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Governance, Structure, and Democracy: Luther Gulick and the Future of Public Administration
Meier, Kenneth J
Public Administration Review; Dec 2010; 70, S1; ProQuest Central
pg. S284

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Administrative Theory & Praxis, 38: 101–114, 2016
Copyright #�2016 Public Administration Theory Network
ISSN: 1084-1806 print/1949-0461 online
DOI: 10.1080/10841806.2016.1165586

ORIGINAL ARTICLES

Machiavelli’s Lessons for Public Administration

Berry Tholen

Radboud University

On issues concerning the basis and function of political science and public administration as a
discipline, Max Weber provides answers that are puzzling when more closely examined. In this
article, it is demonstrated that coherent answers to these issues can be found in the work of Niccolò
Machiavelli. Moreover, Machiavelli’s perspective can solve the puzzle that Weber creates. This
perspective explains, more explicitly and elaborately than Weber, how the practice and the study of
public administration are to be distinguished, but, at the same time, are connected and similar. We
conclude by showing the implications of Machiavelli’s approach for public administration
education, research, and advice.

In his Republic, Plato (2007) presented answers to questions that are basic to public adminis-
tration and political science: (a) Is reliable knowledge for governance possible? (b) If so, what
type of knowledge can experts in administration and government offer? (c) What should be the
role of experts to powerholders? According to Plato, some people, after lengthy study and
contemplation, can develop a rational grip on universal and unchanging ideas. These ideas
encompass knowledge of the true, the beautiful, and the good and just. People who have arrived
at this level of understanding should be philosopher-kings (Plato, 2007). Nowadays, few will
find these three interconnected answers convincing, because of epistemological reasons (the
problems in Plato’s rationalism were already pointed out by Aristotle, 1933/1989a, 1926/
1989b, or because of their antidemocratic character (e.g., Mill, 1861/1991, Chap. 3). For many
current scholars in public administration, the evident answers to these basic issues will likely be
the answers that Max Weber provided. These answers are, in every way, are opposite to those of
Plato: (a) Reliable knowledge should be built on empirical methods. We cannot have knowledge
of universal, eternal truths; we can only hope for empirical theories that last a few decades. (b)
True or scientific knowledge is limited in scope and concerns causal relations, not aesthetics or
ethics. (c) The scientific advisor should, with a detached attitude, provide inconvenient facts to

Address correspondence to Berry Tholen, Department of Public Administration, Institute for Management
Research, Radboud University, P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: b.tholen@fm.ru.nl

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10841806.2016.1165586

mailto:b.tholen@fm.ru.nl

people in power. Having knowledge does not provide the legitimacy to rule (Weber, 1961b,
pp. 145–151).

Attractive or evident as Weber’s answers may seem to many of us, his position is puzzling
for several reasons. Notwithstanding his own advice in the essay “Science as a Vocation,”
Weber in his political writings goes beyond merely indicating inconvenient facts. The
comments and advice that he provides in his political writings clearly express certain ideals con-
cerning the state and politics—for example, on the value of individual liberty and representative
politics (Beetham, 1985; Lassman, 2000). The claim that expert advisors should limit them-
selves to expressing facts is also puzzling in the context of “Science as a Vocation.” In this text,
Weber claims that every scientific discipline encompasses certain values. Medical science, for
example, contains the presupposition that its responsibility is to maintain life and diminish suf-
fering (Weber, 1961b, p. 144). However, does that not mean that every scientific advisor will
(and must) also always be led by his disciplinary valuations and concerns? Have those values
not inspired scientific advisors to particular lines of research that will bring them to particular
(inconvenient) facts and not others? Finally, if scientific experts are completely detached and
value-free, why should they bother to provide advice at all? Although Plato brought scientific
expertise and governing too close together, Weber seems to do the opposite. Weber’s strict
distinction appears to be untenable, even in his own work and actions.

In this article, the focus is on another classic author who provided answers to the three basic
questions: Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli is often presented as the first (modern) scientist in
the field of politics and administration (Cassirer, 1950; Olschki, 1945; Parel, 1972; Walker,
1950; Wolin, 1960). However, in public administration, his work is rarely investigated.
Machiavelli, to be sure, also stood close to the classical era. He explicitly refers to ancient Greece
and Rome as inspiring examples in the preface to his Discourses (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p.
191). Machiavelli can be seen as located between (or in both) modernity and premodernity (e.g.,
Brenner, 2009; Hariman, 1989; McIntosh, 1984; Parel, 1991; Yoran, 2010.) I will not investigate
whether and in what sense Machiavelli’s ideas are to be judged as modern or premodern. His
historical position between the extreme positions of the modern Weber and the premodern Plato,
however, suggests that we may find a moderate middle position in Machiavelli. Occasionally,
Weber explicitly refers to the Florentine master. In “Politics as a Vocation,” for example, he
refers to Machiavelli’s The Prince and History of Florence (Weber, 1961a, p. 124, p. 126). There
are some clear similarities in Weber’s and Machiavelli’s outlooks that appear when we compare
these books. They both understand politics as essentially a matter of conflict and strife over the
power of a state. Weber and Machiavelli both have a particular interest in the strong political
leader. As one more example, they also both address what nowadays is called the issue of “dirty
hands” in a fairly similar way. On the issue of dirty hands, some scholars maintain that Weber’s
understanding exceeds Machiavelli’s (Parel, 1972, p. 14; Walzer, 1973). However, does Weber’s
understanding exceed Machiavelli’s on other issues?

The central question of this article is: What are Machiavelli’s answers to the basic questions
of public administration as a discipline, and does his position help us overcome the puzzlement
that Weber creates?1

Each of the following three sections concentrates on Machiavelli’s answer to one of the basic
questions. After this elaboration, the concluding section considers whether Machiavelli can help
us overcome the confusion. The article then addresses what Machiavelli’s outlook implies for
public administration education, research, and advice.2

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MACHIAVELLI’S METHOD

Driven by the natural eagerness I have always felt for doing without any hesitation the things
that I believe will bring benefit common to everybody, I have determined to enter upon a path
not yet trodden by anyone. (Preface to Discourses, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 190)
In discussing this material I depart very far from the methods of others. But since my purpose is
to write something useful to him who comprehends it, I have decided that I must concern myself
with the truth of the matter as facts show it rather than with any fanciful notion. (The Prince,
Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 57)

Machiavelli is often presented as the founding father of the political and administrative sciences. As
evidence for this claim, passages from his works, such as those above, are often cited. Machiavelli
himself claims to walk a new path, which involves considering facts, not fancy. Cassirer cites with
appreciation Bacon, who regarded Machiavelli as a kindred spirit “who had broken away from all
scholastic methods and tried to study politics according to empirical methods” (Cassirer, 1950,
p. 130). Cassirer also presents Machiavelli as the Galileo of political science (Cassirer, 1950,
pp. 119, 130; see also Olschki, 1945; Parel, 1972; Walker, 1950; Wolin, 1960).

Machiavelli begins the Discourses in what appears to be a general Renaissance approach by
emphasizing the importance of considering ancient times and trying to learn from one’s prede-
cessors; one should follow the example of the physicians and lawyers of his time. However,
Machiavelli observes, “in setting up states, in maintaining governments, in ruling kingdoms,
in organizing armies and managing war, in executing laws among subjects, in expanding an
empire, not a single prince or republic now resorts to the examples of the ancients” (Preface
to Discourses, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 191). States are mistaken not to employ these lessons,
Machiavelli maintains. He differs from many Renaissance writers, however, in the way we
should learn from earlier times. Unlike his contemporaries, such as Erasmus in his mirror
Education of a Christian Prince (1516), Machiavelli hardly ever cites authoritative statements
of ancient writers (cf. Barlow, 1999; Hariman, 1989; Viroli, 1998, pp. 3–4; Wood, 1965,
p. xxii). His objects, furthermore, are not ancient theories and philosophical arguments, but
the deeds of great statesmen as recorded by historians (Fleischer, 1995, p. 331, p. 133).3 Neither
does Machiavelli derive his recommendations from any comprehensive metaphysical
understanding, whether cosmological, religious, or historicist. He does occasionally refer to
the influence of celestial bodies, the importance of religious beliefs, and the periodic rise and
decline of nations (Parel, 1991). Yet these examples are far too few and too unsystematic to
conclude a metaphysical basis underlying Machiavelli’s claims. It is not unreasonable to sup-
pose that these references are often used by Machiavelli for rhetorical reasons. Moreover,
Machiavelli is very clear on the point that human beings can (and, in fact, should) determine
their own destiny instead of having to follow a predetermined scheme (Berlin, 1955/2013;
Cassirer, 1950, p. 157; Flanagan, 1972, pp. 149, 154; Fleischer, 1995, pp. 332, 353; Viroli,
1998, pp. 98–99; Wolin, 1960, p. 224; Wood, 1972, p. 56).4

In the fashion of modern science, Machiavelli offers cause-and-effect-claims. In Chapter
XVI of The Prince, he notes, for example, that seeking the reputation of liberality will eventu-
ally undermine one’s position as a prince (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 59–61). In Book I of
The Art of War, he claims that by employing mercenaries, one brings thieves and villains into
one’s country (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 2, pp. 574–575). As a last example, in the Discourses
(Bk. 1, Chap. 55), Machiavelli indicates that if the populace is not corrupt, public affairs are

MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 103

easily managed (Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 306–311). Machiavelli does not arrive at claims
such as these by one particular empirical method. He does not reach general claims by employ-
ing any method of induction from a range of cases (Fleischer, 1995, pp. 333, 342). Moreover, he
does not perform tests or experiments, nor does his work show any sign of systematical data
collection (Viroli, 1998, pp. 1–2, 63, 81–83). In fact, Machiavelli never explains what he means
specifically by his “new path” (see also Crick, 1984, pp. 48, 51; Garver, 1987, pp. 12–22;
Strauss, 1953). If we observe what he actually does, we witness a series of approaches. Often,
Machiavelli points out examples that illustrate and support his assertions, especially from the
time of the Roman republic but not exclusively. He sometimes supplements these supporting
observations with opposite examples that went awry. At other moments, he simply refers to
his personal experience or suggests that his claim will be evident to anyone who has had any
experience in the matter. In still other cases, he refers to evident implications of human nature.
In the passages containing these examples, each of these approaches can be noted. Berlin seems
to offer a fitting characterization when he writes the following concerning Machiavelli’s
“approach”: “his method is a mixture of rules of thumb, observation, historical knowledge
and general sagacity, somewhat like the empirical medicine of the pre-scientific world” (Berlin,
1955/2013, pp. 41–42; cf. Crick, 1984, p. 48; Wood, 1967).

Berlin certainly is correct in emphasizing the mixed method used by Machiavelli; yet in this
characterization, he misses—or at least leaves implicit—several important aspects. First, for
Machiavelli, gathering knowledge is closely related to learning and individual development.

As to the training of the mind, the prudent prince reads histories and observes in them the actions
of excellent men, sees how they have conducted themselves in wars, observes the causes for their
victories and defeats in order to escape the latter and imitate the former, above all, he does as some
excellent men have done in the past; they selected for imitation some man earlier than themselves
who was praised and honored. (The Prince, Chap. XIV; Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 56–57)

Knowledge relevant to government and administration, or “state craft,” as Machiavelli calls it
(Letter of December 10, 1513, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 3, p. 930) has an empirical basis;
however, there is more to it. It is always knowledge regarding how to act. This knowledge does
not simply concern causes and effects, but, more precisely, also involves what one can do.
Knowledge in statecraft must be action-oriented (Parel, 1972, p. 9). Furthermore, this
knowledge considers how one should behave in war, political strife, and the like. This type
of knowledge is not the type that can be grasped in general laws and universal rules. In the
sphere of politics and administration, there are always exceptions. Machiavelli regularly
mentions anomalies to his own guidelines (Viroli, 1998, p. 84). In this field, predictions are
often off the mark (The Prince, Chapter XXV; Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 90). Second,
knowledge for Machiavelli is contextual. He presents causal relationships, but one finds few
general rules in his writings that are not qualified in some way. His approach to the art of polit-
ical rule is not a “science of social engineering.” His observations regarding men and their beha-
vior are always understood in terms of the specific context. (Germino, 1972, p. 74; Walker,
1993, p. 39). Machiavelli emphasizes often that statecraft does not involve the constant appli-
cation of general rules but requires adapting to changing circumstances (e.g., Discourses III, 9,
Gilbert, Vol. 1, p. 416; The Prince, Chapter XXV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 89–92).
Having knowledge, for Machiavelli, is closely related to being prepared for chance, the

104 THOLEN

unpredictable, or fortune (The Prince, Chapter III, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 16; also see
Cassirer, 1950, p. 157; Crick, 1984, pp. 53–54; Flanagan, 1972; Kontos, 1972, p. 84).

Third, this type of action-oriented contextual knowledge can be learned from the examples of
great practitioners, not from theoretical writers and their general ideas. Machiavelli’s remarks
regarding the new path or method he is following likely refer to this attention to the acts of real
political actors (as they are presented by historians) instead of the books of philosophers
(Fleischer, 1995; Viroli, 1998). To learn the craft of the state, one must imitate and follow
the lead of actors who were exemplars of excellence in their fields: the great men and the
successful republics. For Machiavelli, the political activity of the ancients occasionally exhibited
political wisdom of the highest order (Discourses I, preface; Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 191;
Discourses III 27, Gilbert, 1965/1999, p. 490; Fleischer, 1995, p. 331). He also saw virtuosi in
the political arena of his own time, such as Borgia and Ferdinand of Aragon (The Prince, Chapter
XXI, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 81). By interpreting these actions of others, one can sharpen
one’s own judgment and develop one’s skills (Viroli, 1998, pp. 71, 94). It is important, therefore,
to know what individuals excelling in statecraft did in particular circumstances to know what to
imitate in what setting and to have the desire to gather and act on this knowledge (Fleischer,
1995, p. 336; Plamenatz, 1972, p. 164). Developing statecraft presupposes that one already
has a particular attitude and a certain level of knowledge and skill. Machiavelli expresses this
assumption when he writes (in the text cited at the beginning of this section) that it is his “pur-
pose to write something useful to him who comprehends it” (The Prince, Chapter XXV, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 57). Thus, gathering knowledge, for Machiavelli, is not a matter of apply-
ing some method that can be expressed in an algorithm and that leads to empirical laws. Gath-
ering knowledge is closely connected to developing individual excellence. Becoming a virtuoso
in statecraft demands that one have certain virtues.5 The knowledge one can acquire in this field
is not the same as in the natural sciences, nor can it be so precise and put into empirical laws. It
can only be discerned from exemplary actions by experienced spectators and described in likely
tendencies and precepts and maxims (Crick, 1984, p. 45; Parel, 1972, p. 10).

Machiavelli Versus Weber: Instruments and Aims

Machiavelli presents, for rulers and public officials, guidelines that are not deduced from
philosophical or religious principles or drawn from classical authority; they obtain their support
from empirical findings. These guidelines include examples of best practices (and evident
failures) in ancient times and in his time. Machiavelli does not follow one particular method.
His “new path” is eclectic and intended to teach the statecraft of the (ancient) virtuoso rulers
to contemporary officials. This statecraft does not involve knowledge of general, universal laws
and rules—the sphere of governing, inevitably, is one of uncertainty. It involves the skill to
judge what actions will most likely bring results in a particular context. Max Weber makes simi-
lar points. Although he is more explicit on method (especially on verstehende Soziologie
[interpretative sociology]), Weber, in fact, uses eclectic approaches in his writings that are simi-
lar to Machiavelli’s. His claims rest on interpretations of meanings but also on arguments from
structural factors. He also cites historical cases (ancient Egypt or China) and compares contem-
porary examples (such as the United States, England, and Germany); all of these examples are
in “Politics as a Vocation” (Weber, 1961a, pp. 77–128). Like Machiavelli, Weber emphasizes

MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 105

the limits of law-like knowledge in this field. Therefore, he formulates his theories and
definitions in terms of chance or likelihood (e.g., his definition of power). Yet there is also a
clear difference between these writers on the first basic question of public administration. In
Machiavelli, there is a clear and explicit link between acquiring knowledge and personal
education or development: One who already has the relevant epistemic skills and virtues is able
to discern the relevant causal relations and good examples.

MACHIAVELLI’S EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

Therefore nothing makes a republic so firm and solid as to give her such an organization that the
laws provide a way for the discharge of the partisan hatreds that agitate her. (Discourses I 7,
Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 211)

The matter to be found here assures to a prudent and able ruler a chance to introduce a form that
will bring him glory and her people [i.e., the people of Italy] general happiness. (The Prince,
Chapter XXVI, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 92–93)

In the Discourses, The Prince, and The Art of War, Machiavelli provides maxims on what a
ruler, a representative, a general, or any other public official should do to realize certain
ends. Several examples were presented in the last section. Some scholars have characterized
Machiavelli’s originality by calling him the founder of instrumental political thinking or of
management expertise. He is said to have shown the way to considering the most effective
and efficient means to realize the goals a current ruler happens to have. Cassirer uses a Kantian
term when he calls Machiavelli’s counsels “hypothetical imperatives”; there is no question of
whether the end is good but only of what one must do to attain it. Cassirer maintains that
Machiavelli simply gives advice on political actions without blaming or praising “in the same
way in which a physician describes the symptoms of a certain illness” (Cassirer, 1950, p. 154).

Machiavelli’s lessons have aroused much criticism. Some commentators have called him amoral
or even immoral. This harsh judgment is triggered by the instrumental focus that many perceive in
Machiavelli’s work. These critics are shocked by his willingness to exercise sheer brute force as an
indispensable feature of good princely government and by his claim that princes should learn how
to be not good—that is, be ready to abandon conventional (Christian) ethics if necessary (The
Prince, Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol., p. 58; Skinner, 2002, pp. 144–146). Machiavelli,
moreover, draws religion into the sphere of political instrumentalism when he notes that certain reli-
gions can be used to realize certain objectives of rulers and states. He asserts, furthermore, that the
Christian faith poses a threat to a well-ordered society, because it motivates citizens to be more con-
cerned with the afterlife than with making the best of this state of being (Discourses I 11, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 224; Discourses II 2, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol., p. 331; Skinner, 2002, pp. 156,
172, 180, 183). Ever since the early sixteenth century, these statements have led to characterizations
of Machiavelli as “a teacher of evil,” “enemy of the human race,” and “anti-Christian,” and of The
Prince as “satanic” and “the devil’s bible” (Parel, 1972, p. 16; Strauss, 1958, p. 9).

