Comparing Analyzing Evaluating Critiquing Justifying Essay

the writing will be about Read Combs Ch 15. Only referanss is the chapter.

I suggest using a three-ring binder to store your journal entries after they have been read and graded. Each journal entry should contain several paragraphs, written in your own words, and should conform with the following format:

Journal Format

Author ______________________ Reading Title ________________________

Your Name ___________________ Date ______________________________

1. Summary

Write from memory, noting what you recall as the main ideas of the reading.

1. Integration

• In your own words, how does this reading “connect” (amplify, contradict, substantiate, etc.) to other information about this topic? The other information may be in the form of other readings, news stories, or images of the police portrayed in popular culture.
• What do you see as the implications of the ideas covered in the reading?

1. Application

How can you use the information in this reading?Does the reading change your view of some aspect of policing? Explain.If you think there is no application for the material, say so. However, provide a rationale for your position.

Evaluation

Describe your reaction to the reading (like, dislike, etc.). Why?Who is the appropriate audience for this reading? Why?What would make the reading more useful?

5. Essay question

Create an essay question based on the reading that requires critical thinking (comparing, analyzing, evaluating, critiquing, justifying, etc.). The question should be capable of being answered by someone who has read this and earlier readings in our class.STRET WORD , DIRECTE STYLE , YOUR ONLY REFERENSS IS THE CHAPTER 15 .

