Business Law Small paragraph analyzing a Business Case.

Write an explanation of no more than 100-150 words MAX about how the legal concepts in the selected case can be applied within a business managerial setting of the attached case

 

You can probably just read the Summary portion

George S. Canellos
-,”-:-:-1

Attorney for Plaintiff . ..
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISsroNls
New York Regional Office
3 World Financial Center, Suite 400
New York, NY 10281-102

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(212) 336-1100

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

..;against-

RAJAT K. GUPTA and
RAJRAJARATNAM,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

ECFCASE

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”), for its Complaint

against defendants Rajat K. Gupta (“Gupta”) and Raj Rajaratnam (“Rajaratnam” and

. together with Gupta, the “Defendants”), alleges as follows:
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SUMMARY

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I 1. This matter concerns an extensive insider trading scheme conducted by

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. Gupta and Rajaratnam. On multiple occasions, Gupta disclosed material nonpublic

information that he obtained in the course ofhis duties las a member of the Boards of

D~rectors of The GoldmanSachs Group, Inc~ (“Goldman Sachs”) and The Procter &

GambleCompany (“Procter & Gamble”) to Rajaratnam, the founder and Managing

I General Partner of the hedge fund investment manager named Galleon Management, LP
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I (“Galleon”). Rajaratnam, in tum, either caused the Galleon hedge fullds that he managed·
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to trade on the basis of material nonpublic information, or passed the information on to .

others at Galleon who caused other Galleon hedge funds to trade on the basis of the

material nonpublic information.

2. Specifically, Gupta disclosed to Rajaratnam material nonpublic

information concerning Berkshire Hathaway Inc’s (“Berkshire”) $5 billion investment in

Goldman Sachs before it was publicly announced on September 23,2008. Gupta also

provided to Rajaratnam material non-public information concerning Goldman Sachs’s

financial results for both the second and fourth quarters of2008. Rajaratnam caused the

various. Galleon hedge funds that he managed to trade on the basis of material nonpublic . .

infomiation, generating illicit profits and loss avoidance of more than $23 million. In

. addition, Gupta disclosed to Rajaratnam material nonpublic information concerning

Procter &Gamble’s financial results for the quarter ending December 2008. Rajaratnam

relayed this information to others at Galleon, who in turn caused Galleon funds to trade

on basis of that information, generating illicit profits

of over $570,000.

3. In carrying out the insider trading scheme, Rajaratnam informed certain

co-conspirators that he had obtained nonpublic information concerning Goldman Sachs

from his source on Goldman’s Board of Directors. Rajaratnam also informed at least one

other co-conspirator that he obtained nonpublic information concerning Procter &
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Gamble from his sOurce on Procter & Gamble’s Board of Directors. Gupta, who was

Rajaratnarrt’s source on both companies’ Boards, knowingly or recklessly disclosed

material nonpublic information to Rajaratnam for use in trading activities. Rajaratnam,

for his part, was aware ofthe fact that Gupta was breaching his obligations to maintain

the confidentiality of that information by disclosing it to Rajaratnam.

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4. During the relevant period, Gupta had a variety of business dealings with’

Rajaratnam and stood to benefit from his relationship with Rajaratnam. In addition,

Gupta was an investor in, and a director of, Galleon’s GB Voyager Multi-Strategy Fund

SPC, Ltd., a master-fund with assets that were invested in numerous Galleon hedge funds,

including the Galleon funds that traded – and handsomely profited – based on Gupta’s

illegal tips.

NATUREOF THE PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF SOUGHT

5. TheCommission brings this action pursuantto the authority conferred

upon it by Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) [

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U.S.C. §
.’ . .

77t(b)] and Section 21(d) of the SecUrities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) [15 .

U.S.C.§ 78u(d)]. The Commission seeks permanent injunctions against the Defendants,

enjoining each from engaging in the transactions, acts, practices, and courses ofbusiness

alleged in this Complaint; disgorgement, jointly and severally, of all trading profits or

losses avoided from the unlawful insider trading activity set forth in this Complaint,

together with prejudgment interest; and civil penalties pursuant to Section 21A of the-

Exchange Act [15U.S.C. § 78u-1] under the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud

Enforcement Act of1988. In addition, pursuant to Section 20(e) of the Securities Act [1

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U.S.c. § 77t(e)] and Section 21 (d)(2) ofthe Exchange Act [15 U.S~C. § 78u(d)(2)], the

Commission seeks an order barring Gupta from acting as an officer or director of any

issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section

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of the Exchange Act

[15 U.S.C. § 781] or that is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of the

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 780(d)], and an order enjoining Gupta from associating with

any broker, dealer or investment adviser. The Commission also seeks any other relief the

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Court may deem appropriate pursuantto Section 21 (d)(5) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C .

