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Discussion One

Aristotle says that the virtues are necessary for humans to attain happiness, but he means this in terms of something we might call “flourishing” or “living well”, which he considers quite different than simply feeling good. Thus, according to Aristotle some people might feel that they are happy, but because they lack the virtues they are not truly flourishing. However, imagine someone that is deceitful, selfish, greedy, self-indulgent, and yet enjoys great pleasure and appears to be quite happy. Is someone like this “flourishing” or not? Explain your answer this by referring to this week’s readings and media, and if possible provide examples from real life and/or from literature, film, TV, etc.

Discussion TWO

What are 2 virtues that you believe are important to living a flourishing or successful life in Aristotle’s sense of the term? Explain what goods in human life these virtues enable their possessor to fulfill. Provide examples of characteristic behavior that manifests these virtues, and contrast that with behavior that displays a lack of virtue. Do your examples confirm Aristotle’s view that a virtue is a mean between extremes of excess and defect? If so, explain what those extremes are; if not, explain why. Refer to this week’s readings and media to illustrate and support your claims.

• Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book One 1-5, 7; Book Two 1-4, 6, 7.

o The full text can be read and/or downloaded here:

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html
o A more contemporary translation of chapter 1 can be read and/or downloaded here:

http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam032/99036947
o A more contemporary translation of chapter 2 is available in the Ashford Library by

searching for “Nicomachean Ethics AND AU Taylor AND PT eBook” (without
quotes), or using this link after signing into the Library site:
http://site.ebrary.com.proxy-library.ashford.edu/lib/ashford/Doc?id=10194247

Nicomachean
Ethics

By
Aristotle

Written
350
B.C.E

Translated
by
W.
D.
Ross

BOOK
I

Every
art
and
every
inquiry,
and
similarly
every
action
and
pursuit,
is
thought
to
aim
at
some
good;
and

for
this
reason
the
good
has
rightly
been
declared
to
be
that
at
which
all
things
aim…

2

If,
then,
there
is
some
end
of
the
things
we
do,
which
we
desire
for
its
own
sake
(everything
else
being

desired
for
the
sake
of
this),
and
if
we
do
not
choose
everything
for
the
sake
of
something
else
(for
at

that
rate
the
process
would
go
on
to
infinity,
so
that
our
desire
would
be
empty
and
vain),
clearly
this

must
be
the
good
and
the
chief
good.
Will
not
the
knowledge
of
it,
then,
have
a
great
influence
on
life?

Shall
we
not,
like
archers
who
have
a
mark
to
aim
at,
be
more
likely
to
hit
upon
what
is
right?
If
so,
we

must
try,
in
outline
at
least,
to
determine
what
it
is,
and
of
which
of
the
sciences
or
capacities
it
is
the

object.

Our
discussion
will
be
adequate
if
it
has
as
much
clearness
as
the
subject-‐matter
admits
of,
for
precision

is
not
to
be
sought
for
alike
in
all
discussions,
any
more
than
in
all
the
products
of
the
crafts…We
must

be
content,
then,
in
speaking
of
such
subjects
[as
fine
and
just
actions
and
other
goods]
and
with
such

premisses
to
indicate
the
truth
roughly
and
in
outline,
and
in
speaking
about
things
which
are
only
for

the
most
part
true
and
with
premisses
of
the
same
kind
to
reach
conclusions
that
are
no
better.
In
the

same
spirit,
therefore,
should
each
type
of
statement
be
received;
for
it
is
the
mark
of
an
educated
man

to
look
for
precision
in
each
class
of
things
just
so
far
as
the
nature
of
the
subject
admits;
it
is
evidently

equally
foolish
to
accept
probable
reasoning
from
a
mathematician
and
to
demand
from
a
rhetorician

scientific
proofs.

Now
each
man
judges
well
the
things
he
knows,
and
of
these
he
is
a
good
judge.
And
so
the
man
who

has
been
educated
in
a
subject
is
a
good
judge
of
that
subject,
and
the
man
who
has
received
an
all-‐

round
education
is
a
good
judge
in
general.
Hence
a
young
man
is
not
a
proper
hearer
of
lectures
on

political
science;
for
he
is
inexperienced
in
the
actions
that
occur
in
life,
but
its
discussions
start
from

these
and
are
about
these;
and,
further,
since
he
tends
to
follow
his
passions,
his
study
will
be
vain
and

unprofitable,
because
the
end
aimed
at
is
not
knowledge
but
action.
And
it
makes
no
difference

whether
he
is
young
in
years
or
youthful
in
character;
the
defect
does
not
depend
on
time,
but
on
his

living,
and
pursuing
each
successive
object,
as
passion
directs.
For
to
such
persons,
as
to
the
incontinent,

knowledge
brings
no
profit;
but
to
those
who
desire
and
act
in
accordance
with
a
rational
principle

knowledge
about
such
matters
will
be
of
great
benefit.

These
remarks
about
the
student,
the
sort
of
treatment
to
be
expected,
and
the
purpose
of
the
inquiry,

may
be
taken
as
our
preface.

Let
us
resume
our
inquiry
and
state,
in
view
of
the
fact
that
all
knowledge
and
every
pursuit
aims
at

some
good,
what
it
is
that
we
say
political
science
aims
at
and
what
is
the
highest
of
all
goods
achievable

by
action.
Verbally
there
is
very
general
agreement;
for
both
the
general
run
of
men
and
people
of

superior
refinement
say
that
it
is
happiness,
and
identify
living
well
and
doing
well
with
being
happy;
but

with
regard
to
what
happiness
is
they
differ,
and
the
many
do
not
give
the
same
account
as
the
wise…

Presumably,
then,
we
must
begin
with
things
known
to
us.
Hence
any
one
who
is
to
listen
intelligently
to

lectures
about
what
is
noble
and
just,
and
generally,
about
the
subjects
of
political
science
must
have

been
brought
up
in
good
habits.
For
the
fact
is
the
starting-‐point,
and
if
this
is
sufficiently
plain
to
him,

he
will
not
at
the
start
need
the
reason
as
well;
and
the
man
who
has
been
well
brought
up
has
or
can

easily
get
starting
points.
And
as
for
him
who
neither
has
nor
can
get
them,
let
him
hear
the
words
of

Hesiod:

Far
best
is
he
who
knows
all
things
himself;

Good,
he
that
hearkens
when
men
counsel
right;

But
he
who
neither
knows,
nor
lays
to
heart

Another’s
wisdom,
is
a
useless
wight.

Let
us
again
return
to
the
good
we
are
seeking,
and
ask
what
it
can
be.
It
seems
different
in
different

actions
and
arts;
it
is
different
in
medicine,
in
strategy,
and
in
the
other
arts
likewise.
What
then
is
the

good
of
each?
Surely
that
for
whose
sake
everything
else
is
done.
In
medicine
this
is
health,
in
strategy

victory,
in
architecture
a
house,
in
any
other
sphere
something
else,
and
in
every
action
and
pursuit

the
end;
for
it
is
for
the
sake
of
this
that
all
men
do
whatever
else
they
do.
Therefore,
if
there
is
an
end

for
all
that
we
do,
this
will
be
the
good
achievable
by
action,
and
if
there
are
more
than
one,
these
will

be
the
goods
achievable
by
action.

So
the
argument
has
by
a
different
course
reached
the
same
point;
but
we
must
try
to
state
this
even

more
clearly.
Since
there
are
evidently
more
than
one
end,
and
we
choose
some
of
these
(e.g.
wealth,

flutes,
and
in
general
instruments)
for
the
sake
of
something
else,
clearly
not
all
ends
are
final
ends;
but

the
chief
good
is
evidently
something
final.
Therefore,
if
there
is
only
one
final
end,
this
will
be
what
we

are
seeking,
and
if
there
are
more
than
one,
the
most
final
of
these
will
be
what
we
are
seeking.
Now
we

call
that
which
is
in
itself
worthy
of
pursuit
more
final
than
that
which
is
worthy
of
pursuit
for
the
sake
of

something
else,
and
that
which
is
never
desirable
for
the
sake
of
something
else
more
final
than
the

things
that
are
desirable
both
in
themselves
and
for
the
sake
of
that
other
thing,
and
therefore
we
call

final
without
qualification
that
which
is
always
desirable
in
itself
and
never
for
the
sake
of

something
else.

Now
such
a
thing
happiness,
above
all
else,
is
held
to
be;
for
this
we
choose
always
for
self
and
never
for

the
sake
of
something
else,
but
honour,
pleasure,
reason,
and
every
virtue
we
choose
indeed
for

themselves
(for
if
nothing
resulted
from
them
we
should
still
choose
each
of
them),
but
we
choose
them

also
for
the
sake
of
happiness,
judging
that
by
means
of
them
we
shall
be
happy.
Happiness,
on
the

other
hand,
no
one
chooses
for
the
sake
of
these,
nor,
in
general,
for
anything
other
than
itself.

From
the
point
of
view
of
self-‐sufficiency
the
same
result
seems
to
follow;
for
the
final
good
is
thought

to
be
self-‐sufficient…[T]he
self-‐sufficient
we
now
define
as
that
which
when
isolated
makes
life

desirable
and
lacking
in
nothing;
and
such
we
think
happiness
to
be;
and
further
we
think
it
most

desirable
of
all
things,
without
being
counted
as
one
good
thing
among
others-‐
if
it
were
so
counted
it

would
clearly
be
made
more
desirable
by
the
addition
of
even
the
least
of
goods;
for
that
which
is
added

becomes
an
excess
of
goods,
and
of
goods
the
greater
is
always
more
desirable.
Happiness,
then,
is

something
final
and
self-‐sufficient,
and
is
the
end
of
action.

Presumably,
however,
to
say
that
happiness
is
the
chief
good
seems
a
platitude,
and
a
clearer
account
of

what
it
is
still
desired.
This
might
perhaps
be
given,
if
we
could
first
ascertain
the
function
of
man.

For
just
as
for
a
flute-‐player,
a
sculptor,
or
an
artist,
and,
in
general,
for
all
things
that
have
a
function
or

activity,
the
good
and
the
‘well’
is
thought
to
reside
in
the
function,
so
would
it
seem
to
be
for
man,
if
he

has
a
function.
Have
the
carpenter,
then,
and
the
tanner
certain
functions
or
activities,
and
has
man

none?
Is
he
born
without
a
function?
Or
as
eye,
hand,
foot,
and
in
general
each
of
the
parts
evidently

has
a
function,
may
one
lay
it
down
that
man
similarly
has
a
function
apart
from
all
these?
What
then

can
this
be?
Life
seems
to
be
common
even
to
plants,
but
we
are
seeking
what
is
peculiar
to
man.
Let
us

exclude,
therefore,
the
life
of
nutrition
and
growth.
Next
there
would
be
a
life
of
perception,
but
it
also

seems
to
be
common
even
to
the
horse,
the
ox,
and
every
animal.
There
remains,
then,
an
active
life
of

the
element
that
has
a
rational
principle;
of
this,
one
part
has
such
a
principle
in
the
sense
of
being

obedient
to
one,
the
other
in
the
sense
of
possessing
one
and
exercising
thought.
And,
as
‘life
of
the

rational
element’
also
has
two
meanings,
we
must
state
that
life
in
the
sense
of
activity
is
what
we

mean;
for
this
seems
to
be
the
more
proper
sense
of
the
term.
Now
if
the
function
of
man
is
an

activity
of
soul
which
follows
or
implies
a
rational
principle,
and
if
we
say
‘so-‐and-‐so-‐and
‘a
good
so-‐and-‐
so’
have
a
function
which
is
the
same
in
kind,
e.g.
a
lyre,
and
a
good
lyre-‐player,
and
so
without

qualification
in
all
cases,
eminence
in
respect
of
goodness
being
added
to
the
name
of
the
function
(for

the
function
of
a
lyre-‐player
is
to
play
the
lyre,
and
that
of
a
good
lyre-‐player
is
to
do
so
well):
if
this
is

the
case,
and
we
state
the
function
of
man
to
be
a
certain
kind
of
life,
and
this
to
be
an
activity
or

actions
of
the
soul
implying
a
rational
principle,
and
the
function
of
a
good
man
to
be
the
good
and

noble
performance
of
these,
and
if
any
action
is
well
performed
when
it
is
performed
in
accordance
with

the
appropriate
excellence:
if
this
is
the
case,
human
good
turns
out
to
be
activity
of
soul
in

accordance
with
virtue,
and
if
there
are
more
than
one
virtue,
in
accordance
with
the
best
and
most

complete.

But
we
must
add
‘in
a
complete
life.’
For
one
swallow
does
not
make
a
summer,
nor
does
one
day;
and

so
too
one
day,
or
a
short
time,
does
not
make
a
man
blessed
and
happy.

BOOK
II

Virtue,
then,
being
of
two
kinds,
intellectual
and
moral,
intellectual
virtue
in
the
main
owes
both
its
birth

and
its
growth
to
teaching
(for
which
reason
it
requires
experience
and
time),
while
moral
virtue

comes
about
as
a
result
of
habit,
whence
also
its
name
(ethike)
is
one
that
is
formed
by
a
slight
variation

from
the
word
ethos
(habit)….

[T]he
virtues
we
get
by
first
exercising
them,
as
also
happens
in
the
case
of
the
arts
as
well.
For
the

things
we
have
to
learn
before
we
can
do
them,
we
learn
by
doing
them,
e.g.
men
become
builders
by

building
and
lyre
players
by
playing
the
lyre;
so
too
we
become
just
by
doing
just
acts,
temperate
by

doing
temperate
acts,
brave
by
doing
brave
acts…

[B]y
doing
the
acts
that
we
do
in
our
transactions
with
other
men
we
become
just
or
unjust,
and
by

doing
the
acts
that
we
do
in
the
presence
of
danger,
and
being
habituated
to
feel
fear
or
confidence,
we

become
brave
or
cowardly.
The
same
is
true
of
appetites
and
feelings
of
anger;
some
men
become

temperate
and
good-‐tempered,
others
self-‐indulgent
and
irascible,
by
behaving
in
one
way
or
the
other

in
the
appropriate
circumstances.
Thus,
in
one
word,
states
of
character
arise
out
of
like
activities.
This
is

why
the
activities
we
exhibit
must
be
of
a
certain
kind;
it
is
because
the
states
of
character
correspond

to
the
differences
between
these.
It
makes
no
small
difference,
then,
whether
we
form
habits
of
one

kind
or
of
another
from
our
very
youth;
it
makes
a
very
great
difference,
or
rather
all
the
difference.

