Case Briefs Discussion

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There are 3 case briefs in 1 document that is uploaded.

Jones

1) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – Racial Discrimination

TITLE AND CITATION: Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (June 2003)

TYPE OF ACTION: The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a lower Michigan District Court ruling that the University of Michigan’s Law School did violate the 14th Amendment Equal Rights Protection by utilizing race as a factor when deciding acceptance into the program. An appeal was filed, and the Sixth Circuit Court reversed the District Courts decision that utilizing race as a factor is not a violation of the 14th Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court concurred with the Sixth Circuit that the utilization of race as a factor in admissions is not a violation of the 14th Amendment.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The University of Michigan’s Law School is one of the top law schools in the nation. To ensure they stay in compliance with Regents of University of California v. Bakkee, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. CT. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, the University of Michigan follows the official admissions policy that ensures student body diversity. The university must focus on the student’s academic achievements, along with personal statements, recommendations, and an essay on why the applying student would be a beneficial asset to the law school program. The University also focuses on a student’s undergrad GPA and their Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. The policy does not define diversity solely on race or ethnicity, but the Law School does commit to diversifying the program by including underrepresented minorities to include African Americans, Hispanic, and Native American students. This policy seeks to ensure diversity contributes to the Law School’s character and the legal profession.

When petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan Resident with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score did not receive an acceptance letter to the University of Michigan’s Law Program, she filed a lawsuit, contending that officials at the University discriminated against her due to her race which is a violation of the 14th Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and

42 U.S.C.

§ 1981

.

The lawsuit acknowledged that petitioner Grutter was rejected from the University of Michigan’s law school program because officials utilized her race as the predominant influence, allowing candidates of various minority groups a greater chance of admission with equivalent qualifications and the admission officials had no compelling interest to justify the use of race.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:

Bollinger: The University of Michigan believes that students receive important educational benefits by having a diversified student body, which leads to cross-racial understanding and the breakdown of racial stereotypes.

Grutter: Petitioner Gutter contends that her 14th Amendment right to Equal Protection was violated when the University of Michigan’s Law School did not elect to enroll her in their program. Gutter believes she was discriminated against due to her race and that she should not be overlooked because she is not a minority. She believes race should not play a factor in accepting a student into the Law School’s program.

Issue: Is the use of race as a factor in student admissions by the University of Michigan Law School a violation of the 14th Amendment right Equal Protection?

Decision: No, the law school has a compelling interest in obtaining a diversified student body. The admissions program is tailored to serve the compelling interest of the University of Michigan’s Law School by attaining educational benefits that would stem from a diversified student body, which is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Reasoning: The District Court found that Michigan’s Law School’s use of race as an admissions factor is unlawful. The Sixth Circuit then reversed the District Court’s ruling, stating that Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke was a binding precedent. Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke established that diversity is a state interest and that the University of Michigan’s Law School’s use of race tailored to their admissions is a protentional “plus” factor. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Law School’s tailored admissions decisions on the use of race to further educational benefits through a diverse student body is not in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, or § 1981. Pp. 2335–2347.

In Bakkee, Judge Powell stressed that our nation’s future lies heavily upon leaders who have been educated and trained through vast experiences. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 notes that utilizing race to further compel government interest is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause as long as the policies are narrowly tailored to further interests of the organization. The University of Michigan’s Law School’s use of race in determining admissions is narrowly tailored to their policy that allows the organization’s interest to procreate a productive environment with a diversified student body. The U.S. Supreme Court endorses Justice Powell’s view that diversifying the student body is a state interest that is a justifiable reason for utilizing race in the University of Michigan’s Law School admissions. The U.S. Supreme Court also agrees that the law school’s educational judgment on diversifying the program is essential to its overall educational mission. The Law School’s claim for a diverse student body is supported further by expert studies and reports that confirm diversity promotes learning outcomes, and students are better prepared for society, the legal profession, and a diverse workforce. Due to Law School’s facilitating a training ground for a vast number of our Nation’s Leaders, Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634, 70 S. CT. 848, 94 L.Ed, 1114 acknowledges that all qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity must have access to leadership opportunities. Under this ruling, all law schools have a credible interest in obtaining a diversified student body.

The University of Michigan’s Law School program is noted by the U.S. Supreme Court to view each applicant as an individual and gives thoughtful consideration into how the applicant can contribute to the diverse educational environment. The court is satisfied that the law school’s race-diversity admissions program does not hinder non-minority applicants. U.S. Supreme Court further notes that because the law schools use of race as a factor in admissions is not a violation by the Equal Protection Clause, petitioner Gutter’s claims based under Title VI and § 1981 dissipate.

Rule of law: Electing to use race as a factor in student’s admission is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right Equal Protection. Under the Regents of University of California v. Bakkee, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. CT. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 2d 750, adhering to official admission policy on diversifying the student body is not a violation of Equal Protection but allows for higher learning outcomes and preparation for a diverse workforce.

