Assignment2

see attached  for details….

T e r r o r i s m
T H E B A S I C S
‘A concise and very accessible introduction to terrorism, touching on all the
major debates and issues. Ideal for those who need a quick introduction to the
area and a good choice for students coming at the subject for the first time.’
Professor Andrew Silke, Director Terrorism Studies,
University of East London, UK
Terrorism: The Basics is the perfect introduction for anyone interested in
one of the most discussed, written about and analysed aspects of modern
life. Common misconceptions about the nature of terrorism and terrorists
themselves are dispelled as the authors provide clear and jargon-free
answers to the big questions:
• What does terrorism involve?
• Who can be classified as a terrorist?
• What are terrorists trying to achieve?
• Who are the supporters of terrorism?
• Can there ever be an end to terrorist activity?
These questions and more are answered with reference to contemporary
groups and situations allowing readers to relate the theory to what is
broadcast in the news. Written with clarity and insight, this book is the
perfect first book on terrorism for students of all levels.
James Lutz is a Professor of Political Science at Indiana University-
Purdue University, USA and Brenda Lutz received her Ph.D in Politics
from the University of Dundee, Scotland. They have collaborated on a
great number of works dealing with terrorism including major textbooks,
edited collections.

Human genetics
Riki lewis
international relations
PeteR sutch and Juanita elias
internet
Jason whittakeR
islam
colin tuRneR
Jazz
chRistoPheR MeedeR
Judaism
Jacob neusneR
language (second edition)
R.l. tRask
literary tHeory (second edition)
hans beRtens
logic
Jc beall
management
MoRgen witzel
marketing (second edition)
kaRl MooRe and niketh PaReek
opera
denise gallo
pHilosopHy (fourtH edition)
nigel waRbuRton
poetry (second edition)
JeffRey wainwRight
The Basics
acting
bella MeRlin
antHropology
PeteR Metcalf
arcHaeology (second edition)
clive gaMble
art History
gRant Pooke and diana newall
tHe BiBle
John baRton
Blues
dick weissMan
BuddHism
cathy cantwell
criminal law
Jonathan heRRing
criminology
sandRa walklate
economics
tony cleaveR
european union (second edition)
alex waRleigh-lack
film studies
aMy villaReJo
finance
eRik banks
folk music
Ronald cohen

sHakespeare (second edition)
sean Mcevoy
sociology
ken PluMMeR
teleVision studies
toby MilleR
tHeatre studies
RobeRt leach
world History
PeteR n. steaRns
world music
RichaRd nidel
politics (fourtH edition)
stePhen tansey and nigel Jackson
tHe Qur’an
MassiMo caMPanini
religion (second edition)
MaloRy nye
researcH metHods
nicholas walliMan
roman catHolicism
Michael walsh
semiotics (second edition)
daniel chandleR

T e r r o r i s m
T H E B A S I C S
James Lutz and Brenda Lutz

First published 2011
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2011 James Lutz and Brenda Lutz
The right of James Lutz and Brenda Lutz to be identified as authors of this work
has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Lutz, James M.
Terrorism : the basics / James Lutz and Brenda Lutz.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Terrorism – United States. 2. Terrorism – United States – Prevention.
3. Terrorism – Government policy – United States. 4. National security –
United States. 5. Terrorists – United States. 6. Terrorism. I. Lutz, Brenda J.,
1957– II. Title.
HV6432.L895 2011
363.325–dc22 2010034125
ISBN: 978-0-415-57333-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-415-57334-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-203-83198-4 (ebk)
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011.
To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
ISBN 0-203-83198-5 Master e-book ISBN

To our beautiful daughters
Carol and Tessa
and
our loyal St. Bernards, Annie, Clarabelle, Oliver
and Barnaby

contents
Acknowledgements x
Preface xi
1 what is terrorism? 1
2 what do terrorists want? 16
3 who becomes a terrorist? 30
4 what are the techniques? 45
5 who are the targets? 65
6 who supports terrorists? 82
7 what can be done to counter terrorism? 96
8 what are some of the major groups? 117
9 will terrorism continue? 135
10 overview 149
Glossary 156
Resources 163
References 167
Index 172

acknowledgements
The authors owe a great deal too many people, including, of course
the academics who have provided important studies of terrorism for
us to draw upon. We would like to thank students and colleagues
who provided questions, ideas, and concepts throughout the years
that we have been writing about and teaching about terrorism. These
contributions have been incorporated into the pages that follow.
We would also like to thank the individuals at Routledge who have
worked on this project and who have made it possible, especially
Andy Humphries, Sophie Thomson, and Rebecca Shillabeer.
Andy Humphries initially suggested the project, and everyone else
at Routledge has been very supportive. Notwithstanding all the
assistance that we have received, we remain responsible for any
errors of omission or commission.
Of course, as with everything we undertake our daughters
provide the motivation for all of our endeavors. The encouragement
we receive from our daughter Carol keeps us focused on our work.
Our daughter, Tessa, inspires us each day. When all is said and done
they are the reason why we write.

preface
When we first started writing and research on terrorism in 1998, we
were concerned that too much attention was focused on terrorism
in the Middle East. It appeared that many writers have already
forgotten about the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof Gang,
and similar groups in Western Europe and Latin America. As we
continued researching in this area, the focus on the Middle East
increased after the attacks of 9/11 on New York City and Washington,
DC. Now, quite naturally, the focus has been on Al Qaeda and other
Islamic terrorists. Much has been written, some good and some not
so good, on the subject of Islamic terrorism. What has sometimes
been lost in the discussion is the fact that terrorism involves more
than Islamic groups and more than the Middle East.
Our contribution to the Routledge basics series is designed to
provide information on the underlying issues involved in terrorism
and to help place Islamic political violence within the broader
perspective of global terrorism. There are other groups that have
engaged in terrorism, and these organizations will be discussed.
This book will provide the essential basic information on terrorism.
It will also present an appropriate context for understanding global
terrorism today and in the future.

Prefacexii
Of course, this book is just a starting point for understanding
terrorism and the context in which it occurs. Further, it is designed
to provide the reader with a basic framework and basic knowledge
of the subject. Given the volume of material that now exists,
anyone interested in a deeper understanding of terrorism can find
materials on their own (starting with bibliography in this book and
the suggested readings which have their own bibliographies and
references). This book, however, should provide the necessary
starting point for exploring the topic in more depth.

1
wHat is terrorism?
Concern over terrorism has become a part of life in the twenty-first
century. Although terrorism is not new, the events of 9/11/2001
in the United States, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the
London transport bombings in 2005, continuing suicide attacks
in Iraq and Israel/Palestine, and terrorist violence in many other
places has focused attention on these types of events. Terrorism,
of course, has occurred in many countries and in many contexts.
It is not new phenomenon even though events such as these have
made terrorism a more prominent concern in many countries. As a
result, it is very important to have a better understanding of what
terrorism is – why it occurs, who is responsible, what the terrorists
hope to accomplish, and what the future holds for terrorism. These
questions and others are basic to the topic of this book.
Although many people have a good idea of what terrorism is, it
is useful from the outset to have a working definition as to what can
be considered terrorism (and what cannot be considered terrorism).
It has frequently been stated that: “One person’s freedom fighter
is another person’s terrorist.” Basically this statement says that
terrorism, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. People have a
tendency to brand those who use violence for purposes that they
disagree with as terrorists while they regard those using the same
kinds of violence in a “just cause” as freedom fighters. It is essential
to have a definition that will apply to violent activities regardless
of who is opposing or supporting the individuals involved or
who the targets are. The fact that terrorism includes all kinds of
groups should not blind us to the fact that what might be defined
as terrorism by virtually everyone, could be acceptable to others
in some circumstances. If Jews in Europe facing Hitler’s efforts to

Terrorism: The Basics2
exterminate them had resorted to terrorism in self-defense, such
actions would clearly have been justifiable.
DefInITIon of TeRRoRIsm
There are many definitions of terrorism that have been used.
Oftentimes the definitions are created to identify certain groups
as falling within the definition since the term terrorist has a very
negative association. If a group is labeled as a terrorist group, then
it is easier to mobilize public opinion against it. If supporters of the
group are considered to be freedom fighters or a national liberation
front, the likelihood that they will be able to generate more sympathy
is increased. Other definitions attempt to be more neutral, but it is
important to recognize that any definition will include groups that
some individuals would exclude because they agree with the goals
of the organizations. In other cases, the definition might exclude
groups that others think should be considered as terrorists. The
best approach, of course, is to first specify a definition and then to
determine whether or not a particular group fits the definition. Even
with the arguments over the definitions, there are some common
elements used by scholars, governments, and journalists.
There are a number of basic components necessary in order for
a group to be considered as a terrorist organization. The following
characteristics combine to provide a useful and usable definition of
terrorism.
Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens
violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that
extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence
is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a
non-state actor or actors as either the perpetrator, the victim of the
violence, or both. finally, the acts of violence are designed to create
power in situations in which power previously had been lacking (i.e.
the violence attempts to enhance the power base of the organization
undertaking the actions).
The key elements of the definition will be discussed in the
sections to follow. The importance of the various characteristics will

WhaT is Terrorism? 3
be obvious in many of the other chapters as well. This definition
will underlay much of the discussion in the following chapters and
will demonstrate why it is important and why it combines in a
useful way to describe the phenomenon that we know as terrorism.
PolITIcAl oBjecTIves
The first key element of this definition is that the violence is
primarily undertaken for political reasons. The fact that the actions
are initiated to achieve political ends is a key element that separates
terrorist acts from other forms of violence. The political objectives
separate terrorism from violence that is launched for financial
reasons or because of personal issues. Kidnappings of prominent
political leaders or corporate executives to make political statements
are different from those kidnappings that serve as criminal ventures
to raise money for the abductors. The use of fear to extort money
from businesses (the protection rackets of American gangster
fame) is criminal, not political. Sometimes, of course, opposition
groups have used kidnapping or bank robberies to finance their
organizations, and they have been known to use violence or the
threat of violence to levy “revolutionary taxes” on groups that
could be forced to pay. In these cases, the goals are still generally
political because the money received is used to fund subsequent
political activities, including possibly more violence, rather than
leading to gains in personal wealth.
While political objectives are a key for defining terrorism,
the goals that are sought by terrorists can fall into a number of
categories. The terrorists may be seeking to have a change in
policies, or a change in leadership, or even a change in boundaries.
The attainment of these objectives may be ones that are seen by
the terrorists to be immediately possible or they may see them as
being the end points of a long struggle. Some groups have indeed
geared themselves for a long struggle to achieve these goals while
others may believe that a show of violence is all that is necessary to
topple the government in power or bring about the other changes
that they desire.

Terrorism: The Basics4
vIolence
The second element of a terrorist action is that the activity
involves violence or the threat of violence. Requests for changes,
demonstrations, and petitions are not terrorism, no matter how
disconcerting they may be to a government. Although massive
demonstrations may make a government apprehensive about the
future, there is no direct threat of violence. Actual violence is fairly
obvious when it occurs. Terrorism can also involve the credible
threat of violence. One situation in which the threat of violence
might be present would be one in which a group issues an ultimatum
requiring action; if the appropriate action does not occur, violence
will result. The threat of violence is only likely to be effective as a
technique, however, with a group that has already demonstrated
that it is able and willing to use violence. A political organization
that has never undertaken any type of political violence is unlikely
to be credible in its threats. Once violence has been used, however,
the threat of additional violence may generate the necessary fear
that the dissident group desires and lead the government to give in
to the specific demands of the group. Hoaxes can, as a consequence,
be part of a terrorist campaign, especially when they follow upon
actual earlier violent actions.
TARGeT AuDIence
For violence, and even political violence, to qualify as terrorism,
it must include a target audience beyond the immediate victims.
The violence is intended to influence the target audience or
audiences as part of the attempt to gain the political objectives of
the organization. If a political leader is assassinated with the goal
of removing that individual in order to permit the next in line
to move up, the death is political violence, but it has no target
audience and it is not terrorism. It is a practical effort to put
someone else in power. For an assassination to be a terrorist action,
it must involve parties beyond the assassin or assassins and the
immediate victim. If a political leader is assassinated in order to
send a message to other members of the political elite that they
need to change policies or make concessions in order to avoid a
similar fate, then that assassination is a terrorist act. Bombings

WhaT is Terrorism? 5
of buildings (with or without casualties) or car bombs in crowded
areas are often intended to show the general public that they are
vulnerable. The resulting fear may lead the public to put pressure
on the government to change policies or weaken public support for
the leaders in power who clearly are unable to protect the citizens
from dissidents. Frequently the victims of terrorist actions are
members of the target audience since that is the easiest way to
send a message to all the other members of the target audience.
One of the primary goals of the violence is to create fear in the
target audience. Thus, the immediate victims are usually not chosen
specifically, but are simply convenient targets. The target audience,
not the immediate victims of a terrorist act, is the key group that
terrorist organizations are attempting to influence, and the goal is
to generate fear in the target audience.
The need to reach a target audience is one reason why terrorist
groups seek publicity. If no one knows of a terrorist act, the goals
have not been achieved. If the deaths of government personnel are
ascribed to a plane crash rather than a bomb on the aircraft, the
target audience will draw the wrong conclusion about threats to the
state or to the safety of individuals. The need for publicity is a key
reason why some terrorist organizations have established pre-set
code words with the media so that they can authenticate the claims
of the organization when they provide a warning that a bomb is
about to detonate. Of course, it will not be necessary in all cases
for particular organizations to claim credit for particular terrorist
actions. If a terrorist group has been active in the past, violence
against the government or its supporters will be ascribed to the
group without any need for a pronouncement from the terrorist
group. The local situation and the target will often make it clear that
the cause of a particular group of dissidents is behind the activity.
If swastikas are painted on a Jewish synagogue, the anti-Semitic
message is obvious. If a car bomb goes off at the headquarters of the
ruling party, the general population is likely to know whether it is
a local minority group or whether it is the political opposition that
is behind the attack. Even if the source of the violence is obvious, it
will still be necessary for information about the action to reach the
target audience.

Terrorism: The Basics6
oRGAnIzATIon
For political violence to be terrorism there must be an identifiable
organization. A lone individual is unlikely to be able to carry out
the actions, reach the target audience, and present the political
demands for the changes that are necessary to end the violence. An
effective campaign to create change also requires enough actions
to be credible, an effort beyond a single individual over time. A
political assassination to change a leader can be very effective
even if the assassin is killed if the change in leadership results in a
desired change in the government. If the leader is simply replaced
by another person with the same program and policies, then
nothing has been accomplished and the solitary individual who
was seeking the change is likely to be killed or captured. Terrorist
actions almost inevitably lead to casualties or arrests among the
dissidents; thus, a single individual is very likely to be captured or
killed. Large organizations do not have to be as concerned about
casualties among the members, while smaller organizations have to
conserve scarce resources (members).
Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber in the United
States, is a classic example of the limitations inherent with
campaigns by one individual. Kaczynski sent package bombs to
a variety of individuals. He was essentially upset over the pace
of modernization and damaging changes that were occurring
in the environment. His bombings over the years inspired fear,
but the target audience was unclear, and it was not obvious what
actions the target audience was expected to take. The FBI and
other police agencies knew that the bombings were related due to
forensic analyses, but they were unable to establish the linkages
between the victims, and were they were unable to identify the
political agenda of the person behind them. Until Kaczynski had a
rambling manifesto published, his goals were unclear. Once they
were published, he was identified by his writing and arrested. His
activities demonstrate the need for a broader organization and the
need for publicity (as well as the dangers that may come with
greater publicity).
Organizational structures have changed in recent times with
improved communications and transportation that have resulted in

WhaT is Terrorism? 7
a smaller world. Organizations, such as Al Qaeda, can maintain
linkages with each other and even support or cooperate with
groups that are not a formal part of the organization. Al Qaeda,
for example, has supported actions by other groups that were not
part of the organization. It provided funding and technical support
for a number of attacks when it agreed with the goals and when
it thought there was a chance of successful actions. With mobile
phones, the internet, and other forms of communication, such
improvised or informal cooperative arrangements can extend the
reach of a formal organization and make it much more dangerous.
Basically terrorist groups set up a network operation. The network
does increase the dangers and at the same time often makes it more
difficult for the authorities to infiltrate informers or breakup the
groups involved.
Another form of organization that is present in the modern world
is what has come to be called leaderless resistance. Leaderless
resistance involves individuals or small groups that identify with
some larger cause acting to achieve the goals of a larger group.
There may be an organization that provides some direction to
those wishing to undertake such “lone wolf” attacks by indicating
appropriate targets or disseminating information on how to make
bombs or use other types of violence. The individuals who were
responsible for the London transport bombings in 2005 were not
formal members of Al Qaeda or any other formal group. They did
identify, however, with the goals of Al Qaeda and similar groups,
and they saw their action as part of the broader struggle of militant
Islam against activities of the West with which they disagreed.
These individual attacks do add to the strength of a group, and there
is an element of implied organization present. There has to be some
group that provides a central reference for the identification and
perhaps even to provide information on targets and techniques. The
individuals agree with the broader goals, and they clearly seek to
link themselves with the broader cause and to influence a target
audience. This kind of loosely coordinated activity thus exists in
addition to the more conventionally organized groups; they do not
replace them completely.
The anarchists were a group that operated in the late 1800s
and the early 1900s seeking to change political systems to provide

Terrorism: The Basics8
greater benefits for average citizens and the working class. The
anarchists first attempted to bring about political change through
education efforts designed to convince the political elite to extend
greater rights and freedom to the general population. When
these efforts failed, the anarchists decided to use violence in their
attempts to bring about change. The anarchists attacked political
leaders in many countries. The targets included reigning monarchs
and elected political leaders. Some were members of organized
groups, but in some cases individual anarchists would attempt to
assassinate prominent leaders as part of this broader struggle. The
anarchists thus provide one of the earlier examples of a form of
leaderless resistance.
AcToRs oTheR ThAn sTATes InvolveD
The actions of countries directed against other countries are
excluded in this definition of terrorism. Countries involved in wars
have always attempted to inspire terror in their enemies, but these
kinds of activities are part of international relations. Similarly, in
situations of tension between countries, their intelligence agencies
may engage in activities designed to spread fear or undermine their
opponents. The CIA (American Central Intelligence Agency) and
allies like Secret Intelligence Service (United Kingdom) as well
as the KGB (former Soviet intelligence service) engaged in many
kinds of activities designed to weaken the Soviet Union and its
allies or the United States and its allies respectively during the Cold
War between these countries. At least, at times, the activities of
these agencies were successful. The exclusion of activities between
states is not intended to dismiss the importance of their actions,
nor is it intended to deny that sometimes these activities can be
horrific and cause devastation. During World War II, for example,
both sides bombed cities in an effort to destroy the morale of the
civilian populations. The bombings culminated with the destruction
of Dresden and the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, all of which resulted in the deaths of large numbers
of people. Massacres of civilians and similar types of activities
undertaken by government forces during wartime are clearly evil
as well. Actions such as these are not being dismissed and definitely

WhaT is Terrorism? 9
not accepted. They are simply part of another area of study and
analysis for political science and international relations.
There are three situations in which terrorism can occur within
this definition: first, dissidents may target a government or
governments; second, governments may target a group of their
own citizens or support groups that target a group of their own
citizens; or third, groups may target each other with such violence
independent of government. By far the most frequent form that
terrorism has taken is violence by dissident groups against their
own government or foreign governments. The groups involved
are using the violence as part of an effort to get the government
to change policies or to bring about other changes in a political
system. Governments may also tolerate situations in which local
groups use violence in an effort to create terror in some portion
of its own population that it fears or distrusts. Since governments
have police, security, and military forces to deal with what are
perceived to be domestic threats, this form of terrorism is less likely
to occur. If the targets of the violence are groups opposed to the
government, there may even be active support from the authorities.
Finally, groups may battle among themselves in efforts to end the
political activities of the opposing group or drive out another group.
In Turkey in the 1970s left-wing groups and right-wing groups
targeted each other with violence and terrorism as they competed
to bring about different types of changes. When India and Pakistan
were being formed out of the former British India in 1947, Hindus
and Muslims attacked each other, and Muslim refugees from India
and Hindu refugees from the new state of Pakistan fled in fear.
WeAPon of The WeAk
The last part of the definition depends on the fact that terrorist
actions are used to improve the power situation of the organization
that is using this form of political violence. While the specific
agendas of groups using terrorism are quite different, they all share
this characteristic. They are attempting to improve their power
situation – to increase their probability of being able to influence
political decisions. Terrorist campaigns are frequently mounted by
organizations that have failed to bring about their desired changes

Terrorism: The Basics10
by other means, i.e. they are politically weak. The groups have
failed in democratic elections to gain enough power to bring about
change. Governments have ignored peaceful protests and appeals,
or they have been met by government repression that prevents
further efforts at peaceful change.
A group that can influence the military to undertake a coup
in their country to take over the government to bring about the
changes that are desired will not have to rely on terrorism. Groups
in the past that could organize a rebellion and mobilize sufficient
troops to march on the capital and attempt to defeat the government
did not have to rely on terrorism since they have more powerful
sources. When civil wars break out, both sides have sufficient forces
to engage in such a conflict. While one or both sides in a civil war
may rely on terror techniques much as countries do during wartime,
these activities are not central to the conflict. Terrorism remains a
tool to be used by groups that lack the possibility of these kinds
of peaceful or violent protests against a current government. Since
they are relatively powerless in the conventional political setting of
their own society due to limited electoral appeal or limited support
in the face of government repression, they resort to unconventional
means (terrorism) in an effort to improve their power base. When
governments turn to supporting terrorist groups against their own
citizens it is because they cannot be sure that they will be successful
in relying on conventional police techniques or forms of repression.
Thus, their reliance on terrorism is also a reflection of weakness.
ATTAckInG cIvIlIAns
Some definitions of terrorism include the specification that the targets
of terrorist violence are civilians. The insurgent attacks on military
personnel in Iraq, for example, are not normally considered terrorist
attacks. Civilians are often the targets for terrorism because the
target population consists mainly of civilians and terrorists usually
attack members of the target audience. Adding this component to
a definition of terrorism, however, adds complexity. Are off-duty
police, reserve military personnel, or civilians acceptable targets?
What about civilian employees working on military bases?
When attacks result in the deaths of both civilians and military

WhaT is Terrorism? 11
personnel, are the civilians considered the targets or acceptable
collateral damage? To include this component in the definition also
may require knowledge of the intentions of those launching the
attacks. As a consequence, it does not seem necessary to include the
targeting of civilians as a key component of the definition, but it is
useful to recognize that civilian populations are often the intended
targets of terrorist attacks, if for no other reason than to increase
the resulting fear among a target population as noted.
TeRRoRIsm As PsycholoGIcAl WARfARe
Terrorism is ultimately a form of psychological warfare. The goal of
the terrorist group is to spread fear in the target population in order
to bring about some kind of change. The goals of the terrorists have
been met when the greatest amount of fear has been caused by the
terrorist attack. The most effective terrorist actions are those that
reach the largest number of people. The attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 in the United
States generated immense amounts of fear because of the death
toll and the symbolism involved. The 2005 transport bombings
in London did not kill as many people but indicated to many in
the United Kingdom that they could be at risk. The anthrax scare
in the United States coming so soon after the attacks of 9/11 in
October of 2001 generated a great deal of fear while resulting in
the deaths of less than a dozen people. The hope of the terrorists is
that the attacks will undermine confidence in the public or the elite
and lead to the desired changes or to the weakening of a state, which
in turn makes it more vulnerable to continued terrorism or other
forms of violence.
One of the things that can heighten the fear that occurs with
terrorism is the idea that the violence is random. In actuality,
terrorism is seldom random by intent; in fact, it has to be distinctly
Fear in a target audience is one of the key goals of campaigns of
terrorism. Terrorism is ultimately a form of psychological warfare
that is directed against this target audience. (Wilkinson 1975: 81)

Terrorism: The Basics12
non-random in order to be successful. The targets of terrorist attacks,
whether they are people or objects, are chosen from among a similar
group of targets. One member of the group is interchangeable with
another. The randomness occurs in the sense that any individual
member of a group can become the target for the violence to send
the message to others. While the victims of a lethal attack are likely
to be random in the sense of being victims, they become victims
because they are members of a specific group. The appearance of
complete randomness in the choice of targets, however, can increase
the fear of the target audience. The end result of this situation for
the target audience is the knowledge that any of them could indeed
become victims and that no one is safe.
DIPlomATIc AnD leGAl DefInITIons of
TeRRoRIsm
The definition used above is one that is designed to aid in
understanding terrorism, but it cannot serve as an appropriate
definition in a court of law. Governments usually need a more
precise legal definition if they are going to use their courts and legal
systems to try, convict, and punish individuals who are involved
in terrorist actions, and it may be essential for a government
that has to decide whether or not a person accused of terrorism
elsewhere should be extradited. In many cases, however, national
legal systems will not require any special definition of terrorism.
Hijacking an airplane, setting off a bomb, and killing people are
already crimes under national laws, even when the crimes are
undertaken for political purposes. If a state wishes to impose stiffer
penalties for crimes associated with terrorism, however, then some
sort of legal definition becomes important. Prosecutors must be
able to prove that political intent or political objectives were behind
the violence. Sometimes terrorists on trial are more than happy to
proclaim their political goals, but in other cases such intent may
be quite difficult to prove. A legal definition does not require the
specification of a target audience or information on the level of
organization involved. Similarly, if a national legislature desires
to prohibit financial contributions to terrorist groups, then the
government has to provide some system for designating which

WhaT is Terrorism? 13
groups are prohibited and how they are defined. That type of legal
definition may be more difficult.
Efforts at the international level to come up with treaties and
conventions banning terrorism have, to date, not been particularly
successful. One of the problems with such a convention is the
difficulty in defining terrorism in terms that would be acceptable
to all the countries concerned. Some countries, especially in the
developing world, are afraid that national liberation fronts would
be considered terrorist groups. Arab countries have long considered
Palestinian groups opposed to Israel to be national liberation
movements rather than terrorist groups, and they would resist any
international definition that would automatically consider these
groups to be terrorist organizations. As Andrew Silke (2004: 5)
noted, even close allies can disagree about the definition of terrorism.
Early in the twenty-first century both the United States and the
United Kingdom had lists of organizations that they considered
to be terrorist groups. Thirteen different dissident groups were on
both lists, but the United Kingdom had eight groups not on the US
list, and the United States had fifteen not on the British list.
Countries would find it inconvenient to extradite or prosecute
persons who would be considered as terrorists under an
international convention. The United States or United Kingdom
would have been loath to extradite Iraqi dissidents responsible for
bombs directed against the regime of Saddam Hussein when he was
still in power. Governments no doubt prefer a certain amount of
flexibility in determining who constitutes a terrorist, permitting
the government to take whatever actions seem best. Governments
will at times have to make the distinction between freedom fighter
and terrorist – when the same action is acceptable and when it is
not. Politicians will have to decide, and national public opinion will
be important in that decision. Governments will always be caught
between choosing to support consistent approaches and taking into
account special circumstances that might exist.
GueRRIllA WARfARe AnD TeRRoRIsm
Terrorism and guerrilla warfare have some things in common.
Both are weapons of the weak used by dissident groups that lack

Terrorism: The Basics14
the ability to challenge the government in other ways. Guerrilla
groups, however, generally target police, the security forces, and
the military. They are less likely to target civilians in their attacks.
When guerrilla groups begin to target civilians, they usually cross
over into terrorism, and some dissident groups may indeed combine
military action against military forces and terror attacks against
soft civilian targets. Effective guerrilla warfare may require more
resources and personnel than terrorism; thus, a shift to guerrilla
tactics from purely terrorist attacks may signal the success of the
dissident movement in moving to a higher stage. While guerrilla
tactics may be used by dissident movements, they are unlikely to
be used by governments to attacks their own citizens. Governments
are more likely to rely on repression not terrorism.
conclusIons
While there are many definitions of terrorism, the keys include
political objectives, violence, target audiences, organization, a non-
state actor as the target or perpetrator, and groups that have limited
resources. The definition is not specific to any one group nor does
it exclude others. This definition is in accord with what Tore Bjorgo
(2005a: 2) notes in that terrorism “is primarily an extremism of
means, not one of ends.” Definitions used by governments for legal
purposes need to be more detailed and specific. Governments may
want less precise definitions when dealing with foreign countries
in order to avoid making unpopular decisions or extraditing
individuals for terrorism to foreign governments. Terrorism is
ultimately a form of psychological warfare that is designed to
use fear to influence people. While guerrilla activity shares some
similarity to terrorist attacks, guerrilla groups are more likely to
attack military or police targets and only use terrorist tactics to
supplement their other attacks.
key TeRms
anarchists, CIA, extradition, KGB, leaderless resistance, London
transport bombings, Madrid train bombings, 9/11 attacks, Al Qaeda,
Secret Intelligence Service, Unabomber

WhaT is Terrorism? 15
suGGesTeD ReADInG
Badey, T. J. (1998) “Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic
Approach,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 10, 1: 90–107.
This article provides a useful and workable definition of terrorism on the
international level.
Hoffman, B. (2006) Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded edition, New
York: Columbia University Press.
This is an informative book providing coverage of terrorism in its various
forms and a useful textbook that covers most aspects of terrorism.
Tan, A. H. T. (2006) The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey, London: Routledge.
This volume contains chapters dealing with various kinds of terrorism as
well as an encyclopedic listing of terrorist movements and incidents.
Wilkinson, P. (1975) Political Terrorism, New York: Halstead Press.
This volume is an early, but comprehensive, book on terrorism that is still
relevant.

2
wHat do terrorists want?
Groups that resort to terrorism want to accomplish a wide variety of
goals. These goals are often specific to a country, the target audience,
the time period – in a word the political environment in which the
groups operate. This chapter will first consider some suggestions
about the root causes of terrorism that lead groups that seek change
to rely on violence. There are a number of ways in which terrorist
groups can be classified. First, they can be put into categories on the
basis of what part of the political system they are trying to change
– policies, political leadership, the structure of the political system,
or the boundaries of the state. Second, they can be classified on the
basis of their cause – religious issues, ethnic concerns, or ideological
beliefs. It is also possible for governments to engage in terrorism
against their citizens as noted in Chapter 1. Although the objectives
for this kind of terrorism will be somewhat different, it is often
undertaken or tolerated as part of an effort to achieve similar types
of goals. Finally, it is worthwhile to discuss some of the distinctions
between domestic terrorism and international terrorism.
cAuses of TeRRoRIsm
Any discussion of the goals and objectives of terrorist groups needs
to include some consideration of the possible underlying causes of
terrorism. The question of causes, however, is a very complex one.
Ultimately, there is no single cause or even a very small group of
causes that would explain the level of terrorist activity. This lack of
a single cause is in part due to the fact that terrorism is a technique
that is available to all kinds of political groups that are disgruntled
with the way things are in the current political environment.
Groups unhappy with the current political circumstances will use
other techniques (elections, military takeovers, bribery, etc.) if they

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 17
are able to do so, but they will resort to terrorism if they lack these
or other alternatives. Although there is no single cause of terrorism,
there are a number of factors that appear to contribute to this type
of violence in at least some cases.
Poverty has often been considered a basic cause of terrorism. It
has been assumed that individuals are driven to engage in political
violence because of their economic circumstances or because of the
economic circumstances of the group they belong to. The poverty
theory is an appealing one, and many terrorist groups cite social and
economic injustices as justifications for their violence. While some
studies have found a connection between poverty and terrorism,
most have failed to find any direct connection (Maleckova 2005). It
is not the poorest individuals who routinely join terrorist groups
although some organizations may attract the poorer elements in
society. Other groups tend to attract a more middle-class following,
and other terrorist groups frequently draw upon cross-sections of
the population in terms of economic well-being. Terrorist activity has
not occurred in the poorest countries of the world or the ones with
the greatest differences between rich and poor. While poverty may
have a connection with terrorism, it is indirect and complex.
Another factor that has contributed to outbreaks of terrorism
involves the strains associated with modernization and
globalization. Globalization, like terrorism has been defined in
many different ways. Most definitions agree on the key characteristic
that it involves increasing connections among societies and cultures
in terms of economic, social, political, and communications linkages.
Ongoing changes in the world increasingly create problems for
all societies, both rich and poor. Economic changes bring greater
wealth and status to some groups, while other groups lose. Societies
face the appearance of outside religions that threaten the existing
domestic practices or the appearance of secular ideas that threaten
the more religious elements in all countries. New ideas can also
upset cultural or societal norms and patterns. Globalization also
brings increased migration, and societies often react negatively to
the presence of outsiders. The immigration debates in the United
States and Europe in the first decade of the twenty-first century
are just a recent example of the negative reactions to immigrants
that can occur. With all these changes those who have lost as a

Terrorism: The Basics18
consequence of the new circumstances may be tempted to resort to
violence, including terrorism, to try to turn back the clock and to
try to keep these changes from continuing.
A lack of opportunity for political participation has frequently
been considered a cause of terrorism. Citizens become violent when
other opportunities for political involvement are not available.
While a lack of political participation has generated violence,
including terrorism, truly repressive states with very limited
participation (or none) have usually been able to prevent violence or
have been able to quickly control it when it does occur. On the other
hand democratic states with many opportunities for participation
are often targets for terrorism. The civil liberties associated with
democracies often provide advantages for terrorist groups. There
are limits on the security forces and the techniques that can be
used for dealing with suspected terrorists that are usually present.
The use of the Guantanamo Bay base in Cuba by the United
States to detain suspected terrorists is an obvious exception to
such treatment. One of the reasons that the detention of suspects
at the Guantanamo Bay facility has raised so much controversy is
because it has been so contrary to democratic expectations. Freedom
of movement facilitates attacks; freedom of press guarantees
knowledge of their actions and influences the target audience,
and the right to a fair trial means they may escape punishment
even if they are caught. In democratic states the suspects in trials
would even have the opportunity during the course of criminal
proceedings to further publicize their cause. Of course, critics of
democratic states, including those in some terrorist organizations,
argue that democratic states do not provide real participation and
equality or argue that the system is rigged against certain groups
in society. It is also true that sometimes the rights that accused
individuals are supposed to have are not honored as much as they
should be. Even so, democracies do provide greater opportunities
for terrorists precisely because they are more open.
Authoritarian states usually have been able to maintain control
of actual and potential dissidents. The authorities and security
forces do not have to worry about civil liberties or protecting the
rights of persons suspected of terrorism. Surveillance methods
and interrogation techniques can be virtually unrestricted in such

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 19
systems. Even though such strategies of control can be harmful in
the long term, not only to individual citizens but to state stability,
they can prevent terrorism from occurring, or anyone engaging in
terrorism can be quickly captured. Authoritarian states often are
able to control to at least some extent how the media cover terrorist
actions. In some cases they can even prevent any information about
the terrorism from being publicized. During the existence of the
Soviet Union, there were very few dissidents and virtually no terrorist
episodes. The successor states to the Soviet Union, however, have
faced many more difficulties and violent incidents. The most obvious
example has been the problems that the Russian government has
had with dissidents in Chechnya in the southern part of the country.
The discontent in the region did not begin with the breakup of the
Soviet Union; it was already present. The weaker Russian state that
came into being, however has presented opportunities for Chechen
dissidents that had not previously existed.
Another factor that has been suggested as contributing to outbreaks
of terrorism has been the presence of relatively weak states that
cannot effectively control their own territory. The lack of effective
security forces whether in a democracy or a more authoritarian state
provides opportunities for groups to organize and to launch attacks.
Domestic groups can target weak states, or they can provide a safe
base for groups from other countries that want to attack their home
government. Lebanon in the 1970s and the 1980s and Somalia in the
1990s and the 2000s have sheltered a variety of terrorist organizations
that used the lack of central authority to their own advantage. A factor
that is related to weak states is the aftermath of wars (especially for
the defeated countries) and economic deterioration. The breakup of
empires or states can leave new countries weaker as well. It is no
Democratic systems and weak governments can contribute to
the rise of terrorism. “Inefficiency or leniency can be found in a
broad range of all but the most brutally efficient dictatorships,
including incompetent authoritarian states . . . as well as modern
liberal democratic states whose desire to protect civil liberties
constrains security measures.” (Crenshaw 2003: 94)

Terrorism: The Basics20
surprise that many countries experienced political violence of all
types in the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression.
Similarly, after World War II the weakened European colonial powers
faced national liberation movements that they could no longer
contain. The native populations in Cyprus, Aden, and Algeria, and
the Jewish settler population in Palestine, for example, relied on
terrorist attacks, usually in combination with other activities, to win
their independence.
chAnGes In PolIcIes
Some terrorist groups seek changes in the domestic policies of a
government. The groups may want fairer treatment for a particular
group in society or they may want the government to follow
domestic policies more in line with either conservative, more left-
wing, or other political views. Anti-abortion groups in the United
States are an example of such a group that has used violence to
dispute the effects of a domestic policy. These groups are attempting
to reverse the current policy of the United States government that
permits abortions in some circumstances. Terrorist groups have also
attacked targets linked to foreign governments in attempts to bring
about changes in foreign policies. Al Qaeda and groups influenced by
it have as one of their objectives changes in the foreign policies of the
United States and its allies. These groups want changes in policies
towards the Middle East and Muslim states, including at least partial
Western withdrawal from Muslim areas. Anti-Castro Cuban exile
groups are another example. These groups attacked targets associated
with foreign governments that had recognized or could be seen as
supporting Cuba. Many other exile groups have launched attacks
seeking to undermine foreign support for their home governments.
chAnGes In PolITIcAl leADeRshIP
Sometimes groups seek not only changes in the policies of the
government in power, but also changes in the associated group
that is in power in the government. The objective of the group
goes beyond the removal of just one leader. An assassination could
remove a single individual to be replaced by another, but with
terrorism, groups are seeking a change in the political elite. They

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 21
may be seeking to drive out a particular portion of the political
elite to be replaced by another or to create conditions that are more
likely to bring a new group (ethnic, religious, political beliefs) into
power. There have been groups in the past that hoped to place
different groups into power by using a campaign of terrorism.
Some of the opposition groups in Iraq have sought to bring about
changes in the groups that are in power in the new government
of that country. Of course, there is usually an expectation in all
of these cases that there will be changes in policy that come with
changes in leadership. Groups may hope to bring about changes in
the leadership of foreign governments as well if they see such an
alteration as being likely to bring about the changes in policies that
they prefer.
chAnGes In The PolITIcAl sysTem
When groups are willing or feel compelled to resort to violence, they
are frequently seeking more than policy changes or a different set of
political leaders. They are more likely to want to bring about major
changes in the political system itself. They may hope to replace
a military regime or a one-party government with a democratic
system. In other cases the groups may want to replace a monarchy
with a republic or reestablish a monarchy to replace a republic. The
Islamic Republic in Iran when it was first established had to deal
with terrorist attacks from groups that wanted to establish a more
secular system in that country. Groups from the left have sought
to overthrow the existing government and to replace it with a
government based on the principles expounded by Marx and Lenin.
Groups from the right, on the other hand, have sought to overturn
governments of the left. The ultimate objective of the anti-Castro
exile groups that operated outside Cuba was a complete change in
the nature of the Cuban government.
chAnGes In sTATe BounDARIes
The final change in underlying political circumstances that terrorist
groups may be seeking involves geographic goals. Anti-colonial
movements seek to create independent states that are no longer
parts of the empires that contained them. In other cases regional

Terrorism: The Basics22
groups will use terrorism in an attempt to break away from existing
states and create new nations. In yet other situations a group may
seek to have a portion of a country attached to a different state, as
was the case when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) wanted to
unite Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic after the two parts
of the island were separated after World War I. The changes in
boundaries may imply a change in the political system as well as
a change in boundaries, although it is possible that those seeking
the changes may not have issues with the form of government.
They may be willing to establish the same form for the new state.
Boundary changes would, of course, require a change in the political
leadership and undoubtedly some policy changes as well.
RelIGIous GoAls
Many of the terrorist groups that have appeared had objectives that
have been based in their religious views. Al Qaeda has sought policy
changes within Islamic countries and changes in their political
systems and changes in the foreign policies of other countries. In
some cases the religious group may have sought or may be seeking
to reduce secular influences and to introduce more religious laws
into the land. Extreme Islamic groups in a number of countries have
sought to force the incorporation of more Islamic prescriptions into
national legal codes. Other religious groups have sought to gain
autonomy for their religion or greater rights for their group within
a country where they might have been facing discrimination due to
their minority position. Protestants in New Guinea and Indonesia,
Muslims in southern Thailand, Sikhs in India, and Christians and
followers of traditional religions in the southern Sudan have all, at
times, relied on violent attacks and terrorism in what they perceived
as efforts to protect their religious groups. Anti-abortion groups in
the United States have also been motivated by religious beliefs.
It is also possible for members of the dominant religious group
to use violence against minority religious groups, often in efforts
to drive them out of the country or out of a given area. Extreme
Hindu groups in India have launched attacks against members of
other religions as part of their efforts to incorporate more elements
of Hinduism into national laws and culture and to drive out what

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 23
they see as intrusive and contaminating foreign influences. Muslims
in Indonesia have attacked the Christian minorities in some areas
of the country since they are seen as obstacles to creating a more
Islamic state. The Mormons in the United States before the Civil
War were driven out of New York, Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois in
succession by the dominant Christian communities because they
were different and considered even potentially subversive.
eThnIc oR nATIonAlIsT GoAls
Terrorist groups also can be motivated by ethnic or nationalist
concerns. Minority ethnic groups may become dissatisfied with
their position in particular states, and some members may turn to
terrorism as part of an effort to gain autonomy or independence.
Groups could also have more limited goals. They might want policy
changes such as the ending of discrimination or they might desire
guarantees of greater representation in the ruling circles. Any of
these desired changes could require some changes in the political
system to accommodate such guarantees or inclusion of previously
excluded groups.
The majority group may also engage in terrorism targeting ethnic
minorities because they are feared or disliked. The majority may
wish to repress the minority, or they could attempt to prevent the
minority from creating an independent state or having a particular
region joined to a neighboring country. The actions by the majority
group may eventually reach the level of ethnic cleansing where
there is an effort to drive out those that are “different”. Such efforts
will invariably rely on spreading terrorism among the members
of the targeted group. Genocide is the ultimate form of ethnic
cleansing, but it is not terrorism since it seeks to eliminate the
target population rather than spread terror among the members.
Most other forms of ethnic cleansing, however, simply seek the
removal of the targeted group. Fear is an important part of the
motivation to drive them away, and the members of the groups are,
in fact, permitted to leave.

Terrorism: The Basics24
IDeoloGIcAl GoAls
Ideologies are frequently referred to as left and right or left-wing
and right-wing. Although there are many variations, left-wing
ideologies seek to promote greater equality for individuals in society.
They are opposed to hierarchy and opposed to great differences in
economic wealth. Ideologies of the left include communism and its
variations, socialism, anarchism, and labor (and in the United States
liberalism). Right-wing ideologies accept greater inequalities
as natural and expected in society, support existing institutions,
often have connections to more religious elements in society, and
favor the status quo. Right-wing ideologies include conservatism,
Christian democracy, and monarchism. Most left-wing and right-
wing ideologies, of course, do not promote a reliance on violence,
but the more extreme versions of both groups often do support the
use of violence as a means of obtaining objectives. Any of these
ideologies and others could serve as a basis for violent activities
under the right circumstances, such as might occur when battling
against an authoritarian, repressive government that espoused
different political views.
Terrorist groups whose reason for existence is rooted in
ideology seldom seek to change state boundaries whether they
are of the right or the left. What they often seek to change is the
nature of the political system. Even when they do not want to
change the system, they want changes in the political leadership
so that it would be more inclusive of elements of the society that
they see as unfairly excluded. They also inevitably want to bring
about policy changes. Extreme left-wing groups in the past, such
as the anarchists, attacked the class structure and the privileges
of the existing system. Violent leftists that appeared in Latin
America, Western Europe, and elsewhere in the 1960s and later
were opposed to the inequities of domestic and international
capitalism. More recently environmental and animal rights
groups have appeared to fight the ecological damage done by
capitalism. Extreme right-wing groups have fought against
changes in society. The various fascist parties (including the Nazis
in Germany as an extreme case) sought to prevent socialism and
other new political views from gaining strength. Violent groups
on the right more recently have targeted migrants because of the

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 25
groups’ opposition to foreign religions, foreign cultures, different
races, and different ideas.
comBInATIons of oBjecTIves
While many of the groups that resort to terrorism can be seen
as primarily ethnic, religious, or ideological, some groups are
more difficult to place in just one category, and, of course, it is
not necessary to do so. These groups have mixed motives and
objectives. In many areas of the world, for example, terrorist groups
have formed alliances of convenience with criminal organizations,
especially those involved in drug trafficking. Both the criminal
groups and the political dissidents opposed to the government in
power benefit when the government is weak. The long-term goals
of the criminals and political opponents may not be in agreement,
but cooperation is in their mutual interests in the short term. The
alliance between the drug cartels and leftist groups in Colombia
has been one of the most obvious cases of such cooperation. The
government of Colombia has yet to come up with an effective
way of combating this alliance, and the drug producers and leftists
continue to control significant portions of the country.
In other cases, religion and ethnicity overlap and reinforce each
other. While the rebels in Chechnya in Russia are often portrayed
as Islamic radicals, their battle really began as a national struggle
for independence. The Chechens are overwhelmingly Islamic in
culture (and often in practice as well), and they eventually began
to receive assistance from external Islamic organizations. This
support in turn has led to greater emphasis on Islamic themes
among the rebel groups that are fighting the Russians. In Northern
Ireland, the violence was often seen to be a consequence of religious
differences between Protestants and Catholics. In reality the conflict
is also between those inhabitants who see themselves as British
(overwhelmingly affiliated with Protestantism even if loosely) and
those who consider themselves Irish (overwhelmingly Catholic).
The struggle at times has even involved elements of ideology since
the dissident groups have emphasized the differences between
the economic status of the Catholic Irish (much more likely to
be working class and with a lower standard of living) and the

Terrorism: The Basics26
Protestant British (much more likely to be middle class and with a
higher average standard of living).
Another factor that makes it difficult to classify some terrorist
groups in terms of underlying objectives is due to the fact that the
multiple characteristics reflect changes over time. A group may
attach ideological components to their ethnic or religious goals or
see ethnic or religious implications of their ideologies. Anti-colonial
groups in the old European empires could see their struggle as
both nationalist and as part of an effort to resist domination and
exploitation by capitalist groups in the colonizing power. The basis
of support in the population may also change over time, requiring
a re-orientation of the propaganda of the dissident group. Most
terrorist leaders are, after all, politicians, even if of an unusual type,
and they may shift their appeals and goals to keep popular support
or generate additional support.
GoveRnmenT TeRRoRIsm
As was mentioned in Chapter 1 and as will be discussed in some
detail in Chapter 6, governments will support or permit the use of
terrorism against their own citizens. Governments have some of
the same types of objectives as dissident groups. They are unlikely,
however, to be supporters of terrorism to bring about changes
in political leadership, policy changes, or changes in the political
system. Just the opposite is true – the government is using the
violence as part of attempts to preserve policies, the system, and
especially the leadership. The terrorism is likely to be directed
against opposition groups that are seeking changes in these areas.
If a government is too weak to use repression against the political
opposition it may rely on terror.
When governments attack domestic opponents it will frequently
be on ideological grounds since the disagreements on policy changes
and the political system will often have an ideological component.
Governments may seek to expand the borders of a state, but they
are unlikely to attack their own citizens to achieve any changes in
national boundaries. They may, however, seek to deal with domestic
groups that they fear to avoid threats to the integrity of the state.
The suspect groups inside the borders could be ethnic or religious

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 27
minorities. If the government cannot rely on open repression or
expulsion, it may employ less direct means to dominate the group.
In other cases, the government could reflect a majority view towards
ethnic or religious minorities where they are disliked because
of their differences and become targets for that reason. A weak
government may find it convenient to overlook such attacks since
they might deflect attention from the governmental shortcomings
or because the unpopular minority provides a convenient target. The
monarchy in Russia prior to World War I, for example, acquiesced
in attacks against its own Jewish citizens since they absorbed some
of the blame for the failures of the government.
DomesTIc veRsus InTeRnATIonAl TeRRoRIsm
Frequently, a distinction has been made in the past between foreign
and domestic terrorism. Domestic terrorists attack targets in their
own country and avoid foreign property and personnel. International
terrorists (1) attack foreign targets in their own country, (2) attack
foreign targets abroad, or (3) attack targets associated with their
home governments such as an embassy or a government company
in a foreign country. The last possibility is clearly international
since it crosses state boundaries, but it is really an extension of the
dissident group’s problems with their own government.
To the extent that the distinction between domestic and
international terrorism is valid, domestic terrorists seek to bring
about changes in the policies of their government, in the political
leadership, or in the political system. If they are a regional or
ethnic group seeking to create a new state or join themselves
to a neighboring state, then they may also be seeking to change
state boundaries. International terrorists can have the same aims
in some cases as when they target symbols of the government
abroad. They may also target a foreign country if the government
of that country is aiding their own government. They are hoping
to change the foreign policy of the external government to give
themselves a better chance of bringing about the domestic changes
they desire. The more international terrorist groups may attack a
foreign government in efforts to bring about other policy changes.
Al Qaeda wants to lessen US involvement in the Middle East and

Terrorism: The Basics28
other Islamic areas. The Madrid train attacks in 2004 and the attacks
in the London transport bombings in 2005 by militants identifying
with al Qaeda were intended to convince the Spanish and British
governments to withdraw their support for the United States in the
Middle East. It also seeks to stop Western support of the repressive
governments in power in Middle Eastern countries. These
repressive governments are also seen as being too secular and not
following religious law closely enough. Some of the leftist groups
that operated in the latter part of the twentieth century regarded
international capitalism and capitalist states as their enemies and
sought to undermine the effects that capitalism was having.
It is indeed becoming more difficult to distinguish between
domestic and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism
increasingly has international implications in a more interconnected
world. International terrorism has implications for a government
in the country where the attack takes place, in the country where
the terrorists originated, and sometimes for other countries as
well. While it has become more difficult to separate domestic
from international terrorism in any precise way, it is important
to note that the vast majority of terrorist actions that do occur are
primarily domestic in terms of the objectives they are seeking. It is
the international terrorist acts, however, that attract more attention
since they involve more than one country. These attacks, therefore,
often generate greater publicity, which may be an important aim
for the terrorist group itself. Attacks in democratic countries with
freedom of press coverage can be especially important in this regard.
While the international incidents are still only a small portion of
the attacks that occur, it is the international incidents that are likely
to be more deadly on average than the domestic attacks (Enders and
Sandler 2000: 327–8).
conclusIons
Terrorist groups pursue a wide variety of objectives. They may seek to
have domestic governments or foreign governments (or both) change
policies; they seek changes in domestic leadership or government
systems; they attempt to change state boundaries. Many groups have
goals that are linked to ethnic ideals for autonomy or independence,

WhaT do TerrorisTs WanT? 29
while others have goals imbedded in religious beliefs or ideological
convictions. Some groups reflect combinations of these motivations.
Further, governments may resort to terrorist actions against their
own citizens with the same types of motivations as dissident groups.
Ultimately, many different groups with many different goals have
operated and continue to operate using terrorism as a technique in
efforts to achieve these different objectives because terrorism as a
technique is available to all the groups.
key TeRms
ethnic cleansing, genocide, globalization, government terrorism,
left-wing ideology, right-wing ideology
fuRTheR ReADInG
Bjorgo, T. (ed.) (2005) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways
Forward, London: Routledge.
This volume provides a valuable overview of possible causes of terrorism
and also contains chapters dealing with the types of goals terrorist groups
pursue.
Laqueur, W. (2001) A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers.
This book provides a succinct review of terrorism through the ages by one
of the academics who has been involved in the study of the subject for over
twenty years.
Lutz, J. M. and B. J. Lutz (2008) Global Terrorism, 2nd edn, London:
Routledge.
This textbook relies on numerous cases studies to introduce various aspects
of terrorism including classifications and causes.
Richardson, L. (ed.) (2006) The Roots of Terrorism, London: Routledge.
This edited volume discusses causes in terms of background issues such as
economics, democracy, religion, and globalization.

3
wHo Becomes a terrorist?
A great deal of effort has been made to determine who is likely to
become a terrorist or who is likely to be successfully recruited by an
existing group. These efforts are particularly important to security
forces or anyone else involved in counterterrorism efforts since the
ability to identify persons likely to join such groups would be quite
valuable. There are, however, relatively few predictors available,
although there are some patterns that can be discerned. As noted
in Chapter 2, poverty is not a very good predictor of who will join
a group, but there are some characteristics related to age, gender,
psychological characteristics, and motivations that have been
considered as relevant. These characteristics also vary somewhat
for religious, ethnic, and ideological groups.
PsycholoGIcAl PRofIle
It has often been assumed that many terrorists have psychological
problems – that they are even crazy. These psychological problems
are then assumed to lead them to participate in attacks in which
innocent individuals are killed more or less indiscriminately. We
do not have anything approaching a detailed or complete sample
of terrorists since they keep their identities hidden as much as
possible. There has been enough information gathered on those
involved in many groups to know that very few of the individuals
have any significant psychological problems. There is no evidence
Frederick J. Hacker (1976), an American psychologist, once
classified terrorists as crusaders, criminals, or crazies, a view
that much of the public would probably accept as accurate.

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 31
that persons suffering from mental disorders are overrepresented
in the ranks of terrorists, even though there may be individuals
with problems in some groups. It is possible that some groups are
willing to use individuals with psychological problems at times, but
they cannot rely on them because their mental disorders make them
potentially unstable and poor security risks for the organization. As
a consequence, in psychological terms individuals who join terrorist
groups are disturbingly normal.
Not even suicide terrorists display backgrounds that would
suggest any prevalence of psychological problems. Suicide
attackers and would-be suicide attackers have not displayed suicidal
tendencies as individuals. They appear to volunteer for suicide
missions in order to advance the cause of the group. There is no
evidence that they have deep-seated death wishes or any other
psychological characteristics that pre-dispose them as a group
towards participating in these attacks. Involvement in suicide
attacks has also not been confined to individuals who are particularly
religious. The Tamil Tigers, a dissident ethnic group in Sri Lanka,
was for a long time the group that most frequently used suicide
attacks. Many of the suicide attacks in Lebanon as well as Israel and
the Occupied Territories have been by members of secular political
groups, not by members of religious organizations. It is true that
more recently suicide attacks have become the trademark of Islamic
extremists, but it is important to note that the dominant use of this
technique by religious groups is actually a rather new phenomenon.
It has also been suggested that terrorists can be criminals. Just
as persons with psychological problems are unlikely to be part of
terrorist groups, criminals – or more appropriately opportunists
– are also unlikely to join a violent organization with political
objectives. By definition, criminals usually seek financial gain, and
terrorist groups provide few opportunities in this area since most
terrorist groups are weak and are likely to fail. The groups that have
a chance of success, however slim, can attract some opportunistic
adherents when a group is on the upswing. When criminal
organizations have cooperated with terrorist groups, the ultimate
goal of the criminal groups has been to improve their opportunities
for financial gain by weakening the government or police. It is
possible for some individuals with limited prospects in their society

Terrorism: The Basics32
to join because there is an opportunity for food, shelter, and support
that might not otherwise exist.
Opportunism can take many forms beyond direct involvement
in a group. Merchants or professionals might find it expedient to
support a group in order to continue to conduct their business or
practice their trade since the lack of support could lead to losses
in the business sector. Participation in a group might also provide
status in other ways that could be useful in a conventional political
career or in business. In the southern states in the United States,
many people joined the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), a group that
frequently practiced terrorism, since it provided useful personal
contacts in business and other areas. In other situations where
members of terrorist groups are seen as heroes or defenders of a
particular portion of the population, individuals might gain status
from membership. While individuals who join or support a group
for these reasons might be important for the organization, they
are unlikely to be a large element in most cases. Opportunists, like
criminals, will weigh the costs and benefits of participating, and
quite often they are likely to conclude that the costs will outweigh
any potential benefits.
A particular group of individuals who qualify as criminals that
has been attracted to dissident causes have been individuals from
prison populations. When activists from ideological struggles have
been caught and imprisoned for their activities, they have often
been able to attract followers in prison. Leftists have been able to
argue convincingly that the criminal justice system unfairly targets
the poor or discriminates against workers and peasants. Right-wing
groups, such as the Aryan Nations in the United States, have also
had some successes with white prison populations by arguing that
the political and social systems have been changed to devalue the
worth and contributions of those holding true conservative (or even
reactionary) views and values and that they have devalued the white
race. Extreme religious groups have frequently been able to recruit
new members as well. Religions and ideologies provide guiding
principles and social structures that support the individuals while
they are in prison. A significant number of prisoners in Europe have
converted to Islam and have become involved in more radical and
violent groups in some cases. The ones who are recruited in these

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 33
situations are not normally the professional criminals; they are much
more likely to be petty criminals who have had economic problems
or difficulties in terms of fitting in with their societies. These recruits,
however, do not join the terrorist groups for financial gain, so they
are not the criminal element that Hacker referred to in this threefold
typology of terrorists as noted in the Box at the beginning of this
chapter, nor are these individuals obviously opportunists.
Terrorist groups can at times provide a sense of belonging for
members and give individuals support that they might otherwise
not have. The provision of a support structure is a necessary
component for most groups, but there is no evidence that terrorist
groups in general disproportionately attract rootless individuals
seeking a group identity. Analyses have found that over time,
members of many groups do become very dependent on the group
for a social network and emotional support since they often become
increasingly isolated from the broader society. Solidarity with the
group becomes increasingly important for the members, and as
a consequence, it is often difficult for long-standing members to
exit the group and re-integrate into society. Isolation within the
group may create psychological problems for members, but these
problems appear after individuals have joined, not as a cause for
joining.
Crusader was the last category noted by Hacker. This term refers
to those who are committed to the cause that the organization is
pursuing. Most members of virtually all terrorist groups would be
believers in the cause. Opportunists are unlikely to join a group
with small chances of success. Believers in the cause in contrast
would display above average dedication to the political objectives of
the violent group. The willingness to use violence would also seem
to require a higher level of commitment or belief. Thus, the one
“Prisons form a primary ground for both radicalization and
recruitment … In terms of radicalization, prisons are in themselves
environments conducive to the radicalization of alienated
individuals who have dismissed society and are in search of a new
or higher purpose in life.” (Korteweg et al. 2010: 32)

Terrorism: The Basics34
characteristic of individuals who join terrorist groups is their level
of commitment, and this characteristic clearly dominates when
compared to those who are opportunists – including criminals – and
those with psychological problems. Unfortunately, in the efforts to
profile likely members of groups, there are neither key predictors
of commitment nor predictors as to which individuals with the
appropriate level of dedication are likely to join a group and which
individuals are not likely to do so.
oTheR chARAcTeRIsTIcs
While persons involved in terrorist groups do not fit a psychological
profile, there are some other tendencies that have been observed.
One societal situation that has been linked to circumstances that can
attract individuals to extreme causes involves the condition known
as anomie. A person in this situation, and “an anomic individual”, is
someone who has been displaced from a comfortable or supporting
social structure into new circumstances that are unstructured for
them and may even be chaotic. Persons who move from rural
villages with a clear social and economic structure to urban areas
may find themselves without a solid base. Immigrants moving to
a new country can face even greater adjustment problems. Prison
populations would also include many individuals who would be
considered anomic, even though prison itself will usually provide
some structure. The disruption that comes with major wars can
also create the potential for an increase in the number of anomic
individuals. Persons who find themselves in this situation can be
veterans, people displaced by the fighting, or other civilians who
find their social and economic structures disrupted. The dislocations
that come with the economic, social, and cultural changes associated
with globalization and modernization can also create anomie. All of
the individuals in anomic situations can be attracted to a variety of
organizations, including radical and violent ones. The individuals
provide a potential pool of recruits for dissident terrorist groups
or even for organizations using violence on behalf of governments
or groups in power. Even though anomic individuals may be more
susceptible to the appeals of radical groups, most of them do not join.

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 35
The terrorist groups can provide a sense of belonging for
its members, including those from anomic situations, and give
individuals support groups that they might otherwise lack. The
provision of a support structure is a necessary component for most
groups, but there is no evidence that terrorist groups in general
disproportionately attract rootless individuals seeking a group
identity. Analyses have found that over time, members of many
groups do become very dependent on the group for a social network
and emotional support since they often become increasingly isolated
from the broader society. Solidarity within the group becomes
increasingly important for the members, and as a consequence, it
is often difficult for long-standing members to exit from the group
and re-integrate into society. Isolation within the group may create
psychological problems for members, but these problems appear
after the individuals have joined, they are not a cause for joining.
It would appear that to some extent terrorist groups involve
teens and younger adults and older adults (as well as the very
young, of course) are underrepresented. This tendency is hardly
surprising since the demands of active involvement are more easily
met by younger individuals. The active terrorists are similar to
the rank and file of the regular military in regard to their age. The
leadership cadres of terrorist groups, however, often involve older,
and perhaps less physically fit, individuals. The older age of the
leader is not surprising, especially for groups that have survived
for a number of years. The age difference for the leadership that
is often present corresponds in some ways to the higher ranks of
the regular military or police where experience is valued. Older
individuals are also less likely to be active in terrorist groups, at
least in terms of carrying out attacks for other reasons, since they
are more likely to have family or other responsibilities that limit
opportunities for involvement. While activists involved in groups
may be younger on average, an organization rooted in a particular
portion of the population may be supported by people of all ages
in terms of safe house, food, clothing, money and information. In
such cases, the age of the activists would simply reflect a pragmatic
concern over strength and other physical factors rather than any
special appeal that the organization would have for the young.

Terrorism: The Basics36
As was discussed in the previous chapter, members of terrorist
groups are not particularly poor or deprived. Similarly, they are
not noteworthy for low levels of education. They do not fit the
stereotype as poor and uneducated individuals. Many groups attract
individuals who are representative of a more general population in
terms of education, or in some cases persons who are even better
educated on average than the general population. While there are
some variations among types of terrorist organizations and even
among groups in the same category, neither a lack of education nor
advanced education consistently explains why people choose to join
a terrorist group.
Active members of terrorist groups are much more likely to
be males, just as the regular military is a predominately male
organization. Women typically have not often been in the “front
lines,” for social, cultural, or religious reasons, but they have often
been valuable in support roles and in gathering intelligence. Women,
however, have become more important in many organizations, and
they have increasingly become involved in attacks themselves.
Women have some advantages when they undertake operations.
They often have easier access to target areas because security forces
may consider them to be less suspicious. It will often be awkward,
for example, for security personnel to search women at checkpoints.
Groups have also been willing to use women in suicide attacks for
similar practical reasons. While the active ranks of terrorist groups
are still largely male, female activists have begun to be more
involved in a much wider range of activities.
nATIonAlIsT/eThnIc GRouPs
Terrorist groups based in an ethnic or national movement or
seeking ethnic or nationalist goals, of course, tend to attract
members from that ethnic group or nationality. Even though there
may be sympathetic and dedicated outsiders or opportunists from
other segments of the population, the goals of the organization will
pretty well define the available membership. If an organization is
seeking autonomy or independence, they may have at least the
tacit support of a portion or almost all the ethnic population. The
population or large portions of it may disagree with the terrorist

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 37
tactics of the group, but they may still identify with the overall
objectives. This situation may make it more difficult for security
or police forces to gather intelligence from informants or to isolate
the violent group from the rest of the population, at least in cases
where the ethnic population has real or perceived grievances with
the government in power.
While ethnic terrorist groups reflect the tendency towards
younger and male activists, they often incorporate broader
elements of the population, and support for the organizations
may often be a reflection of this base population in terms of age
and education. Groups like the Tamil Tigers and the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) have been willing to use women
in at least some of their operations. During the terror campaign
against the French authorities and the European settlers in colonial
Algeria in the late 1950s, the Algerian National Liberation Front
cells frequently used women who could pass for French to penetrate
into European areas and plant bombs. The Tamil Tigers have used
women in suicide attacks with some regularity. Violent Chechen
groups, which were initially clearly nationalist but which also later
incorporated religious elements, have also been representative of the
broader population. These Chechen groups also relied on women,
even as suicide bombers. These “black widows” suicide bombers
were women who had lost husbands or sometimes other family
members to Russian forces. Their attacks represented an effort to
gain vengeance against the enemy. Women suicide bombers have
been used against Russian troops in Chechnya itself, and there were
at least two suicide attacks in which women destroyed Russian
airliners.
The fact that Chechen groups have been willing to use women
as suicide attackers is one indication that many of the dissident
organizations in the region are more nationalist than religious.
Islamic groups have been very reluctant to use women in this
fashion, and some Islamic groups continue to refuse to let
women serve as martyrs in suicide attacks.

Terrorism: The Basics38
RelIGIous GRouPs
Religious organizations sometimes are seen as being composed of
especially committed individuals who are driven by their spiritual
values. Obviously, some of the members of religious groups are
extremely dedicated, but it has yet to be proven that religious
groups consistently have more committed members than other
types of organizations. It has also not just been religious groups
that have been able to find volunteers for suicide attacks as noted.
What does seem to be true for terrorist groups based in religion is
that they are often willing to inflict casualties on outsiders, since
those who believe differently (including those with secular beliefs)
have placed themselves in opposition to God by their failure to
adhere to the appropriate beliefs. The actions of the outsiders (or
their inaction if they are not following prescribed patterns) place
them within the target population. In many cases, however, the
targets are not members of other religions but members of the
same religious community who either follow somewhat different
practices or who do not follow the more extreme or fundamentalist
version of the same religion. Conflicts among Sunni and Shia in
the Muslim world or between Protestants and Catholics in the
Christian community are obvious examples of this phenomenon.
Members of terrorist groups rooted in religion often are
representative of broader populations in terms of membership as
are ethnic groups, but there are some important differences. While
activists tend to be young, at least some religious groups involve
older activists as well. Religious groups have also often attracted
educated individuals. It was assumed that exposure to more
education would weaken religious ties, but that has not always
happened. It is possible that some of the more educated members
have joined religious groups when they have difficulty finding
employment commensurate with their education in job markets in
those instances where the supply of graduates exceeds the available
positions. There are a number of Islamic groups that have been quite
successful in attracting college graduates. Sikhs in India involved
in a terrorist and guerrilla campaign against the government have
included individuals with all levels of education. Similarly, the
Muslim groups that fought a terrorist and guerrilla war against the
government of Algeria in the 1990s involved a number of persons

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 39
with university educations. More recently, young men who see
themselves as part of al Qaeda and participants in the global jihad
have included individuals who are in economically marginal jobs
and who are less well educated than similar activists have been
in the past. These activists are also frequently members of small,
close-knit groups whose attitudes reinforce each other (Atran
2008). Some of these recent activists are different from some of
the other groups linked with Al Qaeda. The diversity of supporters,
however, has indicated that Islamic religious activists have come
from many different sectors of society.
Many religious groups have been less likely to involve women
as activists. In part, this reluctance is due to the fact that a number
of religions in their more fundamentalist versions have been
interpreted to place women in secondary roles. Religious groups
that are reacting to changes that occur with globalization and
modernization are more likely to adhere to such views. Islamic
groups have been male dominated as well, but at least some of these
groups have shown an increasing willingness to involve women in
the actual terrorist actions. The disparate collection of American
Christian religious groups that have used occasional terrorist
violence have almost always been male dominated or exclusively
male. On the whole, religious organizations would appear to be
much less likely on average to involve women in actual attacks than
some other types of groups.
There are two distinct types of religious individuals who may
be more likely to join a terrorist group. The first group consists
of recent converts who often are the most adamant in their belief
patterns. A second group with a similar potential has been the
offspring of immigrants in societies where the majority religion is
different. These individuals frequently find themselves isolated in
their new communities. They do not or cannot integrate into the
The Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan was able to attract educated
individuals with advanced degrees to its ranks. Many of these
individuals with scientific training were involved in the efforts to
develop weapons of mass destruction.

Terrorism: The Basics40
majority society, and they turn to religious communities instead for
a social or support network. These two groups in Western Europe
have been seen as a source of members for violent Islamic groups.
The London transport attacks were launched by second generation
Muslims who identified with global jihad. Richard Reid, the man
who tried to use a shoe bomb on a flight from France to the United
States and many of the individuals in the United States who have
been arrested for involvement in terrorist conspiracies have been
converts.
IDeoloGIcAl GRouPs
Left-wing and right-wing ideological groups tend to be different in
many ways in terms of the characteristics of the activists. They are
similar to each other and to other terrorist organizations in that they
attract younger individuals. The leadership may be older, but some
of the extreme left-wing groups such as the Red Army Faction in
Germany the Red Brigades in Italy, and groups in Argentina had
relatively youthful leaders, in part because the groups attracted
and were largely composed of students. Right-wing groups, on the
other hand seem to usually have older leaders even if many of the
activists are young.
The two types of groups have often differed in terms of the
education of the members. Left-wing groups have frequently
included large numbers of university students or recent graduates.
Organizations in Europe, Latin America, and the Weathermen in
the United States drew heavily upon such students. The middle
class and secular groups that launched attacks against the Islamic
Republic in Iran in its first two years of its existence also had a
large number of students in their ranks. Environmental activists
involved in property attacks against targets considered to be doing
ecological damage seem to have attracted such individuals as well.
It is clear that more mainstream environmental groups have had
greater appeal to those with more education. Right-wing groups,
on the other hand, appear to attract individuals with lower levels
of education on average. Many of the activists in these groups face
limited economic prospects, and they often blame their situation on
competition from migrant communities. They can also be victims

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 41
of modernization and thus susceptible to political views that tout
a return to the ideas of a better past and join conservative groups
as a response. Not all right-wing groups have the characteristic of
appealing to the uneducated or undereducated. In the past, European
fascist parties, which often relied on terror tactics, did include more
educated individuals. In part these organization attracted middle-
class individuals who feared the victory of communism or socialism
and greater power for the working classes. Thus, the educational
characteristics of the right-wing organizations have varied in
different periods of time. This variation seems to have been
dependent at least in part on which groups have felt threatened by
impending changes occurring from broader currents or events.
There are also differences between the left and the right in
terms of the involvement of women in the groups. Women have
played a more prominent role in left-wing terrorist groups. They
were part of the anarchist groups in Russia in the late 1800s and
early 1900s, and they were even members of plots to kill the czar.
Women were often involved in the student groups that were active
in Western Europe, Latin America, and the United States. Ulrike
Mienhof was the co-founder with Andreas Baader of the Red Army
Faction (better known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang). Activists in
environmental groups have also included women. It is more difficult
to find examples of women playing similarly important roles in
right-wing groups. The activists are almost always men although
women have joined and supported their male counterparts. They
have perhaps been most active in Scandinavian countries (where in
general women have achieved greater equality with men than most
areas of the world), although there is little evidence that they have
been involved in direct attacks.
Members of left-wing and right-wing groups do differ from
ethnic and religious groups in one important respect. Membership
of an ethnic group is often predetermined, and individuals may not
support a terrorist group, but they still remain linked to it by a
common heritage. While individuals can, and do, change religious
affiliations, in many contexts religious identification is relatively
fixed as well. Only cults such as Aum Shinriyko have an element
of conscious choice for the members. The decision to identify with
an ideology, however, is more fluid and subject to choice. Similarly,

Terrorism: The Basics42
there is more flexibility in deciding to join the terrorist fringe of
either ideological camp that is chosen. This circumstance makes it
more difficult for the terrorist group to develop a support base or
recruit activists in a population because the natural linkage present
with ethnicity and often with religion is absent. It may also explain
why ideological terrorist organizations on average usually lack the
longevity of religious or ethnic groups (Tan 2000: 268).
GoveRnmenT RePRessIon
There is one group of individuals who do appear to be much more
likely to join violent dissident groups. This tendency is true for
ethnic, religious, and ideological groups. Individuals who have lost
family members or close friends to the military, police, or security
forces often join violent opposition groups to avenge the death of
individuals close to them (Silke 2005: 245). Similarly, individuals
with no link to terrorist groups are likely to join such groups if they
have been vigorously questioned by the police or security forces
and mistreated or tortured in the process. They seek vengeance for
what was inflicted upon them. As mentioned above, the Chechen
black widow suicide bombers are examples of individuals who fit
into this category. Members of Palestinian groups, whether secular
or religious, often include persons who have suffered at the hands
of the security forces or lost loved ones. Government efforts to
uncover and deal with terrorist groups often unintentionally
serve as an aid to recruitment. Even successful actions against
known terrorists can lead to new recruits joining the organization.
A vicious circle starts in which government repression leads to
individuals joining terrorist groups which launch more attacks
that generate more repression, etc. Government security forces
and police face the dilemma of taking insufficient action, thereby
permitting terrorist groups to continue to operate, or if they
become too vigorous in their efforts to find terrorists, they risk
turning suspects into recruits. Of course, heavy-handed repression
has sometimes defeated terrorist groups, but often action within
the rule of law involving fair trials and respect for the rights of
defendants and suspects can often eliminate or at least reduce the
dangers of government actions creating new terrorists.

Who Becomes a TerrorisT? 43
conclusIons
Terrorist groups have attracted a wide variety of individuals. For the
most part, they do not suffer from psychological problems nor are
they opportunists or criminals. They are almost always individuals
who are committed to the cause that the group espouses. The one
category of individuals likely to join a violent group is those who
have lost a loved one to government forces or suffered some other
major personal loss or indignity. Beyond this group, those who join
terrorist organizations are more likely to be male, and they are
frequently young. Other than these rather basic attributes, there
are few commonalities. There are some differences among various
kinds of terrorist organizations, although not all the groups in the
same category are similar. Members of leftist groups often include
more educated individuals; members of ethnic or religious groups
are often cross-sections of the broader populations; members of
right-wing groups in many cases are less well-educated. Women
generally appear to play a greater role in left-wing groups and at
least some ethnic groups. Recent converts to a religion or second
generation migrants in religiously different societies may be more
susceptible to extremist appeals. Ultimately, these generalizations,
while important, are not especially helpful since most members
of any category (age, gender, education or not, occupation, recent
convert, or even those who have suffered losses) will not become
members of violent groups, even if they sympathize with them.
Thus, it remains quite difficult to identify or to predict which
individuals are terrorists or are likely to become terrorists.
key TeRms
Aum Shinrikyo, black widows, Red Army Faction, Red Brigades,
Tamil Tigers
fuRTheR ReADInG
Horgan, J. (2003), “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” in A. Silke
(ed.), Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on
Terrorism and Its Consequences. Chichester: Wiley, 3–27.

Terrorism: The Basics44
This chapter details some of the difficulties involved in trying to determine
who is likely to become a terrorist.
Kuznar, L. A. and J. M. Lutz (2007), “Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism,”
Political Studies, 55, 2: 341–61.
This article provides an useful discussion of some of the factors that would
lead groups to support terrorist groups.
Leiken, R. S. (2005), “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, 84, 4:
120–35.
This article assesses the danger from recent converts and second generation
Muslim immigrants in Europe, suggesting that these individuals are more
likely to join terrorist organizations.

4
wHat are tHe tecHniQues?
Terrorism itself consists of a number of distinct strategies and a
wide variety of tactical techniques. Which techniques are used
by which groups have varied by time and circumstance. Terrorist
organizations have proven that they are quite adaptable. They
have adopted whatever tactics are available to them, which fit
the situations they are facing. Five broad or general strategies
that terrorist organizations have used and continue to use will be
discussed below. That discussion will be followed by a consideration
of the various tactics that may be used by groups as well as the
kinds of weaponry that terrorist organizations have relied upon.
sTRATeGIes of TeRRoRIsm
A number of different kinds of strategies have been attributed to
terrorist groups. At times groups have made their basic strategies
very public. At other times the strategies have to be inferred
from their actions, even though there are some situations where
the terrorist group may have intentionally misled the public or
the government as to their methods or objectives. In these cases,
information that is available later will clarify the basic strategy
that was being pursued. Kydd and Walter (2006) have suggested
that terrorist organizations over time have followed five basic
strategies. The five strategies that they identify are (1) attrition, (2)
intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding. Of
course, it is possible for groups to change their strategies over time
or to utilize a combination of these basic strategies as part of their
efforts to achieve their goals.
The attrition strategy is one that is designed to wear down
the government and convince political leaders to change policies

Terrorism: The Basics46
in a direction preferred by a terrorist organization. The attacks
are intended to force the government to see that changes in policy
will be easier than absorbing the damage created by the terrorist
group. The costs of the terrorism can lead to the desired changes.
A colony is granted its independence; discriminatory laws are
repealed; immigration policies are changed. The attacks are likely to
end if the necessary changes occur. Intimidation is directed toward
the public as the key audience and its objective is to convince
the population at large that the government is weak and can no
longer protect important groups or society at large. The ultimate
objective for undermining public support that is the key component
of this strategy is usually the overthrow of the government, and
perhaps a complete change in the political system as well. In these
circumstances, the terrorist group is unlikely to end its campaign if
the government simply changes policies.
Provocation is a more intermediate strategy and is basically
designed to attempt to get the authorities to overreact. The terrorists
are trying to goad the government or its security personnel
into actions that will alienate a portion of the population. If the
government can be induced into launching indiscriminate attacks
against groups in society or arresting and detaining members of
a religious, ethnic, economic, or ideological group, or limiting civil
liberties for the society as a whole, the dissident organization may
be able to attract additional supporters and at the same time weaken
the government. When it works it can be a very effective means
of attracting recruits and financial support if heavy-handed actions
by the police or security forces alienate individuals or groups. This
type of provocation can, of course, be combined with the other
strategies. It can, for example, be a significant part of an attrition
strategy designed to shift support from the government to the
dissidents and can also complement an intimidation strategy.
Spoiling and outbidding are usually more intermediate strategies
intended to strengthen an organization for a longer struggle or to
avoid what the group sees as a negative situation. The spoiling
strategy is frequently designed to prevent an outcome such as a
truce or peace negotiations between the government and moderate
opposition or some other group of violent dissidents. The terrorist
group may believe that a truce or a peace settlement will permit a

WhaT are The Techniques? 47
competing dissident group to gain power or that a settlement would
undercut a long term objective by a premature end to the hostilities.
The negotiated compromise thus becomes unacceptable because it
would prevent ultimate victory. Attacks are launched to inflame the
situation and to avoid such an outcome. Extremists on both sides of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have used this technique to disrupt
negotiations and undercut peace settlements at various times
in that troubled area. Outbidding refers to efforts by competing
groups to gain the allegiance of dissidents or others who are not
satisfied with the current situation. Different organizations may be
trying to appeal to the same segments of society or for assistance
from abroad by appearing to be the most effective group opposing
the government. The leaders of different dissident groups in these
circumstances are acting in much the same fashion as politicians
competing for votes or for control of many of the same resources.
The groups will undertake attacks in an effort to attract recruits and
financial support. In other cases groups may be seeking to retain
their support base that is already present. Further, new attacks or
a series of attacks could be used to convince supporters that the
organization is still active and effective and the group should
continue to receive support.
RoBBeRIes
Finances are important for any terrorist organization. There are
many ways that groups raise money for the cause (the Box below).
The techniques include violent activities. One common method for
raising funds is through bank robberies and similar actions. The
robberies are designed to provide financing for the organizations;
they are not undertaken for profit for a criminal gang or individual
Terrorist groups have developed a number of mechanisms for
financing their operations including channeling money through
charities and front organizations, buying gold and gems, drug
trafficking, smuggling, and operating legitimate businesses.
(Raphaeli 2003)

Terrorism: The Basics48
but to assist in the achievement of the ultimate political objectives.
The robberies can also have the secondary benefit of increasing
fear in the public and weakening support for the government if
the police or security forces are unable to prevent these kinds of
activities. The funds generated from the robberies, of course, can be
used to purchase weapons and explosives or otherwise increase the
potential of a group for continuing its struggle. The Order was
a right-wing group in the United States that intended to change
the government. While it lasted less than two years in the 1960s,
it successfully robbed a series of banks and armored cars. It netted
more than $4 million, most of which as never recovered (Michael
2003: 98). Other terrorist organizations rely on robberies and other
types of criminal activity to finance their activities.
kIDnAPPInGs AnD oTheR hosTAGes
Many groups have resorted to kidnappings as a technique. Like
robberies, kidnappings can serve multiple purposes. They demonstrate
the abilities of the group to the government and the public, and
they also indicate that the government is weak and that individuals
in society are vulnerable. The individuals who are kidnapped may
also be important symbols of the government, political groups,
businesses, etc. Successfully kidnapping them indicates that the
government cannot even protect its own personnel or supporters.
Finally, kidnappings have proven to be a source of income for some
groups when they receive ransoms for prominent individuals.
The combination of funding, intimidation, and publicity has made
kidnapping an effective tactic for many groups, and the success in
one country seems to have encouraged other organizations to use it.
Latin American groups in the 1970s and 1980s became quite adept at
raising money and attention for their causes with such kidnappings.
They have often targeted foreign executives of multinational
corporations with investment in their countries. The multinational
companies were ideal targets since they were often unpopular with
many people, and they were willing to pay the ransoms.
Hostage situations have some similarities with kidnappings
since the individual hostages are held against their will. Kidnappers,

WhaT are The Techniques? 49
however, usually remain hidden from view whereas the hostage-
taking is in public view. Unlike kidnappings where an individual is
targeted, at least some of the hostages are likely to be individuals
who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Hostage
situations provide the terrorist groups with another opportunity
to demonstrate the vulnerability of the government and to attract
publicity for the goals of the organizations. Frequently, groups
holding the hostages try to negotiate with the government for
concessions and changes in policies. At the very least, groups
holding the hostages can have political statements broadcast or
published since few governments are willing to risk the deaths of
hostages for refusing to publish a simple statement of grievances.
Once the group starts to kill hostages, the publicity is likely to be
present in any event. The dissident organizations at times have
sought to gain the release of imprisoned comrades or others in jail.
Such demands are both practical and symbolic because they would
gain freedom for the individuals and at the same time demonstrate
that the group can negotiate as an equal with a government. When
they are successful in gaining the freedom of colleagues in prison,
the loyalty of current members is increased. If the governments
fail to negotiate, they risk seeing the hostages killed (unless the
terrorists are bluffing) or will be forced to mount a rescue attempt
which can lead to deaths among the hostages as well.
Hostage situations are more dangerous for the terrorist groups
than kidnappings. If the kidnapping is well-planned, the members
of the group involved do not become known to the police and are
not placed in danger. Even a well-planned taking of hostages places
the members of the organization in danger of death or capture.
The potential costs of hostage situations are not just higher for the
government. In October 2002 when Chechen dissidents seized a
theater in Moscow with over 800 hostages, the Russian government
eventually mounted a rescue operation. The rescue attempt was
only a partial success. More than 100 of the hostages died in the
rescue attempt, creating a great deal of negative publicity for the
government. On the other hand, there were 40 to 50 dissidents who
were also killed. There are many terrorist organizations that are
too small to be able to afford these kinds of losses and even large
organizations cannot continuously sustain such losses.

Terrorism: The Basics50
AssAulTs
Terrorists will often assault individuals as a tactic without intending
to kill the target. Assaults demonstrate that the individuals are
vulnerable and send a broad warning to the target audience or
audiences without the stigma of murdering anyone. The victim also
remains alive as continuing proof of the abilities of the organization
and the government’s inability to prevent attacks. The attack itself
can also generate publicity for the group. The Red Brigades in Italy
developed the particularly effective technique of kneecapping.
Members of the group would approach the victim and shoot him in
one or both knees. This technique was especially effective since it
required the assailant to get very close to the victim, demonstrating
how vulnerable a person could be. The attackers would then get
away providing evidence of the government’s ineptitude and the
ability of the dissidents. The Red Brigades opted to undertake the
more difficult task of getting close to a victim rather than shooting
him at a distance with a rifle or killing with a remotely detonated
bomb since it demonstrated the abilities of the group. Because the
Red Brigades at this stage were ‘only’ wounding the victims, even if
they were likely to be crippled as a consequence of the attack, they
avoided the negative publicity that would have come with killing
them.
These kinds of assaults maximize the terror aspect of the
dissidents because it appears that anyone can be attacked. It
suggests that the government cannot protect people that are at risk.
At one level, this conclusion is misleading since the terrorists have
the advantage of choosing not to assault an individual who is too
closely guarded. There is no doubt that the Red Brigades aborted
some attempts at kneecapping because they could not get close to
the individual initially chosen. In those cases, however, they could
simply move on to a new target, and once he had been successfully
assaulted, the perception was created that everyone was vulnerable
and that the government was ineffective, a perception that was not
necessarily correct but still effective in creating fear in the target
audience. For the terrorists the perception of vulnerability, even if
not exactly accurate, serves their purpose quite well.

WhaT are The Techniques? 51
hIjAckInGs
Hijacking has been one of the standard techniques used by terrorists
(and others) around the world. Hijackings have been used as a means
to generate publicity for many groups and their objectives. The
more modern hijackings by their very nature usually include a large
number of hostages. The hostages are frequently from more than
one country creating opportunities for enhanced publicity. Planes
are relatively easy to control with their confined spaces, and when –
or if – terms are negotiated for the release of hostages in exchange
for some concessions, a ready means of departure is available for
the terrorists to a neutral country (where the hostages and plane
can then be released). Hijackings were quite effective for a period of
time until enhanced security measures began to limit opportunities
for success. Even weak airport security can be a deterrent since
any potential hijackers could be caught. Small groups cannot risk
the capture of members for no benefits. The captured members of
the group, furthermore, could become a liability in the hands of
the security forces since they could identify other members of the
organization, future plans, or key locations used by the group.
Terrorist groups have occasionally used the hijacking technique
against other types of transportation targets, including trains, buses,
and ships. The same principles apply in general to these targets,
although buses and trains may be less likely to have passengers
from many different countries. The terrorists will also have to
arrange some means of escape, even when they are successful in
getting some of their demands met and generating the publicity
they are seeking. While trying to leave the country where the
attack takes place, they could be vulnerable to attack or arrest. Ships
provide a target that could generate media attention and include
multinational passenger lists. They also can provide the necessary
means of escape to a neutral country, if such an arrangement can
The first recorded hijacking occurred in 1930 in Peru when anti-
government dissidents took over a small plane in order to drop
propaganda leaflets over the capital. (Piszkiewicz 2003: 2)

Terrorism: The Basics52
be negotiated. The journey to a safe port, however, is likely to be
a slow one providing opportunities for interception or action by
special military forces. Ships also have the disadvantage in that a
vessel of any size is going to be more difficult to effectively control
for a small group of militants.
AssAssInATIon
Assassinations are another frequent tactic for terrorists. The victim
of the assassination is not necessarily a particular individual chosen
for elimination but rather a member of a particular group. An
assassination designed to remove a specific individual to bring about
political change is political murder but not necessarily terrorism.
For example, the German officers who tried to kill Hitler desired a
change in leadership, but Hitler had to be removed as an individual
in order for this change to occur, and there was no intended target
audience for the violence. A campaign of assassinations against
members of a particular group, however, is a different situation. The
goal of assassination as a form of terrorism is to spread terror among
the broader group, which is the target audience for the violence.
The anarchists wanted to bring about change in government
policies by assassinating monarchs and other political leaders. They
hoped that political leaders elsewhere would undertake the desired
political reforms in order to avoid death. Larger terrorist groups are
able to undertake such campaigns as part of the broader effort to
intimidate the target audience and the broader public and as part of
a strategy of attrition.
BomBs
Explosives are involved in a great many terrorist actions. In fact,
they are the most common form of terrorist activity, used in
approximately half of all terrorist actions (Enders and Sandler
2006: 7). Of course, bombs come in many sizes, shapes, and levels of
destructiveness. Most bombs are small, but some explosive devices,
however, can cause much more damage. Bombs are a very flexible
weapon for terrorists to use. They can be designed for assassinations,
to cause casualties, to damage buildings, or for other purposes. They

WhaT are The Techniques? 53
can be constructed from many different components. Letter bombs
cause less damage and are generally designed to kill or injure a
recipient. The improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used in Iraq
after 2003 and increasingly used in Afghanistan are examples of
how destructive such innovatively engineered devices can be. Car
bombs that have been used are almost always intended to destroy
buildings or cause a large number of casualties in most cases. The
technique of using car bombs with regular explosives or fertilizer
based bombs spread very quickly once it was demonstrated how
effective such devices could be. As a consequence, many different
groups began to use them. The knowledge of how to prepare the
bombs spread very quickly through the media and the internet, and
this knowledge is now generally available. The fact that fertilizer,
which is a major component of the bombs, can be relatively easily
purchased in many countries has made them more destructive. It
has also been a factor in the popularity of their use. Car bombs were
used against the federal office building in Oklahoma City and in the
first attempt to bring down the World Trade Center Towers. They
were also used by the IRA in its campaigns in Northern Ireland, and
they became a popular choice by dissidents throughout the Middle
East. More sophisticated bombs have been used against airliners
once it became more difficult to arrange hijackings. Groups willing
to detonate bombs on airliners are obviously willing to accept a
significant loss of life in the campaigns to achieve their objectives.
The September 11 attacks were another example of the use of
a special type of bomb in a new way. The four airliners that were
hijacked became sophisticated bombs used against buildings that
could not otherwise be reached. The Pentagon and White House (the
probable target of the airliner that crashed in Pennsylvania) were
particularly inaccessible to attacks in other ways. The attack was
If a political leader is killed to permit someone else to assume
power, that action is a political murder, it is not terrorism. If the
leader is killed to send a message to other members of the ruling
political elite, however, then the assassination is terrorism.
(Schmid 1992: 10)

Terrorism: The Basics54
quite well planned. The four planes were hijacked simultaneously
and directed to their targets. All four flights were early flights,
which limited the chance of airport delays. The United flight that
crashed in Pennsylvania, however, left late, throwing this part of
the attack off schedule and explaining its eventual failure. The four
flights were all transcontinental flights, which meant they were
carrying extra aviation fuel. The planes were hijacked on a Tuesday
morning – a day when there would be fewer passengers on average,
making the takeovers easier. The hijackers also relied on what had
become standard operating procedures for the airliners, which
called for the crews to cooperate with the hijackers in anticipation
of political demands and the eventual release of planes, crews, and
passengers. Of course, no one anticipated that this would be a new
style of hijacking with a much deadlier purpose.
The 9/11 attacks were not the first attempts to use airliners as
bombs. In 1995 Algerian dissidents hijacked an Air France flight
with the apparent intent of crashing it into the Eiffel Tower. French
commandos recaptured the plane in Marseille when it was on
the ground for refueling, which threw that attempt into disarray.
Israel shot down a Libyan airliner in the 1970s that had bypassed
its destination in Cairo and strayed well off course and was flying
over the Sinai Peninsula. The Israelis feared that the plane had been
taken over and was going to be used against a target in Israel. They
feared the same situation when they shot down a small plane from
Lebanon near Tel Aviv in 2001 (Karmon 2002: 197). The potential
for attacks with planes against targets in the United States or
elsewhere probably should have been better anticipated by the
authorities than it was.
It appears that Osama bin Laden did not expect the attacks
to totally destroy the World Trade Center Towers. He seemed
to want to cause major damage to the upper levels and cause
significant casualties. The attacks were much more successful
than that, of course, and he was pleased that the destruction
exceeded expectations. (Robbins 2002: 357–8).

WhaT are The Techniques? 55
oTheR convenTIonAl WeAPons
Some bombs qualify as conventional weapons while some
others would fall into the category of unconventional. Terrorist
organizations rely on all kinds of other conventional weapons.
Whatever is available can be used. Tools, knives, handguns,
shotguns, and rifles are rather common, especially when groups
first appear. As groups become more organized and acquire more
money (through contributions, external supporters, bank robberies,
kidnappings, drugs, or other means), they can begin to gain access
to more sophisticated weapons. Rifles with telescopic sights can
become an important weapon for assassinations. Groups that
persist and attract support may be able to get weapons from raids
on police stations or by buying weapons from corrupt officials. As
noted above, bombs can be made in all kinds of ways. Whether they
are professionally made or improvised, they can be very deadly.
If they can, groups acquire more dangerous weapons when the
opportunity presents itself. A variety of groups have been able
to get their hands on surface to air missiles. There have been a
number of attempts to use such weapons against civilian airliners,
and rebels in the Sudan and Rhodesia have destroyed airliners
with such weapons. Anti-tank weapons (rockets) are very effective
against civilian vehicles, including ones that are armored and have
bullet proof glass. Mortars or other forms of light artillery can be
used for attacks when the terrorists cannot get close to the targets.
One Palestinian group used motorized gliders to get an attack team
inside Israel. This approach avoided the heavily patrolled land
The 17 November Organization in Greece was a leftist group
opposed to the regime in power. It needed weapons for a planned
attack. Lacking alternative sources, members of the group went
to the national war museum in Athens near closing time where
they tied up the staff and a few visitors and stole World War II
vintage weapons and ammunition. The stolen weapons were
then used for the attack. (Corsun 1992: 110)

Terrorism: The Basics56
border and the probability of radar detection present with other
types of aircraft.
In general, terrorists can use any weapon that is available to the
police, the security forces, or the military if they can get them. Many
groups, in fact, do acquire weapons from these sources. Terrorist
organizations have frequently demonstrated an ability to adapt a
variety of things, some of them unlikely, into weapons. Not all the
unusual weapons work as expected, but some of them have. Once
a technique has proven to be successful, other groups elsewhere in
the world will copy it. The internet has provided a mechanism for
the rapid dissemination of information, including material on bomb
building and other weapons. Some terrorist organizations have also
looked into using more unconventional weapons.
WeAPons of mAss DIsRuPTIon
There has been increasing concern that terrorist groups will be
able to take advantage of the complexity and the vulnerability
of modern society in other ways. Much that goes on in modern
society is dependent upon computer systems or other control
systems that rely on computers. A hacker could penetrate a critical
system – such as an air control system, a traffic control system for
railroads or subways, the internet, a financial network, systems
with medical records, or similar operations – and create havoc
by planting a virus or dangerous instructions inside the system.
Many different organizations and government agencies have had
to deal with persons who have hacked into their systems in the
past. To date, the computer hackers have generally been individuals
having ‘fun’ by penetrating the systems. In a few cases, hackers
have been interested in extorting money or stealing funds. While
there does not appear to have been any terrorist successes in this
area, there is the possibility of the danger of such disruptions in
the future. At least some organizations have attracted persons with
the necessary expertise, and it would be surprising if they had not
at least considered some form of cyber attack or checked into the
possibilities. If a successful computer attack were to occur on a
critical system, the resulting disruption could generate significant
problems and spread the fear that is the hallmark of terrorism.

WhaT are The Techniques? 57
WeAPons of mAss DesTRucTIon
A much greater fear for many than weapons of mass disruption
is the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. Generally
included in this category are chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological weapons that are capable of killing large numbers of
people if they are deployed. While it is possible that such weapons
could be used in a more limited capacity, currently the greater fear
is their potential for making large areas unlivable and for large
death tolls.
An early and continuing fear has been that some group of
terrorists would somehow acquire a nuclear weapon and use it
or threaten to use it unless changes in policies, governments, or
boundaries occurred. Even a tactical nuclear weapon that is designed
to do limited damage would be a tremendous threat to a major
city. There is no evidence that any terrorist organization has been
able to acquire such a weapon, although some groups such as al
Qaeda and Aum Shinriyko have tried. A well-financed group could
attempt to build their own devices. The knowledge to build such a
weapon is readily available, including information in libraries and
on the internet. The difficulty is not in knowing how to build such
a weapon but in getting enough weapons-grade materials to use in
the bomb.
A much more likely possibility than the explosion of a nuclear
weapon would be a radiological or dirty bomb in which the
explosion of a conventional bomb would include radioactive
materials that could contaminate the area where the explosion
occurred. The initial explosion would cause damage and death,
while the radioactive materials that were spread would then
continue to cause illness and death to those exposed to the blast
or those in the area in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.
A dirty bomb could make an area uninhabitable or require major,
specialized cleanup, compounding the economic damage done by
the initial explosion. Some terrorist groups have considered using
such dirty bombs but they have not yet done so. The threat is a
real one, however, since acquiring radioactive material is much
easier than getting weapons-grade nuclear material. If terrorists
gained control of a nuclear power facility, they might have the

Terrorism: The Basics58
opportunity to create the equivalent of a dirty bomb. The explosion
at Chernobyl in what is now the Ukraine demonstrated how serious
such an occurrence could be. Of course, security at nuclear facilities
has been increased to prevent just such an event. The danger that
a dirty bomb will be used remains real, and the threat seems more
dangerous than any possibility of the use of a nuclear bomb.
Chemical weapons also have the potential to cause mass casualties.
Chemical weapons were common in World War I, and they were
used by Saddam Hussein in Iraq against domestic opponents and
against the Iranian armed forces. The knowledge of how to make
chemical weapons is readily available, although manufacturing
such weapons with potent effects is more difficult. Aum Shinriyko
in Japan did manufacture sarin gas (a nerve gas) and then used
it in an attempt to cause mass casualties in the Tokyo subway
system. The attack failed to achieve this result because the gas was
not potent enough, even though thousands were hospitalized. The
attack, moreover, got the full attention of the Japanese authorities
resulting in the arrest of key members of the cult and a general
weakening of the organization. (Aum Shinriyko still exists under
a different leader, but no longer appears to be involved in violent
activity. It is also highly probable that the authorities are keeping a
very watchful eye on the group.)
This Japanese cult also tried to develop biological weapons but was
not particularly successful. Other groups have also tried to develop
such weapons but with little success. One recorded biological attack
occurred late in 2001 in the United States when letters contaminated
with anthrax were mailed to a variety of individuals in the media
and politics. While only a few people died as a consequence of these
mailings, the incident was quite successful in generating widespread
fear. Part of the reason for the widespread panic was because it came
so quickly after the 9/11 attacks. In addition, the biological nature
of the attack made it more threatening. If the same number of
people had been killed in a conventional bomb explosion, it would
not have had the same impact. The use of a new type of weapon,
however, had a much greater psychological effect. While the person
or persons responsible has not been definitely identified, the initial
fears that the attacks were another effort by al Qaeda was largely
disproved since the anthrax strain in question originated in the

WhaT are The Techniques? 59
United States. It appears that the person responsible had a domestic
agenda.
Biological and chemical attacks, like nuclear ones, are not
very likely to be used in the immediate future. They all require
significant financial resources and organizational capabilities. A
successful chemical attack would require large quantities of the
toxin that would have to be delivered under ideal conditions. A
contagious biological weapon could easily get out of control. It is
possible, however, to envision groups with a great antipathy to the
West or to Muslims or to black Africans starting an epidemic in an
area that contained a concentration of the target population. As a
consequence, the use of biological weapons is a possibility in some
circumstances for a group with enough money, organization, and
intolerance to launch an attack. For the most part, the difficulties
inherent with developing and using these weapons of mass
destruction make their use much less likely than conventional
weapons.
suIcIDe ATTAcks
A technique that has already been mentioned in other contexts is
that of the suicide attack. It was used for the 9/11 attacks, against
US marines and French paratroopers in Lebanon, against targets
in Israel, by the Tamil Tigers with great regularity during their
long struggle against the government of Sri Lanka, in Iraq and
Afghanistan with great frequency against US forces and other
foreign troops, and in many other countries and situations even
if somewhat less often. These suicide attacks have been deadlier
There are significant practical difficulties involved with using
exotic weapons such as biological or chemical agents; therefore,
terrorists will often prefer the tried and true conventional
weapons and techniques (Cameron 1999: 279). There is, of
course, less chance of failure with the conventional techniques,
and small groups often cannot risk failure that would come with
the use of a new technique.

Terrorism: The Basics60
than most conventional attacks. In a suicide attack, the person
with the bomb can detonate it at a time when casualties are likely
to be the greatest. If in danger of being apprehended by security
personnel there is a last opportunity to explode the device rather
than letting it be disarmed. Suicide attacks can also demonstrate
to observers as well as target audiences how determined the group
is and how far it is willing to go to achieve its objectives. There
is the implicit suggestion that such a level of determination will
mean that the struggle is likely to last a long time. Compared to
other types of attacks, suicide attacks are quite cost-effective for a
terrorist organization (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee 2002). The group
can usually find volunteers from its own ranks since involvement
in a terrorist organization is inherently risky and casualties among
activists involved in conventional (non-suicide) attacks can be high.
The relatively low cost of suicide attacks and their effectiveness
helps to explain why the technique has spread to new groups and
new regions.
Suicide attacks may have the greatest potential for casualties if
combined with weapons of mass destruction. Individuals willing to
die in an attack could unleash an even more devastating attack. A
volunteer could be injected with a contagious disease that could be
spread by casual contact and sent out to infect as many people as
possible in the target population before he or she died. Many of the
difficulties of dealing with radiological or chemical materials, such
as concern about being poisoned from dealing with them, would
diminish if activists intended to die in an attack. A suicide attacker
could always detonate explosive spreading chemical or radioactive
elements if discovery or arrest were imminent. This potential
combination of commitment and technology is a daunting prospect
for the future.
fAlse flAG ATTAcks
There is an additional tactic that can be used in conjunction
with different weaspons and different types of actions such as
bombs or assassinations. In one type of false flag attack a group
will undertake actions in the hope that an entirely different
organization will be blamed for the action. For example, a right-

WhaT are The Techniques? 61
wing group will plant bombs against targets that would typically
be chosen by left-wing groups in order to get the government to
crack down of the leftists. Similarly, a religious or ethnic group
could pick targets that would lead the public and the authorities
to blame a completely different segment of society. Governments
might even use such false flag attacks to permit more stringent
control of potential opposition groups. Shortly after coming to
power, Adolf Hitler used a fire in the German parliament to ban
the German communist party. The fire was most likely started on
Hitler’s orders with just such a goal in mind. It is not surprising
that conspiracy theories have appeared to suggest that the CIA or
Israel were responsible for the 9/11 attacks in order to accomplish
other goals by driving a wedge between the West and Islamic
countries and populations.
Another type of false flag (or false front) attack occurs when
a terrorist group will claim credit for an attack under a different
name. In this fashion the new group may bear the blame for
any unnecessary casualties or for other unpopular or otherwise
negative consequences. In this fashion an attrition or provocation
strategy can be continued against the government without the
known dissident group running the risk of decreased support.
Some times previously unheard of groups claim responsibility for
one or two attacks, and then the groups disappear. Some of these
examples no doubt reflect the use of personnel from the existing
organization to launch the attack in order to observe the reactions
of the government and the public while still avoiding the possible
negative consequences of new types of attacks.
escAlATIon
One very real possibility with terrorist organizations is the prospect
that there will be escalation in terms of techniques and the damage
done and casualties inflicted. When the initial types of attacks do
not accomplish the objectives that the group is seeking, there are
two choices assuming the group has not been detected and dealt
with by the security forces or the police. First, it is possible that the
group will give up the effort and disappear if they are not willing
to take the chance on killing people. Such demobilization of the

Terrorism: The Basics62
members might involve voluntary exile if it is not safe to remain
in their own country. The second alternative is to escalate the level
of violence – from kidnappings and assault to assassination and
murder, from attacks with limited casualties to those with great
death tolls, from conventional attacks to suicide attacks, even from
attacks with conventional weapons to more exotic weapons or
weapons designed to cause mass casualties. While not all groups
can survive to consider escalation, some that do are likely to become
involved in patterns of escalation. Most members of these groups
are committed enough to their cause to engage in illegal and violent
activities. As escalation begins to happen, it becomes even more
difficult for these committed members to turn back. Opportunists
and criminals might drop away with escalation, but they are not the
core of the group to begin with. The committed will persist in their
efforts to bring about change.
conclusIons
The techniques discussed above, which are potentially available
to all terrorist groups are quite varied. Like terrorism itself,
these tactics are not defined by the underlying motivation of the
organizations or their basic objectives. While most groups use
whatever weapons that they can acquire, some organizations will
be unwilling to use suicide attacks or mount actions that will lead
to large numbers of casualties. The decision not to cause casualties
is often done for tactical or strategic reasons. If the group is seeking
popular support and the public in question would be turned away
by mass casualties, then such attacks will not occur. If members of
the support population and the general population are intermingled
rather than segregated, then car bombs and similar tactics would be
counterproductive. If, however, the ethnic, class, or religious group
is separated from the rest of the population, such attacks become
more likely. While there are very real and important differences in
the willingness of organizations to cause death, all terrorist groups
by definition are willing to use violence, and most are willing to
accept the possibility of at least limited casualties. Many groups that
start out trying to avoid hurting people by focusing on symbolic
attacks or kidnapping, however, often do eventually escalate to

WhaT are The Techniques? 63
more violent behavior. If they decide to escalate, there are plenty of
proven techniques available for them to use.
key TeRms
anthrax, attrition strategy, Aum Shinrikyo, dirty bomb, false flag
attacks, intimidation strategy, kneecapping, the Order, outbidding
strategy, provocation strategy, Red Brigades, sarin gas, 17 November
Organization, spoiling strategy
fuRTheR ReADInG
Dolnik, A. (2008), “13 Years since Tokyo: Re-Visiting the ‘Superterrorism’
Debate,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2, 2: 3–11.
Dolnik provides a useful discussion of the likelihood of the use of weapons
of mass destruction in the future.
Dolnik, A. and R. Gunaratna (2006), “Dagger and Sarin: The Evolution
of Terrorist Weapons and Tactics,” in A. T. H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of
Terrorism, London: Routledge, 25–39.
This chapter summarizes the wide range of weapons used by terrorists
over time.
O’Neil, A. (2003) “Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How
Serious Is the Threat?” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57, 1:
99–112.
O’Neil suggests that the likelihood of any use of weapons of mass
destruction by terrorists is very small, but there will always be a danger
of such use.
Pape, R. A (2005) Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York:
Random House.
Pape’s work has become a classic in terms of discussing suicide bombing.
He argues, however, that virtually all such attacks are related to nationalist
issues and not religious ones. It appears that he stretches the definition of
nationalist or territorial issues to make this point.
Tucker, J. B. (ed.), Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and
Biological Weapons, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Terrorism: The Basics64
The selections in this collection deal with various attempts to use chemical
and biological weapons. The book provides an excellent background on the
difficulty of using chemical and biological agents since the vast majority of
attempts failed completely.

