Describe the art of negotiation in a global situation. What are the stages of negotiation and what role do styles of negotiation play.

Describe the art of negotiation in a global situation. What are the stages of negotiation and what role do styles of negotiation play?

Answer must be at least 300 words in APA format.

References….see attached

Readings:

Adair, W. L., Taylor, M., Chu, J., Ethier, N., Xiong, T., Okumura, T., & Brett, J. (2013). Effective Influence in Negotiation. International Studies Of Management & Organization, 43(4), 6-25.

Engle, R. L., Elahee, M. N., & Tatoglu, E. (2013). Antecedents of problem-solving cross-cultural negotiation style: Some preliminary evidence. Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship, 18(2), 83-102.

Hofstede, G. J., Jonker, C. M., & Verwaart, T. (2012). Cultural differentiation of negotiating agents. Group Decision and Negotiation, 21(1), 79-98.

LeFebvre, R., & Franke, V. (2013). Culture matters: Individualism vs. collectivism in conflict decision-making. Societies, 3(1), 128-146.

Lee, S., Adair, W. L., & Seo, S. (2013). Cultural perspective taking in cross-cultural negotiation. Group Decision and Negotiation, 22(3), 389-405.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Antecedents of Problem-Solving Cross-Cultural Negotiation Style: Some Preliminary Evidence
Engle, Robert L;Elahee, Mohammed N;Tatoglu, Ekrem
Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship; Apr 2013; 18, 2; ProQuest Central
pg. 83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Group Decis Negot (2013) 22:389–405
DOI 10.1007/s10726-011-9272-4

Cultural Perspective Taking in Cross-Cultural
Negotiation

Sujin Lee · Wendi L. Adair · Seong-Jee Seo

Published online: 2 November 2011
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract This study introduces the construct cultural perspective taking in nego-
tiation, the active consideration of the other party’s culturally-normative negotiation
behaviors prior to negotiation, and compares the effect of cultural perspective taking
(CPT) versus alternative-focused perspective taking (PT) in cross-cultural negotia-
tions. 160 undergraduate students of North American and East Asian ethnicity in
the United States and Canada participated in a simulated cross-cultural buyer-seller
negotiation in a laboratory study. Participants were randomly assigned to CPT or PT
condition. Results show that negotiators who engaged in CPT claimed more value than
those who engaged in PT. And when both East Asian and North American negotiators
engaged in CPT, East Asian negotiators claimed more value. CPT had no effect on
value creation. This study highlights that learning about the other culture before a
cross-cultural encounter benefits value claiming, but not necessarily value creation.

We thank Ethan Burris, Adam Galinsky, and Elizabeth Mannix for their insightful comments on previous
versions of this manuscript and Michele Castaldi and Jenesis Squires for their valuable assistance with the
project. Data collection was partially funded by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada.

S. Lee (B)
Department of Management Science, Graduate School of Innovation and Technology Management,
KAIST, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
e-mail: sujinlee@kaist.ac.kr

W. L. Adair
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave., West Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1,
Canada
e-mail: wladair@uwaterloo.ca

S.-J. Seo
Graduate School of Innovation and Technology Management, KAIST, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
e-mail: sjeeseo@kaist.ac.kr

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Keywords Negotiation · Perspective taking · Culture · Value claiming

1 Introduction

One of the most important steps in effective negotiation planning is considering the
other party (Fisher et al. 1991). Researchers have defined perspective taking in nego-
tiation as the active consideration of the other party’s alternatives and interests prior
to negotiation, and shown that it aids negotiators in both claiming and creating value
(Galinsky et al. 2008; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001; Neale and Bazerman 1983).
Prior perspective-taking research has not examined the cross-cultural negotiation con-
text, which we argue necessitates a distinct form of perspective taking. In this paper, we
introduce and test cultural perspective taking in negotiation, a form of pre-negotiation
planning that involves actively considering the other party’s culturally-normative com-
munication and strategic repertoires.

Whereas traditional perspective taking involves putting yourself in the other party’s
shoes and considering the other party’s alternatives and interests, cultural perspective
taking involves considering the typical approach to negotiation that a counterpart
from another culture might take. Educating yourself about another culture’s approach
to negotiation is commonly advocated in cross-cultural negotiation training (Acuff
1997; Morrison et al. 1994). Weiss (1994) proposes that when cross-cultural nego-
tiators understand each other’s negotiation norms, they can achieve an ideal process
of mutual adaptation or synergy. It is hoped that by understanding and anticipating a
counterpart’s negotiation repertoire, negotiators will be able to correctly interpret and
adjust to strategies that may not be culturally normative for them. Whereas research
has demonstrated that negotiators’ repertoires are culturally-bounded (e.g. Adair et al.
2001, 2009; Gelfand and McCusker 2001), we have not identified empirical research
testing whether considering the other party’s cultural norms prior to negotiation sig-
nificantly impacts negotiation outcomes.

Prior research on culture and negotiation has focused on the direct effect of the
focal negotiator’s culture (e.g., values, norms, beliefs) or its interaction with contex-
tual factors (e.g., negotiator role, intra- or intercultural dyad) on negotiation processes
and outcomes (for a review, see Brett and Crotty 2008). However, not just the focal
negotiator’s culture but also the different ways that the focal negotiator prepares and
considers the other party’s culture is likely to influence outcomes of cross-cultural
negotiation. Nevertheless, the literature has paid little attention to this question so far.

The current study has two aims. First, we test whether cultural perspective taking
(CPT) offers a distinct advantage over traditional perspective taking (PT) in cross-cul-
tural negotiation. Second, we examine whether the negotiator’s culture and the other
party’s CPT or PT condition moderate the effect of CPT. We build on prior cross-
cultural research to predict that in East Asian–North American negotiations, when
both negotiators engage in CPT, the East Asian negotiator will benefit more than the
North American negotiator. Our sample includes East Asian–North American cross-
cultural dyads that engaged in a simulated negotiation task. Results contribute to
negotiation theory by expanding the conceptualization of perspective taking for the
cross-cultural context and illustrating the culturally-bounded benefits of CPT.

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Cultural Perspective Taking 391

2 Theory and Hypotheses

2.1 Perspective Taking in Negotiation

Perspective taking is the process of imagining the world from another’s perspective or
“putting yourself in another’s shoes.” Some of the positive effects of perspective taking
include a decrease in the confirmation bias and stereotyping (Galinsky 2002; Galinsky
and Moskowitz 2000). These effects seem to occur because perspective taking creates
a mental overlap between oneself and the other party (Davis et al. 1996). Thus, people
who engage in perspective taking see more of themselves in the other party, which
decreases prejudice and stereotyping (Galinsky et al. 2005; Galinsky and Moskowitz
2000). At the same time, perspective taking can lead to mimicry (Chartrand and Bargh
1999), which can be explained by perspective takers also including more of the other
party in their own self-concept (Galinsky et al. 2005). Thus it has been proposed
that perspective taking can help form social bonds and facilitate social coordination
through this bidirectional self-other overlap (Galinsky et al. 2005).

In negotiation, perspective taking involves actively considering the other party’s
alternatives, interests, and/or approach to negotiation, prior to engaging in negotiation
(Galinsky et al. 2008; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). In US negotiation dyads, this
form of pre-negotiation planning offers negotiators several advantages. Actively con-
sidering the other party’s alternatives helps negotiators avoid the tendency to anchor on
the other party’s first offer (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). Negotiators who engage
in perspective taking also benefit by uncovering more hidden agreements, and both
claiming and creating more value than negotiators who do not engage in perspective
taking (Galinsky et al. 2008). In addition to the self-other overlap mechanism, which
would explain social coordination effects (i.e., uncovering integrative solutions), per-
spective taking increases egoistical behavior in competitive or strategic interactions
(Epley et al. 2006). Because perspective taking is a process of understanding the other
party’s thoughts, situations, or hidden interests, under competitive contexts it can be
used to read the other party’s mind, get the other party’s hidden information and
strategically select strategies that favor oneself. This effect helps explain why nego-
tiators who engage in perspective taking extract more concessions and claim more
value than those who do not (Epley et al. 2006; Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001; Neale
and Bazerman 1983). To summarize, the effect of perspective taking in negotiation is
context-specific.

2.2 Cultural Perspective Taking

In this study we build on the existing perspective taking literature by considering
the special case of cross-cultural negotiations. It has been well documented anec-
dotally and empirically that negotiators from different national cultures often have
distinct approaches and strategic repertoires. For example, Japanese negotiators use
family metaphors whereas US negotiators use sports metaphors for intracultural nego-
tiation (Gelfand and McCusker 2001). Low context negotiators use and reciprocate
direct information sharing more whereas high context negotiators use and reciprocate

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offers and persuasion more (Adair 2003; Adair et al. 2001). In addition, US schemas
for intracultural negotiation are more likely to stress self-interest whereas Japanese
schemas for intracultural negotiation are more likely to emphasize altruism (Adair
et al. 2009). And clashing negotiation repertoires has been shown to generate chal-
lenges for adaptation and adjustment (Adair et al. 2001, 2009). This prior research
reveals that cross-cultural negotiators face a different set of coordination challenges
than same-culture negotiators. Hence, we propose that cross-cultural negotiators can
benefit from engaging in a culture-focused form of perspective taking.

A culture-focused form of perspective taking asks negotiators to consider the typi-
cal approach and strategies of negotiators from the other party’s culture. Note this is
similar to forms of preparation advocated by cross-cultural negotiation experts (see
Acuff 1997; Adler 1997; Morrison et al. 1994). As noted by Brett (2001, 204), “If you
want to be an effective negotiator in a global environment, reaching integrative agree-
ments and claiming distributive value, you are going to have to recognize that culture
does matter and be prepared for cultural differences at the negotiation table”. While
the benefits of learning about the other culture and putting yourself in the shoes of the
person from the other culture have been touted for years, no research has empirically
explored the effects of such strategies on facilitating the negotiation performance.

We define CPT in negotiation as the active consideration of the other party’s cul-
turally-normative negotiation repertoires prior to negotiation. This is similar to the
definition of perspective taking (PT) in negotiation: “the active consideration of the
viewpoint of another person” (Galinsky and Mussweiler 2001). Early work on PT
provided participants with specific, unambiguous information about another party’s
orientation towards an object (Pearce and Stamm 1973). The early negotiation research
on PT likewise asked participants to focus on the other party’s alternatives (Galinsky
and Mussweiler 2001). Other work has asked participants to consider the other party’s
interests as well as their alternatives (Epley et al. 2006; Galinsky et al. 2008). In contrast
to these traditional forms of PT that focus on the issues and interests with respect to the
negotiation task, CPT asks negotiators to consider the negotiation approach and norms
of the other party’s culture group. We propose that in a cross-cultural negotiation, CPT
can have a greater impact on value claiming than PT.

2.3 Negotiator CPT and Value Claiming

We predict that in a cross-cultural setting, negotiators who engage in CPT will claim
more value than those who engage in PT. Negotiators who engage in CPT actively
consider stereotypical information about the other party’s culturally-normative nego-
tiation behaviors. This is similar to selecting a “How to Negotiate in X” book to read
on the plane. We argue that such preparation should make negotiators look for signs
of stereotypical behaviors from the other party at the negotiation table. CPT may iron-
ically sharpen the stereotypic difference between negotiators’ cultures—instead of
helping them see commonality—and activate cognitive schema for intergroup inter-
action, which is competitive in nature (Insko et al. 1990). And if negotiators focus
on intergroup differences, they should consider their own gains, rather than mutually

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beneficial joint gains (Lee 2005; Thompson 1993). Thus, CPT should increase the
likelihood of distributive value claiming.

Although PT has been shown to enhance distributive outcomes (Galinsky and
Mussweiler 2001), it has also been shown to decrease stereotype expression and inter-
group bias (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000; Todd et al. 2011). For example, in a study
on interracial bias, White and Asian participants in a perspective taking condition
showed significantly lower pro-White bias than those in a control condition (Todd
et al. 2011). Thus, when PT is compared with CPT, CPT (which accentuates inter-
group stereotypic differences) should be relatively more effective in distributive value
claiming than PT (which decreases such differences). Thus, we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 1 In cross-cultural negotiations, negotiators who engage in CPT will
claim more value than negotiators who engage in PT.

Unlike distributive value claiming, CPT should not affect integrative value creation
because it focuses on cultural differences, not the other party’s interests, cooperative
orientation and shared interests necessary for joint gains (Sebenius 1992). Negotiators
who engage in CPT will focus more on stereotypic cultural differences than shared
interests and intergroup cooperation.

2.4 Culture and Partner Condition as Moderators

In addition to the direct effect of CPT on value claiming, we propose that culture and
partner condition should moderate this effect in East Asian–North American negotia-
tions. Cross-cultural negotiators base their adjustment patterns on the level of cultural
knowledge and understanding that each party has about the other culture (Moran et al.
2007; Morrison et al. 1994; Weiss 1994). Research on negotiation schemas shows
that US and Japanese negotiators do rely on their knowledge of the other’s culture
when anticipating how they will adjust in a cross-cultural negotiation (Adair et al.
2009). Thus, when negotiators take the perspective of the other party’s culture prior
to negotiation, they will improve their ability to anticipate the other party’s moves
and consider what strategies will be most effective. CPT is likely to reinforce the
idea that the other party should behave in his or her own culturally-normative way,
consistent with cultural stereotypes. We propose that this stereotypic expectation gen-
erated by CPT will help or hinder negotiators who engage in CPT strategize their
own behaviors and claim value, depending on the negotiator’s culture and the partner
condition.

Specifically, East Asians who engage in CPT are likely to expect that North Ameri-
can partners will behave consistent with North American cultural norms, such as self-
interest, direct communication and fact/logic (Adair 2003; Adair et al. 2001). To the
extent that cross-cultural negotiators’ cognitive schemas for intercultural negotiation
behavior tend to conform to the other party’s cultural norms (Adair et al. 2009), East
Asian negotiators who engage in CPT are likely to anticipate and be well prepared for
North American partners’ self-interested distributive behaviors. Indeed, research has
shown that in US–Japan intercultural negotiations, Japanese negotiators scored higher
on the schemas of self-interest, direct information sharing and lower on equality and

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altruism than US negotiators—although these patterns were reversed in Japan–Japan
intracultural settings (Adair et al. 2009). And negotiators whose counterparty had a
reputation for distributive gains were better prepared for the counterparty’s distribu-
tive moves and claimed more value than those whose counterparty did not have such
a reputation (Tinsley et al. 2002). Thus, East Asians who engage in CPT should be
prepared to counter distributive moves and claim value for themselves.

In contrast, North Americans who engage in CPT should expect that East Asian
counterparts will behave consistent with East Asian cultural norms, such as an other-
focused relational concern, indirect communication and upholding social-norm ori-
entation (Adair 2003; Adair et al. 2001) and will adjust their cognitive schema for
intercultural negotiation accordingly (Adair et al. 2009). Research has demonstrated
that in US–Japan intercultural settings, US negotiators scored lower on the schemas
of self-interest, direct information sharing and higher on equality and altruism than
Japanese negotiators—these patterns were reversed in US–US intracultural settings
(Adair et al. 2009). Because East Asians who engage in CPT (stereotypically antic-
ipating North American partners’ self-interested competitive moves) are likely to be
better prepared for distributive value claiming than North Americans who engage in
CPT (stereotypically anticipating East Asian partners’ relational cooperative moves),
East Asians should claim more value than North Americans when both parties engage
in CPT. Thus we formally hypothesize:

Hypothesis 2 In cross-cultural negotiations, when both East Asian and North Amer-
ican negotiators engage in CPT, the East Asian negotiators will claim more value than
the North American negotiators.

3 Methods

3.1 Participants

Participants consisted of 160 undergraduate students of North American and East
Asian ethnicity at two universities in the United States and Canada. North American
participants were from Canada (N = 59) or the US (N = 19). Overall there were 26 male
and 52 female North American participants (mean age = 20.22 years, SD = 2.25). East
Asian participants were from Korea (N = 37) and China (N = 45). Overall there were
38 male and 44 female East Asian participants (mean age = 20.44 years, SD = 2.34).
Participants were recruited from a combination of sources including the psychology
and business department participant pools, international student clubs, and the student
life center. All participants received course credit or pay for their participation. The
East Asian participants reported an average of 7.71 years spent living in North Amer-
ica. They reported their proficiency with English as an average 6.06 (SD = 1.10) on a
7-point scale (1 = not at all proficient; 7 = very proficient). Neither North American
participants (M = 1.97, SD = .16) nor East Asian participants (M = 1.95, SD = .22)
reported that they knew their negotiating partner in advance, on a 7-point scale (1 = not
at all; 7 = very much).

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Cultural Perspective Taking 395

3.2 Design and Procedure

The study was a 2 (culture: East Asian vs. North American) x 2 (condition: CPT, PT)
between-participant design. Only cross-cultural negotiations were part of the research
design. No same-culture negotiations were administered. We scheduled equal num-
bers of North American and East Asian students to each experimental session. When
participants arrived at the laboratory, they were paired with a student of different eth-
nicity on a first come first serve basis and randomly assigned into either the buyer or
seller role and either the CPT or PT condition.

Participants had 30 min to prepare individually for an 8-issue new car buyer-seller
negotiation simulation (Nadler et al. 2008; see Table 1). This simulation is a mixed-
motive case: There are distributive issues (delivery date, price), integrative issues
(interest rate, warranty, number of extras, stereo) and compatible issues (down pay-
ment, color). In our experiment, the purpose of the negotiation (e.g., to generate indi-
vidual or joint gains or both) was unspecified. Our manipulation of CPT and PT was
embedded in the role instructions. Participants then met their negotiation partner and
after 40 min of negotiation, they submitted a contract sheet and responded to demo-
graphic questionnaires.

3.3 Manipulations and Measures

The Cultural Perspective Taking manipulation consisted of a description of the other
party’s culture and negotiation norms, similar to the presentation of different cultures
in books on global negotiation (e.g. Acuff 1997; Morrison et al. 1994). We focused our
CPT content on recent studies that have documented variation in East Asian versus
North American negotiators’ behavioral repertoires and schemas (Adair 2003; Adair
et al. 2001, 2009). Specifically, we provided information about the other culture’s ten-
dency to (1) directly reject an offer, (2) directly share preferences, (3) bring up power
and status, and (4) bring up social norms and the status quo (see “Appendices 1 and
2”). Participants read the description of the other party’s culture-specific negotiation
norms and as in traditional perspective taking studies, were asked to think about how
the other party would approach the upcoming negotiation (Galinsky and Mussweiler
2001).

The Perspective Taking manipulation followed the simple procedure used by Galin-
sky and Mussweiler (2001). Specifically, participants were told to think about the other
party’s alternatives in the negotiation (see “Appendix 3”). Buyer’s alternatives would
be to look for another car and seller’s alternatives would be to wait for another buyer.
We chose this brief, simple manipulation rather than a broader “consider the other
party’s interests and perspectives” so that we could clearly distinguish effects of PT
(focus on negotiation alternatives) from CPT (focus on the other party’s culture-spe-
cific negotiation norms).