On closer review, however, the characterization as amoral or immoral is untenable. First,
Machiavelli does not discard the value and reality of conventional virtues and religion. He main-
tains, for example, in The Prince, “I am aware that everyone will admit that it would be most
praiseworthy for a prince to exhibit such of the above-mentioned qualities as are considered good

106 THOLEN

[i.e., conventional virtues, such as being merciful, truthful, chaste, reliable]” (The Prince,
Chapter XV, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 58). In the Discourses, Machiavelli endorses the
value of three of the four cardinal virtues: prudence, temperance, and courage (Skinner, 2002,
pp. 154, 204, 207).6 He respects religion’s transcendent understanding that faith lies beyond
the sphere of politics (Parel, 1972, p. 14). Machiavelli maintains that in the political sphere, these
conventional values are not the only relevant considerations, and sometimes they must be over-
ruled. However, he is not amoral, because he endorses these virtues; nor is he immoral, because
he accepts their value (Berlin, 1955/2013; Parel, 1972; Skinner, 2002; Wood, 1972).

Second, it must be emphasized that the political sphere for Machiavelli is not marked by effec-
tive instruments for the arbitrary aims of rulers. Politics, for Machiavelli, involves undertaking
actions for the common good. His lessons for rulers, administrators, and citizens, in fact, are not
“hypothetical imperatives.” All the advice he gives can be understood as intended to contribute to
particular goods. Even in The Prince, the work that most examines effective individual leader-
ship, Machiavelli identifies the “general happiness of the people” as the ultimate end (see the
quotation from The Prince at the beginning of this section). In the Discourses, we find a more
elaborate concept of the common good. Some commentators have noted Machiavelli’s concern
for the independence and continuity of the political community and for internal stability (Berlin,
1955/2013; McIntosh, 1984, pp. 184–185). Others scholars have focused on his concern for indi-
vidual freedom guaranteed by the rule of law and the civic virtue of all citizens (Benner, 2009;
Pocock, 1975; Plamenatz, 1972; Skinner, 2002; Viroli, 1998; Wolin, 1960; Wood, 1972; Yoran,
2010). Still other observers emphasize the democratic motive in his work (e.g., McCormick,
2011). This article is not the place to investigate Machiavelli’s understanding of the common
good. In the scope of this article, it suffices to conclude that Machiavelli’s recommendations
are not hypothetical imperatives on how to attain arbitrary goals, but are guidelines for realizing
the common good. Machiavelli deviates from traditional advice books, or mirrors for princes, in
his willingness to override conventional virtues and values. Yet he firmly belongs to this tradition
because of his concern that rulers and administrators should focus on proper objectives (Skinner,
2002, p. 143). Returning to Cassirer’s analogy cited at the beginning of this section, it may be
appropriate to compare statecraft with the art of the physician. Machiavelli often presents this
analogy (e.g., The Prince, Chapter III; Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 16–17). However, Cassirer
misses the point that physicians must know what is the proper end for which they employ their
medical instruments (the life and well-being of their patients). On this point, Machiavelli
expresses an analogous orientation for experts on statecraft.

Machiavelli Versus Weber: What the Advisor Should Do

Machiavelli’s many guidelines encompass knowledge of causal relations and proper objectives.
These recommendations are not “hypothetical imperatives” but express a specific understanding
of the common good. In presenting these guidelines and the arguments for them, Machiavelli
offers us knowledge of effective instruments and an understanding of what we should strive
for. From Machiavelli’s perspective, knowledge and action are closely related. Knowledge is
meant to be useful. Knowledge helps people decide how to act and instructs them how to act well.
Each guideline offers its own particular advice; together, they help one to develop skills and the
proper orientation. These guidelines help one develop into a virtu, a virtuoso ruler or administrator.

MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 107

Weber, especially in his political writings, also presents advice and guidelines that clearly are
inspired by a certain framework of values (Beetham, 1985; Lassman, 2000). Remarks in
“Science as a Vocation” seem to make it inevitable for a scientist to work within this structure
(Weber, 1961b, p. 144). However, when explicitly dealing with the issue of values, Weber
remarkably emphasizes that a scientific advisor should be self-limited to present only causal
knowledge. According to Weber, scientists as experts should be “intellectually honest,” and
try to avoid specific values, because they have no authority in this field (Weber, 1961b,
pp. 146–147. In Machiavelli, however, there is no such puzzling contradiction. He follows
the tradition of the mirrors of princes: he shows the rulers their instruments and what their
objectives should be (Skinner, 2002, p. 143).

MACHIAVELLI ON THE ROLE OF EXPERT ADVISORS

I see no other way than for an advisor to be moderate and not to seize upon any of the plans
brought forward as his own undertaking, and to speak his opinion without passion, and without
passion modestly to defend it, so that the city or the prince who follows it does it voluntarily,
and does not seem to enter upon it as pushed by your urgency. (Discourses III 35, Gilbert,
1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 509)

No one, I hope, will think that a man of low and humble station is overconfident when he dares to
discuss and direct the conduct of princes, because, just as those who draw maps of countries put
themselves low down on the plain to observe the nature of mountains and places high above, and to
observe that of low places put themselves high up on mountain tops, so likewise, in order to discern
clearly the people’s nature, the observer must be a prince, and to discern clearly that of princes, he
must be one of the populace. (The Prince, Dedication, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 10–11)

In his books, Machiavelli writes about the role of expert advisors and the way they should act
toward powerholders. Yet these books are also intended as pieces of expert advice on the art of
statecraft for individuals who rule or want to rule. If we want to understand Machiavelli’s
position on this point, we must consider both aspects (Garver, 1987, p. 9). In The Prince,
Machiavelli explains that to maintain popular support, statesmen or government administrators
must demonstrate that they are able to obtain results, and results can only be achieved when
rulers build their policies on the best knowledge available (The Prince, Chapters XV, XXV,
Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, pp. 57–59, 89–92; on the value of knowledge, see also Kontos,
1972, p. 88). A wise prince, therefore, seeks advice continuously (The Prince, Chapter XXIII,
Gilbert Vol. 1, p. 87). The prince must ensure, however, that his advisors are not seeking their
own benefit but can actually be relied on (The Prince, Chapter XXII, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol.
1, p. 85). At the same time, the ruler must beware of flatterers. The prince, therefore, must give
to his chosen advisors unrestricted power to tell him the truth. “With each of them he so bears
himself that every adviser realizes that the more freely he speaks, the better he is received” (The
Prince, Chapter XXIII, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 86).

The citation from the Discourses at the beginning of this section explains that the advisor
should not only have relevant knowledge but also personal virtue. The advisor should bring
his advice to the attention of a ruler or city but not manipulate them to accept what he considers
right. Manipulation is improper, because the advisor should not make the decisions. The advi-
sor’s role is to enlighten the decision-makers.

108 THOLEN

Machiavelli shows that a ruler must rely on expert advisors; however, he also makes clear
that this is a complicated relationship. First, rulers sometimes are reputed to be prudent, not
because of their own natures but because of the good advisors they have gathered around them.
This opinion is mistaken, however. According to Machiavelli, “a prince who is not wise himself
cannot be advised well.” The prince will neither be able to understand his advisors and unify
their advice nor will he be able to control them (The Prince, Chapter XXIII, Gilbert, 1965/
1999, Vol. 1, p. 88; compare “those who know how to rule a kingdom, not those who, without
knowing how, have the power to do it” in Discourses, Dedication, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1,
p. 189). Thus, a ruler is in need of expert advisors. At the same time, the ruler himself must, in a
sense, match their quality. The knowledge or wisdom of experts will exceed that of the ruler in
some sense—otherwise, he would not need them—but the ruler should at least have the same
level of knowledge or wisdom as his experts. The distinction between ruler and advisor on the
point of expertise, then, is less strict than it might appear. Both rulers and advisors share—to
some extent—the same sort of wisdom and expertise. All through his work, moreover,
Machiavelli does not make too fine a distinction between the knowledge of the counselor
and the knowledge of the prince; that is, between those who theorize and those who practice
(Fleischer, 1995, p. 337). He himself, for example, writes The Prince and Discourses as advice
for statesmen but presents his knowledge as that of an experienced statesman (ibid.; for explicit
examples, see the dedications to both The Prince and Discourses).7

There is a second aspect to this complicated relationship. The distinction between ruler and
advisor seems to be clear: the ruler holds power and has popular support; the advisor does not.
For the ruler to show that he is in charge and competent, he must rely on advisors. However, this
reliance puts him in the position of (seeming) dependency on the “real” power-holding expert.
An expert who wants to offer advice must show both supremacy in expertise and with the
assurance not to question the expertise of the ruler. Machiavelli shows himself to be well aware
of this tension in, for example, the Dedication of The Prince cited at the beginning of this
section. By comparing the position of the advisor to a mapmaker, Machiavelli tries to convince
the addressee (Lorenzo de’ Medici) that he (Machiavelli) has a particular expertise to offer
(view from below) while granting the ruler his own expertise (view from the hill) (The Prince,
Dedication, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, 10–11). Machiavelli here uses a metaphor to make
acceptable his claim that he is able to advise the ruler (on this tension, see also Garver,
1987, p. 7; cf. Hariman, 1989, p. 11). Machiavelli knows that speaking truth to power inevitably
may be understood as questioning power.8