Since,
then,
the
present
inquiry
does
not
aim
at
theoretical
knowledge
like
the
others
(for
we
are

inquiring
not
in
order
to
know
what
virtue
is,
but
in
order
to
become
good,
since
otherwise
our
inquiry

would
have
been
of
no
use),
we
must
examine
the
nature
of
actions,
namely
how
we
ought
to
do
them;

for
these
determine
also
the
nature
of
the
states
of
character
that
are
produced,
as
we
have
said…

First,
then,
let
us
consider
this,
that
it
is
the
nature
of
such
things
to
be
destroyed
by
defect
and
excess,

as
we
see
in
the
case
of
strength
and
of
health
(for
to
gain
light
on
things
imperceptible
we
must
use
the

evidence
of
sensible
things);
both
excessive
and
defective
exercise
destroys
the
strength,
and
similarly

drink
or
food
which
is
above
or
below
a
certain
amount
destroys
the
health,
while
that
which
is

proportionate
both
produces
and
increases
and
preserves
it.
So
too
is
it,
then,
in
the
case
of
temperance

and
courage
and
the
other
virtues.
For
the
man
who
flies
from
and
fears
everything
and
does
not
stand

his
ground
against
anything
becomes
a
coward,
and
the
man
who
fears
nothing
at
all
but
goes
to

meet
every
danger
becomes
rash;
and
similarly
the
man
who
indulges
in
every
pleasure
and
abstains

from
none
becomes
self-‐indulgent,
while
the
man
who
shuns
every
pleasure,
as
boors
do,
becomes
in
a

way
insensible;
temperance
and
courage,
then,
are
destroyed
by
excess
and
defect,
and
preserved

by
the
mean…

We
must
take
as
a
sign
of
states
of
character
the
pleasure
or
pain
that
ensues
on
acts;
for
the
man
who

abstains
from
bodily
pleasures
and
delights
in
this
very
fact
is
temperate,
while
the
man
who
is
annoyed

at
it
is
self-‐indulgent,
and
he
who
stands
his
ground
against
things
that
are
terrible
and
delights
in
this
or

at
least
is
not
pained
is
brave,
while
the
man
who
is
pained
is
a
coward.
For
moral
excellence
is

concerned
with
pleasures
and
pains;
it
is
on
account
of
the
pleasure
that
we
do
bad
things,
and
on

account
of
the
pain
that
we
abstain
from
noble
ones.
Hence
we
ought
to
have
been
brought
up
in
a

particular
way
from
our
very
youth,
as
Plato
says,
so
as
both
to
delight
in
and
to
be
pained
by
the
things

that
we
ought;
for
this
is
the
right
education…

Again,
as
we
said
but
lately,
every
state
of
soul
has
a
nature
relative
to
and
concerned
with
the
kind
of

things
by
which
it
tends
to
be
made
worse
or
better;
but
it
is
by
reason
of
pleasures
and
pains
that
men

become
bad,
by
pursuing
and
avoiding
these-‐
either
the
pleasures
and
pains
they
ought
not
or
when

they
ought
not
or
as
they
ought
not,
or
by
going
wrong
in
one
of
the
other
similar
ways
that
may
be

distinguished…We
assume,
then,
that
this
kind
of
excellence
tends
to
do
what
is
best
with
regard
to

pleasures
and
pains,
and
vice
does
the
contrary…

That
virtue,
then,
is
concerned
with
pleasures
and
pains,
and
that
by
the
acts
from
which
it
arises
it
is

both
increased
and,
if
they
are
done
differently,
destroyed,
and
that
the
acts
from
which
it
arose

are
those
in
which
it
actualizes
itself-‐
let
this
be
taken
as
said.

The
question
might
be
asked,
what
we
mean
by
saying
that
we
must
become
just
by
doing
just
acts,
and

temperate
by
doing
temperate
acts;
for
if
men
do
just
and
temperate
acts,
they
are
already
just
and

temperate,
exactly
as,
if
they
do
what
is
in
accordance
with
the
laws
of
grammar
and
of
music,
they
are

grammarians
and
musicians…

Again,
the
case
of
the
arts
and
that
of
the
virtues
are
not
similar;
for
the
products
of
the
arts
have
their

goodness
in
themselves,
so
that
it
is
enough
that
they
should
have
a
certain
character,
but
if
the

acts
that
are
in
accordance
with
the
virtues
have
themselves
a
certain
character
it
does
not
follow
that

they
are
done
justly
or
temperately.
The
agent
also
must
be
in
a
certain
condition
when
he
does
them;

in
the
first
place
he
must
have
knowledge,
secondly
he
must
choose
the
acts,
and
choose
them
for
their

own
sakes,
and
thirdly
his
action
must
proceed
from
a
firm
and
unchangeable
character…

Actions,
then,
are
called
just
and
temperate
when
they
are
such
as
the
just
or
the
temperate
man
would

do;
but
it
is
not
the
man
who
does
these
that
is
just
and
temperate,
but
the
man
who
also
does
them
as

just
and
temperate
men
do
them.
It
is
well
said,
then,
that
it
is
by
doing
just
acts
that
the
just
man
is

produced,
and
by
doing
temperate
acts
the
temperate
man;
without
doing
these
no
one
would
have

even
a
prospect
of
becoming
good.

But
most
people
do
not
do
these,
but
take
refuge
in
theory
and
think
they
are
being
philosophers
and

will
become
good
in
this
way,
behaving
somewhat
like
patients
who
listen
attentively
to
their
doctors,

but
do
none
of
the
things
they
are
ordered
to
do.
As
the
latter
will
not
be
made
well
in
body
by
such
a

course
of
treatment,
the
former
will
not
be
made
well
in
soul
by
such
a
course
of
philosophy.

We
must,
however,
not
only
describe
virtue
as
a
state
of
character,
but
also
say
what
sort
of
state
it
is.

We
may
remark,
then,
that
every
virtue
or
excellence
both
brings
into
good
condition
the
thing
of

which
it
is
the
excellence
and
makes
the
work
of
that
thing
be
done
well;
e.g.
the
excellence
of
the
eye

makes
both
the
eye
and
its
work
good;
for
it
is
by
the
excellence
of
the
eye
that
we
see
well.
Similarly

the
excellence
of
the
horse
makes
a
horse
both
good
in
itself
and
good
at
running
and
at
carrying
its

rider
and
at
awaiting
the
attack
of
the
enemy.
Therefore,
if
this
is
true
in
every
case,
the
virtue
of
man

also
will
be
the
state
of
character
which
makes
a
man
good
and
which
makes
him
do
his
own
work
well.

How
this
is
to
happen
we
have
stated
already,
but
it
will
be
made
plain
also
by
the
following

consideration
of
the
specific
nature
of
virtue.
In
everything
that
is
continuous
and
divisible
it
is
possible

to
take
more,
less,
or
an
equal
amount,
and
that
either
in
terms
of
the
thing
itself
or
relatively
to
us;
and

the
equal
is
an
intermediate
between
excess
and
defect.
By
the
intermediate
in
the
object
I
mean
that

which
is
equidistant
from
each
of
the
extremes,
which
is
one
and
the
same
for
all
men;
by

the
intermediate
relatively
to
us
that
which
is
neither
too
much
nor
too
little-‐
and
this
is
not
one,
nor

the
same
for
all.
For
instance,
if
ten
is
many
and
two
is
few,
six
is
the
intermediate,
taken
in
terms
of
the

object;
for
it
exceeds
and
is
exceeded
by
an
equal
amount;
this
is
intermediate
according
to
arithmetical

proportion.
But
the
intermediate
relatively
to
us
is
not
to
be
taken
so;
if
ten
pounds
are
too
much
for
a

particular
person
to
eat
and
two
too
little,
it
does
not
follow
that
the
trainer
will
order
six
pounds;
for

this
also
is
perhaps
too
much
for
the
person
who
is
to
take
it,
or
too
little-‐
too
little
for
Milo,
too
much

for
the
beginner
in
athletic
exercises.
The
same
is
true
of
running
and
wrestling.
Thus
a
master
of
any
art

avoids
excess
and
defect,
but
seeks
the
intermediate
and
chooses
this-‐
the
intermediate
not
in
the

object
but
relatively
to
us.

If
it
is
thus,
then,
that
every
art
does
its
work
well-‐
by
looking
to
the
intermediate
and
judging
its
works

by
this
standard…[A]nd
if,
further,
virtue
is
more
exact
and
better
than
any
art…,
then
virtue
must
have

the
quality
of
aiming
at
the
intermediate.
I
mean
moral
virtue;
for
it
is
this
that
is
concerned
with

passions
and
actions,
and
in
these
there
is
excess,
defect,
and
the
intermediate.
For
instance,
both
fear

and
confidence
and
appetite
and
anger
and
pity
and
in
general
pleasure
and
pain
may
be
felt
both

too
much
and
too
little,
and
in
both
cases
not
well;
but
to
feel
them
at
the
right
times,
with
reference
to

the
right
objects,
towards
the
right
people,
with
the
right
motive,
and
in
the
right
way,
is
what
is
both

intermediate
and
best,
and
this
is
characteristic
of
virtue.
Similarly
with
regard
to
actions
also
there
is

excess,
defect,
and
the
intermediate.
Now
virtue
is
concerned
with
passions
and
actions,
in
which
excess

is
a
form
of
failure,
and
so
is
defect,
while
the
intermediate
is
praised
and
is
a
form
of
success;
and
being

praised
and
being
successful
are
both
characteristics
of
virtue.
Therefore
virtue
is
a
kind
of
mean,
since,

as
we
have
seen,
it
aims
at
what
is
intermediate.

Again,
it
is
possible
to
fail
in
many
ways…while
to
succeed
is
possible
only
in
one
way
(for
which
reason

also
one
is
easy
and
the
other
difficult-‐
to
miss
the
mark
easy,
to
hit
it
difficult);
for
these
reasons
also,

then,
excess
and
defect
are
characteristic
of
vice,
and
the
mean
of
virtue;

For
men
are
good
in
but
one
way,
but
bad
in
many.

Virtue,
then,
is
a
state
of
character
concerned
with
choice,
lying
in
a
mean,
i.e.
the
mean
relative
to
us,

this
being
determined
by
a
rational
principle,
and
by
that
principle
by
which
the
man
of
practical
wisdom

would
determine
it.
Now
it
is
a
mean
between
two
vices,
that
which
depends
on
excess
and
that
which

depends
on
defect;
and
again
it
is
a
mean
because
the
vices
respectively
fall
short
of
or
exceed
what
is

right
in
both
passions
and
actions,
while
virtue
both
finds
and
chooses
that
which
is
intermediate.
Hence

in
respect
of
its
substance
and
the
definition
which
states
its
essence
virtue
is
a
mean,
with
regard
to

what
is
best
and
right
an
extreme.

Provided
by
The
Internet
Classics
Archive.
Available
online
at

http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/nicomachaen.html

1 Introducing Philosophy

“It is the mark of an educated mind
to be able to entertain a thought

without accepting it”
—Aristotle

©Terry Why/ Getty Images

6 Traditional Theories of Ethics

You have your way. I have my way. As for
the right way, the correct way, and the only

way, it does not exist.
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra

Federico Caputo/iStock/Thinkstock

mos81165_06_c06.indd 175 1/6/14 2:33 PM

CHAPTER 6Section

6.1 How Should One Act?

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, students will be able to:

1. Characterize the classical theories of ethics—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics.

2. Identify some of the problems these theories confront.

3. Describe other metaethical views, such as relativism and egoism.

4. Apply ethical theories to problems that affect both individuals and larger groups, including
environmental challenges.

What We Will Discover

• Philosophers have developed theories to provide support for our claims about right and
wrong.

• Other theories such as egoism and relativism offer alternatives to traditional theories of
ethics.

• Ethics has many specific applications to our lives, from the very personal and specific to
those that affect everyone in society.

6.1 How Should One Act?

Ethics, or moral philosophy, investigates how we can evaluate our behavior in terms of right and wrong, good and bad—in other words, how we
determine what we should do, what we should not
do, and how to tell the difference. After looking at
the three classical ethical views that philosophers have
presented and some of the problems with these theo-
ries, we will explore some alternative approaches.

Utilitarianism

Suppose you and five of your friends are hanging out
one night and decide to order a pizza. You are all
equally hungry and decide to order two pizzas, each
of which has six slices. Thus, when the pizzas are
delivered, it is pretty easy to determine how to divide
the pizzas in a way that is the fairest: Everyone gets
two slices. It may be that one person wanted a third
slice, and someone else may have only wanted one.
Yet without knowing anything else, this arrange-
ment, more than any other, will be the most benefi-
cial to the greatest number of people.

This simple example demonstrates the basic notion at
the heart of the ethical doctrine known as utilitari-
anism. Often associated with the philosophers Jer-
emy Bentham (1748–1822) and John Stuart Mill, utilitarianism offers a very straightforward and
direct way to evaluate behavior. When given a choice between two acts, utilitarianism states that

Photos.com/© Getty Images/Thinkstock

Jeremy Bentham is associated with the
founding of utilitarianism, which states
that given a choice between two acts,
the one that creates greater happiness
for the greatest number of people should
be chosen.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.1 How Should One Act?

Read more
about virtue

ethics in
Aristotle’s

Nicomachean
Ethics in

the Chapter
Readings

section of the
Appendix.

Some of these virtues are traditional characteristics that we still use to describe a good,
moral, or virtuous person, including courage, generosity, and being a good friend. Accord-
ing to Aristotle, a person may have too little courage, which we would call cowardice.
Another person may have too much courage, resulting in rash behavior. A soldier who
runs from the field of battle when first confronting the enemy might not have enough
courage, whereas the soldier who runs straight into machine-gun fire may have too much.
Aristotle insists that the virtuous person will have the right amount of courage and will
aim at what he calls the golden mean between having too little and having too much
of a given characteristic. Thus, someone who displays little generosity will fall on one end
of the spectrum (miserly); someone who is much too generous will fall on the opposite
end (wasteful); and a moderately generous person falls in the middle and is virtuous. The
person who has the requisite moral wisdom, or phronesis, will know how to act in a given
situation, and those acts will be in harmony with the other virtues that make up this per-
son’s character.

Aristotle also describes two virtues that are a bit more complex. One of these he calls
temperance, or sophrosunë (Aristotle, 2002). A temperate person is moderate and has
self-control. This person is able to control his or her emotions through reason and does not
indulge in the extreme. When it comes to drinking wine, the intemperate person will drink
too much of it, whereas the person who rejects it entirely, in spite of finding it enjoyable,
is regarded as insensible. Temperance, then, is a middle ground between the two excesses
of insensibility and intemperance.