National Culture was a dummy variable for East Asian or North American. Korean
and Chinese participants were coded as East Asian, and Canadian and US participants
were coded as North American. We checked for significant differences between the
culture groups represented in each national sample. We found no differences on any of

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Table 1 Payoff matrix

Issue Options Points—Buyer Points—Seller

Interest rate 10 % 0 4, 000

8 % 400 3, 000

6 % 800 2, 000

4 % 1, 200 1, 000

2 % 1, 600 0

Down payment $1,000 −2, 400 −2, 400
$2,000 −1, 800 −1, 800
$3,000 −1, 200 −1, 200
$4,000 −600 −600
$5,000 0 0

Warranty 1 year 0 1600

2 year 1, 000 1, 200

3 year 2, 000 800

4 year 3, 000 400

5 year 4, 000 0

Delivery date 8 weeks 0 2400

6 weeks 600 1, 800

4 weeks 1, 200 1, 200

2 weeks 1, 800 600

Today 2, 400 0

Number of extras 1 0 3200

2 200 2, 400

3 400 1, 600

4 600 800

5 800 0

Stereo AM/FM 0 800

AM/FM/Tape 800 600

AM/FM/CD 1, 600 400

AM/FM/CD/Tape 2, 400 200

AM/FM/CD/Tape/Stereo surround 3, 200 0

Price $12,000 −6, 000 0
$11,500 −4, 500 −1, 500
$11,000 −3, 000 −3, 000
$10,500 −1, 500 −4, 500
$10,000 0 −6, 000

Color Black 0 0

Red 300 300

Light blue 600 600

Silver 900 900

White 1, 200 1, 200

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our dependent measures between the US and Canadian samples or between the Korean
and Chinese samples. Thus, we lump the national samples together to represent North
America (US and Canada) and East Asia (Korea and China).

Value Claiming was computed as the total points each individual participant
obtained in the negotiation.

Value Creation was computed by adding together the buyer’s and the seller’s value
claimed (maximum $13,200).

4 Results

Hypothesis 1 predicted that negotiators who engaged in CPT would claim more value
than negotiators who engaged in PT. To test this hypothesis, we ran a 2 (culture: North
American, East Asian) x 2 (condition: CPT, PT) ANCOVA on value claimed, con-
trolling for role (buyer or seller; p = .15) and the dyad’s joint gains (controlling for
interdependencies between the parties; p < .001). There was a main effect of condi- tion, F(1, 153) = 4.19, p < .05, η2p = .03. As predicted, negotiators who engaged in CPT claimed significantly more value (M = 5093.80, SD = 2634.12) than those who engaged in PT (M = 4328.09, SD = 2119.39). Thus, Hypothesis 1 was supported. There was no effect of culture (p > .50) and no significant interaction (p > .70).

Hypothesis 2 predicted that when both East Asian and North American negotiators
engaged in CPT, East Asian negotiators would claim more value than North American
negotiators. To test this hypothesis, we selected participants in the CPT condition only
and ran a 2 (culture: North American, East Asian) x 2 (partner condition: CPT, PT)
ANCOVA on value claimed. We again controlled for role (p > .20) and the dyad’s
joint gains (p < .01). Neither the main effect of culture (p > .30) nor partner condition
(p > .20) was significant. More central to our hypothesis, we found a significant 2-
way interaction, F(1, 34) = 4.73, p < .04, η2p = .12, indicating that indeed the effect of CPT on value claiming depends both on culture and partner condition. Planned con- trasts using two-tailed tests comparing value claimed by the North American negoti- ator and the East Asian negotiator who both engaged in CPT showed that consistent with our expectation, East Asian CPT negotiators claimed more value (M = 6812.50, SD = 2635.17) than North American CPT negotiators (M = 3612.50, SD = 2799.20), t(34) = 2.86, p < .01, d = 1.18 (see Fig. 1). Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported: When both East Asian and North American negotiators in a dyad engaged in CPT, East Asian negotiators claimed more value than North American negotiators.

For exploratory purposes, we examined the multiple mean differences in Fig. 1.
North American negotiators who engaged in CPT claimed more value when their East
Asian partner was in the PT condition (M = 6233.33, SD = 2156.32) than the CPT
condition (M = 3612.50, SD = 2799.20), t(34) = 2.57, p < .02 (two-tailed), d = 1.05. Thus, East Asian negotiators’ CPT hurt, but PT helped, North American negotiators who engaged in CPT claim value. Together, this pattern of results demonstrates that CPT benefits East Asian more than North American negotiators. We offer further inter- pretation of the post hoc finding in the discussion section. No other mean-comparisons were significant.

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Fig. 1 East Asian and North American Negotiators’ Value Claimed

We ran a 2 (North American condition: CPT, PT) x 2 (East Asian condition: CPT,
PT) ANOVA on joint gains. Neither the main effects (ps > .10) nor the interaction
(p = .50) was significant. As we expected, CPT benefited value claiming, but not
value creation.

5 Discussion

This study offers several contributions to the literature on perspective taking and
cross-cultural negotiation. First, we introduce cultural perspective taking in negotia-
tion, which focuses on considering the other party’s culturally-normative negotiation
repertoire, which is distinct from traditional perspective taking (e.g., Galinsky and
Mussweiler 2001; Pearce and Stamm 1973) that emphasizes understanding of the
other party’s negotiation alternatives. Second, we show that CPT is more effective
than PT in helping cross-cultural negotiators claim value, but not create value. Third,
we show that when both parties in a dyad engage in CPT, East Asian negotiators
benefit more than North American negotiators. Together, the findings improve our
understanding of how learning about other cultures impacts value claiming in the
cross-cultural negotiation context.

Our research contributes to the culture and negotiation literature by showing empir-
ically for the first time that in a cross-cultural negotiation, CPT does in fact improve
value claiming. Common wisdom says that cross-cultural negotiators should consider
the other party’s cultural norms to make a successful deal. CPT offers a clear and sys-
tematic conceptualization of how to prepare for a cross-cultural encounter. Although
this approach is advocated and practiced by businesspeople, politicians, and peace-
keepers around the globe, to our knowledge our study is the first to show that in a
cross-cultural negotiation, CPT does in fact improve value claiming. By manipulat-
ing specific preparation strategies, our findings contribute to existing cross-cultural

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negotiation research that has focused primarily on characteristics of the negotiator and
the context as predictors of processes and outcomes.

The culture and negotiation literature has demonstrated effects of the focal negoti-
ator’s cultural values (Brett and Okumura 1998), communication styles (Adair et al.
2001), cognition (Gelfand et al. 2001), and norms (Liu 2011; Tinsley and Pillutla
1998) on negotiation processes and outcomes. Research has also demonstrated that
members of different cultures have different knowledge structures (Fu et al. 2007) and
that even within the same culture, different contextual factors can predict or inhibit
culturally-normative behaviors (Gelfand and Realo 1999). Finally, research has shown
that cross-cultural negotiators are aware that their counterpart has distinct negotiation
norms (Adair et al. 2009). Despite this growing body of work, how the negotiator’s
taking the perspective of the other party’s cultural values and norms prior to nego-
tiation affects negotiation outcomes has surprisingly been underexplored. Our data
elucidate that taking the perspective of the other party’s culturally-normative behavior
is beneficial for value claiming, but not value creation. Usually, strategies that build
interpersonal capital (e.g., perspective taking) by increasing trust and rapport seem to
engender stronger effects on joint gain than individual gain; however, this effect was
not found in our study. Our explanation is that CPT accentuates intercultural (inter-
group) differences, leading cross-cultural negotiators to competitively focus on their
own gains, rather than creating value.

By including a traditional PT manipulation and the CPT manipulation together, we
were able to show that CPT is a distinct form of perspective taking that is appropriate for
cross-cultural encounters. CPT and PT appear to be similar, but they are different con-
cepts. This study highlights that cultural perspective taking (i.e., considering the other
party’s culturally-normative behaviors) allows negotiators to claim more value than
traditional perspective taking (i.e., considering the other party’s alternatives). Know-
ing the other party’s cultural norms and thinking about the other party’s alternatives
generate distinct outcomes: Whereas PT decreases intergroup differences (Galinsky
and Moskowitz 2000; Todd et al. 2011), CPT appears to activate cultural stereotypes
and accentuate intergroup differences and thus help cross-cultural negotiators claim
more value.

Because CPT activates cultural stereotypes, its effects can be linked to the partner’s
anticipated negotiation repertoire. We predicted that North American negotiators who
engage in CPT may expect East Asian partners to behave stereotypically consistent
with East Asian cultural norms of relational concern and cooperation; thus they will
be less prepared to claim value. In contrast, East Asian negotiators who engage in CPT
may expect North American partners to behave stereotypically based on North Amer-
ican cultural norms of self-interest and competition; thus they will be better prepared
for value claiming. As we predicted, East Asians who engaged in CPT claimed more
value than North Americans who engaged in CPT.

On the other hand, we did find that CPT was effective for North Americans when
their East Asian partners engaged in PT. One explanation for this finding is that because
East Asians have high relational concern (Gelfand and McCusker 2001), they might
concede more to the other party to make a deal when they think that the other party
has an alternative (so he or she could walk away). That is, if relationally-oriented East
Asian negotiators engage in PT (i.e., pay attention to the other party’s alternative), they

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400 S. Lee et al.

are more likely to claim less and concede more to the other party to avoid relationship
breakdown or impasse. These concessionary behaviors of East Asian partners in the
PT condition should be consistent with the Asian stereotype of relational concern and
cooperation. Thus, North American negotiators who engage in CPT should be well
prepared for value claiming in a negotiation with East Asian partners who engage in PT.

In our research the East Asian sample consisted of Koreans and Chinese living
in the US and Canada. Such participants are not just East Asians but they could be
considered biculturals, especially with an average of 7.71 years living in the US or
Canada. As a result, an alternate account for our results is that these individuals could
already be better cultural perspective-takers than North Americans by virtue of their
prior life experience both in East Asia and North America, and thus they might have an
advantage in cross-cultural negotiations. Prior research has shown that biculturals were
effective in closing social distance—by using the “you” pronoun—and thus creating
value in intercultural negotiations (Kern et al. in press). And in a Korean–US nego-
tiation, bicultural Korean negotiators had more positive attitudes than US negotiators
toward their counterpart (Lee 2005). These prior findings bolster our argument that our
CPT manipulation highlighting the other party’s stereotypical negotiation norms led
participants to broaden social distance, rather than close social distance which should
have been the bicultural East Asian negotiators’ natural tendency. Putting the current
study and Kern et al. (in press) together, we suggest that in negotiating with North
Americans, bicultural East Asians could use CPT if their goal is to claim value, but use
“you” pronoun to close social distance between parties if their goal is to create value.

Previously, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) show that alternative-focused perspec-
tive taking helps negotiators claim value. But across cultures, our negotiators claimed
less value in the PT condition than the CPT condition. Our data suggest that PT focus-
ing only on the other party’s alternative can hamper value claiming in cross-cultural
negotiation, possibly because negotiators who focus on the other party’s alternative
may fear that the other party could walk away and thus concede to the other party
to avoid impasse—especially given that PT decreases intergroup bias (Galinsky and
Moskowitz 2000; Todd et al. 2011). Based on this reasoning, we expect that a more
holistic form of traditional PT, asking negotiators to focus on the other party’s inter-
ests, needs, and priorities as in Galinsky et al. (2008), might generate greater value
claimed.

Negotiation research has placed great focus on pre-negotiation preparation regard-
ing the other party. This preparation is undoubtedly very important. However, the
assessment and information gathering about the other party’s preferences and prior-
ities is likely to continue and become more accurate during the negotiation process.
Indeed, it is probably difficult to come up with accurate assessments of the other party
before one actually meets the counterpart. For this reason, it is possible that the stereo-
typical information about how people in another culture tend to behave might prove
to be wrong in a particular setting and with a particular individual from that culture.
Thus, future research should use a longitudinal design to consider how the norma-
tive, stereotypic information about another culture might be useful as an intercultural
negotiation unfolds, and how it sometimes might in fact prove to be disruptive.

In this study, we combined Korean and Chinese students as East Asian group, and
US and Canadian students as North American group. Physical proximity of nations

123

Cultural Perspective Taking 401

may not be a sufficient reason for combining the groups, and indeed Koreans and
Chinese have been found to endorse negotiation norms differentially—for example,
Chinese negotiators endorsed emotional-threat tactics of value claiming more than
Korean negotiators, whereas Korean negotiators endorsed persuasion/offer tactics of
value claiming more than Chinese negotiators (Lee et al. 2010). In our data there
were no differences between the Chinese and Koreans on demographics or any of
our dependent measures, but future studies should be cautious in combining multiple
national samples as one group, especially when they examine dispositional variations
within a regional sample.

To the extent that an individual-differences measure of perspective taking has been
found to affect distributive outcomes (Neale and Bazerman 1983), developing an indi-
vidual-differences measure of cultural perspective taking is warranted. With a CPT
scale, it would be possible to assess individual differences in terms of how people
take the perspective of another culture and whether there are dispositional differences
between the tendency of cultural perspective taking of Chinese and Korean negotia-
tors, for example. In this regard, future research would be challenged in differentiating
CPT from cultural intelligence. That is, cultural intelligence (CQ) is a natural abil-
ity to adapt to new cultural settings successfully (Earley and Ang 2003). CPT is the
active consideration of the other party’s cultural norms. Thus, it appears that CPT is
an effort to understand another culture whereas CQ is a naturally given capability.
Moreover, CPT could easily be activated in negotiation contexts (as in our study),
but CQ could not. Future research should investigate the similarities and differences
between CPT and CQ with respect to the condition under which each has stronger or
weaker effects on cross-cultural value claiming and value creation and whether each
can be successfully manipulated.

We manipulated CPT and PT and examined the differential effect of CPT ver-
sus PT on negotiators’ value claiming, using undergraduates in the laboratory. Thus
there are external validity limitations, especially the generalization of our findings to
real world negotiations. Because people experienced in cross-cultural negotiations are
likely to be adept at taking the perspective of the other party from a different culture,
it would be useful to study the CPT versus PT’s differential effects using real nego-
tiators. But multiple negotiation studies have demonstrated that undergraduates and
laboratory experiments are still valid for generating important knowledge about the
constructs studied in our research—for example, the effects of culture (Gelfand and
Christakopoulou 1999; Gelfand et al. 2002) and perspective taking (Epley et al. 2006)
on value claiming. To the extent that negotiation skills and experiences of participants
are likely to influence negotiation outcomes, we used an experiment to make nego-
tiation setting and experience levels equal for all participants—to see clean effects
of CPT versus PT. Future studies with managers or real negotiators should replicate
or find boundaries of our results and strengthen practical implications of the current
study.

As an initial study of cross-cultural perspective taking in negotiation, we necessar-
ily simplified our model, focusing on the effect of CPT versus PT on value claiming.
Missing here is measurement of the intermediate psychological or behavioral pro-
cesses, namely stereotype activation and accentuating intergroup differences. More-
over, expectation of the other party’s culturally stereotypic behaviors may account for

123

402 S. Lee et al.

the joint effect of CPT-engaged negotiators’ culture and partner condition. That is,
East Asians who engage in CPT may anticipate North American partners’ self-inter-
ested, competitive moves and thus be prepared for value claiming—perhaps by setting
ambitious goals or suggesting an aggressive first offer. In contrast, North Americans
who engage in CPT may anticipate East Asian partners’ relational, cooperative moves
and thus be less prepared for value claiming. Future research should extend the present
study by disentangling these mechanisms and processes underlying the CPT effect on
value claiming.

Appendix 1: Cultural Perspective Taking (CPT) Manipulation Provided to East
Asian Negotiators

North American Cultures and Negotiation:
When preparing for negotiation, it is important to think about and focus on the per-
spective of the other party. The buyer (seller) in this negotiation will be someone from
North America. As you plan for the negotiation, please think about the perspective of
your partner—someone from a different culture playing a different role. The follow-
ing description of North American negotiators should help you imagine how a North
American negotiator will behave when buying (selling) a car.

• North American negotiators are open and explicit about the acceptance or rejection
of an offer (whereas Asian negotiators won’t reject an offer with a direct “no” that
might offend the other party)

• North American negotiators tend to directly state their preferences and priorities
(whereas Asian negotiators tend to reveal their preferences indirectly by making a
lot of offers)

• North American negotiators avoid issues of status and power (whereas Asian nego-
tiators tend to bring up these factors)

• North American negotiators rely on facts and logic in decision making (whereas
Asian negotiators rely on social norms or the status quo). 1

As you prepare for the negotiation, please try to imagine how your North American
partner will play their role. Imagine what a North American car buyer (seller) is like.
Try to picture the negotiation as if you were that person, looking at the world through
his eyes and walking through the world in his shoes. This will give you insight into
the approach and strategies the other party may use.

Appendix 2: Cultural Perspective Taking (CPT) Manipulation Provided to
North American Negotiators

Asian Cultures and Negotiation:
When preparing for negotiation, it is important to think about and focus on the

1 Proceedings of the Negotiation Roundtable. Special report on the state of international business negotia-
tion. Issue No. 8, March 20, 2001.

123

Cultural Perspective Taking 403

perspective of the other party. The buyer (seller) in this negotiation will be some-
one from an Asian culture. As you plan for the negotiation, please think about the
perspective of your partner—someone from a different culture playing a different
role. The following description of Asian negotiators should help you imagine how an
Asian negotiator will behave when buying (selling) a car.

• Asian negotiators won’t reject an offer with a direct “no” that might offend the
other party (whereas North American negotiators are open and explicit about the
acceptance or rejection of an offer).

• Asian negotiators tend to reveal their preferences indirectly by making a lot of
offers (whereas North American negotiators tend to directly state their preferences
and priorities).

• Asian negotiators tend to bring up issues of status and power (whereas North
American negotiators avoid these issues).

• Asian negotiators rely on social norms or the status quo (whereas North American
negotiators rely on facts and logic in decision making). 2

As you prepare for the negotiation, please try to imagine how your Asian partner
will play their role. Imagine what an Asian car buyer (seller) is like. Try to picture
the negotiation as if you were that person, looking at the world through his eyes and
walking through the world in his shoes. This will give you insight into the approach
and strategies the other party may use.

