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IMMANUEL KANT

What Is Enlightenment?
1784

Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) first love was Newtonian science. The
progress that science and mathematics had made since the mid seventeenth

century fascinated him. He wanted to bring a comparable rigor, possibly

even progress, to all branches of philosophy: ethics, epistemology, and espe-

cially metaphysics. At the heart of the “Copernican revolution” that Kant

said he had begun in philosophy lay his belief that innate properties in the

mind—the rules of selecting and combining sense data—govern the

human construction of reality. In effect we think, but we also have the fac-

ulty of intuition, by which we grasp, for example, space and our position

within it. Intuition of space and place relate to Kant’s attempt to construct

an enlightened ethical system. He believed that human beings must possess

an interior moral sense that can be refined, a knowledge that can be trans-

lated into behavior. “Do I have, not merely a self-interested feeling, but also

a disinterested feeling of concern for others? Yes,” Kant said. How to

achieve the moral balance between self-interest and benevolence occupied

much of his writing and teaching life.
Kant lived out his sheltered days as a professor at Albertina Univer-

sity in Konigsberg (now Kaliningrad). He became famous largely as a

philosopher, and his formal philosophical writings are a mainstay of any

university curriculum today. Kant should be seen as singularly important

because of the range of his genius, his rigor in formal philosophy, and his

search for the abstract and the universal. The selection that follows has

been reprinted often. Its clarity and brevity recommend it, but many com-

mentators have failed to notice that it is a distinctively conservative doc-

ument. Think for yourself Kant seems to be saying, but cause no trouble.

Leave the state and its institutions alone; conform; think original

thoughts after hours, in the privacy of your own home. The revolutionary

Locke, the outrageous authors of Treatise of the Three Impostors,

Diderot, Rousseau, and perhaps even Lady Mary Wortley Montagu would

*Immanuel Kant, ‘What Is Enlightenment?” trans. Peter Gay, Introduction to Contempo-

rary Civilization in the West (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 1071-76.

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 203

probably not have agreed with Kant’s desire to alter the political status
quo as little as possible.

Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage.
Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without
another’s guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in
lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use
one’s own mind without another’s guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere
aude.) “Have the courage to use your own understanding,” is there-
fore the motto of the enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of
mankind gladly remain minors all their lives, long after nature has freed
them from external guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for
others to set themselves up as guardians. It is so comfortable to be a
minor. If I have a book that thinks for me, a pastor who acts as my con-
science, a physician who prescribes my diet, and so on—then I have no
need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others
will take care of that disagreeable business for me. Those guardians
who have kindly taken supervision upon themselves see to it that the
overwhelming majority of mankind—among them the entire fair sex—
should consider the step to maturity not only as hard, but as extremely
dangerous. First, these guardians make their domestic cattle stupid and

, carefully prevent the docile creatures from taking a single step without
the leading-strings to which they have fastened them. Then they show
them the danger that would threaten them if they should try to walk by
themselves. Now, this danger is really not very great; after stumbling a
few times they would, at last, learn to walk. However, examples of such
failures intimidate and generally discourage all further attempts.
Thus it is very difficult for the individual to work himself out of the

nonage which has become almost second nature to him. He has even
grown to like it and is at first really incapable of using his own under-
standing, because he has never been permitted to try it. Dogmas and
formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use—or
rather abuse—of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting
nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap
over the narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free move-
ment. That is why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who
have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds.

It is more nearly possible, however, for the public to enlighten
itself; indeed, if it is only given freedom, enlightenment is almost

202

204 IMMANUEL KANT

inevitable. There will always be a few ‘independent thinkers, even
among the self-appointed guardians of the multitude. Once such men
have thrown off the yoke of nonage, they will spread about them the
spirit of a reasonable appreciation of man’s value and of his duty to
think for himself. It is especially to be noted that the public which was
earlier brought under the yoke by these men afterward forces these
very guardians to remain in submission, if it is so incited by some of
its guardians who are themselves incapable of any enlightenment.
That shows how pernicious it is to implant prejudices: they will even-
tually revenge themselves upon their authors or their authors’ descen-
dants. Therefore, a public can achieve enlightenment only slowly. A
revolution may bring about the end of a personal despotism or of avari-
cious and tyrannical oppression, but never a true reform of modes of
thought. New prejudices will serve, in place of the old, as guidelines
for the unthinking multitude.