Aristotle also describes a virtue he calls magnanimity, which is how we see ourselves and
how we are regarded by others (Aristotle, 2002). This can involve the respect others give
us and also the kinds of rewards and honors we can receive. Along with justice, Aristotle
considered this to be the highest virtue. Magnanimity is translated from the Greek word
megalopsuchia, which literally means “great soul” or “great mind.” This is a person who
represents excellence, is worthy of being honored by others, and knows that he or she
is worthy. Neither arrogant nor falsely modest, the virtuous person demonstrates mag-
nanimity, and as a virtue, it is possessed in a reasonable amount. People who think too
highly of themselves or who think they deserve more recognition than they actually do
are considered vain. On the other hand, those who believe they deserve no recognition
or appreciation when the opposite is likely true have too little magnanimity, a characteris-
tic Aristotle calls “low-minded.” We might call such a person too self-effacing, or falsely
modest. The truly magnanimous person has this virtue in its proper proportion; such a per-
son will be appropriately modest while appropriately proud of his or her accomplishments.

To see how virtues might interact with and balance against one another, consider the fol-
lowing example. Suppose Nick likes to go to parties, but he drinks too much and acts as if
he is everyone’s best friend. One night a fight breaks out, and Nick tries to stop it by fight-
ing with everyone involved in the original fight. Nick is unable to keep his desires in check
by practical reason; does not live in accordance with the golden mean, and he indulges in
excess. In contrast, Ted never goes to parties; he stays home alone and never has any fun.
Once, when he saw someone steal an elderly woman’s purse, he ran in the opposite direc-
tion. Ted also does not have his desires by reason, does not live in accordance with the
golden mean, and disproportionately deprives himself. Neither Nick nor Ted would qualify
as having a virtuous character. Jennifer, on the other hand, is a good friend; she is coura-
geous; she is modest but takes pride in what she does and accepts the legitimate praise
of others; and she is generous, honest, and moderate. She has what the Greeks called

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.1 How Should One Act?

eudaimonia, which can be translated in a variety of ways, including happiness, flourishing, and
well-being. Aristotle would say that because Jennifer’s virtues are in their proper balance and
proportion, she has eudaimonia.

It is easy to get lost in Aristotle’s technical vocabulary, but his basic point is that the person who
makes the right moral choices, or behaves ethically, is a virtuous person and is the kind of person
we admire for that reason. We object to those who are deficient in one or more of the char-
acteristics we have mentioned, but we also object to those who display one or more of these
attributes excessively. The person who has eudaimonia is the person who has acquired the cor-
rect conception of the virtues, individually and as a whole, and as such, offers us an example of
what kinds of moral choices should be made. We may not actually know of such a person, and
indeed such a person may not actually exist. However, the conception of such a virtuous person
helps us examine our own choices and behavior to see where we are doing the right thing and
where we may need improvement.

As is often the case with ethical theories, virtue ethics initially sounds clear, obvious, and easy to
apply. But just as challenges exist to both utilitarianism and deontology, certain problems arise
for proponents of virtue ethics.

Problems With Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics differs from utilitarianism and deontology in that it examines not what a person
does, but what kind of character he or she has. In addition to the virtues, this theory provides us
with a spectrum on which to moderate our own behavior, as well as an ideal for which to strive.
Applying these notions in real-world examples is more difficult than it would initially appear,
however.

For example, consider one of Aristotle’s specific virtues, courage. While it is easy to imagine
plenty of scenarios in which someone has an excess of courage or a lack of sufficient courage,
it is difficult to determine what the appropriate amount of courage would be for more nuanced
situations. Imagine Steve is a prisoner of war, kept in very brutal conditions with a number of his
fellow soldiers. He knows he has a fairly good chance of escaping, but if he is caught, the guards
will torture and execute him. He also knows that if a prisoner successfully escapes, the guards
will choose another prisoner at random, torture him, and then execute him. To escape under
these conditions requires a certain degree of courage; but choosing not to escape also requires
some courage. Under these circumstances, how should Steve be appropriately courageous? It
is not clear that there is a golden mean to which Steve can appeal, and it is therefore not clear
which, if either, of the possible actions is virtuous. In this specific case then, it seems that virtue
ethics lacks sufficient guidance for how to act. Similar problems confront the other virtues. Is
there an “appropriate amount” of lying one should do in order to be virtuous? Should one be
willing to break some promises but keep others? Even if we think there may be solutions to vari-
ous individual ethical dilemmas, virtue ethics seems to fail to offer the kind of general solution
offered by utilitarianism and deontology.

Another problem with virtue ethics is that Aristotle and many virtue ethicists seem to think that
certain terms are well understood and that everyone shares the same general conception of the
virtues. But do we? We may think that friendship, for example, is universally understood. Yet
imagine Carl, who thinks of himself as a very good friend to Charles and Kate, the couple that
lives next door. Carl discovers that Charles has been having an affair with Kate’s best friend. Pre-
sumably, friends tell each other the truth, but friends also do not want to see their friends hurt,

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.1 How Should One Act?

Read
Alasdair

MacIntyre’s
work After
Virtue in

the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.

their marriages broken, and so on. It is not at all clear what Carl should do in this case.
More importantly, people would likely disagree over what Carl should do if he is actually
to be a good friend. Thus, we all may not share the same general conception of “friend-
ship.” Such problems multiply because each virtue will confront this kind of problem and
will encounter further problems upon trying to determine the appropriate amount of each
virtue and how they should be balanced with each other. It is for this reason that some
philosophers have rejected virtue ethics entirely. For example, in his text After Virtue, Alas-
dair MacIntyre (2007) dismisses the concept and possibly even the existence of virtues.

One other traditional problem for virtue ethics is that of relativity, or when one culture
views an act as a virtue but another regards that very same act as a vice. Consider two
communities, A and Z. A is a culture of warriors that insists its members be fierce and
respond violently to threats. Z is a culture of pacifists that insists its members always “turn
the other cheek” and respond to threats with nonviolence and negotiation. A group of
outsiders, X, sets up camp outside of both A’s and Z’s land. X appears to have a great num-
ber of weapons and may well pose a threat. Accordingly, A reacts to X’s presence violently,
while Z reacts to X’s presence nonviolently. Virtue ethics does not seem to offer a wholly
adequate way of determining whether A’s violent response or Z’s nonviolent response
is appropriate. A will regard Z’s pacifism as immoral, just as Z will regard A’s violence as
immoral. The point is not so much to determine whether A or Z (or neither) is doing the
virtuous thing. Rather, it is that virtue ethics does not seem to offer enough guidance to
make this determination. Or it ends up saying that both responses, for the respective cul-
ture, are virtuous. But if all our moral evaluations must be made relative to a given culture,
then virtue ethics cannot address actions that have different value in different cultures. In
other words, if evaluations are relativized, then virtue ethics does nothing more than say
some things are right and some are wrong, but no one can really object when someone
from another culture does something wrong so long as they act within their culture’s
moral parameters. There are those who do indeed support this view, which is known as
ethical relativism. (See Table 6.1 for a review of ethical theories and theorists.)

Table 6.1: Concept review: Theories and theorists

Ethical theory Key figure Basic idea

Utilitarianism John Stuart Mill An act (or rule) is good or right if it produces the
greatest net good for the greatest number.

Deontology Immanuel Kant An act is good or right if it is done because it
is the right thing to do, in accordance with a
justified moral rule or rules.

Virtue ethics Aristotle Morality is determined on the basis of specific
virtues, exemplified by a person of noble or
virtuous character.

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CHAPTER 6Section

6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

Each of the three classic ethical theories—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—has advantages and disadvantages, and none offers an obvious or easily applied solution to the question, “What should I do?” In this section, we will look at alternatives that have been
developed in contrast to these three classic theories. Technically, these are regarded as “meta-
ethical” views, in contrast to normative ethics. Normative ethics provides a way of evaluating
acts as moral or determining whether a given act is right or wrong. Metaethics, as employed
here, is the attempt to understand what ethics is and how we can and should understand moral
questions and evaluations.

Ethical Egoism

Ego comes from the Greek word for “I.” Most readers probably know at least a few people
who could be described as having a big ego; that is, people with an exaggerated sense of their
abilities, talents, accomplishments, or qualities. Egoism, then, means to have a focus on one’s
self, and ethical egoism is the idea that one’s conception of right and wrong, good and evil,
and other moral terms are determined by one’s own sense of value. To return to the notion of
utility, we could describe this position as advocating that one should do what maximizes one’s
own utility. In short, I should do what is in my own self-interest. Thus, in the most literal sense,
this theory is selfish. Yet unlike more traditional moral theories, selfishness, or self-interest, is not
seen as wrong or immoral, but the preferred way for one to act.

Let us return to the example of the group of children playing in a sandbox with access to only
one toy. Sally, the ethical egoist—who we will just call the egoist from now on—determines
that what makes her happiest, or maximizes her utility, is to have the toy to herself. Thus, it is in
Sally’s self-interest to get the toy, keep the toy, and play with they toy all by herself. This is not,
however, the only result possible. It may be that she decides that she would get more out of it
if everyone shared, or for that matter, if only one other person got to play with the toy. If she
concludes that some other option is in her self-interest, then she should adopt that choice. So
we can see that the crucial factor in this case is not that Sally gets the toy to herself; it is that
what she perceives as most beneficial to herself will be what she should do.

Great Ideas: Different Cultures, Different Ethics?

In ancient China emperors were known to have several wives. They also had dozens, even thousands,
of concubines, women who functioned as “secondary wives” in many ways, including sexually. For
example, Emperor Taizong (599–649) of the Tang Dynasty was reputed to have 3,000 concubines.

With this in mind, consider the following questions:

1. How might a utilitarian argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
2. How might a deontologist argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
3. How might a virtue ethicist argue that Emperor Taizong was acting immorally?
4. Is there an argument that justifies Emperor Taizong’s behavior? What would such an argu-

ment look like?
5. Do you think ethical values change over time? Would this affect how we might judge this

situation today, and how we might have judged this situation in the 7th century?

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

Read Joel
Feinberg’s
“Psycho-
logical

Egoism” in
the Chapter

Readings
section of the
Appendix.

Now let us revisit the example of Mary, who is trying to decide whether to go dancing
or stay home with her three children. Factoring in the happiness of Mary and the three
children, the utilitarian argued that everyone would be best off if Mary stayed home—that
this scenario would produce the greatest net good for the greatest number. The egoist
might conclude otherwise: If Mary sees her greatest happiness achieved by going out
dancing, then she should go out dancing. Again, Mary may conclude that it would make
her happiest to stay home. The egoist’s position is that what Mary should do is whatever
Mary sees as in her self-interest.

We saw that the classic theories of ethics—utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics—
all had problems when we tried to apply them to real life. Egoism, however, seems not
to have that problem. People determine what is in their self-interest. They do what they
think will make them best off, and according to this theory, that is what they should do.

Suppose Joe is a retired billionaire investment banker. He has several houses, cars, and
servants and can take vacations whenever and wherever he wants. One day Joe sees Mike,
an old friend from high school who has become homeless. Mike asks Joe for $10. For Joe,
this amount is almost nothing; but Joe considers whether he would be better off giving
the money to Mike or keeping it himself. Joe decides he would be happier keeping his
money; egoism tells us that is what he should do. Traditional ethical theories and religious
views may regard Joe as being selfish, greedy, and more generally, acting immorally. Ego-
ism, however, does not; traditional conceptions of selfishness are not regarded by egoism
as immoral. It may turn out, of course, that Joe decides that it is in his self-interest to give
Mike the $10; it might make him feel better to help out an old friend, and after all, it is
not much of a sacrifice for Joe. But egoism leaves that decision up to Joe, and what Joe
perceives to be in his own self-interest is what Joe should do.

Many economists have argued that this is in fact how economic exchanges work in free
markets. Buyers want to get as much as they can as cheaply as they can; sellers want to
sell as much as they can for the highest price. Individuals, then, want to maximize their
utility by getting as much as they can out of the exchange. In the traditional views, this
sounds not just selfish, but greedy. Yet we assume everyone has, more or less, the same
amount of information about the product involved, and we also assume that everyone
knows that everyone else is trying to maximize his or her self-interest. In this way the mar-
ket will in theory be most efficient and create more goods and more wealth for everyone
if everyone acts in ways that maximize his or her self-interest.

Recognizing that greed was traditionally regarded as sin, political economist Bernard
Mandeville (1670–1733) claimed that great benefits would be produced if everyone were
greedy. He described this arrangement as “private vices, public benefits”: That is, the pri-
vate vice of selfishness would actually end up making society wealthier than it would have
been otherwise, which is a public benefit. Joel Feinberg (1926–2004) is another philoso-
pher who considered the role of selfishness in human actions. Feinberg, however, argues
against psychological egoism, the idea that humans are internally driven to do all acts by
selfish motives. He demonstrates logical inconsistencies in this position and ultimately
claims that it is an unsound judgment about human motives in ethical judgment.

Problems With Ethical Egoism

Ethicists, religious leaders, and many others protest against ethical egoism because it
seems to promote selfishness. The objection is fairly obvious: Being selfish is wrong, either

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

because it is immoral, a sin, or both; so too must be an ethical theory that promotes it. How-
ever, another more subtle question might trouble the ethical egoist: How do we determine our
self-interest?

Ethical egoism assumes that any individual can identify what is in his or her self-interest, but
that may not always be the case. When considering what action to take, do I evaluate my self-
interest in the short term, the long term, or something in between? Perhaps I think it is in my
short-term self-interest to eat an entire blueberry pie because it is delicious; this will be against
my self-interest, however, if I have a long-term goal of losing weight. Perhaps we could adopt
the principle that my long-term interest should always override my short-term interest. Yet can
I really be sure what my long-term interest is and that it will not change? Even if the question
of what I know about my self-interest can be answered, a bigger problem may then arise: Can I
ever be wrong about my self-interest? If whatever I do is defined as having been done in my self-
interest, then how could I ever do something against my self-interest? The egoist maxim “One
should do whatever one does” does not seem to offer much in the way of guidance.

An example further illustrates this. Suppose Emma decides it is in her self-interest to become,
over time, very wealthy. Despite her love of shopping, taking nice vacations, and going out to
expensive dinners with her friends, she resists doing so and becomes very frugal. She only buys
the cheapest things and has to actively resist her friends’ invitations to do all her favorite activi-
ties. She puts all the money she saves into the stock market and other investments and slowly
starts to generate a substantial amount of money. She sees her friends less and less often and
becomes somewhat of a hermit. After several years she realizes that she is very lonely, does not
have much fun, and is generally unpleasant to be around. Even though she has met her goal of
becoming wealthy, she realizes that she sacrificed too much to reach that goal. She decides to
give all of her money away to charity and focuses on doing volunteer work to help others.

