the employee skills–mission match, which
poor job of coaching and providing a model that coaching was
remained at a high level even though it declined significantly
important.
during Shinseki’s tenure. Belief in the quality of senior leadership is
important in instilling inspirational commitment, but this declined
Delegation. Although the VA has never been high in terms of
from being poor/adequate to being very poor. Events themselves
employees feeling they have discretion or empowerment because of
indicate an uneven commitment to the agency’s mission, despite
pressures for legal and organizational uniformity across the system
professional and personal passion for the mission. On average,
and quality control in line with health care and insurance industry
Shinseki did a poor job, despite his advice to leaders about
standards, this declined significantly under Shinseki to very low
Evaluating Transformational Leaders: The Challenging Case of Eric Shinseki and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 765
“building morale and determination to win” (Hesselbein and
Shinseki 2004, 78), in enhancing the culture of the VA in this
dimension.
Teamwork. When Shinseki came into the VA, he initially pushed
teamwork in the agency to a high level. However, that sense of
teamwork declined rapidly as a more top-down culture emerged.
On average, Shinseki’s sustained contribution to a culture of
teamwork was poor.
Intellectual Stimulation (Vision, Planning, and Implementation
of Change; Change Management)
Ensure the need. On one hand, Shinseki did a good job of
addressing the need to expand veterans’ benefits, which had been
flatlined for too long. On the other hand, be overlooked the need to
address basic administrative competence and organization issues first
so that greater demand could be met. On average, although the
expanded benefits need was morally appropriate and the capacity to
implement the change was plausible, Shinseki can only be evaluated
as being adequate because his long implementation timeline put
results at risk.
Provide a plan. Shinseki provided a 16-point plan within a year of
becoming head of the VA; he considered this one of his great
strengths. Initially, employees evaluated strategic management under
his leadership favorably, although those perceptions declined over
time as a loss of focus became problematic. A few goals in the plan
were unrealistic or too long to complete. Despite his focus on this
element, Shinseki can only be evaluated as adequate on average.
Build internal support. Parallel with related factors such as
encouraging commitment and teamwork, Shinseki’s long-term
ability to sustain internal support for transformational efforts
waned. For example, when Shinseki first took over as secretary,
employee satisfaction was on par with that of other federal agencies.
However, it continued to decline until the agency was rated as the
second-worst place to work, only after the unpopular Department
of Homeland Security. While Shinseki did not have internal
opposition, most of his support was based on legitimate power and
bonuses and lacked sufficient internal motivation. Shinseki can only
be evaluated as adequate in this regard.
Ensure top management support. In this case, it was the president
and his staff, such as the Office of Management and Budget, who
would establish budget priorities. Shinseki always synchronized with
the president, and his budget increases over time reflected his high
support from this quarter. Although he ultimately was pushed out
by the president, Shinseki had been abandoned by all other major
constituencies, leaving the president little choice as the scandal
unfolded. As a change manager, he was good in this specific
dimension.
Ensure external support. External support for Shinseki resided
with Congress and the veterans service organizations that interact
with the agency and Congress. Through most of his tenure, Shinseki
had good relations with both groups. However, his skill at working
in a dynamic, and exceedingly partisan, political environment was
deficient. Shinseki was unable to anticipate the ferocity of the
assault on him and the agency despite numerous signals sent by
766
Public Administration Review • September | October 2015
Republicans. Critically, he was unable to distance himself and his
agency from the political “hot potato” legislation to greatly expand
veteran benefits in 2014, and when the opportunity to strike back at
Democrats and the president occurred with the Phoenix health care
facility scandal, he only made the political opportunity more
appealing to Republicans because of the mild distaste many had for
him. He quickly transformed from an adequate head in charge of a
frustrating agency to an out-of-touch head in charge of an out-ofcontrol agency. Similarly, in terms of public opinion, the agency was
well considered despite occasional issues reported by the press;
however, because Shinseki did not have a connection with the
public before the crisis, he was quickly demonized when it unfolded.
He can only be evaluated as adequate in this category.