5
wHo are tHe targets?
The wide variety of techniques available to terrorist groups was
discussed in the previous chapter. These techniques can be used
against different targets, and no technique is unique to a particular
type of target. The persons responsible for the attacks may seek
to maximize property damage or cause casualties. The targets of
the violence may be chosen because they have symbolic or shock
value (Stern and Midi 2008: 29). Frequently a government is
the underlying target for dissident organizations because of its
leadership, policies, institutions, or state boundaries. The targets,
moreover, can include property, the general public, some portion of
the population, or specific groups of individuals. The target audiences
and those chosen for the attacks usually are chosen because of
their relationship to the government, but in some cases the target
audiences reflect the agendas of other groups in society. The target
audiences of government terrorism are generally similar, but there
are some important differences with this type of terrorism.
PRoPeRTy ATTAcks
A majority of attacks are solely property attacks directed against
buildings, monuments, offices, or other physical structures related
to some of the groups and situations described below. The property
attacks are designed to gain attention for the demands and goals of
the groups and to demonstrate the weaknesses of the government
and its inability to provide protection. It sends a message to the
target audience as well and frequently contains the implicit threat
that there will be actions designed to kill or wound people if the
demands for change are not met.
While some terrorist groups start with property attacks and
escalate to attacks on people, many never progress to endangering

Terrorism: The Basics66
people. Environmental groups and animal rights groups, for example,
have tended to focus actions on the property of the universities,
corporations, and other businesses that damage the environment
or mistreat animals. They have chosen operations of companies
involved in activities such as logging, animal testing, the fur business,
and similar activities or companies that generate large amounts of
pollution, which are considered unacceptable. These groups have
caused millions of dollars of damage in the countries where they have
operated. These attacks have been very effective in many cases and
changes have occurred since the attacks have harmed the economic
bottom line of the companies or universities. Companies and
universities have had to pay more for enhanced security in addition
to facing adverse publicity when the actions have led to increased
media attention to their operations. Most terrorist organizations,
however, are less effective with a reliance on property attacks since
the changes they desire are political rather than economic.
GoveRnmenT offIcIAls
Government officials have become a frequent target of dissident
groups. They may be assaulted, kidnapped, or killed. The officials
chosen may be specific to a particular ministry or government
function. Police officers and judges often become targets because
they are clear representatives of the authority of the government
and are often seen as part of the ‘corrupt’ criminal justice system.
Mayors and district leaders can become targets for much the same
reason. Those involved in the collection of taxes may be chosen
since they can be very unpopular, and, thus, attacks against them
can generate positive feelings for the terrorists in the general
population. It is possible that virtually any one employed by the
government can become a target, including postal workers, teachers,
low-level bureaucrats, and any others. These bureaucrats serve as
symbols of the government. Only larger dissident groups are likely
to have the personnel to target the whole range of government
employees. Smaller groups, or groups that start out small, will be
more selective in choosing the officials they will attack. Members
of the military and security can be targets as well, especially if they
are off-duty and more vulnerable.

Who are The TargeTs? 67
The victims of the attacks can be any member of the groups in
question. The audience is usually all others in the same category
as the victims – or all government employees – who may become
future victims themselves. They are being warned about the dangers
of being so directly involved in the activities of the government in
power. A second audience frequently will include the general public
who become aware of how weak the government is when it cannot
even protect its own employees. If the government does appear
weak in this regard, public support may decline. Government
employees may become so concerned about their own safety that
they become less effective. The government may also be forced to
divert resources to protecting bureaucrats that would otherwise
be used to catch the dissidents. This diversion of resources could
provide an important tactical advantage to the terrorists.
A clear example of how effective such attacks can be is provided
by the attacks in Iraq after 2003 on police and military recruiting
centers. Many of the attacks have involved suicide bombers while
others have relied on more conventional explosives that are
detonated in the areas where potential recruits gather. All of these
attacks have sent the clear message that even considering serving
the government in a security capacity is dangerous. No doubt
many potential recruits changed their plans as a result. In this case
the attacks also had a very practical objective. If the government
cannot find police or military recruits, then it will be more difficult
for the government to defend itself. The attacks also provided
a demonstration of the weakness of the government to the Iraqi
public, since the government could not even provide protection at
its own policy and military recruiting stations.
GoveRnmenT suPPoRTeRs
The attention of dissident groups can extend beyond those directly
involved in the government. Rallies by government supporters can
be chosen for attacks as can pro-regime party workers. Newspapers
and journalists supporting the government can become targets.
Even media organizations that may not be pro-government, but
which are critical of the terrorists or their goals may be chosen on
the assumption that those not with the terrorist groups are against

Terrorism: The Basics68
it. Organizations, whether business, labor, or professional as well as
individuals seen as being pro-government, can be added to the list
of those who will be targeted because of their support.
Attacks can be extended to include virtually any group that
supports the government or its policies. Areas of the country or
a city known for its positive view of the government may become
the scene of car bombings or other bombs. Persons attending
public ceremonies, parades, or patriotic celebrations could be put
at risk by their simple presence at these events. Successful attacks
of this type would demonstrate the weakness of the government
due to its inability to protect its own supporters. Further, if public
support becomes less obvious due to fear, the terrorist group will
have gained an advantage in its ongoing confrontation with the
government. Even the perception of declining support can have a
negative effect on the government’s ability to deal with terrorist
threats as members of the public will no longer provide information
or provide support in other ways.
RelIGIous TARGeTs
If dissident terrorists have objectives rooted in particular religious
views, then it is possible for other religious groups to become targets
for violence. If the government is based on a majority or minority
religious group and enforces policies favorable to that group at
the expense of the dissidents, then not only the government and
its officials but any member of the religion can become a target.
All members of the group are assumed to be supporters of the
government. The dissidents may target those of a different religious
tradition as with Muslim versus Christian or the violence can occur
within the same religious tradition as is the case with Protestants and
Catholics or Sunni and Shia Muslims. Temples, mosques, and other
places of worship can become symbolic property targets for this type
of violence, and when property attacks or attacks against people occur
at a place of worship, the logic behind the targeting is obvious. A cult
like Aum Shinrikyo in Japan may simply target anyone who is not a
member of the group providing the broadest target group of all.
At times the terrorism can be based in broader communities
and will not necessarily involve direct attacks on governments.

Who are The TargeTs? 69
The violence that occurred with the partition of British India into
Pakistan and India represented terrorism and ethnic cleansing. The
local majorities – Hindu and Muslim alike – attacked members of
the minority religious community. They were often quite successful
in driving out the minority group. There have been periodic clashes
between Muslims and Hindus in India in the years that have
followed. In Indonesia and the Philippines there has been violence
and terrorism between Muslims and Christians that have occurred
without directly involving the government.
There is one additional choice of targets that is in effect
determined by religious views. Extremists of any religious
tradition may target any group they see as overtly too secular. A
wide variety of groups have been opposed to what they see as the
spread of secular humanism, which they consider a great danger.
For example, at times Osama bin Laden has been more concerned
about the dangers of Western secularism than Western Christianity.
Ironically, some extremist Christian groups in the United States
share exactly the same fear. They frequently refer to the need to
fight the ideas associated with secular humanism since they see
these ideas as a threat to religious values. Another example would
be the groups willing to use violence and terror to end abortion
in the United States. These groups are in basic disagreement with
policies that they see as a reflection of secular values. The anti-
abortion movement in both its violent and its non-violent versions
is rather unique in that it brings together persons of different
religions who otherwise have very little in common theologically.

eThnIcITy
Members of particular ethnic groups, just like members of religious
groups, can become targets for terrorist violence if they are facing
a dissident group with ethnic or nationalist goals. Ethnicity
defines members of the group as government supporters or so
linked to the government that attacks against them is an attack
against the government. During the struggle for independence in
Algeria, the European settler population (which overwhelmingly
opposed independence) became a target for terrorist attacks. The

Terrorism: The Basics70
violence in Darfur in the Sudan has involved groups with different
ethnic identities. The Albanian dissidents in Kosovo targeted the
minority Serbian population during their struggles with the central
government since these Serbs were considered, usually correctly,
as supporters of the central government. When there are problems
between majority and minority ethnic groups, one group (or both)
may target members of the other group in an effort to instill fear in
order to achieve political objectives.
Attacks against members of specific ethnic groups are intended to
raise the costs for the government and to generate public pressure
from within the targeted groups for changes in government
policies. Attacks against groups can also occur independently of the
government. Extreme right-wing groups in Europe have attacked
foreign refugees, guest workers, and others they consider outsiders
in an effort to scare them away. Gypsies in Eastern Europe have
also frequently become targets for violence that is designed to drive
them away. Attacks against black Americans by the Ku Klux Klan
and other white supremacist groups in the United States are also
examples of ethnic targeting.
enTIRe PoPulATIons
There can be times when the entire population of a country can
become targets. Terrorist groups will attempt to use fear to have
the public force their government to make changes in keeping
with the objectives of the organization. These kinds of situations
could develop in anti-colonial situations where groups seeking
independence may try to inspire fear in the population of the
colonial power in order to gain independence. The IRA, for example,
launched bombing campaigns in England at various times as part of
an effort to convince the British government to change its policies
Members of extreme Islamic groups, like other violent
fundamentalist religious groups, see themselves as part of a
“cosmic struggle” with the antithetical forces represented by
secularism. (Pillar 2001: 65)

Who are The TargeTs? 71
and to leave Northern Ireland. Various Palestinian groups have
launched campaigns against Israeli citizens in general in what they
see as an essentially anti-colonial struggle. In both these cases and
others the dissident groups are trying to convince the public, and
therefore the government, that keeping the colony is not worth the
cost.
Many of those involved in the global jihad movement see
themselves as engaged in a worldwide anti-colonial struggle
against Western political, economic, and cultural domination
of Islamic states, especially those in the Middle East. The entire
populations of Western countries are often seen as the enemy.
The entire populations share the guilt of their governments since
they have supported government policies when they have attacked
Islam. Campaigns based on strategies of attrition and intimidation
are designed to force changes favorable to the objectives of those
supporting the global jihad, including al Qaeda.
DomesTIc economIc TARGeTs
Some groups have focused on domestic economic targets in their
efforts to win their political objectives. The animal rights groups
and environmental groups usually choose business or university
targets because they wanted them to change their practices. Other
terrorist groups, however, target businesses as part of an effort to
influence governments. Some of the attacks may be just against
property while others may involve an intention to cause casualties.
There are economic activities that have a fairly direct connection
to governments as would be the case with national airlines or
government corporations, and they become symbols of the
government. In other situations, economic activities are targeted
to display the weakness of the government. Utility lines and
power stations may be destroyed to indicate this weakness and to
demonstrate that society as a whole is vulnerable. More generally,
many economic activities may be targets as part of a broader
economic assault on the ability of the government to collect taxes
and raise revenue. If important economic activities are disrupted,
the government will lose tax revenues or royalty payments. The
loss of revenue will then mean that the government has fewer

Terrorism: The Basics72
resources available for all purposes. Diminished resources would
reduce funds available for police or security forces, and there would
be reductions in money available for programs that could address
issues raised by the dissidents or to deal with issues that generate
popular support for the dissidents. Reducing money available for
highways, education, clean water supplies, agricultural programs,
etc., could be even more effective for the dissident group than
assassinating teachers or other government officials.
The economic rationale of this type of targeting can extend to
efforts to discourage investment. Domestic investors who might
provide employment and revenues may become targets in terms
of their business activities or even as individuals. If the terrorist
group can force domestic capital to flee and aggravate national
economic problems, the government could then become more
vulnerable. Foreign investors can become targets for these types of
attacks for the same reasons. Campaigns of violence are designed
to persuade the foreign investor to pull out of a country and look
elsewhere. Even if existing foreign investment cannot be driven
out, new investors may be put off by the danger and chose to
invest elsewhere. Foreign investors, their plants, or other economic
activities provide an additional advantage as targets. It is frequently
the case that these investors are seen as draining local economies
and taking advantage of the local population. As a consequence,
they can be a very popular target with some segments of the
domestic population, generating goodwill for the dissident group.
Left-wing terrorist groups generally adhere to this view of foreign
investment, and they see the multinational corporations as part of
a global capitalist system that exploits and dominates both people
and countries. Thus, foreign investors have a heightened symbolic
value for these groups.
Groups have attacked foreign aid operations for similar reasons.
If they are successful in providing help to the general public, the
government is likely to experience increased popularity. If the
foreign aid is providing necessary infrastructure or assistance for
important economic activities, employment and revenues may
go up. Successful foreign aid operations can thus strengthen the
government and provide resources that potentially make the
government more popular. The availability of aid may thus weaken

Who are The TargeTs? 73
the appeal of dissident groups with claims about government
failure. If the aid agencies can be driven out, however, one source of
potentially important support for the government will have been
eliminated.
Petroleum pipelines and facilities have become favorite targets
for economic attacks. Such facilities are frequently important for a
national economy, and they are either government owned or foreign
owned, therefore providing a symbolic element in addition to the
economic damage that can be done. The various groups opposed
to the US presence in Iraq after 2003 and the government that it
supports have attacked these kinds of facilities with great regularity
as part of an attempt to interrupt revenue flows to the government.
Pipelines in particular are vulnerable to attack since it is difficult to
effectively guard them and they are easy to disrupt. Pipelines can
actually be repaired rather easily, but the constant disruption can
be effective, especially if it discourages additional investment and
strengthens popular doubts about the abilities of the government.
TouRIsm
Tourists have come under special threat from many terrorist groups.
In a number of countries, tourist revenues are quite important for
the economy and jobs; the revenues also provide tax resources and
scarce foreign currency. Efforts to undercut the tourist trade have
become part of an economic assault intended to eliminate these
resources. If the tourists are driven away, the government can
face major problems. The inability of the government to deal with
the threat also makes the authorities appear to be weak. Tourists
Carlos Marighella was a Brazilian leftist who authored the Mini-
Manual of the Urban Guerrilla. This handbook was widely read by
leftist terrorist groups that were willing to resort to violence. He
advocated attacking both domestic and foreign investment as
one way to weaken the state and to bring about a leftist takeover
of the political system. (Laqueur 1977: 185)

Terrorism: The Basics74
as targets are also a vulnerable target since they are difficult to
protect unless extreme, and costly, measures are adopted and these
measures themselves would probably drive away the visitors as
well.
In some circumstances foreign tourists can also be symbolic
targets. Western tourists can be symbolic of the intrusion of external
values, including secular values, into more traditional societies,
including Islamic ones. The tourists themselves are likely to behave
in ways that are contrary to local norms – the consumption of
alcohol, choice of foods, women being inappropriately dressed, etc.
A group can see an attack on the tourists as a way of protecting
the traditional culture and local values from outside contamination.
These kinds of attacks may have a certain appeal to at least portions
of domestic populations which share these concerns about the
intrusion of foreign ideas and values that threaten the local society.
The attack on tourists in Bali in Indonesia by Islamic extremists
in 2002 illustrate how an action can be chosen for more than one
reason and have more than one target audience. The attack clearly
was designed to reveal the continuing vulnerability of the West.
The tourists themselves were a symbolic target, a symbolism
that was enhanced by the fact that the bombs went off in an area
of nightclubs and bars. The attack also stuck at the Indonesian
economy and created difficulties for the new democratic system
that had replaced the previous military regime. Many of the more
extreme Islamic groups have seen the newly elected democratic
government as not being Islamic enough. A weakened government
could provide opportunities for Islamic political groups of all
kinds to increase their influence and to implement the appropriate
policies. The attack was also staged in one of the few Hindu areas
of the country, thus minimizing the potential for death of local
Muslims (Lutz and Lutz 2008: 38). The attacks, consequently, had
the potential of achieving a variety of objectives. The attacks that
occurred in 2005 in Bali just as the tourism industry was beginning
to recover from the 2002 attack was intended to continue to target
the economic base of the Indonesian government and in addition to
continue to strike against the West.

Who are The TargeTs? 75
foReIGn InTeResTs
Attacks against tourists, foreign aid agencies, and foreign investments
are by their nature attacks against foreign interests. Foreign interests
can be targeted in other ways. Activities associated with foreign
countries and governments can become targets for other reasons. A
foreign government may be supporting the domestic government
that the dissidents oppose. Attacks against businesses, embassies,
diplomatic personnel, students and professors, and others from the
external country in question can be intended to send a message that
the group wants a change in the foreign policy of the country. The
intent is to mobilize public opinion in the foreign country to change
policies. One of al Qaeda’s stated goals is to force the United States
and its allies to stop supporting governments in the Middle East
that are authoritarian and which do not sufficiently follow Islamic
principles in how Muslim states are governed.
While dissident groups may target foreign interests in their own
country in an effort to change foreign policies, they may also go
after these interests abroad. The attacks against the US embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were part of an attempt to get the
United States to modify its policies in the Middle East. Embassies
make excellent targets for groups wishing to communicate messages
to foreign governments while having the potential to embarrass the
domestic government that cannot protect these facilities. Algerian
extremists in the 1990s attacked French interests in Algeria because
France was supporting the government in power, but they also set
off a series of bombs in France to demonstrate their disagreement
with the French government’s policy of supporting the exiting
Algerian government. The hijacking of the Air France flight with
the intent to crash the plane into Paris was part of this effort to
bring about policy changes. The end result is that foreign interests
in general or those associated with a specific country can become
targets as part of a broad campaign designed to weaken external
support and assistance for a domestic government.
oTheR DIssIDenT GRouPs
Terrorist organizations may at times attack other dissident groups.
As noted in Chapter 4 in the discussion of strategies, moderates

Terrorism: The Basics76
may be considered dangerous to the objectives of the group as is
the government. In some cases extremist groups will be competing
for support, money and recruits with each other. The different
dissident groups may attempt to outbid each other in efforts to
gain recruits or financial supporters. In other situations, however,
the competition may escalate and the different organizations
may attack each other in an effort to eliminate rivals. On the one
hand, such attacks do not always qualify as terrorism since they
are essentially a very practical effort to eliminate a rival political
group. The attacks, however, do send a message to any one in a
target audience who might be considering forming or supporting a
rival organization that it could be quite dangerous to do so.
vulneRABIlITy of TARGeTs
Vulnerability will affect which individuals become victims within
a targeted group, but it may also affect which groups a terrorist
organization will choose. If journalists can be killed with greater
ease than teachers, then journalists can become the victims to
send a message to the target audience. If elected politicians are
easier to reach than judges, then the politicians will serve as the
victims. If the local Coca-Cola distributor is too difficult to target
as a symbol of American presence in a foreign country, then the
local McDonalds or Pizza Hut can serve just as well. One advantage
that terrorist organizations frequently have is that they operate
in a target rich environment where they have many options. It
often appears to the public that terrorists have successfully struck,
even though they may actually have been unable to go after their
first or second choice of targets. Terrorist groups, of course, do not
normally advertise their failures, so it is impossible to know of plans
that failed unless some members of the group are actually caught
or bombs are discovered and disarmed before they explode. Even
failures can be made to appear as successes. If a bomb smuggled
into a government building goes off prematurely at 2:00 a.m., the
group can simply state that the bomb was intended to detonate at
this time as a warning to the public while avoiding casualties and
that next time a bomb will explode when people are present. Even a

Who are The TargeTs? 77
bomb that fails to explode can be claimed as a warning, especially if
it was smuggled into a supposedly secure building.
It was noted in Chapter 2 that certain countries are perhaps
more vulnerable to terrorist activities than others. The civil
liberties inherent in democratic systems have been seen as making
these political systems more vulnerable because terrorists can
operate more freely. These vulnerabilities appear to permit foreign
dissidents to attack targets associated with their home government
on the soil of democratic states. Weak states almost by definition
provide many opportunities. They can invite campaigns by domestic
dissidents seeking changes. They can also provide appropriate sites
for third-party attacks. The choice of Kenya and Tanzania for
attacks against the US embassies in part reflected the relatively
weak counterintelligence capabilities and limited security forces of
these two countries (at least in terms of detecting foreign threats).
These two US embassies were more vulnerable in these countries
than US embassies in some other countries.
A final category of states that are likely to be vulnerable are
political systems that are in transition. Political systems moving
from a more authoritarian regime to a more open, democratic society
can be especially vulnerable. Such new governments are unlikely to
have kept the security forces or secret police that served the old
governments since such agencies would be of doubtful loyalty and
compromised by their activities under authoritarian rulers. As a
Latin American leftist groups in the 1970s staged a number
of successful embassy takeovers as part of their campaigns
to overthrow existing governments. They initially selected the
embassies of major countries, particularly the United States,
for these actions. When these countries upgraded the security
at their embassies, the dissident groups simply chose the more
vulnerable embassies of smaller countries (Jenkins 1981: 21).
The choice of targets was obviously influenced by defensive
measures that were taken, but the groups were able to continue
to be successful by simply changing their targets.

Terrorism: The Basics78
consequence, the ability to detect and oppose terrorist activities will
be weaker for at least a period of time. Indonesia was in the early
years of a transition to a democratic system at the time of the Bali
bombing in 2002, and the security apparatus of the military regime
had been partially dismantled. Even if a political system is changing
from one type of authoritarian system to another, there may still
be a period of vulnerability if the security forces are in disarray due
to changes in leadership and personnel. The new Islamist regime
that came to power in Iran after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979
had to deal with a campaign by leftist and secular groups. The new
government was vulnerable at first since the security agencies
inherited from the Shah had been purged of their personnel. The
regime had to build new security forces to deal with the dissidents.
GoveRnmenT TeRRoRIsm AGAInsT cITIzens
While a great deal of terrorist activity is by dissidents and directed
against governments, there are cases where governments will
tolerate or accept attacks against groups of their own citizens
that they consider disloyal, threatening, or otherwise a problem.
The government may be indirectly supportive of attacks against
particular groups or more actively involved in the terrorism. In
cases of more direct activity, government personnel may participate
in the assaults on target populations. The government involvement
in this type of activity becomes terrorism instead of repression
when members of the target groups become the victims of the
attacks to instill fear in a broader group (see the Box below). The
broader group that is the target audience for the terrorism may be
There is a difference between government repression or
oppression and terrorism. If citizens can avoid arrest, torture,
prison, and death by following the rules of the state, however
bad these rules might be, the state may be repressive but it is
not practicing terrorism. When individuals can become victims
to send a message to other members of the group, then they are
victims of terrorism (Sproat 1991: 24).

Who are The TargeTs? 79
chosen because of ethnicity or race, religious beliefs, class-based,
regional, or ideological. The victims for the violence are random
individuals from within the broader groups who serve as a means
of spreading fear to the other members of the group.
There have been cases where governments have tolerated
actions by groups to silence opposition or control groups inside
the state. Authorities in the area around Mumbai (Bombay) in
India have stood aside when the local Muslim population has been
attacked by Hindu activists, and there have been few if any cases of
anyone involved in the violence ever being charged (let convicted)
because of the violence. Fascist parties in Europe between World
War I and World War II often had the tacit support of their
governments when they attacked socialists and communists.
White supremacist groups in the American south for many years
were able to attack black Americans with relative impunity since
the local governments usually never charged anyone with the
crimes.
Government agencies can move toward more active support of
attacks against its citizens by domestic groups. The government is
already providing benefits to them since they do not need to worry
about being arrested or evading the security forces. The government
can provide finance, arms, and training for groups, such as party
militias or paramilitary organizations, which are involved in the
terrorism. Government officials might even provide information on
possible targets for the group members. The organizations receiving
the support are thus much more effective in launching their attacks.
In the most extreme cases, the government may organize unofficial
death squads that kill members of the target groups. These death
squads often involve members of the police, security forces, or the
military, but they are not technically operating under government
orders. The attacks against members of the target audience are
designed to silence opposition to the government, eliminate
political trends that are considered threatening or undesirable, or
even to force the target population to migrate. In all of these cases
the terrorism can be much more deadly because of the support
given by the government.
The resort to irregular means of control by the government
is inevitably a sign of weakness on the part of the authorities.

Terrorism: The Basics80
A government that is firmly in control and strong enough has
sufficient security forces, secret police, and other mechanisms for
dealing with threats and does not have to rely on terrorism. These
governments can rely on fear of arrest for specific offenses or for
challenging the system. Weaker governments, however, may rely on
such activities by their supporters. In some cases a government may
be unable to prevent violence among groups and choose to support
the groups that are seen as more loyal. In other cases, however, the
government may lack the means for repression and choose to rely
on irregular forces to undertake attacks. The government of Sudan
first used pro-government militias in the civil war in the south in
the 1980s and 1990s and more recently has used similar militias
in Darfur in the western part of the country to deal with domestic
groups opposed to the present government. In both cases the regular
military forces could not control the situation on their own. At other
times a government may be concerned about domestic or foreign
public opinion and thus avoid using regular government forces in
order to maintain plausible deniability for any involvement. This
approach gives foreign governments the opportunity to avoid
condemnations or negative actions since the problem is officially
between domestic groups. In Nazi Germany, the first attacks against
the Jewish population were not by official security forces but by
paramilitary groups. Many foreign governments accepted the
explanation that these assaults were due to domestic conditions and
beyond the control of the regime.
conclusIons
Terrorist organizations can attack a wide range of targets.
Many attacks are directed against property and not intended to
cause casualties. The building or objects chosen have symbolic
value, but the attacks also hold the implicit or explicit threat
of escalation if political changes are not forthcoming. Many
different portions of the population can become targets for either
dissident or government terrorism. Some terrorist groups may
even target the entire population of a country as has occurred
with attacks by global jihadists opposed to events or Western
support for secular governments in the Middle East or countries

Who are The TargeTs? 81
with Muslim populations. Domestic governments (as opposed
to foreign occupation forces) are unlikely to target the entire
population of their citizens since there are at least some privileged
groups in society that support them. The targeting of members
within particular groups is what has often given terrorism the
appearance of randomness, but the victims are only random within
groups since any member can serve to send the desired message
of vulnerability to the target audience. Government tolerated or
supported terrorism is often quite effective and can involve more
casualties since the attackers do not have to worry about arrest or
interference by the security forces.
key TeRms
death squads
fuRTheR ReADInG
Campbell, B. D. and A. D. Brenner (eds.), (2000) Death Squads in Global
Perspective: Murder with Deniability, New York: St. Martin’s.
The chapters in this book provide both a general background to the use of
death squads and specific examples from many parts of the world.
Drake, C. J. M. (1998) “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 10, 2: 53–85.
This article provides examples on how ideology affects the choice of targets.
It also provides more general views on the importance of target choice.
Lutz, J. M. and B. J. Lutz (2006) “Terrorism as Economic Warfare,” Global
Economy Journal, 6, 2: 1–20.
This article discusses how a variety of organizations in different countries
have chosen economic targets as part of their strategies to weaken the
governments that they are attacking.

6
wHo supports terrorists?
Terrorist organizations do not exist in a vacuum. They need to have
some sources of support in order to survive for more than a brief
period. Dissident terrorist groups need money and a flow of recruits
in order to continue their struggle against governments, which
usually have greater resources. Many dissident organizations fail
quickly precisely because they cannot mobilize enough support,
although they can fail for other reasons. Terrorist groups that have
succeeded in surviving long enough to mount serious campaigns of
actions against governments or other target groups, have been able to
draw upon important sources of support – either domestic, foreign,
or both. Governments that provide assistance to groups involved
in terrorism against its own citizens, of course, do not usually have
a problem in terms of resources. While these governments may be
too weak to successfully use repression against the targeted groups,
they can provide major support to paramilitary groups, militias, or
vigilantes. The effects of such government support were discussed in
Chapter 5, and groups receiving this support have a big advantage,
and, as a consequence, do not usually rely on the other sources of
support discussed below.
DomesTIc symPAThIzeRs
Most terrorist groups have specific objectives that they hope to
achieve in their own country, and they are essentially domestic
political organizations that are attempting to mobilize support
from within their own country. Even the best of governments
cannot please every group in society, and, consequently, there will
be dissatisfaction with some of the policies in place. Governments
that rely on repression obviously create the potential for opposition
groups to develop within their own societies. Groups that are then

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 83
able to organize in opposition to the government and survive can
draw upon at least the tacit support of a portion of the population
dissatisfied with the repression. At the very least, a portion of
the population may be unwilling to provide information to the
authorities or security forces, providing the terrorists with an
obvious advantage. If the terrorists can launch some successful
attacks, they may then be able to gain more active support. If these
attacks weaken the government or demonstrate the inability of
the government to protect citizens or supporters, the group may
be able to mobilize even more adherents, even if some of the new
supporters are opportunists rather than idealists committed to the
cause.
Organizations rooted in ethnic or religious views have some
advantages in appealing for support because they have a natural
affinity with the members of the group. Domestic support for
dissident groups in some circumstances can therefore be quite
substantial. Palestinian groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
for example, have often operated relatively openly. The population
implicitly supports these groups in their resistance to Israel, and they
provide very little information to the Israeli authorities. Persons
who might be willing to provide information to the authorities face
the prospect of retaliation if they are caught or even suspected of
collaboration. Anti-colonial movements elsewhere in the world
frequently have had similar levels of support. Other organizations
will be more selective in mobilizing support by the nature of their
objectives. Ideological groups have to depend upon persons sharing
their views or make an effort to convert additional individuals to
their cause. They are less likely to be able to mobilize support as
readily as ethnic or religious groups.
Assistance can go beyond the tacit support of part or even
all of the population. The group will need recruits for its attacks
and individuals to provide safe houses and to collect intelligence
for the organization. Domestic support can also include financial
contributions that provide funds for weapons to meet the upkeep of
activists involved in the actual attacks. The money can be especially
important for groups that cannot raise funds from robberies
or kidnappings. The Italian Red Brigades were fortunate early
on in their history. One of their members inherited his father’s

Terrorism: The Basics84
substantial fortune, and he used it to help fund the activities of
the organization until he died. In other cases groups have relied on
small contributions from their supporters or on family and friends.
foReIGn GoveRnmenTs
When terrorist groups are present in a country, foreign governments
are frequently blamed for the resulting violence. Some terrorist
groups have actually been able to receive foreign support, including
money, equipment – including arms and explosives, and training.
This support from foreign governments can also include the use
of diplomatic pouches for communications or simply allowing the
groups to operate unhindered on their territory. Such safe havens
can be very important for a group by providing secure locations for
planning operations and opportunities for resting and recovering
between operations without fear of arrest.
Foreign governments have often taken advantage of the existence
of domestic groups in other countries to weaken a state that they
consider threatening. During the Cold War, both the United States
and the Soviet Union supported groups attacking allies of the other
side. The United States supported dissidents attacking the pro-
Soviet regime in Afghanistan and the pro-Soviet Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua. The Soviet Union in turn gave assistance to leftist
organizations in Western Europe and elsewhere and liberation
movements that weakened US allies. Arab countries in conflict with
Terrorist groups “generally cannot survive without either active
or passive support from a surrounding population. Active
support includes hiding members, raising money, providing
other sustenance, and, especially, joining the organization.
Passive support, as the phrase implies, is more diffuse and
includes ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity,
declining to cooperate with police investigations, sending money
to organizations that act as fronts for the group, and expressing
support for the group’s objectives.” (Cronin 2009: 104–5)

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 85
Israel have provided assistance to a variety of Palestinian groups
as part of their efforts to weaken Israel. India and Pakistan have
aided dissident groups on the other side of their common border
in efforts to undermine what each sees as a potential opponent.
Iran and Iraq both supported dissidents on the other side during
their long war in the 1980s. In cases such as these the foreign
governments frequently pursue their own agendas, which often
include weakening a potential enemy, by providing support to the
terrorist groups (and other insurgent groups as well) that exist in
the foreign countries.
There is a significant difference between state supporters of
terrorist organizations in other countries (so-called rogue states
in the terminology of the twenty-first century) and permissive
states. Permissive states do not interfere with the activities of
terrorist groups that use their territory. They may not interfere
because they lack the capacity to do so. In other cases they may fear
repercussions if they attempt to crack down on the terrorist group,
including attacks on their own soil or their interests abroad. States
that are permissive, either through fear or lack of resources, provide
less support than the rogue states that actively seek to assist foreign
terrorist groups.
While some groups receive foreign support, which often makes
them more effective and thus more dangerous, many of them would
exist even if there were no assistance from foreign governments.
Charges of foreign support, while true in some cases, do not explain
the existence of dissident terrorist groups. Governments often
charge that the dissident groups are receiving foreign support (even
if they are not) in order to discredit their domestic opponents. If a
foreign country can be blamed for the violence, then the failures
of the domestic government that may actually have contributed to
the outbreak of violent opposition can be explained away. Foreign
governments can often become convenient scapegoats for domestic
problems and for the presence of internal discontent that leads to
the appearance of violent dissidents.

Terrorism: The Basics86
DIAsPoRA movemenTs
Individuals who have migrated abroad in diaspora groups can
be important supporters for terrorist organizations. Diaspora
populations are composed of individuals from the home country
who have moved abroad. These potential supporters can collectively
provide important financial assistance for dissident groups in the
home country. At least some of these individuals living abroad may
have migrated because of their dissatisfaction with the government
of their home country; thus, the diaspora can be a very logical place
in which dissident groups can seek support. Members of a diaspora
community can be a very willing source of support since they agree
with the need for political change at home. In other cases, financial
support from within the diaspora movement may involve elements
of coercion from the dissident organization. Terrorist groups
within a foreign country may have an existing structure within the
diaspora community that will permit them to extort money from
their fellow nationals. The extortion will likely be successful since
a terrorist organization can be credible if threats are made against
the persons living abroad or against members of their families who
are still living in the home country. Since terrorist organizations
have characteristics that permit them to effectively threaten to
inflict harm, the collection of revolutionary taxes or donations from
different groups can be easier. Of course, continuing extortion from
a migrant community is likely to weaken support for the dissidents
in the long run.
Diaspora communities can provide other resources to assist
terrorist groups. They may contain potential recruits for later
attacks. The community can also provide a safe haven for members
of the group on the run; they can blend in with their fellow
nationals, and they may be difficult for local police forces or security
personnel to find. Of course, if the diaspora group is in a country
with either a weak government or a permissive attitude towards
the terrorist group, the danger of arrest would be even less. The
diaspora may also be able to find ways to send arms, equipment,
or other materials to the dissidents at home. Further, supporters
in the diaspora can arrange to provide training for members of the
groups, and in other cases they may be able to provide intelligence

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 87
or scout locations for actions directed against targets associated with
the home government. Migrant communities can thus effectively
extend the reach of a terrorist group.
Diaspora movements have been especially important for a
number of dissident groups. Irish-Americans supported efforts to
create an independent Ireland when all of the island was under
British rule, and they have later supported efforts to unite Northern
Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. The Irish Republican Army
(IRA) could depend upon Irish-Americans for financing, the
purchase of weapons and other forms of support. The pressure
of Irish-American voters even forced the United States to be a
somewhat permissive country in terms of dealing with supporters
of the IRA. Groups that raised funds for the IRA were able to do so
with relatively little interference from authorities, and the IRA was
never officially designated a terrorist group by the United States
government. Had it been so designated, extradition of suspected
terrorists, interference with fund raising, and other limitations
on supporting activities would have been easier. The Palestinian
diaspora has supported a variety of dissident groups in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip in their efforts to create an independent
Palestinian state. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka received a substantial
amount of support from Tamil communities abroad which is one of
the factors that permitted the group to survive for so long. Sikh
militant organizations that fought to separate the Punjab from
India in the 1980s also were able to depend upon significant external
support from Sikh communities abroad.
foReIGn symPAThIzeRs
While members of migrant communities abroad can be an
important source of support, there can be foreign sympathizers
who are not from the home country. Like diaspora groups, they
can provide finances and other support to dissident terrorist
organizations. These sympathizers may share the ideology of
the groups, whether it be left-wing or right-wing. In other cases
they may have a religious link with the dissidents, supporting co-
religionists in their efforts to practice their religion or impose their
religious values in a particular state or group of states. Individuals

Terrorism: The Basics88
may identify with what they see as a national liberation struggle
that may be similar to their own experiences or recent history. Why
the foreign sympathizers exist will be quite variable, but they can
provide resources to a terrorist group.
The struggle of the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union and the
communist regime in that country clearly benefited from individual
sympathizers abroad. It was not only foreign governments that
provided aid but many individuals as well. Of course, many of
these foreign sympathizers, including Osama bin Laden, not only
provided funds but they also served as volunteer soldiers in the
field in Afghanistan. Volunteers came from many parts of the
world to fight against the Soviet Union and the local communist
government. The experiences that these volunteers shared in
Afghanistan provided the basis for cooperation and mutual support
in later years. Al Qaeda has continued to benefit from private
supporters. Funds have continued to flow to the organizations and
its affiliated group from individuals in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere
in the Islamic world. Sympathizers in a variety of countries have
helped to facilitate the flow of Islamic fighters to Iraq to oppose the
United States, its allies, and the new government of that country
after the invasion of 2003. Individuals who sympathize with the
global jihad in the United States, Western Europe, and elsewhere
have undertaken independent attacks on their own in support of
the objectives of Al Qaeda or have helped others to launch attacks.
Palestinians not only received support from Arab governments
and the Palestinian diaspora but also from Arabs in many parts of
the world who identify with the desire of the Palestinians to form
their own state. Sympathetic Tamils in India provided support to
Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, and political leaders in India have had to
be aware of the voting power of their own Tamil population when
dealing with Sri Lanka and the former movement of Tamils for an
independent or autonomous state. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in
1991 by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber while he was campaigning in
the Tamil area of India. The attack was in retaliation for Gandhi’s
policies while prime minister that had ultimately favored the
government of Sri Lanka when Indian troops became involved
in combat with the Tamil guerrillas. It is clear that the attackers
received at least some assistance from sympathetic Tamils in India

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 89
in setting up the attack. Many individuals in the newly independent
African countries supported efforts of groups in the Portuguese
colonies, Rhodesia, and South Africa to gain independence because
of their identification with the goals of the liberation movements.
The Jewish settler community in British Palestine after World
War II had widespread support among the Jewish community in
the United States but also in Jewish communities elsewhere in
the world that identified with the settlers and the survivors of the
Holocaust who had migrated to Palestine. They supplied substantial
funding for the efforts to create an independent state, and these
sympathetic groups were important in the efforts to smuggle arms
to the Jewish paramilitaries and terrorist organizations in Palestine.
cooPeRATIon AmonG GRouPs
Assistance for dissident organizations can come from cooperation
among groups that share similar objectives. Islamic dissident groups
obviously have worked with each other based on their shared
religious goals, including creating more Islamic governments in
their countries and, more recently, recreating a unified Islamic
community. While there have been other groups with essentially
religious agendas driving their violence, few of the others have
been able to develop international linkages of any consequence.
Groups with objectives related to Hinduism and Sikhism have been
limited to India, while groups primarily based in Christianity or
other religions have been relatively few in recent years and isolated
in individual countries.
Ideological groups have often formed international bonds. The
radical leftist movements operating in Europe from the late 1960s
to the 1980s collaborated with each other. They mounted a few joint
attacks or coordinated campaigns, but probably the most important
advantage cooperation provided was that, for example, a Spanish
group would be able to provide logistical support and information
to a German team seeking to launch an attack against a German
target on Spanish soil. Leftists in different Latin American countries
cooperated at times in their attacks against the conservative regimes
that they opposed. Violent fascist groups occasionally supported
each other before World War II. After the war right-wing groups

Terrorism: The Basics90
opposed to their governments or policies have had more limited
levels of cooperation. The groups that appeared in the late 1980s and
later that opposed culturally different migrants to their countries
in Europe have tried to work together to achieve their common
objectives. There have also been indications that the extreme right
in Europe and the United States have been increasingly trying to
work together.
Collaboration among organizations with an ethnic base is
relatively unusual unless they are dissident groups in the same
empire or separatist groups in the same country. In other cases,
however, such groups are geographically unique for the most part.
Leftist ideological groups, however, have assisted some nationalist
groups. A number of leftist organizations have regarded colonial or
ethnic situations as part of a pattern of global capitalist domination
and exploitation. For example, while Palestinians generally saw
themselves as involved in a nationalist struggle for independence,
leftists saw Israel as a capitalist outpost in the Middle East. Providing
assistance to the Palestinians thus became part of the battle against
the evils of global capitalism. Members of the German Red Army
Faction joined with Palestinians from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, a leftist and nationalist group, to hijack
an Air France flight in 1976. Also, in 1976 members of the Japanese
Red Army launched an attack in Tel Aviv’s Lod Airport after
deplaning as a sign of solidarity with the Palestinian nationalist
cause. This attack was as successful as it was because at that time
Israel was not expecting such an attack from incoming Japanese
passengers posing as tourists.
Cooperation among groups across national boundaries or those
with similar ideologies can enhance the reach of individual groups
and make them more dangerous. Cooperation among different
groups is not very likely. Left-wing groups and right-wing groups
are not very likely to cooperate, and they may end up battling each
other in countries where both exist. Religious and nationalist groups
have cooperated in Chechnya since their goals overlap. There have
been some unlikely alliances. The Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), a leftist group opposed to the government,
apparently hired experienced members of the IRA to teach members
of the group how to construct bombs that would be effective in

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 91
an urban setting. In Sri Lanka, the leftist Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front) refused to cooperate with
the ethnic Tamil Tigers when they both were battling against the
central government. Their lack of cooperation played a role in the
defeat of the JVP in 1989 and probably in the ultimate defeat of
the Tamil Tigers. In Palestine, Hamas (a religiously based group)
and Fatah (a nationalist secular group) have been fighting with each
other rather than cooperating in their battle against Israel.
cRImInAl oRGAnIzATIons
Another form of external support that has become more important
recently has come from criminal groups. There is evidence of
increasing cooperation between criminal organizations and terrorist
groups operating in the same areas. Criminal groups involved in
smuggling have often developed working relationships with terrorist
groups since both groups have common interests in the clandestine
movements of goods and people without interference by the security
forces. Dissident groups and criminal organizations have some other
interests that they share. Both groups are likely to be concerned
about discovery by the police or security personnel. Frequently, they
both want to weaken the national government – the criminal groups
so that they can operate even more freely with more profit while the
terrorist groups will be one step closer to forcing changes in policies
or overthrowing the government. Should the dissident groups gain
power, of course, this alliance of convenience with criminal elements
would most likely come to an end since the two groups would now
find themselves on opposite sides.
Drug trafficking has been an area of common activity for
criminal and violent dissident groups. Dissident groups have even
become directly involved in such trade in many parts of the world
since profits from drugs can become an important source of finances
for continuing the political struggle. The Taliban when it was in
power in Afghanistan turned a blind eye to the export of drugs from
regions under its control. The Taliban with their very fundamental
religious views did not have a positive view of drug use. The drugs
in question, however, were making their way to the West; thus, they
were not harming Muslims for the most part. The negative impacts

Terrorism: The Basics92
of the drug use were in Western societies, which were suspect in
the eyes of the Taliban because the West had accepted secular ideas
and had deviated so far from any religious path. In addition, the
money from drug production was important for the government in
its continuing efforts to gain total control of the country.
The Shining Path movement in Peru and the FARC in
Colombia have been two leftist groups that had strong links to drug
cartels since they controlled the areas that were the sources for
cocaine. The Shining Path organization has been largely defeated
in Peru, but FARC continues to be a major domestic political
actor in Colombia. FARC has become so powerful, in fact, that
there are significant areas of Colombia that are beyond effective
government control. FARC continues to use guerrilla actions
and terrorism to work against the government, so far with a fair
amount of success. The profits from control of drug producing areas
in both Peru and Colombia have been extensive enough that the
guerrillas and terrorists have at times been better armed than at
least the local military forces they have to deal with. Drug profits
can have a corrupting effect on all groups that come into contact
with it. In Colombia the pervasive effect of drug money has affected
politicians and the military, paramilitary groups, and the dissidents
in FARC. The dissident leadership at times seems to have been
more concerned with maintaining its control over the sources of
cocaine than in achieving changes in the policies of the government
or attaining political power.
Some terrorist groups have become even more involved in
criminal activity, focusing even more on the profits from criminal
activity to fund their attempts to achieve political change. Some
groups have even drifted more into criminal activity with a
declining emphasis on their political goals. The IRA used a variety
of criminal actions to help fund their struggle to eliminate British
rule in Northern Ireland. As efforts to achieve a political solution
to the violence in Northern Ireland have taken hold, some elements
of the IRA have continued the criminal activities even though
the political situation has changed. The Abu Sayyaf group in
the Philippines began as an extremist Islamic group with ties to
Al Qaeda. It has opposed the central Philippine government and
worked for independence for the Muslim areas of the country. Abu

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 93
Sayyaf was only one of a number of groups seeking independence
or autonomy for Muslim areas of the Philippines. It was unique in
that its leaders and the initial core of its membership came from
veterans of the war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and the
local communist regime. When the organization was first formed, it
initially had direct connections with Al Qaeda. The group engaged
in some spectacular kidnappings of foreign tourists in Malaysia
and the Philippines. The ransoms from these kidnappings helped
provide funding for other group activities. The group suffered
important losses in confrontations with government security forces,
including the death of some of the original leaders. With a change in
leadership the group has appeared to be much more concerned with
the financial benefits from criminal activity and has been less active
in the political arena. The group splintered with some components
being almost solely engaged in criminal activities while other parts
still undertook violent actions with political objectives.
chAnGInG PATTeRns of exTeRnAl suPPoRT
In the days of the Cold War, external support from foreign states
was quite frequent. Each side supported opposition groups on the
other side, even if they had no ideological affinity with the groups
involved. The end of the Cold War did not end foreign support
entirely, but it did reduce it. It has become much more difficult
for a country to support violent dissidents in the United States
or one of its allies, even in an indirect fashion, given the possible
negative repercussions from US action and the absence of a strong
superpower protector. There are still pairs of states engaged in
disputes or with high levels of tension, such as India and Pakistan,
where the temptation to support groups on the other side of the
border will be very great indeed. Most governments will be quick
to take advantage of opportunities to weaken a potential opponent
that domestic terrorist groups in other countries provide.
Diaspora movements have become more important in recent
years, perhaps because it is easier to collect and transfer money
around the globe and to mobilize other resources than in the past.
In today’s world the virtually instantaneous electronic transfers
of funds can be made to virtually any place in the world, and air

Terrorism: The Basics94
travel permits the movement of key personnel with great rapidity
as well. Money can also be transferred from country to country
by a variety of informal mechanisms that are difficult to regulate
or trade. If a terrorist organization can mobilize support from
migrants, it can be very difficult for governments to interrupt the
flow of funds, especially when the money is moving through the
informal channels. The same can hold true for foreign supporters
and sympathizers in general. While large contributions may be
very useful for the dissidents, small contributions from multiple
sources will be extremely difficult to track or predict effectively.
Cooperation between terrorist groups and criminal organizations
is now another important concern for many governments, and
criminal groups can provide significant resources for terrorists.
When drug trafficking is involved, as is often the case, the increase
in resources can be quite substantial.
conclusIons
Terrorist groups must find a base of domestic support in order to
have any hope of bringing about changes in policies or governments.
While all governments have unhappy citizens, unhappy citizens
will not necessarily support terrorist organizations. If the
dissidents can successfully follow a strategy of provoking a
government into overreacting to the threat, they may be able to
increase their support while neutralizing some other sources of
support for the government. Whereas all terrorist groups, except
those that are a foreign power or intelligence agency, must have
domestic support, groups can attract foreign support. This external
support can be from a foreign government or governments, from
diasporas, from other foreign sympathizers, from like-minded
terrorist organizations in other countries, or from criminal
networks. Of course, in most cases it is probably groups that have
already demonstrated their ability to challenge their government
that are best able to attract some form of external support rather
than external support making a very weak domestic organization
a major threat. This foreign support of all kinds will often increase
the effectiveness of the dissidents, and it can make their activities
more effective, and even more deadly.

Who suPPorTs TerrorisTs? 95
key TeRms
Abu Sayyaf, diaspora population, Janatha Vimokthi Peramuna,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Red Army Faction,
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Shining Path
fuRTheR ReADInG
Fair, C. C. (2005) “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the
Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,
11, 1: 125–56.
This article provides a valuable overview on the importance of diaspora
communities for dissident groups involved in struggles in the home
country.
Rodell, P. A. (2007) “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” in
A. T. H. Tan (ed.), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast
Asia. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 225–47.
This chapter discusses the Abu Sayyaf group and other militant separatist
groups in the Muslim areas of the Philippines, including their tactics and
somewhat varied goals and their foreign connections.
Stern, J. (2000) “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, 79, 6: 115–26.
Stern provides insights on how local conditions can lead to support for
terrorists in neighboring territories. In the case of Pakistan the toleration
of the government and local support for terrorist activities are both
important.
Williams, P. (2008) “Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus,
Appropriation, or Transformation?” in T. J. Biersteker and S. E. Eckert
(eds.), Countering the Financing of Terrorism, London: Routledge, 126–49.
This chapter provides a very good overview of some of the connections
between terrorist groups and criminal organizations.

7
wHat can Be done to
counter terrorism?
Governments around the world have tried a variety of approaches
in dealing with terrorism. Sederberg (2003) has suggested that
terrorism can be dealt with as the equivalent of war, as criminal
activity, and as a disease. Some of these efforts are consistent
with views that regard terrorism as warfare as was apparent with
the announcement of the Global War on Terrorism by President
George Bush, Jr. The invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001 is another example of a
war approach. Russia has adopted a similar strategy for dealing
with the unrest and terrorist attacks originating in Chechnya
relying in large measure on military actions to deal with the
unrest. A second approach focuses on dealing with terrorism
primarily through the police and court systems. Any meaningful
act of terrorism is going to violate existing national laws in any
country; thus, it can always be considered criminal activity and
dealt with accordingly. Most terrorist groups are short-lived
precisely because their initial attacks expose them to reactions
by the police and security forces, and they are quickly discovered
and prosecuted or eliminated in other ways. Other responses
by governments involve considering terrorism a disease where
the causes as well as the symptoms must be dealt with. In this
view the appropriate response for countries attempting to get
to the root causes that underlie the rise of the terrorist groups.
Although there is no one root cause of terrorism, in specific cases
governments may realize that neglect of a particular region or
discrimination against a portion of the population may have
created fertile ground for the appearance and spread of terrorism.
As a consequence, a government may attempt to change policies.
Of course, when governments are actually supporting domestic

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 97
factions that use terror against a group of its own citizens, the
government will obviously choose to do nothing to deal with the
violence. When governments are facing violence by dissidents,
however, they will often take counterterrorism actions in keeping
with one or the other of these perspectives.
RePRessIon
Virtually the first response of any government facing a terrorist
threat will be efforts to capture and eliminate the terrorist group.
While the police activities may be seen as routine by the government
and many citizens, they are likely to be seen as repression by any
dissidents who have decided to resort to violence, as well as by their
sympathizers and supporters. As noted above, police and security
forces frequently can deal with these violent political opponents
reasonably quickly, explaining why most groups last for only a
relatively short time. Terrorist groups are likely to be particularly
vulnerable when they first appear because the members are learning
their craft, and they cannot develop the practical experience that
can only come with time.
Even though many violent dissidents are quickly dealt with,
there are some groups that have been able to survive the initial
stage of scrutiny by the police or security forces. There are times
when the authorities fail to appreciate the severity of the threat
and thus give the dissidents a chance to grow to the point where
they constitute a more serious threat. If the government has been
neglecting a region of the country for a lengthy period of time,
it could easily miss the development of increased unrest and the
creation of potentially violent groups. In other cases, a terrorist
group may survive the early stages of a campaign by sheer luck –
and some groups that actually prepare very well for a campaign of
violent activity can be undone by accident. Some groups have come
to the attention of authorities when there is an accident in a house
or apartment where they are making bombs. External support may
enable a group to deal with the initial attempts at repression or
the organization may be able to take advantage of a weak domestic
government or a weak government in a neighboring state to create
a relatively safe base of operations.

Terrorism: The Basics98
Once a group gets past the initial stages and grows to be more
powerful, for whatever reason, the government will have to rely on
more extensive efforts to eliminate the threat. More resources will
be devoted to police and security forces. Rewards may be offered for
citizen assistance, and new restrictive laws may be put into place. In
more authoritarian states suspects can be arrested and brought in
for questioning, and they can even be tortured. Indefinite detention
may occur for dissidents and for any one suspected of supporting
the terrorists. Family members can even be threatened if the
terrorists are operating from safe bases in a foreign state or in an
area uncontrolled by a weak government. Governments may also
begin to give support to citizens’ groups that attack those suspected
of supporting the terrorists. They can also unleash death squads
and engage in extrajudicial executions in an attempt to eliminate
support for the terrorists.
Greater repression will often work against terrorist groups. Since
terrorism is a weapon of the weak, the dissidents will frequently
be overmatched. The governments of Argentina in the 1970s dealt
with terrorism from the left by simply having unofficial death
squads kidnap suspects who were then interrogated and tortured,
and then executed. The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
in its early days was able to defeat campaigns by secular and leftist
groups with the liberal use of repressive measures. The government
in Russia has been able so far to at least contain the unrest in
Chechnya through repression and more general (and sometimes
indiscriminate) attacks on regions which have supported the
Chechen dissidents.
PhysIcAl secuRITy
Increased security is one inevitable response to terrorism. Metal
detectors in airports and elsewhere, barriers to prevent direct access
for vehicles (loaded with explosives or not), fences, and other
similar defenses against attacks all can provide some protection.
Of course, it is impossible to provide perfect security for every
facility or individual. All government officials cannot be protected
all the time. Similarly, every building, monument, power line,
or public gathering can not be made totally secure. Israel with

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 99
some of the best security measures and well-developed sources of
intelligence gathering in the world has not been able to prevent
suicide attacks and other conventional attacks on its soil. Terrorists
have an advantage in that they can always find vulnerable targets.
They do not have to attack the facilities that are well guarded.
While perfect security is not possible, security improvements for
key areas are undoubtedly wise. Nuclear power facilities have the
capacity to be used to cause major damage if an “accident” can be
staged. Dangerous biological strains or chemical weapons need to be
carefully guarded. Even though the dangers of terrorists accessing
such materials may be slim, the potential damage that can result
warrants enhanced security.
Although enhanced security appears to be a worthwhile objective,
it does have its negative side. The costs of providing security can be
high for both the government and the private sector. Ultimately,
the money devoted to greater security is not as productive as other
economic uses since it does not add to the stock of products in a
national economy, even though at least some security is necessary
to avoid great losses. Greater security will also have indirect costs
in the form of lost opportunities. Each pound, euro, or dollar spent
on security by a government is a pound, euro, or dollar that is not
available for education, research, medical care, housing, or other
programs. For private companies it is less money for research and
development, higher wages, or investment in equipment or new
plants. Once terrorists have been able to force changes in security
measures with the accompanying costs, they have already attained
some level of success. Governments and private companies will
have to balance the costs of security with a reasonable assessment
of the severity of the threats.
InTellIGence GATheRInG
Collecting intelligence on organizations that are attacking the state
or its citizens is inevitably an important counterterrorism technique.
If information on the members or their plans can be uncovered, it
will be much easier to deal with them, either by repression or by
other means. When government agents or informers have been able
to penetrate the dissident organization, counterterrorism successes,

Terrorism: The Basics100
of course, are much more likely. The fear of informers can force the
dissidents to invest scarce resources in protecting themselves from
discovery by the security forces. It could even be productive for
the security agencies to suggest that a thwarted attack was due to
inside information, even if it was not, as part of an attempt to sow
dissension in the ranks of the terrorist organization.
Security agencies also rely on information gathered from the
public. Individuals may voluntarily provide such information – out
of a sense of civic duty, for financial reward, a greater fear of security
personnel than of retribution by the dissidents, or for personal
reasons. Information may also be extracted from suspects under
arrest by using torture or threats to family members, although such
information is often of limited value since it may not be accurate
because individuals under torture may try to tell the interrogators
what they want to hear. In today’s modern societies, computers can
be programmed to highlight suspicious patterns from internet use,
mobile phones, or emails. Once individuals have been identified with
these processes, they can be more carefully scrutinized and subject to
greater surveillance. If attacks do occur, forensic evidence can provide
leads to the attackers. When investigators were able to identify the
vehicle used in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New
York City, they were then able to track down the persons responsible.
Gathering intelligence is likely to be easier for a larger group
of dissidents since there will be more methods that can be used,
including greater opportunities to infiltrate a government agent
or to find an informant. In a larger organization, however, it is
likely to be more difficult to disrupt with any single intelligence
gathering operation or activity by police or security forces. Smaller
groups may be easier to disrupt since they do not have as many
personnel and have fewer resources, although they may be harder
to penetrate since members will be well known to each other and
intelligence gathering much more difficult. Leaderless resistance
styles of operation have made intelligence gathering much more
difficult since only the members of each small cell actually know
what they are planning. They also cannot provide information on
large numbers of other dissidents. Even an agent or informer with
access to the leaders of a loosely connected network will be unable
to learn any details on many planned attacks.

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 101
ATTAckInG fInAncIAl souRces
Counterterrorist agencies have gone after the financial assets of
terrorist groups. When such assets have been found, they can be
frozen by governments, making it more difficult for the group
to buy arms or explosives or to support the activists undertaking
the violent operations. Efforts to intercept the flow of finances to
dissidents are frequently easy for governments to utilize since
many countries already have mechanisms in place to attempt
to track the financial flows of criminal organizations. Because
existing techniques and personnel were available for use against
criminal groups, they could be quickly adapted and used as part
of a counterterrorist program. Existing intelligence efforts can also
increase the effectiveness of these efforts.
There have been some successes in seizing money and assets or
stopping the flow of funds to the dissidents, but there have been
problems as well. Efforts to stop the flow of funds to Al Qaeda
via Islamic charities, for example, have stopped not only funds for
terrorists but donations to real charities. As a consequence, charitable
funds will not be available to help those in need. It is possible that
the absence of funds from the charities might increase discontent
in some countries and even lead to a greater likelihood of terrorist
outbreaks in some cases. Although the interdiction of finances
can be successful at times, it cannot be a solution to the problem
of terrorism since terrorism is usually a low cost style of warfare;
terrorists will still manage to launch attacks with minimal resources.
Terrorist groups have also been innovative in terms of finding
alternative means of financing their activities, including converting
funds to gold or diamonds, engaging in petty crime, using profits
from legitimate business investments, and relying on informal
mechanisms of transferring funds that can avoid interdiction.
ReTAlIATIon
Governments may try to retaliate against terrorist groups. Any
retaliation must depend upon the existence of valuable intelligence
information if it is going to be effective. Of course, under normal
circumstances if retaliation is possible, the authorities may already
have enough information to arrest the members of a group –

Terrorism: The Basics102
although in a democracy they may not have enough information for
a conviction in a court of law. The retaliation could either be through
military action or with covert operations. Retaliation may be more
effective when there are identifiable foreign supporters for the
groups. The toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan removed
an important supporter of Al Qaeda. Other countries have stopped
supporting groups on foreign soil when faced with economic or
other sanctions as well as international diplomatic pressure. At other
times, retaliation is not very effective. Israel has launched numerous
attacks against the countries that have supported Palestinian
groups in the past without any consistent reduction in support in
many cases. Even when foreign countries did reduce support, the
Palestinians continued their efforts. Strikes against Palestinian
camps and training facilities in neighboring countries have hurt
these nationalists at times but have hardly destroyed either the
broad Palestinian movement or specific organizations. Israel also
retaliated against the PLO and Palestinian Authority after the Oslo
Accords had created that body, often without any major declines in
the level of terrorist attacks. In fact, at times retaliation has led to an
increase in the scale of terrorist attacks.
Related to the concept of retaliation has been the idea of
“targeted killings,” which is a euphemism for assassination. Such
killings are intended to eliminate leaders or to punish individuals
for participation in previous attacks – and to send a warning to
others. Killing individuals may hurt organizations, but it is always
possible that the dead leaders will be replaced by someone even
more dangerous. Other individuals who are killed may become
very important symbolic martyrs for the cause. Israel has engaged
in a policy of targeted killings for years. A special squad tracked
down and killed many of the individuals linked to the 1972 Munich
Olympic attacks. Although a number of individuals were killed
in retaliation, it had no obvious effect on the level of continued
Palestinian attacks in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Israel with
obviously good intelligence sources has been able to kill many of the
leaders of Hamas, yet the organization has persisted and continues
to oppose Israel and its policies. The attacks against Hamas may
even have given the group an electoral advantage in elections for
the Palestinian Authority since Israel obviously considered the

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 103
group to be the greatest threat; thus, a vote for Hamas could be
seen as a vote against Israel and its policies.
Successful terrorist actions can lead to increased attention by the
police or security forces, which can qualify as a form of retaliation
because the dissidents have become important enough or dangerous
enough for the government to track down its members. With the
increased attention, many groups can be defeated. In one sense
they will have become the victims of their own successes. The
Symbionese Liberation Army in California in the 1970s had much
greater freedom to operate until they kidnapped Patty Hearst. This
spectacular action brought so much attention that it was eliminated
as a threat relatively quickly. The attention that came with the
kidnapping led the police to expend much greater efforts on finding
and defeating the group. Aum Shinrikyo in Japan avoided excessive
attention until it launched the attack on subway passengers in 1995.
As a result of that attack there was a major government investigation,
and the group was quickly eliminated as a terrorist threat.
sPecIAl foRces
Many countries have special counterterrorism units, which are
brought into play to deal with situations involving terrorists. They
have specially trained police or military forces designed to deal with
situations in which terrorism groups have captured buildings or
airliners and/or have taken hostages. In the United Kingdom, the
Special Air Services Regiment has been the key anti-terrorist unit.
In Germany it is a special unit within the border police. In other
countries it is often elite formations such as commandos, rangers,
or marines that are given the task of dealing with terrorists. In
the United States it is either special units of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation or local police forces that deal with these situations.
There is little doubt that such units can be important, especially
for dealing with building takeovers and hostage situations. There
have been both successes and failures with such units. Leftists
seized the Japanese embassy in Lima, Peru in December 1996, and
Peruvian commandos then spent months preparing an assault that
would rescue all but one of the remaining hostages. When Russian
special forces sought to rescue hostages from a Moscow theatre

Terrorism: The Basics104
in 2002, more than 100 of the over 800 civilians died as a special
gas was used to immobilize the Chechen nationalists in control of
the building. Israeli special forces have had a number of successful
rescue operations, but there has also been failures. Even the failures
suggest, however, that the absence of such units could lead to even
greater losses of life among hostages or leave a government no
choice but to negotiate with groups holding the hostages.
The creation, existence, and training of these special units
constitutes an admission by governments that terrorist groups will
at least occasionally be successful in gaining control of buildings,
transportation vehicles, or people and that a specialized, active
response is necessary. Since most major countries have such groups,
it is a tacit admission that not all of these types of operations by
dissidents can be prevented and that total security is impossible.
InTeRnATIonAl cooPeRATIon
Another mechanism for dealing with terrorist groups is international
cooperation. Diplomatic efforts can provide a means to weaken or to
deal with violent groups. Cooperation among intelligence agencies
often occurs either by prior arrangement or in an ad hoc fashion, and
such cooperation can be useful, although it is more difficult when
countries have had antagonistic relationships in the past (or continue
to have them in the present). Since no intelligence agency can have
people on the ground in every country, local personnel are likely to
be more effective for gathering information on their own soil.
Diplomatic efforts have been made to reach global accords on
definitions of terrorism or for the banning of terrorist organizations.
These attempts have not yet been particularly successful since
there will always be governments that fear such agreements
could be used against groups that they favor or foreign dissident
organizations that are popular in their countries. In most cases no
Arab government wants to deal with the popular discontent that
would occur if it extradited a Palestinian accused of terrorism to
Israel for trial. It could increase popular discontent if the suspects
were extradited to the United States, a European nation, or even
other Arab countries. Although there has been no global agreement
on a definition of terrorism or terrorist groups, there have been

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 105
some accomplishments. International protocols exist criminalizing
certain actions such as skyjacking, piracy, and other activities. While
less than comprehensive, they do provide a mechanism for dealing
with at least some of the methods available to violent groups.
In addition to such global arrangements, regional and bilateral
agreements can lay the groundwork for successful counterterrorism
strategies. The European Union has been relatively successful
in reaching such agreements and has facilitated a variety of
cooperative counterterrorism efforts among the members. The
governments with more established intelligence agencies have been
able to provide assistance to countries with weaker security forces.
Various European countries have cooperated with the United States
as well. In other situations bilateral collaboration is possible. The
British and French intelligence agencies have working relationships
with many former parts of their empires. Russian security (and
military) forces have been present in many of the countries that
used to be part of the old Soviet Union. The United States has treaty
arrangements with several countries such as Canada, Australia, and
Japan that facilitate cooperation in dealing with terrorist groups.
Diplomacy has a role to play in counterterrorism efforts. It can
facilitate intelligence gathering and the disruption of financial flows
to terrorist organizations. International arrangements might also
be able to limit – but probably not eliminate – the assistance that
can come from immigrant populations or foreign sympathizers.
International cooperation might also provide opportunities in at
least some cases for more successful retaliation and repression of
groups. Ultimately, diplomatic efforts will not provide a solution
by themselves, but they can weaken terrorist groups and can even
provide some assistance in dealing with the underlying causes of
terrorism.
concessIons AnD RefoRms
Even though governments may be reluctant to admit it, changes in
policies may be a worthwhile means of undermining support for
terrorist groups. Dissident organizations often draw upon genuine
sources of discontent that exist within a society. A region or particular
ethnic or religious group may be suffering from neglect or even

Terrorism: The Basics106
active discrimination. A social or economic group may be in a similar
situation. The government can undertake reforms to address these
underlying problems that have generated discontent, thus making
it more difficult for a terrorist group to attract material and financial
support and recruits from a region or population group. Changes in
policies could be effective in limiting external support as well. Such
reforms could include government investment in the development of
infrastructure or the provision of education or health care. This type
of effort may require foreign assistance if the domestic government
has been unable to provide such opportunities in the past because of
an ongoing lack of economic resources. Terrorist groups may rely
on a spoiling strategy and launch attacks to undermine the reforms
since they recognize the danger to their objectives that could come
with such efforts by the government. Government officials, workers,
and teachers could become targets, and they might be especially
vulnerable to such spoiling attacks.
Most governments will prefer to launch reform programs
rather than make direct concessions to a terrorist group. Reforms
can be presented as normal policy decisions that result from an
initiative from the political leadership while concessions are seen
as a response, even a coerced response, to very direct demands from
dissident groups. If the dissidents are demanding regional autonomy
or a national liberation front is seeking independence, then the
granting of autonomy or independence is obviously a concession.
If dissident groups are demanding free election in a non-democratic
society, the holding of such elections would also clearly constitute
a concession by the existing rulers. Dissident groups may also use
terrorist actions against foreign targets as noted in Chapter 5 in
an effort to gain concessions. They may be attempting to coerce
the foreign governments to change their policies of support. They
might also want a foreign government to pressure their domestic
government to undertake specific reforms or to grant particular
concessions. Attracting international publicity for their problems
could also have similar effects in terms of leading to changes in
policies by either the domestic government or foreign supporters
of the domestic leadership.
Even though reforms or concessions are one possible solution
to terrorist violence, and one that may attempt to get at the root

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 107
causes of the violence, they are not always possible. Governments
may face pressures to adopt changes that reflect the views of
a minority that are not acceptable to the rest of the population.
Religious extremists – whether Christian, Jewish, Muslim,
Buddhist, or Hindu – may be demanding the incorporation of
religious values into law that are opposed by substantial majorities.
Dissident organizations with particular ideological demands may
want the effective disenfranchisement of their opponents. Violent
groups with racist views may be attempting to drive minorities
or particular categories of immigrants out of the country and to
prevent the entry of minorities. In situations such as these and
others like them, concessions may not be possible and clearly in
many cases will not be desirable.
In other situations, a government may face violence from
extremist groups with mutually exclusive objectives. In 1962 the
French government had reached the point where it was willing to
concede independence to Algeria after a protracted guerrilla and
terrorist campaign by the Algerian National Liberation Front.
It then had to deal with a terrorist campaign by an unhappy
settler community in Algeria and their supporters in France. Any
concession to one group was a clear provocation to the other. In the
1970s, Turkey faced serious outbreaks of violence from both the left
and the right. There was no set of policy concessions and reform that
would have appeased both sides. The Turkish military eventually
intervened in the face of the continuing and escalating violence.
The military government cracked down on both the left and the
right, but its policies were more in the direction of changes desired
by the right and against the interests of the leftist dissidents. In Iraq
in the years after the invasion in 2003, it is difficult to conceive of
any changes in policies that the newly created government or the
United States could have made that would have been effective in
meeting the demands of Iraqi nationalists, Sunni Arab opponents,
various groups of Shia Arab dissidents, and the global jihadist
movement supported by Al Qaeda and affiliated organizations that
were active in the country. These groups have obviously mutually
antagonistic objectives. In a broader arena, the reality of world
politics makes it unlikely that the United States will be able to
withdraw completely from the Middle East or that Russia will be

Terrorism: The Basics108
able to ignore problems in neighboring countries in Central Asia as
demanded by some groups. Further, it is not possible for the West to
stop the processes that come with globalization that have disrupted
local societies and economies even if it wanted to.
In the final analysis, concessions and reforms cannot be a solution
to all terrorist situations. If an elite cannot hope to remain in power
if there are free elections and they believe that repression is likely
to work, then reforms are not going to be attempted. Even when
a government is willing to attempt concession, competing groups
can have mutually contradictory demands. Moreover, governments
may lack the resources to implement the necessary reforms. Finally,
the demands of the dissidents may prove to be unacceptable to the
political leaders, to domestic society, or to important groups of the
domestic population.
neGoTIATIons
Almost all governments proclaim that they will never negotiate
with terrorists. Others suggest that negotiating with terrorists,
just as granting concessions to terrorists, only encourages the
terrorists by granting them a status equal to the government
or that by giving in to demands leads to even more demands.
Negotiations also imply that the government is willing to make
at least some concessions to the dissidents in return for an end
to the violence. Practically speaking, however, governments and
the private sector almost always engage in explicit or implicit
negotiations with terrorists. When groups seize airliners complete
with passengers and demand that a list of grievances be read over
the air or published in a newspaper in exchange for the release
of some of the hostages, most governments will agree to the
demands. In these circumstances, there actually are limited options
available to the government. The dissidents have already achieved
publicity with the hostage taking; if the government refuses these
simple demands, the dissidents may gain even more publicity and
the government may share part of the blame for any loss of life.
When terrorists demand safe passage out of the country in return
for the release of remaining hostages, governments frequently
agree, especially if the country where the terrorists are headed

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 109
has made it known that the terrorists will face penalties if they
fail to live up to their part of the bargain.
A more complicated situation occurs when terrorists seize
hostages or undertake bombing campaigns demanding that
“imprisoned comrades” be released. Governments do not want
convicted terrorists set free to continue their activities, and such
releases are moral victories for the dissidents. There is little doubt
that successful releases will lead to similar demands in the future.
As a consequence, governments will try to avoid negotiating in
these situations. There are times, however, when it is difficult to
avoid some negotiations. If a planeload of hostages from many
different countries is being held, a government may wish to avoid
the negative international publicity from the deaths of hostages
because of its refusal to even discuss issues with terrorists. In this
situation negotiations and concessions may be especially expedient
if a relatively unknown group is making the demands. A well known
group has to be aware of the possibilities of negative publicity for
its causes, and a threat to kill hostages may actually be a bluff. A
new group, even if it is an offshoot of an existing group or a false
front, would be more likely to carry out its threats. Even though
government security experts may know that the groups are linked,
they will still have to deal with adverse domestic and international
public opinion that would be present with the death of hostages.
Although governments may be forced to negotiate with terrorists
in some circumstances, they may be reluctant to engage in more
direct negotiations in an effort to resolve conflicts. Reluctant as
governments may be, such negotiations do occur. The Oslo Accords
that Israel and the PLO agreed to, began as negotiations between
private individuals. The leaders of the PLO and the Israeli political
leaders were aware of these talks, and their initial successes then
proceeded to more formal talks that led to a signed agreement.
The Oslo Accords led to the creation of the Palestinian Authority
and an element of self-government for the Palestinians. The
PLO also agreed to recognize Israel and to renounce the use of
terrorism. The conflicts between various anti-colonial movements
and the colonial powers were inevitably resolved through talks
between the two sides. Direct negotiations do not always work, of
course, but they have the possibility of ending a conflict. Indirect

Terrorism: The Basics110
or direct negotiations, even when they fail may be an effective
counterterrorism technique in other ways. The negotiating process
may give the government leaders and their security forces greater
insights into the nature of their opponents, their goals, and their
possible weaknesses. The talks may also provide opportunities for
gathering useful intelligence that could be helpful in defeating the
dissidents when the talks break down.
DemoBIlIzInG GRouP memBeRs
If counterterrorism programs are successful, it may be necessary to
reintegrate surviving members of the group back into society. For
small groups, most of the members will be dead or in prison. For
larger groups there may be more difficulties in returning members
to a more normal life, especially if the struggle has been a long
one. Veterans of guerrilla struggles and terrorist campaigns will
lack some of the skills necessary for civilian employment or the
necessary job experiences. Local businesses may be reluctant to hire
them. There are no easy answers to the reintegration of individuals
into their domestic societies. It is difficult to evaluate the success
of programs designed to reintegrate members back into civilian
society. Some of the group members will remain wedded to the
process of struggle and the need to defeat the enemy. They will
not be satisfied with the gains made by the dissident groups since
there are few groups, if any, that will achieve all their goals. As a
consequence, these committed dissidents frequently form splinter
groups that seek to continue their struggles to achieve even more
of the original goals. The true hardliners are unwilling to give up.
They will not accept autonomy instead of independence. Ireland
The Japanese Red Army, a leftist group, seized Japanese
embassies and other targets abroad taking hostages. It then
gained concessions from the Japanese government in the 1970s
and 1980s. The willingness of the Japanese government to pay
ransoms or make other concessions contributed to terrorism
becoming a global problem. (Wilkinson 2003: 124)

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 111
faced a civil war after the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922
instigated by hardliners who were dissatisfied with the treaty with
Great Britain. Of course, other hardliners intermittently kept up
the battle to incorporate Northern Ireland into the Irish Free State.
When the PLO agreed to the Oslo Accords, a number of groups left
the PLO and created the rejectionist front against the agreements.
They were unwilling to accept the more limited concessions by
Israel that were part of the accords. Thus, even success can generate
new terrorist problems for governments.
counTeRTeRRoRIsm AnD cIvIl lIBeRTIes
While there are a variety of counterterrorism strategies that
governments can pursue, at the same time there are issues
involving the civil liberties of residents and citizens. When security
is increased in the face of terrorist attacks, governments and their
citizens have to consider how much freedom they are willing to
trade in order to have greater security. This issue is particularly
important for democratic states since a respect for civil liberties
is what helps to define a democratic society. Civil liberties issues
can also be important for authoritarian systems since many of
them generally do follow a rule of law where individuals are only
arrested if they violate existing laws, however restrictive those
laws might be. While there may be only a few freedoms present in
authoritarian societies, limitations on these few freedoms can run
the risk of driving more people into the ranks of the dissidents.
The attacks on 9/11 led to an increased concern about security
in many parts of the world. In the United States, it became easier
for authorities to obtain search warrants and to conduct covert
electronic surveillance and wiretaps. Since secrecy was important
in these situations, individuals would not even know they had been
subjected to searches or that their bank accounts and other records
As far as negotiating with terrorists “it is not at all clear that
refusing ‘to talk to terrorists’ shortens their campaigns any more
than entering into negotiations prolongs them.” (Cronin 2009: 35)

Terrorism: The Basics112
has been accessed and scrutinized. A no-fly list was instituted which
prohibited persons from boarding aircraft because of their suspected
connections to terrorist groups. Presumption of guilt rather than
a presumption of innocence is present with such a non-fly list.
Guantanamo Bay became a detention area for individuals seized
abroad for involvement in terrorist actions. The naval base became
a prison camp for enemy combatants who could be kept there
indefinitely with little or no prospect of ever being brought to trial.
While many of the individuals were eventually released to their
home countries, some have remained. US government agencies
also began practicing more intensive interrogation techniques that
bordered on torture and in at least some cases constituted torture.
Since more extreme forms of torture were not permitted under US
laws and standard practices, the policy of rendition was created.
With rendition suspects were transported to countries friendly to
the United States where they would be tortured by local security
personnel. Any intelligence that was gathered as a result of the
torture was then passed on to the United States. The US agencies
managed to remain within the technical letter of the law by not
practicing torture themselves, but they clearly contributed to the
practice elsewhere. As unacceptable as all these practices are, the
situation was made worse because there were at least some cases
where innocent people suffered as a consequence.
In the United States one practice that cannot be routinely used
is data mining. This technique involves sophisticated computer
searches of all types of government records and files, computer
activity, bank transactions, and all kinds of information. The
computer searches are routinely applied to all citizens and residents.
The data mining can be used to identify individuals with suspicious
profiles who will be subjected to greater scrutiny. In the United
States, the generalized fear of an overbearing government has
meant that government agencies cannot share information with
each other. The CIA, FBI, and Homeland Security cannot access
records of other agencies except with search warrants that specify a
single individual and provide probable cause to justify the search. In
Western Europe, citizens have been more accepting of information
sharing and data mining does occur and has identified as least some
individuals engaged in suspicious activities.

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 113
Questions about civil liberties have appeared before 9/11. Israel
has faced the issue with its policies in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
since the 1980s. There have been long-term detentions without
any trials, at least the occasional use of torture, widespread curfews
that make the conducting of business and maintaining crops and
herds very difficult, destruction of homes as a form of reprisal
for opposition, and other practices. While Israeli authorities have
greater freedom in the occupied territories than on their own soil,
the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled against some of the actions
that have been undertaken in the name of security.
The United Kingdom resorted to practices in Northern Ireland
that removed protections normally in place for citizens. New laws
beginning in the 1970s gave the government longer periods of time
to hold persons on suspicion of terrorism before they had to appear
before a judge. There was more freedom to interrogate the persons
being held. These practices only applied to terrorism suspects and
not to persons accused of ordinary crime. Suspected IRA members
were detained indefinitely without trial (preventative detention).
When there were trials, the trials did not have juries, leaving it to
the judge to determine guilt or innocence. The government had
to resort to this type of trial since members of juries were being
intimidated by the IRA. If the juries provided guilty verdicts,
members of the juries or their family members were subject to
reprisals. As a consequence, the established methods of jury trials
no longer worked.
One consequence of special government laws and special
processes designed to heighten security has been the creation of
suspect communities. Irish Catholics became such a suspect
community in the United Kingdom where presumption of guilt was
frequent. Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel were also suspect
communities. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Madrid train bombings,
and the London transport attacks, Muslims have become suspect in
many countries. Even though members of the groups in question
may be more likely to join or support terrorist organizations, many
members of the groups will not. Such suspicions not only create
problems for the individuals with the authorities, but they are likely
to limit employment or other opportunities. It also becomes more
difficult to integrate these individuals into the broader national

Terrorism: The Basics114
community. One consequence of this trend may then be that the
alienated individuals are more open to recruitment by radical, and
even violent, dissident groups.
Infringements on existing civil liberties, whether they are the
extensive freedoms in a democracy or the more limited ones in an
authoritarian society, can play into the hands of dissident groups
that follow a provocation strategy. The limitations that are imposed,
if they do not work, might drive more people towards supporting
the dissidents out of anger with the government. Portions of the
populations that are less sympathetic to the dissidents could move
into a position of neutrality instead of support for the government
as a consequence of the increased restrictions. While restrictions
on civil liberties might make it easier to deal with terrorists, they
could also be counterproductive by alienating individuals or groups.
Maintaining existing levels, on the other hand, could mean that it
might take longer to meet the immediate threat from terrorists but
that the public will continue to support the current system and that
future threats are minimized.
conclusIons
Whether terrorism is viewed in the context of war, crime, or disease
will affect which methods of counterterrorism that are chosen.
Repression is always going to be used, but will be most often relied
upon within the context of viewing terrorism as crime. Retaliation
is likely within the context of a war on terrorism. International
cooperation may be useful in all contexts. Concessions, reforms,
and negotiations would be most often relied upon if terrorism is
considered from the point of view of treating a disease. The view
taken by the counterterrorism agencies and governments will
influence the particular mix of strategies for dealing with violent
dissidents that they choose.
There are many counterterrorism techniques that are available to
governments. No one technique is a “magic bullet” that will always
work to deal with every terrorist situation. There is a tendency
for proponents of one approach to argue that this approach is the
solution to terrorism in all or almost all circumstances. In fact, any
proposal of one solution to terrorism is guaranteed to be wrong at

WhaT can Be done To counTer Terrorism? 115
least some of the time. Terrorism is a technique that is used by an
immense variety of groups arising from many different situations
and from many different causes involving groups seeking different
objectives. As a consequence, counterterrorist strategies must be
tailored to individual circumstances, which, of course, is much more
difficult for governments and security forces than simply following
a standard blueprint. What works in one situation will fail in
others. Governments in many cases will also have to be careful of
the effects of policies or a mix of policies on existing civil liberties.
Of the various techniques mentioned above, intelligence gathering
will always be extremely valuable. Greater security will be valuable
in protecting targets, such as biological laboratories or nuclear
power plants, that would be extremely dangerous if they fell into
terrorist hands. The value and emphasis of other techniques will
vary according to circumstances.
key TeRms
Guantanamo Bay, Japanese Red Army, leaderless resistance, Oslo
Accords, rendition, suspect communities, Symbionese Liberation
Army
fuRTheR ReADInG
Banks, W. C., R. de Nevers, and M. B. Wallerstein (2008) Combating
Terrorism: Strategies and Approaches, Washington DC: CQ Press.
This volume is one among many books on strategies of counterterrorism,
and one that places the efforts within broader perspectives.
Heymann, P. B. (2003) Terrorism, Freedom, and Security. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
It is even possible that increased security and additional
limitations on civil liberties will not only weaken democracy but
that such actions would lead to an increase of internal discontent
that will actually increase the likelihood of terrorism in the future.
(Sederberg 2003: 273)

Terrorism: The Basics116
Heymann discusses various measures that can be taken in reaction to
terrorist activities, including the potential tensions between freedom and
security.
Horgan, J. and K. Braddock (2010) “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?
Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 2: 267–91.
This article is one of the few works that considers the problems of
reintegrating former militants into society. It includes a discussion and
evaluation of five programs from Indonesia, Northern Ireland, Colombia,
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
Sederberg, P. C. (2003) “Global Terrorism: Problems of Challenge
and Response,” in C. W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The New Global Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
267–84.
Sederberg provides a very useful characterization of the types of responses
that governments can take to deal with terrorism and some of the
consequences of these characterizations.

8
wHat are some of
tHe maJor groups?
The previous chapters have discussed terrorism from a number
of perspectives. At various times some well-known examples of
terrorist groups or situations have been used to elaborate upon key
points, but no group has been discussed in any detail. The material
below will consequently discuss some specific groups in terms of the
various ideas and concepts already discussed. The groups included
are the Assassins, Al Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, Hizballah,
the Ku Klux Klan, ETA, the Tamil Tigers, the Naxalites in India, and
government supported terrorism in Zimbabwe. These are some of
the better known examples and in the case of the dissident groups,
ones that have survived for longer periods of time than others.
Although books have been written about them, the discussions to
follow will be much briefer. First, however, it is important to clarify
that terrorism has been a technique for centuries and is not just a
recent phenomenon.
TeRRoRIsm Is noT neW
It is often thought that terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon
in the world, but in point of fact terrorism did not begin with the
Palestinians after the 1967 war, or in 1969 with the violence in
Northern Ireland, or in 1972 with the Munich Olympics. Many
Americans date terrorism from the 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of a government office
building, or 9/11. The use of terrorism, however, goes back much,
much further in time. One of the earliest examples of terrorism
involved the efforts of Jewish extremists in the first century ce who
used assassination and terrorism as a means of intimidating and
silencing those in the Jewish community who were opposed to the

Terrorism: The Basics118
idea of a revolt against being part of the Roman Empire. Supporters
of the status quo and remaining in the empire were murdered in
the streets of Jerusalem by members of groups supporting rebellion
against Rome. Even though the revolt itself was eventually defeated
by Roman legions, the initial terrorist campaign was quite successful
in intimidating the pro-Roman elements into silence. When the
revolt broke out, there was virtually no internal opposition.
The Reign of Terror in France, from which the term “terrorism”
actually originated, is also an example of activities by radical groups,
sometimes with the support of at least some of the leaders and
factions active in the government of Revolutionary France, to use
terrorism to achieve objectives. Thousands died at the hands of the
government and mobs. The Boxer Rebellion in the late nineteenth
century in China started out with terrorist attacks against
European and Chinese Christians as part of their efforts to drive
out foreign influences – even though it eventually became more
of a conventional armed struggle against the European presence.
These examples and others, including the Assassins discussed
below, indicate that terrorism is anything but a new phenomenon.
In fact, the use of terrorism by dissident groups has been present
for many centuries.
The AssAssIns
Another early example of terrorism was the Islamic sect known as
the Assassins. The Assassins were an unorthodox sect of Islam that
appeared in the eleventh century. Because it was an unorthodox
version of Islam, it adherents faced periodic persecution from other
Muslim populations and their leaders. Even though we know about
the Assassins because of a few attacks on Christian leaders in the
The attacks against pro-Roman elements were quite effective.
As Josephus (1987: 147), a Jewish writer who observed much of
the violence noted, “More terrible than the crimes themselves
was the fear they aroused.” His observation would be equally
descriptive of many modern terrorist groups.

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 119
crusader states in the Holy Land, the vast majority of their victims
were fellow Muslims. Faced with continuing persecution from
fellow Muslims and with limited military resources, the Assassins
had to find another way to protect themselves.
The sect developed a twofold defensive policy to defend
themselves. The first step was to occupy abandoned strongholds in
the mountains of Persia and what is today Lebanon that provided
safe havens for at least some members of the group. In addition,
they began to assassinate the political leaders and officials of the
states that were persecuting them. The group became quite adept in
their assassinations. Despite the best efforts of the leaders to protect
themselves, they were inevitably killed by members of the sect, and
the assassins themselves usually died in the attempt. The death of
the leaders and the willingness of the assassins to die demonstrated
the power of the group to other political leaders. The assassinations
usually occurred in public places so that the news of the deaths
would spread throughout the population and to other states.
Even in these days, there was an awareness of the importance of
publicity for the target audience. At times the Assassins would send
a warning (usually a dagger in the pillow of the leader or official)
that would be sufficient to end any consideration of persecution.
The result of this strategy of assassination was that the local rulers
stopped persecuting members of the sect. The group as a political
actor was eliminated during the course of the Mongol invasions in
the last part of the thirteenth century. For more than two centuries,
however, they had been quite successful in defending members of
the sect from fellow Muslims, and, as a consequence, the group still
exists today.
Al QAeDA AnD The GloBAl jIhADIsTs
No discussion of terrorism would be complete without a discussion
of Al Qaeda. The group was initially formed in Pakistan by Osama
bin Laden from among the foreign volunteers from many parts of
the world who had come to fight against the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan. From the perspective of the members of Al Qaeda,
the defeat of communism in Afghanistan represented the defeat
of a Western ideology. First, there was the victory that came with

Terrorism: The Basics120
the withdrawal of the military forces of the Soviet Union in 1989.
Then, in 1992 the local Afghan communist regime in the capital
was eliminated. After these victories Al Qaeda began to turn its
attention to other aspects of Western culture and ideas that had
penetrated the Middle East and other Islamic countries. In the view
of Al Qaeda and its members, these Western influences threatened
the traditional religious and cultural values of these societies. The
United States in particular symbolized the evils present in Western
culture and society and the ongoing changes within Islamic society
because it was the leading Western power. The United States also
became a target because it supported Middle Eastern governments
where the rulers favored more secular ideas and therefore were
not Islamic enough. These governments supported by the United
States were authoritarian ones as well. When the United States sent
military forces to protect Saudi Arabia after Iraq invaded Kuwait in
1990, bin Laden felt that Muslims were disgraced because they were
no longer capable of defending the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
Finally, bin Laden opposed the United States since it had become
conspicuous for its support for Israel in its confrontations with the
Arab countries and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. His
opposition became clear in 1998 when he issued a fatwa (religious
pronouncement) that called on good Muslims to kill Americans at
any time or place in the world.
Before the attacks of 9/11, Al Qaeda was a more hierarchical
organization at its core with bin Laden as the leader and key
lieutenants in lower level positions of authority. Even in its
early days, however, there was a great deal of flexibility in the
organization. The central leadership planned some operations
directly. In other cases, the group relied on links with relatively
autonomous organizations in different countries to carry out
operations. Finally, in some circumstances, Al Qaeda would provide
financial and technical support for groups that planned their own
operations that were in keeping with the general goals of Al Qaeda.
The attacks on 9/11 were the prime example of direct planning.
The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998
were basically carried out by an Egyptian group with direct links
to Al Qaeda. The first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993
is an example where financial and technical support was provided

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 121
to an independent group that conceptualized and carried out the
operation.
The successful attack on the World Trade Center towers and the
Pentagon in 2001 led to a change in the organizational structure of
Al Qaeda. The invasion of Afghanistan removed the safe base for
bin Laden and Al Qaeda that the Taliban had previously provided.
The old semi-hierarchical nature of the organization had become
more dangerous to the group and impossible to maintain. Al Qaeda
has evolved into a much more decentralized structure and has
become a major actor in a loose network, relying on a leaderless
resistance style of operations. The national dissident groups
operating in different countries that had maintained links to the
old Al Qaeda were well placed to continue operations on their own
initiative. In addition, new groups have appeared drawing their
inspiration from Al Qaeda but lacking any formal or even informal
connections with the organization. In the modern world Islamic
militants continue to pursue political goals such as the creation of
more Islamic governments in their home countries or combating
the influence of the United States and the West. Smaller groups
and individuals who believe in reducing the evils of Western
influence and the spread of secular practices in their societies that
come with modernization have also appeared. They have been able
to participate in the broader struggle by attaching themselves and
their actions to a larger movement.
The global jihad movement has proven to be quite effective in
mounting attacks. This movement cannot be dismembered from
the top since there is no core leadership that is essential for the
continuation of the movement. If one of the individual cells is
broken up by security forces, other cells and individuals remain
immune to capture. Even as some individuals are caught, new
groups can appear that link themselves to the global jihad and
participate in the struggle against the West and the United States.
Al Qaeda has become an example of leaderless resistance with
the basic organization providing an example and inspiration for
individuals and small groups around the world. This global jihadist
movement will continue into the immediate future even if Osama
bin Laden is killed or captured and Al Qaeda as an organization
is completely dismantled. The context for violent activity has

Terrorism: The Basics122
already been established for new militants and groups to attach
themselves to the idea of combating global trends of modernization,
Westernization, secularism, and change.
The IRIsh RePuBlIcAn ARmy
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been in existence for more
than ninety years. Although it has often been viewed as a Catholic
dissident group fighting against Protestants in Northern Ireland,
religion is only part of the differences between the dissidents
and the local political system that has led to violence. The battle
has also been between Irish nationalists and the Protestants in
Northern Ireland who consider themselves to be British. Of course,
the Irish nationalists are largely Catholic while the British are
largely Protestant. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) first appeared
in the aftermath of the 1916 Easter uprising in Dublin. It fought
against the British control of the whole island until the British
were convinced to grant effective independence to the Irish Free
State in 1922. Some members of the IRA, however, were unhappy
with the treaty that left Northern Ireland under British control and
launched attacks against the new Irish government. This campaign
was eventually defeated by the new Irish army. These members of
the IRA also attempted to continue the struggle against the British
in Northern Ireland but it was not successful. While the IRA was
defeated at this time, it kept up intermittent violent attempts to
drive the British out of Northern Ireland before 1970, but these
efforts failed.
By the late 1960s tensions in Northern Ireland were increasing
because the Catholic population was facing discrimination by the
Protestant majority who kept the Catholic population in second
class status. There were peaceful efforts, including marches and
demonstrations, to gain more equality for the Catholics, but the
Protestants generally were unwilling to make any concessions.
The situation steadily deteriorated, and violence by the IRA
against Protestants continued, and repression by the authorities
increased. At this time the official IRA organization argued that
violence was not going to be effective, and for the most part refused
to take up arms. The more hard-line individuals split from the

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 123
organization and created the Provisional IRA (the Provos). The
Provos argued for using the same tactics as the IRA had used to
help win independence. Over the course of time, the Official IRA
disappeared, and the Provos came to be the IRA.
The struggle over Northern Ireland continued for many
decades. The IRA and other militants attacked Protestants and
representatives of the British government. There was violence
by members of Protestant paramilitary groups who targeted
the Catholic population in retaliation for the IRA attacks on
Protestants. During the course of the violence the IRA mounted
some spectacular attacks against the British in Northern Ireland
and Britain. There were bombings against British army bases on
the British mainland, the assassination of Lord Mountbatten (a
distant relative of Queen Elizabeth II), and a bomb exploded in the
hotel in Brighton where Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was
staying during the Conservative Party Conference in 1984. There
was a remote control mortar attack against Number 10 Downing
Street and Prime Minister John Major in 1991. Even though the
British police and military were able to arrest many suspected IRA
members, they could not defeat the organization.
Over the years there were a variety of efforts to end the conflict.
There were ceasefires proclaimed by the IRA and attempts by the
British government to increase the representation of Catholics
in the local political institutions and to gain more equal rights.
Eventually, the British and political spokespersons for the IRA
were able to reach an agreement that appears to have ended more
than thirty years of violence, granting more rights to the Catholics
and accepting the eventual possibility of Northern Ireland uniting
with the Republic of Ireland. The movement towards peace has led
to new splinter groups that were opposed to the negotiations and
anything less than the total incorporation of Northern Ireland into
the Republic of Ireland. Hard-line members of the IRA left the
organization after the agreements to oppose the continued British
presence in Northern Ireland. They formed the Continuity IRA
and the Real IRA as groups that wanted to continue the struggle,
but they appear to have attracted only limited support. Their
appearance, however, does indicate some of the difficulties that are
present in ending long-lasting terrorist campaigns. Although the

Terrorism: The Basics124
IRA had become dormant by 2010, it has not disappeared and could
reactivate if political tensions in Northern Ireland were to increase.
hIzBAllAh
Hizballah (the Party of God) appeared in Lebanon in the early
1980s. It appeared as a movement linked with the Shia population
in Lebanon in the later stages of the ongoing civil war that had
devastated that country. Domestically it represented the interests of
the Shia Muslims, who are the largest group in the country but also
the poorest on average. It eventually came to be the most important
political group representing Shia interests. It benefited from
support from the clerics ruling in the Islamic Republic of Iran that
were quite willing to provide assistance to another Shia population.
Hizballah has had both domestic and foreign political goals, but the
domestic objectives have been more important in many respects to
the organization.
Militants from Hizballah have attacked foreign troops on
Lebanese soil. Suicide attacks against American marines and
French paratroopers in 1983 were instrumental in leading to the
withdrawal of the foreign peacekeeping forces from the Beirut area.
Guerrilla and terrorist attacks against Israeli troops elsewhere in
Lebanon contributed to the eventual withdrawal of these forces
from most of Lebanon. Israel even eventually withdrew from a
small area of southern Lebanon that had long been under effective
Israeli control through proxy Lebanese forces from 1982 to 2000.
All of these attacks were directed against foreign involvement, and
they were related to the basic domestic concern of removing at least
some foreign troops from the country.
Hizballah was also willing to use violence against domestic
opponents in the struggles for political advantage in Lebanon,
relying both on terrorist violence and like other political groups in
Lebanon on its own militia. As the Lebanese political system began
to rebuild itself, Hizballah became an important domestic political
party like other Lebanese parties and a power to be considered.
It also spent considerable time and effort on achieving domestic
programs that benefited the Shia population in the country. The
party also developed a wing that provided social services to the

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 125
Shia population. These actions and programs generated a great
deal of political support in the Shia population that has meant that
Hizballah has been an important participant in elections and the
national legislature.
Hizballah has been primarily interested in the domestic political
system. Like most Arab parties, however, it supports the Palestinians
in their struggle for an independent state in areas occupied by Israel.
It has provided assistance to groups in Gaza and the West Bank that
have opposed the Israeli occupation and even the existence of Israel.
It has, however, intermittently involved itself in actions directed
against Israel, including rocket attacks, support for terrorism inside
Israel, and incursions across the border against Israel, including
rocket attacks and kidnappings of Israeli troops. While these actions
are evidence of Hizballah’s support for the Palestinian cause, they
are also very popular with the Lebanese public. The confrontation
with Israel in 2008 began with the death of three Israeli soldiers
and the kidnapping of two others in a Hizballah attack. This action
led to Hizballah rocket attacks and Israeli air and artillery strikes
and the advance of Israeli ground forces into Lebanon. The military
action increased Hizballah’s support because it was able to continue
its rocket attacks and to prevent Israel from destroying its military
capabilities. The anger in Lebanon over the destruction from the
Israeli attacks was generally directed against Israel for the nature
of it retaliation against Lebanon and not against Hizballah for
provoking the actions. The Israeli retaliatory strikes ultimately did
not prove to be an effective counterterrorism or counter guerrilla
technique.
The ku klux klAn
At the end of the American Civil War, the newly freed slaves in
the southern states now had the right to vote and participate in
government while many of the whites could not participate because
of their service in the rebel government or armed forces. The Ku
Klux Klan (KKK) appeared in 1867 and used terrorism to intimidate
the former slaves and help the old elite regain control of the state
governments. The freed slaves and their white supporters were
assaulted, terrorized, and killed. The terror attacks were ultimately

Terrorism: The Basics126
very successful in changing the balance of political forces. Once the
white population was securely in control, the KKK disbanded since
it was no longer needed.
The KKK reappeared in the 1920s, but it had a different political
agenda. While it was still anti-black, black Americans were second
class citizens and the KKK was not necessary as a means of controlling
a minority. It was more concerned with immigrant groups from
southern and eastern Europe. The new immigrants were culturally
different and overwhelmingly Jewish or Catholic, both of which
were suspect religions for the KKK which was overwhelmingly
Protestant. Various local branches of the KKK used violence
against the new immigrants in efforts to preserve the privileged
position of the white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant population. It is not
a coincidence that US immigration quotas were established at this
time, and the quotas discriminated against migrants from southern
and eastern Europe. The KKK eventually faded in the years prior to
World War II, but it never disappeared completely.
The KKK resurfaced in the southern United States in the 1950s
and 1960s with the advent of the civil rights movement. It used
violence and terrorism in these efforts to defeat the campaign to
provide equal rights for black Americans. It failed in its efforts, in
part because the FBI and other police agencies were able to infiltrate
the various branches with relative ease. While the KKK was
defeated and as an organization was greatly weakened, other groups
appeared to take its place. Groups like the Aryan Nations continued
the animosity against minority groups, including black Americans,
Jewish citizens, and members of immigrant groups from different
cultural areas such as the Middle East and Asia. There have also
been sporadic attacks against members of these different minorities.
Many of these new racist, anti-immigrant groups have operated
within the context of leaderless resistance types of networks.
The anti-immigrant groups in the United States have their
counterparts in Europe. A variety of groups have appeared that
have been opposed to immigrant communities, especially those
from culturally different areas of the world such as Asia, parts of
Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. The migrants consist
of guest workers, refugees from conflicts, or asylum seekers. The
opposition to the presence of these communities has increased

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 127
when the migrants were Muslim, Hindu, or from other non-
Christian traditions. The anti-immigrant groups in question are
not particularly religious, but they were opposed to these “foreign”
religions. As was the case in the United States, the groups have
launched attacks against those that they dislike in efforts to drive
them out. There have been increasing contracts between such
groups in Europe and the United States, perhaps in part because
the European groups have become increasingly concerned about
minorities and immigrants. Many of the migrants have faced at
least verbal harassment and a significant number have experienced
physical assaults. Muslim groups have become especially suspect
after the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the
London transport bombings in 2005.
euzkADI TA AskATAsunA (eTA)
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), or Basque Homeland and Freedom,
is a Basque nationalist group that was formed in the 1970s while
Francisco Franco was still ruling in Spain. Before the Spanish Civil
War of 1938–1939, the Basque region had a significant degree of
local autonomy. This autonomy was lost with the victory of Franco
and the Nationalists. The Basque region sided with the Republicans
during the Civil War, but the Franco regime was also in favor of
government centralization. The founders of ETA sought to reverse
this process and regain autonomy for the region or even to gain
independence. The group launched a small number of attacks
in the last years of the Franco regime. The targets usually were
government officials and members of the Civil Guard (a national
paramilitary police unit). Their most spectacular action occurred
Migrants from other areas of the world have faced problems in
many European countries. In Sweden migrants from Asia, Africa,
and Latin America have been targeted. In one year, one of seven
men were subject to a physical assault and as many as half the
non-European immigrants have been threatened, harassed, or
assaulted. (Bjorgo 1997: 42)

Terrorism: The Basics128
when a bomb planted in a tunnel under a street detonated and killed
the prime minister as he was being driven down the street.
With the advent of a democratic system in Spain, ETA continued
its terrorist activities. It was able to increase its attacks since there
were more limitations on the security forces and more rights for
those suspected of being involved in any attacks. ETA has continued
to be active into the twenty-first century, and still hopes to achieve
independence for the Basque areas of Spain and even in theory the
Basque areas of France. There were a number of political parties
that appeared in the Basque region, seeking greater autonomy or
independence. The most extreme nationalist party, Herri Batsuna,
in effect served as the political arm of ETA. Although any direct
link between the two has always been denied, the party was banned
in 2003 for providing financial support to ETA.
Through the more than quarter of a century of its existence,
ETA adopted a wide variety of techniques. There were continuing
attacks against government officials. At one point ETA undertook
a rather effective campaign to disrupt the Spanish tourist industry
by bombing hotels on the Mediterranean coast. The group also
on occasion attacked wealthy Basque businesspeople to encourage
financial contributions to the independence cause. The violence by
ETA has contributed to political changes important for the region.
The central government has granted greater autonomy to the
area. These concessions by the government have reduced support
for ETA. Greater international cooperation between French and
Spanish officials has also reduced, but not eliminated, the ability
of ETA to continue its attacks. There have been talks between
representatives of ETA and the Spanish government, and ETA has
accepted ceasefires for periods of time, but the group still continues
to fight for independence for the Basque homeland.
The nAxAlITes
The Naxalites were a Marxist-Leninist groups that appeared in the
Bengal area of India in 1967. The West Bengal state, which includes
Calcutta, was a stronghold for leftist parties. There were two
communist parties in the state – one that was aligned with the Soviet
Union and one that was aligned with China. Both parties frequently

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 129
served in governing coalitions. A third communist party appeared,
drawing its members from the two parties. These members were
dissatisfied with the slow pace of change in government policies that
left the poorer members of society in virtually the same position as
before. The new party was particularly active in rural areas where
peasant families and other locals were losing control of their land
to large landowners.
The Naxalites derived their name from the village of Naxalbari
where violence broke out. Local conditions in the village and the
surrounding area were particularly difficult. Landlords were gaining
control of more and more land. As disputes between the landlords
and the peasants increased, the landlords formed gangs to intimidate
the peasants. The landlords were able to use their resources to
influence the local police and government officials. The courts were
frequently used by the landlords. When the courts ruled in favor
of the peasants, the writs were not enforced, and when criminal
charges were brought against the landlords or their employees,
the defendants were often acquitted (Banerjee 1984: 86, 103). In
this situation, the Naxalites began to use violence to pressure the
landlords and others to treat the poorer inhabitants better. Assaults
and property attacks were effective in getting better treatment for
the peasants. As the local dissidents began to make progress in the
area, the Indian government sent in police reinforcements even
military units that were successful in defeating the dissidents and
driving them into more inhospitable areas.
While the initial violence activity by the leftists was dealt with
by the government forces, they were not completely eliminated.
More importantly, the government did nothing to reform the local
conditions that had led to the appearance of the violent dissidents.
The Naxalites were able to recover and to once again become a
political force in the region. By 2010 the violence had become more
deadly. The dissidents were able to mount major attacks on police
stations, killing a number of officers. The attacks proved to be a
major embarrassment to the government which had thought that it
had the situation under control.
One other reason why the group was able to recover and become
dangerous again was because there were other outbreaks of violence
throughout India. Violence by different leftist groups came to be

Terrorism: The Basics130
known by the generic term Naxalite, even though many of the
groups had no direct connection to the dissident group in West
Bengal. The presence of the other groups plus government concern
with other types of violence in the country, problems in Kashmir,
and continuing tension with Pakistan meant that Indianasecurity
forces were stretched thin. The problems that India has faced
with the Naxalites and other leftist groups has clearly shown
that violence and terrorism by leftist groups has not disappeared
from the world with the collapse of the Soviet Union and negative
publicity on communist governments. Leftist terrorist groups still
exist and find support.
The TAmIl TIGeRs
The Tamil Tigers were formed in Sri Lanka to defend the interests
of the Tamil minority in that country. Under British colonial rule
the Tamils had become overrepresented in the professions and
the civil service. When Sri Lanka became an independent country,
political parties representing the Sinhalese majority began to
establish quotas on the positions that the Tamils could have in the
professions, universities, and government service. Sinhalese was
made the official language and Buddhism the official religion of
the country. Most Tamils did not speak Sinhalese, and they were
either Hindu or Christians; therefore, the intent of the majority
to disadvantage the Tamils was obvious. In 1983 there were riots
that targeted the Tamils after an insurgent group attacked an
army patrol and killed a number of soldiers. Mobs attacked Tamils
and Tamil cultural sites. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Tamils died in
the violence, and more than 100,000 became refugees. During
the violence, the police did little to protect the Tamils or their
property (Kaarthikeyan 2005: 134). In the aftermath of these mob
actions, many dissident Tamil groups appeared using violence to
seek changes in policies, autonomy for the Tamil areas within a
federal system, or complete independence for the Tamil regions of
the country. The Tamil Tigers (or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam) eventually became the dominant Tamil dissident group.
They took a more extreme view, pushing for independence rather
than autonomy or equal rights, although at times they appeared

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 131
willing to bargain over the future. The Tamil Tigers absorbed
some of the other dissident groups while other competing groups
were eliminated by force.
The Tigers used terrorism, guerrilla attacks, and even became
involved in larger scale battles with the Sri Lankan armed forces.
The terrorist attacks were launched against a variety of targets,
including high level government officials, security personal,
bureaucrats, and the Sinhalese population in general. The group was
also responsible for a large number of suicide attacks. The Tigers
eventually became strong enough to control large areas of the
country and to engage in a civil war against the government. The
Tigers were able to hold their own against the Sri Lankan armed
forces for many years. The Tigers also became involved in combat
with Indian peacekeeping forces that were sent to the country in
an effort to resolve the conflict. The Indian efforts failed, and the
military forces were withdrawn.
The Tigers were finally defeated in 2009 after more than
twenty-five years of struggle by the Sri Lankan armed forces. The
tide in the long battle may have turned against the Tamil Tigers
when the tsunami set off by an underwater earthquake in 2004
hit Sri Lanka. The areas of the country most heavily affected by
the tsunami included the regions of the country controlled by
the Tigers in the east and the north of the island. Although the
government and the Tigers agreed to a truce during the rescue
and recovery operations, the fighting eventually resumed. The
government forces were now able to gain the upper hand since the
government had the resources to recover more quickly from the
results of the natural disaster, and the Tigers were then completely
defeated.
Between 1980 and 2003 the Tamil Tigers were involved in more
suicide attacks than any other single group and more attacks
than all the Palestinian groups combined. (Lutz and Lutz 2008:
74–6)

Terrorism: The Basics132
zImBABWe unDeR muGABe
The last example is one of government supported terrorism rather
than violence by a dissident group. Robert Mugabe came to power
in Zimbabwe after a successful guerrilla struggle led to majority
rule by the African population in the former Rhodesia that had
been governed by a white settler minority. Mugabe won the first
election in 1979 that was part of the arrangements for independence
in 1980, but he soon began to use repression against opposition
political groups and the general population in regions that were
strongholds of the opposition parties. Zimbabwe became for all
practical purposes a one party state for many years.
Under Mugabe’s leadership, Zimbabwe began to experience
major economic difficulties and a marked decline in standards of
living. The government was also afflicted with increasing levels
of corruption that contributed to the national economic problems.
One consequence of the declining economic situations was the
end of subsidies that had previously been paid to the veterans of
the guerrilla struggle. The veterans then focused on some of the
commercial farms that were still owned by whites. The veterans
began squatting on the farms and started confrontations with
the owners in efforts to take over the farms that they regarded
as a remnant of colonialism and rule by the white settlers. The
confrontations became increasingly violent. The police were
instructed not to respond to calls from the white farmers for
assistance in protecting their property. Writs issued by the courts in
favor of the farmers were not enforced. In confrontations resulting
in injuries or death, only the whites were prosecuted. The ongoing
process represented terrorism by private groups that were initially
tolerated by the government and at times actively supported by the
government. Most of the white farmers eventually gave up their
farms and left the country. Those that remained even in the face of
the violence lost their farms when they were eventually taken over
by the government and distributed to the veterans.
The white farmers were more vulnerable to terrorism supported
by the state because they had, quite naturally, favored a new
opposition party that had appeared. Since the attacks against the
farmers had worked, the same techniques were used against this

WhaT are some of The major grouPs? 133
party. Some repressive actions were undertaken by the police or
security forces, but many more actions were launched by members
of the government party, the party militia, or a youth wing of
the party. Supporters of the opposition were assaulted or killed.
Other members, including candidates for political office, simply
disappeared. Rallies for the party were disrupted by either the
police or by party groups. As had been the case with the white
farmers, when there were confrontations that became violent
the only persons ever arrested were members of the opposition.
Even with the increased government repression and the terrorist
violence, the new party mounted an effective election campaign in
2008. Its presidential candidate finished slightly ahead of Mugabe
in the first round of voting but faced a runoff since he had not won a
clear majority. The candidate eventually withdrew from the runoff
election because of the dangers to his supporters. As a consequence,
Mugabe was able to begin another term as president.
The government support for the terrorism against its own
citizens in Zimbabwe is evidence of the weakness of the government.
Mugabe’s government did not launch the attacks against the white
farmers on its own. It appears that it was unable to control the
veterans, and it chose to support their violence rather than attempt
to control or direct them. Attempts to stop the violence could have
provoked a reaction that might have resulted in attacks against
the government and the ruling elite. The white farmers provided
a useful diversion for a group of potentially dangerous party
militants. With the new opposition party, government repression
alone was no longer working, so additional violence was required
to keep the opposition in check. For the moment, this combination
of repression and government supported terrorism has kept the old
political elite in power.
conclusIons
The above examples are just a sample of the terrorist organizations
that have been active. The examples represent groups with religious,
ethnic, and ideological motives and goals and some with mixtures
of motivations. The efforts of Mugabe to stay in power, however,
may largely have reflected a desire of the political elite to continue

Terrorism: The Basics134
to enjoy the privileges of office. The situation in India with the
Naxalites also involved some state toleration of violence by the
landlords. There are, of course, many more such groups that have
been active in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. While most
groups have had little impact, the organizations above are not the
only examples of groups that have made their presence felt.
key TeRms
Assassins, Euzkadi ta Askatasuna, Hizballah, Irish Republican
Army, Ku Klux Klan, Naxalites, Al Qaeda, Tamil Tigers
fuRTheR ReADInG
Lutz, J. M. and B. J. Lutz (2008) Global Terrorism, 2nd edn, London:
Routledge.
This introductory volume contains case studies on the above groups and
many others that provide a useful base for evaluating terrorist groups. The
volume also includes and extensive bibliography with additional sources
on many groups.