The ethical egoist would have offered Emma little guidance. By choosing her long-term goals
over her short-term goals, Emma presumably maximized her utility. However, had she decided
otherwise—to continue shopping, vacationing, and eating at expensive restaurants—she would
have maximized her utility as well. This is because she would have made either choice in her own
self-interest. Worse yet, her long-term goals changed, so she gave up not just her short-term
pleasures but also her original long-term goal when she adopted a new one. Whatever Emma
determines is in her self-interest is what she should do, but she clearly was not able to determine
what that long-term self-interest really was.

Great Ideas: Short-Term and Long-Term Interests

Mark graduated from college six months ago. He has $5,000 in student loans and $1,000 in savings.
He has been looking for a job for several weeks, with no luck.

Reflection Questions:
With this in mind, consider the following questions:

1. Which of the following should Mark pursue if he wants to maximize his short-term
interests?

2. Which of the following should Mark pursue if he wants to maximize his long-term
interests?

(continued)

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

Like utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, ethical egoism also falls short on the ethical
issue of lying. The classical theories all had guidance for when or if one should lie, but their
results were unsatisfactory and occasionally led to strange or even wrong outcomes. An egoist
would be even less helpful on this subject. If Carolyn asks Bob to go to the movies but Bob does
not want to go, should he lie and say he is busy? Should he tell the truth and say he does not
want to go? The advice ethical egoism seems to offer is that it is all right for him to lie if he does
so out of self-interest; the same is true if he tells the truth out of self-interest. It is unclear how
this reasoning can help Bob make an ethical decision, however.

Relativism

We have now examined a number of theories and also acknowledged that each has its problems.
One might be tempted to abandon the search for an ethical theory at this point, at least one
that tells people what they should do and how they should live. Rather than taking this course
of action, however, we should recognize that there are no universal or general ethical standards;
that a person’s ethical view is relative to his or her culture, society, tradition, religion, worldview,
and even individual values. Because moral claims are said to be relative to something else, this is
a metaethical view known as relativism. Even though philosophers distinguish between different
kinds of relativism, we will generally use the term to mean that any ethical claim is relative to a
set of beliefs and that any such ethical claim is true, or consistent with, that set of beliefs. To take
a simple example: Suppose you like comedies and your best friend likes action films. It is not too
problematic here to reject the suggestion that comedies are better than action films or to reject
the suggestion that action films are better than comedies; each claim is relative to one’s beliefs,
desires, and preferences. Although it may make things more difficult when you and your friend
go see a movie together, neither of you is determined to convince the other that there is some
true, objective, or factual claim being ignored about the merits of comedies and action films.

Moral Relativism
Moral relativism extends this idea to the area of ethics. Ethical evaluations—saying some act is
right or wrong—are made in terms of the context of that act and therefore are relative to the
actor’s culture and values. For example, some cultures bury their dead; some cremate their dead;
some allow them to be exposed to the elements and scavengers; some mummify their dead (at
least their important dead, such as Egyptian pharaohs); some cultures have even been reported
to eat their dead. Which is right? Are any of these wrong? Some religions require the cremation
of the dead, whereas other religions prohibit it. What is the relativist response to these issues?

Great Ideas: Short-Term and Long-Term Interests
(continued)

3. How confident should Mark be about these decisions? In other words, can he distinguish
with a very high degree of certainty between his short-term and long-term interests?

A. Mark borrows more money to buy an expensive guitar he has wanted for several years,
in order to become a professional musician.

B. Mark invests $500 and pays $500 on his student loans.
C. Mark pays $1,000 on his student loans.
D. Mark invests $1,000 in a speculative stock offering, having been told by a friend that

the stock will go up 100% in the next year.
E. Mark buys $1,000 in lottery tickets.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

The relativist simply says that the practice a given culture adopts as correct determines what
should be done. Let culture A be a society that cremates, or ritually burns, its dead, while culture
B is a society that prohibits cremation. The relativist says A’s tradition is correct for A and not
for B; in the same way, B’s tradition is correct for B and not for A. Just as important for the view
we are calling moral relativism is that those who live in culture A cannot say that cremating is
right and not cremating is wrong; they can only say it is right for them. In the same way, those
in culture B cannot say that cremating is wrong and not cremating is right; they can only say it
is wrong for them. The opinion of cremation, then, is relative to the given culture, and there is
no objective ethical standard to appeal to for determining whether cremating one’s dead is right
or wrong.

Many people find this position very attractive. It seems to eliminate the need, or desire, to
provide objective evaluations for all people and all societies. It allow us to simply “agree to dis-
agree,” in that if some culture or society or religion does something that our society would deem
as immoral, we are free to say it is wrong for our society but not for others.

Moral relativism is often characterized in terms of cultures, and cultural anthropologists have
identified many practices that contrast, and even conflict, with some of the standard Western
traditions. There are numerous rituals and ceremonies relating to birth, achieving adult status,
marrying, and dying, to name a few, that reflect a wide range of beliefs and values.

We saw that Aristotle recommended generosity, within its appropriate limits, as one of the chief
qualities a virtuous person would possess. Imagine a society in which people who are deemed
good or virtuous are those who have the greatest wealth; in this society people would gain vir-
tuous status by accumulating as much as they can and keeping it all to themselves. In contrast,
consider a society in which people are deemed good or virtuous if they give all of their wealth
away. Aristotle regarded a moderate amount of generosity as universally virtuous. Here we see
that the moral relativist might regard a deficiency of generosity (keeping everything for oneself)
as a virtue, relative to a society’s values; an excess of generosity (giving everything away) can
also be seen as virtue, relative to a society’s values. The moral relativist concludes that the claim
“generosity is a virtue” can only be evaluated in terms of a specific society’s values.

Great Ideas: Cultural Relativism

Consider some of the following activities that involve cultural practices and traditions. Can you imag-
ine a version of one or more of these practices that you would find objectionable? What does cultural
relativism tell us about your objection? If you cannot imagine any practice that is objectionable, does
that mean absolutely everything is morally permissible? If so, what are the implications of this idea?

• Dating
• Marriage
• Health care
• How the elderly are treated
• What foods one can eat
• Raising children
• Education
• Encountering strangers
• Death
• Adultery

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

Just as we considered the perspective of the other moral theories on this subject, what would
the moral relativist have to say on the topic of lying? Is it wrong to lie? Is it okay to lie? Is it some-
times wrong to lie and sometimes right to lie? The moral relativist would likely say, “It depends.”
If your society rewards lying, or at least does not punish it, then lying might well be okay. If your
society, on the other hand, has strict penalties against lying (whether legal, official, or informally
enforced by community members), then lying will be wrong. “Lying is right” or “lying is wrong”
are the kinds of claims avoided by the moral relativist, who would advocate statements more
along the lines of, “Lying is right relative to a society that permits or encourages lying” and
“Lying is wrong relative to a society that prohibits lying.”

Extreme Relativism
So far we have discussed relativism in terms of societies and cultures. However, it is worth point-
ing out there is an extreme, or radical, kind of relativism, often associated with the ancient Greek
philosopher Protagoras (ca. 490–420 bce). This kind of relativism is said to hold true for individu-
als: If a person says something is true or false, right or wrong, then it is true or false and right
or wrong for that person. We saw an example of this when you and your friend discussed your
preferences for movies: For you it was true that comedies were best; for your friend, it was true
that action films were best. Protagorean, or extreme, relativism extends this idea to all claims,
including ethical ones. Presumably, this means if you think shoplifting is wrong but another per-
son says shoplifting is not wrong, there is no “fact” we can point to in order to determine who
is correct. Shoplifting is wrong for you, but not wrong (or even right) for the other person. That
is about all there is to say about such disagreements.

This kind of relativism is often attractive in ethics because it allows us to avoid judging or criticiz-
ing other people and cultures. This is especially true when we are considering cultures and tradi-
tions with which we are not very familiar. However, similar to the other moral theories, issues
have been raised with relativism as well.

Problems With Relativism

One problem with relativism is that some acts or traditions seem wrong not just in relation to
a culture, but simply wrong on their own. For example, an ancient Hindu practice called suttee
requires a woman whose husband has recently died to commit suicide by throwing herself on
his funeral pyre. This can be done voluntarily, or she might be forced to do so. (The practice has
been outlawed but occasionally still occurs.) Some societies continue to practice slavery. Others
make child pornography widely available. Some societies practice infanticide, or the killing (or
allowing to die) of an infant after birth if it lacks desired characteristics (frequently if it is a girl).
Some societies have executed prisoners—often on flimsy or inadequate charges and with little
legal protection—in order to take their organs and sell them on the black market. Of course, the
20th century offered many examples of leaders—Joseph Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Adolf Hitler,
to name a few—who caused the deaths of millions under their reign.

The relativist would seem to say that such examples are wrong only relative to a specific culture
or worldview. Perhaps we are from a culture that views infanticide or slavery as wrong; we would
then say that, for us, these things are wrong. Yet from the perspective of a culture that does not
share our views, perhaps infanticide or slavery—or both—are not wrong or are even right. The
extreme cases tend to make people uncomfortable, which is the point. Do we want to say that
a government policy that results in family members eating each other is only wrong relative to

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

a given value system, or that such a policy is simply, fundamentally, universally, and obviously
wrong? To be consistent, the relativist has to say that no matter how wrong something seems
to be, the idea of “wrong” is still relative. This suggestion may make you as uncomfortable as it
makes some ethical theorists.

Reformer’s Dilemma
A second, more sophisticated objection to relativism, known as the “Reformer’s Dilemma” (Feld-
man, 1978, p. 166), has been provided by the philosopher Fred Feldman (b. 1941). Imagine
Sarah lives in a society that values boys but not girls. To keep the society going, some number
of girls is needed, but parents are allowed to kill a third, female child if they already have a girl.
Furthermore, if a couple already has three children, girls or boys, they are required to kill all
subsequent female children. Sarah thinks this is wrong; perhaps she just feels it is wrong, or
perhaps she has substantial arguments for her position. Yet moral relativism says that her soci-
ety determines what is wrong or right, and it has determined that killing girls is right. So Sarah
must be wrong to object to this policy. More generally, anyone who objects to any of a society’s
policies must be wrong. Thus, by this logic, Martin Luther King Jr. would have been wrong to
object to oppressive and racist American practices in the 1960s; Nelson Mandela would have
been wrong to object to the oppressive and racist South African system of apartheid. In fact,
anyone who wished to change society could never be correct. This seems problematic, given
that many of history’s most admired people were critical of their societies. Worse, this seems to
suggest that if criticizing social values always puts a person in the wrong, then society cannot
ever be improved, and thus must be perfect. Yet as Feldman observes, this poses a challenge to
the absolute relativist.

Remembering What We Agree On
Perhaps the most sophisticated response to relativism can be found in the work of American
philosopher Donald Davidson, who expanded upon the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Davidson
(1974) argues that radical relativism is incoherent, for several reasons. First, assume that the
relativist is right and that a person’s beliefs are relative to his or her society. However, we must
recall that within any society, a person can “belong” to many different kinds of groups, based
on ethnicity, class, income level, language, gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on.
Consider Jafari, who has lived for most of his life in France but was born in Egypt. His native
language is Arabic and he is Muslim. From which group does he derive his values? What if one
group to which Jafari belongs approves of, say, restricting women from working outside the
home, whereas another group to which he belongs disapproves of such a prohibition? How
does Jafari figure out whether it is right or wrong? To take the idea to its extreme, does a poor
White 50-year-old Lutheran heterosexual woman from Texas have moral values in common with
an 18-year-old wealthy Chinese lesbian or with a homosexual middle-class 50-year-old White
Unitarian male from Pennsylvania? It seems that the many factors that constitute culture pose a
problem for the relativist who argues that culture determines our values.

Second, Davidson points out that when discussing ethical viewpoints, politics, religion, and other
controversial topics, we almost always focus on the areas over which we disagree. Yet in order
to reach a point of disagreement, there are actually numerous issues and ideas upon which we
actually agree. Consider a debate over gun control between Jim and John. Jim thinks no one
should be able to own a handgun; John thinks everyone should be required to own a handgun.
Their disagreement seems substantial, yet imagine if they started their disagreement by listing

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

the points on which they agree, the points that make their disagreement possible—such as that
guns do not speak Japanese, guns do not make good hats, guns are not an appropriate filling for
sandwiches, guns cannot fly, and so on. This exercise hardly makes our disagreements disappear,
yet it highlights how people’s agreements typically outnumber their disagreements. As Davidson
puts it, disagreements—even between two people from dramatically different cultures—can
only occur within the context of massive agreement, or on the assumption of an enormous back-
ground of shared ideas. Relativists would likely purport that two people from different cultures
would agree on very little. However, in order to disagree, Davidson argues that they must agree
on an awful lot even to reach the point of disagreement.

Nietzsche’s Challenge

Relativism seems to place ethical problems on a scale of “difficult to solve” to “unsolvable.”
As Davidson indicates, this may be the consequence of focusing exclusively on what divides us
rather than what unites us. Others have challenged even more fundamentally the values of soci-
ety as a whole, including traditional political and religious structures. Perhaps the most powerful
such challenge came from the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche.

Nietzsche’s father, uncle, and grandfathers were all Lutheran pastors, but Nietzsche’s father
died when he was 4 years old, and his brother died a few months later. Nietzsche was raised by
his mother and sister, was sent to a highly prestigious boarding school in Germany, and at the
age of just 24 accepted a position to teach classical philology (the study of classical Greek and
Latin texts) at the University of Basel in Switzerland. Nietzsche taught there for 10 years, but his
job was interrupted by military service, during which he received a serious injury. His health in
general was not good, and he had to resign from his teaching post. He spent much of the rest
of his life wandering around Italy, France, Switzerland, and Germany. In 1889 Nietzsche had a
mental breakdown and collapsed in Turin, Italy. He spent the remaining years of his life unable
to communicate, not realizing that the many books he had produced had begun to make him a
world-famous philosopher.

