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How to Brief a Case Using the “IRAC” Method
When briefing a case, your goal is to reduce the information from the case into a format
that will provide you with a helpful reference in class and for review. Most importantly,
by “briefing” a case, you will grasp the problem the court faced (the issue); the relevant
law the court used to solve it (the rule); how the court applied the rule to the facts (the
application or “analysis”); and the outcome (the conclusion). You will then be ready to
not only discuss the case, but to compare and contrast it to other cases involving a similar
issue.
Before attempting to “brief” a case, read the case at least once.
Follow the “IRAC” method in briefing cases:
Facts* 20 points
Write a brief summary of the facts as the court found them to be. Eliminate facts that are
not relevant to the court’s analysis. For example, a business’s street address is probably
not relevant to the court’s decision of the issue of whether the business that sold a
defective product is liable for the resulting injuries to the plaintiff. However, suppose a
customer who was assaulted as she left its store is suing the business. The customer
claims that her injuries were the reasonably foreseeable result of the business’s failure to
provide security patrols. If the business is located in an upscale neighborhood, then
perhaps it could argue that its failure to provide security patrols is reasonable. If the
business is located in a crime-ridden area, then perhaps the customer is right. Instead of
including the street address in the case brief, you may want to simply describe the type of
neighborhood in which it is located. (Note: the time of day would be another relevant
factor in this case, among others).
Procedural History* 10 points
What court authored the opinion: The United States Supreme Court? The California
Court of Appeal? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals? (Hint: Check under the title of the
case: The Court and year of the decision will be given). If a trial court issued the
decision, is it based on a trial, or motion for summary judgment, etc.? If an appellate
court issued the decision, how did the lower courts decide the case?
15 points
Issue
What is the question presented to the court? Usually, only one issue will be discussed, but
sometimes there will be more. What are the parties fighting about, and what are they
asking the court to decide? For example, in the case of the assaulted customer, the issue
for a trial court to decide might be whether the business had a duty to the customer to
provide security patrols. The answer to the question will help to ultimately determine
*
This applies to case briefs only, and not exams. Use the IRAC method in answering
exams: Issue/Rule/Analysis/Conclusion.
whether the business is liable for negligently failing to provide security patrols: whether
the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, and what that duty of care is, are key issues in
negligence claims.
Rule(s): 10 points
Determine what the relevant rules of law are that the court uses to make its decision.
These rules will be identified and discussed by the court. For example, in the case of the
assaulted customer, the relevant rule of law is that a property owner’s duty to prevent
harm to invitees is determined by balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the
burden of preventive measures. There may be more than one relevant rule of law to a
case: for example, in a negligence case in which the defendant argues that the plaintiff
assumed the risk of harm, the relevant rules of law could be the elements of negligence,
and the definition of “assumption of risk” as a defense. Don’t just simply list the cause of
action, such as “negligence” as a rule of law: What rule must the court apply to the facts
to determine the outcome?
35 points
Application/Analysis:
This may be the most important portion of the brief. The court will have examined the
facts in light of the rule, and probably considered all “sides” and arguments presented to
it. How courts apply the rule to the facts and analyze the case must be understood in order
to properly predict outcomes in future cases involving the same issue. What does the
court consider to be a relevant fact given the rule of law? How does the court interpret the
rule: for example, does the court consider monetary costs of providing security patrols in
weighing the burden of preventive measures? Does the court imply that if a business is in
a dangerous area, then it should be willing to bear a higher cost for security? Resist the
temptation to merely repeat what the court said in analyzing the facts: what does it mean
to you? Summarize the court’s rationale in your own words. If you encounter a word that
you do not know, use a dictionary to find its meaning.
10 points
Conclusion
What was the final outcome of the case? In one or two sentences, state the court’s
ultimate finding. For example, the business did not owe the assaulted customer a duty to
provide security patrols.
Note: “Case briefing” is a skill that you will develop throughout the semester. Practice
will help you develop this skill. Periodically, case briefs will be collected for purposes of
feedback. At any time, you may submit your case brief(s) for feedback.
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A11-1154
Court of Appeals
Page, J.
Took no part, Wright, J.
David McKee, M.D.,
Respondent,
vs.
Filed: January 30, 2013
Office of Appellate Courts
Dennis K. Laurion,
Appellant.
________________________
Marshall H. Tanick, Teresa J. Ayling, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota, for
respondent.
John D. Kelly, David L. Tilden, Hanft Fride, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota, for appellant.