9
will terrorism continue?
There is little doubt that terrorism will continue to be a problem
in many parts of the world. There are a number of reasons why
attacks will continue, perhaps at a decreasing rate or perhaps at an
increasing rate. They will continue, however, despite the various
counterterrorism techniques that are available to governments
and the increasing level of resources devoted to defeating terrorist
organizations. They will continue even if governments find the
right mix of defensive techniques. The reasons for the continued
use of terrorism by dissident organizations and governments
include the fact that terrorism has worked in the past to achieve
major objectives. Terrorism has also been effective in terms of
achieving some intermediate goals for organizations. Terrorism is
also a violent technique that is an inexpensive one, which requires
relatively few resources. Related to the cost effective nature of
terrorism is the fact that this type of violence remains a weapon of
the weak.
hoW successful Is TeRRoRIsm?
As already noted, most terrorist groups fail very quickly as their
members are apprehended by the police or as the member become
discouraged by the lack of progress in the struggle against the
governments and by the dangers involved. In fact, there have been
suggestions that terrorism is virtually doomed to fail in terms of
achieving any long-term or even intermediate objectives. This
suggestion, however, appears to be an exaggerated view. There are a
number of fairly obvious examples of successes achieved by the use
of terrorism. One obvious area where terrorism has been successful
involves those cases where the state uses terrorism as noted in

Terrorism: The Basics136
Chapter 6. Of course, state terrorism or state supported terrorism
has greater chances of success and is something of a special case.
State terrorism even when employed by a weak state has a chance
of attaining political objectives. Mugabe and his colleagues have
managed to stay in power in Zimbabwe through a combination of
terror and repression. While not all state uses of terrorism will be
successful, they do provide examples of success. Many of those who
argue that terrorism is likely to fail do not include state terrorism,
and dissident terrorism is much more prevalent.
Most cases of terrorism, however, involve dissident groups, but
even some of these groups have been successful as well. National
liberation movements involved in anti-colonial struggles have
achieved their key objective of independence. The British gave up
the struggle to control most of Ireland when the Irish Free State
was established in 1922. The British also left Palestine in 1948 and
Cyprus in 1960. The French pulled out of Algeria in 1962. The
dissidents in Algeria relied on both terrorism and guerrilla warfare.
In Cyprus there was some guerrilla activity that supported a major
terrorist campaign in the urban areas against British officials
and local Cypriot supporters. In the case of Ireland and Palestine,
the dissidents relied on terrorism to accomplish their goals, and
neither struggle ever reached the stage of active guerrilla warfare.
Such colonial situations provide a number of advantages for the
nationalists. There is likely to be a divide between the ruling
authorities and the general colonial population that the dissidents
can utilize. The governing colonial power had someplace to go when
they agreed to independence. Even the well-established settler
population in Algeria had the option of returning to France – as
most of them did when it became clear that Algeria was going to
gain its independence.
There have been other examples of success that have largely
gone unnoticed. In the 1920s and 1930s, there were violent dissident
movements, which were seeking to create independent Croatian and
Macedonian states out of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Croats
had been rather enthusiastic supporters of the idea of Yugoslavia
after World War I, but they quickly came to dislike the dominance
of the new state by the Serb political elite. The Macedonians were
similarly disillusioned. Both groups had nationalist organizations

Will Terrorism conTinue? 137
that used terrorist attacks as part of their efforts to create new states,
but they were unsuccessful except for the brief creation of a puppet
Croatia by Nazi Germany during World War II that was governed
by a local fascist party. With the end of World War II, the idea of an
independent Croatia disappeared. These independence movements
failed at the time, and they would normally be considered examples
of movements that had failed to achieve their basic goals. There
were sporadic attacks by Croat nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s
in Europe and North America that tried to draw attention to the
goal of an independent Croatia, but they had little effect. Yet, if one
looks at a map of Europe today, there is currently an independent
Croatia as well as an independent Macedonia. It is quite possible that
the violent efforts before World War II to create these independent
countries kept alive the concept of independent states. The actions
after World War II by the Croat nationalists may have had a similar
effect. It is possible that because of these earlier terrorist efforts,
both Croatia and Macedonia were able to break away a half-century
later when Yugoslavia was weak and vulnerable because the idea of
independence had been kept alive.
The organizations discussed in Chapter 8 also provide examples
of successful terrorism. The Assassins were quite adept at providing
protection for the sect members. Centuries later the KKK was an
important factor in the return to power of the old elite in the
American South. While the old leaders might have eventually
returned to power, there can be no doubt that the KKK at least sped
up the process. Hizballah has been able to use terrorism in a very
effective fashion. Not only have the attacks achieved goals such
as forcing out foreign troops, but the actions helped to propel the
organization into an important domestic political position.
There are more recent examples of successful campaigns by
dissident organizations. In Nepal a leftist group used guerrilla
warfare and terrorism to help bring about significant changes
in the political system. The monarchy has lost much of its real
power, and the government is now ruled by a prime minister and
government that depend upon a popularly elected legislature. In
2010 the former rebels held seats in the national legislature and
were part of the governing coalition cabinet. In Kosovo, the Kosovo
Liberation Army campaigned to create an independent Kosovo

Terrorism: The Basics138
free of Serb rule. Its actions played a role in the eventual creation of
an independent Kosovo that is now ruled by the majority Albanian
population. The members of this group felt that violence had been
an essential part of the successful effort to separate Kosovo from
what remained of Yugoslavia.
The IRA, PLO, and ETA have also been able to attain some of
their objectives. The IRA campaign after World War I was essential
in bringing about the creation of the Irish Free State, even if
Northern Ireland was not included. The campaigns of the IRA later
in Northern Ireland did not bring about the desired unification,
but there have been political changes in the north that have been
favorable to the Catholic population. In the case of the PLO, Israel
eventually proved willing to negotiate with the organization as the
representative of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West
Bank. Under the Oslo Accords the PLO and Israel agreed to the
creation of the Palestinian Authority for the Palestinians while
the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist. While there is still no
independent Palestinian state, it is at least a possibility that would
have been less likely without the activities of the PLO. In the case
of ETA, there is no independent Basque state at present, but the
Basque region in Spain has been granted considerable autonomy, a
situation that would not have been likely to have happened if ETA
had not been active.
InTeRmeDIATe GoAls
Even though most terrorist organizations frequently have difficulties
in achieving their long-term objectives, some of them may be able
to have at least some partial successes and are able to achieve some
important intermediate goals. Some of these objectives may be
Albanian dissidents seeking to separate Kosovo from what
remained of Yugoslavia in the 1990s concluded that “you could
win more by a few months of armed struggle than Albanian
politicians had achieved in nearly a decade of peaceful politics”
(Ash 2003: 63). There is, in fact, now an independent Kosovo.

Will Terrorism conTinue? 139
related to the outbidding, spoiling, and provocation strategies that
were mentioned in previous chapters. Successes in these areas are
likely to increase the probabilities of achieving some of the more
long-term objectives of a terrorist organization.
Terrorist organizations are essentially political organizations
that may be competing with other violent dissident groups for
recruits, finances, and other forms of support. Even paramilitary or
militia groups operating with the toleration or the active support
of the government may be competing with each other. The groups,
whether dissident or pro-government, that are perceived to be more
successful will attract the resources. The leaders of the groups would
see their actions as successful when they displace other factions
seeking the same or similar goals. If a dissident group is able to
appropriate the vast majority of the resources available to dissident
groups opposed to the government, it is likely to be more effective.
Although the specific group winning this battle for resources
may not achieve its ultimate objectives, the intermediate step can
contribute to later successes and strengthen the organization. It can
also be argued that in most cases the chances of achieving objectives
that are shared by a number of groups are more likely when
competing dissident factions are eliminated and the resources are
concentrated in a single organization. The Tamil Tigers managed to
absorb or eliminate other dissident groups. Its ability to unify the
opposition helps to explain its ability to maintain its campaign for
independence for so long.
Dissidents can also adopt spoiling strategies that are designed to
disrupt peace negotiations, elections, or other government projects.
Groups may attempt to disrupt elections if they or their allies are
unlikely to win. Islamic rebels in Algeria in the 1990s wanted to
disrupt elections in part to weaken the government and lessen its
legitimacy. The elections also provided a forum for more moderate
Islamic leaders who might then be able to lead those who wanted
change in the political system. A group may feel that it is essential
to prevent peace negotiations that could undercut the goals of the
organizations. A compromise peace might result in the end of support
for the dissidents as formerly unhappy citizens become willing to
accept the changes offered by the government. If concessions are
likely to solve the dispute, the hardliners could be opposed to an

Terrorism: The Basics140
agreement as was the case with the Real IRA and the Continuity
IRA. Preventing such a negative outcome from the perspective of
the group can also be important for the future positive prospects of
the group – even if the organization is miscalculating its chances of
ultimate success. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin
in 1995 for being insufficiently protective of Israel by his willingness
to compromise with the Palestinians prevented outcomes opposed
by some in Israel. He was assassinated by a Jewish extremist who
disagreed with giving up land in the West Bank. His death was
an effective spoiling attack since the implementation of the Oslo
Accords was slowed down and then effectively stillborn. The attack
itself was not an isolated action since there had been other terrorist
activities by Jewish extremists opposed to any concessions to the
Palestinians. The assassination is an example of an individual act
within a wider framework of the leaderless resistance campaign of
terrorism designed to keep the West Bank as part of Israel.
Sometimes governments can undertake spoiling or provocative
actions, such as when Ariel Sharon made a well-publicized visit
with an armed guard to the Dome of the Rock, a very holy site
for Muslims in Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as
those in other countries. The riots that were a direct consequence
of the visit were very effective in promoting election outcomes
that favored those opposed to negotiations with the Palestinians,
including Ariel Sharon and his party. If governments need to take
a more clandestine approach, a paramilitary can be encouraged to
undertake attacks that will derail negotiations. The attacks may
be blamed on the dissidents who are charged with negotiating
in bad faith. They can also be intended to provoke the dissidents
into a violent reaction. If the attacks are made against supporters
of the dissidents, the organization may feel obligated to strike
back to protect its supporters. Violence may serve as an excuse to
postpone an election in the interests of public safety (and thereby
insure the continuation of the current government in power). Such
attacks could also provide the government with an excuse not
to follow through on concessions or to break off negations with
dissidents. Such government involvement in spoiling attacks can
obviously succeed. A disruption in negotiations may be productive
from the government’s perspective if it feels that it was being

Will Terrorism conTinue? 141
forced into making too many concessions or if it believes that the
circumstances have changed so that a counterterrorism policy of
outright repression is now likely to succeed.
Spoiling attacks may also be intended to indicate to the
government that it cannot proceed with some policies without
making some concessions to the dissident group. Sunni Arab
terrorists in Iraq in the years after the 2003 invasion cannot
hope to regain the position of overwhelming political dominance
that they held for all the years prior to 2003. Their attacks have
been intended to demonstrate to the other factions in Iraq that
any government in Iraq is not going to be able to function if the
interests of the Sunni Arab minority are ignored. This violence is
basically a demonstration of negative power wherein concessions
to the minority are necessary for stability and peace. The success
of this type of terrorism needs to be evaluated not only in terms
of what organizations seek to accomplish in a positive sense but
in what they may be seeking to prevent. Negative goals can be the
very essence of spoiling attacks.
Dissidents can undertake provocation strategies that are
designed to provide important short term benefits to the
organization. Attacks designed to provoke overreactions among
the target audiences or their governments can be an intermediate
objective. Many terrorist groups have been successful in getting
governments to overreact with negative policy changes or with
getting the security forces to adopt harsher measures for dealing
with suspect populations, thus alienating them and leading
them to provide active or at least tacit support to the dissidents.
Limitations on civil liberties imposed by a government can play
into the hands of the dissident groups. Guantanamo Bay, for
example, has provided Al Qaeda and groups linked to the global
jihad with a propaganda advantage. These groups and their
supporters are able to portray the United States as anti-Islamic
because it will not apply the civil liberties supposedly present in
a democracy to Muslims. As a consequence, it becomes easier to
recruit new members and to mobilize support for the continuing
struggle between Islam and the West.
It is obvious that other dissident organizations at times
intentionally sought to create similar overreactions by security

Terrorism: The Basics142
forces. The Kosovo Liberation Army consciously attempted to
force the Serbian military and security forces into adopting
more repressive measures against the Albanian population by
attacks on isolated police and military patrols. The police were
especially targeted. The IRA was quite effective in pursuing such
strategies with the British troops in Northern Ireland, driving a
wedge between the Catholic community and the military. Many
of the bombings in Iraq after 2003 have been intended to bring
about crackdowns by the government or overreactions by other
segments of Iraqi society. In all of these cases intermediate goals
were achieved that may or may not have contributed to long-term
successes. Organizations may miscalculate the long-term effects
of their actions, the circumstances previously favorable to the
dissidents may change, the government may receive important
external assistance or find an effective counterterrorism policy, or
the dissidents may make fatal mistakes. Even so, the intermediate
successes can be important even if eventual victory will depend
upon other events and circumstances.
Al Qaeda as an organization and the global jihad movement as
the loosely connected network that has grown out of Al Qaeda,
have utilized multiple strategies at various times that have
included intermediate objectives. One of the initial goals sought
by bin Laden and Al Qaeda with the early terrorist attacks such
as the East African embassy attacks was an effort to drive a wedge
between the United States – and the West in general – and the
Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere. The 9/11 attacks
included this objective among others, and the US reaction to the
attack suggests that Al Qaeda appears to have succeeded quite
well with this goal. The response by the United States provided
Al Qaeda and related groups with an opportunity to portray the
Governments may be aware of the dangers of provocation. Plans
for attacking Al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan in 1998 were put
aside since the damage done might not justify the increased
sympathy for Al Qaeda and the Taliban. (Benjamin and Simon
2002: 294–6).

Will Terrorism conTinue? 143
United States as launching attacks against Islam in general. Even
though this was not the US policy, the appearance of such an
intent has been a potent propaganda weapon for the extremists.
While the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was not especially popular
among Muslims, it was accepted by many as a logical consequence
of the 9/11 attacks. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, which occurred for a
complex set of reasons but within the context of the US global war
on terrorism, however, was not accepted by most Arabs or many
non-Arab Muslims as an appropriate response. The invasion has
made it possible for Al Qaeda and related groups to portray their
continuing attacks on the United States and the West as part of
a continuing battle between Islam and the West. Individuals can
see themselves as defending their religion and their countries
against Western encroachment and what they see as economic,
political, and cultural imperialism. Being able to portray the
attack in this fashion has spurred recruitment, financing of
various organizations, and the activities of independent groups
that have launched attacks because they see themselves as part
of the global jihad against the West. It is not especially surprising
that Al Qaeda and other groups have been able to find many
volunteers to launch attacks in Iraq since 2003 against the United
States, other foreign troops, and those Iraqis seen as collaborating
with the United States. The 9/11 attacks thus eventually served
the provocation goal quite well, accomplishing one of the basic
objectives of Al Qaeda.
TeRRoRIsm As An InexPensIve meThoD
Another reason why terrorism will continue is that it is quite cost
effective. It does not require major financial resources for dissidents
to begin to use terrorism, even if the initial efforts become successful
campaigns that will eventually require more resources. Of course,
if organizations are successful, they are more likely to attract the
necessary additional resources. They have to use outbidding strategies
against other dissident factions, but the most successful groups will
naturally attract the resources. Achieving intermediate goals may
be very important in this regard. A number of attacks that caused
significant casualties such as the Madrid train bombings, the London

Terrorism: The Basics144
transport bombings, or the attack on the federal office building in
Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh were inexpensive. None of
these attacks required a major outlay of funds. In fact, in these three
cases the attacks were financed by the participants. The attempted car
bombing in Times Square in New York in 2010 is another example of
a relatively inexpensive attempt. If the attacker had been a bit more
sophisticated, the bomb would have caused considerable damage
and significant casualties. In the case of suicide attacks, groups with
larger memberships can rely on them if suicide attacks are acceptable
to the organization, its members, its supporters, and potential
supporters. Suicide attacks can be more damaging at lower cost than
conventional attacks as noted in Chapter 4. As long as terrorism as
a technique remains relatively inexpensive, it will continue to be
used by dissident organizations. Organizing an armed rebellion or
creating a political party to contest political campaigns by contrast
is a much more expensive proposition although successful terrorism
campaigns may set the stage for more open rebellion as occurred in
Sri Lanka with the Tamil Tigers. The inexpensive nature of terrorism
also helps to explain why the technique will be used by governments.
Even if the government supported attacks fail, very little will have
been lost in terms of resources (unless the source of the attacks are
discovered and public support for the government declines greatly as
a consequence).
TeRRoRIsm As A WeAPon of The WeAk
Because terrorism is a relatively inexpensive technique, it will
continue to be used by organizations that are weak – either in
an absolute sense or relative to their opponents. The Palestinians
resorted to terrorism as their primary technique when it became
obvious after the 1967 war that conventional warfare by Arab
armies or guerrilla warfare by Palestinian groups was unlikely to
result in the end of Israel or the establishment of an independent
Palestinian state. The PLO as an organization was not a particularly
weak political organization, especially when compared to many
other dissident terrorist groups, but it was weak relative to the
Israeli Defense Force and the Israeli security services. Most
dissident groups, of course, are quite weak in an absolute sense;

Will Terrorism conTinue? 145
therefore, terrorism becomes their preferred technique precisely
because there is a lack of alternative acceptable courses of action.
The groups that have turned to terrorism are weak, and they
usually lack other options for achieving their political objectives,
at least initially. While terrorism often will fail to achieve any of
the long-term objectives or even intermediate ones, it will remain
one of the few means available that weak organizations can use in
an attempt to bring about political change. Ineffective as terrorism
may be for many groups, the alternative will be to give up and to
do nothing. Terrorism at least provides a prospect, however limited,
of change. If doing nothing appears to be unacceptable to dissidents
then terrorism will be tried. As a consequence, dissidents that are
desperate to achieve political changes and willing to take the risks
involved with violent action will continue to engage in terrorism.
Similarly, weaker governments facing threats from discontented
citizens will also be tempted to support terrorism as a means of
staying in power. Even if the government terrorism may fail, it at
least provides an opportunity to avoid collapse.
conclusIons
For the above reasons, there is little doubt that many different
terrorist organizations will continue to rely on terrorism. It is
one of the few techniques available for weak groups that lack
resources precisely because it is inexpensive. It will also remain a
useful technique for organizations with more resources that are
absolutely weak or relatively weak compared to their opponents.
Governments that lack the resources to deal with their opponents
through repression will also continue to be tempted to utilize
paramilitary or other informal pro-government organizations to
deal with what they see as dangerous internal opposition.
Of course, if terrorism always failed, the fact that it is a weapon
of the weak and that it is inexpensive would have little meaning.
What gives terrorism the status of a persistent phenomenon
is that fact that it succeeds at least some of the time or at least
that it appears to succeed. It seems obvious that at least some
dissidents have achieved major objectives as was noted above. In
addition, others have managed to attain significant intermediate

Terrorism: The Basics146
goals even if they may eventually be defeated and disappear or be
forced to compromise without achieving their ultimate objectives.
Other groups will make a transition to guerrilla warfare or even
open rebellion as they become stronger and have access to more
domestic or foreign resources. All the examples of such success or
even the perception that dissidents have been successful will fuel
additional terrorist activities by new groups copying the old. The
time line of group activities can also be important. By 2010 the
Tamil Tigers would appear to have been totally defeated in their
efforts to create an autonomous or independent Tamil homeland
in Sri Lanka, although it is possible that in fifty years there will be
such a state just as there are now independent countries of Croatia
and Macedonia. Even if there is never such a state, for many of the
twenty-five years the Tamil Tigers operated, they appeared to have
a good chance of being successful. As a consequence, even though
the Tigers were eventually defeated, their struggle served as a
positive example or even an inspiration for many other dissidents.
The effectiveness (or apparent effectiveness) of suicide attacks by
the Tamil Tigers no doubt encouraged other dissidents to consider
using such attacks. During the period when the organization was
active, the apparent successes were more relevant than the ultimate
failure.
Perception is also important in other ways. Many of the groups
and individuals involved in the global jihad see the battle as a
clash between the West and Islam. Outside observers who share
this view as a main cultural conflict that has exacerbated tensions
may see similar opportunities for driving wedges between different
segments of their domestic societies or between other religions or
global areas. The apparent success of the strategy of provocation
might lead other groups to attempt a similar strategy. Even if the
global jihad will eventually fail in all senses of the word, it will
have inspired similar attempts along the way – which may in turn
then be in the process of influencing yet others who are considering
relying on terrorism. Apparent successes can begin a vicious cycle
where each perception that a group has attained an objective or
seems like it might attain its ultimate objectives then encourages
even more terrorism.

Will Terrorism conTinue? 147
There seems to be little doubt that terrorism will continue
to be an ongoing phenomenon and problem in the world. It is an
inexpensive weapon that can be used by weak organizations that lack
alternative means of attempting to achieve political objectives. Weak
groups can include governments that resort to terrorism and which
can be successful in doing so. It is also a technique that provides at
least a chance of achieving major goals for dissident organizations
even if that chance is relatively small. Terrorism as a technique has
somewhat higher probabilities of gaining intermediate objectives
than ultimate goals. Finally, there are obvious cases where particular
terrorists appear to be having successes at the time, thus further
encouraging adoption of terrorism as a method by other groups or
governments.
key TeRms
Kosovo Liberation Army, Al Qaeda, Tamil Tigers
fuRTheR ReADInG
Abrams, M. (2006) “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International
Security, 31, 2: 42–78.
Abrams argues on the basis of a study of twenty-three groups that terrorist
groups do not attain any of their key objectives and usually fail to even
attain any tactical or short-term objectives.
Cronin, A. K. (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
In discussing how terrorist groups can end, Cronin discusses examples
of success and examples of transformation from terrorist activities to
Perception can be as important as reality in explaining political
phenomena. It can be the “image of success that recommends
terrorism to groups who identify with the innovator.” (Crenshaw
2003: 98)

Terrorism: The Basics148
other types of political pressure that have been facilitated by the terrorist
activities.
Lutz, J. M. and B. J. Lutz (2009) “How Successful Is Terrorism?” Forum
on Public Policy, http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/spring09papers/
papers09spring.html, 1–22.
The authors provide a fair number of examples of terrorist groups that
achieved some of their basic goals and others that achieved some of their
intermediate goals.

10
oVerView
The preceding chapters have discussed many of the characteristics
of terrorism and active groups. There have been a great many
terrorist organizations that have operated in the world. Different
types of terrorist groups continue to operate. While much of the
current attention is naturally given to Islamic groups, there are
many other types of terrorist groups. There are terrorists linked
to other religions, and terrorists from ethnic groups have also not
disappeared. Right-wing groups continue to operate in the United
States and Europe, and even some leftist groups remain active as
is the case with the Naxalites in India. Over the course of time,
terrorist organizations that have several types of objectives have
appeared in many parts of the world. Even though it is true that
many terrorist groups fail quickly, some survive to become
meaningful threats. This concluding chapter on the overview of
terrorism will summarize the key findings from the earlier chapters,
but first there will be a reevaluation of the factors that have been
considered to be causes of terrorism or that contribute to terrorism.
RooTs of TeRRoRIsm ReevAluATeD
As noted in Chapter 2, there are a number of potential causes of
terrorism. It is necessary to reemphasize that terrorism is simply
a technique that is available for use by all kinds of groups with all
kinds of grievances. The most obvious factor that leads to terrorism
is that some portion of society becomes discontented enough to
resort to violence. Any attempt to specify causes, however, must
go beyond this basic fact. There will always be some obvious
factors or circumstances that would lead dissidents or governments
to resort to violence as a way of dealing with problems. It is also

Terrorism: The Basics150
important to remember that terrorism is only one type of political
violence. The same conditions and situations that lead to terrorism
can also lead to other types of political violence. As noted earlier,
discontented groups resort to terrorism when they cannot rely on
political parties and elections, pressures groups, bribery, military
interventions, or armed insurrection to achieve their goals. There
are no unique causes of terrorism, but whatever causes other types
of political violence can also be behind terrorism.
A number of suggestions were put forward to explain the
incidence of terrorism. While the idea that poverty is a basic
cause has been popular, there is nothing in the preceding chapters
to suggest that poverty has been a major factor. The IRA is one
group whose history would provide some support for the poverty
explanation. In 1916, the Irish were poorer than their English
counterparts. Of course, anti-colonial movements typically involve
such differences since the colonial power is inevitably richer than
the colony. Although differences no doubt contribute to the desire
to end the colonial status, other conditions explain outbreaks of
anti-colonial violence of all kinds. In the case of Northern Ireland,
the Catholic Irish community was clearly less well off than the
Protestant British residents. The reforms undertaken by the British
government recognized the disparity between the two groups
and attempted to correct it. Other cases of terrorism provide less
support. Hizballah did represent a poorer segment of Lebanese
society, but the group’s most obvious terrorist actions have been
against foreign targets. The Basque region of Spain has been one
of the more economically advanced and prosperous areas of the
country. As a consequence, concessions by the government to the
Basque region did not deal with questions of poverty, but with
increased autonomy for the area. In other cases, such as the whites
who joined the KKK and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, moreover, the
terrorists were better off economically than the general population.
With government terrorism, poverty is not an issue. The case of
the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe is a good illustration since
the government support of terrorism was designed to preserve a
position of privilege for the ruling elite, not to gain one.
Limited political participation can be a contributing factor in the
appearance of terrorism. It has obviously been important in anti-

overvieW 151
colonial struggles since participation for the colonial subjects is
limited or non-existent. National liberation movements frequently
seek greater representation for the colonial population as part of
their broader demands. The IRA, ETA, and Tamil Tigers all saw
themselves as being in this type of situation. The Catholic Irish
were underrepresented in Northern Ireland, but the Tamils were
included in the Sri Lankan political system as were the Basques
once democracy was established in Spain. The underlying problem
for the Basques, Tamils, and Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland
was that they were outnumbered political minorities. Al Qaeda
and the global jihadists also feel that their views are not being
represented by governments in the Middle East or respected by
governments in the West. It is not clear, however, that Al Qaeda
and similar groups represent majority opinion even if they do
speak for the discontent of an important number of Muslims. For
Hizballah, greater participation for the Shia in Lebanese society
and the political system was a prime concern. Participation for
the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories was a secondary issue
for Hizballah. Frequently, government tolerated or supported
terrorism is intended to limit participation by the citizens who are
being targeted. The KKK and similar groups in Europe and North
America today have also been intent on limiting participation of the
groups of which they did not approve. In the time frame in which
the Assassins operated, participation was not a primary issue. For
the Assassins, survival for the group was the priority concern.
Globalization and the modernization that goes with it do have
relevance for the use of terrorism by many groups. Clearly, Al
Qaeda and the global jihadists are fighting against the effects of
globalization and the increase of Western influences in Islamic
societies in the Middle East and elsewhere. The penetration of more
traditional societies by businesses, governments, aid workers, and
perhaps most importantly Western ideas and values have generated
changes and threats. As traditional structures change, there are
more anomic individuals who may support extremist groups that
are promising to combat the unwanted changes. The Naxalites
have mobilized support from groups that have been adversely
affected by economic and social changes occurring as the rural areas
became more integrated into the national system and even the

Terrorism: The Basics152
broader global system. Even some nationalist struggles reflect the
effects of globalization even if the members of the groups do not
necessarily think of their struggles in these terms. In some ways
the nationalists are reacting to threats to their cultures and societies
that have come with increasing incorporation into the broader
world that often result in the assimilation of local societies and the
disappearance of local languages. The Basques and Irish have seen
their societies changed by increased interactions with the broader
world. Irish Gaelic and Basque as languages are being displaced by
English and Spanish notwithstanding efforts to keep them alive.
The KKK in the 1920s and the current extreme right-wing groups
in the United States and Europe, which are anti-minority and anti-
immigrant, are other examples of violent reactions to globalization
and the accompanying migration patterns. In essence, they are
attempting to reestablish an idealized version of the past when their
societies were much less diverse. Hizballah, on the other hand, has
shown no direct indications of being a reaction to globalization,
nor, for example, have the Assassins, the Tamil Tigers, or Mugabe’s
government in Zimbabwe. While global attention may have placed
at least a few restraints on government actions in countries such as
Zimbabwe, the attention may also have meant that governments
rely more on irregular forces and terrorism rather than on
repression.
State weakness has clearly contributed to some outbreaks of
terrorism. A weak state structure permits dissidents to create
organizations and to survive the early, dangerous days when many
groups are dismantled by the police or security forces. Hizballah
gained strength in Lebanon during the long civil war and internal
turmoil among domestic groups that was aggravated by the
interventions of outside states. The Naxalites have taken advantage
of local weaknesses in the Indian political systems, and they have
managed to survive in part because the police and security forces
have been insufficient to deal with the dissidents. The ETA gained
strength when Spain was in transition from Franco to the new
democratic system. The Assassins appeared in a time when there
were many smaller states instead of a large empire which provided
an environment where they could organize and survive. While
it stands to reason that terrorist organizations can benefit from

overvieW 153
weak states, not all groups have appeared in such circumstances.
The IRA and most of the extreme right-wing groups have not
been facing weak states. In fact, they often have been opposing
policies in well-established political systems. The government of
Sri Lanka that the Tamil Tigers were fighting was not as strong
as European governments, but it would not qualify as weak. Al
Qaeda has not just focused its efforts on weak governments or
opportune situations, but has also taken on powerful countries,
including the United States. Finally, weakness comes into play as
a characteristic of dissident groups and governments that resort to
terrorism. Mugabe’s government tolerated the land occupations of
the veterans because it was too dangerous to attempt to challenge
the war veterans, and it relied on state supported terrorism to deal
with the increasing domestic opposition because it was too weak to
rely on other mechanisms of repression.
In the final analysis, there is no single cause for terrorism since
it is simply a violent technique that is chosen by groups with
limited alternatives for dealing with political problems and for
attaining different kinds of objectives. Globalization, inequality,
lack of representation, weak governments, and other factors – some
of which could be very specific to individual sets of circumstances
– can play a role in generating the necessary conditions that will
lead to or contribute to the use of terrorism. Some groups will
use terrorism for other reasons that are essentially practical ones.
Government elites, for example, can use terrorism as a means of
staying in power. The Assassins used a well developed campaign of
terrorism to protect their sect from extinction. In the future there
may be new causes, or at least variations on the existing causes.
New objectives or mixtures of objectives could occur as well. Thus,
there will always be exceptions that cannot be explained by any one
cause, even a complex mixture of the more standard causes.
conclusIons
There are some conclusions and insights about terrorism that
can be derived from the preceding chapters. Terrorism can indeed
have many causes like most other political phenomena. Violent
groups have varying goals including religious, national, and

Terrorism: The Basics154
ideological ones. They pursue policy changes, government changes,
and boundary changes. There are multiple combinations of these
various objectives, meaning that many situations are relatively
unique. The goals of the dissidents will then affect the types of
responses that governments may take in their efforts to combat the
violence. Identifying the objectives of the groups and the possible
causes that underlie their activities will help any government
response to be effective – whether it be a government response to
domestic dissidents or response by foreign governments to states
using terrorism against its own citizens. The multiple causes, of
course, require specific mixtures of approaches to attempt to deal
with the presence of terrorism, and there is not even any standard
response to particular types of terrorism.
Individuals who join terrorist organizations do not have any
obvious characteristics beyond high levels of commitment to the
cause. They do not have any identifiable psychological traits and are
frequently representative of their broader communities in terms of
economic, social, and educational characteristics. Dissident groups
that attract these individuals use a variety of tactics and weapons.
Often, the weapons are whatever can be obtained, and in rare cases
they could even include weapons of mass destruction. The groups
can choose a wide variety of targets. In fact, one advantage that
terrorists have is their ability to choose from a number of different
types of targets and the fact that one member of a target audience
can be replaced by another. These circumstances effectively
multiply the number of potential targets. Governments supporting
or using terror have different sets of tactics, including death squads,
that they can utilize. Their targets will, of course, be different in
many cases than the targets of dissident groups. Both governments
and dissidents can choose their targets and tactics in the context
of a number of overall strategies. Strategies can include attrition,
intimidation, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding as discussed in
earlier chapters. Even though some tactics are more likely to be
more useful for particular strategies, most tactics can be used with
any of the strategies or mixtures of them.
In order for terrorists to gain any chance of success, they have
to find support. There has to be some domestic support when the
targets and objectives are domestic, otherwise the groups cannot

overvieW 155
survive unless it is a front for a foreign intelligence service.
Dissident groups can become more deadly when they can attract
foreign support from governments, sympathizers, or diaspora
populations. The presence of such foreign support will affect the
chances of success for the groups. While most terrorist groups
fail completely, there are some cases where violent dissident
organizations have been successful in achieving either major or
intermediate objectives. These successes, or at least the appearance
of success, will encourage other groups to adopt the same tactics to
achieve their goals. Government terrorism, of course, is much more
likely to be successful. State terror can become more lethal if the
government can attract support from the governments of foreign
allies.
When all is said and done, terrorism appears to work at least
in some cases for groups that are desperate enough to adopt this
technique. Terrorism, as a consequence, will continue in the future.
The future terrorists of 2020 or 2025 may still be predominately
religious (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, or others). They could also
be nationalist or ideological. Violent dissident ethnic organizations
have continued into the twenty-first century. Extreme right-
wing ideological groups still remain active in many countries. It
is even possible that left-wing ideologies could stage a revival as
the memory of the failures of communism fade into the past. The
Naxalites demonstrate that violent left-wing ideologies are still
possible even though the end of communism in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe discredited leftist movements to a large extent.
Government terrorism can also continue to be present as a means of
dealing with opponents. While the exact nature or objectives of the
terrorist groups of the future is unknown, there seems to be little
doubt that terrorism will continue. Leaderless resistance styles of
organization combined with modern communication technologies
will be especially difficult for governments to counteract. Even the
most effective counterterrorism measures currently known will
not always work, and groups that feel they have no alternatives to
their current situation except to rely on violence will appear and
continue to use terrorism as a technique to achieve their goals.

glossary
Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines was formed by individuals
who had served in Afghanistan fighting Soviet troops and
the local communists. It is one of the groups attempting
to gain independence for the Muslim areas of the country.
The group has had intermittent links to Al Qaeda since it
was formed.
Al Qaeda is a radical Islamic organization that seeks to reduce
Western influence in the Middle East among other goals.
It has launched some spectacular attacks, including the
ones on 9/11, and inspired violence by other individuals
and groups.
Anarchists were a group of left-wing idealists who operated in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
They assassinated rulers and government leaders in an
attempt to bring about political change. They were an
early example of leaderless resistance.
Anomie refers to a situation in which an individual finds himself
or herself without a known social, economic or cultural
structure that provides a framework for everyday action.
Members of anomic groups can be a source of recruits for
terrorist groups.

glossary 157
Anthrax is a poison that can be quite deadly, especially when inhaled
in its powder form. While it can kill and make people sick,
it is not contagious.
Aryan Nations is one of a number of extremist right-wing groups
in the United States. It is quite racist and has targeted
minorities and Jews because they are considered to be
threats to the purity of the white race.
Attrition strategy is pursued by terrorist groups and is designed
to wear down a government until it is willing to make
concessions or even give in to the terrorist organization
completely in order to end the violence and the costs of
dealing with it.
Aum Shinrikyo was a Japanese religious cult that launched a
sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995. The attack
attempted to prevent a government investigation into the
group’s activities.
Black widows are a group of Chechen women who became suicide
bombers to protest the continued Russian occupation of
the region. The women were willing to become suicide
bombers in revenge for their husbands or other family
members who had been killed by the Russian military or
security forces.
CIA is the major intelligence agency of the United States
that focuses on foreign operations and seeks to deal with
foreign terrorist groups that target US interests abroad or
in the United States.
Death squads are non-governmental groups that seek out
opponents of a government to assassinate them to instill
fear in a target audience. While the squads are not official
government units, many of the members come from the
military or security agencies. They normally have the
support of the government.
Diaspora populations are members of ethnic groups that have
migrated abroad who still identify with local populations
in their homeland.
A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive device that contains
radioactive materials that can potentially cause sickness in

glossary158
people who are exposed. In addition, it can contaminate
the area affected by the explosion.
Ethnic cleansing occurs when violence and terror are used
by governments or other groups to drive an ethnic or
religious group out of a particular area.
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) is a Basque movement that has
used violence in its efforts to achieve independence for
the Basque region of Spain.
Extradition occurs when one country requests the deportation of
an individual from another country for trial for crimes
that were committed in the requesting country.
False flag attacks occur when an organization launches attacks and
attempts to have the blame attached to some other group.
Genocide occurs when a government or even a non-governmental
group attempts to destroy an ethnic or religious group.
Globalization refers to the increasing connections among different
societies and cultures around the world in terms of
economic, social, political, and communication linkages.
Government terrorism occurs when the ruling government or
state agencies support terrorist attacks against their own
citizens by other domestic groups such as paramilitary
organization, militias, death squads, or vigilantes.
Guantanamo Bay is a US naval base in Cuba that has been used to
house terrorist suspects who have been captured abroad.
The individuals sent to the base in many cases continue to
be held indefinitely with no prospect of being charged or
brought to trial. Others have been returned to their home
governments for either release or imprisonment.
Intimidation strategies are used by terrorists and are directed
toward target populations. It is designed to get them to
withdraw their support from the government – or their
support from an opposition group if the government is
pursuing such a strategy.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was involved in the successful
struggle to create an independent Irish state after World
War I. It later was a key actor in the terrorist campaign to
drive the British out of Northern Ireland and unite that
territory with the Republic of Ireland in the south.

glossary 159
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna is a leftist political party in Sri
Lanka. At one time it launched a terrorist and guerrilla
campaign against the government in an effort to take
power, but the attempt failed.
The Japanese Red Army is a leftist group that appeared in Japan
to oppose capitalism in that country and global capitalism.
Members of the group have been involved in terrorist
attacks in other countries in collaboration with other
leftist groups.
The KGB was the major intelligence agency of the Soviet Union
when it existed. It was involved in both foreign operations
and in dealing with internal dissidents.
Kneecapping is the technique, apparently first developed by the
Red Brigades in Italy, of approaching a target and shooting
him in one or both knees rather than killing the target.
The disabled victim served as a constant reminder of the
power of the terrorist group.
The Kosovo Liberation Army appeared to fight for an
independent Kosovo that would be controlled by the
Albanian population of the territory.
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) was a right-wing racist terrorist
organization that appeared three times in the United
States. After the Civil War it sought to put whites in power
at the expense of freed slaves. In the 1920s it reappeared
as anti-Catholic, anti-Jewish, anti-immigrant, and anti-
black. It appeared once again in the 1950s and 1960s to
oppose the civil rights movement.
Leaderless resistance refers to a style of operations where
individuals or small groups that identify with some larger
cause undertake violent actions to achieve the goals of a
larger group. They do not act under the direct orders of
someone in a larger group although websites can provide
information about potential targets.
Left-wing ideologies focus on reducing inequality and hierarchy
in domestic societies. Many left-wing ideologies draw
upon ideas of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin.
The London transport bombings were attacks in 2005 by a group
of Muslims in the United Kingdom who identified with

glossary160
the aims of Al Qaeda but apparently had no direct contact
or instructions from Al Qaeda. The four individuals
launched suicide attacks on subway trains and a bus.
The Madrid train bombings in 2004 were undertaken by a
group associated with Al Qaeda to protest the presence
of Spanish troops in Iraq. Nearly 200 people were killed
and many more were injured when bombs went off in
crowded commuter trains coming into the Spanish capital.
The Naxalites were a leftist group in India that tried to protect
peasants and the poor in the countryside from exploitation
by local landlords and local political authorities. The term
has now come to be used in a more general way to describe
a variety of violent leftist groups operating in many parts
of India.
The 9/11 attacks were launched by Al Qaeda operatives in
September of 2001. Hijacked airliners flew into each
of the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. A fourth hijacked airliner was destined for the
White House but did not reach its target when it crashed
in western Pennsylvania.
The Order was a right-wing extremist group in the United States.
Even though the group lasted a little more than a year, it
successfully robbed banks and armored cars.
The Oslo Accords was an agreement between Israel and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization designed to end the
conflict between Israeli authorities and the Palestinians in
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The agreement created
the Palestinian Authority and provided for at least an
element of self-rule for the Palestinians.
An outbidding strategy is one that is designed to gain resources,
support, and recruits at the expense of other dissident
groups. Terrorist organizations may seek to launch more
spectacular attacks in order to gain these types of support.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was a
terrorist group seeking an independent Palestine that
combined nationalism with Marxist-Leninist ideology. It
has had a clear leftist ideological orientation, The PFLP

glossary 161
viewed the problem of Palestine as a result of global
capitalism.
A provocation strategy is one that is designed to get the
government or its security forces to overreact to the
actions of the dissident group. The dissidents hope that
the overreaction will negatively affect a portion of the
population that will then turn to supporting the terrorist
group instead of the government.
The Red Army Faction (or Baader-Meinhof Gang) was a leftist
group in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s that
was determined to undermine the government and the
international capitalist system.
The Red Brigades was a leftist group in Italy in the 1970s and
1980s that mounted a serious challenge to the government
before it was finally contained by the Italian authorities.
Rendition is a practice used by the United States of transferring
suspects from the United States or other countries to
allied or friendly countries where the security agencies
can use torture to extract intelligence from the suspects.
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is a
dissident leftist group that has been active for many years
in Colombia. It has used both terrorism and guerrilla
tactics and has gained control of some rural areas. It has
developed a cooperative working arrangement with the
drug cartels in Colombia.
Right-wing ideologies favor the status quo and often seek to
return societies to an earlier time that is seen as an ideal
period. Such groups are often opposed to immigrants
from foreign cultures or religions.
Sarin gas is the nerve gas used by Aum Shinrikyo in its attacks
against the passengers on the Tokyo subway. Although
it can be deadly, the materials used in the subway attack
were too weak to cause mass casualties.
The Secret Intelligence Service is the main intelligence agency
of the United Kingdom dealing with foreign operations
and foreign threats.
The 17 November Organization was left-wing terrorist group
in Greece that managed to elude the security forces for

glossary162
a quarter of a century before a premature explosion of a
bomb led to the exposure of the organization.
Shining Path was a leftist terrorist and guerrilla group active in
Peru that controlled rural areas and which cooperated
with drug producers.
A spoiling strategy is one that is designed to prevent what a terrorist
group regards as a negative outcome. The strategy can be
used in attempts to disrupt elections or peace negotiations.
Suspect communities are formed when governments or local
populations begin to believe that members of the
ethnic or religious groups are likely to be terrorists. As a
consequence the group members are subjected to greater
scrutiny or even discrimination.
The Symbionese Liberation Army was a small leftist group in
California opposed to the American political and social
system. Its major feat was the kidnapping of Patty Hearst
and her apparent later conversion to the leftist cause.
The Tamil Tigers was a Tamil group in Sri Lanka that was opposed
to the Sinhalese majority and mounted a serious terrorist
and guerrilla struggle for more than 25 years before
being defeated. It was seeking to create an autonomous
homeland or independent Tamil state in the northern and
eastern portions of the country.
Theodore Kaczynski was known as the Unabomber before he
was identified and captured. He sent or placed bombs
directed against a variety of targets as part of a protest
against modernization and change.

resources
In the years prior to 2001, the materials on terrorism were relatively
limited. There was an occasional book and a handful of edited
volumes. There were journal articles but these materials were also
few in number. Since 2001 there has been a sometimes bewildering
amount of information. The bibliography for this volume, and
especially the suggested readings at the end of each chapter, provide
a very useful starting point. Of course, there will be more recent
materials that have become available. The materials below provide
a useful starting point for looking at newer materials as well as the
existing information.
Books
There are hundreds of books written about terrorism, most of which
focus on terrorism in the years since 9/11. Books prior to that period
most frequently deal with terrorism in Europe and Latin America
by leftist groups and terrorism by Palestinian groups. Needless to
say, most of the materials after 9/11 focus on Islamic groups. Of
course, there has always been terrorism by religious groups in all
periods, ethnic groups, and other types of ideological groups. The
bibliography that follows includes some of the most useful books
in the field. More recent works by the same authors are also likely

resources164
to be very useful. In general, books from academic presses or books
from presses that produce textbooks for university courses are likely
to contain valid information and well supported conclusions. More
popular books include both ones that are extremely worthwhile and
others of lesser value.
jouRnAl ARTIcles
Virtually all journals in political science, international relations, and
sociology will have articles that deal with some aspect of terrorism.
Journals in many other fields deal with aspects of terrorism as well.
There are a few academic journals that tend to specialize on terrorism
issues. While a list of journals that carry articles on terrorism with
some regularly would be quite extensive, there are three that are
valuable as starting points: Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, and Perspectives on Terrorism, a recent journal
which is also an online journal.
WeBsITes
Websites dealing with terrorism are plentiful as well. Many of them
reflect particular ideological perspectives or the views of the persons
who create them. They do not necessarily involve any detailed
analysis of the issues involved in terrorism. Some of the study
centers and or other websites are supported by governments or by
groups that receive extensive government support. They tend to
reflect the views of the government in power and can be used by the
governments. Websites, as a result, need to be accessed with great
care. There are many websites that basically provide information on
books, articles, and other papers on terrorism. Search engines can
be useful as well, although the number of hits that will be generated
will be in the hundreds of thousands. Google scholar will provide
more precise information based on key terms and avoid some of the
less useful materials that deal with terrorism. Addresses for websites
can be tricky since they can change from time to time, but search
engines can usually provide access to current versions through the
name of the group if the website address has changed.

resources 165
The Jamestown Foundation maintains a website that can serve as
a starting point to search out materials on terrorism, and it seeks to
avoid any ideological bias in its information (http://www.jamestown.
org/programs/gta/terrorismfocusgta).
Most governments maintain websites providing information on
terrorism and counterterrorism. The one for the United Kingdom
is the Counter Terrorism Portal (http://www.powerbase.info/index.
php?title=Counter-Terrorism_Portal). There are similar websites
for the United States that are noted below with the data websites.
Of course, such government websites need to be used with a bit of
care since governments have their own agendas at times.
There are a number of websites that contain useful data on
terrorist incidents that can be consulted. The Global Terrorism
Database (also known as National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism or START) is maintained
by the University of Maryland. It contains information on incidents
from around the world for the years from 1970 to 2008 (with the
information being updated through later years). The information
can be categorized in a number of ways. The data from 1970 to 1997
are only for international terrorist incidents. The data from 1998
onward are for both international and domestic terrorist incidents
(http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/). This database carries forward and
continues the earlier collections of material by the RAND Centre
in St. Andrews and then the National Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism.
The United States National Counterterrorism Center has issued
annual reports on terrorism beginning in 2005. The reports which
can be accessed electronically provide summary statistics for those
years (http://wits-classic.nctc.gov/Reports.do). Earlier years were
issued by the Department of State as Patterns of Global Terrorism.
Years from 1995 to 2003 are available on an archive page http://www.
state.gov/s/ct/rls/index.htm
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), National
Counterterrorism Center maintains a useful database. This
website has incident data for terrorist incidents from 2004
through 2009. It is possible to derive information by target type,
country, and other characteristics. It provides opportunities to
organize the data in a number of ways (http://wits.nctc.gov/

resources166
FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?t=Reports&Rcv=Facility&Nf=p_
IncidentDate|GTEQ+20090101||p_IncidentDate|LTEQ+200912
31&N=0).
Many universities also have centers that focus on the study
of terrorism. Websites for these centers often will have useful
information or point people in the right direction in terms of
additional materials. Among the better know centers are the Centre
for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews
University in the United Kingdom (http://www.st-andrews.
ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv/), the Centre for Terrorism and
Counterterrorism Studies (CTC) of Leiden University (The
Hague Campus) (http://www.terrorismdata.leiden.edu/), and the
Combating Terrorism Center at the US military academy at West
Point (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/).

references
Abrams, M (2006) “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security,
31, 2: 42–78.
Ash, T. G. (2003) “Is There a Good Terrorist,” in C. W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The
New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 60–70.
Atran, S. (2008) “Who Becomes a Terrorist Today,” Perspectives on Terrorism,
2, 5: 3–10.
Badey, T. J. (1998) “Defining International Terrorism: A Pragmatic
Approach,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 10, 1: 90–107.
Banerjee, S. (1984) India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising.
London: Zed Books.
Banks, W. C., R. de Nevers, and M. B. Wallerstein (2008) Combating
Terrorism: Strategies and Approaches. Washington DC: CQ Press.
Benjamin, D. and S. Simon (2002) The Age of Sacred Terror. New York:
Random House.
Bjorgo, T. (1997) Racist and Right-Wing Violence in Scandinavia: Patterns,
Perpetrators, and Responses. Oslo: Tano Aschehougs.
—— (2005a) “Introduction,” in T. Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism:
Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward, London: Routledge, 1–15.

references168
—— (ed.) (2005b) Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward.
London: Routledge.
Cameron, G. (1999) “Multi-Track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum
Shinrikyo and Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 22, 4: 277–309.
Campbell, B. D. and A. D. Brenner (eds.), (2000) Death Squads in Global
Perspective: Murder with Deniability, New York: St. Martin’s.
Corsun, A. (1992) “Group Profile: The Revolutionary Organization 17
November in Greece (1975–1991),” in Y. Alexander and D. A. Pluchinsky
(eds.), European Terrorism: Today and Tomorrow, Washington, DC: Brassey’s,
93–125.
Crenshaw, M. (2003) “The Causes of Terrorism,” in C. W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.),
The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 92–105.
Cronin, A. K. (2009) How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and
Demise of Terrorist Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dolnik, A. (2008) “13 Years since Tokyo: Re-Visiting the ‘Superterrorism’
Debate,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2, 2: 3–11.
Dolnik, A. and A. Bhattacharjee (2002) “Hamas Suicide Bombings, Rockets,
or WMD?” Terrorism and Political Violence, 14, 3: 109–28.
Dolnik, A. and R. Gunaratna (2006) “Dagger and Sarin: The Evolution of
Terrorist Weapons and Tactics,” in A. T. H. Tan (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism.
London: Routledge, 25–39.
Drake, C. J. M. (1998) “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 10, 2: 53–85.
Enders, W. and T. Sandler (2000) “Is Transnational Terrorism becoming
More Threatening?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, 3: 307–302.
—— (2006) The Political Economy of Terrorism. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Fair, C. C. (2005) “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from
the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,
11, 1: 125–56.
Hacker, F. J. (1976) Crusaders, Criminals, and Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in
Our Times. New York: Norton.
Heymann, P. B. (2003) Terrorism, Freedom, and Security. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.

references 169
Hoffman, B. (2006) Inside Terrorism, revised and expanded edition, New
York: Columbia University Press.
Horgan, J. (2003) “The Search for the Terrorist Personality,” in A. Silke
(ed.), Terrorists, Victims, and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and Its
Consequences. Chichester: Wiley, 3–27.
Horgan, J. and K. Braddock (2010) “Rehabilitating the Terrorists?
Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 22, 2: 267–91.
Jenkins, B. M. (1981) Embassies under Siege: A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers,
1971–1980. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
Josephus (1981) The Jewish War, trans. G. A. Williamson. New York: Dorset
Press.
Kaarthikeyan, S. D. R. (2005) “Root Causes of Terrorism? A Case Study
of the Tamil Insurgency and the LTTE,” in T. Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of
Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward. London: Routledge, 131–40.
Kaplan, J. and L. Weinberg (1998) The Emergence of a Euro-American Radical
Right. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Karmon, E. (2002) “Countering NBC Terrorism,” in A. Tan and K.
Ramakrishna (eds.), The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and Counter-
Strategies. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 101–21.
Korteweg, R., with S. Gohel, F. Heisbourg, M. Ranstorp, and R. de Wijk
(2010) “Background Contributing Factors to Terrorism: Radicalization and
Recruitment,” in M. Ranstorp (ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation:
Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe. London: Routledge, 21–49.
Kuznar, L. A. and J. M. Lutz (2007) “Risk Sensitivity and Terrorism,”
Political Studies, 55, 2: 341–61.
Kydd, A. H., and B. F. Walter (2006) “The Strategies of Terrorism,”
International Organization, 31, 1: 49-80.
Laqueur, W. (1977) Terrorism. Boston, MA: Little Brown.
—— (2001) A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers.
Leiken, R. S. (2005) “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, 84, 4: 120–
35.
Lutz, J. M. and B. J. Lutz (2006) “Terrorism as Economic Warfare,” Global
Economy Journal, 6, 2: 1–20.

references170
—— (2008) Global Terrorism, 2nd edn, London: Routledge.
—— (2009) “How Successful Is Terrorism?” Forum on Public Policy, http://
forumonpublicpolicy.com/spring09papers/papers09spring.html, 1–22.
Maleckova, J. (2005) “Impoverished Terrorists: Stereotypes or Reality,” in
T. Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward.
London: Routledge, 33–43.
Michael, G. (2003) Confronting Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in the
USA. New York: Routledge.
O’Neil, A. (2003) “Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: How
Serious Is the Threat?” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57, 1: 99–112.
Pape, R. A (2005) Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York:
Random House.
Pillar, P. R. (2001) Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington DC:
Brookings Institution.
Piszkiewicz, D. (2003) Terrorism’s War with America: A History. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Raphaeli, N. (2003) “Financing of Terrorism: Sources, Methods, and
Channels,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 4: 59–82.
Richardson, L. (ed.) (2006) The Roots of Terrorism. London: Routledge.
Robbins, J. S. (2002) “Bin Laden’s War,” in R. D. Howard and R. L.
Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Readings and Interpretations, Guildford, CT: McGraw-Hill/
Duskin, 354–66.
Rodell, P. A. (2007) “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” in
A. T. H. Tan (ed.), A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 225–47.
Schmid, A. P. (1992) “The Response Problem as a Definition Problem,”
Terrorism and Political Violence, 4, 4: 7–13.
Sederberg, P. C. (2003) “Global Terrorism: Problems of Challenge
and Response,” in in C. W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The New Global Terrorism:
Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 267–
84.

references 171
Silke, A. (2004) “An Introduction to Terrorism Research,” in A. Silke (ed.),
Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures. London: Frank Cass,
1–29.
——(2005) “Fire of Iolaus: The Role of State Countermeasures in Causing
Terrorism and What Needs to be Done,” in T. Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes of
Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward. London: Routledge, 241–55.
Sproat, P. A. (1991) “Can the State Be Terrorist,” Terrorism, 14, 1: 19–29.
Stern, J. (2000) “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, 79, 6: 115–26.
Stern, J. and M. Modi (2008) “Producing Terror: Organizational Dynamics
of Survival,” in T. J. Biersteker and S. E. Eckert (eds.), Countering the
Financing of Terrorism. London: Routledge, 19–46.
Tan, A. H. T. (2000) “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia:
Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 23,
4: 267–88.
—— (2006) The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey. London: Routledge.
Tucker, J. B. (ed.), (2000) Toxic Terror: Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wilkinson, P. (1975) Political Terrorism. New York: Halstead Press.
—— (2003) “Why Modern Terrorism? Differentiating Types and
Distinguishing Ideological Motivations,” in C. W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The New
Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 106–38.
Williams, P. (2008) “Terrorist Financing and Organized Crime: Nexus,
Appropriation, or Transformation?” in T. J. Biersteker and S. E. Eckert
(eds.), Countering the Financing of Terrorism. London: Routledge, 126–49.

index
abortion 20, 22, 69
Abu Sayyaf 92–3, 156
Aden 20
Afghanistan 53, 59, 84, 88, 91–2,
93, 96, 102, 119–20, 121, 142,
143, 156
Albanians 70, 138, 142, 159
Algeria 20, 37, 39, 54, 69, 75, 107,
136, 139
Al Qaeda 6–7, 20, 22 27–8, 39, 57,
59, 71, 75, 88, 92–3, 101, 102,
107, 117, 119–22, 141, 142,
143, 151, 153, 156, 160
anarchists 7–8, 24, 41, 52, 156
animal rights groups 24, 66, 71
anomic, anomie 34–5, 152, 156
anthrax 11, 158; in United States
11, 58–9
Argentina 40, 98
Aryan Nations 32, 126, 157
assassination 4, 6, 8, 20–1,
52–3, 55, 60–1, 62, 72, 88,
102, 119, 127–8; and ancient
Judea 117–8; of Rajiv Gandhi
88–9; of Hitler 52; of Lord
Mountbatten 123; of Yitzak
Rabin 140
Assassins, the 117, 118–119, 137,
151, 152, 153
assaults 50–1, 62, 66, 78, 80, 125,
127, 129, 133
attrition strategy 45–6, 52, 61, 71,
154, 158
Aum Shinrikyo 39, 41–42, 57, 58,
68–9, 103, 157, 161
Australia 105
authoritarian systems 18–9, 24,
75, 77, 98, 111, 114, 120
Baader-Meinhof Gang 41, 161
Bali attacks 74, 75, 78
bank robberies 3, 47, 48, 55, 160
bin Laden, Osama 54, 69, 88, 119,
120–1, 142
biological weapons 57, 58–9, 99
Black Widows (Chechnya) 37, 42,
157
bombs 1, 4–5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 37, 40, 42,
50, 52–5, 57–60, 61, 62, 67, 68,
71, 74, 75, 76–7, 88, 90–1, 97, 109,
123, 128, 142, 144, 157, 161, 162
Boxer Rebellion 118
Buddhism 107, 130
Bush, George 96
Canada 105
Catholic 25, 38, 68, 113, 122–3, 126,
138, 142, 150, 151, 158
Central Asia 108
Chechens, Chechnya 19, 25, 37,
42, 90, 96, 98, 104, 157; Moscow
theater takeover 49, 104
chemical weapons 57, 58, 59, 60, 99
China 118, 128
Christianity 22, 23, 25, 38, 39, 68, 69,
89, 107, 118, 127, 130, 138, 142,
159, 151, 155
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) 8,
61, 112, 157
civil liberties 18–9, 42, 46, 77, 111–4,
115, 141
civil war 10, 131; in Ireland 111; in
Lebanon 124, 152; in Spain 127;
in Sri Lanka 131; in Sudan 80; in
the United States 125, 159
Cold War 8, 84, 93
Colombia 25, 90–1, 92, 161
communism 24, 41, 61, 79, 88, 93
119, 120, 128, 129, 130, 155, 156
Continuity IRA 123, 140

index 173
corporations 27, 48, 66, 71, 72, 75
counterterrorism 30, 96–115, 125,
135, 141, 142, 156, 165
crazies 30–1
criminals 3, 25, 30, 31, 32–3, 34, 43,
47–8, 62, 91–3, 94, 96, 101
Croatia 136–7, 146
crusaders 30, 33
Cuba 18, 20, 21, 158
cyber attack 56
Cyprus 20, 136
Darfur 70, 80
death squads 79, 98, 154, 157, 158
democracy 18, 19, 21, 28, 74, 77–8,
102, 111, 114, 115, 128, 141, 151,
153
diaspora populations 86–7, 88, 93,
94, 155, 157
diplomatic activity 12, 102, 104–5
dirty bomb 57–8, 157–8
Dresden bombing 8
drug trafficking 25, 48, 55, 91, 92, 94,
161, 162
Eastern Europe 70, 126, 155
Easter Uprising 122
Egypt 120
environmental groups 6, 24, 40, 41,
66, 71
escalation 61–2, 63, 76, 80
ethnic cleansing 23, 41, 69, 158
ethnicity 16, 21–2, 23, 25–9, 30, 31,
36–7, 41, 42, 43, 46, 61, 62, 69–70,
78, 83, 90, 91, 105–6, 133. 149,
153, 155, 157, 158, 162, 163
Europe 1–2, 17, 20, 24, 26, 32, 40,
41, 70, 79, 84, 88–90, 104, 112,
118, 126–7, 137, 149, 151, 152,
153, 155, 163
European Union 105
Euzkadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) 117,
127–8, 138, 151, 152, 153, 158
extortion 3, 86
extradition 12, 13, 14, 87, 104, 158
false flag attack 60–1, 159
fascism 24, 41, 79, 89, 137
Fatah 91
FBI 6, 103, 112, 126
foreign aid 72–3, 75
foreign investment 72–3, 75
France 37, 40, 54, 59, 75, 105, 107,
118, 124, 128, 136
freedom fighters 1, 2, 13
French Revolution 118
Gandhi, Rajiv 88–9
Gaza 83, 87, 113, 125, 138, 160
genocide 23, 159
Germany 24, 40, 52, 61, 80, 89, 90,
103, 137, 161
globalization 17–8, 34, 39, 108,
151–3, 158
global jihad 39, 40, 71, 79–1, 88, 107,
119, 121–2, 141, 142, 143, 146, 151
government terrorism 9, 14, 16, 26–7,
29, 34, 42–3, 65, 78–80, 81, 82,
96–7, 117, 132–3, 135–6, 140, 144,
145, 147, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155,
157, 158
Greece 55, 162
Guantanamo Bay 18, 112, 141, 158
guerrilla activity 13–4, 38–9, 88–9, 92,
107, 110, 124, 131, 132, 136, 137,
144, 146, 159, 161, 162
Gypsies 70
Hamas 91, 102–3
Hearst, Patty 103
Herri Batsuna 128
hijacking 51–2; airline 12, 51, 53–4,
75, 90, 108, 160
Hindus, Hinduism 9, 22–3, 69, 74,
78–9, 89, 107, 127, 130, 155
Hiroshima (atomic bombing) 8
Hitler 1–2, 52, 61
Hizballah 117, 124–5, 137, 150, 151,
152
hoaxes 4
Holocaust 89
Homeland Security (US) 112
hostages 48, 49–50, 51, 103, 104,
108–9, 110
India 9, 22–3, 38, 69, 78–9, 85, 87,
88–9, 93, 131; and Naxalites 117,
128–30, 134, 149, 152–3, 160
ideology 16, 20–1, 24–6, 29, 30, 32,
40–2, 46, 78, 83, 87, 89, 90, 93,

index174
107, 119, 133–4, 154, 155, 160,
161, 163
Indonesia 22, 23, 69, 75, 78
internet 7, 53, 56, 57, 100
intimidation strategy 45, 46, 71,
154–5, 158
Iran 21, 40, 58, 78, 85, 98, 124
Iraq 1, 10, 13, 21, 53, 58, 59, 67, 73,
85, 88, 107–8, 120, 141, 142, 143,
160
Ireland 22, 87, 110–1, 122, 136, 138,
150, 152, 159
Irish Republican Army (IRA) 22,
53, 70–1, 87, 90–1, 92, 113, 117,
122–4, 138, 142, 150, 151, 153,
158–9
Islam (Muslims) 9, 20, 21, 22, 23,
25, 28, 31, 33, 37, 38–9, 40, 59, 61,
68, 69, 70, 74, 75, 78–9, 81, 88, 89,
91, 92–3, 107, 108, 113, 118–22,
124, 127, 140, 141, 142–3, 149,
151, 155, 156, 160; Algeria 38–9,
139; anti-West 7, 71, 120, 121,
141, 146, 156; charities 101; in
Western Europe 32, 40, 88
Israel 1, 13, 31, 47, 54, 59, 61, 71, 83,
84–5, 90, 91, 98–9, 102–3, 104–5,
109, 111, 113–4, 120, 124–5, 138,
140, 144, 160
Italy 40, 160, 161
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 91, 159
Japan 39, 58, 68–9, 103, 104, 105,
110, 157, 159
Japanese Red Army 90, 110, 159
Jews 1–2, 5, 20, 27, 80, 89, 107,
117–8, 126, 140, 157, 159
Kaczynski, Theodore 6, 162
Kenya 75, 77, 120
KGB 8, 160
kidnapping 3, 48–9, 55, 62, 63, 66,
83, 93, 103, 125, 161
kneecapping 50, 159
Kosovo 70, 137–8, 141–2, 159
Kosovo Liberation Army 137–8, 142,
159
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) 32, 70, 117,
125–7, 137, 150, 151 152, 159
Kuwait 120
Latin America 24, 40, 41, 48, 77, 89,
126, 127, 163
leaderless resistance 7–8, 100–1,
121, 126, 140, 155, 156, 159
Lebanon 19, 31, 54, 59, 119, 124–5,
151, 152
left-wing 9, 20, 21, 24–5, 28, 32,
40–2, 43, 55, 61, 72, 73, 77, 78,
84, 87, 89, 90–1, 92, 98, 104,
107, 110, 111, 128–30, 137, 149,
155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163
Lenin, Vladimir 21, 159
London transport bombings 1, 7,
11, 28, 40, 113, 127, 143, 160
lone wolf attack 7
Libya 54
McVeigh, Timothy 144
Macedonia 136–7, 146
Madrid train bombings 1, 28, 113,
127, 143, 160
Major, John 123
Malaysia 93
Marx, Karl 21, 159
media 5, 6, 19, 49, 51–3, 58, 66,
108; as targets 67–8, 76
Middle East 20, 27–8, 53, 71, 75,
80, 90, 107, 119, 120, 126, 142,
151, 156
migrants, migration 17–8, 24–5, 34,
39–40, 41, 46, 43, 86, 87, 90, 94,
105, 107, 125, 126–7, 152, 159,
161
military coup 10, 16–7, 150
military regime 21; in Indonesia
74, 78; in Turkey 107
modernization 6, 17–8, 34, 39, 41,
121–2, 151, 162
Mormons 23
Mountbatten, Lord 123
Mugabe, Robert 132–4, 136, 150,
153
Munich Olympics 102
Nagasaki (atomic bombing) 8
Naxalites 117, 128–30, 134, 149,
151–3, 155, 160
Nazis 24, 80
Nepal 137
New Guinea 22

index 175
Nicaragua 84
Northern Ireland 22, 25, 53, 70–1,
87, 92, 111, 113, 117, 120, 122–4,
138, 142, 150, 151, 158–9
nuclear weapons 57–8, 59, 99
Oklahoma City bombing 53, 117,
144
opportunists 31–2, 33–4, 36, 43, 62,
83
Order, The 47–8, 160
Oslo Accords 102, 109, 111, 138,
140, 160
outbidding strategy 45, 46, 47,
138–9, 143, 154–5, 160
Pakistan 9, 69, 85, 93, 119, 130
Palestine, Palestinians 1, 13, 31, 42,
47, 56, 71, 83, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91,
102–3, 104, 109, 113–4, 117, 120,
125, 131, 136, 138, 140, 144, 151,
160, 161, 163; Jewish settlers in
20, 89; Palestinian disapora 88
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) 37, 102, 109, 111, 138,
144, 160
Palestinian Authority 102, 102, 109,
138, 160
paramilitary groups 79, 80, 82, 89,
92, 123, 139, 140, 145, 158
participation, political 18, 125, 150–1
Pentagon 11, 53, 121, 160
Persia 119
Peru 51, 92, 103, 162
Philippines 69, 92–3, 156
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) 90, 160–1
Portugal 89
poverty 17, 30, 36, 150
prisons 112; as recruiting grounds
32, 33, 34
property attacks 27, 40, 65–6, 68, 71,
80, 129, 130
Protestant 22, 25–6, 38, 68, 122–3,
126, 150
provocation strategy 45, 46, 61, 94,
114, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146,
154, 161
Rabin, Yitzak 140
radiological weapon 57, 58, 60, 157–8
Real IRA 123, 140
recruits, terrorist 30, 32–3, 34, 42, 46,
47, 76, 82, 83, 86, 106, 114, 139,
141, 143, 156
Red Army Faction 40, 41, 90, 161
Red Brigades 40, 50, 83–4, 160, 161
Reid, Richard 40
Reign of Terror 118
religion (also see specific religions)
16, 17, 21, 22–3, 24, 25–9, 30, 31,
32, 37, 38–40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 61,
62, 68–9, 70, 78, 83, 87, 89, 90, 91,
92, 105–6, 107, 120, 122, 126, 127,
133, 143, 146, 149, 153, 155, 157,
158, 161, 162, 163
rendition 112, 161
repression 10, 14, 18, 24, 26, 27, 28,
42, 78, 79, 80, 82–3, 97–8, 99, 105,
108, 114, 122, 132–3, 136, 141,
142, 145, 152, 153
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) 90, 92, 161
Rhodesia 55, 89, 132
right-wing 9, 20, 21, 24–5, 32, 40–1,
43, 46–7, 60–1, 70, 79, 87, 89–90,
107, 149, 152, 153, 155, 157, 159,
160, 161
robberies 47–8, 83; banks 3, 47, 48,
55
Roman Empire 118
Russia 19, 27, 41, 105, 107–8; and
Chechnya 19, 25, 37, 96, 98, 157;
Moscow theater takeover 49, 103–4
Saddam Hussein 13, 58
sarin nerve gas 58, 158, 161
Saudi Arabia 88, 120
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) 8,
161
September 11, 2001 (9/11) 1, 11,
53–4, 58, 59, 61, 96, 111, 113, 117,
120, 127, 142, 143, 156, 160, 163
Serbs 70, 136, 137–8, 142
17 November Organization 55, 162
Sharon, Ariel 140
Shining Path 92, 162
Sikhs 22, 38, 87, 89
socialism 24, 41, 79
Somalia 19

index176
South Africa 89
Soviet Union 8, 19, 84, 88, 93, 105,
119–20, 128, 130, 155, 159; and
Cold War 8, 84
Spain 89, 127, 128, 150, 151, 152;
and ETA 127–8, 138, 152, 158;
and Madrid train bombings 1, 28,
113, 127, 143, 160
Special Air Services Regiment 103
spoiling strategy 45, 46–7, 106, 139,
140, 141, 154–5, 162
Sri Lanka 88, 91, 130–1, 144, 150,
151, 153, 159; and Tamil Tigers
31, 59–60, 87, 91, 130–1, 144, 146,
151, 152, 153, 162
Sudan 27, 55, 70, 80
suicide attacks 1, 31, 36, 37, 38, 42,
59–60, 62, 67, 88, 99, 124, 131,
144, 146, 158, 160
surface-to-air missiles 55
suspect communities 26–7, 113–4,
127, 141, 162
Sweden 127
Symbionese Liberation Army 103,
162
Taliban 91–2, 102, 121, 142
Tamil Tigers 31, 37, 59–60, 87, 88–9,
91, 117, 130–1, 139, 144, 146, 151,
152, 153, 162
Tanzania 75, 77, 120
target audience 2, 4–5, 6, 7, 10, 11,
12, 14, 16, 18, 46, 50–1, 52, 60, 65,
67, 70, 74, 76, 78, 79, 81, 119, 141,
154, 157
terrorism as disease 96, 114
Thailand 22
Thatcher, Margaret 123
Times Square attack 144
tourism 73–5, 90, 93, 128
Turkey 9, 107
Unabomber 6
United Kingdom 8, 13, 28, 103,
105, 111, 123, 136, 162, 165; and
civil liberties 113 and London
transport bombing; 1, 11, 160;
and Northern Ireland 25–6,
70–1, 87, 92, 111, 113, 122–3,
142, 150, 158–9
United States 6, 13, 17, 20, 22, 24,
27–8, 32, 40, 41, 53–5, 69, 70, 73,
77, 87, 89, 90, 93, 103, 104, 105,
108, 111–3, 120, 121, 125–7, 141,
142–3, 149, 152, 153, 157, 159,
160, 161, 165; and anthrax 11,
58–9; and Cold War 8, 84; and
East African embassy attacks 75,
77, 120, 141; and Guantanamo
Bay 18; and Iraq 59, 88, 107,
143; and Mormons 23; and
9/11 1, 11, 54, 143
vigilantes 82, 158
weak states 19–20, 25, 26, 27, 46,
48, 74, 77, 78, 82, 86, 97, 98, 133,
136, 137, 145, 152, 153
weapons of mass destruction 39,
57–9, 60, 62, 154
weapons of mass disruption 56
Weathermen 40
West Bank 83, 87, 113, 125, 138,
140, 160
White House 53, 160
women, role of 36, 37, 39, 41, 43,
157
World Trade Center 11, 54, 121,
160; 1993 attack 53, 100, 117,
120–1
World War II 8, 137
Yugoslavia 136–7, 138
Zimbabwe 117, 132–3, 136, 143,
150

BOOK COVER
TITLE
COPYRIGHT
CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
PREFACE
1 WHAT IS TERRORISM?
2 WHAT DO TERRORISTS WANT?
3 WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST?
4 WHAT ARE THE TECHNIQUES?
5 WHO ARE THE TARGETS?
6 WHO SUPPORTS TERRORISTS?
7 WHAT CAN BE DONE TO COUNTER TERRORISM?
8 WHAT ARE SOME OF THE MAJOR GROUPS?
9 WILL TERRORISM CONTINUE?
10 OVERVIEW
GLOSSARY
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
INDEX

Dr Benjamin Cole, is an Associate of the Centre for Critical and Major
Incident Psychology, University of Liverpool. He received his PhD
in International Relations from Southampton University in 1998.
He is co-author of The New Face of Terrorism, with Dr Nadine Gurr (I.B.Tauris,
2001 and 2002), editor of Conflict Terrorism and the Media in Asia (Routledge,
2006), and co-author of Martyrdom: Radicalisation and Terrorist Violence among
British Muslims, with Dr Jon Cole (Cass Pennant, 2009).

THE CHANGING FACE
OF TERRORISM
How Real is the Threat from Biological,
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons?
Benjamin Cole

Published in 2011 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd
6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
www.ibtauris.com
Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan
175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010
Copyright © 2011 Benjamin Cole
The right of Benjamin Cole to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by
him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof,
may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any
form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior written permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 978 1 84511 893 8

A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available
Printed and bound in Sweden by Scandbook
from camera-ready copy supplied by the author

CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations vii
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction 1
1 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN)
Terrorism in Historical Context 5
2 Technological Opportunities and Constraints to using
CBRN Weapons 33
3 Operational Motivations and Disincentives to using
CBRN Weapons 65
4 Political Motivations and Disincentives to using
CBRN Weapons 89
5 Theological Motivations and Disincentives to using
CBRN Weapons 113
6 Psychological Motivations and Disincentives: The Terrorist
Personality and Group Decision Making 133
7 State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism: Motivations and Disincentives 159
8 Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 177
9 The Future 201
Notes 217
Bibliography 257
Index 263

ABBREVIATIONS
AAA Animal Aid Association (Canada)
ALF Animal Liberation Front (UK)
ANC African National Congress
ARM Animal Rights Militia (Canada)
BTWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BW Biological weapons
CBIRF Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USA)
CBRN Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
CBRRT Chemical Biological Rapid Response Teams (USA)
CBW Chemical and biological weapons
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USA)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CW Chemical weapons
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team (USA)
DINA Secret Service (Chile)
ETA Basque Separatist movement (Spain)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
FEMA Federal Emergence Management Agency (USA)
FEST Federal Emergency Support Team (USA)
FSU Former Soviet Union
G8 Group of Eight industrialized nations
GIA Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
HEU Highly enriched uranium
HUA Harkat ul-Ansar (Pakistan)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority
IRA Irish Republican Army
ISI Inter Services Intelligence agency (Pakistan)
JI Jemaah Islamiyah

viii The Changing Face of Terrorism
KGB Secret Service (Soviet Union)
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team (USA)
NIF National Islamic Front (Sudan)
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty (1974)
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USA)
OTA Office of Technology Assessment (USA)
PFLP Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine
PKK Kurdish Workers Party
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
RAF Red Army Faction (West Germany)
RAIDS Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Team (USA)
SIS Italian Intelligence Service
SLA Symbionese Liberation Army (USA)
SNLA Scottish National Liberation Army
TEU Technical Escort Unit (USA)
UN United Nations
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
ZOG Zionist Occupation Government

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank a number of people who assisted in the
preparation and production of this book: Ms Jacintha Moore; Dr Mike
Brannan; Mr Ian Haworth; Dr John Walker; Professor Frank Barnaby;
the Rt Hon Alan Meale MP; Mr Julian Perry Robinson; Dr Alistair Hay;
Dr Jonathan Cole; Mrs Rita Owen and Pat FitzGerald.

INTRODUCTION
In the last decade of the twentieth century the threat of mass destruction
terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
weapons became a major feature of national security debates in many
Western countries. The lethality of international terrorist violence had been
steadily increasing since the 1970s, and a new generation of terrorists had
emerged, the so-called ‘religious’ terrorists, who were less constrained than
their predecessors. The use of sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway by
the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and increasing numbers
of reports of terrorist interest in CBRN weapons were seen as indicators
of the emergence of a new threat that represented a clear and present
danger to the national security of a number of countries. But despite the
worsening threat assessments there were no further significant terrorist
incidents involving CBRN weapons after Aum Shinrikyo attack on the
Tokyo subway.
It was not until 11 September 2001 (9/11) that the world formally entered
the era of mass destruction terrorism, but this first act of mass destruction
terrorism was not a result of a CBRN weapon. In a totally unexpected move,
suicide bombers hijacked four Boeing passenger airliners. Two of them were
flown into the World Trade Centre in New York and one was flown into
the Pentagon building in Washington. The fourth, which seemed destined
for Camp David, crashed in a field outside Pittsburgh, when its passengers
attempted to regain control from the hijackers. Besides the 246 passengers
of the four Boeings, 2,603 people were killed at the World Trade Centre,
and 125 people were killed at the Pentagon.1 Despite the appalling death toll
it could have been as high as 50,000 if the twin towers of the World Trade
Centre had collapsed immediately. The events of that day immediately made
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the principle
national security issue in many countries.
It came as a considerable surprise in some quarters that this first
successful act of mass destruction terrorism was not caused by a CBRN

2 The Changing Face of Terrorism
weapon but by an unanticipated ‘conventional’ method. To a certain extent
the preoccupation of the policy community with CBRN terrorism in the
1990s had led to the more immediate risks of mass destruction terrorism
using conventional weapons and methods being underestimated. This
was reflected in the heightened state of awareness and preparedness for
CBRN terrorism in the late 1990s compared to the relative complacency
surrounding airline security in the USA.
9/11 was immediately seen as a portent of an impending terrorist attack
on the USA using CBRN weapons. The Pentagon warned that the next
major attack would not involve aircraft as ‘they’ve been there and done
that … the real fear now is chemical’,2 whilst NATO Secretary General
George Robertson stated that the coalition now had to ‘start thinking
the unthinkable … Some threats that remained in the realm of almost
unbelievable fiction now have to be treated as threats for which we have to
have credible capabilities and strategies’.3 Even in the UK, the government
abandoned its previous reticence over publicizing the potential threat when
Prime Minister Tony Blair openly warned of the threat of WMD terrorism,
and Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon ordered contingency plans to deal with
CBRN threats to be updated.4
In the days following 9/11 anti-CBRN terrorism measures were
strengthened. All crop-spraying aircraft in the USA were grounded after
police discovered evidence in a suspected terrorist hideout indicating that
they might be planning to use them to disperse chemical and biological
weapons (CBW).5 But whilst this suggests that al-Qaeda might have been
thinking about using CBW, there was no evidence that it actually possessed
any. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated
the possibility that chemical tankers in the USA might be converted into
crude chemical bombs. The customs service also tightened its procedures
to try and prevent CBRN agents being smuggled into the USA on container
ships. This fear of a terrorist attack using CBW also reached the UK, where
contamination of the water supply was raised as a particular concern.6
These fears of CBRN terrorism were seemingly realized just a few
weeks after 9/11 when seven letters containing anthrax were sent to a
number of TV stations and politicians in the USA. These seven letters
cross-contaminated a large volume of other post as they passed through the
postal system as well as the buildings in which they were opened. For a time
it disrupted the work of government with the Capitol building and Supreme
Court building, among others, being closed down for decontamination. The
letters were initially considered to have been the work of al-Qaeda, but as
investigations continued it soon became apparent that it was more likely to

Introduction 3
have been the work of someone from inside the US biological weapon (BW)
defence community. In 2008, the FBI closed the case following the suicide
of Dr Bruce Ivins, who had been a microbiologist at the biological defence
research facility at Fort Detrick.7 Ivins was known to suffer from mental
health problems and was not linked to any known terrorist organization.
The letters did not therefore herald the arrival of the bio-terror threat which
US politicians and security experts had been anticipating and fearing for the
previous decade, but it served as a warning of what terrorists could achieve
if they are able to acquire BW.
These scares involving CBW gradually calmed down and attention
focused on the threat of nuclear terrorism. After receiving a briefing on al-
Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director
George Tenent in 2002, President Bush ordered his national security team
to give nuclear terrorism priority over every other threat to the USA.8
Despite this increased focus on the threat of CBRN terrorism, the
linkage between 9/11 and the threat of CBRN terrorism has never been
adequately explained. 9/11 did not involve CBRN weapons, so why would
it impact on threat assessments of CBRN terrorism? Terrorists have
attempted to perpetrate acts of mass destruction for decades, so 9/11 did
not even signal the sudden emergence of a new threat of mass destruction
terrorism. Instead, reasons for the heightened focus on CBRN terrorism
can be found in the threat assessments of the 1990s, which highlighted
a number of core assumptions that continue to underpin current threat
assessments. These were:
• technologically, it is becoming increasingly possible for terrorist groups
to develop CBRN weapons;
• the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks, the rise of ‘religious’
terrorism, and the increased use of CBRN weapons by terrorist groups,
indicate that further terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons and
WMD are inevitable;
• the political, theological, tactical and strategic disincentives to using
CBRN weapons and perpetrating acts of mass destruction are weakening,
whilst the political, theological, tactical and strategic motivations to use
CBRN weapons are increasing, for a greater number of groups;
• the disincentives to using CBRN weapons are strongest in respect of
‘secular’ terrorist groups, particularly because of the perception that the
use of these weapons would undermine their political support;
• the motivations to using CBRN weapons are strongest for ‘religious’
terrorists because they operate under fewer constraints. The increase

4 The Changing Face of Terrorism
in acts of terrorism by ‘religious’ terrorist groups since the 1980s,
was therefore considered to increase the threat of CBRN and WMD
terrorism.
These assumptions suggest that al-Qaeda, the perpetrator of 9/11,
poses a significant threat of CBRN terrorism. However, an assessment of
the threat from CBRN terrorism in the twenty-first century necessitates a
re-evaluation of these core assumptions. This book will assess the extent
and nature of the threat of CBRN terrorism by identifying and assessing the
range of factors that will impact on terrorists’ decision making on whether
to use CBRN weapons. The ability of terrorist groups to develop or
otherwise acquire CBRN weapons is determined by a number of enabling
and constraining factors, arising from CBRN weapon technology, the
security environment in which terrorist groups operate, and the potential
role of state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism. If a terrorist group can
acquire a CBRN weapon, its decision making on whether and how to use
it will be a function of how it reconciles the conflicting political, religious,
psychological, and military motivations and disincentives to using these
weapons. This book will explore these enabling and constraining factors,
alongside the motivations and disincentives, in order to assess how they
might impact on terrorists’ decision making.

