International Trade

Assignment 1: LASA 2: International Trade

Visit the U.S. Government Web site:
 

http://www.export.gov/tradedata/index.asp

1. Go to the Import/Export Data link.
2. Find TradeStats Express.
3. Find National Trade Data.
4. Determine the trade balance between the U.S. and China for the most recent five year period.
5. Illustrate the trend over this period with a graph of the data.

Based on the data provided, create a report in Microsoft Word discussing the trade balance between China and the U.S. for the most recent five year period. In your discussion, include an analysis of the effect of such trade balance on the economies of China and the U.S., both individually and comparatively. Justify your discussion and analysis by using appropriate examples and references.  Include in your report an analysis of the impact on the U.S. economy of the situation where China holds such a large amount of the U.S. debt.

 

Assignment 2: The Net Exports Effect

The “net exports effect” is the impact on a country’s total spending caused by an inverse relationship between the price level and the net exports of an economy. Using this principle, discuss how the following economic variables change during an economic expansion:

• The balance of payments
• The rate of interest
• The value of the dollar

In your answer, also discuss the case in the context of both a flexible exchange rate and a fixed exchange rate.

  

48

72

Assignment 1 Grading Criteria	Maximum Points
Accurately determined the trade balance between China and the U.S. for the most recent five year period. (40 points) Illustrated the trend over this period with a graph of the data. Cited the source. (8 points)		48
Researched and analyzed the impact of foreign trade between the two countries and their economic growth during this period. (8 points) Discussed the issues, concerns, and ramifications of the trade balance on China’s economy.(20 points) Discussed the issues, concerns, and ramifications of the trade balance on the U.S. economy. (20 Points) Compared the impact of trade balance between China and the U.S. for this period. (20 Points) Used appropriate terminology (4 Points)		72
Provided adequate and appropriate examples and references to justify conclusions. Used a variety of credible texts, Web sites and other references.
Discussed the nature and possible future effects upon the U.S. economy. (30 Points) Discussed the ability of the U.S. to sustain growth and development. (20 Points) Justified these conclusions with appropriate data and other resources.(20 Points) Used appropriate terminology. (2 Points)
Organization (16 points): Introduction, Transitions, and Conclusion Usage and Mechanics (16 points): Grammar, Spelling, and Sentence structure APA Elements (20 points): Attribution, Paraphrasing, and Quotations Style (8 points): Audience and Word Choice	60
Total:	300

From the text<<<<b>b>b>b>book (Colander, David C. Macroeconomics, 7th Edition. McGraw-Hill Learning Solutions) read the following chapters:

16: International Trade Policy, Comparative Advantage, and Outsourcing

17: International Financial Policy

16: International Trade Policy, Comparative Advantage, and Outsourcing

One of the purest fallacies is that trade follows the fl ag. Trade follows the lowest price current. If a dealer in any colony wished to buy Union Jacks, he would order them from Britain’s worst foe if he could save a sixpence.

—Andrew Carnegie

Patterns of Trade

Before I consider these issues, let’s look at some numbers to get a sense of the nature and dimensions of international trade.

Increasing but Fluctuating World Trade

In 1928, total world trade was about $500 billion (in today’s dollars). U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) was about $830 billion, so world trade as a percentage of U.S. GDP was almost 60 percent. In 1935, that ratio had fallen to less than 30 percent. In 1950 it was 20 percent. Then it started rising. Today it is about 250 percent, with world trade amounting to about $32 trillion. As you can see, international trade has been growing, but with significant fluctuations in that growth. Sometimes international trade has grown rapidly; at other times it has grown slowly or has even fallen.

In part, fluctuations in world trade result from fluctuations in world output. When output rises, international trade rises; when output falls, international trade falls. Fluctuations in world trade are also in part explained by trade restrictions that countries have imposed from time to time. For example, decreases in world income during the Depression of the 1930s caused a large decrease in trade, but that decrease was exacerbated by a worldwide increase in trade restrictions.

Differences in the Importance of Trade

The importance of international trade to countries’ economies differs widely, as we can see in the table below, which presents the importance of the shares of exports—the value of goods and services sold abroad—and imports—the value of goods and services purchased abroad—for various countries.

Among the countries listed, the Netherlands has the highest amount of exports compared to total output; the United States has the lowest.

The Netherlands’ imports are also the highest as a percentage of total output. Japan’s are the lowest. The relationship between a country’s imports and its exports is no coincidence. For most countries, imports and exports roughly equal one another, though in any particular year that equality can be rough indeed. For the United States in recent years, imports have generally significantly exceeded exports. But that situation can’t continue forever, as I’ll discuss.

Total trade figures provide us with only part of the international trade picture. We must also look at what types of goods are traded and with whom that trade is conducted.

What and with Whom the United States Trades

The majority of U.S. exports and imports involve significant amounts of manufactured goods. This isn’t unusual, since much of international trade is in manufactured goods.

The primary trading partners of the United States are Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and the Pacific Rim countries.

Figure 16-1 shows the regions with which the United States trades. Exports to Canada and Mexico made up the largest percentage of total U.S. exports to individual countries in 2006. The largest regions to whom the U.S. exports are the Pacific Rim and the European Union. Countries from which the United States imports major quantities include Canada and Mexico and the regions of the European Union and the Pacific Rim. Thus, the countries we export to are also the countries we import from.

The Changing Nature of Trade

The nature of trade is continually changing, both in terms of the countries with which the United States trades and the goods and services traded. For example, U.S. imports from China, India, and other East Asian countries have increased substantially in recent years. In 1989 goods from China accounted for 2.5 percent of all U.S. merchandise imports. Today they account for 15 percent. Imports from India have increased tenfold over that time—from 0.1 percent to 1 percent of all goods imported.

FIGURE 16-1 (A AND B): U.S. Exports and Imports by Region, 2006

Major regions that trade with the United States include Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and the Pacific Rim.

Source: FT900 U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services 2006, U.S. Census Bureau (www.census.gov).

The kind of goods and services the United States imports also has changed. Thirty years ago, the goods the United States imported from China and India were primarily basic manufacturing goods and raw commodities. Technologically advanced goods were produced here in the United States. That is changing. Today we are importing high-tech manufactured goods from these countries, and they are even developing their own new products that require significant research and development.

Q-1

How has the nature of U.S. imports from China changed in recent years?

The change in the nature of the goods that a country produces and exports up the technological ladder is typical for developing countries. It characterized Japan, Korea, and Singapore in the post-World War II era, and today characterizes China and India. As this movement up the technological ladder occurs, foreign companies that had been subcontractors for U.S. companies become direct competitors of the U.S. companies. For example, the automaker Kia and the electronics producer Samsung have developed into major global firms, and in the future you can expect numerous Chinese companies to become household names.

We can expect the nature of trade to change even more in the future as numerous technological changes in telecommunications continue to reduce the cost of both voice and data communications throughout the world and expand the range of services that can be provided by foreign countries. Production no longer needs to occur in the geographic area where the goods are consumed. For example, financial accounting, compositing (typesetting) of texts, and research can now be done almost anywhere, and transferred with the click of a mouse. Even the customer service calls for a U.S. company can be answered almost anywhere at the same phone costs as if they were answered in the United States. (India, which has a sizeable well-educated, English-speaking population, even trains its employees to speak with a Midwest U.S. accent to make it less apparent to customers that the call is being answered in India.) This trade in services is what the press often refers to as
outsourcing
, but it is important to remember that outsourcing is simply a description of some aspects of trade.

Is Chinese and Indian Outsourcing Different Than Previous Outsourcing?

There has been a lot of discussion about outsourcing to China and India recently, and thus it is worthwhile to consider what is, and what is not, different about trade with China and India. First, what isn’t new is trade. Manufacturers have used overseas suppliers for years. What is different about outsourcing to China and India today compared to earlier outsourcing to Japan, Singapore, and Korea in the 1980s and 1990s is the potential size of that outsourcing. China and India have a combined population of 2.5 billion people, a sizable number of whom are well educated and willing to work for much lower wages than U.S. workers. As technology opens up more areas to trade, and as India and China move up the technology chain, U.S.-based firms will likely experience much more competition than they have experienced to date. How U.S. companies deal with this competition will likely be the defining economic policy issue for the next decade. If they develop new technologies and new industries in which the United States has comparative advantages, then the United States’ future can be bright. If they don’t, significant, difficult adjustment will need to occur.

How U.S. companies deal with new high-tech competition will likely be the defining economic policy issue for the next decade.

The rising competitiveness of Asian economies with the U.S. economy is manifested in the large deficit the United States is running on its
balance of trade
—the difference between the value of exports and the value of imports—as is shown in Figure 16-2(a). A trade deficit means that U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports. The United States has been running trade deficits since the 1970s, and in 2006 the U.S. trade deficit reached over $750 billion. The trade deficit looks a little less threatening when considered as a percentage of GDP, as is shown in Figure 16-2(b), but it is still of concern. This means that the United States is consuming a lot more than it is producing, and paying for current consumption with promises to pay in the future.

FIGURE 16-2 (A AND B): The U.S. Trade Balance

The United States has been running trade deficits since the 1970s. Panel (a) shows the trade deficit in billions of dollars. As (b) shows, the trade deficit looks slightly less threatening when considered as a percent of GDP.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.gov).

ADDED DIMENSION

International Issues in Perspective

Since the 1970s, international issues have become increasingly important for the U.S. economy. That statement would be correct even if the reference period went back as far as the late 1800s. From the late 1800s through the first 40 years of the 1900s, the United States was in an isolationist period in which the country turned inward in both economic and foreign policies.

The statement would not be correct if the reference period were earlier than the late 1800s. In the 1600s, 1700s, and most of the 1800s, international trade was vital to the American economy—even more vital than now. The American nation grew from colonial possessions of England, France, and Spain. These “new world” colonial possessions were valued for their gold, agricultural produce, and natural resources. From a European standpoint, international trade was the colonies’ reason for being.*

A large portion of the U.S. government’s income during much of the 1800s came from tariffs. Our technology was imported from abroad, and international issues played a central role in wars fought here. (Many historians believe that the most important cause of the U.S. Civil War was the difference of views about tariffs on manufactured goods. The South opposed them because it wanted cheap manufactured goods, while the North favored them because it wanted to protect its manufacturing industries.) Up until the 1900s, no one would have studied the U.S. economy independently of international issues. Not only was there significant international trade; there was also significant immigration. The United States is a country of immigrants.

Only in the late 1800s did the United States adopt an isolationist philosophy in both politics and trade. So in reference to that isolationist period, the U.S. economy has become more integrated with the world economy. However, in a broader historical perspective, that isolationist period was an anomaly, and today’s economy is simply returning international issues to the key role they’ve usually played.

Another important insight is that international trade has social and cultural dimensions. While much of the chapter deals with specifically economic issues, we must also remember the cultural and social implications of trade.

Let’s consider an example from history. In the Middle Ages, Greek ideas and philosophy were lost to Europe when hordes of barbarians swept over the continent. These ideas and that philosophy were rediscovered in the Renaissance only as a by-product of trade between the Italian merchant cities and the Middle East. (The Greek ideas that had spread to the Middle East were protected from European upheavals.) Renaissance means rebirth: a rebirth in Europe of Greek learning. Many of our traditions and sensibilities are based on those of the Renaissance, and that Renaissance was caused, or at least significantly influenced, by international trade. Had there been no trade, our entire philosophy of life might have been different.

In economics courses we do not focus on these broader cultural issues but instead focus on relatively technical issues such as the reasons for trade and the implications of tariffs. But keep in the back of your mind these broader implications as you go through the various components of international economics. They add a dimension to the story that otherwise might be forgotten.

* The Native American standpoint was, I suspect, somewhat different.

Debtor and Creditor Nations

Running a trade deficit isn’t necessarily bad.

In fact, while you’re doing it, it’s rather nice. If you were a country, you probably would be running a trade deficit now since, most likely, you’re consuming (importing) more than you’re producing (exporting). How can you do that? By living off past savings, getting support from your parents or a spouse, or borrowing.

Running a trade deficit isn’t necessarily bad.

Countries have the same options. They can live off foreign aid, past savings, or loans. The U.S. economy is currently financing its trade deficit by selling off assets—financial assets such as stocks and bonds, or real assets such as real estate and corporations. Since the assets of the United States total many trillions of dollars, it can continue to run trade deficits of a similar size for years to come, but in doing so it is reducing its wealth each year.

The United States has not always run a trade deficit. Following World War II it ran trade surpluses—an excess of exports over imports—with other countries, so it was an international lender. Thus, it acquired large amounts of foreign assets. Because of the large trade deficits the United States has run since the 1980s, now the United States is a large debtor nation. The United States has borrowed more from abroad than it has lent abroad.

Q-2

Will a debtor nation necessarily be running a trade deficit?

As the United States has gone from being a large creditor nation to being the world’s biggest debtor, international considerations have been forced on the nation. The cushion of being a creditor—of having a flow of interest income—has been replaced by the trials of being a debtor and having to pay out interest every year without currently getting anything for it when they pay that interest. Eventually, the United States will have to deal with this issue. Before we consider how it might do so, let’s review the principle of comparative advantage, which is central to economists’ understanding of trade.

The Principle of Comparative Advantage

The reason two countries trade is that trade can make both countries better off. The reason that this is true is the principle of comparative advantage to which you were introduced in Chapter 2. It is, however, important enough to warrant an in-depth review. The basic idea of the principle of
comparative advantage
is that as long as the relative opportunity costs of producing goods (what must be given up in one good in order to get another good) differ among countries, then there are potential gains from trade. Let’s review this principle by considering the story of I.T., an imaginary international trader, who convinces two countries to enter into trades by giving both countries some of the advantages of trade; he keeps the rest for himself.

The principle of comparative advantage states that as long as the relative opportunity costs of producing goods differ among countries, then there are potential gains from trade.

The Gains from Trade

Here’s the situation. On his trips to the United States and Saudi Arabia, I.T. noticed that the two countries did not trade. He also noticed that the opportunity cost of producing a ton of food in Saudi Arabia was 10 barrels of oil and that the opportunity cost for the United States of producing a ton of food was 1/10 of a barrel of oil. At the time, the United States’ production was 60 barrels of oil and 400 tons of food, while Saudi Arabia’s production was 400 barrels of oil and 60 tons of food.

Q-3

If the opportunity cost of oil for food were the same for both the United States and Saudi Arabia, what should I.T. do?

The choices for the United States can be seen in Figure 16-3(a), and the choices for Saudi Arabia can be seen in Figure 16-3(b). The tables give the numerical choices and the figures translate those numerical choices into graphs.

These graphs represent the two countries’ production possibility curves. Each combination of numbers in the table corresponds to a point on the curve. For example, point B in each graph corresponds to the entries in row B, columns 2 and 3, in the relevant table.

Let’s assume that the United States has chosen point C (production of 60 barrels of oil and 400 tons of food) and Saudi Arabia has chosen point D (production of 400 barrels of oil and 60 tons of food).

FIGURE 16-3 (A AND B): Comparative Advantage: The United States and Saudi Arabia

Looking at tables (a) and (b), you can see that if Saudi Arabia devotes all its resources to oil, it can produce 1,000 barrels of oil, but if it devotes all of its resources to food, it can produce only 100 tons of food. For the United States, the story is the opposite: Devoting all of its resources to oil, the United States can only produce 100 barrels of oil—10 times less than Saudi Arabia—but if it devotes all of its resources to food, it can produce 1,000 tons of food—10 times more than Saudi Arabia. Assuming resources are comparable, Saudi Arabia has a comparative advantage in the production of oil, and the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of food. The information in the tables is presented graphically below each table. These are the countries’ production possibility curves. Each point on each country’s curve corresponds to a row on that country’s table.

Now I.T., who understands the principle of comparative advantage, comes along and offers the following deal to the United States:

If you produce 1,000 tons of food and no oil (point F in Figure 16-3(a)) and give me 500 tons of food while keeping 500 tons for yourself, I’ll guarantee you 120 barrels of oil, double the amount you’re now getting. I’ll put you on point H, which is totally above your current production possibility curve. You’ll get more oil and have more food. It’s an offer you can’t refuse.

I.T. then flies off to Saudi Arabia, to whom he makes the following offer:

If you produce 1,000 barrels of oil and no food (point A in Figure 16-3(b)) and give me 500 barrels of oil while keeping 500 barrels for yourself, I guarantee you 120 tons of food, double the amount of food you’re now getting. I’ll put you on point G, which is totally above your current production possibility curve. You’ll get more oil and more food. It’s an offer you can’t refuse.

Both countries accept; they’d be foolish not to. So the two countries’ final consumption positions are as follows:

For arranging the trade, I.T. makes a handsome profit of 380 tons of food and 380 barrels of oil. I.T. has become rich because he understands the principle of comparative advantage.

Now obviously this hypothetical example significantly overemphasizes the gains a trader makes. Generally the person arranging the trade must compete with other traders and offer both countries a better deal than the one presented here. But the person who first recognizes a trading opportunity often makes a sizable fortune. The second and third persons who recognize the opportunity make smaller fortunes. Once the insight is generally recognized, the possibility of making a fortune is gone. Traders still make their normal returns, but the instantaneous fortunes are not to be made without new insight. In the long run, benefits of trade go to the producers and consumers in the trading countries, not the traders.

Dividing Up the Gains from Trade

As the above story suggests, when countries avail themselves of comparative advantage, there are high gains of trade to be made. Who gets these gains is unclear. The principle of comparative advantage doesn’t determine how those gains of trade will be divided up among the countries involved and among traders who make the trade possible. While there are no definitive laws determining how real-world gains from trade will be apportioned, economists have developed some insights into how those gains are likely to be divided up. The first insight concerns how much the trader gets. The general rule is

The more competition that exists among traders, the less likely it is that the trader gets big gains of trade; more of the gains from trade will go to the citizens in the two countries, and less will go to the traders.

What this insight means is that where entry into trade is unimpaired, most of the gains of trade will pass from the trader to the countries. Thus, the trader’s big gains from trade occur in markets that are newly opened.

Three determinants of the terms of trade are

1. The more competition, the less the trader gets.

2. Smaller countries get a larger proportion of the gain than larger countries.

3. Countries producing goods with economies of scale get a larger gain from trade.

This insight isn’t lost on trading companies. Numerous import/export companies exist whose business is discovering possibilities for international trade in newly opened markets. Individuals representing trading companies go around hawking projects or goods to countries. For example, at the end of the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, what the business world calls the import/export contingent flew to Kosovo with offers of goods and services to sell. Many of these same individuals had been in Iraq and Iran in the early 1990s, in Saudi Arabia when oil prices rose in the 1970s, and in the Far East when China opened its doors to international trade in the 1980s.

A second insight is

Once competition prevails, smaller countries tend to get a larger percentage of the gains of trade than do larger countries.

The reason, briefly, is that more opportunities are opened up for smaller countries by trade than for larger countries. The more opportunities, the larger the relative gains. Say, for instance, that the United States begins trade with Mali, a small country in Africa. Enormous new consumption possibilities are opened up for Mali—prices of all types of goods will fall. Assuming Mali has a comparative advantage in fish, before international trade began, cars were probably extraordinarily expensive in Mali, while fish was cheap. With international trade, the price of cars in Mali falls substantially, so Mali gets the gains. Because the U.S. economy is so large compared to Mali’s, the U.S. price of fish doesn’t change noticeably. Mali’s fish are just a drop in the bucket. The price ratio of cars to fish doesn’t change much for the United States, so it doesn’t get much of the gains of trade. Mali gets almost all the gains from trade.

There’s an important catch to this gains-from-trade argument. The argument holds only if competition among traders prevails. That means that Mali residents are sold cars at the same price (plus shipping costs) as U.S. residents. International traders in small countries often have little competition from other traders and keep large shares of the gains from trade for themselves. In the earlier food/oil example, the United States and Saudi Arabia didn’t get a large share of the benefits. It was I.T. who got most of the benefits. Since the traders often come from the larger country, the smaller country doesn’t get this share of the gains from trade; the larger country’s international traders do.