________________________
SYLLABUS
Six allegedly defamatory statements posted online by the appellant criticizing the
respondent doctor for what the appellant perceived as rude and insensitive behavior are
not actionable because either (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the
statements’ falsity or (2) the statements do not convey a defamatory meaning as a matter
of law.
Reversed.
1
OPINION
PAGE, Justice.
This case presents the narrow question of whether the court of appeals erred in
concluding that six allegedly defamatory statements made by appellant Dennis Laurion
regarding an encounter with respondent David McKee, M.D., survive summary
judgment. We hold that none of the six statements is actionable either (1) because there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of the statements or (2) because the
statements are not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm
respondent’s reputation and lower him in the estimation of the community. Therefore,
we reverse.
On April 17, 2010, Kenneth Laurion, the father of Dennis Laurion (Laurion), was
admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital in Duluth after suffering a hemorrhagic stroke. On April
19, Kenneth Laurion was transferred from the intensive care unit (ICU) of St. Luke’s to a
private room.
The attending physician arranged for Dr. McKee, a neurologist, to
examine Kenneth Laurion.
Dr. McKee had never met Kenneth Laurion before he
examined him on April 19.
Three family members were present in Kenneth Laurion’s hospital room when Dr.
McKee’s examination began: Laurion, his mother, and his wife. The examination lasted
no longer than 20 minutes, during which time Dr. McKee made certain statements and
acted in a manner that, as a whole, the Laurions perceived as rude and insensitive. After
Kenneth Laurion had been discharged from the hospital, Laurion posted the following
statements regarding Dr. McKee on various “rate-your-doctor” websites:
2
My father spent 2 days in ICU after a hemorrhagic stroke. He saw a speech
therapist and a physical therapist for evaluation. About 10 minutes after
my father transferred from ICU to a ward room, Dr. McKee walked into a
family visit with my dad. He seemed upset that my father had been moved.
Never having met my father or his family, Dr. McKee said, “When you
weren’t in ICU, I had to spend time finding out if you transferred or died.”
When we gaped at him, he said, “Well, 44% of hemorrhagic strokes die
within 30 days. I guess this is the better option.” My father mentioned that
he’d been seen by a physical therapist and speech therapist. Dr. McKee
said, “Therapists? You don’t need therapy.” He pulled my father to a
sitting position and asked him to get out of bed and walk.[] When my
father said his gown was just hanging from his neck without a back, Dr.
McKee said, “That doesn’t matter.” My wife said, “It matters to us; let us
go into the hall.” Five minutes later, Dr. McKee strode out of the room.
He did not talk to my mother or myself. When I mentioned Dr. McKee’s
name to a friend who is a nurse, she said, “Dr. McKee is a real tool!”
Laurion also sent letters to a variety of medically-affiliated institutions
complaining about Dr. McKee’s conduct. The letters included substantially the same
statements communicated in the online postings. According to Laurion, his purpose in
sending the letters was to get somebody to tell Dr. McKee (1) that he exhibited “poor
behavior” and (2) that the recipients “don’t like getting letters like this.”
After learning of Laurion’s online postings from another patient, Dr. McKee
commenced this action against Laurion, asserting claims for defamation per se and
interference with business. Dr. McKee’s complaint alleged that 11 statements from
Laurion’s online postings and letters were defamatory. After some discovery, Laurion
moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Dr. McKee’s lawsuit. The district
court granted Laurion’s motion and dismissed Dr. McKee’s claims with prejudice,
concluding that, as a whole, the statements lacked defamatory meaning and that,
3
individually, the statements were either protected opinion, substantially true, or too vague
to convey a defamatory meaning.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the interference with
business claim, but reversed the district court with respect to six of the allegedly
defamatory statements posted online by Laurion. McKee v. Laurion, No. A11-1154,
2012 WL 177371, at *6-7 (Minn. App. Jan. 23, 2012). As to those six statements, the
court concluded that (1) the statements were factual assertions and not opinions, (2) there
were genuine issues of material fact as to the statements’ falsity, and (3) the statements
tended to harm Dr. McKee’s reputation. Id. at *2-6. The actionable statements identified
by the court of appeals are as follows:
Statement 1: Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you [Kenneth
Laurion] were transferred or died.”
Statement 2: Dr. McKee said, “44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within 30 days. I
guess this is the better option.”
Statement 3: Dr. McKee said, “You [Kenneth Laurion] don’t need therapy.”