Chapter 15 What Next? The Future of Terrorism
Opening Viewpoint: Carnivore and the Dawn of Internet Surveillance
In July 2000, it was widely reported that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) possessed a surveillance system
that could monitor Internet communications. Called Carnivore, the system was said to be able to read Internet
traffic moving through cooperating Internet service providers. All that was required was for Carnivore to be installed
on an Internet provider’s network at their facilities. Under law, the FBI could not use Carnivore without a specific
court order under specific guidelines, much like other criminal surveillance orders.
The FBI received a great deal of negative publicity, especially after it was reported that the agency had evaded
demands for documents under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request filed by the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, a privacy rights group. Concern was also raised by critics when it was reported in November
2000 that Carnivore had been very successfully tested and that it had exceeded expectations. This report was not
entirely accurate. In fact, Carnivore did not operate properly when it was used in March 2000 to monitor a criminal
suspect’s e-mail; it had inadvertently intercepted the e-mail of innocent Internet users. This glitch embarrassed the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and angered the DOJ’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.
By early 2001, the FBI gave Carnivore a less ominous-sounding new name, redesignating the system DCS (Digital
Collection System)-1000. Despite the political row, which continued well into 2002 (in part because of the
continued FOIA litigation), Carnivore was cited as a potentially powerful tool in the new war on terrorism. The use
of DCS-1000 after 2003 was apparently reduced markedly, allegedly because Internet surveillance was outsourced
to private companies’ tools. The program reportedly ended in 2005 because of the prevalence of significantly
improved surveillance software.
Throughout this book, readers have been provided with a great deal of information about the
causes of terrorism, the motives behind political violence, terrorist environments, and
counterterrorist responses. Many examples of postwar terrorist movements and environments
were presented to illustrate theoretical concepts and trends. The discussion in this chapter
synthesizes many of these concepts and trends, and it examines emerging trends that characterize
terrorist environments for the immediate future. The discussion also includes a presentation on
central circumstances and options for controlling or ending terrorist violence. As suggested by
the monthly data presented in Figures 15.1 and 15.2, the present-day terrorist environment
remains quite active, and it is very plausible that a similar scale of activity will continue in the
near future.
There is one concept that must be understood at the outset: Projecting future trends is not
synonymous with predicting specific events, and the two should be differentiated as follows:
Figure 15.1 Global Terrorist Attacks in a Single Year by Month, 2015
Figure 15.2 Global Terrorist Attacks in 2015
•
•
Projections involve theoretical constructs of trends based on available data.
Predictions are practical applications of data (that is, intelligence) to anticipate specific
behaviors by extremists.
Predicting terrorist threats is the rather difficult work of intelligence agencies. Making accurate
predictions is problematic because most uncovered threats involve generalized rather than
specific forewarnings. Thus, intelligence agencies can learn about real threats to specific interests
or in specific cities, but they often do not have details about the timing or location of attacks. For
example, the U.S. Department of Justice issued many threat warnings after the September 11,
2001, attacks, but very few described specific threats against specific targets. Furthermore, the
fundamental characteristic of asymmetrical warfare is that terrorists intentionally strike when
least expected, using new and innovative tactics.
One must develop a logical longitudinal framework to evaluate the future of political violence
and countering terrorism. A longitudinal framework uses past history, trends, and cycles to
project future trends and countermeasures. It allows scholars, students, and practitioners to
“stand back” from immediate crises and contemporary terrorist environments to try to construct a
reasonable picture of the near future. These projections must be made with the understanding
that the more near-term a forecast is, the more likely it is to be a realistic projection. Conversely,
far-term forecasts are less likely to be realistic because projections must be consistently updated
using contemporary data.
Photo 15.1 A U.S. Marine fights to pacify an insurgent stronghold in the city of Fallujah, Iraq.
U.S. Department of Defense
The discussion in this chapter will review the future of political violence from the following
perspectives:
•
•
•
•
An Overview of Near-Term Projections
The Future of Terrorism: New Threats
Controlling Terrorism: Ending Terrorist Campaigns and New Challenges
Final Considerations: Terrorism in the United States
An Overview of Near-Term Projections
The discussion in this section examines near-term projections within the contexts of two
theoretical models, and an important analytical question. The following subjects are discussed:
•
•
•
The Theory of Terrorist “Waves”
Fourth-Generation War
Whither the “Old Terrorism”?
The Theory of Terrorist “Waves”
Professor David C. Rapoport designed a theory that holds that modern terrorism has progressed
through three cycles, or “waves,” lasting roughly 40 years each and that we now live in a fourth
wave. His four waves are as follows:1
•
•
•
•
anarchist wave: 1880s to the end of World War I
anticolonial wave: end of World War I to the late 1960s
New Left wave: late 1960s to the near present
religious wave: about 1980 until the present
If Professor Rapoport’s theory is correct, the current terrorist environment will be characterized
by the New Terrorism for the immediate future. Having made this observation, it can also be
argued that the sources of extremist behavior in the modern era will generally remain unchanged
in the near future and will continue to occur for the following reasons:
•
•
•
People who have been relegated to the social and political margins—or who perceive that
they have been so relegated—often form factions that resort to violence.
Movements and nations sometimes adopt religious or ethnonational supremacist
doctrines that they use to justify aggressive political behavior.
Many states continue to value the “utility” of domestic and foreign terrorism.
These factors are not, of course, the only sources of terrorism and extremist sentiment, but they
are certainly among the most enduring ones. These enduring sources have precipitated new
trends in terrorist behavior that began to spread during the 1990s and continued well into the 21st
century so far. These new trends include the following:
•
•
•
•
increasing use of communications and information technologies by extremists, especially
social networking media and the Internet
adaptations of cell-based organizational and operational strategies by global
revolutionary movements
use of relatively low-tech improvised tactics such as suicide bombers and lone-wolf
sympathizers
efforts to construct or obtain relatively high-tech weapons of mass destruction or,
alternatively, to convert existing technologies into high-yield weapons
Figure 15.3 Tactics Used in Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 1970–2011
Fourth-Generation War
About the time of the commencing of Professor Rapoport’s “religious wave” of terrorism, a
compelling theory was advanced arguing that modern conflict represents a new era of warfare—
one that portends continued asymmetrical war into the foreseeable future.
In 1989, William S. Lind and colleagues published a prescient article titled “The Changing Face
of War: Into the Fourth Generation.”2 They argued that the modern era of conflict has moved
into a “fourth generation” of how war will be waged. According to the authors, first-generation
war “reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and
column.”3 Second-generation war “was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed
wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire [, and] [t]actics were based on fire and
movement.”4 Third-generation war was “based on maneuver rather than attrition . . . the first
truly nonlinear tactics.”5
According to Lind et al., fourth-generation war is characterized by many of the features
discussed at length in previous chapters. Central elements of fourth-generation war include the
following:
[It is] likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace
will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no
definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between “civilian” and “military” may disappear.6
Although the authors at the time of publication did not broadly conclude that terrorism is
exclusively the fourth generation of war, they did identify attributes of what we now refer to as
asymmetrical warfare within the context of terrorist violence, which were discussed in prior
chapters. These attributes include the following:7
•
•
•
Stateless centers of origin for conflict. Nonstate centers of conflict origin include
religion and ideology, which may take root in many nations and regions without state
sponsorship. Terrorists would not be dependent on state support. This has become a
principal attribute of the New Terrorism, and this concept was discussed throughout this
book.
Intentional attacks directed at an enemy’s culture. When prosecuted correctly, such
tactics effectively circumvent governmental, military, and security safeguards. For
example, modern-day Islamist extremists effectively recruit dedicated followers by
presenting an idealized cultural comparison of their movements vis-à-vis established
regimes and societies. This strategy was one reason for the expansion of lone-wolf and
small-cell terrorism in Western nations, perpetrated by supporters of Islamist ideals
against “enemy” societies. Another example of cultural confrontation, discussed
in Chapter 9, would be participation of extremist groups in the illicit drug trade with the
objective of subverting enemy societies.
Advanced psychological warfare. Lind et al. specifically emphasized that terrorists
would skillfully use manipulation of the media to wage psychological warfare. This is an
intensifying phenomenon in the modern era. Previous chapters discussed the
effectiveness of extremist uses of the Internet, modern communications, and social
networking media.
The concept of fourth-generation war—also referred to as 4GW—generated a rich discussion
about policy options for combating terrorism in the modern era as well as projections for
continued fourth-generation war into the foreseeable future.8 Lind and his colleagues were
persuasive, and current consensus among experts is that the concept of fourth-generation war
accurately explicates present-day conflict.9
Whither the “Old Terrorism”?
The “old terrorism” was characterized by the terrorist environments, organizational profiles, and
tactics developed during the postwar era. These characteristics included the following