Fuentes
2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – Fair Labors Standards Act

TITLE AND CITATION: Houston Police Officers Union v. Houston, 330 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2003)

TYPE OF ACTION:
The Union representing the Police Officers from the Houston Police Department sued the City of Houston in Federal court, claiming the system the Department had in place violated the Police Officers rights to take time off when they were forced to work overtime. The District Court ruled in favor of the City of Houston. The Union then appealed the ruling to the Circuit Judge of the Sixth Circuit.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Federal Government requires all employers to allow their employees to accrual compensation time for all hours worked over 40 per work week. Congress allows for government agencies to allow for compensation time to accrual to help the agencies from having to pay all of the overtime earned at one time. The Houston Police Department has a policy in place which allows their supervisors to dictate when their officers can take time off using their compensation time due to staffing and other operational need of the agency. The Union was not happy with the procedure the Houston Police Department had in place and challenged it.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
The City feels like the language used in the rule “within a reasonable period of time after making the request” forces the law enforcement agency to dictate a specific amount of time that the employee will be eligible to use their compensatory time. This time may be extended and the employee will not loose it if agency staffing did not permit for the employee to take time off.
The Union representative for the Houston Police Department interprets this statement differently than from the City. The Union argues that when an employee decides to use their compensatory time, the agency must honor their request unless taking the time off would cause a major disruption or hurt the normal operation of the agency.
ISSUE:
For this case, two issues come up during the appeal process. First, what is the proper way to interpret regulations of Department of Labor section 207(0)(5)? Secondly, Did the Houston Police Department correctly apply the provision to its operation?
DECISION:
The answer to the above questions is yes; a law enforcement agency or any other public employer must allow for an employee to use their compensatory time within a reasonable amount of time after requesting to use it. If staffing issues or other operation concerns will be effected by the employee using their compensatory time, the employee will not loose it, but instead will have to wait to use their time in a reasonable amount of time after they requested to use it.

REASONING:
To keep the local community safe, and have adequate response by the Houston Police Department, both the City and the Union have agreed to a policy on who compensatory time can be used. The result and reasoning behind the decision is to preserve the safety of the community. Once an employee request time off, the agency will honer the employees request unless it will cause major disruption to the agencies operations. The agency must use a good faith rule to ensure they give the employee the right to take time off when they request and feasible for agency staffing and needs as well.
RULE OF LAW:
The rule of law for this case allows for an equal balance between the employee having the right to take time off of work and making sure that the agency will still be able to function without causing harm or potential disruption to the local community. The argument brought on by the Union about the City violating section 207(0)(5) was not supported by the District Court then Circuit Court which eventually ruled in favor of the City.

shankle
· 3) Title and Citation: Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2003)
Type of Action:
Phelan alleges that his constitutional rights were violated under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
 

Facts of the Case:
James Phelan was the City of Chicago as a police officer in 1992 but took a leave of absence in 1993.  While on a leave of absence in 1995, he was hired as a ward superintendent in the 23rd Ward.  He held this position until on or about July 1997, when he took a leave of absence due to health concerns.  During this time Phelan used all of his sick days and at that time he requested and was approved for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).  Phelan was suspected of mail fraud and subsequently indicted by the City in September of 1997.  At that time, the City requested he resign but Phelan refused. Upon his return from his FMLA leave the City terminated him.  After Phelan’s termination he requested to be reinstated to his position as a probationary police officer and the City informed him that he no longer had a position at the Police Department.  Following this notification, Phelan filed a suit against the City of Chicago.
 
Contentions of the Parties:

            The City of Chicago contends that they did not violate the 14th Amendment by dismissal of Phelan because he is not entitled to due process before termination.  Meaning he would be entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard.  As such, no property rights were deprived of Phelan.
 
            On the violation of FMLA the city simply contended that the termination was justified due to poor performance not because he went on leave.  As a result, there was no violation of the Federal law governing FMLA.
 
            On the violation of reverse discrimination, the City maintained that it could not demonstrate a prima facie case that he was discriminated against which consist of showing he belonged to a racial minority, he was rejected from taking a job he was qualified to take, and the position remained open while the employer seeks applications from other persons.  He could not show evidence of reverse discrimination especially since he belongs to a racial majority.
Phelan argues that the City of Chicago violated his property rights without due process and that his termination was motivated by going on leave under the FMLA.  Both reasons are evidence of reverse discrimination against him.
 

Issue
:
Did the dismissal violate his right to due process under the 14th Amendment which is only applicable to the states?
 
Whether the dismissal violated the Family and Medical Leave Act?
 

 

 

Decisions:
 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld a motion for summary judgment for the City of Chicago in the due process and reverse discrimination claims.
 
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts grant of a motion to dismiss Phelan’s claim of FMLA violation.
 
Reasoning:
The reasoning is that if he were a career service under the Municipal court he would be entitled for a notice of dismissal an opportunity to be heard.  However, his positions were not under the protection therefore he was not entitled to a hearing.  The reason for firing was justified due to Phelan’s poor performance in the workplace.
 
The FMLA provided opportunity for employees to go on extended leave to take care of family or their own health.  But upon arrival after leave, they are guaranteed the same position as if he never left.  This means he cannot receive more entitled benefits other than what he was entitled to before he went on leave.  It is a violation under FMLA, if an employer terminates an employee’s position if the deciding factor for termination is only because the employee decided to go on leave.  A reason of poor performance is not a violation for termination under the FMLA.
 
Rule of Law:
            It is a constitutional right that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without the due process of law.  In this case the appellant is claiming a violation of this right through reverse discrimination, a violation of FMLA and the 14th Amendment.