A third insight is

Gains from trade go to the countries producing goods that exhibit economies of scale.

Trade allows an increase in production. If there are economies of scale, that increase can lower the average cost of production of a good. Hence, an increase in production can lower the price of the good in the producing country. The country producing the good with the larger economies of scale has its costs reduced by more, and hence gains more from trade than does its trading partner.

Q-4

In what circumstances would a small country not get the larger percentage of the gains from trade?

Comparative Advantage in Today’s Economy

The comparative advantage model conveys a story with the theme, “trade is good”; trade benefits both parties to the trade. This story doesn’t fit much of the lay public’s view of trade, nor the fears of outsourcing discussed above. If trade is good, why do so many people oppose it, and what accounts for the difference between economists’ view of trade and the lay public’s view? I suggest three reasons.

Gains from trade are often stealth gains.

One reason for the difference is that laypeople often do not recognize the gains of trade—the gains are often stealth gains such as a decline in prices—while they easily identify the loss of jobs caused by the trade adjustments as countries shift production to take advantage of trade. For example, consider the price of clothing: A shirt today costs far less in real terms (in terms of the number of hours you have to work to buy it) than it did a decade or two ago. Much of the reason for that is trade. But how many people attribute that fall in price of shirts to trade? Not many; they just take it for granted. But the reality is that much of our current lifestyle in the United States has been made possible by trade.

Much of our current lifestyle is made possible by trade.

Another reason for the difference between the lay view of trade and economists’ view is that the lay public often believes that since countries such as China have lower wages, they must have a comparative advantage in just about everything, so that if we allow free trade, eventually we will lose all U.S. jobs. This belief is an internal logical contradiction; by definition comparative advantage refers to relative opportunity cost. If one country has a comparative advantage in one set of goods, the other country must have a comparative advantage in another set.

That said, economists also must admit that the lay public does have a point.

The comparative advantage model assumes that a country’s imports and exports are equal.

As we saw above, U.S. imports and exports are not equal. Currently, the United States imports much more than it exports, and foreign countries are accepting our IOUs in exchange for those imports. As long as foreign countries are willing to accept those promises of the United States to pay some time in the future, they can have a comparative advantage in the production of many more goods than the United States.1 Currently, people in other countries finance the U.S. trade deficit by buying U.S. assets. Once the other countries decide that it is no longer in their interests to finance the U.S. trade deficit, economic forces such as the adjustment of exchange rates will be set in motion to restore a more equal division of comparative advantages.

The comparative advantage model assumes that a country’s imports and exports are equal.

A third reason accounting for the difference between the lay view of trade and the economists’ view is that laypeople often think of trade as trade in just manufactured goods. Trade is much broader, and includes the services that traders provide. Countries can have comparative advantages in trade itself, and the gains the trader makes can account for the seeming differences in countries’ comparative advantages.

Q-5

What are three reasons for the difference between laypeople’s and economists’ views of trade?

Notice in my example that the international traders who brought the trade about benefited significantly from trade. I included traders because trade does not take place on its own—markets and trade require entrepreneurs. The market is not about abstract forces; it is about real people operating to improve their position. Many of the gains from trade do not go to the countries producing or consuming the good but rather to the trader. And the gains that traders get can be enormous.

Consider, for example, the high-priced sneakers ($100) that many “with-it” students wear. Those sneakers are likely made in China, costing about $8 to make. So much of the benefits of trade do not go to the producer or the consumer; they go to the trader. However, not all of the difference is profit. The trader has other costs; there are, for example, costs of transportation and advertising—someone has to convince you that you need those “with-it” sneakers. (Just do it, right?) A portion of the benefits of the trade is accruing to U.S. advertising firms, which can pay more to creative people who think up those crazy ads.

The United States currently has a large comparative advantage in facilitating trade. Many of the firms that specialize in the role as trader are U.S.-based companies, and these companies buy many of the goods and services that support trade from their home country—the United States. Therefore, trade with China and India has been generating jobs in the United States. These are jobs that laypeople often do not associate with trade—jobs in research, management, advertising, and distribution of goods. What this means is that goods manufactured in China, India, and other Asian countries are creating demand for advertising, management, and distribution, and are therefore creating jobs and income in the United States. That’s one reason for the large increase in service jobs in the U.S. economy.

Trade with China and India has been generating jobs in the United States.

A final consideration to keep in mind is that trade increases income and wealth abroad, thereby creating additional demand for U.S. goods. Two billion consumers whose incomes are increasing offer many new growth opportunities for U.S. firms. Trade expands the total pie, and even when a country gets a smaller proportion of the new total pie, the absolute amount it gets can increase.

The concentrated nature of the costs of trade and the dispersed nature of the benefits present a challenge for policy makers.

When one adds these considerations to the initial layperson’s reaction to trade, a much more nuanced view emerges that makes trade look much better. This does not mean that trade presents no problems. One big policy problem is that the benefits of trade are quite uneven. The people whose jobs are outsourced are significantly hurt by trade and are very visible. The benefits of trade in lower prices and jobs created by trade are spread throughout the economy and are much less visible. It is the concentrated nature of the costs of trade and dispersed nature of the benefits that will continue to present a challenge to policy makers when dealing with the effects of trade.

Other Sources of U.S. Comparative Advantage

When thinking about how the theory of comparative advantage relates to the current debate about outsourcing—what jobs are outsourced and what jobs are created in the United States—it is important to remember that comparative advantage is not determined by wages alone. Many other factors enter into comparative advantage and these other factors give the United States a comparative advantage in a variety of goods and services. Some of those other sources of U.S. comparative advantage include

1. Skills of the U.S. labor force. Our educational system and experience in production (learning by doing) has created a U.S. workforce that is highly productive, which means that it can be paid more and still be competitive.

2. U.S. governmental institutions. The United States has a stable, relatively noncorrupt government, which is required for effective production. These institutions give firms based in the United States a major comparative advantage.

3. U.S. physical and technological infrastructure. The United States has probably the best infrastructure for production in the world. This infrastructure includes extensive road systems, telecommunications networks, and power grids.

4. English is the international language of business. U.S. citizens learn English from birth. Chinese and Indian citizens must learn it as a second language. One is seldom as comfortable or productive working in one’s second language as in one’s first language.

5. Wealth from past production. The United States is extraordinarily wealthy, which means that the United States is the world’s largest consumer. Production that supports many aspects of consumption cannot be easily transferred geographically, and thus the United States will maintain a comparative advantage in producing these nontransferable aspects of consumption.

6. U.S. natural resources. The United States is endowed with many resources: rich farmland, a pleasant and varied climate, beautiful scenery for tourism, minerals, and water. These give it comparative advantages in a number of areas.

7.
Cachet
. The United States continues to be a cultural trendsetter. People all over the world want to watch U.S. movies, want to have U.S. goods, and are influenced by U.S. advertising agencies to favor U.S. goods. As long as that is the case, the United States will have a comparative advantage in goods tied to that cachet.

8. Inertia. It takes time and costs money to change production. Companies will not move production to another country for a small cost differential. The difference has to be large, it has to be expected to continue for a long time, and it must be large enough to offset the risk of the unknown. Thus, the current place of production has an advantage over other potential places for production simply because the current location is known.

9. U.S. intellectual property rights. Currently, U.S. companies and individuals hold a large number of intellectual property rights, which require other countries that use their patented goods or methods to pay U.S. patent holders. Every time someone (legally) buys the Windows operating system for his or her computer, a portion of the purchase price covers a payment to a U.S. company. America’s culture of embracing new ideas and questioning authority cultivates an environment of innovation that will likely continue to generate new intellectual property rights.

10. A relatively open immigration policy. Many of the brightest, most entrepreneurial students of developing countries immigrate and settle in the United States. They create jobs and help maintain U.S. comparative advantages in a number of fields, especially high-technology fields. More than 50 percent of the engineering degrees, for example, go to foreign students, many of whom remain in the United States.

Combined, these other sources of comparative advantage will maintain the United States’ competitiveness in a variety of types of production for the coming decades.

The United States has numerous sources of comparative advantage.

Some Concerns about the Future

The above discussion of the sources of U.S. comparative advantage should have made those of you who are U.S. citizens feel a bit better about the future of the U.S. economy; the United States is not about to lose all its jobs to outsourcing. But that does not mean that there are not real issues of concern. The typical layperson’s concern that the comparative advantage story does not capture what is going on with trade and outsourcing has some real foundations, and deserves to be considered seriously.

Inherent and Transferable Sources of Comparative Advantages

When David Ricardo first made the comparative advantage argument in the early 1800s, he was talking about an economic environment that was quite different than today’s. His example was Britain and Portugal, with Britain producing wool and Portugal producing wine. What caused their differing costs of production was climate; Britain’s climate was far less conducive to growing grapes than Portugal’s but more conducive to raising sheep. Differing technologies or labor skills in the countries did not play a key role in their comparative advantages, and it was highly unlikely that the climates, and therefore comparative advantages, of the countries could change. Put another way, both countries have inherent sources of comparative advantages, which we will call
inherent comparative advantages
—comparative advantages that are based on factors that are relatively unchangeable, rather than transferable sources of comparative advantages, which we will call
transferable comparative advantages
—comparative advantages based on factors that can change relatively easily.

As the theory of comparative advantage developed, economists applied it to a much broader range of goods whose sources of comparative advantages were not due to climate. For example, some countries had land, specific resources, capital, types of labor, or technology as sources of comparative advantage. Extending the analysis to these other sources of comparative advantage makes sense, but it is important to keep in mind that only some of these comparative advantages are inherent; others are transferable. Comparative advantages due to resources or climate are unlikely to change; comparative advantages that depend on capital, technology, or education, however, can change. In fact, we would expect them to change.

The Law of One Price

Whether a country can maintain a much higher standard of living than another country in the long run depends in part on whether its sources of comparative advantages are transferable or inherent. Saudi Arabia will maintain its comparative advantage in producing oil, but the United States’ comparative advantage based on better education is likely to be more fleeting. In cases where sources of comparative advantage are not inherent, economic forces will push to eliminate that comparative advantage. The reason is the law of one price: in a competitive market, there will be pressure for equal factors to be priced equally. If factor prices aren’t equal, firms can reduce costs by redirecting production to countries where factors are priced lower. The tendency of economic forces to eliminate transferable comparative advantage is sometimes called the
convergence hypothesis
. Even seemingly inherent comparative advantages can be changed by technology. Consider oil. The development of cost-effective fuel cells may leave Saudi Arabia with a comparative advantage in oil but not necessarily with a comparative advantage in producing energy.

Law of one price: in a competitive market, there will be pressure for equal factors to be priced equally.

When markets are working, any country with a comparative advantage due only to transferable capital and technology will lose that comparative advantage as capital and technology spread to other countries. Ultimately, in the case of transferable comparative advantage, production will shift to the lower-wage country that has equivalent institutional structures. This is the law of one price in action: The same good—including equivalent labor—must sell for the same price, unless trade is restricted or other differences exist. That is what’s happening now with the United States and outsourcing. Skills needed to do information technology work, for example, are transferable. Because an information technology professional with three to five years’ experience earns about $75,000 in the United States and only $26,000 in India, those jobs are moving abroad. As long as wages differ, and the workers’ productivities in countries are comparable, transferable comparative advantages of U.S. production will continue to erode, and as they erode, production and jobs will be moved abroad.

Transferable comparative advantages will tend to erode over time.

The question, therefore, is not: Why is outsourcing to China and India occurring today? The questions are: Why didn’t it happen long ago, and how did U.S. productivity, and hence its standard of living, come to so exceed China’s and India’s productivity, and hence their standards of living? Or alternatively: How did the United States get in its current high-wage position, and is it likely to maintain that position into the indefinite future?

How the United States Gained and Is Now Losing Sources of Comparative Advantage

To better understand the current U.S. position, let’s look at it historically. The United States developed its highly favorable position from the 1920s until the late 1940s when the two world wars directed production toward the United States. Those wars, the entrepreneurial spirit of the U.S. population, U.S. institutions conducive to production, and the flow of technology and capital into the United States gave the United States a big boost both during the two world wars and after. Coming out of World War II, at the then-existing exchange rates, the United States had a major cost advantage in producing a large majority of goods, just as China has a cost advantage in producing the large majority of goods today.

Such cost advantages in a majority of areas of production are not sustainable because the balance of trade will be highly imbalanced. In the absence of specific policy by governments, or large private flows of capital, eventually that imbalance will right itself. After World War II, the trade balance that favored the United States was maintained temporarily by U.S. companies, which invested heavily in Europe, and by the U.S. government, which transferred funds to Europe with programs such as the Marshall Plan. These flows of capital financed Europe’s trade deficits and allowed the United States to run large trade surpluses, just as current flows of investment into the United States from a variety of countries, and the explicit policy of buying U.S. bonds by Chinese and Japanese central banks, are financing the U.S. trade deficits now, and allowing large Chinese trade surpluses with the United States.

In the absence of specific policy by governments, or large private flows of capital, eventually any large trade imbalance will right itself.

Methods of Equalizing Trade Balances

Capital flows that sustain trade imbalances eventually stop, and when they do, adjustments in sources of comparative advantages must take place so that the trade surplus countries—such as China today—become less competitive (lose sources of comparative advantage) and the trade deficit countries—in this case, the United States—become more competitive (gain sources of comparative advantage). This adjustment can occur in a number of ways. The two most likely adjustments today are that wages in China rise relative to wages in the United States or the U.S. exchange rate falls. Both adjustments will make Chinese goods relatively more expensive and U.S. goods relatively cheaper, just as these adjustments did with countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea in previous decades. Neither of these is especially pleasant for us, which is why we will likely hear continued calls for trade restrictions in the coming decade.

Q-6

What are two likely adjustments that will reduce the wage gap between China and the United States?

Unfortunately, as I will discuss below, the trade restriction policies that governments can undertake will generally make things worse. In a globalized free-trade economy, the U.S. wage advantage can only be maintained to the degree that total cost of production of a good in the United States (with all the associated costs) is no more expensive than the total cost of producing that same good abroad (with all the associated costs). The degree to which production shifts because of lower wages abroad depends on how transferable are the U.S. comparative advantages that we listed above. Some of them are generally nontransferable, and thus will support sustained higher relative U.S. wages. English as the language of business; the enormous wealth of the United States gained earlier; inertia; and U.S. political, social, and capital infrastructure will keep much production in the United States, and will maintain a comparative advantage for U.S. production even with significantly higher U.S. wages.

The U.S. wage advantage can only be maintained to the degree that total cost of production of a good in the United States is no more than the total cost of that same good abroad.

But in the coming decades, we can expect a narrowing of the wage gap between the United States and China and India. Given these strong market forces that cannot be prevented without undermining the entire international trading system, about the only available realistic strategy for the United States is to adapt to this new situation. Its best strategy is to work toward maintaining existing comparative advantages through investment in education and infrastructure, while continuing to provide an environment conducive to innovation so that we develop comparative advantages in new industries.

Varieties of Trade Restrictions

The policies countries can use to restrict trade include tariffs and quotas, voluntary restraint agreements, embargoes, regulatory trade restrictions, and nationalistic appeals. I’ll consider each in turn and also review the geometric analysis of each.

FIGURE 16-4 (A AND B): Selected Tariff Rates

The tariff rates in (a) will be continually changing as the changes negotiated by the World Trade Organization come into effect. In (b) you see tariff rates for the United States since 1920.

Source: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Bank (www.worldbank.org).

Tariffs and Quotas

Tariffs
are taxes governments place on internationally traded goods—generally imports. (Tariffs are also called customs duties.) Tariffs are the most-used and most-familiar type of trade restriction. Tariffs operate in the same way a tax does: They make imported goods relatively more expensive than they otherwise would have been, and thereby encourage the consumption of domestically produced goods. On average, U.S. tariffs raise the price of imported goods by less than 3 percent. Figure 16-4(a) presents average tariff rates for industrial goods for a number of countries and the European Union, and Figure 16-4(b) shows the tariff rates imposed by the United States since 1920.

Three policies used to restrict trade are

1. Tariffs (taxes on internationally traded goods).

2. Quotas (quantity limits placed on imports).

3. Regulatory trade restrictions (government-imposed procedural rules that limit imports).

Probably the most infamous tariff in U.S. history is the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, which raised tariffs on imported goods to an average of 60 percent. It was passed at the height of the Great Depression in the United States in the hope of protecting American jobs. It didn’t work. Other countries responded with similar tariffs. As a result of these trade wars, international trade plummeted from $60 billion in 1928 to $25 billion in 1938, unemployment worsened, and the international depression deepened. These effects of the tariff convinced many, if not most, economists that free trade is preferable to trade restrictions.

The dismal failure of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was the main reason the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
, a regular international conference to reduce trade barriers, was established in 1947 immediately following World War II. In 1995 GATT was replaced by the
World Trade Organization (WTO)
, an organization whose functions are generally the same as GATT’s were—to promote free and fair trade among countries. Unlike GATT, the WTO is a permanent organization with an enforcement system (albeit weak). Since its formation, rounds of negotiations have resulted in a decline in worldwide tariffs.

Tariffs and Quotas

Quotas
are quantity limits placed on imports. They have the same effect on equilibrium price and quantity as the quantity restrictions discussed in Chapter 5, and their effect in limiting trade is similar to the effect of a tariff. Both increase price and reduce quantity. Tariffs, like all taxes on suppliers, shift the supply curve up by the amount of the tax, as Figure 16-5 shows. A tariff, T, raises equilibrium price from P0 to P1 by an amount that is less than the tariff, and equilibrium quantity declines from Q0 to Q 1. With a quota, Q1, the equilibrium price also rises to P1.

FIGURE 16-5: The Effects of Tariffs and Quotas

There is, however, a difference between tariffs and quotas. In the case of the tariff, the government collects tariff revenue represented by the shaded region. In the case of a quota, the government collects no revenue. The benefit of the increase in price goes to the importer as additional corporate revenue. So which of the two do you think import companies favor? The quota, of course—it means more profits as long as your company is the one to receive the rights to fill those quotas. In fact, once quotas are instituted, firms compete intensely to get them.

Tariffs affect trade patterns. For example, as of 2007 the United States imposes a tariff on light trucks from Japan, so the United States imports few light trucks from Japan. You will see Japanese-named trucks, but most of these are produced in the United States. Many similar examples exist, and by following the tariff structure, you can gain a lot of insight into patterns of trade.

The issues involved with tariffs and quotas can be seen in a slightly different way by assuming that the country being considered is small relative to the world economy and that imports compete with domestic producers. The small-country assumption means that the supply from the world to this country is perfectly elastic at the world price, $2, as in Figure 16-6(a).

FIGURE 16-6 (A AND B): Tariffs and Quotas When the Domestic Country Is Small

This exhibit shows the effects of a tariff in (a) and of a quota in (b) when the domestic country is small. The small-country assumption means that the world supply is perfectly elastic, in this case at $2.00 a unit. With a tariff of 50 cents, world supply shifts up by 50 cents. Domestic quantity demanded falls to 175 and domestic quantity supplied rises to 125. Foreign suppliers are left supplying the difference, 50 units. The domestic government collects revenue shown in the shaded area. The figure in (b) shows how the same result can be achieved with a quota of 50. Equilibrium price rises to $2.50. Domestic firms produce 125 units and consumers demand 175 units. The difference between the tariff and the quota is that, with a tariff, the domestic government collects the revenue from the higher price. With a quota, the benefits of the higher price accrue to the foreign and domestic producers.

The world price of the good is unaffected by this country’s demand. This assumption allows us to distinguish the world supply from domestic supply. In the absence of any trade restrictions, the world price of $2 would be the domestic price. Domestic low-cost suppliers would supply 100 units of the good at $2. The remaining 100 units demanded are being imported.

In Figure 16-6(a) I show the effect of a tariff of 50 cents placed on all imports. Since the world supply curve is perfectly elastic, all of this tax, shown by the shaded region, is borne by domestic consumers. Price rises to $2.50 and quantity demanded falls to 175. With a tariff, the rise in price will increase domestic quantity supplied from 100 to 125 and will reduce imports to 50. Now let’s compare this situation with a quota of 50, shown in Figure 16-6(b). Under a quota of 50, the final price would be the same, but higher revenue would accrue to foreign and domestic producers rather than to the government. One final difference: Any increase in demand under a quota would result in higher prices because it would have to be filled by domestic producers. Under a tariff, any increase in demand would not affect price.