. § 78u(d)(5)].

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 20(b),

. 20(d), and 22(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 77t(d), and 77v(a)] and

Sections 21(d), 21(e), and 27 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.c. §§ 78u(d), 78u(e), and

78aa].

7. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Sections 20(b) and 22(a) of the

Securities Act [15 U.S.c. §§ 77t(b) and 77v(a)], and Sections 21(d), 21A, and 27 of the

Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), 78u-l, and 78aa]. Certain of the acts, practices,

transactions, and courses of business alleged. in this Complaint occurred within the

Southern District of New York. For exarilple, Galleon and Rajaratnam were based in and

had offices in New York, New York, where Rajaratnam resides. Trades made on the

basis of the insider tips alleged herein were made by traders working in New York, New
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York. In addition, many of the communications in furtherance of the insider trading

alleged herein were made from, to, or within New York, New York.

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DEFENDANTS

8. Gupta, age 62; resides in Westport, Connecticut. From November 200

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through May 2010, Gupta was a member of Goldman Sachs’s Board of Directors.

During his tenure on Goldman Sachs’s Board, Gupta served as a member of the Board’s

Audit Committee, Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee, and Compensation

Committee. During the relevant time period,. GUpta was a member of Procter &

Gamble’s Board of Directors, and served on the Board’s Audit Committee and its . ..

Innovation and Technology COllimittee. During the relevant time period, Gupta served

on the Boards of Directors of several other public companies, and was then and is now

. affiliated with other entities. Gupta is a Founding Partner and fortner Chairman of New

Silk Route Partners LLC (“New Silk Route”), artinvestment firm that was originally

called Taj Capital Partners and was founded by Gupta, Rajaratnam, and others in 2006.

Gupta holds a Bachelor of Technology degree inmechanicalen~ineering from the Indian

,I Institute of Technology and an MBA from Harvard Business School.
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9. Rajaratnam, age 54, resides in New York, New York. Rajaratnam is the

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founder and a Managing General Partner of Galleon. During the period relevant to the

allegations inthis Complaint, Rajaratnam either served as Portfolio Manager of the

G::tlleon hedge funds that engaged in the illicit trading described herein, or conveyed the

information he received to others at Galleon, who traded on the basis of the information.

Prior to founding Galleon, Rajaratnam worked at Needham & Co., a registered broker-

dealer, for 11 years, at which time he held Series 7 and Series 24 securities licenses.

Rajaratnam obtained a degree from the University of Sussex, England, in 1980, and an

MBA in Finance from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1983.

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10. Gupta and Rajaratnam had mUltiple business dealings spanning many

years, including, among others: Gupta invested a total of more than $2 rriillion in two of

Galleon’s offshore hedge funds, “Captains” and “Buccaneers;” Rajaratnam and Gupta

both invested many millions of dollars in the highly leveraged GB Voyager Multi­

Strategy Fund venture described above, with Rajaratnam providing the vast majority of

the equity capital ($40 million) and Gupta viewing the venture as a possible platform for

further joint business with Rajaratnam; Gupta and Rajaratnam formed an investment fund

named the “Voyager Special Opportunity Fund” and jointly solicited a nuniber of

prominenfSouth Asian global business leaders to invest in the fund; Gupta and

Rajaratnam, along with two other principals, organized Taj.Capital Partners, the New

Silk Route predecessor, and solicited investors for that fund; and Rajaratnam was one of

the original co-founders of New Silk Route and agreed to provide $50 million­

approximately one-third – of the total management-level capital commitment of the

contemplated enterprise.

RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES

11. B¢rkshire is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Omaha, Nebraska.

Berkshire is a holding company that owns subsidiaries engaged in many busmess

activities. Berkshire’s securities are registered with the Commission pursuant to Section

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I2(b) of the Exchange Act, andits stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange

(”NYSE”) under the symbols “BRK-A” for its Class A shares, and “BRK-B” for its Class

B shares.

12. Galleon, a Delaware . limited partnership,. was a hedge fund investment

adviser based in New York, New York. As of March 2009, Galleon had over $2.6 billion

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under management. Galleon was founded in 1997 and registered with the Commission as

an investment adviser in January 2006. In the wake of the October 16, 2009 arrest of

Rajaratnam on charges of insider trading, Galleon began to liquidate itself and the hedge

funds it advised. During the relevant period, Galleon served as the investment adviser for

several hedge funds, including the hedge funds that engaged in the trading described

herein .