commonalities:
•
•
leftist ethnonationalist motives
leftist ideological motives
•
•
•
•
•
•
surgical and symbolic selection of targets
deliberate media manipulation and publicized incidents
relatively low casualty rates
identifiable organizational profile
hierarchical organizational profile
full-time professional cadres
Although this model of terrorism did not become a relic of the past during the 1990s, it ceased to
be the primary model for terrorist movements and environments in the 2000s. The relatively
clear objectives and motives of the old terrorism certainly continued to fuel many conflicts, but
many modern terrorists began to promote vaguely articulated objectives and motives. The new
terrorists also became cell-based, stateless revolutionaries, unlike earlier terrorists, who tended to
organize themselves hierarchically and had state sponsors. Even though the number of
international incidents declined during the era of the New Terrorism, the casualty rates were
higher in comparison with the past. This is not to say that the old terrorism has disappeared from
the world scene or will do so in the near future. It will continue alongside a growing—and more
aggressive—threat from the New Terrorism.
Table 15.1 compares several key characteristics of the old and new terrorism.
The Future of Terrorism: Terrorist Environments in the 21st
Century
Traditional sources of extremist behavior have not been eliminated and will not be in the
foreseeable future. As in the recent past, intense expressions of intolerance and resentment
continue to motivate many extremists to blame entire systems, societies, and groups of people for
their problems. Under these conditions, political violence will continue to be seen by many
people as a justifiable option. The likelihood of political violence remains high as long as
intolerance and blaming are motivated by passionate feelings of national identity, racial
supremacy, religious dogma, or ideological beliefs. Both state and dissident terrorists continue to
exploit these tendencies for their own purposes.
Many characteristics of terrorism from the past remain relevant, and it is likely that future
terrorism will exhibit the same moralist characteristics discussed in previous chapters. At the
core of terrorist moralism are conceptual perspectives, which are summed up by the following
familiar axioms:
•
•
•
•
“One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” (Unknown)
“One man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize a thousand.” (Wu Ch’i)
“Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.” (Senator Barry Goldwater)
“It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.” (allegedly an American officer in
Vietnam)
These perspectives, as well as other behavioral attributes such as codes of self-sacrifice, are
central and enduring features of modern terrorism.
Terrorist Typologies in the New Era
State-Sponsored Terrorism
State terrorism is always a possibility when regimes are threatened from within by dissident
movements or from without by perceived adversaries, or when regimes conclude that their
foreign policy will benefit from covert aggression. Authoritarian regimes have historically
emphasized the maintenance of order over human rights, and this is unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future. The use of proxies continues to be an option in areas where states believe that
they can destabilize neighboring rivals, such as in the Middle East and along the India–Pakistan
border region. Authoritarian states also continue to use terrorism as domestic policy, and
aggressive states continue to foment acts of international terrorism as foreign policy. Thus, stateinitiated terrorism will not soon disappear and will remain a feature of future terrorist
environments.
Domestically, political repression is—and long has been—a common practice by regimes more
interested in protecting the authority of the state than in human rights. The old instruments of
repression continue to be common tools of authoritarian government. These instruments include
security institutions such as police, military, and paramilitary forces. One should expect the
pervasiveness of security institutions to be augmented by the continued improvement of
surveillance and communications technologies. One should also expect that some of the world’s
more ruthless regimes will occasionally deploy weapons of mass destruction against dissident
ethnonational groups, as the regime of Saddam Hussein did against Iraqi Kurds and the regime of
Bashar Al-Assad did against civilian opponents.
Internationally, aggressive regimes in the postwar era frequently supported sympathetic proxies
to indirectly confront their adversaries. This practice was often a safe and low-cost alternative to
overt conflict. It is reasonable to assume that some regimes will continue this practice in the near
future, especially in regions where highly active proxies have the opportunity to severely press
their sponsoring regime’s rivals. For example, in early 2002, a ship bearing Iranian arms was
intercepted by Israeli security forces before it could offload the arms. The weapons, which were
bound for Palestinian nationalist fighters, were almost certainly part of a proxy operation by the
Iranian government.
Photo 15.2 Pakistani demonstrators burn American flags.
Mazhar ABID/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images
One issue that became prominent during the 2000s was nuclear proliferation among activist and
authoritarian regimes. The West became particularly concerned about nuclear weapons
development in Iran and North Korea, especially after Iran aggressively pursued a nuclear
enrichment program. North Korea repeatedly claimed that it had manufactured nuclear
weapons10 and subsequently conducted numerous tests of ballistic missiles. These examples are
of continuing concern for the international community.
Dissident Terrorism
Patterns of dissident terrorism during the 1990s and 2000s were decreasingly ideological and
increasingly cultural. Ethnonationalist terrorism continued to occur on a sometimes grand scale,
and religious terrorism spread among radical Islamist groups. In addition, stateless international
terrorism began to emerge as the predominant model in the global arena. These trends are
continuing, as vestiges of the East–West ideological competition give way to patterns of
religious extremism and seemingly interminable communal conflicts. This “clash of
civilizations” scenario has been extensively debated since it was theorized by Professor Samuel
Huntington.11
The death of Osama bin Laden in May 2011 was a victory in the war on terrorism, but dissident
terrorism continues to be a problem, principally because violent dissidents find safe haven in
supportive environments. These environments are centered in weakly governed regions, such as
in the Levant of Syria and Iraq, Pakistan’s semi-autonomous regions, Islamist insurgent
strongholds in regions such as Yemen and East and West Africa, and ethnonational regions such
as Gaza and the West Bank during Palestinian intifadas. From these regions, stateless
revolutionaries and other independent internationalist movements continue to engage in terrorist
violence on behalf of a variety of vague causes, such as religious terrorism inspired by Al-Qa’ida
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). In effect, terrorism continues to be used as a
violent option in countries in which ethnonational and religious conflicts remain unresolved.
Photo 15.3 Photographs that shocked the world. An American soldier pulls an Iraqi detainee
with a leash in Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad in late 2003. Such images served to rally
opposition to the U.S.-led occupation.
www.antiwar.com
Nevertheless, counterpoints exist that may mitigate against an indefinite continuation of dissident
political violence. First, the utility of international counterterrorist cooperation has been
demonstrated as a sustainable countermeasure. A significant number of terrorist conspiracies
were thwarted in the Middle East and Europe—and a number of terrorists were captured or kept
on the run—as a direct result of cooperation among intelligence, law enforcement, and security
agencies. A second counterpoint is that there is no single binding or common ideological
foundation for political violence. Unlike during the heyday of ideological terrorism, there is no
modern equivalent to revolutionary Marxism. Religious extremism is self-isolating, and there is
no longer an international “solidarity movement” in the West for ethnonationalist (or religious)
violence. A third counterpoint is that terrorist movements and environments have historically had
an end-point—as suggested by Professor Rapoport and others—wherein extremist movements
and environments terminated or transformed. This phenomenon is discussed further in this
chapter.
Religious Terrorism
The death of Osama bin Laden did not signal the end of the modern terrorist environment, and
terrorism motivated by religion continues to be a global problem. Religious terrorism spread
during the 1980s and grew to challenge international and domestic political stability during the
1990s and well into the 2000s. The frequency of and casualties from sectarian attacks grew
quickly during this period. Religious terrorists also became adept at recruiting new members and
organizing themselves as semi-autonomous cells across national boundaries.
The trends that developed toward the end of the 20th century positioned religious violence as a
central aspect of terrorism in the 21st century. Internationally, religious terrorists of many
nationalities have consistently attacked targets that symbolize enemy interests. Unlike the
relatively surgical strikes of secular leftists in previous years, religious terrorists such as ISIS and
others have proven to be particularly homicidal. For example, Al-Qa’ida was responsible in
April 2002 for the explosion of a fuel tanker truck at a synagogue in Tunisia, killing 17 people—
12 of them German tourists. This kind of lethality is now a fundamental element of international
religious terrorism. Domestically, terrorist movements in Pakistan, Israel, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and elsewhere have actively sought to overthrow or destabilize their governments
and damage symbols representing foreign interests. For example, Western civilians were taken as
hostages by radical Islamist antigovernment Abu Sayyaf terrorists in the Philippines during 2001
and 2002 as a calculated—and successful—tactic to garner international attention.
Ideological Terrorism
Few ideologically motivated insurgencies survived into the new millennium, primarily because
most ideological terrorist environments and wars of national liberation were resolved during the
1980s and 1990s. Nevertheless, a few Marxist insurgencies persisted during the 2000s, and
Western democracies witnessed the growth of newly activist neofascist and anarchistic
movements. Violence from neofascists tended to consist of relatively low-intensity hate crimes,
mob brawls, and occasional low-yield bombings. Violence from the new anarchists usually
involved brawls with the police at international conferences or occasional confrontations with
racist skinheads. The growth and resilience of right-wing movements and groups in the West