Appendix 3: Perspective Taking (PT) Manipulation Provided to Both North
American and East Asian Negotiators

Negotiation:
When preparing for negotiation, it is important to think about and focus on the potential
alternatives that the buyer (seller) has to this negotiated agreement. A clear under-
standing of the alternatives the buyer (seller) has will assist you in preparing for the
negotiation.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

c.10726_2011_Article_9272

Cultural Perspective Taking in Cross-Cultural Negotiation
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Perspective Taking in Negotiation
2.2 Cultural Perspective Taking
2.3 Negotiator CPT and Value Claiming
2.4 Culture and Partner Condition as Moderators
3 Methods
3.1 Participants
3.2 Design and Procedure
3.3 Manipulations and Measures
4 Results
5 Discussion
Appendix 1: Cultural Perspective Taking (CPT) Manipulation Provided to East Asian Negotiators
Appendix 2: Cultural Perspective Taking (CPT) Manipulation Provided to North American Negotiators
Appendix 3: Perspective Taking (PT) Manipulation Provided to Both North American and East Asian Negotiators
References

Wendi L. Adair, associate professor of psychology, 4046 PAS, University of Waterloo, Water-
loo, Ontario, N2L 3G1 Canada; tel.: 519-888-4567, ext. 38143; fax: 519-746-4147; e-mail:
wladair@uwaterloo.ca. Masako Taylor, professor of business administration, Osaka Gakuin
University, 2-36-1 Kishibe Minami, Suita, Osaka, Japan 564-8511; tel.: 81-6-6381-8434;
fax: 81-6-6381-8455; e-mail: mstaylor@ogu.ac.jp/masakotaylor@gmail.com. Jihyun Chu,
University of Waterloo, e-mail: jc3926@columbia.edu. Nicole Ethier, University of Water-
loo, e-mail: naethier@gmail.com. Tracy Xiong, University of Waterloo. Tetsushi Okumura,
professor, Nagoya City University; Jeanne Brett, DeWitt W. Buchanan, Jr. Distinguished
Professor of Dispute Resolution and Organization, Kellogg School of Management North-
western University, Chicago; tel.: 847-491-8075; fax: 847-467-5700; e-mail: jmbrett@kel-

Int. Studies of Mgt. & Org., vol. 43, no. 4, Winter 2013–14, pp. 6–25.
© 2014 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com.
ISSN 0020–8825 (print)/ISSN 1558–0911 (online

)

DOI: 10.2753/IMO0020-882543040

Wendi L. AdAir, MAsAko TAyLor, Jihyun Chu,
niCoLe eThier, TrACy Xiong,
TeTsushi okuMurA, And JeAnne BreTT

Effective Influence in Negotiation
The Role of Culture and Framing

Abstract: These studies integrate research on social influence and negotiation
to predict the effectiveness of influence strategies in the East and the West.
Building on prior research documenting cultural differences in preferences for
interests, rights, or power arguments (Tinsley 1998, 2001), we propose that
framing such arguments as logical versus normative appeals will further explain
cultural variation in influence-strategy effectiveness. We present results from a
negotiation-vignette study demonstrating Canadian students are more responsive
to arguments framed logically, whereas Chinese students are more responsive to
arguments framed normatively, depending on the ethnicity of their counterpart.
Then we present results from a negotiation simulation conducted by U.S. and
Japanese dyads, indicating that these within-culture patterns of influence
effectiveness support the social-psychological needs perspective and predict
negotiation outcome. These findings offer extensions to existing theory on culture
and negotiation and implications for managers in cross-cultural negotiation and
conflict settings.

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 7

Mastering negotiation in today’s global economy and multicultural workplace
depends on understanding how culture impacts such factors as negotiators’ goals,
strategy choice, communication, and interpersonal dynamics. While researchers
have established many main effects of culture on negotiation behavior and dynam-
ics (Brett 2007; Gunia et al. 2011; Liu 2011), this work has focused largely on
the integrative, value-creating side of negotiation. How negotiators in different
cultures claim value has received less attention, particularly in the area of social
influence, or how negotiators construct and frame arguments to induce concessions
or agreement from the other party. Our research applies the psychology of social
influence to the question of how negotiators in the East and the West construct
effective arguments.

We begin by reviewing the social-psychological needs perspective and argu-
ing that an influence attempt in negotiation will be successful when it appeals to
a target’s underlying needs (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly 1996; Cialdini 1993). We
focus on two different needs that have been shown to be sensitive to social-influence
strategies: the need to be seen as logical and rational, and the need to be socially
accepted. Applying this theorizing about influence to negotiation, we argue that a
negotiator should be able to claim more value (receive more concessions) when
using influence strategies that appeal to the target’s underlying needs that have
been cued or activated by the sociocultural context of negotiation. In other words,
a negotiator who is sensitive to upholding social norms in negotiation, for example
letting a superior have her way, should be most responsive to an argument that is
framed as an appeal to uphold social norms. Likewise, a negotiator who has strong
needs for facts and objective truth should be convinced more easily with arguments
framed according to logic.

We then propose that the negotiation context will activate a different set of needs
for North American and East Asian negotiators. Based on cultural differences in
how negotiation is typically conceptualized or framed (Gelfand et al. 2001), we
argue that East Asian negotiators should be particularly sensitive to upholding social
norms in the form of status recognition to superiors or maintaining company rules
and precedent (Tinsley 1997). In contrast, we argue that North American negotiators
will be attentive to arguments that appeal to logic. Prior theory has suggested and
research has found evidence of Westerners preferring factual evidence and explicit
logic in persuasion (Fu and Yukl 2000; Triandis 1994) in contexts of conflict man-
agement and police negotiation (Beune et al. 2011; Ting-Toomey 1988). Thus, we
propose that the negotiation context generates, or constructs, a different model of
influence in negotiation for North Americans and East Asians.

logg.northwestern.edu. A previous version of this paper was presented at the International
Association for Conflict Management Annual Conference, Kyoto, Japan, June 15–18, 2009.
The authors thank Kathleen O’Connor and David Sally for assistance with data collection
in the United States and the Cornell University Tokyo Alumni Club for assistance with data
collection in Japan.

8 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

Finally, we introduce the interests/rights/power model of dispute resolution to
define three content areas that a negotiator may use to construct an argument (Ury,
Brett, and Goldberg 1993). We propose that negotiators can frame the same inter-
ests-, rights-, or power-based arguments using an information frame or a normative
frame. Thus, prior research showing cultural preferences for interests-, rights-, or
power-based arguments can be refined if we further examine how these arguments
are framed. Our hypotheses predict that both argument content and framing will
affect the negotiator’s effectiveness differently when used in Eastern and Western
organizational contexts.

Our results across two studies demonstrate that interests-, rights-, and power-
based arguments can be framed informationally or normatively to appeal to different
negotiation targets. Negotiators in the East react more favorably to power-based
arguments when framed normatively and Western negotiators react more strongly
to interests- or rights-based arguments when framed informationally. We also show
support for the underlying needs mechanism and demonstrate that how influence
strategy and the target’s needs interact varies depending on the national culture
context. For negotiators, we offer practical advice for the effective implementa-
tion of influence strategies that includes having a repertoire of influence strate-
gies, understanding the target’s needs, and heeding the cultural context in which
negotiations take place.

Influence in negotiation

Negotiation research has largely ignored the study of social influence (Malhotra
and Bazerman 2008), possibly because negotiation researchers have focused on
identifying cognitive barriers to rationality (Bazerman et al. 2000), or because
researchers have assumed that negotiators’ preferences are fixed and therefore not
responsive to influence attempts (Malhotra and Bazerman 2008). However, real
world negotiators, marketers, and salespeople alike will agree that negotiation in-
volves using social influence to shift and reframe the target’s preferences to be in
line with what one wants to accomplish. In fact, one of the world’s greatest influence
researchers, Robert Cialdini (1993), regularly uses the negotiation context to test
and illustrate principles of influence such as reciprocity or scarcity.

To influence is to redirect another person’s attitudes or behaviors. Classic social
psychology distinguishes between informational and normative influence (Deutsch
and Gerrard 1955; Turner 1991). Informational influence provides the target with your
view of reality and seeks to change the target’s beliefs; normative influence provides
a target with your view of what is socially acceptable and seeks to address the target’s
desire for social approval (Deutsch and Gerrard 1955). A related perspective is that
informational influence appeals to one’s sense of logic and rationality whereas norma-
tive influence appeals to one’s desire to uphold social norms (Cialdini 1993).

Crafting a successful argument depends on understanding a target’s underly-
ing needs and framing the argument to address those needs (Chaiken et al. 1996;

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 9

Cialdini 1993; Turner 1991). For example, informational influence works because
people are motivated to be logical and rational. The influence attempt provides them
with information that suggests an alternative attitude is more rational and logical,
and so they change. Normative influence works because people have a need to be
liked, approved of, and respected by others. Normative influence informs the target
that social norms and standards suggest an alternative attitude, and to conform to
these social standards the target should change. In support of the needs mechanism,
research has shown that individuals’ need for cognition and affect help explain their
likely responses to different influence attempts (Haddock et al. 2008). We argue
that the effectiveness of influence in negotiation can likewise be predicted based on
the degree to which an argument appeals to an influence target’s need to be logical
or need to uphold social norms.

Framing negotiation arguments to appeal to culturally distinct
need

Several lines of research suggest cultural variation in influence norms, citing a greater
likelihood of rational influence in the West and emotional or normative influence in the
East (Adair and Brett 2004) when considering persuasion in general (Johnstone 1989),
and more specifically in the negotiation context (Adair and Brett 2004). Results of
empirical research, however, have not been entirely consistent. Supporting theoretical
predictions, Drake (1995) found that U.S. negotiators tended to frame arguments in
terms of logic, whereas Taiwanese negotiators framed arguments around social roles
and relationships. In the context of police interrogation, Buene et al. (2011) found
that strategic sequences focusing on rationality were most eliciting confessions from
low-context (i.e., preferring direct communication) Dutch suspects, whereas relational
sequences were more effective with high-context (i.e., preferring indirect communica-
tion) Middle Eastern suspects. However, Adair et al. (2004) studied negotiators’ use of
persuasive messages and found that Japanese negotiators were more likely than U.S.
negotiators to use both persuasion containing facts or logic and persuasion contain-
ing a threat. And Tinsley (2001) reports that in the West (Germany and the United
States), negotiators used more arguments based on parties’ underlying interests, but
in the East (Japan) negotiators used more power-based arguments.

We propose that one reason this prior research does not paint an entirely consis-
tent picture is that researchers have measured culturally normative influence in many
different ways, including negotiators’ use of influence, negotiators’ preferences for
influence, and negotiators’ response to influence. Another possible explanation for
inconsistent prior findings is that researchers have tested message content, such
as status and mutuality, or message framing, such as appeals to informational or
normative needs, but not both together. If negotiators from different cultures have
different needs and motives, then an argument with the same content may have
very different effects when framed informationally or normatively.

Several empirical studies suggest cultural differences in the prevalence of

10 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

various influence-related needs. In one study comparing U.S. (individualistic)
and Polish (collectivist) participants (Cialdini et al. 2001), researchers found that
compliance was greater following appeals to social proof in Poland and to com-
mitment/consistency in the United States. These cultural differences were due to
strong needs to demonstrate social responsibility (i.e., upholding social norms,
being respected by others) characteristic of collectivist cultures (Cialdini et al.
2001), and the strong need to be accurate and consistent with one’s own past ac-
tions characteristic of individualistic cultures (Cialdini et al. 2001). Evidence that
East Asians are more likely to comply with social norms than North Americans
can also be found in some research on behavioral intentions. In a study of purchase
intentions, researchers found that whereas U.S. respondents based their purchasing
decisions on how they felt about the objective information such as brand, Korean
respondents placed greater emphasis on what the “right thing to do” was in the
society (Lee and Green 1991).

Together, this literature suggests that when responding to an influence attempt,
East Asians have a stronger need to uphold social norms and North Americans have a
stronger need to adhere to logic. Such differences may be particularly prevalent in an
organizational negotiation context. The negotiation context unavoidably engenders
role distinctions (buyer/seller, superior/subordinate) that confer status and provide
information about social power and socially appropriate behavior. Prior research
has found that East Asians are more likely to conceptualize negotiation in terms of
relationships, social networks, roles, and face (Gelfand et al. 2001; Tinsley 1997).
Thus, in Eastern cultures, the negotiation context should activate the need to uphold
social norms that dictate role-appropriate behavior. Hence influence attempts that
appeal to social norms should be consistent with the cognitive representation of
the situation and therefore easy to follow (Morris and Gelfand 2004). In contrast,
in the West we expect the negotiation context will activate informational needs
that require actions that maintain a sense of rationality and logic that go beyond
social acceptance. Hence influence attempts that appeal to needs for logic should
be consistent with the cognitive representation of the situation and therefore easy
to follow (Morris and Gelfand 2004).

Culture and the framing of interests, rights, and power arguments

One of the few models that has generated empirical research into social influence
strategies in negotiation is the interests, rights, and power (I/R/P) model of conflict
resolution (Ury et al. 1993). These authors propose that interests, rights, and power
are three strategies that negotiators use to influence the outcome of a dispute. In
terms of social influence in negotiation, an interests-based argument proposes an
integrative or value-creating agreement that meets the target’s underlying concerns,
namely, the reasons why the negotiator is taking the position. A rights-based argu-
ment suggests an agreement in which value is claimed by the party whose position
is supported by an objective standard, for example contract law or corporate policy.

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 11

A power-based argument references one’s power to impose sanctions to be borne
by the target if the target does not concede. In other words, I/R/P arguments attempt
to redirect the other party’s thinking and behavior.

Importantly, influence arguments can be framed to appeal to either informational
or normative needs. For example, consider the following power-based argument
offered by an executive trying to get a coworker to agree with her growth forecasts:
“I have been in this company longer than you, and I have many years of facts and
figures that support my assessment of your division’s growth potential.” This ar-
gument is power-based because the negotiator refers to her tenure and expertise.
However, a target’s decision to concede could be based on informational factors
(i.e., “many years of facts and figures”) or social-normative factors (i.e., “I have
been in this company longer than you”), or possibly both.

As noted above, rights arguments refer to an objective standard to persuade a
party to concede. As a further example of argument framing, consider the follow-
ing rights appeal from a negotiator trying to nail down a five-year contract when
his counterpart is suggesting just three years: “I want a five-year contract, they are
standard for our industry.” This same content could be followed by an informational
frame—“I have data here on the last 20 contracts, and all of them are 5 years in
duration”—or a rational frame—“The five-year model works well, and it doesn’t
make sense to change what works well.” The main message content could alterna-
tively be followed with a normative frame: “The industry expects us to uphold their
standard practice,” or “It is not expected for someone at your level to change the
terms, just get the deal done.” The first two examples appeal to the counterpart’s
need for logic and rationality, whereas the second two examples appeal to the
counterpart’s desire to uphold social norms and do what is expected of him.

Because influence arguments can be framed informationally or normatively, and
prior research suggests that in an organizational conflict Western negotiators will have
greater needs for logic whereas Eastern negotiators will have greater needs to uphold
social norms, we propose to test cultural variation in responsiveness to influence as a
function of message content and message framing. We base our predictions on prior
work by Tinsley (1998, 2001) that found interests and rights arguments more effective
in Euro-Western cultures and power arguments more effective in Eastern cultures. We
extend this existing research in two ways. First, we predict that Western negotiators
will respond most favorably to interests or rights arguments framed informationally
(versus normatively) and Eastern negotiators will respond most favorably to power
arguments framed normatively (versus informationally). Second, we predict that
these effects can be explained by a needs mechanism.

Hypotheses

Our first set of hypotheses test whether framing impacts the effectiveness of a
negotiator’s influence attempts in the East and the West, focusing on interests- and
power-based arguments.

12 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

Hypothesis 1a: Eastern negotiators will rate power-normative influence
strategies as more effective than Western negotiators will.

Hypothesis 1b: Western negotiators will rate interests-informational influence
strategies as more effective than Eastern negotiators will.

Our second set of hypotheses focuses on rights- and power-based arguments to test
the psychology-of-influence needs-based prediction that negotiators will claim more
value when their influence strategy appeals to the target’s underlying needs.

Hypothesis 2a: for Western negotiators, rights-based persuasion will interact
with partner’s informational needs to predict value claimed.

Hypothesis 2b: for Eastern negotiators, power-based persuasion will interact
with partner’s normative needs to predict value claimed.

Study 1

Study 1 employed a vignette method to test H1. Participants were from China
(representing an Eastern culture) and Canada (representing a Western culture).
We examined participants’ effectiveness ratings for four different influence strate-
gies (power-normative, power-informational, interests-normative, and interests-
informational) offered by a professor in a culturally homogeneous or culturally
heterogeneous student-professor conflict.

Sample

A total of 94 participants completed the study (41 Canadian and 27 Chinese) in
exchange for research credit in a course. Chinese participants were born in main-
land China, Taiwan, or Hong Kong and their first language was either Mandarin or
Cantonese. Canadian participants were all Caucasian Canadian, born in Canada, and
spoke English as their first language. The average age of the sample was 21 years old
(Sd = 5.08); 26 percent of the participants were male, and 64 percent were female.

Procedure

Participants read a short vignette and were asked to imagine themselves in a situ-
ation where they had to resolve a grade conflict with a university professor (Ap-
pendix A). The vignette was designed with experimental realism and pilot tested
with Chinese and Canadian student samples. Students imagined they are about to
graduate, with plans for family celebrations followed by a summer of travel, when
they discover they are 2 percent short of the necessary passing grade in one course.
Students imagine approaching the professor (Dr. Chan or Dr. McKenzie) and ask-

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 1

ing the professor to reconsider the grade. The professor declines to change the
grade. After reading the vignette, participants filled out a short quiz to assure they
had attended to information in the vignette. Participants then read eight possible
responses from the professor, justifying why the professor is not willing to change
the grade. Each response reflected an influence strategy the professor might use to
convince the participant to accept the grade decision. Participants then indicated
how effective each influence statement would be, relative to the other statements,
in convincing them to accept the professor’s decision.

Measures

The study employed a 2 (participant culture: Chinese or Canadian) x 2 (professor
ethnicity: Chinese or Canadian) design. Our predictor, Culture, was coded 0 for
Canadian participants and 1 for Chinese participants. The dependent measure was
computed from participants’ rank order of influence statements offered by the profes-
sor (presented in random order). The eight influence statements were adapted to the
vignette context from the code for interests, rights, and power persuasion offered in
Tinsley (2001). We created two arguments for each of four influence types: interests-
informational, interests-normative, power-informational, and power-normative (Table
1). Participants were asked to rank order the effectiveness of the eight influence state-
ments given by the professor from 1 (most effective) to 8 (least effective).

Results

We first tested our hypotheses using the Mann-Whitney Test, the nonparametric
equivalent of an independent t-test. Results of this test did not reveal any significant
differences in ranking order based on participant culture or professor nationality. A
potential reason why we did not find significant differences is that the 1–8 prefer-
ence ranking scale was too refined. For example, if participants gave ratings of 4
and 5, respectively, for interests-informational statements and Power-Normative
statements (our two main comparison strategies), it may be difficult to detect dif-
ferences given the range of other rankings. Therefore, we transformed the data to
make a broader comparison. We recoded the ranking data so that statements ranked
from 1 to 4 were considered more effective (coded 1) and statements ranked from
5 to 8 were considered less effective (coded 0). A two-way multivariate analysis
of variance (MANOVA) revealed a significant multivariate interaction effect for
participant culture and ethnicity of the target (ethnicity of the professor). Wilks’s
l = .92, f (2, 88) = 3.93, p <. 001, partial eta squared = .80. Power to detect the effect was .69. Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate interaction effects were examined.

H1a predicted that in a negotiation context, Chinese participants will rate
power-normative-focused influence strategies as more effective than Canadian
participants will. A marginally significant interaction (f (1, 89) = 3.38, p = .07,

14 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

Table 1
Study 1—Influence statements

Interests-based approach Power-based approach

Informational influence Interests-informational:
“I know you are concerned
about retaking the course
but taking the course the
second time will help you
boost your overall average.“

Power-informational:
“In my past experience of
teaching this course as
the professor, I have never
changed my mind regard-
ing a pass or fail. If we look
at all your grades over the
term, they indicate the grade
that you deserve.”