. 13. Goldman Sachs is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York,

New York. Goldman Sachs is a global investment banking, securities, and investment

management firm that provides services to a client base that includes corporations,

financial institutions, governments, and high-net-worth individuals. The subsidiaries of

Goldman Sachs include broker-dealers and investment advisers registered with the

Commission. Goldman Sachs’s securities are registered with the Commission pursuant

to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and its stock trades on the NYSE under the symbol

“OS.”

14. Procter & Gamble is an Ohio corporation headquartered in Cincinnati,

Ohio. Procter & Oamble isa provider ofbrartded consumer goods products in over 180

countries around the world .. Procter & Gamble’s securities are registered with the

Commission pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Exchange Act and its stock trades on the

NYSE under the symbol “PO.”

FACTS

A. Trading in Advance of Berkshire’s $5 Billion Investment in Goldman Sachs

15. In September 2008, Gupta disclosed to Rajaratnam material nonpublic

information he learned as a member of the Goldman Sachs Board of Directors concerning

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Berkshire’s $5 billion investment in Goldman Sachs, which was publicly announced on

September 23, 2008. Rajaratnam, in turn, caused certain Galleon hedge funds to trade on

the basis of the material nonpublic infonnation that Gupta disclosed.

16. Soon after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

(“Lehman”) on September 15, 2008 – which precipitated a sharp decline in the [mancial

markets – senior management of Goldman Sachs began considering various strategic

alternatives as they tried to navigate through the ongoing financial crisis. These

alternatives included a potential investment from an institutional investor like Berkshire,

and.were discussed at various Goldman Sachs Board meetings and posting calls during

the week and a half following Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.

17. Goldman Sachs executives continued to explore various strategic

alternatives the weekend after the Lehman bankruptcy. The Goldman Sachs Board

convened a Special Meeting on Sunday, September 21,2008. During that meeting,

which Gupta attended via teleconference, the Board approved Goldman Sachs becoming

a Bank Holding Company. The Goldman Sachs Board was also updated on certain

strategic alternatives that had been considered over the weekend.

18. Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein (“Blankfein”) had a long-standing

practice of informing the Board during posting calls, meetings and phone calls about the

then-current fmancial status ofthe”firm. qoldman’s net revenues had been particularly

strong in the week leading up to the meeting – despite the fact that the week had begun ”

with Lehman’s bankruptcy and that the financial markets were in a general state of

turmoil. While the Board’s determination to convert Goldman Sachs into a Bank

Holding Company was publicly disclosed on the evening of September 21, information

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concerning Goldman Sachs’s strategic alternatives and strong net revenue remained.

confidential.

19. On the morning of Monday, September 22 – the day after the Sunday

evening Goldnian Sachs Board meeting – Gupta’s office placed a four minute call to

Rajaratnam. Shortly afterwards, Rajaratnam caused certain Galleon hedge funds he

managed to purchase over 100,000 Goldman Sachs shares.

20. On the morning of September 23, Rajaratnam placed a call to Gupta. Less

than a minute after the call began, Rajaratnam caused the’ Galleon hedge funds to

purchase an additional 50,000 Goldman Sachs shares .

. 21. A Special Telephonic Meeting of the Goldman Sachs Board was convened

at 3:15 p.m. on September 23, during which the Board considered and approved a$5
billion preferred stock investment by Berkshire in Goldman Sachs.and a public equity

offering. As Gupta knew, Berkshire was a respected and influential investors and its

decision to make such a large investment in Goldman Sachs would be favorably viewed

by investors as a strong vote of confidence in the frrm when the informationwas

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·disclosed to the public. Gupta participated in the Board meeting telephonically, staying I

connected to the call until approximatdy 3:53 p.m. Immediatelyafter disconnecting

from the Board call, Gupta called Rajaratnam from the same line. Within a minute after

that telephone conversation, at 3:56 p.m. and 3:57 p.m., and just minutes before the close . .

of the markets, Rajaratnam caus~d certain Galleon hedge funds to purchase more than

217,200, Goldman Sachs shares (Rajaratnam had actually attempted to purchase far more

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shares, placing an order for 350,000). Rajaratnam later informed a co-conspirator that he

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received the information upon which he placed the trades minutes before the close. il

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22. Goldman Sachs publicly announced the Berkshire investment, along with

a $2.5 billion public stock offering, after the market close on September 23. Goldman

Sachs’s stock price, which had closed at $125.05 per share on September 23, opened at

$128.44 per share the following day and rose to a closing price that dayof$133.00 per

share, a gain of 6.36% from the prior day’s closing price.