Provide resources. On one hand, Shinseki presided over enormous
increases in resource gains for the agency. Mandatory increases
(primarily for expanded benefits) grew by 86 percent from 2009 to
2014. However, the discretionary budget only grew by one-third,
making it hard to catch up with increasing service demands over
time. While he was excellent at securing new funds overall, he was
poor at providing a good mix of resources. On average, he was
adequate in providing resources.
Institutionalize changes. Most of Shinseki’s individual goals had a
2016 deadline. He was making good progress in benefit wait times,
seemed to have largely fixed the patient wait time problem (but had
not), and had made significant progress in reducing homelessness
but was far from eliminating it. Not only did the scandal reveal the
inaccuracy of the patient wait time goal, but also it distracted the
agency from its other goals and damaged to its reputation.
Ironically, the publicness of his failure enabled the agency to get
funding in the areas where it needed it (which would not have been
the case had the February 2014 legislation passed), as well as to
address some long-term issues that Shinseki had failed to adequately
confront such as employee pay. It is difficult to assess how much
credit he should receive, but in the short term, an evaluation of poor
is the highest evaluation for transforming the organization that
seems appropriate.
Pursue comprehensive change. The broader desire of the president
and Shinseki was not only about coping with the demands placed
on a system as defined in 2008, or about being more user friendly,
but also about greatly expanding benefits provided. Here, there was
a vast improvement in terms of including new benefits; this access
to care was institutionalized in mandatory budget allocations. While
this expansion of services may have made speedier service an elusive
target, there is little doubt that VA funding will remain more
comprehensive for years to come. However, this structural
expansion of services is balanced by the strain put on other areas of
the agency and the exceptional stress put on the VA by the scandal.
On balance, his very mixed record in this area can be considered
adequate.
Qualitatively, then, using this analysis of factors contributing to successful transformation, Shinseki was excellent in 2 of the 22 factors,
good in 1, adequate in 6, poor in 11, and very poor in 2. If Shinseki
were rated by his lowest scores, which often occurs when a widely
reported but little-understood scandal occurs, then Shinseki was a
very poor transformational leader worthy of the disgrace he suffered.
This is a harsh judgment for a man who successfully expanded
services to veterans at a time when most Americans have retired. If
Shinseki were evaluated more holistically by his median score, then
he ranks as a poor leader because of the many challenges he failed
to overcome. If one looks at the qualitative mean of his individual
performance assessments, he is halfway between poor and adequate.
This evaluation as somewhat subpar is certainly less than admirable,
but also less of an indictment. If one focuses on the role he played in
expanding services, the attempts he made to increase organizational
effectiveness while demand grew, and his integrity throughout the
process, then Shinseki could be rated a good but flawed transformational leader who led his agency to the “promised land,” although he
himself could not enter. The final assessment depends on one’s point
of reference in interpreting the importance of his various efforts.
Department of Health and Human Services. In this perspective,
Shinseki’s challenges—more defined by the president than by the
agency—were probably comparable but certainly not exceptional
compared with his peers. Yet it also needs to be noted that being
a transformational leader in a federal agency is a relatively rare
feat, and the highly politicized environment in which the Obama
presidency has operated has made transformation that much more
difficult, as many agency secretaries and heads have learned.
Conclusion
While the evaluation of great transformational leaders in senior
administrative positions is rather easy, they are, in reality, scarce. In
contextual terms, few administrative leaders have the circumstances
or desire to be truly transformational, as Kaufman (1981) demonstrated. On the other hand, administrative leaders can be transforEvaluation of Shinseki’s Context
mational under select circumstances and with
The assessment of Shinseki is tempered by
sufficient will, skill, and some luck, as Doig
Administrative leaders can
his context. Is he being compared with the
and Hargrove (1987) also showed. Because
be transformational under
administrative “greats” of federal administrabeing a transformational leader is hard, it is
select circumstances and
tive history, to the average secretary in his own
all the more important to evaluate without
with sufficient will, skill, and
agency over time, or to contemporary peers
prejudice those who strive and fall short. To
in the federal government? Five factors can be
be fair, one should have a good yardstick—
some luck.
used to provide a basis for comparison.
which is to say, a tested theory or framework
in advance of the evaluation—and one should
1. Breadth of task: The breadth was quite broad because of
be able to make comparative judgments across agencies and/or over
major problems that Shinseki faced and the major initiative
time.
