Effectiveness of International Organizations
International organizations respond to global social injustice by providing a variety of services that save lives and build futures. Some organizations provide relief aid such as food, shelter, and medical services. Others provide developmental aid such as the technology and training needed to create self-sustaining communities. These organizations are funded by governments, corporations, and other private donors. With a large number of organizations working internationally, confusion, disorganization, and even fraud may occur. Poor coordination among the various organizations and lack of knowledge about local cultural practices are factors that may reduce the effectiveness of an organization in providing assistance to those in need.
To prepare for this Discussion:
- Review the book excerpt, “Chapter 2: Before and Beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Study the principles of the various human rights initiatives and consider how they relate to international organizations.
- Review the article, ”Human Rights Bodies.” Think about the human rights bodies that monitor global human rights and social justice issues.
- Review the article, “Haiti: The Aid Dilemma (Q & A with Adam Davidson).” Think about the relief effort provided by international organizations following the Haiti earthquake. Consider the challenges, successes, and long-term issues of providing aid.
- Review the article, “NGO Research Guide.” Take note of the various NGOs that have contributed to social justice.
- Select one international organization that took action for social justice. Use the Walden Library and the Internet to conduct additional research on the organization you selected to determine their projects, activities, and relief efforts.
- Select one situation where the international organization took action for social justice.
- Consider the effectiveness of their efforts for that specific situation.
With these thoughts in mind: Due by Wednesday 2/14/18
Post a 500-word a brief description of the international organization you selected. Then explain the social justice issues that the organization addresses and types of assistance they offer. Finally, describe one situation where the organization took action for social justice and describe the effectiveness of its actions.
Be sure to support your postings and responses with specific references to the Learning Resources.
Learning Resources
Please read and view (where applicable) the following Learning Resources before you complete this week’s assignments.
Readings
· Book Excerpt: Wronka, J. M. (2008).
Chapter 2: Before and beyond the universal declaration of human rights
. In Human rights and social justice: Social action and service for the helping and health professions (pp. 65–96). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.
· Article: Carr, C. (1993, Sept 16). The humanitarian illusion. The New York Times. A23. (See Attachment)
Use the ProQuest Central database and search using the article title.
· Article: Duke University Libraries. (n. d.). NGO Research Guide. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://library.duke.edu/research/subject/guides/ngo_guide/ngo_database.html
· Article: Davidson, A. (29 June 2010) Haiti: The aid dilemma (Q & A With Adam Davidson) [Optional Material]. Frontline. Arlington, VA: PBS. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haiti-aid/qa.html
· Article: Pogge, T. (2005). Symposium: World poverty and human rights, Ethics & International Affairs, 19(1), 1–7. (See Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using the article title.
·
Article: Risse, M. (2005). Do we owe the global poor assistance or rectification? Response to world poverty and human rights. Ethics and International Affairs, 19(1), 9–18. (See Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using the article title.
· Article: United Nations Human Rights. (n. d.). Human Rights Bodies. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from
http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
Carr; , Caleb . New York Times , Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]16 Sep 1993:
A.23.
ProQuest document link
ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT)
The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing
perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday
Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.
Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would
be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem
unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs
and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia’s troubles.
The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with
heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could
see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status
would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months — or years. Are all the countries in
the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be — and the
conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial.
FULL TEXT
AuthorAffiliation
Caleb Carr is author of “The Devil Soldier.” This is adapted from an article that appears in the fall issue of the World
Policy Journal.
Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid again showed he would stop at nothing when he sent women and children amid his
henchmen into Mogadishu streets to attack members of the United Nations force last week.
The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing
perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday
Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.
Only two routes offer hope of changing the deplorable status quo: increased control by the military forces or
speedy withdrawal. As always, the United States will lead the way in making this choice; its decision will have
enormous implications for U.S. policy in other parts of the world.
The U.S. and U.N. entered Somalia believing they could direct the combat troops to ignore the political situation
and pursue an extra-military — that is, extra-political — end: the distribution of humanitarian aid.
The U.N. forces established famine as the enemy, not the gangs of such warlords as General Aidid and Gen.