Übermensch
Nietzsche’s influence on 20th-century philosophy is difficult to overstate. He presented, and still
represents, a radical challenge to traditional ethical viewpoints. His position called for a reevalua-
tion of all values; that is, a criticism and scrutiny of all the various things that traditional morality
and religion had said were good or wrong. In doing so Nietzsche determined that much of tradi-
tional morality was fundamentally wrong. He declared that “God is dead” (and had been killed
by human beings) and defended atheism. Nietzsche thought that Judaism and Christianity had
adopted the ancient ideas of the Greeks and Romans and perverted them. Before Christianity,
the “good” was identified as the strong, the powerful, the courageous, the noble, and the cre-
ative; the “bad” was that which was weak, timid, small-minded, and cowardly. Nietzsche argued
that Christianity turned this upside down. He suggested that people had been convinced by “the
priests”—those who control a society’s moral, cultural, political, and religious values—that what
had been good was now evil and what had been bad was now good. Hence, he saw the prevail-
ing morality as preventing those who were noble, creative, and bold from being recognized as
superior to the masses. He also argued that the masses—who were timid and weak—could be
easily controlled by those in power, like sheep by a shepherd. He thought both Christianity and

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

Read
Friedrich

Nietzsche’s
Beyond Good

and Evil in
the Chapter

Readings
section of the
Appendix.

democracy (a democracy being of a mass of people who were kept ignorant and did what
they were told) held back society’s very few exceptional individuals who were capable of
achieving greatness. Such an individual was called by Nietzsche an Übermensch, which is
usually translated as “superman” or “overman” (Nietzsche, 1973). This overman creates
his (or her; Nietzsche’s issues with women are notorious, but very complex) own values,
and his own morality, as an expression of his power to overcome the values people around
him have tried to force upon him. In this way the overman becomes a free and indepen-
dent spirit, risking everything in his unwillingness to accept social conventions. Ultimately,
Nietzsche (1974) suggests a view he calls “eternal recurrence” as the goal of the truly
noble soul: People should seek a life that they would be happy living if they were to have
to live exactly that way for eternity.

Critiques of

Nietzsche

Those who have resisted Nietzsche’s ideas (and there are many) do so for a number of rea-
sons. Unlike Nietzsche, they think moral and religious traditions express important truths
and values, and certainly disagree that “God is dead.” Most Nietzsche scholars reject the
idea that he was the type of extreme relativist discussed previously in this chapter; how-
ever, it is easy to see why some might regard him that way. After all, if one creates one’s
own values, then those values would seem relative to that person. Some critics regard
Nietzsche as elitist because of his suggestion that just a few “great souls” were allowed
full access to freedom and independence, but the great masses who did not so qualify
were relegated to mediocrity, following rules they did not understand and more or less
doing what they were told.

However, there is no denying that in the history
of ethics, Nietzsche presents a serious challenge
to a number of different moral and religious
traditions. He requires us to examine our moral
values and see how we use them to justify our
actions. Has Christianity been used to promise
people a true reward that will come after death
to make it easier to control them while alive?
Have Western societies often punished people
who are unwilling to go along with their over-
riding values? Interestingly enough, at times
Nietzsche identified Jesus as a person whom
society punished for being brave and indepen-
dent enough to raise profound objections to
the values imposed upon him, but Nietzsche
(1968) also remarked that the “last true Chris-
tian died on the cross” (sec. 39). Have societ-
ies that officially or unofficially regarded them-
selves as Christian acted in ways that violate
the very Christian principles they are said to
embrace? These and many of Nietzsche’s other
questions are important reminders that people
often say one thing but do another. Nietzsche’s

Oronoz/SuperStock

Friedrich Nietzsche called for intense
scrutiny and criticism of all of what
traditional morality and religion had
deemed as good and bad.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

willingness to expose this hypocrisy has continued to confront Western philosophy, specifi-
cally its development of moral theories. He has, therefore, demanded that philosophers and all
those interested in moral questions carefully consider whether what we do actually conforms to
what we believe. Demanding we make this critical and uncomfortable self-examination is the
very thing that makes those demanding it unpopular; many think this was precisely the reason
Socrates was executed. At the same time, most of us recognize that it is to our benefit to see
if there are any contradictions between what we believe, why we believe it, and how we treat
others.

Tolerance and Diversity

We may well reject Nietzsche’s scathing critique of society and its hypocrisy. We may also resist
what seem to be Nietzsche’s elitism and his lack of tolerance. At the same time, given the
increasing global interdependence and the diversity of societies, philosophers have also worried
about whether we can determine what an appropriate amount of tolerance is. The United States
is a diverse country, with people from a vast number of backgrounds who represent numer-
ous ethnic groups, religious traditions, and countries of origin. Some 80% of Americans speak
English, but according to the 2010 U.S. Census, more than 350 other languages are spoken (or
signed) in the United States (although some of these are spoken by a very small groups). Some
estimate there are more than 200 different religious denominations in the United States. There is
even more diversity globally, of course: The planet’s 7 billion people speak thousands of different
languages, practice thousands of different religious traditions and denominations, and are com-
posed of thousands of different ethnic groups. In India alone, for example, some 350 different
languages are spoken by a substantial number of people, even though its official state language
is Hindi (and its secondary “official” language is English).

Assuming that differences in culture, religion, ethnicity, and other value systems generate dis-
agreement, this degree of diversity would indicate a good deal of disagreement. It would be nice
to think that ethicists—or anyone else, for that matter—could come up with a recipe for pre-
venting, or at least minimizing, these disagreements and thereby minimize the military invasions,
terrorism, and various other violence caused by these disagreements. That may seem a bit opti-
mistic, but it is worth thinking about how the study of ethics could move us closer to this goal.

Extreme Tolerance and Intolerance
We can start by identifying two positions on opposite ends of the spectrum: extreme toler-
ance and extreme intolerance. The extremely tolerant person will accept all cultures, perspec-
tives, views, and ethical values expressed by any society, anywhere, and at any time. In short an
extremely tolerant person tolerates everything. Extreme intolerance, on the other hand, involves
tolerating nothing but one’s own view. Thus, the extremely intolerant culture Z rejects all other
cultures from A through Y. One and only one position is acceptable to Z, and Z regards all
other cultures as wrong. The extremely tolerant society, on the other hand, never considers
another view to be wrong and never challenges or criticizes it. Thus, it would never need to
engage another culture or society militarily. The extremely intolerant society may always be at
war, however, for it always sees any culture with distinct views as being incorrect.

It is likely that few, if any, cultures qualify as either extremely tolerant or extremely intolerant.
Most fall between these two extremes. Considering the polar opposites is useful, however,

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.2 Alternatives to Traditional Theories of Ethics

because it gives us a sense of the limits involved in describing the various ways one might
endorse, or advocate, tolerance. For even though many agree that “tolerance” is generally a
good thing, we can see that too much tolerance could be as bad as too much intolerance. Imag-
ine you are sitting quietly at home, watching a baseball game with a friend. Someone comes in,
shoots your friend, and takes everything you own. An extremely tolerant person would have no
objections to this scenario. More generally, extreme tolerance may lead to what one might call
the paradox of tolerance, for the extremely tolerant person cannot object to the extremely intol-
erant person, and ends up tolerating the most vicious, dogmatic, and violent kind of intolerant
behavior. Even if tolerance is a virtue, Aristotle would tell us that too much tolerance can be bad.

However, a look around indicates that threats are more likely to stem from intolerance. A gov-
ernment may ban free speech or a particular religion. Two countries may go to war over a piece
of land not because they each want it, but rather they each want to prevent the other from
acquiring it. Terrorists may kill people who practice a different religion or those who simply hold
different values. A town may practice informal discrimination against people regarded by the
majority as “different,” whether because they are a different race, religion, sexual orientation,
or have another minority identity. A person may decide that abortion is so immoral that it is
acceptable to murder a doctor who performs abortions. Do philosophers, specifically ethicists,
have tools to question these and other intolerant acts?

Reflective Equilibrium
In his extremely influential 1971 book A Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls
(1921–2002) puts forth a strategy he calls reflective equilibrium. While the full theory is quite
complex, Rawls’s fundamental ideas help make clear our sense of fairness. Rawls believes any
plausible conception of justice must be one that is regarded by all who participate in a society’s
decisions as fair, and thus he is famous for characterizing justice as fairness (Rawls, 1971).

Rawls describes a thought experiment where people come together to design a society in which
they will at some point live. He puts a crucial condition on those designing this society: They
are behind what he calls a “veil of ignorance” (1971). That is, they do not know what kind of
person they will be in this future society: They do not know their gender, race, religion (if any),
class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical handicaps, and so on. Thus, what the participants
determine to be fair must express what each thinks would be fair for all. For instance, a man
would not describe a society that discriminates against women, for he might discover that in this
future society, he is one.

Part of Rawls’s discussion requires the notion of reflective equilibrium, where individuals with
various moral and political views discuss the moral and political views of others, in order to see
what agreement can be reached. As Rawls describes the idea, “adopting the role of observing
moral theorist, we investigate what principles people would acknowledge and accept the conse-
quences of when they have an opportunity to consider other plausible conceptions and to assess
their supporting grounds” (Rawls, 1971).

To illustrate the idea further, consider the following example. John and Mary, who come from
very different backgrounds, compare their notions of a just and fair society. They both are willing
to consider the other’s viewpoint and recognize that some adjustment to their own notion may
have to be made. Perhaps John is suspicious of religions other than his own, whereas Mary is
an agnostic and thus has no religion. Through reflective equilibrium, John adjusts his beliefs to
accept others who may not share his religious views, and Mary adjusts her beliefs to allow more
tolerance for those who cherish their religious commitments. After much give and take, they

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CHAPTER 6Section

6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

come to a position they both accept. In a certain sense Rawls offers a sophisticated account of
precisely what many people do all the time: compromise. In doing so he suggests a nonviolent
way of solving our disputes, and thus provides us with another way to think about making our
diverse and often contentious planet more harmonious.

6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

We have seen some of the best known ethical theories and some of the challenges they confront. We have also seen some of the alternatives to these traditional theories and some of their weaknesses. We will now look at more specific ethical issues, describe
the problems they present, and examine how ethical theories might be used to resolve them. We
will begin with personal or individual ethical issues before turning to more general social ethi-
cal issues, although there is often overlap between these. We will see that many ethical issues
require us to think about the relationship between the individual and his or her society and how
one influences the other. (See Table 6.2 for a list of topics to be explored in ethics.)

Table 6.2: Concept review: Topics to be explored

Individual issues in ethics

Promises

Free speech

Greed

Vegetarianism

Euthanasia

Social issues in ethics

Animal rights

Plato’s critique of democracy

Rawls’s conception of fairness

The environment

The personal and the political

Libertarianism

Victimless crimes

Promises

We all make promises, and for the most part we expect promises to be kept. Since I expect oth-
ers to keep their promises, deontological ethics insists that this means I should keep the promises
I make. The utilitarian takes a different approach; perhaps there are situations in which the great-
est number achieves the greatest net good by breaking a promise. We probably also think that
promises have a certain context, or set of conditions. For example, we should not make promises
we know we cannot keep. Yet it may not be unethical to make a promise, try our best to fulfill
it, yet end up breaking it. Various kinds of examples bear out these ideas further.

Imagine you promise to pay Smith $5 next week if he loans it to you today (you are friends, so he
does not charge you interest). Smith may think that in addition to being paid back, if he loans you
money, you might return the favor some day if he is in need. Similarly, you do not want Smith to

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

regard you as someone who does not meet his obligations; or perhaps you might need to borrow
money again in the future, so you want to be sure to pay it back this time. One might look at this
from the point of view of ethical egoism: You and Smith are both looking out for your self-interest,
now and in the future. So Smith loans you the money, and you promise to pay it back (and do).

On the one hand, your self-interest is best met by getting the money and ensuring the poten-
tial to borrow more. Smith’s self-interest is best met by loaning the money and ensuring his
potential to borrow from you. The deontologist, on the other hand, says that you have made a
promise to Smith—to pay him back—and that one should keep one’s promises; not out of self-
interest, but because it is the right thing to do. (We can determine that it is the right thing to do
by looking at it from the perspective of the Golden Rule or from the perspective of Kant, who
would suggest that morality requires that promises be kept.) Meanwhile, the utilitarian might
say there are various outcomes, but paying back the loan will certainly create a utility calcula-
tion that would not be lower than any of the other outcomes. Presumably, being honest and
keeping one’s promises are virtues—at least if done appropriately and in moderation—so the
virtue ethicist will also insist that the money be paid back. As we see, then, the ethical egoist,
the deontologist, the utilitarian, and the virtue ethicist all agree that the promise should be kept,
but they arrive at that conclusion from very different directions.

However, these theories may not always agree so nicely. Consider marriage vows, in which
partners promise to love, cherish, honor, and obey, among other things, “till death do us part.”
Despite the fact this promise is binding and often made before God, it is not always kept. Pre-
sumably, people make this promise fully intending to keep it, but circumstances change. Assum-
ing one or both members of a marriage are sufficiently miserable to end it, the utilitarian would
probably conclude that doing so would lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. The
deontologist might say that although promises should never be made lightly, the Kantian “uni-
versality requirement”—that we act in such a way that it would always be the right thing to
do in those circumstances—could be taken to mean that ending the marriage is the right thing
to do. The virtue ethicist would probably argue that keeping a promise to remain married, if it
makes one or both of those people miserable, is immoderate and fails to recognize that it is
sometimes appropriate to break promises. In this case, however, one can also see that others
might argue that a utility calculation, an application of the categorical imperative, or the virtue
of honesty might require the marriage to continue.

Thus, ethical theories might not only conflict with each other, but may even conflict with com-
mon sense. For instance, if one interprets Kant as saying that promises must never be broken,
then it would violate his ethical principle to dissolve the marriage, even if it condemns both
people to abject misery for the rest of their lives. This also shows that ethical theories are not
really “recipes” that guarantee a certain and reliable ethical outcome. Instead, they can offer
guidance for ascertaining right and wrong, so long as we understand that their application may
change depending on a situation’s specifics.

Free Speech

In the United States specifically, a number of political and ethical questions arise from how one
interprets the Constitution. It will be helpful to see a specific example of this from the Bill of
Rights. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States reads:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

The questions this raises about religion—whether what is known is the “establishment” clause
or the “free exercise” clause—are pretty well known. However, the questions of the freedom of
speech and of the press raise issues that are also worth looking at, in terms of constitutionally pro-
tected rights, and what our ethical theories might say about when those rights might be violated.

As we saw with the issue of promises, we probably start with an assumption that free speech, for
individuals and for the media (or press), cannot be prohibited without a very good reason. In other
words, free speech is always assumed to be protected unless legitimate reasons can be provided.

Yelling “Fire!”
The most famous example of when free speech can be prohibited comes from the Supreme
Court case Schenck v. United States (1919), in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted that
one should not be allowed to yell “Fire!” in a crowded theatre. The reason is that falsely indicat-
ing there is a fire could cause panic and put people in danger as they all rush toward the exits.
Holmes’s reasoning sounds utilitarian: Even if the person yelling “Fire!” gets some degree of
pleasure from doing so, everyone else is at risk of psychological trauma and physical injury. Thus,
the greatest good for the greatest number demands prohibiting this kind of speech. The deon-
tologist, who rejects lying on principle, would agree with Holmes’s conclusion, pointing out that
falsely yelling “Fire!” is a lie. As we have seen before, two different ethical theories come to the
same conclusion, though for different reasons.