(homelessness) that the agency acquired during his tenure.
Only the quality of medical care was in good condition
The evaluation of Shinseki as secretary of the Department of
when Shinseki took over, and years of underfunding had left Veterans Affairs has both its challenges and ironies. It is challengthe agency in a weakened state.
ing because he ranked well in some of the 22 indicators but poor in
2. Radicalness of changes: Ironically, the radicalness of change most of them. Do you “average out” his performance in making a
was significantly less than the transformation of which
global assessment, assert that a leader is only as good as his weakest
he was a part in the army, where the entire structure was
link, or give the leader the benefit of the doubt for their efforts? Or
shifted for the first time since World War II.
do you simply leave the assessment as mixed and decline to general3. Complexity of change: The complexity was relatively great
ize? Whatever strategy is used from the holistic assessment, howbecause of the massiveness of the overlapping systems and
ever, the real work of assessment is in a systematic review of their
the level of political intrusiveness of veterans service organiperformance as transformational leaders. Additionally, to put the
zations, Congress, and the White House.
accomplishment in perspective, how does the leader compare with
4. Demands on followers: The demand on followers was great predecessors and peers? Because of the scandal that ended Shinseki’s
because of underfunding, new programs, and the constant
career at the VA, most would likely place him at the bottom of that
stress to increase productivity in numerous areas.
list. Because of the lack of interest by his predecessors in being trans5. Speed of change: Although system transformation takes a
formational (creating a very low bar), he ranks above them, given
long time, Shinseki had five years to accomplish the first
his extraordinary success in elevating permanent funding levels,
round of changes. He had planned on having until 2015
despite the internal challenges he failed to address in an adequate or
to accomplish his goals, but a significant amount of his
timely manner.
progress unraveled in the scandal, and it is unlikely that he
would have fully achieved the goals he set for himself.
The greatest irony, perhaps, is comparing Shinseki to himself. As
chief of staff of the army, he was the initial architect of the moveOverall, his challenges were substantial but not extraordinary.
ment from a conventional divisional structure to the more highly
From the viewpoint of his own agency, none of his successors had
articulated and rapidly mobile brigade structure in use today. He
striven for such a degree of transformation, and none had presided
also accurately warned that the transformation of Iraq would not
over such an increase in funding. Only one person in the agency,
occur in its conquest but rather in being able to keep it subdued
Undersecretary for Health Kizer, who served in the 1990s, can be
with sufficient military force while nation building was implesaid to have taken on such a transformational role, and was certainly mented. Because his departure from the army was earlier than he
one who was far more successful in his respective position.
would have liked, and because he was publicly overruled on his
forecast, Shinseki expressed eagerness for a second chance that he
Shinseki was not alone in the Obama cabinet regarding the level
really did not need. When offered, he took on a challenge at the
of challenges; in fact, it could be argued that many had greater
VA at age 66, one with which he had little experience. It was more
challenges, such as in implementing the Affordable Care Act at the
complex than he anticipated, and it was harder for him to master
Evaluating Transformational Leaders: The Challenging Case of Eric Shinseki and the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs 767
the details as instinctively as he had in the army. Indeed, the use of
a typical military command style in a civilian agency dominated by
a professional health focus was a major aspect of his downfall; he
did not adapt his style. In the end, despite progress in policy goals
(expansion of benefits and services), technical difficulties mounted
and ultimately erupted. Nor did he change the internal culture;
rather, the internal culture declined substantially during his tenure,
with lower morale in general and strains of corruption that he did
not detect until it was too late. To the degree that Shinseki can be
considered a successful transformational leader, it is based on his
admirable success in the army, and not his experience in the VA,
which, sadly, ended in humiliation.
Kaufman, Herbert. 1981. The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs.
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Today, February 10.
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