Statement 4: Dr. McKee said, “[I]t doesn’t matter” that the patient’s gown did not
cover his backside.
Statement 5: Dr. McKee left the room without talking to the patient’s family.
Statement 6: A nurse1 told Laurion that Dr. McKee was “a real tool!”2
Id. at *6.
1
The nurse who allegedly made this statement was not involved in Kenneth
Laurion’s treatment and has never been identified; she allegedly made the statement to
Laurion at a post office after his father had been discharged from the hospital.
2
For ease of discussion, we will refer to the individual statements by their number
throughout the remainder of this opinion.
4
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Riverview
Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010). Our
task is to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district
court correctly applied the law. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d
758, 761 (Minn. 1993). No genuine issue for trial exists when “ ‘the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.’ ” DLH, Inc.
v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
To establish the elements of a defamation claim in Minnesota, a plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the defamatory statement was “communicated to someone other than the
plaintiff”; (2) the statement is false; (3) the statement tends to “harm the plaintiff’s
reputation and to lower [the plaintiff] in the estimation of the community,” Bahr v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919-20 (Minn. 2009); and (4) “the recipient of the false
statement reasonably understands it to refer to a specific individual.” State v. Crawley,
819 N.W.2d 94, 104 (Minn. 2012).
Statements 1, 2, & 4
Truth is a complete defense to a defamation action and “true statements, however
disparaging, are not actionable.” Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252,
255 (Minn. 1980). As a general rule, the truth or falsity of a statement is a question for
the jury. Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876,
889 (Minn. 1986). If the statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of expression
5
or detail are immaterial. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516
(1991) (explaining that the common law approach to falsity in the context of libel
“overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth”); see also Clancy
v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 11, 277 N.W. 264, 269 (1938) (characterizing the
question of truth as “[w]hether the publications were substantially true”); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977) (“Slight inaccuracies of expression are
immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance.”).
“Minor
inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as ‘the substance, the gist, the sting, of the
libelous charge [is] justified.’ ” Masson, 501 U.S. at 517 (quoting Heuer v. Kee, 59 P.2d
1063, 1064 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936)). A statement is substantially true if it would have
the same effect on the mind of the reader or listener as that which the pleaded truth would
have produced. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity in order to establish a
successful defamation claim. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d at 104.
Viewing the evidence here in a light most favorable to Dr. McKee, we conclude
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statements 1, 2, and 4.
As to Statement 1 (Dr. McKee said he had to “spend time finding out if you transferred or
died.”), Dr. McKee described his account of the statement in his deposition testimony:
I made a jocular comment . . . to the effect of I had looked for [Kenneth
Laurion] up in the intensive care unit and was glad to find that, when he
wasn’t there, that he had been moved to a regular hospital bed, because you
only go one of two ways when you leave the intensive care unit; you either
have improved to the point where you’re someplace like this or you leave
because you’ve died.
6
In light of the substantial similarity between Statement 1 and Dr. McKee’s account, we
conclude that any differences between the two versions are nothing more than “minor
inaccuracies” that cannot serve as a basis for satisfying the falsity element of a
defamation claim. Masson, 501 U.S. at 516. Here, the “gist” or “sting” of Laurion’s and
Dr. McKee’s versions are the same. Id. at 517. Both communicate the notion that
patients in the intensive care unit who have suffered a hemorrhagic stroke leave the
intensive care unit either because they have been transferred to a regular room or they
have died. Therefore, “the substance” of Statement 1 is justified given the similarity of
the two versions. Id. In other words, Dr. McKee’s account of what he said would
produce the same effect on the mind of the reader as Statement 1.
The minor
inaccuracies of expression in Statement 1 as compared to Dr. McKee’s version of what
he said do not give rise to a genuine issue as to falsity. For these reasons, we conclude
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statement 1.
As to Statement 2 (Dr. McKee said, “Well, 44% of hemorrhagic strokes die within
30 days. I guess this is the better option.”), Dr. McKee acknowledged in his deposition
that during the examination of Kenneth Laurion, he communicated to those present that
some ICU patients die. However, he denies referencing a specific percentage. Thus, Dr.
McKee posits that Statement 2 is false, or that, at the least, there is a genuine issue of
material fact as to the falsity of Statement 2 because he never stated a specific percentage.