1
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR
(CBRN) TERRORISM IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on 11 September
2001 (9/11) came as a complete surprise, but should not have been
unanticipated. Throughout the 1990s terrorism analysts from both inside
and outside government had been arguing that it was only a matter of time
before the first act of mass destruction terrorism. Yet threat assessments
had increasingly focused on acts of mass destruction terrorism involving
CBRN weapons. This raises questions about why attention was focused on
CBRN weapons when there was a greater potential threat from other forms
of attack. The starting point in searching for the answer to that question is
the history of CBRN terrorism, coupled with the nature of the public and
political debates that have surrounded it. This historical narrative shows that
some terrorist groups in the latter part of the twentieth century have always
been interested in CBRN weapons, with the first decade of significant
terrorist interest in CBRN terrorism being the 1970s.
CBRN Terrorism in the 1970s
Terrorism in the 1970s was dominated by ethno-nationalist separatist or
independence groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and the Irish Republic Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. It was also the
decade when radical left- and right-wing political groups in Western Europe
such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) also known as the Baader-Meinhof

6 The Changing Face of Terrorism
gang, and the Red Brigades were operating at their peak. Despite the high
levels of terrorist violence, particularly in the Middle East, security debates
in the West were dominated by the Cold War. Concerns about terrorism
and ethno-nationalist guerrilla movements assumed significance primarily
because of concerns that the Soviet Union was using them as proxies to
de-stabilize democratic regimes and spread communism.
Against this background of heightened terrorist activity, there was
significant, albeit limited, interest among some terrorists groups in using
CBRN weapons. These incidents can be divided into three broad groups:
those where there was a threat to use CBRN weapons but no evidence
that the group involved actually possessed them; incidents where a group
possessed a CBRN weapon but it was never used; and incidents in which a
CBRN weapon was actually used. In the majority of reported incidents in
the 1970s there was no evidence that the group concerned actually possessed
a CBRN weapon. Yet there were a small number of incidents in which a
terrorist group acquired a CBRN weapon and apparently intended to use it.
A number of groups, such as the revolutionary left-wing group Weather
Underground, attempted, but failed, to acquire CBRN weapons.1 But a
number of groups and individuals did succeed in developing or otherwise
acquiring CBW. These included left-wing groups, right-wing groups, an
unspecified Arab group, and various individuals whose political affiliations
are unknown. Perhaps the most significant of these incidents occurred in
1972 when members of the Order of the Rising Sun, a neo-Nazi group
in the USA, were arrested in possession of 30–40kg of Typhoid bacillus
and charged with conspiring to contaminate the water supplies of large
cities in the USA.2 This case indicated that some terrorist groups had the
technological capability to develop biological agents, and were interested
in using them to indiscriminately kill large numbers of civilians. There was
also one other alleged plot to indiscriminately kill civilians by poisoning
water supplies, but in all of the other cases the targets were discriminate,
these included President Gerald Ford, the Supreme Court and the Capitol
Building in Washington.3 The threat from this small number of groups
and individuals was neutralized by the success of the security forces in
apprehending the culprits before they executed their attacks.
There were only three terrorist incidents involving the use of CBRN
weapons in the 1970s. In November 1973 members of the left-wing
revolutionary group, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) killed
California school superintendent Dr Marcus Foster and wounded Deputy
Superintendent Robert Blackburn with cyanide-tipped bullets.4 In 1979 the
Arab Revolutionary Army Palestinian Commandos injected Israeli oranges

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 7
that were being exported to Western Europe with mercury. More than a
dozen people were poisoned by the oranges, and a number of children were
killed. The following year, the same terrorist group threatened to poison
other Israeli agricultural exports to Europe,5 whilst in Italy, the Red Brigades
allegedly tried seven times to poison reservoirs, but were unsuccessful
because the toxins were quickly diluted.6 This last incident was particularly
worrying because of the intent to cause indiscriminate mass casualties.
A number of observations can be made from these incidents. The
number of incidents involving the use of a CBRN weapon or in which
the terrorist group acquired a CBRN agent but did not use it, was far
outweighed by the number of unsubstantiated allegations, threats and
hoaxes. The ‘weapons’ involved were crude, with the terrorists being
restricted to using chemical or biological agents for individual assassinations
or as contaminants. The nature of the plots raised a number of significant
questions that remained unanswered. Foremost amongst them was whether
terrorist use of these weapons was restricted by technical considerations,
or whether some groups might have been deterred from using them for a
range of moral, tactical, political or religious reasons.
These incidents fostered a small but well-informed debate on CBRN
terrorism in the academic and policy communities. Writing in 1977, David
Rosenbaum argued that individuals with the necessary skills to develop
nuclear weapons are easily found, and that ‘most revolutionaries now
however seem to consider indiscriminate slaughter a primary tactic and one
of which they are proud’.7 Yet the debate was reasonably balanced, with
analysts such as Brian Jenkins questioning terrorists’ ability and motivations
to procure CBRN weapons: ‘nuclear terrorism is neither imminent nor
inevitable … simply killing a lot of people is not an objective of terrorism’.8
It was argued that serious obstacles to CBRN terrorism existed, and that the
political and strategic disincentives to perpetrating WMD attacks would be
high. Studies assumed that terrorists needed political and material support,
and aimed to raise awareness of their cause in order to build popular support
for it. The view of many observers was that the use of CBRN weapons and
particularly WMD, would stiffen the resolve of governments not to accede
to the terrorists’ demands, and would alienate the potential supporters of
terrorist groups.
As a result of the small number of attacks, and their limited impact,
the debate on CBRN terrorism in the 1970s was not driven by events.
CBRN terrorism was not a significant feature of mainstream terrorist
activity and neither was it a major threat to the national security of any state.
For governments, it remained marginal to other more immediate national

8 The Changing Face of Terrorism
security concerns. Thinking about nuclear terrorism was merely an adjunct
to broader debates about nuclear non-proliferation following India’s test of
a nuclear weapon and the signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1974. As a consequence, the issue was lost sight of alongside the
more immediate concerns of policy makers to contain proliferation and
manage the Cold War. As a consequence, the issue failed to galvanize any
significant response from governments. Overall, events in the 1970s served
notice of emerging risks and challenges, but the spectre of WMD terrorism
involving CBRN weapons still seemed to be a long way off.
CBRN Terrorism in the 1980s
Terrorist activity in the 1980s was similar to that in the previous decade. It
was dominated by ethno-nationalist groups such as the PLO, the IRA, the
Basque separatist group Euzkadi Ta As Katasuna (ETA), and the Ellalan
Force of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (the Tamil Tigers) in Sri
Lanka. However, some of the political groups in Western Europe such
as the RAF and Red Brigades were in decline by the end of the decade.
The strategies and targets of many of these groups evolved as government
counter-terrorism measures began to have an impact, but many of these
groups still displayed an interest in perpetrating indiscriminate attacks
against civilian targets.
The arguments about terrorist use of CBRN weapons that emerged
in the 1970s continued to permeate the public debate in the 1980s. Grant
Wardlow argued that, ‘The capability of killing on a grand scale must be
balanced against the fear of widespread revulsion and alienating perceived
constituents [supporters], of provoking a massive, publicly approved
government crackdown’,9 whilst Konrad Kellen argued that because
terrorists believe that their struggle is intended to better the human
condition, mass killing is not likely to be attractive to most of them.10
At the beginning of the 1980s the main focus of governments and
the policy community was on nuclear terrorism, which culminated in the
convening of the International Task Force On the Prevention of Nuclear
Terrorism, in 1985. The task force brought together experts from different
fields to consider nuclear terrorism from the point of view of arms control,
security, intelligence, civil nuclear programmes, crisis prevention and
international law. Its seminal report was published in 1987.11 Chemical and
biological terrorism was a much lower concern at that time, despite the fact
that chemical weapons (CW) are easier to develop than nuclear weapons and
most of the incidents in the 1970s involved CW. The threat of biological

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 9
terrorism was downplayed because the use of biological weapons (BW) was
considered to be so morally repugnant that: no one would consider using
them; the technology was too difficult for all but the most sophisticated
laboratories to master; and the potential destructiveness of these weapons
was simply too great for terrorists to consider using them.12
There was a slight increase in the number of actual attacks involving
CBRN weapons during the 1980s, including a small number of serious
incidents. Arguably the most important was the first case of BW terrorism.
In September 1984, followers of the Rajneeshpuram Cult in the USA,
infected the salad bars of restaurants in the town of The Dalles in Oregon
with salmonella, causing serious food poisoning to 751 people. This attack
had been preceded by a number of other failed attacks. In August, cult
members had given water laced with Salmonella typhimurium to two local
government officials and the bacteria was also used to contaminate produce
at a local grocery store, and was smeared onto door and urinal handles in
the county courthouse. On another occasion a cult member was instructed
to contaminate the food in schools and nursing homes. Cult members then
made two attempts to contaminate the water supply of The Dalles. It appears
that they did not have enough Salmonella typhimurium and so probably used
sewage mixed with dead rats instead. None of this contamination appears
to have caused any illness. There are also reports that the group attempted
to aerosolize HIV-contaminated blood, and also considered using hepatitis
and giardia.13
The next incident occurred in 1985 in Israel, when the nerve agent
carbamate was added to the coffee at an Israeli military dining hall, but there
were no reports of casualties.14 This was followed in 1987 by the killing of
19 police recruits in the Philippines in what officials believed could have
been a mass poisoning by either the communist New Peoples’ Army, or one
of the Muslim separatist groups operating on the island of Mindanao.15
Following the successful contamination of Israeli oranges in 1979 there
was also a large increase in the number of threats by different insurgent
groups to contaminate the export products of a number of states. These
threats were primarily intended to damage the national economies of those
states and publicize the causes of the relevant insurgent groups. Examples
include Uganda (coffee and tea), Sri Lanka (tea), South Africa (wine and
fruit), the Philippines (pineapples), Israel (citrus fruits), Chile (grapes), and
the USA (the pain killer Tylenol).16
An equally significant development was an increased number of incidents
in which groups and individuals managed to develop a CBRN agent but did
not actually use it. This provided a clear indication of an increasing interest

10 The Changing Face of Terrorism
in CBRN weapons amongst terrorist groups. In 1981, a number of neo-
Nazi arms caches uncovered by West German police were reported to have
contained ‘various poisons including arsenic, strychnine and cyanide’.17
In 1982, it was claimed that Israel had captured a PLO representative in
Lebanon, who was in possession of a CW. In 1983, the FBI seized 28g of
ricin from two brothers in Springfield, Massachusetts, but it is not known
why they had acquired it.18 There were also reports that in the early 1980s,
French police raided a safe house in Paris belonging to a cell of the left-
wing RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang), where they discovered a laboratory
containing cultured Clostridium botulinum (which produces botulinum toxin),
and notes about bacteria induced diseases.19
There were also a number of other incidents that served as indicators of a
potential worsening of the situation in the 1990s. The first group of incidents
involved the burgeoning extreme right-wing movement in the USA. This
movement is comprised of a diverse mix of racist, Christian, neo-Nazi, white
supremacist, and anti-government groups. In 1983 a plot was hatched at a
meeting of white supremacists from the USA and Canada at the Headquarters
of the Aryan Nations, in Idaho, which included the ‘polluting of municipal
water supplies’. Four years later, this resulted in 14 individuals being indicted
for plotting to engage in indiscriminate mass murder by poisoning the water
supplies of two major US cities.20 In 1985, police in the USA raided the
compound of The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of Lord, a Christian,
millenarian, neo-Nazi group, where they discovered 30 gallons of potassium
cyanide that the group was intending to use to poison the water supplies of
several cities.21 In 1988, members of a racist group called the Confederate
Hammerskins were convicted of attacking the Jewish Temple Shalom and
the Mosque of Richardson in Dallas, Texas. Former members testified that
the group had planned to pump cyanide into Temple Shalom, through its air
conditioning system. 22 The final CBRN terrorist incident of the 1980s passed
almost unnoticed in 1989. In Japan, members of the Aum Shinrikyo religious
cult murdered a lawyer and his family in the city of Yokohama, by injecting
them with potassium chloride.23 It was a portent of a wave of CBRN attacks
by Aum Shinrikyo in the early 1990s.
As was the case in the 1970s, a diversity of different types of terrorist
groups threatened or attempted to acquire CBRN weapons in the 1980s.
But again, no group managed to develop a WMD or even to effectively
weaponize a CBW agent that it had acquired. This restricted them to using
chemical and biological agents as contaminants. Security forces were the
target of some of these attacks, but the majority of the attacks and planned
attacks, were aimed against civilians, and there was an increase in the number

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 11
of plots that could potentially have resulted in mass casualties. Unfortunately,
these incidents provided no further clarity to the uncertainties about the
threat that had been identified in the 1970s. The relative influence of the
various moral, technical, political, religious, tactical, and strategic factors
that might impact on terrorists’ decision making on whether to acquire and
use CBRN remained unknown. It was apparent that some groups with an
intent to cause indiscriminate mass casualties lacked the technical expertise
to weaponize CBRN agents, whilst others which might have had the
technological capability seemed to lack interest. It also remains unknown
whether those groups that actually had a CBW but were arrested before
using it would ever have actually gone through with an attack.
CBRN Terrorism in the 1990s
The defining feature of the security environment in the 1990s was the
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These events
fostered radical changes in international relations and changed the nature of
security debates as a wave of nationalism and other ideologies and causes
rose to prominence in a number of strategically significant regions of the
world. The result was that the primary threats to international security were
perceived to come from a greater number of smaller, more amorphous
sources, such as regional states in pursuit of regional political ambitions,
inter-ethnic civil wars, and transnational threats from non-state actors
particularly terrorism, narcotics, and crime. To an extent these problems
were interlinked, with many radical regimes in the developing world being
profoundly anti-American, and actively seeking to limit the influence of the
USA in their regions. This prompted allegations that these regimes were
sponsoring terrorism as a means of pursuing their foreign policy goals. In
particular, a significant increase in terrorist activity from groups with an
Islamic fundamentalist or Islamist ideology seemed to confirm assessments
that Iran was attempting to export its revolution throughout the Gulf
region and the Middle East, threatening US strategic interests such as the
security of Israel and oil supplies. These threats had always existed but had
previously been dominated by Cold War issues. Now they rose to assume
the primacy that the superpower confrontation had once held. It was at this
time that al-Qaeda rose to prominence as a major facilitator of global jihad,
with a number of high profile attacks on US targets.
In conjunction with these changes in the international political system,
the debate on CBRN and WMD terrorism gained heightened political
prominence. This was due to a combination of increased levels of

12 The Changing Face of Terrorism
terrorism and the continued proliferation of CBRN weapons and WMD,
particularly by states that were alleged to sponsor terrorism. The 1991 Gulf
War and the subsequent exposure of Iraq’s WMD programme provided
conclusive evidence that the clandestine production of WMD is possible
despite the existence of international arms control treaties. Concerns about
Libya’s intentions were also raised after the identification of an alleged
CW production facility at Tarhuna. These developments were linked into
a broader set of concerns about the increasing ease with which terrorist
groups could potentially acquire the technological expertise to develop
CBRN weapons. There was particular concern that some scientists who
had previously been employed in the WMD programmes of the former
Soviet Union (FSU) might hire their services out to the highest bidder.
But in general terms, it was also a time of rapid advances in biotechnology
and genetic engineering, and of increasingly easy access to dual-use
technology and scientific expertise. In 1996, former Director of the CIA
John Deutch, summed up the situation by claiming that the ‘proliferation of
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their potential use by states
or terrorists is the most urgent challenge facing the national security, and
therefore the intelligence community in the post-Cold War world’.24
Terrorism in the 1990s was dominated by two underlying trends. The first
was the increasing lethality of terrorist violence.25 On average, individual
terrorist incidents were becoming more lethal. During the 1980s the number
of international terrorist incidents was approximately 50 per cent greater
than in the 1970s, and twice as many people were killed.26 During the 1990s
the number of international terrorist incidents began to fall. A record 484
incidents occurred in 1991, which fell to 343 in 1992, then to 360 in 1993,
to 353 in 1994 and finally to 278 in 1995. Yet as the figures fell, a greater
percentage of these incidents resulted in fatalities.27 The evidence in respect
of domestic terrorism is more problematic. In Algeria and Sri Lanka there
were a significant number of attacks against civilian targets, whilst there was
no significant increase in the number of casualties from attacks by groups
such as the IRA and ETA.
Hidden within these statistics however, was a more dramatic trend that
lies at the heart of the contention that the trend towards increasing levels
of lethality in terrorist attacks will result in the increasing use of CBRN
weapons. Writing in 1990, Professor Paul Wilkinson identified a trend that
originated from 1982, of increasingly indiscriminate and lethal attacks in
which civilians were targeted. He pondered:

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 13
How does one explain this increase in indiscriminateness? In part it
results from the terrorists’ ever more desperate desire for publicity.
With the media and the public satiated with reports of violence around
the world, terrorist leaders have concluded that they must commit
greater atrocities to capture the headlines. Another key factor is the
growing attraction of soft targets to terrorists, increasingly aware of
the greater risks that face them if they seek to attack high prestige
targets … Some experienced observers have suggested that another
major element may be a shift inside terrorist organizations away from
the more pragmatic ‘politically minded’ terrorist leaders to fanatical
hard men, obsessed with vengeance and violence.28
But despite these trends, terrorist attacks which sought to kill large
numbers of people were actually quite rare.29 Between 1925 and 2000 there
were only 16 terrorist incidents that resulted in more than 100 casualties.30
Nine of these attacks occurred in the 1980s, and only four in the 1990s.
So statistically, attacks at the higher end of the casualty spectrum reached
a high point in the 1980s and then declined in number. This shows that
the generally increasing lethality of terrorist attacks does not automatically
result in an increase in the number of the most lethal attacks. However,
these figures do not include failed attacks, and attacks where there was an
intention to kill large numbers but which failed to achieve that goal, such as
the bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993. The other main feature
of these attacks is that many of the targets were discriminate in nature,
such as the 1984 bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. But
of the four attacks that occurred in the 1990s, half of them – the series of
10 bombs detonated in Bombay in 1993, and the destruction of a Moscow
apartment block in 1999, were indiscriminate in nature. Therefore, even
when terrorists seek to kill large numbers of people, they will not necessarily
choose an indiscriminate civilian target, although there did seem to be a shift
towards attacking such targets in the 1990s. This raises questions about the
extent to which many terrorist groups are interested in perpetrating attacks
that would cause indiscriminate mass casualties.
These figures in themselves do not prove that terrorists will attempt
to procure CBRN weapons in order to perpetrate indiscriminate attacks
resulting in mass casualties. What 9/11 proved is that it is possible to kill
large numbers of people with conventional weapons, and in the 1990s,
terrorists had not yet reached the full potential for mass killing using
conventional weapons. This suggested that if greater numbers of terror
groups are moving towards attacks intended to cause mass casualties, it

14 The Changing Face of Terrorism
should initially have been manifest in a greater number of attacks involving
conventional weapons. And this is exactly what happened, when an Islamist
terrorist cell attempted to destroy the World Trade Centre in 1993 by
detonating a massive bomb in its basement. The bomb exploded but failed
in its intention to topple one of the towers into the other. It was a portent
of things to come and provided clear evidence of some terrorists’ interest
in perpetrating indiscriminate mass casualty attacks.
The increasing lethality of terrorist violence was perceived to be driven
by the other main trend in terrorist violence in the 1990s: the growth of
‘religious’ terrorism. Many secular terrorist groups such as the IRA and
the PLO are ‘religious’ to the extent that their members are drawn almost
exclusively from one particular faith, but their ideologies and goals are
political in nature. For a new generation of terrorists that first emerged in the
late 1980s, their ideologies and objectives are a blend of politics and religion.
This involves all of the world’s major religions, from extreme right-wing
Christian groups, radical Jews, militant Sikhs, and Islamic fundamentalists
or Islamists. These ‘religious’ terrorist groups operate all around the world,
including Europe, North America, South Asia, and the Middle East. When
the first of these modern ‘religious’ terrorist groups emerged in 1980, they
comprised only two of the 64 active terrorist groups. By 1992 that number
had risen to 11, comprising a quarter of all the terrorist groups that carried
out attacks in that year. By 1994, the trend had accelerated, and 16 (or one-
third) of the 49 identifiable groups could be classified as being religious in
character or motivation. In 1995 that number had risen again to 25 out of
58 known active terrorist groups, or 42 per cent. These figures indicated that
politico-religious ideologies were fast becoming one of the primary drivers
of terrorism.31
But among these new ‘religious’ terrorists there are differences over
the extent to which they are driven by theological imperatives. Many have
clear political objectives such as the liberation of their homelands from
occupation, or the establishment of a theocratic regime. In contrast, others
have much less comprehensible nationalist or ideological motivations,
embracing far more amorphous religious and millenarian aims, which in
their eyes are divinely sanctioned. In some instances their aims go far beyond
the establishment of some theocracy amenable to their particular deity, to
embrace mystical, almost transcendental and divinely inspired imperatives,
or a vehemently anti-government form of populism, reflecting far-fetched
conspiracy notions, based on a volatile mixture of seditious, racial, and
religious dictums.32

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 15
The linkage between the growth of ‘religious’ terrorism and the trend
towards increasing lethality in terrorist attacks is evident from the fact that
although ‘religious’ terrorists committed only 25 per cent of the recorded
international terrorist incidents in 1995, they were responsible for 58 per
cent of the fatalities, and carried out all of the attacks in 1995 which incurred
more than eight fatalities.33 This is particularly apparent in the attacks that
resulted in more than 100 casualties. All of the attacks in the 1990s which
resulted in more than 100 casualties were perpetrated by ‘religious’ groups,
whilst several of those in the 1980s, such as the bombing of Pan Am flight
103 over the Scottish village of Lockerbie in 1988, were perpetrated by
‘secular’ groups. It was generally considered that the theological imperatives
of the ideologies of these groups led them to place fewer constraints on the
use of violence.
Yet despite the broad range of ‘religious’ terror groups, the high levels
of lethality associated with this type of group were primarily due to the
activities of Islamic fundamentalist and Islamist groups. In the 1980s and
1990s, Shi’a terrorist groups were responsible for over a quarter of the
deaths from terrorism, and between 1982 and 1989 were responsible for
30 per cent of the total fatalities despite committing only 8 per cent of all
attacks.34 However, Shi’a terrorist groups were not responsible for any of
the significant terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons in the 1990s.
This illustrates that the linkages between the general trend of the increasing
lethality of contemporary terrorism and the use of CBRN weapons, are
equivocal at best.
One of the features of CBRN terrorism in the 1990s was a significant
increase in the number of groups and individuals linked to extreme right-wing
Christian groups in the USA, developing biological agents. There were eight
incidents of US citizens developing, or attempting to develop ricin in the
1990s. Whilst the motives of some of the perpetrators are unknown, at least
four of these incidents can be linked to wider networks of extreme right-
wing Christian groups. The amounts of ricin that were discovered were
small, with the largest amount being 130g, and none of the perpetrators had
developed an effective delivery mechanism. The targets of most of these
plots were discriminate in nature, and included judges, federal officials, and
local government officials. In one of the plots in 1994 by a cell linked to
the Patriots’ Council, the plan was to smear the ricin on the doorknobs of
federal law enforcement officials, whilst another plot involved mailing ricin
to the target.35 None of these plots resulted in an actual attack, but the
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995, which

16 The Changing Face of Terrorism
killed 169 adults and children, was seen as evidence of the interest of this
type of group in perpetrating acts of mass murder.
Individuals linked to the wider networks of extreme right-wing
Christian groups also showed an interest in other forms of CBW. In 1995,
Larry Wayne Harris acquired bubonic plague virus from the American Type
Culture Collection. Harris claimed to be writing a training manual for the
Aryan Nations, and that he had purchased the virus to support his research on
treatments for the plague. No evidence was ever discovered that he had any
plans to use the virus.36 In 1998, members of a Texan independence group
called the Republic of Texas were arrested for planning to murder federal
agents, their families, and government officials. Investigators discovered
that they possessed containers of HIV-infected blood, samples of the rabies
virus, and anthrax spores, as well as instruction manuals, written threats, and
production equipment. According to press reports the group were trying to
develop a device to shoot barbs coated with anthrax, HIV, or rabies at President
Clinton.37 In 1997, investigators discovered a cache of chemicals at the home
of a libertarian extremist called James Dalton Bell. The cache included 500g of
sodium cyanide, disopropyl fluorophosphate, as well as a range of corrosive
acids and two precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of the nerve agent,
sarin. Computer files revealed that Bell was also interested in purchasing castor
beans (from which ricin can be produced) and cultivating botulinum toxin.38
There was also an attempt by white-supremacist skinheads to disperse toxic
chemicals through the internal ventilation systems of buildings in Arizona.39
A common feature of all these incidents was that although these groups
and individuals had the technical knowledge to develop biological agents, none
of them proved willing or able to develop a delivery mechanism to weaponize
the agent into a WMD. A further interesting feature of these incidents was
that there were no actual attacks. It could be argued that the police prevented
the attacks from taking place, but there is also no hard evidence that these
individuals were actually preparing to carry out an attack. The reasons for this
reticence remain unclear, since the fact that they had gone to the effort of
acquiring chemical and biological agents is indicative of an intention to use
them. However, there is no evidence that some of them were professional
terrorists, and they could best be described as fantasists or criminals. As
such, they may have been intimidated by the risk of being caught, or else felt
that the time was not right to launch an attack.
In contrast to the reticence of extreme right-wing groups in the USA, the
explosion of violence from the Aum Shinrikyo religious cult in Japan during
the 1990s has been the single most important incident of CBRN terrorism
ever. Aum Shinrikyo was the first non-state group to possess both the potential

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 17
capability to develop a WMD, and the intent to use them. Between 1990 and
1995 the cult was known to have been responsible for 17 CBW attacks or
attempted attacks. Ten of these attacks involved the use of CW, four attacks
used the nerve agent sarin, four used the nerve agent VX, one used phosgene
and one involved the use of hydrogen cyanide. The cult also attempted to carry
out seven attacks using biological weapons, four involved anthrax and three
involved the use of botulinum toxin. But all of these attacks failed because
the cult’s engineers had failed to produce virulent strains of either anthrax
bacteria or botulinum toxin. During 1993 the cult attempted to use BW for
indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, whilst it used CW for eight actual and
attempted assassinations between 1993 and 1995. Because the attempted BW
attacks in 1993 failed, the cult switched tactics in 1994 and 1995 to use sarin
and hydrogen cyanide for indiscriminate attacks against civilian targets. The
most serious attack perpetrated by the cult was the sarin attack on the Tokyo
subway in March 1995, in which cult members placed 11 bags of sarin on five
different trains and punctured them with sharpened umbrella tips. The attack
killed 12 people and injured over 5,000.40 The cult has also been linked with
19 other incidents that might have been CBW attacks, and is also suspected of
murdering internal dissidents with sarin and VX. There is also evidence that
the cult considered attacking the USA, and that it had attempted to procure
the ebola virus and nuclear weapons.41
Overall, Aum Shinrikyo’s campaign of terrorism using CBW was a failure.
Only two of the indiscriminate attacks against population targets succeeded.
These two attacks using sarin, resulted in the deaths of 19 people. More
surprisingly, only one of the assassinations, using VX, succeeded. It would
have been cheaper, easier, and more effective for the murderers to have used a
gun. Nevertheless, Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated the potential threat posed
by terrorist groups that make a sustained effort to acquire and use CBRN
weapons.
In contrast to Aum Shinrikyo, some other groups that seemed to be
capable of developing CBRN weapons displayed a reticence about actually
using them. In November 1995 Chechen separatists threatened to detonate
radiological devices in and around Moscow. The Chechen guerrilla leader
Shamyl Basayev informed the Russian television network NTV that he
had hidden four cases of caesium in Moscow. NTV discovered a case
in Izmailovsky Park that was emitting 310 times the amount of normal
radioactivity. Basayev had frequently threatened to attack Moscow with
nuclear weapons but Russian officials dismissed the threat, claiming that
the material was caesium-137 (which is used in X-ray equipment), and
that it was only capable of emitting 100 times the background amount

18 The Changing Face of Terrorism
of radioactivity.42 In July 1995 and March 1996 Chechen separatists made
further threats to use CBW on Russian territory. The Head of Russia’s
chemical warfare troops, Stanislav Petrov, denied that the Chechens
possessed modern CW, but admitted they could have stocks of chlorine and
prussic acid, which are similar to agents that had been used as CW in the
First World War.43 In December 1998, a radiological dispersal device was
allegedly discovered in Chechnya.44 Following renewed fighting in 1999 and
2000 both sides claimed that the other had waged chemical warfare. These
allegations stemmed from the bombing of tanks of chlorine near the city
of Grozny. The Russian army claimed that the insurgents had blown up
containers of toxic chemicals, and suggested that the insurgents might set
off other bombs at what were suspected to be chlorine filled chemical plants
on the outskirts of the city.45
Several other groups which attempted to use CBW lacked the technical
sophistication of Aum Shinrikyo, consequently they were restricted to using
often commercially available materials as contaminants. As was also the case
in the 1970s and 1980s, the efforts of many terrorist groups to develop or
use CBRN weapons appeared to be ad hoc decisions that were determined
by opportunity and circumstances.46 But there was also an increase in
the number of reports of terrorist groups and individuals persistently
attempting to procure CBRN weapons, including from the former Soviet
Union. This included numerous reports about al-Qaeda. The majority of
these reports remain unsubstantiated and the fact that there were no attacks
using CBRN weapons by Islamist cells linked to al-Qaeda indicates that these
attempts failed.
The increased number of CBRN terrorist incidents during the 1990s
provides a considerable amount of additional information from which
to draw conclusions about the potential threat from CBRN terrorism, and
many unknowns remain. No terrorist group was able to develop a WMD but
there is still a lack of clarity about the factors which were either preventing
or deterring these groups from using CBRN weapons. However, a number
of general observations can be made. There was a correlation between the
increase in terrorist activity by ‘religious’ terrorist groups and the increased
acquisition of BW in the 1990s because of the number of cases involving
cults and extreme right-wing Christian groups in the USA. However, this
did not tie in very strongly with the trend of increasing lethality in terrorist
attacks, since extreme right-wing Christian groups do not have a history
of systematic campaigns of violence against indiscriminate civilian targets.
Islamic fundamentalist and Islamist groups are primarily responsible for the
increasing lethality of ‘religious’ terrorism, but apart from al-Qaeda’s failed

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 19
efforts to procure CBRN weapons, they did not feature prominently in the
history of CBRN terrorism. Another significant observation was that the
increased use of CBRN weapons did not contribute to the trend towards
increasing lethality in terrorist attacks, although many of the intended targets
of the actual and planned CBRN attacks were indiscriminate in nature.
These developments, coupled with major conventional terrorist attacks
such as the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing
in 1995, and the bombing of the US embassy in Kenya in 1998, heightened
perceptions of societal vulnerability to terrorism. For US citizens, vulnerability
to terrorism became ‘America’s Achilles heel’.47 This galvanized the media
and political debate on CBRN terrorism, prompting knee-jerk reactions from
legislators in the USA, which blew the threat out of proportion.
These incidents made terrorism a national security priority and
challenged accepted beliefs and assumptions about terrorist activity in
the USA. They prompted Senator Richard Lugar to argue that ‘from the
tragedies of Oklahoma City and the World Trade Centre to the first act of
nuclear terrorism requires but one small step’.48 Following the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995 President Clinton declared that ‘one thing we owe
those who have sacrificed is a duty to purge ourselves of the dark forces
which give rise to this evil. They are forces that threaten our common
peace, our freedom, our way of life’.49 However, the defining incident which
brought the issues of terrorism and proliferation together was the Aum
Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway. It made the issue policy-relevant,
transforming what was previously considered to be a potential threat into
something that was real and imminent. In the immediate aftermath of the
attack President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39, ‘US
Policy on Counter-Terrorism’, which stated that:
The development of effective capabilities for preventing and
managing the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological or
chemical (NBC) materials or weapons is the highest priority. Terrorist
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable and
there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of such
materials/weapons or removing this capability from terrorist groups.50
Similarly, Congress declared in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (1996) that ‘international terrorism is among the most serious
transnational threats faced by the United States and its allies, far eclipsing
the dangers posed by population growth and pollution’.51 Yet a reasoned

20 The Changing Face of Terrorism
analysis of the extent and impact of international terrorism at that time did
not support this statement.
In many respects the arguments that dominated the public debate in
the early 1990s were not dissimilar to those that were first developed in
the literature from the late 1970s, but from the mid-1990s the debate was
marked by an emphasis on worst-case analysis, and the sense of balance
within the debate was lost. The debate in the USA in particular generated
apocalyptic visions of terrorist attacks involving WMD, spawning a whole
new terminology of ‘super terrorism’, ‘catastrophic terrorism’, ‘ultimate
terrorism’, and ‘ultraterrorism’.52 Senator Sam Nunn argued that, ‘the
threat of terrorist attack on American cities involving chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapons has reached a point where a bold and
vigorous effort is required. This is a clear and present danger to the American
people that requires a timely response’.53 Similarly, Kyle Olsen argued that
‘people must recognize that the threat from bioterrorism is not a curiosity
but a grim reality as we enter the next century’.54 Oliver Revell, a former FBI
Investigations Chief, suggested that there is a new style of terrorism, which
‘wants nothing more than the overthrow of the West, and since that’s not
going to happen, they just want to punish; the more casualties the better’.55
This change in the tone of the debate was due to the political context
within which the debate was taking place, as well as the trends in terrorist
activity which, it was argued, were pointing towards the increasing use of
CBRN weapons by terrorists. One of the underlying reasons for the change
in the public debate on CBRN terrorism in the 1990s was the nature of the
ideologies of the active terrorist groups at that time. During the 1970s, the
conclusions about CBRN terrorism were drawn from an analysis of the
strategies and objectives of secular terrorists. In the 1990s the focus shifted
to ‘religious’ terrorists. The perceived differences between the two types of
groups contributed to the different tenor of the debate. Bruce Hoffman
argues that the different characteristics, justifications, and mindsets of
‘religious’ and ‘quasi-religious’ groups suggest that they might be the most
likely types of group to use CBRN weapons, because they have radically
different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification,
concepts of morality, and world view.56 It became a commonly held belief
that a CBRN attack was probably not likely to come from a typical terrorist
group, but it was more likely to emanate from a group who have placed
themselves above conventional morality. The RAND Corporation argued
that,

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 21
Terrorist groups with more millennial aims, as opposed to those
operating on behalf of concrete political programmes, may be less
constrained in their actions and hence more willing to cause or risk
mass casualties. These more fanatical and extreme terrorist groups
tend to hold apocalyptic views, devoid of specific political content and
seek the creation of new and continuing disasters as the precondition
for the emergence of a new heavenly order on earth.57
This emphasis on ‘religious’ terrorism highlighted three principle groups
of suspects: Islamic fundamentalists and Islamists; extreme right-wing
Christian groups in the USA; and religious cults.
The sheer volume of work on this issue in the 1990s was significantly
higher than in other decades. More importantly, the issue became a debate
in its own right, rather than remaining an adjunct to the broader debates
about proliferation and terrorism. Activist legislators in the USA seized on
the issue and demanded action. The cumulative pressure from the debate in
the policy community and the Congress led to significant policy responses
from the administration, which were replicated in other states. President
Clinton was noticeable in making strong public statements on the issue. In
January 1999, he went on record as stating that the USA would be subject to
a terrorist attack involving chemical or biological weapons within the next
few years,58 whilst William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defence, stated that
‘the question is no longer if this will happen, but when’.59 This contrasted
with the much more discreet approach of European leaders, who rarely
made public comments about the threat.
This change in political context was paralleled by developments in science
and technology which served to broaden the debate. Concern about nuclear
terrorism revived in the early 1990s when it became evident that there was
a haemorrhage of nuclear materials from insecure nuclear facilities in the
states of the former Soviet Union. However, the most likely threat was still
considered to be from CBW. By the mid-1990s, developments in education
and technology had made the development of all forms of CBRN weapons
relatively easier for non-state actors. But it was the explosive growth of the
biotechnology industry, which coupled with the potential casualty levels
that BW can cause, combined to put biological terrorism at the forefront
of concern for the USA. In 1998, Richard Betts argued that ‘Biological
Weapons should now be the most serious concern, with nuclear weapons
second and chemicals a distant third’.60
By the late 1990s the debate in the USA was again becoming more
balanced, with an increasing number of analysts downplaying the likelihood

22 The Changing Face of Terrorism
of a catastrophic attack involving a WMD, whilst accepting that it was a
theoretical possibility. This was summed up best by Richard Falkenrath,
who argued that WMD terrorism was ‘a low-probability, high-consequence
threat’. Falkenrath concluded that there has been a general aversion amongst
most terrorist groups to causing mass casualties. He suggested that this was
not necessarily due to the inability of terrorist groups to develop CBRN
weapons, but rather to a conscious decision on the part of many terrorist
groups to kill fewer people than they potentially could have. He identified
the main reasons for terrorists making such decisions as being a fear that
such attacks would undermine their political support, raise the risk of
unfettered government reprisal, and generally because such violent attacks
do not make it easier for terrorists to achieve their aims.61 Whereas at the
beginning of the decade, analysts focused on the factors which made CBRN
terrorism more likely, by the late 1990s a larger number of analysts were
emphasizing the factors which would inhibit CBRN terrorism. Yet despite
this, the US Commission on National Security still claimed in 1999 that ‘the
most serious threat to our security may consist of unannounced attacks
on American cities by sub-national groups (such as drug cartels, cults, or
criminal gangs) using genetically engineered pathogens’.62
The Threat from CBRN Terrorism at the Turn of the
Twenty-first Century
At the turn of the twenty-first century there was little evidence to indicate
any significant worsening of the threat of CBRN terrorism. Despite this,
the world officially moved into the realm of mass destruction terrorism on
9/11. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, speculation about further
mass casualty attacks including with CBRN weapons and WMD flooded
the media and assumed a heightened prominence in the policy debate. 9/11
also heralded an abrupt upturn in the trend of attacks causing large number
of casualties. Since 2001, there have been 19 terrorist attacks which have
resulted in more than 100 deaths, 16 of which were perpetrated by Islamist
or Islamic fundamentalist groups.63 This reversed the decline in the most
lethal attacks that occurred in the 1990s.
The fears of al-Qaeda using CBRN weapons were seemingly confirmed
in October 2001 when anthrax was posted in seven letters to a number of
media providers as well as Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. By
late October the attack seemed to be escalating out of control when two
postal workers in Washington died, and a number of other postal workers in
facilities that processed contaminated letters in Washington and New Jersey

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 23
also contracted anthrax. Only about 10g of anthrax in total was posted in the
letters but it disseminated widely causing significant cross-contamination.
Despite being sealed in envelopes an aerosol of anthrax was released during
the processing of the mail.64 Spores were found in Washington area postal
facilities, as well as all the offices of all major government departments
including the Supreme Court and the State Department, and congressional
offices. Contaminated letters also turned up across a wide geographical area,
including New York, Florida, Washington, Nevada, and Connecticut, and
spores were even carried to US diplomatic missions abroad in diplomatic
pouches. The crisis petered out after a few months and the last case of
infection was reported on 7 November 2001. A total of 22 people contracted
anthrax during the course of the attack of whom four died, and a massive
environmental decontamination was undertaken.65
The reasons why the perpetrator stopped sending the letters remain
unknown. It is conceivable that the perpetrator had achieved his objective,
or had wanted to escape before being detected. Perhaps as important was
the fact that the letters had passed their peak effectiveness once counter-
measures to screen post and decontaminate postal sorting offices had
been put in place. The origins of the anthrax are also uncertain, but it was
evident that the perpetrator possessed considerable technical skills because
the weaponization process that had been used was extraordinarily effective.
The concentration and purity of the spores coupled with a coating on the
spores and a special form of silica identified in one of the samples was
characteristic of what is known as the ‘optimal US process’. It caused
considerable concern because the anthrax had been designed and milled
to a very fine size specifically to stay in the air, increasing the chances of
infecting people with the respiratory form of the disease.66
Al-Qaeda was initially the prime suspect, but the fact that the letters
stopped suddenly while the war in Afghanistan was continuing suggests that
it was not the culprit. The technical sophistication of the anthrax raised the
question of whether a state had sponsored the attack. Many commentators
and political figures were quick to point the finger at Iraq. But no evidence
of Iraqi involvement was ever discovered, and previous Iraqi attempts to
weaponize anthrax had been significantly cruder than the samples contained
in the letters. In November 2001, the FBI announced that that they
suspected that the letters were the work of a lone individual.67 By December
an official close to the investigation confirmed that a government insider or
someone with links to such an individual was ‘the most likely hypothesis …
it’s definitely reasonable’.68 This seemed to confirm the fears raised in the
1990s, that lone operators represented one of the principle threats of CBRN

24 The Changing Face of Terrorism
terrorism, and also confirmed fears of the potential role of ‘insiders’ from
national CBRN weapon development and defence infrastructures. It was
not until 2008 that the FBI closed the case, when Dr Bruce Ivins, a former
microbiologist at the biological defence facility at Fort Detrick, committed
suicide. Ivins was reported to have had a history of mental illness69 and has
not been linked with any known terrorist organization.
A number of observations can be drawn from the attack that are
pertinent to the assessment of future BW threats. Despite the prevailing
fear of BW causing mass casualties, the letters were singularly unsuccessful
in killing many people. Thousands of people were screened for anthrax,
but very few were found to be infected, and the majority of those were
successfully treated with antibiotics. An alternative explanation is that the
objective of the attack was not to actually kill people but rather, to create
disruption and public anxiety. There is some evidence for this hypothesis
in the fact that the letters themselves warned of the anthrax and the need
to take antibiotics which enabled those who handled the letters to protect
themselves. A number of hoaxes sent before the genuine letters also fit into
this explanation by heightening the sense of public awareness. Although
several postal workers were killed, it is conceivable that the perpetrator
did not anticipate that the mail sorting process would expel spores from
the letters and cause such extensive cross-contamination and collateral
casualties.70 Since there is no reason to believe that the perpetrator did
not possess more anthrax it can be assumed that he must have achieved
everything he wanted with the small number of letters that he did send.
One of the main impacts of the attack was the short-term disruption to
everyday life. Despite the persistent sense of unease during those months,
everyday life quickly resumed as people adapted. The attacks brought
temporary halts to the work on Capitol Hill, at the Supreme Court, and at the
Postal Service, but once the buildings were decontaminated and technology
was brought in to screen incoming post, work continued as normal. The
speed with which people adapted was aided by the fact that attacks were
targeted rather than random in nature and the anthrax was contained in
letters rather than released directly into the environment.
The anthrax letters were not the breakthrough in biological terrorism
that people had feared and the attack is better characterized as a criminal
rather than a terrorist act. But whilst al-Qaeda and its affiliates were not
the perpetrators, significant evidence of al-Qaeda’s efforts to develop
CBRN weapons was discovered in the aftermath of the US invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001. This was coupled with a sharp increase in the number
of reports of Islamist terrorist groups either talking about, or planning

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 25
to use, CBRN weapons. However, it is extremely difficult to differentiate
fact from fiction in many of the often sensationalist media stories about
al-Qaeda and CBRN weapon plots, many of which are based on dubious
sources and were subsequently discovered to be untrue. But a small number
have been confirmed and have resulted in convictions.
According to the 9/11 Commission, al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan
were considering ways of using WMD prior to 2001. This included using
mustard gas and cyanide against Jews in Iran, ‘forcing Russian scientists
to fire a nuclear armed missile against the US’, and using air conditioning
systems in buildings to pump poison gas.71 But the first actual incident
occurred in February 2002, when a cell of four Tunisians was convicted in
Italy of conspiring to traffic in false documents, weapons, explosives, and
chemical weapons.72 Police in Rome and Milan had intercepted telephone
conversations involving the leader of the cell in which he had discussed the
use of chemical substances in terrorist attacks. Some reports suggest that
he discussed how to hide chemical poison in cans of tomatoes, whilst other
reports suggests that the cell simply used ‘tomato cans’ as a codeword for
cyanide. However, there is no indication that they actually possessed any
chemical agents.73 The same month, police in Rome foiled an attack by a
cell of Moroccans who possessed a cache of potassium ferrocyanide with
the intention of poisoning the water supply in the neighbourhood around
the American embassy.74
In 2003, US intelligence sources allege that al-Qaeda came within 45
days of launching a cyanide attack on the New York subway system, after
details of the plot were found on a computer belonging to members of the
cell who had been arrested in Bahrain. The attack was apparently called off
by bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, for unknown reasons.75 The
same year, al-Qaeda operatives allegedly delivered an unspecified poison to
Afghan cooks who were working for the US armed forces in Afghanistan,
with the intention that they kill American servicemen. Some sources suggest
that the Islamist group Ansar al Islam was involved and that the poison in
question was ricin.76
Since 2001 a number of Islamist terrorist cells in the UK have discussed,
or planned to use, CBRN weapons. One cell allegedly planned to kill Members
of the European Parliament and officials by releasing sarin into the European
Parliament building,77 but the veracity of this report is questionable given
that there is no evidence of al-Qaeda ever having produced sarin. In January
2003 however, police discovered a primitive production facility along with
castor beans and instructions for manufacturing ricin at an apartment in
north London. Despite sensational media reporting of the discovery, no

26 The Changing Face of Terrorism
ricin was ever found.78 In 2004, UK police arrested an Islamist cell which
had developed a plan to detonate a radiological weapon in a major city,
whilst another cell discussed poisoning hamburgers or beer at a soccer
stadium. British intelligence sources also claimed to have prevented a CW
attack using conventional explosive and osmium tetroxide.79 Despite the
interest of these three cells in using CBRN weapons, the key feature of all
of these plots was that they were at a preliminary planning stage, and none
of them possessed the necessary CBRN agents or materials.
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it was discovered that Ansar al
Islam had successfully developed ricin. Ansar al Islam is generally considered
to be an affiliate of al-Qaeda, although the extent of the links between the
two groups are a matter of considerable speculation. There is no evidence
that Ansar al Islam had actually used ricin, but Kurdish intelligence
sources indicated that it was intended for use in assassinations.80 This
added credence to the USA’s intelligence assessments of al-Qaeda’s CBRN
weapon development. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence in 2003, the former Director of the CIA George Tenet
claimed that al-Qaeda was seeking materials to develop CBRN weapons
and re-iterated concerns that al-Qaeda had a sophisticated BW capability
having acquired both the expertise and equipment in Afghanistan.81 But
despite these reports, it is evident that al-Qaeda had failed to develop CBRN
weapons (al-Qaeda’s efforts to develop CBRN weapons will be explored in
greater depth in Chapter 2).
The willingness of Islamist terror groups to use CBRN weapons was
illustrated by a spate of chlorine bomb attacks on Shi’a civilian targets in
Iraq in early 2007. In these attacks chlorine cylinders were packed around
explosives in car bombs, causing casualties from both blast and chemical
effects.82 In 2004 US forces also discovered 3kg of cyanide at a house in
Baghdad which insurgents were going to place in construction bricks and
then use to attack US troops.83 However, these attacks were ad hoc in nature,
and betrayed the lack of technological capability within the insurgency to
develop effective CBRN weapons.
Whilst al-Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups have been
responsible for the majority of terrorist incidents involving CBW since
9/11, other types of groups have also experimented with using CBW. In
2001, rebels from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC)
fired improvised CW mortar shells at police, killing four and injuring one.84
This was a significant departure for the FARC, which has been fighting
the Columbian government since the 1960s but had not previously been
linked with any CWB attacks. And in 2007, a right-wing extremist in the

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 27
UK was convicted of possessing ricin.85 This illustrates how groups with
no previous interest in CBRN weapons can suddenly decide to experiment
with them. Although these seem to have been isolated incidents, rather than
the beginning of systematic campaigns by these groups to develop and use
CBW.
The twenty-first century has therefore also seen a confluence of two
significant trends in terrorist activity that emerged in the 1990s. Islamist
groups that are responsible for a significant increase in the most lethal
terrorist attacks, including an act of mass destruction, are also responsible
for the increase in the attempted acquisition and use of CBRN weapons.
However, this increase in the attempted acquisition and use of CBRN
weapons by Islamist terror cells, was matched by a corresponding decrease
in the attempted acquisition of CBRN weapons by extreme right-wing
groups in the USA. Similarly, since the Aum Shinrikyo attacks in the early
1990s, there has been no indication of religious cults seeking to acquire
CBRN weapons. Unlike the groups and individuals linked to the extreme
right wing movement in the 1990s however, Islamist terror groups have
displayed a greater willingness to actually use whatever agents or weapons
they can acquire.
As a consequence of the activities of al-Qaeda and other Islamist
terrorist groups, and partly fuelled by government pronouncements, the
nature of the policy debate on CBRN terrorism changed completely to
assume that a WMD attack involving a CBRN weapon would only be a
matter of time. The prevailing attitude was summed up by British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, who declared that,
These dangers can strike at any time. At the moment barely a day goes
by without some new piece of intelligence coming via our security
services about a threat to UK interests. Today’s breed of terrorist
knows no bounds – of geography, of humanity, of scale. They are
looking for evermore dramatic and devastating outrages to inflict on
the people they claim to be their enemy.86
Highlighting the threat in this way serves the interests of the police
and security services in heightening public awareness and encouraging the
population to watch out for suspicious activity, but publicity of this sort
can also have negative repercussions. Terrorists will generally monitor
political and social developments in their target state carefully, and will
adapt their strategies and tactics accordingly. The nature of the public and
political debate on CBRN terrorism indicates that this is a threat which the

28 The Changing Face of Terrorism
West particularly fears. This in itself could encourage some groups to try
and develop CBRN weapons, which is why many governments used to
downplay the issue.
Conclusion
Despite 30 years of CBRN terrorism, worsening threat assessments, and the
continuing interest of Islamist terrorist cells in these weapons, the nature
and extent of the current threat from CBRN terrorism remains unclear. The
most recent incidents of CBRN terrorism are not fundamentally different
from those in the 1980s. The majority still involve the crude dissemination
of chemical and biological agents, particularly as contaminants. Despite
the larger number of incidents linking terrorists to CBRN weapons, only
a small proportion of them actually led to the use of a CBRN weapon. In
1999, the Monterrey database of terrorist CBRN incidents identified 282
such incidents, but only 26 per cent of them involved the actual use of
a weapon.87 Although there are also a number of cases where a group or
individual acquired an agent or pathogen but were arrested before being
able to use it.
Nevertheless, these previous incidents suggest that further terrorist
incidents involving CBRN weapons are probably inevitable. But it does not
establish a case that a terrorist incident involving a WMD is inevitable or even
likely, since no terrorist group has ever posed a credible WMD threat. Aum
Shinrikyo’s success in developing sarin and VX remains an isolated case, and
it never managed to develop a WMD. The most significant development in
respect of CBRN terrorism in the 1990s was the increasing acquisition of
chemical and biological agents by terrorist groups. Yet attacks have been
rare enough to suggest that they will remain occasional isolated incidents.
However, the setting of key precedents such as the use of CBW against
indiscriminate population targets, has been a highly significant development.
But weighed against this are indications that some technologically capable
groups and individuals have previously been deterred from using CBRN
weapons.
Of the incidents in the twentieth century which did not result in an
attack there are difficulties in differentiating between what are genuine cases
of terrorists attempting to acquire CBRN weapons with a serious intent to
use them; cases where groups made threats with no intent to either develop
or use such weapons; and reports which are little more than hearsay. Some
incidents are supported by a body of facts, but unsubstantiated reports
comprise over half of the recorded incidents. But even uncorroborated

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 29
reports cannot be dismissed as mere hearsay since the security forces in a
number of states may well have prevented some attacks but not released full
details. It is now commonly assumed that terrorists will use CBRN weapons,
if they can acquire them.
In the twentieth century, incidents involving CW constituted
approximately 52 per cent of the previous cases of CBRN terrorism,88
but there have been many more threats and conspiracies than cases where
terrorists actually managed to execute an attack using a CW. There was an
increase in both the number of plots and threats, and also the number of
times that terrorists have actually acquired or used CW, in the 1990s. The
increase in the number of cases of acquisition and use was due almost
entirely to the large number of attempted attacks by Aum Shinrikyo in
the twentieth century. Incidents involving BW constitute approximately
26 per cent of the previous cases of CBRN terrorism.89 There have only
ever been five confirmed cases of terrorists actually using BW, although
the increasing trend of successful acquisition of BW in the 1990s is even
more pronounced than is the case with CW. There has been a much lower
incidence of radiological and nuclear terrorism than is the case with CBW,
(approximately 4 per cent of previous cases of CBRN terrorism).90 There
is no evidence that a terrorist group has ever even attempted to develop
a nuclear weapon, and there have been only a few reports of groups
attempting to purchase a nuclear device or fissile material.
Equally as significant is the fact that the targets of many of the planned
CBW attacks highlighted in this chapter were, or were intended to be,
discriminate in nature, against individuals or the occupants of specific
buildings. The targeting of individuals or specific buildings means that
many of these attacks were not intended to cause indiscriminate mass
destruction. But even so, a significant number of the other planned attacks
were intended to cause indiscriminate mass casualties, although none of
them actually succeeded. However, in the cases where the agent was not
used it is sometimes impossible to determine what the target actually was,
or whether the group would actually have gone through with the attack.
There is, however, a significant number of cases where the intent was to
cause casualty levels sufficient to be labelled ‘mass destruction’, principally
through contaminating the water supplies of cities. Whatever the feasibility
of achieving this objective through contaminating water supplies, the intent
of the perpetrators is what is important.
Most importantly, no group has ever developed a WMD. Only Aum
Shinrikyo has ever manufactured a nerve agent, or got close to engineering
a CW into a WMD, but their inability to achieve this was due to its inability

30 The Changing Face of Terrorism
to mass produce sarin of sufficiently high purity and to develop an effective
delivery system. Most of the attacks by other groups have had to rely on
using chemicals in a discriminate fashion, or as contaminants, particularly in
food and drink, which has greatly restricted the potential casualties that they
could cause. In terms of BW, the various individuals or groups linked to
extreme right-wing groups in the USA who managed to develop biological
pathogens or toxins also had to rely on using them as contaminants. Aum
Shinrikyo also attempted to engineer biological agents into a WMD but
failed, although it is not known how close it actually was to successfully
developing and weaponizing their pathogens. This raises questions about the
technological problems that terrorists face in developing and using CBRN
weapons and WMD. The principle significance of the Tokyo subway attack
was as an indicator that non-state actors were getting closer to developing a
WMD. But significantly, it remains an isolated case.
A wide spectrum of groups, including nationalist separatist movements,
Islamic fundamentalists, Islamists, religious cults, and various extreme right
wing groups, have at some time shown an interest in acquiring and using CW,
and interest is by no means restricted to ‘religious’ groups. However, there
does appear to have been a gradual shift in the type of groups attempting to
procure BW, from predominantly secular and ethno-nationalist groups in the
1970s and 1980s to predominantly ‘religious’ groups in the 1990s. Perhaps
the most worrying aspect of these developments is the fact that, unlike with
CW, it is not entirely due to the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, because of the
number of extreme right-wing Christian groups and individuals in the USA
who successfully developed ricin, as well as the Rajneeshees’ use of Salmonella
typhimurium. Religious cults have been responsible for the largest number
of incidents or attacks where actual possession of a chemical or biological
weapon has been involved, followed by extreme right-wing Christian groups
and individuals in the USA. Some Islamic fundamentalist groups along with
some national liberation movements such as the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) have been responsible for some isolated incidents. Since 2000,
the situation has reversed, with Islamist groups being responsible for the
majority of incidents. Whilst this indicates that some groups might pose
more of a threat than others at any given time, it also indicates that a threat
could theoretically come from any quarter. Therefore, whilst a correlation
has been identified between terrorists with a politico-religious ideology and
CBRN weapons, it is important to avoid generalizations about ‘religious’
terrorists and CBRN weapons. The past history of CBRN terrorism shows
that not all ‘religious’ terrorist groups are interested in CBRN weapons. In
fact, only a small number of groups have ever made a systematic attempt to

CBRN Terrorism in Historical Context 31
procure them. This suggests that alternative explanations need to be sought
to explain the interest of specific terrorist groups in CBRN terrorism.
Therefore, whilst the trends in terrorist activity suggest broad directions
in terrorist activity, they are of little use for determining the nature and
extent of the future threat of CBRN terrorism. Instead, the nature of
the future threat can be determined in greater detail only by exploring key
themes in terrorists’ decision making in greater depth. These include the
technical opportunities and constraints faced by terrorists attempting to
develop CBRN weapons, their potential motivations to use these weapons,
the likely disincentives to using these weapons, the strategies and tactics
which different terrorist groups use, the personal motivations of individual
terrorists, and the dynamics of decision making within different terrorist
groups.

2
TECHNICAL OPPORTUNITIES
AND CONSTRAINTS TO USING
CBRN WEAPONS
The history of terrorism involving CBRN weapons outlined in Chapter  1
suggests that further attacks involving these weapons are inevitable, but
the extent and nature of the future threat remains unclear. One of the
fundamental issues in assessing the threat is the ability of terrorist groups to
develop or otherwise acquire different types of CBRN weapons – and equally
as significant, the lethality of the weapons that they might prove to be capable
of developing. Analysts are now almost unanimous in concluding that it is
becoming increasingly easy for terrorist groups to develop CBRN weapons,
yet there is a dichotomy within the literature over exactly how easy it is.
Some analysts consider that terrorists could develop CBRN weapons very
quickly once they set their minds to it, yet others consider that developing
CBRN WMD is a long and complex process. This chapter will examine the
technological issues involved in developing CBRN weapons, in order to make
an assessment of how easy it could be for terrorist groups to develop different
types of CBRN weapons, and hence the likely nature of future threats.
Increasing Availability of Technical Information
The starting point for any terrorist group attempting to develop CBRN
weapons is gathering and mastering the relevant theoretical knowledge.
It is now considered that the necessary theoretical knowledge required
for developing CBRN weapons is available from open sources. Academic
journals contain much of the information that is required, and a literature
search through sources such as Acta Scandinavia and the Merck Index can

34 The Changing Face of Terrorism
identify this information. Aum Shinrikyo began its CBW programme with
an exhaustive literature search, which included downloading the entire
protein data bank from the Brookhaven National Laboratory in the USA,
which included details of the chemical breakdowns of various toxins.1
A number of other open sources provide even greater details of how to
actually manufacture biological weapons. This includes the book Silent Death,
by Steve Preisler (also known as ‘Uncle Fester’), which provides instructions
on how to make biological toxins such as ricin.
The internet is also a useful source of information for terrorists. It
is possible to find detailed technical information on developing CBRN
weapons, including formulas for CW such as sarin, and chemical equations
for precursor chemicals. This includes one of the easiest means of
manufacturing the nerve agent VX, using the chemical empta.2 However,
the internet is not a wholly reliable source of information. Whilst some of
the available information is accurate, much of it is erroneous, incomplete,
and even hazardous to the health of the individual attempting to use it. This
is apparent from an analysis of CBRN weapon production instructions that
al-Qaeda has posted on various jihadi websites. Al-Qaeda has disseminated
a considerable amount of information on the development and use of
CBRN weapons through its literature and on the internet. This includes
the Mujahideen Poisons Handbook, which has been found in the possession
of a number of convicted terrorists in the West, and the eleventh volume
of the Encyclopaedia of Jihad, which is devoted to the development of CW.
In 2005, one al-Qaeda linked website posted detailed instructions in Arabic
on how to make nuclear, radiological and biological weapons.3 However,
an evaluation of this information shows that it typically contains technical
flaws and generally does not contain information about the weaponization
of chemical and biological agents, or their delivery, including the relevance
of atmospheric conditions when dispersing CBW.4
But whilst the relevant theoretical knowledge might be available, it still
requires skilled engineers to be able to use it to develop a functional weapon.
Increasing numbers of people are now being educated and trained in the
necessary skills to undertake such projects. What was once considered to
be esoteric knowledge about how to culture and disperse infectious agents
has now spread amongst tens of thousands of people, and is used in many
legitimate commercial applications. Some sources suggest that the techniques
for making nerve agents are similar to those used for insecticides;5 whilst the
massive growth of biological research and the biotechnology industry has
made the development of BW significantly easier for both states and non-
state actors alike.6 The task is made easier by the fact that as technology

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 35
progresses, new ways of developing some types of CBRN weapons are
emerging, some of which are easier to master than the traditional ways.7
What remains to be seen is the extent to which these highly educated
individuals are being recruited into terrorist groups. Aum Shinrikyo
managed to recruit hundreds of trained scientists and engineers, but there
is little evidence of other terrorist groups recruiting individuals with such
skills. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, large numbers of
engineers who had previously worked on the Soviet WMD programme
became unemployed or were simply not paid by the governments of the
successor states. Some of these engineers allegedly become available for
hire to proliferator states such as Iran. It is not inconceivable that some
unscrupulous individuals might be willing to sell their skills to terrorist
groups for financial gain, or else for ideological, political, and nationalist
reasons, but there is no evidence that this has ever happened.
However, the openly available information is not enough to guarantee
the successful development of a CBRN weapon. There are certain ‘tricks
of the trade’ in engineering these weapons, which have not been codified
explicitly. Terrorist groups will have to learn these processes through
the experimentation and development process, unless they can find an
experienced practitioner to show them. These ‘tricks of the trade’ can
be learned, especially by skilled engineers, but it takes time. Once these
processes have been learned, they can then be operated by engineers of a
lower calibre, and can be passed on to other engineers by word of mouth
and training.8 This was evident from the fact that it took Aum Shinrikyo
up to two years to develop sarin. Consequently, even if a terrorist group
manages to recruit skilled engineers and acquires the necessary theoretical
knowledge, materials, and production facilities, there is still a technological
barrier which terrorists have to cross. Whether this will prevent them from
developing some types of CBRN weapons completely or merely increase
the amount of time it takes them, is dependent upon a number of factors
that will be explored below.
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons are extremely difficult to manufacture, even for a modern
state with all of the necessary resources. However, a distinction must be
drawn between the finely engineered military weapons with high explosive
yields which states seek to develop and the much cruder devices with low
yields with which terrorists would be satisfied.

36 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The explosive core of nuclear weapons comprises an amount of
‘fissile material’. The optimum fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons
are plutonium-239 (Pu-239), or uranium that has been enriched to
approximately 94 per cent, uranium-235 (U-235), otherwise known as highly
enriched uranium (HEU), although plutonium-240 (Pu-240) and uranium
of lower enrichment levels can also be used. The minimum amount of
fissile material required for a nuclear weapon is known as the ‘critical mass’.
The critical mass required varies according to the efficiency of the design
of the weapon, whether it uses Pu-239 or HEU, the shape of the material
(a sphere is the optimum shape), the density of the material, the purity of
the material, and the physical surrounding of the material. The amounts
required for a 20 Kiloton (Kt) bomb would be in the order of 5–6kg of
Pu-239, and 25kg of HEU, as an absolute minimum. Although if used in
their metal form, even more would be required because some of it would be
lost during the machining process.9 A more recent estimate puts the amount
required by a state possessing a low technical capability at 6kg of plutonium
or 16kg of HEU. With the most sophisticated designs it is estimated that
only 3kg of Pu-239, or 5kg of HEU would be enough.10
Because of the high levels of security surrounding virtually all states’
stockpiles of Pu-239 and HEU, terrorists will probably find it easier to
acquire Pu-240 (otherwise known as reactor-grade plutonium because it is
created in the fuel rods of nuclear power reactors as one of the main by-
products of nuclear power generation) and uranium comprising less than 94
per cent U-235. Whilst both are capable of being used in nuclear weapons,
significantly more material would be required, perhaps in the order of 7–15
kg of Pu-240, and the finished device would be capable of producing only
a low-yield explosion.11
Sophisticated nuclear weapon designs would require less fissile material,
but it is extremely unlikely that terrorists would be able to develop such
weapons because it took weapons laboratories in the nuclear weapon states
many years of experimentation and testing with large cadres of highly
educated and experienced personnel. Since such weapons would require
much higher levels of skill and considerably more experimentation to
complete,12 there is a much higher likelihood of failure, therefore terrorists
are more likely to opt for a crude design.
Nuclear weapon designs are based on one of two basic principles:
implosion or the gun principle. With implosion devices, conventional
explosives are used to compress a sphere comprising a sub-critical mass of
fissile material into a smaller, ‘critical mass’ which initiates the explosion.
With the gun design, two sub-critical masses of HEU are fired together,

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 37
becoming a ‘critical mass’, which initiates the explosion. The gun design is
the easier of the two to develop but is only effective with HEU, whilst the
implosion design requires a greater range of equipment and skills and a lot
of testing. A crude nuclear device might weigh a tonne or more, while a
sophisticated device might weigh a few hundred pounds.13
Developing a nuclear weapon design is a serious problem, but not
if a group has access to individuals with the right skills. Some analysts
consider that a Physics PhD student could design a crude nuclear device.
Schematic drawings of basic nuclear weapons similar to those dropped on
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 are readily available,
but the detailed design drawings and specifications that are essential for
fabricating actual parts are not. Preparing such drawings requires the
direct participation of individuals who are thoroughly versed in several
quite distinct disciplines such as: the physical, chemical, and metallurgical
properties of the various materials being used, as well as the characteristics
affecting their fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation effects; technology
concerning high explosives and/or chemical propellants; as well as some
aerodynamic, electrical circuitry and other skills.14 This suggests that a team
of at least three engineers with the right skill-mix is required. Terrorist
groups might have difficulty building a team with such diverse skills, but
people with the necessary skills can be found in the general scientific and
technical community, therefore it could conceivably be done.
One of the advantages of crude nuclear weapons is that they can utilize
Pu-240 and low enriched uranium. Victor Gilinsky, an American Nuclear
Regulatory Commissioner, argued that:
So far as reactor grade Plutonium is concerned, one fact is that it
is possible to use this material for nuclear warheads at all levels of
technical sophistication. In other words, countries less advanced than
the major industrial powers but, nevertheless, possessing nuclear
power programs can make very respectable weapons … Of course,
when reactor grade plutonium is used there may be a penalty in
performance that is considerable or insignificant, depending on the
weapon design. But whatever we might once have thought, we now
know that even simple designs, albeit with some uncertainties in
yield, can serve as effective, highly powerful weapons – reliably in the
kiloton range.15
The ease with which a nuclear weapon could be constructed by a terrorist
group was discussed in detail by Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene

38 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Eyster, William Marman and Jacob Wechsler for the 1985 International
Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. They argued that crude
nuclear devices that are guaranteed to work without the need for extensive
theoretical or experimental demonstration could potentially be constructed
by a group that had no previous experience of designing or building nuclear
weapons. Although the amounts of fissile material required would need to
be several times larger than the minimum quantity required by experienced
weapon designers.
The devices considered by Mark and his colleagues were similar to those
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which had yields of approximately
20Kt. However, it is possible to develop even cruder weapons that are
more unpredictable and inefficient, but which could still provide a powerful
explosion. The likely yields of such crude weapons are difficult to estimate
with accuracy, although one estimate suggests ranges of between a few tens
of thousands of tonnes of TNT and 1Kt might be achievable.16 Whilst this
is considerably smaller than the weapons deployed by the nuclear weapon
states, it is still a lot larger than conventional explosives, and would also
guarantee a significant level of radioactive contamination.
The quickest and easiest way to make a crude nuclear weapon would be
to use either uranium or plutonium oxide powder, with no post-acquisition
processing or fabrication. Although the amount of uranium or plutonium
required would be considerably greater than if it was used in its metal form,
perhaps as much as 35kg.17 The plutonium oxide would need to be contained
in a spherical vessel in the centre of a large mass of conventional high
explosive armed with detonators that are arranged to go off simultaneously.
When detonated, the shock wave would compress the plutonium enough
to produce some fission, with a potential explosive yield in the order of
tens or hundreds of tonnes of TNT, along with substantial radioactive
contamination. With such a primitive device no effort would be made to
focus the shock wave and so the high explosive would simply need to be
stacked around the plutonium.18 Reducing the oxide to metal form would
take a number of days, and require specialized equipment and techniques,
but could theoretically be within reach of a technologically sophisticated
group.19
There are a number of potential hazards in developing nuclear weapons,
including those arising from the handling of high explosives, the possibility
of inadvertently causing an explosion, especially when conducting a number
of chemical processes, and the chemical toxicity or radiological hazards
inherent in the materials used.20 Failure to manage these risks could lead
to the failure of the project, yet these problems are not insurmountable to

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 39
knowledgeable engineers. The toxicity of the metal and its extreme chemical
radioactivity would necessitate the use of glove boxes, protective suits and
masks,21 but little shielding is necessary and sensible precautions against
achieving criticality accidentally could also be taken.22
Whilst developing a nuclear weapon is clearly an extremely difficult
proposition, the US OTA argued that:
A small group of people, none of whom has access to the
classified literature, could possibly design and build a crude nuclear
explosive device. They would not necessarily require a great deal of
technological equipment or have to undertake any experiments. Only
modest machine shop facilities, that could be contracted for without
arousing suspicion, would be required. The financial resources for
the acquisition of necessary equipment on the open market need not
exceed a fraction of a million dollars. The group would have to include
as a minimum, a person capable of researching and understanding the
literature in several fields and a jack of all trades technician … There
is a clear possibility that a clever, competent group could design and
construct a device which would produce a significant nuclear yield
(i.e. a yield much greater than the yield of an equal mass of high
explosive).23
Radiological Weapons
Radiological weapons, or ‘dirty’ bombs, are considerably easier to develop
than nuclear weapons. The purpose of such weapons is to spread radioactive
contamination rather than cause casualties through blast effects. There
are several way of dispersing radioactive material as a contaminant. The
most crude is to pack it around a conventional bomb and let the explosion
disperse it. Constructing such a device requires no special skills apart from
knowledge of how to protect oneself from the radioactivity. Other more
sophisticated methods could involve using radioactive isotopes that can be
dissolved and sprayed, whilst some others can be vapourized or burned.24
This could include introducing them as powders into the ventilation systems
of buildings, or dispersing them through spraying devices in the atmosphere,
or merely by dumping them into the water supplies of buildings.25 However,
these methods would require special technical skills.26
Radiological weapons could potentially utilize a wide range of
radioactive materials, but for maximum effectiveness they require an isotope
with a relatively short half-life in order to ensure maximum radiation effects.

40 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Some suitable isotopes such as strontium-90, caesium-137 and cobalt-60,
have already been smuggled out of the former Soviet Union (FSU).27
Strontium-90 is particularly hazardous because it becomes congested in
the bones, and can cause cancer, whilst caesium-137 causes problems for
decontamination because it sticks to surfaces, and cobalt-60 emits gamma
rays of high energy which produce hazardous radiation levels for a long
period of time. Plutonium is also capable of being scattered from these
devices, in the form of small particles that are capable of being inhaled,
irradiating surrounding lung tissue and possibly causing lung cancer.28
Chemical Weapons
Chemical weapons are lethal man-made poisons that can be disseminated as
gasses, liquids or aerosols. There are four basic types.29 The first category
comprises choking agents such as chlorine and phosgene, which damage
lung tissue causing the lungs to fill with fluid. The second category comprises
blood gases such as hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride. These agents
attack enzymes in the human body preventing the synthesis of molecules
used by the body as an energy source, or interfere with the transport of
oxygen in the blood, causing vital organs to shut down. The third category
comprises vessicants, or ‘blister’ agents, such as mustard gas and lewisite
which cause burns and tissue damage to the skin, the inside of the lungs,
and other tissues throughout the body. The fourth category comprises
nerve agents. These are the most lethal CW and they kill by disabling
crucial enzymes in the nervous system. Nerve agents are divided into two
groups: G-agents such as tabun, sarin and soman, which mainly cause death
after inhalation; and a V-agent called VX. Soman is the most lethal of the
G-agents, and sarin is three times more lethal than tabun,30 whilst VX is
more lethal than all three of the G-agents. There are three methods of
producing chemical casualties: through inhalation, absorption through the
skin, and ingestion through the digestive tract. Sarin is an example of an
inhalation agent. VX is one of the most dangerous agents relying on the
skin route, whilst cyanide is a common ingestion agent.31
In addition, many commercially available chemicals or insecticides
can be used as weapons in their own right. These include organochlorine
insecticides, herbicides, carbamates, and toxic industrial chemicals such as
hydrogen cyanide, carbonyl chloride, cyanogen chloride, and arsine, all of
which have been used as CW in the past.32 Chlorine which was used as a
CW during the First World War is now a standard industrial product, and is
easy to obtain in countries such as Iraq, where it is used as a water purifier

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 41
and cleaner.33 Phosgene oxime, another one of the original CW agents, is
now commonly used in industry and is shipped all over the USA.34 There
are a host of other commercially available chemicals that could potentially
be used as crude CW, including osmium tetroxide which was at the centre of
an alleged plot in London in 2004.
The effectiveness of a CW depends to a great extent on the nature of
the agent and the conditions under which it is used. Hydrogen cyanide
evaporates so quickly that its use in an open environment is limited, whilst
mustard gas and VX are not so volatile and therefore more suitable for use
outdoors.35 Even those agents that are suitable for use outdoors must be
delivered in huge doses in order to inflict mass casualties. It would require
hundreds of thousands of kg of sarin per km2 to kill large numbers of
people, or 4 tonnes of VX to cause several hundred thousand deaths if
released in aerosol form in a crowded urban area. To pollute a 5 million litre
reservoir, it would require 10 tonnes of potassium cyanide to kill a single
person drinking 100ml of untreated water.36 Therefore, assuming perfect
dispersal and optimum weather conditions, the lethality of different types
of CW varies: 1.36kg of chlorine can theoretically kill 5,000 people; whilst
710g of hydrogen cyanide and 10g of sarin could theoretically be enough
to produce the same effect.37 A poor delivery mechanism will lessen the
effectiveness of these agents even further.
CW are amongst the easiest CBRN weapons to produce. The production
processes of some agents are simple, accurately described in publicly available
sources and require only commonly available laboratory glassware, good
ventilation and commercially available chemicals. However, the equipment
and safety requirements will vary according to the agent being produced,
the synthesis path chosen, and the purity of the agent. A high-purity agent
would be difficult to achieve using some production processes without the
use of specialized equipment. But equipment needs can be minimized by
choosing a specific agent and production paths that avoid high-energy,
high-pressure, and high-temperature reactions.38 For instance, hydrogen
cyanide is very easy to produce, whilst tabun is the easiest of the G-agents
to produce. Large-scale production facilities are unnecessary, and it requires
only an individual who has a sound knowledge of organic chemistry and
access to a laboratory with some sophisticated equipment. Indeed, certain
CW can even be manufactured in a kitchen or basement in quantities
sufficient to cause large numbers of casualties. Sarin for instance, dates from
the 1930s, and can now be made in more than a hundred different ways,
most of which are fairly simple processes that would not tax the abilities
of a graduate-level chemist. The most difficult step is probably finding the

42 The Changing Face of Terrorism
formula.39 Greater expertise and some specialized equipment is required
for producing the most toxic CW agents, but they could theoretically be
within the reach of a terrorist group that had access to individuals with the
necessary technical skills.40
Laboratory-scale production, however, will yield only small quantities
of an agent, and it would take some time before such small-scale facilities
could produce enough agent for an effective mass casualty attack against an
outdoor target.41 Therefore, should terrorists succeed in developing CW
in a laboratory-scale facility, they face two additional technical problems:
improving the yield of the production process; and scaling up the process
to produce larger quantities.42 Some processes may also produce only low
yields of an agent in proportion to the quantities of precursors being used,
and having to procure large quantities of precursors will increase the cost
and potentially attract attention. Taken together, these two factors suggest
that terrorists will face significant practical difficulties in producing the large
quantities of an agent required for indiscriminate mass casualty attacks.
Aum Shinrikyo is a useful case study of a terrorist group developing and
using CW. It was a wealthy organization that had 300 engineers among its
membership and access to much of the dual-use equipment and materials
required for CW production. Consequently, the limitations evident in the
Aum Shinrikyo programme should apply with greater effect to groups with
fewer resources. Whilst the cult’s engineers successfully produced sarin,
tabun, VX, mustard gas, and hydrogen cyanide, it took them approximately
two years to produce the first batches of sarin in its laboratories.43 The cult
then attempted to switch to large-scale production in a specialized facility
that was designed to be capable of producing 2 tonnes of sarin in a day.44
Despite having computerized high-tech manufacturing technology, there
were repeated and major leaks of toxic substances, some of which overcame
the workers and escaped the confines of the building.45 As a result, Aum
Shinrikyo only produced approximately 30 litres of sarin in total.46 In
addition, the sarin which it produced in its laboratories for use in the attack
on the town of Matsumoto was very pure, but when it switched to industrial
scale manufacture the quality of the sarin dropped to approximately 39 per
cent because of problems in the manufacturing process.47
Other terrorist groups with fewer resources will probably have to rely
on lower technology, and smaller-scale facilities. Therefore it seems unlikely
that most terrorist groups will be able to manufacture a high-quality agent
in bulk. Consequently, groups that are intent on using CW to inflict large
numbers of casualties will probably be forced to produce agents in small
batches, and stockpile it until they have enough for their purposes.

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 43
Biological Weapons
There are four main categories of biological agents that can be used as
weapons. The first comprises viruses, which are micro-organisms that
multiply inside the host’s body. This includes smallpox, plague, ebola, and
cholera, which are spread through coughing, sneezing, and contact with
body fluids. The second category comprises bacteria that cause illness
by reproducing themselves or by producing toxins inside human tissues.
Bacterial toxins include anthrax, botulinum, and typhoid. The third category
comprises rickettsia, which are bacteria that, like viruses, can only live inside
host cells. They are carried by rodents, and insects such as lice, ticks, and
fleas. Rickettsia can cause Q-fever, psittacosis, and Rocky Mountain Spotted
Fever.48 The fourth category are biological toxins. These are non-living,
and as a result are not contagious. This category includes ricin, which is
produced from castor beans.
In general terms, viruses are more difficult to culture and develop into
weapons than bacteria or toxins. Past incidents of BW terrorism indicate
that the BW that terrorists are most likely to produce are ricin, plague,
tulameria, botulinum, and anthrax, although Aum Shinrikyo also acquired
Q-fever.49 The FBI lists plutonium, botulinum toxin, and ricin, as the three
most toxic substances in the world.50 However, both botulinum toxin and
ricin are notoriously difficult to weaponize, and botulinum also deteriorates
quickly in the environment. Therefore, despite their toxicity, they are difficult
to use as WMD.51
The effectiveness of any BW will be affected by factors such as the
particular pathogen used, its growth conditions, the age of the culture
and the methods of preparing and preserving it, all of which will affect its
ability to survive dissemination.52 The particles of toxins and pathogens
used in BW are very small (approximately 1–5 micrometres in diameter),
and because they are light and fluffy they do not fall to earth very quickly.
This means that given the right weather conditions certain BW can drift for
up to 100 miles. Their tiny size means that they can be sucked deep into the
lungs, where they stick to the membranes and then enter the bloodstream
where they begin to replicate. One particle of some pathogens is enough
to kill, although the lethality of others is dependent upon the inhalation of
a sufficient quantity. As a consequence they do not need to be produced
in such large quantities as do CW in order to cause significant numbers
of casualties. However, most BW are vulnerable to humidity, desiccation,
oxidation, air pollution, heat, shock, and ultraviolet light, all of which makes
them difficult to weaponize and use effectively.53 Like CW, biological agents

44 The Changing Face of Terrorism
can therefore be differentiated by their degree of persistence. The rate at
which they die or decay in the environment is known as the ‘decay time’.
Some pathogens such as anthrax have a long decay time, but others such as
ricin and botulinum toxin have a relatively short decay time.
As is the case with CW, the development of BW does not require any
particularly specialized technology. The laboratories of universities and the
biotechnology industry are adequate for the purpose, and information on the
necessary science and technology is now openly available. Culturing micro-
organisms and bacteria, or growing and purifying toxins, is inexpensive
and can be accomplished by anyone with university level training and good
laboratory skills. There are now many more people in the world who are
sufficiently educated and trained to complete such a task.54
There are potential safety hazards for individuals working with biological
agents, so industrial facilities which handle them have rigorous safety
mechanisms and procedures in place to protect their staff. This typically
includes the use of protective suits and secure facilities that are specifically
designed for handling dangerous pathogens. This will include negative
pressure laboratories in which the air pressure is kept artificially low in order
that any loose pathogens cannot escape the confines of the laboratory.
Terrorists with the necessary skills to culture and work successfully with these
pathogens should be aware of the basic safety procedures and equipment
that would enable them to work with a reasonable degree of safety, but
standards may not be as high as in an industrial facility. For instance, Aum
Shinrikyo scientists working with botulinum toxin allowed particles of the
toxin to flake into the air as they were grinding it into a powder. They were
protected by contamination suits, but after work they simply took their
suits off without decontamination. One worker commented that, ‘If the
powder had worked, we would be dead’.55 There are also other examples of
situations in which people have worked on BW with little or no protection,
and survived. During the Second World War, British production of anthrax
weapons was undertaken behind sheets of glass, and the workers had no
respiratory equipment. Whilst UN weapon inspectors working for the
United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) discovered that
Iraqi engineers had been working on micro-organisms in basic laboratory
cabinets.56
Therefore, in some respects BW might look easier to develop than some
forms of CW, in terms of access to the necessary materials and the level of
expertise required, but there are some key technical problems which have to
be solved in order to produce an effective BW. The nature of these problems
can be discerned from the issues involved in developing an anthrax weapon.

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 45
The key to an anthrax weapon is to create and disperse spores containing
particles of exactly the right size for inhalation and dispersal, i.e. between
1 and 5 micrometres. An OTA report concluded that engineering Bacillus
anthracis into a weapon is a low technology procedure, which does not pose
any insurmountable problems. The difficult part is not culturing the toxin,
but processing the crude slurry into a form that is suitable for dispersal. This
requires drying it, adjusting the particle size, and loading it into a dispersal
device. At some stage it would also be a sensible precaution for the group
to test its weapon to make sure that it worked effectively. A project of this
complexity would require practical engineering skills, months of systematic
effort, and also luck. Basic microbiology skills that a university undergraduate
would learn should be sufficient to isolate Bacillus anthracis. Using a 100-litre
culture vessel several kilogrammes of crude slurry containing billions of
spores could be produced in a matter of days. Drying the slurry is a difficult
procedure, but basic freeze-drying procedures can be used. Milling the
powder into particles of the desired diameter is the most demanding part
of the whole process, mostly because of the danger of contamination.57
A few essential details of these procedures are not commonly known.
The degree of difficulty is evident from the fact that despite years of
development time, Saddam Hussein’s BW engineers never mastered the art
of weaponizing bacterial agents. Following the 1991 Gulf War, UNSCOM
inspectors only found crude BW preparations mounted on bombs and
missiles. Aum Shinrikyo was equally unsuccessful in weaponizing any
pathogen. It operated a BW laboratory from 1990, in which it attempted
to aerosolize botulinum toxin, anthrax, and Q-fever, but failed.58 One
suggestion is that the botulinum and anthrax may not have been properly
incubated,59 others believe that the Cult only managed to grow weak strains
of Clostridium botulinum and Bacillus anthracis, and had difficulty aerosolizing
them into a respirable particle size.60 But even in their crude form, these
pathogens are still deadly. If anthrax slurry were left in an underground
railway tunnel, the wind from passing trains would dry it out and disperse
the spores, potentially leading to thousands of casualties.61
In the 1990s there was considerable speculation about the prospect
of terrorists developing genetically modified pathogens which combine
DNA from different pathogens to produce a new pathogen with different
characteristics such as increased lethality, greater ease of weaponization,
greater resistance to antibiotics, or greater resistance to environmental
factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union led the way in developing
such weapons, and deployed modified forms of plague and anthrax in its
strategic arsenal. Smallpox is another pathogen which is amenable to genetic

46 The Changing Face of Terrorism
engineering. However, a certain amount of caution must be exercised in
assessing terrorists’ ability to exploit this technology. Genetic engineering is
at the cutting edge of biotechnology research, requiring modern laboratory
facilities, and terrorists already face huge technological problems in
culturing and weaponizing naturally occurring pathogens. Whilst the Soviet
Union was successful, it operated a massive industrial infrastructure and
conducted large numbers of tests on live animals. Testing is essential because
genetically modified pathogens are frequently weaker than the original,
because modifications which might strengthen some characteristics, such
as penetration, could weaken other features such as lethality.62 It is generally
agreed that reliable genetic engineering of pathogens cannot be guaranteed
because not enough is known about the interactions between the different
characteristics of pathogens, although this could change as scientific
knowledge develops.63
Some members of Aum Shinrikyo were interested in genetic engineering
and attempted to go down this route by procuring sophisticated molecular
design software that made it possible to re-engineer the molecular structure
of chemicals or micro-organisms, but they were unsuccessful.64 Aum
Shinrikyo never even got beyond cultivating and weaponizing natural
pathogens, and doubts have to be expressed about what it could have
achieved with this equipment even in the medium term. Therefore, the
development of genetically modified BW by a terrorist group remains a
theoretical threat only. It is extremely doubtful that terrorists would choose
to try and develop a genetically modified pathogen, considering the number
of easily obtainable natural pathogens with the requisite lethal potential that
are available. The majority of terrorist groups that have attempted to develop
BW with limited facilities and resources have struggled to produce weapons
from even naturally occurring pathogens, therefore it is highly unlikely that
they would choose an even more difficult technological option. Over time,
however, these considerations might change as the biotechnology industry
becomes more sophisticated and scientific knowledge disseminates.
Acquiring the Materials to Develop WMD
Over the years there have been a number of reported attempts by terrorist
groups to steal nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. In January 1990,
Armenian rebels were reported to have attacked a Soviet army base in
Azerbaijan with the aim of stealing nuclear weapons, but the report cannot
be corroborated.65 In 1996, a report produced by the FBI and the CIA,
claimed that agents of the Iraqi government and Islamic Jihad had offered

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 47
rogue Russian nuclear scientists US$2 million for a nuclear warhead.66 In 1998,
the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) is reported to have attacked a US Army
base in Germany in an attempt to steal nuclear weapons.67 Whilst in 2001,
Colonel General Igor Valynkin head of the organization responsible for
nuclear warhead storage in Russia announced that two terrorist efforts to
reconnoitre nuclear weapon storage sites had been detected.68 However,
the only known instance of a terrorist group successfully stealing a CBRN
weapon occurred in 1975, when a large quantity of mustard gas (53 litres
according to one report) was stolen from a US army base in West Germany.
This was followed by threats from the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) to use it
against Stuttgart, and possibly other cities, unless an amnesty was granted to
all political prisoners.69
It is also conceivable that a terrorist group could purchase a ready made
CW. Between 1975 and 1976 reports from Vienna claimed that an Austrian
chemist, Richard Konigstorfer, and a criminal gang led by his brother, Johann
Konigstorfer, attempted to sell tabun, sarin, and large quantities of diisopropyl
fluorophosphate to terrorists and criminals.70 Whilst in 1996 the Turkish
authorities seized 19 containers of mustard gas and one container of sarin
from a smuggler in Istanbul who claimed that he had acquired them from a
KGB officer in Russia.71
The extreme difficulty of stealing CBRN weapons from a state, means
that terrorists have to develop these weapons for themselves. After gathering
the relevant theoretical knowledge and procuring the necessary production
facilities, the next step is acquiring the raw materials to develop the weapon.
The relative ease, or difficulty, with which a terrorist group can acquire the
raw materials to produce CBRN weapons varies considerably according to
the type of device that is being sought. CW precursor chemicals are the
easiest to acquire if development is taking place in a developed state, BW are
slightly more difficult, and nuclear materials are the most difficult to acquire.
Acquiring fissile material is the most difficult element of nuclear weapon
development. Natural uranium needs to be enriched in order to make an
effective bomb, because it comprises only 0.7 per cent U-235. Plutonium
is not a naturally occurring substance but is created in the fuel rods of
nuclear power reactors during the energy production process, and has to
be separated from the other elements of the fuel rods.72 Both processes are
very difficult to master, even for states, so it is not credible that a terrorist
group could produce its own HEU or plutonium.
Instead, the most likely way for terrorists to acquire fissile material is
to either steal it, or buy it on the black market. Since 1991, the principal
source of nuclear material for the black market has been the states of the

48 The Changing Face of Terrorism
FSU.73 In 2007, Russia possessed stockpiles of approximately 200 tonnes of
plutonium, and 1,000 tonnes of HEU.74 It also continues to produce large
quantities of fissile material for its civil and military nuclear programmes, as
well as low-enriched uranium for sale commercially. Following the break-
up of the Soviet Union, the accounting, control, and physical protection
measures required for the effective management and security of nuclear
materials at the nearly 1,000 sites that hold enriched uranium or plutonium,
and the facilities which hold other nuclear materials, began to break down.75
Many Russian facilities are extremely old and in a state of disrepair, which in
certain cases enables relatively easy access to intruders and insiders interested
in smuggling nuclear materials out. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
workers in the Russian nuclear industry have lost their privileged status and
are now very poorly paid. In conjunction with a chronic lack of funding,
this has led to a general decline in management efficiency at many facilities.
Lack of investment has meant that these problems were not rectified. To
ensure that adequate levels of security are re-instated, significant amounts
of investment are required.
In conjunction with these problems in the Russian civil and military
nuclear infrastructure, endemic corruption, weaknesses in the Russian
bureaucracy and the criminalization of Russian society has created
conditions which increase the incentives and opportunities to smuggle
nuclear material out of the country. Export controls are no longer fully
effective, officials can be bribed, and the law enforcement agencies are
overstretched and underfunded. Faced with intense economic hardship,
individuals have had to look after their own interests, which was reflected
in the early cases of theft and smuggling that were perpetrated by amateurs
seeking to improve their economic situation. Most worryingly this included
disaffected employees at nuclear storage and production facilities. Between
January 1993 and August 1994, 300 employees of the Russian nuclear
industry were arrested for illegally possessing, stealing, or transporting
radioactive waste. The persistence of Russia’s economic problems means
that the conditions which generate the motives and opportunities to steal
nuclear materials are likely to endure for some time.76
In February 2002, the National Intelligence Council’s annual report to
the US Congress stated that ‘weapons-grade and weapons-useable nuclear
materials have been stolen from some Russian Institutes. We assess that
undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know the extent
or magnitude of such thefts’. Viktor Yerastov, Head of Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy’s Nuclear Materials Accounting and Control Department
was quoted as confirming that ‘Quite sufficient material to produce an

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 49
atomic bomb was stolen from the Chelyabinsk region in 1998’, whilst the
US intelligence community reported that the Russian warhead security
system ‘was designed in the Soviet era to protect weapons primarily against
a threat from outside the country and may not be sufficient to meet today’s
challenge of a knowledgeable insider collaborating with a criminal or
terrorist group’.77
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the lack of national or site-
specific inventory systems, which means that it is not even known how much
nuclear material Russia and the other states of the FSU actually possess.
Sources indicate that 10 per cent of all nuclear material was hidden during
the Soviet era, and facility managers used to withhold surplus material
from accountancy measures in case there were production shortfalls in
subsequent years. The present governments of the FSU states do not know
where all of this material is located,78 which means that there are caches
inside FSU states which are unaccounted for, and could potentially enter the
black market with no risk of detection.79
The states of the FSU, however, are not the only potential source of
nuclear materials. All states with nuclear industries have stockpiles of nuclear
materials and there is an international trade in nuclear materials with nuclear
reactor fuel being transported globally. This creates potential opportunities
for terrorists to attempt to steal nuclear material in transit. In addition,
some of the isotopes that are suitable for use in radiological bombs have
civilian applications, particularly in hospitals. Therefore terrorists intent on
building a radiological bomb could potentially steal the necessary material
from civilian sources in any number of states. Since only small quantities
of isotopes are used for medical purposes, it would be difficult to acquire
large quantities from these sources, but if a group were content with using
a small-scale radiological weapon, it would be sufficient.
The smuggling of nuclear material is made easier by the relatively
small amounts of material that are required to make nuclear weapons,
with a critical mass being somewhere between the size of an apple and a
grapefruit.80 In each year since 1991, there have been numerous reports of
a wide range of nuclear materials being offered for sale on the black market.
The International Atomic Energy Authority’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking
Database, contains a total of 1,080 incidents, which occurred between 1993
and 2006. The reports on the database indicate that the illicit smuggling
of nuclear materials is a persistent problem, with about 16 incidents of
the unauthorized possession of nuclear material being reported a year.81
The database includes 14 incidents involving HEU and four incidents
involving Plutonium. In all of these cases however, the amounts involved

50 The Changing Face of Terrorism
were extremely small – at least an order of magnitude smaller than the
amount necessary to build a bomb. The largest amount was 2.73kg of HEU
(enriched to 87 per cent) seized by Czech police in December 1994, whilst
the largest amount of plutonium was 363g that was seized in Germany
in August 1994.82 However, a significant number of incidents involving
radioactive materials suitable for use in a radiological weapon, including
caesium-137 and cobalt-60, continue to occur each year.
The IAEA database shows that in 67 per cent of reported cases of
lost or stolen nuclear material the material is never recovered. With other
illicit markets the majority of the traffic tends to remain hidden from
the authorities. If the same is true in respect of the trafficking in nuclear
materials, there could be even greater quantities of material available than
are recorded on the IAEA database. This leaves a considerable degree of
uncertainty about the nature and quantities of the materials that have leaked
into the black market without being noticed or intercepted.
In the 1990s, there was concern about the growing professionalism of
the smugglers and the involvement of the Russian mafia. By 2007 however,
the smuggling was still largely being conducted by isolated suppliers. These
were primarily economic opportunists who had no pre-arranged buyers for
the material that they stole. Most importantly, the IAEA database shows no
clear nexus between organized crime and terrorism in this trafficking. Three
incidents involved undocumented connections with terrorist organizations,
but these cases displayed the same amateurish features as other incidents
and involved small quantities of material such as osmium 197, low enriched
uranium and depleted uranium.83
There are still concerns about the security of material being held in the
Russian civil nuclear sector, and potentially unaccounted for stocks. It is
possible that there have been further leakages of fissile material other than
those reported, and considerably more resources and work are required
in order for Russia to secure its facilities. This suggests that materials are
likely to continue to come onto the black market. Yet just because nuclear
materials are more available than they were in the 1970s and 1980s, this does
not mean that terrorists will be able to acquire them. They need to be able
to make contact with the smugglers, to outbid any rival buyers, and then be
sure that what they are being sold is what the smuggler claims it to be. This
suggests that the risks of terrorists acquiring nuclear material of any sort on
the nuclear black market are probably still quite small.
Obtaining biological pathogens, precursor chemicals for CW, and
relevant production facilities, is considerably easier than procuring nuclear
materials because the majority of the materials and facilities required for

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 51
producing CBW are dual-use, with the same technologies often being
widely used for peaceful purposes. Organisms and chemical precursors
which are used for pesticides, solvents, vaccines, medicines, beer, and even
some household products can be used to produce CBW.84 Aum Shinrikyo
procured much of the specialized dual-use production equipment for its
CBW programme, openly in the USA.85 This suggests that the procurement
of many of the necessary materials and technologies for producing CBW
will not necessarily raise any concerns within the supplier companies.
In certain states, biological pathogens can be acquired from biological
supply services such as the American Type Culture Collection in the USA.
Regulations concerning the release of pathogens from these sources have
been tightened considerably since the 1990s. This makes it more difficult to
acquire samples from official sources, but most pathogens and toxins can
still be collected or synthesized from natural sources. In 1992, members of
the Aum Shinrikyo visited Zaire on a medical mission to treat ebola victims,
but government officials believe that their real purpose was to obtain a
sample of the virus.86 The plague virus can be obtained from fleas on rats;
anthrax spores and botulinum can be recovered from contaminated soil;
ricin is developed from protein from castor beans; tricothene mycotoxins
are derived from corn; aflatoxin from peanuts; and saxitoxin is an organic
chemical synthesized by blue-green algae.87 However, obtaining pathogens
and toxins from natural sources can take time.
In industrialized states, chemical precursors for CW are easily available
because most of them are standard industrial products that are commercially
available. Because of their dual-use nature there are few, if any checks on
sales. Although exports of certain chemicals need export licences under the
rules of the Australia Group, which attempts to regulate the sale of chemicals
that might be diverted to CW production.88 There are some key chemicals
however, which are indicators of the possible production of CW. One of
the main pieces of evidence that the USA used as justification to destroy
the Shaifa chemical factory in Sudan in 1999, was the alleged presence of
the chemical empta in soil samples taken at the site. The sole use of empta
is the production of VX.89 As noted earlier, some commercially available
chemicals can also be used as CW in their own right.
As is the case with nuclear weapons and materials, the states of the
FSU also face significant problems in securing their former CW and BW
facilities. Russia holds considerable quantities of CW which are scheduled
for destruction under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC),90 but there are concerns about its security. Storage facilities for CW
in Russia are as inadequate as those housing nuclear materials. Photographs

52 The Changing Face of Terrorism
show old, rusty, and leaking munitions. Some blister munitions are stored
together with their fuses, and protection and control systems do not exist at
the stockpiles. Old CW have also been dumped at a large number of sites
which could be easily raided.91 A lot of CW agents, however, are stored in
bulk form, in 1 tonne containers, which greatly reduces the risk of leakage,
and much of it has deteriorated with age. The task of securing these weapons
and agents is complicated by the fact that there is only partial knowledge of
the location of chemical munitions and agents that had been stored for use
at testing sites all across the FSU.92 In contrast, Russian biological research
centres are not as vulnerable as nuclear or CW facilities, because essential
bio-safety measures restrict access to the critical areas, greatly reducing the
opportunities for theft and easing the task of physical protection, although
the threat from insiders is still a concern. However there have been no
reports so far of terrorists exploiting these weaknesses.
Delivery Mechanisms for WMD
If a terrorist group manages to develop or acquire a CBRN agent, it then
faces the problem of weaponizing it, so that it can be delivered effectively.
This technology is complex and involved. Previous incidents of CBRN
terrorism show that a number of individuals and terrorist groups have
succeeded in procuring or developing chemical agents and biological
pathogens and toxins, but then failed to weaponize them effectively. Nuclear
and radiological weapons are the easiest of the CBRN weapons to deliver,
because they can simply be loaded into trucks and driven to their target. This
is a common method used by terrorist groups to deliver bombs. It poses
no technological problems, and consequently increases the attractiveness
of nuclear weapons to terrorists, especially since the method of delivery
for CBW can have a significant affect on the effectiveness of an attack. In
fact, some analysts consider that developing effective dispersal mechanisms
is more difficult than developing some CW agents or biological pathogens
and toxins.
To maximize casualties from a CW attack, the terrorist ideally needs to
ensure that the target receives a continuous exposure to the agent. A single
release of an agent will be rapidly dispersed as the agent is blown downwind,
and basic civil defence measures would be effective in minimizing its effects.
Instead, what is needed is to maintain a high concentration of the agent in
an area for a period of time; the best way of achieving this is by a continuous
release of the agent,93 ideally through an aerosol apparatus. In addition, it
has to be released at a high enough altitude to spread over the target, but not

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 53
so high that it passes over it. Merely releasing it from the top of the nearest
tall building is not good enough to maximize casualties.
It is unlikely that a chemist will also have the necessary skills to develop
an aerosol dispersal mechanism, preferably with a remote-control firing
mechanism. The chemist would need a partner with engineering and
electrical engineering skills. Whilst individuals with the necessary skills
can be found within industry,94 the terrorist group will have to identify
and recruit such an individual, which entails a risk of detection. Without
such an individual, the group would have to fall back on a cruder dispersal
mechanism, with a concomitant loss of lethality.
Aum Shinrikyo came closest to effectively weaponizing a CW, but its
engineers discovered that producing sarin was easier than disseminating it.
Its first two attempts to kill Daisaku Ikeda, the leader of the Soka Gakkai
sect, with sarin, failed owing to a faulty delivery mechanism.95 The most
effective dispersal method is spraying the agent into the environment
as a gas. This requires raising its temperature, which is time-consuming
and dangerous. Aum Shinrikyo engineers originally converted a truck
that contained a mechanism which dripped the sarin onto a heater which
vaporized it, and it was then blown out of the truck by a fan.96 The system
was used in the attack on the town of Matsumoto in 1994, but the system
malfunctioned and caught fire, leaking gas fumes into the truck.97 It took
months to resolve the problem.98 In contrast, the Tokyo subway attack was
planned and executed in haste, which forced the Aum Shinrikyo engineers
to improvise a dispersal mechanism of putting sarin into plastic bags which
were pierced with sharpened umbrella tips, leaving the sarin to gradually
leak out and vapourize. In another attack by the cult, an improvised delivery
mechanism comprised a bag containing a condom full of sodium cyanide
and a condom full of hydrochloric acid. The acid would eat through the
rubber, and produce cyanide gas when it mixed with the sodium cyanide.
The effectiveness of such crude weaponization is unknown, but a simulation
concluded that the gas could have been sucked into the ventilation system,
and out onto a nearby platform, killing up to 20,000 people.99
Other groups have relied on low technology methods, such as
using conventional explosives to disseminate CW because of a lack of
weaponization expertise. Insurgent groups in Iraq, which were unable to
weaponize chlorine, had to resort to packing containers of chlorine around
conventional explosives in car bombs.100 Similarly, cyanide was packed
around the bomb used in the 1993 World Trade Centre attack but was
vapourized in the explosion, whilst in the anthrax attack on the USA in
2001, the anthrax was simply sent to named individuals in the post. This

54 The Changing Face of Terrorism
extremely crude means of delivery is useless for killing large numbers of
people but nevertheless proved to be an effective means of delivering a
lethal BW agent to a named individual and in causing significant disruption
to the everyday life of many people.
The most efficient aerosolization systems for BW require considerable
technological sophistication and remain beyond the reach of most states
and terrorist groups. However, less efficient aerosolization techniques
are commercially available, and could potentially be mastered by some
technologically capable groups, but their use would lead to a reduction in the
effectiveness of the pathogen or toxin, because mechanical stresses can kill
many micro-organisms.101 Whilst several terrorist groups have previously
succeeded in developing biological agents, it is not known whether they
ever succeeded in engineering those pathogens into a form that was
capable of being used in an efficient aerosol mechanism. An inability to
mill toxin particles to the correct size could simply force terrorists to use
them as contaminants. Aum Shinrikyo produced an aerosol dispersal system
for botulinum toxin which fitted into a briefcase. It held vinyl tubes of a
solution containing the toxin. Using the power from dry batteries, the toxin
was converted into steam, which was then blown out of the case by a small
electric fan.102 It remains unknown whether the device would have worked
because of Aum Shinrikyo’s problems with developing the toxin itself. As
time goes by however, aerosolization systems that are more suitable for the
dispersal of CBW will become increasingly available as their commercial
applications increase. So in the coming decades, the weaponization of CBW
might not be as difficult as it is currently.103
The operational use of CBW in open spaces is also subject to the vagaries
of the weather. These weapons do not have an ‘all-weather capability’, and
conditions must be exactly right in order to carry out an attack in the open
air. For instance, during the first Aum Shinrikyo attack at Matsumoto, the
wind was blowing in the wrong direction, which reduced the number of
casualties.104 Therefore terrorists would also need a good knowledge of
how these conditions might affect the operational use of their weapon, in
order to maximize casualties.
There are also a number of more unconventional delivery methods
which are open to terrorists. A terrorist who has been inoculated against
a specific form of infectious disease could potentially take a sample of
the pathogen onto an aeroplane, to infect the other passengers during
the course of the flight. Once the aeroplane arrived at its destination, the
infected passengers would then disperse and infect numerous other people,
before the first symptoms of the disease became apparent.

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 55
It is also possible to use BW to inflict mass casualties by contaminating
foodstuffs or liquids. Yet introducing biological agents into food-processing
plants assumes that the agent will not be killed in the production process
or identified by quality control procedures which are in place to detect
the presence of bacteria such as salmonella. It would be possible to
contaminate some foodstuffs or liquids after production, but contaminating
large numbers of individual packages would be a time-consuming task, and
would be less appealing and effective as a means of causing mass casualties.
Similarly, agents could be introduced into food in restaurants. But since
nearly all micro-organisms are killed by heat, they would have to be added
to food after cooking, which is why the Rajneeshpuram cult disseminated
Salmonella typhimurium by contaminating food in salad bars. This would restrict
casualties to the patrons of those specific restaurants, but this approach is
theoretically capable of causing large numbers of casualties if, for instance,
several fast-food restaurants were targeted simultaneously. Alternatively,
targeting a range of different venues over an extended period of time could
also serve terrorists’ purposes by disrupting commerce and everyday life.
The option of poisoning water supplies is also a poor method of
disseminating a chemical or biological agent. It would require large amounts
of CBRN materials or agents to produce a level of contamination sufficient
to inflict mass casualties, because the volume of dilution in even small
reservoirs, would drastically affect the amount of the agent needed. Most
pathogens and toxins will also be destroyed in reservoirs owing to the action
of sunlight and the subsequent addition of chlorine. The harm done by
those that remained would depend upon the dose, rate of consumption, and
the resistance of the individual who consumed the contaminated water.105
There are also a number of other factors related to reservoirs which would
impact upon the effect of a contaminant. These include: variable in-flow
and down-flow rates; thermal stratification of reservoir waters and seasonal
turnover; other biological activity that might remove the contaminant or
reduce its concentration; and potential reactions of the contaminant with
chemicals naturally present in the water. In addition, a number of filtration
and purification systems operate at water treatment plants which would
further reduce their effectiveness.106 In 1999, the threat by the SNLA to
contaminate water supplies in the UK attempted to bypass these systems by
pumping the weed killer paraquat, directly into water mains via fire hydrants.
But even so, toxicologists argued that there would be little danger.107
Contaminating the water supply of a specific installation or building is
a more feasible option, as is contaminating air conditioning systems. This
might be relatively easier than outdoor attacks but it still requires knowledge

56 The Changing Face of Terrorism
of ventilation systems. The precise number of casualties from such an
attack would depend upon a number of factors, including the rate at which
air is exchanged, the number of cubic feet serviced by the system, and the
precise dose of the agent that would be required to kill an individual. These
are complex calculations, and without a detailed understanding of them, the
success of an attack would require a significant amount of luck.108
Lack of an effective dispersal mechanism will force terrorists to use any
CBW agents that they manage to develop as contaminants. Yet even when
used in this fashion some CBRN agents are potentially capable of inflicting
significant numbers of casualties. However, lack of knowledge of some of
the other complex practical aspects associated with the form of delivery
chosen could also severely limit casualty levels in an attack. In the short term
this has two potential effects: to put WMD beyond the reach of terrorist
groups, and to reduce the effectiveness of attacks by the CBRN weapons
that terrorists do prove capable of developing. Nevertheless, technologically
sophisticated groups could, over time, prove capable of developing, or
acquiring, efficient dispersal mechanisms.
Finance
Assessments of the likely costs of developing CBRN weapons vary
depending upon the nature and scale of the exercise. Nuclear weapons are
the most expensive for a terrorist group to develop, primarily because of the
potential cost of acquiring the fissile material and the specialized production
machinery. Of the cases of nuclear smuggling that have been uncovered in
Germany in the 1990s, HEU was being offered at prices between $1 million
and $60 million, whilst plutonium was being offered at prices between
$700,000 and $1 million,109 even though none of the quantities involved
constituted a critical mass.
CBW are the cheapest weapon types to develop, especially in small-
scale production operations. The American white supremacist, Larry Wayne
Harris, paid only $240 for three vials of bubonic plague from the American
Type Culture Collection.110 One analyst has estimated the start-up costs of
a BW programme as less than $1 million, and botulinum toxin could be
produced for $400 per kg. Another analyst estimates that the production
of 1,000kg of sarin in a small laboratory could cost about $200,000. Many
of these estimates, however, do not specify whether they include additional
costs such as the need to procure equipment and materials.111 The greater
the quantity of CBW that a group intends to develop, the higher the cost.
Producing enough CW for a mass-destruction attack will require industrial-

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 57
scale production capacity and involve considerably higher costs. The degree
of technical difficulty in developing specific types of CBW agent will also
affect the cost, as will developing an effective delivery mechanism.
From an analysis of the technology it is apparent that terrorist groups
do not necessarily have to be well funded to develop CBRN weapons. There
are low-cost options available which can provide a reasonable assurance of
success. In some cases, the more basic technology of some of the lower-
cost options probably provides a higher assurance of success. Therefore,
assuming that a terrorist group makes reasonable technological choices,
finance should not be an inhibiting factor, except if the group intends to
produce the weapon on an industrial scale. Although it is also probably true
to say that the greater the financial resources that a group has at its disposal,
the better the weapons it could potentially produce. But having sufficient
financial resources is not enough in itself to guarantee success.
Nature of the Threat
From this analysis of the technology and the various other factors involved
in developing CBRN weapons, it is clear that there are varying levels of
difficulty associated with developing and using different types of CBRN
weapons. Terrorists have previously succeeded in developing specific agents
and made specific technical choices, for a number of reasons: the group’s
strategic objectives; the ease of acquiring the necessary raw materials; and
the relative ease of development. This suggests that a small number of CBW
are relatively easier to develop than the others, and the failure of terrorists
to develop other types hints at the technological difficulties involved. Due
to these technological problems, terrorists are going to have to undertake
systematic, long-term programmes, to develop even the most basic types
of CBRN weapons. The fact that Aum Shinrikyo took approximately two
years to develop its first batches of sarin is a useful indicator. There are three
general levels of threat which can be identified:
1 Most common threats: this is the threat which governments are most
concerned with in the short term, and represents the weapon types
which the largest number of terrorist groups would be able to develop.
This is the category into which the vast majority of the previous cases of
CBRN terrorism fit. It comprises the easiest of the CBRN weapons to
develop, because of ease of access to the necessary production facilities,
raw materials and expertise. It includes the use of commercially available
chemicals, as well as basic CW and BW such as chlorine, cyanide, and

58 The Changing Face of Terrorism
ricin. Some might be very crudely weaponized, but most are likely to be
usable only as contaminants. The persistent leakage of nuclear materials
from the FSU also puts radiological weapons into this category,
although acquiring this material could still prove to be more difficult
than developing CW and crude BW.
2 Intermediate threats: these require a greater degree of technical expertise
and access to more specialized production facilities. These threats are
going to be much less frequent, and will probably occur intermittently
over a longer timeframe. This group of weapons includes nerve agents
and biological agents such as anthrax and botulinum. The weaponization
of these agents might be more sophisticated than with the most common
threats, but dispersal of the agent will be inefficient. This is the category
into which the Aum Shinrikyo attacks on Matsumoto and the Tokyo
subway fit.
3 Least common threats: these are WMD, and are likely to occur very
rarely. It will be restricted to the terrorist groups that have the highest
technological skill levels and financial resources. This group of weapons
includes nuclear weapons, as well as efficiently weaponized CBW. No
terrorist group has yet proven capable of developing such weapons,
although Aum Shinrikyo might have achieved it given more time.
In categorizing these threats there are a number of independent variables
in play. The biggest assumption is that a rogue state will not deliberately
supply a WMD to a terrorist group. This is a theoretical risk which is
impossible to quantify, and is examined in greater depth in Chapter  8.
The second variable is that terrorists might steal or otherwise acquire a
complete CBRN weapon from a possessor state. Following the break-up of
the Soviet Union, reports circulated that a number of its nuclear weapons
had gone missing, but none of these reports has ever been substantiated.112
However, there has been one corroborated report of the smuggling of CW
from the FSU. But if freelancing individuals or criminal gangs did manage
to steal a WMD they would presumably sell it to the highest bidder, and a
proliferator state should always manage to outbid a terrorist group. WMD
possessor states hold them under tight control, so whilst this might be an
unlikely proposition, it would be unwise to consider that this scenario will
never happen, especially if the group can gain assistance from insiders.
The third variable is that terrorists can obtain the assistance of scientists
and engineers who had previously worked on the WMD programmes of any
of the possessor states. This would enable some terrorist groups to acquire
CBRN weapons much quicker than if they had to rely on engineers who had

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 59
never previously produced a CBRN weapon. More significantly, even low-
technology groups could suddenly become a threat if they gained access
to such individuals. There are already considerable concerns that engineers
in the FSU are selling their skills to proliferators. Although they appear to
be financially driven rather than ideologically driven, and few groups will
have the financial resources to pay them more than a state would. Serious
questions must also be asked about whether such people would be so
unscrupulous as to assist a terrorist organization, even for money. There is
a significant difference between assisting a proliferator state and assisting an
unpredictable terrorist group which is highly likely to use a WMD. Of the
independent variables, this is the most likely to occur, and is a real concern.
The potential list of CBW that terrorists could potentially develop is
enormous, but previous terrorist incidents suggest that the most likely
BW to be developed include anthrax, botulinum toxin, bubonic plague,
tulameria, and ricin; and the CW most likely to be developed and used
include insecticides, hydrogen cyanide, mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and
VX.113 It remains uncertain whether terrorists are most likely to prefer
CW or BW, because whilst CW might be relatively easier to produce, BW
are theoretically capable of producing higher numbers of casualties.114
Ron Purver also argues that CW are also more controllable than BW, and
will therefore suit operations with restricted objectives.115 He argues that
terrorists will select CBW agents depending upon a number of criteria,
including toxicity, ease of manufacture or other means of acquisition,
cultivation and dissemination, hardiness, immunity to detection and counter-
measures, rapidity of effect, and contagiousness.116 Terrorists could also
have to make decisions about whether to opt for the weapon types which
are best suited to their requirements, or those that they are most capable of
developing. Groups with a limited technical capability might be tempted to
go for the easiest technological options such as tabun and hydrogen cyanide.
In respect of BW, experts believe that terrorists would be more likely to
choose a bacteriological rather than a viral or rickettsial agent which are
easier to treat, more difficult to cultivate, and do not live long outside of a
host. In addition, some toxins are attractive because they are more stable.117
Right-wing extremist groups in the USA may have chosen ricin because the
processes for extracting and purifying the toxin from castor beans are well
known and relatively easy, and also perhaps because it is extremely toxic,
works quickly, and chemical toxicologists will not necessarily recognize it
because it is difficult for them to pick up on.118 Therefore it is both an easy
technological option and also a desirable one.

60 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Terrorists have a wide range of technological choices available to them,
which they will have to consider against their intended objectives. This does
not necessarily mean that a group will choose to develop the specific type of
weapon that is best suited to the objective that it is seeking to achieve. Aum
Shinrikyo was intent on committing genocide, but nuclear weapons or BW
would have been superior to sarin for this objective. The Aum Shinrikyo
case indicates that if a group fails to develop the type of weapon which
best meets its requirements, it is still likely to develop and use a less effective
alternative, which in turn will limit the level of casualties that they might be
able to inflict.
Al-Qaeda and CBRN Weapons
Besides Aum Shinrikyo, the only other group that has systematically
attempted to develop and procure CBRN weapons has been al-Qaeda and
its affiliated groups. Initial reports of al-Qaeda attempting to purchase CW,
including cyanide compounds, first emerged in 1996.119 Other reports of al-
Qaeda attempting to procure and weaponize BW agents, including anthrax,
botulinum, salmonella, ricin, yersinina pestis, and ebola, began to emerge
in 1999,120 at the same time as reports of al-Qaeda establishing CBW
production facilities in Afghanistan.121 In testimony before a court in the
USA in 2001, al-Qaeda activist Ahmed Ressam gave evidence of al-Qaeda
training its operatives to use CW. He reported that in a camp near Jelalabad,
‘Our Chief put cyanide in a box, added sulphuric acid and put small dogs
inside … They died in about four minutes’. He also described an oily form
of cyanide which could be smeared on door handles, and how he was taught
to disseminate cyanide through the ventilation systems of buildings. He
claimed that ‘the idea was to use it in US government buildings to kill as
many people as possible with no danger to yourself ’. He also suggested
that bin Laden was interested in acquiring aircraft to disseminate BW at low
altitude. This might explain the interest shown by Zaccarias Moussaoui and
Mohammed Atta in crop dusting aircraft, prior to 9/11.122 In July 2002,
the Director of the USA’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency publicly
announced that al-Qaeda’s interest in BW was focused mainly on anthrax.123
But whilst al-Qaeda researched the production of CBW, there is no evidence
that it had succeeded in weaponizing any agents.124 Despite these numerous
reports there was nothing to corroborate them, and it was not until the
ousting of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 that the extent of al-
Qaeda’s CBRN weapons development programme became apparent.