Voluntary Restraint Agreements

Imposing new tariffs and quotas is specifically ruled out by the WTO, but foreign countries know that WTO rules are voluntary and that, if a domestic industry brought sufficient political pressure on its government, the WTO rules would be forgotten. To avoid the imposition of new tariffs on their goods, countries often voluntarily restrict their exports. That’s why Japan has agreed informally to limit the number of cars it exports to the United States.

Voluntary restraint agreements are often not all that voluntary.

The effect of such voluntary restraint agreements is similar to the effect of quotas: They directly limit the quantity of imports, increasing the price of the good and helping domestic producers. For example, when the United States encouraged Japan to impose “voluntary” quotas on exports of its cars to the United States, Toyota benefited from the quotas because it could price its limited supply of cars higher than it could if it sent in a large number of cars, so profit per car would be high. Since they faced less competition, U.S. car companies also benefited. They could increase their prices because Toyota had done so.

Embargoes

An
embargo
is a total restriction on the import or export of a good. Embargoes are usually established for international political reasons rather than for primarily economic reasons.

An embargo is a total restriction on import or export of a good.

An example was the U.S. embargo of trade with Iraq prior to the U.S. invasion. The U.S. government hoped that the embargo would so severely affect Iraq’s economy that Saddam Hussein would lose political power. It did make life difficult for Iraqis, but it did not bring about the downfall of the Hussein government. The United States has also imposed embargoes on Cuba, Iran, and Libya.

WWW

Web Note 16.1: Regulations

Regulatory Trade Restrictions

Tariffs, quotas, and embargoes are the primary direct methods to restrict international trade. There are also indirect methods that restrict trade in not-so-obvious ways; these are called
regulatory trade restrictions
(government-imposed procedural rules that limit imports). One type of regulatory trade restriction has to do with protecting the health and safety of a country’s residents. For example, a country might restrict imports of all vegetables grown where certain pesticides are used, knowing full well that all other countries use those pesticides. The effect of such a regulation would be to halt the import of vegetables. Another example involves building codes. U.S. building codes require that plywood have fewer than, say, three flaws per sheet. Canadian building codes require that plywood have fewer than, say, five flaws per sheet. The different building codes are a nontariff barrier that makes trade in building materials between the United States and Canada difficult.

A second type of regulatory restriction involves making import and customs procedures so intricate and time-consuming that importers simply give up. For example, at one time France required all imported VCRs to be individually inspected in Toulouse. Since Toulouse is a provincial city, far from any port and outside the normal route for imports after they enter France, the inspection process took months.

Q-7

How might a country benefit from having an inefficient customs agency?

Some regulatory restrictions are imposed for legitimate reasons; others are designed simply to make importing more difficult and hence protect domestic producers from international competition. It’s often hard to tell the difference. A good example of this difficulty began in 1988, when the EU disallowed all imports of meat from animals that had been fed growth-inducing hormones. As the box “

Hormones and Economics

” on the next page details, the debate continues.

Some regulatory restrictions are imposed for legitimate reasons; others are designed simply to make importing more difficult.

Nationalistic Appeals

Finally, nationalistic appeals can help to restrict international trade. “Buy American” campaigns and Japanese xenophobia2 are examples. Many Americans, given two products of equal appeal except that one is made in the United States and one is made in a foreign country, would buy the U.S. product. To get around this tendency, foreign and U.S. companies often go to great lengths to get a MADE IN THE U.S.A. classification on goods they sell in the United States. For example, components for many autos are made in Japan but shipped to the United States and assembled in Ohio or Tennessee so that the finished car can be called an American product.

WWW

Web Note 16.2: Buy American

Reasons for Trade Restrictions

Let’s now turn to a different question: If trade is beneficial, as it is in our example of I.T., why do countries restrict trade?

Unequal Internal Distribution of the Gains from Trade

One reason is that the gains of trade are not equally distributed. In the example of the argument for trade discussed at the beginning of the chapter, I.T. persuaded Saudi Arabia to specialize in the production of oil rather than food, and persuaded the United States to produce more food than oil. That means, of course, that some U.S. oil workers will have to become farmers, and in Saudi Arabia some farmers will have to become oil producers.

Often people don’t want to make radical changes in the kind of work they do—they want to keep on producing what they’re already producing. So when these people see the same kinds of goods that they produce coming into their country from abroad, they lobby to prevent the foreign competition.

Had I.T. been open about the difficulties of trading, he would have warned the countries that change is hard. It has very real costs that I.T. didn’t point out when he made his offers. But these costs of change are relatively small compared to the gains from trade. Moreover, they’re short-run, temporary costs, whereas gains from trade are permanent, long-run gains. Once the adjustment has been made, the costs will be gone but the benefits will still be there.

For most goods, the benefits for the large majority of the population so outweigh the small costs to some individuals that, decided on a strict cost/benefit basis, international trade is still a deal you can’t refuse. The table below lists economists’ estimates of the cost to consumers of saving a job in some industries through trade restrictions.

REAL-WORLD APPLICATION

Hormones and Economics

Trade restrictions, in practice, are often much more complicated than they seem in textbooks. Seldom does a country say, “We’re limiting imports to protect our home producers.” Instead the country explains the restrictions in a more politically acceptable way. Consider the fight between the European Union (EU) and the United States over U.S. meat exports. In 1988 the EU, in line with Union-wide internal requirements, banned imports of any meat from animals treated with growth-inducing hormones, which U.S. meat producers use extensively. The result: the EU banned the meat exported from the United States.

The EU claimed that it had imposed the ban only because of public health concerns. The United States claimed that the ban was actually a trade restriction, pointing out that its own residents ate this kind of meat with confidence because a U.S. government agency had certified that the levels of hormones in the meat were far below any danger level.

The United States retaliated against the EU by imposing 100 percent tariffs on Danish and West German hams, Italian tomatoes, and certain other foods produced by EU member nations. The EU threatened to respond by placing 100 percent tariffs on $100 million worth of U.S. walnuts and dried fruits, but instead entered into bilateral meetings with the United States. Those meetings allowed untreated meats into the EU for human consumption and treated meats that would be used as dog food. In response, the United States removed its retaliatory tariff on hams and tomato sauce, but retained its tariffs on many other goods. In the 1990s, Europe’s dog population seemed to be growing exponentially as Europe’s imports of “dog food” increased by leaps and bounds. In 1996 the United States asked the WTO to review the EU ban. It did so in 1997, finding in favor of the United States. The EU appealed and in 1999 the WTO stood by its earlier ruling and the United States reimposed the 100 percent tariffs. Since then, the EU has stood firm and has conducted studies that, it says, show the use of growth hormones to be unsafe, but the WTO continues to rule that they are safe. In 2004, the EU replaced its ban on U.S. beef with a provisional ban until it collects more information, and argued that this provisional ban met the WTO rules. The United States disagreed and continued its retaliatory tariffs. So the dispute continues.

Which side is right in this dispute? The answer is far from obvious. Both the United States and the EU have potentially justifiable positions. As I said, trade restrictions are more complicated in reality than in textbooks.

With benefits so outweighing costs, it would seem that transition costs could be forgotten. But they can’t.

Benefits of trade are generally widely scattered among the entire population. In contrast, costs of free trade often fall on small groups of people who loudly oppose the particular free trade that hurts them. This creates a political push against free trade.

Benefits of trade are generally widely scattered among the entire population. In contrast, costs of free trade often fall on specific small groups.

It isn’t only in the United States that the push for trade restrictions focuses on the small costs and not on the large benefits. For example, the European Union (EU) places large restrictions on food imports from nonmember nations. If the EU were to remove those barriers, food prices in EU countries would decline significantly—it is estimated that meat prices alone would fall by about 65 percent. Consumers would benefit, but farmers would be hurt. The farmers, however, have the political clout to see that the costs are considered and the benefits aren’t. The result: The EU places high duties on foreign agricultural products.

The cost to society of relaxing trade restrictions has led to a number of programs to assist those who are hurt. Such programs are called
trade adjustment assistance programs
—programs designed to compensate losers for reductions in trade restrictions.

Governments have tried to use trade adjustment assistance to facilitate free trade, but they’ve found that it’s enormously difficult to limit the adjustment assistance to those who are actually hurt by international trade. As soon as people find that there’s assistance for people injured by trade, they’re likely to try to show that they too have been hurt and deserve assistance. Losses from free trade become exaggerated and magnified. Instead of only a small portion of the gains from trade being needed for trade adjustment assistance, much more is demanded—often even more than the gains.

Telling people who claim to be hurt that they aren’t really being hurt isn’t good politics.

That’s why offering trade adjustment assistance as a way to relieve the pressure to restrict trade is a deal many governments can refuse.

Telling people who claim to be hurt that they aren’t really being hurt isn’t good politics.

Haggling by Companies over the Gains from Trade

Many naturally advantageous bargains aren’t consummated because each side is pushing for a larger share of the gains from trade than the other side thinks should be allotted.

To see how companies haggling over the gains of trade can restrict trade, let’s reconsider the original deal that I.T. proposed. I.T. got 380 tons of food and 380 barrels of oil. The United States got an additional 100 tons of food and 60 barrels of oil. Saudi Arabia got an additional 100 barrels of oil and 60 tons of food.

Suppose the Saudis had said, “Why should we be getting only 100 barrels of oil and 60 tons of food when I.T. is getting 380 barrels of oil and 380 tons of food? We want an additional 300 tons of food and another 300 barrels of oil, and we won’t deal unless we get them.” Similarly the United States might have said, “We want an additional 300 tons of food and an additional 300 barrels of oil, and we won’t go through with the deal unless we get them.” If either the U.S. or the Saudi Arabian company that was involved in the trade for its country (or both) takes this position, I.T. might just walk—no deal. Tough bargaining positions can make it almost impossible to achieve gains from trade.

Strategic bargaining can lead to higher gains from trade for the side that drives the hardest bargain, but it also can make the deal fall through.

The side that drives the hardest bargain gets the most gains from the bargain, but it also risks making the deal fall through. Such strategic bargaining goes on all the time.
Strategic bargaining
means demanding a larger share of the gains from trade than you can reasonably expect.If you’re successful, you get the lion’s share; if you’re not successful, the deal falls apart and everyone is worse off.

Haggling by Countries over Trade Restrictions

Another type of trade bargaining that often limits trade is bargaining between countries. Trade restrictions and the threat of trade restrictions play an important role in that kind of haggling. Sometimes countries must go through with trade restrictions that they really don’t want to impose, just to make their threats credible.

Once one country has imposed trade restrictions, other countries attempt to get those restrictions reduced by threatening to increase their own restrictions. Again, to make the threat credible, sometimes countries must impose or increase trade restrictions simply to show they’re willing to do so. For example, in the mid-1990s China was allowing significant illegal copying of U.S. software without paying royalties. The United States exerted pressure to stop such copying but felt that China was not responding effectively. To force compliance, the United States made a list of Chinese goods that it threatened with 100 percent tariffs unless China complied. The United States did not want to put on these restrictions but felt that it would have more strategic bargaining power if it threatened to do so. Hence the name
strategic trade policies
—threatening to implement tariffs to bring about a reduction in tariffs or some other concession from the other country.

Q-8

In strategic trade bargaining, it is sometimes reasonable to be unreasonable. True or false? Explain.

Strategic trade policies are threats to implement tariffs to bring about a reduction in tariffs or some other concession from the other country.

Ultimately, strategic bargaining power depends on negotiators’ skills and the underlying gains from trade that a country would receive. A country that would receive only a small portion of the gains from trade is in a much stronger bargaining position than a country that would receive significant gains. It’s easier for the former to walk away from trade.

The potential problem with strategic trade policies is that they can backfire. One rule of strategic bargaining is that the other side must believe that you’ll go through with your threat. Thus, strategic trade policy can lead a country that actually supports free trade to impose trade restrictions, just to show how strongly it believes in free trade.

Specialized Production

My discussion of comparative advantage took it as a given that one country was inherently more productive than another country in producing certain goods. But when one looks at trading patterns, it’s often not at all clear why particular countries have a productive advantage in certain goods. There’s no inherent reason for Switzerland to specialize in the production of watches or for South Korea to specialize in the production of cars. Much in trade cannot be explained by inherent resource endowments. If they don’t have inherent advantages, why are countries and places often so good at producing what they specialize in? Two important explanations are that they learn by doing and that
economies of scale
exist.

Learning by Doing

Learning by doing
means becoming better at a task the more often you perform it. Take watches in Switzerland. Initially production of watches in Switzerland may have been a coincidence; the person who started the watch business happened to live there. But then people in the area became skilled in producing watches. Their skill made it attractive for other watch companies to start up. As additional companies moved in, more and more members of the labor force became skilled at watchmaking and word went out that Swiss watches were the best in the world. That reputation attracted even more producers, so Switzerland became the watchmaking capital of the world. Had the initial watch production occurred in Austria, not Switzerland, Austria might be the watch capital of the world.

Learning by doing means becoming better at a task the more you perform it.

When there’s learning by doing, it’s much harder to attribute inherent comparative advantage to a country. One must always ask: Does country A have an inherent comparative advantage, or does it simply have more experience? Once country B gets the experience, will country A’s comparative advantage disappear? If it will, then country B has a strong reason to limit trade with country A in order to give its own workers time to catch up as they learn by doing.

REAL-WORLD APPLICATION

The Antiglobalization Forces

Often when the World Trade Organization or a similar type organization promoting free trade hosts a meeting, protests (sometimes violent ones) are held by a loosely organized collection of groups opposing globalization. The goals of these groups are varied. Some argue that trade hurts developed countries such as the United States; others argue that it hurts developing countries by exploiting poor workers so that Westerners can get luxuries cheaply. Still others argue against a more subtle Western economic imperialism in which globalization spreads Western cultural values and undermines developing countries’ social structures.

Each of these arguments has some appeal, although making the first two simultaneously is difficult because it says that voluntary trade hurts both parties to the trade. But the arguments have had little impact on the views of most policy makers and economists.

Supporting free trade does not mean that globalization does not have costs. It does have costs, but many of the costs associated with free trade are really the result of technological changes. The reality is that technological developments, such as those in telecommunications and transportation, are pushing countries closer together and will involve difficult social and cultural changes, regardless of whether trade is free or not. Restricting trade might temporarily slow these changes but is unlikely to stop them.

Most empirical studies have found that, with regard to material goods, the workers in developing countries involved in trade are generally better off than those not involved in trade. That’s why most developing countries work hard to encourage companies to move production facilities into their countries. From a worker’s perspective, earning $4 a day can look quite good when the alternative is earning $3 a day. Would the worker rather earn $10 a day? Of course, but the higher the wages in a given country, the less likely it is that firms are going to locate production there.

Many economists are sympathetic to various antiglobalization arguments, but they often become frustrated at the lack of clarity of the antiglobalization groups’ views. To oppose something is not enough; to effect positive change, one must not only understand how the thing one opposes works but also have a realistic plan for a better alternative.

Economies of Scale

In determining whether an inherent comparative advantage exists, a second complication is
economies of scale
—the situation in which costs per unit of output fall as output increases.Many manufacturing industries (such as steel and autos) exhibit economies of scale. The existence of significant economies of scale means that it makes sense (that is, it lowers costs) for one country to specialize in one good and another country to specialize in another good. But who should specialize in what is unclear. Producers in a country can, and generally do, argue that if only the government will establish barriers, they’ll be able to lower their costs per unit and eventually sell at lower costs than foreign producers.

In economies of scale, costs per unit of output go down as output increases.

Q-9

Is it efficient for a country to maintain a trade barrier in an industry that exhibits economies of scale?

Most countries recognize the importance of learning by doing and economies of scale. A variety of trade restrictions are based on these two phenomena. The most common expression of the learning-by-doing and economies-of-scale insights is the
infant industry argument
, which is that with initial protection, an industry will be able to become competitive.Countries use this argument to justify many trade restrictions. They argue, “You may now have a comparative advantage, but that’s simply because you’ve been at it longer, or are experiencing significant economies of scale. We need trade restrictions on our_____industry to give it a chance to catch up. Once an infant industry grows up, then we can talk about eliminating the restrictions.”

The infant industry argument says that with initial protection, an industry will be able to become competitive.

Macroeconomic Aspects of Trade

The comparative advantage argument for free trade assumes that a country’s resources are fully utilized. When countries don’t have full employment, imports can decrease domestic aggregate demand and increase unemployment. Exports can stimulate domestic aggregate demand and decrease unemployment. Thus, when an economy is in a recession, there is a strong macroeconomic reason to limit imports and encourage exports. These macroeconomic effects of free trade play an important role in the public’s view of imports and exports. When a country is in a recession, pressure to impose trade restrictions increases substantially.

National Security

Countries often justify trade restrictions on grounds of national security. These restrictions take two forms:

1. Export restrictions on strategic materials and defense-related goods.

2. Import restrictions on defense-related goods. For example, in a war we don’t want to be dependent on oil from abroad.

For a number of goods, national security considerations make sense. For example, the United States restricts the sale of certain military items to countries that may be fighting the United States someday. The problem is where to draw the line about goods having a national security consideration. Should countries protect domestic agriculture? All high-technology items, since they might be useful in weapons? All chemicals? Steel? When a country makes a national security argument for trade, we must be careful to consider whether a domestic political reason may be lurking behind that argument.

Reasons for restricting trade include

1. Unequal internal distribution of the gains from trade.

2. Haggling by companies over the gains from trade.

3. Haggling by countries over trade restrictions.

4. Specialized production: learning by doing and economies of scale.

5. Macroeconomic aspects of trade.

6. National security.

7. International politics.

8. Increased revenue brought in by tariffs.

International Politics

International politics frequently provides another reason for trade restrictions. Over the past decades, the United States restricted trade with Cuba to punish that country for trying to extend its Marxist political and economic policies to other Latin American countries. The United States also has trade restrictions on Iran for its position on nuclear power plants. The list can be extended, but you get the argument: Trade helps you, so we’ll hurt you by stopping trade until you do what we want. So what if it hurts us too? It’ll hurt you more than it hurts us.

Increased Revenue Brought in by Tariffs

A final argument made for one particular type of trade restriction—a tariff—is that tariffs bring in revenues. In the 19th century, tariffs were the U.S. government’s primary source of revenue. They are less important as a source of revenue today for many developed countries because those countries have instituted other forms of taxes. However, tariffs remain a primary source of revenue for many developing countries. They’re relatively easy to collect and are paid by people rich enough to afford imports. These countries justify many of their tariffs with the argument that they need the revenues.

Why Economists Generally Oppose Trade Restrictions

Each of the preceding arguments for trade restrictions has some validity, but most economists discount them and support free trade. The reason is that, in their considered judgment, the harm done by trade restrictions outweighs the benefits. This is true, even though, from the U.S. perspective, transferable comparative advantages are likely to place significant pressures on jobs to leave the United States, and hold down U.S. wages in the coming decades. Most economists believe that the United States will be better off if it allows free trade than it would be if it did not.

Economists generally oppose trade restrictions because

1. From a global perspective, free trade increases total output.

2. International trade provides competition for domestic companies.

3. Restrictions based on national security are often abused or evaded.

4. Trade restrictions are addictive.

Free Trade Increases Total Output

Economists’ first argument for free trade is that, viewed from a global perspective, free trade increases total output. From a national perspective, economists agree that particular instances of trade restrictions may actually help one nation, even as most other nations are hurt. But they argue that the country imposing trade restrictions can benefit only if the other country doesn’t retaliate with trade restrictions of its own. Retaliation is the rule, not the exception, however, and when there is retaliation, trade restrictions cause both countries to lose. Thus, if the United States were to place a tariff on goods from China, those aspects of production that depend on Chinese goods would be hurt, and, as I discussed above, there are many such goods. Moreover, China would likely place tariffs on goods from the United States, hurting both countries. Such tariffs would cut overall production, making both countries worse off.