This enlightenment requires nothing but freedom—and the most
innocent of all that may be called “freedom”: freedom to make public
use of one’s reason in all matters. Now I hear the cry from all sides:
“Do not argue!” The officer says: “Do not argue—drill!” The tax col-

lector:

lector: “Do not argue—pay!” The pastor: “Do not argue—believe!”
Only one ruler in the world says: “Argue as much as you please, and
about what you please, but obey!” We find restrictions on freedom
everywhere. But which restriction is harmful to enlightenment?
Which restriction is innocent, and which advances enlightenment? I

reply: the public use of one’s reason must be free at all times, and this
alone can bring enlightenment to mankind.
On the other hand, the private use of reason may frequently be nar-

rowly restricted without especially hindering the progress of enlight-

enment. nlightenment. By “public use of one’s reason” I mean that use which a man,
as scholar, makes of it before the reading public. I call “private use”

that use which a man makes of his reason in a civic post that has been

entrusted to him. In some affairs affecting the interest of the commu-

nity a certain [governmental] mechanism is necessary in which some
members of the community remain passive. This creates an artificial
unanimity which will serve the fulfillment of public objectives, or at

least keep these objectives from being destroyed. Here arguing is not
permitted: one must obey. Insofar as a part of this machine considers
himself at the same time a member of a universal community—a
world society of citizens— (let us say that he thinks of himself as a
scholar rationally addressing his public through his writings) he may
indeed argue, and the affairs with which he is associated in part as a

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 205

passive member will not suffer. Thus, it would be very unfortunate if
an officer on duty and under orders from his superiors should want to
criticize the appropriateness or utility of his orders. He must obey. But
as a scholar he could not rightfully be prevented from taking notice of
the mistakes in the military service and from submitting his views to
his public for its judgment. The citizen cannot refuse to pay the taxes
levied upon him; indeed, impertinent censure of such taxes could be
punished as a scandal that might cause general disobedience. Never-
theless, this man does not violate the duties of a citizen if, as a scholar,
he publicly expresses his objections to the impropriety or possible
injustice of such levies. A pastor too is bound to preach to his congre-
gation in accord with the doctrines of the church which he serves, for
he was ordained on that condition. But as a scholar he has full free-
dom, indeed the obligation, to communicate to his public all his care-
fully examined and constructive thoughts concerning errors in that
doctrine and his proposals concerning improvement of religious
dogma and church institutions. This is nothing that could burden his
conscience. For what he teaches in pursuance of his office as repre-
sentative of the church, he represents as something which he is not
free to teach as he sees it. He speaks as one who is employed to speak
in the name and under the orders of another. He will say: “Our church
teaches this or that; these are the proofs which it employs.” Thus he
will benefit his congregation as much as possible by presenting doc-
trines to which he may not subscribe with full conviction. He can com-
mit himself to teach them because it is not completely impossible that
they may contain hidden truth. In any event, he has found nothing in
the doctrines that contradicts the heart of religion. For if he believed
that such contradictions existed he would not be able to administer
his office with a clear conscience. He would have to resign it. There-
fore the use which a scholar makes of his reason before the congrega-
tion that employs him is only a private use, for, no matter how sizable,
this is only a domestic audience. In view of this he, as preacher, is not
free and ought not to be free, since he is carrying out the orders of
others. On the other hand, as the scholar who speaks to his own pub-
lic (the world) through his writings, the minister in the public use of
his reason enjoys unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to
speak for himself. That the spiritual guardians of the people should
themselves be treated as minors is an absurdity which would result in
perpetuating absurdities.

But should a society of ministers, say a Church Council, .. . have
the right to commit itself by oath to a certain unalterable doctrine, in

206 IMMANUEL KANT

order to secure perpetual guardianship over , all its members and
through them over the people? I say that this is quite impossible. Such
a contract, concluded to keep all further enlightenment from human-
ity, is simply null and void even if it should be confirmed by the sover-
eign power, by parliaments, and by the most solemn treaties. An
epoch cannot conclude a pact that will commit succeeding ages, pre-
vent them from increasing their significant insights, purging them-
selves

hem
selves of errors, and generally progressing in enlightenment. That
would be a crime against human nature, whose proper destiny lies pre-
cisely in such progress. Therefore, succeeding ages are fully entitled
to repudiate such decisions as unauthorized and outrageous. The
touchstone of all those decisions that may be made into law for a
people lies . in this question: Could a people impose such a law upon
itself? Now, it might be possible to introduce a certain order for a def-
inite short period of time in expectation of a better order. But while
this provisional order continues, each citizen (above all, each pastor
acting as a scholar) should be left free to publish his criticisms of the
faults of existing institutions. This should continue until public under-
standing of these matters has gone so far that, by uniting the voices of
many (although not necessarily all) scholars, reform proposals could
be brought before the sovereign to protect those congregations which
had decided according to their best lights upon an altered religious
order, without, however, hindering. those who want to remain true to
the old institutions. But to agree to a perpetual religious constitution
which is not to be publicly questioned by anyone would be, as it’were,
to annihilate a period of time in the progress of man’s improvement.
This must be absolutely forbidden.
A man may postpone his own enlightenment, but only for a limited