23. On September 24, Rajaratnam liquidated the long position he had built in

Goldman Sachs’s shares on the afternoon of September 23, generating profits of over

$800,000.

B. Trading in Advance of Goldman Sachs’s Fourth Quarter of 2008 Financial
Results’

. 24. Gupta also disclosed material nonpublicinformation that he learned

during a GoldmanSachs Board posting call about Goldman Sachs’s financial results for

the fourth quarter of2008 to Rajaratnam, who caused certain Galleon funds he managed

. to trade on the basis of the information .
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l 25. Goldman Sachs announced negative results for thefourth quarter of2008
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on December 16, 2008, reporting a $2.1 billion loss, the first quarterly loss that Goldman

had sustained as a publicly-traded company.

26. Blankfein began to appreciate very early in the fourth quarter of 2008 that II
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senior executives at Goldman Sachs conducted a Board posting call during which they

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informed the Board of the company’s then-current financial situation. The daily and

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basis for their presentations to the Board showed that the company was then operating at

a quarter to date loss of $1.96 per share.

27. Gupta dialed into the October 23,2008, Board posting call around the time

it was scheduled to start and remained on the call until 4:49 p.m. Just 23 seconds after

disconnecting from the call, Gupta called Rajaratnam. The call lasted approximately

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minutes. The following morning,just as the financial markets opened at 9:30 a.m.,

Rajaratnam caused certain Galleon hedge funds to begin selling their holdings of

Goldman Sachs stock. The funds finished selling off their holdings – which had·

co~sisted of 150,000 shares – that same day at prices ranging from $97.74 to $102.17

per share. The same day (October 24, 2008), in discussing trading and market

information with another co-conspirator in the trading scheme, Rajaratnam explained that

”the street” expected Goldman Sachs to earn $2.50 per share but that Rajaratnam had

heard the prior day from a member of the Goldman Sachs Board that the company was

actually going to lose $2 ·per share. As a result Of Rajaratnam’s trades on the basis of the

materialnonpublic inforination that Gupta provided, Galleon hedge funds avoided losses

of more than $3.6 million:

C. Trading in Advance of Goldinan Sachs’s for the Second Quarter of 2008
Financial Results .

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28. Gupta also disclosed to Rajaratnam material rionpublic information

concerning Goldman Sachs’s positive financial results for the second quarter of 2008,

which were publicly announced on June 17, 2008. Rajaratnam caused certain Galleon

funds he managed to trade on the basis of that information.

29. Approximately one week before the earnings announcement, on June 10,

2008, at 5 :41 p.m., Blankfein placed a call to Gupta that lasted more than 8 minutes. The

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call was one of several Blankfein made to various Goldman Sachs Directors around the

same time that evening. Blankfein’s practice was to apprise Directors of the then-current

financial status ofthe firm when he spoke to them.

30. Goldman Sachs’s second quarter of2008 had ended on May 30, 2008. By

June 10,2008, Goldman Sachs’s financial reporting team had already compiled and

analyzed the quarterly financial data and put together a draft earnings press release that

had been circulated to various finance personnel, including Viniar, prior to Blankfein’s

call with Gupta. The company’s financial performance was strong in an extremely

difficult environment, and significantly better than analyst consensus estimates.

31. Blankfein knew the earnings numbers (which Were positive) and discussed

them with Gupta during their June 10, 2008, telephone conversation.

i 32. On the night of June 10, 2008, at 9:24 p.m., Gupta placed a short call to

I Rajaratnam’s home. The call was the first in a flurry ofshort calls between the two over
: I , , an 18-minute span that night, which culminated”in a 4-minute call from Rajaratnam to

Gupta, at 9:42 p.m~ On the following morning, June 11, at 8:43 a.m., Rajaratnam placed

another call to Gupta that lasted about 2.5 minutes. Beginning at 9:35 a.m., minutes after

the markets opened, Rajaratnam caused certain Galleon hedge funds to significantly

increase an existing long position they had established in Goldman Sachs shares by

purchasing over 7,350 Goldman Sachs june $170 call option contracts (Goldman Sachs’s

share price had opened at $167.00 per share on June 11).

33. Rajaratnam also caused Galleon funds to purchase 350,000 additional

Goldman Sachs shares on June 11 and 12, selling only a small portion of those shares on

June 13.