persists. With the popular growth of aboveground neofascist parties in Europe, they are arguably
a vanguard of a renewed fascist movement. Similar far-rightist tendencies in the United States
portend a continuation of Patriot and racial supremacist sentiment.
Criminal Dissident Terrorism
Traditional criminal enterprises such as the Russian Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, Sicilian Mafia,
Colombian gangs, and Mexican drug cartels continue to ply their trades because of strong and
enduring markets for their services. Drugs, arms, and other goods are routinely transported and
sold in the international market despite attempts by governments to suppress these transactions.
Because of the versatility of these enterprises, it is unlikely that there will soon be an end to
criminal dissident terrorist violence directed against law enforcement personnel who challenge
them.
Participation in illicit commerce is a sensible option for criminal-political enterprises. With the
reduction in support from sympathetic states and the concomitant viability of the drug and
smuggling trades, it is quite conceivable that extremist movements will continue to attempt to
become self-sustaining through transnational crime. For example, from the 1990s through the
2010s, Colombian, Southeast Asian, and South Asian groups involved themselves in the opiumheroin and cocaine trades and, to a lesser degree, the arms trade. ISIS became adept at illicitly
trading in antiquities and petroleum to support its insurgency during the 2010s. Thus, it is logical
to presume that past trends linking political extremism to transnational crime will continue for
the foreseeable future.
The World in Conflict: Persisting Sources of Terrorism
During the 20th century, seemingly unmanageable regional and internal conflicts raged for years
and often decades before the warring parties made peace with one another. An enormous amount
of carnage occurred during communal conflicts, and millions of people died. Terrorism on a
massive scale was not uncommon during this period. It was also during this period that highprofile acts of international terrorism became a familiar feature of the international political
environment.
During the 1990s and 2000s, contending nations and communities continued to engage in
significant levels of violence. Terrorism and violent repression were used by many adversaries,
who claimed them as necessary methodologies to resolve the problems of their political
environments. This general trend is unlikely to abate in the near future, and it is reasonable to
project that the lethality of modern fourth-generation war may increase in intensity.
The following cases are projected sources and targets of terrorist violence in the near future.
The Middle East
The 2011 Arab Spring demonstrations revealed widespread popular dissatisfaction with longstanding authoritarian regimes. Several of the uprisings led to chronic discord and civil war,
primarily in Syria, Libya, and Egypt. Political, religious, and ethnonationalist conflicts have thus
continued to be endemic to the Middle East after decades of instability, and many of these
conflicts are long-standing and seemingly intractable. Fundamentalist movements captured the
imaginations of many young Muslims who became disenchanted with the perceived failures of
nationalism and socialism. Large numbers of foreign fighters found their call to action after the
U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and rallied to the side of the Iraqi insurgents, and foreign volunteers
continued to travel to Iraq after the Western withdrawal. This trend spread to Syria, where
foreign fighters included volunteers from Western nations. As a result, many international targets
were attacked throughout the Middle East, a trend likely to continue. For example, in August
2003, Iraqi insurgents bombed the United Nations headquarters in Iraq, killing UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights Sérgio Vieira de Mello. Religious tensions between Shi’a and
Sunni Muslims also increased after sectarian violence erupted in Iraq and Syria. At the same
time, Al-Qa’ida morphed into a model for other Islamists, including insurgents in Africa, a
phenomenon that continued to be replicated by other movements and cells. In a sense,
the organization of Al-Qa’ida became an ideology of Al-Qa’ida. Al-Qa’ida’s evolution
engendered new Islamist movements and organizations that proved to be extremely proficient in
recruiting dedicated fighters, funding their cause, and effectively waging war. ISIS, Boko
Haram, and others are typical of this new generation of Islamist insurgencies.
Palestine and Israel
Palestinian nationalism entered its second generation during the first intifada, which became a
war fought by young gunmen, terrorists, and suicide bombers who grew up amid the turmoil of
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Black September, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s
expulsion from Lebanon, the airline hijackings, and many other incidents occurred when
members of the new generation were children and teenagers. The new generation unhesitatingly
began a new round of violence against Israel, one that was to prove more lethal and more
pervasive.
Aside from violence growing out of the first intifada, the state of Israel has long been a unifying
target for secular nationalists and religious extremists throughout the Middle East. Extremist
movements and regimes use the existence of Israel to attract and motivate prospective
supporters. This pattern continued into the era of the New Terrorism, and with a new generation
born in the 1990s, as radical Islamist movements cited Western support for Israel as a rallying
issue. For example, Osama bin Laden’s initial grievances were the supposed “desecrations” of
Islam’s holy sites by the Saudi government and the deployment of foreign troops to Saudi
Arabia. His symbolic concepts of Christian “Crusaderism” and the royal Saud family as enemies
were later augmented by a newly professed concern for the plight of the Palestinians. Thus, AlQa’ida found common cause with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and other movements and countries
that considered Israel to be an implacable enemy.
Latin America
Most of the communal and ideological conflicts in Central and South America were resolved by
the late 1990s. Violent leftist dissidents and repressive rightist regimes were no longer prominent
features of the Latin American political environment. Significantly, in 2016 a cease-fire and
peace plan were ratified in Colombia, with the prospect of ending the five-decade ideological
conflict between FARC and the Colombian government. However, some conflicts remained
unresolved in the 2000s. For example, although in Peru the Marxist Tupac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement and Shining Path were largely dismantled by the early 2000s, some vestiges of these
groups continued to engage in low-intensity political violence. Aside from these pockets of
political violence, near-term indigenous terrorist violence (as opposed to internationalthreats)
have become sporadic and on a lower scale of intensity than during the period from the end of
World War II to the early 1990s.
Europe
International terrorists have long used Europe as a battleground, as proven by the attacks in
Madrid on March 11, 2004, and London on July 7, 2005. This is an enduring feature of the
modern terrorist environment, as evidenced by repeated discoveries of Islamist cells and arrests
of suspected ISIS and Al-Qa’ida operatives in Western European countries. European volunteers
have also been recruited to fight with Islamist insurgencies in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere.
Domestically, there is palpable animosity from followers of neofascist movements targeting
immigrant workers or other people they define as undesirables. There are also pockets of
ethnonationalist conflict remaining in Spain and the United Kingdom, although there is little
evidence that these conflicts will escalate. The Balkans remains the most unstable region in
Europe, and sporadic violence occurs from time to time. However, the large-scale communal
conflicts and genocidal behavior that resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia have been
suppressed by North Atlantic Treaty Organization and UN intervention. Russia’s conflict in
Chechnya became a source of periodic terrorism, and plausible threats continue to arise.
Africa
Ethnonational communal conflict is a recurring feature in Africa. In East Africa, periodic
outbreaks of ethnonational violence have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. Similar
outbreaks occur in West Africa.
Another pattern of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is the use of state-sponsored domestic
terrorism by authoritarian regimes to suppress dissident ethnonationalist and political sentiment.
Some internal conflicts—such as in Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—flare up
periodically. Some conflicts have been characterized by examples of terrorism on a large scale.
In North Africa, radical Islamist movements have proven themselves motivated to commit acts
of terrorism, and they are very capable of doing so. Algerian, Moroccan, Libyan, and Egyptian
affiliates of Al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and other fundamentalist movements have attacked foreign
interests, religious sites, and government officials as part of a vaguely defined
international jihad. Armed Islamist movements such as Boko Haram in Nigeria provide a
particularly troublesome model for future Islamist insurgencies.
Asia
Recurrent patterns of ethnonational conflict and domestic terrorism suggest that some Asian
nations and regions will continue to experience outbreaks of political violence. These outbreaks
have ranged from small-scale attacks to large-scale conflicts. For example, ethnonational groups
continue to wage war in Kashmir, the Caucasus, and elsewhere, and terrorism is an accepted
method of armed conflict among many of these groups.
Ideological rebellions are less common than during the postwar era, but pockets of Marxist
rebellion are still to be found, such as in Nepal and the Philippines. These leftist remnants have
occasionally used terrorist tactics rather effectively. Typical of the remnant ideological
movements in Asia is the New People’s Army (NPA), a Marxist guerrilla group in the
Philippines that was founded in 1969.12 Its ideology is Maoist, and its strategy has been to wage
a protracted guerrilla insurgency from the countryside with the goal of overthrowing the
government and building a communist society. It engages in urban terrorism, such as bombings,
shootings, extortion, and assassinations. The NPA has several thousand fighters and targets
Filipino security forces.
Radical Islamist movements, inspired in part by Al-Qa’ida and ISIS internationalism, have
appeared in several Asian countries, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, India,
Pakistan, and the Central Asian republics. A significant number of these movements have
demonstrated their willingness to engage in terrorism.
Case in Point: The Western Alliance
During the Cold War, Western nations were frequent targets of leftist terrorism. The reasons for
this were rather uncomplicated: In the ideological conflict between the Marxist East and