The problem for Dr. McKee with respect to Statement 2 is that the gist or sting of
Statement 2 is the mention of hemorrhagic stroke patients dying and not the percentage
referenced. Statement 2 squarely satisfies the test for substantial truth because it would
7
have the same effect on the reader regardless of whether a specific percentage is
referenced (or whether the percentage is accurate). See Masson, 501 U.S. at 517. The
presence or absence of a specific percentage within Statement 2, without more, has no
bearing on how a reader would perceive the statement because the gist or sting of Dr.
McKee’s reference to death does not change based on the statistical reference. Nor does
the presence, absence, or inaccuracy of the stated percentage, without more, cast Dr.
McKee in a more negative light than does his discussion of patients dying. That is
especially true when the reader is given no context for the statistics. Therefore, we
conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Statement 2.
As to Statement 4 (Dr. McKee said, “That doesn’t matter” that the patient’s gown
did not cover his backside), Dr. McKee testified that he told the patient that the gown
“looks like it’s okay” because it did not appear that the gown was at risk of falling off.
We are not persuaded that there is any meaningful difference between the two versions of
the statements sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the falsity of Statement 4. The
substance or gist of the two versions is the same. Commenting that the gown “looks like
it’s okay” is another way of communicating that “it didn’t matter” that the gown was not
tied in the back. Thus, any inaccuracy of expression does not change the meaning of
what Dr. McKee admits to having said. For these reasons, we conclude that Statement 4
is not actionable.
Statements 3, 5, & 6
Next, we consider whether Statements 3, 5, and 6 are capable of conveying a
defamatory meaning. In order for a statement to be defamatory, it must tend to “harm the
8
plaintiff’s reputation and . . . lower him in the estimation of the community.” Stuempges,
297 N.W.2d at 255. In the context of libel, “a publication may be defamatory on its face;
or it may carry a defamatory meaning only by reason of extrinsic circumstances.” Utecht
v. Shopko Dep’t Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 653 (Minn. 1982). The question of whether a
statement’s language reasonably conveys a defamatory meaning is one of law.
Id.
Whether a defamatory meaning is conveyed depends upon how an ordinary person
understands “the language used in the light of surrounding circumstances.” Gadach v.
Benton Cnty. Co-op Ass’n, 236 Minn. 507, 510, 53 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1952). In deciding
whether the words bear an innocent meaning, the words “must be construed as a whole
without taking any word or phrase out of context.” Morey v. Barnes, 212 Minn. 153,
156, 2 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1942). If the words are capable of conveying a defamatory
meaning, it is for the jury to decide whether they were in fact so understood. Utecht, 324
N.W.2d at 654.
We conclude, as a matter of law, that Statements 3, 5, and 6 are not capable of
conveying a defamatory meaning. Statement 3 was published as follows: “Dr. McKee
said, ‘Therapists? You don’t need therapy.’ ” We fail to see how this statement, standing
alone, is capable of a defamatory meaning that would harm Dr. McKee in the eyes of the
community. By itself, Statement 3 is harmless. Doctors routinely evaluate whether
therapy is appropriate for a given patient. Reading Statement 3 in the context of the
entire posting, see Morey, 212 Minn. at 156, 2 N.W.2d at 831, we reach the same
conclusion. The posting is silent as to Kenneth Laurion’s actual need, if any, for therapy
after his stroke. Given that neurologists routinely evaluate whether a patient does or does
9
not need therapy and the posting’s silence as to whether Kenneth Laurion actually needed
therapy, we fail to see how Statement 3 could harm Dr. McKee’s reputation. Simply put,
there are no facts in the posting, or in the record before us for that matter, that provide a
context in which Statement 3 is capable of lowering Dr. McKee in the estimation of the
community.
See Stuempges, 297 N.W.2d at 255.
Presumably, the purpose of
Dr. McKee’s visit was to evaluate Kenneth Laurion’s condition. Given this purpose, a
determination as to whether or not Kenneth Laurion needed ongoing therapy was
appropriate. Therefore, we reject Dr. McKee’s assertion that the statement calls into
question his competency as a physician. We also reject the notion that, in the light of
surrounding circumstances, Statement 3 is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning as
published and conclude that it is not actionable as a matter of law.
Statement 5 was published as follows: “Five minutes later, Dr. McKee strode out
of the room. He did not talk to my mother or myself.” Laurion argues that Statement 5 is
true because Dr. McKee did not stop to chat, provide reassurance, or report to the family
regarding Kenneth Laurion’s condition. Dr. McKee asserts that, although he admitted
during his deposition that he did not talk with Laurion or his mother when he finished
examining Kenneth Laurion, the statement is false because Laurion admitted in his
deposition that Dr. McKee said to the Laurion family, “you can go back in,” after leaving
the hospital room. In the end, any dispute as to whether Dr. McKee spoke with Laurion
or his mother upon leaving the room is not material because we conclude that Statement
5 is not capable of conveying a defamatory meaning.