“I know you are concerned
about retaking the course
but if you want to succeed
later in graduate school or
the work setting, retaking
the course will benefit you in
the long run.”

“I am the professor and my
decisions are final. I can
see from your attendance
record why you didn’t pass
the class. ”

Normative influence Interests-normative:
“In my past experience of
teaching this course as
the professor, I have never
changed my mind regarding
a pass or fail. This course
mark is produced by the
same TA and applies to all
students in the course.”

Power-normative:
“In my past experience of
teaching this course as
the professor, I have never
changed my mind regarding
a pass or fail. This course
mark is produced by the
same TA and applies to all
students in the course.”

“I know how important it
is for you to graduate this
semester given your cur-
rent standing, but this is
a difficult course for every
student. Other students who
have taken this course again
have greatly benefited from
the experience.”

“I am the professor and my
decisions are final. Other
students have respected my
assessment of the grade
that they earned.”

partial eta square = .39) partially confirms that Chinese participants rated power
normative arguments more effective than Canadian participants did, but only
when the imagined professor was Chinese. However, contrary to our expectations,
this effect did not hold when participants imagined interacting with a Canadian
professor. When being persuaded by a Canadian professor, Chinese and Canadian
participants rated power normative arguments as equally effective. The pattern of
the interaction appears in Figure 1.

H1b predicted that in a negotiation context, Canadian participants will rate
interests-informational influence strategies as more effective than other Eastern

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 15

negotiators will. We found a significant two-way interaction (f (1, 89) = 7.93, p
< .01, partial eta square = .08) indicating that as expected, Canadian participants rated interests-informational arguments more effective than Chinese participants did, but only when the imagined professor was Chinese. Our predicted effect did not hold when participants imagined interacting with a Canadian professor. When interests-informational arguments were offered by a Canadian professor, Canadian participants rated them as less effective than Chinese participants did (Figure 2).

Discussion

The results from Study 1 support our prediction that the effectiveness of influence
across cultures can be partly explained by how the argument is framed. Using a
realistic undergraduate student scenario in which a student tried to negotiate a
grade with a professor, we found that two factors had a significant effect on how
Chinese and Canadian participants rated influence effectiveness: argument framing
and target ethnicity. The findings suggest that making straightforward predictions
for culturally normative influence strategies in negotiation is too simplistic of an
approach. Whereas Chinese participants were more responsive to power arguments,
it was only when they were framed normatively (versus informationally) and when
the professor was Chinese. While Canadian participants were more responsive to
interests based arguments, this was only the case when they were framed infor-
mationally (versus normatively) and the professor was Chinese. While the results
provide some evidence that the context of negotiation can activate a need for logic
for Canadian students but a need to uphold role-based social norms for Chinese

Figure 1. Study 1—Chinese and Canadian participants’ ratings of power-
normative influence effectiveness when professor was Canadian versus
Chinese

0.1

0.3

0.5

0.6

0.7

Participant culture
Chinese

Participant culture
Canadian

In
flu

en
ce

e
ffe

ct
iv

en
es

Professor culture
Canadian

Professor culture
Chinese

16 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

students, they also suggest that the counterpart’s ethnicity plays a role, as does the
influence statement’s message content.

Study 2

Study 2 was designed to strengthen the findings from Study 1 by further testing the
interaction between a negotiator’s influence strategy and the target’s underlying
needs (H2). We used a more realistic and dynamic scenario by conducting a face-
to-face negotiation simulation. We measured negotiators’ actual use of rights- and
power-based arguments during the negotiation interaction. In addition, we measured
negotiators’ general informational and normative needs as a baseline prior to the
study to examine cultural variation in whether the organizational negotiation context
activated a specific set of needs as predicted.

Sample

Western participants were U.S. students enrolled in an executive MBA program;
Eastern participants were Japanese managers and employees attending a workshop
on cross-cultural negotiation in Japan. There were 30 U.S. participants (15 dyads)
with an average age of 33.76 (Sd = 4.73). There were 28 Japanese participants
(14 dyads) with an average age of 34.87 (Sd = 5.58) and an average of 1.73 (Sd
= 1.82) years spent living in the United States. The U.S. sample was 90 percent
male, and the Japanese sample was 57 percent male (four participants did not
report gender).

Figure 2. Study 1: Chinese and Canadian participants’ ratings of interests-
informational influence effectiveness when professor was Canadian versus
Chinese

0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7

0.8

Participant culture
Chinese
Participant culture
Canadian
In
flu
en
ce
e
ffe
ct
iv
en
es
s
Professor culture
Canadian
Professor culture
Chinese

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 17

Procedure

Participants completed the Summer Interns dyadic negotiation simulation (Lewicki
et al. 2006), in which the manager of engineering and the manager of human re-
sources (HR) are in conflict over their company’s Summer Intern Program (SIP).
Each year Engineering receives two summer interns through the SIP. But because
the timing and requirements of SIP do not meet Engineering’s needs, Engineer-
ing has hired its own interns. The two managers must resolve up to four current
issues that address what to do with the interns hired by Engineering and through
the SIP, and up to four future issues that address how the parties will avoid such
situations in the future. Fueling the emotion underlying the conflict is the endorse-
ment of SIP by the senior manager, who is aligned with HR, and dissatisfaction
with the SIP expressed by managers of other line departments, who are aligned
with Engineering. The exercise has been used to study strategic focus, information
exchange, persuasion, and cultural differences in conflict resolution negotiations
(Tinsley 1998, 2001).

Before the exercise, participants completed a survey assessing their cultural
values, demographics, and general influence-related needs. Following a brief in-
troduction to negotiation and the session, participants received their individual role
instructions and had 20 minutes to prepare for the negotiation. Participants were
then paired with someone of the same cultural background playing the opposite
role and had 40 minutes to negotiate the case, after which they jointly reported
their outcome.

All Japanese participants, who had applied to a U.S. MBA program, spoke flu-
ent English. Therefore, all role instructions and survey materials were in English.
They were, however, given the opportunity to negotiate in Japanese. Prior to data
analysis, the Japanese authors carefully reviewed all the free-response answers to
survey questions (e.g., what is your goal in this negotiation, how will you achieve
your target) and excluded any Japanese participants who did not clearly understand
the nature of the negotiation case.

Measures

The independent variable culture was coded 0 for U.S. participants and 1 for Japa-
nese participants. Influence-related needs were measured prior to the negotiation
session, when participants were asked to consider daily situations in which others
“want you to give them something, or make a concession, or say ‘yes’” and respond
to 12 possible reasons to comply with the request, preceded by the statement: “You
should say “yes” because . . . ,” on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all effective, 7
= very effective). Results of a factor analysis revealed one factor for susceptibility
to logical influence (three items, a = .71; e.g., it is the logical and rational thing to
do) and one factor for susceptibility to normative influence (seven items, a = .81;
e.g., you will feel guilty if you do not say “yes”; it is your duty to help this person

18 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

when they make an appeal). The factors were labeled Informational Needs and
Normative Needs, respectively.

To measure the use of influence strategies in the context of the Summer Interns
exercise, the research team modified the code used by Tinsley (2001) to measure
rights- and power-based influence from negotiation transcripts of the Summer Interns
case (Table 2). Rights-based influence included three types of arguments (department
function, department budget, and company policy). Power-based influence included
arguments that referred to the focal negotiator’s power, status, or expertise.

Before the process data were coded, all audio recordings were transcribed (and
first translated in the case of the Japanese recordings) and formatted in a data file
such that each row was a single speaking turn. Two coders were first trained to
identify unique thought units within a speaking turn and then unitize all of the data.
Each transcript was unitized by both coders, and Gutzgow’s unitizing reliability
was .08. Coders met to discuss and resolve any unitizing discrepancies. Then, over
a period of six months, the two coders, who were blind to the hypotheses in the
study, were trained to identify the different forms of influence in the negotiation
transcripts at the level of the thought unit (Cohen’s kappa = .78). To quantify the
frequency codes for statistical analysis, we followed the procedure in Adair et al.
(2001) to compute logged proportion scores.

At the conclusion of the negotiation, parties together completed a worksheet
indicating how each separate issue was addressed or resolved. Options included:
(1) issue decided in favor of HR, (2) issue decided in favor of Engineering, (3) is-
sue decided jointly, (4) issue will be brought to third party to resolve, or (5) issue

Table 2
Study 2—Coding scheme for rights- and power-based influence

Influence code Category Example

Rights arguments Department function “SIP is a program with a formal process
where HR is in charge to hire students
and provide orientation so that they un-
derstand the company’s background.”
“HR has never delivered on time to meet
my needs.”

Department budget “Personnel has a budget for 10 interns
only.”

Company policy “It doesn’t apply just to intern hiring. It
applies to overall company policy.”

Power arguments Departmental expertise
or stature

“It’s hard to give you veto power over this.
We know it better than you do.”
“We’ve been doing it this way for a long
time.”

note: Other codes included interests, offers, preferences and priorities, accept/reject an
offer, and other.

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 19

not discussed. The dependent measure, value claimed, was calculated by counting
the total number of issues that were resolved in each party’s favor. For example,
if three issues were decided in HRs favor, two issues were decided in Engineer-
ing’s favor, and two issues were not discussed, HR would receive a score of 3 and
Engineering would receive a score of 2.

Results

Correlations between the main variables in our analyses appear in Table 3. There
was not a significant correlation between culture and the number of issues claimed,
general informational and normative needs, or the frequency of influence strate-
gies used. The lack of cultural differences in general Informational and Normative
Needs assessed before the introduction of the negotiation simulation suggests that
these are in fact individual-difference and not culture-level variables. In addition,
it suggests that cultural differences we uncover in hypothesis testing are due to the
differential activation of needs in the negotiation context.

We tested H2 using multilevel regression, which allows us to present results that
control for dependency between the dyad members. H2 predicted that we would
find different patterns of influence strategy interacting with partner’s needs in the
West and the East.

H2a predicted that in the West, the interaction between negotiators’ use of
rights-based persuasion and partners’ informational needs will be predictive of
the value negotiators claim. This finding was marginally significant, t = 2.0, p =
.06 (Figure 3). That is, when partners had high informational needs, there was a
positive relationship between the negotiators’ use of rights-based persuasion and
claimed value. When partners had low informational needs, the relationship be-
tween the negotiators’ use of rights-based persuasion and the value claimed was
strongly negative.

Table 3
Study 2—Mean, standard deviations, and correlations

Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5

1. Culturea .48 .50

2. Rights influenceb –.27 .22 .19

3. Power influence –2.04 .38 –.15 .08

4. Informational needs 5.28 1.10 .09 –.07 –.24

5. Normative needs 3.83 1.06 –.18 .02 –.06 .39**

6. Issues claimed 1.57 1.27 .01 –.03 .07 –.06 –.03
notes: ** Significant at p < .01 (two-tailed); a 0 = United States, 1 = Japan; b all influence strategies are logged proportion scores.

20 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

Figure 3. Study 2: Value claimed as predicted by the interaction between
partner’s informational needs and negotiator’s use of rights-based
persuasion (U.S. sample)

Figure 4. Study 2: Value claimed as predicted by the interaction between
partner’s normative needs and negotiator’s use of power-based persuasion
(Japanese sample)

0
0.5
1

1.5

2.5

3.5

Negotiator low power
influence

Negotiator high power
influence

V
al

ue
c

la
im

ed
(

#
is

su
es

)

Partner low normative
needs

Partner high
normative needs

0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3

Negotiator low rights
influence

Negotiator high rights
influence

V
al
ue
c
la
im
ed
(
#
is
su
es
)

Partner low
informational needs

Partner high
informational needs

H2b predicted that in the East, the interaction between negotiators’ use of
power-based persuasion and partners’ normative needs would be predictive of value
claimed. This interaction was statistically significant within the Japanese sample,

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 21

t = 2.2, p < .05 (Figure 4). More specifically, this finding suggests that when Japa- nese partners had high normative needs, Japanese negotiators’ use of power-based persuasion techniques resulted in increased value claimed, in comparison to when partners had low levels of normative needs.

Discussion

Effective deal making and conflict resolution in a multicultural world requires at the
minimum an understanding of how negotiators raised and trained in different socio-
cultural environments develop distinct mental models of negotiation, value-based
motivations and goals, and culturally normative behaviors for information exchange
and influence (Brett 2007). It could be argued that more complex factors, such as
how negotiators adjust or adapt their mental models, goals, and repertoires when
negotiating cross-culturally, or the role of language in cross-cultural negotiation, can
be understood only once we have a strong foundation of knowledge on intracultural
negotiation. This study begins to create a solid foundation of knowledge on culture
and influence in negotiation for researchers and practitioners. By integrating the
social psychology of influence with research on culture and influence in negotia-
tion, we show that influence effectiveness across cultures is best understood as a
function of message content and framing.

Our findings highlight the importance of considering characteristics of the
individual, the culture, and the situation, as emphasized by dynamic constructiv-
ist theory. The dynamic constructivist approach conceptualizes culture as a set
of knowledge structures that become highly accessible in memory through daily
use and observation (Hong 2009). Thus, to understand the impact of culture on
psychological processes, we need to consider how the situation activates different
knowledge structures (Hong 2009; Hong et al. 2000). Researchers in this area have
found that the interaction between an individual difference and a manipulated con-
text can explain when people respond in a culturally normative fashion and when
they do not, that is, when culture matters (Chiu et al. 2000; Hong and Mallorie
2004; Hong et al. 2000).

Supporting dynamic constructivism in a negotiation context, Gelfand and Realo
(1999) found that an accountability manipulation led to more competitive behavior
for people with individualist values and more cooperative behavior for people with
collectivist values. Liu, Friedman, and Hong (2012) extend this work to show that
Chinese negotiators are more relationship focused than their American counterparts
only when negotiating with in-group members under conditions of high accountability.
In other words, we can turn stereotypical Chinese cooperativeness on or off by acti-
vating different values or by changing the situation. These studies show that our lay
understanding of culturally normative behavior may actually account for only some
behavior, some of the time. We need to examine culture, individual differences, and
the situation to explain why and when people adhere to cultural norms.

When considering the effectiveness of influence in negotiation, dynamic con-

22 adaIr (Canada) ET al.

structivism suggests we model influence strategies represented in an individual’s
cultural knowledge set, the individual’s needs, and the situation that activates the
knowledge set and the needs. Consistent with this approach, our studies show that
the effectiveness of culturally normative influence strategies (i.e., interests in the
West, power in the East), depend on how the arguments are framed in a negotiation
context. Our Study 2 shows that even when there are no individual differences in
general influence-related needs, in the negotiation context Westerners respond more
to arguments framed informationally and Easterners respond more to arguments
framed normatively. Together these findings offer support for a dynamic construc-
tivist model and also extend findings on culture and individual differences in other
areas of social influence literature. For example, Barrett et al. (2004) showed that
social-obligation-based compliance (corresponding to our “normative influence
effectiveness”) is predicted by collective-primacy values both in Poland and the
United States. Regardless of national culture, people were more likely to fill out a
survey for a stranger when they had strong collective primacy, and this effect was
even stronger when group reputation was made salient. Likewise, individualistic
values, rather than national culture, were the strongest predictor of consistency-
based compliance following requests to complete two surveys for both U.S. and
Asian samples (Petrova, Cialdini, and Sills 2007). These authors conclude that
researchers should consider within-nation variation in cultural orientation, or
individual differences, as well as culture effects.

As our results highlight, another important situational factor to consider in future
research is the cultural context. Negotiating with someone from your own culture
may activate one set of culturally normative negotiation strategies, but negotiating
with someone from another culture may suppress culturally normative responses
and instead activate behaviors guided by a different knowledge structure that may
contain information from past experience or stereotypes about the other culture
(Adair, Taylor, and Tinsley, 2009; Morris and Fu 2001). This is an area that can
be studied with intra- versus intercultural negotiation simulations, as well as by
priming bicultural participants and manipulating their counterpart’s culture.

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Appendix A

Study 1

Chinese Professor

Imagine that you are studying at University of Waterloo as an undergraduate
student.

This is your 4B term of your undergraduate studies. Recently, you have handed

EffECTIvE InflUEnCE In nEgOTIaTIOn 25

in your “intent to graduate form” and you are excited to graduate since you have
made plans to travel to Europe and Asia with some of your colleagues. Your fam-
ily and relatives are also excited about your graduation, and they have planned a
big surprise graduation party at a fancy restaurant for you to attend after you get
home. After the final exam, you start packing your things and begin to say goodbye
to Waterloo.

Today is the day when unofficial grades come out, and you are nervous about
checking your grades on Quest. When you check your grades, however, you find
out that you have failed a course by 2 percent (to pass, a student must obtain a
grade of 50 percent). Unfortunately, you are aware that obtaining a failed course
grade does not permit you to graduate this term, leaving the only option to retake
the course next term.

You are devastated by the final score and promptly make an appointment to
see the professor to change his/her mind. At the appointment, your professor, Dr.
Chan, declines to alter the grade.

Canadian Professor

Imagine that you are studying at University of Waterloo as an undergraduate
student. This is your 4B term of your undergraduate studies. Recently, you have
handed in your “intent to graduate form” and you are excited to graduate since
you have made plans to travel to Europe and Asia with some of your colleagues.
Your family and relatives are also excited about your graduation, and they have
planned a big surprise graduation party at a fancy restaurant for you to attend after
you get home. After the final exam, you start packing your things and begin to say
goodbye to Waterloo.

You are devastated by the final score and promptly make an appointment to
see the professor to change his/her mind. At the appointment, your professor, Dr.
McKenzie, declines to alter the grade.

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Group Decis Negot (2012) 21:79–98
DOI 10.1007/s10726-010-9190-x

Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents

Gert Jan Hofstede · Catholijn M. Jonker ·
Tim Verwaart

Published online: 26 February 2010
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract Negotiations proceed differently across cultures. For realistic modeling
of agents in multicultural negotiations, the agents must display culturally differenti-
ated behavior. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that tackles these
challenges, based on Hofstede’s model of national cultures. The context is a trade
network for goods with a hidden quality attribute. The negotiation model is based on
the ABMP negotiation architecture and applies a utility function that includes market
value, quality preference and risk attitude. The five dimensions of Hofstede’s model
are the basis for the modification of ABMP parameters and weight factors in the util-
ity function. The agents can observe each other’s group membership and status. This
information is used, along with the indices of Hofstede’s dimensions, to differentiate
behavior in different cultural settings. The paper presents results of test runs that ver-
ify the implementation of the model. The model helps to explain behaviors of actors
in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to
generate culturally differentiated agents. Further validations of the model with case
studies from literature and experiments have yet to be conducted. Extensions can make
this model a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural negotiation
and for implementation in negotiation support systems.

G. J. Hofstede
Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands

C. M. Jonker
Delft Technical University, Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands

T. Verwaart (B)
LEI Wageningen UR, Postbus 29703, 2502 LS Den Haag, The Netherlands
e-mail: tim.verwaart@wur.nl

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80 G. J. Hofstede et al.

Keywords Multi-agent simulation · Culture · Bargaining · Negotiation ·
Trade network

1 Introduction

Anybody with experience in international trade knows that bargaining practices differ
across the world. Multinational companies sometimes work with different price lists
for different countries. To give just one example: whereas German buyers want to
know exactly how much the products cost, Arabs need to have room for bargaining.
In order to sell at the same price, the selling company needs to adapt its offer to the
varying bargaining practices. This means that a single piece of advice about how to
bargain, or a single model to describe bargaining, are obviously not valid across the
world unless culture is taken into account.