Even those who advocate the greatest amount of free speech recognize that in this specific case,
the harm caused outweighs the right to say whatever one wishes. There are other such restric-
tions recognized in the law: One cannot threaten the life of the president, for example, nor freely
joke about bombs or hijacking while in an airport. Most people recognize these as legitimate
restrictions to the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.

Freedom for Speech We Do Not Like
Real life presents many situations in which one person’s right to say something may violate
another person’s right not to hear (or see) it. For instance, there are various laws that regulate
pornography’s production, distribution, and sale. Should adults be able to take whatever kind
of pictures they want and sell them to another adult? Some argue that to prevent them from
doing so is a restriction on free speech; others argue that pornography objectifies women (treat-
ing them solely as a means to an end, not as ends in themselves, in Kantian language) in ways
that can lead to violence, sexual abuse, rape, and other immoral and illegal acts, and thus should
not qualify as protected speech. Even though most people agree that child pornography should
be illegal (as it is in the United States), what about a novel that depicts a pornographic scenario
involving a child? Should consenting adults be allowed to write and read such novels?

Great Ideas: Bradley Manning, Daniel Ellsberg,
and Free Speech

In 2010 soldier Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning was arrested on charges that he had passed classified
material to a website known as Wikileaks. In 2013 Manning pleaded guilty to 10 of the 22 charges
he faced, though many debate whether he should be regarded as a hero or a traitor for exposing
national secrets.

(continued)

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

Many other such cases have arisen in which one per –
son’s right to free speech conflicts with another
person’s desire—possibly legitimate desire—to pre-
vent that speech. Should high school students be
allowed to wear T-shirts that other students—or
teachers—find offensive? Should a person be allowed
to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government?
Should a person be allowed to design a Web page
calling for the murder of physicians who provide
abortion services? Should a student be allowed to
pray in school? Should such schools allow or prevent
such prayers at official school functions such as foot-
ball games or graduations? We may want to protect
religious speech, but what if one person’s religious
speech offends another person’s religious beliefs? Is
there a danger of a majority trampling the rights of
a minority?

Ethical theories do not provide exact formulas for
solving such debates. How might a utilitarian respond
to these kinds of cases? How might a deontologist
respond? Would they agree? Would they disagree?
How would they support their conclusions? Would it
depend on the circumstances of the case? If so, does
that prevent us from developing a sufficiently general
notion of morality, as expressed in the Golden Rule
or the “greatest net good for the greatest number”
principle of utilitarianism?

Great Ideas: Bradley Manning, Daniel Ellsberg,
and Free Speech (continued)

Manning is not the first American to make government secrets public; in 1971 Daniel Ellsberg leaked
the now famous Pentagon Papers, which revealed numerous problems about the prosecution of the
Vietnam War.

Are such leaks justified? Some suggest that without them, government malfeasance and incompe-
tence would be much harder to discover; others argue that the government must withhold certain
information from the public for reasons of national security.

Reflection Questions:

1. Can revealing government secrets ever be justified?
2. Can revealing government secrets ever lead to more benefits than maintaining those

secrets?
3. Defend your answers to numbers 1 and 2 using a version of utilitarianism.

Steve Senne/

Associated Press

A high school in Rhode Island displayed this
school prayer banner in their auditorium
until one of its students, an atheist,
requested the school take it down. She
argued that the banner was offensive to
non-Christians.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics
Greed

Earlier we saw that ethical egoism calls into question some of the traditional philosophical and
religious objections against selfishness and its end result, greed. Here we will explore whether
there is any conflict between what traditional views say about greed and certain principles
underlying a capitalist economy.

In director Oliver Stone’s 1987 film Wall Street, a wealthy investor named Gordon Gekko makes
a speech that is now probably better known than the movie itself. He declares:

Greed—for lack of a better word—is good. Greed is right. Greed works. Greed
clarifies, cuts through, and captures the essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed,
in all of its forms—greed for life, for money, for love, knowledge—has marked
the upward surge of mankind. (Pressman & Stone, 1987)

As we saw briefly, in economic exchanges between two people, each wants the very most he or
she can get. If John wants to buy something from Mary, he wants the most he can get for the
least amount of money, and Mary wants the greatest amount of money she can get while giving
up the least. This desire for getting the most for the least is often considered the way we should
(and do) act. Traditionally, however, wanting as much as possible of something was regarded as
being greedy. In contrast to Gordon Gekko, one might consider this passage from the Gospel
according to Saint Luke: “Watch out! Be on your guard against all kinds of greed; a man’s life
does not consist in the abundance of his possessions” (Luke 12:15). Indeed, many religious tradi-
tions regard greed—sometimes called avarice, covetousness, or cupidity—as a sin. Gekko says
“greed is good”; Saint Luke says “greed is bad.” Presumably, they cannot both be right.

With the exception of ethical egoism, Saint Luke seems to be backed up by traditional ethical
theories. Returning to our sandbox with four children and one toy: The greedy child wants the
toy all to him- or herself. The utilitarian will reject this as failing to generate the greatest good for
the greatest number, whereas the deontologist will point out that this is not the kind of act that
would always be the right thing to do. It is probably safe to assume that Saint Luke approved
of the Golden Rule, and we can simply apply it by asking the greedy child: “Would you like it
if some other greedy child took the toy and did not allow anyone else—including you—to play
with it?” The virtue ethicist would see such greed as an extreme: We may desire to have certain
things, but those desires should be moderate. Perhaps we should not desire too little, which
would be an extreme of self-sacrifice, but the extreme of desiring too much is greed, and thus
virtue ethics would reject it.

Does this mean our ethical theories are in fundamental conflict with our economic theories?
In many ways, Gordon Gekko summarized how capitalism works. A business wants to sell the
most goods or offer the most services at the highest prices it can charge, and it wants to capture
the largest market share. Its competitors want to do the same thing. Its customers, on the other
hand, want to get the most goods or services for the lowest prices they can find and will go
to a company’s competitors to do so. There exists, then, competition between customers and
companies, and the end result is that customers get the best price, companies that make the
best product have the highest profits, and companies that charge too much or produce goods
or services of lower quality go out of business. So it is possible that acting in one’s self-interest
(whether as company or customer) reveals that maybe Gordon Gekko is right. Greed is good!

There are some legal restrictions that prevent certain types of greed. Agencies such as the Food
and Drug Administration ensure that companies do not take shortcuts on products that might

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

Classic Vision/age footstock/SuperStock

An enduring contribution of philosopher
Ludwig Feuerbach is the observation that
“you are what you eat.”

make consumers ill. The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division supports competition
among companies and works to prevent monopolies. The U.S. government has sued both IBM
and Microsoft for operating as monopolies. Thus, there are some rules that prevent absolute,
unrestricted greed. However, that does not mean that companies (or customers) should not act
in their own financial best interest.

It unclear how ethical theories treat this apparent conflict between business practice and moral
values. Perhaps one might say that in certain contexts greed is good, whereas in other contexts
it is wrong. Perhaps the term greedy is not adequate for describing entities or individuals who
seek the biggest profits or the lowest prices. Or we might say that businesses should not follow
the same moral code as individuals. We should also consider that many outrageously profitable
companies have also made substantial charitable contributions and supported worthy causes.
Cynics might suggest that companies do this to improve their public image or for a tax deduc-
tion, which would then beg the question of whether a company’s reasons for giving to charity
mattered.

In any case we see the difficulty in applying ethical theory. While not many parents would teach
their child the merits of being greedy, how would we explain to the child how the business
world works? The difficulty is illustrated by imagining the child to ask, “So, should I be greedy
or should I not be greedy?”

Vegetarianism

Ethical questions can arise from even the most ordinary activities, such as eating. A once famous,
now somewhat forgotten German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) once observed,
“You are what you eat” (1864). We are all familiar with the notion that a healthful diet is impor-
tant and that those who eat foods high in saturated fat, cholesterol and trans fats are at greater

risk for stroke, heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and
other health problems. But aside from health issues,
can there be ethical issues involved with diet? From
one perspective, what people eat may reflect their
relationship to the rest of nature and the extent to
which they seek to be in some kind of harmony with
nature. Another perspective considers how our food
is produced and whether it forces sentient beings to
experience cruelty and pain. Should we care if our
food is borne from the pain and suffering of other
animals? Should we want to know more about the
process, or is it acceptable to be ignorant of how our
food is produced? The German politician Otto von
Bismarck once pointed out that one cannot enjoy
politics or sausage if one closely observes how either
is made. Would someone continue to enjoy eating
meat if he or she knew how the animal from which it
came was raised?

We might begin addressing this issue by identifying
the extreme positions relative to food. At one end
of the spectrum, there is the extreme omnivore: a
person who eats anything and everything he or she

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

wants and does not care about how that food is produced. At the other end of the spectrum
is the extreme vegan, a person who refuses to eat any animal products or by-products such as
butter, eggs, cheese, honey, or food containing these, such as pastas and breads. Few people
adopt either such extreme: Even an extreme omnivore might (we hope) draw the line at eating
human flesh, and an extreme vegan may be willing to eat some things, such as yeast or apples,
even though it may be difficult to determine whether yeast is in the relevant sense of “alive,”
and often apples are glazed with a shellac made from insects.

Great Ideas: Are You What You Eat?

Which of the following would you definitely eat? Which would you possibly eat? Are there any items
in this list you would never eat? What kind of reasons did you use to distinguish among the three
categories?

• Cat
• Dog
• Chimpanzee
• Chicken
• Rat
• Pig
• Squirrel

• Horse
• Soybean
• Lobster
• Cockroach
• Bonobo
• Rabbit
• Spider

• Human
• Cow
• Dolphin
• Octopus
• Snail
• Grapes

Take one of the foods you would possibly eat and justify your choice using one of the ethical theories
discussed in this chapter.

Within these extremes is a wide range of positions. Some carnivores do not eat red meat (beef,
pork, and sometimes duck) but only chicken and fish. Some vegetarians eat eggs, cheese, and
butter, and others make an exception for fish. Some people say they will not eat anything with
a personality or anything with a face! What people are willing to consume may depend on their
culture or religion: In some cultures, eating pork is thought to be not just revolting but a violation
of strict religious dietary laws. In the United States many are repulsed by the idea of eating dogs
or chimpanzees, but other cultures may eat both without giving it any more thought than some
Americans would to eating a pork chop.

Speciesism
Can ethicists offer any guidance on determining the right thing to do (or eat)? Ethicist Peter
Singer (b. 1946) has famously argued from the perspective of utilitarianism that animals—includ-
ing humans—deserve some degree of respect because they have “interests.” Singer rejects the
idea that human interests are somehow superior to those of other sentient beings. Minimally,
all animals seek pleasure and avoid pain. We assume, with some good evidence, that rocks
do not feel pain but that cats do. Singer believes that we should take this pain into consider-
ation. To do otherwise is what he calls speciesism, which ignores the interests (and suffering)
of other species. Singer thinks speciesism is no more defensible than racism or sexism. Singer

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.3 Individual Issues in Ethics

Read Peter
Singer’s “All
Animals Are
Equal” in

the Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.

(1975) concludes that respecting the greatest good for the greatest number—the greatest
number of sentient beings, that is—offers an argument in favor of vegetarianism or even
veganism.

Singer’s position may be extreme, and his views are controversial. However, supporters
of his view argue that food production methods inflict needless pain and cruelty. For
example, veal is often produced by taking a calf from its mother at birth and raising it in
a small crate in which it cannot turn around or lie down comfortably. The calf is never
allowed any exercise and is fed a milk substitute so that it will produce a prized pink flesh
when it is slaughtered between 12 and 23 weeks of age. Factory-farmed chickens are kept
in small cages, often along with tens of thousands of other chickens; they frequently have
their beaks removed and are injected with growth-producing drugs that make them so fat
they cannot stand up. The crowded conditions also generate a great deal of disease that
quickly spreads from chicken to chicken. These and other methods for raising animals for
food have been criticized for inflicting an unacceptable level of pain.

This is an interesting ethical issue that many people prefer to ignore. It is, after all, consid-
erably easier to enjoy fried chicken if one does not know what the chicken experienced.
Of course, there are many who argue that eating meat itself is not wrong as long as one’s
meat does not comes from large-scale factory farms.

Virtue ethics might make a compelling case on this issue: that one should prevent any cru-
elty that can be avoided and that a moderate approach might include some meat but not
too much, or perhaps meat of some kinds but not others. Aristotle recommended eating
“clear meats,” by which he seemed to mean poultry and fish. It is interesting to consider
whether this course of action might be in agreement with some versions of utilitarianism
(though not Singer’s) as well as some versions of deontology. To be sure, ethical theory
is not, generally, going to determine what we eat, but it might make us pause and think
about whether we have good reasons for eating what we do.

Euthanasia

Ethics can raise troubling questions not only about seemingly ordinary activities like eating,
but also its most difficult and mysterious ones, such as death. Suppose Richard’s wife of
40 years, Elizabeth, has been diagnosed with pancreatic cancer. Elizabeth, who is in her
70s, has been told by several different physicians that the disease is unquestionably ter-
minal; she can expect to live at most another 18 months, over which time she will experi-
ence increasing levels of pain. Drugs can minimize the pain but not fully relieve it. As the
weeks go by, Elizabeth experiences increasingly agonizing pain. Her doctor has given her
the strongest drugs available, and in massive doses, but they seem not to work. Through
it all, Richard has to helplessly watch his wife suffer.

In this type of case, some ethicists (such as James Rachels; 1941–2003) have argued for
euthanasia (from the Greek for “good death”), or the right to die. The argument is
straightforward: A person who is virtually certain to die within a given amount of time
and is experiencing or will experience a lot of pain before he or she dies should be able
to choose an earlier, less painful death. What purpose is served by keeping a person alive
only to experience constant, agonizing pain? This argument is also used to support phy-
sician-assisted suicide (PAS), which is slightly different from euthanasia. In PAS a doctor

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CHAPTER 6Section

6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Read James
Rachels’s
“Active

and Passive
Euthanasia”

in the
Chapter
Readings

section of the
Appendix.

Read
Philippa
Foot’s

“Killing
and Letting
Die” in the

Chapter
Readings
section of the
Appendix.

provides a patient with a lethal dose of medication or another way of causing death, but
the patient, not the doctor, ends his or her own life. Some countries, such as Netherlands
and Belgium, have made PAS legal. Oregon legalized PAS in 1997; the Supreme Court
upheld Oregon’s “death with dignity” law as constitutional in 2006, and it has since
become legal in Washington and Vermont.