Machiavelli shows that anyone who acts as an expert advisor must be skilled in rhetoric and pres-
entation. These skills are necessary to deal with the inevitable tension in the relation between ruler
and advisor and important in fulfilling the role of an effective advisor. Many commentators have
pointed out the rhetorical skills that Machiavelli employs—especially the commentators who most
oppose his work. On the level of composition in his introductions, his presentation of arguments,
and his use of language and style, Machiavelli shows himself a master of classical rhetoric (e.g.,
Garver, 1980; Hariman, 1989; Kahn, 1994; Strauss, 1958; Tinkler, 1988; Viroli, 1998). Doing
the best one can as an expert advisor involves using one’s skills to persuade the prince. Trying
to change the government for the better demands that the advisor not limit himself to soberly deli-
vering knowledge on demand. This clearly fits Machiavelli’s understanding of the type of knowl-
edge the expert can provide (see section “Machiavelli’s Expert Knowledge” above); it is knowledge
of instruments and objectives that can help the ruler to develop his judgment and his virtue in

MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 109

statecraft. As Viroli summarizes in his chapter on Machiavelli as a rhetorician: “Eloquence has the
power to educate the mind to virtue” (Viroli, 1998, p. 110). Where universal causal laws or algo-
rithms are virtually absent or of little use, and when the audience must be sensitized to particular
objectives and values, the expert advisor must try to persuade the public to accept his interpretation
of what is proper through clever communication. He must try to combine reason with eloquence,
ratio with oratio. Machiavelli wrote The Prince, the Discourses, and other works to move his read-
ers to pursue courses of action that he as an expert knew to be correct. Machiavelli exemplified how
an expert advisor should proceed (Viroli, 1998, pp. 82, 97).

Machiavelli Versus Weber: Knowledge and Power

Machiavelli notes that rulers need expertise and expert advisors. Rulers should ensure that these
experts neither flatter them nor give advice merely to serve their own interest. Machiavelli
emphasizes that an expert advisor should also use his skills in rhetoric and persuasion. The
advisor should use these skills, not to manipulate the powerholder to actions that suit the
advisor’s interests, but to soften tensions and effectively educate the powerholder. Machiavelli
makes a clear distinction between the roles and positions of rulers and expert advisors. How-
ever, on other points, he does not sharply distinguish the two. Both ruler and advisor should
be skilled in rhetoric. The advisor, to some extent, has the same type of knowledge a power-
holder has—or at least, that is what people believe, and that is the reason they give him their
support. For this reason, an expert advisor can fulfill an advisory and educating role. Weber,
when he explicitly addresses the issue, presents a simpler view concerning the two roles.
The expert knows about facts and instruments; the decision-maker knows about values
and objectives. The two roles should be kept separate (Weber, 1961b, p. 147). In contrast,
Machiavelli presents a view whereby the two roles are different, yet similar and interconnected.

CONCLUSION

Machiavelli offers coherent answers to the three basic questions of the study of public admin-
istration. These answers convey that government and administration demand knowledge for
action. An educated and experienced person can distinguish good from bad actions and learn
from them. The knowledge involves effective instruments for realizing objectives in particular
circumstances; the knowledge also concerns proper aims. These two aspects cannot be sepa-
rated. An expert advisor counsels the decision-maker on individual actions, but at the same time
supports the development of the decision-maker’s craft and virtue. The expertise of the advisor,
therefore, resembles the expertise of the ruler or administrator. This overlap contributes to, but
also threatens, the legitimacy of the ruler. From Machiavelli’s perspective, knowledge and
power (or the respective roles of the expert advisor and the decision-maker) do not coincide
in one person, as in Plato’s Republic. However, knowledge and power are not as strictly sepa-
rated as Weber would have it in “Science as a Vocation.” They meet in the middle, so to speak,
between the advisor and the prince.

We can now conclude that in Machiavelli’s position, the puzzle we found in Weber is
solved. The confusion resulted from Weber’s strict separation of roles—a distinction that

110 THOLEN

he himself was not able to match. From Machiavelli’s perspective, the expert advisor to the
powerholder must be well aware that he is not the legitimate decision-maker; that he should
not manipulate to gain from his position; and that he should offer counsel to the best of his
ability. However, in fulfilling his role, the advisor inevitably moves to the sphere that Weber
wants to reserve strictly for rulers: his advice implies emphasizing objectives and values. The
expert’s advice is even concerned with the virtue of the rulers and involves the typical
political instrument of rhetoric.

According to the perspective Machiavelli provides, we can formulate lessons for the study of
public administration; that is, for research, advice, and education in this field. A first lesson for
research in the field of public administration is that its focus should be on practical knowledge,
not on finding, testing, and refining general theories. These theories can provide little certainty
and can be of little use in actual politics and administration. Second, although it is of little use to
try to develop general theories, this does not mean that it is unnecessary or impossible to con-
duct research and learn in this field. The emphasis should be on the way to develop the skills to
learn from past experiences. One should really concentrate on developing the skill to recognize
good practices and exemplary actions. Furthermore, one should not only focus on contemporary
actions and the newest fashions in government. One should also study actions and cases in his-
tory, even ancient history. Political and administrative knowledge is contextual; however,
experiences from the (even distant) past can help sharpen judgment and insight.

Machiavelli’s perspective also provides lessons for scientific advisors. Conducting research
implies making choices, not least about what to study. The expertise one has, therefore, inevi-
tably expresses what one judges to be worthwhile to know and realize. It shows the intellectual
honesty of the expert advisor when he expresses what he values and why. Giving advice, there-
fore, is not simply providing the instruments to effectively realize some given policy goal.
Giving advice should also not be limited to counsel for particular cases. The advisor can also
support decision-makers in developing their craft and virtue. Being able to fulfill these roles
implies that the advisor has particular knowledge and rhetorical skills. These tasks make the
role of the expert advisor highly responsible. An expert advisor in the field of public adminis-
tration should be oriented to the common good. In an important way, the expert advisor is part
of or moves within the sphere of politics and administration.

Finally, there are lessons to be learned for the organization of education in this field. Concern
for research and the skill of making advice effective in leading to (the development of) the bet-
ter judgment of decision-makers should be part of public administration curriculums. Ethics,
both theoretical and practical, should not be a marginal but a central element of educational pro-
grams in this field. Ethics is necessary, because of the inevitable value-aspect of the choices that
scientific advisors must make. Yet ethics is also important to address the tensions that are
always part of expert advice and, therefore, of the study of public administration. Weber
attempted to dispense with these tensions by making sharp distinctions—distinctions that
cannot be maintained. Machiavelli demonstrates what it takes to accept this lesson.

NOTES

1. This article does not pretend to present a history of ideas. It does also not take on the task of situating each author in
his particular time and circumstances—factors that might explain specific preoccupations or lines of argument. Plato,

MACHIAVELLI’S LESSONS 111

Weber, and Machiavelli are placed, so to speak, in a transtemporal conversation. The basic presupposition of this article
is that thinkers from other times still have relevance for contemporary administration, leadership, and the study thereof.
2. A note on reading and interpreting Machiavelli: The range and quantity of scholarly interpretations are enormous
(on this point, e.g., see Berlin, 1955/2013/; Parel, 1972). In this article, I will not try to present a novel interpretation of
his work. I will rely on a comprehensive group of authors who offer mainstream interpretations. On the issues where
interpretations strongly differ, I will show the variety of views. All references to Machiavelli’s works are to the
three-volume edition by Allan Gilbert (1965/1999).
3. This does not mean, however, that Machiavelli did not know his classics. He was, for example, well-versed in De
Officciis (The Duties of the Ruler) by Cicero, and without mentioning him, Machiavelli evidently comments on Cicero
in his lessons to statesmen (Barlow, 1999; Colish, 1978).
4. This does not mean, of course, that Machiavelli might not be influenced on particular issues by ancient or Christian
ideas, metaphors, or concepts. Here we merely claim, in line with the mainstream understanding of Machiavelli’s work,
that he does not deduce his lessons for statesmen from one encompassing metaphysics or religion. For further reading
on Machiavelli’s relation to (Christian) religion and his use of religious arguments and symbols, see de Grazia (1989),
Nederman (2009), Parel (1991), Strauss (1958), and Viroli (2010).
5. In connecting knowledge and virtue, Machiavelli remains close to the ancient understandings as found in Plato
and Aristotle (e.g., Blanchard, 1996). His approach, however, also strongly resembles recent writings on virtue
epistemology. (On virtue epistemology, see Fairweather & Zagzebski, 2001; Roberts & Wood, 2007). For reasons
of limited space, I will not dwell on these resemblances here.
6. In fact, one might maintain that Machiavelli also gives the fourth virtue, justice, its due, albeit more implicitly. In
the course of The Prince, and more clearly in the Discourses, the aim of politics is related to realizing the common good
(see below).
7. As Viroli indicates, Machiavelli clearly presents himself in his books and letters as a self-sure advisor with
self-esteem who is proud of his knowledge and his autonomy (Viroli, 1998, p. 42).
8. The metaphor that Machiavelli uses here is at odds with what he writes elsewhere on his expertise and ambi-
tions. Earlier, in the dedication to The Prince, for example, he refers to his own longtime experience in public office
(i.e., the view from the hill) as the basis of his expertise, not to his membership in the populace (The Prince, Dedi-
cation, Gilbert, 1965/1999, Vol. 1, p. 10). Rhetoric may make certain tensions bearable or acceptable, but it does not
dissolve them.