‘Culture’ is a notion with many meanings, some of which are contested in some
disciplines. However, the leading paradigm today is widely accepted and used in both
practice and academia. According to it, culture refers to the unwritten rules of society.
Culture is that which makes a group cohesive by smoothing communication. It is a
phenomenon that is specific to a group, not to an individual. Its essence is unconscious
shared systems of values, and it is transmitted in early youth through example and edu-
cation. As a result it is stable across centuries in spite of huge changes in environment
and technology. Cultural differences show no signs of diminishing in the Information
Age (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005).

Within the literature various basic dimensions can be found according to which
societies differ from one another. Of these, the most widely used is Hofstede’s model
(Hofstede 2001), (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). His work is accessible, sparse, and
based on a very large, very well stratified sample that continues to give it great explan-
atory value. No other model matches society-level variables so well to date (Smith
2004).

This paper describes an agent-based model for bargaining in the context of trade.
The agents follow common sense strategies such as maximizing gain, seeking good
quality, and minimizing risk. But they also have models of how to behave in an appro-
priate manner. These models are based on Hofstede’s five dimensions of culture. The
challenge that we take up is the one posed by De Rosis et al. (2004), who suggested to
investigate the feasibility of Hofstede’s model for building culturally consistent agent
characters. An agent-based model of bargaining in which the agents are cultured offers
several promises. It can help understand the dynamics of international negotiations in
trade. It could also serve as a training tool for aspiring international traders.

The paper first briefly introduces Hofstede’s model of five dimensions of culture.
Next, the ABMP (Agent-Based Market Place, Jonker and Treur 2001) negotiation
model that we adopt is presented. We show how this model can be used in agent-
based simulations. We also discuss the limited subset of negotiation situations that
are considered in this article. In the third section we link culture and negotiation by
describing the influence of each of Hofstede’s dimensions of culture on negotiators’
practices and preferences. This section sets the scene for the presentation of the rules
for our cultured agents in the fourth section. Section five shows example runs with the

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 81

model and discusses them. Finally we discuss the model and how to proceed, since
this model forms the basis of future research and tools.

2 Hofstede’s Five Dimensions of Culture

Each human society has found a different pattern of response to the problems of social
life. In some societies, groups are permanent and close-knit while in others, group
membership is volatile and voluntary. In some, leadership style is usually autocratic
and in others, participative. Research has shown and repeatedly confirmed that basic
tendencies to deal with a few central issues of social life are stable across the genera-
tions in societies (Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). They are, because they are instilled
into a society’s members from birth. As a baby and as a toddler, a child is primed as
a social being. Once a child sets foot into the wider society as a teenager, its basic
cultural orientation is firmly in place.

This research stream has led to dimension models of culture. The most widely
used of these is the five-dimension model by Hofstede. The five dimensions are about
five issues that relate to our basic drives. They will be introduced briefly in order to
use them further on in the text. Note that these are not personality traits, but societal
patterns! Also note that the picture drawn here is necessarily simplified. It presents
the two caricatured extremes of each dimension. In reality, almost all cultures have
intermediate positions on almost all dimensions. The dimensions are introduced in the
following subsections.

2.1 Collectivism Versus Individualism

This dimension is about affiliation. To a collectivist (e.g., East Asian, most non-Western
countries) mindset, fixed membership of a single group in which all members are inter-
dependent is the natural state of being human. No member of the natural group can be
cast aside. This means that maintaining harmony is crucial.

To an individualist (e.g., North-American, North-west European) mindset, self-
sufficiency is the natural state of being. Everybody should be judged in the same way,
whether or not the person is a group member. Honest people speak their minds, even
if that means open disagreement.

2.2 Hierarchy: Large Versus Small Power Distance

This dimension is about dominance as an ascribed quality. It has to do with author-
ity as seen from below. Are parents, teachers, priests and bosses held in awe, and
is autocratic leadership expected? Then we have a society of large power distance
(e.g., China, India, Russia.).

Or is leadership a role that could change from one person to another with ease,
and are all people born equal? In that case, the society is one of small power distance
(e.g., Anglo and Germanic countries).

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82 G. J. Hofstede et al.

2.3 Aggression and Gender: Masculinity Versus Femininity

This dimension is about assertive dominance, about muscle power, and about the emo-
tional roles of the two sexes. In what is called a masculine society (e.g., Japan, Anglo
countries), men in particular are supposed to be fighters. Women are supposed to be
cheerleaders to the men’s fight—but they have to be tough too. Men try to look and act
like real men and women try to look and act like real women. These are tough societies,
with strong-handed police and military and with heavy punishment for offenders.

In what is called feminine societies (e.g., Scandinavian countries), both men and
women are supposed to be peace-loving and consensus seeking and their social behav-
iors are not strongly different. Criminals should be helped, not punished.

2.4 Otherness and Truth: Uncertainty Avoidance

This dimension is about how to cope with the unknowable. Some societies are termed
uncertainty avoiding (e.g., Arab, Latin and Slavic countries). They tend to have strict
rules and rituals about things that are strange or different, such as religious rules and
food taboos, or strange sexual practices. In these societies, the distinction between
clean and dirty is important. In fact they feel that any distinction should be a sharp
one. They are concerned about right and wrong, about theory, about arguing for its own
sake. They like to show their emotions, particularly anxiety, verbally and non-verbally.

Other societies are termed uncertainty tolerant (e.g., Anglo countries, China, Scan-
dinavia, Vietnam). They are relaxed and curious about strange things and people, and
not worried about establishing strict classification schemes for everything. They value
exploratory behaviors and novel experiences, and a relaxed communication style.

2.5 Short Versus Long-Term Gratification of Needs

This dimension is about all the basic human drives. Which drive should get precedence,
one that presses now or one that might become pressing in ten years? Some societies
live for today, and these are termed short-term oriented. Behaving in an appropriate
manner and respecting conventions is important in these societies, as well as ‘keeping
up with the Joneses’ as the Americans have it. There are strong opinions about good
and bad, and these are believed to be immutable.

Other societies live for the future; these are termed long-term oriented (e.g. China,
Japan). Reasoning is pragmatic, and principles are adapted to context. Good and bad
are seen as complementary and changeable. Planning, foresight and perseverance are
valued. On the downside, this could lead to stinginess and calculation.

2.6 Five Dimensions, One World

So far in this text, the dimensions of culture have been isolated from one another in an
artificial way. In reality, cultures have a recognizable feel to them, a Gestalt that can
be described, albeit only roughly, by its combination of dimension scores. The five

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 83

dimensions are no more than abstractions that capture main behavioral trends. Cultures
have ‘Gestalts’ of behavior. Experienced negotiators know the range of behaviors that
they can expect from negotiators from other parts of the world. They also know how
gender, age, status and personality can affect the negotiation style of people from these
parts of the world.

In Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009) the influence of each of the dimensions
on trade processes was modeled separately; a slightly artificial, but also necessary
intermediate step to model agents differentiated along the Hofstede dimensions. Rec-
onciling these dimensional models into one believable model that shows the ‘whole
negotiator’, although still abstracting from personality, is the aim of this article.

3 Negotiation

In bilateral negotiation, two parties aim at reaching a joint agreement. They do so by
exchanging various offers or bids using e.g. an alternating offers protocol (Osborne
and Rubinstein 1994) called the “negotiation dance” in Raiffa et al. (2002). Negoti-
ation is a complex emotional decision-making process aiming to reach an agreement
to exchange goods or services (Thompson 2005).

3.1 Agent Models for Negotiation

The literature on automated negotiation contains a number of agent models for nego-
tiation. The focus of that literature is on reaching deals that are Pareto-efficient (i.e.,
neither can improve without making the situation worse for the other). Furthermore,
some aim at reaching fair outcomes, i.e., in which the deal is equally good for both
parties. The strategies differ in whether or not they take knowledge about the domain,
and/or opponent into account. Examples of strategies that do not use any domain
or opponent knowledge can be found in Faratin et al. (1998) and Jonker and Treur
(2001). Other strategies try to learn the opponent’s preferences, see e.g., (Coehoorn
and Jennings 2004) and (Hindriks and Tykhonov 2008). The work presented in this
paper aims to develop models of actual human behavior. It does not aim to develop an
optimal bargaining strategy that can outperform human negotiators or other agents.

3.2 Focus on Interpersonal Bargaining

This work focuses on a specific type of negotiations: two persons bargaining about
business transactions. Gaming simulations form the context of the bargaining ses-
sions. The gaming simulations are designed as tools in supply chains and networks
research (Meijer et al. 2006). In this setting participants negotiate a transaction of a
commodity with either base quality or a superior quality. The real quality is known to
the supplier and invisible to the customer. The customer can either trust the supplier’s
quality statement, or request third-party testing at the cost of a fee. A customer may
negotiate that the supplier provide certified quality by third-party testing and have the
commodity delivered with the test report as a certificate. So, the relevant attributes for
comparing bids are price, quality, and certification.

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84 G. J. Hofstede et al.

If the quality is above base level and the transaction is not certified, the customer
is exposed to the risk of supplier’s opportunism. The valuations of quality and risk
have a rational component that can be calculated from market value and probabil-
ity of deceit. Furthermore, they have a subjective component that is influenced by a
trader’s personality and culture. The rational component of the valuation of quality is
the difference in market price with the price of base quality. The rational component
of the valuation of risk is the product of probability of deceit and value of the quality
attribute. The subjective valuation comes in addition to the rational value. For quality,
it is the trader’s quality preference, for instance because of the societal status that
results from trading high quality products. For risk, it is an agent’s risk aversion. To a
risk-averse agent, the absence of risk has a value by itself.

In a culturally homogeneous society, not all agents have equal quality preference
and risk aversion. However, significant differences between cultures exist in the aver-
age values of these parameters.

3.3 Agent-Based Market Place (ABMP) and its Application in the Agents

For the agents’ negotiation strategy we chose ABMP (Jonker and Treur 2001), because
its similarity to human negotiations has been validated (Bosse et al. 2004). The ABMP
process is an exchange of bids, starting with a bid by one of the partners. The other
partner evaluates the bid using a utility function that maps a weighted linear combi-
nation of bid attributes to the interval [0, 1]. The weight factors in the utility function
represent an agent’s preferences. The utility function used in this research is elaborated
in a following subsection.

ABMP is a concession strategy. An agent prepares a bid that is a concession to
its previous bid. Concession factor γ and negotiation speed β are the parameters that
govern the concession making.

Concession factor γ is the fraction of the opening bid’s utility that the agent is
willing to give in during the negotiation. It determines the minimum utility that is
acceptable to an agent, also called the reservation value.

Negotiation speed β is the fraction of difference between the agent’s previous bid
and the minimum utility that an agent uses to determine the target utility of its next bid.

After calculation of the utility of a partner’s bid and the target utility of its own next
bid, the agent decides whether to accept partners bid or not, governed by the utility
gap parameter ω.

Acceptable utility gap ω is the maximal difference between own target utility and
last partner’s bid’s utility for which an agent will accept partner’s bid.

If the target utility minus the partner’s last bid’s utility is greater than the acceptable
utility gap, the agent does not accept and has to decide about its next action. It can
terminate the negotiation for several reasons. First, partner’s bid may be interpreted
as unrealistic if its utility is too far below the minimum utility. Second, an agent may
be unsatisfied by the progress in partner’s bids. Third, there may be no more room for

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 85

a substantial change of attributes to make a bid with the target utility. In the latter case
the agent terminates the negotiation. In the first two cases the probability that an agent
terminates the negotiation depends on the impatience parameter ι.

Impatience ι is the probability that an agent will terminate the negotiation if (a) the
utility of partner’s bid is less than the cut-off value or (b) progress in the last three
rounds is less than the minimal progress required. In the present model the cut-off
value φ is computed from minimum utility μ:

φ = (1 − ι)μ.

Minimal progress ϕ over three rounds of negotiation is computed as

ϕ = (1 − μ)ι.

So, the decisions whether to accept a bid or not and whether to continue or not depend
on partner’s bid, own last bid, partner’s progress, and the values of parameters γ , β, ω,
and ι. Evaluation of bids involves the utility function discussed in the next subsection.
This utility function is also used in planning a new bid that has the target utility, taking
the agent’s quality preference and risk aversion into account.

3.4 The utility function

The agent model applies a utility function as proposed by Tykhonov et al. (2008):

U (b) = wv V (b) + wq Q(b) + wr R(b),

with 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, i = v, q, r, and
∑

wi = 1.
V (b) represents the business value of a bid. A customer agent calculates it as

Vc =
1 − v + q − rc

2
,

with v representing the price of the bid, mapped to the interval [0, 1] (0 represents
minimal market price for base quality of the commodity; 1 represents maximal market
price for top quality); q in [0, 1] (0 represents base quality; 1 top quality); customers
cost of risk is calculated as

rc = (1 − c)(1 − t )q,

with c = 1 representing presence and c = 0 absence of a quality certificate; t rep-
resents the customers trust in the supplier, defined as the customer’s estimate of the
probability that the supplier will cooperate and deliver according to contract, even if
the supplier has the motive and the opportunity to defect.

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86 G. J. Hofstede et al.

For a supplier the business value of a bid is calculated as

Vs =
1 + v − q − rs

2
,

with suppliers cost of risk

rs = c f,

where f stands for the certification fee scaled to the same ratio as v.
Both customers and suppliers may have a preference in excess of the market value

for dealing top quality rather than base quality products. A trader’s preference for
dealing top quality, even if profits from base quality trade are superior, is represented
by wq ; in the present model Q(b) is computed as:

Q = q − 0.5.

Some traders may be risk-averse, in which case wr is positive. In the present simulation
suppliers are informed about the actual quality level, so

Rs = 0.

For risk-avoiding customers the absence of risk may have a value in itself, which is
represented as follows in the present model:

Rc = 0.5 − rc.

4 Culture and Bargaining

Hofstede et al. (2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009) modeled the influence of culture on trade
processes for each of the five dimensions separately. From these papers, the narra-
tive descriptions of the influences of the dimensions on trade negotiations—i.e. the
bargaining about transactions—are cited below.

4.1 Power Distance (Hofstede et al. 2009)

Traders from egalitarian cultures may have different ways to negotiate, but they will
always negotiate. Traders from large power distance cultures on the other hand are
not used to negotiate seriously. The powerful dictate the conditions. The less powerful
have to accept. In feminine or collectivist cultures the powerful may exercise restraint,
or the lower ranked may successfully plead for compassion, but this is not a joint deci-
sion making process like a negotiation is. The higher ranked partner decides. When
people from hierarchical cultures are forced to negotiate, because they are in a position
of equal status or trade with foreigners, the negotiations often end in a game of power.

The higher ranked in hierarchical societies prefer top quality commodities to stress
their position. They accept risk, because they do not expect the lower ranked to deceive

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 87

them. The lower ranked on the other hand, avoid risk and protect themselves by settling
for base quality commodities.

A trader from a culture with large power distance expects a lower ranked busi-
ness partner to accept his conditions rapidly. If the lower ranked partner has the same
cultural background, there is no problem and the rights of the higher ranked will be
recognized and respected: the lower ranked will be modest and give in easily. How-
ever, a trader from an egalitarian culture will not give in to the pressure if his status
is lower, but will either react furiously (e.g., break off negotiations) or simply ignore
the pressure (make a counterproposal), in which case the opponent will be furious.

If a trader from a culture with large power distance negotiates with a foreigner and
assumes the foreigner to have a higher status, he may give in more easily than the
foreigner expected. In that case the foreigner may be happy, but his opponent will
not have his fair share. If both are from hierarchical cultures but do not perceive one
another’s hierarchical position they may make misattributions resulting in one of them
being dominated or stopping the negotiations.

4.2 Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede et al. 2008b)

Uncertainty avoiding traders have an emotional style of negotiation, making sure that
the opponents understand their feelings. They will not adapt their behavior to their
opponent’s. They are quality-minded and avoid risk in business transactions, espe-
cially when dealing with strangers. For uncertainty avoiding traders, time is money.
They want to go directly to their target, and are impatient. After a few unsuccessful
iterations, the uncertainty avoiding trader will break off the negotiation.

Uncertainty tolerant traders on the other hand have a relaxed style of negotiation.
They try to adapt their behavior to their counterparts, although they are not prepared
to come to an agreement at all cost. They do not show their emotions and may be
disconcerted if their opponents do. They are careful not to be more yielding than their
counterparts are, not especially modest, and are ready to break off negotiations in case
of insufficient progress.

4.3 Individualism and Collectivism (Hofstede et al. 2008a)

For a collectivistic trader negotiation has to be preceded by the formation of a relation-
ship. If that goes wrong there will be no negotiation. During the negotiation, collectivist
traders discriminate between in-group and out-group partners. They feel obliged to be
more conceding to an in-group partner, are more hesitant to break off negotiations with
in-group partners, and will try to maintain harmony as long as the opponent follows
the in-group rules. Breaking the rules asks for a reaction. The style of that reaction
may be furious, or they might never explicitly say anything, but just avoid the other
from now on. The reply to a proposal from an in-group partner will be modest, but
there is no need to be modest to an out-group partner. If an out-group partner replies
with no or small concession, negotiation is likely to be broken off, where an in-group
partner or an acquainted relation would get a second chance.

123

88 G. J. Hofstede et al.

Responsibility for in-group welfare and compliance with in-group rules always
play a prominent role in a collectivistic culture. A collectivist will accept benefits for
his in-group rather than his personal advantage as a convincing argument.

Individualists have one thing in mind during negotiations: their own personal inter-
est. Depending on their personality and incentives, this might be the material advantage
of the deal in question, or the development of new long-term trusting relations with
perspectives of future deals, or just the pleasant conversation during the negotiations,
or the satisfaction of winning the game, but one thing stands for sure: individualists
pursue private interests. So individualist traders are not very modest in their negoti-
ations, nor will they give in for the purpose of maintaining harmony. If they are not
aware of the cultural differences when trading with collectivists, they may be upset
by the lack of explicit communication, or they may upset their opponents by being
too explicit, or by talking business before the relationship has been established and
acknowledged. They are not particularly patient or impatient negotiators, but behave
patiently as long as it serves their interest.

4.4 Masculinity and Femininity (Hofstede et al. 2006)

The dimension of masculinity versus femininity can be interpreted as a preference for
performance versus cooperation. A performance oriented trader (masculine culture)
is interested in fast trades, with as many top quality goods as possible in one trade.
This trader is rather impatient, and if bids are too far off from his profile, he will walk
away quickly. The performance oriented sticks to the contract of the deal, deceive the
trade partner to the limits of the contract without any compunction, and expects the
partner to do so too. Each subsequent negotiation will be dealt with without taking
past trustworthiness into account. Each new contract will be set up from scratch. The
trader learns from mistakes to make sure that the contract will not lead to new and
uncomfortable surprises on his side.