Some of the opposition to euthanasia and PAS comes from an insistence that there is a
difference between killing people and letting them die, as was suggested by philosopher
Philippa Foot (1984) in her work “Killing and Letting Die.” Other opposition is grounded
in religion. In this view, life is a precious gift from God. To end it prematurely is to reject
that gift; only God should determine when life should end. As Saint Thomas Aquinas put
it, “Whoever takes his own life sins against God.” According to some religious traditions,
suicide indicates a lack of trust in God and a rejection of God’s plan. Other nonreligious
objections to PAS are based on the potential consequences of its legalization: that it could
inspire a catastrophic lack of respect for life; that family members or physicians might pres-
sure patients to end their lives prematurely; or that a person may end his or her life not
because of terminal illness but due to a treatable condition such as depression.

Assuming Elizabeth has PAS available as an option, she and her husband still confront
an extremely difficult decision, one that has to be made under the most challenging cir-
cumstances. Even though ethics may help clarify what is at stake, it may not ultimately
be able to design a satisfactory solution. Also, the effects of such ethical decisions may
not always be limited to the individual. If Elizabeth terminates her life via PAS, her decision
affects many others and is representative of just one view within her larger society. Others
may condemn her decision on the basis of their own ethical or religious views, though it
is questionable whether they have the right to insist their views be the basis of universally
enforced laws. We probably do not think kosher laws—such as the prohibition on eating
pork—should be imposed on those who do not keep kosher. Should a Roman Catholic’s
view be imposed on someone who does not share such beliefs or even actively rejects
them?

Many argue that a compromise is to continue to develop drugs and other forms of pallia-
tive care—treatment that reduces suffering—to alleviate a terminally ill person’s anguish.
The hospice movement emphasizes the reduction of end-of-life suffering and promotes
death with dignity, and it has thus become an increasingly attractive option for those who
resist endorsing PAS.

6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Ethical theory can do a great deal to clarify what is at stake and help us better evaluate our choices. It can be challenging, however, to distinguish between ethical questions that confront individuals and those that involve large parts or even all of society. This
is the focus of our next discussion. Because these questions affect everyone, we must
consider how everyone’s voices can be integrated into solutions, or why, perhaps, such
solutions should be left to experts. We will conclude by considering whether we can truly
make sense of the distinction between individual and social ethical decisions.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Animal Rights

We touched on the question of animal rights when discussing ethical issues related to eating
meat and vegetarianism. Ethics can also help us navigate other issues in the relationship between
humans and animals. As we consider some of these, recall that humans are of course animals.
Too frequently animal rights discussions proceed in terms of the contrast between humans and
animals. We may be different kinds of animals, or possess qualities other animals do not; but we
also have a number of things in common with the rest of the animal kingdom. Here, however,
we will use “animals” to refer to the nonhuman kind.

What We Have in Common
For centuries the distinction between humans and animals was taken for granted, and a sharp
line between them was easily drawn. René Descartes, for instance, regarded animals as simply
physical bodies that lacked minds or souls; thus, animals were similar to organic machines. This
is in line with a long history of Western and Christian thinking. Another aspect of that tradition,
sometimes called the great chain of being, ranks all things from highest to lowest: God, followed
by the angels, then human beings, then other animals, then plants. There are a number of dis-
tinctions within these categories as well; some cultures or societies rank kings higher than other
humans, men higher than women, some classes of angels above others, and some even rank
certain plants above others, so that the oak tree is superior to the yew tree.

In contemporary times, however, research and interaction with some species such as cetaceans
(whales, dolphins) and primates (chimpanzees, bonobos) make drawing the line between human
beings and other animals more difficult. Research has indicated that nonhuman animals may do
many of the things once regarded as uniquely human, such as make tools, develop plans, grieve,
remember, and use language. In addition, biologists have demonstrated that human DNA and
chimpanzee DNA overlap between 95% and 98%. Primatologists have suggested that the DNA
of bonobos overlaps with human DNA to an even greater extent (Navin, Thomas, NISC Com-
parative Sequencing Program, & Yi, 2006). In light of these discoveries, some have proposed the
propensity for religion, the ability to pretend, the sense of time, and even essential differences in
the brain as qualities that makes humans unique.

Great Ideas: Are There Limits to the Way
We Treat Animals?

Given the account of animal sentience, intelligence, and their ability to feel pain, are there any animals
you would hesitate to submit to drug or product testing if those tests involved experiencing severe
levels of pain and then death?

Reflection Questions:

1. Identify one nonhuman animal you would approve of and one you would object to being
used for such testing.

2. Identify the differences that informed your response.
3. If you cannot name one animal in each category—either because you see no differences

or because you think no animals should be treated this way—explain what your position
implies for other ways animals are treated.

4. If all animals could be treated in the way described, does that mean there is no such thing
as “cruelty to animals”?

5. If no animals should be treated in the way described, what does that imply about how
humans test drugs for their safety and efficacy?

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

One could conclude that drawing the line between human beings and other animals is arbitrary
and depends on controversial criteria. For instance, would it seem odd to give crabs or mice the
same respect we might think bonobos and dolphins deserve? If the line all the way from human
beings to, say, bacteria is continuous and without any gaps, then anywhere we draw the line will
be controversial and, to a certain extent, involve guesswork. One solution is to simply distinguish
humans from other animals, but that seems more an assumption rather than a defensible position.

Where Do We Draw the Line?
Drawing this line is essential to the question of animal rights. Cultures vary on their acceptance
of acts done with and to animals, such as making clothes and shoes from their body parts;
testing pharmaceuticals and perfumes on them; and even watching them fight to the death
for entertainment or sport. For example, many Americans objected strongly when professional
football player Michael Vick was involved in dogfighting. Yet other countries regularly stage bull-
fights, which often conclude with a ritualized death of the bull. In the United States some groups
object to raising, killing, and skinning animals for fur, whereas others regard such criticism as too
sensitive. Does the fact that people need safe, effective drugs mean that chimpanzees should be
subjected to medical testing? One such test, called the Draize test, applies a substance (a cos-
metic or other product) to an animal that is restrained and conscious; scientists then record the
substance’s effects (burning, toxicity, and so on). Is this test necessary or useful?

Responses to these issues often depend on our relationship to other animals. As Descartes pro-
posed, if we recognize humans as unique and all other animals as inferior, there is no obvious
problem in treating other animals as we wish. On the other hand, those who propose that we
draw the line at sentience (as does Peter Singer) would have a problem with testing on animals,
using animal products, bullfighting, and even eating honey or using leather products. Some-
where in between may be a response that many find satisfactory—a compromise that says tor-
turing animals for perfume or fur is unnecessary but that subjecting them to tests that improve
human life and health is acceptable. This compromise incorporates the idea that cruelty to other
animals not only inflicts needless pain and suffering but also says a good bit about those who
are willing to inflict that pain and suffering.

The Environment

Many ethical issues are also political ones, meaning that many choices we make as individuals
significantly affect the larger community. At the same time, the community imposes restrictions
and laws that limit our choices as individuals, often for good reason. Few would oppose laws that
require everyone to stop at red lights or drive in the same direction on the same side of the road.

One set of political or social issues is known as environmental ethics. This is the study of obli-
gations and values relating to the environment, including any human obligations and values.
Many philosophers and religious traditions have considered the relationship between human
beings and the environment. Aristotle suggested that all things are made by nature for human
beings; that is, the value of things is what they can produce for humans. Genesis 1:26 states,
“And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion
over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth,
and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.” Some have interpreted the notion
of dominion to mean that humans are masters of the earth and can do with it what they please.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

In this view, nature is an instrument to achieve other human goals and is therefore said to pos-
sess “instrumental value.” Thus, just as a spoon may have instrumental value in allowing me
to achieve my goal of eating, the group of plants that produces digitalis may have instrumental
value in the medicine they can create for patients with heart conditions. Of course, something
also has value if people get pleasure and enjoyment from it, and so one would be able to say
that a particularly vibrant sunset has instrumental value in providing the pleasure humans get
from experiencing it.

More recently, however, many environmental ethicists have argued that things other than human
beings have intrinsic value, meaning that they have value in themselves and not for some other
purpose. This view rejects the assumption that only human beings possess intrinsic value and
argues that other things have a right to exist not solely because of some human purpose they
serve but simply because they are part of nature and the universe. This is a controversial view, and
one that is in fact quite old. Many religious traditions regard the earth as a sacred gift that must
be cared for and protected. This seems to be the idea expressed in Ezekiel 34:18: “Seemeth it a
small thing unto you to have eaten up the good pasture, but ye must tread down with your feet
the residue of your pastures? and to have drunk of the deep waters, but ye must foul the residue
with your feet?” Many Native American traditions have also regarded the relationship between
people and their environment as sacred. As one ancient Native American proverb states:

Treat the earth well.

It was not given to you by your parents,

it was loaned to you by your children.

We do not inherit the Earth from our Ancestors,

we borrow it from our Children.

Thus, we have two distinct ways of interpreting the relationship between human beings and their
environment. One regards the environment as possessing solely instrumental value (although
this does not necessarily endorse the idea of using it however one pleases); the other regards the
environment as possessing intrinsic value, thus preventing it from being treated simply instru-
mentally and requiring respect. Of course, there are many different interpretations of each of
these positions, as well as positions that seek some degree of compromise between them, or
even combine the two views. We can contrast the two perspectives more clearly with a specific
example.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Great Ideas: Ethics, Economics, and the Environment

You are the CEO of Smith Petroleum. Large amounts of oil have been discovered in the middle of Yel-
lowstone National Park. The oil industry claims that the reserves in Yellowstone will lower gas prices
in the United States by 10 cents a gallon and create at least 10,000 new jobs. Both private environ-
mental groups and federal agencies, however, have described the environmental damage posed by
the drilling as “catastrophic.”

The decision to drill is entirely yours to make. Before you answer the following questions, you may
wish to visit this link:

http://www.nps.gov/yell/index.htm

Reflection Questions:

1. What is your decision?
2. How do you justify your decision from an economic and environmental standpoint?
3. What ethical issues are involved?
4. If you decided to drill, how do you respond to someone who claims that Yellowstone’s rock

formations are both enormous and irreplaceable?
5. What are the costs and benefits involved in your decision? Are they solely economic costs

and benefits, or are there other factors you must consider?
6. Does your view change on this when you remember that occasionally oil companies have

made predictions that were overly optimistic?

Ethics of Extinction
Consider the dwarf wedge mussel, an aquatic mollusk found exclusively on the Atlantic coast
of North America. This mussel has become extinct in Canada and is severely endangered in the
United States. It has very little obvious use to human beings. It does not seem to provide any
particularly essential medicinal value, is not eaten, and does not offer much in terms of aesthetic
value or beauty to human observers since it spends most of its time buried completely in the
bottom of streams and rivers.

This animal’s survival may well depend on whether it is regarded in terms of possessing instru-
mental or intrinsic value. Those who see little use for it may not particularly care if it goes extinct,
beyond some possible repercussions in the rest of the food chain. However, the instrumentalist
perspective would suggest that if the mussel plays a crucial role in its ecosystem that affects the
fishing industry, this might be reason enough to prevent the mussel’s extinction. (Some instru-
mentalists tend to err on the side of caution in these cases, recognizing that human beings may
not always be wholly aware of what value a given organism might have; it might be something
that has yet to be discovered.)

The intrinsic perspective does not need to specify some value or product the mussel offers
human beings; its existence as part of an environmental subsystem gives it intrinsic value. We
should simply do what is reasonable to protect the mussel and prevent its extinction out of our
respect for the earth in general and this little part of it specifically. Some might think it is silly to
protect such an odd little critter. Others may argue not protecting it is silly. For example, suppose
a major threat to this mussel is chemical runoff from golf courses. Are we genuine stewards of
an environment if we allow species to go extinct in order to preserve the right to hit a small white
ball relatively large distances with the goal of placing it in a hole that is 4.25 inches in diameter?

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Population growth, the economic and technological development of large countries such as
India and China, and the difficulty in determining the costs and benefits of specific economic and
developmental policies are all other issues that fall under this category. Humans have become
considerably more aware that resources are finite, and many environmental ethicists insist that
we realize we are dependent on the earth and not treat it as a source of riches to exploit and
plunder. Some have likened the earth to a spaceship on which humans are traveling. From that
perspective, the earth looks more like a home to be cared for than a department or grocery store
from which we take things without regard to the consequences.

The Personal and the Political

We began by looking at certain kinds of behavior—keeping promises, end of life issues, even
determining what to eat—that seem to be based on individual choices that more or less only
affect the person who makes them (obviously, if one breaks a promise, it affects the person to
whom the promise was made). We then considered more general ethical questions that affect
whole communities. Here we will conclude our discussion of ethics by looking at the distinction
between the individual and society, a line that is not easily drawn.

Consider “victimless crimes” (sometimes called consensual crimes), activities that are against the
law but do not physically harm a person or property, or were voluntarily (consensually) entered
into. Examples of victimless crimes include smoking marijuana, failing to wear seat belts and
motorcycle helmets, committing suicide, as well as engaging in prostitution, sodomy, or bungee
jumping. The question is whether the state, or society, has the right to prevent a person from
engaging in such activities. Those who stress minimal state involvement and emphasize a libertar-
ian approach to state authority suggest that drug laws, pornography laws, curfews for teenagers,
and even driver’s licenses are beyond the legitimate scope of what government can legislate.

Victimless crimes help clarify government’s legitimate role and also demonstrate that society’s rules
can change over time. For instance, many states had laws against sodomy for decades. Even though
sodomy is a general term used to describe
nonreproductive sex acts—acts that can-
not lead to reproduction—sodomy laws
were generally enforced only against
homosexuals. Such laws were ruled
unconstitutional in the United States in
2003 but are still found in other coun-
tries’ legal codes. Another example are
sumptuary laws, which were designed to
prevent extravagant consumption. The
Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example,
prohibited people who did not have sub-
stantial wealth from wearing lace, hat-
bands, belts, or capes.

Laws that prohibit activities that are
very common and widely accepted may
not effectively curb behavior, and may
even worsen it. Many have argued that
the ban on alcohol during Prohibition
(1919–1933) was both widely ignored

Associated Press

It is sometimes argued that banning a victimless crime
could generate more victims than the banned activity. An
example is the 18th Amendment banning alcohol in the
United States. Prohibition gave rise to organized crime
and gangsters like Lucky Luciano, shown here at right.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.4 Social Issues in Ethics

Read Virginia
Held’s

“Feminist
Transfor-
mations
of Moral

Theory” in
the Chapter

Readings
section of the
Appendix.

and allowed criminals to develop powerful criminal organizations. If this objection is cor-
rect, then banning the victimless crime of drinking alcohol generated more victims than
drinking itself would have caused.