10
As with Statement 3, taking “the language used in the light of surrounding
circumstances,” Gadach, 236 Minn. at 510, 53 N.W.2d at 232, we fail to see how
Statement 5 is reasonably capable of conveying a defamatory meaning that would harm
Dr. McKee’s reputation and “lower him in the estimation of the community.” Stuempges,
297 N.W.2d at 255. In the context of the posting as a whole, there is no indication
whether Dr. McKee’s choice not to speak to the family was justified based on how busy
he was, whether he returned to speak with the family later, or whether he was attending to
a time-sensitive matter when he went to the nurse’s station. Moreover, Dr. McKee’s own
deposition testimony demonstrates the innocuous nature of Statement 5. When asked
whether it is common practice to stop and speak to the spouse of the patient after a
medical evaluation, Dr. McKee logically explained that “it depends on whether or not I
think the patient has understood . . . the information at hand and [is] able to relate it.”
Dr. McKee continued: “If I’ve just explained things to a patient who seems to understand
well and expect that the family will be going in shortly thereafter, I wouldn’t necessarily
. . . repeat the entire conversation to a family member . . . .” Given Dr. McKee’s own
testimony, in addition to the context in which Statement 5 was published, we conclude
that the statement is not capable of conveying a meaning that would lower Dr. McKee in
the estimation of the community. Accordingly, we conclude that Statement 5 is not
actionable.
Statement 6 was published as follows: “When I mentioned Dr. McKee’s name to
a friend who is a nurse, she said, ‘Dr. McKee is a real tool!’ ” The parties dispute
whether Statement 6 is protected opinion. The First Amendment protects statements of
11
pure opinion from defamation claims. Diesen v. Hessburg, 455 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Minn.
1990) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974)). Referring to
someone as “a real tool” falls into the category of pure opinion because the term “real
tool” cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating a fact and it cannot be proven true or
false. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990). We conclude that
it is an opinion amounting to “mere vituperation and abuse” or “rhetorical hyperbole”
that cannot be the basis for a defamation action. See id. at 17, 20; Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 566 cmt. e (1977) (explaining that people often engage in name-calling
“without any real intent to make a defamatory assertion, and it is properly understood by
reasonable listeners to amount to nothing more”).
Nonetheless, the assertion that a nurse told Laurion that Dr. McKee is a “real tool”
is one of fact because whether a nurse actually made the statement to Laurion is an
assertion that can be proven true or false. Dr. McKee argues that Laurion’s possible
fabrication of the existence of the nurse, and thus the statement attributed to the nurse,
creates a genuine issue of fact as to the falsity of Statement 6. As described above,
Laurion’s assertion that the nurse made the statement to him and the implicit assertion
that the nurse exists are susceptible to proof. We nevertheless conclude that even though
Statement 6 includes a factual assertion that can be proven true or false, Statement 6 is
not actionable because the statement is incapable of conveying a defamatory meaning.
First, the part of the statement that can be proven true or false—whether a nurse made the
statement to Laurion—does not itself place Dr. McKee in a negative light even if it is
false. The assertion that a nurse made the statement only has the potential to cast
12
Dr. McKee in a negative light when combined with the second part of the statement—
that Dr. McKee is a “real tool.” However, attributing the statement to an unidentified
nurse does not add defamatory meaning to the statement. See Seelig v. Infinity Broad.
Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 118 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the attribution of a
vague, derogatory statement to the plaintiff’s ex-husband did not make the statement
actionable). Because, as discussed above, the assertion that Dr. McKee is a “real tool” is
an opinion that is not susceptible to proof and is therefore not actionable, and because the
first part of Statement 6—that a nurse made the statement—does not cast Dr. McKee in a
negative light, Statement 6 as a whole is not actionable.
As a final matter, a review of Laurion’s online posting as a whole does not change
our holding in this case. Given the reasoning underlying our conclusion that the six
individual statements at issue are not actionable, it would defy logic to conclude that the
posting, when viewed as a whole, is somehow actionable. Therefore, we reject any
argument that the totality of Laurion’s statements makes his online posting actionable.
Because the six statements at issue, viewed individually or in the context of the
entire posting, are not actionable, we conclude that the district court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Laurion.
Reversed.
WRIGHT, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
13