A cooperation oriented trader (feminine culture) is interested in the relationship with
the trade partner; building trust is important. The amount of goods or quality level is
not of the most interest, because the relationship built during negotiation might pay off
in future negotiations. Given the interest in the relationship with the trade partner, a
first negotiation with a trade partner will take time that is willingly spent by the trader.
During such negotiations, the trader appreciates a negotiation process in which both
partners show a willingness to accommodate the other over time. Past negotiations do
play an important role in subsequent negotiations. The trader is perfectly willing to
see the current negotiation as a kind of continuation of the previous one. If the trade is
about the same kind of commodity, the trader will start the negotiation from the deal
of the last one. If the other accepts, then the deal can be made in one round and in
seconds, whereas the first deal might have taken a lot of rounds and lots of time.

4.5 Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation (Hofstede et al. 2008c)

Long term oriented negotiators are pragmatic and take the bigger picture. They tend
to see one bargaining instance as a small step in a long process, and their decisions

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 89

will be led by their estimation of the profitability or other success chances of that
longer process. Long-term oriented traders show patience. They do not rapidly break
off negotiations. They do not overcharge, but they do not rapidly give in.

Short term oriented negotiators, on the other hand, think in terms of moral princi-
ples and apply them to the situation that is before them here and now. They are very
reliable when it comes to following standards of appropriateness of behavior, but this
can make them disregard the ulterior consequences of their actions. They are conced-
ing and patient with high-status partners and do not show them distrust. Otherwise
they follow an opportunistic quality strategy.

5 Modeling Culture in ABMP

The model of the effects of culture on ABMP parameters and utility weight factors is
based on the narrative descriptions in the preceding section. The descriptions indicate
if a parameter is to be increased or decreased along each of Hofstede’s dimensions.
Table 1 summarizes the direction of the effects (increasing versus decreasing).

Some cultural dimensions have a direct effect on the parameter values, but in other
cases the influence depends on the relationship with the partner:

– The societal status of an agent and that of its partner affect behavior in societies
where power distance matters.

– Also in short-term oriented societies, partner’s status is relevant.

Table 1 Influence of culture on the utility weight factors and ABMP parameters

Culture type Conditions wq wr γ β ω ι

Large power d. Self status high +

Self status low −
Higher partner + + +! −
Lower partner −

Small power d.

Uncertainty av. Similar partner + + + +

Different p. + ++ + +

Uncer. tolerant

Individualistic

Collectivistic Ingroup partner + −
Outgroup p. + −

Masculine + + + +

Feminine − − −
Long-t. oriented − −
Short-t. oriented General +

High partners + − + −
wq Quality preference; wr Risk aversion; γ Concession factor; β Negotiation speed; ω Acceptable utility
gap; ι Impatience; + Increased parameter value; − Decreased; +! Increased every negotiation round

123

90 G. J. Hofstede et al.

– Members of uncertainty avoiding societies distrust strangers more than people they
are familiar with.

– Common group membership and group distance are important in collectivistic
societies.

In the model the agents are labeled with tags that indicate status and group member-
ship. The tags are visible to other agents so that they can estimate status difference
and group distance. The model combines effects of culture with effects of status and
group membership.

The effects on negotiation parameters and weight factors are modeled as follows.

(1) The Hofstede indices PDI, UAI, IDV, MAS, and LTO position national cultures
on the five dimensions. They are known for many countries (see, e.g., Hofstede
2001). Let H, A, I, M, and L, respectively, represent the indices as real values
scaled to [0,1], so that H = 1 represent maximal power distance, (1 − H ) = 1
represent maximal egalitarianism, etc. Thus, there are 10 cultural stereotypes.

(2) Status and group distance are represented as real values in [0,1]. Where sta-
tus, status difference and group distance are relevant, the effect is conditional
upon the value of a cultural index. For instance, the product (1 − I)g represent the
effect of group distance g in conjunction with collectivism (1 − I); in a maximally
individualistic society, 1 − I = 0, so group distance g has no effect.

(3) As indicated in Table 1, some of the cultural stereotypes may have a positive,
monotonously increasing, effect on a particular parameter value; other stereo-
types may have a negative, monotonously decreasing, effect.

(4) For each parameter there may be a set of positive effects and a set of negative
effects. The joint effect of a set of effects working with equal sign is weakly dis-
junctive, i.e. the joint effect equals the maximum of the effects of the individual
dimensions1 (e.g., if we model statement “people from uncertainty avoiding or
masculine societies prefer rapid negotiations”, then the joint effect is the maxi-
mum of the effects of uncertainty avoiding and masculinity).

(5) The resulting joint negative effects are assumed to compensate for joint positive
effects, vice versa: the effect on parameter x is the difference of the joint positive
and joint negative effects.

ex = ex + − ex −.

One can, for instance, represent the effect “in hierarchical societies parameter
x is increased in case of status difference, unless the society is collectivistic or
feminine” as follows:

ex = ex ,H (si −s j )
[
H (si − s j )

] − max {ex ,(1−I )g [(1 − I )g] , ex ,1−M (1 − M)
}
,

1 Weak disjunction is taken as the formalism to combine effects of cultural dimensions working in the same
direction, because it takes only the stronger of the dimensions into account. This is to be preferred to, for
instance, linear combinations, or (weighted) geometrical averaging, because in those cases a strong effect
of a high value of one dimension would be conditional upon high values of the other dimensions. Weak
disjunction is also preferred to stronger forms of disjunction, because combination of moderate values of
several dimensions must not have a strong joint effect.

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 91

Where ex ,D represent a function that computes the effect of D on x. No actual
evidence for the form or the range of the functions is available. In the current
model we assume linear relations with range [0,1] for ex ,D , so the above example
would reduce to

ex = H (si − s j ) − max [(1 − I )g, 1 − M ] .

(6) Joint positive and joint negative effects deduced from Table 1 are presented in
Table 2.

(7) The actual value of x is assumed to be a function that maps xT (the typical value
of x) and the effect ex to a range [x L , x H ], x L ≤ xT ≤ x H . In the current model
we take a simple approach and use linear interpolation:

x = xT +
ex + |ex |

2
(x H − xT ) +

ex − |ex |
2

(xT − x L ).

(8) The utility weights wi , i = v, q, r , are to be normalized for proper functioning
of ABMP. Culturally adjusted values of w′q , and w′r (see Table 2) are relative to
w′v = 1, so:

wi =
w′i

1 + w′q + w′r
.

(9) The culturally adjusted parameter values and weight factors resulting from rules
(1)–(8) are used in the ABMP evaluation of bids, in the decisions (to accept or
not; to continue or not; see Hofstede et al. 2006), and in the planning of a new
bid. In each round of the negotiation, the parameters are recomputed.
The next section presents results obtained from this model.

6 Test Runs

The models discussed in the previous sections, including the ABMP architecture, are
implemented in a multi-agent simulation, where agents can select trade partners, nego-
tiate business transactions with price, quality, and certification as attributes, deliver
truthfully or opportunistically, have deliveries tested for quality, and update beliefs
about partners according to experiences in negotiations and testing. The simulation
environment is implemented in Cormas.2

The model was tested for correct implementation. The observed variables were:

– The number of successful negotiations (i.e. terminated with a contract) in runs of
200 time steps with a population of 8 supplier agents and 8 customers;

– The percentage of negotiations that failed, i.e. that were terminated by one of the
agents before agreement was reached;

2 http://cormas.cirad.fr/indexeng.htm

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http://cormas.cirad.fr/indexeng.htm

92 G. J. Hofstede et al.

Table 2 Formulas for the effects of culture on negotiation parameters; H, A, I, M, and L represent the
scaled Hofstede indices; si represent the agent’s societal status in [0, 1]; sj partner’s status; group distance
g between the agent and partner is computed from agent labels, with 0 representing minimal distance, 1
maximal distance; ρ represent the round number in the current negotiation

x Increasing effect ex + of culture on x Decreasing effect ex − of culture

w′q max (H si , A, M, 1 − L) max
[
H (1 − si ) , 1 − M, L

]

w′r max

⎡

⎣
H

(
s j − si

)
, A,

√
Ag,

(1 − I ) g, M

⎤

⎦ max
[
H

(
si − s j

)
,

(1 − L) s j

]

γ max

⎡
⎣
H
(
s j − si

)
, (1 − I ) (1 − g) ,

(1 − L) s j
⎤

⎦

β max [ A, M ] max [(1 − I ) g, 1 − M ]

H
(
s j − si

)
ρ

ι max ( A, M) max

⎡

⎢
⎢
⎢

H
(
s j − si
)
, (1 − I ) (1 − g) ,

(1 − M) , L , (1 − L) s j

⎤

⎥
⎥
⎥

– The percentage of successful negotiations leading to top quality transactions, as a
measure of willingness to accept risk.

In all test runs, the agents were set to be neutral with respect to trust, i.e. they had no
information whether their partners were trustworthy or not (t = 0.5). The option of
certification was switched of, so that agents were forced to accept risk if they bought
top quality products.

The following hypotheses about agents behavior in this environment are formu-
lated on the basis of the narrative descriptions in this article’s section on culture and
bargaining.

H1 In hierarchical societies (large power distance), high-ranked agents buy top qual-
ity products; low-raked agents buy basic quality products to protect themselves
from risk.

H2 In hierarchical societies, high-ranked agents are more successful trading with
low-ranked than with equal-status partners, because lower-ranked yield.

H3 In uncertainty avoiding societies, high quality products are preferred, but agents
are risk-avoiding and impatient. Therefore, trade proceeds less smooth in uncer-
tainty avoiding than in uncertainty tolerant societies.

H4 In uncertainty avoiding societies, inter-group trade fails more often than in-group
trade.

H5 In collectivistic societies, in-group trade runs smoother than inter-group trade.
H6 In masculine societies, agents deal rapidly but many negotiations fail, due to the

combination of impatience and high quality ambitions.
H7 In feminine societies, negotiations proceed slowly, but with a low failure rate.
H8 In short-term oriented societies, agents prefer top quality.

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Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 93

Table 3 Average results of simulated negotiations for cultural stereotypes, with the value for the particular
dimension set to either 0.1 or 0.9 and the values for the other dimensions set to 0.5 (8 suppliers; 8 customers;
10 runs of 200 time steps for each configuration; parameter values as in Table 4)

Culture type Conditions Number of transactions % Failed negotiations % Top quality

Large power d. Self status high 44 57 97

Self status low 50 60 0

Customer higher 77 45 98

Supplier higher 4 92 0

Small power d. 72 49 2

Uncertainty av. Similar partner 29 71 76

Different p. 27 73 87

Uncer. tolerant 49 58 1

Individualistic 66 50 1

Collectivistic Ingroup partner 117 13 61

Outgroup p. 39 65 0

Masculine 36 71 80

Feminine 61 45 0

Long-term or. 55 52 0

Short-term or. General 24 72 95

High customers 57 47 91

H9 In short-term oriented societies, agents are more conceding toward high-status
partners. This leads to rapid transactions and low failure rate if partner’s status
is high.

To test the hypotheses, the model was run for each of the configurations of culture,
status and group membership represented in Table 1. To simulate a cultural stereo-
type, the value of one normalized index ( H, A, I, M, or L) was set to 0.1 or 0.9, while
the values of the other normalized indices were set to 0.5. In all runs, group distance
between suppliers and customers was set to 1, except in the runs simulating uncertainty
avoiding and collectivistic societies with in-group partners, where group distance was
set to 0. Status was set to 0.5 for all agents, except in the runs where status difference
mattered. In the latter case the status of either suppliers or customers was set to 0.1
and that of their counterparts to 0.9.

For each configuration, 10 runs (with different random generator seed) were made.
Each run lasted 200 time steps with a population of 8 supplier agents and 8 customers.
In 200 time steps 8 pairs can complete approximately 100 negotiations together, so
for each configuration a total of approximately 1,000 negotiations were completed
(successfully or unsuccessfully).

Table 3 presents average results per run of simulated negotiations, using the param-
eter settings displayed in Table 4. In the following paragraphs the results are compared
with the hypotheses.

123

94 G. J. Hofstede et al.

Table 4 Parameter values used in the simulation runs

Type of value w′q w′r γ β ω ι

Typical value xT 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.02 0.3

Maximal value x H 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.1 0.7

Minimal value x L 0 0 0 0 0 0.1

w′q Quality preference; w′r Risk aversion; γ Concession factor; β Negotiation speed; ω Acceptable utility
gap; ι Impatience

H1 is confirmed. In hierarchical societies, the higher-status agents buy top quality
products and accept the associated risk. The lower-status agents buy basic quality
products.

H2 is partly confirmed. In this simulation the higher-ranked agents succeed in enforc-
ing transactions only in the consumer role. In the supplier role the higher-ranked
supplier agents insist on selling top quality to lower-ranked agents and the lower-
ranked keep asking for basic quality until the suppliers break-off.

H3 is confirmed. In uncertainty avoiding societies, top quality is dominantly traded
and transaction success is lower than in uncertainty tolerant societies.

H4 is confirmed. In uncertainty avoiding agent societies, transactions with strangers
mostly fail.

H5 is confirmed. In collectivistic societies, in-group trade runs smoothly and agents
show trust in each other, trading top quality products. Collectivist inter-group
trade is less efficient than in-group trade and also less efficient than trade in
individualistic societies.

H6 is confirmed. Failure rate is high in the masculine society.
H7 is confirmed. Failure rate is low in the feminine society and negotiations proceed

relatively slow.
H8 is confirmed. The agents in the short-term oriented societies dominantly trade

top quality products.
H9 is confirmed. When trading with high-ranked customers, transaction rate is high

and failure is low in short-term oriented societies.

These results comply with the expected behavior of the agents and verify the imple-
mentation. However, they do not validate that the implemented model generates believ-
able culturally differentiated agent behavior.

For that purpose results produced by this model can be compared with results known
from intercultural negotiation literature. For instance, Brett and Okumura (1998) report
that joint gains in intercultural negotiations between Japanese and USA negotiators
were lower than in either Japanese-Japanese or USA-USA negotiations. These situa-
tions are tested with the present model. All agents are assumed to have equal status.
Japanese culture is more uncertainty avoiding and collectivistic than USA culture.
Group distance experienced by the negotiators is expected to be very relevant in Japan.
To verify this effect, tests are run with maximal group distance g = 1 and reduced
group distance g = 0.5 for the intra-cultural negotiations. In human negotiations, the
effect of group distance can be reduced by getting acquainted, but we assume that
Japanese agents will still experience USA agents more as strangers than out-group

123

Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 95

Table 5 Average results of simulated negotiations between agents configured with cultural dimensions
similar to Japan ( H = 0.5, A = 0.9, I = 0.4, M = 0.9, L = 0.8) and USA ( H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I =
0.9, M = 0.6, L = 0.3) (8 suppliers; 8 customers; 10 runs of 200 time steps; parameter values as in Table 4;
status = 0.5 for all agents)

Supplier/customer Group distance Number of transactions % Failed negotiations % Top quality

USA/USA g = 1 31 70 70
Japan/Japan g = 1 9 90 0
USA/USA g = 0.5 32 70 69
Japan/Japan g = 0.5 43 60 23
USA/Japan g = 1 0 100
Japan/USA g = 1 19 81 37
USA/Japan g = 0.7 7 93 0
Japan/USA g = 0.7 22 79 38

Japanese agents. Therefore, intercultural tests are run with g = 1 and g = 0.7. For
The hypotheses to be tested in this situation are:

H10 Japanese agent’s negotiation results strongly depend on group distance.
H11 Intercultural negotiations between simulated USA and Japanese agents are less

efficient than intra-cultural negotiations in those countries.
H12 Even if group distance is reduced, better results are obtained in a culturally

homogeneous than in an intercultural setting.

The results presented in Table 5 confirm the hypotheses. USA agents are not very
sensitive to group distance, but Japanese are. Under the assumption that Japanese
agents experience larger group distance with USA than with other Japanese, H11 and
H12 are confirmed. The difference in results with USA and Japan in customer versus
supplier role is caused by differences in risk attitude.

The second example of results obtained with realistic cultural indices is based on
results of human gaming simulations by Meijer et al. (2006). One of their findings is
that Dutch buyers prefer to trust their suppliers with respect to agreements to deliver
top quality products, while buyers from the USA prefer certification and third party
testing. Simulations were run to test if the model could simulate this effect. For this
test the following parameter settings were modified:

– quality preference w′Q was raised to 0.2 (to stimulate to top quality trade);
– trust in each other agent was set to t = 0.8 (to enable trusting behavior);
– the certification option was switched on, i.e. buyers had the opportunity to demand

a certificate, which incurs extra cost on the suppliers (10% of the maximum price
of top quality products) and thereby raises price.

All agents are equally configured, except for culture. The hypothesis is:

H13 Agents configured as Dutch buyers are more inclined to trust than USA agents;
customer agents configured with USA culture are more inclined to pay for
certified quality than Dutch agents.

The results presented in Table 6 confirm this hypothesis.

123

96 G. J. Hofstede et al.

Table 6 Average results of simulated negotiations between agents configured with cultural dimensions
similar to Dutch ( H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I = 0.8, M = 0.1, L = 0.4) and USA (H = 0.4, A = 0.5, I =
0.9, M = 0.6, L = 0.3) (8 suppliers; 8 customers; 5 runs of 200 time steps; parameter values as in Table 4,
except typical value of w′Q = 0.2)

Supplier/Customer Number of
transactions

% Failed
negotiations

% Top quality % Certified
transactions

USA/USA 48 54 89 15

Dutch/Dutch 50 48 94 7

Dutch/USA 54 49 91 13

USA/Dutch 45 57 93 4

7 Conclusion

Negotiation can be approached as a rational process of collaborative decision making,
as advocated by Raiffa et al. (2002). However, it is observed that negotiation outcomes
differ across the world and that people from different countries differ with respect to
the way they negotiate and the results they obtain (Gelfand and Brett 2004). As to all
forms of negotiations, this applies to business negotiations and the bargaining about
commercial transactions. There is abundant evidence that the result of decision mak-
ing in business is influenced by the cultural background of the decision makers (e.g.,
Graham et al. 1994; Adair et al. 2004; Metcalf et al. 2006) or institutional differences
across countries (e.g., Kumar and Worm 2004), the development of which is also influ-
enced by culture (Hofstede 2001). Therefore, agent-based simulations of international
supply chains and networks should account for cultural differences.

De Rosis et al. (2004) suggested to explore the feasibility of Geert Hofstede’s five-
dimensional model (Hofstede 2001) to differentiate agents’ behavior across cultures.
The present paper shows how Hofstede’s theory can be used for this purpose, in a
multi-agent simulation of international trade.

In contrast with models that aim to optimize rational decision making, the model
should in this case realistically simulate human negotiation behavior. The ABMP
negotiation architecture (Jonker and Treur 2001) was validated to satisfy this require-
ment by Bosse et al. (2004) . Therefore, the ABMP architecture is chosen as the basis
for modeling cultural differences. A model has been developed for the joint effect of
the dimensions of culture on ABMP parameters, based on earlier work that modeled
the separate effects of individual dimensions (Hofstede et al. 2006, 2008a,b,c, 2009).

The model proposed in this paper has been tested on imaginary stereotypical cul-
tures that differ on only one of the dimensions. Tendencies in the results along each
of the dimensions comply with what is expected on the basis Geert Hofstede’s theory.
The tests with the stereotypical cultures confirm that the model is sensitive to varia-
tions of the cultural indices in the desired direction. Further testing with combinations
of dimensions that are drawn from actual cultures should give evidence of the model’s
validity.