From a different perspective, however, it has been argued that many so-called victim-
less crimes cannot be removed from their social context. Take as an example Al, whose
occasional yet illegal marijuana use seems to harm no one but himself (and it is debat-
able whether he is even doing that). Those defending this law might argue that Al and
everyone else who violates the laws against marijuana financially support drug cartels
and criminals who have corrupted governments, murdered police officers, politicians, and
judges, supported terrorism, and numerous other serious crimes. From this perspective,
we may want to ask if Al’s marijuana habit is in fact a victimless crime or if the larger con-
text in which he buys marijuana must be considered.

Prostitution is another so-called victimless activity prohibited in some countries (such as
the United States, except in a small part of Nevada). Two distinct issues arise here: whether
engaging in sex as a prostitute or a customer should be illegal and whether the victims—if
there are any—are the result of the activity or a result of the activity being illegal. The lib-
ertarian perspective argues that prostitution involves a voluntary, consensual agreement
between two adults in which the government has no legitimate right to interfere. Those
who oppose legal prostitution argue that prostitutes face a wide variety of dangers from
both customers and pimps, including rape and battery. They also argue that many prosti-
tutes sell sex out of economic necessity, and thus it should not be regarded as voluntary.
Furthermore, many impoverished and desperate young women are sold against their will
into prostitution. How we describe the situation may determine our moral evaluation of it.

The relationship between the personal and the political is an issue that Virginia Held con-
fronts in her article about feminist responses to ethical theory. The personal realm has
often been aligned with the feminine while the political has often been aligned with
the masculine. Women are thought of as participating in the life of the home (the per-
sonal) while men have been thought to lead the life of the state (political). Held examines
assumptions about the role of women in society and the ways that women are working
in the ethical tradition to provide a feminine voice in a world that is dominated by the
masculine.

As we have seen, some activities that were once illegal have become legal, or at least
“decriminalized,” presumably due to society’s changing standards. Perhaps this means, as
the saying goes, that “you cannot legislate morality,” meaning that the state simply is not
good at legislating ethical choices. However, we legislate morality all the time. A society
legislates against murder on the assumption that it is wrong. No one responds to the fact
that people continue to murder each other by recommending that we get rid of laws that
make murder illegal. Ethics provides some guidance but offers no clear-cut set of rules to
determine an answer on which everyone will agree. Ethics can clarify how we determine
the relationship between the individual citizen and their society. Is it a laissez-faire society?
Or is it a society that exerts its power to ensure that all its members are treated fairly and
given equal access to opportunity? How we answer that question plays an important role
in how we look at a society’s laws, rules, and informal policies. That answer will in turn
help us evaluate the morality of the various activities in which people and communities
engage.

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CHAPTER 6Section

6.5 Summary and Resources

Chapter Highlights

• Philosophers have developed substantial and complex approaches to solving ethical
issues, including utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics.

• Other ethical views, known as metaethics, raise significant questions about how the
discipline of ethics should be understood.

• Applying ethical theory to specific problems reveals that a more rigorous understanding
of those theories can help clarify those problems though not necessarily offer solutions.

Philosopher Vignette:

John Stuart Mill

John Stuart Mill was born in a London suburb in 1806. His
father, James Mill, undertook his education, and John began
study of Greek at the age of 3 and Latin at the age of 8. By the
time he was getting ready for what most would call the fresh-
man year of high school, Mill had read most of the ancient clas-
sics and intensely studied history, mathematics, and economics.
At the age of 20, Mill suffered from serious depression that he
attributed to his rigorously analytical education. Mill connected
to his emotions through the poetry of William Wordsworth, and
over time his depression faded.

In 1830 Mill met Harriet Taylor. Taylor was married at the time,
but they began a friendship that ultimately led to marriage 21
years later. It is generally believed that Mill and Taylor’s relation-
ship was platonic until Taylor’s husband died. They were married
two years after Taylor’s husband’s death. Mill found great com-
fort and inspiration in their relationship. He felt such a strong emotional and intellectual connection
to her that, after her tragic death in 1858, he spent half of each year for the rest of his life in Avignon,
France, just to be close to her grave. He was ultimately buried next to her when he died in 1873.

Mill’s relationship with Taylor changed his views about the ends that ought to be pursued in the realm
of human happiness and well-being. Mill believed in gender equality, and he worked with Taylor to
complete his work On the Subjection of Women, an extended argument that attempts to expand the
notion of women’s rights and criticizes some of the restrictions and obstacles women faced.

Mill wrote on a wide array of philosophical topics, including logic, politics, equality, economics, reli-
gion, and ethics. He is best known for Utilitarianism, in which he attempts to refine the definition of
utilitarianism, define its ultimate aims, and refute arguments against it. Mill’s ethical system is based
on the principle (what he calls “the greatest happiness principle”) that the best action is the one that
creates the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.

Mill—along with American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce—is widely considered to be the most
important English-speaking philosopher of the 19th century. His views on gender equality and social
welfare were ahead of his time. His writings reflect a keen intellect that was able to incisively and
clearly break down problems and brilliantly present his own arguments and positions. Mill sought to
bring about a better world, one in which all humans enjoyed equality and pursued the pleasures of
the mind. His works paved the way for much of our current thinking about justice, equality, and social
harmony.

John Stuart Mill

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.5 Summary and Resources

Case Study: Lifeboat Ethics

In the 1974 article “Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,” Garrett Hardin presents an
ethical thought experiment regarding the issue of the environment and resource distribution around
the world. Hardin’s primary question is whether all humans have an equal right to an equal share of
the earth’s resources. He suggests that we imagine the rich countries of the world as lifeboats. Each
lifeboat represents a country’s resources (land, clean water, resources used for profit, oil, etc.). The
more resources a country has, the bigger its boat. In the water surrounding each lifeboat are people
swimming. These swimmers represent the world’s poor people. Suppose our lifeboat is called the
United States and has 60 seats total, 50 of which are taken. Around the boat are 100 swimmers. How
do we determine to whom to give the 10 remaining seats?

Hardin claims that the first option is to try applying Christian or Marxist philosophy. In these cases we
would have to take everyone into our boat, as each person is no more important than any other, and
all deserve to be saved. However, having 150 people in a boat designed for 60 means that the boat
will fall apart or capsize, and everyone will drown.

The second option is to choose 10 people from the 100 swimmers to allow onto the boat. But how to
choose? Will we choose those who are first? The neediest? Those with the best rowing or boat-repair
skills? We must also consider that once we fill all the seats, we lose our “safety factor.” With 10 seats
still open, we have room to move people around or seat new passengers that are born on the boat.
Or, should we lose a part of our ship, the 50 passengers would still be safe because of the 10 empty
seats. Hardin claims that it is important to seat people, but it is equally important to leave some seats
open. Therefore, in order to ensure the safety and survival of all the boat’s passengers, we need to
prevent swimmers from boarding our vessel.

Hardin says that people who feel guilty for preventing swimmers from boarding the boat can give
up their spot. The swimmer who climbs into your seat will not feel badly about this turn of events.
Hardin claims that as people jump out and climb on, the boat will “purge itself” of feelings of guilt.
At some point none of the passengers will feel badly about the swimmers in the water, at least not
badly enough to give up their own seat.

Hardin uses this thought experiment to critique socialist ideals as well as the idea of a world food bank.
He believes that opening up resources to allow everyone equal access creates a “ruin of the com-
mons.” If the world established a food bank out of which poorer countries could take food when they
did not have the resources to feed their populations, the world would be taxed beyond its capacity,
which would result in even greater catastrophe. For example, suppose country X can sustain 50 mil-
lion people. However, their population has risen to 70 million over the past 10 years, and their leaders
have taken food out of the food bank to feed everyone. Suddenly, the country experiences a severe
drought, and its resources cannot be distributed quickly enough. Rather than a few hundred thousand
people dying if the population were still at 50 million, 20 million people are now in danger of dying.

At first glance, Hardin’s analysis seems callous and arbitrary. However, when further analyzed, it is
possible to see that Hardin’s underlying motivation is not only to prevent large crises like famine, but
also to create responsible citizens who understand the importance of not overly taxing the world’s
resources. Consider that 7 billion humans now live on earth, compared with 1 billion in 1818. Hardin
believed that the best world would be one in which nations kept some open seats on their lifeboats,
even when that meant letting others drown in the sea.

Reflection Questions:

1. Do you find Hardin’s analysis logistically convincing? Ethically convincing? Why or why not?
2. Does the perspective from which one confronts this issue matter in these cases? If you

were a swimmer as opposed to a passenger, would that make a difference in the way you
viewed things?

(continued)

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.5 Summary and Resources

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Identify one of the Aristotelian virtues you think is important for a moral person to
have. Describe what it would be like to have too much of this feature and what it
would be like to have too little of this feature.

2. Relativism is a very popular view. Describe a situation in which you think relativism
might not provide the best response, and explain why. If you cannot do that, explain
why that means that ultimately nothing can be called wrong, no matter how evil it
may appear.

3. Explain what kind of responsibilities the current generation has, if any, to future gen-
erations in terms of treating the environment well. If you think the current generation
has no such obligations, discuss whether the generation before you should have had
such an obligation and what the implications are if they did not.

4. When you think about the ways that you try to live an ethically good life, which ethical
theory do you think most directly aligns with the motives and/or ethical considerations
that you take into account when you make moral decisions?

5. One common critique of virtue ethics is that there is not a universal standard by which
one can judge whether or not one has achieved the virtuous characteristic. How do
you think that one can tell whether or not one has maximized a virtue in her or his
life? Which three virtues do you think are most important in your own life? Why?

6. Is it necessary to have a grounding for one’s ethical actions and beliefs, or is ethics
something that naturally emerges and that people recognize intuitively? Is there another
option?

7. Is it possible to create positive ethical beliefs in people who seem to be immoral? How
can one go about creating those dispositions and actions? Are some people just natu-
rally more ethical than others?

8. Do you think that it is acceptable to sacrifice a single person for the good of the many?
Why or why not? What if the person is a serial rapist? Does that change your view? If
so, why? What if the person is your mother? Does that change your view? If so, why?

9. Feminist philosophers have critiqued the history of ethical philosophy due to many fac-
tors. It is obvious that this history has been dominated by masculine perspectives and
philosophies. In addition, others have claimed that men tend to focus on duty, respect,
and autonomy, whereas women’s ethical thinking aligns more with responsiveness, care,
and community. Do you think that men and women think differently when it comes to
ethics? If so, what does that mean about religious and philosophical conceptions of eth-
ics that rely on a male perspective? Are they in some sense inadequate? Why?

Case Study: Lifeboat Ethics (continued)

3. What is humanity’s responsibility regarding reproduction? Is the ethical human the one who
refuses to procreate so as not to add to the world’s population? Why or why not?

4. Is there a way to create more seats in the lifeboat using no additional resources?
5. Do humans deserve the right to life, even if they have been irresponsibly brought into the

world? Why or why not?

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.5 Summary and Resources

Additional Resources

Ethical Theory

Some detailed descriptions of various ethical theories can be found here:

http://ethics.sandiego.edu/theories/Intro/index.asp

Kantian Ethics

Nigel Warburton provides an introduction to Kantian ethics at:

http://virtualphilosopher.com

Nietzsche

A discussion of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality under the heading “Christopher Janaway on
Nietzsche on Morality” is available at:

http://www.philosophybites.com

A discussion of many of the views that have been attributed, wrongly, to Nietzsche, under the
heading “Brian Leiter on Nietzsche Myths” is available at:

http://www.philosophybites.com

Psychological and Ethical Egoism

A development of issues surrounding various versions of egoism can be found here:

http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/Egoism.html

Utilitarianism

A number of discussions of ethics, including a discussion of rule utilitarianism by British
American philosopher Brad Hooker, under the title “Consequentialism” is available at:

http://www.philosophybites.com
Virtue Ethics

A 2-minute introduction to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, presented under the predictable title
“Virtue Ethics” is available here:

http://philinstall.uoregon.edu

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.5 Summary and Resources

Chapter Reading List

Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill

Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant

Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle

After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre

“Psychological Egoism,” Joel Feinberg

Beyond Good and Evil, Friedrich Nietzsche

“All Animals Are Equal,” Peter Singer

“Active and Passive Euthanasia,” James Rachels

“Killing and Letting Die,” Philippa Foot

“Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory,” Virginia Held

Key Terms

act utilitarianism An interpretation of
utilitarianism that focuses on a given act and
evaluates it in terms of that act generating
the greatest net good for the greatest num-
ber of people.

categorical imperative An obligation or
demand that holds for an agent without
qualification, or unconditionally.

consequentialist A type of ethical theory
that includes utilitarianism and evaluates the
morality of an act in terms of the results it
produces.

environmental ethics The study of obliga-
tions and values relating to the environment,
including any human obligations and values.

ethical egoism The ethical view that a
person should do what is in that person’s
self-interest.

eudaimonia The state of being justifiably
happy and content, particularly emphasized
in Aristotelian ethics.

euthanasia The intentional causing of death
in order relieve pain or suffering.

golden mean The appropriate place
between two extremes; in Aristotelian ethics,
virtues are those characteristics that achieve
this balance.

instrumentalist A view that ideas, con-
cepts, and other claims are valuable to the
extent that they can be used to bring about
some result.

magnanimity The virtue of having a great
soul, or the character of being nobly gener-
ous; regarded as a particularly important
virtue by Aristotle.

metaethics The study of concepts, claims,
and assumptions that ethics uses to evaluate
moral actions.

phronesis The ability to judge appropriately,
to determine what appropriate ends are
and how to achieve them; often translated
as “practical wisdom” and often associated
with Aristotle.

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CHAPTER 6Section 6.5 Summary and Resources

physician-assisted suicide (PAS) A pro-
cedure whereby a physician aids a patient
in ending his or her life, although the act (in
contrast to euthanasia) is carried out by the
patient.

reflective equilibrium A procedure, ide-
ally leading to the most reasonable result,
whereby reflection on various factors leads to
the fullest possible consideration of the fac-
tors underlying a decision.

rule utilitarianism An interpretation of
utilitarianism that emphasizes identifying
those rules that, when generally adopted,
will lead to the greatest net good for the
greatest number.

speciesism The discrimination against a
species; often a critical term used to charac-
terize human behavior relative to nonhuman
animals.

temperance A virtue that emphasizes mod-
eration and control of one’s natural appetites
and keeps them in check.

utilitarianism The ethical theory that evalu-
ates the morality of an act or a rule in terms
of its consequences, and whereby an act is
seen as moral if it produces the greatest net
good for the greatest number.

utility A term used to measure and evaluate
satisfaction and benefits; used to compare
various activities in terms of their success in
maximizing utility.

virtue ethics An approach to moral and
ethical questions that focuses on a person’s
character.

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