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 61
After the fall of Kabul, hundreds of documents relevant to CBRN
weapon development, written in Arabic, Urdu, Persian, Mandarin, Russian,
and English, were recovered. Analysis showed that the plans they contained
were very crude, but protocols for manufacturing botulinum toxin, ricin,
and cyanide were discovered,125 there was also documentary evidence of al-
Qaeda’s interest in sarin, mustard gas, and VX.126 One textbook contained
details of methods for poisoning air conditioning systems, and there was
also evidence of experiments with the air dispersal of cyanide. This material
did not come from a single source, but from people from several nationalities
with different educational backgrounds,127 and included a considerable
amount of material that had been downloaded from the websites of
extreme right-wing US groups.128 There was also evidence of al-Qaeda’s
interest in nuclear and radiological weapons. Notes were discovered that
explained how to detonate explosives to compress plutonium and trigger a
thermonuclear reaction.129
As the US-led coalition took control of the whole country, a number
of CBW development facilities were discovered. The Taliban Ministry of
Agriculture had been culturing anthrax spores, ostensibly for developing
vaccines for cattle. Bottles labelled anthrax, which had been developed from
strains imported from India, Iran, and Turkey, were reportedly discovered
inside a factory at Badram Bagh.130At the former al-Qaeda training camps at
Darunta and Farmada, evidence was discovered of CW production facilities.
At Darunta there was a CW laboratory run by a Saudi citizen called Abu
Khabab, who has been identified as al-Qaeda’s chief CW engineer. He left
behind containers of toxic liquids, including one marked ‘cyanide’. Much of
the equipment came from the United Arab Emirates and the chemicals came
from China.131 BW or anthrax laboratories were discovered in Kabul and at
Shah-I-Kot, and at an underground facility in the Turnak Farms area near
Kandahar airport, a cache of U-235, cyanide and hundreds of containers
full of unknown powders and liquids was reportedly discovered.132 US
troops also discovered laboratory equipment that would support ‘a very
limited production of biological and chemical agents’, in a house near
Kandahar.133 Further reports indicated that Ayman al Zawahiri’s home in
Kabul as well as five of 19 al-Qaeda labs in Afghanistan tested positive for
traces of anthrax.134
Al-Qaeda also has an interest in nuclear and radiological weapons,
but despite numerous reports dating from the late 1990s that al-Qaeda
was either attempting to purchase, or had purchased, nuclear weapons or
fissile material, no evidence was found in Afghanistan that it possessed a
nuclear weapon.135 But there was evidence that al-Qaeda had taken the first

62 The Changing Face of Terrorism
steps towards developing a nuclear weapon. A blueprint for a ‘Nagasaki-
type bomb’ and a so-called super bomb manual which discussed the
advanced physics of nuclear weapons were discovered, although doubts
have been raised about the accuracy of the blueprint.136 The most worrying
development was the discovery that two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists,
Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmoud and Abdul Majid, had met with bin Laden
in August 2001 and discussed the development of CBRN weapons. Inside
their villa in Kabul were discovered plans for a helium balloon which was
designed to disperse CBW, and articles entitled ‘Biological Warfare – an
Imminent Danger’, ‘Anthrax: The Threat’, and ‘Chemical Nightmares’.
Pakistani intelligence interrogated the two scientists and claimed that the
discussions were academic and in any case, neither scientist had the expertise
needed to construct a nuclear weapon.137
The evidence discovered in Afghanistan indicates that despite possessing
considerable resources, al-Qaeda had not managed to produce CBRN
weapons. The ousting of the Taliban regime was a significant set back for
the al-Qaeda CBRN weapon development programme, as was the death of
Abu Khabab in Pakistan in 2008. But this did not stop al-Qaeda’s ambitions
to develop CBRN weapons. Evidence came to light of terrorists linked
to al-Qaeda attempting to develop CBRN weapons in other countries. In
2001, two captured militants in Malaysia indicated that Jemaah Islamiyah,
a group affiliated to al-Qaeda, was attempting to procure and weaponize
biological agents.138 In Northern Iraq in 2003, American and Iraqi Kurdish
forces discovered a makeshift laboratory in a facility belonging to Ansar
al-Islam. The group had reportedly developed a cyanide cream that kills on
contact, as well as quantities of ricin, which were tested on animals.139 The
same year, police in London discovered a crude ricin production laboratory
in a flat in north London, but there was no evidence that any ricin was ever
produced there. With the capture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed in 2003,
captured documents indicated that al-Qaeda had plans and the necessary
materials to manufacture cyanide and two biological toxins, and was also
close to producing anthrax.140 Whilst in 2004, US officials announced
that a group of al-Qaeda members including Abu Mussab al Zarqawi had
established a CBW lab at Kirma in Iraq, which was being used to produce
ricin and cyanide.141 There have also been reports of CBW production
facilities linked to al-Qaeda affiliates in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia,
although subsequent sweeps by the Georgian security forces found no
evidence of these facilities.142
Despite these efforts there is no hard evidence that al-Qaeda, or any
of its affiliates have crossed the technological barrier to developing CBRN

Technical Opportunities and Constraints 63
weapons. In particular, no delivery mechanisms for CBW were ever
discovered in Afghanistan. It therefore remains restricted to using easily
available CBRN agents as contaminants, perhaps in the air conditioning
systems of buildings, or else in crude ‘dirty bombs’, such as the use of
chlorine truck bombs in Iraq.
Conclusion
The technology to develop CBRN weapons is now within reach of some
terrorist groups, therefore technological factors are not necessarily an
insurmountable obstacle to a determined and technologically sophisticated
terrorist group. Yet technological factors have posed serious barriers to
terrorist groups attempting to develop CBRN weapons in the past. The
previous cases of CW terrorism highlighted in Chapter 1 indicate that
only Aum Shinrikyo has ever succeeded in developing a nerve agent.
Other groups have had to rely on using commercially available chemicals.
Equally, the past cases of BW terrorism highlighted in Chapter 1 indicate
that terrorist groups have only ever succeeded in producing ricin, Salmonella
typhimurium, and typhoid. Significantly, Aum Shinrikyo tried and failed
to culture anthrax and botulinum toxin. Therefore it cannot be assumed
that a terrorist group will be able to develop CBRN weapons as soon as
it sets its mind to it. One of the biggest assumptions is that terrorists will
automatically be able to recruit individuals with the necessary skills merely
because increasing numbers of skilled people exist in the community. The
precise nature of the future threat will depend to a large extent upon the
skills of the engineers that terrorists might manage to recruit. WMD threats
will emerge only if a group can successfully build a team which is capable
of mastering weaponization technology. Yet even if a group does manage to
assemble such a team, it is not a simple task to develop these weapons, and
it will take time. The less time that a group spends, the poorer the weapon
that it is likely to produce.
These technological constraints indicate that lower-level CBRN threats
will be considerably more likely to emerge in the future than WMD threats.
This first order of threats consists primarily of commercially available
chemicals, radiological weapons, and crude forms of biological pathogens or
toxins, which have not been produced in significant quantities and are only
crudely weaponized. The second order of threats consists of nerve agents
and well manufactured biological pathogens and toxins which have been
produced in significant quantities but which have still not been effectively
weaponized. These threats are likely to occur only rarely. The development

64 The Changing Face of Terrorism
of WMD capable of causing large levels of casualties is the least likely threat
to emerge, and it remains to be seen whether a terrorist group will ever be
able to master WMD technology.

3
OPERATIONAL MOTIVATIONS
AND DISINCENTIVES TO USING
CBRN WEAPONS
If a terrorist group is technologically capable of developing CBRN
weapons, it is commonly assumed that operational imperatives will at some
stage encourage it to attempt to use them. Yet this has not necessarily been
the case in the past. A number of terrorist cells have proven capable of
developing ricin and hydrogen cyanide since 9/11, but these agents have
not been used. Chapter 2 indicated that the types of CBRN weapons that
terrorists are likely to be able to develop will be constrained by technological
factors, which will have an impact on how these groups might be able to
use the weapons that they might manage to develop. But equally, a group’s
strategy and tactics will also play a key role in determining what weapons it
decides to use. Whilst CBRN weapons will undoubtedly provide terrorist
groups with different tactical options, question marks remain over whether
some groups would necessarily want those options. One possible explanation
for the reticence of some individuals and groups to use these weapons is
that they do not fit easily with the group’s tactics. Terrorism is instrumental
behaviour, and it is commonly assumed that terrorists make rational choices
about ends and means, particularly that they will use the optimum weapons
and tactics at their disposal to achieve their objectives. The question is what
operational imperatives might encourage terrorist groups to procure and
use CBRN weapons.

66 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The Purposes of Terrorist Violence
Terrorist groups use violence for a number of complementary and often
interlinked purposes, which are derived from the strategy that the group is
pursuing and the tactics that it uses to carry out that strategy. These tactical
and strategic factors will vary between different groups, and can also vary
over the course of their campaigns of violence.
Propaganda
Terrorists use violence as a means to generate propaganda, in order to
publicize their cause to their constituency, their enemies, and the international
community. Terrorists need propaganda in order to maintain and build their
support base, and to keep political pressure on the state(s) with which they
are in conflict. All terrorist attacks serve this objective, although some types
of attack will have a higher propaganda value than others, and terrorists also
have to consider the potential propaganda losses from their actions.
The dynamic interrelationship between violence, propaganda, and the
political environment in which terrorists operate is illustrated by the case
of the PLO. Along with other Palestinian terrorist groups, such as Black
September, the PLO was hugely successful in generating propaganda during
the late 1960s and early 1970s with audacious attacks. This included the
killing of nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, and hijackings
such as the seizure of three airliners that were diverted to Dawsons Field
in 1970 and subsequently blown up. But by 1973, Yasser Arafat and other
PLO leaders were worried about the adverse effects that the large number
of attacks were having on world opinion, and attacks on moderate Arab
states such as Saudi Arabia threatened its financial backing. As a result, Black
September ceased its operations. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Arafat saw
the potential for the PLO to secure a political victory, so he imposed an even
stricter prohibition on terrorist activity by the various Palestinian groups.
This left only hardline groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP), and the Abu Nidal group to continue the campaign of
indiscriminate terrorism.1
In deciding how to generate propaganda, terrorists have to decide what
levels of violence and types of targets would most suit their objectives.
Higher levels of violence in themselves would not necessarily alienate
potential supporters or international political support, particularly if their
constituency believed that high levels of violence were justified. But an
increased level of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets does have the
potential to undermine support for terrorist groups. For example, the 1987

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 67
Enniskillen bomb in Northern Ireland, which killed 11 civilians, did not
affect the IRA’s core support, but the uncommitted were appalled by it. Polls
in the UK showed a steep fall in support for a withdrawal of British armed
forces from Northern Ireland, from 61 per cent to 40 per cent.2 Groups
could also choose to act against public opinion if they believed that their
ideology or politico-strategic circumstances demanded it. Hence, the Real
IRA chose to continue the war in Northern Ireland following the Good
Friday agreement in 1998, despite the consensus within the nationalist
community for the peace process.
In some situations, adverse publicity can actually be better than none at
all, especially if the group is in decline. For some groups, this consideration
might serve to remove constraints on both the levels and the targets that it is
directed against. But equally, media attention is rarely vital to the continued
existence of terrorist groups, therefore the media is more important to some
terrorist groups than others. Some groups do not seek publicity, especially
when the media reports particularly extreme incidents. Terrorists’ decision
making about what levels of violence are required for propaganda purposes
will therefore vary between different groups and in different politico-
strategic circumstances.
Extortion
Terrorist violence is also for extortion, by threatening or committing acts
of violence in order to coerce governments into making concessions. At
a strategic level, this extortion is intended to secure the major objectives
of the group, such as al-Qaeda’s efforts to change US foreign policy,
but terrorists have also used extortion for much narrower purposes. For
instance, a core objective of the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) in West
Germany during the 1970s was to secure the release of their comrades
held in prison. They attempted to achieve this by taking hostages such as
businessmen and diplomats and using them as bargaining chips. After an
initial success, the West German government refused to release the most
dangerous RAF prisoners that it held.3 This tactic gradually lost effectiveness
during the 1970s, as more and more states refused to accede to hijackers’
and kidnappers’ demands, and specialized anti-terrorist units were used to
secure the release of hostages. Nevertheless, all terrorist groups attempt to
extort concessions from governments. Bin Laden in particular, has issued
a number of extortion threats, by threatening to continue al-Qaeda’s mass
casualty attacks on the USA if it does not change its foreign policy.

68 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Deterrence
The threat of violence could also theoretically be used to deter states from
pursuing specific measures against the group or the community that the
group purports to represent. Examples of the use of threats of violence
for deterrence are rare, but Yitzhak Shamir argued that the Jewish terrorist
group LEHI used violence for the purpose of deterring the British
authorities from taking or damaging Jewish lives.4
Defeating the Security Forces of the State
It is impossible for terrorists, who are engaged in an on-going war against
the security forces of a state, to defeat those security forces because of the
disproportionate balance of power between the two, but they are capable
of achieving tactical victories. Consequently, attacking the security forces
is a tactic within a wider strategy of securing a political victory. This was
exemplified by the truck bombing of the US Marine Corps barracks in
Beirut, in 1983. This attack killed 241 marines and, in conjunction with the
bombings of the French barracks and the US embassy in Beirut, it led to
the withdrawal of the multilateral force that was overseeing the ceasefire
in the Lebanese civil war. The essence of this tactic is that killing soldiers
generates propaganda and heightens the cost of the conflict, thereby
generating public and political pressure on governments to accede to the
demands of the terrorist group. The targeting of soldiers also enables the
terrorists to legitimize their violence to a higher degree, because they can be
portrayed as agents of a repressive government and it enables the group to
claim that they are soldiers fighting a legitimate war. This can help the group
to maintain public support for its cause.
Breaking the Political Will of Public Opinion and Governments
All of these uses of violence feed into the ultimate purpose for which
terrorists use violence: to break the political will of public opinion and
governments to continue the struggle. One of the main ways that terrorists
attempt to achieve this is by attacking economic targets, in order to increase
the cost of war and force concessions from governments. A key element of
the IRA’s strategy was to increase the economic cost of continued British
engagement in Northern Ireland. Hence its bombing campaigns in the City
of London, and other commercial centres which caused billions of pounds
worth of damage.5 In doing so, it normally tried to avoid civilian casualties
by issuing warnings, thereby avoiding the negative publicity that arises
from killing civilians. In contrast, Gemaah Islamiya in Egypt used the same
tactic very differently by attacking foreign tourists in an effort to destroy

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 69
the Egyptian tourist industry. In 1992 this led to a 53 per cent decline in
tourism, damaging Egypt much more than any of Gemaah Islamiyah’s
other activities.6 This tactic reached its height in 1997, when 58 foreign
tourists and four Egyptians were massacred at Luxor. Whilst killing large
numbers of people is not necessarily a pre-requisite of such a strategy, this
single incident brought the Egyptian tourist industry to almost a complete
halt for a short period of time.
Most terrorists groups have also attempted to achieve this through
indiscriminate acts of violence. They hope to create a situation in which
public and political opinion will not accept any more death and destruction,
and comes to believe that the cost of conceding to the terrorists’ demands is
less than the cost of not conceding to them. The IRA attempted to achieve
this in the mid-1970s when bomb explosions were an almost daily occurrence
in Northern Ireland, and many such as the Birmingham pub bombings on
the UK mainland, were indiscriminate in nature.7 This campaign involved a
large number of incidents which though indiscriminate, typically resulted in
relatively small numbers of fatalities. Theoretically therefore, generating fear
and uncertainty amongst the target audience need not necessarily require
large numbers of casualties. However, the IRA’s campaign failed, as has
the campaign of suicide bombings by Palestinian groups in Israel, because
societies and governments often tend to be extremely resilient in the face
of terrorist violence. This might partly help to explain why al-Qaeda and
its affiliates have tried to achieve the same objective through perpetrating
a number of attacks against US targets that have involved high levels of
civilian casualties.
Using Different Tactics as Part of an Integrated Strategy
The tactics identified above are not mutually exclusive, and are normally
combined by terrorist groups in an integrated strategy. For instance, the
primary strategic aim of militant Islamists is to undermine the principal
foundation of the state: its hybah, the perceived invincibility that it cultivates
amongst its people. To undermine this hybah, the militants attempt to
demonstrate the failure of the state to protect its key leaders and strategic
installations. The second strategic aim of Islamists is to weaken the
foundations of the state, particularly by striking at its sources of revenue.
This has resulted in militant groups attacking the gas and oil industries in
Algeria, and tourism in Egypt. This will weaken the state’s ability to provide
the necessary services to its citizens, resulting in a decline in popular
support for the regime. The third objective is to provoke the ruling elites

70 The Changing Face of Terrorism
to strike back indiscriminately with emergency laws and other extreme
measures, which would alienate the population by disrupting everyday life.
By demonstrating its inability to deal efficiently with violent challenges, the
legitimacy of the regime will decline even further. The resulting popular
resentment is intended to fuel popular opposition to the regime and create
a social atmosphere that is receptive to militant ideas.8
A similar integrated strategy was outlined in the al-Qaeda training
manual, Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, that was discovered
in the aftermath of 9/11. It lists bloodshed and mass murder as ideal
characteristics for warriors, and states that an Islamic state cannot be created
except by war. It identifies a number of specific tactics for Islamist terror
cells including: kidnapping and assassinating enemy personnel, assassinating
foreign tourists; freeing captured brothers; destroying the places of
amusement, immorality and sin; destroying embassies and vital economic
centres; and destroying bridges leading into and out of cities.9 Other
terrorist manuals that were discovered in Afghanistan focus on attacking
civilian targets. The manual of Afghan Jihad states that ‘There must be plans
in place for hitting buildings with high human intensity like skyscrapers,
ports, airports, nuclear power plants and places where large numbers of
people gather such as football grounds … The choice of targets should
be as follows … like the statue of Liberty in New York, Big Ben tower …
in other words, hitting museums and monuments which have sentimental
value’. It also identifies Jews as targets, ‘In every country we should hit
their organizations, institutions, clubs and hospitals … the targets must be
identified, carefully chosen and include their largest gatherings so that any
strike should cause thousands of deaths’. A chapter on external pressure
states that ‘the strikes must be strong and have a wide impact on that nation
… Four targets must be simultaneously hit. In any of those nations so that
the government knows that we are serious’.10 So even though economic
targets are part of al-Qaeda’s target set, it also seeks to kill large numbers of
civilians at the same time. The rationale for this was summarized by Ayman
al Zawahiri,
The mujahid Islamic movement must escalate its methods of strikes
and tools of resisting the enemies to keep up with the tremendous
increase in the number of its enemies, the quality of their weapons,
their destructive powers, their disregard for all taboos, and disrespect
for the customs of wars and conflicts. In this regard we concentrate
on the following: the need to inflict maximum casualties against the
opponent, for this is the language understood by the West.11

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 71
Similarly, the strategies and tactics of far right groups in the USA are
primarily derived from traditional guerrilla and terrorist doctrines. The
Militia of Montana’s blueprint for battle planned to paralyse the US economy
and transport system; assassinate leading personalities in sport and the
arts for propaganda purposes; eliminate spies and traitorous government
officials; and generally ferment ‘an air of nervousness, discredit, insecurity,
uncertainty, and concern on the part of the government’.12 One of the main
tactics of the far right has been to target federal buildings. In 1996 federal
officers prevented a bombing campaign by the Arizona-based Viper Militia
which had intended to attack federal buildings such as the offices of the
FBI, the Internal Revenue Service, the Secret Service, National Guard, and
police departments.13
Integrated strategies contain a wide range of different target types,
including:
1 senior individuals in government and society, such as judges, politicians,
and military figures;
2 military and other security force personnel and facilities;
3 civilians;
4 economic targets such as shopping centres and the financial districts of
major cities, and other economic related targets such as transportation
systems;
5 government buildings, such as parliaments, government ministries or
embassies;
6 symbolic targets, usually with high sentimental or cultural value, such as
Big Ben in London, or the Eiffel Tower in Paris.
In analysing terrorists’ strategies and tactics, it is important to differentiate
between attacks in which the target is discriminate, and attacks in which the
target is indiscriminate, in nature. Many previous terrorist attacks involving
high levels of casualties were discriminate in nature because they were
targeting government or military facilities. The attacks on the Oklahoma
City federal building and the US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, are
examples of attacks intended to kill and injure discriminately, because
the terrorists were targeting people in specific sites, which by their nature
classified those people as ‘legitimate’ targets. The 1998 attack on the US
embassy in Kenya has also been cited as an example of indiscriminate mass
killing, but this attack actually fits into the same category as the Oklahoma
and Beirut bombings. Whilst the bombers were clearly prepared to accept
a number of indiscriminate casualties, the intention of the attacks was to

72 The Changing Face of Terrorism
kill the occupants of the embassy. Therefore, the actual outcome of the
attack should not be confused with the terrorists’ intentions. In contrast, the
bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993, the destruction of the World
Trade Centre on 9/11, and the Aum Shinrikyo attacks on the Tokyo subway,
are all examples of indiscriminate attacks, aimed at the general population
of a state, and the targets are selected primarily as a means to kill as many
people as possible.
It is also generally true that the better defended a target is, the less likely
a terrorist is to attack it. This is not to say that terrorists are deterred from
attacking well-defended targets, but because there are so many potential
targets available to them, they can simply choose a target which offers the
highest assurance of success. However, a key feature of terrorism is that
terrorist groups will continually innovate in order to defeat defences around
specific targets. This was evident from attacks such as the failed shoe-bomb
plot on transatlantic airliners in 2001, in which a British Islamist terrorist
smuggled a bomb on board an airliner hidden in the heels of his shoes.
Consequently, there are innumerable targets within any state that are of
interest to terrorists. Attacking any of these targets will be consistent with
a number of terrorist strategies and tactics, and typical terrorist campaigns
will generally involve most of these target types. Many terrorist campaigns
also evolve over time, moving through different phases in which different
tactics and strategies are pursued and then rejected, depending upon the
capabilities of the group, the perceived effectiveness of each tactic, the
attitudes of its leadership, and its politico-strategic situation at any given
time. Therefore, terrorist groups will differ over which types of target are
more important than others, and at which time. Merely generating public
hysteria and media attention is perhaps enough for some groups at certain
times; whilst for others attacking the organs of the state will be most
important. Other groups that might not think that they are achieving their
objectives, might come to believe that escalation to new levels of violence,
or focusing on new targets, might be necessary.
CBRN Weapon Effects
Terrorists’ interest in using CBRN weapons, and the roles in which they
might use them will partly be influenced by their effects, in terms of the
potential casualties that they can cause and the contamination that they
might leave behind afterwards.
An approximate idea of the potential destructiveness of small and
crude nuclear weapons can be ascertained from the impacts of the weapons

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 73
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the Second World War. The
Hiroshima bomb had an explosive yield of 13Kt, and killed 140,000 people
(by end of 1945; others died in subsequent years). The blast destroyed
everything within a radius of 1.6km, and started fires over an area of 11.4km2.
The Nagasaki bomb had a yield of 21Kt, and killed 80,000 people (by the
end of 1945). The blast destroyed everything within a radius of 1.6km,
and started fires up to 3.2km away from the blast site.14 The radioactive
contamination arising from nuclear explosions also persists for many years.
Cruder weapons than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs will have lower
blast and contamination effects. This means that nuclear weapons cannot
be used for discriminate attacks, even if the target is discriminate in nature,
because their use they would incur massive collateral casualties.
It is much more difficult to quantify potential casualty levels from
terrorist use of CW and BW. The quantities of nerve agents and BW agents
required to kill an individual are frequently very small. For example, only
500μg of ricin is enough to kill a person. But the likely casualty levels caused
by a terrorist attack using CBW will be dependent upon a number of factors
including how the weapon is used, the quality of the agent, the effectiveness
of the dispersal mechanism, the environmental conditions at the time of
the attack, as well as the effectiveness of the state’s medical systems in
treating the casualties. The Aum Shinrikyo attacks using sarin on the town
of Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway in 1995, which resulted in seven and
12 deaths respectively, but injured 144 and over 5,000 respectively, provide a
good indication of the potential impacts of a poor quality nerve agent, that
is poorly disseminated.
The result of a BW attack would be a largely simultaneous outbreak of
disease after an incubation period of a few days (depending on the pathogen
or toxin used, and the dose inhaled), which would spread rapidly if a
highly infectious pathogen were used. Because of the ability of biological
pathogens to multiply inside the host, BW can be fatal in minute quantities.
A few kilos of an effectively disseminated BW agent can potentially cause
tens to hundreds of thousands of casualties. The US Office of Technology
Assessment argued that a plane equipped with 100kg of anthrax and a crop
sprayer could potentially kill up to three million people in Washington, DC.15
But a biological agent without an effective system of dispersal cannot easily
cause casualties on this scale. BW are colourless and odourless which means
that unless the terrorists are caught in the act of releasing a pathogen, an
attack will go unnoticed until people start falling ill. The effects of BW can
also be managed through the use of vaccines and effective treatments, so an
efficient medical response from the state will limit the number of fatalities.

74 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Another feature of CBRN weapons is that their effects can spread
uncontrollably, even if they are used in a discriminate fashion. This was
evidenced by the murder of Alexander Litvinenko in 2007, by the poisoning
of his tea with the radioactive isotope polonium 210. Traces of polonium
were subsequently discovered at a number of locations across London and
affected a number of other people, necessitating a significant environmental
clean up.
However, it is BW which have the greatest potential to spread
uncontrollably. Evidence of this was apparent from the anthrax letters
of 2001 which despite being sent to a limited number of targets spread
anthrax spores uncontrollably and indiscriminately. The indiscriminate
spread of the spores was reflected in the diversity of the casualties, ranging
from postal workers, office staff, a seven-month-old baby who had been
in the ABC news headquarters, as well as police officers and public health
workers who had responded to the incidents. As the attack wore on, cases
of infection spread to include individuals who had no apparent links to
the mail system or the targets of the letters. One worked in the basement
of a hospital in New York City, and another was a housebound 94-year-
old.16 At one point the fear of uncontrollable infection was so high that the
Federal authorities considered vaccinating anyone who worked in a high
risk area. The indiscriminate spread of the anthrax was sufficient to make
the letters a threat of international concern. The international team which
was established within the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to
deal with the crisis received requests for assistance from 70 countries and
two territories.17
The propensity of CBRN weapons to spread contamination in
uncontrollable and unforeseen ways makes it difficult to use them in a
discriminate fashion, unless the perpetrator is prepared to accept collateral
casualties. Another feature of CBRN contamination that could affect the
choices that terrorists might make in developing and using specific weapon
types is its degree of persistence. Some CW such as soman, mustard gas, and
VX will persist in the environment, whilst others, such as sarin and tabun, do
not. Similarly, biological agents die when exposed to the environment, the
time this takes is known as the ‘decay time’. Anthrax has a long decay time,
whilst botulinum toxin and ricin have a relatively short decay time. CBRN
contamination can be cleaned up, but it takes time. These considerations
will all impact on whether and how terrorists might choose to use CBRN
weapons.

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 75
Ends and Means
Chapter 1 illustrated that some previous terrorist incidents involving CBRN
weapons were intended to cause indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks, whilst
others used, or intended to use, CBRN weapons in a controlled fashion
against specific targets. One of the major operational disincentives to using
CBRN weapons could be their inherent uncontrollability, because terrorists
generally seek certainty and control in their operations. Yet the majority
of the previous incidents of CBRN terrorism were attempts to use these
weapons in a controlled fashion. Whilst CBRN weapons, and WMD in
particular, is the optimum choice of weapon for achieving some goals and
attacking some target types, their utility for attacking the whole range of
potential target types is questionable. The ways in which terrorists might
use CBRN weapons will also be determined by the technical characteristics
of the weapons that they prove to be capable of producing. In particular,
inability to effectively weaponize chemical and biological agents will restrict
terrorists to using them as contaminants. In general terms, answers to
questions about whether terrorists would want to use CBRN weapons
and how they might use them will be partly determined by the operational
advantages that their use might be perceived to confer, weighed against the
operational disadvantages that their use might incur.
Assassinations
The assassination of political, judicial, military, and other individuals is a
traditional terrorist tactic. For maximum impact these attacks need to kill
only the target and minimize collateral casualties which could undermine
domestic and international support for the cause. However, some terrorist
cells have displayed a willingness to accept a significant number of collateral
casualties in order to kill one individual. One attempt by suicide bombers to
assassinate former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 resulted
in over 100 civilian casualties. In general though, limiting collateral casualties
can serve an important function in enabling the terrorist group to justify its
actions to its constituency and the international community.
CBRN weapons cannot be considered to be the weapons of choice for
assassinating individuals because they would have to be used in a highly
controlled fashion. It is possible to use most CBW in a controlled fashion,
such as by injecting the target with the agent, contaminating their food,
or even introducing the CBW into their homes. But terrorists have always
enjoyed considerable success in conducting assassinations using firearms
and conventional bombs. It is difficult to consider why terrorists would

76 The Changing Face of Terrorism
choose to use CBRN weapons to assassinate an individual when other
means with which they have had much more experience, are easier to use,
and are significantly more controllable, that are much more readily available
to them.
Nevertheless, far right groups in the USA have intended to use ricin for
just this purpose. One plot to kill government officials by members of the
Patriots’ Council involved spreading ricin on their doorknobs. An interesting
observation about the Aum Shinrikyo CW attacks between 1990 and 1995
was that many of them were targeted against specific individuals, and failed.
The group would have been better off using firearms or bombs which
would have provided a higher assurance of success. However, the anthrax
letters in 2001 proved that using the post is an effective way to penetrate
the physical security of highly protected government buildings. Therefore
postal delivery can have a dramatic impact for a short period of time, and
could be useful as a means of attacking individuals who are hard to get at,
but it is of limited use for a sustained high-impact campaign because of the
ability to put counter-measures in place. There is also now a question about
how much use it might be in the future considering that decontamination
facilities have been installed at postal sorting offices in the USA.
Therefore, the use of CBRN weapons for conducting assassinations
confers few operational advantages to the terrorist, and incurs several
disadvantages. However, terrorists’ decisions to use CBRN weapons for this
purpose, could be driven by a number of other factors. The use of a CBRN
weapon increases the intimidation element of an attack, because of the
latent threat that next time the group might develop a WMD capability and
inflict higher numbers of casualties. There is also a heightened propaganda
element to using these weapons, because their novel nature will attract more
media attention. Lastly, there is the possibility that individuals or groups
might become fixated with CBRN weapons, and consider using them even to
the extent of ignoring operational considerations. Aum Shinrikyo’s decision
to use CW was primarily derived from the fixation of Shoko Asahara, the
leader of the cult, with technology and poison gas.
Attacking Military Facilities
Attacking military facilities is a typical means for terrorists to kill members
of the security forces. When terrorists specifically target military facilities
it is assumed that they are intending to be discriminate in who they kill, in
order to be able to legitimize their actions. However, inflicting discriminate
casualties using a WMD, would be extremely difficult to achieve. The
massive blast and radiation effects of nuclear weapons mean that they

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 77
cannot be used in this role, and the use of CBW in the environment will
lead to additional indiscriminate casualties if the target is in a built-up area.
CBW could potentially be used discriminately in the open air, if the target
is isolated enough that the contamination does not spread the agent over
populated areas. So unless the group was willing to accept large numbers of
indiscriminate casualties, it would have to use weapons against facilities in
isolated areas.
Alternatively, if access can be gained to a facility, water supplies can be
poisoned, or CW and biological pathogens released into air conditioning
systems, or else used to contaminate food and drink in the staff restaurant.
This would effectively limit casualties to the occupants of the facility. And it
could also be the optimum means to maximize the potential casualties from
an attack, because it does not require the terrorists to develop an effective
delivery mechanism and the agent would not be vulnerable to the vagaries
of the weather.
CBRN weapons do not seem to offer terrorists the capability to achieve
complete victory over the security forces, but they do offer the potential
for more spectacular tactical victories because of their capacity to kill more
people. This would help to achieve the objective of heightening the cost of
the conflict, and generating public and political pressure on states to accede
to their demands. The 1983 attacks on the US Marine Corps barracks and
embassy in Beirut indicates that the greater the number of casualties, the
greater the political impact, and likelihood that the group will achieve its
overall goal. Although it must also be borne in mind that the withdrawal
of the multilateral force was primarily a function of the political context
within which the attacks took place. Public opinion in the USA was already
questioning the Beirut mission, and politically the USA was in a position
where it could easily concede the goals of the group. There are limits to
what can be achieved by inflicting mass casualties on discriminate targets,
particularly in states that have been subjected to prolonged campaigns of
terrorist violence, and where public opinion has become hardened. An
equally telling example in respect of the USA is the Oklahoma City bombing,
when public and political opinion stood firm against the extreme right wing.
Public opinion in the USA is likely to harden in the face of such acts as it
gains greater direct exposure to terrorism, since the government and public
opinion know that they cannot accede to the demands of these groups.
Terrorists however, have had plenty of success attacking this type
of target using conventional explosives. Therefore CBRN weapons are
not necessarily the weapon of choice for even this type of target. Similar
results can be achieved with conventional weapons which are easier to

78 The Changing Face of Terrorism
obtain, safer to use, and more familiar to the terrorists. The controlled use
of conventional weapons such as truck bombs, makes it relatively easier to
limit indiscriminate casualties. Although the attack on the US embassy in
Kenya in 1998 demonstrated how difficult it is to control even the effects
of conventional weapons. In some scenarios, CBRN weapons might offer
a means of defeating defences that have been put in place to counter more
conventional forms of attack, particularly if the group can gain access to the
facility. As is the case with using CBRN weapons for assassinations, there is
also an intimidatory and propaganda value in their use for attacking these
targets, particularly in generating fears that the terrorists might switch to
using these weapons against indiscriminate population targets.
Indiscriminate Attacks on Population Targets
Indiscriminate attacks on population targets can take two general forms:
those where the intent is to cause limited casualties and those where the
intent is to kill as many people as possible. Some terrorists have previously
considered using CBRN weapons for limited casualty attacks. Dhiren
Barot, who was convicted in the UK in 2006 for a number of bomb plots
including a plan to use a radiological weapon, claimed that he intended to
use the weapon to cause ‘collateral’ objectives such as ‘injury, fear, terror,
and chaos’.18 As noted previously, some CBRN weapons are capable of
being used in a limited and controlled fashion, but this would be impossible
in an open-air attack.
WMD are the weapons of choice for causing indiscriminate mass
casualties, because they have the potential to inflict casualties far in excess
of what is achievable with conventional weapons. The consequences of
such an attack on the willingness of societies and governments to continue
the struggle against a terrorist group has never been tested, but it is generally
assumed that the greater the level of terror and casualties inflicted, the more
likely that states will concede to the terrorists’ demands.
For many terrorist groups, a number of operational factors will constrain
their use of CBRN weapons in this role. Since the use of CBRN weapons
against population targets in the open air is indiscriminate in nature, it will
kill any of the terrorists’ own people who happen to be in the killing zone of
the weapon. For instance, the use of a WMD in Jerusalem would probably
kill a large number of Muslims, even if the attack took place in a Jewish
quarter. As has been stated earlier, terrorists have always been willing to
accept a certain level of collateral casualties in order to achieve their goals,
but the potential casualties resulting from the use of a WMD could be
higher than a group is willing to accept. This could prove to be a significant

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 79
inhibitor on terrorists’ willingness to use WMD against population targets,
although careful target selection could possibly limit the significance of
this factor. In addition, public opinion can also harden against the group in
response to indiscriminate killings.
In general terms therefore, CBRN weapons offer significant operational
advantages in this role, which outweigh the operational problems that
would be encountered. For objectives such as propaganda and intimidation,
the greater the number of casualties caused by indiscriminate attacks on
population targets, the greater the effect.
Economic Damage
Attempting to extort concessions from governments by causing levels of
economic damage which the government is unwilling to bear has been a
feature of many terrorist campaigns, but there is no example of such a
strategy ever succeeding. The IRA was notably unsuccessful in inflicting
an economic cost that would have been sufficient to compel the British
government to unconditionally withdraw from Northern Ireland. That this
strategy failed could be argued to have been a consequence of the limited
destructive capacity of conventional explosives, even though truck bombs
caused billions of pounds worth of damage. Instead, the key factor in the
failure of the strategy was the British government’s ability to prevent regular
major attacks, its steadfast political commitment to the principle of refusing
to give in to terrorism, and its willingness to bear the cost by underwriting
insurance claims on terrorist bomb damage.
The greater destructive and contamination effects of CBRN weapons
makes them very effective for causing economic damage. The blast effects
of nuclear weapons are significantly greater than that of the largest
conventional bombs, which makes them ideally suited to causing long-
term damage to whole industrial and commercial centres and killing those
who work in them. CBW are slightly less effective than nuclear weapons
for causing economic damage since they would kill workers but would
not physically destroy economic infrastructure. The effectiveness of
contamination from all CBRN weapons for causing economic damage
depends upon the amount, toxicity, and persistence of the material or agent
that the group has access to, and how effectively they can disperse it. But
even limited disruption to a major financial centre like London’s ‘square
mile’, which is the city’s financial nerve centre, would result in the loss of
millions of pounds. Although the blast damage from large conventional
bombs could have a higher economic impact than some forms of CBW
contamination if rebuilding takes longer than decontamination.

80 The Changing Face of Terrorism
One al-Qaeda training manual specifically recommends using CBRN
weapons against population targets of high economic value. The manual,
Al-Mubtakar al-Farid : Li Israal al-Safah al-Athiri Ila al-Kafir al-‘Anid (The Unique
Invention: to Deliver the Gaseous Killer to the Stubborn Infidel ) which provides
guidance on manufacturing a hydrogen cyanide dispersal device, highlights a
range of different buildings to attack including theatres, brothels, shopping
malls, bars and government offices. Similarly, on another prominent jihadi
website, a posting entitled ‘Instances of Radiation Pollution from 1945–87’,
encouraged the use of radiological weapons in large commercial areas in
order to cause economic damage.19
Terrorists’ willingness to use CBRN weapons for causing economic
damage could, however, be constrained if the territory on which the target
is situated has some value to the terrorists, or if some of its supporters lived
in the areas surrounding the attack. However, the IRA sought to eliminate
civilian casualties from its economic attacks by providing warnings to the
police, which enabled the area surrounding its bombs to be evacuated.
Alternatively, there are some biological pathogens that kill only livestock
and destroy crops. These pathogens can potentially lead to massive
decreases in crop yields, costing states vast amounts of money. The past
record of BW terrorism indicates that only the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
have ever threatened to use anti-crop BW, and that appears to have been a
bluff.20 Whilst only the Mau Mau, a nationalist liberation movement fighting
against British rule in Kenya in the 1950s, has ever used a CBW (in this case the
plant toxin African milk bush or Synadenium grantii, and poisons such as arsenic)
against livestock.21 Whilst anti-crop and livestock BW are a potential threat,
the past record of CBRN terrorism indicates that people have previously
been considered to be the principal targets of such weapons. However, for
groups which might want to avoid causing indiscriminate civilian casualties,
anti-crop and livestock BW could be perceived as a means by which they
can execute a potentially economically devastating BW attack, without the
moral dilemmas associated with killing people. Although if the goal of the
group is to seize control of the state, they would not wish to contaminate it
with pathogens or agents which could persist in the environment for a long
period of time.
Blackmailing Governments
The potential levels of destruction and panic caused by the threat of using
any form of CBRN weapon makes them ideally suited to use for blackmail
purposes. The traditional means by which terrorists used to blackmail
governments are now of limited utility, especially because since the 1970s,

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 81
governments have also become a lot tougher (at least publicly) in refusing to
give in to terrorist demands. Airplane hijackings now occur only infrequently,
and hostage situations frequently result in the deaths of the kidnappers
when Special Forces attempt to free the hostages. This occurred in the 1981
Iranian embassy siege in London, and the seizure of the Japanese embassy
in Peru in 1996. Successful blackmail does not necessarily rely on making
increasingly violent threats, but when states refuse to accede to terrorists’
demands in the face of more conventional threats, escalating the level of
violence inherent in blackmail threats might be considered as the only
means by which states can be successfully blackmailed.
Blackmail involving CBRN weapons has been a concern for decades. The
RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) apparently considered using nuclear weapons
in this role. Michael Baumann, a member of another left-wing terror group
stated that ‘During their attack on the Stockholm Embassy the RAF people
noticed that the government no longer gives in’. He went on to claim that
the RAF were capable of acquiring a nuclear weapon and that ‘If you had
a thing like that under your control you can make the Federal Chancellor
dance the can-can on colour TV’.22 What has changed since the 1980s is
that CBRN-weapon threats could be perceived by terrorists as a means to
replace traditional methods of blackmail and intimidation. The potential
consequences of a terrorist attack involving a CBRN weapon, especially a
WMD, will make governments extremely sensitive to the potential costs of
calling the terrorists’ bluff and getting it wrong. Even crude CBRN weapons
could have a powerful intimidatory effect, because of the latent threat that
the group might move on to develop a WMD.
A number of potential problems have been identified with using WMD
for blackmail. The terrorists would have to establish the credibility of
the threat in order to demonstrate that they had the capacity to follow it
through. Equally, they would have to convince the government that they
had an interest in negotiating, therefore their demands would need to be
commensurate with the threat. Consequently, they might opt for more
limited demands which governments could accede to, although if the
government could not be assured that the threat would be removed after the
terrorists’ demands had been met it would have little incentive to negotiate.
However, the terrorists would need to maintain the threat indefinitely in
order to ensure a permanent change.23 It could also be argued that groups
would be less interested in some forms of CBRN-weapon threats because
they might not want to threaten something they would not want to carry
out, particularly if it involved large numbers of indiscriminate casualties.

82 The Changing Face of Terrorism
As a result, it does not appear that terrorist groups have developed
any specific strategies for blackmailing governments with CBRN weapon
threats. Therefore, the question of whether CBRN weapons would enhance
blackmail threats remains unanswered. But whether they are useful in this
role or not, some terrorists might nevertheless be inclined to attempt to use
them for blackmail threats.
Deterrence
During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact deterred each other from
launching a military attack with the threat of nuclear retaliation. Whether
the logic of deterrence also extends to non-state actors remains untested
and unknown. Some analysts consider that it is not rational for terrorists
to attempt to deter a state with the threat of using CBRN weapons. But
whilst legitimate questions might be raised about how a terrorist group
could deter a state, it is conceivable that some terrorist groups might think
in terms of deterrence, particularly if they are attempting to mimic states.
Some elements among the Chechen insurgents certainly seem to have
considered their use in this role. During the first Chechen war in 1995, they
buried radioactive materials in a Moscow park as a deterrent to the Russian
government escalating the war in Chechnya. When the former Chechen
leader Jokhar Dudayev was asked whether the Chechen insurgents had
WMD, he issued a clear deterrent threat: ‘We won’t use them, unless Russia
uses nuclear weapons.’24
Similarly, al-Qaeda’s thinking on the use of WMD has evolved over time,
but in the late 1990s the group perceived them to be a deterrent to an all out
US assault on Afghanistan as well as potential attacks on Muslim states in
the Middle East. The group therefore sought a WMD capability in order to
counterbalance US and Israeli WMD.25 Interestingly, al-Qaeda launched its
attack on 9/11 before it had a WMD deterrent in place, provoking the very
action that it apparently wanted to deter. Nevertheless, several weeks after
the beginning of the war in Afghanistan, bin Laden claimed in an interview
with the Pakistani newspaper Dawn that ‘I wish to declare that, if America
used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with
chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as deterrent’.26 Given
that al-Qaeda did not actually possess any CBRN weapons, this statement
was made for purely propaganda purposes and should not necessarily
be taken as an indication of how al-Qaeda would use CBRN weapons.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that terrorists might believe that the threat
of further mass destruction attacks might deter a backlash from the state.
However the USA’s reaction to 9/11 should have proven to all terrorist

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 83
groups that states will not be deterred by the threat of further attacks. States
now believe that terrorists will use CBRN weapons if they possess them, so
their usefulness as a deterrent must now be limited.
Intimidating Public and Political Opinion
CBRN weapons could prove to be extremely effective for intimidating public
opinion because of the disruption and panic that they can generate. Public
opinion in the West is highly sensitive to the threat of CBRN terrorism, and
it remains uncertain how it would respond to a major attack. CBRN weapons
have a high intimidation factor because they pose a sudden, unanticipated,
and unfamiliar threat to public health.27 Conventional weapons only impact
directly on those in the immediate vicinity of the attack, whereas the way in
which CBRN-weapon effects can spread uncontrollably makes the residents
of entire cities vulnerable to them.
Evidence of the intimidatory impact of CBRN weapons on the general
public was apparent during the anthrax letter attack on the USA in 2001. In
contrast to the limited number of deaths and illness that the letters caused,
they were highly successful in generating public anxiety and disrupting
everyday life. This was heightened by the extensive media coverage of the
letters and criticism of the US Administration’s response. In fact, the level
of disruption was completely disproportionate to the limited casualties and
lack of physical destruction that they caused. Panic buying of gas masks and
the antibiotic Cipro was reported as fear of further attacks spread. More
disturbingly, public confidence in the ability of the Administration to manage
the crisis was severely undermined. The response of the Administration was
probably as adequate as it could have been in the circumstances, but the
public perception was that it was seriously inadequate.
Therefore, WMD could be considered to be the optimum weapons for
intimidating public and political opinion, but it requires them to be used.
The question is how terrorists might use them for this purpose. Some
might potentially use them for discrete limited-scale attacks, with the latent
threat of perpetrating indiscriminate mass casualty attacks. 9/11 suggests
that other groups might go straight to using them for indiscriminate mass
casualty attacks.
Propaganda
In the 1970s, Brian Jenkins argued that ‘terrorists want a lot of people
watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead’.28
This suggests that the use of a WMD is not necessarily compatible with
the objective of generating propaganda. Yet one of the easiest ways of

84 The Changing Face of Terrorism
seizing people’s attention is to commit an atrocity, as was made apparent
on 9/11. However, it is also possible to secure significant media attention
by committing an audacious or otherwise innovative type of attack which
does not cause significant numbers of casualties. This is exactly what
occurred in the immediate aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin attack on the
Tokyo subway. The eyes of the world were upon Japan, and Aum Shinrikyo
received massive media coverage. What this also demonstrates is that the
use of CBRN weapons need not necessarily kill a lot of people in order
to generate propaganda. The threat, or use, of any type of CBRN weapon
would be a massive propaganda coup that might help to rally supporters and
guarantee that the group’s cause would gain heightened public and political
attention. Since the use of such weapons is still rare, the use of even crude
CBRN weapons will generate publicity. Even a demonstration of a CBRN
weapon capability that does not result in any deaths would still be likely
to have a profound propaganda effect. The likely psychological impact of
CBRN contamination on the population suggests that even after it has been
cleared, fear within the population will remain for some time. Therefore
Jenkins’ argument might be relevant only to the use of WMD, rather than
all types of CBRN weapons.
In broad terms, CBRN weapons do provide terrorists with an enhanced
capability to generate propaganda, and in many cases groups have merely
had to threaten to use any type of CBRN weapon, or provide some
other indication of their capability, in order to be successful. The primary
consequence of right-wing terrorists in the USA being apprehended
in possession of ricin during the 1990s was to give them a much higher
profile in debates about CBRN terrorism, despite the fact that they never
actually used them. Therefore, mere threats may be enough, and a group
may never need to escalate to actually use the weapons that they possess.
Whether a group would actually use them for purely propaganda purposes
will depend upon what the group wants to achieve with its propaganda. If it
merely wants press coverage, the use of a CBRN weapon or a WMD would
certainly guarantee it. But assuming there is some purpose to generating
press coverage, such as winning public and political support, the levels of
violence that groups use might need to be restricted unless the support that
they are seeking to generate will actually respond favourably to an act of
mass destruction.
Terrorist Attacks on Nuclear and Chemical Facilities
Terrorist groups, particularly those with limited technical capacity, have the
option of producing similar results to those caused by the use of chemical

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 85
and radiological weapons by attacking commercial nuclear and chemical
facilities. There is evidence of al-Qaeda and its affiliates planning to attack
nuclear power plants but no such attacks has ever actually occurred. Plans
found in caves in Afghanistan were marked with the location of nuclear
power plants in the USA, suggesting that they were potential targets.29
Similarly, after the 2003 Casablanca bombings, a round-up of members
of the Salafia Jihadia terrorist group in Morocco exposed a plot to attack
a French nuclear power station at Cap de la Hague. Additional evidence
suggests that al-Qaeda trained Salafia Jihadia for the mission.30 Terrorists
can attack these targets using their traditional techniques of sabotage and
truck bombings. States can physically protect such facilities, but whilst most
possess a manageable number of nuclear facilities, there is generally a large
number of potential chemical targets in most states.
In the background papers for the 1985 International Task Force On
the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, Daniel Hirsch identifies two threats:
the truck bomb and the insider threat.31 Truck bombs have proved to be
hugely successful and destructive in past terrorist attacks, and could cause
considerable damage to a nuclear facility, leading to a release of radiation
that contaminates the surrounding area. But even if adequate security
measures are put in place to protect against truck bombs, it is difficult to
contain the threat from insiders because facilities employ large numbers of
people who must have access to sensitive areas.32
In the USA, original Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations
provided only for attacks by three external attackers, on foot, armed with
hand-held automatic weapons, and with the help of perhaps one insider. A
considerable number of facilities, including research reactors and those in
urban areas were exempted from these requirements. In the mid-1980s Sandia
National Laboratory in the USA was contracted by the NRC to evaluate
the threat and suggest easily implemented and cost-effective safeguard
mechanisms.33 Its report indicated that nuclear facilities were extraordinarily
vulnerable, and unacceptable damage to vital reactor systems could occur
from relatively small charges at close distances, and from larger but still
reasonable-size charges at distances which were greater than the protected
area for most plants. However, the cost of implementing additional protective
measures was considerably greater than was originally anticipated.34
In contrast, Oleg Bukharin argues that in most scenarios involving a
terrorist attack against a research reactor or nuclear fuel cycle installation
there would not be a release of radioactive material off-site. But he concedes
that incidents similar to the accidental explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear
reactor in 1986 could be caused. He concluded that ‘A global catastrophe

86 The Changing Face of Terrorism
is possible as a result of sabotage of a nuclear power reactor with its large
inventory of radioactivity and high rates of energy generation’,35 and there
are numerous systems within nuclear plants which can be switched off,
or sabotaged, particularly coolant systems, in order to cause a release of
radiation.
The sabotage of nuclear power stations is generally considered in terms
of terrorists’ ability to overcome the security forces protecting the reactor,
but it remains to be seen whether terrorists would be able to overcome
the contingency plans and procedures that would come into play during
an incident.36 Nuclear reactors in the USA have extremely strong physical
security measures, and are generally designed to enable the reactor to be
shut down from at least two locations. Consequently, it is extremely difficult
to envisage how terrorists could effect a radioactive release from a nuclear
power station through a frontal assault,37 and even if they did, whether
the nature of the release would pose a major threat to public health.38 But
whilst the authorities in the USA might be confident about this, older power
stations in other states could potentially be a lot more vulnerable.
If the intention of the terrorists is to cause economic damage there are
the easier ways to achieve it, such as toppling key pylons on the primary
distribution line outside of nuclear power plants, or using rockets to
attack key buildings which might lead to a shutdown of the reactor. These
attacks would also generate publicity. But in the absence of assistance
from an insider, the risk of causing an off-site release of radiation would
be minuscule. Most of the critical areas of nuclear power stations are in
well-sealed areas, which would require substantial amounts of explosives
to breach.39
Terrorists could also attempt to attack radioactive material in transit.
Such materials are transported in casks that are constructed to shield the
population, and to be immune to accidents. Numerous experiments have also
been conducted to test their vulnerability to explosives. The results showed
that casks were neither ruptured nor penetrated as a result of overpressure
from nearby explosives, bulk contact or platter charges. However, casks
that did not have water jackets could be breached by a number of different
explosive charges, if enough was known about the design, and the explosive
was used in the optimum way. Shaped charges could be guaranteed to breach
a cask. But it was also estimated that the potential radioactive release from
such attacks would be a zero-to-small health hazard.40
Alternatively, terrorists could choose to attack chemical facilities.
Industrial chemical facilities are more numerous and less well protected
than nuclear power plants. The risk of releasing chemical contamination

Operational Motivations and Disincentives 87
from an attack on a chemical plant is much higher than the risk of releasing
radioactive contamination from an attack on a nuclear power plant. Whilst
this theoretically makes them a more attractive target than nuclear power
stations, there have been no previous terrorist incidents involving industrial
chemical plants.
The number of deaths caused by attacking nuclear and chemical facilities
will vary, according to the effectiveness of the attack and the location of the
facility, but two previous incidents provide useful indications. Two people
died in the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1986, although
many more received lethal doses of radiation in the immediate aftermath,
and an unquantifiable number of others received radiation poisoning, which
could lead to lethal cancers in the longer term. In contrast, an accidental
release of chemicals at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, killed
over 2,800 people, and up to 180,000 needed medical assistance for related
ailments.41 The level of contamination caused by attacking nuclear and
chemical facilities will also be variable. Following the Chernobyl disaster,
the Soviet authorities established a 30km exclusion zone around the plant
which was evacuated, and a further 113 villages outside of the zone were
later evacuated. But it appears as if the Soviet authorities were prepared to
tolerate people living with higher levels of radiation than would have been
acceptable in the West, therefore the exclusion area would probably have
been bigger if the incident had occurred in the West. Unofficial analysis of
satellite photographs indicated that an area much larger than the 30km zone
had been abandoned by farmers, with some land as far away as 100km from
the plant being abandoned.42 In the mid-1960s the Brookhaven National
Laboratory in the USA assessed the impact of a large nuclear reactor accident,
and concluded that the casualties could be as high as 45,000 with significant
radioactivity levels spreading over an area of 10,000–100,000km2.43
Conclusion
This analysis indicates that whilst CBRN weapons can be used for a wide
range of tactics and strategies, they are not necessarily the best weapons for
many roles. A rational analysis of ends and means suggests that the technical
capabilities of CBRN weapons, particularly WMD, make them the weapon of
choice for a range of tactics and strategies including: causing indiscriminate
mass casualties against civilian targets; generating propaganda; scenarios in
which they can be used to circumvent defences against conventional attack;
intimidating public opinion; blackmailing governments; and for causing
economic damage. For most types of attack, the technical and operational

88 The Changing Face of Terrorism
factors favour the use of conventional weapons. Yet terrorists have a history
of using CBRN weapons in roles for which conventional weapons and
tactics are more suited, and which in certain cases would provide a greater
assurance of success. Therefore it cannot be assumed that terrorists would
refrain from using CBRN weapons just because conventional weapons are
more suited to the task, familiar to the terrorist, and more readily available.
It is perhaps the propaganda and intimidation value of these weapons
which might prove to be the driving factor behind their use in these roles.
Their use by terror groups is still so novel, and they generate such levels of
anxiety, that even using them in discriminate attacks, such as assassinating
individuals, will guarantee media coverage, and have an impact beyond that
from the use of conventional weapons.
However, terrorists are unfamiliar with using CBRN weapons. The
greater complexity and risks of using these weapons increases the chances
of failure, capture, or even death for the terrorist. Terrorists traditionally
tend to be risk averse in conducting their operations, with the survival of
the group being an overriding imperative. Therefore, if the use of CBRN
weapons exposes the group to greater risks it would act as a disincentive to
their use. However, there is some doubt about whether this would apply
to ‘religious’ terrorists, particularly those who specifically seek martyrdom.
But even Islamist cells have displayed evidence of being risk averse. One al-
Qaeda-related website which posted a recipe for ricin warned of the dangers.
The author noted, ‘Be very careful when handling poisons … I know several
[Mujahideen] whose bodies are finished due to poor protection etc.’.44
Consequently, operational motivations and disincentives could play a
key role in determining what kinds of CBRN weapons terrorists might try
to acquire. Even their use in a role to which they are not suited is an act
of escalation and has value in its psychological impact on the target state.
Terrorist tactics and strategies related to CBRN weapons could also change
over time. This has already been demonstrated by al-Qaeda. In the late
1990s it sought to acquire WMD as a deterrent to USA and Israeli WMD.
Since 9/11 and the advent of the war on terror, al-Qaeda apparently sees
the use of WMD against the USA as a legitimate means of retribution for
the past and present killing of Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. Used in a
first strike role, al-Qaeda hopes that the use of a WMD would bring about a
severe reprisal by the USA that would garner more support for the Islamists
within the Muslim world.45

4
POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS AND
DISINCENTIVES TO USING CBRN
WEAPONS
One of the key anomalies in the past record of CBRN terrorism is the
small number of actual cases in which these weapons have been used. Even
accounting for the occasions where security forces have prevented attacks
from taking place, there still appears to have been a degree of reticence
among some terrorist groups which are (or were) technologically capable
of developing CBRN weapons, but have chosen not to use them. Potential
reasons for some groups’ apparent lack of interest can be sought in the
political and strategic disincentives to using CBRN weapons that might play
a role in terrorists’ decision making. Those disincentives lie in the political
goals that the group wants to achieve and the strategies that it uses to achieve
them, coupled with the perceived consequences of using CBRN weapons.
What is more uncertain is just how strong those disincentives might be, and
the extent to which they might potentially weaken during the course of a
terrorist campaign. The previous chapter illustrated how CBRN weapons
can potentially be used in a number of tactical roles, although their utility
varies according to the outcome that the terrorists are looking for and the
targets that they choose to attack. A rational analysis of ends and means
would suggest that terrorists would not choose to use CBRN weapons for
many roles other than indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, causing public
panic, or to attack buildings that are protected against more conventional
forms of attack. For many tactical roles, conventional weapons have the
significant advantages of being readily available and more suited to attacking
the majority of potential targets, and there is also considerable potential
for terrorists to escalate their violence using these weapons. Despite this,

90 The Changing Face of Terrorism
terrorist groups have previously planned or tried to use CBRN weapons
when there is no apparent tactical imperative to do so. In some cases, this
could also be explained by reference to the political and strategic factors
that might motivate a terrorist group to escalate its level of violence, and
how terrorists reconcile those motivations with the political disincentives
to escalation.
Political Objectives as Motivations to Escalate Levels of Violence
Bruce Hoffman argues that, ‘Contrary to popular belief and media depiction,
most terrorism is neither crazed nor capricious … it is also conceived and
executed in a manner that simultaneously reflects the terrorists group’s
particular aims and motivations, fits its resources and capabilities and takes
into account the “target audience” at which the act is directed’.1 Despite
many differences, terrorist groups have one common trait: none commits
actions randomly or senselessly. Every terrorist group has identifiable goals
and seeks maximum publicity from its actions as a means of intimidating
the government and population of the target state.
The tactical choices made by terrorist groups are heavily influenced by
the political objectives that they are trying to achieve. Despite the generalized
categorization of terrorist groups as being either ‘religious’ or ‘secular’
in nature, virtually all terrorist groups have political objectives. Even the
majority of ‘religious’ groups actually seek political objectives, especially
in the short and medium term. As a consequence, ostensibly ‘religious’
terrorist groups can include members who are not particularly religious,
or even some do not even share the same religion as the majority of the
group. In a study of 41 Hezbollah suicide bombers who attacked Israeli,
US and French targets in Lebanon between 1982 and 1986, only eight of
the bombers were identified as being Islamic fundamentalists, 27 were from
left-wing political groups such as the Lebanese Communist Party, and three
were Christians. These individuals were not driven by a politico-religious
ideology, but by a commitment to resist a foreign occupation. In fact, what
nearly all suicide bombers have in common is a specific secular and strategic
goal, to compel states to withdraw their military forces from territory that
the terrorists consider to be their homeland.2
This can also be true for terrorist groups or networks that are
transnational in nature. This is borne out by the fact that al-Qaeda attacks
have killed citizens from 18 of the 20 countries that bin Laden has cited
as supporting the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.3 In the short to
medium term, al-Qaeda wants changes in the foreign policy of the USA,

Political Motivations and Disincentives 91
particularly the withdrawal of its military forces from the Gulf region and
other Muslim states, but their longer-term goal is to overthrow non-Islamist
regimes in the Muslim world and re-establish the Khalifate. An al-Qaeda
training manual Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants, identifies the
main mission of the network as being the overthrow of ‘godless’ regimes
and their replacement with Islamic regimes. It singles out the Egyptian,
Syrian, Libyan, and Saudi rulers as blasphemers against the Koran.4 The
political elements of al-Qaeda’s objectives also came out strongly in videos
and other communiqués that it has issued after 9/11. In October 2001 it
released a video in which bin Laden stated that:
The storm (of airplanes) will not calm as long as you, (i.e. the USA) do
not end your support for the Jews in Palestine, lift your embargo from
around the Iraqi people and leave the Arabian peninsula. Al-Qaeda
orders Americans, the English and their Arab accomplices to leave
the Arabian Peninsula because the ground will burn beneath their feet
… I swear to God that America will never dream of security or see it
before we live it and see it in Palestine, and before the army of infidels
depart the land of Mohammed.5
Only religious cults can be considered to be wholly apolitical, but
even some cults have sought political objectives. The prime example
is the Rajneeshpuram Cult in Oregon, USA, whose goal of influencing a
local election led it to choose a biological pathogen that was intended to
sicken people rather than kill them. Therefore terror groups use violence
as a means of influencing the internal politics of the target state, and there
have been cases of groups using acts of extreme violence to achieve short-
term political goals. The simple calculus for these groups is that the higher
the level of casualties the greater the initimidatory effect and therefore the
greater the likelihood that it will lead to the achievement of their political
objectives.
A prime example of a ‘religious’ group using an act of mass destruction
to intimidate public and political opinion in order to achieve a discrete
political objective is the Madrid train bombings in 2004. In December 2003,
the Norwegian intelligence service found an al-Qaeda planning document on
a radical Islamist website, which outlined a strategy for compelling the USA
and its allies to leave Iraq. It noted that more 9/11 type attacks on the USA
would be insufficient, and that it would be more effective to attack America’s
European allies. Coercing them into withdrawing their armed forces from
Iraq and Afghanistan would increase the economic and military burden

92 The Changing Face of Terrorism
on the USA and eventually force it to withdraw from Iraq. The document
specifically identified the UK, Poland, and Spain as potential targets, and
concluded that Spain was a particularly weak link in the coalition because of
the high level of domestic opposition to the Iraq war. The document stated:
It is necessary to make utmost use of the upcoming general election
in Spain in March next year … We think that the Spanish government
could not tolerate more than two, maximum three, blows, after which
it will have to withdraw as a result of popular pressure. If its troops
still remain in Iraq after these blows, then the victory of the Socialist
Party is almost secured, and the withdrawal of the Spanish will be on
its electoral programme.
The document conceived of a domino effect, in which once Spain and
Italy had withdrawn from Iraq, the pressure on the British government to
withdraw would be too great for it to remain in Iraq.6
Three days before the 2004 Spanish elections, an al-Qaeda cell planted 10
bombs on commuter trains in Madrid, which killed 190 people and injured
approximately 1,800. In the subsequent elections, the opposition Socialist
Party led by Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was elected to power and Spain
withdrew its troops from Iraq. The tragedy of the situation was that this
would likely have happened anyway. But nevertheless, the Madrid bombings
were heralded by al-Qaeda as a major success. It is a reasonable assumption
that the 7/7 and 21/7 bombings on the London transport system were
an attempt to replicate the perceived success of the Madrid bombings.
CBRN weapons, particularly WMD, have significantly greater intimidatory
and coercive power than the conventional explosives used in these attacks,
therefore the use of these weapons would be entirely consistent with this
strategy.
In contrast, one of the primary objectives of right-wing Christian and
secular terrorist groups in the USA, is to overthrow the system of federal
government through civil war. One of the cornerstones of the belief system
of these groups is that the federal government, the financial centre in New
York, and the media are controlled by Jews. They label it as the Zionist
Occupation Government (ZOG), and claim that it is usurping the rights of
US citizens. They believe that the eventual goal of the ZOG is to establish
a New World Order, using the UN and other international organizations,
which will operate for the benefit of international banking interests, the
Jews, Freemasons, and other ‘dark forces’. Consequently, these groups do

Political Motivations and Disincentives 93
not believe in any form of government above the local level, and oppose
federal income taxes and the federal judiciary.
The strategies and tactics used by right wing terrorist groups in the USA
to achieve this goal are diverse, but have largely focused on acts of controlled
violence against targets associated with the federal government. Right-wing
theorists suggest that one of the primary tactics for initiating a war with the
federal government is to attack federal buildings. There is evidence that in
the 1980s, members of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord,
reconnoitred the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City with that
purpose in mind,7 but no group actually attempted to pursue such a strategy
until Timothy McVeigh destroyed the building in 1995. Therefore, if these
groups are interested in procuring CBRN weapons, it does not necessarily
mean that they would use them for indiscriminate attacks against population
targets.
Secular political terrorist groups are generally considered to be the least
likely type of terrorist group to use CBRN weapons simply because they
are motivated solely by political considerations. The goal of most secular
left- and right-wing terror groups, as well as many ethno-nationalist and
other separatist groups, is to re-structure the existing political system of
states according to the tenets of their own political ideology. They deny the
legitimacy of the institutions of the state, or seek to separate themselves
from it in the case of ethno-nationalist separatist groups, but they do
not necessarily seek to destroy the state and its population. These goals
mean that the principal target of these types of groups is the regime of
the particular state in which they operate. Consequently, many secular
terrorist groups focus on a narrowly defined target set, which typically
includes political, military, and economic targets, as well as individuals and
institutions associated with the regime or the existing order. This enables
them to legitimize casualties according to their ideology and goals. These
types of groups have previously engaged in indiscriminate acts of violence
against population targets but the purpose of such attacks is primarily
symbolic, to communicate a message, rather than being an end in itself.8 But
even amongst secular terrorist groups, there are differences in the extent to
which they use indiscriminate violence.
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a resurgence of extreme
secular right-wing terrorist groups. In Europe, this has consisted mainly
of a disparate collection of small groups, with no long-term systematic
programme of violence to achieve their political goals. They mainly engage
in indiscriminate, unstructured violence against immigrants and opposing
political groups, although some of these groups and individuals are used

94 The Changing Face of Terrorism
by more sophisticated neo-Nazi organizations which give their violence
some form of structure,9 and some have engaged in short-term bombing
campaigns. Because of this, right-wing violence has often been characterized
as the least discriminate and most senseless form of contemporary political
violence. To an extent this is borne out by statistics, which show that in the
1980s right-wing attacks were considerably more lethal than those of their
left-wing counterparts.10
The primary goal of secular right-wing terrorists is to replace the liberal
democratic state with some form of national socialist or fascist regime.
They see violence as the catalyst to achieve this, often by generating chaos
which might lead to civil war. One fascist group that operated in Italy during
the 1970s and 1980s pursued a ‘strategy of tension’, stated that,
Our belief is that the first phase of political activity ought to be to create
the conditions favouring the installation of chaos in all the regimes
structures. This should necessarily begin with the undermining of the
regimes economy as a whole so as to arrive at confusion throughout
the whole legal apparatus. This leads on to the situation of strong
political tension, fear in the world of industry and hostility towards
the government and political parties.11
Right-wing terrorist groups do not necessarily espouse any specific
programme of reform, but instead tend to concentrate on crude nationalist
and racist slogans, calls for the expulsion of immigrants, and the need for
strong government. They criticize liberal states for their social welfare
policies, their tolerance of diverse opinion, and their immigration policies.12
Yet their violence is not always completely random or indiscriminate. The
targets of these groups are also determined by their ideology and the need
to maintain and develop the support of their constituency. The pattern of
right-wing violence has remained roughly the same since the 1970s, with
sporadic attacks against particular types of target. In the 1980s right-wing
violence was certainly more lethal than left-wing violence, but there were
relatively few indiscriminate large-scale attacks, and the majority of those
were directed at left-wing targets or immigrants.13 So with the exception of
a few major indiscriminate bombings, right-wing terrorist groups have also
attempted to keep their violence within limits. The more sophisticated of
them act like the left-wing groups, carefully selecting targets, recognizing
the value of symbolic acts of violence and accepting that violence itself will
reap rewards only if it is carefully moderated.14

Political Motivations and Disincentives 95
However, some ‘secular’ terrorists have objectives that are as
revolutionary as ‘religious’ terrorists and seem to be less willing than other
secular groups to place limits on their violence. Some of the Palestinian
factions which split from the PLO following its tacit acceptance of the
existence of Israel and its policy of political compromise, have consistently
resorted to acts of indiscriminate violence. One of the most prominent of
these was the Abu Nidal group which has adopted a much broader set of
revolutionary objectives than the PLO. In an interview Abu Nidal stated
that,
I want to tell you what I dream about: about a single Arab people,
living in freedom, justice and equality. My enemies are the Zionist
occupation of my homeland. My enemies are imperialism in all its
forms, the division and divisiveness of my Arab people, and the chaos
in our Arab society.15
The more revolutionary nature of these objectives does not necessarily
constitute a motivation for conducting indiscriminate mass casualty attacks;
but there is a common assumption that groups which have bigger goals,
will use greater levels of violence to achieve them. But whilst some secular
groups with revolutionary political objectives might be more prone to strike
at indiscriminate targets and inflict higher levels of casualties more often,
their political objectives also establish an imperative to strike at targets that
are integral to the power and security of the regime they seek to overthrow
or influence.
Some ‘religious’ groups also have limited political objectives and have
carefully constrained their violence to fit those objectives. Hezbollah is an
Islamic fundamentalist group whose primary objective is to free all Lebanese
land from Israeli occupation. It has restricted its violence primarily to Israeli
military targets, and claims to only fire rockets at civilian targets in retaliation
for Israeli attacks that kill Lebanese civilians. This enables Hezbollah to claim
the mantle of being freedom fighters rather than terrorists. Hezbollah also
provides an example of how a religious fundamentalist group can also adapt
its politico-religious objectives to reflect the reality of the society in which it
operates. It has accepted the multi-confessional nature of Lebanese society
and given up its objective if establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon.16
The levels of violence used by different groups for political purposes
can also fluctuate over time depending upon the changing strategic situation
in which groups find themselves. This was evident in Israel and the occupied
Palestinian Territories immediately after 9/11. In late 2001 and 2002, the

96 The Changing Face of Terrorism
second Palestinian Intifadah escalated into unprecedented levels of violence
as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades stepped up their campaigns of
suicide bomb attacks, particularly against Israeli civilian targets. One of the
features of these attacks was that many of the suicide bombings against
civilian targets were carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which is
linked to the secular, Fatah organization. This suggests that the ideological
affiliation of these individuals is secular and nationalist in nature rather
than Islamist.17 The Palestinian leadership sought to drive the Israeli Prime
Minister, Ariel Sharon from power because few of them saw any point in
entering into negotiations with Israel whilst Sharon was in power. They hoped
to achieve change by convincing Israelis in the words of Hussam Shahin, a
Fatah leader in Ramallah, that ‘while freedom costs, the occupation will cost
them also’. The suicide bombers were successful in causing considerable
pain to Israel, but it was insufficient to coerce Israel into offering a political
compromise.18 At one stage there were several suicide bombings a week,
resulting in hundreds of Israeli civilians being killed and thousands injured,
whilst thousands of Palestinians were killed in strikes by the Israeli Defence
Force. Ultimately this level of violence was unsustainable and the Intifadah
settled back into lower levels of violence later in 2002.
Konrad Kellen argues that groups which consider themselves to be on
the defensive or under threat of extinction are willing to undertake more
extreme or riskier attacks than groups that are in a relatively strong position,
which might be deterred from riskier types of attack. This phenomenon can
be applied to both secular and ‘religious’ terrorist groups, and has already
been apparent in the history of a number of groups.19 This also links in
with the observation that terrorists might escalate their level of violence
when they perceive that other tactics have failed. Evidence to support this
contention can be found in incidents such as the 1998 bombing in Omagh,
Northern Ireland, which was a direct result of the marginalization of IRA
hardliners by the Northern Ireland peace process, which put them on the
defensive, provoking an act of indiscriminate violence. These arguments
would also seem to apply to Islamic fundamentalist and Islamist groups,
which perceive themselves to be on the defensive in their conflict with
the economically and militarily more powerful USA. Therefore this might
be a factor in the high lethality of attacks by some Islamist and Islamic
fundamentalist groups. Similarly, when the secular PLO first engaged in the
Middle East peace process in the late 1990s, the Islamist group Hamas risked
being marginalized, and it responded with a series of indiscriminate suicide
bombings against Israeli civilian targets in an effort to derail the process.

Political Motivations and Disincentives 97
Kellen argues that these groups will go further and escalate the level
of violence that they employ more than those groups which consider their
campaigns to be succeeding.20 Most terrorists generally operate below
their potential capacity for violence, and retain considerable capacity for
escalation below the CBRN-WMD threshold. So any terrorist group
considering escalation will most likely consider the conventional options
for escalation first, especially if technical factors make the acquisition of
CBRN weapons difficult. But in certain situations where a group’s capacity
for escalation through conventional forms of violence might be limited by
technical, strategic, or tactical factors, CBRN weapons might offer better
options for escalation, despite being less accessible.
Analysis of incidents from the past record of CBRN terrorism provides
some support for Kellen’s hypothesis. Violence by the RAF peaked in
1977, and a partial explanation for the occasional RAF interest in CBW
during the 1970s and 1980s could be sought in their steady decline from
that time. Whilst several of the alleged threats preceded this high point,
there is no publicly available evidence that they constituted anything more
than threat or hearsay. However, the most serious of the incidents, the
discovery of a bathtub full of botulinum in an RAF safe house, occurred in
the 1980s when their campaign of violence was in decline. In contrast, the
sporadic interest of extreme right-wing secular and racist terrorist groups
in developing CBW from the 1970s through to the 1990s is probably better
explained by their racist motivations rather than their general strategic
situation, which is invariably poor in the majority of states which experience
this form of violence. At first sight, the various Aum Shinrikyo attacks seem
to prove Kellen’s hypothesis. Asahara ordered the major attacks because the
authorities were closing in on the cult, and he feared that police and legal
investigations would destroy it. Yet Aum Shinrikyo was always intending to
unleash its CW because of its belief system, the police investigations merely
brought forward the date of the Tokyo attack. What this indicates is that at
least at a tactical level, being on the defensive can influence the timing and
targets of any attack.
This analysis indicates that the political objectives of most secular
and religious groups are broadly similar and that political objectives and
considerations are central to terrorists’ decision making on whether to
use CBRN weapons. There is nothing in these political objectives which
could be argued to drive a group to decide to use a WMD, but equally it
also indicates that the attainment of discrete political objectives does not
necessarily preclude acts of mass destruction using CBRN weapons.

98 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Ethno-nationalist Separatist Groups, and Groups with
Ethnic Enemies
Ethno-nationalist groups and extreme right-wing racist terrorist groups
differ from other secular groups in that although they also tend to have
limited political goals, their target set also includes specific ethnic
communities. The genocidal nature of the ethnic conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka, during the 1980s and 1990s provide
evidence that racial motivations can drive groups to use extreme levels of
violence. For example, one of the defining features of the majority of right-
wing terrorist groups is their racism, which drives their use of indiscriminate
violence against people of colour and immigrant communities. Yet the
evidence indicates that terrorist groups do not necessarily target their ethnic
enemies indiscriminately, or if they do, it may not necessarily be the core
component of their strategy.
Conor Gearty argues that for some ethno-nationalist groups such as the
Basque Separatist Movement, ETA in Spain and the PLO, the purpose of
their violence is primarily symbolic in nature, to communicate a message
in order to generate public and political support. In contrast, other groups,
including the various republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland, the
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Sikh nationalists in the Indian state of Punjab,
have all at some stage used violence to intimidate their ethnic and nationalist
enemies. The objective of this strategy is to enforce the separation of their
communities and provoke a government backlash leading to further social
polarization.21 Therefore, these types of groups can have radically different
perceptions of the purpose of violence, which in turn will affect the nature
of their campaigns.
Most of these types of groups have at some stage engaged in
indiscriminate acts of violence, but the emphasis that each group places
on this type of attack varies. For many of those groups that are trying to
polarize communities and drive their ethnic enemies form their territory,
indiscriminate attacks tend to be a more common feature of their
campaigns, and they are generally willing to inflict significantly higher
numbers of casualties. For instance, the Tamil Tigers have perpetrated
two indiscriminate attacks which resulted in over 100 deaths, and the Sikh
nationalists in the Punjab, have perpetrated one, with one other failure when
a bomb placed on an airliner exploded only after the plane had landed.22
For many other ethno-nationalist groups however, there has been a
conscious recognition that only if their violence is properly calculated and
in some way regulated, will they achieve their objectives. Many have not

Political Motivations and Disincentives 99
used indiscriminate violence in any systematic way to heighten tension and
polarize their societies, and as a result, many groups of this type operate
well below their potential capacity for violence. For instance, official UK
sources estimated in 1999 that the IRA in Northern Ireland had enough
weapons and equipment to equip 500 men to carry out the equivalent of
a full-scale war for six months.23 But even before the paramilitary groups
operating in Northern Ireland implemented a ceasefire as part of the peace
process, levels of IRA violence were nowhere near the capacity offered by
this arsenal.
There have been examples of some ethno-nationalist groups using
CBRN agents to attack discriminate targets. This includes an incident in 1992
when members of the PKK in Turkey poisoned the water tanks of a Turkish
Air Force compound in Istanbul, with potassium cyanide. The contamination
was discovered before it caused any casualties.24 Whilst in 2008, two members
of the SNLA were convicted in the UK of contaminating vodka bottles
with caustic soda and sending them to a journalist and a local government
councillor in England. The men were motivated by an extreme hatred of the
English and had threatened to kill English people ‘at random and with no
discrimination or compunction’, including by poisoning the water supply in
England. Their objective was to persuade the British government to grant
Scotland independence.25
Even some ethno-nationalist groups that have politico-religious
ideologies have demonstrated a general willingness to place certain limits
on their violence. The two prime examples are elements of the Chechen
insurgency in Russia and the Sikh nationalists in the Punjab. The Chechen
insurgents comprise a diverse mix of groups, who are driven by a range
of political and religious motivations and ideologies, from nationalism to
Islamism. They have largely restricted their violence to military and political
targets within the borders of Chechnya, although they have conducted
a number of raids into Russia itself with the purpose of taking civilian
hostages. Three of these raids resulted in over 100 casualties, most notably
the Beslan school siege, but these casualties were as much a consequence of
the failure of the Russian security forces to manage the incidents properly
as the terrorists’ desire to kill large numbers of Russian civilians. Chechen
interest in constraining their violence was also illustrated by their burying
caesium-137 in Moscow and threatening to detonate radiological weapons,
but never following through on the threat. This could be interpreted as an
attempt to intimidate Russian public opinion and generate propaganda,26
but it can also be interpreted as a deterrent threat to Russia to limit its own
violence. It therefore appears that the Chechen leadership deliberately

100 The Changing Face of Terrorism
constrained its violence, whilst keeping open the option to escalate as a
deterrent threat.
The Sikh nationalists fighting to achieve independence for the Punjab
have also placed some constraints on their violence. In common with some
other ‘religious’ terrorist groups, their former leader, Sant Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale, was willing to sanction violence against an open-ended range
of targets. He once commented that, ‘I only finish (i.e. kill) those who are
enemies of the Sikh faith like policemen, government officials and Hindus’.27
Much of this indiscriminate violence was comprised of shootings and
bombings which caused relatively low numbers of casualties.28 And like the
Chechen insurgents, the Sikh nationalists generally restricted their violence
to within the borders of the Punjab, attacking Hindus primarily in an effort
to persuade them to leave the state. However, following the 1984 battle for
the Golden Temple in Amritsar, in which Bhindranwale was killed and the
backbone of his movement destroyed, their tactics appeared to broaden
out. They were blamed for the 1985 bombing of an Air India passenger
airliner over the Irish Sea in which 328 people were killed and another failed
attempt to down an airliner a few hours later. But whilst the casualty levels
from their campaign of terrorism in the Punjab rose following the Indian
army’s attack on the Golden Temple, most of the casualties continued to be
incurred in small-scale indiscriminate bombings and shootings.29
The other main type of terrorist group which is less inclined to limit
its violence are extreme right-wing groups in the USA that have racist
ideologies. The type of person that these groups attracts opposes gun
control, believes that abortion is a sin, that homosexuality is an abomination,
is racist and anti-semitic, and wants to make the USA a country for white
people only. Besides perpetrating indiscriminate attacks against individuals,
their violence has been directed against Jewish banks, TV stations, gay
nightclubs, black churches and abortion clinics. They comprise a wide range
of different racist secular groups including white supremacists, neo-Nazis,
white nationalists and white separatists.30 Some of these groups are also
influenced by the teachings of the Christian Identity Church, the ultimate
objective of which is the creation of a national state where the white race
can preserve its culture and live out its destiny. The Church considers that
the use of terrorism against the ZOG will be the prelude to a racial war of
Armageddon, which will result in the establishment of Christ’s kingdom on
earth.31 These ideological issues will be explored further in Chapter 5.
In 1999, intelligence sources identified more than 2,000 extreme right-
wing groups across the USA, with more than a million full-time supporters
and thousands more supporting them through hundreds of internet websites.

Political Motivations and Disincentives 101
The Simon Wiesenthal Centre in the USA also estimated that there were 400
race hate groups in the USA, with a combined membership of between
20,000 and 40,000.32 Since 9/11 many of these groups have gone into
decline, but because there is no reliable data on their membership it remains
unknown whether their decline is terminal or merely temporary. Individual
groups in this broader right-wing movement have different ideologies
and methods, and do not necessarily engage in systematic campaigns of
indiscriminate racist violence to achieve their goals. But amongst the most
violent of them are the National Alliance and the Aryan Brotherhood.
The attitude of some of these groups towards indiscriminate mass
casualty attacks became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11. Some of them
supported the targeting of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon,
because they consider them to be part of the ZOG and the New World
Order. The former attorney of the National Alliance declared that ‘A
handful of Arabs had the whole elite reeling … the Pentagon in flames, and
the President and other officials running like scared rabbits … We should be
blowing up NYC (New York City) and DC (Washington DC), not waiting
for a bunch of camel jockeys to do it for us’. Rocky Suhayda the leader of
the American Nazi Party, raged that ‘It was a disgrace that in a population
of at least 150 million white and Aryan Americans, we provide so few that
are willing to do the same’.33 Concerns about these groups was heightened
by the involvement of some right wing groups in a number of previous
plots to use CBRN weapons against indiscriminate population targets by
poisoning water supplies in major cities. Although there was no evidence of
plots to attack specifically ethnic minority targets with these agents.
Using Violence as a Means to Generate Popular and
Political Support
One of the principal objectives of the majority of secular and ethno-
nationalist groups is to generate popular and political support. Bruce
Hoffman argues that ‘Terrorism, therefore, may be seen as a violent act that
is conceived to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates,
to communicate a message’.34 That message is directed towards a diverse
audience: the government of the state; public opinion within the state;
the international community; and the domestic constituency of the group
itself. Messages aimed at the government of the state and public opinion
are intended to intimidate and coerce. But those same messages are also
directed towards the group’s constituency, in order to maintain and enhance

102 The Changing Face of Terrorism
the domestic support that the group receives, and sometimes also towards
the international community in order to gain international political support.
At one level, some groups seek to generate international political
support for their cause, either as a means of putting pressure on the state
that they are fighting to make concessions, or to gain material support, such
as arms supplies (for a fuller analysis of state sponsorship of terrorism, see
Chapter 8). Depending upon from which state(s) the group is attempting
to gain support, this can potentially serve as a powerful constraint on the
level of violence that a group uses and the targets that it is directed against.
This is particularly the case with groups that are attempting to win support
from Western states, where public opinion can potentially be sympathetic to
many causes, but can be opposed to the use of indiscriminate violence. The
IRA was notably successful in calibrating its violence to a level which did
not alienate its support in the USA. For many ethno-nationalist separatist
groups, gaining the support of powerful Western states such as the USA is
a major objective, or, failing that, powerful regional states.
At the national level, Bruce Hoffman argues that the overriding tactical
and ethical imperative for left-wing terrorists has been to tailor the level
of violence that they use to their perceived constituencies. Killing innocent
civilians was seen by some left-wing groups as tarnishing their image as a
revolutionary vanguard in the pursuit of social justice. In their perception,
violence should be used to gain publicity for their cause and to educate
the public.35 As a result, left-wing political violence has tended to be highly
discriminate and limited.
In contrast, some other types of groups have specifically used
indiscriminate violence as a means of mobilizing popular opinion. Italy,
which has been the Western European country most affected by neo-fascist
violence, experienced several ‘stagi’, or massacres, between 1969 and 1986.
This included the bomb attack on Bologna railway station in 1980, which
killed 85 people and injured 200. Resorting to indiscriminate violence
represented a qualitative escalation of political violence in Italy, but the
aim of the campaign was to persuade the public through the very climate
of insecurity that it helped to create (alongside the activities of left-wing
groups such as the Red Brigades) to accept the need for an authoritarian
government.36 Similarly, Chris Hani, the former leader of the African
National Congress (ANC) armed wing, Spear of the Nation, stated in the
1980s that he permitted bomb attacks against white civilian targets because,
‘If we don’t increase our level of violence, we’ll risk losing the support of
young blacks in the townships’.37

Political Motivations and Disincentives 103
It has been asserted that ‘religious’ terrorist groups differ from
secular groups because they do not attempt to appeal to a constituency,
and consequently are more willing to engage in indiscriminate attacks
against a broader range of targets. However, only religious cults really fit
this description. Other types of ‘religious’ groups, such as Islamists, Sikh
nationalists, Jewish and extreme right-wing Christian terrorists do have
constituencies which they purport to represent. These ‘religious’ groups aim
to guarantee the attainment of the greatest possible benefits for themselves
and their co-religionists, or even just those amongst their co-religionists who
adhere to the group’s particular politico-religious ideology. They recognize
that their success or failure depends primarily upon their ability to gain
popular legitimacy amongst their constituency. Their ability to do this will
depend upon the attractiveness of their ideology as well as the methods that
they use to achieve their aims. Therefore, the activities of these groups also
tends to reflect a need to appeal to their constituencies and to mobilize them
in support of their objectives.
There is, however, an apparent difference between the way that some
‘religious’ terrorists appeal to their constituencies and the way that many
secular and ethno-nationalist groups appeal to theirs. Secular terrorists
believe that whilst the general population might not actually support their
cause, they are a potential source of support, which can be mobilized by
increasing their awareness of the cause the group espouses, through carefully
calibrated violence that does not alienate them. In contrast, many ‘religious’
groups appear to believe that the best way of mobilizing their constituency
is by pursuing heightened levels of violence against clearly defined enemies,
which their constituency also identifies as their enemy.
Many of these ‘religious’ groups are also less interested in generating
international political support than secular and ethno-nationalist separatist
movements. Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda have little interest in gaining
political support from states because they perceive all non-Islamist regimes
to be illegitimate. Instead, their focus is on mobilizing the global community
of Muslims, the ummah, which they hope will gain awareness through
their actions, and inspire them to overthrow the ‘illegitimate’ regimes
under which they live. However, they might have a pragmatic interest in
forging links with the small number of radical regimes which might supply
them with material support. Consequently, their violence is not generally
constrained by concerns about gaining international political support. For
al-Qaeda, spectacular attacks against the West that result in large numbers
of casualties are a tactic for generating popular support within the ummah
by demonstrating the strength and power of the network. Bin Laden argues

104 The Changing Face of Terrorism
that his bombing campaigns in Saudi Arabia had important propaganda
effects for mobilizing this constituency. He argued that,
Most important amongst these is the awareness of the people to the
significance of the American occupation of the country of the two
sacred Mosques, and that the original decrees of the regime are a
reflection of the wishes of the American occupiers. So the people
became aware that their main problems were caused by the American
occupiers and their puppets in the Saudi regime … these missions
also paved the way for the rising of the voices of opposition against
the American occupation from within the ruling family and the armed
forces; in fact we can say that the remaining Gulf countries have been
effected to the same degree, and that the voices of opposition to the
American occupation have begun to be heard at the level of the ruling
families of the … Gulf countries.38
Provoking a response from their enemies by such acts also serves to
generate propaganda and garner support for the group. In response to the
attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the US launched
cruise missile attacks on several al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the
Shaifa pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan which was linked to bin Laden,
and was alleged to have been a CW production facility. The discovery
that the Shaifa plant was not a CW production facility, coupled with
widespread international criticism of the attack, turned the missile strikes
into a propaganda victory for the Sudan and al-Qaeda, sparking worldwide
demonstrations by Muslims. The anger that it generated turned bin Laden
into a hero and a symbol for militant Islamist groups around the world.
Yet there are also examples of Islamist and fundamentalist groups
modifying their tactics in order not to lose popular support. The need for
Islamist groups to win popular support has been most evident in Egypt,
where indiscriminate attacks on tourists by the Gamaah Islamiyah and
Al Jihad groups provoked widespread public hostility which left the two
groups in disarray. This prompted the leadership of Gamaah Islamiyah to
abandon the strategy on the grounds that it had lost them too much public
support. Not all members of the leadership accepted this view however,
and some continued to believe that high profile attacks would highlight the
group’s cause and weaken the Egyptian government.39
This has also been evident in Iraq where the wave of atrocities against
Shi’a civilians perpetrated by some Sunni Islamist terror groups, including
al-Qaeda in Iraq, eroded their popular support in the Muslim world. In

Political Motivations and Disincentives 105
2005 the USA intercepted a letter from al-Qaeda’s deputy leader Ayman al
Zawahiri, telling Islamist insurgents in Iraq to stop indiscriminately targeting
Muslims and Shi’a mosques in order not to alienate the masses.40 The
consequences of this became apparent in 2007 when the mass defection
of many ordinary Sunnis to form the Awakening Councils, led to al-Qaeda
being expelled from Anbar province. This, according to Abu Tariq, an al-
Qaeda leader in the province, ‘created weakness and psychological defeat.
This also created panic, fear, and the unwillingness to fight. The morale of
the fighters went down’.41 Significantly, opposition to al-Qaeda’s killing of
civilians also gradually began to influence its supporters. By 2008, there was
a growing belief among many militant Islamists that the use of violence
against innocent civilians, both in the Middle East and the West, had proven
to be counter productive for mobilizing the ummah.42
Similarly, Hezbollah has recognized that its resistance to Israel requires
a popular base if it is to succeed, so it provides a range of social services
in the communities that it represents, in order to achieve this. It does not
consider that attacking Israeli civilians is necessary to build this popular
support, although it does consider it necessary to retaliate against Israeli
attacks which kill Lebanese civilians by launching rocket attacks on Israeli
settlements.43 Instead, Hezbollah prefers to limit its violence in order to
gain legitimacy as a resistance movement, presumably with the intention of
garnering international political support.
In the same way, the extreme right-wing Christian movement in the USA
also has a constituency amongst the white population, which the various
groups in the movement attempt to cultivate and appeal to for support.
Much of the violence attributed to members of these groups consists of
unstructured low level attacks, particularly against people of colour. Whilst
these groups accept that some white people have ‘sold out’ to the ZOG
and the New World Order, they are generally attempting to mobilize the
white race in the USA to their cause. The risk of losing popular support
should therefore be a major disincentive to this type of group conducting
indiscriminate mass casualty attacks which run the risk of killing innocent
white Christians.
Using CBRN Weapons for Political Objectives
For any terrorist group one of the biggest unknowns is how public opinion
will react to the use of a CBRN weapon. When they consider how their
constituency will react, they need to consider a number of factors: popular

106 The Changing Face of Terrorism
attitudes towards their enemy; why they intend to use these weapons; how
they intend to use them; and the target.
In many states there exists a societal revulsion towards the use of CBRN
weapons, which is significantly stronger than with conventional weapons.
There is a sense that CBRN weapons are uniquely terrible because of
the nature of the injuries they cause, their indiscriminate effects, and the
lingering effects of the contamination they leave behind, even if they do not
kill large numbers of people. Therefore it is generally considered that using
CBRN weapons against any target would evoke a negative public reaction in
the majority of states, even amongst potential supporters. For this reason,
many analysts consider that secular terrorist groups on the left and right
would be reluctant to use CBRN weapons for fear of alienating the political
support on which they depend. The only types of secular group that this
argument might not capture are those which identify a racial enemy.
CBRN weapons and WMD are the optimum means of committing
indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, but because this is not a tactic of
most secular terrorist groups they should theoretically have limited interest
in procuring and using such weapons. Therefore, one of the primary
disincentives to the use of CBRN weapons is the sheer numbers of
indiscriminate casualties that WMD can potentially cause. Brian Jenkins
argues that killing lots of people is not necessarily a major objective of most
terrorist groups, because it would be counter-productive for pursuing their
political objectives. For secular terrorists in particular, their primary concern
is that they are more likely to lose support than gain it by causing huge
numbers of casualties.
The relationship between committing acts of indiscriminate violence
and generating propaganda, however, is not clear-cut. This is evident from
the 1972 Munich massacre in which members of the Palestinian Black
September group kidnapped nine Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics
and were all then killed during a shoot-out with the police. The operation
was a failure because it did not achieve its objective of securing the release of
Palestinian prisoners, and the righteousness of their cause was tarnished in
the eyes of the world, because international opinion was almost unanimous
in condemning the attack. But the episode demonstrated that even when
an operation fails in all its objectives, it can still be counted as a success if
it is dramatic enough to capture the attention of the media. In these terms,
Munich was an unequivocal success.44
What this incident suggests is that even negative publicity can prove
useful. Whilst a CBRN attack might evoke universal revulsion, leading to a
loss of political sympathy and support, it would still be highly effective in

Political Motivations and Disincentives 107
gaining media attention and focusing worldwide attention on the cause of
the group that perpetrated the attack. This occurred with Aum Shinrikyo
after its attack on the Tokyo subway, even though generating propaganda
was not an objective of the attack. The use of CBRN weapons could
therefore be perceived by the constituency of the group to confer prestige
on it, as a symbol of its strength and commitment, and could provide the
qualitative escalation that groups might consider necessary to spark a wider
revolt to overthrow the governments they are fighting.
This might help to explain why some secular political groups have
previously been involved in plots involving CBRN weapons, or are alleged
to have been involved in such plots. The RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) were
implicated in five alleged plots to use CBW during the 1970s and 1980s,
including one where botulinum toxin was allegedly produced.45 Similarly,
secular right-wing groups have also sporadically been linked to CBW plots.
Yet as far as is publicly known, none of these types of secular groups has
ever undertaken a long term, systematic effort to procure CBRN weapons.
This seems to suggest that whilst considering the options, their interest in
CBRN weapons was determined more by opportunity and circumstance
than by longer-term strategic or tactical requirements. As noted previously,
these considerations could also become more acute if the group is in decline.
Whilst concerns about alienating political support would seem to rule
out most secular groups from using CBRN weapons for indiscriminate mass
casualty attacks against population targets, Chapter 3 indicated that CBRN
weapons are capable of being used in a number of more discriminate roles.
By selecting what they could justify as ‘legitimate’ targets, terrorist groups
could still consider using CBRN weapons to achieve a significant propaganda
effect. Whether this would alienate members of their constituency can only
be guessed at. Some people would probably be repulsed by the use of a
CBRN weapon, even in this role, but others might accept it as a necessary
evil to achieve a greater good. This might help to account for the occasional
interest of secular left- and right-wing groups in procuring these weapons,
and why some extreme right-wing Christian or racist groups and individuals
in the USA have procured ricin in order to murder individuals, even though
it would have been more effective to use conventional weapons for that
purpose.
In contrast, because many ‘religious’ terrorist groups perceive their
constituency differently, and attempt to mobilize it through different means,
they might be more willing to consider perpetrating indiscriminate mass-
casualty attacks involving CBRN weapons. But they would still have to
constrain their attacks in order to avoid alienating their constituencies.

108 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Mass-casualty attacks would need to be restricted to what can be identified
as ‘legitimate’ targets, just as the Oklahoma City bombing was legitimized as
an attack on the federal government. If extreme right-wing Christian groups
in the USA attempted to use CBRN weapons to precipitate a race war, they
would either have to use them in a discriminate fashion, or else they would
have to select their targets carefully in order to minimize collateral casualties
among the white Christian population. This might account for why a
number of groups in this movement have discussed using CBW agents
against indiscriminate population targets by poisoning water supplies, but
the most serious incidents involving these type of groups have involved
discriminate political targets. Concerns that members of their constituency
would be accidentally killed could be addressed by careful target selection,
which for Islamic fundamentalists or Islamists could perhaps be as obvious
as choosing a target in the USA.
Operational Disincentives and Political Objectives
As described in Chapter 3, the effects of using CBRN weapons can be
unpredictable and uncontrollable, this should make some terrorists more
cautious about using them. When the prominent Chechen warlord Salman
Raduyev, was challenged by a journalist about whether the Chechen
insurgents would attack Russian nuclear power plants during the Russian-
Chechen war of 1999–2000, he claimed that they would not, ‘because the
consequences of this cannot be predicted’.46 Whether this was actually the
reason or not, Chechen insurgents have never attacked a Russian nuclear
power station.
Similarly, the use of CBRN weapons against indiscriminate population
targets in Israel would in all probability also affect Palestinian civilians
because of the close proximity of the two communities. However, there
are many towns and cities in Israel that are predominantly, if not totally,
populated by Jewish people. In operational terms, this means that discrete
targets would have to be identified for indiscriminate attacks if a group
wanted to avoid killing its own people. Attacking such targets might provide
a high degree of assurance that Palestinians would not be caught up in the
immediate attack, but the propensity of CBRN contamination to spread
in an unpredictable and uncontrollable fashion, means that it could not
be guaranteed that Palestinians or Arabs in surrounding states would not
be affected. Nevertheless, Abu Mussab al Zarqawi felt that he could use a
WMD inside Israel. He declared that he did not have a WMD, ‘but if we had
such a bomb – and we ask God that we have such a bomb soon – we would

Political Motivations and Disincentives 109
not hesitate for a moment to strike Israeli towns such as Eilat, Tel Aviv and
others’.47 His thoughts on the possibility of this causing Palestinian or Arab
civilian casualties are unknown.
Similarly, any group attempting to achieve independence for their
territorial homeland should be deterred from using CBRN weapons within
the boundaries of their homeland because of the contamination that they
cause. It is extremely doubtful that terrorists would irradiate the land that
they ultimately seek to inherit. Therefore, for groups that operate primarily
on their own territory, any consideration of the use of CBRN weapons
might necessitate a change in their strategy to attack targets outside of their
homeland. Yet it is also conceivable that in certain circumstances, groups
might still consider that the advantages that would accrue from using these
weapons could outweigh the disadvantages of using them on their own soil.
Although it might constrain them to use these weapons in limited, highly
controlled ways.
Another possible disincentive for some groups considering the use of
CBRN weapons is the fear of provoking an unprecedented government
backlash. Some terrorist groups operate within a fairly permissive
environment, which would be threatened if they carried out an attack of
such magnitude. During the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland for
instance, many terrorists from both the nationalist and loyalist communities
were known to the security forces, but they were left at liberty for lack of
evidence to convict them of any specific crime. If the British government
had felt compelled to act, there were a number of legal and even extra-legal
measures that it could have used to clamp down on terrorist activity, such
as internment without trial. Similarly, the Indian government was extremely
unwilling to act against the Sikh nationalists holed up in the Golden Temple
at Amritsar, and was only goaded into attacking the Temple by a series of
high-profile terrorist attacks and threats.
Evidence of a group being sensitive to the political costs of their
operations can be seen following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006,
which was sparked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah. Over
1,300 people, mostly civilians, were killed during the invasion, a fifth of
Lebanon’s population were forced to flee their homes, and the country’s
infrastructure was devastated. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual leader
of Hezbollah, admitted in an interview on Lebanese TV that Hezbollah
had not envisaged that the seizure of the soldiers would lead to the war and
claimed that if he had know he would not have sanctioned the operation.48
He may well have made this statement because of concerns that the Lebanese
population would turn against Hezbollah. But whether the statement was a

110 The Changing Face of Terrorism
genuine statement of regret or merely a political expedient is irrelevant, it
nevertheless still illustrates that Hezbollah is sensitive to the political costs
of its actions. Although the extent to which such considerations might
restrict its use of violence in the future remains to be seen.
But whilst some groups might be deterred by the threat of an
unprecedented backlash, it is precisely such backlashes that some groups
are attempting to provoke. When governments clamp down on terrorist
activities they invariably encroach on the civil liberties, and in some states
even the human rights, of their citizens. This undermines the legitimacy of
the government in the eyes of the population, and generates support for
the terrorist cause. There are instances of indiscriminate atrocities being
perpetrated specifically in order to provoke an adverse reaction from their
target audience. Hamas has formerly attempted to undermine the Middle
East peace process with indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians in order to
turn Israeli public opinion against it. Similarly, the Jewish terrorist Baruch
Goldstein attempted to turn Arab opinion against the peace process with an
attack at the Cave of the Patriarch which killed 30 Muslim worshippers.49
Some ‘religious’ groups also have ideological motivations for seeking to
provoke a massive backlash from the target state, this will be explored in
Chapter 5. However, an act of terrorism that successfully provokes a backlash
from a government might also result in a potential loss of international
support for the group. For some groups this might not be a concern, but it
will be a factor for others. Therefore, different types of groups, at different
times, are less likely to be deterred by a potential backlash from the target
state. For groups that deliberately seek to provoke a backlash, the use of a
CBRN weapon or a WMD would be almost guaranteed to provoke it.
Yet such a strategy does not necessarily need to involve large numbers
of indiscriminate casualties in order to be successful, or even involve the
use of CBRN weapons in order to be successful. The IRA conducted a
highly personal campaign to provoke the then British prime minister
Margaret Thatcher into overreacting and invoking widespread repression
which would drive moderate nationalists to support the IRA. This was
achieved through killing British servicemen and her close colleagues such
as the politicians Airey Neave and Ian Gow. The most dramatic example
of this strategy was the 1984 attack on the Grand Hotel in Brighton, where
delegates from the Conservative party conference were staying, and which
nearly killed Mrs Thatcher herself.50
Following 9/11, the US led invasion of Afghanistan and the global hunt
for al-Qaeda has shown terrorists that states will unleash an unprecedented
backlash in response to an act of mass destruction. In the first few years after

Political Motivations and Disincentives 111
9/11, al-Qaeda suffered considerable damage. It lost its bases in Afghanistan
and many of its top leaders and operatives were killed or captured. As a
result, it lost the ability to centrally command and control global terrorist
operations, forcing it became more of an inspiration to autonomous cells
operating in other countries than a functioning organization. Yet the war
against al-Qaeda has been a failure. Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al
Zawahiri, were not killed or captured and al-Qaeda was not destroyed.
Instead, al-Qaeda found a new safe haven in the lawless tribal areas of
north-west Pakistan, and within a few years had begun to centrally direct
global terrorist operations again. The failure to kill bin Laden and destroy
al-Qaeda undoubtedly weakens this potential disincentive to using CBRN
weapons and WMD. Yet not all groups are as well equipped as al-Qaeda
to survive such an extreme backlash. Its diffuse and transnational nature
makes it incredibly resilient and its operating environment in Pakistan and
Afghanistan makes it very difficult for the USA to track down al-Qaeda
operatives.
Equally, governments themselves can also lose international support
by implementing harsh measures to suppress terrorism, whatever the
provocation. When Russia invaded Chechnya in 1999 in retaliation for the
Moscow apartment block bombings, it incurred considerable criticism from
the West and the Muslim world. The invasion, and the atrocities carried
out by the Russian army, were a propaganda defeat for Russia. It was never
able to regain the moral high ground, despite constantly trying to justify its
actions as a legitimate campaign to wipe out terrorists. It was only after 9/11
that Russia was able to regain some credibility by justifying its operations in
Chechnya by reference to the ‘war on terror’.
Conclusion
This analysis indicates that there will be conflicting political motivations
and disincentives for all terrorist groups that might be considering using
CBRN weapons. For some types of group, and in certain circumstances, the
motivations are stronger than the disincentives, and vice versa. In addition,
the balance between these motivations and disincentives can change over
time as the politico-strategic situation of the group changes. The strongest
motivations to use CBRN weapons centre around groups that have ethnic
enemies, those that consider that the best way to build additional support
within their constituency is through acts of extreme violence, and those
that are threatened with destruction by the security forces. The strongest
disincentives to using CBRN weapons centre around considerations of

112 The Changing Face of Terrorism
losing the support of the international community and alienating their
domestic constituency. These factors will inhibit some secular groups in
particular, from using CBRN weapons for indiscriminate mass-casualty
attacks. But ‘religious’ groups also need to take account of these factors.
However, these considerations will not necessarily inhibit terrorist groups
from using CBRN weapons in more discriminate roles; in fact, the strong
propaganda value to be gained from using such weapons could make
them distinctly attractive for use in these roles. Therefore these factors
might just shape the nature of tactics, prompting their controlled use
against discriminate targets. In general terms, this suggests that all types of
terrorist groups could potentially be subject to strong political and strategic
motivations to use CBRN weapons, but the level of the potential risk varies.
Secular political groups are more likely to place limits on their violence,
including on the use of CBRN weapons, whilst the disincentives identified
in this chapter appear to be much weaker in respect of ‘religious’ terrorist
groups, and secular political groups that have ethnic enemies.