Two examples are given of simulations of results of negotiation research reported
in business science literature. The simulations reproduce qualitative aspects of the

123

Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents 97

cases reported in that literature, thus confirming that the model can reproduce actual
cultural effects. However, this does not provide a full validation of the model. It is a test
that confirms the model’s sensitivity for relevant parameters. Validation and tuning of
parameters require more simulations of actual cases from literature or experiments.

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c.10726_2010_Article_9190

Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Hofstede’s Five Dimensions of Culture
2.1 Collectivism Versus Individualism
2.2 Hierarchy: Large Versus Small Power Distance
2.3 Aggression and Gender: Masculinity Versus Femininity
2.4 Otherness and Truth: Uncertainty Avoidance
2.5 Short Versus Long-Term Gratification of Needs
2.6 Five Dimensions, One World
3 Negotiation
3.1 Agent Models for Negotiation
3.2 Focus on Interpersonal Bargaining
3.3 Agent-Based Market Place (ABMP) and its Application in the Agents
3.4 The utility function
4 Culture and Bargaining
4.1 Power Distance (Hofstede et al. 2009)
4.2 Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede et al. 2008b)
4.3 Individualism and Collectivism (Hofstede et al. 2008a)
4.4 Masculinity and Femininity (Hofstede et al. 2006)
4.5 Long- Versus Short-Term Orientation (Hofstede et al. 2008c)
5 Modeling Culture in ABMP
6 Test Runs
7 Conclusion
References

Societies2013, 3, 128–146; doi:10.3390/soc3010128

societies
ISSN 2075-4698

www.mdpi.com/journal/societies

Article

Culture Matters: Individualism vs. Collectivism in Conflict
Decision-Making

Rebecca LeFebvre and Volker Franke *

International Conflict Management, Kennesaw State University, 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw,

Georgia 30144, USA

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: vfranke@kennesaw.edu;

Tel.: +1-678-797-2931; Fax: +1-770-423-6312.

Received: 25 January 2013; in revised form: 1 March 2013 / Accepted: 4 March 2013 /

Published: 12 March 2013

Abstract: Does culture matter in decision-making? Existing literature largely assumes that

the cognitive processes that inform decision-making are universally applicable, while only

very few studies indicate that cultural norms and values shape cognitive processes. Using

survey based quasi-experimental design, this research shows that subjects with higher

levels of individualism tend to be more rational in their decision processing, while those

with higher levels of collectivism tend to be more dependent and less likely to betray the

interests of members of more central ingroups in favor of less central ingroups. Furthermore,

the results indicate that in conflict settings that seem familiar, individuals are more likely to

compromise in order to achieve peace.

Keywords: individualism; collectivism; social identity; culture; decision-making

1. Introduction

In August of 2012, Erick Barrondo became Guatemala’s first ever Olympic medal winner. After

finishing second in the men’s twenty kilometer walk race, Barrondo said, “It’s well known that

Guatemala has problems with guns and knives. I hope that this medal inspires the kids at home to put

down guns and knives and pick up a pair of trainers instead” [1]. Even today, Guatemala feels the

effects of its 36-year civil war that ended in 1996, as individuals throughout the country make

decisions regularly on whether to cooperate or fight, and whether to pursue peaceful activities or use

violence. The country’s history of armed conflict and polarized politics created a complex social

OPEN ACCESS

Societies 2013, 3 129

environment prompting the presence of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation, MINUGUA,

for ten years ending in 2004. In its final report on the mission, the UN noted that “the most difficult

challenge for MINUGUA was to operate in the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multilingual

environment of Guatemala” [2]. This raises the question of how significant the impact of culture is on

the decisions made not only by deployed peacekeeping troops, but also by the individuals living in the

conflict society [3]. Decision-making as an activity is considered to be a rational universal practice in

human behavior, as people of all cultures have problems and opportunities that require making choices

from among alternatives. Most research studies presume that the cognitive processing behind decision

making is also universal, although a small set of literature suggests that cultural variation does make a

difference in cognitive processes [4]. If the argument for cultural variation can be more fully

supported, particularly in the context of conflict, then culturally-relevant constraints in decision-making

environments become more applicable to models of decision processing and conflict prevention.

The main research question of this study is: how do cultural norms and values affect decision-making

in conflict situations? Using a comparative case study, we examined cross-country differences in

decision-making processes between sample populations in the U.S. and Ghana. We selected these two

countries based on significant cultural differences, with the U.S. being highly individualist and Ghana

being highly collectivist [5]. The design of our study centered on a survey that examined key

individual attributes such as individualism-collectivism and styles of decision making in response to a

quasi-experimental decision scenario presented to a sample of university students from each country.

The article is divided into four main sections. The first section provides a review of the current

literature on conflict theory, decision theory, culture, and group identity. The second section presents a

theoretical framework and develops a set of testable hypotheses. The third section provides a

discussion of the methodology and data collection techniques and the fourth section presents our

findings and some preliminary suggestions for future research.

2. Decision-Making in Conflict

In this section, we review relevant literature from conflict resolution theory, decision theory,

cultural dimensions, and group identity in an attempt to systematically explore the impact of cultural

dimensions on decision-making processes, especially in the context of conflict resolution

and transformation.

2.1. Conflict Resolution Theory

Conflict resolution emerged as a field of study in the 1950s and 1960s when a group of scholars

began to develop specific approaches and techniques for analyzing the cultural generalizability of

conflict resolution [6]. Early theorists in the field of conflict resolution did not find cultural variation to

be particularly relevant. For example, Burton and Sandole characterized conflict resolution approaches

as generic, based on universal behaviors thought to transcend cultural differences, because the root of

conflict was seen not through the impact of social institutions and cultural values, but rather through

the drive to satisfy basic human needs [7]. Anthropologists such as Avruch and Black brought

increased awareness to the culture question, challenging some of the assumptions made about the

universality of human nature. Avruch and Black introduced the notion of ethnoconflict theory which

Societies 2013, 3 130

precedes discussion of interests, needs, and values in the analysis of conflict by focusing on the

implicit knowledge contained within a culture that is often taken for granted and may rarely be

verbalized [8]. They refer to this knowledge as “local common sense”. The importance of cultural

relevance to conflict resolution theory emerged partly as a result of specific case studies that

demonstrated the ineffectiveness of taking North American-based conflict resolution techniques and

trying to transfer them to other parts of the world without accounting for local common sense [9,10].

Conflict resolution techniques often involve various aspects of negotiation, and in the study of

negotiation processes, we find that cultural variation becomes apparent while building relationships,

communicating, setting goals, and reaching agreements [11]. Cohen considered negotiations to be a

special case of communications, with all the inherent traps of misunderstandings and

misinterpretations [12]. In international negotiations, the potential for miscommunication is

characteristic of intercultural interaction in general, for in order to have true communication, the

parties must have a common base of semantic assumptions. People who have no shared experience or

common history have no guarantee that the intended meaning by the sender is decoded correctly by the

receiver. In this sense, culture becomes a key variable when people from different cultures interact.

Although there are differences of opinion on the relevance of culture to conflict resolution, the field

has evolved to a point where culture is considered to be an important factor in settings of interactive

conflict resolution. However, just how does culture factor in, and how does it affect the individual

level, shaping how people make personal decisions about whether to participate in conflict escalation

or resolution activities?

2.2. Decision Theory

How do people go about making a decision? In particular, we are interested in how people make

decisions when faced with a situation of conflict. We briefly review four types of decision theory.

2.2.1. Theories of Rationality

The rational choice theory was the dominant paradigm in decision making from World War II until

the late twentieth century. Rational choice theory makes three broad assumptions: actors know what

they want, are able to order their wants, and will choose the best means to reach their desired ends [13].

For instance, in expected utility theory, different people attribute different value to risk, so each seeks

to maximize their own “expected utility” rather than maximizing an overall “expected value” that is

mathematically calculated [14]. In other words, people make a rational choice by analyzing the costs,

benefits, and risks and seeking to optimize their outcome based on their own preference for risk.

One flaw in any rational approach is the assumption that people have perfect information and the

perfect ability to calculate all the costs and benefits before making a decision [15]. In order to

accommodate the more imperfect real world, Simon introduced his famous satisficing theory to

include shortcuts in the optimization process [16], allowing individuals to set a threshold and accept

the first choice that crosses their threshold, leaving the rest of the alternatives without analysis.

Some scholars believe that rationality provides the only scientific approach to social theory [13].

Theories of rationality do simplify or generalize the problem at hand, and generalization is seen to be

of great value because it allows for prediction. However, critics of the rational choice approach argue

Societies 2013, 3 131

that it is inherently inconsistent with observed human behavior [17–20]. For example, more lottery

tickets are sold as the size of the prize increases, indicating that the size of the jackpot is more

important to players than the probability of actually winning [21].

2.2.2. Theories of Emotion

Although much of the criticism against rational choice stems from cognitive theory (described in

the next section), there are a few emotion-based decision factors worth mentioning. The concept of

affect in decision-making is one that arises when emotions such as fear are particularly strong. Affect

enables a person to make decisions quickly in the face of danger, but can also cloud judgment [15].

Gordon and Arian studied the relationship between feelings of threat and decision processing from

data on the Arab/Israeli conflict as well as local U.S. conflict situations such as neighborhood crime [22].

They found that when people felt threatened, their decision process was dominated by emotion, not

logic or rational considerations. Their findings showed that the stronger the level of threat, the more

belligerent the policy choice; the lower the level of threat, the more pacific the policy choice. They

argued that even though logic has as role in decision-making, much of the process is driven by emotion.

2.2.3. Theories of Cognition

Observation has shown that people often make choices that are not rational, and many social

scientists have pursued an explanation for this unpredictable behavior via a cognitive approach.

Cognitive approaches focus on human processing of information, including how individuals gather

information and then use it to evaluate situations [23]. This approach has led to a model of human

behavior broadly referred to as “behavioral decision theory”, which shows that people use cognitive

shortcuts and preferences when processing information, deviating predictably from rational choice

theories [18].

Kahneman and Tversky researched why people seem to exhibit inconsistent behavior when making

decisions in risky situations and published their ground-breaking research on prospect theory in 1979 [19].

In prospect theory, the objects of choice are prospects with value assigned in terms of gains and losses,

rather than final outcomes. People react differently depending on how the situation is presented in

terms of those gains and losses. Underlying the work on prospect theory are the concepts of heuristics

and biases. Heuristics are essentially cognitive shortcuts, which reduce complex tasks to simpler

operations of judgment. Judgmental heuristics, however, can introduce error and lead to suboptimal

outcomes [18,23–25]. These errors are usually referred to as biases, which can vary depending on the

heuristic being used. Three commonly discussed heuristics are: availability, representativeness, and

adjustment and anchoring. The availability heuristic is based on information that is most accessible to

a person or occurrences that can be most easily brought to mind. In the representativeness heuristic,

others are grouped into types with assumed similarity of characteristics, as in stereotypes. Using the

adjustment and anchoring heuristic means starting from an initial value that is known and making

adjustments from there based on the current situation [25]. There are many other heuristics that have

been identified in political science and psychological literature, with more than fifty distinct heuristics

named [26]. The danger of this seemingly endless proliferation of heuristics is that keeping track of

them all and discovering how individuals coordinate these multiple judgment strategies becomes

Societies 2013, 3 132

overwhelmingly complex. A more productive approach would be to focus on the cognitive processes

behind the decisions rather than on the individual heuristics themselves.

There are varied examples in the literature of how social scientists have applied aspects of cognitive

theory to specific situations. The application of the cognitive approach to domestic politics and voting

practices is the most prevalent [26,27]. Other applications include understanding how heuristics are

used by political elites [23] and security policy makers [24]. The application of heuristics to decision

making in situations of conflict has been studied only infrequently.

2.2.4. Blended Theories

One can imagine various ways to combine theories of rationality, emotion, and cognition, but there

is one particular blended approach that has received the most attention in the literature: poliheuristic

theory. Poliheuristic theory offers an alternative to the traditional rational actor model by integrating

aspects of both the cognitive and rational approaches to decision-making. Poliheuristic theory is

conceptualized as a two-stage decision process. The first stage is a cognitive process, which screens

the possible alternatives and narrows the choices by eliminating options based on one or more

heuristics. In the second stage, the remaining alternatives are then evaluated in a rational way in order

to minimize risk and maximize benefit [28–30]. Poliheuristic theory has made important contributions

to understanding the decision making process in the realm of foreign policy [31], but its application to

other types of decisions made by individuals and groups has been limited [29].

2.3. Cultural Dimensions

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a

nationality,” but what determines nationality? Is it culture? From a legal point of view, nationality is

about reflecting an individual’s genuine link with a country, based on objective factors such as place of

birth, descent, and residency [32]. On the other hand, culture, even though it is often associated with a

country, is more difficult to define and measure [33]. One common definition of culture is based on the

anthropological conception of a learned system of meanings rooted in symbols and language that allow

people to adapt to their environment and interpret their experiences [34]. Hofstede’s 1980 study

defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one

human group from another” [35].

In attempts to understand and categorize national cultures, a number of scholars have narrowed

their focus to the study of values. Values are principles that give order and guidance to people in their

thoughts and actions as they face common human problems and issues [36]. By observing the

principles that different social groups use in their thoughts and actions, researchers have been able to

infer the values shared by various social groups. Societies can then be categorized and compared based

on commonly shared values. In 2008, Thomas reviewed the five major frameworks that have emerged

out of these value studies, each allowing for the categorization and comparison of national cultures: the

Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck framework, Hofstede’s model, the Schwartz Value Survey, Trompennars’s

value dimensions, and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE)

study [37]. Each of these five studies categorized culture in terms of value measurements, deriving a

set of four to nine dimensions depending on the framework. The only dimension to appear in all five

Societies 2013, 3 133

values studies is the individualism-collectivism dimension. The individualism-collectivism dimension

has been used extensively in the study of social behaviors, especially in efforts to predict behavioral

patterns [37–40]. For example, conducting a meta-analysis of 253 studies on individualism-collectivism,

Osyerman et al. concluded that the individualism-collectivism construct does impact basic psychological

processing, and that cultural differences in the dimension “provide a powerful explanatory tool for

understanding the variability in the behavior of individuals in different parts of the world” [39].

The term individualism is used to define the degree to which members of society define their self-image

as an individual or as part of a larger group. On the other hand, those who define themselves from the

social and collective aspects of the self-concept are described with the term collectivism. Individualism

and collectivism are sometimes seen as opposite ends of a single continuum, but it is more accurate to

describe them as worldviews that make different aspects of the self-concept salient. The core elements

of individualism are independence and uniqueness, whereas the core elements of collectivism are duty

to in-group and maintaining harmony. Triandis writes about the prototypical social relationships that

describe each of these two constructs [41]. For collectivism, the prototypical relationship is the family.

The family cares for its members and cooperates together, often acting as a single unit with common

goals. Each member of the family has a well-defined role and status determined by position within the

group. Family members have strong emotional ties to one another and are linked typically for life. For

individualism, the prototypical relationship is the marketplace where an individual makes a payment

and receives a good or service in return. The relationships are emotionally distant and although

members of the market interact frequently, each member maintains his or her own distinct identity.

The marketplace encourages competition, and status is usually determined by individual achievement

and success and not by membership in a particular group.

The individualism-collectivism construct is useful as a mechanism for systematically describing

ways in which cultures differ. The construct is helpful for understanding how culture influences

not only what people think but also how they think. How could the measured difference in

individualism-collectivism play out in terms of decision making? Chen and Li explored cultural

differences of decision-making between individualist and collectivist societies by looking at Chinese

(collectivist) versus Australian (individualistic) cultures [42]. They found that the Chinese were less

cooperative with foreigners than with Chinese, whereas Australians were equally cooperative with

members of either group. However, such research studies into the cultural impacts on decision making

are rare and there are many unresolved and unanswered questions in this area. Do individualist and

collectivist cultures differ in the values they apply to decisions made in the face of conflict? Do such

differences enhance or aggravate peacekeeping efforts that are initiated in conflict prone zones? Can

peacekeeping personnel be trained to manage cultural differences and achieve peace more efficiently?

There is a need for further research to gain an improved understanding of how cultural differences

manifest themselves in the decision making process, particularly in conflict contexts. The well-

established differences in the individualism-collectivism dimension between the two countries make

the U.S. and Ghana an excellent test case for a cross-country comparative study on culture and its

impact on decision-making.

Societies 2013, 3 134

2.4. Social/Group Identity

Most generally, identity represents “the process by which the person seeks to integrate his (sic)

various statuses and roles, as well as his diverse experiences, into a coherent image of self” [43].

Individuals draw on multiple, sometimes even competing subidentities (e.g., religious, political, social,

ethnic, or occupational) to derive their self-conceptions. These subidentities become consequential for

behavior in situations when their salience is invoked [44]. A person’s various subidentities form

specific links between the self and his or her membership in social groups. Hofman specified salience

as the probability by which a subidentity is remembered and activated in a given context [45].

Prolonged salience upgrades the subidentity in the “prominence hierarchy” thereby enhancing its

“centrality” and the degree to which it connects with other subidentities. The more central a

subidentity is to an individual’s self-conception and the more interconnected it is with other

subidentities, the more committed the individual will be to preserving and enhancing that identity and

to display attitudes, values, and social behaviors consistent with it.

In the present context, the concept of “social identity” refers to “that part of individuals’ self

concept which derives from knowledge of their membership in a social group (or groups) together with

the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” [46]. Theories of social identity are

typically based on three premises:

(1) people are motivated to create and maintain a positive self-concept;

(2) the self-concept derives largely from group identifications; and

(3) people establish positive social identities through normative comparisons between favorable in-groups

and unfavorable out-groups [47].

Social identity research has demonstrated that individuals tend to invoke their group identifications

in many decision contexts, since the norms, values, stereotypes and behavior patterns associated with a

particular identity provide a sense of certainty and may inform their choice among decision

alternatives [48–54].

3. Theory and Hypotheses

The main research question of this study asks with regard to cultural variation: (1) how are

decisions made (the decision-making process), and (2) what are the actual decisions (the decision-making

outcome). We operationalized the decision-making process using the scale developed by Spicer &

Adler-Smith which identifies a self-reported general decision making style (GDMS) falling into one of

five categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or spontaneous [55]. A rational style is a

logical and structured approach to decision making. An intuitive style relies upon hunches, feelings

and impressions. A dependent style relies upon the direction and support of others. An avoidant style

tends to postpone or avoid making decisions. In addition, a spontaneous style is impulsive and prone to

making spur of the moment decisions.

The independent variable, “cultural norms and values”, was measured analyzing: (1) the cultural

traits of the individual decision maker, (2) the society that the individual lives in, and (3) the cultural

context of the conflict setting. Recognizing that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of decision-making

operate at the country level and variation occurs across people within each country, we measured the

Societies 2013, 3 135

cultural traits of the decision maker by employing the Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale

(AICS) [56]. Individualists are those that exhibit traits of uniqueness, responsibility, and

competitiveness, while collectivists seek advice and harmony.