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Berry Tholen is a senior lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, Institute for Management Research,
Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

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What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector
Innovation ?1

Rainer Kattel2

Introduction3

When there are 20,000 new apps emerging monthly in the Apple app store, and
even if only few of them make money or are sold for a fortune, it is easy to think that
technological development and innovation are driven by the private sector. It is in-
deed a commonplace to view either behemoths like Apple or Google or small start-
ups like WhatsApp as highly creative and coveted workplaces. In the same breath
the government is described by such adjectives as slow, rigid, expensive. Th is is
one of the key drivers of the currently popular public-sector-innovation discourse:
public-sector organizations should be more innovative, exciting places like Apples
and Googles; in a word, they should be less bureaucratic and hierarchical, less We-
berian (Bason 2010).

Th ere are three objections to this view, all saying in diff erent versions that the
question as such – why is the government not more like Apple – is wrong to begin
with. First one argues that the government deals with entirely diff erent phenomena
than the business sector; second one argues that much of the business creativity and
innovation is in fact paid by the government in one form or another; and the third
argument is based on the observation that innovations in the public and private sec-
tors are quite profoundly diff erent in nature and impact.

Th e fi rst set of arguments is well summarized by Joan Robinson: “It is a popular
error that bureaucracy is less fl exible than private enterprise. It may be so in detail,

1 The paper received “The Alena Brunovska Award for Teaching Excellence in Public Administra-
tion” at the 22nd NISPAcee Annual Conference 2014 held in Budapest, Hungary, May 22 – 24,
2014.

2 Professor of Innovation Policy and Technology Governance and Head of the Program at the
Ragnar Nurkse School of Innovation and Governance, Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn,
Estonia.

3 The article is based on my ongoing research within the FP7-funded project LIPSE, www.lipse.org.

10.1515/nispa-2015-0001

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The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 20

but when large scale adaptations have to be made, central control is far more fl ex-
ible. It may take two months to get an answer to a letter from a government depart-
ment, but it takes twenty years for an industry under private enterprise to readjust
itself to a fall in demand” (1946, 177). Th e second set of arguments is exemplifi ed by
Mariana Mazzucato’s discussion of what is actually inside Apple’s products: she lists
13 basic technological solutions inside Apple’s fl agship products such as the iPod,
the iPad and the iPhone that all were signifi cantly funded and oft en also developed
by the (US) government and its various agencies. Th ese technologies include: inter-
net, cellular technology, microprocessor, micro hard drive, liquid-crystal display,
signal compression, lithium-ion batteries, DRAM cache, click-wheel, SIRI, multi-
touch screen, NAVSTAR-GPS (2013, Chapter 5, Figure 13). Mazzucato does not
deny Apple’s ingenuity in designing remarkable products from existing technologi-
cal solutions; she rather emphasizes the diff erences in mode of supporting techno-
logical development and innovation: governments are good at taking on long-term
risks, the private sector excels at driving innovation further by means of competi-
tion, adaptation, etc. Th e third set of arguments – that public- and private-sector
innovations are profoundly diff erent – is what concerns us here in more detail.

To start with, scholarly literature on public-sector innovation (PSI hereaft er)
has been tormented since its inception by recurring bangs of consciousness: is there
such a thing as public-sector innovation to begin with ?4 If we cannot delineate and
defi ne public-sector innovation, then the concept – PSI – will denote any good idea
or positive change in the public-sector organizations as innovations and “will lose
credibility because it has no meaning” (Lynn 1997, 98; Pollitt 2011).

Th e aim of this article is to, fi rst, give a brief overview of prevailing attempts to
conceptualize (defi ne) public-sector innovation and, second, contrast it with older
literature on innovation (Tocqueville, Weber, Schumpeter); this inter-generational
discussion shows that the older discussions of PSI have more profound and nu-
anced views that have all but vanished from today’s conceptualizations. Th us, while
we cannot know what Max Weber would have said about PSI, it seems worthwhile
for us to engage in a dialogue with him and his contemporaries.

Public-sector innovation: What is it ?

By and large we can divide scholarly eff orts to delineate and conceptualize public-
sector innovation into three periods: 1) the Schumpeterian period: innovations and
the public sector are related to a larger theory of how evolutionary change takes
place in societies, mainly associated with Schumpeter (1912, 1939); 2) the organi-
zational-theory period: innovations in the public sector are similar to innovations
in private companies, mostly associated with early organizational theory and with

4 Lynn (1997) gives an overview of early literature on the topic.

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What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector Innovation ?

Wilson (1989); 3) the autochthonous-theory period: the most recent trend to disas-
sociate public and private-sector innovations.

Th e Schumpeterian period is characterized by Schumpeter’s theory of innova-
tion, which in fact is an application in economics and business of his wider theory
of how evolutionary change takes place in societies. Alas, Schumpeter never really
developed his wider theory of social change (see also Andersen 2009). In his 1939
Business Cycles, Schumpeter states, in a footnote, that he “believes, although he can-
not stay to show, that theory [of innovation] here expounded is but a special case,
adapted to the economic sphere, of a much larger theory which applies to change in
all spheres of social life, science and art included” (1939, 97). His 1912 Th eorie der
wirtschaft lichen Entwicklung / Th e Th eory of Economic Development5 apparently as-
sumes a similar theory, without going into greater detail, either. We can deduce that
what Schumpeter meant by this larger theory of change in social life is that change
is driven by entrepreneurial, creative persons, or “new men”, as he called them in
1939, that look for “new combinations”, that is innovative solutions, and thus bring
forth evolutionary changes, entirely new ways of doing things (in business, politics,
art, science, etc.) that will spread, in some cases more than others, throughout the
given sphere of life.6 Some of these changes will change value systems and disrupt
incumbent hierarchies.7

In the economic sphere, such individuals drive innovations and, thus, eco-
nomic growth. Th e role of the public sector in entrepreneurial innovation is two-
fold: fi rst, the public sector can take on the role of the entrepreneur (in fact, Schum-
peter argues that in socialism, as there is no private ownership, the state will be the
sole innovator; 1912, 173); second, innovations in businesses can also be “called
forth” by governments (1939, 84).

In sum, what we can take from Schumpeter is that ever since early theories of
innovation, the public sector has had a dual character vis-à-vis innovation: it itself
can be changed by innovators, and the state can play a crucial role for business in-
novations, as well (either by directly leading or indirectly supporting entrepreneur-
ial activity). Interestingly, this foreshadows rather closely the currently emerging

5 We use the German original fi rst edition here, as in later editions (that served as the basis for
English translation as well) these discussions were cut by Schumpeter; so, e.g., the second chap-
ter of the original edition runs to almost 100 pages, the English translations carries only half as
many. In this chapter, Schumpeter discusses his theory of innovation.

6 “Das erste Moment, die Freude am Neugestalten, am Schaffen neuer Formen der wirtschaftli-
chen Dinge ruht auf ganz denselben Grundlagen wie das schöpferische Tun des Künstlers, des
Denkers oder des Staatsmannes” (1912, 142).

7 “Sie werden Neues schaffen und Altes zerstören, kühne Pläne irgendwelcher Art konzipieren
und durchführen, deren Originalität aller Erfassung zu spotten scheint, ihre Mitbürger ihrer
Herrschaft unterwerfen, vielleicht die nationale Politik und Organisation beinfl ussen, den
‘natürlichen’ Gang der Wirtschaft durch gesetzliche und ungesetzliche Mittel und jedenfalls an-
ders als durch ‘Tausch’ abändern usw” (1912, 157).

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The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 2015

conceptual dichotomy between innovations in the public sector and innovations
through the public sector (European Commission 2013).