5
THEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS
AND DISINCENTIVES TO USING
CBRN WEAPONS
Among the widely accepted arguments concerning the potential motivations
of terrorist groups to escalate their violence to use CBRN weapons is
that the theological nature of the ideology of ‘religious’ terror groups
makes them more likely than their ‘secular’ counterparts to resort to acts
of indiscriminate violence, and hence to use CBRN weapons. Chapter 4
illustrated how the ideologies of ‘religious’ terrorist groups are typically a
mix of political and religious elements, and that ostensibly ‘religious’ groups
have political objectives, which often do not differ significantly in nature
from those of secular groups. However, ‘religious’ groups differ significantly
from secular groups in that religion is a defining feature of their ideology.
This chapter will assess how the theological aspects of the ideology of
this type of group could act as either a motivator or a disincentive to using
CBRN weapons and WMD.
Theological Imperatives to Perpetrate Mass Casualty Attacks
Chapter 1 highlighted that one of the principle trends in terrorism in the
1990s was the growth in the number of terrorist groups with politico-
religious ideologies, and that some of these ‘religious’ terrorist groups were
also driving the trend in the increasing lethality of contemporary terrorism.
Since 1990, ‘religious’ terrorist groups have been responsible for the majority
of the terrorist attacks that have resulted in more than 100 casualties, and
have been almost solely responsible for the tripling of attacks of this
magnitude since 9/11. The question remains however, whether theological

114 The Changing Face of Terrorism
imperatives have driven this trend of increasing lethality in attacks by
this type of group, and whether religion is in fact one of the principle
motivational forces driving terrorism towards acts of mass destruction.
The correlation between the growth of contemporary ‘religious’
terrorism and the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks has prompted
the generalized observation that ‘religious’ terrorists have engaged in
more lethal attacks than their secular counterparts primarily because they
perceive violence to be a sacramental act, or divine duty, executed in direct
response to a theological imperative.1 Indeed, all ‘religious’ terrorists argue
that their actions are perpetrated on behalf of their God, and one of the
stated objectives and motivations of many ‘religious’ groups is to defend
their faith. This type of group invariably invokes the concept of religious
war to give their campaign of terrorism a spurious theological legitimacy.
This is particularly evident among Islamist groups, which tend to invoke the
concept of jihad whenever Muslims are in conflict with non-Muslims. Al-
Qaeda and other Islamist groups which share its ideology, believe that they
are in a ‘cosmic war’, a religious war pitting good against evil. They therefore
believe that they must strike with the full force of God’s wrath. In such a
war there is no middle ground and no distinction between combatant and
civilian. This serves to both dehumanize and demonize the enemy as agents
of the devil.2
Whilst Chapter 4 described the role of nationalism in motivating some
Muslim suicide bombers, the role that religion plays in contemporary
‘religious’ terrorism is illustrated by interviews with Hamas suicide bombers
in Gaza. These interviews show that the bombers are deeply religious,
and that in being selected for a mission they have to be convinced of the
religious legitimacy of the acts they were contemplating. Many of them
memorize large sections of the Koran and are well versed in the finer points
of Islamic law and practice. Religion is also at the heart of their preparations
immediately preceding their attacks. They undergo intensified spiritual
exercises including prayers and recitations of the Koran for up to two hours a
day. This focuses on six specific chapters which feature themes such as jihad,
the birth of the nation of Islam, and the importance of faith. The bombers
will also spend most of the night praying. Immediately prior to setting out
on their final journeys, the suicide bombers perform a ritual ablution before
attempting to attend at least one communal prayer at a mosque. They will
then recite the traditional Islamic prayer that is customary before battle, and
ask Allah to forgive their sins, before finally putting a Koran in their pocket
and then setting off.3 The immediate objectives and motivations for these
individuals volunteering to become suicide bombers are primarily political in

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 115
nature, in seeking to drive the Israelis out of Palestinian territory, but these
interviews also clearly indicate that religion is a major motivational factor
for these individuals in agreeing to indiscriminately kill Israeli civilians.
It is also important not to underestimate the role of religion in
motivating secular terrorists. The hierarchy of the Catholic Church in
Northern Ireland condemned the actions of the IRA, but there were clergy
who were sympathetic to the goals and methods of the IRA. In Belfast,
one particular priest played a role in the indoctrination of new recruits.
He lectured the recruits that the IRA’s actions were justified in Catholic
teachings because they were fighting an enemy who was occupying their
country, and that it was not a sin to kill in defence of one’s country.4
In pursuing the theological imperatives of their ideology, ‘religious’
terrorist groups typically display intolerance, if not deep hatred of other
religions. Islamic fundamentalist and Islamist groups treat the contents
of the Koran as being incontestable because it is handed down from God
to man. They use selective quotes, taken out of context, to support their
objectives and tactics, including indiscriminate attacks on non-Muslim
civilians. Some Islamist ideologues have focused on certain sections of
the ‘sword verses’ in the Koran which state ‘when the sacred months have
passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and
confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of worship’.5 Yet, they
ignore the following text which states that, ‘but if they repent and fulfil their
devotional obligations and pay zakat [tax for alms] then let them go their
way, for God is forgiving and kind’.6
Militant Islamist teachings pronounce that ‘those who adamantly
refuse to convert to Islam are, to all intents and purposes, enemies of
Allah Himself ’.7 This establishes a moral and theological imperative for
perpetrating indiscriminate attacks against non-Muslim targets, which is
reflected in the pronouncements of a number of Islamic fundamentalist
and Islamist groups. Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Hezbollah,
once commented that ‘We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us
and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy’.8 Similarly,
Antar Zoubari, a leader of the Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) in Algeria,
argued that the GIA’s campaign of violence is an ‘all-out war’ to establish an
Islamic state. If innocents should perish in pursuing this divinely ordained
goal that is an acceptable consequence, whilst the killing of ‘apostates’ or
those not part of the Islamic movement, was a duty. This is justified by
reference to verses in the Koran which state that ‘I am innocent of those
killed because they were associated with those who had to be fought’.9
Hamas uses similar rhetoric of pursuing all-out war until Israel is totally

116 The Changing Face of Terrorism
vanquished. Its covenant states that ‘Israel will continue to exist until Islam
will obliterate it’. Whilst Article 7 of the Hamas Charter displays clear
millenarian overtones: ‘The time [of redemption] will not come until the
Muslims fight the Jews and kill them, and until the Jews hide behind rocks
and trees when the call is raised: “Oh Muslim, here is a Jew hiding come
and kill him”.’10 9/11 was proof that the most high profile Islamist terrorist
group in the world believes that acts of mass destruction are both necessary
and justified theologically.
These groups also display a deep hatred of co-religionists whom they do
not consider to be sufficiently pious or to have strayed from the true path.
There are divisions among Islamic jurists about the penalty for apostates,
with many believing that they should be executed. Indeed, in some Muslim
states, apostasy is a crime punishable by death. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates
have increasingly adopted the doctrine of takfir, by which they claim the
right to decide who is a ‘true’ Muslim. Once they have declared certain
Muslims to be apostates, they start to target them.11 It is argued that such
theologically inspired intolerance and hatred can potentially lead to the
sanctioning of almost limitless violence against those who are not members
of the terrorist’s religion, and that ‘religious’ terrorists are not constrained
by the same kind of political, moral, and practical constraints that influence
secular terrorists.
Such theologically driven violence became increasingly apparent in
Iraq following the American led invasion in 2003, when Sunni Islamist
groups carried out a large number of indiscriminate bomb and gun attacks
against Shi’a civilian targets.12 For many of the indigenous Iraqi Sunni
insurgent groups, their motives for attacking Shi’a civilians are complex,
and are as much about their loss of political control to the Shi’a after the
fall of Saddam, as they are about hate of the Shi’a per se. But for Islamist
groups, particularly those comprising non-Iraqis, attacks on Shi’a civilians
have more theological overtones. Between 2003 and 2007, these particular
groups carried out five attacks which killed over 100 Shi’a civilians,13 and
numerous other attacks which resulted in lower levels of casualties. This
campaign was largely driven by one man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who led
his own terrorist group called Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad. In 2004 he
formally joined al-Qaeda and the group became al-Qaeda in Iraq. Zarqawi
explained his strategy and goals in a letter to bin Laden in January 2004
which stated that: ‘targeting and striking their (Shi’a) religious, political and
military symbols, will make them show their rage against the Sunnis and
bear their inner vengeance. If we succeed in dragging them into sectarian

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 117
war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and
death.’14
Zarqawi’s motivations were partly political because of the Shi’a
domination of the Iraqi government and their alleged collaboration with
the USA, but Zarqawi was also heavily influenced by Mustafa Setmariam
Nasar, a prominent Syrian born Islamist ideologue who is known for his
rabid hatred of heterodox Islamic sects.15 For Zarqawi therefore, killing
Shi’a civilians was also an end in itself. Yet despite the actions of Zarqawi’s
group, al-Qaeda itself has previously avoided targeting Shi’a civilians,
focusing instead on targets linked to the USA, other Western nations, and
Arab regimes that it is seeking to overthrow. In July 2004, Iraqi intelligence
sources claimed that a number of factions of the Iraqi resistance had cut
their ties with Zarqawi because of the level of civilian casualties that al-
Qaeda in Iraq was causing.16 As noted in Chapter 4, this ultimately led to
a haemorrhage of popular support from Islamist groups operating inside
Iraq, and also from al-Qaeda itself at a global level.
Another example of religiously driven violence from Iraq was the co-
ordinated truck bombing of two villages of the Yazhidi sect in 2007, which
killed over 400 people. The Yazhidis are a pre Muslim sect who worship a
supreme God and seven angels in the form of peacocks. Their belief system
combines elements of Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Judaism, Christianity
and Islam. However, some Muslims believe that they are devil worshippers.17
Many Islamist terrorist groups also tend to be driven by a deep-seated
anti-semitism, as was indicated in the title of the fatwa of the World Islamic
Front in 1998 declaring ‘Jihad against Jews and Crusaders’. It is also reflected
in al-Qaeda military manuals. In Military Sciences – Targets Inside the Cities, the
focus of the strategy is economic targets but in the sections on ‘human
targets’ it states that the priority should be on attacking Jews, followed
by Christians.18 This indicates how religious hatred impacts on al-Qaeda
operations at a tactical level because a purely objective, non-theological
strategy would not have differentiated economic targets by religion. Similarly,
Al-Mubtakar al-Farid: Li Israal al-Safah al-Athiri Ila al-Kafir al-‘Anid (The Unique
Invention: to Deliver the Gaseous Killer to the Stubborn Infidel), highlights a range
of different buildings to attack with hydrogen cyanide. Among the various
targets listed in the manual are a large number than can defined as economic,
but it also lists churches in Muslim lands and synagogues.19
Despite the fact that one of the main elements of al-Qaeda’s strategy is
to strike at economic targets, it does not care how many civilians are killed in
attacks on economic targets. This contrasts with secular groups such as the
IRA which used to attack British economic targets but would normally issue

118 The Changing Face of Terrorism
warnings, in order to limit or prevent civilian casualties. Islamist terrorist
groups provide no warnings of their attacks, and there is frequently a clear
intention to kill as many civilians as possible. To an extent, heightened
civilian casualties could increase the economic impact of an attack, but not
significantly so, and it is not an essential feature of an economic targeting
strategy.
Therefore, some Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist groups and leaders
clearly fit the categorization of using theologically inspired intolerance
and hatred to sanction almost limitless violence against those who are not
members of the terrorist’s religion or from the same branch of the religion.
But Islam itself is not a motivational factor to engage in terrorism, or even
to perpetrate indiscriminate mass casualty attacks or use CBRN weapons.
It is the ideology of these groups, and the way that Islamist ideologues use
Islam to support their political and social objectives, that is the driver.
Similarly, the ideology of a number of extreme right-wing Christian
terrorist groups in the USA is considered to establish a moral imperative
and a strong justificatory mechanism for perpetrating indiscriminate attacks
against certain categories of civilians. The belief system of many of these
groups is based on the theological teachings of the Christian Identity
church, which is strongly racist. It preaches that the white race is superior
to all others in being God’s ‘chosen people’, that Jewish people are the seed
of Satan, and that people of colour have no souls. It uses many Biblical
passages to support its ideology, including Numbers 25, which is used to
justify violence against interracial marriages and other forms of alleged
immorality. In this verse, an Israelite priest called Phinehas killed an Israelite
man and a Midianite woman who were embracing. God immediately lifted
a plague that he had imposed on the Israelites and blessed Phinehas. But
rather than being about racial purity, the story is actually about the ‘sin’ of
religious intermixing.20
This is also evident in the Christian Identity belief that there will be a day
of reckoning as predicted in the Book of Revelations, which will take the
form of an apocalyptic race war that will lead to the creation of an Aryan
state as God’s kingdom on earth.21 Theoretically, this could be considered
to establish a powerful theological imperative to conduct terrorist attacks
involving mass casualties. To that end, groups and individuals that are part of
the movement have learnt practical survivalist skills, with some even making
shelters to protect themselves from CBRN weapons. Rather than using
constitutional means to achieve these goals, Aryan Nations promotional
literature proclaims its desire to ‘make clear to ourselves and our enemies
what we intend to do: We will have a national racial state at whatever price in

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 119
blood is necessary’.22 What this might actually mean in practice was spelled
out by Robert Matthews, the deceased former leader of the military wing of
the Aryan Nations, known as The Order, who once declared that in order
to prevent the white race being overrun by immigrants, all Jews, Blacks,
Hispanics, and other ‘mud people’ along with white ‘race traitors’ must be
exterminated in ‘a racial war of Armageddon’.23 This indicates that at least
some elements among the extreme right wing Christian groups in the USA
harbour genocidal fantasies, and their objective of initiating a race war, or
war against the federal government, would result in mass casualties.
These types of group, as well as secular extreme right wing groups in
the USA, are also driven by a deep seated anti-semitism. This is evident
from their belief that the USA is under the control of the ZOG. Following
9/11, Billy Roper, the deputy membership co-ordinator of the National
Alliance declared, ‘anyone who is willing to drive a plane into a building to
kill Jews is alright by me. I wish our members had half as much testicular
fortitude’.24
The past record of extreme right-wing Christian terrorist groups in the
USA developing and using CBRN weapons is mixed. Many of the previous
incidents in which groups and individuals from this broader movement have
sought to acquire CBRN weapons, or plotted to use them, appear to have
involved discriminate targets such as the murder of government officials.
Yet there have also been several reports of their interest in using CBRN
weapons for indiscriminate attacks against population targets. One plot that
was hatched at a meeting of white supremacists from the USA and Canada
at the Headquarters of the Aryan Nations in 1983 included the ‘polluting of
municipal water supplies’ of a number of US cities.25 In addition, the Militia
of Montana was alleged to have attempted to recruit guards at the Rocky
Flats nuclear facility, where large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium are
stored.26 But despite fitting the profile of a potentially genocidal terrorist
movement, the only successful mass casualty attack ever perpetrated by
elements linked to this movement was the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Whilst this attack killed 169 people,
including children, the Alfred P. Murrah building itself was a discriminate
political target.
A key theme in the ideologies of the most dangerous ‘religious’ terrorist
groups is millenarianism. This is the belief in an impending violent upheaval
which will tear down the existing political and social structures which are
considered to be corrupt and unjust. During this violent transformation
the devout will be saved, and ultimately inherit a new and purified world in
which they will be rewarded. Most millenarian groups are prepared to wait

120 The Changing Face of Terrorism
for these events to happen, but the most dangerous of them are messianic
ones which preach that man can hasten the coming of the millenarian
event.27 This includes the Christian Identity church, which argues that it
is incumbent upon each individual to hasten their redemption by actively
working to ensure the return of the messiah. Its teachings pronounce that by
accelerating the inevitable apocalypse, the tribulations which currently afflict
the white race will end, ushering in a period of 1,000-year rule by Christians,
at the end of which Christ will return to earth.28 Whilst all extreme right-
wing Christian groups in the USA share a belief in an impending apocalypse
and the second coming of Christ, some are prepared to wait for it. One
possible explanation for the reticence of some extreme right-wing Christian
groups and individuals in the USA to use CBRN weapons is that they are
waiting for the apocalypse to begin, before acting.
In contrast, some Islamist ideologues argue that jihadis are already
engaged in a cosmic struggle of good against evil. The rise of Islamic
fundamentalism and Islamism is partly derived from a belief that Islam is
at a critical historical juncture. Globalization and the erosion of traditional
values, along with widespread economic and political upheaval and
inequalities, has led to heightened levels of uncertainty about the future
within many states in the Muslim world. Faced by perceived threats from
Western political, economic and cultural influences, Islamic fundamentalists
and Islamists believe that they must preserve their religious identity and
seize the moment to fundamentally alter their future.29 Suleiman abu Gaith,
a spokesman for bin Laden stated that,
We believe we are still at the beginning of this war … So if we are
killed or captured or the enemies of Allah manage to achieve one
victory … we should not forget that this path is long and it is a path
that the Muslims have to walk upon until the judgement day.30
Whilst some terrorist groups with politico-religious ideologies might be
more prone to strike at indiscriminate targets and inflict higher levels of
casualties more often than their secular counterparts, many still display a
tendency to strike at targets which are integral to the political and economic
power of their opponents, or to use violence for limited political objectives.
This indicates that some ‘religious’ terrorists have been willing to limit
civilian casualties in their attacks. Only religious cults can be considered to
be wholly apolitical, but even some cults have demonstrated an interest in
political objectives. The prime example is the Rajneeshpuram Cult in Oregon,

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 121
whose political objective to influence the outcome of local elections led it to
choose a pathogen that was intended to sicken people rather than kill them.
Rather than it being religion itself that encourages the use of
indiscriminate attacks against population targets, it is individual political
or religious ideologues who use religion to justify terrorist violence, who
determine the level of violence that a particular group will use. Clerical
sanction is a vitally important component of the violence of ‘religious’
terror groups. Most Islamist terrorist groups have a spiritual adviser who
will sanction the acts of violence perpetrated by the group. This includes,
Sheikh Yassin, who was the former spiritual leader of Hamas, Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir, the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah and bin Laden himself, who
issues fatwa in the name of al-Qaeda. One of the members of the Jemaah
Islamiyah cell that planted the 2002 Bali bombs confirmed that the group
was acting on the basis of a fatwa issued by bin Laden and distributed by
Ba’asyir.31
Bin Laden has issued a large number of fatwa to justify terrorist violence
and the killing of American civilians. In 1996, he declared that ‘terrorising
the American occupiers (of Islamic holy places) is a religious and logical
obligation’. In February 1998 he issued a further fatwa which declared that
‘the killing of Americans and their civilian and military allies is a religious
duty for each and every Muslim to be carried out in whichever country they
are until Al-Aqsa mosque has been liberated from their grasp and until
their armies have left Muslim lands’.32 In an interview with the Pakistani
newspaper Dawn, bin Laden claimed that the killing of innocent people
could be justified by Islamic teachings. He argued that because the USA
and its allies are massacring Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, and
Iraq, then Muslims had the right to attack the USA. If an enemy occupies a
Muslim territory and uses common people as a human shield, he argued that
it is legitimate for Muslims to attack that enemy, even if innocent civilians
get hurt. Using this argument he justified the deaths of civilians on 9/11
because the targets were economic and military in nature. Yet he also holds
the whole of the US responsible for the actions of its government, because
it is the people who elect the President and Congress which is sanctioning
atrocities committed against Muslims.33 He took this argument further
in a video in which he claimed that the occupants of the World Trade
Centre were not civilians because they were part of the economic system
of the USA. He argued that ‘yes we kill their innocents and this is legal,
religiously and logically … The twin towers were legitimate targets, they
were supporting US economic power’.34

122 The Changing Face of Terrorism
When he was asked in 1998 about obtaining chemical or nuclear
weapons bin Laden responded that ‘acquiring such weapons for the defence
of Muslims [was] a religious duty’.35 The key theological development
underpinning al-Qaeda’s ambitions to develop CBRN weapons, including
WMD, was a fatwa issued on its behalf by the well-known Saudi Islamic
Scholar Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, in May 2003. This document, A
Treatise on the Legal Status of using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels,
provided a religious justification for the use of WMD. It states that in a
state of jihad against infidels, the mass killing of US civilians is permissible:
‘Thus the situation in this regard is that if those engaged in jihad establish
that the evil of the infidels can be repelled only by attacking them at night
with weapons of mass destruction, they may be used even if they annihilate
all the infidels.’ He went on to argue that it was also possible for Muslims to
target other Muslims, ‘as long as jihad has been commanded … and it can be
carried out only in this way, it is permitted’.36 For Islamist terrorists intent
on using CBRN weapons and WMD, this fatwa may well have removed
any perceived religious constraints and empowered them to pursue the
acquisition and use of these weapons.
Therefore, whilst this type of group uses religion as a motivational
force and justificatory mechanism for their violence, there is no automatic
imperative for ‘religious’ terrorists to escalate their violence to acts of mass
destruction and the use of CBRN weapons. Indeed, religion itself does
not provide the imperative to engage in terrorism. Instead, it is terrorist
ideologies, and the way that they use religion, which have driven the
escalating levels of violence witnessed since 2000 and the persistent efforts
to acquire CBRN weapons. In addition, ‘religious’ terrorists have not been
alone in seeking to kill large numbers of people. Nevertheless, it is possible
to draw a generalized conclusion that ‘religious’ terrorists have been more
willing than their secular counterparts to cause indiscriminate mass casualty
attacks. In addition, they have also been more persistent than their secular
counterparts in their efforts to acquire and use CBRN weapons.
Religious Terrorists and Genocide
The clearest ideological motivation for some ‘religious’ groups to escalate
to use a WMD is the objective of genocide. Genocide is a term that has
been used to cover a range of actions from the deliberate and absolute
extermination of a race, culture, community, or national identity, to massive
and sustained acts of violence against civilians but not necessarily with an
intention of extermination. Since the end of the Cold War there has been

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 123
an increase in the number of internecine conflicts where warring factions
have committed acts of genocide or deliberately killed large numbers of
civilians of a specific ethnic or national group. This includes the civil wars
in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Afghanistan. Genocidal goals are
typically associated with groups that are driven by theological, national,
racial, or tribal motivations. But whilst some ‘religious’ terrorists seek to
remove broadly defined categories of enemies from their territory, and will
regard indiscriminate mass casualty attacks not only as morally justified
but as a necessary expedient for the attainment of their goals, they are not
necessarily genocidal.
Since the mid-1990s the type of terror group that has been most closely
linked with genocide is religious cults. Prior to the Aum Shinrikyo attacks
between 1990 and 1995, cults were primarily perceived as a sociological,
psychological, or theological phenomenon but a growing number of
incidents led to a gradually broadening perception of the potential threat
that cults can pose to society as a whole. It is now known that some of them
have political agendas, sometimes operating within the institutions of the
state,37 whilst others reject both state and society.
Cults are inherently volatile entities, which by their very nature are
violent. But for the vast majority of them this violence is directed inwards
as a control measure by the leadership. As a consequence, the most visible
manifestation of cult violence has been the phenomenon of mass suicides.
However, there has also been a small number of incidents in which cults
have violently lashed out at society. Since the 1970s there have been three
cases of religious cults – the Rajneeshpuram Cult, the Covenant, the Sword,
and the Arm of the Lord, and Aum Shinrikyo, intending or attempting to use
CBW in pursuit of their goals. Despite their small number, the significance
of these cases lies in the fact that two of them intended to perpetrate acts of
indiscriminate mass destruction. This ranks them amongst the most serious
previous incidents of CBRN terrorism.
The central theme in the belief system of dangerous cults is millenarianism,
or millennialism. They believe that an act of divine intervention will create
a cataclysm which only the righteous will survive. It is very common for
cults to have an apocalyptic focus, particularly pseudo-Christian groups, but
the concept has now reached further than Judaeo-Christian theology, even
appearing in Far Eastern cults such as Aum Shinrikyo. These cults believe
that God has promised that the end of the world is coming and that ‘He’
will save the righteous, or ‘chosen ones’. However, not all millenarianism is
violent, so a group’s belief in an impending apocalypse does not necessarily
mean that it will resort to violence. There are no objective criteria by which

124 The Changing Face of Terrorism
it is possible to determine whether a cult will explode into outward-directed
violence, although the nature of a cult’s core myth could be an important
indicator. Those that model themselves on an avenging angel or vindictive
god are more likely to lash out than those where the core myth is a suffering
messiah. However, some cults can switch myths when under pressure, for
example, because of the millennium or the state of mind of the leader.38
Cults are also the type of group which are most likely to act in
accordance with pre-ordained moments in history. The ‘moment’ is
important in millennialism, and for this reason cult violence may not be
steady, but rather occasional, sudden, and extreme. The millennium is the
most obvious example of a moment in time when cults might resort to
violence, but the anticipated explosion of cult-related violence in 1999–2000
failed to materialize. To a great extent the threat was overstated because of
the confusion over when the millennium actually falls. Whilst most people
accept it to be the beginning of the year 2000, mathematically, the period
of 1,000 years actually falls at the beginning of the year 2001. And in any
case, many groups work on their own timescales. Shoko Asahara, the leader
of Aum Shinrikyo, variously predicted the years 1997, 1999, 2000 and
2003.39 Therefore cult leaders are predisposed to pick any date they wish for
Armageddon or the Second Coming of Christ. Consequently the potential
threat will not simply disappear as time passes.
Some of these moments are not self evident, because they are
determined by the leader of the Cult. Former members of the Covenant,
the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, stated that:
We thought there were signs of Armageddon, and we believed
that once those signs were there it was time for us to act, to make
judgements against those who were doing wrong or who refused to
repent. We felt you could kill those people, that God wanted us to kill
those people. The original timetable was up to God, but God could
use us in creating Armageddon. That if we stepped out things might
be hurried along. You get tired of waiting for what you think God is
planning.40
But whilst the focus on religious cults is justified, there is an inherent
danger of exaggerating the threat. Not all cults are interested in physical
violence and most of those that are will implode. In many ways, Aum
Shinrikyo’s fixation with a war of Armageddon specifically involving WMD
makes its belief system inherently different from that of other cults. The
activities of Aum Shinrikyo, the Rajneeshpuram Cult, and the Covenant,

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 125
the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord in acquiring and using CBW indicates
that there is a threat to society from religious cults, but the main threat they
present is still to the individual.41
Nevertheless, for cults that might want to initiate a war of Armageddon,
CBRN weapons would be the optimum means of achieving it. Their belief
systems can incorporate no incentives to be discriminate in choosing their
targets because they define the whole of society as a target. Therefore, once
a cult decides to lash out, it might impose no limits on its violence. Cults
are also unique because many of them do not operate under any of the
practical or moral constraints which can inhibit other types of terrorist
groups. They have no constituency apart from themselves, and neither are
they in a bargaining relationship with the authorities because they want
nothing more than the destruction of existing society.42 Previous incidents
suggest that if a cult intends to lash out violently, it will use CBRN weapons
if it can acquire them. Although the Rajneeshpuram cult’s choice of
salmonella, demonstrates that some cults are willing to place constraints on
their violence, depending upon their goals and sense of morality. Therefore,
whilst they represent a very small threat, they are potentially amongst the
most extreme threats.
The labelling of other types of ‘religious’ terrorist groups as having
genocidal objectives is more contentious. Certainly, the anti Shi’a violence in
Iraq can be considered genocidal because of the large number of bombings
and shootings on sectarian grounds. The bombing of Shi’a mosques as
symbols of an apostate religion is also a good indictor of genocidal intent.
The willingness of some Sunni Islamist groups to use CBRN weapons
to achieve this goal was evident in early 2007, when there was a spate of
chlorine bomb attacks in Iraq directed at Shi’a civilians.43 For most terrorist
groups however, genocidal objectives do not dominate but can be one
element of a broader strategy for wider political objectives.
Al-Qaeda and the Clash of Civilizations
Chapter 4 indicated how some secular and ethno-nationalist groups have
pursued strategies of ‘polarization’, to divide the different communities
of the states that they operate within. Al-Qaeda, has taken this strategy
to another dimension by seeking to initiate a global war in order to meet
its ideological objectives to destroy the sources of unbelief in the world
and establish ‘true’ Islamic states with the ultimate objective of and re-
establishing the Islamic Khalifate, uniting all Muslims in one state. This was
conceptualized by Professor Samuel Huntingdon, who, writing in 1993,

126 The Changing Face of Terrorism
suggested that the world was entering a period that would be marked by
what he called a ‘clash of civilizations’. He suggested that in the post-Cold
War world conflicts derived from cultural and religious divisions would
replace the ideologically driven conflicts of the Cold War. Huntingdon
contended that the clash of civilizations is likely to occur at two levels. At
the micro-level, groups living along the fault lines between civilizations
will often struggle violently over the control of territory and each other;
whilst at the macro-level, states from different civilizations struggle for
economic, political and military power and also promote the values essential
to their respective civilizations.44 He envisaged that the key division will be
between the West and those civilizations which increasingly view the West
as imposing its own cultural hegemony upon them, with the central pivot
being between the West and a Confucian-Islamic axis critically opposed to
further Western incursions on their respective civilizations.45 Terrorism is
considered to be one of the means by which such a clash of civilizations
will be played out.
Commentators have suggested that evidence of an impending clash of
civilizations can be seen in the widespread mistrust and opposition to the
USA in the Muslim world, coupled with the steady growth of Islamism and
Islamic fundamentalism challenging the established regimes in many Muslim
states. These developments at national level have been matched by growing
international networks of Islamists, notably al-Qaeda. The presence of al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and independent groups inspired by al-Qaeda, in states
across the Muslim world seemingly made it uniquely positioned to pursue a
strategy of igniting a global clash of civilizations. It is not known whether
bin Laden planned 9/11 as the catalyst to a clash of civilizations, but as the
war on terror unfolded he attempted to transform it into a war of Muslims
against ‘infidels’.
Following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al-Qaeda issued a
number of propaganda videos in which bin Laden used rhetoric reminiscent
of the clash of civilizations. Some of these messages were directed at a
global audience, attempting to mobilize the ummah, the global brotherhood
of Muslims, to support al-Qaeda, by arguing that an attack on one is an
attack on all. Other messages exhorted the populations of specific states
to rise against their rulers. This particularly focused on Pakistan and Saudi
Arabia because of their support for the USA, their strategic significance,
and their vulnerability to internal unrest. These messages were the start of
a ‘war of ideas’ between al-Qaeda and the West, which was played out in
the media. Al-Qaeda began this war of ideas in an unfavourable position
because the widespread unease about the war in Afghanistan in the Muslim

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 127
world was outweighed by the fact that the extremity of the violence on
9/11 had alienated moderate opinion within Muslim states. Nevertheless,
al-Qaeda proved extremely adept at manipulating the media and possessed
a crucial advantage because it could frame its statements in terms that
found resonance with many Muslims, particularly by exploiting issues such
as Palestine.
The core theme in bin Laden’s statements was that the war on terror was
actually a war on Islam, and frequently invoked the symbol of the medieval
crusades to make this point. A few weeks after 9/11, bin Laden called for
Pakistanis to use all means available to resist the invasion of the ‘American
Crusader forces’ in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In a fax to Al Jazeera he wrote
‘We ask God to make us defeat the infidels and the oppressors and to crush
the new Jewish-Christian crusader campaign on the land of Pakistan and
Afghanistan … We are steadfast in the way of Jihad’.46 At the beginning of
November 2001, al-Qaeda released another statement in which bin Laden
reiterated the same themes in a call to arms for Muslims to rise up against
the ‘Christian Crusade’ against Islam. He claimed that ‘The world has been
split into two camps: one under the banner of the cross, as the head of
infidels [President] Bush, has said, one under the banner of Islam’. He
went on to claim that the Pakistani government had placed itself under the
banner of the cross and urged that believers should not rest until ‘they bring
victory to truth and its people, and defeat falsehood and its people, with
God’s permission. Your stance against evil gives us heart. The heat of the
crusade against Islam has intensified, its ardour has increased and the killing
has multiplied’.47 He called for Muslims everywhere to join his jihad against
Christianity and Judaism: ‘God says “never will the Jews or the Christians be
satisfied with thee unless thou follow their form of religion”. It is a question
of faith, not a war against terrorism, as Bush and Blair try to depict it.’48
Al-Qaeda achieved a degree of success with these statements. For many
Muslims, bin Laden expresses and acts out their desires, and has proven
to be successful in striking at the USA. Thousands of Muslims from
around the world went to fight with the Taliban and many others provided
financial support, whilst others subsequently joined the insurgency in Iraq.
At the outset of the war on terror there were almost daily demonstrations
in many Muslim states against the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In
Pakistan these demonstrations involved thousands of people, which
encouraged the radical Islamist political parties to call on army officers to
rise in revolt against the government,49 whilst clerics in the city of Quetta
announced a fatwa calling for a jihad against the government.50 But despite
the widespread nature of these popular demonstrations, they never grew

128 The Changing Face of Terrorism
into a mass movement in any state, nor did they pose a serious challenge to
stability or the rule of law and order in any state. Even in those states which
might have been most receptive to bin Laden’s message, the effect of his
propaganda was limited.
One of al-Qaeda’s key problems was that its war was never solely against
the USA, but also against what it perceives to be apostate regimes in the
Muslim world. As a result, it received no support from Muslim governments.
The outcome of the war in Afghanistan and images of civilians rejoicing at
the fall of the Taliban emboldened Muslim liberals who began to speak out
against religious obscurantism and the hijacking of the faith. In addition,
Muslim governments that are threatened by militant groups within their
own borders have used the ‘war on terror’ to legitimize the repression of
their own militants. Yemen and Pakistan have placed religious schools under
tighter government control, whilst Saudi Arabia has carefully monitored the
private charities that send some $250m each year to Islamic causes abroad.51
As a result, Islamist terrorists became isolated in many states. Opinion
within the ummah was therefore deeply fractured and al-Qaeda received little
active support. Whilst bin Laden correctly assumed that Muslims would
oppose the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he was wrong in assuming that
this would equate to active support for al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
Bin Laden also greatly overestimated the strength of his own position.
Islamism is not a homogeneous movement, but rather consists of many
disparate groups in different countries, most of which do not recognize
bin Laden’s leadership. Al-Qaeda has made efforts to unite militant groups
under bin Laden’s leadership, but with limited success. Even when it has
succeeded, for instance when Abu Mussab al Zarqawi’s group was re-
branded as al-Qaeda in Iraq, the inability of al-Qaeda’s core leadership to
control the anti-Shi’a excesses of Zarqawi illustrated how weak the al-Qaeda
leadership actually is. Whilst Islamist militants across the world celebrated
9/11, it was not sufficient to persuade them to unite under the leadership of
al-Qaeda. With only a limited number of activists spread across the globe
and limited popular support, bin Laden was unable to initiate the clash of
civilizations that he sought.
The events of 9/11 proved that an indiscriminate act of mass
destruction, whether using CBRN weapons or more conventional weapons,
will not necessarily act as a catalyst to a wider conflict. To an extent, the
failure of 9/11 and the anthrax letters in the USA in 2001 could act to
reduce the incentives for other groups to use CBRN weapons or an act
of mass destruction to try and spark a clash of civilizations. For al-Qaeda
however, a clash of civilizations is an element of its ideology and whilst it

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 129
might have failed in the short term it continues to seek to perpetrate further
spectacular attacks and acquire CBRN weapons for use against the West in
the hope of winning support amongst the ummah for a wider war.
Theological Disincentives to Escalate Levels of Violence
By their very nature, ‘religious’ terrorists require theological justification
for their violence, and militant religious ideologues can invariably find
sections in their religious texts which can be used to justify the use of
violence. However, there are also elements of religious texts which can
also act to constrain the use of violence by terrorist groups. For instance,
there are sections of the Koran which repudiate the use of violence or place
constraints on its use. For instance, some verses state that if Muslims enter
the enemy’s territory they must not kill women and children, or destroy
crops and trees.52 The Koran also prohibits the killing of Muslims by fellow
Muslims, and threatens harsh punishments for those that do so. It also urges
Muslims to ‘Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you, but do
not transgress limits. God does not love transgressors’.53
There are many examples of Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist groups
undertaking acts of controlled and discriminate violence in order to achieve
limited goals. Some argue that it is only possible to fight jihad in countries
where Muslims are in direct conflict with non-Muslims, such as in Iraq or
Kashmir. Whilst the declared strategy of Hezbollah is to strike primarily at
Israeli military targets, and to only attack civilian targets in retaliation for
Israeli attacks on civilians. Whether a particular group chooses to undertake
indiscriminate mass casualty attacks against civilians is therefore largely
a decision for the military and spiritual leaders of the group and how it
interprets the Koran. As a result, Islamist groups tend to strike at a mix of
discriminate and indiscriminate targets, in the same way as many ‘secular’
groups have done.
‘Religious’ terrorist groups often have their own spiritual leaders
who advise on the theological legitimacy of using violence. Hezbollah
for instance has got around the ruling against killing Muslims by seeking
religious sanction for any attacks which might potentially involve Muslim
deaths, in order to assess whether each attack was consistent with Islamic
Laws. In one specific instance, Hezbollah received clerical sanction to attack
an Israeli prison, despite the presence of Muslim prisoners, on the principle
that the end justifies the means, but it was permitted only if Israeli casualties
exceeded the Muslim casualties.54 A religious edict to this effect was passed,
and the attack was carried out.

130 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Even secular terrorist groups have shown themselves to be willing
to constrain their violence in the face of condemnation from religious
figures. In 1990, the IRA conducted a series of ‘proxy bomb’ attacks, in
which they forced individuals to drive car bombs into army checkpoints, by
threatening to kill their families. This tactic was very successful, and resulted
in the killing of six soldiers, but the IRA was forced to stop the attacks
though a combination of public outrage and pressure from the Catholic
Church. At the funeral of one of the proxy bombers, Bishop Edward Daly
told the congregation that the IRA and its supporters were ‘the complete
contradiction of Christianity. They may say they are followers of Christ.
Some of them may even still engage in the hypocrisy of coming to church,
but their lives and their works proclaim clearly that they follow Satan’.55 Such
rhetoric hurt the IRA. But it is noteworthy that the IRA was not deterred
from implementing this tactic during the planning of the attacks, rather it
responded to religious pressure only after the attacks had taken place.
Religious edicts have also been used to geographically limit where terrorists
might strike. Islamist terrorists had been living and operating in the UK since
the early 1990s but it was not until the advent of the ‘war on terror’ that UK-
based Islamists began to target mainland UK. Prior to 9/11, Islamist clerics
such as abu Qatada had argued that British Muslims lived under a ‘covenant
of security’ with the UK which precluded them from military action inside the
UK. Under this Koranic concept, individuals fleeing persecution who seek
security in a host country automatically enter into a ‘covenant of security’, by
which they will not attack the host that protects them.56 However, between
2001 and 2003 the UK was argued to have breached the covenant through its
involvement in the war on terror. Therefore, whilst the immediate catalyst for
Islamist terrorist attacks in the UK is political, it is justified by Islamist clerics
in both political and theological terms.
At a personal level, religious convictions can act as a powerful influence
on individuals in deciding to renounce terrorist violence. In 2004, the
Malaysian media reported an interview with four Malaysian members of
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who were being held in Indonesian custody. They
explained that killing US citizens, robbing financial institutions and creating
an Islamic nation through violence were objectives of JI. They cited a fatwa
issued by bin Laden, which stated that all Muslims should take revenge on
Americans: ‘This is because the Americans have victimised or have killed
civilians everywhere, and so we can reciprocate by killing American civilians
anywhere, irrespective of whether or not they are armed, whether they are
soldiers or civilians, women, men or children.’ All four expressed remorse
and stated that JI had deviated from true Islamic teachings.57

Theological Motivations and Disincentives 131
Because of the role that militant religious figures play in legitimizing
their violence, terrorist groups need to calibrate their violence to ensure
that it does not alienate them. An interesting development in respect of
al-Qaeda is how its use of indiscriminate violence has been criticized by a
number of militant Islamist ideologues. Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (otherwise
known as Dr Fadl), the ideological godfather of al-Qaeda, withdrew his
support from the group in 2007. Al-Sharif argued that al-Qaeda’s bombings
in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere were illegitimate, and that targeting
civilians in Western countries was wrong. He pronounced that jihad had
been blemished with these grave sharia violations. Likewise, Sheikh Salman
al-Oudah, a Saudi religious scholar who is one of bin Laden’s erstwhile
heroes, went on MBC, a widely watched Middle Eastern TV network, to ask:
‘My Brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent
people, children, elderly, and women have been killed … in the name of
al-Qaeda. Will you be happy to meet God almighty carrying the burden of
these hundreds of thousands or millions [of victims] on your back?’58 For
al-Qaeda, losing the support of al-Sharif, al-Oudah, and others like them,
has had a profound effect on alienating both grass roots support, and the
support of other militants.
Terrorist groups also need to take account of the pronouncements
of mainstream clerics because of the impact that they can have on public
opinion. The objective of terrorist groups in winning popular support
is considerably harder if influential clerics denounce their activities. In
Iraq, the role of mainstream Sunni clerics in openly speaking out against
the indiscriminate killing of Shi’a civilians was one of the factors that
contributed to the haemorrhage of popular support from al-Qaeda to
the Awakening Councils. Zarqawi and his followers chose to ignore the
mainstream clerics, but in other circumstances it could encourage some
degree of restraint. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 in
response to the capture of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah, the Grand
Mufti of Tyre criticized Hezbollah for acting without the consent of their
co-religionists. Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah,
was forced to appear on Lebanese TV to argue that if he had known that
the seizure of the two Israeli soldiers would spark the invasion he would not
have sanctioned the operation.59 Nasrallah’s reaction displayed a sensitivity
to the potential impact of clerical criticism in undermining popular support
for Hezbollah.
Ultimately, individual ideologues decide what levels and types of
violence are theologically prohibited. It is conceivable that some ideologues
might prohibit the use of CBRN weapons or WMD by the groups that they

132 The Changing Face of Terrorism
represent. Or indeed, that individual terrorists themselves believe that there
is no theological basis for the use of CBRN weapons. However, there are
no known cases of clerics linked to terrorist groups explicitly opposing the
use of CBRN weapons.
Conclusion
This analysis indicates that the theological elements of the ideologies
of some ‘religious’ terrorist groups can potentially be used to provide a
motivation to use CBRN weapons and perpetrate indiscriminate mass
casualty attacks. However, the level of violence used by different ‘religious’
groups is a function of what their spiritual leaders will sanction. Despite the
dogmatic nature of their objectives, theological motivations to use CBRN
weapons are not overwhelmingly strong or universal. Some ‘religious’ groups
pursue limited goals, and the strategies of these groups typically incorporate
a wide range of tactics, one of which might be the use of indiscriminate
mass-casualty attacks. In addition, the influence of theological disincentives
could also potentially limit how and where CBRN weapons would be used.
Therefore, even when groups experience strong motivations to use CBRN
weapons, their use in discriminate attacks might be the preferred tactical
option. Only a very small number of religious cults have an overriding
theological imperative to use WMD for indiscriminate attacks, but these
cults will always be very few in number at any given time. For the majority of
other types of terrorist group there are strong theological incentives to limit
their tactics and weapons in pursuit of limited goals. In general, it is always
the extremists from any type of group who espouse millenarian, apocalyptic
or genocidal objectives, which establish strong motivations to use WMD
for indiscriminate attacks. However, any ‘religious’ terrorist group which
decides to use CBRN weapons or WMD will undoubtedly use religion as a
both a motivational and a justificatory force.

6
PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS
AND DISINCENTIVES:
THE TERRORIST PERSONALITY
AND GROUP DECISION MAKING
In conjunction with the tactical, strategic, political, or theological motivations
to use CBRN weapons outlined in the previous chapters, personal motivations
and the dynamics of group decision making are also significant factors in
trying to understand why some terrorist groups but not others might try to
use such weapons. Some terrorists, by their very nature are more extreme
than others in their use of violence. As a result, analysis of why some
groups might be willing to use CBRN weapons must address the issue of
why one terrorist is more extreme than another. Chapters 3–5 indicate that
the use of CBRN weapons could be reconciled with the tactics, strategies,
and objectives of many terrorist groups, and that the members of all types
of terrorist group could be subject to a conflicting mix of motivations and
disincentives to using them. Terrorist decision making on the use of CBRN
weapons will be a result of how they balance these conflicting motivations
and disincentives. Hence, organizational factors within terrorist groups will
impact on this decision making. For any group, the balance between these
factors will depend upon the attitudes of the individuals concerned, and the
decision-making dynamics within the group. Studies of terrorists’ memoirs
and interviews have enabled psychologists to identify a broad variety of
personal, political, social, and economic motivations that lead individuals to
join terrorist groups and engage in conventional acts of violence, but there
remains a fundamental lack of understanding about why they engage in
violence.1 As a consequence, it is equally impossible to determine whether

134 The Changing Face of Terrorism
there is anything that differentiates terrorists who would use CBRN weapons
from those who would not. Whilst it is impossible to construct meaningful
‘offender profiles’ of the type of terrorist who would use CBRN weapons
or WMD, generalized observations about the personal factors and group
dynamics which might influence decision making on whether to use these
types of weapons can be discerned.
Is There a Psychological Difference between using Conventional
and CBRN Weapons?
At the heart of any analysis of personal motivations or disincentives to
use CBRN weapons is whether there is a psychological distinction between
using conventional and CBRN weapons, particularly WMD. Some analysts
argue that this would be a fairly easy transition to make, whilst others
suggest that it is in fact a major psychological step. The events of 9/11
showed that some terrorists are willing to perpetrate attacks that result in
mass casualties, albeit not with CBRN weapons. This would suggest that for
terrorists willing to conduct indiscriminate attacks involving large numbers
of casualties it is indeed only a small escalatory step to use CBRN weapons,
including WMD. Yet there are suggestions that within some societies the use
of CBRN weapons is psychologically different from the use of conventional
weapons, for a number of closely interrelated reasons.
The principal reason is the potentially higher destructive capacity of
WMD, which can cause significantly more casualties in a single attack than
virtually all conventional weapons. This is closely linked to the uniquely
horrifying nature of the consequences of all CBRN weapons, not only in
terms of casualty levels but also because of the horrendous nature of the
deaths, injuries, and contamination that they can cause. Whilst conventional
weapons are capable of causing a large number of deaths and appalling
injuries, the type of injuries and level of deaths caused by WMD can far
exceed the consequences of conventional weapons.
These two factors underpin a third: a deep-rooted societal taboo against
the use of CBRN weapons within some cultures. This taboo is derived
from a mixture of moral, religious, political, and strategic considerations.
These weapons are considered to be morally reprehensible, in part because
of a visceral disgust of poisons and disease, and because societal values
and moral norms dictate that even when violence is justified, it should to
be proportionate. The use of WMD would under normal circumstances
be a totally disproportionate response to most acts of violence or other
grievances. In addition, the use of poison is often seen as unworthy of

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 135
decent or heroic people, and is rather seen as the weapon of the weak and
deceitful, something that is unnecessarily vicious and morally unacceptable.2
Terrorists seek to portray themselves as heroes of the people, which suggests
that they would avoid the use of CBRN weapons for those reasons. Yet
societal taboos have always been challenged and broken. One of the reasons
why the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway was considered to be
so important because it was perceived to break this taboo. Yet this taboo
should still pertain to some terrorist groups, particularly ‘secular’ groups.3
However, the more frequently that CBRN weapons are used, the weaker
this taboo becomes, and the easier it will be for other terrorists to cross the
moral threshold.
However, this notion of a societal taboo against the use of CBRN
weapons is highly speculative and is based upon Western Christian moral
and social values. But even in the West there have always been criminals who
have been prepared to use chemical and biological agents to murder people.
It is also apparent that in certain ideological belief systems, or in particular
politico-strategic scenarios, states and sub-state combatant groups do not
consider that there is a ‘taboo’ against the use of CBRN weapons. During
the Second World War, the USA had no compunction against using nuclear
weapons against Japanese civilian targets. The extremity of the threat
faced by the USA and its armed forces overrode any moral objections that
might have been raised about the use of these weapons. Similarly, Islamist
terrorists, particularly al-Qaeda, consider themselves to be in a divinely
sanctioned ‘cosmic war’ against the USA in which the very future of Islam
is at stake. In the Islamist world view therefore, the situation is not wholly
dissimilar to that of the USA during the Second World War. Therefore, why
would they not make similar decisions about the use of CBRN weapons?
In addition, al-Qaeda in Iraq has used crude chlorine bombs against Shi’a
civilians. It is clear that in the prevailing geo-strategic circumstances, al-
Qaeda does not consider that there is any societal taboo against the use of
CBRN weapons. The same is equally true of millenarian cults such as Aum
Shinrikyo that might be trying to hasten the end of the world.
Nevertheless, for some groups and individual terrorists these
considerations might establish strong psychological disincentives for
using CBRN weapons, and suggest that one of the principal variables in
determining whether terrorists will resort to CBRN weapons and WMD
is whether they have any moral objections to using them. However, there
are a number of other psychological factors which establish conflicting
motivations and disincentives to using CBRN weapons. The strength of
these disincentives is also likely to vary depending upon the lethality of the

136 The Changing Face of Terrorism
weapon and the target that is selected. They are likely to be strongest in
respect of WMD attacks against population targets and weakest in respect
of more controlled and discriminate attacks.
Terrorist Normality vs Psychopathy
The fact that using WMD runs counter to conventional notions of morality
and social values would suggest that they are most likely to be used by
individuals who are psychopathic, or even psychotic. There is a body of
literature which has concluded that many terrorists are indeed psychopaths.
However, only a small number of terrorists have a known clinical history of
mental illness. For example, Buford Furrow, a member of the Aryan Nations
who murdered a Filipino postman and injured five Jewish children at a
daycare centre in Los Angeles, during a shooting spree in 1999 was a known
psychotic who fantasized about mass killings, and was under psychiatric
treatment at the time.4 Similarly, Thomas Leahy, who was convicted in the
USA of possessing ricin, had a history of schizophrenia as well as alcohol
and drug misuse. This made him delusional, and led him to believe that
he was surrounded by enemies.5 There is some evidence that right-wing
groups tend to attract more psychopaths than other types of terrorist
groups. Psychiatric studies of imprisoned neo-Fascist terrorists in Italy
discovered that many of them exhibited ‘free floating feelings of aggression
and hostility’.6 It is also the case that some terrorists, such as Abu Mussab
al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq are more extreme than
others, particularly in targeting innocent civilians. It is tempting to label such
individuals as psychopaths or psychotics, simply because of the extremity
of their violence. Yet despite this, there is little evidence to support the
argument that terrorists should be regarded as psychopathic owing to the
nature of the offences that they commit. There is some evidence to suggest
that only a few terrorists seem to derive real satisfaction from the harm that
they cause, and some are even known to have expressed remorse.7
Whilst there is a considerable amount of disagreement between
psychologists about the terrorist personality, there is at least nominal
agreement among most of the serious researchers that terrorists are
essentially ‘normal’ individuals.8 One of the key reasons why psychopaths
and psychotics would not necessarily seek to join a terrorist group, and why
terrorist groups themselves would not necessarily recruit such individuals,
is that they are generally incapable of working effectively within groups and
their lack of impulse control tends to make them a potential security risk.
Chapter 2 indicated that developing or acquiring CBRN weapons, and then

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 137
successfully executing an attack, would require protracted planning and a
high level of caution. The success of such an enterprise requires thought,
reflection, and rigorous planning, yet psychotics tend to be impulsive. This
suggests that a successful CBRN attack would need to be carried out by
psychologically ‘normal’ people.9
The notion of terrorist ‘normality’ is supported by analyses of terrorists,
which emphasize the rationality and functionality of terrorist activity10 in
terms of assessing tactics and strategies against the goals that the group is
seeking to achieve. Chapter 3 identified a number of ‘rational’ uses for the
use of CBRN weapons and WMD, for example detonating a radiological
weapon in a major commercial centre, which is consistent with al-Qaeda’s
economic targeting strategy. Conversely, other analyses have considered
that terrorists are often influenced by unconscious and irrational thought
processes, and that this irrationality could lead them to use CBRN weapons
because of some perceived advantage that they would confer. Certainly, the
past record of CBRN terrorism contains numerous incidents of individuals
and groups choosing to use CBRN weapons in roles for which they are
not particularly suited, or for which conventional weapons would be
optimal. This suggests that terrorists are sometimes not acting rationally in
choosing to use CBRN weapons. But the concept of rational choice does
not necessarily equate to the ‘right’ decision, based upon which weapon will
be most effective in achieving a specific goal. Instead, rationality assumes
only a judgement of how to link ends to means effectively, the conclusions
of which are followed through consistently. Therefore, any decision needs
only be the optimal one at that given moment, and then actioned.11
There appear to be two major sources of bias leading to apparently
irrational decisions. The first is identified by psychologists as ‘cognitive bias’
whereby individuals take short cuts in receiving and processing information
about their environment. Cognitive psychologists have shown that these
short cuts can severely distort reality. The second is known as ‘motivated
bias’, which occurs when the fulfillment of emotional needs and desires
dominates the decision-making process. Psychologists in the Freudian
tradition argue that decision makers often pay little attention to the outside
environment and instead choose alternatives that satisfy inner needs, such
as avoiding fear, revenge, shame, or guilt.12 There is certainly evidence to
suggest that some individuals and groups have been interested in CBRN
weapons as a result of an innate curiosity or fascination with the technology,
or a perceived need to demonstrate their competence or worth to society.13
Part of the reason why Aum Shinrikyo conducted so many CBW attacks was
because of Shoko Asahara’s personal fixation with these types of weapons,

138 The Changing Face of Terrorism
whilst for other groups they could also serve as a source of self-esteem and
group cohesion.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to conceptualize a psychologically ‘normal’
individual who would commit an act of mass destruction. It has been
suggested that individuals and groups from heavily brutalized societies
will have the kind of psychological mindset to use WMD because they are
driven by a greater sense of hatred and desire for justice or revenge. This is
an argument that could potentially be applied to Palestinian terrorists who
largely come from the economically deprived and violent neighbourhoods
of the refugee camps in the Gaza strip and West Bank. The Israeli army
has often killed Palestinian civilians in its operations, and the various armed
Palestinian groups have no qualms about killing Israeli civilians, often citing
revenge for the most recent killings by the Israeli army as their motivation.
Some suicide bombers display rage at Israel, which is encapsulated by the
statement of one young bomber in Gaza that: ‘The Israelis humiliate us.
They occupy our land and deny our history.’ Many Palestinians have had
relatives killed by the Israeli army, and many have witnessed acts of violence
by the Israeli security forces. Increasing numbers of groups are using the
suffering of their own people as a justification for escalating their levels of
violence. But as shown in Chapter 5, Palestinian suicide bombers are more
than just angry young men and women, they also have to be convinced of
the religious legitimacy of what they are doing before being chosen to go
on a mission.14
Bin Laden has taken this a step further by citing the suffering of Muslims
globally as justification for attacks against the USA, the West and ‘apostate’
Muslim regimes. He has claimed that ‘if avenging the killing of our people is
terrorism then history should be a witness that we are terrorists. Yes we kill
their innocents and this is legal, religiously and logically’.15 Since 9/11 and
the advent of the war on terror, al-Qaeda sees the use of WMD against the
USA as a legitimate means of retribution for the past and present killing of
Muslims in Afghanistan and Iraq. In November 2002 bin Laden declared:
‘This is an unfair division. The time has come for us to be equal … Just as
you kill, you are killed. Just as you bombard, you are bombarded. Rejoice
at the harm coming to you.’ Shortly afterwards, the organization obtained
a fatwa that permitted the use of WMD to attack Western population
targets.16 Therefore, even some Muslims in countries such as the UK, who
are not brutalized, have reacted to the perceived brutalization of Muslims in
other countries, by joining terrorist cells.
The psychology of vengeance is one of the major motivational factors
for individuals choosing to become terrorists. Humans generally have a

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 139
strong sense of justice, and a desire for vengeance is one aspect of a desire
for justice, particularly when other means of redress are closed. Studies
have shown that individuals seeking vengeance will often compromise
their own integrity, social standing and personal safety in order to exact
revenge. The act of vengeance sends the message that harmful acts will
not go unpunished. Therefore, exacting vengeance serves multiple purposes
in terms of restoring personal pride, dignity, and self-respect as well as
deterring the transgressor from perpetrating similar acts in the future. Many
terrorist recruits have reported that it was ‘the feeling that I was striking back’
which motivated them to join the terrorist group. Individuals do not even
need to experience the events first hand in order to want to seek revenge,
they simply need to identify with the victims. Many Islamist jihadis for
instance, are reacting to what they see on television and the propaganda of
Islamist ideologues, rather than because they have been directly influenced
by events.17
Whilst the desire for vengeance might help to explain the motivations of
individual terrorists and some terrorist groups, it does not provide a complete
explanation for why individuals become involved in terrorism and neither is
there an inextricable link between vengeance seeking and CBRN terrorism.
It does not explain why extreme right-wing groups in the USA who are not
brutalized have been linked to CBRN weapon plots. Neither does the desire
for vengeance automatically drive groups towards using CBRN weapons.
The population of Chechnya is an extremely brutalized society, but despite
this, the various elements that comprise the Chechen insurgency have not
sought to use CBRN weapons against Russian civilian targets. Reports
suggest that the only Chechen commander who has displayed an interest
in using CBRN weapons was Rizvan Chitigov, who was killed in 2005, and
he apparently wanted to use them against Russian troops.18 The example of
the Chechen insurgents demonstrates that the desire for vengeance does not
necessarily lead to an escalation to use CBRN weapons.
A desire for vengeance may be the most powerful motivation for many
terrorists, but it is apparent that others are also driven by a desire for the
personal status and rewards that membership of a terrorist organization
confers.19 Whilst the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were condemned as
mass murderers by the majority of people, they are lauded as heroes by the
global Islamist community. Their names and exploits will be celebrated in
perpetuity on militant Islamist websites and in other publications. Similarly,
bin Laden as the man ultimately responsible for the attack has achieved
celebrity status among this constituency. It is entirely conceivable that some
terrorists are driven by a desire to achieve similar notoriety. The best way of

140 The Changing Face of Terrorism
achieving lasting recognition as a terrorist is to execute a spectacular attack,
and a successful WMD attack on the West would secure lasting fame for the
perpetrator, even if he was killed in the process.
For terrorists, the desire for vengeance, status, and rewards might be
major motivational factors in deciding whether to escalate their level of
violence, but equally as significant is the role of the ideology of the group
and how the individual uses that as a justificatory mechanism to commit
acts of violence. The major significance of ideology for debates about
using CBRN and WMD weapons lies in the strength of the justificatory
mechanisms that they provide.
Justificatory Mechanisms
Terrorists will use a number of mechanisms to overcome any moral
disincentives they might have for using CBRN weapons. In part, this stems
from the basic cognitive processes which individuals undergo in the first
instance in choosing to resort to terrorism. Terrorist groups typically justify
their violence in terms of warfare against an evil oppressor, thereby freeing
their violence from conventional moral constraints by shifting responsibility
for the consequences of their actions to their opponents. This is typically
achieved by emphasizing the oppression of the terrorist’s constituency.20
There is a strong element of this phenomenon in the rhetoric of Christian
Identity groups in the USA, Islamists, and other groups who perceive
themselves to be on the defensive against a more powerful and oppressive
enemy. In this situation they consider that CBRN weapons are the only
means by which terrorists can match the military power of a state.
However, it is the ideology of the terrorist group which forms the basis
of the primary justificatory mechanisms for the individual committing
violent acts. Terrorists openly reject conventional societal norms and values,
undergoing a gradual but steady disengagement from moral realities as
they commit more acts of violence, which in turn enable greater acts of
ruthlessness.21 This is facilitated by the group idealizing its own goals whilst
devaluing or demonizing its opponents, which polarizes the world into an
us-versus-them scenario. Psychologist Dr Joel Simon Hochman testified at
the Charles Manson trial in 1969–70 that, ‘I think that historically the easiest
way to program someone into murdering is to convince them that they are
alien, that they are them and we are us, and that they are different from us’.22
Jerrold Post argues that, ‘To the extent that the terrorist ideology devalues
and dehumanizes the establishment and identifies it as the cause of society’s

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 141
problems, it is not only not immoral to attempt to destroy the establishment,
it is indeed the highest order of morality’.23
Within this process, conventional notions of morality are replaced by
the morality of the group and its ideology, and it is these moral norms and
values which are used to justify terrorist violence. Analysis of some left-
wing West German terrorists showed that they acted as though they were
absolved of responsibility for their actions by the group’s ideology.24 What
is sometimes lost in this process is the element of proportionality which
conventional notions of morality apply to acts of violence.25 Terrorists
are more likely to be absolutists, for whom the ends are more important
than the means, which implies that no act of violence would necessarily be
ruled out on moral grounds.26 Therefore, it is the extent of this rejection
of conventional morality which is potentially the key factor in determining
whether individual terrorists will choose to use CBRN weapons, particularly
WMD.
Yet these new moral values can also potentially act as a strong disincentive
to using CBRN weapons. Terrorists tend to perceive and present themselves
as being held to a higher moral standard than their adversaries. It is this,
after all, which enables them to justify their violence against the evil
oppressors, both to themselves and their constituency. They attempt to
present themselves as champions of justice within an unjust society, rather
than barbarians engaging in violence for the sake of violence. If their aim is
to establish their legitimacy as a political actor, and reinforce their position
as a moral force, then certain actions would be precluded.27
The extent to which these new values subsume the traditional societal
norms and values with which the individual grew up is also likely to vary
widely. The normative social values which individuals acquire through their
lifetime are so deeply ingrained within the personality that they can never
be completely subsumed. As a result, they can still influence the individual.
Hence, there have been instances in which terrorists have refused to carry
out certain kinds of attacks. Hans-Joachim Klein, a member of the RAF,
threatened to inform the authorities if the group carried out a threat to
bomb Lufthansa passenger jets; he left the group shortly afterwards.28 If
any act of violence is likely to lead to conflicts between terrorists’ objectives
and these deeply ingrained social values, it is likely to be the use of CBRN
weapons.
However, the social values and moral norms of different societies can
vary widely over time for a whole range of cultural, religious, societal,
political, or socio-economic reasons. When the Red Brigades were operating
in Italy, violence was seen as a societal norm, rather than an aberration. In

142 The Changing Face of Terrorism
fact, many terrorists come from societies and communities where personal
and structural violence is the norm – from Palestinian refugee camps in
Israel, to Chechnya and intercommunal violence in Northern Ireland.
In societies where violence is the norm, it is significantly easier for the
individual to transition into a more structured campaign of violence. Yet
there does not appear to be any obvious link between individuals coming
from such backgrounds and acts of CBRN terrorism.
As a result of these conflicting moral imperatives, terrorists have to
reconcile their desire to commit acts of violence with these normative
values. Therefore, even if the tactical, strategic and political motivations
favour the use of CBRN weapons, the possibility that an individual will
use them will also be determined by the strength of the psychological
justificatory mechanisms that he or she uses. But the more extreme the level
of violence, the more difficult it is to reconcile with these normative values.
Therefore terrorists also calibrate their level of violence to what they can
morally justify to themselves. These moral conflicts will be most extreme
when considering using WMD for indiscriminate attacks, but where the
target is more discriminate these conflicts should be easier to reconcile.
Therefore, a basic inability to reconcile these competing imperatives could
potentially have contributed to the relatively low incidence terrorists using
CBRN weapons.
Whether religious belief systems constitute stronger justificatory
mechanisms for committing acts of CBRN terrorism than political belief
systems, because of their divinely inspired nature, is a matter of conjecture,
although most analysts assume that they do. It has been argued that the
transcendental nature of the objectives of religious terrorism releases
the perpetrators from political and moral constraints, and that they are
unconstrained by conventional norms of proportionality, instrumentality,
and societal acceptability, because for them violence has a cleansing and
redemptive element.29
A key feature of the ideology of ‘religious’ terrorist groups is their use
of religious terminology to dehumanize the enemy. People who are not of
the same religion as that of the group are considered to be are less than
human, and will ultimately end up in hell. Islamist groups use the term
kuffar to refer to non-Muslims, which literally means unbeliever but is used
colloquially as a derogatory term. Islamist terrorists use of this term to
dehumanize non-Muslims, making it easier for them to kill non-combatants.
In the UK, the radical preacher abu Hamza preached that ‘killing a kuffar
for any reason, you can say is OK even if there is no reason for it’.30 And
Jawad Akbar, who was convicted in 2007 of plotting to cause explosions in

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 143
the UK, bore a deep hatred of non-Muslims and told his wife that ‘when
we kill the kuf, this is because we know Allah hates the kufs’.31 Similarly,
the Christian Identity church claims that the non-white races are not really
human, referring to Blacks and Hispanics as ‘mud people’ and ‘Latrinos’.
These factors can remove the sense of proportionality in how these groups
use violence. Whilst not all religious groups might choose to use CBRN
weapons, or engage in indiscriminate attacks, the emergence of more of
these types of group increases the probability that some of them might turn
to using CBRN weapons if they can acquire them.
In contrast, the belief systems of secular terrorists generally identify
discriminate categories of targets. Their dehumanizing terminology tends
to be directed at the political establishment and security forces of the state,
although racist secular groups will emphasize the biological inferiority of
their ethnic victims. This establishes a form of ‘bounded morality’, which
whilst not generally being understood or accepted by society, does constrain
their acts. Because they commit their acts for their perceived constituency,
they generally accept principles of proportionality and justice, which
typically preclude indiscriminate attacks, particularly mass-casualty attacks.32
However, they still perceive themselves to be outsiders, and are irretrievably
hostile to the establishment. Such implacable opposition might have an
impact on their willingness to escalate the level of violence that they use,
but this does not appear to have been the case.33 Whilst the justificatory
mechanisms of secular groups seem to be significantly weaker than those of
‘religious’ groups, they are not so weak as to completely rule out the use of
CBRN weapons. A significant number of secular groups have either used or
considered using CBRN weapons.
In conjunction with the justificatory mechanisms derived from the
group’s ideology, individuals can also be decisively influenced by political or
religious figures whom they deem to have legitimate authority. These figures
can make it very difficult for individuals to question what is required of
them. Stanley Milgram’s seminal experiments in the 1960s demonstrated the
potential power of an authority figure over the individual. Milgram asked
participants to deliver an ‘electric shock’ to a subject in another room when
they made a mistake in a task. The ‘shocks’ were not real, but the actor in
the other room performed as if they were. Despite being of above-average
intelligence, two-thirds of the subjects were prepared to deliver ‘shocks’
that they knew were dangerous, whilst pleading with the experimenter to
stop the study.34 Individuals who obey an authority figure to commit an
act which they personally object to, absolve themselves of responsibility
by transferring it to the person who sanctioned the act. This resolves any

144 The Changing Face of Terrorism
moral conflicts for the individual, who also becomes less constrained by
any potential political disincentives. The fact that many ‘religious’ terrorists
actively seek prior sanction for their actions from a religious figure indicates
the critical psychological significance of this justificatory mechanism. It also
suggests that if the group cannot obtain explicit sanction from a religious
figure, the individual will have greater personal difficulty carrying out the
attack.
In addition, all types of terrorists sometimes attempt to justify their
acts by deliberately disregarding or misrepresenting the damage that they
have caused. By minimizing the damage in this way, they avoid the full
implications of their actions. When they do not know the harm that they
are causing, it becomes de-personalized and consequently less difficult to
overcome moral inhibitions. Similarly, if the terrorist who gives the order
to carry out an attack is not one of those who actually executes the act, it
is morally easier for that individual.35 Yet there must be considerable doubt
about whether this would apply to using WMD, because the consequences
of using them would be so dramatic and extreme that terrorists would know
the likely consequences of their actions. There would be no escaping the
moral dilemmas in ordering and executing such an attack.
Decision Making Structures within Terrorist Groups
One of the principal factors that influences terrorists’ choice of weapons
and tactics is the dynamics of the decision-making process within the group.
Many ‘secular’ terrorist groups have ‘democratic’-style decision-making
structures.36 The Provisional IRA for example, was led by a seven man
Army Council, which was responsible for strategy and the planning of all
operations. This included when bombing campaigns were conducted and
which targets were chosen. In the 1980s the IRA adopted an organizational
structure based upon cells of eight people each, with central control
over the cells being exercised by an operations officer, who would know
of every operation being planned, and had the authority to approve or
cancel any operation.37 But it is not only ‘secular’ terrorist groups that have
such ‘democratic’ styles of decision-making. Bin Laden’s leadership style
is to foster co-operation among disparate terrorist groups and discourage
internal rivalries. Decision making in al-Qaeda is not consolidated in the
leader and it does not have a hierarchical structure, which gives individual
cells a significant degree of freedom of operation.38
Within such groups, tactical and strategic decision making would depend
upon the balance of beliefs amongst the group leadership. Whilst groups

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 145
with this type of decision-making structure might contain individuals who
would countenance the use of CBRN weapons or WMD, the group itself
would use them only if the balance of opinion amongst the leadership was
in favour. This might make it less likely that such a group would resort to
using CBRN weapons, but does not necessarily exclude it completely. It
is only when the group’s leadership contains a majority of hardliners that
the most extreme tactics will prevail. However, over time the leadership of
a group will change as some members are killed and other operatives rise
through the ranks. The impact of changes in leadership on the strategy and
tactics used by a group can also be dramatically influenced by changes in
the politico-strategic situation facing the group, which can also establish an
imperative for the group to change its strategy or tactics.
Such group dynamics is evident from an account of a debate on the
use of WMD, within al-Qaeda’s ruling body, the Majlis al-Shura, in the late
1990s. One faction within the Shura believed that WMD were no more than
an empty threat which no rational leadership would ever use. Others argued
that because the group was only likely to acquire a primitive WMD with
limited destructive capacity, they would only be able to be used in a tactical
role. Others argued that ‘weapons of mass destruction would considerably
enhance the fighting capability and moral influence of the Mujahideen
and the fighters of al-Qaeda. They are in dire need of such weapons to
compensate for the vulnerability of their military ordnance. The insufficiency
of their numbers and their growing isolation from their peoples’. Several
also envisioned the use of WMD paired with suicide attacks to maximize
their effect.39 As highlighted in Chapter 3, al-Qaeda’s assessment of the
utility of WMD evolved from the notion of deterrence, to using them as a
first strike weapon to punish for the past and present killing of Muslims.40
These changes in strategy reflected both changes within the leadership of
al-Qaeda and the changed geo-strategic situation following the advent of
the ‘war on terror’.
In contrast, some groups have more authoritarian leadership structures.
The Palestinian Abu Nidal group for instance, was run by Abu Nidal
himself, supported by four top aides. Under the aegis of a general council,
his orders were passed to underground cells which operated in different
countries.41 Similarly, the leaders of ad hoc Islamist terrorist cells exercise
sole control over their cells. Although in some authoritarian groups, such
as the Red Brigades in Italy, operational decisions are often taken near the
bottom of the structure rather than descending from the top.42 Within
these authoritarian types of decision-making structures, it is down to the
leader to decide whether to use CBRN weapons, since he or she cannot be

146 The Changing Face of Terrorism
effectively challenged by other individuals within the group hierarchy. As a
consequence, groups with this type of decision-making structure could be
considered to represent more of a threat in respect of CBRN terrorism
because once the leader decides to use these weapons, group dynamics will
have little impact. The potential threat is heightened because this type of
group is frequently amongst the most extreme.
Command and control within terrorist groups can also break down at
times, and factions can often leave the main group or start to act semi-
autonomously, particularly if there are disagreements over strategy and
tactics. In such circumstances there is a danger of hardline elements breaking
away and unconstrained by the more moderate elements in the leadership,
escalating their level of violence. There is clear evidence that elements acting
outside of a hierarchical decision-making structure can lead to an escalation
in violence. For example, the attack by members of Gemaah Islamiyah at
Luxor, Egypt, which killed 58 foreign tourists and four Egyptians in 1997,
was carried out on the orders of hardline commanders who were opposed to
the non-violent strategy being advocated at that time by those elements of
the group’s leadership who were being held in Egyptian prisons.43 But even
if disagreements over strategy do not lead to the break-up of the group,
divisions and rivalries are still capable of leading to an escalation of violence
as each faction competes for control, and this could conceivably lead to the
use of CBRN weapons. There have been examples of this phenomenon
at the conventional level, such as in Lebanon, where Amal and Hezbollah
sought to outdo each other with suicide bombings.44 The less cohesive a
group, the more this is likely to occur.
One of the features of terrorism in the 1990s was the heightened
attention paid to lone terrorists. To date, the most famous lone bomber
has been the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, who conducted a 20-year
bombing campaign in the USA. The potential threat of CBRN attacks
from lone terrorists is perceived to be higher than that from established
groups because they operate outside of any potential constraints of
group dynamics. However, the extent to which some of these individuals
do operate alone is debatable. They are often part of ‘communities of
belief ’ which communicate their ideas to one another and interact without
actually meeting, often through the internet. These ‘virtual communities’
have a shared sense of belonging and distinct group dynamic despite the
absence of a significant command structure or physical organization.
Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995,
did not belong to any particular group, but was a member of an unofficial
community of like-minded individuals who shared information. These

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 147
communities might have less group loyalty, cohesion, and social function
than traditional terrorist groups, but they do serve as a motivating force.45
The lone terrorist model is actually a feature of another phenomenon
that emerged strongly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, of individuals
operating in very small groups, loosely organized, and with less discipline
than their traditional counterparts. This has particularly been the case with
the extreme right in the USA. Following its failure to sustain a campaign of
violence in the 1980s, it remained quiet until the early 1990s, spending its
time maintaining and building support and preparing for a second wave of
violence. Learning from the mistakes of the 1980s, Louis Beam, a former
Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan and ambassador at large for the Aryan
Nations, pioneered a new strategy known as ‘leaderless resistance’. This
strategy posited a mass movement led by a Christian Identity vanguard
but which was unconscious of this fact. Sub-units would have a great deal
of autonomy and anonymity, enabling the easy creation of terrorist cells
comprising between four and six members. These cells would commit
acts of terrorism on their own initiative without waiting for orders from
a hierarchy.46 As a consequence, the movement as a whole would be less
vulnerable to penetration, because not even the individual cells would
fully understand their interrelation with other parts of the movement.
Beam’s theory was that individual acts of violence would initiate a chain
reaction, leading to a white supremacist revolution.47 This phenomenon is
also manifest in the wider Islamist movement which consists of numerous
independent cells and groups, which might be networked with each other,
but are independent of each other and al-Qaeda. This has led to the concept
being re-branded as leaderless jihad.
The concept of ‘leaderless resistance’ has also been manifest in other
developments in terrorist organization. The 1993 World Trade Centre
bombing was perpetrated by an ad hoc group of individuals who shared
common beliefs and goals, and who came together for that specific attack
and had little connection to a controlling authority. These ad hoc groups
operate under fewer constraints than those which are part of a rigid
command structure. This could be because ad hoc groups form because
their members share similar views about the use of violence, beliefs which
perhaps are not shared by the leadership of the cells or groups from which
they originate. It is therefore conceivable that ad hoc cells could form
specifically to perpetrate CBRN attacks, unconstrained by a more cautious
leadership. It has also been suggested that the individuals who are recruited
into these types of groups are more inclined to be driven by a desire for
revenge, and hence would be more interested in causing mass casualties.

148 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The principle of ‘leaderless resistance’ is a particular concern in respect
of CBRN terrorism because small groups of extremists or individuals
might not choose to operate under the same political, strategic, or moral
constraints as the majority of the movement. This is evident from a number
of incidents such as the case of Larry Wayne Harris, who was apprehended in
possession of ricin and the plague virus in 1995, in which individuals appear
to have been acting independently, without sanction from a hierarchy. These
cases indicate that individuals within a broader group or movement might
develop and use CBRN weapons whatever the views of the leadership on
the issue, and that the lack of a formal infrastructure will not necessarily
inhibit technologically capable terrorists from developing CBRN weapons.
Therefore, in general terms, strong hierarchical command structures
mean that a group’s leadership can maintain its authority and either keep
extremist individuals under control, or else lead the group to escalating levels
of violence. The looser and more diffuse the nature of the group, the more
freedom that individuals or cells have to conduct their own campaigns of
extreme violence. Whilst an individual might be part of a wider ‘community
of belief ’, the potential constraining influence of the community would
probably be weaker than is the case within formal group structures.
However, groups with a wide range of different types of organizational
structure have been linked to previous CBRN weapon plots. Many of the
most serious cases previous cases of CBRN terrorism involved groups with
authoritarian decision-making structures, particularly religious cults, as well
as hardline individuals and cells acting autonomously. However, al-Qaeda’s
interest in CBRN weapons shows that even groups with a more democratic
style of decision making will use these weapons.
Group Decision Making
Despite the emergence of more lone operators in the 1990s, terrorism
essentially remains a group activity. This renders the individual terrorist
susceptible to the powerful influences of group and organizational dynamics.
Some of the strongest psychological motivations and disincentives to using
CBRN weapons that will influence the individual will be derived from the
dynamics of decision making within the group.
Wanda von Baeyer-Katte identifies an ‘upside down logic’ that
characterizes terrorist decision making. The group decides what is good
and bad, and if the cause is served by a particular act, the act is considered
good by definition.48 One of the principal reasons why the group is so
influential is that the individual is driven by a strong motivation to belong,

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 149
because it consolidates an incomplete psycho-social identity. This creates
the foundation for especially powerful group dynamics, suggesting that
the group is an unusually powerful setting for producing conforming
behaviour. Memoirs and interviews with terrorists suggest that individuals
have a tendency to submerge their personal identity into a group identity,
and in the process subordinate their own judgement to that of the group.49
This suggests that in group debates about whether to use CBRN weapons,
individuals might ignore their own personal objections.
Within any terrorist group there are significant pressures for compliance
and conformity that mute dissent. Features of this ‘group think’ are:
illusions of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and risk taking
and collective rationalization of efforts to dismiss challenges to key
assumptions; the presumption of the superiority of the group’s morality; the
unidimensional perception of the enemy as evil or incompetent; intolerance
of challenges to shared beliefs by a group member; unwillingness to express
views that deviate from the perceived group consensus; and a shared illusion
that unanimity within the group is genuine. This might also result in some
members withholding adverse information concerning the instrumental
and moral soundness of a decision from the group.50 The consequences of
this are the reduction of critical judgement, the assumption of the group’s
morality, and the illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive risk taking.
All three of these factors will play a significant role in group decisions about
whether or not to use CBRN weapons.
Occasionally, unanimity within a group can be lost. In some groups this
has led to the emergence of factions under charismatic individuals, which
break away and often prove to be more extreme than the parent group.
Divisions between members do not invariably lead to the break-up of
terrorist groups, but they can drive up levels of violence. When factions
exist within an organization, competing viewpoints have to be reconciled,
and it is through this process that a group’s leadership might escalate
levels of violence.51 As rivals or different factions compete for influence,
they might reach a point at which they consider that displaying a stronger
commitment to the cause through higher levels of violence is the best
means of gaining influence. Yet this would also be partly dependent upon
the politico-strategic context within which the group is operating. When the
IRA considered calling a ceasefire as part of the Northern Ireland peace
process there was competition for control of the organization between the
advocates of the peace process and the hardliners who wanted to continue
the war. This competition did not lead to an escalation of IRA violence

150 The Changing Face of Terrorism
because the political context had created an opportunity to explore political
solutions, and that was what the majority of its constituency favoured.
The pressures for conformity with the collective belief are also closely
linked with a phenomenon known to psychologists as ‘risky shift’, by which
groups often make riskier decisions than the individuals preferred privately.
Terrorist memoirs and interviews provide plenty of evidence of this
phenomenon. Adriana Faranda, a member of the Red Brigades, explained
that you accept decisions, even if you are a dissenting minority: ‘you support
the others. Its a kind of pact of obedience.’52 The individuals concerned are
able to justify their more extreme actions by the knowledge that all members
of the group will share responsibility, thereby lessening personal guilt for
the consequences. A wish by the group to define its identity more clearly,
peer pressure, and the individual desire to conform or appear decisive are
other factors which can account for this phenomenon.53 Conformity to the
collective belief increases with the length of time that the individual remains
in the group. Similarly, in groups that contain individuals with poor self-
esteem who depend upon the group for their sense of significance, these
tendencies will be magnified.54 C.J.M. Drake suggests that the concept of
risky shift will ultimately lead terrorists towards taking increasingly greater
risks.55
Further work into this phenomenon by Solomon Asch in 1951 indicated
that the degree of conformity increases with the size of the group up to
a maximum of seven members, and thereafter does not rise. But, more
importantly, it was the desirability of belonging to the group, and the level
of confidence that the individual had in his or her own ability, that affected
conformity. Asch found that when they complied with a judgement with
which they disagreed, many participants underestimated the extent to
which they conformed. However, further work has suggested that Asch’s
findings were misinterpreted, and that participants actually managed to
resist pressures to conform on about two-thirds of the judgements, and that
conformity was the exception rather than the rule. Ability to resist group
pressure is made easier if the individual has an ally. If two naive participants
were present in an Asch-type experiment, conformity dropped to 5.5 per
cent of the judgements given.56 These findings indicate that conformity is
not guaranteed, and that individuals will reject some decisions taken within
groups. Consequently, there is no guarantee that decisions to escalate levels
of violence will find compliance with all members of the group.
The concept of risky shift ties in with the concept of the ‘diffusion of
responsibility’, by which an individual might consent to commit an act which
he or she would otherwise reject, because an authority figure had stated that

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 151
it was justified to commit the act. Again, the individual justifies perpetrating
the act by shifting responsibility to the leader, or group, who ordered the act.
Yet these factors do not invariably lead to escalation. The IRA was subject
to these group dynamics but maintained constraints on its level of violence.
The critical influence of the group on the psychology of individual
members could also potentially help to explain why groups that are in decline
might resort to heightened levels of violence, including CBRN weapons. As
the group falls into decline, the individual is faced with the fear of losing
all that he or she gains from membership. It is the fear derived from their
deep psychological need to belong to the group which might drive them to
consider any measures to ensure the group’s survival.
The power of the group over its members can potentially be strengthened
even further by the relationship between the group and wider society. Group
dynamics are most powerful within groups that have gone ‘underground’
and are cut off from society. This has included groups such as the RAF
(Baader-Meinhof gang) and the SLA; religious cults, small cells which are
operating outside of their own countries; and even right-wing groups in the
USA that have established their own communities. Isolated from society,
group cohesion develops in response to shared danger, and the members
become more self-reliant. The group and its ideology then becomes the
individual’s life, a source of safety and security. Because of this reliance, the
fear of expulsion from the group can become all encompassing.57
Group cohesiveness encourages the pursuit of violence because news is
filtered through the group, leading to increased misperceptions of the outside
world, reinforcing the beliefs of the group and creating the conditions in
which ideology can become corrupted and abstract.58 Martha Crenshaw
notes how ‘ideology may become increasingly corrupted and surrealistic,
it is used to escape a disconcerting reality rather than to guide actions. The
extreme abstractness of such beliefs … disconnect their holders from
objective reality’.59 Consequently, alienation and isolation from mainstream
society could be one of the key factors leading to CBRN terrorism, because
it also isolates the group from societal norms and values, strengthening the
individual’s acceptance of the group’s morality and potentially corrupting
that ideology.
Operating ‘underground’ establishes a pattern of behaviour in which
the predominant determinant is the internal dynamics of the group. From
only mixing with like-minded individuals, group judgements are affected
by self-reinforcing group values rather than conventional societal values.60
But, even more significantly, it is possible for the members to conform to
the agenda of just a few individuals, or even of just the leader. The leader

152 The Changing Face of Terrorism
is likely to be highly influential in determining how individual members
view the organization and its goals, and a member’s reliance on the group
can be exploited in order to ensure compliance. Voices of opposition are
often muted because of the fear of jeopardizing their position within the
organization, consequently the group might engage in levels of violence
that none of the individual members believed were justified.61 Andreas
Baader used the threat of expulsion to ensure compliance from members of
the Baader-Meinhof gang, ‘whoever is in the group simply has to be tough,
has to be able to hold out, and if one is not tough enough, there is not
room for him here’. In some cases dissension might go beyond expulsion
from the group to include the threat of death. One former member of the
RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) commented on the pressures that ‘can lead
to things you can’t imagine … the fear of what is happening to one when
you say, for example, “No I won’t do that, and for these reasons.” What
the consequences of that can be’.62 For ‘religious’ groups, members might
not dissent for fear of appearing to lack faith. Under these conditions, if
the leader is interested in using CBRN weapons, the group is more likely
to follow that course of action. These factors might help to explain the
previous RAF interest in CBRN weapons, and why religious cults, and some
Islamist groups, have also previously displayed an interest in using them.
Therefore, the close-knit insular organization of left-wing groups which
go ‘underground’ is less of an aspect of right-wing terrorism, and the
attendant consequences for group dynamics are not so relevant. Although
some skinhead groups and neo-Nazis are extremely alienated. Some groups
of activists live together, becoming a surrogate family when the members
break their ties with the outside world to become more centred on the
group.63 Some individuals and groups of this type have been linked to
CBRN plots, such as the plan by members of the Confederate Hammerskins
to pump cyanide into the air conditioning system of the Temple Shalom in
Dallas, Texas.64 In contrast, terrorists who are not alienated from society, but
live within the community, who might have family lives and interact socially
with people outside of the group, are continually exposed to societal norms
and values. It can be noted that groups such as Hezbollah, ETA and the
IRA, whose members are not alienated from their communities, have never
previously been linked to CBRN threats.
However, the individual’s psychological reliance on the group does not
automatically generate pressure within groups to escalate their violence.
It might ensure compliance and greater risk-taking, but it might also be a
factor in why terrorists have generally proven to be risk averse, because they
will do all that they can to ensure the survival of the group. Engaging in a

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 153
programme to develop and use CBRN weapons entails a higher degree of
risk, in terms of being discovered, killed by ones own weapons, or provoking
a governmental or societal backlash against the group which could lead to
its destruction. Equally, debates about escalation might risk splits within the
group. Therefore, the issue of using CBRN weapons might never really be
debated within some groups. Hence, psychological factors associated with
group dynamics can also act as disincentives. Ad hoc terrorist cells, such as
the one that was responsible for the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing,
pose a potentially greater threat because they operate underground and thus
experience the most extreme consequences of group dynamics outlined
above. But their members are not psychologically reliant upon the group in
the same way, therefore considerations about preservation of the group are
nowhere near as powerful.
Despite the fact that group dynamics can distort individual decision
making, this is not necessarily irrational. As noted in Chapters 3–5, most
terrorist groups will be subject to a conflicting mix of political, theological,
strategic, and operational motivations and disincentives to using CBRN
weapons. Group dynamics can influence how individuals and groups resolve
these conflicting priorities. Consequently, there is a rational decision-making
process that could persuade terrorists that using WMD would further their
aims. Group dynamics can influence which political and strategic factors are
most important in any decision the group makes. But whilst group dynamics
can act as a powerful motivational factor, the social and moral beliefs of the
individual will not necessarily be totally submerged, and can still act as strong
disincentives upon the individual. There is some evidence to support this
contention from past cases of CBRN terrorism. When the Rajneeshpuram
cult discussed the use of BW, part of the reasoning for using salmonella
rather than typhoid, AIDS, hepatitis, or giardia was the level of damage that
would result. They were prepared for some incidental casualties, but their
intention was not to kill anyone.65 For lone operators, the psychological
disincentives to using CBRN weapons are stronger, because the powerful
justificatory mechanisms outlined above are not relevant.
Religious Cults and Mind Control
Religious cults pose one of the potentially greatest threats in respect of
CBRN terrorism because of the confluence of many of these psychological
motivations and escalatory pressures within their group dynamics. The
leadership of a powerful, authoritarian, religious figure, coupled with the
individual’s strong sense of belonging to a cohesive group, means that

154 The Changing Face of Terrorism
diffusion of responsibility and risky shift would be powerful influences
on cult members. Most cults also isolate themselves from society, thereby
magnifying these tendencies. As is the case with other religious terrorists,
cults that perpetrate acts of violence use explicit clerical sanction to justify
their actions. Shoko Asahara instructed his top disciples that killing by the
enlightened few was justified because it helped send victims to a higher
plane: ‘It is good to eliminate people who continue to do bad things and
are certain to go to hell’ and in doing so he also assured them that they
themselves would rise another level towards Nirvana.66 When Asahara
ordered the murder of a lawyer called Sakamoto and his family, he justified
the murder of the baby by claiming that it was holy work because it
prevented the child being brought up by Sakamoto, who was attempting
to repeat bad deeds from a previous life, and that it would be born again in
a higher world.67 Similarly, Charles Manson’s philosophy incorporated the
notion that it was acceptable to kill because one is killing only part of one’s
self, and death liberated the soul. He told his followers that they were above
the law because they were divinely guided, and they followed his directives
without question.68
Because of the bizarre nature of the beliefs of some cults, it is generally
assumed that it is unintelligent, weak, and mentally ill people who join them.
This might be an accurate description of some cult members,69 but it is in
general terms a misconception. Healthy minds that are intellectually alert
and inquisitive, and perhaps idealistic, are in fact the easiest to recruit and
control. In addition, individuals do not join cults, but are actively sought
out and recruited. Hence, many intelligent people become members
of cults, including professional people such as doctors, teachers, and
engineers. Aum Shinrikyo specifically sent recruiters to universities with
instructions to target intelligent young people.70 Where religious cults differ
from conventional terrorist organizations is in their use of mind-control
techniques which exacerbate the effects of group dynamics. Cult watchers
contend that sophisticated mind-control techniques will work on anyone,
given the right circumstances.71 The use of mind-control techniques gives
the leader, or small leadership clique, complete control over the lives of the
cult members.72
The use of mind control techniques means that the membership will
unquestioningly follow the leader’s directives. Consequently, cult members
are compelled to live out the imperatives of the religious doctrine that
the leader espouses, and are invariably heavily influenced by the leader’s
personal fantasies, delusions, and intentions. The two basic principles of
psychological coercion are that if you can make a person behave the way

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 155
that you want them to, you can make them believe the way you want them
to; and that sudden drastic changes in environment lead to heightened
suggestibility and drastic changes in attitude and beliefs. Cults use mind-
control techniques in an atmosphere of intense group pressure to conform
at all times to the desires of the leader. The victim is broken down physically
and mentally, thereby becoming susceptible to the leader’s suggestions and
wishes. This process can take a little as three to four days. The end result is
a sudden and drastic personality change. The new personality is unable to
reason, to choose, or to critically evaluate, and is dependent upon the cult
to interpret reality. Having lost the freedom of choice, cult members simply
do what they are ordered to do by the leader.73 Once in such a condition,
the cult comes to dominate and control all aspects of the individual’s life.
Aum Shinrikyo used a wide variety of mind-control techniques which
included separating members from their families, sleep deprivation, minimal
diets, an unceasing barrage of cult teachings, extensive use of psychoactive
drugs including LSD and thiopental, and various physical punishments
including confinement, scalding baths, and immersion in near-freezing water.
In conjunction with this treatment they were also subjected to a constant
barrage of the cult’s teachings and religious initiations. Aum Shinrikyo
even explored the possibility of using electricity to control brainwaves, and
produced electrode caps which regularly administered an electrical discharge
into the brain of the wearer. This was purported to tune the wearer’s brain-
waves into those of Asahara.74 One member described her experience of
an initiation ceremony, in which she was administered unknown drugs:
‘Gradually a vision like hell came to me. I began to see scenes of hungry
demons. I thought that the Guru’s teachings must be right and true. Then I
began to hear the Guru’s mantra, then two sets of the mantra at once. I felt
I must do better in Aum.’75
As a result, cult members act upon the imperatives of the cults’ belief
system. These belief systems are heavily influenced by the state of mind
of the leadership. Jessica Stern identifies leadership structure as being one
of the key indicators in determining the latent potential for violence within
a cult. She suggests that a single leader is more dangerous than a group in
which a number of disciples are granted sacred authority.76 If a single leader
is prone to violence, it is an indicator that the cult itself might potentially
resort to violence.
Whilst cult leaders tend to be very charismatic, Ian Howarth suggests
that it is very common for cult leaders to suffer from some form of mental
illness. Some of them become delusional and actually begin to believe that
they are who they claim to be, or can even perform the miracles that they

156 The Changing Face of Terrorism
claim. After reading the Bible, Asahara wrote that ‘I hereby declare myself
to be the Christ’, and ‘I am the last Messiah in this century’. On another
occasion he also declared himself to be Buddha.77 David Koresh, leader
of the Branch Davidians, claimed to have been the recipient of the final
message of God, the Seventh Seal, and had therefore been appointed to
be the seventh messenger of the Book of Revelation.78 Charles Manson
also claimed to be Jesus Christ. His control over his group was such that his
followers testified in court that they truly believed that he was Jesus Christ.79
Yet despite indications of emotional traumas and maladjustment in the past
of many of these cult leaders, most of them do not have backgrounds
marked by extreme violence. Asahara was a bully during his time at school,
whilst Manson had engaged in armed robbery, homosexual rape, and wife
beating, but had no sustained past record of violence.80 Instead, their
murderous tendencies seem to have emerged only during the lifetime of
their cult activities.
Because of the role of the leader within the cult, the delusions that affect
the leader grow to dominate the life and behaviour of the cult. Paranoia
can be a dominant feature of cult thinking, which is frequently manifest in
extreme forms of behaviour. Aum Shinrikyo was riven by paranoia, fuelled
by Shoko Asahara’s predictions of Armageddon. Enemies were perceived
to be everywhere. Members suspected of breaking cult laws, disloyalty,
spying, or dissent, were confined, tortured, and even killed. Towards the
end, this even included persecuting members with the wrong blood type,
after Asahara had declared that people with blood group O were bound
to break Buddhist laws.81 This sense of paranoia was fuelled by the cult’s
isolation from the outside world. Police raids, a critical media, along with
angry neighbours and parents of cult members fostered these feelings
of persecution and alarm. Similarly, Jim Jones the leader of the People’s
Temple became increasingly paranoid and delusional, believing that the
CIA was poisoning him, and he sometimes imagined that he was Lenin.82
This sense of paranoia can also fuelled by external factors, and most cults
that have resorted to violence: Aum, the People’s Temple, Rajneeshpuram,
the Branch Davidians, and the Solar Temple have done so when they were
under investigation by the law enforcement agencies of the states in which
they were operating.
Yet evidence from the trial of Charles Manson and three female
members of The Family suggested that the exercise of mind control is not
in itself enough in itself to cause or encourage an individual to murder at
the behest of a leader. Manson had control over the hardcore members of
The Family, yet several of them refused to kill for him. Analysis of the three

Psychological Motivations and Disincentives 157
women convicted of the Sharon Tate murders indicated that none of them
was psychotic, but all of them were predisposed to murder before meeting
Manson. All of them had a history of alienation which was manifest in anti-
social or deviant behaviour. Leslie Van Houten had extreme difficulties with
impulse control, and there was a deep anger and rage within her. Analysing
her relationship with Manson, the psychologist Dr Joel Simon Hochman
argued that, ‘His ideas, his presence, the role he played in his relationship
to her, served to reinforce a lot of her feelings and attitudes. It served to
reinforce and give her a way of continuing her general social alienation,
her alienation from the establishment’. Hochman stated of Sadie Glutz
that ‘One is struck by the absence of a conventional sense of morality
or conscience in this girl’. The conclusion drawn from the psychological
evidence presented at the trial was that decisions to kill ultimately come
from the individual.83
These factors serve to heighten the potential threat from cults. The
use of mind control suggests that the psychological disincentives to using
violence and CBRN weapons which would otherwise inhibit the individual
are removed, because for the individual member societal norms are replaced
by the cult belief system. Several members of Aum Shinrikyo displayed
indications of moral objections to their actions, yet still went through with
them. After producing a stockpile of sarin, the cult’s head chemist Hideo
Murai, phoned an old friend and warned him to ‘Stay away from crowded
places … Aum Supreme Truth is out of control’. Another leader of the
cult, Dr Nakagawa was riven with guilt after the murders of the Sakamoto
family, yet failed to admit this to Shoko Asahra, and went on to play a key
role in other attacks. Similarly, one of the Tokyo subway attackers, Dr Ikuo
Hayashi, recounted ‘I didn’t know why I was chosen for the attack. I wanted
to refuse, but the atmosphere didn’t allow it’.84
However, mind control is not unbreakable and it does not always
completely replace the conventional societal norms and moral values which
previously governed the behaviour of the individual. Some members,
known as ‘walk aways’, leave cults, typically as a result of something unusual
they have seen, heard, or experienced, which provided information directly
opposed to what they were led to understand about the cult.85 Many
members left, or attempted to leave, Aum Shinrikyo. One member lost
faith after witnessing the killing of another member, whilst another was
appalled at the physical mistreatment of patients in the cult’s hospital.86 This
typically involved rank and file members of the cult but, significantly, one
of the individuals who was chosen to execute a BW attack on Kasumigaseki
station on the Tokyo subway realized that what he was doing was wrong,

158 The Changing Face of Terrorism
and replaced the botulism toxin in the devices with water.87 However, it
appears that the number of ‘walk aways’ is typically only a fraction of cult
membership.
Conclusion
Whilst it is impossible to identify personality characteristics which might
differentiate terrorists who might use CBRN from other terrorists who
would not, this analysis suggests that terrorists operate under conflicting
psychological motivations and disincentives to using CBRN weapons. The
nature and consequences of using CBRN weapons suggest that moral and
psychological factors might be amongst the most powerful influences shaping
terrorist decision making. Ultimately, it could be personal psychology and
group dynamics which are the key to determining how terrorists balance the
conflicting political, theological, strategic, and operational motivations and
disincentives to using CBRN weapons.
The likelihood of CBRN terrorism is obviously strongest when
strong psychological motivations tie in to strong political, strategic, and
tactical motivations to use these weapons. But personal psychology and
group dynamics are an unknown factor in assessing the threat because
individuals could choose to use these types of weapons when there is no
ostensibly rational political or strategic reason to do so. Equally, when other
factors might be pushing terrorists to use CBRN weapons, psychological
disincentives could prove to be the decisive factor in decisions not to use
such weapons, or else might influence decision making in terms of the type
of weapon used and the target that is chosen. Moral constraints could be
another potential factor leading some groups to use CBRN weapons in a
limited fashion against discriminate targets.
Whilst it is impossible to quantify the precise psychological characteristics
which will determine whether a group will engage in CBRN terrorism, it
is possible to identify combinations of factors which make it more likely.
This analysis suggests that authoritarian groups, cut off from society, with
psychotic leaders, represent the biggest threat. It is also possible to argue
that the psychological justificatory mechanisms of ‘religious’ terrorists are
stronger than the psychological disincentives which might influence them.
However, it is quite clear that all types of terrorist groups could operate
under psychological motivations to use CBRN weapons, depending upon
the individuals who comprise the group and the conditions under which it
operates.

7
STATE-SPONSORED CBRN
TERRORISM: MOTIVATIONS AND
DISINCENTIVES
One of the principle independent variables in assessing the threat of CBRN
and WMD terrorism is the possibility of state sponsorship. Acquiring a
CBRN weapon from a state would make questions about the technological
constraints on any particular terrorist group redundant. This would draw
a much wider range of groups into assessments about the nature of the
threat, because it brings in those groups that might have the motivation to
use them but otherwise lack the technological capability to develop them
independently. In the twentieth century there were a number of allegations
of state complicity in terrorist plots involving CBRN weapons but none
was ever proven. Despite the prevalence of state-sponsored terrorism, it has
never crossed the threshold into CBRN or WMD terrorism. This chapter
will explore why.
State Sponsorship of Terrorism
Since 9/11, state sponsorship of terrorism has become a major theme in US
assessments of the potential threat from CBRN terrorism. Denying further
state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists was one of the
cornerstones of the 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.1
There is no evidence of the complicity of a state in the events of 9/11, but
the fact that several alleged proliferators of WMD also sponsor terrorism
was enough to drive US foreign policy in the ‘war on terror’.2 In January
2002, President Bush delivered his infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech in his
State of the Union address. Bush described an axis of evil comprising Iran,

160 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Iraq, and North Korea, which was arming to threaten global peace and
security. The speech explicitly linked the threats of WMD proliferation and
terrorism. Bush pledged to prevent regimes that sponsor terrorism from
threatening the US and its allies with CBRN weapons. This re-iterated a
previous announcement in January 2002 when Bush told the UN that ‘rogue
States [are] the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear
weapons for terrorists … I will not wait on events while dangers gather’.3
To an extent, the USA was using the war against terrorism to solve its other
security issues, but it also reflected a genuine concern that these states might
one day cross the threshold to sponsor an act of CBRN terrorism.
State sponsorship of terrorism has increased markedly since the 1970s,
much of it with political and ideological objectives such as the overthrow
of specific regimes and the extension of the political influence of the
sponsoring state. Bruce Hoffman argues that for state sponsors,
terrorism remains a useful and integral tool of their respective foreign
policies: a clandestine weapon to be wielded whenever the situation is
appropriate and the benefits palpable, but remaining sheathed when
the risks of using it appear to outweigh the potential gains and the
possible repercussions are likely to prove counterproductive. For the
state sponsor, much as for the terrorist group itself, terrorism is not a
mindless act of fanatical or indiscriminate violence but a purposefully
targeted, deliberately calibrated method of pursuing specific objectives
at acceptable cost.4
During the Cold War, the USA funded and armed numerous anti-
communist groups in the developing world such as the Contras in Nicaragua
and the Afghan Mujahideen, whilst the Soviet Union funded communist
insurgencies around the world. The collapse of communism in eastern
Europe between 1989 and 1990 brought new evidence to light of eastern
intelligence agencies supporting terrorist groups in the West, although it fell
short of proving that they actually controlled the activities of groups such
as the RAF.5
In the post Cold War world, there was a shift in state sponsors of
terrorism to states in the developing world. The seminal event for states
using non-state actors to pursue their foreign policy goals occurred in 1979,
when radical ‘students’ seized the US embassy in Iran, and held the occupants
hostage for 444 days. The success of this act did not go unnoticed by radical
states in the developing world, which realized that it could be an effective
way, perhaps the only effective way, in which they could strike at the USA.