International Trade Provides Competition

A second reason most economists support free trade is that trade restrictions reduce international competition. International competition is desirable because it forces domestic companies to stay on their toes. If trade restrictions on imports are imposed, domestic companies don’t work as hard and therefore become less efficient.

For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States imposed restrictions on imported steel. U.S. steel industries responded to this protection by raising their prices and channeling profits from their steel production into other activities. By the 1970s, the U.S. steel industry was using outdated equipment to produce overpriced steel. Instead of making the steel industry stronger, restrictions made it a flabby, uncompetitive industry.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. steel industry became less and less profitable. Larger mills closed or consolidated, while nonunion minimills, which made new steel out of scrap steel, did well. By the late 1990s, minimills accounted for 45 percent of total U.S. steel production. In 2002 it looked as if a number of larger mills were going to declare bankruptcy, and enormous pressure was placed on the federal government to bail them out by taking over their pension debt and instituting tariffs. The U.S. government responded by imposing 20-30 percent tariffs on foreign steel imports. Most economists opposed the tariffs and pointed out that they were unlikely to lead to a rebuilding of the U.S. steel industry because other countries had a comparative advantage in steel production. Moreover, other countries would retaliate with tariffs on U.S. goods. Despite their opposition, the tariffs were instituted. Major U.S. trading partners—including EU countries, Japan, and China—responded by threatening to implement tariffs on U.S. goods worth about $335 million, and in 2003, the U.S. government withdrew the tariffs.

The benefits of international competition are not restricted to mature industries like steel; they can also accrue to young industries wherever they appear. Economists dispose of the infant industry argument by reference to the historical record. In theory the argument makes sense. But very few of the infant industries protected by trade restrictions have ever grown up. What tends to happen instead is that infant industries become dependent on the trade restrictions and use political pressure to keep that protection. As a result, they often remain immature and internationally uncompetitive. Most economists would support the infant industry argument only if the trade restrictions included definite conditions under which the restrictions would end.

Very few of the infant industries protected by trade restrictions have ever grown up.

WWW

Web Note 16.3: Protection and Industrialization

Restrictions Based on National Security Are Often Abused or Evaded

Most economists agree with the national security argument for export restrictions on goods that are directly war related. Selling bombs to Iran, whom the United States has called a member of the Axis of Evil, doesn’t make much sense. Economists point out that the argument is often carried far beyond goods directly related to national security. For example, in the 1980s the United States restricted exports of sugar-coated cereals to the Soviet Union purportedly for reasons of national security. Sugar-frosted flakes may be great, but they were unlikely to help the Soviet Union in a war.

Another argument that economists give against the national security rationale is that trade restrictions on military sales can often be evaded. Countries simply have another country buy the goods for them. Such third-party sales—called transshipments—are common in international trade and limit the effectiveness of any absolute trade restrictions for national security purposes.

Economists also argue that by fostering international cooperation, international trade makes war less likely—a significant contribution to national security.

Trade Restrictions Are Addictive

Economists’ final argument against trade restrictions is:

Yes, some restrictions might benefit a country, but almost no country can limit its restrictions to the beneficial ones.

Trade restrictions are addictive—the more you have, the more you want. Thus, a majority of economists take the position that the best response to such addictive policies is “Just say no.”

Yes, some restrictions might benefit a country, but almost no country can limit its restrictions to the beneficial ones.

Institutions Supporting Free Trade

As I have stated throughout the text, economists generally like markets and favor trade being as free as possible. They argue that trade allows specialization and the division of labor. When each country follows its comparative advantage, production is more efficient and the production possibility curve shifts out. These views mean that most economists, liberal and conservative alike, generally oppose international trade restrictions.

WWW

Web Note 16.4: Export Promotion

Despite political pressures to restrict trade, governments have generally tried to follow economists’ advice and have entered into a variety of international agreements and organizations. The most important is the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has about 150 members, and is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). You will still occasionally see references to GATT, even though the WTO has taken its place. One of the differences between the WTO and GATT is that the WTO includes some enforcement mechanisms.

Important international economic organizations include the WTO, which took the place of GATT.

Achieving agreement on trade barrier reductions is politically difficult, as is demonstrated by the latest WTO negotiations, called the Doha Development Round. Begun in 2001, it was meant to lead to fairer trade rules for developing countries, especially in agriculture. The Round did not go well; the United States and Europe were unwilling to eliminate subsidies to their farmers that the developing countries said made it impossible for them to compete fairly, and hence would not reduce their tariffs on manufactured goods. As of 2007, there was still no agreement.

The push for free trade has a geographic dimension, which includes
free trade associations
—groups of countries that have reduced or eliminated trade barriers among themselves.The European Union (EU) is the most famous free trade association. All barriers to trade among the EU’s member countries were removed in 1992. In the coming decade more European countries can be expected to join the EU. In 1993, the United States and Canada agreed to enter into a similar free trade union, and they, together with Mexico, created the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Under NAFTA, tariffs and other trade barriers among these countries are being gradually reduced. Some other trading associations include Mercosur (among South American countries) and ASEAN (among Southeast Asian countries).

A free trade association is a group of countries that allows free trade among its members and puts up common barriers against all other countries’ goods.

ADDED DIMENSION

Dumping

The WTO allows countries to impose trade restrictions on imports if they can show that the goods are being dumped. Dumping is selling a good in a foreign country at a lower price than in the country where it’s produced. On the face of it, who could complain about someone who wants to sell you a good cheaply? Why not just take advantage of the bargain price? The first objection is the learning-by-doing argument. To stay competitive, a country must keep on producing. Dumping by another country can force domestic producers out of business. Having eliminated the competition, the foreign producer has the field to itself and can raise the price. Thus, dumping can be a form of predatory pricing.

The second argument against dumping involves the short-term macroeconomic and political effects it can have on the importing country. Even if one believes that dumping is not a preliminary to predatory pricing, it can displace workers in the importing country, causing political pressure on that government to institute trade restrictions. If that country’s economy is in a recession, the resulting unemployment will have substantial macroeconomic repercussions, so pressure for trade restrictions will be amplified.

Economists have mixed reactions to free trade associations. They see free trade as beneficial, but they are concerned about the possibility that these regional free trade associations will impose significant trade restrictions on nonmember countries. They also believe that bilateral negotiations between member nations will replace multilateral efforts among members and nonmembers. Whether the net effect of these bilateral negotiations is positive or negative remains to be seen.

Q-10

What is economists’ view of limited free trade associations such as the EU or NAFTA?

Groups of other countries have loose trading relationships because of cultural or historical reasons. These loose trading relationships are sometimes called trading zones. For example, many European countries maintain close trading ties with many of their former colonies in Africa where they fit into a number of overlapping trading zones. European companies tend to see that central area as their turf. The United States has close ties in Latin America, making the Western hemisphere another trading zone. Another example of a trading zone is that of Japan and its economic ties with other Far East countries; Japanese companies often see that area as their commercial domain.

These trading zones overlap, sometimes on many levels. For instance, Australia and England, Portugal and Brazil, and the United States and Saudi Arabia are tied together for historical or political reasons, and those ties lead to increased trade between them that seems to deviate from the above trading zones. Similarly, as companies become more and more global, it is harder and harder to associate companies with particular countries. Let me give an example: Do you know who the largest exporters of cars from the United States are? The answer is: Japanese automobile companies!

Thus, there is no hard-and-fast specification of trading zones, and knowing history and politics is important to understanding many of the relationships.

One way countries strengthen trading relationships among groups of countries is through a most-favored-nation status. The term
most-favored nation
refers to a country that will be charged as low a tariff on its exports as any other country.Thus, if the United States lowers tariffs on goods imported from Japan, which has most-favored-nation status with the United States, it must lower tariffs on those same types of goods imported from any other country with most-favored-nation status.

A most-favored nation is a country that will pay as low a tariff on its exports as will any other country.

Conclusion

International trade, and changing comparative advantages, will become more and more important for the United States in the coming decades. With international transportation and communication becoming easier and faster, and with other countries’ economies growing, the U.S. economy will inevitably become more interdependent with the other economies of the world. As international trade becomes more important, the push for trade restrictions will likely increase. Various countries’ strategic trade policies will likely conflict, and the world could find itself on the verge of an international trade war that would benefit no one.

Concern about that possibility leads most economists to favor free trade. As often happens, economists advise politicians to follow a politically unpopular policy—to take the hard course of action. Whether politicians follow economists’ advice or whether they follow the politically popular policy will play a key role in determining the course of the U.S. economy in the 2000s.

Summary

• The nature of trade is continually changing. The United States is importing more and more high-tech goods and services from India and China and other East Asian countries.

• Outsourcing is a type of trade. Outsourcing is a larger phenomenon today compared to 30 years ago because China and India are so large, enormous outsourcing is possible.

• According to the principle of comparative advantage, as long as the relative opportunity costs of producing goods (what must be given up in one good in order to get another good) differ among countries, there are potential gains from trade.

• Three insights into the terms of trade include

1. The more competition exists in international trade, the less the trader gets and the more the involved countries get.

2. Once competition prevails, smaller countries tend to get a larger percentage of the gains from trade than do larger countries.

3. Gains from trade go to countries that produce goods that exhibit economies of scale.

• The gains from trade in the form of low consumer prices tend to be widespread and not easily recognized, while the costs in jobs lost tend to be concentrated and readily identifiable.

• The United States has comparative advantages based on its skilled workforce, its institutions, and its language, among other things.

• Inherent comparative advantages are based on factors that are relatively unchangeable. They are not subject to the law of one price.

• Transferable comparative advantages are based on factors that can change relatively easily, The law of one price can eliminate these comparative advantages.

• Trade restrictions include tariffs and quotas, embargoes, voluntary restraint agreements, regulatory trade restrictions, and nationalistic appeals.

• Reasons that countries impose trade restrictions include unequal internal distribution of the gains from trade, haggling by companies over the gains from trade, haggling by countries over trade restrictions, learning by doing and economies of scale, macroeconomic aspects of trade, national security, international political reasons, and increased revenue brought in by tariffs.

• Economists generally oppose trade restrictions because of the history of trade restrictions and their understanding of the advantages of free trade.

• The World Trade Organization is an international organization committed to reducing trade barriers.

• Free trade associations help trade by reducing barriers to trade among member nations. Free trade associations could hinder trade by building up barriers to trade with nations outside the association; negotiations among members could replace multilateral efforts to reduce trade restrictions among members and nonmembers.

Key Terms

balance of trade (
379
)

comparative advantage (
381
)

economies of scale (
397
)

embargo (
392
)

free trade association (
400
)

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (
390
)

infant industry argument (
397
)

inherent comparative advantage (
387
)

learning by doing (
396
)

most-favored nation (
401
)

quota (
390
)

regulatory trade restriction (
392
)

strategic bargaining (
395
)

strategic trade policy (
396
)

tariff (
390
)

trade adjustment assistance program (
395
)

transferable comparative advantage (
387
)

World Trade Organization (WTO) (
390
)

Questions for Thought and Review

1. Will a country do better importing or exporting a good for which it has a comparative advantage? Why? LO1

2. Widgetland has 60 workers. Each worker can produce 4 widgets or 4 wadgets. Each resident in Widgetland currently consumes 2 widgets and 2 wadgets. Wadgetland also has 60 workers. Each can produce 3 widgets or 12 wadgets. Wadgetland’s residents consume 1 widget and 9 wadgets. Is there a basis for trade? If so, offer the countries a deal they can’t refuse. LO2

3. Why does competition among traders affect how much of the gains from trade are given to the countries involved in the trade? LO3

4. Why do smaller countries usually get most of the gains from trade? What are some reasons why a small country might not get the gains of trade? LO3

5. Which country will get the larger gain from trade: a country with economies of scale or diseconomies of scale? Explain your answer. LO3

6. How is outsourcing to China and India today different than U.S. outsourcing in the past? LO4

7. What are three reasons why economists’ and laypeople’s view of trade differ? LO4

8. List at least three sources of comparative advantages that the United States has and will likely maintain over the coming decade. LO5

9. How do inherent comparative advantages differ from transferable comparative advantages? From the standpoint of adjustment costs to trade, which would a country prefer and why? LO5

10. What is the law of one price and why is it important to any discussion of the future of the U.S. economy? LO5

11. Which is the law of one price likely to eliminate: a transferable or an inherent comparative advantage? Explain your answer. LO5

12. What are two methods by which the wage gap between Chinese and U.S. workers will likely narrow? LO5

13. Suggest an equitable method of funding trade adjustment assistance programs. Why is it equitable? What problems might a politician have in implementing such a method? LO6

14. Demonstrate graphically how the effects of a tariff differ from the effects of a quota. LO6

15. How do the effects of voluntary restraint agreements differ from the effects of a tariff? How are they the same? LO6

16. Mexico exports many vegetables to the United States. These vegetables are grown using chemicals that are not allowed in U.S. vegetable agriculture. Should the United States restrict imports of Mexican vegetables? Why or why not? (Difficult) LO6, LO7

17. When the United States placed a temporary price floor on tomatoes imported from Mexico, U.S. trade representative Mickey Kantor said, “The agreement will provide strong relief to the tomato growers in Florida and other states, and help preserve jobs in the industry.” What costs did Americans bear from the price floor? (Difficult) LO6

18. If you were economic adviser to a country that was following your advice about trade restrictions and that country fell into a recession, would you change your advice? Why, or why not? (Difficult) LO7

19. What are two reasons economists support free trade? LO7

20. A study by the World Bank on the effects of Mercosur, a regional trade pact among four Latin American countries, concluded that free trade agreements “might confer significant benefits, but there are also significant dangers.” What are those benefits and dangers? (Difficult) LO8

21. What is the relationship between GATT and WTO? LO8

Problems and Exercises

22. Suppose there are two states that do not trade: Iowa and Nebraska. Each state produces the same two goods: corn and wheat. For Iowa the opportunity cost of producing 1 bushel of wheat is 3 bushels of corn. For Nebraska the opportunity cost of producing 1 bushel of corn is 3 bushels of wheat. At present, Iowa produces 20 million bushels of wheat and 120 million bushels of corn, while Nebraska produces 20 million bushels of corn and 120 million bushels of wheat.

a. Explain how, with trade, Nebraska can end up with 40 million bushels of wheat and 120 million bushels of corn while Iowa can end up with 40 million bushels of corn and 120 million bushels of wheat.

b. If the states ended up with the numbers given in a, how much would the trader get? LO2

23. Country A can produce, at most, 40 olives or 20 pickles, or some combination of olives and pickles such as the 20 olives and 10 pickles it is currently producing. Country B can produce, at most, 120 olives or 60 pickles, or some combination of olives and pickles such as the 100 olives and 50 pickles it is currently producing.

a. Is there a basis for trade? If so, offer the two countries a deal they can’t refuse.

b. How would your answer to a change if you knew that there were economies of scale in the production of pickles and olives rather than the production possibilities described in the question? Why? If your answer is yes, which country would you have produce which good? LO2, LO3

24. The world price of textiles is Pw, as in the accompanying figure of the domestic supply and demand for textiles.

The government imposes a tariff t, to protect the domestic producers. For this tariff:

a. Label the gains to domestic producers.

b. Label the revenue to government.

c. Label the costs to domestic producers.

d. Are the gains greater than the costs? Why? LO6

25. In 2005 the hourly compensation for manufacturing employees in Germany was $33.00. In the United States it was $23.65, while in Taiwan it was $6.38. (Difficult)

a. Give three reasons why firms produce in Germany rather than in a lower-wage country.

b. Germany has just entered into an agreement with other EU countries that allows people in any EU country, including Greece and Italy, which have lower wage rates, to travel and work in any EU country, including high-wage countries. Would you expect a significant movement of workers from Greece and Italy to Germany right away? Why or why not?

c. Workers in Thailand are paid significantly less than workers in Taiwan. If you were a company CEO, what other information would you want before you decided where to establish a new production facility? LO2, LO4

26. Suppose that two countries, Machineland and Farmland, have the following production possibility curves.

a. Explain how these two countries can move from points A and C, where they currently are, to points B and D.

b. If possible, state by how much total production for the two countries has risen.

c. If you were a trader, how much of the gains from trade would you deserve for discovering this trade?

d. If there were economies of scale in the production of both goods, how would your analysis change? LO2

27. Suppose there are two countries, Busytown and Lazyasiwannabe, with the following production possibility tables:

a. Draw the production possibility curves for each country.

b. Which country has the comparative advantage in producing cars? In producing gourmet meals?

c. Suppose each country specializes in the production of one good. Explain how Busytown can end up with 36,000 cars and 22,000 meals and Lazyasiwannabe can end up with 28,000 meals and 24,000 cars. L O 2

28. One of the basic economic laws is “the law of one price.” It says that given certain assumptions one would expect that if free trade is allowed, the price of goods in countries should converge.

a. Can you list what three of those assumptions likely are?

b. Should the law of one price hold for labor also? Why or why not?

c. Should it hold for capital more so or less so than for labor? Why or why not? LO5

29. On January 1, 2005, quotas on clothing imports to the United States first instituted in the 1960s to protect the U.S. garment industry were eliminated.

a. Demonstrate graphically how this change affected equilibrium price and quantity of imported garments.

b. Demonstrate graphically how U.S. consumers benefited from the end of the quota system.

c. What was the likely effect on profits of foreign companies that sold clothing in the U.S. market? LO6, LO7

30. The U.S. government taxes U.S. companies for their overseas profits, but it allows them to deduct from their U.S. taxable income the taxes that they pay abroad and interest on loans funding operations abroad, with no limits on the amount deducted. (Difficult)

a. Is it possible that the overseas profit tax produces no net revenue?

b. What would you suggest to the government about this tax if its desire were to increase corporate income tax revenue?

c. Why might the government keep this tax even if it were not collecting any net revenue? LO6, LO7

31. In the 1930s Clair Wilcox of Swarthmore College organized a petition by economists “that any measure which provided for a general upward revision of tariff rates be denied passage by Congress, or if passed, be vetoed.” It was signed by one-third of all economists in the United States at the time, of all political persuasions. A month later, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was passed.

a. Why did economists oppose the tariff?

b. Demonstrate the effect of the tariff on the price of goods.

c. How would the tariff help the economy if other countries did not institute a retaliatory tariff?

d. What would be the effect on the macro economy if other countries did institute a retaliatory tariff? LO6, LO7

Questions from Alternative Perspectives

1. Evaluate the following statement: Comparative advantage will benefit all people because everyone has a comparative advantage in something. Therefore, trade based on comparative advantage should be facilitated without undue government intervention. (Austrian)

2. In the 10th century B.C., King Solomon brought the Israelites into great economic wealth through specialization and trade. It was difficult when faced with the practices and beliefs of their trading partners, however, for Israel to maintain its identity as a people of one God. King Solomon, for example, provided a place for each of his wives to worship the gods of her own people. If such syncretism (adoption of foreign practices and beliefs) is inevitable with increased globalization, should trade be encouraged, even today? (Religious)

3. Global outsourcing has cost the U.S. economy far over one million jobs since 2001, or somewhere between 15 and 35 percent of the total decline in employment since the onset of the 2001 recession.

a. How does outsourcing affect the bargaining power of U.S. workers and the bargaining power of U.S. employers?

b. What will it likely do to the overall level of U.S. workers’ wages?

c. What will it likely do to lawyers’ wages?

d. If you stated that it affected lawyers’ wages differently, do you believe that the U.S. policy response to out sourcing would be different? (Post-Keynesian)

4. In David Ricardo’s original example of comparative advantage in his Principles of Political Economy, written in 1817, Portugal possesses an absolute advantage in both the production of cloth and the production of wine. But England has a comparative advantage in the production of cloth, while Portugal’s comparative advantage is in wine production. According to Ricardo, an English political economist, England should specialize in the production of cloth and Portugal in wine making.

a. Was Ricardo’s advice self-serving?

b. Knowing that light manufacturing, such as clothing and textile production, has led most industrialization processes, would you have advised 19th century Portugal to specialize in wine making? (Radical)

5. The text presents free trade as advantageous for developing countries. However, in its period of most rapid development, the half century following the Civil War, the United States imposed tariffs on imports that averaged around 40 percent, a level higher than those in all but one of today’s developing economies.

a. Why did so many of today’s industrialized countries not follow those policies as they were developing?

b. What does this insight into economic history suggest about the doctrine of free trade and whose interests it serves? (Radical)

Web Questions

1. Go to the WTO’s home page at www.wto.org to find out how trade disputes are settled.

a. What is the procedure for settling disputes?

b. What is the timetable for the settlement procedure?

c. What happens if one of the countries does not abide by the settlement?