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34. OnJune 16, after a 2% run up in the price of Goldman Sachs common

stock, Rajaratnam caused the Galleon hedge funds to sell the June $170 call option

contracts they had purchased on June 11, generating profits of approximately $9.3

million.

35. On June 17, prior to market open, Goldman Sachs announced its quarterly

results. Revenues and earnings per share beat analysts’ estimates, and Goldman Sachs’s

share price opened the day at $185.04 per share – about 1.62% higher than the prior

day’s closing price of $182.09 per share. After the announcement, Rajaratnam caused the

Galleon funds to sell the Goldman Sachs shares they had pUrchased after Rajaratnam

received the material nonpublic information from Gupta on June 10, generating profits of

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over $9 million.

36. The total illicit profits made by the Galleon hedge funds by virtue of their

trading on the basis of Gupta’s material nonpublic infomiation concerning Goldman

. Sachs’s second quarter of 2008 results were nearly $185 million.

D. Trading in Advance of Procter & Gamble’s Second Quarter 2008 Financial
Results

37. . Gupta also disclosed to Rajaratnam material nonpublic information that

Gupta learned as a member of Procter & Gamble’s Board of Directors about Procter &

. Gamble’s financial results for the October through December 2008 quarter (Procter &

Gamble’s second quarter). Rajaratnam then passed the material nonpublic information to

his Galleon colleagues, whothen caused certain Galleon funds to trade on the basis of the

information.
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38. At 9:00 a.m. on January 29,2009, the day before Procter & Gamble’s pre-I
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which Gupta was a member, met telephonically to discuss the planned release. Gupta

dialed into the Audit Committee meeting at its scheduled start time·and remained on the

. call for over 19 minutes. A draft of the earnings release, which had been mailed to Gupta

and the other committee members two days before the nieeting, stated, among other

things, that the company expected organic sales, or sales related to preexisting rather than

newly acquired business segments, to grow 2-5% in the fiscal year. This compared

negatively to the 4-6% growth the company had previously publicly predicted.

39. Gupta called Rajaratnam in the early afternoon on January 29, 2009.·

Shortly afterwards, Rajaratnam advised another co-conspirator that he had learned from a

. contact on Procter.& Gamble’s Board that the company’s organic sales growth would be

lower than expected .. In the late afternoon of January 29, 2009, Galleon funds sold short

approximately 180,000 Procter & Gamble shares. After Procter & Gamble issued its

earnings release in the pre-market on January 30 (the actual release was substantially the

. same as the draft release Gupta had been provided), Procter & Gamble’s stockprice,

which had closed at $58.22 per share on January 29, opened on January 30 at $56.50 per

share.. The stock price declined further to $5450 per share by the close on January 30,

down approximately 6.39% from the prior day’s closing price.

40. By virtue of their trades,which were onthe basis of material nonpublic

information that Gupta provided to Rajaratnam, the Galleon funds generated illicit profits

of over $570,000.

E. Gupta Had a Fiduciary Duty to Keep Confidential All Material Nonpublic
Information about Goldman Sachs

41. As a Goldman Sachs Director, Gupta had a duty to keep confideritial all

material nonpublic information about Goldman Sachs.

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42. Goldman Sachs’s corporate governance guidelines in effect and applicable

to Gupta during the relevant period provided that the proceedings and deliberations of the

Board and its committees were confidential, and that a director who had an awareness of

material nonpublic infonnation relating to the finn was prohibited from buying or selling

Goldman Sachs securities, and was prohibited from recommending that another person

do so. Moreover; non-employee directors such as Gupta were prohibited from speaking

on behalf of the company without consulting the Chief Executive Officer.

F. Gupta Had a Fiduciary Duty to Keep Confidential All Material Nonpuhlic
Information about Procter”& Gamble

43. Asa Procter & Gamble Director, Gupta had a duty to keep confidential all

material nonpublic infonnation about Procter & Gamble.

44. “Procter & Garilble’s insider trading policy in effect and applicable to

” Gupta during the relevan~ period prohibited him from trading while in possession of

material nonpublic”infonnation concerning Procter & Gamble, or from conveying that

infonnation to others.

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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

CLAIM I
Violations of Section lO(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 Thereunder

(Against Both Defendants)

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I 45. “The Commission reallegesand incorporates by reference paragraphs 1

through 44, as though fully set forth herein.