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 161
So whilst the embassy crisis was the beginning of a long campaign of state-
sponsored terrorism by the revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini
in Iran, it was also crucially significant as a precedent for a host of other
regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere, which realized that the West was
vulnerable to terrorism.
In 2007 the USA identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria
as states which have repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism.6 With the exception of Sudan, all of these states had been on the
list for over a decade. There have also been allegations of some of these states
co-operating in sponsoring terrorism. For instance, terrorist training camps
in Sudan were allegedly financed and run by Iran,7 whilst Palestinian Islamic
Jihad received support from both Syria and Iran.8 However, on the basis of
the criteria that the US State Department uses to justify the inclusion of a
state on the list, such as the provision of safe havens for terrorist groups,
it could be argued that several other states should also have been added to
the list. In particular, this includes Pakistan because of persistent allegations
that elements within the Pakistani security establishment sponsor Islamist
insurgent and terrorist groups operating in Indian controlled Kashmir as
well as Afghanistan. Indeed, Pakistani support was critical to the Taliban
seizing power in Afghanistan. There are also parts of Pakistan which are not
under the direct control of the Pakistani government, in which terrorists
have found a safe haven. This has led to the observation that to a certain
extent, the inclusion of a state on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism,
was also a reflection on its relations with the USA.9
The principle motivations for these to sponsor terrorism are national
self interest, ideology, and revenge. The most obvious ways in which states
use the sponsorship of terrorism to further their national interests is by
using it to undermine hostile regimes, or to coerce another state into making
political concessions. The motives of Syria in sponsoring Hezbollah for
instance, are closely bound up with its interest in regaining control of the
Golan Heights from Israel, regaining its influence in Lebanon, and generally
enhancing its power in the Middle East. For ideologically driven states,
sponsorship is often directed at terrorist groups that share the same ideology,
for example communist regimes sponsoring left-wing terrorist groups. This
also serves the national self interest for these regimes, if they can help to
secure the victory of an ideological ally in another state. The ideological
legitimacy accorded to these motives by the state sponsors means that they
do not consider that they are supporting terrorism. Instead, they view their
actions as legitimate support for freedom fighters who are struggling against
oppressive regimes. Iran, Syria, and Pakistan define groups such as Hamas,

162 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and the insurgents in Indian controlled Kashmir
as freedom fighters, whereas the West considers them to be terrorists.
Ironically, this mirrors the situation with the Nicaraguan Contras during
the 1980s. The USA described them as freedom fighters, but they were
described by many other states as terrorists. These conceptual differences
over the definition of terrorism lie at the heart of the problem of state-
sponsored terrorism. There have also been cases of states sponsoring
terrorism as a means of exacting revenge against another state. In the wake
of the bombing of Tripoli by the USA in 1986, Libya sent several large
shiploads of weapons and explosives to the IRA in Northern Ireland, as
punishment for Britain’s involvement in the bombing raid.10
It is Iran however, that is considered to be the most active sponsor of
terrorism, supporting numerous Islamist and fundamentalist groups such
as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian Territories, and Shi’a
insurgents in Iraq. This potentially also makes it one of the most dangerous,
because it supports some of the types of group which are most closely
associated with the steady increase in the lethality of modern terrorism.
Significantly however, Iran is ideologically divorced from the wider
networks of Sunni Islamist groups and cells, including al-Qaeda, that have
proliferated in the Middle East.
Iran’s policy is partly driven by ideological motivations. It presents
its revolution as an example to Muslims across the world to re-assert the
fundamental teachings of the Koran. Because it considers itself to be the
only state to have begun the process of redemption by creating a ‘true’
Islamic state, it considers that it must be the advocate of oppressed and
aggrieved Muslims everywhere.11 Consequently, exporting the Islamic
revolution became an Iranian foreign policy goal, which has been manifest
in its support for Shi’a groups and causes throughout the Middle East. In
addition, Iran also sponsors terrorist groups for geo-political reasons, by
either assisting groups that will be loyal to it or those with whom it shares a
common enemy. Hence, in the early 1990s there were indications that Iran
had shifted its policy to support not only Shi’a groups but also Sunni groups.
This was interpreted as a move to increase Iranian influence in the Middle
East following the first Gulf War by filling the vacuum caused by Iraq’s
inability to sponsor some terrorist groups, and Syria’s interest in developing
closer relations with the USA.12 The Iranian objective in sponsoring
terrorism is the belief that increasing levels of terrorism will encourage
governments to clamp down on their Muslim populations and subsequently
enable Iran to act as a focus for the exploited and repressed Muslims in
those states.13

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 163
R. James Woolsey, a former Director of the CIA, stated in evidence
before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate that,
Iran is by far and away the most active and dangerous state sponsor …
Tehran supports Lebanese Hezbollah both financially and militarily.
In large part because of this support over the past decade, Hezbollah
now poses a greater threat to US and Western interests than any other
Middle Eastern terrorist group … and senior Iranian officials and
Tehran’s media organizations are funnelling propaganda to the rest of
the Islamic world that the US is the ‘Great Satan’ whose policy is to
oppress Muslims.14
Besides being influenced by regional geo-political and strategic factors,
Iranian policy on sponsoring terrorism also seems to vary according to
internal political factors within Iran. In the early twenty-first century there
was a schism in Iranian politics between the reformist President Khatami
and the conservatives led by Ayatollah Khameini who sought to preserve
the structure and principles of the 1979 revolution.15 Following the Axis
of Evil speech in 2002, US-Iranian relations deteriorated and there was
an apparent hardening of the Iranian approach to sponsoring terrorism.
Of particular concern were allegations of Iranian support for al-Qaeda,
particularly that it was helping al-Qaeda fighters escape from Afghanistan.16
Iran also continued to provide training bases for a number of militant groups,
including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.17 These activities might
have been a consequence of a dislocation in decision making within Iran,
centering around the reformist-conservative divide within Iranian politics,
which led to the conservative elements acting independently.18 In 2005
however, the conservative President Ahmedinajad was elected President of
Iran, and US-Iranian relations worsened even further as the USA attempted
to use diplomatic and economic measures to coerce Iran into giving up its
nuclear programme. This strategy failed, and Iranian support for Hamas,
Hezbollah, and Iraqi Shi’a insurgents continued, if not increased.
On the other side of the state-terrorist relationship, there are major
benefits for terrorists in seeking the support of a state. This comes in two
basic forms: passive and active. Passive support includes the provision
of safe havens. Syria for instance, has provided a haven for members of
groups such as Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups. Active support
can include the provision of logistical support, financing, training, weapons,
intelligence, the use of diplomatic bags, and false papers. Iran for instance
provides extensive active support to its client groups, particularly through

164 The Changing Face of Terrorism
training, arms shipments, and finance,19 which it arranges through a network
of safe houses, embassies, consulates, mosques, special schools, and tourism
companies.20
Terrorists do not necessarily have to identify with their patron’s cause, to
obtain its support. All they have to be willing to do is perform a service for
a price. As such, it adds a new dimension to international terrorism because
it is not geared to seeking publicity, but to achieve the foreign policy goals
of their patron, by bringing pressure to bear through acts of violence.
Consequently it operates under fewer constraints than ordinary terrorism.
Bruce Hoffman argues that:
because state-sponsored terrorists do not depend on the local
population for support, they do not concern themselves with the risk
of alienating popular support or provoking a public backlash. Thus
the state-sponsored terrorist and his patron can engage in acts of
violence that are typically more destructive and bloodier than those
carried out by groups acting on their own behalf. 21
In fact, Hoffman points out that overall, state-sponsored attacks were
eight times more lethal than those carried out by groups without state
support or assistance.22 Yet despite these figures, this does not necessarily
mean that state-sponsored terrorists are unconstrained killers, or that their
patrons are interested in causing indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks.
The extent of state sponsorship of terrorism can ebb and flow
depending upon the geo-strategic situation of the sponsor. In the late
1990s evidence of state sponsorship of terrorism was limited. An analysis
of the chronologies of 330 significant terrorist incidents identified by the
State Department from 1992 to 1996 revealed only six in which states were
purported to have had direct control over the alleged perpetrators. Over
two-thirds of the incidents classified as international terrorism were directly
attributable to non-state actors.23
Since 9/11 some regional security environments have changed
completely, particularly in the Middle East. Here, regional states are
concerned about the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the
aggressive use of military force by Israel in the Palestinian Territories and
Lebanon, which it invaded in 2006. For those states identified in the ‘axis of
evil’, or which appear on the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of
terrorism, there are acute security concerns about whether they will be next
on the list for military intervention and regime change. At the same time,
the instability in Iraq created opportunities for a power struggle between

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 165
regional states. These drivers have established new incentives to support
insurgent and terrorist groups inside Iraq as a means of tying down US
military power and competing for political influence within the new Iraq.
Iran in particular has been accused of actively supporting militia groups
and acts of terrorism within Iraq, whilst Syria has been variously accused
of complicity or negligence in acting as a transit point for Islamist terrorists
into Iraq. Nevertheless, whilst the war in Iraq has led to an upsurge in state-
sponsored terrorism, it has not led to a single act of state-sponsored CBRN
terrorism. Both Iran and Syria have been successful in achieving their aims
in Iraq through sponsorship of conventional forms of terrorism.
Allegations of State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism
One of the principal global developments which has underpinned the
debate on terrorism and CBRN weapons has been the heightened interest
of terrorist groups in CW, after states in the developing world used them
in regional conflicts. This was particularly true of Iraq, which used CW
during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–88, and against the Kurdish town of
Halabja in Northern Iraq in March 1988, which resulted in the deaths of
6,000 civilians.24 One commentator, has even argued that terrorist interest
in CBRN weapons, ‘seems in large measure to be a consequence of state
actions’.25
The first allegations of states assisting terrorists in developing CBRN
weapons and planning attacks surfaced in the 1980s, but none was ever
substantiated. A former member of the East German secret police (the
Stasi) claimed that in the early 1980s an East German terrorist camp had been
teaching terrorists to use CBW against civilian targets. Iraqis and Palestinians
were allegedly taught how to disseminate CBW agents in public places, such
as airports and train stations, and how to poison water supplies. The former
Stasi officer also claimed that agents of the Iraqi secret police, the Mukhabarat,
had been trained to use CBWs. This training allegedly took place in 1980-
1985, after which it continued in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Some experts believed
that some Stasi officials who were reluctant to return to a unified Germany
continued to train agents in Iraq.26
After the end of the Cold War, one of the principle threats of state-
sponsored CBRN terrorism was considered to be posed by Iraq. During
the 1991 Gulf War, there were reports that Iraq had plans to use BW against
airports, airlines, schools, trains, railroads, oil refineries, and hospitals in Europe.
Weapons inspectors working for UNSCOM discovered plans to use biological
agents in terrorist activities, including an anonymous threat to contaminate the

166 The Changing Face of Terrorism
water supply of a city in British Colombia with a biological agent.27 Following
the war, there were continued reports of Iraqi intentions to sponsor acts of
CBRN terrorism. In 1998, British intelligence warned that Iraq was planning
to smuggle anthrax into the UK in duty-free goods. An ‘all ports’ warning
was issued, but government Ministers subsequently downplayed the reports
and stated that there was no evidence of such a plot.28 It was also alleged
that an Iraqi terrorist network was being maintained in the USA, which was
equipped with biological agents that had been smuggled into the USA by Iraqi
women.29 Whilst these warnings never amounted to anything (particularly
because the Iraqi WMD programme was largely dismantled by UNSCOM
after 1991), they heightened concerns that some states might resort to
CBRN terrorism if they felt threatened enough, and were a major factor in
the US decision to invade Iraq and oust the Saddam regime in 2003.
In the 1990s there were also persistent but unproven allegations of
Islamist and Islamic fundamentalist terrorists receiving state support
in acquiring and using CBRN weapons. In 1993, there was a report that
proposals were made at a meeting of terrorist groups in Tehran, under the
auspices of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, to poison the water supplies of
major Western cities.30 Whilst in August 1996 there was a report that Israel
had warned the USA of a plan by Iran to poison water resources in Western
Europe and the USA with a biological agent, and that both the US and Israel
believed that Iranian scientists had developed a BW aerosol that could be used
by terrorists.31 But as was the case with the warnings about the threat from the
Saddam regime, these warnings never came to anything.
Despite these reports and allegations, no states were involved in any
of the previous incidents of CBRN terrorism. This suggests that states
have previously been unwilling to release CBRN weapons to terrorist
groups. The precise reasons for this will probably remain unknown, but it
is possible to speculate that state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism would
be inconsistent with the purposes for which states seek to acquire CBRN
weapons. The main drivers of proliferation are deterrence and prestige,
and releasing CBRN weapons to terrorist groups would be inconsistent
with those purposes. Saddam Hussein for instance, saw the purpose of the
Iraqi CBRN weapon arsenal as being to preserve his regime. They were
considered to have been successful in this role when they were used during
the Iran-Iraq war, and were also perceived to have deterred the US-led
coalition from attempting to seize Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War. If
this was the primary purpose of the Iraqi CBRN weapon arsenal, it seems
unlikely that the regime would have passed them to terrorists and risk a
backlash that would crush the regime.

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 167
However, there are unresolved questions about precisely what constitutes
state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism. It is generally considered that it means
the ordering and directly abetting of a CBRN attack. Yet many groups that
have been implicated in efforts to procure and use CBRN weapons have
received support from a state, even though the state concerned was not
complicit in the specific CBRN plot. Therefore, even if a state is not directly
implicated in an attack involving CBRN weapons, more general support for
the group could be considered to constitute the sponsorship of that attack.
Potential Motivations for States to Sponsor CBRN Terrorism
As no government has ever previously sponsored an act of CBRN terrorism,
debate about what factors might motivate states to do so in the future are
highly speculative. An obvious observation is that ‘rogue’ states, which do
not accept international norms of behaviour are candidates for doing so.
Yet over nearly four decades of CBRN terrorism, no ‘rogue’ government
has ever taken such a decision. Saddam Hussein is a prime example. Another
observation is that regimes driven by extremist ideologies would do so.
Again, this has never previously happened. Even President Ahmedinajad
of Iran, who once declared that Israel should be wiped off the face off the
map, has not done so.
Instead, one of the more likely factors which could potentially lead to
the state sponsorship of CBRN terrorism are the actions of powerful rogue
elements within governments or the security apparatus of the state, which
have the power to release CBRN weapons from their national weapon
arsenals to terrorist groups. In particular, the intelligence services of many
states are frequently accused of operating independently, often outside of the
rule of law. The role of Colonel Oliver North of the US National Security
Council during the Iran-Contra scandal is indicative of the potential of such
rogue elements, even within democratic societies. In this operation Colonel
North sought to secure the release of US hostages being held in Lebanon by
illegally selling arms to Iran, and then using the money to fund the Contras
in Nicaragua. Similarly, ideologically driven agencies and individuals in other
states have also proven capable of sponsoring terrorist attacks. In particular,
the security services of some other states have occasionally been implicated in
terrorist violence. In Italy during the 1970s and 1980s, elements of the Italian
Intelligence Service (SIS) were directly involved in the campaign of violence
being undertaken by various neo-fascist groups.32 Whilst elements of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary in Northern Ireland were occasionally accused of
collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries during the war against the IRA.

168 The Changing Face of Terrorism
A key actor in contemporary state-sponsored terrorism is Pakistan’s Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. In particular, the ISI has been accused of
funding, arming, and training Islamic fundamentalist insurgents and terrorist
groups operating in Indian controlled Kashmir. This support took place
through an umbrella organization called Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA).33 HUA
has expanded beyond its original remit in Kashmir and now plays a role
within Pakistan itself. It also used to operate training camps in Afghanistan.
After seven HUA members were killed by US Tomahawk cruise missile
raids against al-Qaeda’s Afghan training camps in 1998, the group swore
revenge against the USA.34 The ISI also had strong links to the Taliban.
During the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 there were allegations
of ISI collusion in the transport of weapons and other war materiel to the
Taliban, despite the official support of the Pakistani government for the
‘war on terror’.35 Following 9/11, President Musharraff forced a number of
Islamist generals and ISI officers to resign, but it is uncertain whether this
has actually put a stop to ISI support for the insurgencies in Afghanistan
and Kashmir.
A greater potential risk could perhaps come from rogue individuals
within states’ CBRN weapons programmes. This potential risk was given
credence by the discovery in 2004 of the clandestine nuclear supply network
run by A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapon scientist known as the
‘father of the Pakistani bomb’. Khan’s network supplied Iran, North Korea,
and Libya with nuclear technology and expertise for over two decades.36
Despite this, there is no evidence of the network supplying terrorist or other
jihadi groups, perhaps because Khan was driven by financial rather than
ideological considerations. It is individuals who are driven by ideological or
religious motives that probably pose the biggest risk. This concern was given
credence by the role of the two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, Sultan
Bashiruddin Mehmoud and Abdul Majid, who met bin Laden in August
2001 and discussed the development of CBRN weapons. Mehmoud and
Majid appear to have been driven by ideological motives, since both of them
had been forced out of their jobs in 1999 because they advocated equipping
other Islamic nations with highly enriched uranium and plutonium-239.37
A further variable in government decision making on whether to
sponsor an act of CBRN terrorism are the political and strategic threats
to its future. As no state has ever resorted to an act of state-sponsored
terrorism in response to a geo-strategic threat, it is difficult to identify what
circumstances might prompt such a decision to be made. In the build up
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there was concern that the invasion would
force Saddam Hussain into a ‘no win’ situation that would encourage him

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 169
to use CBRN weapons against Israel and the West, and possibly to give
them to terrorists. As it transpired, Saddam had no CBRN weapons, but
the question remains of what would have happened if he did. In non-crisis
situations it is hard to conceive of an incentive for a state to sponsor an
act of CBRN terrorism. Therefore, for many of the states of concern, the
principal factors which might lead them to resort to CBRN terrorism are
probably linked to specific politico-military scenarios. The principal situation
in which a state might resort to CBRN terrorism could be assumed to be
one in which the regime is threatened, and it lashes out either to defend
itself or in a final act of revenge. But no proliferator regime which both
possesses CBRN weapons and sponsors terrorism, has ever been pushed
into such a position, therefore it is difficult to test this proposition.
Disincentives for States to Sponsor CBRN Terrorism
The fundamental reason why states have not released CBRN weapons to
terror groups is that they have been deterred from doing so by fear of the
inevitable retribution from the victim state and the international community
if they were ever discovered to be responsible. In the past, responses to
acts of state-sponsored terrorism invariably centred around diplomatic and
economic sanctions, but there were also a number of instances of states
which have been the victims of terrorism retaliating with military force
against the state sponsor of the group concerned. Israel in particular has
repeatedly used military force against its neighbours in response to terrorist
attacks launched from their territory. Some of this action was punitive
in nature, but other operations such as the creation of a security zone in
southern Lebanon in 1978, the Israeli army’s drive to Beirut in 1982, and the
invasion of southern Lebanon 2006, had the wider objectives of attempting
to secure Israel’s northern border and destroy the military power of the
PLO and Hezbollah. Significantly however, Israel has placed some limits on
its use of military force in these operations, notably in not attacking Iran for
its sponsorship of Hezbollah and Hamas.
Prior to 9/11, retaliation by the USA against state sponsors of terrorism
was rare and largely punitive in nature, such as the air strikes on Libya in
1986 following the bombing of a disco in Berlin in which a number of US
servicemen were killed. Successive administrations in the USA were simply
not prepared to risk significant military casualties when responding to
limited acts of terrorism. However, the casualties and the damage caused on
9/11 were so great that President Bush felt compelled to use overwhelming
military force to try and secure a lasting solution to the actual and perceived

170 The Changing Face of Terrorism
threats from terrorism. The subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq
have demonstrated to the world that the USA and its allies will respond to
threats of state-sponsored acts of mass destruction with military action to
oust the regime responsible. This suggests that a state-sponsored terrorist
incident involving a CBRN weapon would be such a major escalation in
violence that it would also provoke the most severe backlash from the victim
state and the international community. In such a situation it would also be
unlikely that the state which was responsible would retain the support of its
erstwhile allies.
There are also scenarios in which state sponsors of terrorism need to
control the level of violence perpetrated by their proxies. This is particularly
evident in the chaos in Iraq following the fall of the Saddam regime. Both
Syria and Iran have been accused of supporting various insurgent and
militia groups inside Iraq, or facilitating the transport of foreign fighters
across their borders into Iraq. Iran in particular has been accused of
providing specialist bomb-building skills and material to Shi’a militias. Both
governments fear the implications arising from the creation of a pro-US
regime in Baghdad. Given the ‘axis of evil’ speech, which was followed by
the invasion of Iraq, they are naturally concerned that they will then be
next in line for regime change. It is therefore in their interests for the USA
to remain militarily bogged down in Iraq for as long as possible. But at the
same time, neither Iran nor Syria wants instability on their borders. Both
are threatened by internal instability, and both are extremely wary of the
extreme Sunni Islamist elements operating in Iraq.38 As a consequence, they
seek to sustain the Iraqi insurgency but to maintain it at a level which does
not threaten to escalate out of control or provoke military retaliation from
the USA.
Another factor which might inhibit state sponsors is that the weapons
they pass on to terrorist groups could be turned against themselves one day.
The USA has already learned this lesson the hard way. During the Soviet
war in Afghanistan, the CIA supplied vast quantities of arms to the Afghan
Mujahideen, including sophisticated Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. At the
end of the war the surplus missiles risked falling into the hands of terrorist
groups. The CIA attempted to buy the missiles back from the Mujahideen,
but was unsuccessful. Similarly, during the time when he lived in Sudan,
bin Laden was under observation by the Sudanese Intelligence Service,
apparently because he was so extreme that even the radical Sudanese
government considered that he might become a threat to them one day.39
The extent of this risk will be dependent upon the level of control which
state sponsors have over their proxies. Iran does not appear to maintain

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 171
tight control over its proxies. In fact, the Iranian regime deliberately avoided
the creation of a unified central command for the terrorist groups it
sponsored, because it considered that these groups should be left to plan
their own campaigns. Instead, it satisfied itself with maintaining a small
degree of influence through its ability to manipulate its ideological influence
and financial powers.40 One intelligence source has commented that, ‘The
Iranians do not appear to select the targets … Rather they hand out the
equipment and the knowledge and each group get on with it. Sometimes the
cash disappears, sometimes nothing happens but sometimes the terrorists
attack’.41
However, if a state did pass a CBRN weapon to a terrorist group for
a specific attack, the state sponsor would undoubtedly attempt to exercise
some additional form of control over the group in order that the weapon
was used for its intended purpose. There is evidence of some states
maintaining tight control over their proxies. Part of the reason why Iraqi-
sponsored terrorist attacks did not occur during the Gulf War was apparently
because the Iraqis maintained strict control over the supply of arms to their
proxies through their embassies, and insisted on giving the go-ahead for
all attacks. When communications between the Iraqi foreign ministry and
its embassies and intelligence agencies were destroyed, that permission was
never received.42 Therefore, problems derived from a loss of control over
their proxies should not be a major problem. In turn, this means that state
sponsors should be able to ensure that the acts they sponsor meet their
foreign policy objectives.
Most state sponsors of terrorism also have some form of relationship
with the West which they would not want to jeopardize by sponsoring a
CBRN terrorist attack. When Lebanese militias seized a number of Western
hostages in the 1990s, both Syria and Iran became involved to secure their
release in order to try and improve their relations with the USA. President
Assad of Syria needed US backing for his political role in Lebanon,
whilst President Rafsanjani of Iran wanted to open up his country to the
Western world in order to rescue its economy.43 Even the most isolated
states are in this position to a certain extent. North Korea for instance,
needs international food aid and has been forced to negotiate with the
USA over its nuclear weapons programme. Therefore, all state sponsors
have something to lose from alienating the international community, and
the USA in particular. The use of a CBRN weapon would be such a major
act that it would severely damage relations with the West, and undoubtedly
provoke the strongest reaction. So despite the generally higher levels of
lethality associated with state-sponsored terrorist attacks, these sponsors

172 The Changing Face of Terrorism
still seem willing to calibrate levels of violence to acceptable levels, and will
rein it back completely when political conditions require it. This was borne
out after 9/11 when Sudan and Iran both co-operated with the USA in
hunting down al-Qaeda operatives.44 Nevertheless, relations between states
fluctuate, so the likely strength of this disincentive will vary depending upon
changes in international relations. This can be seen in the worsening of US-
Iranian relations following the election of President Ahmedinajad and the
subsequent revelations about the Iranian nuclear weapons programme,
which left Iran increasingly isolated.
The 2003 US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledged
these political disincentives, and stated that the USA will attempt to enhance
them by working with its international partners to convince states to stop
sponsoring terrorism. This approach includes the use of incentives such as
material assistance, as well as punishments such as diplomatic and economic
sanctions.45 An example of a state that has been brought in from the cold
in this way is Libya, which was a former proliferator of WMD and a state
sponsor of terrorism. In return for the dismantling of Libya’s WMD
development programme and making financial restitution for the Lockerbie
bombing, the West agreed to normalize relations with Libya, and remove
longstanding economic sanctions. However, efforts by the USA and the
West to incentivize Iran and Syria to stop supporting Hezbollah, Hamas,
and the insurgents in Iraq have been a notable failure. For both of these
states, there is more utility in continuing to sponsor terrorism than to accept
the incentives that are being offered.
This leaves the question of whether regional states are equally deterred
from sponsoring acts of CBRN terrorism against regional rivals, and there
is strong evidence to suggest that they are. The likely reaction to such an
incident from the international community and other regional partners is
likely to be so strong that the potential repercussions would undoubtedly
weigh heavily in decision making about whether to sponsor such an attack.
One example involving two proliferators was the case of Iran and Iraq in the
1990s. Both supported armed opposition groups in each other’s territory.
But whilst Iraq was willing to use CW against its internal dissidents, it was
deterred from sponsoring such attacks in Iran.
Similarly, the likelihood of Pakistan, or possibly rogue elements within
the Pakistani security apparatus releasing CBRN weapons to the Islamist
insurgents in Indian controlled Kashmir can be considered to be small.
Whilst the ISI is argued by some analysts to be acting semi-independently of
the government in sponsoring Islamist terrorist groups, it is a wholly different
proposition to suggest that it could or would extend this assistance to include

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 173
CBRN weapons or materials such as nuclear isotopes. These weapons and
materials are under strong command and control arrangements in Pakistan
so doubts must be raised about whether the ISI has access to them. In
addition, Pakistan is now in a state of nuclear deterrence with India and the
use of a Pakistani supplied CBRN weapon by any of the militant groups
operating in India would undoubtedly provoke a military response from
India. This was evident from the Indian reaction to the suicide bomb attack
on its Parliament building in December 2001, which killed 12 people. There
was an immediate build up of military forces along the border with Pakistan
which took months of diplomacy to defuse. Given Pakistani conventional
military inferiority and the potential for any conflict to escalate into a nuclear
war, Pakistan knows that it cannot win a war against India. Consequently,
Pakistan needs the levels of violence in Kashmir to remain at a level which
is sufficient to destabilize Indian political control of the state but not so high
that it provokes Indian military retaliation against Pakistan itself.
Al-Qaeda and State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism
One of the main questions in the aftermath of 9/11 was whether al-
Qaeda received state support for the attack and what the implications of
this might be for CBRN terrorism. An immediate finger of suspicion was
pointed at Iraq, but reports of al-Qaeda seeking state support had been
around since the mid-1990s. Between 1991 and 1996 al-Qaeda was based
in the Sudan, and during that time apparently worked closely with Sudan’s
ruling National Islamic Front (NIF). Bin Laden’s interest in CBRN weapons
seemingly began in this period, when it allegedly began to experiment with
CW at a laboratory in Khartoum, supported by elements of the NIF and
the Sudanese military.46 In 1997, a report published by an Arabic newspaper
in France alleged that Dr Hasan al-Turabi, the speaker of the Sudanese
Parliament and leader of the NIF, hosted a meeting with the leaders of
several terrorist groups, including bin Laden. The report claimed that
terrorist groups might have been constructing a ‘bacterial’ laboratory and
that terrorist groups had been provided funding for the construction of a
CBW facility in the Sudan.47 The following year, the USA bombed the Shaifa
pharmaceutical plant near Khartoum, in retaliation for the bombing of its
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The discovery of the chemical empta in
soil samples taken near the plant was cited as evidence that it was producing
VX nerve agent, and other sources indicated that bin Laden might have been
the owner of the plant. However, it is now widely accepted that it was not
a CW facility.48 In November 1998, the CIA confirmed that al-Qaeda had

174 The Changing Face of Terrorism
attempted to develop or buy chemical weapons for use against US troops in
the Persian Gulf. And in February 1999, Sandy Berger, a former National
Security Adviser to President Clinton, informed a press conference that,
‘we know bin Laden was seeking chemical weapons’ and ‘we know that he
had worked with the Sudanese government to acquire chemical weapons’.49
Sudan itself was alleged to have CW at that time but there is insufficient
evidence in the public domain to determine whether the allegations are true.
One possible explanation of these reports is that neither al-Qaeda nor the
Sudanese regime actually possessed CW, but they agreed to work together
to develop them. However, the relationship between Sudan and al-Qaeda
broke down before these efforts came to fruition, and al-Qaeda moved its
operational bases to Afghanistan in 1996.
In Afghanistan, al-Qaeda developed an extremely close relationship
with the Taliban regime and the two came to depend on each other for their
continued existence. Djamel Beghal, the alleged co-ordinator of a plot by
suicide bombers to blow up the US embassy in Paris, stated that ‘Al-Qaeda is
an integral part of the Taliban regime and its political and military structures
… None of the terrorist operations of al-Qaeda could have been decided
after May without the agreement of the Taliban and their Chief Mullah
Omar’.50 Al-Qaeda provided the Taleban with troops, arms, and money, and
was closely involved in Taleban military training, planning, and operations.
It also provided infrastructure and humanitarian aid to the regime. A former
Afghan government official described the Taleban and al-Qaeda as being
‘two sides of the same coin: Osama cannot exist in Afghanistan without the
Taleban and the Taleban cannot exist without Osama’.51 As described in
Chapter 2, the safe haven that al-Qaeda found in Afghanistan enabled it to
build up a CBRN weapon development infrastructure, and gave its scientists
the time and freedom to experiment and develop CBRN weapons.
Besides al-Qaeda’s links with the Taliban, there were also a significant
number of reports which hinted at possible Iraqi state sponsorship of
al-Qaeda during the time of the Saddam regime. In December 1998, bin
Laden was reported to have met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey who
was believed by some to be an agent of the Iraqi intelligence service, the
Mukhabarat. There were also reports of contacts between bin Laden’s
operatives and Iraq’s special security organization, which is responsible for
protecting Iraq’s WMD programme. Bin Laden is also believed to have had
numerous contacts with Iraqi agents during his years in Sudan.52 Papers
recovered from the headquarters of the Mukhabarat reveal that an al-Qaeda
envoy was invited to Baghdad in 1988, but there is no evidence of a meeting
between bin Laden and Iraqi officials, or of any subsequent meetings.53

State-sponsored CBRN Terrorism 175
Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers was also alleged to have
met a low rank Iraqi intelligence officer early in 2001, some of these reports
suggested that he was given a vial of anthrax at that meeting.54 There were
also allegations that some al-Qaeda terrorists received false identities from
Muslims who had been killed in Kuwait during the 1991 Iraqi invasion,55 and
bin Laden himself was reported to have been in Baghdad in 1998 before the
bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.56 But despite these
allegations, no convincing proof of links between the Saddam regime and
al-Qaeda has ever been found.
There have also been some specific allegations of Iraqi sponsorship of
CBRN terrorism activities. Reports in 2002 suggested that Islamist terrorists,
including members of al-Qaeda, were being trained how to use CBW in
secret camps near Baghdad, by instructors from Iraqi military intelligence.57
Subsequent reports in 2002 suggested that Iraqi military instructors had
trained up to 250 al-Qaeda fighters in northern Iraq in the use of CBW
and possibly nuclear weapons.58 Further allegations have been made that
the Islamist group Asbat al-Ansar, a Lebanon based organization affiliated
with al-Qaeda that was then operating in northern Iraq, had been given
VX nerve agent by the Iraqi regime.59 Whilst captured members of Ansar
al Islam suggested that the Saddam regime had supplied the group with
CW.60 There were also allegations that Saddam planned to arm Palestinian
terrorists with BW to attack Israeli and US targets. US and UK intelligence
estimates suggested that Iraq was developing a simple weapon that could be
used by terrorist groups.61 Again however, no firm evidence of such links
has ever been uncovered.
This lack of evidence supports with assessments which expressed doubt
about whether the Saddam regime and al-Qaeda could ever have worked
together, given their ideological differences. Bin Laden was known to have
referred to Saddam as a bad Muslim and denied the legitimacy of his regime.
Whilst the Saddam regime might have had some short-term objectives that
might have been served by working through al-Qaeda, there would have
been limits to the extent that the Saddam regime would have wanted to
use al-Qaeda. Despite this, the allegations of Iraqi state sponsorship of
al-Qaeda were always given prominence over the ideological differences
between the two by the USA, and others. In the lead up to the invasion of
Iraq in 2003, the US Administration reported intelligence of the Saddam
regime’s support for al-Qaeda, suggesting that it might supply al-Qaeda
with CBW. This became a key element of the Administration’s rationale for
invading Iraq. In the aftermath of the invasion, Western intelligence agencies
failed to find any significant evidence to support these allegations. Most

176 The Changing Face of Terrorism
significantly, it soon became apparent that Iraq did not actually possess any
CBRN weapons, proving that the reports of the regime supplying them to
al-Qaeda were baseless. When the Ansar al Islam base in northern Iraq was
seized by US and Kurdish forces, small quantities of ricin were discovered
but it was not known whether it had been supplied by the Iraqi state.
There is a general lack of clarity concerning the nature of al-Qaeda’s
former relationships with Sudan and the Saddam regime, but what is clear,
is that neither of them passed CBRN weapons to al-Qaeda. It can therefore
be assumed that these two supposedly ‘rogue’ regimes were deterred from
giving CBW to al-Qaeda. The allegations about Saddam and al-Qaeda
nevertheless illustrate how allegations of state-sponsored CBRN terrorism
can be over inflated by the media and also used by governments and others
with vested interests in the pursuit of wider foreign policy objectives. Since
the advent of the ‘war on terror’, other states have not stepped in to support
al-Qaeda, although as mentioned previously, some al-Qaeda affiliates in Iraq
have received state support.
Conclusion
State sponsorship is a wild card in any assessment of the potential threat
of CBRN terrorism. However, the evidence suggests that state sponsors of
terrorism make rational cost-benefit decisions in supporting terror groups,
and it is difficult to conceive of situation, outside of a crisis situation in
which a state would make a decision to give CBRN weapons to such a group.
The fact that state-sponsored terrorist attacks are amongst the most lethal,
is not an indicator that states will prove willing to release CBRN weapons
to terrorist groups. In fact, it can even be argued that state sponsors might
actually constrain terrorist groups from using CBRN weapons, for fear that
they will be implicated in the attack and hence dragged into unwinnable
wars with the USA or powerful regional neighbours. As a result, state
sponsors generally seek to manage the level of violence perpetrated by
their proxies in order to prevent it escalating uncontrollably. But whilst it is
unlikely that a state would sponsor such an attack, the possibility cannot be
ruled out entirely. The two most likely scenarios in which it might happen
are ideologically driven government agencies or rogue elements acting
independently; and when a regime is threatened with destruction, prompting
it to release CBRN weapons to a terrorist group as an act of revenge against
its enemies. In general though, it can be concluded that an act of state-
sponsored terrorism would be such an extreme act that would likely result in
such severe repercussions that it would only ever be an option of last resort.

8
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
TERRORIST DECISION MAKING
Terrorist groups that are intent on using CBRN weapons face a final series
of constraints that they have to overcome in order to execute their attack –
the security environment in which they have to operate. The threat posed by
terrorist violence after 9/11 led to the introduction of the most far-reaching
counter-terrorism measures ever seen. Whilst the vulnerability of Western
democracies might make defence against terrorism more problematic,
acts of CBRN and mass destruction terrorism are much more difficult to
plan, prepare, and execute than conventional terrorist attacks. This gives
states greater opportunities to detect and prevent future attacks. Many
previous terrorist plots to use CBRN weapons have been prevented by law
enforcement agencies, and even the experience with 9/11 and the attacks by
Aum Shinrikyo indicates that there will probably be clues of future plots to
use CBRN weapons. The security environment will also critically influence
the tactics that terrorists use and the targets that they attempt to strike.
Therefore the precise nature of the future threat from CBRN terrorism will
be influenced and shaped by the effectiveness of national and international
counter-terrorism measures.
Prevention
It is impossible to protect effectively all potential terrorist targets all of the
time, but the threat from CBRN terrorism can be contained, and in respect
of certain groups possibly even defeated, by generic anti-terrorism measures
combined with a range of dedicated anti-CBRN terrorism measures. To
that end, the USA and the West is pursuing an integrated strategy of policy

178 The Changing Face of Terrorism
responses at the national, bilateral, multilateral, and global levels. Each level
of response has its individual strengths and weaknesses, but a multi-level
approach of this kind has a synergistic effect, especially when co-operative
ventures feed back into measures taken at the national level, encouraging
states to implement their international obligations into domestic law.
The primary, and most critical, level of defence is at the national
level. No two states are responding to the threat in exactly the same way
because national organizational structures and operational capabilities vary
considerably, as do threat perceptions and the level of resources that different
states can devote to managing the threat. Implementing an effective defence
against CBRN terrorism is predicated upon the establishment of a coherent
national strategy and programme of long-term planning. The multi-faceted
nature of the threat means that counter-terror programmes require the co-
ordination of the activities of a wide range of government departments
and agencies which have different areas of expertise and responsibility.
In practice, this tends to create problems of intra- and inter-agency co-
operation. Therefore, one of the first challenges confronting governments
is to establish strong bureaucratic structures with clear lines of authority
and responsibility. This is best achieved with a ‘top-down’ approach to co-
ordinate the range of prevention and consequence-management measures
that are implemented. The failure to prevent 9/11 led the USA to create the
Department of Homeland Security in an attempt to improve bureaucratic
co-ordination and enable the rationalization of resources.
The international dimension of counter-terrorism incorporates both
legal and operational elements. At the global level, the counter-terrorism
obligations of states are enshrined in 13 United Nations (UN) resolutions,
conventions, and protocols. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373
establishes states’ obligations for combating terrorism, whilst UNSCR 1540
requires all states to implement a variety of domestic measures to prevent
non-state actors from acquiring WMD, their means of delivery, and related
materials. However, there is a long history of states failing to implement UN
resolutions. Therefore, these measures are being complemented by a range
of other international agreements and programmes which are intended to
persuade reluctant states to abide by their obligations under these resolutions
and conventions, and to provide assistance to those states that are willing,
but lack the capacity to meet their obligations.
In 2005, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which
provides the legal basis for international co-operation in the investigation,
prosecution, and extradition of suspects who commit nuclear and radiological

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 179
terrorism. This was followed in 2006 by the USA and Russia launching the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. This initiative incorporates
efforts to improve the accounting, control, and physical protection of
nuclear and radioactive substances. It also contains measures to suppress
the illicit trafficking of these materials and to ensure co-operation in the
development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism, as well as
commitments to strengthen national counter-terrorism legislation.1
At the operational level, many states co-operate in sharing intelligence,
providing training assistance for law enforcement and military personnel,
detaining and extraditing suspects, enhancing border security, preventing
non-violent terrorism related activities on their territory, and providing
other forms of material support. Most of this operational support takes
place at bilateral level. However, there are also a number of global initiatives
such as the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, which was formed in 2002 to seek additional resources and
partners for non-proliferation, disarmament, counter proliferation and
nuclear safety projects in the FSU.2 The main problem with developing
international co-operation on counter-terrorism is that it requires states to
work with others that might not be their natural allies, or with whom they
might normally have poor relations. Hence the USA had to work closely with
the undemocratic Musharraff regime in Pakistan, and was at times frustrated
by the regime’s seeming unwillingness to suppress militants operating inside
Pakistan.
Legislative Framework
The effectiveness of national law enforcement agencies in preventing future
terrorist attacks is underpinned by the powers that they have under national
anti-terrorism legislation. The consequences of weak anti-terrorism
legislation were made apparent by the Japanese experience with Aum
Shinrikyo. One of the reasons why the cult avoided close police scrutiny was
because of Japanese laws on religious activities. The 1947 draft constitution
provided strong and unambiguous guarantees of religious freedom and the
1951 Religious Corporation Act further strengthened the rights of religious
organizations, giving them strong protection from state intrusion into their
affairs. These legislative shortcomings were exacerbated by the fact that
Japanese culture is extremely bureaucratic, and Japanese officialdom obeyed
these legal dictums literally.3 This confluence of factors is unlikely to be
repeated in other states but it is indicative of how weaknesses in national
legislation can seriously hinder efforts to contain the threat from terrorism.

180 The Changing Face of Terrorism
There has always been a lack of uniformity between the anti-terrorism
legislation of different states. This often begins with the very definition of
‘terrorism’ itself, but also encompasses broader issues such as the extradition
of suspects or the suppression of non-violent terrorist activities such as
fundraising or propaganda activities. The USA has frequently had difficulty
in co-ordinating international economic sanctions against alleged state
sponsors of terrorism, whilst the UK used to face tremendous difficulties
in extraditing IRA suspects from the USA. This creates inconsistencies and
loopholes which terrorists can exploit. Following 9/11 these differences
diminished as states felt compelled to co-operate with the USA in sharing
intelligence and extraditing suspects, but significant inconsistencies remain.
Counter-terrorism legislation in all democratic states is capable of being
strengthened in areas such as the provision of greater rights of surveillance,
the detention of suspects, ‘stop and search’ powers, as well as the banning
of militant or terrorist groups and activities that are being undertaken on
their behalf. However, there is an inherent tension between strengthening
anti-terrorism legislation and maintaining civil liberties, and each state differs
in how far it is willing to allow its legislation to encroach on civil liberties. As
a result, terrorist groups are able to operate with greater levels of freedom
in some states than others. This was illustrated by the relative freedom of
action given to Islamist radicals and terrorists in the UK in the 1990s, after
they had fled from other more repressive states.
The aftermath of 9/11 has seen the introduction of some of the most
stringent anti-terrorism legislation ever enacted – legislation that would
probably never have been introduced had it not been for 9/11 and the
perceived ‘new’ threat. Many governments took the opportunity to introduce
new anti-terrorism legislation to give their police and security forces wider
powers to investigate and detain suspects, as well as new powers to prevent
non-violent terrorist activity. In the USA this included the Patriot Act,
which gives broad new powers to police forces and intelligence agencies,
particularly in respect of tapping the telephones of suspected terrorists.
Whilst in the UK, the government amended anti-terrorism legislation to
include a much wider range of offences such as inciting terrorism, glorifying
terrorism, as well as seeking and providing terrorism training (either in the
UK or abroad). Most controversially, the government was also given the
power to detain foreign terrorist suspects indefinitely without trial. The
government also attempted to introduce a power to detain British terrorist
suspects without charge for up to 90 days – a longer period of time than in
any other Western democracy, but the proposal was rejected by Parliament.4

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 181
Ironically, legislative provisions in respect of CBRN terrorism should
be uniform because most states have signed the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), the BTWC, and the 1980 Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material. The CWC and BTWC ban the production
and possession of chemical, biological and toxin weapons in all signatory
states. Consequently, the legislative instruments which states should have
introduced to meet their obligations under these treaties and conventions
should enhance the powers of law enforcement officials to investigate and
prosecute individuals and groups for the possession or production of CBW,
or the possession of fissile material. The CWC also requires companies to
report their transfers and use of such chemicals to the CWC organization,
which enables the improved tracking of precursor chemicals. This
obliges governments and chemical companies to be more vigilant about
transactions, and could be used to introduce tougher measures to monitor
domestic activities involving dual-use chemicals.5
In reality however, the implementation of these treaties and conventions
at national level has been variable. For instance, at the time of the Aum
Shinrikyo attacks, it was not illegal to manufacture or possess sarin in
Japan.6 In some states there are legal obligations on individuals to uphold
the prohibition on the offensive application of biological pathogens, but
outside of the USA the direct regulation of pathogens is largely restricted
to imposing standards for bio-safety containment.7 The effectiveness of the
national authorities that have to implement the provisions of the CWC and
BTWC can also be undermined by factors such as their relative power vis-
à-vis other government departments or agencies which have overlapping
responsibilities or conflicting interests, and by the bureaucratic culture of
the state. Despite these weaknesses, there is considerable opposition within
many states to remedying it. The biotechnology industry in particular,
generally dislikes the prospect of introducing verification and disclosure
obligations under the BTWC because they can be onerous and intrusive.
Therefore, in many states, greater steps could still be taken to bring domestic
laws, administrative procedures, and regulations into conformity with these
treaties.
Law Enforcement and Intelligence
The key to preventing future CBRN terrorist attacks is good intelligence
and police work. The impact that effective law enforcement can have was
illustrated by the case of the Gemaah Islamiyah group in Egypt, which was
virtually destroyed by the Egyptian security forces, prompting it to renounce
the use of violence and enter mainstream politics. Similarly, groups such as

182 The Changing Face of Terrorism
the SLA and the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang), which were linked to CBRN
terrorist plots in the 1970s and 1980s, no longer exist after being defeated by
the law enforcement and security forces of the states in which they operated.
But even if the security forces cannot defeat a particular terrorist group they
might be capable of severely curtailing its activities. The British security
services infiltrated the IRA to such an extent that the IRA once admitted
that 90 per cent of its operations were cancelled because of security force
activity.8
In the West, the end of the Cold War led to additional intelligence
resources and assets being focused on the proliferation of CBRN weapons
and terrorism but this has not been sufficient to prevent all acts of terrorism
or bring a halt to the proliferation of WMD technology. The situation is
considerably worse in some regional states, where weak governments often
lack the capacity to exercise effective law enforcement throughout their
territory. This can create ‘ungoverned spaces’ which terrorists can exploit as
safe havens. One of the more persistent of these ‘ungoverned spaces’ is the
northwest of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, where bin Laden is believed
to have found sanctuary after being ousted from Afghanistan in 2001. The
USA is investing considerable resources in assisting regional states to shut
down these ‘ungoverned spaces’ but the difficulties faced by the Pakistani
government in imposing the rule of law over its provinces bordering
Afghanistan suggests that it is incredibly difficult to empower weak states
to achieve this.
Intelligence services face immense problems in penetrating terrorist
organizations, particularly those with cell structures and those that are
transnational in nature. Penetrating al-Qaeda’s senior leadership has proved
particularly difficult, but these problems are not insurmountable. Whilst
bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri remained at large, the majority of al-
Qaeda’s top leadership at the time of 9/11 were gradually tracked down and
either killed or captured. The intelligence agencies of several states have also
proven to be very successful in obtaining intelligence on al-Qaeda affiliates
and other terrorist cells that exist within the networks of Islamist militants at
both national and global level. The British intelligence services in particular,
have gathered good quality intelligence of the Islamist networks in the UK,
which has enabled the police to prevent a significant number of terrorist
attacks. Similarly, the FBI has been successful in infiltrating a number of
extreme right-wing Christian militia groups, which over the years has led to
the prevention of a number of CBRN terrorist plots.
Monitoring communications traffic has traditionally been an
invaluable source of intelligence on terrorist activities, and whilst the use

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 183
of the internet and encryption technology has made it more difficult to
intercept anything of value, intelligence agencies can still monitor terrorist
communications. Since 9/11, several al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe
have been arrested following the interception of communications traffic.
However, communications intercepts have been of less use in tracking down
bin Laden himself, and there is now evidence of al-Qaeda’s top leadership
eschewing hi-tech communications and relying instead on couriers.
Intelligence can also be gleaned from terrorist defectors, or from the
interrogation of captured terrorists. The plot by members of the Patriots’
Council to murder US federal officials using ricin in 1994 was discovered
when the wife of one of the members informed the FBI.9 Similarly, the
planned CW attacks by the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord
were prevented when two members of the group revealed the plan to the
FBI after being arrested on unrelated charges.10
Intelligence received from members of the public reporting suspicious
activities could also play a critical role in preventing CBRN terror attacks.
It was members of the public in Japan who first warned the police of
noxious odours emanating from Aum Shinrikyo buildings. In this respect,
the public debate on CBRN terrorism serves a useful purpose in terms of
raising public awareness of the potential threat. This concept of ‘societal
verification’ might prove to be one of the key sources of intelligence on
covert CBRN acquisition activities. In states that have been the subject of
terrorist attack for some time, governments encourage vigilance and the
reporting of suspicious activities by members of the public and have often
established mechanisms such as anonymous telephone lines that members
of the public can call.
Beyond these traditional intelligence gathering activities, intelligence and
law enforcement agencies now need to watch out for technical indicators
from small-scale, clandestine CBRN weapon-development activities. One of
the telling aspects of the Aum Shinrikyo case was that its CW development
programme produced strong indicators of what the cult was up to, but
these indicators were overlooked by the police when they were reported
by members of the public. This suggests that there should be technical
indicators of other terrorists’ clandestine CBRN weapon-development
activities which law enforcement and intelligence agencies can potentially
pick up on. Law enforcement agents can potentially use detection devices
to actively find clandestine CBRN weapon-development facilities, but the
generally limited range of existing detection devices means that they will
need to rely on intelligence to narrow down the geographical area in which
to search.

184 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The greatest number of unequivocal technical indicators arise in respect
of clandestine nuclear weapon development. Acquiring fissile material by
theft or purchase is an unequivocal indicator of intent to develop a nuclear
or radiological weapon. There are also a number of specialized production
facilities and other key materials such as boron polycarbonate, which despite
being dual use in nature, should arouse suspicion if an individual who was
not linked to the nuclear industry attempted to purchase them.11 Potential
technical indicators of small-scale CBW development activities are more
difficult to identify because CW production can be easily disguised as a
legitimate commercial activity. But there are a few key materials that are
required for making some nerve gases, such as phosphoryl chloride and
dimethlamine, but these are only required in small quantities. Nevertheless,
standard industrial regulatory activities could be a source of useful
information about suspicious activities. Chemical suppliers, particularly
those in the West, know who they are dealing with, and are generally careful
about who they sell to. As a result, some precursors are easier to obtain
than others. Yet many chemicals can be obtained in small quantities without
arousing much suspicion, because there is little control and reporting of
sales in many states.12 Similarly, procuring biological pathogens from a
commercial source will leave a record, although obtaining them from
the environment will leave no indicators at all. The actual production of
CW, as well as some BW manufacturing processes, is likely to produce
noxious odours,13 but this just means that terrorists would need to locate
their production facilities in places where those odours would not arouse
suspicion.
The greater the sophistication of the CBRN weapon-development
programme, and the larger its scale, the greater the number of indicators that
might be given away. The other major factor that might contribute towards
the detection of clandestine CBRN weapon-development facilities is the
length of time it might take a group to develop its weapons. The longer it
takes, the higher the chances of detection because of the higher likelihood of
a security breach, and the greater time it gives the security forces to identify
key individuals and look for patterns in their activities to indicate their
involvement in CBRN weapon development. Aum Shinrikyo provided a
number of significant indicators of its industrial-scale manufacture of sarin,
by procuring a significant amount of specialized dual-use equipment, which
any CW specialist would have identified as being usable to produce CW.
In contrast, small-scale CW production activities are much more difficult
to detect. The former director of the CIA, James Woolsey, told the US
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, ‘The chemical weapons problem

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 185
is so difficult from an intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we
have high confidence in our ability to detect non-compliance, especially on
a small scale’.14 Overall therefore, terrorists can potentially produce CBW
clandestinely without leaving significant technical indicators, especially by
purchasing small quantities of precursors and choosing specific agents
and production processes which can be more easily disguised as legitimate
commercial activity.
Consequently, a technologically sophisticated terrorist group, that
exercises a degree of caution, could choose to pursue technological options
which will minimize the number of technical indicators that are likely to be
picked up by the security forces. However, taking options which leave the
fewest potential indicators will probably complicate the task of developing
specific types of CBRN weapons and might increase the cost. It might also
not necessarily be consistent with the goals of the group. For instance, the
Aum Shinrikyo had to produce sarin on an industrial scale because of its
genocidal objectives. Therefore, depending upon the roles for which the
CBRN weapons are required, some groups could be compelled to pursue
technological options that leave a higher number of indicators.
The limited and ambiguous indicators of covert CBRN weapon
development that are likely to be picked up by the security forces will tend
to make sense only if they can be linked to known terrorists. Therefore, it
is primarily by monitoring the activities of known terrorists that clandestine
CBRN weapon-development programmes might be identified. But despite
what can be achieved by good intelligence and police work, it is impossible
to stop determined terrorists all of the time. Nevertheless, developing
CBRN weapons can increase the visibility of terrorist cells to the intelligence
services. This will increase the chances that future CBRN weapon plots will
be detected and prevented.
Preventing the Acquisition of CBRN Agents
The most basic measures that can be implemented to contain the threat
from CBRN terrorism are the imposition of effective physical controls over
the relevant agents, materials and production facilities that are required for
making these weapons. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is difficult to completely
deny access to many CBW agents and production facilities because of
their dual use nature. However, there is currently a wide range of control
measures in place in many states, which restrict access to these agents and
materials, and there is also a range of other measures that could potentially
be put in place to restrict access even further.

186 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The greatest opportunities to restrict terrorists’ access to the materials
and production facilities required to manufacture CBRN weapons, lie with
nuclear weapons. Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium have very few
uses, and the number of commercial transactions involving these materials
is limited. This means that terrorists are not going to be able to buy fissile
material on the open market, and are extremely unlikely to be able to
manufacture it themselves. Their only real options for procuring fissile
material are either to steal it, or purchase it on the black market. So if states
can effectively secure their stocks of fissile material, they should be able to
deny terrorists the ability to produce nuclear weapons.
The UN Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
places a legal obligation on states to secure nuclear materials in storage and
during transport, but it has been inadequately implemented. Standards of
accountancy, control, and security of fissile material vary between states.
In states such as the USA, France, and the UK, which can devote sufficient
resources to securing their stockpiles, standards are high. In contrast, little
is known about the security of stockpiles in Pakistan and India, whilst
standards in Russia and the other states of the FSU are generally considered
to be poor. One of the principle tasks for the international community has
been to assist Russia in improving its accountancy, control and security
measures, to ensure that they comply with international standards. The
USA particularly, has invested considerable resources in programmes
to secure and protect nuclear and radioactive materials in the FSU. This
includes the Material Protection, Control and Accounting Programme and
the 2005 Nuclear Security Cooperation Initiative, as well as programmes
to strengthen border controls and the Container Security initiative. Other
initiatives include the 2004 Global Threat Reduction Initiative which was
designed to accelerate efforts to identify, secure, remove, and facilitate
the disposition of high-risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials
around the world.15
The situation in respect of safeguarding radioactive substances that
could potentially be used in a radiological weapon is much weaker. In
many states the regulatory oversight of radiation sources that are used in
radiotherapy and industrial radiography equipment is weak. The IAEA has
published Physical Protection Guidelines, and in 2002 established a nuclear
security programme to assist member states in improving the safety and
security of nuclear and radiological materials.16 Despite this, standards of
physical security in respect of both fissile material and other radioactive
sources need to be improved further in many states.

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 187
In contrast to nuclear weapons, CW can be developed from commercially
available chemicals, which makes it difficult to prevent terrorists acquiring
them. It is possible for governments and industry to achieve a measure of
monitoring and control of chemical precursors through systems of supplier
awareness and self-regulation. Chemical suppliers generally know who they
are dealing with, and can monitor what they are supplying, and to whom.
Some potential sales to terrorist groups might therefore be refused. This
can potentially make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire the necessary
precursor chemicals, but there are limits to what can be achieved, and a
careful terrorist who is intent on developing CW should still be able to
purchase the necessary precursors.
The biological agents that are most suitable for use in BW are generally
contained in secure areas of government and commercial facilities, because
of standard bio-safety regulations. This makes it difficult to steal these agents,
but there is also a legitimate trade in these pathogens that terrorists can
potentially exploit. The task of protecting these laboratories and monitoring
the trade in pathogens is enormous. Even in 2001, the USA did not know
which research and commercial laboratories retained virulent viruses, or
who had access to them.17 All states could therefore take greater steps to
tighten their regulations controlling the trade, transport, accountability and
security of sensitive biological agents. Yet even if the regulation and physical
protection of biological agents in research and commercial facilities can be
tightened, BW agents can be acquired from the environment. Therefore,
whilst it is impossible to completely deny terrorists access to biological
pathogens, improved security and better regulation can make it considerably
more difficult.
The imposition of effective controls of CBRN agents and materials
could force terrorist groups that want to develop CBRN weapons down
particular technological routes, which in turn will impact on the effectiveness
and the operational use of the weapons that they might manage to develop.
In particular, strong controls on stocks of fissile material makes the
development of radiological weapons a much more viable prospect for
terrorists than nuclear weapons. In the field of CW, restrictions on the
availability of different chemicals coupled with the technological difficulty
of developing some types of CW, could influence the technological choices
that some terrorists make. On the one hand it has encouraged the use of
the most easily available chemicals such as hydrogen cyanide or chlorine,
but on the other hand it could also encourage some groups to innovate and
procure agents that are not typically linked with CW. This is one possible
interpretation of the decision by one UK-based cell to discuss acquiring

188 The Changing Face of Terrorism
osmium tetroxide, which is not listed in the CWC and had not previously
been used as a CW. As discussed in Chapter 3, the type of agents that
terrorists can acquire will significantly impact on their operational use and
the likely level of casualties that they might cause. For instance, hydrogen
cyanide is relatively easy to obtain but is of limited use outdoors. Similarly,
ricin is the easiest BW to manufacture but cannot be easily weaponized into
a WMD, making it useful primarily as a weapon for assassination or as a
contaminant.
Physical Security of Potential Targets
Physical security measures to protect individuals, buildings, or geographical
areas adds another level of difficulty for terrorists planning to carry out
an attack using CBRN weapons. Physical security measures can include
the use of guards at strategic sites or buildings, the installation of truck
bomb defences, the control of traffic flows in and out of specified areas,
flooding areas with police and army units, and the use of CCTV cameras.
These generic measures can be enhanced with the addition of CBRN
weapon detectors at key locations. Existing versions of these devices
have some inherent limitations, in terms of having a limited lifespan, or
only being able to detect specific agents. Although improved models are
under development. This means that security planners have to address the
question of where to deploy these devices. The obvious choices are high
value political, economic, or military targets, entry points to a state, as well
as with the first-responder and specialist security force units which will have
to deal with any attacks.
Following 9/11, the USA invested heavily in CBRN terrorism counter-
measures. Police officers in New York were issued with radiation sensors
to detect nuclear devices, and they were also fitted to cranes at sea ports.
The Federal government also rushed sophisticated neutron flux detectors
and gamma ray sensors to ‘choke points’ in Washington and New York.18
The US Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) also have helicopters
and vans known as ‘Hot Spot Mobile Labs’ to search cities for radioactive
substances. There was also discussion of creating a national network of
radiation monitoring, similar to a system that operates in France. The
Bush Administration also allocated additional funding to border security,
particularly to prevent CBRN weapons being smuggled into the country,
which included a new entry-exit visa database and tracking system.19
Particular attention was paid to cargo containers, because only two of the
18 million which entered the USA in 2001 were physically inspected. The
risk that cargo containers might be used to smuggle a nuclear device into

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 189
the USA was confirmed in October 2001, when an al-Qaeda suspect was
discovered in one. To combat the risk, improved analytical computer tools
have been developed to target searches.20
Additional physical security at nuclear power stations has also been
identified as a necessity in several states. The US NRC has been analysing
precautions to protect reactors against the threat posed by truck bombs.
This includes creating buffer zones around the vital areas of a facility,
although this could prove difficult at some smaller ones. Its rules require
facilities to be prepared for attacks by small groups of trained terrorists,
possibly working with a confederate inside the plant.21 Additional protection
against the threat from an insider can also be provided by measures such as
compartmentalization to restrict entry of personnel to key areas and the
adoption of a two-person rule. This might prove difficult in existing power
stations, but it is possible to design out vulnerable areas in new plants.22
However, there are limits to the effectiveness of physical protection
measures against some forms of CBRN weapon attack, particularly
attacks involving a WMD. There is no effective physical defence against an
indiscriminate attack against the population of a state, because the terrorists
could use the weapon at any location where there is a large concentration of
people. The blast effects of nuclear weapons are so great that they can be
used at a wide range of locations in a city in order to cause indiscriminate
mass casualties. If the intention was to destroy a specific target such as a
building or a commercial centre, a nuclear weapon would not need to be
placed in the vicinity of it in order to destroy it. The same is also true of
BW agents that can be spread person to person, as well as biological agents,
radiological and chemical contamination which are capable of being spread
on the wind. In contrast, the cruder types of CBRN weapons that terrorists
are likely to be able to manufacture will be much less effective unless they
can be brought into range of the target, and so physical defences could
potentially play a role in constraining these threats.
Physical security measures can seriously complicate the task of
executing an attack using CBRN weapons and increase the chance of failure
or detection for the terrorist. Coupled with other constraints that restrict the
types of weapons that terrorists can acquire, physical security can in certain
scenarios have a significant impact on the nature of the threat. Al-Qaeda has
experimented with hydrogen cyanide, but it is only really useable as a CW if
it is used indoors. It requires the terrorist cell that possesses the cyanide to
gain access to the target that it wishes to attack. Good security measures at
potential target buildings will therefore impact on the ability of a terrorist cell
to execute a successful attack using hydrogen cyanide and could encourage

190 The Changing Face of Terrorism
terrorists to attack targets with less protection. Alternatively, the presence
of physical security measures could perhaps encourage terrorist cells to
use CBRN weapons, if those weapons offer a way of getting around those
defences. Many official buildings have explosives detectors which would not
detect BW. In another scenario, smuggling a conventional explosive device
into a soccer stadium would be very difficult, so one terrorist cell in the UK
discussed the possibility of poisoning beer and burgers being sold by a fast
food vendor in one stadium.23
Use of Military Force
The use of military force has always been an integral part of counter-
terrorism for virtually all states that have faced persistent terrorist threats.
This can range from the use of military personnel to support police
operations, to limited operations by special forces units or air strikes on
specific targets, to the full-scale invasion of a state. However, the use of
military force is dependent upon good intelligence in order to be effective.
Israel has routinely used military force to strike at terrorist targets in the
Palestinian territories and neighbouring states, with mixed success. It has
been particularly successful in killing many senior leaders of the various
armed Palestinian groups, but it has failed to destroy the military power of
any of these groups, and these strikes have often resulted in the death of
innocent civilians. Similarly, in response to the bombings of its embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the USA launched over 50 Tomahawk
cruise missiles at targets in Afghanistan and Sudan that were linked to bin
Laden. The attack caused limited damage to the Islamist training camps in
Afghanistan and failed to kill bin Laden. The backlash that it generated only
provided additional popular support for bin Laden in many Muslim states.
In the post 9/11 world, many states have placed an even greater
emphasis on the use of military force for counter-terrorism purposes. The
US National Security Doctrine codifies the use of military force to both
track down terrorists and fight preventive wars when necessary. It states
that the US,
must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together
we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn. As a matter of
common sense and self defence, America will act against emerging
threats before they are fully formed … Our priority will be first to
disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack
their leadership, command, control, and communications, material

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 191
support and finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the
terrorist’s ability to plan and operate.24
The doctrine also warned that the USA was ready to exercise its right of
self defence by acting pre-emptively. It stated that
The US has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the
threat to our national security the greater is the risk of inaction – and
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of
the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our
adversaries, the US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.25
The doctrine acknowledged the need to enlist the support of the
international community but also warned that the USA was willing to act
unilaterally if necessary.
One of the most contentious elements of the doctrine is the provision
it makes for the use of preventive military action against state sponsors
of terrorism and states that proliferate CBRN weapons. As discussed in
Chapter 7, there were no links between proliferator states and any previous
of the incidents involving the use of a CBRN weapon, and there are good
reasons to suggest that state sponsors of terrorism will continue to refrain
from assisting terrorists with acquiring CBRN weapons. Nevertheless, this
element of the doctrine was used to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Yet the war actually led to an increase in terrorism within Iraq, including
some acts of CBRN terrorism. In addition, it has not prevented states such
as Iran and Syria sponsoring terrorism within Lebanon and Iraq. There are
also other inherent risks in using military force against proliferator regimes
because it could potentially create the motivation for regime loyalists or
nationalists to seek revenge on the USA by sponsoring acts of terrorism.
The fundamental problem with the use of military force for counter-
terrorism purposes is the need to reconcile it with the political dimension
of counter-terrorism policy. Any civilian deaths caused by military
operations simply add to the underlying sense of repression and alienation
that spawned the terror group in the first instance, and can undermine the
positive impacts of any political programmes that have been put in place
to address the political, social, and economic root causes of terrorism.
Similarly, states can alienate potential international political support by being
seen to overreact to terror threats with the use of military force. The USA,

192 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Russia, and Israel have all been heavily criticized for the way that they have
used military force to combat terrorist and insurgent groups. Hence, there is
a fundamental inconsistency between the military and political dimensions
of the US National Security Doctrine. One of its major objectives is to
win the support of moderate Muslims, yet the use of military force against
Muslim states has actually alienated moderate Muslim opinion. Therefore,
the longer-term effectiveness of the use of military force will depend upon
how well states are able to mange the synergies between the military and
political dimensions of counter-terrorism.
Despite these shortcomings, the use of military force will have an impact
on managing the future threat of CBRN terrorism. Any intelligence that is
received of clandestine CBRN weapon development in other states should
now precipitate a strong military response to destroy it. However, in instances
where accurate intelligence of the location of CBRN weapon development
facilities is lacking, states will have to invade the state in question in order to
uncover them, as the USA did in Afghanistan. There have been two previous
examples of states using military force to destroy terrorist CBRN weapon-
development facilities, which highlight both the potential and the limitations
of the use of military force for this purpose. The first was the destruction
of the Shaifa chemical plant in Sudan with cruise missiles following the
bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The second
was the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which successfully destroyed
al-Qaeda’s CBRN weapon-development infrastructure and killed many key
al-Qaeda leaders. Yet in both instances the limitations of the use of military
force based on limited or flawed intelligence are also apparent. It soon became
apparent that the Shaifa plant was not actually a CW-production facility. In
Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda facilities were destroyed by bombing in 2001,
but it was not until ground troops began to search the country that the full
extent of al-Qaeda’s CBRN weapon development infrastructure became
apparent. The invasion of Afghanistan severely disrupted al-Qaeda’s ability
to directly control international terrorist activities, but failed to destroy it.
After a few years al-Qaeda began to operate freely again in certain parts of
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and its leadership began to resume more direct
control of international terrorist activities.
Despite this, the greater willingness of states to use military force to
pre-empt acts of CBRN terror, means that terrorist groups will no longer
have completely safe havens in which they will have the time and freedom
to develop CBRN weapons. This was evident when the al-Qaeda CW
expert Abu Khabab was killed by an American air strike inside Pakistan,
in 2008. This indicates that even in ostensibly safe havens, terrorists will

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 193
have to ensure strict secrecy. However, as the initial success of the war
in Afghanistan receded into the distance, to be replaced by a protracted
counter-insurgency war, so the political willingness of Western states to
intervene militarily in failed states may have weakened.
Capacity Building in Regional States
The international dimension of contemporary terrorism, makes
it imperative for states to work with, and through, other states in
implementing their counter-terrorism policies. The US National Strategy
for Combating Terrorism stresses the importance of enlisting the support
of the international community, of adapting old alliances, and forging
new partnerships, to facilitate regional solutions that isolate the spread of
terrorism.26 This involves working with weak states that despite being willing
to engage in counter-terrorism efforts, often lack the capacity to manage
terrorism within their own borders. The war on terror has therefore seen
the USA provide significant assistance, including direct military support, to
build the counter-terrorism capacity of a number of regional states.
The first significant commitment of US assistance after 9/11 occurred
in the Philippines where the security forces were fighting the Abu Sayyaf
group. The group allegedly has links to al-Qaeda and had previously
kidnapped and killed US citizens. The Philippines army had previously
had only limited success in fighting the Abu Sayyaf. Now for the first time,
US special forces troops were despatched to the Philippines to train the
Filipino counter-terrorism forces. This was replicated in Georgia where al-
Qaeda fugitives were thought to have joined hundreds of Chechen rebels
hiding in the Pankisi gorge region, on the border with Chechnya. Georgia is
riddled with corruption, beset by separatist conflicts, and hampered by weak
government. At that time, its army was poorly equipped and over-stretched
in dealing with these problems. To help the government re-establish control
over the Pankisi gorge, the USA sent special forces soldiers to train the
Georgian army and provided other forms of military assistance.27 The USA
also provided weapons, money, and expertise to Yemen, Nepal, Jordan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Indonesia.28
The Political Dimension of Counter-terrorism
Future threats of CBRN terrorism could also potentially be mitigated
through political measures. The principal objective of a political approach
to counter-terrorism is to deny terrorists popular support, and ultimately to
persuade the terrorists themselves to give up their campaigns of violence,
by addressing the root causes of terrorism. This can take the form of

194 The Changing Face of Terrorism
socio-economic programmes to improve the economic well being of the
community that the terrorists purport to represent, political reforms to
address the political objectives of the group, as well as measures to redress
any perceived social inequalities. Since 9/11, the USA has recognized that
in conjunction with action by security forces, political measures have the
capacity to restrict the growth and activities of terrorist groups, by giving
the political dimension of counter-terrorism a prominent role alongside the
use of military force. The core elements of the political dimension of US
counter-terrorism policy are to address the root causes of terrorism and
to wage a war of ideas against terrorist ideologies in order to deny them
popular legitimacy.
Many states that have experienced violence from indigenous terrorist
groups have negotiated with them, and in doing so have entered a bargaining
relationship. A number of states have demonstrated that it is possible to
negotiate ceasefires with some terrorist and insurgent groups, and even
achieve longer term peace agreements. The Philippines and Columbia have
at times been able to secure ceasefires with the various ethno-nationalist
separatist and left-wing revolutionary groups they are fighting, whilst
they try to negotiate a lasting political solution. Peace in these states has
proved elusive, but it demonstrates that states can negotiate with terrorist
and insurgent groups, and in some instances these political approaches can
potentially secure lasting peace deals.
The UK government engaged in several attempts at dialogue with the
IRA during the course of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This ultimately
led to a number of political compromises by both sides and resulted in
the Anglo-Irish agreement and the Good Friday agreement in 1998 that
brought the IRA’s campaign of violence to an end. This indicates that
conflicts involving secular political or ethno-nationalist separatist groups
can be resolved, although the emergence of the Real IRA and the Continuity
IRA splinter groups indicated that political engagement will not necessarily
draw in all of the most extreme elements within these groups. Therefore
the success of political approaches may well remain partial. However, like
the USA, the UK has categorically ruled out negotiations with al-Qaeda and
other Islamist terrorist groups.
In contrast to the secular IRA however, engaging and meeting the
aspirations of ‘religious’ terrorist groups, appears to be an entirely different
proposition. The very nature of religious fundamentalism suggests that
these types of group are incapable of compromising on their underlying
goals and principles. Amir Taheri argues that, ‘Islamic fundamentalism has
always viewed itself as a force capable of conquering the contemporary

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 195
world from without. It cannot conceive of either coexistence or political
compromise. To the exponents of Holy Terror, Islam must either dominate
or be dominated’.29 This is clearly reflected in the ideology of al-Qaeda and
the groups inspired by it, which believe that they are engaged in a ‘cosmic
war’ of ‘good’ against ‘evil’. By the very nature of such a conflict, there can
be no compromises with the enemy.
In many cases therefore, governments cannot accede to the optimum
demands of many terrorist groups. The USA could potentially try to meet
the political demands of al-Qaeda by withdrawing its troops from the
Arabian peninsula, but political realities are such that it could not withdraw
its support for Israel or the Muslim states in the Middle East which al-Qaeda
seeks to overthrow. In any event, these political objectives are simply short-
term objectives in al-Qaeda’s longer term ‘cosmic war’ against the forces
of ‘evil’. Similarly, India is unwilling to grant Kashmir independence, Israel
is not going to withdraw to its pre-1967 frontiers and the government of
Columbia will not accede to the left-wing revolutionary demands of the
FARC. The USA would have similar problems meeting the demands of the
extreme right-wing and far-right terrorist groups within its own borders. Their
racist agenda is not acceptable within a democratic society, and neither is the
federal government going to legislate itself out of existence by devolving
its powers to state and local level, simply because it suits a small minority
of extremists. There does not seem to be room for compromise between
the federal government and these groups, since the paranoia that fuels their
belief systems is derived from the very existence of the federal government.
At the far end of the spectrum, political solutions are not the answer to the
threat posed by religious cults, because they are internally driven by religious-
based doctrines of Armageddon. Cults cannot be engaged by governments
because they do not seek political goals, and the social goals that they seek
will be fulfilled only in the aftermath of Armageddon. Therefore they have
no interest in bargaining with governments for concessions.
Yet, as is the case with secular terrorist groups, some ‘religious’
groups have shown a willingness to re-formulate their goals and adapt to
changing circumstances. Hezbollah, for instance, has renounced the idea
of establishing an Islamist state in Lebanon and has recognized the multi-
confessional nature of Lebanese society. It has participated in elections and
its members have served in the Lebanese parliament. As noted in Chapter 4,
the objectives of many ‘religious’ terrorist groups are actually political in
nature, and the attainment, or partial attainment of these objectives, can
have an impact on the use of violence by terror groups. For example, suicide
bombings by Hezbollah against American, French, and Israeli targets in the

196 The Changing Face of Terrorism
1980s, ended when these nations withdrew their troops from Lebanon. One
of the main objectives of Hezbollah is to liberate all Lebanese territory from
Israeli occupation. The last remaining dispute is over the Turnak Farms
region. Israel has proven unwilling to negotiate over this disputed territory,
so it remains to be seen whether it would be possible to negotiate a deal
which returned the land to Lebanon in return for a permanent cessation of
Hezbollah’s military activities against Israel. Similarly, there was a dramatic
decline in Palestinian suicide bombings following the Israeli withdrawal
from Gaza between 2004 and 2005. Even some Islamist groups that were
previously linked to al-Qaeda have proven willing to re-assess their use of
violence. The Egyptian government’s overtures to Gemaah Islamiyah to
renounce violence, were accepted after the Egyptian security forces had all
but destroyed the group.
This analysis suggests that it is possible to mitigate some future terrorist
threats through political measures, but that it is generally not possible to
find political solutions that would meet the optimum demands of most of
these groups. In particular, political solutions cannot guarantee to convince
the most militant factions, or address the threat posed by ad hoc terrorist
cells that are brought together for specific missions. But even if an all-
encompassing political solution is impossible to find, it is only through
engaging with moderate opinion within the terrorists’ own communities that
governments can try to manage the threat of terrorism. As a consequence,
political solutions do appear to have a potential role in managing the risks
of CBRN terrorism.
Consequence Management
Strengthening national and international counter-terrorism measures will
undoubtedly make it more difficult for terrorists to procure and use CBRN
weapons, but it will never eliminate the threat entirely. This means that states
also need effective consequence-management capabilities to cope with the
effects of a CBRN attack. There are a wide range of measures that states
can put in place to minimize the damage and casualties from most forms
of CBRN attack. The combination of the poor quality CBRN weapons
that terrorists are likely to produce in conjunction with good consequence
management by the state, could significantly limit casualties from future
CBRN attacks.
The response to a CBRN terrorist attack requires effective political and
bureaucratic control of the emergency. People need timely and credible
information from the government in order to avoid panic reactions such

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 197
as hospitals being inundated with people who believe that they might have
been exposed to the CBRN agent. The confusion and delays that marked
the US government’s response to the anthrax letters in 2001 hints at the
problems that might arise if a highly infectious pathogen such as smallpox
is released. The inability of government officials to answer basic questions
about the origin of the attack, the nature of the risks, and how long the
letters might keep coming, meant that the administration was unable to
contain the psychological impact of the attack on the American people.
These unknowns contributed to the government’s inadequate handling of
the public relations aspect of managing the attack. Contradictory public
statements from government officials suggested a lack of clarity and
purpose, which contributed to public anxiety. The difficulties of effectively
managing this low level BW attack, raises fundamental questions about how
to manage a WMD attack.
Following a CBRN terrorist attack, the most important operational
community are the first responders. This includes the local police, hazardous
material specialists, fire and medical services. They must be capable of
mounting an effective no-notice response to an attack since there would
be little or no time to bring in outside experts to deal with the immediate
consequences. They have the greatest opportunity to limit the casualties in
any attack. But in virtually all states, the vast majority of first responders have
no specialist training or equipment to deal with an attack involving a CBRN
weapon. However, it is possible to create a layered system of preparedness
which would start with broad-based awareness training, and the provision
of specialized equipment and training for local specialists (e.g. hazardous
materials teams, bomb squads, and emergency management officials) and
specialized medical units at regional level.30
These first responders at local and regional level can be supported
by specialized national counter-CBRN response teams. In the USA this
includes the NEST, the Chemical Biological Rapid Response Teams
(CBRRT); the National Guard’s Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection
Teams (RAIDS), the FBI’s Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST),
the State Department’s Federal Emergency Support Team (FEST); the
Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)
and the Army’s Technical Escort Unit (TEU).31 The Public Health Service
has also created medical-response teams that are capable of organizing an
effective operational response to a large-scale attack.32 All of these response
teams are being equipped with CBRN-related equipment.
Following an attack, the first issue for the government is to actually identify
what is happening. This will not be an issue with nuclear weapons because

198 The Changing Face of Terrorism
the blast effects will be obvious. The contamination effects of a chemical or
radiological attack will also be immediately apparent, although it may take time
to identify the precise agent that has been used. In contrast, it will not be
immediately apparent that a BW attack has occurred. An attack will probably
first be detected by epidemiological surveillance systems when casualties begin
arriving at hospitals. This makes public health specialists in infectious diseases
a critical part of the front line of defence. It is through quick diagnosis of the
disease and recognition that it has been the result of a deliberate release that
casualties can be limited and the outbreak contained. Since the incubation
period of some infectious diseases can be days, many lives can potentially be
saved. Most developed states already have systems in place to detect, contain,
and treat natural outbreaks of disease, but these would be inadequate to deal
with the potentially large number of casualties from a WMD attack.
With an infectious disease, the medical response would have to be very
fast. In the USA, the Epidemiological Surveillance system at the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) provides early warning. Specialized equipment held
at a few sites such as the CDC and the Army Medical Research Institute
of Infectious Diseases can identify an agent within three hours, although
standard enzyme based tests can take 18–24 hours.33 The UK has adopted
the innovative approach of combining specialist public health expertise in
infectious diseases, radiation and chemical protection in one agency, the
Health Protection Agency, which can support first responders anywhere in
the country. The problems of managing the medical response to a CBRN
weapon attack were apparent in the US Administration’s handling of the
anthrax letter attack in 2001. The medical response to the attack was delayed
by a dispute between the FBI and Army scientists over the quality of the
anthrax, which prompted the FBI to withhold information from the CDC
while it waited for more data about the anthrax. As a result, decision makers
lacked the information they needed about how the spores might spread.
This delayed the testing and treatment of postal workers and contributed
to a number of deaths.34 Therefore, adequate training for public health
professionals in the identification of cases of contamination by CBW
agents coupled with an effective warning system that can rapidly identify the
agent that has been used are critical in creating a system that can respond
quickly to biological, chemical, and radiological attack.
The ability to treat large numbers of casualties will also be dependent
upon local medical services having access to the necessary treatments
and prophylaxis. Since 9/11, a number of states have invested heavily in
developing new vaccines and treatments, and have procured stockpiles of
vaccines, antibiotics, anti-toxins, and iodine tablets sufficient to treat large

Homeland Security and Terrorist Decision Making 199
numbers of casualties. The quantities of vaccine, antitoxins or antibiotics
required to deal with a WMD attack would be enormous. In a scenario
involving a BW attack that caused 30,000 casualties, it would require
approximately 2 tonnes of antibiotics which would have to be delivered
overnight.35 VX is the easiest CW to treat if atropine is administered
immediately, which will be a problem if the stocks are held too far away
from the site of an attack. For large states therefore, logistics is a particular
problem and stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines can only help to limit
casualties rather than prevent them. In order to be effective these central
stockpiles need to be maintained at a high state of readiness and to be
capable of being delivered to the site of an attack extremely quickly. Israel
has implemented the most widespread and effective programme of CBRN
consequence-management measures of any state. All Israeli citizens are
issued with protective kits which include gas masks, atropine injections, and
powder to treat chemical burns,36 and the home front command has systems
for distributing antibiotics within a very short space of time. Israel has the
advantage of being a geographically small state and having a relatively small
population, which means the Israeli programme cannot be replicated in
most other states. It is impossible to determine how effectively the existing
medical infrastructures of different states could deal with massive numbers
of CBRN casualties. No state has enough isolation beds to cope with a
massive outbreak of infectious disease, and most doctors have a lack of
knowledge about uncommon agents and pathogens such as anthrax.37
Therefore, strengthening public health systems is one of the foremost
consequence-management measures.
The armed forces of many states also have the capability to contribute
significantly to civil defence plans because of their specialized knowledge,
training and equipment for operating in large-scale CBRN environments. So
as states improve the capabilities of their armed forces to cope with CBRN
weapon threats they will also enhance their domestic capability to cope with
the threat.
Technology can greatly enhance the capabilities of consequence-
management programmes, but such technologies are invariably expensive,
and policy makers have to strike a balance between the resources that
they can afford to invest in technology and its inherent limitations. The
key technologies are detection devices, protective suits, decontamination
systems, and bomb disposal equipment. However, there is no technical fix
to the threat from CBRN terrorism, new technologies are only one of a
suite of responses and counter-measures that governments need to put in
place to counter the threat.

200 The Changing Face of Terrorism
The majority of future CBRN terrorist attacks are likely to be crude
agents that are poorly weaponized, or simply used as contaminants. The
potential casualty levels from this kind of attack are likely to be small.
This means that effective consequence-management measures have the
potential to significantly contribute to limiting the casualties of any future
attack. Even with a WMD attack, where casualties will be high, effective
preparations such as mechanisms for delivering large quantities of medical
counter-measures to the site of the attack at short notice will save lives.
Conclusion
Government counter-terrorism measures will never prevent all future
CBRN terrorist attacks, but it is now much harder for terrorists to
operate in many states and some future CBRN attacks will undoubtedly
be prevented by such measures. Every minor improvement in capabilities
could increase the chances of detecting and preventing a potential attack.
Hence, counter-measures could potentially influence the technological
choices that terrorists make in trying to develop CBRN weapons and will
also influence terrorists’ operational decision making. Some groups may
be deterred from even attempting to develop CBRN weapons because of
the heightened risk of detection, others may make sporadic ad hoc efforts
to develop CBRN weapons for specific attacks rather than a systematic
development programme similar to what Aum Shinrikyo established. It
could also encourage groups to develop the easiest and least visible types of
agents and weapon, but even some of these options are capable of causing
significant casualties, for instance if ricin was used to contaminate food or
hydrogen cyanide was introduced into a building through its air conditioning
system. But the most violent and committed groups are not likely to be
deterred, and will simply accept the additional risk of detection. Similarly,
consequence management will never be wholly effective, but continued
improvements in response capabilities will reduce the potential damage and
casualties from any CBRN attack. Governments need to achieve coherence
in their programmes, so that even if they do not have significant resources
they can at least focus on the lower cost responses that will enable them
to maximize the value of the resources which they can invest. However,
terrorists have proven themselves to be highly adaptive, and will continue
to innovate in their use of weapons and tactics to defeat whatever defences
states might put in their way.

9
THE FUTURE
Since 9/11 there has been a presumption that terrorists will use CBRN
weapons if they can acquire them, regardless of the operational difficulties
involved and their tactical limitations for certain roles. But 9/11 itself did
not fundamentally change the nature of the threat from CBRN terrorism,
as is evident from the limited number of incidents thus far in the twenty-
first century. For some Islamist groups and al-Qaeda in particular, the
procurement and use of CBRN weapons and WMD seems to be a major
objective. Yet there is not much evidence of increasing interest in acquiring
CBRN weapons amongst other terrorist groups. So what is the threat in the
coming years? Much will depend upon how terrorism itself develops in the
twenty-first century. The trends in terrorist activity that were identified in
the 1990s provide useful indicators, as does the nature of terrorist activity
immediately following 9/11, but they cannot be used to predict with
certainty how terrorist activity will develop. The most significant unknown is
how individual groups will continue to reconcile the conflicting motivations
and disincentives to using CBRN weapons that have been identified in the
preceding chapters. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some plausible
scenarios and make a number of reasonable observations about the extent
and nature of the potential future threat.
Terrorism and the War on Terror
The future threat from CBRN terrorism will partly be determined by
the nature of terrorism in the twenty-first century. The basic assumption
underpinning future threat assessments is that terrorism will continue
to plague many parts of the world. In many states the social, economic,
and political conditions that are the root causes of terrorism are likely

202 The Changing Face of Terrorism
to persist. There are still too many weak and failed states in the world
whose governments cannot meet the basic needs of their people, and the
lawlessness in these states enables terrorists to thrive. In addition, terrorist
ideologies are also likely to continue to emerge and evolve in unpredictable
ways. These ideologies have the ability to transcend national boundaries and
permeate the societies of all states. A number of states, or rogue elements
within states, are also likely to continue to sponsor terrorism, particularly at
a regional level, for a mixture of ideological and political reasons.
Whilst the persistence of terrorism is a given, the relative impact of
specific terrorist groups operating at national, regional, and international
levels is likely to fluctuate over time. Some of the more intractable terrorist
campaigns are likely to persist, particularly al-Qaeda inspired violence, as
well as the conflicts in the Palestinian territories and Kashmir. At the same
time, some groups or movements could go into decline or enter periods of
dormancy, as has been the case with extreme right-wing terrorist cells in the
USA since 2001. It is also conceivable that some terrorist campaigns will
come to an end, either through peace processes such as in Northern Ireland,
or if individual groups are defeated militarily, as happened to Gemmah
Islamiyah in Egypt. However, the ideologies of terrorist groups will ebb
and flow in popularity over time, as evidenced by the decline of left-wing
groups in Europe. Terrorism is by its very nature adaptable and the specific
groups or threats that exist at any given time could disappear, evolve, re-
emerge, or be replaced when existing groups split, or as new ideologies or
causes emerge. This makes it extremely difficult to make long-term threat
assessments.
The most worrying development in terrorism in the early twenty-first
century has been the confluence of three major trends in terrorism that
had emerged in the twentieth century. The majority of terrorism is now
perpetrated by groups with a politico-religious ideology, there has been
an increased interest in attacks causing large numbers of indiscriminate
casualties, and there is increased terrorist interest in the acquisition and
use of CBRN weapons. This could also be exacerbated by developments
in terrorist organization, particularly the increased prevalence of ad hoc
terrorist cells that come together for specific purposes. These cells are often
led by hardliners, and have previously been linked to plots to use CBRN
weapons and attacks intended to cause mass casualties, such as the 1993
World Trade Centre bombing. The driver behind the confluence of these
trends has been the activities of Islamist groups, but despite this, all types
of groups must continue to be considered to pose a potential, albeit lower,
threat of CBRN terrorism.

The Future 203
It is possible to speculate about the broad nature and extent of terrorism
in the future based upon these trends in terrorist activity, but what is more
important is how levels of lethality and the level of interest in CBRN
weapons might develop within specific terrorist groups and movements.
The analysis in Chapter 3 indicates that terrorist campaigns evolve and are
not exclusively, or at all times, focused on causing indiscriminate civilian
casualties. A more relevant approach is to identify which groups at any given
time are intent on developing CBRN weapons or causing large numbers of
indiscriminate casualties. For instance, between 2001 and 2002 there was a
significant increase in both the frequency and lethality of attacks by Islamist
groups and the various armed Palestinian groups operating in Israel and the
Palestinian territories, with a greater emphasis on targeting civilians. Yet the
Palestinians were unable to sustain their campaign of suicide bombings at
the peak it reached in the early part of 2002. In contrast, the wider networks
of Islamist groups have greater freedom of action to operate around
the world and there is currently no indication of a lessening of violence
amongst this type of group.
The most important feature of terrorist activity at the turn of the
twentieth century is that it is dominated by groups that have a politico-
religious ideology. In particular, there is no indication that Islamist and
Islamic fundamentalist groups, some of which have demonstrated their
intent to perpetrate indiscriminate mass casualty attacks and to use CBRN
weapons, will decline in influence in the near future. A particularly worrying
development has been the growth of links between al-Qaeda and other
groups, including groups in North Africa which have not previously
been linked to CBRN weapon threats. Al-Qaeda itself has proven to be
remarkably resilient during the war on terror and is likely to continue to exist,
and influence other Islamist groups. Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty
about how Islamist terrorism might evolve, in particular whether Islamist
groups will increasingly focus their violence on targeting ‘illegitimate’
Muslim regimes in the Middle East and Asia rather than international
terrorism against the USA and Europe.
Yet neither is there any evidence that Islamism might become a mass
movement and spark a clash of civilizations. Contrary to what bin Laden
hoped for, the implementation of tougher counter-terrorism measures
by many states during the war on terror, has not led to the alienation of
Muslim communities in the West, and it has only led to a small number of
other Islamist groups joining al-Qaeda. Militant Islamism as a movement,
remains deeply divided.1 There is some evidence of increased support for
Islamism in Muslim communities in the West, but these elements remain

204 The Changing Face of Terrorism
a small minority. Crucially, moderate Muslims have not actively supported
the militants. Whilst some ordinary Muslims might share some of the same
views as militant Islamists, particularly in terms of opposition to the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, they do not necessarily share the Islamist ideology, or
the objective of establishing an Islamic state. The horror of what happened
on 9/11 has meant that moderate Muslims were not alienated by tougher
anti-terrorism legislation, and in fact some approved of it because it helped
them in their own struggle to maintain control of their own communities.
Some Muslims living in Western Europe want radical clerics and their
supporters deported because they do not represent mainstream Islam,
and they know that the rhetoric and actions of these individuals make the
lives of ordinary Muslims more difficult. Equally as important, Western
governments did their best to try and protect their Muslim communities
from any public backlash.
Despite the fact that Islamists have dominated CBRN threat assessments
since 9/11 it is still important not to underestimate the potential threat from
religious cults, the extreme right wing in the USA, and other groups that might
emerge in the future. The political, social. and economic conditions which
could contribute to their resurgence could emerge again, with little warning.
A feature of cults is that they can appear very quickly, almost overnight,
whilst established cults can take a radical turn, perhaps under a new leader.
Since cults have no rational objective they can quickly come into conflict
with a society which they perceive to be sinful and lost.2 Negative reactions
from the local populations that they live amongst can create the conditions
in which cult leaders can develop persecution complexes and crises can
develop. The Rajneeshpuram cult and Aum Shinrikyo both lashed out in
violence when they faced legal challenges. The essence of millenarianism
is that it can strike without warning or apparent reason, sometimes in the
most unexpected of places. Equally, the extreme right wing in the USA has
not disappeared. It still attract s considerable support, but this is primarily
manifest in unco-ordinated racist violence, rather than a co-ordinated and
sustained campaign of terrorist violence. However, the emergence of new
ideologies, groups and leaders among this wider movement could potentially
herald a switch to a more co-ordinated campaign of terrorist violence.
However, it is impossible to determine whether there will be increasing
numbers of indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. In the 1990s, the evidence
suggested that the increasing lethality of terrorist attacks was not having an
impact on the number of the most lethal attacks, which actually declined
in number. The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen a dramatic
reversal of that position. The large number of conventional attacks

The Future 205
perpetrated by Islamist terrorist groups since 2000 that have resulted in over
100 casualties, coupled with evidence from training manuals discovered
in Afghanistan, indicates that Islamist terrorism has entered a new phase
which is characterized by an increased emphasis on causing large numbers
of indiscriminate casualties. Yet this could be argued to be a consequence
of Islamist groups being put on the defensive by the ‘war on terror’ and the
fact that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq created greater opportunities for
Islamist terrorist groups to strike. Continued changes in the geo-strategic
situation and in the internal security situation in states such as Iraq and
Afghanistan should therefore impact on the nature of future Islamist
terrorism. The strategies and tactics used by terrorist groups can also change
and adapt in unforeseen ways, and this could also be the case for Islamist
groups. In all likelihood therefore, the number of attacks that result in large
numbers of casualties is likely to fluctuate over the decades.
Again though, developments concerning mass casualty attacks need to be
viewed from the perspective of specific groups rather than being examined
as a generic trend. Some groups see a greater utility in perpetrating mass
casualty attacks than others, and others are more willing to accept collateral
civilian casualties in attacking political and economic targets than others.
The war on terror has significantly heightened the disincentives to causing
indiscriminate mass casualties, because it has shown terrorist groups that
they would be severely damaged by the resultant military backlash. However,
this will deter some groups more than others. 9/11 has also shown terrorist
groups that a single act of mass destruction is not enough to achieve their
goals. In contrast, the various armed Palestinian groups adopted a different
strategy involving a sustained campaign of smaller scale, indiscriminate
violence against civilian targets to batter Israel into submission. Yet this
strategy also failed and actually proved to be counter-productive because
of the high levels of suffering inflicted on Palestinian non-combatants by
Israeli counter-attacks, and the loss of international sympathy and support.
It remains to be seen how these events might influence other terrorist
groups. It is conceivable that the failure of these strategies could deter some
terrorist leaders from escalating to new and different forms of violence
such as the use of CBRN weapons. However, the signs are not good. The
Moscow theatre siege in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004 illustrated
that the use of indiscriminate attacks has become a tactic for some groups
that have traditionally focused on political and military targets.
The future threat from terrorism will also be shaped by the security
environment in which terrorist groups have to operate. The security
environment can significantly alter the strategic position of specific terrorist

206 The Changing Face of Terrorism
groups, which in turn can alter the decision-making dynamics within the
group. At one level a more restrictive security environment might deter some
groups from plotting more complex mass casualty attacks, but alternatively,
being put on the defensive could change the dynamics of decision making
the other way. But whilst it is considerably more difficult for terrorists to
operate in the post 9/11 world, particularly in the West, they still have
considerable scope in which to operate.
All states need to work to increase the disincentives and weaken
the motivations for terrorists to escalate their levels of violence. This
necessitates a holistic approach that goes beyond counter-terrorism. This
was partially achieved through the post 9/11 international coalition that
formed in the hunt for al-Qaeda, which heralded significantly greater levels
of international co-operation on counter-terrorism, particularly in terms
of sharing intelligence, clamping down on non-violent terrorist related
activity, and extraditing suspects. But not all states signed up to the values
underpinning the war on terror, and the coalition did not accept the USA
acting as an international policeman. The fundamental problem is that there
is no single accepted vision of the world around which states can unite.
The USA is perceived to be imposing its free trade, Christian, democratic
values on a world in which many states do not accept them. As a result, the
post 9/11 international coalition had considerable limitations. It was held
together solely by the perceived moral right of the USA to bring al-Qaeda
to justice, and was strongest in those states that fully accept the values of the
USA. The further that the USA moved beyond the objective of destroying
al-Qaeda, the more the coalition unravelled as it came up against issues of
fundamental disagreement. In particular, Arab states will always believe that
they have a religious obligation to support the Palestinian groups seeking
independence from Israel, just as some elements in Pakistan consider it a
national and religious duty to support the insurgency in Kashmir.
Since 9/11, the security environment has been significantly enhanced
by the rigorous overhaul of anti-terrorism measures in many states. The
USA realized that it needed to be engaged in the world and to pursue a
more proactive counter-terrorism strategy. This was codified in the 2002
National Security Doctrine, which enshrined the doctrine of military
pre-emption. But whilst military action can serve as a useful tool to help
manage the threat, it is not a solution. The National Security Doctrine
proposes a number of broad-brush solutions to address the root causes
of terrorism, but it has numerous limitations. The causes of terrorism are
often endemic and the proposed solutions are too generalized to be capable
of effective implementation. It will never be possible to achieve global

The Future 207
prosperity sufficient to undermine the economic roots of terrorism, and
states generally cannot concede to terrorists’ optimum political demands.
Similarly, whilst accepting that the USA needs to win the battle of ideas
in order to separate terrorists from their constituencies, this is a battle that
it cannot win. The complexity of the root causes of terrorism means that
it will be extremely difficult to isolate terrorists from their constituencies.
This is implicitly recognized in the Doctrine, which stresses a combination
of stifling terrorism at source and using military force to defeat it where it
does appear. A more realistic scenario is that focused and concerted efforts
by national governments and the international community might be able
to alleviate the root causes of terrorism in specific states in a piece-meal
manner.
There is also an inherent tension between the military aspects of counter-
terrorism policy and its political dimensions. The policy dilemma being
faced by the USA is that the challenges posed by Islamist terrorism require
it to be engaged in the world yet it is precisely this perceived ‘interference’ in
regions such as the Middle East and Asia that helps to generate support for
Islamism. US support for Israel and its military aggression in Iraq has been
a provocation to Islamists and moderate Muslims alike. Imposing sanctions
on Arab and Muslim states for sponsoring terrorism has also had the same
effect. This is primarily because of the deep distrust of US motives felt
in most parts of the world. This distrust is encapsulated by its perceived
double standards, particularly in the Middle East where it was willing to use
military action to enforce UN Resolutions in respect of Iraq, yet acquiesces
in Israeli non-compliance with other UN Resolutions.
The doctrine codified the use of pre-emptive military force to strike at
terrorists anywhere in the world yet the doctrine is a product of its time, and
it is uncertain how the world will react to the USA pre-empting perceived
threats in the coming decades. Military action runs the risk of appearing
arbitrary and punitive, and has the potential to alienate regional states and
public opinion. In addition, other states such as India, Israel, and Russia
see it as legitimizing their own military operations against terrorists and
state sponsors of terrorism. The potential for destabilizing delicate regional
relations and creating popular support for terrorists is considerable.
In addition, the basic principles on which the Doctrine is based are
not being applied consistently. Despite seeking to promote democracy
as a means of combating terrorism, the USA and the West are forced to
work with a number of undemocratic regimes, such as those in Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia, which are critical players in the war against terrorism.
Al-Qaeda propaganda has made much of US support for these regimes,

208 The Changing Face of Terrorism
and withdrawal of Western support for these regimes is one of al-Qaeda’s
principal objectives. This also ties in with the problem of how the USA
should deal with state sponsors of terrorism, such as Pakistan and Syria,
from whom it needs support in the war against al-Qaeda. This hints at
the extent to which the complexity of the politics of the war on terror
undermines the objective of stopping terrorism.
The post 9/11 security environment which is characterized by tougher
counter-terrorism legislation, the use of military force pre-emptively, and a
much higher degree of international co-operation, has made it considerably
more difficult for terrorists to operate. This is borne out by the gradual
tracking down of the al-Qaeda leadership, the prevention of a significant
number of attacks by Islamist cells in Europe, and the fact that successful
attacks by Islamist cells have largely been restricted to states in Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia, where they have greater freedom to operate. The
successful bomb attacks on the transport systems of London and Madrid
indicate that terrorists will still be capable of attacking Western states,
but suggests that because future attacks in the West will be less frequent,
terrorist groups will endeavour to make them more destructive. In addition,
it is extremely unlikely that many governments will be able to successfully
address the root causes of terrorism because the social, economic, and
political problems that generate the groundswell of discontent in which
terrorist ideologies can take root, are endemic in many states. Some terrorist
groups might be defeated by security force action, others might potentially
seek peace agreements, and some others might simply fade away over time,
but these are long-term processes that are likely to affect only a small number
of groups at a time. The root causes of terrorism will not be solved easily
and the ideologies of terrorist groups are so deeply rooted. This means that
significant levels of terrorism are likely to continue to affect many states
throughout the twenty-first century.
The Future Threat from CBRN Terrorism
Since the acquisition and use of CBRN weapons has been a significant
feature of terrorism since the 1970s it can be assumed that it will continue
to be a feature of terrorism in the twenty-first century. The fact that CBRN
terrorism is a threat which the West particularly fears could also encourage
further acts of CBRN terrorism. However, the increased prevalence of
groups with a politico-religious ideology that are seeking to perpetrate acts
of indiscriminate mass destruction and to acquire CBRN weapons, suggests
that the potential threat from CBRN terrorism is greater in the early twenty-

The Future 209
first century, than at any time previously. The catalyst for this heightened
threat has been the upsurge in violence by Islamist terrorist groups and cells
which are one of the main drivers in the increased lethality of terrorism, and
are now directly linked to the increased terrorist interest in CBRN weapons.
A number of precedents for acquiring and using CBRN weapons were set
in the twentieth century, and amongst organizations such as al-Qaeda and
some other Islamist groups, these weapons are an accepted and desirable
means to achieve their objectives. The key questions that remain to be
answered are the extent and nature of the future threat.
The most significant constraints on the future threat from CBRN
terrorism are technological. Analysis of CBRN weapon technology and
previous CBRN terrorist incidents does not indicate that a growing number
of terrorist groups are capable of developing CBRN weapons. Many
plots still involve the use of commercially available agents and materials
for use as contaminants, and no group has come close to replicating Aum
Shinrikyo’s success in developing sarin. It is undeniable that the theoretical
knowledge required to develop CBRN weapons is available and that given
time, skilled individuals can engineer that knowledge into a weapon. What
is more problematic, is whether groups can recruit teams of engineers with
the necessary skills. It would seem to require at least two individuals to
successfully develop an effective CBW capable of causing mass casualties,
although individuals acting on their own could potentially develop an agent
or pathogen without a sophisticated delivery mechanism. Whilst nuclear
weapons would seem to require a team of at least three people. Whilst there
might be increasing numbers of people with the necessary skills within
Western society, and increasingly so in the developing world, it cannot
simply be assumed that terrorist groups will be able to recruit them. Hence,
al-Qaeda’s failure to develop CBRN weapons prior to the fall of the Taliban
regime is a more realistic indicator of what the majority of terrorist groups
are likely to be able achieve, than the Aum Shinrikyo experience. It remains
a fact that most terrorist groups are technologically incapable of developing
CBRN weapons, but that could potentially change very suddenly if they can
gain access to black market weapons or recruit people who are technically
proficient.
Even if terrorist groups manage to recruit skilled engineers, the
development of CBRN weapons is a difficult task and it requires a significant
investment of finance. Because of this, the quality of the weapons that
different terrorist groups might prove to be capable of producing is likely
to vary considerably. Technological constraints mean that the most likely
CBRN weapon threats that might emerge will be crude CBW agents that

210 The Changing Face of Terrorism
will either be used as contaminants or dispersed by explosives, as well as
radiological weapons. Occasionally, it is conceivable that a group might
succeed in producing agents or weapons equivalent to those developed by
Aum Shinrikyo. But even the number of fatalities that these weapons could
produce is likely to be relatively small because the poor quality of the agents
that are likely to be produced, and ineffective dispersal mechanisms. The
likelihood of a terrorist group being capable of manufacturing a WMD is
likely to remain very small.
Whether any particular group will choose to develop a CBRN weapon,
and the way in which it chooses to use it, will be the result of a decision
making process of reconciling the competing motivations and the
disincentives to using these weapons. These motivations and disincentives
are determined by a number of variables which include: the ideology of the
terrorist group; the political goals of the group; the tactics and strategies
used by the group; the organizational dynamics of the group; the attitudes
of the group members and its leadership; and the politico-strategic situation
in which the group operates. The balance between these factors will be
specific to each terrorist group, so different terrorist groups can potentially
reach radically different decisions about whether to use CBRN weapons. In
addition, group decision-making can change over time, since the balance
between these motivations and disincentives to using CBRN weapons is a
dynamic one.
Analysis of terrorist ideologies, goals, strategies, and tactics suggests
that all types of terrorist groups can potentially have motivations to use
CBRN weapons, although they appear to be strongest in groups that have
politico-religious ideologies. The main aspects of their ideologies which
might motivate them to use CBRN weapons are millenarian beliefs and their
identification of a broader target set. At its most extreme, the rhetoric of
some of these individuals and groups displays genocidal goals. But even
these types of group operate under constraints. Religious orientation might
be a useful indicator of the type of group that might use CBRN weapons,
but not all ‘religious’ groups have displayed an interest in using them. Even
among Islamist and extreme right-wing Christian groups in the USA, some
groups present a greater risk than others. Most ‘religious’ terrorist groups
have a constituency to whom they are attempting to appeal, some seek
support from the international community, and theological dictums do
not in themselves establish imperatives to conduct indiscriminate acts of
violence. As is the case with secular groups, they also operate under practical
disincentives to using CBRN weapons, notably that these weapons would
contaminate the land of which they are attempting to gain control, and the

The Future 211
propensity of these weapons to spread contamination in uncontrollable
and unpredictable ways. In addition, there are also operational factors
which would limit how and where they might want to use CBRN weapons.
Therefore, whilst the motivations of ‘religious’ groups to use CBRN
weapons appear to be stronger than those of secular groups, they still
operate under strong disincentives which cannot be ignored. The exception
are religious cults, which if they do decide to lash out violently against
society, operate under no political or ideological constraints, and will use
CBRN weapons indiscriminately. But the number of such cults will always
be very few in number at any given time.
In general it can be argued that groups with more limited goals have
fewer motivations to acquire and use CBRN weapons because their goals
are best achieved through controlled and limited acts of violence. This
strongly suggests that secular groups will be disinclined to use CBRN
weapons. But even secular groups can have strong motivations to use CBRN
weapons and WMD. The propaganda value of these weapons, particularly
for groups in decline, makes them an attractive option. And racist secular
groups that target specific ethnic communities are perhaps less inclined
to keep their violence within strict limits. But whilst they might be more
interested in perpetrating indiscriminate acts of violence against their ethnic
enemies, they would still want to be discriminate in restricting violence to
these specific enemies. In general terms, considerations of alienating their
domestic constituency, and losing political and material support from the
international community will undoubtedly inhibit some secular groups from
using CBRN weapons for indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. However,
these considerations might not necessarily inhibit them from using them in
more discriminate roles. In fact, the strong propaganda value to be gained
from using such weapons could make them distinctly attractive for use in
more limited roles. Therefore, the balance of motivations and disincentives
might generally deter secular groups from using them in indiscriminate
roles, but the motivations are much stronger in respect of using them in
discriminate roles.
These motivations and disincentives arising from the ideologies and
goals of terrorist groups, will also be critically influenced by the politico-
strategic situation in which a group operates at any given time. For some
groups, the motivations to use CBRN weapons will come to outweigh the
disincentives to using them only when the group faces the possibility of
being defeated, or is forced onto the defensive. This kind of action-reaction
cycle has been evident since 9/11, when the ‘war on terror’ forced al-Qaeda

212 The Changing Face of Terrorism
onto the defensive, leading to increased efforts by Islamist cells around the
world to acquire and use CBW.
Interestingly, tactical considerations do not appear to have played a
significant role in previous CBRN terrorist incidents. CBRN weapons confer
a decisive military advantage for only a limited number of types of attacks.
A rational analysis of ends and means suggests that the technical capabilities
of CBRN weapons, particularly WMD, makes them the weapon of choice
for a range of purposes and tactics, including: causing indiscriminate
mass casualties against civilian targets; generating propaganda; scenarios
in which they can be used to circumvent defences against conventional
attack; intimidating public opinion; blackmailing governments; and for
causing economic damage. But for the majority of purposes and tactics,
conventional weapons should theoretically be the preferred option. The
strategies and tactics of most groups incorporate a wide range of targets,
and many groups choose not to conduct indiscriminate mass casualty
attacks. Even when groups do strike at indiscriminate population targets, it
cannot automatically be assumed that they would be interested in causing
casualty levels that could be defined as ‘mass destruction’. For many groups,
indiscriminate attacks causing limited casualties could equally serve their
purposes. Yet the past record of CBRN terrorism indicates that terrorists
have been willing to use them in roles to which they are not particularly
suited, ostensibly because of their propaganda and intimidatory effects. This
suggests that the tactical limitations of CBRN weapons for a number of
roles will not necessarily inhibit terrorist groups from attempting to procure
and use them.
Ultimately, it will be the attitudes of individual terrorists and the
dynamics of decision making within each group, that will determine how
terrorists balance the conflicting motivations and disincentives to using
CBRN weapons which will influence their decision making. This will partly
depend upon the nature of decision making within each group or cell.
Those with authoritarian style decision-making structures appear to pose a
greater threat, but even groups and cells with an ostensibly democratic style
of decision making can pose a threat. In addition, decision making within
groups will invariably change as new leaders emerge, or groups split. It is
impossible to predict potential changes in the decision making of individual
terrorist groups and cells, but much will depend upon the extent to which
hardliners might take over the leadership of specific groups or cells.
Terrorists’ ability to develop and use CBRN weapons will also be
constrained by the anti-CBRN terrorism counter-measures that are put
in place by the states in which they operate. The strengthening of generic

The Future 213
counter-terrorism measures in the post 9/11 world has made it considerably
more difficult for terrorists to engage in CBRN terrorism. Many states have
invested considerable additional resources into CBRN-specific counter-
terrorism measures. Tightening legislation, strengthening controls on access
to CBRN agents and materials, enhanced physical security at CBRN weapon
storage sites, the increased use of CBRN weapon detection devices, and the
creation of dedicated anti-CBRN terrorism response units will all increase
the chances of detecting and preventing a future attack. This more rigorous
security environment has restricted terrorists’ freedom to plan and execute
complex, large-scale operations of the kind needed for CBRN terrorism.
The acceptance of the need to use pre-emptive military action against
burgeoning threats means that terrorists cannot now be assured of a safe
haven in which to develop CBRN weapons and plan their attacks. This will
not eradicate the threat of CBRN terror but it should prevent some attacks
from being executed. In addition, increased investment in consequence-
management programmes will enable states to reduce the casualty levels
in any future attack. Most states still have a long way to go in enhancing
their first response, medical response, and decontamination capabilities, but
most now know what is required and have at least begun the process of
creating the necessary infrastructure. The main task of the USA and the
international community will be to maintain the intensity of this security
environment in the coming decades.
The potential impact of the security environment on the threat of CBRN
terrorism is evident in the war against al-Qaeda, the group that has been
assessed as posing the greatest risk of CBRN terrorism in the immediate
future. The war in Afghanistan destroyed a number of its CBRN weapon-
development centres and forced it onto the defensive to the extent that its
operations became sporadic with little central planning. In the near term
this has probably restricted al-Qaeda’s capability to pose a serious threat
with CBRN weapons. Its current CBRN weapon development capability
is unknown, but the continued prosecution of the war against al-Qaeda
will make it difficult for it to acquire and use CBRN weapons. Perhaps
the greatest threat from al-Qaeda might not be its own CBRN weapon
capability but the fact that its rhetoric and actions has encouraged a wide
range of other independent Islamist groups and cells to try to acquire and
use CBRN weapons. Yet none of the independent Islamist cells operating
within Western Europe that have been linked with CBRN weapon plots
since 9/11, possessed the technological capability to develop effective
CBRN weapons.