2. Go to the National Center for Policy Analysis Web site (www.ncpa.org). Select “Policy Issues,” then “Trade” and finally “Tariffs and other Trade Barriers” to answer the following:

a. List three trade barriers mentioned in the articles.

b. What are the reasons the trade barriers were instituted?

c. According to the articles, what was the result of those trade barriers?

3. Go to the home page of free trade association ASEAN (www.aseansec.org) and answer the following questions:

a. What countries belong to the trade association?

b. When was the association established?

c. What is the association’s stated objective?

d. What is the combined gross domestic product of all members?

4. Choose a country, and using The Economist magazine’s country site (www.economist.com/countries), answer the following questions:

a. Using export and import shares, how globalized is your country?

b. What goods does your country export and import?

c. What are the probable goods for which your country has a comparative advantage?

Answers to Margin Questions

1. The type of goods being imported has changed from primarily low-tech goods to technologically advanced goods. (
378
)

2. A debtor nation will not necessarily be running a trade deficit.
Debt
refers to accumulated past deficits. If a country had accumulated large deficits in the past, it could run a surplus now but still be a debtor nation. (
381
)

3. He should walk away because there is no basis for trade. (
381
)

4. The percentage of gains from trade that goes to a country depends upon the change in the price of the goods being traded. If trade led to no change in prices in a small country, then that small country would get no gains from trade. Another case in which a small country gets a small percentage of the gains from trade would occur when its larger trading partner was producing a good with economies of scale and the small country was not. A third case is when the traders who extracted most of the surplus or gains from trade come from the larger country; then the smaller country would end up with few of the gains from trade. (
384
)

5. Three reasons for the difference are (1) gains from trade are often stealth gains, (2) comparative advantage is determined by more than wages, and (3) nations trade more than just manufactured goods. (
385
)

6. Two likely adjustments that will reduce the wage gap are a fall in the value of the dollar (U.S. exchange rate) and a rise in Chinese wages relative to U.S. wages. (
389
)

7. An inefficient customs agency can operate with the same effect as a trade restriction, and if trade restrictions would help the country, then it is possible that an inefficient customs agency could also help the country. (
393
)

8. True. In strategic trade bargaining it is sometimes reasonable to be unreasonable. The belief of the other bargainer that you will be unreasonable leads you to be able to extract larger gains from trade. Of course, this leads to the logical paradox that if “unreasonable” is “reasonable,” unreasonable really is reasonable, so it is only reasonable to be reasonable. Sorting out that last statement can be left for a philosophy or logic class. (
396
)

9. Whether or not it is efficient for a country to maintain barriers to trade in an industry that exhibits economies of scale depends upon the marginal costs and marginal benefits of maintaining those barriers. Having significant economies of scale does mean that average costs of production will be lower at higher levels of production; however, trade restrictions might mean that the industry might be able to inflate its costs. (
397
)

10. Most economists have a mixed view of limited free trade associations such as NAFTA or the EU. While they see free trade as beneficial, they are concerned about the possibility that these limited trade associations will impose trade restrictions on nonmember countries. Whether the net effect of these will be positive or negative is a complicated issue. (
401
)

1 One could make the model fit reality if one thinks of the United States as having a comparative advantage in producing IOUs.

17: International Financial Policy

A foreign exchange dealer’s office during a busy spell is the nearest thing to Bedlam I have struck.

—Harold Wincott

AFTER READING THIS CHAPTER, YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO:

1. Describe the balance of payments and the trade balance, and relate them to the supply and demand for currencies.

2. List four important fundamental determinants of exchange rates.

3. Explain how a country influences its exchange rate by using monetary or fiscal policy.

4. Explain how a country stabilizes or fixes an exchange rate.

5. Define purchasing power parity and real exchange rate.

6. Differentiate fixed, flexible, and partially flexible exchange rates, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each.

7. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a common currency.

In 2007 a euro that had cost 80 cents a few years earlier cost about $1.35, and there were expectations that the value of the dollar might fall further. The dollar had, however, fallen far less against the Chinese yuan, because the Chinese government was holding the value of its currency down. Earlier, in 2001, Argentina went through five presidents in two weeks as it struggled to adjust from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate, and in the late 1990s the international financial system almost broke down as Asian currency values fell substantially.

To understand what’s happening in these events, you must understand exchange rates and the balance of payments. This chapter gives you that understanding. The chapter starts with an in-depth consideration of the balance of payments, showing how it relates to the trade balance and exchange rates. That discussion is then tied to a consideration of the supply of and demand for currencies and how monetary and fiscal policy affect exchange rates. Finally I discuss exchange rate policy in some depth and present the arguments for and against various exchange rate regimes.

The Balance of Payments

The best door into an in-depth discussion of exchange rates and international financial considerations is a discussion of
balance of payments
(a country’s record of all transactions between its residents and the residents of all foreign nations).1 These include a country’s buying and selling of goods and services (imports and exports) and interest and profit payments from previous investments, together with all the capital inflows and outflows. Table 17-1 presents the 1987 and 2006 balance of payments accounts for the United States. These accounts record all payments made by foreigners to U.S. citizens and all payments made by U.S. citizens to foreigners in those years.

TABLE 17-1: The Balance of Payments Account, 1987 and 2006

The balance of payments is a country’s record of all transactions between its residents and the residents of all foreign countries.

Goods the United States exports must be paid for in dollars so, in order to buy U.S. exports, foreigners must exchange their currencies for dollars. Exports involve a flow of payments into the United States, so in the balance of payments accounts they have a plus sign. Similarly, U.S. imports must be paid for in foreign currency; they involve a flow of dollars out of the United States, and thus they have a minus sign. Notice that the bottom line of the balance of payments is $0. By definition, the bottom line (which includes all supplies and demands for currencies, including those of the government) must add up to zero.

The current account is the part of the balance of payments account that lists all short-term flows of payments.

As you can see in Table 17-1, the balance of payments account is broken down into the current account and the financial and capital account. The
current account
(lines 1-14) is the part of the balance of payments account in which all short-term flows of payments are listed. It includes exports and imports, which are what we normally mean when we talk about the trade balance. The
financial and capital account
(lines 15-25) is the part of the balance of payments account in which all long-term flows of payments are listed. If a U.S. citizen buys a German stock, or if a Japanese company buys a U.S. company, the transaction shows up on this account.

The financial and capital account is the part of the balance of payments account that lists all long-term flows of payments.

The U.S. government can influence the exchange rate (the rate at which one currency trades for another) by buying and selling
official reserves
—government holdings of foreign currencies—or by buying and selling other international reserves, such as gold. Such buying and selling is recorded in the government financial balance (line 23)—the part of the balance of payments account that records the amount of its own currency or foreign currencies that a nation buys or sells. Foreign governments can also influence the U.S. exchange rate by buying and selling reserves. Such buying and selling is recorded in the foreign government financial balance (line 22).

To get a better idea of what’s included in these accounts, let’s consider each of them more carefully.

The Current Account

Looking at Table 17-1, you can see that the current account is composed of the merchandise (or goods) account (lines 2-5), the services account (lines 6-9), the net investment income account (line 11), and the net transfers account (line 12).

Starting with the merchandise account, notice that in 1987 the United States imported $410 billion worth of goods and exported $250 billion worth of goods. The difference between the value of goods exported and the value of goods imported is called the
balance of merchandise trade
. Looking at line 5, you can see that the United States had a balance of merchandise trade deficit of $160 billion in 1987 and $836 billion in 2006.

The merchandise trade balance is often discussed in the press as a summary of how the United States is doing in the international markets. It’s not a good summary. Trade in services is just as important as trade in merchandise, so economists pay more attention to the combined balance of goods and services.

The balance of trade is the difference between the value of goods and services exported and imported.

Thus, the
balance of trade
—the difference between the value of goods and services exported and imported—(line 10) becomes a key statistic for economists. Notice that in both 1987 and 2006 most of the U.S. trade deficit resulted from an imbalance in the merchandise account. The service account worked in the opposite direction. It was slightly positive in 1987; in 2006 the services account reduced the trade deficit by $71 billion. Such services include tourist expenditures and insurance payments by foreigners to U.S. firms. For instance, when you travel in Japan, you spend yen, which you must buy with dollars; this is an outflow of payments, which is a negative contribution to the services account.

Q-1

If you, a U.S. citizen, are traveling abroad, where will your expenditures show up in the balance of payments accounts?

There is no reason that in a particular year the goods and services sent into a country must equal the goods and services sent out, even if the current account is in equilibrium, because the current account also includes payments from past investments and net transfers. When you invest, you expect to make a return on that investment. The payments to foreign owners of U.S. capital assets are a negative contribution to the U.S. balance of payments. The payment to U.S. owners of foreign capital assets is a positive contribution to the U.S. balance of payments. These payments on investment income are a type of holdover from past trade and services imbalances. So even though they relate to investments, they show up on the current account.

Payments on investment income show up on the current account.

The final component on the current account is net transfers, which include foreign aid, gifts, and other payments to individuals not exchanged for goods or services. If you send a $1,000 bond to your aunt in Mexico, it shows up with a minus sign here.

Adding up the pluses and minuses on the current account, we arrive at line 14, the current account balance. Notice that in 1987 the United States ran a $161 billion deficit on the current account, and in 2006 the United States had a deficit of $857 billion (line 14). That means that, in the current account, the supply of dollars greatly exceeded the demand for dollars. If the current account represented the total supply of and demand for dollars, the value of the dollar would have fallen. But it doesn’t represent the total. There are also the financial account and statistical discrepancies.

The Financial and Capital Account

The financial and capital account measures the flow of payments between countries for financial assets such as stocks, bonds, and ownership rights to real estate. It is broken into two subcategories: (1) the capital account, which includes debt forgiveness, migrant’s transfers, and transfers related to the sale of fixed assets; and (2) the financial account, which includes trade in assets such as business firms, bonds, stocks, and ownership right to real estate.2 As you can see, the capital account transactions are rather small on balance. As you can also see in Table 17-1, in both years there was a significant inflow of financial assets into the United States in excess of outflows of assets from the United States. In 1987, financial inflows (payments by foreigners for U.S. real and financial assets) were $169 billion more than financial outflows (payments by U.S. citizens for foreign assets). In 2006, inflows exceeded outflows by $710 billion.

In thinking about what determines a currency’s value, it’s important to remember both the demand for dollars to buy goods and services and the demand for dollars to buy assets.

To buy these U.S. assets, foreigners needed dollars, so these net financial inflows represent a demand for dollars. In 1987 and 2006, the demand for dollars to buy real and financial assets offset the excess supply of dollars on the current account. Because of the importance of financial flows, when you think about what’s likely to happen to a currency’s value, it’s important to remember both the demand for dollars to buy goods and services and the demand for dollars to buy assets.

If we added up the current account balance and the financial account balance, the two would not completely balance because of measurement errors. Line 26 takes care of that problem; it is the sum of all the above items with the sign reversed, and thus is a measure of the statistical discrepancy in the figures. In 1987 there was a small −$8 billion discrepancy, and in 2006 there was a +$147 billion discrepancy. These discrepancies arise because many international transactions, especially on the capital account, go unrecorded and hence must be estimated. Including line 26, the net balance of payments, including all government payments, is always zero.

When economists say that a country is running a balance of payments deficit or surplus, they are excluding its government’s financial transactions (line 23). Thus, if line 23 is positive, the United States is running a balance of payments deficit and, if it is negative, it is running a balance of payments surplus. Government financial transactions represent its buying and selling of currencies. Foreign governments also may be buying up U.S. currency, which they did substantially in 2006, as you can see by the large positive entry on line 22. These foreign countries are increasing their holding of U.S. dollars, and their purchases of U.S. dollars allow the U.S. balance of payments accounts to remain in equilibrium even as private quantities supplied and demanded for these currencies differ.

While the current and financial accounts offset each other, there is a difference between the long-run effects of the demand for dollars to buy currently produced goods and services and the demand for dollars to buy assets. Assets earn profits or interest, so when foreigners buy U.S. assets, they earn income from those assets just for owning them. The net investment income from foreigners’ previous asset purchases shows up on line 11 of the current account. It’s the difference between the income U.S. citizens receive from their foreign assets and the income foreigners receive from their U.S. assets. If assets earned equal returns, we would expect that when foreigners own more U.S. capital assets than U.S. citizens own foreign capital assets, net investment income should be negative. And when U.S. citizens own more foreign capital assets than foreigners own U.S. capital assets, net investment income should be positive. Why is this? Because net investment income is simply the difference between the returns on U.S. citizens’ assets held abroad and foreign citizens’ assets held in the United States.

Q-2

How can net investment income be positive if a country is a net debtor nation?

Since the 1980s, the inflow of capital into the United States has greatly exceeded the outflow of capital from the United States. As a result, the United States has become a net debtor nation; the amount foreigners own in the United States now exceeds the amount U.S. citizens own abroad by well over $1 trillion. So we would expect that U.S. investment income would be highly negative. But looking at line 11 of Table 17-1, we see that was not the case. The reason? Foreigners’ returns have been low, and many of the foreign assets owned by U.S. citizens abroad are undervalued. For example, the Japanese bought a lot of U.S. real estate at very high prices and have been losing money on those investments. While this trend has continued much longer than expected, we cannot expect it to continue forever.

Exchange Rates

Supply and demand are two central forces of economics, so it shouldn’t be surprising that our initial discussion of the determination of exchange rates uses supply and demand curves. As I stated above, an exchange rate is the rate at which one country’s currency can be traded for another country’s currency. The exchange rate is determined in what is called the
forex market
(foreign exchange market). In the forex markets, traders buy and sell currencies, taking orders from banks, which in turn take orders for currencies from individuals and companies that want to exchange one currency for another. It is a very busy market with nearly $2 trillion traded every day.

The exchange rate will tell you the price of a foreign currency. Below is an exchange rate table from March 5, 2007. It tells you how much a dollar was worth in terms of other currencies on that day.

The second column reports the U.S. dollar equivalent. It tells you the price of foreign currencies in terms of dollars. For example, one Argentinean peso costs about 32 cents. You also can look at exchange rates from the viewpoint of the foreign currency. For example, how many pesos are needed to buy one U.S. dollar? The third column tells you that one U.S. dollar costs 3.10 pesos.

FIGURE 17-1: The Supply of and Demand for Euros

As long as you keep quantities and prices of what straight, the standard, or fundamental, analysis of the determination of exchange rates is easy. Just remember that if you’re talking about the supply of and demand for euros, the price will be measured in dollars and the quantity will be in euros.

As you learned in Chapter 5, people exchange currencies to buy goods or assets in other countries. For example, an American who wants to buy stock of a company that trades on the EU stock exchange first needs to buy euros with dollars. If the stock costs 150 euros, he will need to buy 150 euros. With an exchange rate of $1.30 for 1 euro, he will need to pay $195 to buy 150 euros ($1.30 × 150). Only then can he buy the stock.

Let’s now turn to the graphs. At first glance, the graphical analysis of foreign exchange rates seems simple: You have an upward-sloping supply curve and a downward-sloping demand curve. But what goes on the axes? Obviously price and quantity, but what price? And what quantity? Because you are talking about the prices of currencies relative to each other, you have to specify which currencies you are using.

To demand one currency, you must supply another currency.

In Figure 17-1, I present the supply of and demand for euros in terms of dollars. Notice that the quantity of euros goes on the horizontal axis and the dollar price of euros goes on the vertical axis. When you are comparing currencies of only two countries the supply of one currency equals the demand for the other currency. To demand one currency, you must supply another. In this figure, I am assuming that there are only two trading partners: the United States and the European Union. This means that the supply of euros is equivalent to the demand for dollars. The Europeans who want to buy U.S. goods or assets supply euros to buy dollars. Let’s consider an example. Say a European wants to buy an IBM computer made in the United States. She has euros, but IBM wants dollars. So, to buy the computer, she or IBM must somehow exchange euros for dollars. She is
supplying
euros in order to
demand
dollars.

Q-3

Show graphically the effect on the price of euros of an increase in the demand for dollars by Europeans.

The supply curve of euros is upward-sloping because the more dollars European citizens get for their euros, the cheaper U.S. goods and assets are for them and the greater the quantity of euros they want to supply for those goods. Say, for example, that the dollar price of one euro rises from $1.30 to $1.35. That means that the price of a dollar to a European has fallen from 0.78 euro to 0.74 euro. For a European, a good that cost $100 now falls in price from 78 euros to 74 euros. U.S. goods are cheaper, so the Europeans buy more U.S. goods and more dollars, which means they supply more euros.

The demand for euros comes from Americans who want to buy European goods or assets. The demand curve is downward-sloping because the lower the dollar price of euros, the more euros U.S. citizens want to buy, using the same reasoning I just described.

The market is in equilibrium when the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded. In my example, equilibrium occurs at a dollar price of $1.30 for one euro. If the price of euros is above or below $1.30, quantity supplied won’t equal the quantity demanded and there will be pressure for the exchange rate to move to equilibrium. Say, for example, that the price is $1.50. The quantity of euros supplied will be greater than the quantity demanded. People who want to sell euros won’t be able to sell them. To find buyers, they will offer to sell their euros for less. As they do, the price of euros falls.

Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments

A deficit in the balance of payments means that the private quantity supplied of a currency exceeds the private quantity demanded. A surplus in the balance of payments means the opposite.

The total balance of payments (including government financial flows) is always in equilibrium, so we know that the quantity of a currency supplied always equals the quantity demanded. That does not mean, however, that foreign or domestic governments did not buy or sell currencies to maintain that equilibrium. If a government wants to keep its exchange rate higher than what would be supported by the market, the government must remove the excess supply of its currency. Its purchase of domestic currency would be recorded as a positive entry in the government financial account. Without that entry, the balance of payments would be in deficit. Thus, in Figure 17-1, when the price of euros is $1.50, the quantity of euros supplied exceeds the quantity demanded, so without the government’s purchase of euros, Europe is running a balance of payments deficit. When the price of euros is below $1.30, the quantity of euros demanded exceeds the quantity supplied, so excluding government sale of euros, Europe is running a balance of payments surplus.

Fundamental Forces Determining Exchange Rates

Exchange rate analysis is usually broken down into fundamental analysis and short-run analysis. In this section, I discuss fundamental analysis—a consideration of the fundamental forces that determine the supply of and demand for currencies, and hence cause them to shift. These fundamental forces include a country’s income, a country’s prices, the interest rate in a country, and the country’s trade policy. That means that changes in a country’s income, changes in a country’s prices, changes in interest rates, and changes in trade policy can cause the supply of and demand for a currency to shift. Let’s consider how they do so.

Changes in a Country’s Income

The demand for imports depends on the income in a country. When a country’s income falls, demand for imports falls. Hence, demand for foreign currency to buy those imports falls, which means that the supply of the country’s currency to buy the foreign currency falls. That’s why, in my presentation of the AS/AD model, I said that imports depend on income.

How important is this relationship? Very important. For example, in the early 2000s, strong economic growth in the United States relative to its primary trading partners led to increased imports, which increased the supply of U.S. dollars. The increase in the supply tended to lower the price of the dollar relative to foreign currencies.

Changes in a Country’s Prices

Four important fundamental determinants of exchange rates are income, prices, interest rates, and trade policy.