46. The infonnation concerning (i) Berkshire’s September 2008 investment in

Goldman Sachs; (ii) Goldman Sachs’s mid-fourth quarter financial condition, (iii)

Goldman Sachs’s financial results for the second quarter of2008, and (iv) Procter-&

Gamble’s January 30,2009, earnings release, respectively, was, in each case, material

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and nonpublic. In addition, the information was, in each ca,se, considered confidential by

the companies that were the sources of the information, and each of these companies had

policies protecting confidential information.

47. Gupta learned about each ofthe foregoing transactions, circumstances and

events in his capacity as a director of Goldman Sachs and Procter & Gamble,

respectively,while subject to written policies of confidentiality, and Gupta knew or

recklessly disregarded that he owed a fiduciary duty, or obligation arising from a similar

relationship of trust and confidence, to keep the information confidential.

. 48. Gupta tipped the material non-public information to RajaratnaIil with the

expectation of receiving a benefit.

49. Rajaratnam knew, recklessly disregarded, or should have known, that the

tips he received from Gupta were conveyed by Gupta in breach of Gupta’s fiduciary duty,

or similar relationship of trust and confidence~

50. By virtue of the foregoing, each of the Defendants, in connection with the

purchase. or sale ofsecurities; by the use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate

commerce, or of the mails, or a facility of a national securities exchange, directly or

indirectly: (a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b) made untrue

statements of material fact or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make

the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading; or (c) engaged in acts, practices or courses of business which operated or

would have operated asa fraud or deceit upon persons.

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51. By virtue of the foregoing, each of the Defendants, directly or indirectly

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violated, and unless enjoined, will again violate, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15

u.S.C. § 78j(b)] and RulelOb-5 thereunder [17 C.F.R; § 240.10b-5].

CLAIM II
Violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act

(Against Both Defendants)·

52. The Commission realleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1

through 51, as though fully set forth herein.

53. By virtue of the foregoing, each ofthe Defendants, in the offer or sale of

securities relating to Goldman Sachs’s fourth quarter 2008 financial condition and

Procter & Gamble’s.secondquaiter ended December 2008, by the use of means or

instruments of transportation or corn.rti.unication in interstate commerCe or by the use·of

the mails, directly or indirectly: (a) employed devices, schemes or artifices to defraud; (b)

obtained money or property by means of an untrue stateinent of a material fact or omitted

to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light ofthe

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and (c) engaged in

transactions, practices or courses of business which operate or would operate as a fraud

or deceit upon a purchaser.

54. By reason of the conduct describedabove,each of the Defendants, directly

or indirectly violated, and unless enjoined will again violate, Section 17(a) of the

Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)].

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RELIEF SOUGHT

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WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court enter a

Final Judgment:

I.

Permanently restraining and enjoining each of the Defendants, and his officers,

agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or

participation with them who receives actual notice of the injunction by personal service

or otherwise, andeachofthem, from violating Section lOeb) of the Exchange Act [15

U.S.C.§ 78j(b)], and Rule lOb-S thereunder [17 C.F.R § 240.lOb-S];

II.

Permanently restraining and enjoining each of the Defendants; his officers,

agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and thos~ persons in active concert or

participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction by personal service or

otherwise, and each of them, from violating Section l7(a) of the Securities Act [15

U.S.C §§ 77q(a)];

III.

Ordering .each of the Defendants to disgorge, with prejudgment interest, jointly

and severally, all illicit trading profits, other ill-gotten gains received, and/or losses

avoided as a result of the conduct alleged in this Complaint;

IV.

Ordering each Defendant to pay civil monetary penalties pursuant to Section 2lA

of the Exchange Act [lSU.S.C. § 78u-l];

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V.

Barring Gupta pursuant to Section 20(e) ofthe Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77t(e)]

and Section 21 (d)(2) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)] from acting as an

officer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to Section

120fthe Exchange Act [lSU.S.C. § 781] or that is required to file reports pursuant to

Section lS(d) oftheExchange Act[lS U.S.C. § 780(d)];

VI.

Permanently restraining and enjoining Gupta from associating with any broker,

dealer, or investment adviser; and

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. VII.

Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York
October 26,2011

Of Counsel:

David Rosenfeld (RosenfeldD@sec.gov)
Sanjay Wadhwa (WadhwaS@sec.gov)
Valerie Szczepanik (SzczepanikV@sec.gov)
Kevin McGrath (McGrathK@sec.gov)
John Henderson (HendersonJ@sec.gov)

~
Regional Director
Attorney for Plaintiff
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
New York Regional Office
3 World Financial Center, Suite 400
New York, New York 10281-1022
(212) 336-10

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