Th e organizational-theory period. Research explicitly dealing with innovation
in the public sector goes back at least to the 1960s; however, its inception seems
somewhat accidental in nature. Researchers in organization theory dealing with in-
novation and how organizational structure supports creative work and novel ideas
oft en did not diff erentiate between public and private-sector organizations (this
non-diff erentiation goes, in fact, back to Taylor’s Principles of Scientifi c Management
as well as to Weber’s bureaucracy as an ideal type for both public and private orga-
nizations). For instance, Th ompson talks explicitly about business and government
organizations and their “capacity to innovate” (1965, 1), and defi nes innovation as
the “generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, products
or services. Innovation therefore implies the capacity to change or adapt” (1965, 2;
see also, e.g., Mohr 1969). Much of the subsequent management and organization-
theory literature dealing with innovation moves eff ortlessly from the private to the
public sector and back and deals, in fact, mostly with the paradox of managers call-
ing for innovative ideas that end up meeting resistance in implementation, oft en
from the same managers or organizational structures (Lynn 1997). Th is strand of re-
search dealt mostly with diversity of tasks and incentives in an organization (Becker
and Whisler 1967 is a good overview). One of the key fi gures in this tradition is
James Q. Wilson, whose defi nition of (public-sector) organizational innovation re-
mained largely the same from the 1960s to the 1980s: “real innovations are those
that alter core tasks; most changes add to or alter peripheral tasks” (1989, 225). Wil-
son, without referring to Schumpeter, understood these alternations in core tasks to
be evolutionary in nature and in impact: “Government agencies change all the time,
but the most common changes are add-ons; new program is added on to existing
tasks without changing the core tasks or altering the organizational culture” (ibid.).
Th us, there is a rather extensive literature that emerged from organization theory
that incidentally or purposefully deals with public-sector innovation, where the lat-
ter is defi ned more or less similarly from the 1960s to the 1990s. Th is literature uses
more or less varied Schumpeterian notion of innovation, but it almost does not
diff erentiate at all between the private and public sectors, and thus innovations in
any organization can be defi ned as signifi cant and enduring changes in core tasks.
Th is way innovation should be diff erent from incremental changes in organizations
(public or private) and in fact is similar to (technological) breakthroughs familiar

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What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector Innovation ?

from the private-sector evolutionary literature (see, e.g., Lynn 1997, who explicitly
uses the concept of breakthrough).8

Th e autochthonous-theory period. In the 2000s, literature dealing with public-
sector innovation tried to move away both from private-sector Schumpeterian ap-
proaches emphasizing novelty in action and from organizational-level changes to-
wards innovation genuinely attributable to the public sector and towards discussing
innovations in public services and governance (See, e.g., Hartley 2005; Moore and
Hartley 2008; also Pollitt 2011). However, while there is a distinct attempt to discuss
public-sector phenomena (i.e. decentralization of agencies or regions) and move
away from the private-sector categorization and concepts (such as product, service
etc. innovations, life cycles and trajectories), there is hardly any substantial change
in terms of conceptually diff erentiating public-sector innovations from the private-
sector ones. Th e main tenets are still changes that are new to the organization and
that are large and durable enough (e.g. Hartley 2005, 27; Moore and Hartley 2008,
5). Hartley, for instance, delivers a useful discussion of the diff erence between pub-
lic-sector innovations in traditional, new-public-management- and network-based
paradigms of public administration (2005, 28 – 30). Yet, her conceptual framework
is hardly diff erent from Wilson’s. Similarly to organization-theory literature, also
the most recent literature on public-sector innovation sees innovations in public
sector in the end as something diff erent from incremental improvements that can
also fail and not lead to better public service. Th us, e-voting would constitute a real
innovation for most public-sector researchers, and yet some would argue that this
innovation did not really bring any improvement or at least that the jury is still out.
However, in most cases the line between innovation or not, improvement or not, is
not only tenuous at best, oft en it seems plain arbitrary. Moore and Hartley (2008),
for instance, use contracting-out and private-public partnerships as examples; in
other words, public-sector innovation is another term for NPM-style reform prac-
tices.9

However, in contrast to earlier periods of public-sector innovation concepts,
and with the exception of Lynn (1997; see also Lynn 2013), the current period of
scholarship pays much less attention to the evolutionary character of changes de-

8 Ironically, while this is indeed important for the early Schumpeterian literature, from the 1970s
and 1980s onwards, evolutionary economics develops complex theoretical frameworks that show
how routine-based individual skills and company-level behavior leads towards a higher level of
complexity and helps to explain how Schumpeterian creative destruction shapes economies and
competitive environments (See Dosi 1984; Nelson and Winter 1982). This leads to learning
economies and national systems of innovation approach that seek to explain innovations not
only as breakthroughs but indeed as incremental everyday changes in company routines, learn-
ing and various levels of interactions (e.g. user-producer; see Freeman 1982 and 1987; Lundvall
1992). Thus, the evolutionary economics dealing with private-sector innovations moves almost
exactly in the opposite direction as the emerging public-sector literature during the 1980s.

9 See Drechsler (2005) on the role academic and policy-talk fashion plays in such relabeling prac-
tices.

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The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 2015

scribed as innovations. Th is is not to say that there is not an acute awareness that
one has to diff erentiate ordinary change from innovation. For instance, Osborne
and Brown 2013 argue, “the management of innovation is an entirely diff erent task
from the management of developmental change” (2013, 3); Lynn similarly concurs
that all non-transformative change is “‘innovation lite’, which is indistinguishable
from ordinary change” (2013, 32). Yet, how this transformative change in fact works
in the public sector – and diff ers from typical private-sector dynamics – remains
almost always under discussed. Even the most advanced concepts of public-sector
innovation do not address in detail how selection mechanisms and other processes
take place that would enable us to distinguish innovations from ordinary changes.
What makes one reform or new service an innovation, and the other not ? Oft en
there seem to be normative connotations involved in distinguishing innovation
from change: as innovation is good, a successful reform must be innovative.

On the other hand, evolutionary dynamics dominate private-sector-innova-
tion literature, evident in such concepts as backward and forward linkages, increas-
ing returns to scale, fi rst-mover advantage, winner-takes-all markets, imperfect
competition, externalities, etc. (most present already in Schumpeter, especially in
his 1939 Business Cycles). In fact, innovation research in the private sector is all
about evolutionary change: how and why certain products, services, technologies,
technology systems, but also organizational forms and institutional frameworks be-
come dominant over others that in turn become obsolete or vanish altogether (Nel-
son and Winter 1982, Perez 2002, etc.). Th e role of technology, particularly large-
scale shift s following technological revolutions that lead to whole new paradigms, is
diffi cult to underestimate here.

However, such evolutionary practices and processes are simply much less evi-
dent or even lacking in the public sector. Moreover, many of these processes would
also not be desirable in the context of public organizations, such as monopoly rents
garnered by fi rst movers or undercutting the same fi rst movers by imitation. Th ere
is hardly any competition within the public sector for such evolutionary processes
to take place. Th e way innovations diff use in the market environment, via imperfect
competition and imitation, is hardly a way for public-sector innovations to emerge
and to diff use. Furthermore, in business innovations, there are lots of failures at
innovations and lots of losses through innovations or imitations by competitors.
Again, these phenomena seem not to be present in the public sector or present
themselves in a diff erent form.

Th at is not to say that there is no evolutionary change in the public sector. As
we have seen above, almost all literature on public-sector innovation assumes that
there is evolutionary change, but conceptualizing the evolutionary changes in the
public sector seems to have been lost in private-sector terminology. Th e key lesson
from previous literature, accordingly, seems to be that we should not attempt to
look for similar processes to take place within the public sector; rather we should

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15
What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector Innovation ?

try to focus on evolutionary processes within the public sector that originate from
the logics of the public sector and pertain to such phenomena as power, legitimacy
and trust.

Public-Sector Innovation: No theory for old men ?

Th is is arguably exactly the topic of perhaps the earliest “discussion” on public-sec-
tor innovation, namely between Tocqueville and Weber on the state-level public
administrations in the US. Tocqueville’s analysis, and admiration, of state-level ad-
ministration is famous, Weber’s counterarguments are much more scattered and
less well-known (Tocqueville’s was published in 1835 and 184010; Weber’s remarks
can be found in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft from 1922 and elsewhere).11

Tocqueville’s main question in looking at the US state and especially town-
ship-level administration was how diverse townships in New England, without
central administration, can still provide relatively uniform public services, espe-
cially under an administrative system where most public functions are fulfi lled
by elected offi cials (1876, 92). He explained this with judicial oversight of admin-
istrations, and called both – decentralized administration and judicial oversight
– innovations (ibid.).12 In Tocqueville’s view, decentralized administration with
elected offi cials and judicial oversight work better than centralized administra-
tions (which, he argues, was an innovation of the French Revolution; 121): cen-
tralized administrations have more resources, are good at regulating business,
maintaining social order and security but also keep society equally from improve-
ment and decline (113); centralized administrations are good at mastering re-
sources to combat problems, but they are poor at rejuvenating what might be
called socio-political resources for change (109).

When we jump two-thirds of a century forward, we can see that all the ills of
centralized administration described by Tocqueville become positives in Weber’s
view: in order to keep the social order, that is to keep authority and society func-
tioning, centralized bureaucracy is the “technically” better instrument over elected

10 We refer here to the 1848 French edition, available via Project Gutenberg, and to the 1876 Eng-
lish translation.

11 In Weber’s case, we use the 2002 German edition. For a comparative discussion of Tocqueville’s
and Weber’s discussions of America, see Kalberg 1997.

12 “C’est ce qui ne se découvre pas au premier coup d’œil. Les gouvernants regardent comme
une première concession de rendre les fonctions électives, et comme une seconde concession
de soumettre le magistrat élu aux arrêts des juges. Ils redoutent également ces deux innova-
tions.” / “The communities therefore in which the secondary functionaries of the government are
elected are perforce obliged to make great use of judicial penalties as a means of administration.
This is not evident at fi rst sight; for those in power are apt to look upon the institution of elective
functionaries as one concession, and the subjection of the elected magistrate to the judges of the
land as another. They are equally averse to both these innovations.”