The United States’ demand for imports and foreign countries’ demand for U.S. exports depend on prices of U.S. goods compared to prices of foreign competing goods. If the United States has more inflation than other countries, foreign goods will become cheaper, U.S. demand for foreign currencies will tend to increase, and foreign demand for dollars will tend to decrease. This rise in U.S. inflation will shift the dollar supply outward and the dollar demand inward.

Changes in Interest Rates

People like to invest their savings in assets that will yield the highest return. Other things equal, a rise in U.S. interest rates relative to those abroad will increase demand for U.S. assets. As a result, demand for dollars will increase, while simultaneously the supply of dollars will decrease as fewer Americans sell their dollars to buy foreign assets. A fall in the U.S. interest rate or a rise in foreign interest rates will have the opposite effect.

Changes in Trade Policy

The demand for imports is affected by a government’s trade policy. An increase in trade restrictions, such as the 30 percent tariff President George W. Bush imposed on imported steel in 2002, increases the price of imports, reducing the quantity of imports demanded. Consequently, the demand for foreign currency to buy those imports declines so that the supply of a country’s currency falls. A number of other countries threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs on American goods, which they were allowed to do under WTO rules. These retaliatory tariffs would have reduced U.S. exports and reduced the demand for the U.S. dollar. To avoid these retaliatory tariffs, President Bush repealed the tariffs on steel in late 2003.

Some Examples

To make sure that you’ve understood the analysis, let’s consider some examples. First, the U.S. economy goes into recession with interest rates remaining constant—what will likely happen to exchange rates? Second, the Mexican economy has runaway inflation—what will likely happen to exchange rates? And third, the interest rate on yen-denominated assets increases—what will likely happen to the exchange rate? If you answered: The value of the dollar will rise, the value of the peso will fall, and the value of the yen will rise, you’re following the argument. If those weren’t your answers, a review is in order.

Indirect Methods of Influencing Exchange Rates

The government can influence the price of its currency either directly through market intervention or indirectly through monetary and fiscal policy. Let’s begin with the indirect method of monetary and fiscal policy.

Monetary Policy’s Effect on Exchange Rates

Monetary policy affects exchange rates in three primary ways: (1) through its effect on the interest rate, (2) through its effect on income, and (3) through its effect on price levels and inflation.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Interest Rates

Q-4

What effect does the lowering of a country’s interest rates have on exchange rates?

Expansionary monetary policy pushes down the U.S. interest rate, which decreases the financial inflow into the United States, decreasing the demand for dollars, pushing down the value of the dollar, and decreasing the U.S. exchange rate. Contractionary monetary policy does the opposite. It raises the U.S. interest rate, which tends to bring in financial capital flows from abroad, increasing the demand for dollars, increasing the value of the dollar, and increasing the U.S. exchange rate. This interest rate effect is the dominant short-run effect, and it often overwhelms the other effects.

The interest rate effect on exchange rates is the dominant short-run effect.

To see why these effects take place, consider a person in Japan in the early 2000s, when the Japanese interest rate was close to 0 percent. He or she reasoned, “Why should I earn 0 percent return in Japan? I’ll save (buy some financial assets) in the United States where I’ll earn 3 percent.” If the U.S. interest rate goes up due to contraction in the money supply, other things equal, the advantage of holding one’s financial assets in the United States will become even greater and more people will want to save here. People in Japan hold yen, not dollars, so in order to save in the United States they must buy dollars. Thus, a rise in U.S. interest rates increases demand for dollars and, in terms of yen, pushes up the U.S. exchange rate. This example illustrates that it is relative interest rates that govern the flow of financial assets.

REAL-WORLD APPLICATION

Iceland’s Struggle to Slow Inflation

In 2006, the Icelandic inflation rate exceeded its target inflation rate, and investors became worried. The financial press began to issue comments such as this: “The negative outlook has been triggered by a material deterioration in Iceland’s macro-prudential risk indicators, accompanied by an unsustainable current account deficit and soaring net external indebtedness.” A group of developed countries, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), warned that that failure to bring inflation down could damage the country’s international credibility, and that “[i]n the absence of swift and vigorous policy action, financial market stability could beat risk.”

In response to these and other warnings, foreign exchange traders began selling kr$oAna, the Icelandic currency. The kr$oAna’s value started to decline, which led the Icelandic Central Bank to tighten the money supply and raise interest rates. In 2006 the Icelandic Central Bank issued the following statement:

Economic developments since the end of March indicate that a considerable increase in the policy rate may be required to maintain sufficiently tight monetary conditions. Rising inflation expectations have caused the real policy rate to decline. Furthermore, the depreciation of the kr$oAna has eased conditions in the traded goods sector. The current policy rate hike is intended to respond to these developments. Attaining the inflation target within an acceptable period of time is the firm intention of the Central Bank.

The Central Bank of Iceland continued raising interest rates by substantial amounts, to 12 percent and then to 13.5 percent, stating that “further rises were unavoidable.” They continued raising interest rates and, in mid-2007, the interest rate was about 15 percent while inflation had decreased to less than 6 percent.

Countries are continually taking into account the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates. For example, in the mid-1990s, Taiwan kept its money supply tight, raising its interest rates to keep the new Taiwan dollar high. In 1997 Taiwan cut reserve ratios; interest rates fell and the value of the new Taiwan dollar fell.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Income

Monetary policy also affects income in a country. As money supply rises, income expands; when money supply falls, income contracts.3 This effect on income provides another way in which the money supply affects the exchange rate. As we saw earlier, when income rises, imports rise while exports are unaffected. To buy foreign products, U.S. citizens need foreign currency, which they must buy with dollars. So when U.S. imports rise, the supply of dollars to the foreign exchange market increases as U.S. citizens sell dollars to buy foreign currencies to pay for those imports. This decreases the dollar exchange rate. This effect through income and imports provides a second path through which monetary policy affects the exchange rate: Expansionary monetary policy causes U.S. income to rise, imports to rise, and the U.S. exchange rate to fall via the income path. Contractionary monetary policy causes U.S. income to fall, imports to fall, and the U.S. exchange rate to rise via the income path.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Price Levels

Q-5

What effect would contractionary monetary policy have on a country’s exchange rates?

A third way in which monetary policy can affect exchange rates is through its effect on prices in a country. Expansionary monetary policy pushes the U.S. price level up. As the U.S. price level rises relative to foreign prices, U.S. exports become more expensive, and goods the United States imports become relatively cheaper, decreasing U.S. competitiveness. This increases demand for foreign currencies and decreases demand for dollars. Thus, via the price path, expansionary monetary policy pushes down the dollar’s value for the same reason that an expansion in income pushes it down.

Contractionary monetary policy puts downward pressure on the U.S. price level and slows down any existing inflation. As the U.S. price level falls relative to foreign prices, U.S. exports become more competitive and the goods the United States imports, relatively more expensive. Thus, contractionary monetary policy pushes up the value of the dollar via the price path.

The Net Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates

Monetary policy affects exchange rates through interest rate path, the income path, and the price level path, as shown in the accompanying diagram.

Notice that all these effects of monetary policy on exchange rates are in the same direction. Expansionary monetary policy pushes a country’s exchange rate down; contractionary monetary policy pushes a country’s exchange rate up. Summarizing these effects, we have the following relationships for expansionary and contractionary monetary policy:

Expansionary monetary policy lowers exchange rates. It decreases the relative value of a country’s currency.

There are, of course, many provisos to the relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate. For example, as the exchange rate falls, the price of imports goes up and there is some inflationary pressure from that rise in price and hence some pressure for the price level to rise as well as fall. Monetary policy affects exchange rates in subtle ways, but if an economist had to give a quick answer to what effect monetary policy would have on exchange rates, it would be

Expansionary monetary policy lowers exchange rates. It decreases the relative value of a country’s currency.

Contractionary monetary policy increases exchange rates. It increases the relative value of a country’s currency.

Contractionary monetary policy increases exchange rates. It increases the relative value of a country’s currency.

Fiscal Policy’s Effect on Exchange Rates

The effect of fiscal policy on exchange rates is not so clear. The reason why can be seen by considering its effects on income, the price level, and interest rates.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Income

Expansionary fiscal policy expands income and therefore increases imports, increasing the trade deficit and lowering the exchange rate. Contractionary fiscal policy contracts income, thereby decreasing imports and increasing the exchange rate. These effects of expansionary and contractionary fiscal policies via the income path are similar to the effects of monetary policy, so if it’s not intuitively clear to you why the effect is what it is, it may be worthwhile to review the slightly more complete discussion of monetary policy’s effect presented previously.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Price Levels

Let’s turn to the effect of fiscal policy on exchange rates through prices. Expansionary fiscal policy increases aggregate demand and increases prices of a country’s exports; hence, it decreases the competitiveness of a country’s exports, which pushes down the exchange rate. Contractionary fiscal policy works in the opposite direction. These are the same effects that monetary policy had. And, as was the case with monetary policy, the price path is a long-run effect.

The Effect on Exchange Rates via Interest Rates

Fiscal policy’s effect on the exchange rate via the interest rate path is different from monetary policy’s effect. Let’s first consider the effect of expansionary fiscal policy. Whereas expansionary monetary policy lowers the interest rate, expansionary fiscal policy raises interest rates because the government sells bonds to finance that budget deficit. The higher U.S. interest rate causes foreign capital to flow into the United States, which pushes up the U.S. exchange rate. Therefore, expansionary fiscal policy’s effect on exchange rates via the interest rate effect is to push up a country’s exchange rate.

Contractionary fiscal policy decreases interest rates since it reduces the bond financing of that deficit. Lower U.S. interest rates cause capital to flow out of the United States, which pushes down the U.S. exchange rate. Thus, the U.S. government budget surplus in the late 1990s put downward pressure on the interest rate and downward pressure on the exchange rate value of the dollar, while the deficits in the early 2000s put upward pressure on the interest rate and exchange rate.

The Net Effect of Fiscal Policy on Exchange Rates

Q-6

What is the net effect of expansionary fiscal policy on the exchange rate?

Of these three effects, the interest rate effect and the income effect are both short-run effects. These two work in opposite directions, so the net effect of fiscal policy on the exchange rate is, in general, ambiguous, although in specific instances either the interest rate effect or the income effect may swamp the other. The following diagram summarizes these three effects.

Fiscal policy affects exchange rates through the income path, the interest rate path, and the price level path, as shown in the accompanying diagram.

As you can see, it’s unclear what the effect of expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy will be on exchange rates.

Direct Methods of Influencing Exchange Rates

The supply/demand analysis may have made it look like exchange rates are driven by fundamentals. Unfortunately, that is not the case. In day-to-day trading, fundamentals can be overwhelmed by expectations of how a currency will change in value. The supply and demand curves for currencies can shift around rapidly in response to rumors, expectations, and expectations of expectations. As they shift, they bring about large fluctuations in exchange rates that make trading difficult and have significant real effects on economic activity.

Q-7

Why don’t most governments leave determination of the exchange rate to the market?

Let me outline just one potential problem. Say you expect the price of the currency to fall one-half of 1 percent tomorrow. What should you do? The correct answer is: Sell that currency quickly. Why? One-half of 1 percent may not sound like much, but, annualized, it is equivalent to a rate of interest per year of 617 percent. Based on that expectation, if you’re into making money (and you’re really sure about the fall), you will sell all of that currency that you hold, and borrow all you can so you can sell some more. You can make big money if you guess small changes in exchange rates correctly. (Of course, if you’re wrong, you can lose big money.) This means that if the market generally believes the exchange rates will move, those expectations will tend to be self-fulfilling. Self-fulfilling expectations undermine the argument in favor of letting markets determine exchange rates: When expectations rule, the exchange rate may not reflect actual demands and supplies of goods. Instead, the exchange rate can reflect expectations and rumors. The resulting fluctuations serve no real purpose, and cause problems for international trade and the country’s economy. Let’s consider an example.

Suppose that a firm decides to build a plant in the United States because costs in the United States are low. But suppose also that the value of the dollar then rises significantly; the firm’s costs rise significantly too, making it uncompetitive. When currencies fluctuate, companies find it harder to make good decisions on where to produce.

In a real-world example, from July to September 1997, the value of the Thai baht fell nearly 40 percent. Goodyear (Thailand), which had been one of the five most profitable companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand, suddenly faced a 20 percent rise in the costs of raw materials because it paid for those raw materials in dollars. It also faced a decline in tire prices because the demand for tires had fallen 20 to 40 percent when the Thai economy contracted. Within just two months, a highly profitable venture had become unprofitable. Other firms were closing shop because they were unable to pay the interest on loans that were denominated in dollars. In summary, large fluctuations make real trade difficult and cause serious real consequences.

The problems caused by fluctuating exchange rates have led to calls for government to intervene and either stabilize or fix its exchange rate directly by buying or selling its currency. It can increase the value of its currency by buying its currency, assuming it has international reserves to buy it with. Alternatively, it can decrease the value of its currency by selling its currency. This ability of a country to buy and sell its currency means that, assuming it has sufficient reserves, a country can fix its currency at a specific level.

Currency Support

A country fixes the exchange rate by standing ready to buy and sell its currency anytime the exchange rate is not at the fixed exchange rate.

A country can maintain a fixed exchange rate above its market price only as long as it has the reserves.

Let’s consider currency support. Suppose that, given the interaction of private supply and demand forces, the equilibrium value of the euro is $1.30 a euro, but the European Union wants to maintain a value of $1.50 a euro. This is shown in Figure 17-2. At $1.50 a euro, quantity supplied exceeds quantity demanded. The European Union must buy the surplus, Q2-Q1, using official reserves (foreign currency holdings). In doing so, it shifts the total demand for euros to D1, making the equilibrium market exchange rate (including the European government’s demand for euros) equal to $1.50. This process is called
currency support
—the buying of a currency by a government to maintain its value at above its long-run equilibrium value. It is a direct exchange rate policy. If a government has sufficient official reserves, or if it can convince other governments to lend it reserves, it can fix the exchange rate at the rate it wants, no matter what the private level of supply and demand is. In reality, governments have no such power to support currencies in the long run, since their reserves are limited. For example, in 2002 the Argentinean government tried to keep its currency fixed to the U.S. dollar, but it ran out of foreign reserves and was forced to let its currency decline in value.

FIGURE 17-2: A Demonstration of Direct Exchange Rate Policy

If the government chooses to hold the exchange rate at $1.50, when the equilibrium is $1.30, there is an excess supply given by Q2 − Q1. The government purchases this excess (using official reserves) and closes the difference, thus maintaining equilibrium.

A country has more power to prevent the value of its currency from rising since it can create its own money. Thus, throughout the early 2000s, China used yuan to buy large amounts of dollars, thereby preventing the value of the yuan from rising relative to the dollar.

Currency Stabilization

A more viable long-run exchange rate policy is
currency stabilization
—the buying and selling of a currency by the government to offset temporary fluctuations in supply and demand for currencies. In currency stabilization, the government is not trying to change the long-run equilibrium; it is simply trying to keep the exchange rate at that long-run equilibrium. The government sometimes buys and sometimes sells currency, so it is far less likely to run out of reserves.

Successful currency stabilization requires the government to choose the correct long-run equilibrium exchange rate. A policy of stabilization can become a policy of support if the government chooses too high a long-run equilibrium. Unfortunately, government has no way of knowing for sure what the long-run equilibrium exchange rate is, so how much stabilizing it can do depends on its access to reserves. If it has sufficient reserves, the government buys up sufficient quantities of its currency to make up the difference.

Once the government has dried up the sources of borrowing foreign currencies, if it wants to hold its exchange rate above the private equilibrium exchange rate, it must move to indirect methods of monetary and fiscal policy to affect private supplies and demands for its currency.

Q-8

In general, would it be easier for the United States to push the value of the dollar down or up? Why?

The same argument about running out of reserves cannot be made for a country that wants to maintain a below-market exchange rate. Since a government can create all the domestic currency it wants, it’s easier for the European Union to push the value of its currency down by selling euros than it is for the government to hold it up by buying euros. By the same token, it’s easier for another country (say, Japan) to push the value of the euro up (by pushing the value of the yen down). Thus, if the two governments can decide which way they want their exchange rates to move, they have a large incentive to cooperate. Of course, cooperation requires an agreement on the goals, and often countries’ goals conflict. One role of the various international economic organizations is to provide a forum for reaching agreement on exchange rate goals and a vehicle through which cooperation can take place.

Notice that, in principle, any trader could establish a fixed exchange rate by guaranteeing to buy or sell a currency at a given rate. Any “fix,” however, is only as good as the guarantee, and to fix an exchange rate would require many more resources than an individual trader has; only governments have sufficient resources to fix an exchange rate, and often even governments run out of resources.

Strategic currency stabilization is the process of buying and selling at strategic moments to affect the expectations of traders, and hence affect their supply and demand.

In reality, given the small level of official reserves compared to the enormous level of private trading, significant amounts of stabilization are impossible. Instead, governments use strategic currency stabilization—buying and selling at strategic moments to affect expectations of traders, and hence to affect their supply and demand. Such issues are discussed in depth in international finance courses.

Stabilizing Fluctuations versus Deviating from Long-Run Equilibrium

The key to whether or not exchange rate intervention is a viable option involves the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. Direct exchange rate policy can succeed if the problem is one of stabilization. If, however, the problem is long run, or if the government estimates the wrong equilibrium, eventually the government will run out of official reserves. Here’s the rub: While in theory it is important to make the distinction, in practice it is difficult to do so. The government can only guess at the long-run equilibrium rate, since no definitive empirical measure of this rate exists. The long-run equilibrium must be estimated. If that estimate is wrong, a sustainable stabilization policy becomes an unsustainable deviation from long-run equilibrium policy. Thus, a central issue in exchange rate intervention policy is estimating the long-run equilibrium exchange rate.

REAL-WORLD APPLICATION

Determining the Causes of Fluctuations in the Dollar’s Value

A s you can see on the graph, the dollar’s value has fluctuated considerably since 1973. A good exercise to see if you understand movements in the value of the dollar is to try to choose which factors caused the fluctuation.

Let’s start with the relatively small fluctuations in 1973 and 1974. These probably reflected expectational bubbles—in which speculators were more concerned with short-run fluctuations than long-run fundamentals—while the dollar’s low value in 1979 and 1980 reflected high inflation, relatively low real interest rates, and the booming U.S. economy during this period.

The rise of the dollar in the early 1980s reflected higher real U.S. interest rates and the falling U.S. inflation rate, although the rise was much more than expected and probably reflected speculation, as did the sudden fall in the dollar’s value in 1985. Similarly, the fluctuations in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflected both changing interest rates in the United States and changing foreign interest rates, as well as changing relative inflation rates.

In the late 1990s, the value of the dollar rose substantially. Part of the explanation for this lies in the weakness of the Japanese economy, which led the Japanese central bank to increase the Japanese money supply, thereby lowering the Japanese interest rate. That weakness also was reflected in the fall in the prices of Japanese stocks. That fall led investors to shift out of Japanese stocks and into U.S. stocks, thereby increasing the demand for the dollar, and pushing up the U.S. effective exchange rate. Since the early 2000s, the value of the dollar has been declining slowly as its trade deficit has expanded.

Source: Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System (www.federalreserve.gov).

As you can see, after the fact we economists are pretty good at explaining the movements in the exchange rates. Alas, before the fact we aren’t so good because often speculative activities make the timing of the movements unpredictable.

Purchasing Power Parity and

Real Exchange Rates

Purchasing power parity is one way economists have of estimating the long-run equilibrium rate.
Purchasing power parity (PPP)
is a method of calculating exchange rates that attempts to value currencies at rates such that each currency will buy an equal basket of goods. It is based on the idea that the exchange of currencies reflects the exchange of real goods. If you are able to exchange a basket of goods from country × for an equivalent basket of goods from country Z, you should also be able to exchange the amount of currency from country × that is needed to purchase country X’s basket of goods for the amount of currency from country Z that is needed to purchase country Z’s basket of goods. For example, say that the yen is valued at 100 yen to $1. Say also that you can buy the same basket of goods for 1,000 yen that you can buy for $7. In that case, the purchasing power parity exchange rate would be 143 yen to $1 (1,000/7 = 143) compared to an actual exchange rate of 100 yen to $1. An economist would say that at 100 to the dollar the yen is overvalued—with 100 yen you could not purchase a basket of goods equivalent to the basket of goods you could purchase with $1.