democratic West, as well as in the anticolonial wars of national liberation, revolutionaries
associated the West with repression and exploitation. In the modern era, Western nations have
become targets of the practitioners of the New Terrorism. International terrorists still associate
them with international exploitation, but they add other dimensions to the new terrorist
environment, such as fundamentalist religion, anti-Semitism, and a willingness to use new
technologies and weapons of mass destruction. Symbolic targets have been attacked worldwide,
and these include embassies, military installations, religious sites, tourists, and business visitors
to foreign countries. Beginning during the 1990s and continuing through the 2010s, attacks
against Western interests became increasingly symbolic, high profile, and very lethal. As a
consequence, attacks in the modern era are characteristically highly destructive, causing a
significant number of casualties.
Table 15.2 summarizes several examples of ongoing conflicts that are likely to result in terrorist
violence in the near future.
The Future of Terrorism: New Threats
High-Tech Terrorism
New technologies allow terrorists to communicate efficiently, broaden their message, and wield
unconventional weapons in unexpected ways. This is a principal characteristic of asymmetrical
warfare. Because of incremental improvements in communications and computer technologies, it
is reasonable to conclude that the ascendant trend among terrorists and their supporters on their
use will continue. This is also true of the increasing availability of weapons components for
weapons of mass destruction as well as the continuing softening of terrorists’ reluctance to use
them.
Information Technologies
Cyberterrorism is a plausible threat for the foreseeable future. As one possible scenario suggests,
a variation on [the] theme of terrorism as an asymmetric strategy goes further to suggest that
unconventional modes of conflict will stem . . . from a shift in the nature of conflict itself. In this
paradigm, unconventional terrorist attacks on the sinews of modern, information-intensive
societies will become the norm, replacing conventional conflicts over the control of territory or
people.13
The Internet and social networking media provide opportunities for commercial, private, and
political interests to spread their message and communicate with outsiders. The use of the
Internet and social networking media by extremists has become a common feature of the modern
era. Information technologies are being invented and refined constantly and continue to be
utilized by practitioners of the New Terrorism. These technologies facilitate networking among
groups and cells and permit propaganda to be spread widely and efficiently. The Internet and
other communications technologies are used to send instructions about overall goals, specific
tactics, new bomb-making techniques, and other facets of the terrorist trade. Both overt and
covert information networks permit widely dispersed cells to exist and communicate covertly.
Information and computer technologies can also be used offensively. The adoption of cyberwar
techniques by extremists is quite possible, in which new technologies are used by terrorists to
attack information and communications systems.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The scenario of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction is no longer the stuff of novels
and films, nor is the very real possibility that terrorists may use such weapons on a previously
unimaginable scale: “In the near future it will be technologically possible to kill thousands,
perhaps hundreds of thousands, not to mention the toll the panic that is likely to ensue may
take.”14
There are incentives for international terrorists to construct and use weapons of mass destruction
in lieu of conventional weapons. The psychological and economic impact of such devices can
easily outweigh the destructive effect of the initial attack (which might be relatively small). For
example, regarding terrorists’ use of radiological weapons,
such a bomb would cause very few deaths from cancer. But the economic and psychological
costs would be formidable. If a bomb with some six pounds of plutonium exploded in
Washington, D.C., 45,000 people might have to stay indoors for an undefined period afterward
to avoid being exposed to fallout.15
Experts have argued that terrorists are making concerted efforts to acquire the requisite
components for constructing weapons of mass destruction and that the acquisition of these
components and the assembly of effective weapons are probably just a matter of time. Terrorists
who are motivated by race or religion (or both) are likely to have little compunction about using
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons against what they define as “subhumans” or
nonbelievers. It will be recalled that the Japanese “doomsday” cult Aum Shinrikyō acquired and
used Sarin nerve gas in Tokyo’s subway system to hasten its vision of the Apocalypse. Aum also
apparently attempted to obtain samples of the deadly Ebola virus, which has a very high fatality
rate during outbreaks, as occurred in West Africa in 2014. A member of Aryan Nations in the
United States tried to obtain bubonic plague bacteria via mail order; fortunately, his behavior
was amateurish, and the sample was not delivered to committed racial supremacist terrorists.
These examples from the 1990s should be interpreted as precursors to terrorist efforts in the
current environment. For example, the anthrax attack in the United States in late 2001 illustrates
how toxins or chemicals can be delivered to intended targets.
As an alternative to the construction of weapons of mass destruction, terrorists have
demonstrated their ability to convert available technologies into high-yield weapons. The
destructive and psychological consequences of turning a nation’s technology into a high-yield
weapon have not been lost on modern terrorists. A case in point is the fact that modern airliners
were used as ballistic missiles during the September 11, 2001, attacks. In another case, in
December 1994, elite French GIGN counterterrorist police thwarted Algerian terrorists from
using an airliner as a missile over Paris.
Exotic Technologies
Some technologies can theoretically be converted into weapons by terrorists who have a high
degree of scientific knowledge and training. These exotic technologies include the following:
Electromagnetic Pulse Technologies.
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) technologies use an electromagnetic burst from a generator that
can disable electronic components such as microchips. If used on a sizable scale, EMP could
destroy large quantities of military or financial information. High-energy radio frequency devices
are another type of generator that can disable electronic components.
Plastics.
Weapons constructed from plastics and other materials such as ceramics could possibly thwart
detection by metal detectors. Handguns, rifles, and bullets can be constructed from these
materials.
Liquid Metal Embrittlement.
Some chemicals can theoretically weaken metals when applied. They can embrittle, or make
rigid, various metals. Should liquid metal embrittlement technology be obtained by motivated
extremists, it would be easily transportable and could conceivably be applied to vehicles and
aircraft.
Feasibility and Likelihood of High-Tech Terrorism
The feasibility of terrorists’ acquisition and use of emerging technologies must be calculated by
addressing the availability of these technologies. Acquiring new and exotic technologies
frequently requires specialized access and knowledge, and hence, not all technologies are readily
available. Having said this, the old adage that “where there is a will there is a way” is very
relevant because some practitioners of the New Terrorism (such as Al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and their
affiliates) have exhibited great patience and resourcefulness. They have also proven to be
meticulous in their planning.
Technical instructions for manipulating new information technologies are readily available. In
fact, a great deal of useful information is available for terrorists on the Internet, including
instructions on bomb assembly, poisoning, weapons construction, and mixing lethal chemicals.
Extremists who wish to use computer and Internet technologies to attack political adversaries can
also obtain the technical knowledge to do so. For example, information about how to engage in
computer hacking is easy to acquire; instructions have been published in print and posted on the
Internet. There is also an underground of people who create computer viruses for reasons that
range from personal entertainment to anarchistic sentiment.
The feasibility of obtaining weapons of mass destruction has increased in recent years. This has
occurred in part because the scientific knowledge needed for assembling these weapons is
available from a number of sources, including the Internet. Some weapons assembly requires
expertise, but not necessarily extensive scientific training; an example would be radiological
weapons, which are relatively unsophisticated devices because they simply require toxic
radioactive materials and a dispersion device. Other devices, such as nuclear weapons
components, have so far been exceedingly difficult to assemble or steal. Nevertheless, the
feasibility of obtaining weapons of mass destruction has increased not only because of the
dissemination of technical know-how but also because terrorists do not necessarily need to
acquire new or exotic technologies. Older technologies and materials—such as pesticides, carbon
monoxide, and ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO)—can be used to construct high-yield
weapons. Aerosols and other devices can also be used as relatively unsophisticated delivery
systems.
The likelihood that new technologies will be acquired and used is perhaps a moot consideration
because modern terrorists have already acquired and used many of these technologies. For
example, apparently apolitical and anarchistic hackers—some of them teenagers—have
vandalized information and communications systems, thus demonstrating that cyberwar is no
longer an abstract concept. There is little reason to presume that this trend will diminish, and
there are many good reasons to presume that it will increase. The increasing availability of new
technologies, when combined with the motivations and morality of the New Terrorism, suggests
very strongly that technology is an increasingly potent weapon in the arsenals of terrorists.
Soft Targets and Terrorist Symbolism
Terrorists throughout the postwar era tended to select targets that were both symbolic and “soft.”
Soft targets include civilians and passive military targets, which are unlikely to offer resistance
until after the terrorists have inflicted casualties or other destruction. This tactic was sometimes
quite effective in the short term and occasionally forced targeted interests to grant concessions.
This trend continued unabated into the 2000s, even as new movements and the New Terrorism
supplanted the previous terrorist environment. Those who practice the New Terrorism have
regularly selected soft targets that symbolize enemy interests. These targets are chosen in part