To measure societal aspects, we collected data using survey-based quasi-experimental design at an

American university and compared results to data collected at a university in Ghana, The cultural

dimensions of these two countries vary across Hofstede’s measures, as shown in Figure 1, with the

most marked difference seen in the individualism-collectivism score [5]. Even if individuals within a

country do not align with Hofstede’s dimensions for that country, we anticipated that living in a

society with particular cultural dimensions would affect how the individual behaved.

Figure 1. Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions for the U.S. and Ghana.

Source: The Hofstede Center 2012 [5].

For the final cultural aspect, the setting of a particular conflict scenario was varied randomly

between two descriptions that differed distinctly in the individualist/collectivist nature of the groups

involved. The conflict scenario was written as a short fictional vignette depicting a mining operation

under protest. Participants were asked to take on a specific role within the vignette and make decisions

that would potentially affect themselves and the various groups to which they belonged (see below for

a more detailed description of the scenario). The vignette itself was designed to make salient different

layers of social identity, as shown in Figure 2. Both versions of the vignette followed this layered

model. The key difference between the versions was in the description of the overall community—

individualist versus collectivist—and reference to friends and family.

We hypothesized that each of the three aspects of culture would impact decision making. First, the

individualist-collectivist nature of a person should affect their decision-making style. The desire for

uniqueness and the competitive drive are likely to reflect a more rational decision making style, while

the desire for harmony and the drive to seek advice from others are likely to result in a more dependent

decision making style for collectivists. We tested the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals with more individualist traits are more rational in their decision-making.

H2: Individuals with more collectivist traits are more dependent in their decision-making.

Societies 2013, 3 136

With regard to the second cultural aspect, society, we hypothesized that people living in a more

collectivist society (Ghana over the U.S.) would be more likely to prioritize the needs and interests of

their more central ingroups, namely those identity groups that are at more salient at the inner layers.

H3: Individuals from a more collectivist society are more likely to prioritize the interests of

members of social groups that are closer to the core of their salient identities.

We also anticipated an effect of the cultural setting of the scenario, expecting that when decision

makers were presented with a conflict scenario in a cultural setting that did not align with their own

cultural experiences, their style of decision-making would adjust and become more avoidant.

Additionally, we expected that when decision makers were presented with a scenario in a cultural

setting that generally felt similar to their own social surroundings, their decisions would more often

lean toward cooperation and the pursuit of peace, rather than continued protests. This type of effect can

be considered a “representativeness” heuristic where the opposition is judged to be more trustworthy

because they represent something more familiar.

H4a: The more individualistic a person is, the more avoidant his/her decision-making style will

become in collectivist contexts.

H4b: The more collectivist a person is, the more avoidant his/her decision-making style will

become in individualist contexts.

H5: When the setting of the story assimilates one’s own cultural context, decision makers more

often choose to cooperate and achieve peace, than resist and continue protesting.

Figure 2. Layers of Group Identity in the Vignette.

4. Methods and Data

Data was collected from 469 undergraduate students across two universities: Kennesaw State

University (KSU) located in Kennesaw, Georgia where 265 respondents participated through an

on-line survey system implemented through introductory psychology classes, and the University of

Societies 2013, 3 137

Cape Coast (UCC) in Ghana, where 204 participants completed a paper survey. UCC participants

came from three classes: 84 participants from an introductory level history class; 67 participants from

a junior level sociology class; and 53 students from a senior level business class. The resulting samples

from KSU and UCC were compared on key demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, religion,

ethnicity, major, and country of origin, indicating that both samples were similar in terms of age,

percent native born, religion, and distribution of ethnicities with one dominant ethnicity and one

secondary ethnicity. The largest demographic difference was in terms of gender, where KSU had an

unusually high participation of females, much higher than the university average.

Selecting our sample from student populations presents a well-recognized limitation to the

generalizability of our findings, because college students are not representative of society or the public

at large. However, the primary goal of this experiment is not to generalize to society, but to test for the

impact of culture on decision-making in a laboratory-like setting, controlling as much as possible for

other, non-cultural, decision factors [57]. Surveying student participants is justified by the fact that

they represent likely future leaders [58], a population of interest as exemplar carriers of social identity

and values and, as such, a valid target group for research into the cultural dynamics of local conflict

and its resolution and/or transformation.

Employing the quasi-experiment previously described, participants were randomly assigned one of

two versions of the story: one set in an individualistic culture and the other set in a collectivist culture.

Prior to being presented with the vignette, participants were asked to complete the AICS instrument to

determine their individualism-collectivism traits, and the GDMS instrument to determine the general

decision making style. After reading the vignette, participants were presented with two decisions to

make. The first decision was whether to reveal fellow protest members who were dangerously

sabotaging the mine, and the second decision was whether to take an offer from the company CEO that

would provide additional benefits to the protest group, but not all the miners. Each of these decisions

was presented as a binary choice. Finally, the GDMS instrument was administered again in modified

form, with references to the particular decision just made in order to assess the extent to which their

decision was affected by type of setting/cultural context. The flow of the experiment is represented in

Figure 3.

Figure 3. Experimental Design.

Societies 2013, 3 138

The AICS instrument consisted of 26 items measuring traits divided between individualism and

collectivism that had been previously validated and shown to be reliable with α > 0.70 [59]. Responses

were given on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Based on

participant feedback from a pretest conducted earlier, the most repetitive questions in the survey were

removed, resulting in 14-item instrument with a slightly reduced reliability of α > 0.67. See Appendix

A for the 14-item question set. The GDMS instrument consisted of 25 items with five items identified for

each of the five decision-making styles and a previous validation shown to be reliable with α > 0.67 [55].

Again based on participant feedback from the earlier pretest, the most repetitive questions in the

survey were removed, resulting in 17-item instrument with a slightly reduced reliability of α > 0.64.

See Appendix B for this 17-item question set.

5. Findings

We tested the first two hypotheses using regression analysis. H1 anticipates a positive relationship

between individualism and rational decision making, and this was reflected in the results. The

correlation between the rational decision-making style and individualism was statistically significant

(p < 0.05), remaining so when controlled by age, gender, country, and religion1. Another factor that

emerged as significant was the country location, with participants from the U.S. being less rational,

whereas those from Ghana being more rational. H2 anticipates a correlation between dependent

decision making and collectivism, as reflected by the negative sign on the individualism coefficient

(see Table 1). The correlation between a dependent decision-making style and collectivism was

significant (p < 0.01), remaining so when controlling for age, gender, country, and religion. The

coefficient for individualism-collectivism was small and again country location emerged as a

significant factor with a larger coefficient value indicating that those from the U.S. were less

dependent and those from Ghana tended to be more dependent. No issues of heteroskedasticity were

present in the models. Adjusted R-squared was 4% and 5% for the rational and dependent models

respectively, with statistical significance for the F-stat of both, indicating robust models. Overall, our

statistical analysis showed support for both H1 and H2, revealing significant relationships between

individualism and rational decision-making (H1), and collectivism and dependent decision-making

(H2). The small coefficients and low R-squared values suggest, however, that individualism-collectivism

traits are only a small part of the decision-making equation. Tables 1 and 2 show a

summary of the results.

H3 anticipates that in a more collectivist society (Ghana), decision makers will prioritize interest of

members of more central ingroups over those of less central ingroups. This hypothesis was tested via

the first decision made after reading the vignette. In this case, the participants must decide whether to

reveal the names of the people sabotaging the mine (the inner group circle of protestors) to the head of

the mining company (the most outer group circle, see Figure 2). Revealing their names could get the

people into trouble with the law or cause them to lose their jobs. However, not revealing their names

puts all the miners in physical danger (the group circle between the other two layers), and puts the

company at risk (the most outer group circle). There were many factors for participants to consider,

and the dilemma had no straightforward or obvious answer, but a general indicator of prioritizing inner

1 Due to the dominance of the Christian religion in both samples (93% in Ghana and 77% in the U.S.), we controlled for

religion as a dummy variable of Christian or not-Christian.

Societies 2013, 3 139

group circle interests should show in the decision not to reveal the names. We therefore hypothesized

that participants from the U.S. were more likely to reveal the names, and participants from Ghana were

less likely to reveal the names. The results of our logistic regression did support this hypothesis when

controlling for age, gender, and religion (p < 0.05). Gender also emerged as a significant factor (p < 0.05),

with men more often deciding to reveal the names. See Table 3 for the results.

Table 1. OLS Regression Results for Rational Decision-Making Style.

DV=Rational I II III IV V
Individualism
(variable of interest)

0.108
(0.028) **

0.122
(0.012) **

0.121
(0.013) **

0.103
(0.034) **

0.110
(0.026) **

Age

−0.325
(0.128)

−0.325
(0.129)

−0.380
(0.075) *

−0.391
(0.065) *

GenderMale

−0.463
(0.853)

−2.475
(0.338)

−1.858
(0.472)

USParticipant

−7.087
(0.004) ***

−5.750
(0.023) **

ReligionChristian

7.218
(0.025) **

Adjusted R-Squared 0.008 0.013 0.011 0.028 0.037

F-Stat

4.867
(0.028) **

3.872
(0.022) **

2.561
(0.054) *

4.035
(0.003) ***

4.268
(0.001) ***

N 469 425 424 424 424
P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1.

Table 2. OLS Regression Results for Dependent Decision-Making Style.

DV=Dependent I II III IV V
Individualism
(variable of interest)

−0.152
(0.003) ***

−0.139
(0.013) **

−0.141
(0.011) **

−0.172
(0.002) ***

−0.169
(0.002) ***

Age

−0.064
(0.793)

−0.081
(0.741)

−0.172
(0.477)

−0.178
(0.462)

GenderMale

3.121
(0.279)

−0.197
(0.946)

0.135
(0.964)

USParticipant

−11.692
(0.001) ***

−10.972
(0.001) ***

ReligionChristian

3.888
(0.291)

Adjusted R-Squared

0.016 0.011 0.011 0.049 0.049

F-Stat

8.747
(0.003) ***

3.284
(0.038) **

2.607
(0.051) *

6.407
(0.001) ***

5.351
(0.001) ***

N 469 425 424 424 424

P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1.

Societies 2013, 3 140

Table 3. Logit Regression of Country Location and Choice to Reveal Saboteurs.

DV=Reveal I II III IV
USParticipant
(variable of interest)

0.310
(0.115)

(0.387)
(0.057) *

0.494
(0.020) **

0.520
(0.018) **

Age

0.021
(0.227)

0.021
(0.252)

0.021
(0.269)

GenderMale

0.455
(0.044) **

0.465
(0.041) **

Religion: Christian

0.134
(0.633)

% of cases correctly predicted 60% 59% 58% 58%
N 446 417 416 416

P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at .05; * = significant at 0.1.

Statistical analysis did not support H4a and H4b, indicating that there was no effect of individualist

versus collectivist cultural context on the tendency to avoid decision-making. However, an individual’s

country of residence emerged as a factor that affected the avoidance tendency. Individuals from Ghana

were more likely to want to avoid making the vignette-based decisions altogether.

Finally, H5 was tested to determine if the familiarity of the vignette setting had an effect on the

decision to compromise with the company management and take an offer that met part but not all of

the protesting group’s stated objectives. Participants were asked if the location of the vignette was

similar to where they lived. Analysis showed that the coefficient for the familiarity of the cultural

context did have the hypothesized effect and was significantly correlated to the decision to cooperate,

remaining so when controlled by age, gender, country, and religion (p < 0.05). See Table 4 for a

summary of the results.

Table 4. Logit Regression Results for Similarity-of-Setting.

DV=Cooperate I II III IV V

LocationFeltSimilar
(variable of interest)

0.562
(0.037) **

0.634
(0.021) **

0.613
(0.029) **

0.742
(0.012) **

0.743
(0.013) **

Age

−0.044
(0.049) **

−0.044
(0.048) **

−0.038
(0.092) *

−0.039
(0.059) *

GenderMale

0.060
(0.797)

0.128
(0.596)

0.130
(0.588)

USParticipant 0.357 (0.133) 0.364 (0.133)
Religion: Christian 0.032 (0.916)
% of cases correctly predicted 67% 67% 68% 67% 66%
N 432 410 409 409 409

P-value in parentheses; *** = significant at 0.01; ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

Analysis of the data collected in the U.S. and Ghana indicate that culture does indeed have an

impact on decision making, showing indications of cultural impact across individual traits, societal

traits, and conflict setting. First, the two hypotheses regarding personal traits were well-supported by

Societies 2013, 3 141

the data, indicating that cultural traits such as individualism and collectivism can have an effect on the

general decision making style of individuals. Those who are more individualist tend to be more

rational, and those who are more collectivist tend to be more dependent. This is an important finding

for those who work in mediation and conflict resolution. When attempting to bring parties together to

form an agreement, one ought to understand the cultural traits of the parties involved and tailor one’s

approach accordingly. Our findings lead us to conclude that we ought not to expect collectivists to

make long lasting decisions without the involvement of others in their group or individualists to toss

aside the thoroughly researched and logical choice to go with a snap decision.

Second, the nature of the society one lives in informs the decision making process. This study

shows support for the third hypothesis that those from a collectivist society (Ghana) are more likely to

prioritize interests of members of more central social identity groups by, in this case, not revealing the

sabotage of associates. The country location emerged several times throughout the study as a relevant

factor in determining decision making styles including rational, dependent, and in some cases avoidant

thinking. This finding has particular relevance to peacekeeping operations. Preparation and training for

peacekeeping missions should be built on an awareness of the cultural traits of the target society, and

particularly on the central group identities informing the parties to the conflict. Our research suggests a

tendency for collectivist societies to want to solve group problems within the most central and salient

ingroup identities and a general reluctance to go to outer circles to find a solution. This potentially

makes collectivist societies less prone to accepting external intervention, and is an area worthy of

further research.

Third and finally, our analysis indicates that the cultural setting of a situation can alter decision-making

processes, but not in all cases. The nature of the conflict setting itself did not appear to have an impact,

showing no support for the fourth set of hypotheses. However, the fifth hypothesis was supported,

showing an effect of the feeling of familiarity to a conflict setting on the tendency toward peace. This

may be an indication that it is advisable to deploy peacekeepers from collectivist societies to conflict

settings in collectivist societies because their familiarity will aid their effectiveness. Similarly,

peacekeepers from individualist societies should be sent to conflict settings in individualist societies.

The importance of aligning cultural traits of peacekeepers with cultural traits of conflict societies needs

to be explored more thoroughly in future research.

While the survey method we used is effective for collecting large amounts of standardized data

suitable for quantitative analysis, there is a minor limitation to the generalizability of our data because

of the use of college students as previously discussed. However, this limitation did not prevent us from

revealing the impact of culture on decision-making in our particular experimental setting. A further

limitation of our approach is that the artificial nature of the questionnaire poses potential threats to

validity. Having respondents self-report their perceptions measured in terms of responses to

predetermined Likert-type statements limits the accuracy with which people can respond. However, by

presenting all participants in a group with the same stimulus in a controlled setting, experiments and

surveys allow for a level of standardization that is effective in eliminating most concerns for reliability.

The field of international conflict theory has recognized the value of considering cultural variation

in applications of conflict management such as cross-cultural negotiations and interactive conflict

resolution, yet little research has been done to date to understand the implications of cultural variation

on individual decision making processes. Decision theory has marginalized the impact of cultural

Societies 2013, 3 142

dimensions to the cognitive process, assuming that findings are universal to human behavior.

Conversely, theories of ethnoconflict emphasize “local common sense”, or the implied cultural

constraints in a society, which can be part of the unconscious cognitive processing. Understanding how

local common sense plays into the decision-making process displayed during conflict situations can

play a key role in effective conflict transformation efforts.

The results of this research lead us to conclude that there are cultural constraints that have an effect

on the decision making process. Consequently, the broader assumption often made in the literature that

decision-making has universal characteristics must be tempered. The cultural traits of individuals as

well as the general cultural characteristics of the society in which they live factor into the decision

making process. This study has focused on quantitative measures attempting to reveal often

subconscious factors such as one’s own traits and tendencies, the salience of one’s group identities,

and the effects of where one lives. However, there is also likely to be important information in the

conscious part of the decision-making process that could be discovered simply by asking people “why”

they make certain decisions. Such a study would be able to reveal trends in justification factors and

rationale that become salient when making decisions. This is a prime area for future research that

could be used to begin building a conceptual model of the decision-making process in conflict

situations from the point of view of cultural constraints.

Further research is also warranted in other locations of the world. This study was limited to just the

U.S. and Ghana in an initial cross-country comparison. Incorporating other countries that have

similarities and differences in key cultural dimensions would allow for further comparisons and

refinement of the conceptual model. In addition, conducting follow-on research on non-student

populations within the same country would allow for an informative within-country comparison to

highlight cultural differences between populations aside from the country location factor. For example,

it would be useful to study the decision-making of a population experienced in the realm of

peacekeeping and conflict resolution to compare with the typically inexperienced university student

population. How does the conflict decision-making approach vary between these groups? What is the

effect of professional experiences, for instance in the military or police, in a person’s decision-making

process and outcome? Future research should investigate decision theory specifically in the context of

conflict resolution practices, peacekeeping strategy development, and pre-deployment troop training to

assess the extent to which individuals with different demographic, professional or identity

backgrounds make decisions on whether to fight or to cooperate. Central to any such analysis is the

need to gain a thorough understanding of the deeper effects of culture on cognitive processing and

decision-making. Only through such studies will we be able to help in heeding Erick Barronodo’s call

to the youth of Guatemala, and understand why some youth choose to pick up guns and knives and

others do not.

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Appendix A: Reduced Auckland Individualism Collectivism Scale (AICS) Questionnaire

The following questionnaire is used to measure individualist and collectivist traits. Items are

indicated with I or C to indicate they are part of the individualist or collectivist index respectively.

Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or

don’t know.

1. I define myself as a competitive person. (I)

2. Before I make a major decision I seek advice from people close to me. (C)

3. I believe that competition is part of human nature. (I)

Societies 2013, 3 146

4. I consider my friends’ opinions before taking important actions. (C)

5. I like to be accurate when I communicate. (I)

6. It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision. (C)

7. I ask the advice of my friends before making career related decisions. (C)

8. I sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group. (C)

9. I prefer using indirect language rather than upset my friends. (C)

10. I take responsibility for my own actions. (I)

11. My personal identity independent of others is very important to me. (I)

12. Winning is very important to me. (I)

13. I see myself as “my own person.” (I)

14. I consult my family before making an important decision. (C)

Appendix B: Reduced General Decision Making Style (GDMS) Questionnaire

The following questionnaire is used to measure general decision making styles. Items are indicated

with an R, I, D, A, or S to indicate they are part of the rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, or

spontaneous index respectively. Each question is implemented on a scale of strongly agree, agree,

disagree, strongly disagree, or don’t know.

1. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. (I)

2. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. (D)

3. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than to have a

rational explanation for it. (I)

4. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making decisions. (R)

5. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. (R)

6. When making decisions I do what feels natural at the moment. (S)

7. I like to have someone steer me in the right direction when I am faced with important decisions. (D)

8. My decision making requires careful thought. (R)

9. When making a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. (I)

10. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specified goal. (R)

11. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. (A)

12. I often make impulsive decisions. (S)

13. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. (D)

14. I often put off making important decisions. (A)

15. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. (D)

16. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. (A)

17. I make quick decisions. (S)

distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license

(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

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