Mohammed Said Hersi, who is also known as General Morgan. The coalition was unwilling or unable to recognize
that famine in Somalia is not a natural disaster; it is a policy orchestrated by the clan leaders to preserve their
power and to destroy Somalis who will not join their sides.
Recognition of this fact came too late in the international effort, and acknowledgment of its implications is proving
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just as tardy. We now hunt General Aidid like the criminal he has always been; yet our delay in beginning that hunt,
and our willingness to seat him and the other gang leaders at an internationally sanctioned peace conference in
Addis Ababa earlier this year, have given him the time, media attention and the setting in which to portray himself
as a legitimate leader.
Seizing Generals Aidid and Morgan and other gang leaders and disarming their followers should have been the first
order of business. If our troops are to stay, we should pursue that goal more aggressively. If famine remains the
enemy, its agents must be quickly and severely stopped.
Many in the West are uncomfortable with such an approach, echoing General Aidid’s inevitable claim that it
amounts to colonialism. That may be so, but it is also the only cure for Somalia’s ills. Proof is evident all over the
country, notably in towns like Baardheere, where marines quickly established a weapons-free zone, neutralized the
gangs and helped the citizens rebuild their lives. This is colonialism, no doubt — but, after all, the local leaders were
the agents of famine and disease.
Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would
be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem
unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs
and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia’s troubles.
The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with
heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could
see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status
would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months — or years. Are all the countries in
the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be — and the
conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial.
For the consequences of Somalia extend far beyond the fate of that nation and beyond troubled Africa. In U.S.
foreign policy, they encompass the long overdue recognition that military intervention cannot be nonpolitical.
If we send U.S. and U.N. forces abroad because of a humanitarian crisis, we will come into conflict with political
leaders who are not capably addressing that crisis or are abetting it. Before going in, we must determine the
legitimacy of those leaders and whether we are prepared to remove them.
Such a policy shift would have regional implications, not only in the developing world but more importantly in the
former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian-Serb-Croat conflict is not a natural disaster or a humanitarian crisis. It is a crude
display of power politics that drags on because the factional leaders and their followers care more about winning
than showing mercy to innocent civilians.
In deciding whether or not to intervene in any way in that conflict, we must ask ourselves questions we did not
grapple with before the start of the Somali expedition: Do we accept the legitimacy of the leaders of the conflict?
Do we believe that the ethnic and religious basis of their dispute is valid grounds for war and slaughter?
If not, we must be prepared, should we choose military intervention, to arrest all such leaders, disarm their
followers and create a U.N. protectorate whose term may be far longer than that in Somalia.
For there may be no leaders who truly believe in peace and compromise in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, and it may
take generations to foster such changes. The alternative, of course, is to stay out of the fight — a course that
dooms many civilians to violent death and the rest to an almost medieval way of life.
Gen. Colin L. Powell was thus quite right to say that if we withdrew from Somalia, our chances of creating any true
new world order would be severely diminished. Yet if we backed down from the responsibility of creating a full-
scale U.N. protectorate, withdrawal would be the only sensible, workable solution that remained.
There is no middle road in such conflicts, as we saw in the largely symbolic airlift of medical supplies to Bosnia
earlier this year, and as the stalemate in Somalia continues to demonstrate.
If we enter the fray, we become political players. Any attempt to portray a political conflict as a humanitarian crisis
is simply sidestepping the terrible choice before us.
DETAILS
Subject: ARMAMENT, DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES; FAMINE; POLITICS AND
GOVERNMENT; CIVIL WAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE
Location: SOMALIA
People: CARR, CALEB
Company / organization: Name: United Nations; NAICS: 928120
Publication title: New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.
Pages: A.23
Publication year: 1993
Publication date: Sep 16, 1993
Section: A
Publisher: New York Times Company
Place of publication: New York, N.Y.
Country of publication: United States, New York, N.Y.
Publication subject: General Interest Periodicals–United States
ISSN: 03624331
CODEN: NYTIAO
Source type: Newspapers
Language of publication: English
Document type: Op-Ed
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- The Humanitarian Illusion
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Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?
Risse, Mathias
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World Poverty and Human Rights
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