because of their symbolic value but also because they are likely to result in significant casualties.
Suicide bombers have become particularly adept at maximizing casualties. Fourteen people (11
of them French workers), for example, in May 2002 were killed by a suicide bomber outside a
hotel in downtown Karachi, Pakistan. In Iraq, hundreds of people have been killed by suicide
bombers in dozens of attacks.
Thus, regardless of terrorist motives or environments, it is highly likely that violent extremists
will continue to attack passive symbolic targets.
Controlling Terrorism: Ending Terrorist Campaigns and
New Challenges
Counterterrorist experts in the modern era are required to concentrate on achieving several
traditional counterterrorist objectives. These objectives can only minimize rather than eliminate
the terrorist threats of the near future. Objectives include the following:
•
disrupting and preventing terrorist conspiracies from operationalizing their plans
•
•
•
deterring would-be terrorist cadres from crossing the line between extremist activism and
political violence
implementing formal and informal international treaties, laws, and task forces to create a
cooperative counterterrorist environment
minimizing physical destruction and human casualties
It is clear that no single model or method for controlling terrorism will apply across different
time lines or terrorist environments. Because of this reality, the process for projecting
counterterrorist models must include a longitudinal framework based on both theory and
practical necessity. The theoretical models used in the near future will continue to reflect the
same categories of responses seen in the recent past. These include the use of force, operations
other than war, and legalistic responses. The practicality of these models requires them to be
continually updated and adapted to emerging terrorist threats. With these adaptations, perhaps
terrorism will be controlled to some degree by keeping dissident terrorists off balance and state
terrorists isolated—thereby preventing them from having an unobstructed hand in planning and
carrying out attacks or other types of political violence.
A Theoretical Model for Ending Terrorist Campaigns
In her seminal publication, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of
Terrorist Campaigns,16 Professor Audrey Kurth Cronin explicated a theoretical model for
evaluating why terrorist campaigns end. Analyzing the history of terrorism, Professor Cronin
identified six patterns commonly found in the decline and ending of terrorist campaigns:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Decapitation. Capturing or killing the movement’s leader.
Negotiations. Integrating the extremist movement into a legitimate political process.
Success. When the movement achieves its goals, and thereby its definition of success.
Failure. Group implosion because of mistakes, burnout, or collapse; or marginalization,
when the group loses popular support.
Repression. Defeat of the movement with force.
Reorientation. The transitioning of a movement from terrorism to another form of
violence.
Professor Cronin concluded that, historically, terrorist campaigns end when they undergo one or
more of the foregoing patterns. Assuming the applicability of her model, it poses important
analytical considerations for the ongoing conceptualization of counterterrorist policies—not the
least of which is how counterterrorist policies may be designed to hasten the demise of AlQa’ida, ISIS, and other movements by triggering one or more of these patterns.
Responding to Terrorism: Conventional Adaptations
Government Responses
Western policy makers acknowledge and accept the limitations of exclusive reliance on coercive
methods, and alternative measures have been developed such as operations other than war. Past
reliance on conciliatory options such as peace processes, negotiations, and social reforms had
some success in resolving both immediate and long-standing terrorist crises. If skillfully applied,
future adaptations of these options could present extremists with options other than political
violence. In the past, these options were usually undertaken with the presumption that some
degree of coercion would be kept available should the conciliatory options fail; this is a
pragmatic consideration that is likely to continue. Professor Cronin’s six patterns are an
instructive theoretical model for framing government options in the sense that an array of
responses offer potentially effective options.
Societal Responses
To be successful, societal responses must adapt to the idiosyncrasies of each nation and region.
This is difficult in many cases—and seemingly nothing more than impossibly idealistic in
others—because a great many regimes and contending groups have little interest in reducing
social tensions and often try to manipulate these tensions to their benefit. This fact portends
ongoing conflict in many regions.
Countering Extremism
Extremist ideologies and beliefs are the fertile soil for politically violent behavior.
Ethnocentrism, nationalism, ideological intolerance, racism, and religious fanaticism are core
motivations for terrorism. History has shown that coercive measures used to counter these
tendencies are often only marginally successful. The reason is uncomplicated: A great deal of
extremist behavior is rooted in passionate ideas, long histories of conflict, and codes of selfsacrifice (explored in Chapter 3). It is difficult to forcibly reverse these tendencies, and although
coercion can eliminate cadres and destroy extremist organizations, sheer repression is a risky
long-term solution.
Combating Terrorism in the New Era
New Fronts in a New War
Counterterrorist measures must adapt to the fact that evolving terrorist environments in the 2000s
reflect the ability of extremists to operate within a variety of political environments. During this
adaptation process, it is important to remember that
Photo 15.4 A Predator drone aircraft departs on a mission.
U.S. Air Force/Getty Images News/Getty Images
[counterterrorist] instruments are complementary, and the value of using them should be—and
generally are [sic]—more than just the sum of the parts. If the process is not properly managed,
the value may be less than the sum of the parts, because of the possibility of different instruments
working at cross purposes.17
Thus, as some terrorist environments continue to be characterized by the New Terrorism, one
projection for near-term counterterrorism stands out: Counterterrorist models must be flexible
enough to respond to new environments and must avoid stubborn reliance on methods that “fight
the last war.” This reality is particularly pertinent to the war on terrorism. Unlike previous wars,
the new war was declared against behavior as much as against terrorist groups and revolutionary
cadres. The “fronts” in the new war are amorphous and include the following:
Covert “Shadow Wars”
These are fought outside of public scrutiny, using unconventional methods. Shadow
wars require the deployment of military, paramilitary, and coercive covert assets to far regions
of the world. Advanced surveillance and lethal technologies, such as drone aircraft, are essential
to conducting covert operations.
Homeland Security Measures
Coordinated homeland security options are required to harden targets, deter attacks, and thwart
conspiracies. Internal security requires the extensive use of nonmilitary security personnel, such
as customs officials, law enforcement agencies, and immigration authorities.
Counterterrorist Financial Operations
These operations are directed against bank accounts, private foundations, businesses, and other
potential sources of revenue for terrorist networks. Intelligence agencies are able to
independently hack into financial databases, but a broad-based coalition of government and
private financial institutions is necessary for this task.
Global Surveillance of Communications Technologies
This entails surveillance of technologies including telephones, cell phones, social networking
media, Internet sources, and e-mail. Agencies specializing in electronic surveillance, such as the
U.S. National Security Agency, are the most capable institutions to carry out this mission.
Identifying and Disrupting Transnational Terrorist Cells and Support
Networks
This necessitates international cooperation to track extremist operatives and “connect the dots”
on a global scale. Primary responsibility for this task lies with intelligence communities and law
enforcement agencies.
The new fronts in the new war clearly highlight the need to continuously upgrade physical,
organizational, and operational counterterrorist measures; flexibility and creativity are essential.
Failure to do so is likely to hinder adaptation to the terrorist environment of the 2000s. Thus, for
example, the inability to control and redress long-standing bureaucratic and international
rivalries could be disastrous in the new environment.
The Continued Utility of Force
Violent coercion continues to be a viable counterterrorist option. The dismantling of terrorist
cells, especially in disputed regions where they enjoy popular support, cannot be accomplished
solely by the use of law enforcement, intelligence, or nonmilitary assets. Situations sometimes
require a warlike response by military assets ranging in scale from small special operations units
to large deployments of significant air, naval, and ground forces. The stark use of force, when
successfully used against terrorists, has a demonstrated record that is relevant for coercive
counterterrorist policies in the near future. This record includes the following successes:
•
•
•
•
Elimination of terrorist threats. This occurred, for example, in the successful hostage
rescue operations by West German and Israeli special forces in Mogadishu and Entebbe,
respectively, in 1977.
General deterrence by creating a generalized climate in which the risks of political
violence outweigh the benefits. An example is Saddam Hussein’s use of the Iraqi military
to suppress armed opposition from Iraqi Kurds in the north and the so-called Marsh
Arabs in the south—this sent an unmistakable message to other would-be opponents.
Specific deterrence against a specific adversary that communicates the high risks of
further acts of political violence. One example is the American air raids against Libya
during Operation El Dorado Canyon in 1986.
Demonstrations of national will. This occurred, for example, in the deployment of
hundreds of thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir in 2002 after a series of terrorist
attacks and provocations by Kashmiri extremists, some of whom acted as Pakistani
proxies.
History has shown, of course, that military and paramilitary operations are not always successful.
Some of these operations have ended in outright disaster; others have been marginally
successful. It is therefore likely that future uses of force will likewise fail on occasion.
Nevertheless, the past utility of this option and its symbolic value are certain to encourage its
continued use throughout the modern counterterrorist era. Absent a viable threat of force, states
are highly unlikely to dissuade committed revolutionaries or aggressive states from committing
acts of political violence.
Countering Terrorist Financial Operations
Mohammed Atta, the leader of the September 11 cell, was closely affiliated with Al-Qa’ida