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The NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, Vol. VIII, No. 1, Summer 2015

offi cials (2002). Elected offi cials and other “‘schöpferische’ Betätigung der Beamten”
leads rather to unpredictability and a politically corrupt system.

While Tocqueville and Weber had diff erent normative goals – the former
describing the benefi ts of an active civic life, the latter describing the benefi ts of
a well-functioning and predictable state apparatus – both discuss eventually how
authority, to use Weber’s term, is maintained in society with competitive interests
via institutional and administrative innovations (although Weber does not use the
term). We can paraphrase Weber: the modern state is defi ned by its authority to
use violence to uphold the very same authority. Above all, Tocqueville and We-
ber show how such innovations lead to diff ering socio-political relationships and
networks, institutional and organizational structures and cultures, in other words:
how these innovations drive diff erent evolutionary change. But both also show why
evolutionary processes in the public sector are punctured by political, legal, institu-
tional and administrative constraints. In fact, these very constraints are part of these
evolutionary processes, forming simultaneously internal factors that are changed
and external factors limiting changes. Constraints are intrinsic to the public sector.
Th us, to use Tocqueville’s example, judicial oversight in small townships acted as a
constraint on elected offi cials, yet this same constraint led to better service for the
citizens. Weber, on the other hand, writing two-thirds of a century later, argued that
modern societies have become increasingly more complex and thus require central-
ized administrations that can act simultaneously as constraints and enablers.

Consequently, following Tocqueville and Weber, we can argue that instead
of competition as driver and diff user of evolutionary processes, as is the case in
the private sector, intrinsic public-sector features act simultaneously as constraints
and enablers and engender punctured evolutionary processes as a consequence of
public-sector innovations. Notice that in both cases the innovations infl uence or-
ganizational-level capacities, institutional interactions and, eventually, the political
authority of a state. Th eir recommendation, as it were, would be to look at changes
in the public sector that lead to 1) changes in constraints and enablers that relate
directly to how authority is obtained / retained and 2) engender clearly discern-
ible evolutionary trajectories in their respective ecosystem; such changes could be
termed public-sector innovations.13

Concluding remarks

Summarizing above 150 years of discussion on conceptualizing public-sector inno-
vations and innovations generally, we can draw the following conclusions:

13 It can be argued that a recently emerging literature on social innovation tries to fi ll the gap in
public-sector-innovation literature by looking at values and social relevance and thus moves the
discussions towards issues of authority, trust, etc; see Bekkers et al. 2013 for an overview.

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What would Max Weber Say about Public-Sector Innovation ?

A From the oldest literature discussing public-sector innovations (Tocqueville,
Weber):
1) Public-sector innovations are in the most abstract sense related to public au-

thority and legitimacy;
2) Innovations lead to evolutionary changes in constraints and enablers that are

intrinsic to the public sector (rules, relationships, institutions);
B From recent public-sector-innovation literature:

3) Literature on public-sector innovations rarely deals with authority (and re-
lated phenomena such as legitimacy, trust, etc.) but rather with relatively spe-
cifi c features of these changes, e.g. with specifi c modalities (within public-sec-
tor organizations), agency (reactions to external stimuli such as technology,
politics, social challenges) and morphology (incremental changes); most of
these changes are in fact not evolutionary, or their impact remains diffi cult to
discern;

4) Innovation is too oft en defi ned from a normative viewpoint (as something
leading to signifi cant improvement in public-service delivery), rather than a
process that explains how profound changes take place in the public sector.

5) In defi ning innovation, the literature has focused mostly on organizational or
policy levels, but in doing so it has neglected the wider, public-sector-level,
constraints and enablers.

In sum, looking at these two strands of older and recent literature on PSI, we can
see that disproportionally large areas of public-sector activity in relations to innova-
tions are under-researched in current PSI research. Max Weber has given us per-
haps the best possible roadmap for future PSI-related research.

References

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Bason, C. 2010. Leading Public Sector Innovation. Bristol: Policy Press.
Becker, S. W. and T. L. Whisler. 1967. “Th e Innovative Organization: A Selective

View of Current Th eory and Research.” Journal of Business 4, 462 – 469.
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novation to Social Innovation in the Public Sector: A Literature Review of
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Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Dosi, G. 1984. Technical Change and Economic Performance. London: Macmillan.

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Drechsler, W. 2005. “Th e Rise and Demise of the New Public Management.” Post-
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The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5 Num 4 April 2013 80

The first principle addresses the de-
velopment of a true science in the field of
management. This can be applied to the art
of bricklaying (Myers Jr., 2011). The
process of bricklaying can be significantly
enhanced if scientific principles are em-
ployed. This may be implemented through
the enactment of rules that will govern the
motion of every workman involved in the
process of bricklaying (Bell & Martin,
2012).

Secondly, the bricklaying process

would also be more efficient through the
perfection and standardization of all im-
plements and working conditions (Paxton,
2011). This would ensure that the bricks
are of uniform size and shape. This would
enhance the efficiency of the bricklaying
process. As for the working conditions, it
is necessary to provide a favorable atmos-
phere for employees engaged in the brick-
laying process.

Employees tend to work better if the
management implements various mecha-
nisms to motivate them (Phelps & Parayi-
tam, 2007). Money is one major medium
for motivating employees. Employees
need to feel they are getting value for their
labor and that they are being compensated
adequately. However, there are other fac-
tors that may come into play in the motiva-
tion of employees. This is where science
comes in. An organization may need to
draft appropriate policies and rules that
would spur efficiency in the services ren-
dered by employees.

The development of a true science is
crucial in the management process. A true
managerial science would ensure the effi-
ciency of the workman in various ways.
First, it makes it possible for the standardi-
zation and perfection of the working
equipment. This ensures the uniformity of
goods and services being produced and
may increase the demand for such prod-
ucts as they will be more appealing to cus-
tomers (Giannantonio & Hurley-Hanson,

2011). A true science would also define
appropriate rules and regulations which
should be adopted in the process of creat-
ing goods and services.

The second principle is the scientific
selection and training of the workman. The
success of any business organization de-
pends on the selection of personnel to
work in the organization. Consequently,
many organizations go to great lengths to
ensure that only the best talent is selected
and hired for a given job. Organizations
have sought to develop their human re-
source departments so that they can be
effective in the staffing process. This is a
critical task that may be made easier
through the use of scientific methods in the
selection of the workman.

Organizations, therefore, have drafted
various meticulous ways of selecting the
right man for the job. This includes careful
scrutiny of the professional and academic
qualifications of all prospective employ-
ees. The next stage is a thorough interview
of the shortlisted candidates for the post
before settling on the most qualified indi-
vidual. Scientific methods of selection are,
therefore, quite handy in the recruitment
process.

It is also important to release any
workers who do not live up to the expecta-
tions of the organization. Those employees
who are unable to adapt to the new meth-
ods of production become unnecessary
baggage to the organization and have to be
weeded out. Each employee, therefore,
strives to work harder and more efficiently
in order to avoid being eliminated from the
organization. The basis for determining
which employee is less effective can be
established through scientific methods of
selection and recruitment (Maqbool et al,
2011).

However, Taylor contends that it is
the responsibility of the employer to train
employees and ensure they are fit to

The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5 Num 4 April 2013 81

handle the responsibilities assigned to
them. Instead of the management letting
each employee figure out his tasks and
goals, it has to guide the workers in their
daily activities in the organization. Reli-
ance on the old rule of the thumb may be
inefficient in improving the performance
of the employees (Blake & Moseley,
2010).

The third principle calls for the
workman’s scientific education and devel-
opment. It is the responsibility of the or-
ganization to ensure that employees re-
main relevant at their jobs (Wagner-
Tsukamoto, 2007). In order for the organi-
zation to remain profitable, it is crucial
that each employee continue dispensing
their duties in accordance with the princi-
ples laid down for them. The implication
of this principle is that workers have to
constantly undergo training and develop-
ment in order to be more efficient in per-
forming the tasks assigned to them.

It is for this reason that collegiate
education has been put into place. This has
arisen out of the need to constantly refresh
the knowledge and skills of employees,
especially in the fast-changing markets
that characterize modern business. Some
organizations provide in-house training for
their employees, while others allow for
study leaves so that their employees can
gain more knowledge.

There are some cases in which em-
ployees take it upon themselves to upgrade
their education. In such cases, employees
may quit their jobs in order to pursue fur-
ther studies, hoping to land better jobs on
completion of their studies. Such employ-
ees usually have to finance their own edu-
cation and, though it may be expensive,
they find it a worthwhile investment as
they are able to land better paying jobs in
future.

The fourth principle postulates the
cooperation between employees and the

management. Taylor explains that his in-
tention is for a clear division of labor be-
tween the groups, with the management
team responsible for all the planning and
cognitive functions. Taylor warns manag-
ers that they would run into significant risk
if they try to quickly adjust from the old
approaches of doing things to his new sys-
tem. He cautions that the most significant
danger in introducing new methods is de-
vising a way to transform the psychologi-
cal attitudes and habits of the management
team, as well as those of the workers
(Blake & Moseley, 2010, 2011).