period of time. And to give up enlightenment altogether, either for
oneself or one’s descendants, is to violate and to trample upon the
sacred rights of man. What a people may not decide for itself may
even less be decided for it by a monarch, for his reputation as a ruler
consists precisely in the way in which he unites the will of the whole
people within his own. If he only sees to it that all true or supposed
[religious] improvement remains in step with the civic order, he can
for the rest leave his subjects alone to do what they find necessary for
the salvation of their souls. Salvation is none of his business; it is his
business to prevent one man from forcibly keeping. another from
determining and promoting his salvation to the best of his ability
Indeed, it would be prejudicial to his majesty if he meddled in these
matters and supervised the writings in which his subjects seek to

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? 207

bring their [religious] views into the open, even when he does this
from his own highest insight, because then he exposes himself to
the reproach: Caesar non est supra grammaticos [Caesar is not above
grammarians]. It is worse when he debases his sovereign power so far
as to support the spiritual despotism of a few tyrants in his state over
the rest of his subjects.
When we ask, Are we now living in an enlightened age? the answer

is, No, but we live in an age of enlightenment. As matters now stand it
is still far from true that men are already capable of using their own
reason in religious matters confidently and correctly without external
guidance. ‘Still, we have some obvious indications that the field of
working toward the goal [of religious truth] is now being opened.
What is more, the hindrances against general enlightenment or the
emergence from self-imposed nonage are gradually diminishing. In
this respect this is the age of the enlightenment and the century of
Frederick [the Great].

-A prince ought not to deem it beneath his dignity to state that he
considers it his duty not to dictate anything to his subjects in religious
matters, but to leave them complete freedom. If he repudiates the
arrogant word tolerant, he is himself enlightened; he deserves to be
praised by a grateful world and posterity as that man who was the first
to liberate mankind from dependence, at least on the government, and
let everybody use his own reason in matters of conscience. Under his
reign, honorable pastors, acting as scholars and regardless of the
duties of their office, can freely and openly publish their ideas to the
world for inspection, although they deviate here and there from
accepted ‘doctrine. This is even more true of every other person not
restrained by any oath of office. This spirit of freedom is spreading
beyond the boundaries [of Prussia], even where it has to struggle
against the external hindrances established by a government that fails
to grasp its true interest [Frederick’s Prussia] is a shining example
that freedom need not cause the least worry concerning public order
or the unity of the community. When one does not deliberately
attempt to keep men in barbarism, they will gradually work out of that
condition by themselves.

I have emphasized the main point of the enlightenment—man’s
emergence from his self-imposed nonage—primarily in religious mat-
ters,

at
ters, because our rulers have no interest in playing the ‘guardian to
their subjects in the arts and sciences. Above all, nonage in religion is
not only the most harmful but the most dishonorable. But the disposi-
tion of a sovereign ruler who favors freedom in the arts and sciences

208 MOSES MENDELSSOHN

goes even further: he knows that there is no danger in permitting his
subjects to make public use of their reason and to publish their ideas
concerning a better constitution, as well as candid criticism of existing
basic laws. We already have a striking example [of such freedom], and
no monarch can match the one whom we venerate.

But only the man who is himself enlightened, who is not afraid of
shadows, and who commands at the same time a well-disciplined and
numerous army as guarantor of public peace— only he can say what
[the sovereign of] a free state cannot dare to say: “Argue as much as
you like, and about what you like, but obey!” Thus we observe here as
elsewhere in human affairs, in which almost everything is paradoxical,
a surprising and unexpected course of events: a large degree of civic
freedom appears to be of advantage to the ‘intellectual freedom of the
people, yet at the same time it establishes insurmountable barriers. A
lesser degree of civic freedom, however, creates room to let that free
spirit expand to the limits of its capacity Nature, then, has carefully
cultivated the seed within the hard core—namely, the urge for and the
vocation of free thought. And this free thought gradually reacts back
on the modes of thought of the people, and men become more and
more capable of acting in freedom. At last free thought acts even on
the fundamentals of government, and the state finds it agreeable to
treat man, who is now more than a machine, in accord with his dignity.