members operating in several countries. He apparently received wire transfers of money in
Florida from operatives in Egypt and was in close contact with Syrians who managed financial
resources in Hamburg, Germany.18 Estimates suggest that the total cost of the attack was
$300,000, which is a small sum for the amount of destruction and disruption that resulted.19 Very
few if any of these funds came from state sponsors. They instead came from private accounts run
by Al-Qa’ida operatives.
It is very clear from the Atta example that Al-Qa’ida—and, logically, other practitioners of the
New Terrorism—have successfully established themselves as “stateless revolutionaries.”
Stateless revolutionaries are minimally dependent on the largesse of state sponsors. Some
financial support does, of course, covertly emanate from state sponsors, but the modern terrorist
environment exhibits less dependency than previous environments on state sponsorship. Stateless
revolutionaries have, in fact, demonstrated that the world’s financial systems and profits from
transnational crime provide resources that can ensure their financial (and hence, operational)
independence. This profile is unlikely to change in the near future.
Finding Hidden Fortunes
Historically, terrorists and their extremist supporters have amassed sizable amounts of money
from a variety of sources, as illustrated from the following cases:
•
•
•
•
•
transnational crime—for example, past trafficking and smuggling activities of Colombian
and Sri Lankan groups
exploiting local resources—for example, ISIS’s smuggling of antiquities and oil
personal fortunes—for example, Osama bin Laden’s personal financial resources
extortion—for example, the criminal profits of Abu Sayyaf
private charities and foundations—for example, front organizations that support
Hezbollah and Hamas20
Large portions of these assets were deposited in anonymous bank accounts, thus allowing funds
to be electronically transferred between banking institutions and other accounts internationally in
mere minutes. During the months following the September 11, 2001, attacks, government
agencies from a number of countries made a concerted effort to identify and trace the terrorists’
banking accounts. Law enforcement and security agencies also began to closely scrutinize the
activities of private charities and foundations in an attempt to determine whether they were
“front groups” secretly funneling money to supporters of terrorist organizations. Since
September 11, 2001, government agencies such as the U.S. Treasury Department have covertly
tracked global bank data to monitor transfers of money and other banking activities.21
These investigative practices have not been without controversy, and they will continue to
provoke serious debate in the immediate future. For example, one problem encountered in the
United States came from local coordinators of private charities and foundations, who argued
vehemently that their groups were not fronts for terrorist support groups. Another problem
encountered on a global scale involved the tradition and policy of customer anonymity found in
some banking systems, such as those of the Cayman Islands and Switzerland. Many mainstream
executives and policy makers were very hesitant to endorse an abrogation of the sanctity of
customer anonymity. Their rationale was straightforward: Individual privacy and liberty could be
jeopardized if security officers were permitted to peruse the details of hundreds of thousands of
bank accounts looking for a few terrorist accounts that might or might not exist. From a practical
business perspective, customers could reconsider doing business with financial institutions that
could no longer guarantee their anonymity, thus causing these institutions to lose customers.
These tensions will not abate in the near future and will require that a balance be developed
between the need for international security and the need to preserve the sanctity of long-standing
banking practices.
A Resilient Adversary: Terrorist Adaptations
Terrorists adapted quickly to the new focus on financial counterterrorist measures. Implementing
a process that apparently began during the global crackdown after September 11, 2001, terrorists
and their supporters began to transfer their assets out of international financial institutions, where
they were vulnerable to seizure. This is an adaptation that serves as a strong indicator for terrorist
behavior in the near future.
Operatives removed assets from financial institutions and began investing in valuable
commodities such as gold, diamonds, and other precious metals and gems.22 From the
perspective of counterterrorist officials, this tactic can potentially cripple the global effort to
electronically monitor, track, and disrupt terrorist finances. From the perspective of terrorists and
their supporters, the chief encumbrance of this adaptation is the fact that they could become
literally burdened with transporting heavy suitcases filled with precious commodities. However,
this is an acceptable encumbrance because it is very difficult for counterterrorist agents to
identify and interdict couriers or to locate and raid repositories. It is likely that this adaptation
will continue to be made as circumstances require, perhaps making it virtually impossible to
trace terrorists’ assets that have been skillfully hidden.
Another adaptation used by terrorists is through an ancient practice known as hawala. Hawala is
a transnational system of brokers who know and trust one another. Persons wishing to transfer
money approach hawala brokers and, for a fee, ask the broker to transfer money to another
person. Using the name and location of the recipient, the initial broker will contact a broker in
the recipient’s country. The recipient of the money contacts the local hawala broker, who
delivers the money. To prevent fraud, the sending broker gives the recipient broker a code
number (such as the string of numbers on a $20 bill). The recipient (who receives the code from
the sender) must give the broker this code number in order to pick up his or her funds. No
records are kept of the transaction, thus ensuring anonymity. This is a useful system because it
relies on an “honor system” to succeed, and money is never physically moved.
The Case for International Cooperation
Cooperation between nations has always been essential to counterterrorist operations.
International treaties, laws, and informal agreements were enacted during the postwar era to
create a semblance of formality and consistency to global counterterrorist efforts. However,
cooperation at the operational level was not always consistent or mutually beneficial, as
illustrated by the case of the prosecution of the Achille Lauro terrorists. In the era of the New
Terrorism and international counterterrorist warfare, international cooperation at the operational
level has become a central priority for policy makers. A good example of this priority is found in
the new front-line missions of intelligence and criminal justice agencies.
Intelligence and Law Enforcement
The world’s intelligence communities and criminal justice systems have always been important
counterterrorist instruments. After the September 11 attacks, these institutions were tasked with
increased responsibilities in the global war on terrorism—largely because of their demonstrated
ability to incapacitate and punish terrorists. These institutions, perhaps more so than military
institutions, are also able to apply steady and long-term pressure on terrorist networks.
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are in many cases more adept than military assets at
keeping terrorists “on the run” over time. This is not to say that these institutions are a panacea
for future terrorism, but international cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies does provide the means to track operatives, identify networks, and interdict other assets
on a global scale.
International law enforcement cooperation in particular provides worldwide access to extensive
criminal justice systems that have well-established terminal institutions (such as prisons) for
use against terrorists. Counterterrorist terminal institutions—under the jurisdiction of criminal
justice and military justice systems—provide final resolution to individual terrorists’ careers
after they have been captured, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned. Applying a concept
familiar to students of the administration of justice, these institutions can effectively incapacitate
terrorists by ending their ability to engage in political violence or propaganda. When faced with
the prospect of lifelong incarceration, terrorists are likely to become susceptible to manipulation
wherein, for example, favors can be exchanged for intelligence information. In a cooperative
environment, these intelligence data may be shared among allied governments.
Several important objectives are attainable through enhanced international cooperation between
intelligence, law enforcement, and security institutions. These objectives—which are certain to
be central considerations for counterterrorist policy makers and analysts well into the near
future—include the following:
•
destabilization of terrorist networks
•
•
•
disruption of terrorist conspiracies
collection of intelligence from captured terrorist operatives
incapacitation of imprisoned operatives
An example from early 2002 illustrates how international intelligence and security cooperation
can achieve these objectives.23 Mohammed Haydar Zammar, a Hamburg-based Syrian German,
was held by Syrian authorities after his capture in Morocco. Zammar had been part of the
Hamburg cell that recruited Mohammed Atta, the leader of the September 11 hijackers’ cell.
Zammar had legally left Germany in October 2001 and traveled to Morocco, allegedly to divorce
his Moroccan wife. He was captured and detained by Moroccan authorities, who deported him to
Syria with the knowledge of American authorities. During his interrogation in Syria, Zammar
provided very useful information about the Hamburg cell; the planning of the September 11,
2001, attacks; and details about Al-Qa’ida. The Germans lodged mild protests against Morocco
and Syria, arguing that under international law and extradition treaties, Germany should have at a
minimum been notified about Zammar’s detention, deportation, and imprisonment. Nevertheless,
the operation was successful.
Final Considerations: Terrorism in the United States
The threat of terrorism in the United States emanates from domestic and international sources.
International sources of terrorism emanate primarily from religious extremists who are trained
operatives from, or sympathizers of, Al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and other similar movements. Domestic
sources of terrorism include threats from right-wing racial supremacist groups and extremist
tendencies emanating from the Patriot movement. Potential threats from left-wing sources come
primarily from single-issue groups such as radical environmentalists, although violence could
also come from fringe anarchist factions.
The Future of International Terrorism
During the years immediately preceding and following the turn of the 21st century, it became
very clear that the near future of international terrorism in the United States is considerably