Taylor contends that it is possible to

determine the best way to perform a task
to maximize its efficiency. This can be
achieved through a scientific study. Ac-
cording to Taylor, all a manufacturer needs
is a man with a stopwatch and a properly
ruled book. Then, you only need to select
ten to fifteen men who are skilled in a par-
ticular task for a scientific analysis. The
next step is to analyze the exact series of
operations needed while doing the work
under investigation, as well as understand-
ing the tools which are used. A stopwatch
is utilized to measure the required time for
each of these elementary steps to select the
quickest way of doing each step. Finally,
the subsequent tasks are to eliminate all
false, slow, and useless movements, col-
lect the quickest and most efficient move-
ments, and implement them into one series
(Blake & Moseley, 2010, p29).

Division of labor takes a central posi-
tion in Taylor’s fourth principle. This is
because the cooperation between employ-
ees and the management provides a suit-
able working environment for distribution
of tasks among the employees according to
their skills and qualifications. This works
best if there is a common understanding
between the management and the employ-
ees.

Taylor’s theory of scientific manage-
ment revolutionized the management of

The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5 Num 4 April 2013 82

organizations locally and internationally.
However, Taylor’s theory faced various
challenges (Peaucelle, 2000). Some of the
challenges included a lack of education
among the lower levels of supervision and
within the ranks of the workers. Another
challenge is the concept of task allocation
in which a task is broken down into
smaller tasks. This allows planners to de-
termine the best approach to go about ac-
complishing tasks. Then, there is the re-
ductionist approach which may dehuman-
ize workers.

Taylor’s legacy contribution to the

field of business management and its vari-
ous disciplines is still thriving today (Myer
Jr., 2011; Wren, 2011). Taylor’s contribu-
tions have survived the management evo-
lution that has progressed from the indus-
trial age into the information age, and is
now poised to enter into what some au-
thors hypothesize as the virtual age. This
possible entry into the virtual age suggests
that many new applications of Taylor’s
principles will be put into practice in the
future (Myer Jr., 2011, p11).

Challenges of Taylorism in Modern
Managerial Practice

Lack of Education

Lack of education presented a major

challenge to the early use and adoption of
scientific management. This was an espe-
cially noteworthy issue with the lower
levels of supervision and laborers. Taylor
noted that most of the factory workers had
insufficient education levels because most
were recent immigrants. In addition, many
workers were not even fluent in English,
which rendered communication to be diffi-
cult (Blake & Moseley, 2010).

Taylor was unconvinced that low
level supervisors and line workers were
sufficiently qualified to handle effective
planning. This was because they had low
levels of education as most had not under-

gone proper training. Although the work-
men were best suited for their jobs, they
were incapable of comprehending the sci-
ence of management. Since they did not
have the relevant educational background,
they lacked the mental capacity to work
(Blake & Moseley, 2010). Lack of educa-
tion was, therefore, a key challenge in the
adoption and use of scientific methods of
management. Since most of the lower
cadre workers lack the necessary education
to enable them to comprehend the scien-
tific aspects of management, it would be
difficult even to train them. This is com-
pounded by the problem of language, con-
sidering that most of them were recent
immigrants.

Nevertheless, Taylor attempted to
meet the challenge of lack of education by
making a proposition. He proposed that
there should be a separation of powers
between planning and execution. To this
end, Taylor suggested the creation of de-
partments for planning, and these depart-
ments would be run by engineers.

These engineers would be tasked with
four basic responsibilities; namely, devel-
oping scientific methods of doing work,
establishing goals for worker productivity,
setting up systems for worker rewards and
teaching and training personnel on how to
use scientific methods of management
(Blake & Moseley, 2010, 2011; Paxton,
2011).

The Concept of Task Allocation

Another challenge facing Taylor’s

scientific management methods lay in the
concept of task allocation. Task allocation
has drawn sharp criticism over the years
and it involves the splitting a huge single
task into several smaller ones that allow
the planner to determine how best the task
can be handled. The implication here is
that a single task will be accomplished by
a series of persons, ranging from top man-
agement to workers.

The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5 Num 4 April 2013 83

Task allocation, which leads to divi-
sion of labor, has made Taylorism an ex-
pensive system of management. This is
because it creates redundant positions for
non-value adding workers such as supervi-
sors and other indirect workers (Pruijt,
2002). Taylor subdivided the work meant
for one gang boss among eight men. The
eight men included different categories of
clerks, gang bosses, speed bosses, inspec-
tors and shop disciplinarians.

This means that Taylorism not only
vouches for efficiency but also for the
provision of middle class jobs. This makes
it very expensive to implement and run. It
is for this reason that the US Steel Corpo-
ration laid off 60 specialized foremen
(Pruijt, 2002). This dismayed Taylor but
there was no other choice for the steel cor-
poration as it had too many non-value add-
ing supervisors in its organization. The
emergent high costs of operations due to
unnecessary personnel led companies to
dilute Taylor’s model of scientific man-
agement.

The concept of task allocation has
been criticized for its lack of flexibility. It
is complex or impossible to increase the
time allowed for operations as the time
cycle is clearly stated in the standard
worksheet of operations (Prujit, 2002).
This becomes a major dilemma for older
workers, especially when timelines have
been set to accommodate the more youth-
ful workers in the organization. The older
workers, consequently, may find it diffi-
cult or impossible to keep up with the
company’s expectations, objectives and
goals.

Dehumanization of Workers

Dehumanization of workers is yet an-

other challenge to Taylorism (Blake &
Moseley, 2010). This can be attributed to
Taylor’s reductionist approach to scientific
management. The general perception was
that the individual worker had no chance

to excel or think on his/her own. This
criticism arose from later writings based
on Taylor’s research by other authors as
opposed to Taylor’s own words and theo-
ries (Maqbool et al., 2011).

Actually, Taylor had considered and
discussed worker’s happiness throughout
his monograph. He stressed that the task
was always regulated so that the worker
who is well suited to his job will thrive
while working at this rate during a long
time period. The worker will grow happier
and more prosperous, instead of being
overworked (Taylor, 1911, p15). Taylor’s
concept of human motivation was ex-
tremely limited. Taylor had a strong con-
viction that the only way to motivate
workers was through monetary incentives
(Brogan, 2011). Although the study of
human motivation would not become
popular for several decades to come, it still
seems naïve to contend that money is the
sole motivator for employees (Blake &
Moseley, 2010, p30). Taylor frequently
came under sharp criticism for having his
work being exclusively beneficial to the
management team. This was despite the
fact that he tried to establish a common
ground between management and laborers.

Taylor further indicated that the ma-
jority of these men hold that the funda-
mental interests of employees and employ-
ers are necessarily antagonistic (Zuffo,
2011; Blake & Moseley, 2010). Scientific
management, in contrast, has its basis that
the interests of the employees and employ-
ers should be necessarily the same. The
employer’s prosperity cannot subsist
through a long time period unless it is ac-
companied by the employee’s prosperity
and vice versa. It is possible to give the
worker what they want most, which is high
wages, and the employer what they want,
which is low labor costs—for their manu-
factures (Caldari, 2007).

Nevertheless, Taylor showed concern
for the well-being of the workers through-

The International Journal of Organizational Innovation Vol 5 Num 4 April 2013 84

out his research despite exhibiting an
attitude that was often biased against
workers (Taylor, 1911; Blake & Moseley,
2010). For instance, he contended that
naturally, man strives to do as little work
as is safely possible in the majority of
cases. The implication of this assertion is
that man has to be given timelines for
them to meet goals and obligations.

His directions were geared toward the
uneducated. As an example, during his
case study explanation at Bethlehem Steel,
he directed a pig iron worker to obey his
supervisor by saying “When he tells you to
pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and
you walk, and when he tells you to sit
down and rest, you sit down. You do that
right straight through the day. And what’s
more, no back talk” (Blake & Moseley,
2010, p30; Taylor, 1911, p18). This atti-
tude from management would not be ac-
ceptable in modern work environment, but
it was commonplace during Taylor’s time.

Conclusion

Taylor’s principles of scientific man-
agement still remain relevant in modern
times, although they have undergone some
modifications. Some corporations have
made some revisions on the principles and
have been able to experience continued
success in the fast-changing world of busi-
ness. There are three essential principles
that underlie Taylor’s scientific approach
to management. They are the development
of a true science, the scientific selection of
the workman, the workman’s scientific
education and development and the inti-
mate relationship between the manage-
ment and the workers.

However, Taylor’s principles of sci-
entific management have faced various
challenges. The most prominent among
them is lack of education, dehumanization
of workers and the concept of task alloca-
tion. Lack of education cripples the work-
ers’ ability to understand the scientific

methods of management. Dehumanization
of the workers occurs due to Taylor’s as-
sumption that the individual worker cannot
excel or think on his/her own. This is the
implication created when Taylor vouches
for the creation of middle class jobs. The
jobs are for supervisors who guide the
workers in dispensing their duties. The
concept of task allocation pushes the or-
ganizational costs of operation to higher
levels.

Essentially, the principles of scientific
management as presented by Taylor have
withstood the test of time and are poised to
enter the next age, which pundits refer to
as the virtual age. However, some modifi-
cations may be needed in order to make
Taylorism more efficient and profitable to
companies.

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