TABLE 17-2: Actual and Purchasing Power Parity Exchange Rates for 2006

Purchasing power parity is a method of calculating exchange rates such that various currencies will each buy an equal basket of goods and services.

Table 17-2 shows various calculations for purchasing power parity for a variety of countries. The second column shows the 2006 actual exchange rates. The third column shows purchasing power parity exchange rates. The fourth column shows the difference between the two, or the 2006 distortion in the exchange rates (if you believe the PPP exchange rates are the correct ones).

Criticisms of the Purchasing Power Parity Method

WWW

Web Note 17.1: The Big Mac Index

For many economists, estimating exchange rates using PPP has serious problems. If the currency is overvalued and will eventually fall, why don’t traders use that information and sell that currency now, making it fall now? After all, they are out after a profit. So if there is open trading in a currency, any expected change in the exchange rate will affect exchange rates now. If traders don’t sell now when there are expectations that a currency’s overvaluation will eventually make its value fall, they must believe there is some reason that its value won’t, in fact, fall.

Purchasing power parity exchange rates may or may not be appropriate long-run exchange rates.

Critics argue that the difficulty with PPP exchange rates is the complex nature of trade and consumption. They point out that the PPP will change as the basket of goods changes. This means that there is no one PPP measure. They also point out that, since all PPP measures leave out asset demand for a currency, the measures are missing an important element of the demand. Critics ask: Is there any reason to assume that in the long run the asset demand for a currency is less important than the goods demand for a currency? Because the asset demand for a currency is important, critics of PPP argue that there is little reason to assume that the short-run actual exchange rate will ever adjust to the PPP exchange rates. And if that rate doesn’t adjust, then PPP does not provide a good estimate of the equilibrium rate. These critics further contend that the existing exchange rate is the best estimate of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate.

Real Exchange Rates

Regardless of one’s view of the usefulness of purchasing power parity, the concept gets at the importance of prices in the determination of exchange rates. Say, for example, that the price level in the United States goes up by 10 percent while the price level in Europe stays constant. In such a situation, we would expect some change in the exchange rate—the most likely effect would be that the U.S. dollar falls by 10 percent relative to the euro. To capture the distinction between changes in exchange rates caused by changes in price levels and changes in exchange rates caused by other things, economists differentiate between nominal and real exchange rates. A
real exchange rate
is an exchange rate adjusted for differential inflation or differential changes in the price level. A nominal exchange rate is the exchange rate you see in the papers—it is the rate you’d get when exchanging currencies.

A real exchange rate is an exchange rate adjusted for differential inflation or differential changes in the price level.

Let’s consider the above example: The U.S. price level rises by 10 percent, the European price level remains constant, and the nominal U.S. exchange rate falls by 10 percent. In that case, the real exchange rate will have remained constant. More generally, the change in the real exchange rate (foreign/domestic or in this case euro/$) can be approximately calculated by adding the difference in the rates of inflation between the two countries (domestic inflation —foreign inflation) to the percentage change in the nominal exchange rate.

%Δreal exchange rate =

%Δnominal exchange rate + [domestic inflation − foreign inflation]

Q-9

If U.S. inflation is 2 percent, the European Union’s inflation rate is 4 percent, and the nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate rises by 3 percent relative to the euro, what happens to the real exchange rate of the dollar?

For example, say the U.S. price level had risen only by 8 percent and Europe’s had remained constant, but the U.S. nominal exchange rate had fallen by 10 percent. In that case, we would say that the real U.S. exchange rate had fallen by 2 percent.

%Δreal exchange rate = −10 + (8 − 0) = −2 percent

Advantages and Disadvantages of Alternative Exchange Rate Systems

The problems of stabilizing exchange rates have led to an ongoing debate about whether a fixed exchange rate, a flexible exchange rate, or a combination of the two is best. This debate nicely captures the macro issues relevant to exchange rate stabilization, so in this section I consider that debate. First, a brief overview of the three alternative regimes:

Three exchange rate regimes are

1. Fixed exchange rate: The government chooses an exchange rate and offers to buy and sell currencies at that rate.

2. Flexible exchange rate: Determination of exchange rates is left totally up to the market.

3. Partially flexible exchange rate: The government sometimes affects the exchange rate and sometimes leaves it to the market.

Fixed exchange rate
:When the government chooses a particular exchange rate and offers to buy and sell its currency at that price. For example, suppose the U.S. government says it will buy euros at $1.30 per euro and sell dollars at 0.78 euro per dollar. In that case, we say that the United States has a fixed exchange rate of 0.78 euro to the dollar.

Flexible exchange rate
: When the government does not enter into foreign exchange markets at all, but leaves the determination of exchange rates totally up to currency traders. The price of its currency is allowed to rise and fall as market forces dictate.

Partially flexible exchange rate
: When the government sometimes buys or sells currencies to influence the exchange rate, while at other times letting private market forces operate. A partially flexible exchange rate is sometimes called a dirty float because it isn’t purely market-determined or government-determined.

Fixed Exchange Rates

The advantages of a fixed exchange rate system are

1. Fixed exchange rates provide international monetary stability.

2. Fixed exchange rates force governments to make adjustments to meet their international problems.

The disadvantages of a fixed exchange rate system are

1. Fixed exchange rates can become unfixed. When they’re expected to become unfixed, they create enormous monetary instability.

2. Fixed exchange rates force governments to make adjustments to meet their international problems. (Yes, this is a disadvantage as well as an advantage.)

Let’s consider each in turn.

Fixed Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Stability

Fixed exchange rates provide international monetary stability and force governments to make adjustments to meet their international problems. (This is also a disadvantage.) If they become unfixed, they create monetary instability.

The advantage of fixed exchange rates is that firms know what exchange rates will be, making trade easier. However, to maintain fixed exchange rates, the government must choose an exchange rate and have sufficient official reserves to support that rate. If the rate it chooses is too high, its exports lag and the country continually loses official reserves. If the rate it chooses is too low, it is paying more for its imports than it needs to and is building up official reserves.

The difficulty is that as soon as the country gets close to its official reserves limit, foreign exchange traders begin to expect a drop in the value of the currency, and they try to get out of that currency because anyone holding that currency when it falls will lose money. For example, in December 1997, when traders found out that South Korea had only $10 billion in reserves instead of the official government announcement of $30 billion, they sold the Korean won and its value dropped. False rumors of an expected depreciation or decrease in a country’s fixed exchange rate can become true by causing a “run on a currency,” as all traders sell that currency. Thus, at times fixed exchange rates can become highly unstable because expectation of a change in the exchange rate can force the change to occur. As opposed to small movements in currency values, under a fixed rate regime these movements occur in large, sudden jumps.

Fixed Exchange Rates and Policy Independence

Maintaining a fixed exchange rate places limitations on a central bank’s actions. In a country with fixed exchange rates, the central bank must ensure that the international quantities of its currency supplied and demanded are equal at the existing exchange rate.

Say, for example, that the United States and the Bahamas have fixed exchange rates: $1 B = $1 U.S. The Bahamian central bank decides to run an expansionary monetary policy, lowering the interest rate and stimulating the Bahamian economy. The lower interest rates will cause financial capital to flow out of the country, and the higher income will increase imports. Demand for Bahamian dollars will fall. To prop up its dollar and to maintain the fixed exchange rate, the Bahamian government will have to buy its own currency. It can do so only as long as it has sufficient official reserves of other countries’ currencies.

Because most countries’ official reserves are limited, a country with fixed exchange rates is limited in its ability to conduct expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. It loses its freedom to stimulate the economy in response to a recession. That’s why, when a serious recession hits, many countries are forced to abandon fixed exchange rates. They run out of official reserves, and choose expansionary monetary policy to achieve their domestic goals over contractionary monetary policy to achieve their international goals.

Flexible Exchange Rates

The advantages and disadvantages of a flexible exchange rate (exchange rates totally determined by private market forces) are the reverse of those of fixed exchange rates. The advantages are

1. Flexible exchange rates provide for orderly incremental adjustment of exchange rates rather than large, sudden jumps.

2. Flexible exchange rates allow government to be flexible in conducting domestic monetary and fiscal policies.

The disadvantages are

1. Flexible exchange rates allow speculation to cause large jumps in exchange rates, which do not reflect market fundamentals.

2. Flexible exchange rates allow government to be flexible in conducting domestic monetary and fiscal policies. (This is a disadvantage as well as an advantage.)

Let’s consider each in turn.

Flexible Exchange Rates and Exchange Rate Stability

Advocates of flexible exchange rates argue as follows: Why not treat currency markets like any other market and let private market forces determine a currency’s value? There is no fixed price for TVs; why should there be a fixed price for currencies? The opponents’ answer is based on the central role that international financial considerations play in an economy and the strange shapes and large shifts that occur in the short-run supply and demand curves for currencies.

When expectations shift supply and demand curves around all the time, there’s no guarantee that the exchange rate will be determined by long-run fundamental forces. The economy will go through real gyrations because of speculators’ expectations about other speculators. Thus, the argument against flexible exchange rates is that they allow far too much fluctuation in exchange rates, making trade difficult.

Flexible Exchange Rates and Policy Independence

Flexible exchange rate regimes provide for orderly incremental adjustment of exchange rates rather than large sudden jumps, and allow governments to be flexible in conducting domestic monetary and fiscal policies. (This is also a disadvantage.)

The policy independence arguments for and against flexible exchange rates are the reverse of those given for fixed exchange rates. Individuals who believe that national governments should not have flexibility in setting monetary policy argue that flexible exchange rates don’t impose the discipline on policy that fixed exchange rates do. Say, for example, that a country’s goods are uncompetitive. Under a fixed exchange rate system, the country would have to contract its money supply and deal with the underlying uncompetitive-ness of its goods. Under a flexible exchange rate system, the country can maintain an expansionary monetary policy, allowing inflation simply by permitting the value of its currency to fall.

Advocates of policy flexibility argue that it makes no sense for a country to go through a recession when it doesn’t have to; flexible exchange rates allow countries more flexibility in dealing with their problems. True, policy flexibility may lead to inflation, but inflation is better than a recession.

Partially Flexible Exchange Rates

Faced with the dilemma of choosing between these two unpleasant policies, most countries have opted for a policy in between: partially flexible exchange rates. With such a policy, they try to get the advantages of both fixed and flexible exchange rates.

When policy makers believe there is a fundamental misalignment in a country’s exchange rate, they will allow private forces to determine it—they allow the exchange rate to be flexible. When they believe that the currency’s value is falling because of speculation, or that too large an adjustment in the currency is taking place, and that that adjustment won’t achieve their balance of payments goals, they step in and fix the exchange rate, either supporting or pushing down their currency’s value. Countries that follow a currency stabilization policy have partially flexible exchange rates.

Partially flexible exchange rate regimes combine the advantages and disadvantages of fixed and flexible exchange rates.

If policy makers are correct, this system of partial flexibility works smoothly and has the advantages of both fixed and flexible exchange rates. If policy makers are incorrect, however, a partially flexible system has the disadvantages of both fixed and flexible systems.

Which View Is Right?

Q-10

Does government intervention stabilize exchange rates?

Fixed vs. Flexible vs. Partially Flexible Exchange Rates

Which view is correct is much in debate. Most foreign exchange traders I know tell me that the possibility of government intervention increases the amount of private speculation in the system. In the private investors’ view, their own assessments of what exchange rates should be are better than those of policy makers. If private investors knew the government would not enter in, private speculators would focus on fundamentals and would stabilize short-run exchange rates. When private speculators know government might enter into the market, they don’t focus on fundamentals; instead they continually try to outguess government policy makers. When that happens, private speculation doesn’t stabilize; it destabilizes exchange rates as private traders try to guess what the government thinks.

Many of my economics colleagues who work for the Fed aren’t convinced by private investors’ arguments. They maintain that some government intervention helps stabilize currency markets. I don’t know which group is right—private foreign exchange traders or economists at the Fed. But to decide, it is necessary to go beyond the arguments and consider how the various exchange rate regimes have worked in practice. Appendix A to this chapter gives you an introduction into the history of exchange rate regimes.

The Euro: A Common Currency for Europe

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Web Note 17.2: Multinational Money

If you think of countries with a fixed exchange rate as being in a marriage, you can think of a common currency as in a marriage for life, from which it is almost impossible to escape. In 2002 12 European nations consummated their fixed exchange rate regime established under the EU’s plan for monetary union and adopted the euro as their common currency. Slovenia joined in 2007; those countries using the euro as their currency are shown in Figure 17-3 with the euro symbol (). (Other members of the EU are considering joining in the near future.) They adopted the euro for a number of reasons, some political and some economic; but regardless of why they did it, the euro will have significant effects on international finance and trade over the next decade.

First, let’s consider the advantages the EU countries get from adopting a common currency. The first advantage is that, politically, a common currency ties the countries closely together. World Wars I and II started from fights among European countries. An important motive behind the increasing integration of Europe—from initial creation of a common market, to the establishment of the European Union with reduced border controls, to the establishment of the monetary union—has been to prevent large-scale war from ever happening again. Many feel that political reasons drove the countries toward union.

Three economic advantages of a common currency are that it:

1. eliminates the cost of exchanging currencies,

2. facilitates price comparisons, and

3. creates a larger market.

There are, however, also economic reasons. One is to eliminate the cost of exchanging currencies when trading among members, and thereby provide an incentive to increase trade within the EU countries. A second is price transparency. With the adoption of a single currency, consumers and businesses can more easily see price differentials, resulting in greater competition. For example, instead of having to compare a pair of German shoes priced at 60 marks with an Italian pair priced at 48,000 lire, a consumer just needs to compare 30 euros with 25 euros. A third advantage is that the common currency makes it more likely that companies will think of Europe as a single market. Producing for that market would give European consumers more clout and make Europe, as well as the United States, the reference market when new goods are planned. It would also allow European firms to take advantage of economies of scale when producing for the European market. Finally, planners hoped that the importance of the euro would lead individuals throughout the world to hold their assets in euros rather than in dollars. That would mean lower interest rates for Europe relative to what they would have been, and the possibility that the euro will be used as an international reserve currency along with the dollar. An international reserve currency is a currency in which people and firms hold their savings. This means that the EU could create euros and exchange them for other currencies to buy products without increasing the money supply and risking inflation. (For the EU, it would be like getting an interest-free loan.) Because the U.S. dollar has been the world’s reserve currency, the United States has been getting those interest-free loans, which is one of the reasons it’s been able to run continual large trade deficits. If the euro partially replaces the dollar as the world reserve currency, there will likely be a large fall in demand for the dollar and a decrease in its relative value.

FIGURE 17-3: Map of EU Countries

Members of the European Union as of 2007 included Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Those countries that also share a common currency are marked with a $, the symbol of the euro.

A major disadvantage of a common currency is the loss of independent monetary policy for member countries.

One major disadvantage of the common currency area is that members of the EU will no longer have independent monetary policies. So if an external shock hurts one region worse than another, the region hit hard cannot increase the money supply to offset the effect on output. For example, in the early 2000s, Ireland’s economy was growing quickly while Germany’s economy was contracting, but the two countries shared the same interest rate and monetary policy. A common currency also presents nationalism problems. A country’s currency is a symbol to people of their country, and giving it up means losing part of their identity. Loss of nationalism is one reason Britain has been reluctant to adopt the euro.

The initial adoption of the euro has gone relatively smoothly, although realization of its advantages is still in the future. It will be an experiment that will be followed carefully over the next decade.

Conclusion

This chapter began with a quotation suggesting that a foreign exchange dealer’s office can be the nearest thing to bedlam that there is. Seeing some order within that bedlam is not easy, but understanding the balance of payments and its relation to the determination of exchange rates is a good first step. And it is a necessary step. With international transportation and communication becoming easier and faster and other countries’ economies growing, the U.S. economy will become more interdependent with the global economy in the upcoming decades, making understanding these issues more and more necessary to understanding macroeconomics.

Summary

• The balance of payments is made up of the current account and the financial and capital account.

• Exchange rates in a perfectly flexible exchange rate system are determined by the supply of and demand for a currency.

• An increase in a country’s income increases the demand for foreign currency and leads to a decline in the value of the country’s own currency.

• An increase in a country’s price level reduces the demand for one’s currency and increases the demand for foreign currency and leads to a decline in the value of one’s own currency.

• A decrease in a country’s interest rates reduces the demand for that country’s currency and increases the demand for foreign currency, leading to a decline in the value of one’s own currency.

• Increased trade restrictions on imports reduce the demand for foreign currencies, leading to an increase in the value of one’s own currency.

• To raise the price of its currency, a country can either increase private demand through contractionary monetary policy or decrease private supply through contractionary monetary policy.

• Expansionary monetary policy, through its effect on interest rates, income, and the price level, tends to lower a country’s exchange rate.

• Fiscal policy has an ambiguous effect on a country’s exchange rate.

• A country can stabilize or fix its exchange rate by either directly buying and selling its own currency or adjusting its monetary and fiscal policy to achieve its exchange rate goal.

• It is easier technically for a country to bring the value of its currency down than it is to support its currency.

• It is extraordinarily difficult to correctly estimate the long-run equilibrium exchange rate; one method of doing so is the purchasing power parity approach.

• Fixed exchange rates provide international monetary stability but can create enormous monetary instability if they become unfixed. Fixed exchange rates force governments to make adjustments to meet their international problems.

• Flexible exchange rates allow exchange rates to make incremental changes, but are also subject to large jumps in value as a result of speculation. Flexible exchange rates give governments flexibility in conducting domestic monetary and fiscal policy.

• A real exchange rate is an exchange rate adjusted for differences in inflation:

%δreal exchange rate = %δnominal exchange rate + [domestic inflation —foreign inflation]

• A common currency creates strong political ties, reduces the cost of trade, facilitates price comparisons, and creates a larger single market. A common currency also makes it impossible to have an independent monetary policy. The 13 countries that share the euro gave up their own national currencies and gave up independent monetary policies.