threatening. Trends indicate that the United States is a preferred target for international terrorists
both domestically and abroad. Although this is not a new phenomenon, the modern terrorist
environment has made the American homeland acutely vulnerable to attack for the first time in
its history. The asymmetrical nature of new threats, terrorists’ predilection for mass-casualty
attacks, and the destructive magnitude of obtainable weapons are unlike the threats inherent in
previous terrorist environments. The existence of prepositioned “sleeper” agents has proven to be
a real possibility. For example, an alleged Hezbollah cell was broken up in July 2000 when 18
people were arrested in Atlanta, Georgia. Similarly, recent mass-casualty attacks by lone-wolf
and small-cell sympathizers of Islamist movements indicate that radicalized homegrown
extremists represent a primary domestic threat condition.
Violence emanating from international sources continues to come from Middle Eastern
spillovers. It is unlikely that the previous international activity profile in the United States—
threats from groups such as Omega 7, the Provisional IRA, and the Jewish Defense League—
will reemerge on the same scale. The most significant spillover threat of the early 21st century
comes from religious extremists. It is conceivable that spillover activity from nationalists with an
anti-American agenda will occur in the American homeland; these would likely be cases of the
contagion effect, with newcomers imitating previous homeland incidents committed by other
terrorists. Regardless of the source of international terrorism, the activity profile is almost certain
to be that of the New Terrorism.
The Future of the Violent Left
Although the modern political and social environment does not exhibit the same mass fervor as
existed during the era that spawned the New Left, civil rights, and Black Power movements,
leftist activism continues. Nationalism within American ethnonational communities is not strong
in comparison to the Black Power era, but identity politics in the modern era has given rise to
new ethnonational civil rights organizations. On the far left, U.S. activists have employed the
Black Bloc tactic (discussed in Chapter 7) during protests against police incidents, right-wing
policies, and appearances by right-wing personalities. A persistent anarchist movement has also
taken root in the United States and other Western democracies. This movement is loosely rooted
in an antiglobalist ideology that opposes alleged exploitation by prosperous nations of poorer
nations in the new global economy. New anarchists also oppose right-leaning political parties
and movements in the West. It remains to be seen whether violent tendencies will develop within
this trend.
Photo 15.5 The war on terrorism continues.
U.S. Department of Defense
Single-issue extremism continues to be a feature of the radical left. Radical environmentalists
have attracted a small but loyal constituency. New movements have also shown themselves to be
adept at attracting new followers.
The Future of the Violent Right
Trends continue to suggest that extremists on the fringe and far right persist in promulgating
conspiracy theories and attract true believers to their causes. Reactionary activists continued to
attract a number of people to their causes during the 1990s and 2000s. For example, racial
supremacist and Patriot political sentiment morphed into White nationalist and alternative right
(so-called alt-right) political movements. Also, some extremist anti-abortion activism continued
sporadically, sustained by a core of dedicated true believers.
The future of the politically violent right comes from weak network/weak sponsor scenarios. By
advocating leaderless resistance, the violent Patriot and neo-Nazi right learned the lessons of
1980s cases of terrorist groups such as The Order. Thus, conspiracies that were uncovered by
law enforcement authorities beginning in the mid-1990s exhibited a covert and cell-based
organizational philosophy. Possible threats also exist from religious extremists who aspire to
reinvigorate the violent moralist movement. An extremist pool resides within racial supremacist
communities and the Patriot and neo-Confederate movements as well as newer movements such
as the White nationalist and alt-right movements. There is also a continued proliferation of
antigovernment and racial conspiracy theories. Publications such as The Turner
Diaries24 and The Myth of the Six Million25 continue to spread racial and anti-Semitic extremism.
The promulgation of these theories keeps reactionary tendencies alive on the right, illustrating
the conspiracy mythology that continues to be characteristic of racial supremacist and Patriot
extremism.
Chapter Summary
This chapter explored trends that suggest the near-term future of terrorism. An underlying theme throughout this
discussion was that the near future will reflect the emerging profile of the New Terrorism. Traditional terrorism is
certainly still a factor, but it is no longer an exclusive or predominant model. These trends can be analyzed within
the context of past terrorist environments, with the caveat that these environments will continue to adapt to emerging
political environments. The near future of terrorism will be shaped by ongoing regional conflicts, new technologies,
and renewed attacks against symbolic soft targets.
Counterterrorism in the post–September 11, 2001, era will have to adapt to new fronts in the war on terrorism. These
new fronts require creative use of overt and covert operations, homeland security measures, intelligence, and
cooperation among counterterrorist agencies. Disruption of terrorist financial operations will prove to be one of the
most important and challenging priorities in the new war. Regarding prospects for terrorism in the United States,
most threats in the near future may come from international religious extremists, domestic rightists, and single-issue
leftists.
A Final Thought
There is one final perspective that is worth contemplating. Throughout history, violent dissidents have claimed the
lives of countless innocent people whom they labeled as enemies. Among these “enemies” have been reformers,
defined as those who genuinely tried to resolve the problems and grievances that gave rise to extremist sentiment in
the first place. Many of these reformers have sympathized with the plight of the groups championed by the
dissidents, especially when the championed group has in fact been exploited or otherwise oppressed.
Some terrorist movements have made special work of killing and terrorizing reformers, labeling them pejoratively as
“collaborators” or some other term. Why do terrorists harm these people? What possible threat can emanate from
those who try to better the conditions of extremists’ championed groups? The answers to these questions are
straightforwardly addressed in the following quotation:
The best defense against terrorism is a government which has the broad popular support to control terrorist activities
through normal channels of law enforcement without resorting to counter-terror. Terrorists often correctly perceive
that their greatest enemy is the moderate who attempts to remedy whatever perceived injustices form the basis for
terrorist strength. It is often these moderates who are targets of assassinations. 26
Thus, the true terrorist wants to “enrage the beast” within the state and is encouraged when the enemy becomes a
genuine instrument of repression. In contrast, the true reformer understands that terrorists will not long survive
when—to paraphrase Mao Zedong—the state successfully dries up the sea of the people’s support for the extremists.
This is a perspective that is worth remembering, but one that is too frequently forgotten when nations must
reestablish stability and normalcy after terrorists strike.
Key Terms and Concepts
The following topics are discussed in this chapter and can be found in the glossary:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Carnivore 424
customer anonymity 442
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) technologies
general deterrence 441
hawala 443
liquid metal embrittlement 437
shadow wars 440
specific deterrence 441
terminal institutions 443
weapons of mass destruction 436
437
Prominent Persons and Organizations
The following organization is discussed in this chapter and can be found in Appendix B:
•
New People’s Army (NPA)
434
Discussion Box
This chapter’s Discussion Box is intended to stimulate critical debate about the possible use, by democracies and
authoritarian regimes, of antiterrorist technologies to engage in surveillance.
Toward Big Brother?
Electronic surveillance has become a controversial practice in the United States and elsewhere. The fear is that civil
liberties can be jeopardized by unregulated interception of telephone conversations, e-mail, social networking
media, and fax transmissions. Detractors argue that government use of these technologies can conceivably move
well beyond legitimate application against threats from crime, espionage, and terrorism. Absent strict protocols to
rein in these technologies, a worst-case scenario envisions state intrusions into the everyday activities of innocent
civilians. Should this happen, critics foresee a time when privacy, liberty, and personal security become values of
the past.
Discussion Questions
1. How serious is the threat from abuses in the use of new technologies?
2. How should new technologies be regulated? Can they be regulated?
3. Is it sometimes necessary to sacrifice a few freedoms to protect national security and to
ensure the long-term viability of civil liberty?
4. Should the same protocols be used for domestic electronic surveillance and foreign
surveillance? Why?
5. What is the likelihood that new surveillance technologies will be used as tools of
repression by authoritarian regimes in the near future?
On Your Own
The open-access Student Study Site at edge.sagepub.com/martin6e has a variety of useful study aids, including
eFlashcards, quizzes, audio resources, and journal articles. The websites, exercises, and recommended readings
listed below are easily accessed on this site as well.
Recommended Readings
The following publications project challenges facing the world community in the present and in the near future:
Heiberg, Marianne, Prendan O’Leary, and John Tirman, eds. Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted
Conflicts. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.
Holmes, Jennifer S. Terrorism and Democratic Stability Revisited. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press,
2008.
Weimann, Gabriel. Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015.
The following publications are an eclectic assortment of recommendations that provide classic—and arguably
timeless—insight into the nature of dissident resistance, ideologies of liberty, state manipulation, and revolution:
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist: A Commentary on the Constitution of the
United States. New York: Modern Library, 1937.
Koestler, Arthur. Darkness at Noon. New York: Macmillan, 1963.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Edited by David Spitz. New York: Norton, 1975.
Moore, Barrington, Jr. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the
Modern World. Boston: Beacon, 1966.
Orwell, George. Animal Farm. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1946.