Key Terms

balance of merchandise trade (
410
)

balance of payments (
408
)

balance of trade (
410
)

currency stabilization (
421
)

currency support (
420
)

current account (
409
)

financial and capital account (
409
)

fixed exchange rate (
424
)

flexible exchange rate (
424
)

forex market (
412
)

official reserves (
409
)

partially flexible exchange rate (
424
)

purchasing power parity (PPP) (
422
)

real exchange rate (
424
)

Questions for Thought and Review

1. If a country is running a balance of trade deficit, will its current account be in deficit? Why? LO1

2. When someone sends 100 British pounds to a friend in the United States, will this transaction show up on the financial or current account? Why? LO1

3. Support the following statement: “It is best to offset a capital and financial account surplus with a current account deficit.” LO1

4. Support the following statement: “It is best to offset a capital and financial account deficit with a current account surplus.” LO1

5. In Figure 17-2, a foreign government chooses to maintain an equilibrium market exchange rate of U.S. $1.30 per unit of its own currency. Discuss the implications of the government trying to maintain a higher fixed rate—say at $1.50. LO3

6. In the early 1980s, the U.S. economy fell into a recession (the government faced the problem of both a high federal deficit and a high trade deficit, called the twin deficits), and the dollar was very strong. Can you provide an explanation for this sequence of events? (Difficult) LO1

7. Ms. Economist always tries to travel to a country where the purchasing power parity exchange rate is lower than the market exchange rate. Why? LO5

8. Throughout the early 2000s, the U.S. trade gap widened, spurred by a surge of imports. What was likely happening to income in the U.S. economy? LO3

9. Draw the schematics to show the effect of expansionary monetary policy on the exchange rate. LO3

10. What effect on the U.S. trade deficit and exchange rate would result if Japan ran an expansionary monetary policy? LO3

11. What would be the effect on the U.S. exchange rate if Japan ran a contractionary fiscal policy? LO3

12. If expansionary monetary policy immediately increases inflationary expectations and the price level, how might the effect of monetary policy on the exchange rate be different than that presented in this chapter? LO3

13. What effect will a combination of expansionary fiscal policy and contractionary monetary policy have on the exchange rate? LO3

14. If you were the finance minister of Never-Never Land, how would you estimate the long-run exchange rate of your currency, the neverback? Defend your choice as well as discuss its possible failings. (Difficult) LO5

15. If U.S. inflation is 4 percent and Japan’s inflation is 1 percent, and the nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate falls by 3 percent relative to the yen, what happens to the real exchange rate? LO5

16. Which is preferable: a fixed or a flexible exchange rate? Why? LO6

17. Dr. Dollar Bill believes price stability is the main goal of central bank policy. Is the doctor more likely to prefer fixed or flexible exchange rates? Why? (Difficult) LO6

18. If currency traders expect the government to devalue a currency, what will they likely do? Why? LO6

19. A country eliminates all tariffs. Would you expect the value of its currency to rise or fall? Explain your answer. LO6

20. During the 1995-96 Republican presidential primaries, Patrick Buchanan wrote an editorial in The Wall Street Journal beginning, “Since the Nixon era the dollar has fallen 75 percent against the yen, 60 percent against the mark.” What trade policies do you suppose he was promoting? He went on to outline a series of tariffs. Agree or disagree with his policies. (Difficult) LO3

21. In an op-ed article, Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, asked the following question: “Is it really worth spending money in the exchange markets, modifying monetary policy, and taking care to balance the budget just to save another percentage or two [of value of exchange rates]?” What’s your answer to this question? (Difficult) LO3

22. In mid-1994 the value of the dollar fell sufficiently to warrant coordinated intervention among 17 countries. Still, the dollar went on falling. One economist stated, “[The intervention] was clearly a failure … It’s a good indication something else has to be done.” Why would the United States and foreign countries want to keep up the value of the dollar? LO6

23. What are three advantages of the euro for Europe? LO7

24. What are two disadvantages of the euro for Europe? LO7

25. Should Canada, the United States, and Mexico adopt a common currency? Why or why not? LO7

Problems and Exercises

26. In the early 2000s, China was running a large current account surplus.

a. What did this suggest about its capital account?

b. China’s private balance of payments was in surplus. What does this suggest about its exchange rate regime?

c. What actions was the Chinese central bank likely undertaking in the foreign exchange markets? Demonstrate the situation with supply and demand graphs.

d. If the Chinese central bank pulled out of the forex market, what would likely happen to the yuan?

e. In May 2004, inflation picked up in China; what effect did that likely have on the value of the yuan? LO2

27. Draw the fundamental analysis of the supply and demand for the British pound in terms of dollars. Show what will happen to the exchange rate with those curves in response to each of the following events:

a. The U.K. price level rises.

b. The United States reduces tariffs.

c. The U.K. economy experiences a boom.

d. The U.K. interest rates rise. LO2

28. The government of Never-Never Land, after much deliberation, finally decides to switch to a fixed exchange rate policy. It does this because the value of its currency, the neverback, is so high that the trade deficit is enormous. The finance minister fixes the rate at $10 a neverback, which is lower than the equilibrium rate of $20 a neverback.

a. Discuss the trade or traditional macro policy options that could accomplish this lower exchange rate.

b. Using the laws of supply and demand, show graphically how possible equilibria are reached. LO2

29. Will the following be suppliers or demanders of U.S. dollars in foreign exchange markets?

a. A U.S. tourist in Latin America.

b. A German foreign exchange trader who believes that the dollar exchange rate will fall.

c. A U.S. foreign exchange trader who believes that the dollar exchange rate will fall.

d. A Costa Rican tourist in the United States.

e. A Russian capitalist who wants to protect his wealth from expropriation.

f. A British investor in the United States. LO1

30. You’ve been hired as an economic adviser to Yamaichi Foreign Exchange Traders. What buy or sell recommendations for U.S. dollars would you make in response to the following news?

a. Faster economic growth in the EU.

b. Expectations of higher interest rates in the United States.

c. The U.S. interest rate rises, but less than expected.

d. Expected loosening of U.S. monetary policy.

e. Higher inflationary predictions for the United States.

f. The U.S. government imposes new trade restrictions on imports. LO2

31. State whether the following will show up on the current account or the capital and financial account:

a. IBM’s exports of computers to Japan.

b. IBM’s hiring of a British merchant bank as a consultant.

c. A foreign national living in the United States repatriates money.

d. Ford Motor Company’s profit in Hungary.

e. Ford Motor Company uses that Hungarian profit to build a new plant in Hungary. LO1

32. One of the basic laws of economics is the law of one price. It says that given certain assumptions one would expect that if free trade is allowed, the prices of goods in multiple countries should converge. This law underlies purchasing power parity.

a. Can you list what three of those assumptions likely are?
b. Should the law of one price hold for labor also? Why or why not?
c. Should it hold for capital more so or less so than for labor? Why or why not? LO5

33. A Wall Street Journal article, “As Fear of Deficits Falls, Some See a Larger Threat,” describes the following threat of a high U.S. budget deficit:

[T]he investors who finance our deficits by buying Treasury bonds and bills, especially the foreigners who buy a larger share of them than ever, will question our ability to repay them, and balk at lending more—triggering a big drop in the dollar and much higher interest rates.

a. Why would a drop in foreign confidence in the U.S. ability to repay debt lead to a drop in the dollar and much higher interest rates?

b. In what way are higher interest rates and a lower value of the dollar bad for the U.S. economy? LO5

Questions from Alternative Perspectives

1. If all currencies were on a gold standard, there would be no exchange rates between currencies and we would not face the difficulties presented by fluctuating exchange rates.

a. What would be the benefit of having all currencies on a gold standard?

b. What would be the cost? (Austrian)

2. According to Gary North in Priorities and Dominion: An Economic Commentary on Matthew, in the book of Matthew, Jesus teaches about the rate of exchange between earthly wealth and eternal wealth.

a. Would Jesus argue for a high or low exchange rate for earthly riches? Explain your answer.

b. Do wealthy people believe the exchange rate is high or low?

c. Do you believe the perceived exchange rate falls or rises as one approaches death? (Religious)

3. Most traders in currencies are men.

a. Why is this?

b. Why has it remained even though there is supposed to be no discrimination in employment?

c. The language of traders is often quite coarse; does this fact provide a possible answer to both a and b?

d. Did you think of it before you read c? (Feminist)

4. Nobel Prize-winning economist James Tobin has suggested that a method of decreasing unwanted sudden capital flows among countries would be to place a small tax on such flows. Post-Keynesian economist Paul Davidson argued against doing so because it won’t solve the problem, suggesting that it is like using a pebble when a boulder is needed. What might Davidson’s argument be? (Hint: It is related to the role of expectations.) (Post-Keynesian)

5. Most economists favor lowering barriers to trade. But even among mainstream economists there is far less support for financial liberalization—the removal of government regulation of financial and capital markets—than for trade liberalization. “It is a seductive idea,” says free-trader Jagdish Bhagwati, “but the claims of enormous benefit from free capital mobility are not persuasive.” In addition, capital market liberalization entails substantial risks because it strips away the regulations intended to control the flow of short-term loans and contracts in and out of a country. The IMF, on the other hand, remains an unabashed supporter of free financial markets, arguing that they are a precondition for a developing country attracting long-term foreign investment.

a. Who has it right?

b. Is financial liberalization a good or bad policy, especially for developing countries? (Radical)

Web Questions

1. The Big Mac index is an index of purchasing power parity created by a magazine called The Economist. The Economist publishes the exchange rate value of various currencies that would make the Big Mac cost the same as in the United States. Go to www.economist.com and search for its Big Mac index. Look up the purchasing power parity of the dollar for five currencies and compare them with the actual exchange rates.

a. Which currencies were undervalued? Which were overvalued?

b. What are the shortcomings of the Big Mac index?

c. If you were to design your own index, what types of goods would you use in your basket of goods? Explain your answer.

d. How could you check the validity of the Big Mac index?

2. Pick a foreign currency and answer the following questions using www.oanda.com.

a. What is the name of your country’s currency?

b. In the last year, has the currency risen or fallen in value against the dollar?

c. Using information from The Economist magazine (www.economist.com/countries) about your country, explain why the currency’s price rose or fell.

3. Go to the IMF’s Web site at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/center/action/eng/devalue/index.htm to find out how the IMF can help a country facing a shortage of official reserves.

a. Describe the problem facing the fictitious African economy.

b. What course of action did you recommend?

c. What was the outcome of your recommendations?

Answers to Margin Questions

1. The expenditures of a U.S. citizen traveling abroad will show up as a debit on the services account. As tourism or traveling, it is a service. (
410
)

2. Net investment income is the return a country gets on its foreign investment minus the return foreigners get on their investment within a country. A country is a net debtor nation if the value of foreign investment within a country exceeds the value of its investment abroad. A country can be a net debtor nation and still have its net investment income positive if its foreign investment is undervalued at market values (valuation is generally done at book value), or if its foreign investment earns a higher rate of return than foreigners’ investment within that country. (
412
)

3. An increase in the demand for dollars is the equivalent of an increase in the supply of euros, so an increase in the demand for dollars pushes down the price of euros in terms of dollars, as in the following diagram. (413)

4. A fall in a country’s interest rate will push down its exchange rate. (
415
)

5. Contractionary monetary policy pushes up the interest rate, decreases income and hence imports, and has a tendency to decrease inflation. Therefore, through these paths, contractionary monetary policy will tend to increase the exchange rate. (
417
)

6. The net effect of expansionary fiscal policy on exchange rates is uncertain. Through the interest rate effect it pushes up the exchange rate, but through the income and price level effects it pushes down the exchange rate. (
418
)

7. In the short run, normal market forces have a limited, and possibly even perverse, effect on exchange rates, which is why most governments don’t leave determination of exchange rates to the market. (
419
)

8. In general, it would be easier for the United States to push the value of the dollar down because doing so involves the United States buying up foreign currencies, which it can pay for simply by printing more dollars. To push the dollar up requires foreign reserves. (
421
)

9. The real exchange rate of the dollar relative to the euro rises 1 percent.

%δreal exchange rate = %δnominal exchange rate + [domestic inflation − foreign inflation] = 3 + (2 − 4) = 1. (
424
)

10. There is much debate about whether government intervention stabilizes exchange rates—private traders tend to believe it does not; government economists tend to believe that it does. (
427
)

APPENDIX A: History of Exchange Rate Systems

A good way to give you an idea of how the various exchange rate systems work is to present a brief history of international exchange rate systems.

The Gold Standard: A Fixed Exchange Rate System

Governments played a major role in determining exchange rates until the 1930s. Beginning with the Paris Conference of 1867 and lasting until 1933 (except for the period around World War I), most of the world economies had a system of relatively fixed exchange rates under what was called a
gold standard
—a system of fixed exchange rates in which the value of currencies was fixed relative to the value of gold and gold was used as the primary reserve asset.

Under a gold standard, the amount of money a country issued had to be directly tied to gold, either because gold coin served as the currency in a country (as it did in the United States before 1914) or because countries were required by law to have a certain percentage of gold backing their currencies. Gold served as currency or backed all currencies. Each country participating in a gold standard agreed to fix the price of its currency relative to gold. That meant a country would agree to pay a specified amount of gold on demand to anyone who wanted to exchange that country’s currency for gold. To do so, each country had to maintain a stockpile of gold. When a country fixed the price of its currency relative to gold, it fixed its currency’s price in relation to other currencies as a result of the process of arbitrage.

Under the gold standard, a country made up the difference between the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded of its currency by buying or selling gold to hold the price of its currency fixed in terms of gold. How much a country would need to buy and sell depended on its balance of payments deficit or surplus. If the country ran a surplus in the balance of payments, it was required to sell its currency—that is, buy gold—to stop the value of its currency from rising. If a country ran a deficit, it was required to buy its currency—that is, sell gold—to stop the value of its currency from falling.

The gold standard enabled governments to prevent short-run instability of the exchange rate. If there was a speculative run on its currency, the government would buy its currency with gold, thereby preventing the exchange rate from falling.

But for the gold standard to work, there had to be a method of long-run adjustment; otherwise countries would have run out of gold and would no longer have been able to fulfill their obligations under the gold standard. The
gold specie flow mechanism
was the long-run adjustment mechanism that maintained the gold standard. Here’s how it worked: Since gold served as official reserves to a country’s currency, a balance of payments deficit (and hence a downward pressure on the exchange rate) would result in a flow of gold out of the country and hence a decrease in the country’s money supply. That decrease in the money supply would contract the economy, decreasing imports, lowering the country’s price level, and increasing the interest rate, all of which would work toward eliminating the balance of payments deficit.

Similarly a country with a balance of payments surplus would experience an inflow of gold. That flow would increase the country’s money supply, increasing income (and hence imports), increasing the price level (making imports cheaper and exports more expensive), and lowering the interest rate (increasing capital outflows). These would work toward eliminating the balance of payments surplus.

Thus, the gold standard determined a country’s monetary policy and forced it to adjust any international balance of payments disequilibrium. Adjustments to a balance of payments deficit were often politically unpopular; they often led to recessions, which, because the money supply was directly tied to gold, the government couldn’t try to offset with expansionary monetary policy.

The gold specie flow mechanism was called into play in the United States in late 1931 when the Federal Reserve, in response to a shrinking U.S. gold supply, decreased the amount of money in the U.S. economy, deepening the depression that had begun in 1929. The government’s domestic goals and responsibilities conflicted with its international goals and responsibilities.

That conflict, which was rooted in the after-effects of World War I and the Depression, led to partial abandonment of the gold standard in 1933. At that time the United States made it illegal for individual U.S. citizens to own gold. Except for gold used for ornamental and certain medical and industrial purposes, all privately owned gold had to be sold to the government. Dollar bills were no longer backed by gold in the sense that U.S. citizens could exchange dollars for a prespecified amount of gold. Instead, dollar bills were backed by silver, which meant that any U.S. citizen could change dollars for a prespecified amount of silver. In the late 1960s, that changed also. Since that time, for U.S. residents, dollars have been backed only by trust in the soundness of the U.S. economy.

Gold continued to serve, at least partially, as international backing for U.S. currency. That is, other countries could still exchange dollars for gold. However, in 1971, in response to another conflict between international and domestic goals, the United States totally cut off the relationship between dollars and gold. After that, a dollar could be redeemed only for another dollar, whether it was a U.S. citizen or a foreign government who wanted to redeem the dollar.

The Bretton Woods System: A Fixed Exchange Rate System

As World War II was coming to an end, the United States and its allies met to establish a new international economic order. After much wrangling, they agreed upon a system called the
Bretton Woods system
, an agreement about fixed exchange rates that governed international financial relationships from the period after the end of World War II until 1971. It was named after the resort in New Hampshire where the meeting that set up the system was held.

The Bretton Woods system established the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to oversee the international economic order. The IMF was empowered to arrange short-term loans between countries. The Bretton Woods system also established the World Bank, which was empowered to make longer-term loans to developing countries. Today the World Bank and IMF continue their central roles in international financial affairs.

The Bretton Woods system was based on mutual agreements about what countries would do when experiencing balance of payments surpluses or deficits. It was essentially a fixed exchange rate system. For example, under the Bret-ton Woods system, the exchange rate of the dollar for the British pound was set at slightly over $4 to the pound.

The Bretton Woods system was not based on a gold standard. When countries experienced a balance of payments surplus or deficit, they did not necessarily buy or sell gold to stabilize the price of their currency. Instead they bought and sold other currencies. To ensure that participating countries would have sufficient reserves, they established a stabilization fund from which a country could obtain a short-term loan. It was hoped that this stabilization fund would be sufficient to handle all short-run adjustments that did not reflect fundamental imbalances.

In those cases where a misalignment of exchange rates was determined to be fundamental, the countries involved agreed that they would adjust their exchange rates. The IMF was empowered to oversee an orderly adjustment. It could authorize a country to make a one-time adjustment of up to 10 percent without obtaining formal approval from the IMF’s board of directors. After a country had used its one-time adjustment, formal approval was necessary for any change greater than 1 percent.

The Bretton Woods system reflected the underlying political and economic realities of the post-World War II period in which it was set up. European economies were devastated; the U.S. economy was strong. To rebuild, Europe was going to have to import U.S. equipment and borrow large amounts from the United States. There was serious concern over how high the value of the dollar would rise and how low the value of European currencies would fall in a free market exchange. The establishment of fixed exchange rates set limits on currencies’ relative movements; the exchange rates that were chosen helped provide for the rebuilding of Europe.

In addition, the Bretton Woods system provided mechanisms for long-term loans from the United States to Europe that could help sustain those fixed exchange rates. The loans also eliminated the possibility of competitive depreciation of currencies, in which each country tries to stimulate its exports by lowering the relative value of its currency.

One difficulty with the Bretton Woods system was a shortage of official reserves and international liquidity. To offset that shortage, the IMF was empowered to create a type of international money called
special drawing rights (SDRs)
. But SDRs never became established as an international currency and the U.S. dollar kept serving as official reserves for individuals and countries. To get the dollars to foreigners, the United States had to run a deficit in its current account. Since countries could exchange the dollar for gold at a fixed price, the use of dollars as a reserve currency meant that, under the Bretton Woods system, the world was on a gold standard once removed.

The number of dollars held by foreigners grew enormously in the 1960s. By the early 1970s, those dollars far exceeded in value the amount of gold the United States had. Most countries accepted this situation; even though they could legally demand gold for their dollars, they did not. But Charles de Gaulle, the nationalistic president of France, wasn’t pleased with the U.S. domination of international affairs at that time. He believed Europe deserved a much more prominent position. He demanded gold for the dollars held by the French central bank, knowing that the United States didn’t have enough gold to meet his demand. As a result of his and other countries’ demands, on August 15, 1971, the United States ended its policy of exchanging gold for dollars at $35 per ounce. With that change, the Bretton Woods system was dead.

The Present U.S. System: A Partially Flexible Exchange Rate System

International monetary affairs were much in the news in the early 1970s as countries groped for a new exchange rate system. The makeshift system finally agreed on involved partially flexible exchange rates. Most Western countries’ exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate, although at various times governments buy or sell their own currencies to affect the exchange rate.

Under the present partially flexible exchange rate system, countries must continually decide when a balance of payments surplus or deficit is a temporary phenomenon and when it is a signal of a fundamental imbalance. If they believe the situation is temporary, they enter into the foreign exchange market to hold their exchange rate at what they believe is an appropriate level. If, however, they believe that the balance of payments imbalance is a fundamental one, they let the exchange rate rise or fall.

While most Western countries’ exchange rates are partially flexible, certain countries have agreed to fixed exchange rates of their currencies in relation to rates of a group of certain other currencies. For example, a group of European Union countries adopted irreversible fixed exchange rates among their currencies, by electing to have one currency—the euro, which was introduced in 2002. Other currencies are fixed relative to the dollar (not by the United States but by the other countries).

Deciding what is, and what is not, a fundamental imbalance is complicated, and such decisions are considered at numerous international conferences held under the auspices of the IMF or governments. A number of organizations such as the Group of Eight focus much discussion on this issue. Often the various countries meet and agree, formally or informally, on acceptable ranges of exchange rates. Thus, while the present system is one of partially flexible exchange rates, the range of flexibility is limited.

Key Terms

Bretton Woods system (
434
)

gold specie flow mechanism (
434
)

gold standard (
433
)

special drawing rights (SDRs) (
435
)

1 Balance of payments records are not very good. Because of measurement difficulties, many transactions go unrecorded and many numbers must be estimated, leaving a potential for large errors.

2 The separation of the financial and capital accounts is a recent change; earlier, both were simply called the capital account.

3 When there’s inflation, it’s the rate of money supply growth relative to the rate of inflation that’s important. If inflation is 10 percent and money supply growth is 10 percent, the rate of increase in the real money supply is zero. If money supply growth falls to, say, 5 percent while inflation stays at 10 percent, there will be a contractionary effect on the real economy.

(Colander 408)

Colander, David C. Macroeconomics, 7th Edition. McGraw-Hill Learning Solutions, 102007. .