214 The Changing Face of Terrorism
One particular aspect of the threat which the global security environment
should be able to prevent is the risk of state sponsored CBRN terrorism. The
unprecedented reaction of the USA to 9/11 should continue to deter states
from sponsoring acts of CBRN terrorism, particularly for those regimes
whose primary concern is their own survival. The greatest potential risk lies
in the USA and international community creating the conditions in which
states feel compelled to sponsor such attacks. The invasion of Iraq in 2003
might have deterred the latent threat of state sponsored CBRN terrorism.
But there is an inherent risk that if the USA attempts to use military force
against other state sponsors of terrorism which actually possess CBRN
weapons, it will foster the very threat it is trying to prevent.
Conclusion
It is a reasonable assumption that at some stage in the future there will be
further terrorist incidents involving CBRN weapons. But it is also the case
that the imperatives to develop and use these weapons will not be the same
for all groups at all times. As a result, any assessment of extent and nature
of the future threat is inherently problematic because these motivations
and disincentives to using CBRN weapons and the relationship between
them can fluctuate over time for any given group. Perhaps the most realistic
scenario for the future is that small numbers of individuals, cells and groups
will continue to attempt to acquire and use CBRN weapons. Since the
motivations to use CBRN weapons appear to be stronger amongst groups
with a politico-religious ideology, and there has been a steady growth in
the numbers of these groups since the 1980s, it can be concluded that the
potential threat of CBRN terrorism is greater in the twenty-first century
than it was in the twentieth century. But whilst there might now be a greater
interest in CBRN terrorism, the number of technologically capable terrorist
groups does not seem to have increased.
In many cases, terrorist CBRN weapon threats are most likely to
be a consequence of the emergence of specific political, strategic, and
technological circumstances, in conjunction with a mindset within the
terrorist group that is willing to use such weapons. In particular, groups
have previously proved to be more inclined to perpetrate indiscriminate acts
of violence when they are in decline, or feel that they have no other recourse
to achieve their goals. Other scenarios include if hardliners seize control of
the groups, or break away to form splinter groups. Under these conditions
groups are less concerned with losing international political support and
alienating their domestic constituency. The principle variable however will

The Future 215
be sudden changes in technological opportunity: if a group suddenly gains
access to CBRN materials or weapons, or it manages to recruit individuals
with the necessary technical skills, or even if a state sponsor suddenly proves
to be willing to release CBRN weapons to a terror group. As a result, the
majority of future CBRN weapon threats are likely to remain sporadic and
ad hoc.
In general terms it is impossible to identify specific future threats
simply by studying the motivations and disincentives that influence terrorist
groups, because the goals and tactics of all types of groups establish
potential motivations and disincentives to use CBRN weapons. The crucial
determining factors are the technological opportunities that are open
to them, the attitudes of individual terrorists and the nature of decision
making within each group or cell. This is in turn influenced by the strategic
environment in which each group operates. From these general observations
it can be concluded that the future threat from CBRN terrorism is limited.
In many cases, it is likely that different terrorist groups or cells will make
only sporadic and ad hoc efforts to acquire CBRN weapons, and only a few
will make a systematic effort to procure and use them. The past history of
CBRN terrorism also indicates that those groups which might prove to be
capable of developing and using CBRN weapons will use them against a
variety of discriminate and indiscriminate targets. Technological constraints
coupled with the tactical choices that some groups are likely to make will
mean that indiscriminate mass casualty attacks involving CBRN weapons
are likely to be very rare. This is summed up best by Richard Falkenrath,
who describes it as a ‘low-probability, high-consequence threat’.3 Instead,
the most likely threats are likely to come from commercially available or
crudely developed CBRN agents that will either be used as contaminants
or crudely weaponized. Only occasionally are groups likely to successfully
develop nerve agents or BW. But history suggests that even groups which
do manage to develop CBW agents will struggle to weaponize them
effectively, which will limit their effectiveness. So whilst the threat from
WMD terrorism is small, it nevertheless remains a real threat. There are
however, a number of variables in assessing the future threat that have the
potential to evolve suddenly and in unpredictable ways, making accurate
threat assessments difficult.

NOTES
Introduction
1 ‘9/11’, Wikipedia, www.en.wikipedia.org.
2 ‘SAS troops clash with Taliban unit deep inside Afghanistan’, Sunday Times (23
September 2001).
3 ‘Iran refuses to back US action’, Metro (27 September 2001).
4 ‘New threat of chemical war’, Metro (19 September 2001).
5 ‘US airport staff face security screening’, Daily Telegraph (24 September 2001).
6 ‘SAS troops clash with Taliban unit deep inside Afghanistan’, Sunday Times (23
September 2001).
7 ‘Suicide scientist “was sole anthrax terrorist”’, Daily Telegraph (7 August 2008).
8 Barton Gellman, ‘Fears prompt US to beef up nuclear terror detection’,
Washington Post (3 March 2002).
Chapter 1
1 In 1970, the revolutionary left wing group Weather Underground, attempted to
blackmail a homosexual lieutenant at the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases in Fort Detrick, near Frederick Maryland,
into providing them with biological pathogens. Joseph Douglass Jr and Neil
Livingstone, America the Vulnerable (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1987); ‘Army
tells of plot to steal bacteria from Fort Detrick’, New York Times (21 November,
1970) pp.  31–32; Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction,
a publication of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Non Proliferation
Project of the Centre for Non Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies (October 1998); Jack Anderson, ‘Weatherman seeking
BW germs’, Washington Post (20 November 1970). In 1972 there were indications
of a terrorist plot to use chemical agents against a US army nuclear weapon
storage site in Europe. Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new
threat to public safety’, Conflict Studies, No. 295, Research Institute for the Study
of Conflict and Terrorism (December 1996) p. 11.
2 Andrew Hubback, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and

218 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Terrorism (June 1997) p. 5; Ron Purver, ‘The threat of chemical and biological
terrorism’, The Monitor, 3(2) (Spring 1997) p. 12.
3 In 1970 an individual was arrested whilst allegedly preparing to poison the city
water supply of Los Angeles with a biological poison. Neil Livingstone, The War
Against Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982) p. 112. In June 1974,
the Chief Military Officer of the Aliens of America, also known as the Alphabet
Bomber, a politically left wing group, claimed that postcards with nerve gas
under their stamps had been sent to all nine Justices of the US Supreme Court.
There were no injuries and no fatalities. Muharem Kurbegovic subsequently
admitted that he intended to kill President Gerald Ford with nerve gas and
‘bomb the Capitol building with a ‘projected nerve gas munition’. According
to one account he was in the process of purchasing the last ingredient when
he was arrested. Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. In
1976 in San Francisco, USA, an individual was apprehended in possession of
nerve gas; although other reports state that the individual was on the verge of
completing his nerve gas production. Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction. The same year Michael Townley smuggled Chilean produced
Sarin into the US in a perfume atomizer with the intention of assassinating
the former Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier. There were subsequent
reports that anti-Castro Cubans in the USA had learned of the Chilean produced
sarin, and had asked DINA, the Chilean intelligence organization, for some.
Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’, p. 14.
The other significant incident in 1976 came when US postal authorities seized
a package that contained a small charge designed to explode a vial of nerve gas
when the package was opened. An Arab terrorist group was suspected. William
Beecher, ‘Terrorist gangs, reaching for nerve gas, gruesome new weapons’,
Boston Sunday Globe (7 November 1976); Ian Ball, ‘Terror gang gets nerve gas’,
Daily Telegraph (8 November 1976).
4 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
5 Danny Shoham, Chemical and Biological Terrorism, An Intensifying Profile of a Non
Conventional Threat (The Arial Centre For Policy Research, 1998).
6 Fred Kaplan, ‘Arsenals of today’s terrorists’, Boston Globe (27 December 1983)
pp. 1–3.
7 David M. Rosenbaum, ‘Nuclear terror’, International Security, 1(3) (Winter 1977)
p. 147.
8 John. F. Murphy, ‘Co-operative international arrangements: prevention of
nuclear terrorism and the extradition and prosecution of terrorists’, in Paul
Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1986) p. 374.
9 Quoted in Alison Jamieson, Terrorism (Hove: Wayland, 1991) p. 44.
10 Konrad Kellen, ‘The potential for nuclear terrorism: a discussion’, in Leventhal
and Alexander: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 113.
11 Alexander and Leventhal: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism.

Notes 219
12 D.A. Henderson, ‘Bioterrorism as a public health threat’, Journal of Emerging
Diseases, 4(3) (June–September 1998) p. 1.
13 W. Seth Carus, A Case Study in Biological Terrorism, The Rajneesh in Oregon, 1984
(Centre for Counterproliferation Research National Defence University, 1997)
pp. 5–6.
14 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’, p. 14.
15 Keith B. Richburg, ‘Poison used in 19 deaths in Philippines’, Washington Post
(7 September 1987).
16 Jessica Stern, ‘Will terrorists turn to poison’, Orbis, 37(3) (Summer 1993) p. 396.
In 1989 (although some reports suggest 1988), one of the most celebrated cases
of food contamination occurred, when an unidentified person called the US
embassy in Santiago claiming that he had poisoned fruit destined for the USA
and Japan. The caller claimed that killing policemen and placing bombs had not
resolved the problems of Chile’s lower classes, and that he wanted to involve
other states. An exhaustive search by the US Food and Drug Administration led
to the discovery of two grapes that contained minute quantities of cyanide that
were not enough to kill an adult. The USA, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Germany
and Hong Kong suspended fruit imports from Chile, which the Chilean fruit
industry claimed cost an estimated US$333 million. The caller’s motivation is
not known, and neither is it clear that any tampering actually took place. There
have been many threats by animal rights activists to contaminate food products,
usually in protest against the use of animals in research. These have sometimes
caused significant economic losses to individual companies or sometimes entire
economies, but rarely has there been evidence of such contamination actually
occurring. Numerous examples of this type of threat can be cited involving
groups such as the Animal Aid Association (AAA) and the Animal Rights Militia
(ARM) in Canada, and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) in the UK. These
attacks were not necessarily intended to kill or injure but to cause economic
damage. In the short-term they were successful, but they achieved no lasting
outcome. One notable case involving the ALF was its suspected involvement in
the poisoning of eggs found in British supermarkets. The eggs were punctured
and marked with skull and crossbones. An attached message signed ‘ALF’,
warned that the eggs had been poisoned. In 1985 British police charged four
members of the ALF with injecting mercury into turkeys sold at supermarkets,
and in 1984 the confectionery manufacturer Mars, reportedly lost US$4.5
million, after a hoax in the UK, in which the ALF purported to have spiked
chocolate bars with rat poison, to protest against tooth decay experiments being
carried out on monkeys. Eight bars were found to contain notes, claiming that
‘cruelty based products’ had been adulterated. However, no poison was found.
17 Siegfried Buschschluter, ‘Neo-nazi weapons found’, Guardian (2 November
1981); Robert Tilley, ‘230 bombs in neo-nazi arms caches’, Daily Telegraph
(3 November 1981).
18 Carus: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, p. 127.

220 The Changing Face of Terrorism
19 Milton Leitenberg, ‘Biological weapons arms control’, Contemporary Security
Policy, 17(1) (April 1996) pp. 1–79; Siegfried Buschschluter, ‘Bacteria lab found
in terrorist hideout’, Guardian (8 November 1980).
20 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
21 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
22 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction.
23 D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror : Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996)
pp. 27–43, 20–24.
24 John M. Deutch, Speech to Harvard-Los Alamos Conference on Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, Washington,
DC (23 May 1996) .
25 Figures collated by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) show that
during the 1970s there were a total of 8,114 terrorists incidents worldwide,
which resulted in 4,978 deaths and 6,902 injured. During the 1980s there were
31,426 incidents, resulting in 70,859 deaths and 47,849 injured. The RAND-
St Andrews database of international terrorist incidents, which has been in
operation since 1968, records 2,536 incidents in the 1970s, resulting in 1,975
deaths, and records 3,658 incidents in the 1980s, resulting in 4,077 deaths.
26 Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror : Mass Destruction has Never been so Easy
(London: Vision Paperbacks, 1996) p. 52.
27 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998) p. 47.
28 Paul Wilkinson, ‘Terrorist targets: new risks to world order’, Conflict Studies, No.
236 (December 1990) p. 7.
29 Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’,
Survival, 40(3) (Autumn 1998) p. 52.
30 The terrorist incidents in the twentieth century which incurred more than 100
casualties are:
1999: bombing of a Moscow apartment block – 119 dead.
1998: bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania – 212 dead.
1995: bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building, Oklahoma City – 168 dead.
1993: co-ordinated series of ten bomb explosions in Bombay – 235 dead.
1989: bombing of an Avianca aircraft in Bogota – 107 dead.
1989: bombing of a French UTA airliner in Niger – 171 dead.
1988: bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland – 278 dead.
1987: Tamil Tigers’ shooting of Sinhalese civilians on a number of buses – over
100 dead.
1987: car bomb in a bus station in Sri Lanka – 113 dead.
1987: bombing of a South Korean Airliner on the Thai–Burma border – 117
dead.
1985: bombing of an Air India airliner over the Irish Sea – 328 dead.
1983: derailing of a train in India – over 200 dead.
1983: bombing of the US Marines barracks in Beirut – 241 dead.
1979: arson attack on a cinema in Abadan, Iran – 477 dead.

Notes 221
1946: poisoning of German POWs by the Jewish reprisal organization Nakam
– 100s dead.
1925: bombing of a cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria – 160 dead.
31 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 48.
32 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 47. For a fuller discussion of millenarianism see
Chapter 5.
33 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 48.
34 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 94.
35 The plots most closely linked to the networks of Christian right-wing extremists
are:
In May 1994 a court found four people who were linked to a militia group
of radical tax protestors known as the Patriots’ Council, guilty of possessing
ricin. Two of the group were convicted of conspiracy to assassinate federal
law enforcement officers by smearing the ricin on doorknobs. Conrad deFiebre,
‘Two convicted of possessing deadly poison’, Star Tribune (1 March 1995) p. 1B.
In April 1993, Thomas Lewis Lavy, who was alleged to have had links to
survivalist groups and other right-wing Christian Fundamentalists was
apprehended by Canadian Custom’s officials who discovered 130g of ricin and
manuals which described techniques for producing botulinum toxin and ricin.
In 1995, FBI agents arrested Lavy at his farm, where a large quantity of castor
beans, from which ricin is derived, were discovered. Statement for the Record
of Robert M Burnham Chief, Domestic Terrorism Section before the United
States House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce Hearing Witness,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Hearing Regarding: Threat
of Bioterrorism America: Assessing the Adequacy of Federal Law Relating
to Dangerous Biological Agents (1 June 1999). Richard Falkenrath, Robert
D. Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) p. 39.
In 1997 in Winsonsin, a makeshift laboratory for producing ricin was discovered
at the home of Thomas C. Leahy. Further analysis indicated that he had also
attempted to produce botulism, and had produced a lethal mixture of nicotine
sulfate which he mixed with dimethyl sulfoxide and placed in a spray bottle.
Animal viruses and vaccines, staph bacteria cultures, fungicides, insecticides,
hypodermic needles and gas masks were also found. Leahy claimed that he
wanted the poisons to ‘kill his enemies’ by sending them through the US Postal
Service and to ‘protect’ himself. Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction; ‘Excerpts: FBI report on domestic terrorism’, USIS Washington File
(17 April 1997).
In 1997 at the home of libertarian extremist James Dalton Bell investigators
discovered a cache of chemicals which included 500g of sodium cyanide,
disopropyl fluorophosphate, and a range of corrosive acids, and two precursors
used in sarin. Computer files revealed that Bell was interest in acquiring castor
beans and cultivating botulinum toxin. Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of

222 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Mass Destruction; John Branton, ‘Feds were looking for nerve gas and anthrax’,
Columbian (8 May 1997).
36 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’, p. 12;
Purver: ‘The threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, pp. 5–8; Wendy
Barnaby, The Plague Makers. The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London: Vision
Paperbacks, 1997) pp. 54–55; Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer: America’s Achilles
Heel, p. 40.
37 Karisa King, ‘Alleged plot involved anthrax, HIV and rabies’, Brownsville Herald
(14 July 1998); Diane Schiller, ‘Anthrax and HIV are suspected in valley plot’,
San Antonio Express (13 July 1998).
38 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction; John Branton, ‘Feds
were looking for nerve gas and anthrax’, Columbian (8 May 1997).
39 Shoham: Chemical and Biological Terrorism, p. 21.
40 The attacks in the 1990s perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo are:
In April 1990, cult members sprayed a solution of Botulinum toxin from three
vehicles as they drove near two US naval bases, Narita airport, the Diet, the
Imperial Palace and the HQ of a rival religious group. The attack failed.
In June 1993, it made an attempt to disrupt the wedding of Crown Prince
Naruhito by spraying botulinum toxin from a specially equipped vehicle cruising
central Tokyo. The attack failed.
June–July 1993. Cult members twice attempted to release anthrax from their
HQ building in eastern Tokyo. The attacks killed only birds and plants.
June–August 1993. Cult members twice attempted to use a truck equipped with
a spraying device to spread anthrax near the legislature, the Imperial Palace and
the Tokyo tower.
Late 1993/early 1994. Cult members twice attempted to kill the leader of the
Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect by spraying sarin outside of a building in which he
was giving a lecture. First by using a radio controlled helicopter and second with
a vehicle equipped with a spraying device.
May 1994. The attempted murder of an attorney by spraying sarin in the
ventilator system and on the windshield of his car.
June 1994. Cult members released sarin in a residential district of the town of
Matsumoto, from a specially equipped truck. There were seven fatalities and 144
confirmed serious injuries.
September 1994. The attempted murder of the writer Shoko Egawa, by
pumping phosgene gas through the letterbox of her apartment;
November and December 1994. On two separate occasions cult members
attempted to murder a man, first by squirting or injecting him with VX.
December 2004. The murder of a man by spraying his face or injecting him with
VX.
January 1995. The attempted murder of the leader of a group helping former
Aum members, by spraying him with VX.

Notes 223
February 1995. The attempted murder of the leader of a rival religious
organization, the Institute for Research into Human Happiness, by placing VX
in the air conditioning of his car.
March 1995. Cult members placed suitcases intended to release botulinum toxin
in Kasumigaseki subway station in Tokyo. However, one of the group had
replaced the toxin with water.
May 1995. Cult members left a crude device for producing hydrogen cyanide at
Shinjuku subway station.
Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999) p. 64; Evelyn le Chene, ‘Chemical and biological weapons proliferation,
and the problem of special interest groups’, Intersec, 7(6) (June 1997); Carus:
Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, pp. 63–66; Kyle Olsen, testifying at hearings conducted
by the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, October 1995:
‘Hearings on global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: a case study
of Aum Shinrikyo’, Senate Hearings 104–422, Global Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Part 1, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Committee of Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session,
Washington DC, US GPO (31 October 1995) pp. 87–88; Brackett: Holy Terror:
pp. 27–43; David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the
World: The Incredible Story of the Aum (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996)
pp.  190–198; ‘Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities’, Monterey
Institute for International Studies, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation
Studies, .
41 In 1995 the US authorities might have foiled an Aum Shinrikyo plot to use sarin
at Disneyland. Justice Department officials confirmed that Disney executives
did receive a threat, but denied any real plot by cult members. Terrorism in
the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. A US Senate Committee also
alleged that cult members tried to obtain the Ebola virus from Congo. Carus:
Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, pp. 63–66. In 1997 evidence given in court by Dr Ikuo
Hayashi revealed that Aum had also planned to release nerve gas in the USA
in June 1994. Dr Hayashi said, ‘The guru had ordered us to release sarin in
several places in America’. The plan was abandoned for unknown reasons.
‘Japanese cult said to have planned nerve gas attacks in US’, New York Times
International (23 March 1997). There were also allegations of plans to acquire
nuclear weapons, including an attempt in 1995 to obtain a nuclear warhead from
the black market in Russia. It was also alleged that the cult co-operated with
North Korea, Mafia Groups in the former Soviet Union, and indirectly with
Iran, in smuggling nuclear materials out of Russia. It was also reported that
during raids on Aum Shinrikyo facilities following the Tokyo subway attack,
Japanese police confiscated technical information on uranium enrichment
processes and a notebook that listed enquiries about the cost of obtaining a
nuclear warhead. Dr Hayashi alleged that Shoko Asahara had asked him, ‘What
do you think would happen if an atomic bomb was dropped on Washington?’
Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 65; Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, ‘Illicit

224 The Changing Face of Terrorism
trafficking in nuclear materials’, Conflict Studies, No. 314/315, Research Institute
for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (January–February 1999) p. 30; Kaplan
and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 190–198; ‘Japanese cult said
to have planned nerve gas attacks in US’, New York Times International (23 March
1997).
42 Programme for Promoting Nuclear Nonproliferation, Newsbrief (Fourth Quarter
1995) p. 15; Gavin Cameron, ‘Nuclear terrorism a real threat’, Jane’s Intelligence
Review (September 1996) pp. 422–455.
43 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’, p. 13.
44 Stefan Leader, ‘Osama bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’, Jane’s
Intelligence Review (June 1999) p. 36.
45 Michael Wines, ‘Kremlin offers video as proof ’, Moscow Times, reproduced in New
York Times Service (14 January 2000). Excerpt found on the internet at site ; Alice Lagnado, ‘Generals
replaced after Grozny setback’, The Times (8 January 2000); Marcus Warren,
‘Russians attack Grozny from all sides’, Daily Telegraph (27 December 1999);
Alice Lagnado, ‘Moscow Steps up Bombing of Grozny’, The Times (3 January
2000).
46 Incidents which occurred in the 1990s are:
1999: Adam Busby, leader of the Scottish National Liberation Army (SNLA)
issued blackmail letters in the name of the Republican Revenge Group, which
threatened to contaminate water supplies in the UK with the highly toxic weed
killer, paraquat, unless British troops were withdrawn from Northern Ireland.
1998: the Belgian authorities found evidence of Clostridium botulinum production
in a building associated with the Algerian terrorist organization, the GIA. Police
only confirm possession of a document on how to grow the botulinum.
1997: Israelis affiliated with an extreme non-political organization sprayed
harmful chemicals on Palestinian owned vineyards.
1997: Sydney, Australia, chlorine gas was used to attack two shopping centres.
The first attack injured four, and the second injured 19 people. The gas came
from a jar on the floor in the middle of the complex, the motive remains
unknown.
1997: Indian security forces seized four plastic jerry cans filled with chemicals
used by militants from a hide out in Baramulla district in North Kashmir. Earlier
the Border Security Force claimed to have seized a probable ‘chemicalized’
grenade from a militant hide out in Srinagar in January.
1996: Khmer Rouge guerrillas, in Thailand, poisoned streams being used by
government troops with highly toxic insecticides. There were reports of eight
soldiers being killed in one incident.
1996: at Long Island, New York, a group called the Long Island UFO Network
were reported to have acquired five canisters of radium. They had planned
to disperse it in the food, cars, and toothpaste of prominent Long Island
Republican Party politicians. Their motive was to reveal an alleged conspiracy to
cover up the crash landing of a UFO, and ultimately seize control of the county

Notes 225
government, but members were apprehended before they were able to poison
anyone.
1994: on New Years Eve, cyanide laced champagne killed at least nine Russian
soldiers and six civilians in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan. Another 53 were
hospitalized.
1994: the ALF mailed fragments of hypodermic needles allegedly contaminated
with HIV.
1992: in a mini market in Jerusalem, a Palestinian worker contaminated various
food articles with parathion.
1992: a Chilean judge investigated the use of sarin, which was produced by the
secret service DINA, the sarin was bottled into a spray device, and blown into
the faces of people from a political party. The victims died.
1992: the PKK poisoned water tanks at a Turkish air Force Compound in
Istanbul with lethal concentrations of potassium cyanide. It was discovered
before any casualties were incurred.
1992: the German authorities foiled a neo-Nazi plot to pump hydrogen cyanide
into a synagogue. There was also a neo-Nazi plot to ‘use Cyanide to murder
children in a Jewish day-care centre’ in Dallas, Texas, USA.
1991: January, in Baton Rouge, Los Angeles, Federal Agents uncovered a plot by
a biochemist, Stephen Ashburn, to spray US President Bush with sarin.
1990: June, there were reports of the use of Chlorine Gas by the Tamil Tigers
against Sri Lankan troops.
1990: Edinburgh Scotland, nine people were infected with Giardia lamblia (which
causes severe diarrhoea), when the water supply of their apartment building was
deliberately contaminated with giardia infected faeces.
47 Falkenrath et al.: America’s Achilles Heel.
48 International Physicians For the Prevention of Nuclear War, ‘Crude nuclear
weapons: proliferation and the terrorist threat’, IPPNW Global Health Watch
Report 1, p. 42.
49 Thomas J. Badey, ‘US anti-terrorism policy: the Clinton administration’,
Contemporary Security Policy, 19(2) (August 1998) p. 52.
50 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism: new threat to public safety?’, p. 20.
51 Badey: ‘US anti-terrorism policy’, p. 52.
52 Ehud Sprinzak, ‘The great superterrorism scare’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1998);
Ashton Carter, John Deutch and Philip Zelikow, ‘Catastrophic terrorism’,
Foreign Affairs (November–December 1998); Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 45.
53 Sam Nunn, ‘Terrorism meets proliferation: a post-Cold War convergence of
threats’, The Monitor, 3(2) (Spring 1997) p. 4.
54 Quoted in Robert Taylor, ‘All fall down’, Special Report, New Scientist (11 May
1996) p. 32.
55 Nunn, ‘Terrorism meets proliferation: a post-Cold War convergence of threats’,
p. 4.
56 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 94.

226 The Changing Face of Terrorism
57 Gail Bass et al., Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of
US Nuclear Programmes (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1980).
58 Bill Clinton, ‘Russians help to make chemical arms’, The Times (25 January 1999).
59 William Cohen, US Defense Secretary, quoted in Sprinzak: ‘The great
superterrorism scare’, p. 111.
60 Richard Betts, ‘The new threat of mass destruction’, Foreign Affairs (January–
February 1998), p. 27.
61 Falkenrath: ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’, p. 44.
62 ‘New world coming: American security in the 21st century’, Report of the US
Commission on National Security (15 September 1999) .
63 These attacks are:
2010: suicide bomb attack by the Pakistan Taliban on a volleyball game at Lakki
Marwat, Pakistan – 105 dead.
2009: car bomb attack by the Pakistan Taliban on the Peebal Mandi market in
Peshawar, Pakistan – approximately 120 dead.
2008: gun attack by Lashkar-e-Toiba on the Indian city of Mumbai – 166 dead.
2008: suicide bombing at a dog fight outside Kandahar, Afghanistan – over 100
dead.
2007: suicide car bomb, Amirli, Iraq – 156 dead.
2007: attempted assassination of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan, 2007 – approximately
150 dead.
2007: Yazhidi villages, Iraq, August 2007, four co-ordinated truck bombs –
approximately 400 dead.
2006: Baghdad, mortar fire and five car bombs in Sadr City – 215 dead.
2006: Mumbai, India, seven bombs placed by Islamist terrorists on commuter
trains – 183 dead.
2005: Hilla, Iraq, suicide car bomb – 125 dead.
2004: Karbala and Baghdad, co-ordinated attacks on Shi’a mosques – 181 dead.
2004: Beslan school siege, Russia – 334 dead.
2004: Madrid train bombs, 11 co-ordinated explosions – 191 dead.
2004: sinking of Superferry 14, by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines –
over 100 dead.
2003: Karbala, two car bombs explode outside the Imam Ali mosque – 125
dead.
2002: Bali nightclub bombings, Indonesia – 202 dead.
2002: Moscow theatre siege – 129 dead.
2001: Luanda, Angola, rebel attack on a train – 150 dead.
2001: 9/11 – approximately 3,000 dead.
In 2002 FARC killed 1999 civilians when a mortar bomb fired by its troops,
landed on a church. This incident is not included in the list because it is
considered to have been accidental, since it occurred during a battle with
government troops.
64 ‘Wind may explain mystery anthrax cases’, New Scientist (17 December 2001).

Notes 227
65 ‘Investigation of bioterrorism related anthrax’, JAMA (5 December 2001),
286(21) p. 2662.
66 Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, ‘Analysis of the anthrax attacks’, Federation of
American Scientists, .
67 ‘Anthrax sent by one man, FBI says’, The Times (10 November 2001).
68 Rosenberg: ‘Analysis of the anthrax attacks’.
69 ‘Suicide scientist “was sole anthrax terrorist”’, Daily Telegraph (7 August 2008).
70 Rosenberg: ‘Analysis of the anthrax attacks’.
71 ‘Al-Qaeda operatives discussed WMD attacks while training prior to 9/11,
report says’, Global Security Newswire (16 June 2004).
72 ‘Al-Qaeda plotted cyanide attack on Rome’s water’, The Times (21 February
2002); ‘Terror suspects on trial in Italy’, BBC News Online (5 February 2002)
.
73 ‘Raids yield clues to Europe-wide terrorist network’, The Times (25 January
2003); ‘Cyanide plot to poison Rome water’, Daily Telegraph (21 February 2002).
74 ‘Al-Qaeda plotted cyanide attack on Rome’s water’, The Times (21 February 2002);
‘Cyanide plotters face terror charges’, BBC News Online (21 February 2002)
; ‘Italians puzzle over
“cyanide plot”’, BBC News Online (21 February 2002) .
75 ‘Al-Qaeda planned US cyanide hit’, BBC News Online (18 June 2006) .
76 James Gordon, ‘Feds find poison plot vs Gulf troops’, Daily News (10 February
2003); Mike Toner, ‘Humble bean produces a deadly toxin’, Fox News Service (20
March 2003).
77 ‘Bin Laden British cell had plans for nerve gas attack on European Parliament’,
Sunday Telegraph (16 September 2001).
78 ‘Poison terror suspects linked to al-Qaeda training camp’, Sunday Times (12
January 2003); ‘Terror on the doorstep’, Sunday Times (12 January 2003); ‘How
poison trail spread to Britain’, Sunday Times (19 January 2003).
79 ‘Rare poison linked to terrorist plan attack in Britain’, Daily Telegraph (6 April
2004); ‘Chemical “bomb plot” in UK foiled’, BBC News Online (6 April 2004)
; ‘Muslim was planning dirty
bomb attack on the UK’, Daily Telegraph (14 October 2006); ‘Fertiliser bombers
jailed for at least 95 years’, Daily Telegraph (1 May 2007).
80 ‘Kurds leader backs US-led war on Iraq’, Sunday Telegraph (6 February 2003);
‘Makeshift ricin labs linked to bin Laden’s men’, Sunday Times (6 April 2003).
81 ‘Intelligence chiefs paint grim picture of proliferation’, Arms Control Today
(March 2003).
82 ‘Concern over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online (22 February 2007);
‘Chlorine bomb hits Iraqi village’, BBC News Online (16 May 2007). One attack
in Ramadi in April 2007 killed 35, one attack on Abu Sayda in May 2007, killed
32 and injured 50, one attack in Baghdad in February 2007 killed two, one attack

228 The Changing Face of Terrorism
North of Baghdad in February 2007, killed five and injured 150. One attack in
Anbar Province in February 2007, killed 12.
83 John Lumpkin, ‘US forces in Iraq find some cyanide’, Associated Press (7 February
2004); Douglas Jehl, ‘US aids report evidence tying al-Qaeda to attacks’, New
York Times (10 February 2004).
84 Adam Dolnik and Jason Pate, ‘2001 WMD terrorism chronology’, James Martin
Center for Non Proliferation Studies, .
85 ‘County Durham man admits ricin terror plot’, BBC News Online (6 March 2010)
.
86 ‘Three charged over plot to attack London underground’, Daily Telegraph (17
November 2002).
87 Jonathan B. Tucker and Amy Sands, ‘An unlikely threat’, Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, July/August 1999, p. 48.
88 Presentation by Dr Amy Sands, ‘CBRN terrorism: assessing the threat’, The
Seventh Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington DC,
January 11–12, 1999, .
89 Presentation by Dr Amy Sands, ‘CBRN terrorism: assessing the threat’.
90 Presentation by Dr Amy Sands, ‘CBRN terrorism: assessing the threat’.
Chapter 2
1 David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible
Story of the Aum (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996) p. 102.
2 ‘Patent blunder’, Scientific American (November 1998) p. 25.
3 ‘Al-Qaeda woos recruits with nuclear bomb website’, Sunday Times (6 November
2005).
4 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and
weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review, 12(3) (November 2005)
pp. 632–637.
5 Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism: new threat to public safety’,
Conflict Studies, 295 (December 1996–January 1997) p. 4.
6 The essence of biotechnology is growing large numbers of cells under
controlled conditions. At its simplest it involves the use of living organisms in
agriculture, food and other industrial processes. The biotechnology industry is
now thriving in many industrialized states.
7 ‘New routes to old poisons’, Guardian (4 November 1998).
8 Interview, name withheld by request (23 March 1999).
9 J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Marman and Jacob
Wechsler, ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, in Paul Leventhal and Yonah
Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books,
1987) p. 58.

Notes 229
10 Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough and Evan Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear
Proliferation (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1995) p. 10.
11 Mark et al.: ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, p. 57.
12 Mark et al.: ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, p. 64.
13 Mark et al.: ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, p. 55.
14 Mark et al.: ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, p. 58.
15 Frank Barnaby, ‘Nuclear terrorism’, Safe Energy, 95 (June–July 1993) p. 11.
16 Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror : Mass Destruction Has Never Been So Easy
(London: Vision Paperbacks, 1996) p. 170.
17 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 169.
18 International Physicians For the Prevention of Nuclear War, ‘Crude nuclear
weapons: proliferation and the terrorist threat’, Report No 1 (1996) p. 5.
19 Robert Mullen, ‘Nuclear violence’, in Leventhal and Alexander: Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism, p. 56.
20 Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, pp. 60–63.
21 Richard Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley Thayer: America’s Achilles
Heel, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1988) p. 136.
22 Frank Barnaby, ‘Issues surrounding crude nuclear explosives, in crude nuclear
weapons, proliferation and the terrorist threat’, IPPNW Information Series,
Health Watch, p. 10.41; Section 2 of Alexander and Leventhal: Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism, pp. 91–164.
23 US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and
Safeguards (Washington DC: Office of Technology Assessment, 1977).
24 Peter D. Zimmerman and Cheryl Loeb, ‘Dirty bombs: the threat revealed’,
Defense Horizons, No. 38, Center for Technology and National Security Policy,
National Defense University (Washington DC, January 2004).
25 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999) p. 56.
26 Salama and Hansell: ‘Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and weapons of
mass destruction’, p. 641.
27 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p.  173. Other suitable isotopes include
polonium-210, lithium-6, americium-241, yttrium-90, iridium-192,
plutonium-238, radium-226, and californium-252. Zimmerman and Loeb:
‘Dirty bombs: the threat revealed’.
28 Barnaby: ‘Nuclear terrorism’, p. 12.
29 A potential fifth category comprises ‘incapacitating agents’, such as
hallucinogens, CS, BZ, or other psychochemical agents. However these agents
are not designed to kill or injure but to cause disorientation to the individual, and
their effects are relatively short term. Therefore their interest value to terrorists
is limited, with their primary value perhaps lying in how their use might generate
media attention.
30 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 134.

230 The Changing Face of Terrorism
31 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 24.
32 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 24.
33 ‘Concern over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online (22 February 2007);
‘Chlorine bomb hits Iraqi village’, BBC News Online (16 May 2007).
34 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 6.
35 D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror : Armageddon In Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996)
p. 114.
36 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 2.
37 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 113.
38 Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer: America’s Achilles Heel, p. 107.
39 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 109.
40 Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’,
Survival, 40(3) (Autumn 1998) p. 48.
41 Interview with Dr Alistair Hay, University of Leeds (28 April 1999).
42 Interview, name withheld by request (23 March 1999).
43 Aum Shinrikyo started its CW programme in 1992, and the first attack using
sarin occurred in the Spring of 1994.
44 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 121.
45 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 116.
46 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 117.
47 Kyle Olsen, testifying at Hearings conducted by the US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations October 1995. ‘Hearings on global proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction: a case study of Aum Shinrikyo’, Senate
Hearings 104–422, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Part 1, Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee of Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 104th Congress, 2nd Session,
Washington DC, US GPO (31 October 1995) pp. 87–88. Brackett, Holy Terror,
pp. 27–43.
48 Wendy Barnaby, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare (London:
Vision Paperbacks, 1997) p. 23.
49 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 96.
50 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 136.
51 ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects (U)’, Central Intelligence Agency, May
2003.
52 Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer: America’s Achilles Heel, p. 123.
53 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 51.
54 Robert Taylor, ‘All fall down’, Special Report, New Scientist (11 May 1996) p. 33.
55 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 53.
56 Wendy Barnaby: The Plague Makers, p. 45.
57 Taylor: ‘All fall down’, p. 34.
58 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 114.
59 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 96.
60 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 68.
61 Taylor: ‘All fall down’, p. 35.

Notes 231
62 Interview with Dr Alistair Hay (28 April 1999).
63 Wendy Barnaby: The Plague Makers, p. 129.
64 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 233.
65 Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe (New York: Doubleday,
1997) pp. 1–12.
66 William Webster, The Nuclear Black Market, International Task Force Study (The
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, USA, 1996).
67 Cockburn and Cockburn: One Point Safe, pp. 1–12.
68 National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of
Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (February 2002) pp. 2 and 6.
69 Norman Crossland, ‘Mustard gas theft follows terrorist threat to Stuttgart’, The
Guardian (13 May 1975). Richard Falkenrath et al., however, argue that it is not
clear that the terrorists even possessed the gas canisters, many of which were
recovered later. Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer: America’s Achilles Heel, p. 37.
70 ‘Planned bank raids with quick killing nerve gas: sellers arrested in Vienna,
manufacturer taken into custody in Berlin; terrorist groups also interested’, Der
Spiegel (8 March 1976).
71 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 16.
72 The uranium enrichment process requires highly specialized equipment such
as gas centrifuges. Establishing a clandestine facility to enrich uranium will take
considerable time and expense, even assuming that manufacturers will supply
such equipment to individuals who are not affiliated with major nuclear facilities
or institutions. Plutonium can be separated from nuclear fuel rods through
a series of chemical processes, which are relatively easier to master than the
enrichment of uranium. This does not necessarily require industrial-scale
facilities: laboratory-size facilities called ‘hot cells’ can be used to separate small
quantities. With these two processes, the smaller the facility, the longer will be
the time required to separate the necessary amount. The longer the time, the
greater the risk of detection. Equally, the bigger the facility, the greater the risk
of detection. However these are extremely complex processes even for states
to master, and the thought of small terrorist cells building and running such
facilities clandestinely is almost inconceivable, as is the use of existing facilities.
In the background papers of the 1985 Task Force, Robert Mullen provides an
indication of what establishing a plutonium separation facility would involve:
‘To build that facility, they need a site and the planning and design of the facility
by architects, engineers and plutonium chemists. They would need to survey,
grade, and excavate for the four major elements of the facility: the spent fuel
feed handling area, the hot processing line, the plutonium clean up and storage
area, and the waste handling operation. Once the site was prepared skilled
workers would be required to pour a lot of concrete; other skilled workers
would have to install specialized mechanical, plumbing, and electrical systems,
including the radiation shielding and remote handling equipment. The terrorists
would then have to acquire, store, and install the processing equipment.’ The
complexity of this task increases the likelihood of failure: secrecy would be

232 The Changing Face of Terrorism
hard to maintain, the theft of spent fuel would trigger a massive search, the
number of people involved raises security risks, there is a danger of defections
from the groups considering the hazardous nature of the undertaking and its
consequences, and then there are the dangers associated with the process itself.
Consequently, Mullen concluded that separating plutonium was not a credible
option for a terrorist group. Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, p. 232.
73 For a fuller account of nuclear smuggling from the Former Soviet Union, see
Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr, Richard A. Falkenrath and Steven E.
Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
74 Second Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile
Material Report 2007, pp. 10 and 14, .
75 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 162; Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, ‘Illicit
trafficking in nuclear materials’, Conflict Studies, 314/315, Research Institute for
the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (January–February 1999) p. 10.
76 Hoffman and Claridge: ‘Illicit trafficking’, p. 12. This includes cases in 1992, when
3.7lb of HEU were stolen from the Luch Scientific Production Association and
in 1993 when 10lb was stolen from Murmansk naval base, although the Russian
authorities apprehended both perpetrators.
77 National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of
Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (February 2002) pp. 2 and 6.
78 Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 165.
79 John Sopko, ‘The changing proliferation threat’, Foreign Policy, 103 (Winter
1996–97) p. 10.
80 Allison et al.: Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, p. 45.
81 Staff Report, ‘IAEA illicit trafficking database releases latest aggregate statistics’,
IAEA (11 September 2007) .
82 Summary Listing of Incidents Involving Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials
and Other Radioactive Sources (4th Quarter 1996), attached to IAEA’s Letter of
29 January 1997, Reference N4.11.42.
83 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, ‘Nuclear terrorism’s fatal assumptions’, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists (23 October 2007).
84 Sopko: ‘The changing proliferation threat’, p. 9.
85 Sopko: ‘The changing proliferation threat’, p. 11.
86 ‘Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW activities’, Monterey Institute for
International Studies, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation Studies,
.
87 ‘New routes to old poisons’, Guardian (4 November 1998); Purver: ‘Chemical
and biological terrorism’, p. 7.
88 The Australia Group is a cartel of chemical producers that operate an informal
export control regime, based upon lists of chemical precursors. Under the rules
of the group, the export of any listed chemicals from a member group will be
denied if there concern that it might be used in a CW programme.

Notes 233
89 Michael Barletta, ‘Chemical weapons in the Sudan: allegations and evidence’,
Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, p. 123.
90 For a fuller description of the Convention, see Chapter 8.
91 Masha Katsva, ‘Threat of chemical and biological terrorism in Russia’, The
Monitor (Spring 1997) p. 15.
92 Katsva: ‘Threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 15.
93 Interview with Dr Alistair Hay (28 April 1999).
94 Interview with Dr Alistair Hay (28 April 1999).
95 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 132.
96 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 139.
97 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 29.
98 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 29.
99 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 279–280.
100 ‘Concern over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online (22 February 2007),
‘Chlorine bomb hits Iraqi village’, BBC News Online (16 May 2007).
101 Falkenrath, Newman and Thayer: America’s Achilles Heel, p.  123; Falkenrath:
‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’, p. 47.
102 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 235.
103 Interview with Julian Perry Robinson, University of Sussex (23 February 1999).
104 Brackett: Holy Terror, pp. 32–33.
105 Karl Lowe, ‘Analysing technical constraints on bio-weapons: are they
important?’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons:
Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Control
Institute, 1997) p. 54.
106 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 6.
107 ‘Water terror plot foiled’, Observer (11 July 1999).
108 Lowe: ‘Analysing technical constraints’, p. 55.
109 Hoffman and Claridge: ‘Illicit trafficking’, p. 17.
110 Sopko: ‘The changing proliferation threat, p. 6.
111 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 4.
112 In 1991 a secret operation by the environmental organization Greenpeace called
Loose Cannon apparently came within weeks of taking delivery of a Russian
nuclear weapon. Greenpeace offered a Soviet soldier £150,000. Just before the
exchange was to take place the British, US, German, or Russian intelligence
services picked up on Greenpeace’s communications and the Russian army
officer was apprehended. In September 1996, a number of Russian soldiers
were killed when the warhead of a missile they were probably trying to steal
exploded at a military base in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in Russia’s Far East.
According to Frank Barnaby who quotes intelligence sources, a number of FSU
nuclear weapons are missing. In the mid 1980s, before the Soviet Union began
to break up, there were about 30,000 nuclear weapons on Soviet territory. The
majority of these weapons may still be secure, while they are in the hands of the
military, but given the fact that many Russian troops are extremely badly paid, if
paid at all, there is a risk that a device could fall into the wrong hands.

234 The Changing Face of Terrorism
113 Purver: ‘Chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 6.
114 Ron Purver: ‘The threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, The Monitor
(Spring 1997) p. 5.
115 Purver: ‘The threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 7.
116 Purver: ‘The threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 7.
117 Purver: ‘The threat of chemical and biological terrorism’, p. 6.
118 Interview with Dr Alistair Hay (28 April 1999).
119 Muhammad Salah, ‘Bin Ladin front reportedly bought CBW from E. Europe’,
Al-Hayah (20 April 1999). Al-Qaeda also reportedly purchased three CBW
factories in the former Yugoslavia and hired a number of Ukrainian chemists
and biologists to train its members. Guido Olimpio, ‘Islamic group said
preparing chemical warfare on the West’, Corriere della Sera (8 July 1998) and
Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man who Declared War on America (Roseville,
CA: Prima, 2001) p.  326. In 1998 John Gannon, Chairman of the National
Intelligence Council revealed that the CIA had discovered that al-Qaeda had
attempted to acquire unspecified CW for use against US troops stationed in
the Persian Gulf. Barry Schweid, ‘US suggests Iraq got weapons from Sudan’,
Record (New Jersey) (27 August 1998). In 1999 reports indicated that al-Qaeda
had constructed crude CBW labs in Khost and Jalalabad, and had acquired
ingredients for CW and BW from states of the FSU. John McWetty, ‘Bin Laden
set to strike again?’, ABC News (16 June 1999). There were also reports that al-
Qaeda affiliates had attempted to create a pesticide/nerve agent with a very high
absorption rate. Alan Culluson and Andrew Higgins, ‘Computer in Kabul holds
chilling memos, Wall Street Journal (31 December 2001).
120 Khalid Sharaf-al-Din, Al-Sharq-al-Awsat and Washington’s Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS); A.J. Venter, ‘Elements loyal to bin Laden acquire
biological agents through the mail’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 1999); Paul
Daley, ‘Report says UBL-linked terrorist groups possess deadly anthrax, plague
viruses’, Melbourne Age (4 June 2000).
121 ‘Afghan alliance – UBL trying to make chemical weapons’, Parwan Payam-e-
Mojahed (23 December 1999); John McWethy, ‘Bin Laden set to strike again’,
ABC News (16 June 1999).
122 ‘Inside bin Laden’s academies of terror’, Sunday Times (7 October 2001);
‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects (U)’, Central Intelligence Agency, May
2003; ‘Bin Laden’s biological threat’, BBC News Online (28 October 2001).
123 ‘Weapons worries’, CBS News (18 July 2002).
124 Salama and Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability?: al-Qaeda and weapons of
mass destruction’, p. 618.
125 ‘Scientists confirm bin Laden weapon tests’, The Times (29 December 2001).
126 ‘Terrorist CBRN: materials and effects (U)’, Central Intelligence Agency, May
2003.
127 ‘Schools of terror that taught how to kill’, The Times (29 December 2001).
128 Jason Burke, Al-Qa’ida Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003)
p. 187.

Notes 235
129 ‘Al-Qaeda nuclear plans confirmed’, BBC News Online (16 November 2001) .
130 ‘Prize prisoners betray al-Qaeda secrets’, Sunday Telegraph (2 December 2001);
‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph (13 December
2001).
131 ‘Network studied Oklahoma style bomb’, Sunday Times (18 November 2001);
‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph (13 December
2001).
132 ‘Uranium and cyanide found in drums at bin Laden base’, Daily Telegraph (23
December 2001); ‘Marines called in after discovery of germ war plant’, The Times
(23 March 2002).
133 Judith Miller, ‘Lab suggests al-Qaeda planned to build arms, officials say’, New
York Times (14 September 2002).
134 ‘Al-Qaeda: anthrax found in al-Qaeda home’, Global Security Newswire (10
December 2001); Judith Miller, ‘Labs suggest al-Qaeda planned to build arms,
officials say’, New York Times (14 September 2002).
135 Thom Shanker, ‘US analysts find no sign bin Laden had nuclear arms’, New York
Times (26 February 2002). The first reports of al-Qaeda attempting to purchase
nuclear weapons surfaced in 1998 when a leaked intelligence report stated that
al-Qaeda paid over £2 million to a middle man in Kazakhstan for a ‘suitcase
bomb’. Marie Colvin, ‘Holy war with US in his sights’, The Times (16 August
1998). The same year he was alleged to have paid a group of Chechens $30
million and two tonnes of opium in exchange for approximately 20 nuclear
warheads. Riyad Alam al-Din, ‘Report links bin Ladin, nuclear weapons’, Al-
Watan al-Arabi (13 November 1998); Emil Torabi, ‘Bin Laden’s nuclear weapons’,
Muslim Magazine (Winter 1998). In 2000, the intelligence services of an unnamed
European country reportedly intercepted a shipment of approximately 20
nuclear warheads originating from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and
Ukraine, intended for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. ‘Arab security sources speak of
a new scenario for Afghanistan: secret roaming networks that exchange nuclear
weapons for drugs’, Al-Sharq al-Aswat (24 December 2000). In 2001, bin Laden
allegedly bought 48 suitcase sized nuclear weapons from the Russian mafia. ‘Al-
Majallah obtains serious information on al-Qa’ida’s attempt to acquire nuclear
arms’, Al-Majallah (8 September 2002). The same year, al-Qaeda reportedly
acquired a Russian-made suitcase sized nuclear weapon from Central Asian
sources. ‘N-weapons may be in US already’, Daily Telegraph (Sydney Australia)
(14 November 2001). In 2002, al-Qaeda operative abu Zubayda, claimed that al-
Qaeda had the knowledge to construct a dirty bomb and hinted that there may
be such a device in the USA. Jamie McIntyre, ‘Zubaydah: al-Qaeda had dirty
bomb know how’, CNN (22 April 2002). In 2003, British intelligence discovered
documents in Afghanistan which suggest that al-Qaeda had built a radiological
weapon, using medical isotopes provided by the Taliban. Ed Johnson, ‘Report:
al-Qaeda made bomb in Afghanistan’, Associated Press (30 January 2003). In

236 The Changing Face of Terrorism
2004 Ayman Al Zawahiri claimed that al-Qaeda possessed nuclear weapons
purchased in Central Asia as well as ‘portable nuclear material’. Max Delany,
‘Under attack al-Qaeda makes nuclear claim’, Moscow News (3 March 2004). In
2005 it was alleged that Pakistani businessman Saifullah Paracha claimed to al-
Qaeda operatives that he knew where to obtain nuclear weapons, but he denied
the allegations. ‘Pakistani told al-Qaeda operatives to acquire nuclear weapons,
US investigators say’, Nuclear Threat Initiative (11 February 2005); Frank Davies,
‘US alleges Pakistani businessman urged al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons’,
Miami Herald (11 February 2005). In 2004, the Egyptian newspaper La-Hayat
reported that al-Qaeda had purchased tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine
in 1998. ‘Al-Qaeda said to possess nuclear arms’, Associated Press (9 February
2004). The same year reports indicated that al-Qaeda-affiliate Midhat Mursi (aka
Abu Khabab) may have been constructing a dirty bomb. Muhammad Wajdi
Qandyl, ‘Searching for weapons of mass destruction and al-Qaeda’, Al-Akhbar
(18 January 2004).
Reports of efforts by al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear material seem to date
back to the mid 1990s, when he reportedly secured the services of an Egyptian
scientist who procured 1kg of Uranium form South Africa. Rohan Gunaratne,
Inside al Qa’ida Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst, 2002) p.  187. In the
late 1990s, Jama Ahmed Fadl, one of the al-Qaeda terrorists who carried out
the 1998 bomb attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was paid
US$10,000 to buy uranium from a former Sudanese army officer. ‘Inside bin
Laden’s nuclear arsenal’, Daily Telegraph (23 December 2001). In 1998, the
Russian intelligence services allegedly blocked a deal in which a Pakistani
firm controlled by bin Laden attempted to purchase uranium. Earl Lane and
Knut Royce, ‘Nuclear aspirations? Sources: bin Laden tried to obtain enriched
uranium’, Newsday (19 September 2001). The same year, the German authorities
arrested Mamduh Salim, an aide to bin Laden, on trying to obtain nuclear
materials including HEU. Benjamin Weiser, ‘US says bin Ladin aide tried to
get nuclear weapons’, New York Times (26 September 1998). In 2000, al-Qaeda
envoys were sent to Eastern Europe to purchase enriched uranium but were
unsuccessful. ‘Arab security sources speak of a new scenario for Afghanistan:
secret roaming networks that exchange nuclear weapons for drugs’, Al-Sharq
al-Aswat (24 December 2000). In 2001, al-Qaeda allegedly obtained seven
enriched uranium rods from Mafia connections. Uthman Tizghart, ‘Does bin
Laden really possess weapons of mass destruction? Tale of Russian mafia boss
Simion Mogilevich who supplied bin Ladin with the nuclear dirty bomb’, Al-
Majallah (25 November 2001). In 2001 Jamal al-Fadhl claims that he investigated
the possibility of purchasing uranium for al-Qaeda. Kimberly McCloud and
Matthew Osborne, ‘WMD terrorism and Usama bin Ladin’, CNS Report (20
November 2001). The same year, Russian businessman Ivan Ivanov claims that
he met bin Laden in China to discuss setting up a company to buy nuclear waste.
Adam Nathan and David Leppard, ‘Al-Qaeda’s men held secret meetings to build
dirty bomb’, Sunday Times (14 October 2001). In 2002 the Russian intelligence

Notes 237
services allegedly blocked an attempt by al-Qaeda to acquire 11lbs of radioactive
thallium from measuring devices in decommissioned Russian submarines, and
the same year German police arrested al-Qaeda member Ibrahim Muhammad
K who had allegedly attempted to purchase 48g of uranium in Luxembourg.
Craig Whitlock, ‘Germany arrests two al-Qaeda suspects’, Washington Post (24
January 2005). Al-Qaeda insider Abu Walid al-Misri alleged that bin Laden
was pressured by network affiliates to purchase radiological material through
contacts in Chechnya. Nick Fielding, ‘Bin Laden’s dirty bomb quest exposed’,
The Times (19 December 2004). In 2001, bin Laden told two Pakistani scientists
that al-Qaeda’s cache of radioactive material seems to have been provided by
the Radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which acquired it from within
the Former Soviet Union, but according to the two Pakistani scientists it was
insufficient for a use as a weapon. ‘Inside bin Laden’s nuclear arsenal’, Daily
Telegraph (23 December 2001).
136 ‘Nuke plans found: Brit paper discovers details of weapons in Kabul safe house’,
Toronto Sun (15 November 2001); Hugh Dougherty, ‘Afghan nuclear weapons
papers may be internet spoofs’, Press Association (19 November 2001); ‘Osama
bin Laden’s bid to acquire weapons of mass destruction represents the greatest
threat that Western civilization has faced’, Mail On Sunday (23 June 2002).
137 ‘Prize prisoners betray al-Qaeda secrets’, Sunday Telegraph (2 December 2001);
‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph (13 December
2001).
138 Maria Ressa, ‘Reports: al-Qaeda operative sought anthrax’, CNN (10 October
2003); Judith Miller, ‘US has new concerns about anthrax readiness’, New York
Times (28 December 2003).
139 William Safire, ‘Tying Saddam to terrorist organizations’, New York Times (25
August 2002); ‘UK knew of bioterror tests in Iraq’, BBC News Online (20 August
2002). There are other unconfirmed reports that Ansar al Islam also obtained
quantities of VX and developed aflatoxin, Bart Gellman, ‘US suspects al-Qa’ida
got nerve agent from Iraqi analysts: chemical may be VX, and was smuggled
via Turkey’, Washington Post (12 December 2002); ‘Ansar al Islam’, Federation of
American Scientists (30 April 2004); Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qa’ida’s Armies: Middle
East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror (New York: Washington
Institute for near East Policy, 2005) citing Isma’il Zayir, ‘Ansar al-Islam group
accuses Talabani of spreading rumours about its co-operation with al-Qa’ida,
Al-Hayat (22 August 2002).
140 Barton Gellman, ‘Al-Qaida near biological, chemical arms production’,
Washington Post (23 March 2003).
141 Program transcript – terrorist attacks in Iraq, NBC Nightly News (2 March 2004).
142 ‘Al-Qaeda made biological weapons in Georgia – French Minister’, Moscow News
(3 January 2005). Andrew McGregor, ‘Ricin fever: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the
Pankisi gorge’, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. II, Issue 24,
16 December 2004, p. 11.

238 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Chapter 3
1 Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, ‘Terror international: hostages,
hijackings and bombings in the early 1970s’, War In Peace, pp. 1509–1515.
2 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (London: St Martin’s Press, 1998) pp. 157–
158.
3 Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London:
I.B.Tauris, 1998) pp. 88–91.
4 Yitzhak Shamir, Summing Up: An Autobiography (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson,
1994) pp. 22–23.
5 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 161. The 1992 City of London bomb cost
£350 million, whilst the February 1996 bomb in the Docklands area of London
cost £75–150 million.
6 James Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London:
Hutchinson, 1994) p. 185.
7 Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA (London: HarperCollins, 1995) pp. 383–384.
8 Ibrahim Karawan, ‘The Islamist impasse’, Adelphi Paper 341, International
Institute for Strategic Studies (London: OUP, 1997) pp. 7–20.
9 ‘Follow these steps to commit mass murder’, Metro (14 September 2001).
10 ‘Al-Qaeda terror manual orders attack on Big Ben’, Sunday Telegraph (3 February
2002).
11 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004) p. 23.
12 Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror : Mass Destruction has Never been so Easy
(London: Vision Paperbacks, 1996) p. 102.
13 ‘Viper militia – up in arms’, PBS (2 July 1996) .
14 ‘The atomic bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki’, Wikipedia .
15 Frank Barnaby: Instruments of Terror, p. 132.
16 ‘Wind may explain mystery anthrax cases’, New Scientist (17 December 2001).
17 Christina S. Polyk, Jonathan T. Macy, Margarita Irizarry-De La Cruz, James
E. Lai, Jay F. McAuliffe, Tanja Popovic, Seregan P. Pillai, Eric D. Mintz, and
the Emergency Operations Center International Team, ‘Bioterrorism related
anthrax: international response by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’, Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8(10), .
18 ‘Muslim was planning dirty bomb attack on the UK’, Daily Telegraph (14 October
2006).
19 Sammy Salama and David Wheeler, ‘From the horses mouth: unravelling al-
Qaeda’s target selection calculus’, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation
Studies (17 April 2007) .
20 In Sri Lanka, between 1983 and 1987, a militant group of Tamil guerrillas
threatened to introduce anti plant pathogens against rubber plants and tea

Notes 239
bushes, which are two of Sri Lanka’s major export products. There was no
evidence that any such attacks were ever carried out. Milton Leitenberg,
‘Biological weapons arms control’, Contemporary Security Policy, 17:1(April 1996)
pp. 1–79. Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka: Institute of
Fundamental Studies, 1987) pp. 51–52.
21 Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the
20th Century (Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense
University, July 1999) pp. 80–81.
22 Michael Baumann, ‘The mind of a German terrorist’, Encounter, 51(3)
(September 1978) p. 87.
23 Brian Jenkins, ‘Will terrorists go nuclear?’, Orbis, 29(3) (Fall 1985) pp. 514–15.
24 ‘Terms of war and peace’, Time (4 March 1996) p. 37.
25 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? al-Qaeda and
weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review, 12(3) (November 2005)
pp. 625 and 626.
26 Hamid Mir, ‘Osama claims he has nukes: if US uses N-arms it will get same
response’, Dawn (10 November 2001).
27 Cleto DiGiovanni Jr, ‘Domestic terrorism with chemical or biological agents:
psychiatric aspects’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 156(10) (October 1999)
p. 1502
28 Brian Michael Jenkins, ‘International terrorism: a new mode of conflict’, in
David Carlton and Carlo-Schaerf (eds), International Terrorism and World Security
(London: Croom Helm, 1975) p. 15.
29 ‘US nuclear plants exposed to attacks’, BBC News Online (5 September 2002);
Bill Gertz, ‘Nuclear plants targeted’, Washington Times (31 January 2002); John J.
Lumpkin, ‘Diagrams show interest in nuke plants’, Associated Press (30 January
2002).
30 Martin Arostegui, ‘Terrorism in Morocco deeper than imagined’, United
Press International (7 June 2003); ‘Frenchman on trial in Morocco over suicide
bombings’, Agence France Presse (25 August 2003).
31 Daniel Hirsch, ‘The truck bomb and insider threats to nuclear facilities’, in Paul
Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1986) p. 207.
32 Hirsch: ‘The truck bomb’, p. 207.
33 Hirsch: ‘The truck bomb’, p. 209.
34 Hirsch: ‘The truck bomb’, p. 210.
35 Oleg Bhukarin, ‘Problems of nuclear terrorism’, The Monitor (Spring 1997) p. 9.
36 Robert Mullen, ‘Nuclear violence’, in Leventhal and Alexander (eds): Preventing
Nuclear Terrorism, p. 237.
37 Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, p. 239.
38 Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, p. 239.
39 Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, p. 241.
40 Mullen: ‘Nuclear violence’, p. 242.

240 The Changing Face of Terrorism
41 Keesings Record of World Events (March 1985) pp. 33467–33468; (April 1988)
p. 35839.
42 Maxine Angela Roberts, The Chernobyl Incident of 1986: Its Impact on Soviet
Agriculture, MSc dissertation, Wye College, University of London (July 1993)
p. 42.
43 Hirsch: ‘The truck bomb’, p. 215.
44 ‘Terror on the doorstep’, Sunday Times (12 January 2003).
45 Salama and Hansell: ‘Does intent equal capability?’, pp. 626–628.
Chapter 4
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998) p. 157.
2 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: Why Suicide Bombers do It (NewYork: Random House,
2005) pp. 188–197.
3 Pape: Dying to Win, pp. 188–197.
4 ‘Follow these steps to commit mass murder’, Metro (14 September 2001).
5 ‘Bin Laden issues fresh threat of suicide attacks’, Sunday Telegraph (14 October
2001).
6 Pape: Dying to Win, pp. 254–255.
7 ‘Timeline: Oklahoma bomb’, BBC News Online (2 March 2007) .
8 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (London: St Martin’s Press, 1988) p. 34.
9 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) p. 103.
10 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 115.
11 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 48.
12 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 48.
13 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 115.
14 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 48.
15 Yosi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story of Abu Nidal (London: Sidgwick
& Jackson, 1986) p. 68.
16 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris,
2006) pp. 117–119.
17 Pape: Dying to Win, pp. 209–210.
18 ‘The Middle East’s bloodstained spiral’, Economist (9 March 2002).
19 Konrad Kellen, ‘The potential for nuclear terrorism: a discussion’, in Paul
Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1986) pp. 113–115. Al Jihad and Al Gamaah Islamiyah
in Egypt escalated their level of violence, particularly against the tourist industry
when their position within mainstream society began to deteriorate in 1992.
Richard Engel, ‘Egypt digs for the truth’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (24 February
1999) p. 2.2.
20 Kellen: ‘The potential for nuclear terrorism’, p. 115.
21 Conor Gearty: Terror (London: Faber & Faber, 1991) pp. 102, 106, 120–121.

Notes 241
22 Gearty: Terror, p. 105.
23 ‘IRA arms may go to rogue factions’, Sunday Telegraph (4 July 1999).
24 Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’,
Conflict Studies, No. 295, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (December 1996) p. 14.
25 ‘Two jailed for vodka poison plot’, BBC News Online (25 January 2008) .
26 Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, ‘Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials’,
Conflict Studies, No. 314/315, Research Institute For The Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (January–February 1999) p. 28.
27 Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar : Mrs Ghandi’s Last Battle (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1985) p. 102.
28 Official government figures put the number of Hindus killed at 165 in the first
22 months of Bindranwale’s campaign. Tully and Jacob: Amritsar, p. 125.
29 Gearty: Terror, p. 105.
30 ‘Frequently asked questions: white power’, Aryan Nations webpage, .
31 Andrew Hubback, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (June 1997) p. 5.
32 ‘Attack is tip of hate crime iceberg’, Guardian (11 August 1999).
33 Martin Durham, ‘The American far right and 9/11’, Terrorism and Political
Violence,15(2) (June 2003) p. 99.
34 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 131.
35 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 158.
36 Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998) p. 65.
37 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 171.
38 Ely Karmon, ‘Bin Laden is out to get America!’, The International Policy
Institute For Counter Terrorism (29 October 1998) .
39 Engel: ‘Egypt digs for the truth’, p. 2.
40 ‘Al-Qaeda rift over murder of muslims’, Daily Telegraph (8 October 2005).
41 ‘Al-Qaeda leaders admit: we are in crisis. There is panic and fear’, The Times (11
February 2008).
42 ‘My brother Osama. How many innocent people have you killed in the name of
Al-Qaeda’, Independent On Sunday (22 June 2008).
43 Harik: Hezbollah, pp. 81–94.
44 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, pp. 72–73.
45 Milton Leitenberg, ‘Biological weapons arms control’, Contemporary Security
Policy, 17(1) (April 1996) pp. 1–79; Siegfried Buschschluter, ‘Bacteria lab found
in terrorist hideout’, Guardian (8 November 1980). The other incidents are:
1970: There are numerous allegations that the RAF had an interest in BW,
and/or were receiving training in how to use BW. Several agencies reported
that the remnants of the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) were preparing to use

242 The Changing Face of Terrorism
bacteriological weapons. At least 13 terrorists were being trained in a camp
south of Beirut, which was run by the PFLP, the most radical Palestinian terror
organization. The account claims that Western security agencies treated this
information with scepticism. A few years earlier the RAF (Baader-Meinhof
gang) had threatened to poison water in 20 West German towns if three radical
lawyers were not allowed to defend a comrade on trial. But there are no sources
for this allegation. Another source claims that ‘an unconfirmed report denied by
the authorities’ alleges that domestic terrorist elements possibly hard core RAF
(Baader-Meinhof gang) members were planning to attack the Federal Research
Institute for Animal Viruses in Tübingen (Germany) to steal infectious viruses.
The source claims that the targeted facility was photographed by an unidentified
person planning the attack. Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorism and the Potential Use of
Biological Weapons, A Discussion of Possibilities (RAND Corporation, December
1989); Risk Assessment Weekly (19 May 1989); Richard C. Clark, Technological
Terrorism (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin Alder, 1980) p. 137.
In 1980 there was reportedly a threat by the RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) to
spread anthrax through the West German postal system. The account does not
specify the intended targets, nor does it clarify whether the terrorists intended
to mail some kind of dissemination device or if they only intended to send
contaminated letters. Simon, Terrorism and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons;
Risk Assessment Weekly (19 May, 1989); Clark: Technological Terrorism, p. 137.
1975: A large quantity of mustard gas, possibly 53 steel bottles each containing
a litre of mustard gas was stolen from a US army base in West Germany. The
paper said they were of British origin and had been handed to the West German
army to be destroyed. Other reports state that it was a West German material
depot in France. This was followed by fears that the gas may be in the possession
of terrorists. This was followed by threats from the RAF (Baader-Meinhof
gang) to use it against Stuttgart, and possibly other cities, unless an amnesty
was granted to all political prisoners. Norman Crossland, ‘Mustard gas theft
follows terrorist threat to Stuttgart’, Guardian (13 May 1975). Richard Falkenrath
et al., however, argue that it is not clear that the terrorists even possessed the
gas canisters, many of which were recovered later. Richard Falkenrath, Robert
D. Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles Heel, Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988) p. 37.
The RAF (Baader-Meinhof gang) is reported to have attacked a US Army base
in Germany in January 1988 in an effort to steal nuclear weapons. This incident
cannot be confirmed with publicly available evidence Andrew Cockburn and
Leslie Cockburn, One Point Safe (New York: Doubleday, 1997) pp. 1–12.
46 ‘Sergeyev: troops won’t stop at Terek’, Moscow Times (13 October 1999) .
47 ‘Al-Qaeda denies Jordan WMD plot’, BBC News Online (30 April 2004) .
48 ‘I didn’t think abduction would lead to war, says Hezbollah chief ’, Daily Telegraph
(28 August 2006).

Notes 243
49 Between April 1994 and March 1996 Hamas killed 130 people in 13 attacks on
buses and queues at bus stops. Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 159; Cameron:
Nuclear Terrorism, p. 136.
50 Gearty: Terror, p. 121.
Chapter 5
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Indigo: London, 1998) p. 94.
2 Reza Hassan, How to Win a Cosmic War : Confronting Radical Islam (London:
Random House, 2009) pp. 5–6.
3 Nasra Hassan, ‘An arsenal of believers: talking to suicide bombers’, New Yorker
(19 November 2001).
4 ‘Conspiracy to hide IRA bomber priest set to rock church’, Independent.Ie (5
November 2006).
5 Qur’an, 9:5.
6 Qur’an, 9:5; Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Pennsylvania:
University of Philadelphia Press, 2004) p. 17.
7 Amir Taheri, Holy Terror : the Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Hutchinson
1987) p. 191.
8 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 96.
9 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 98.
10 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 98.
11 ‘My brother Osama. How many innocent people have been killed in the name
of al-Qaeda?’, Independent on Sunday (22 June 2008).
12 The schism between the Sunni and Shi’a branches of Islam occurred within
a century of Mohammed’s death, over whether a direct descendent of the
Prophet should be appointed instead of the broader community’s favoured
candidate when appointing the caliph, the leader of the ummah. The origins of
the split were political and personal, though the split later became enshrined in
doctrine. The Shi’a feel that to appoint anyone other than a descendent of the
Prophet was a corruption of the ideals of the prophet.
13 These five attacks are:
2007: suicide car bomb, Amirli, Iraq – 156 dead.
2006: Baghdad, mortar fire and 5 car bombs in Sadr City – 215 dead.
2005: Hilla, Iraq, suicide car bomb – 125 dead.
2004: Karbala and Baghdad, co-ordinated attacks on Shi’a mosques – 181 dead.
2003: Karbala, two car bombs explode outside the Imam Ali mosque – 125
dead.
14 Agence France Press (12 February 2004).
15 Gary Gambill, ‘Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: a biographical sketch’, Terrorism Monitor,
The Jamestown Foundation, II(24) (16 December 2004) p. 4.
16 Gordon Corera, ‘Unravelling Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda connection’, Terrorism Monitor,
The Jamestown Foundation, II(24) (16 December 2004) p. 8.

244 The Changing Face of Terrorism
17 ‘Deadly sect attack kills 200’, BBC News Online (15 August 2007) .
18 Abi Hajer Abd al-Azizal-Muqrin, ‘Military sciences – targets inside the cities’,
Mu’askar al –Battar (al-Battar Camp) Magazine, 7, pp. 23–27.
19 Sammy Salama and David Wheeler, ‘From the horses mouth: unravelling al-
Qaeda’s target selection calculus’, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation
Studies (17 April 2007) .
20 Jonneke Bekkenkamp and Yvonne Sherwood, Sanctified Aggression (London:
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2003) p. 122.
21 Andrew Hubback, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (June 1997) p. 4.
22 Quoted in Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 114.
23 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 114.
24 Martin Durham, ‘The American far right and 9/11’, Terrorism and Political
Violence, 15(2) (June 2003) p. 99.
25 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, a publication of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non Proliferation Project of the Centre for
Non Proliferation Studies at the Monterrey Institute of International Studies
(October 1998).
26 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999) p. 58.
27 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) p. 92.
28 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 117.
29 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 78.
30 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin, 2004)
p. 33.
31 ‘bin Laden prompted Bali bombers’, BBC News Online (2 April 2004).
32 ‘The UK’s bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online (4 October 2001) .
33 Hamid Mir, ‘Osama claims he has nukes: if US uses N-arms it will get same
response’, Dawn (10 November 2001).
34 ‘Bin Laden: yes, I did it’, Sunday Times (11 November 2001).
35 ‘The UK’s bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online (4 October 2001) .
36 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles:
Brassey’s, 2004) p. 156.
37 In the USA, the Moonies gave money to President Nixon’s election campaign, in
an attempt to influence US policy on the Republic of Korea; in Japan, the Soka
Gakkai cult is a powerful political actor whose philosophy is to take over the
world, and some of its members have been elected to the Japanese parliament.
Aum had members in the bureaucracy, judiciary, and the military. David Kaplan

Notes 245
and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World : The Incredible Story of the
Aum (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996) pp. 47, 187.
38 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 72.
39 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 123.
40 Stern: The Ultimate Terrorists, p. 72.
41 Interviews with Ian Haworth, and Alan Meale MP, former Secretary of the
House of Commons All-Party Committee on Religious Cults (14 April 1999).
42 Hubback: ‘Apocalypse when?’, p. 22.
43 ‘Chlorine bomb hits Iraq village’, BBC News Online (16 May 2007); ‘Concern
over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online (22 February 2007).
44 Samuel Huntingdon, ‘The clash of civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3) (Summer
1993), p. 29.
45 Huntingdon: ‘The clash of civilizations’, p. 47.
46 ‘Our holy war by bin Laden’, Metro (25 September 2001).
47 ‘Bin Laden targets Christians’, The Times (2 November 2001).
48 ‘Arab chiefs say bin Laden is at war with world’, The Times (5 November 2001).
49 ‘Call for jihad reaches fever pitch’, Daily Telegraph (29 September 2001); ‘Islamic
leader threatens civil war with US forces in Pakistan’, Daily Telegraph (24
September 2001).
50 ‘Three die in anti US protests across Pakistan’, The Times (22 September 2001);
‘Low key demo disguises climate of fear’, Daily Telegraph (13 October 2001).
In Pakistan the war threatened to hasten the growth of the Islamist parties.
Many Pakistanis view bin Laden as a hero, and some Pakistanis are also from the
same ethnic Pashtun group as the Taliban. A senior cleric of the fundamentalist
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party told the crowd ‘our Rulers are faithless … We
will attack any Muslims who help the Americans’. The biggest challenge to
Musharraf was potential dissent from hardline colleagues in the military and
ISI who could engineer a coup. The popular uprising in Pakistan that bin Laden
had hoped for, never happened. When Pakistan’s Islamic parties called for a
general strike in early November, Musharraf declared the day a national holiday
rendering it ineffective. But whilst two out of three Pakistanis opposed the war
in Afghanistan all of the mainstream political parties backed Musharraf.
51 ‘The liberals’ hour’, Economist (22 December 2001).
52 Interview, name withheld by request (23 March 1999).
53 Qur’an, 2:190.
54 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (London: Fourth Estate, 1997) p. 89.
55 ‘Proxy bomb’, Wikipedia, .
56 Aatish Taseer, ‘A British jihadist’, Prospect Magazine, 113 (August 2005).
57 ‘Four ex-members admit Jemaah Islamiah is deviant’, Bernama (2 April 2004).
58 ‘My brother Osama. How many innocent civilians have been killed in the name
of al-Qaeda’, Independent on Sunday (22 June 2008).
59 ‘I didn’t think abduction would lead to war, says Hezbollah chief ’, Daily Telegraph
(28 August 2006).

246 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Chapter 6
1 See John Horgan, ‘The search for the terrorist personality’, in Andrew Silke
(ed.), Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its
Consequences (Chichester: Wiley, 2003) pp. 3–28.
2 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999) pp. 37–39.
3 Brad Roberts, ‘Has the taboo been broken?’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism with
Chemical and Biological Weapons (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Control
Institute, 1997) p. 130.
4 ‘Gun ban on Furrow was ignored’, Sunday Telegraph (15 August 1999).
5 In January 1997, in Janesville, Winsconsin USA, the FBI, local police and a
hazardous materials team searched the home of Thomas Leahy. In the basement
they found a makeshift laboratory where tests indicated that he had produced
approximately 0.7g of pure ricin. After further laboratory analysis, it was
determined that he had also attempted to grow botulism, and had produced a
lethal mixture of nicotine sulphate which he mixed with dimethyl sulfoxide and
placed in a spray bottle. Animal viruses and vaccines, staph bacteria cultures,
fungicides, insecticides, hypodermic needles, and gas masks were also found.
At his sentencing in January 1998, Leahy claimed that he wanted the poisons
to ‘kill his enemies’ through the US Postal Service and also to ‘protect’ himself.
It has been alleged that Leahy had had a lifelong fascination with poisons, he
had also taken medication for schizophrenia, and had a history of alcohol and
drug abuse. Leahy was sentenced to 55 months in prison for possessing toxin as
a weapon. ‘Janesville man gets more than 12 years for making toxic chemical’,
Sentinel (8 January 1998).
6 Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) p. 104.
7 Horgan: ‘The search for the terrorist personality’, p. 6.
8 Andrew P. Silke, ‘Cheshire cat logic: the recurring theme of terrorist abnormality
in psychological research’, Psychology, Crime and Law, 1998(4) pp. 51–69.
9 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (London: St Martin’s Press, 1998) pp. 157–
158; Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 20–22.
10 Horgan: ‘The search for the terrorist personality’, p. 17.
11 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 57.
12 L. Barnett and I. Lee (eds), Introduction to The Nuclear Mentality – A Psychosocial
Analysis of the Arms Race (London: Pluto Press, 1989) p. 54.
13 Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley Thayer, America’s Achilles
Heel (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998) p. 210.
14 Nasra Hassan, ‘An arsenal of believers: talking to the human bombs’, New Yorker
(19 November 2001).
15 ‘Bin Laden: yes, I did it’, Sunday Times (11 November 2001).

Notes 247
16 Sammy Salama and Lydia Hansell, ‘Does intent equal capability? Al-Qaeda and
weapons of mass destruction’, Nonproliferation Review, 12(3) (November 2005),
pp. 626–628.
17 Andrew Silke, ‘Becoming a terrorist’, in Silke: Terrorists, Victims and Society,
pp. 40–44.
18 ‘Several major rebel commanders reportedly killed’, Chechnya Weekly, 6(13) The
Jamestown Foundation (30 March 2005).
19 Silke: ‘Becoming a terrorist’, pp. 40–44.
20 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 55; Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 28.
21 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 53.
22 Vincent Bugliosi and Curt Gentry, Helter Skelter : The Shocking Story of the Manson
Murders (London: Arrow, 1992) p. 56.
23 Jerrold Post, ‘Prospects for nuclear terrorism: psychological motivations and
constraints’, in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear
Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986) p. 96.
24 K. Wasmund, ‘The political socialization of West German terrorists’, in P. Merkl
(ed.), Political Violence and Terror, p. 19.
25 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 18.
26 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 18–19.
27 Brian M. Jenkins, ‘Understanding the link between motives and methods’, in
Roberts: Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons, pp. 46–47.
28 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 171.
29 Bruce Hoffman, ‘Terrorism and WMD: some preliminary hypotheses’, The
Nonproliferation Review (Spring–Summer 1997) p. 48; Cameron: Terrorists’ Target
Selection, pp. 85, 114.
30 ‘Holocaust a punishment from God, said radical preacher’, The Times (14 January
2006).
31 ‘Profile: Jawad Akbar’, BBC News Online (30 April 2007) .
32 Cameron: Terrorists’ Target Selection, pp. 129–130.
33 Cameron: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 127.
34 Julia Berryman, David Hargreaves, Kevin Howells and Elizabeth Ockleford,
Psychology and You: An Informal Introduction (Leicester: The British Psychological
Society, 1997) p. 116.
35 Cameron: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 53.
36 Brigitte Monhaupt of the Red Army Faction (RAF) stated that: ‘Any concept of
action … is of course subject to discussion by everyone … Leadership … not
domination. It is determined by what all members want’. Post: ‘Prospects for
nuclear terrorism’, p. 96.
37 Martin McGartland, Fifty Dead Men Walking (London: Blake, 1997) pp. 217, 218,
221, 255.
38 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2004) pp. 89–90.

248 The Changing Face of Terrorism
39 ‘Book: the story of the Arab Afghans: from the entry to Afghanistan to the final
exodus with the Taliban’, Ashraq Alawasat (8 December 2004) . Ashraq Alawasat, a
London-based Arabic newspaper obtained the manuscript of this book by Abu
Walid al-Masri, a leading ideologue and member of bin Laden’s inner circle. As
a member of the Majlis al-Shura, al-Masri participated in the meetings at which
the al-Qaeda leadership debated WMD.
40 Salama and Hansell: ‘Does intent equal capability?’, p. 627.
41 Yossi Melman, The Master Terrorist: The True Story behind Abu Nidal (London:
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1986) pp. 72, 75, 78, 83.
42 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 164.
43 Sageman: Understanding Terror Networks, pp. 62–63. Similarly, there was an
escalation in IRA violence in 1971–72 after many of the IRA’s leadership were
interned, and young, aggressive, and undisciplined terrorists were freed from
the constraints that the leadership had imposed. Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection,
p. 165.
44 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 91.
45 ‘The new terrorism: does it exist? How real are the risks of mass casualty
attacks?’, Panel 4, ‘Lone operators and mass casualties’, Proceedings of a
Conference Co-Sponsored by Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
and the Center For Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories (29–30 April 1999) .
46 Andrew Hubback, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (June 1997) p. 6.
47 The concept of ‘leaderless resistance’ has also spread to other states. In the UK,
one issue of the Combat-18 magazine, Strikeforce, carried an editorial demanding
an ‘international terror/sabotage campaign by TOTALLY anonymous cells and
groups’.
48 Post: ‘Prospects’, p. 95.
49 Post: ‘Prospects’, pp. 93–94.
50 I. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Post: ‘Prospects’, p. 97.
51 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 51; Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 170.
52 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 169.
53 Berryman, Hargreaves, Howells and Ockleford: Psychology, p. 113; Cameron:
Nuclear Terrorism, p. 45; Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 170.
54 Post: ‘Prospects’, p. 98.
55 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 170.
56 Berryman, Hargreaves, Howells and Ockleford: Psychology, p. 115.
57 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 27. Cameron also suggests that this is reflected in
the type of individual who joins such groups. RAF’s and Red Brigades’ terrorists
came from incomplete family structures and had backgrounds of social isolation
and personal failure. In contrast, those in nationalist separatist groups represent

Notes 249
less of an extreme break with society and can come and go from the group with
relatively more ease, pp. 32, 44; Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 167; Adrian
Guelke, The Age of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998) p. 93.
58 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, p. 46; Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 168.
59 Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism and International Cooperation (New York: Institute for
East–West Security Inc., 1989) p. 16.
60 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 168.
61 Drake: Terrorists’ Target Selection, p. 43.
62 Post: ‘Prospects’, p. 94.
63 Cameron: Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 104–105, 110.
64 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, a publication of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non Proliferation Project of the Centre for
Non Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
(October 1998).
65 W. Seth Carus, ‘A case study in biological terrorism: the Rajneesh in Oregon,
1984’, paper summary, Center for Counterproliferation Research, National
Defense University (29 July 1997).
66 David Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World (New York:
Crown Publishers, 1996) pp. 50, 251.
67 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 42.
68 Michael Jordan, Cults: From Bacchus to Heaven’s Gate (London: Carlton, 1999)
pp. 95, 104.
69 Many of Charles Manson’s devotees seem to have suffered from emotional or
even psychological problems even before entering the cult. Many were drop
outs, often from broken homes, see Bugliosi and Gentry, Helter Skelter, pp. 403,
182. Bugliosi, the Chief Prosecutor, felt that most of Manson’s devotees were
weak and easily led.
70 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 74.
71 The Cult Information Centre identifies 26 different forms of mind control:
Hypnosis – inducing a state of high suggestibility, often thinly disguised as
relaxation or meditation.
Peer-group pressure – suppressing doubt and resistance to new ideas by exploiting
the need to belong.
Love bombing – creating a sense of family and belonging through hugging,
kissing, touching, and flattery.
Rejection of old values – accelerating acceptance of new lifestyle by constantly
denouncing former values and beliefs.
Confusing doctrine – encouraging blind acceptance and rejection of logic through
complex lectures on an incomprehensible doctrine.
Metacommunication – implanting subliminal messages by stressing certain key
words or phrases in long, confusing lectures.
Removal of privacy – achieving loss of ability to evaluate logically by preventing
private contemplation.

250 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Time-sense deprivation – destroying ability to evaluate information, personal
reactions and body functions in relation to passage of time by removing all
clocks and watches.
Disinhibition – encouraging childlike obedience by orchestrating childlike
behaviour.
Uncompromising rules – inducing regression and disorientation by soliciting
agreement to seemingly simple rules which regulate mealtimes, bathroom
breaks and use of medication.
Verbal abuse – desensitizing through bombardment with foul and abusive
language.
Sleep-deprivation and fatigue – creating disorientation and vulnerability by
prolonging mental and physical activity and withholding adequate rest and sleep.
Dress codes – removing individuality by demanding conformity to a dress code.
Chanting and singing – eliminating non-cult ideas through repetition of mind-
narrowing chants and phrases.
Confession – encouraging the destruction of individual ego through confession
of personal weakness and innermost feelings or doubts.
Financial commitment – achieving increased dependence on the group by burning
bridges to the past through donation of assets.
Finger pointing – creating a false sense of righteousness by pointing to the
shortcomings of the outside world and other cults.
Flaunting hierarchy – promoting acceptance of cult authority by promising
advancement, power and salvation.
Isolation – inducing loss of reality by physical separation from family, friends,
society and rational references.
Controlled approval – maintaining vulnerability and confusion by alternately
rewarding and punishing similar actions.
Change of diet – creating disorientation and increased susceptibility to emotional
arousal by depriving the nervous system of necessary nutrients through the use
of special diets and/or fasting.
Games – inducing dependence on the group by introducing games with obscure
rules.
No questions – Accomplishing automatic acceptance of beliefs by discouraging
questions.
Guilt – reinforcing the need for ‘salvation’ by exaggerating the sins of the former
lifestyles.
Fear – maintaining loyalty and obedience to the group by threatening soul, life,
or limb for the slightest ‘negative’ thought, word or deed.
Replacement of relationships – destroying pre-cult families by arranging cult
marriages and ‘families’.
72 Interview with Ian Haworth, founder of the Cult Information Centre.
73 Ian Haworth, ‘Caring for cult victims’, Carer and Counselor, 7(3) (Summer 1997)
p 28.
74 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 22, 62, 183.

Notes 251
75 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 82.
76 Stern: ‘Apocalypse never’, p. 72.
77 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 67.
78 Jordan: Cults, p. 112.
79 Bugliosi and Gentry: Helter Skelter, pp. 107, 449.
80 Bugliosi and Gentry: Helter Skelter, p. 199.
81 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 172.
82 Jordan: Cults, p. 119.
83 Bugliosi and Gentry: Helter Skelter, pp. 597–603.
84 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 140, 240; W.D. Brackett,
Holy Terror : Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996) p. 22.
85 Haworth: ‘Caring for cult victims’, p. 29.
86 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 35, 114.
87 Kaplan and Marshall: The Cult at the End of the World, p. 236; Chronology of
Aum Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities, James Martin Center for Non Proliferation
Studies .
Chapter 7
1 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 2003.
2 In 2007, the USA identified Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state
sponsors of terrorism, all except Cuba are also alleged proliferators of CBRN
weapons and WMD.
3 ‘Know thine enemy’, Economist (2 February 2002).
4 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998) p. 197.
5 Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998) p. 40.
6 ‘State sponsors of terror’, US State Department, .
7 James Adams, The New Spies Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London:
Hutchinson, 1994) p. 180.
8 Adams: The New Spies, p. 184.
9 Guelke: The Age of Terrorism, p. 148.
10 ‘Provisional IRA Arms Importation’, Wikipedia, .
11 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 96.
12 Adams: The New Spies, p. 183.
13 Adams: The New Spies, p. 188
14 Quoted in Peter Taylor, States of Terror : Democracy and Political Violence (London:
BBC Books, 1993) p. 197.
15 ‘Means of persuasion’, Economist (16 February 2002) pp. 12–13.
16 ‘How not to make a friend of Iran’, Economist (9 February 2002) p. 52.
17 ‘Fanatics move on to training camps in Iran’, Sunday Times (14 April 2002).
18 ‘Back in the doghouse’, Economist (26 January 2002) pp. 60–61.
19 For a description of Iran’s network of terrorist training camps, see: Amir Taheri,
Holy Terror : The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Hutchinson, 1987)

252 The Changing Face of Terrorism
pp. 90–102; ‘Iran funds Hamas terror group to sabotage peace process’, Sunday
Telegraph (15 August 1999).
20 Taheri: Holy Terror, pp. 103–109.
21 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 189.
22 Hoffman: Inside Terrorism, p. 189.
23 Thomas J. Badey, ‘US anti-terrorism policy: the Clinton administration’,
Contemporary Security Policy, 19(2) (August 1998) pp. 53–55.
24 Iran has been attempting to expand its nuclear weapons programme since 1988.
The CIA has also reported that Iran has an extensive CW programme, despite
signing the CWC in 1993. It is also considered to have conducted research on
anthrax and biological toxins, and suspected of producing BW at a pesticides
facility near Tehran. Syria’s nuclear programme remains at an embryonic stage
and is limited in scope. However, it is considered to have a chemical warfare
programme which has been active for approximately two decades, which
according to Israeli sources has now successfully produced VX nerve agent.
25 Leonard Cole, ‘Überterrorists: review of Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorist’,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September–October 1999) p. 67.
26 Harvey Morris, ‘Crisis in the Gulf: Saddam terrorists trained by Stasi’, Independent
(30 January 1991).
27 William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for
Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) p. 49.
28 ‘Ministers sound retreat on anthrax warning’, Guardian (25 March 1998).
29 Terrorism in the USA Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, a publication of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non Proliferation Project of the Centre for
Non Proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies
(October 1998).
30 Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, new threat to public safety’,
Conflict Studies, No. 295, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (December 1996) p. 12.
31 Danny Shoham, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism, an intensifying profile of a
non conventional threat’, The Arial Centre For Policy Research (1998).
32 Guelke: The Age of Terrorism, p. 65.
33 ‘Bin Laden shielded by cult status in Pakistan’, Sunday Telegraph (20 February
2000).
34 ‘Pakistan funds Islamic terror’, Sunday Telegraph (16 May 1999).
35 ‘Intelligence team defied Musharaff to help Taliban’, Daily Telegraph (10 October
2001); ‘Pakistan’s “godfathers of the Taliban” hold the key to hunt for bin
Laden’, Daily Telegraph (23 September 2001); ‘The assassins and drug dealers
now helping US’, Daily Telegraph (26 September 2001); ‘My door was forced
open and I was grabbed’, Daily Telegraph (11 November 2001).
36 Karen Yourish and Delano D’Souza, ‘Father of Pakistani bomb sold nuclear
secrets’, Arms Control Today (March 2004).
37 ‘Rogue scientists gave bin Laden nuclear secrets’, Daily Telegraph (13 December
2001).

Notes 253
38 Ahmed S. Hasim, Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Iraq (London: Hurst and
Company, 2006) pp. 136–138.
39 Frank Smyth, ‘Culture clash, bin Laden, Khartoum and the war against the
west’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 1998) p. 22.
40 Taheri: Holy Terror, pp. 100–101.
41 Adams: The New Spies, p. 180.
42 Adams: The New Spies, p. 167.
43 Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (London: Fourth Estate, 1997)
p. 143.
44 Smyth: ‘Culture clash’, p. 25.
45 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 2003, pp. 11,
18 and 21.
46 US District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America vs
Osama bin Laden: ‘Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl’ (6–13 February 2001) pp. 292,
366, 524–526.
47 Jihad Salim, ‘Report on bin Ladin, Zawahiri, “Afghans”’, Al-Watan al-Arabi (16
February 2001).
48 ‘US cruise attacks ignored warnings’, Guardian (6 October 1998).
49 Stefan Leader, ‘Osama bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’, Jane’s
Intelligence Review (June 1999) pp. 34–37.
50 ‘All terrorist acts approved by Taliban’, Daily Telegraph (20 October 2001).
51 ‘The UK’s bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online (4 October 2001) .
52 Leader: ‘Osama bin Laden and the terrorist search for WMD’, pp. 34–37.
53 ‘World exclusive: the proof that Saddam worked with bin Laden’, Sunday
Telegraph (27 April 2003).
54 ‘Hijacker met Iraqi agent in Europe’, Metro (19 September 2001); ‘FBI overlooks
Iraq’s connections to anthrax attacks’, Newsmax; ‘Prague discounts an Iraqi
meeting’, New York Times (21 October 2001); ‘Czechs retract Iraqi terror link’,
UPI (20 October 2001).
55 ‘Terrorists murderous trade in stolen identities’, The Times (22 September 2001).
56 ‘Hotel clue points to an Iraqi connection’, Sunday Times (30 September 2001).
57 Gwynne Roberts, ‘Militia defector claims Baghdad trained al-Qaeda fighters in
chemical warfare’, Sunday Times (14 July 2002).
58 ‘Abu Nidal’s nemesis’, DEBKA File (Jerusalem) (20 August 2002).
59 Barton Gellman, ‘US suspects al Qaeda got nerve agent from Iraqis’, Washington
Post (12 December 2002).
60 ‘How poison trail spread to Britain’, Sunday Times (19 January 2002).
61 ‘Whitehall dossier says Saddam plans biological weapons for Palestinians’, The
Times (3 August 2002); ‘Blair’s Iraq dossier will show how Saddam trained al-
Qaeda fighters’, Sunday Telegraph (15 September 2002); ‘Militia defector claims
Baghdad trained al-Qaeda fighters in chemical warfare, Sunday Times (14 July
2002).

254 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Chapter 8
1 ‘The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’, Fact Sheet, The White
House (15 July 2006) .
2 ‘The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’, Fact Sheet, The White
House (15 July 2006) .
3 D.W. Brackett, Holy Terror, Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, 1996)
p. 52.
4 ‘New wartime court to jail terror suspects’, Sunday Telegraph (11 November 2001).
In the UK, Islamists had previously had the advantage of a deportation process
that could stretch out over several years because it enabled numerous appeals,
and the UK would not deport suspects to countries where they might face the
death penalty. An emergency Anti-Terrorism Bill was introduced to streamline
the extradition process, including removal of right to apply for judicial review
for suspected terrorists, rejection of asylum applications from people deemed
to be a threat to national security or thought to be terrorists, and an extension
of the law of incitement to cover religious hatred. Also, the Proceeds of Crime
Bill enabled tougher measures to track down funds belonging to terrorists.
Emergency powers were also provided to imprison suspected international
terrorists indefinitely, using special courts that were closed to the public. Human
Rights legislation was sidestepped to implement the new measures because
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that
individuals should not be imprisoned without trial or without proper rights, can
be suspended under powers in Article 15, which can be granted in ‘times of war
or other public emergencies’. This was not the same as internment where there
was no trial, but rather suspects are held until they can convince the courts that
they are not a threat and have identified a safe country which is willing to accept
them. ‘Human rights waived in terror clampdown’, Metro (16 October, 2001).
5 Ron Purver, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism: new threat to public safety?’,
Conflict Studies, 295, Research Institute For The Study of Conflict and Terrorism
(December 1996–January 1997) p. 23.
6 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 147.
7 Brackett: Holy Terror, p. 94.
8 C.J.M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (London: St Martin’s Press, 1998) p. 123.
The Royal Ulster Constabulary claims a ratio of four out of five attacks; whilst
some of these cases might have been incidental many were based on intelligence
of the IRA’s intentions.
9 ‘Next dominant domestic terrorism fear: biochemical weapons’, Gannett News
Service (28 March 1997).
10 Jessica Stern. ‘Apocalypse never, but the threat is real’, Survival, 40(4) (Winter
1998–99) p. 178.
11 J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster, William Marman, and Jacob
Wechsler, ‘Can terrorists build nuclear weapons?’, in Paul Leventhal and Yonah
Alexander (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington, MA; Lexington Books,

Notes 255
1987) p. 236. The material needed for neutron shielding, boron polycarbonate
brick or sheet, is uncommon and its acquisition would attract attention.
12 Richard Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman and Bradley Thayer: America’s Achilles
Heel, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1988) pp. 103–104.
13 Falkenrath et al.: America’s Achilles Heel, pp. 110, 123.
14 Frank Barnaby, Instruments of Terror : Mass Destruction has Never been so Easy
(London: Vision Paperbacks, 1996) p. 139.
15 ‘The global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism’, Fact Sheet, The White House
(15 July 2006) .
16 ‘The global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism’.
17 Michael Barletta and Amy Sands, ‘Arms control for anthrax, a safety-and-
security approach to strengthening BWC’, in Michael Barletta (ed.), After 9/11:
Preventing Mass Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation, Occasional Paper
No. 8, Center for Non Proliferation Studies, May 2002, p. 13.
18 ‘New York on guard for dirty bomb’, The Times (6 July 2002).
19 ‘Border security’, .
20 ‘The Trojan box’, Economist (9 February 2002).
21 ‘US studying truck-bomb defenses at reactors’, The New York Times, Special
Edition – Terrorism (23 April 1993).
22 Daniel Hirsch, ‘The truck bomb and insider threats to nuclear facilities’, in
Leventhal and Alexander: Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, p. 214.
23 Rosie Cowan, ‘Terror plot trial told of scheme to sell poisoned drinks’, Guardian
(25 March 2006).
24 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 2003,
p. 5.
25 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 2003,
p. 5.
26 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, The White House, February 2003,
p. 2.
27 ‘US ready to send special forces troops to Georgia’, The Times (28 February
2002).
28 ‘Bush steps up war on terror’, Metro (6 March 2002).
29 Amir Taheri, Holy Terror : The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Hutchinson
1987) p. 191.
30 Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’,
Survival, 40(3) (Autumn 1998) p. 60.
31 James H. Anderson, ‘Microbes and mass casualties: defending America against
bioterrorism’, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, No. 11 (26 May 1998) p. 11.
The USA will spend $250 million over six years to train ten, 22-member National
Guard RAIDS Units, which will be able to react to any CBW incident within
four hours, ‘US plans force to beat germ terrorists’, The Times (2 February 1999).
32 Falkenrath et al.: America’s Achilles Heel, p. 305.
33 ‘Wargame finds large holes in US counter-bioterrorism’, Defense News (1999).

256 The Changing Face of Terrorism
34 ‘Death to America’, Sunday Times (5 January 2003).
35 Richard Preston, ‘The secret war’, Arena (1998) p. 212.
36 ‘US evacuates diplomats in anthrax alert’, The Times (19 December 1998).
37 A. Henderson, ‘Bioterrorism as a public health threat’, Journal of Emerging
Diseases, 4(3) (June–September 1998).
Chapter 9
1 ‘Farewell Londonistan’, Economist (2 February 2002) p. 28.
2 Andrew Hubback, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (June 1997) p. 21.
3 Richard Falkenrath, ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism’,
Survival, 40(3) (Autumn 1998) p. 44.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Adams, James, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage (London:
Hutchinson, 1994).
Allison, Graham T., Cote Jr, Owen R., Falkenrath, Richard A. and Miller,
Stephen E., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).
Barnaby, Frank, Instruments of Terror : Mass Destruction has Never been so Easy
(London: Vision, 1996).
Barnaby, Wendy, The Plague Makers: The Secret World of Biological Warfare
(London: Vision, 1997).
Brackett, D.W., Holy Terror : Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill,
1996).
Burke, Jason, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: Penguin,
2004).
Cameron, Gavin, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the Twentieth Century
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).
Carter, Ashton, Deutch, John and Zelikow, Phillip, ‘Catastrophic terrorism:
tackling the new danger’, Foreign Affairs (November/December 1998).
Coogan, Tim Pat, The IRA (HarperCollins: London, 1995).
Drake, C.J.M., Terrorists Target Selection (London: St Martin’s Press, 1988).
Falkenrath, Richard, Newman, Robert D. and Thayer, Bradley, America’s
Achilles Heel: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Terrorism (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1998).
Guelke, Adrian, The Age of Terrorism (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998).
Harik, Judith Palmer, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London:
I.B.Tauris, 2006).
Hoffman, Bruce, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998).
Jaber, Hala, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (London: Fourth Estate, 1997).
Kaplan, David E. and Marshall, Andrew, The Cult at the End of the World
(New York: Crown Publishers, 1996).

258 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Leventhal, Paul and Alexander, Yonah (eds), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism:
The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear
Terrorism (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987).
Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: Why Suicide Bombers do It (New York: Random
House, 2005).
Roberts, Brad (ed.), Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating
Risks and Responses (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Control
Institute, 1997).
Silke, Andrew (ed.), Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on
Terrorism and its Consequences (Chichester: Wiley, 2003).
Stern, Jessica, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1999).
Taheri, Amir, Holy Terror : The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London:
Hutchinson, 1987).
Tully, Mark Tully and Jacob, Satish, Amritsar : Mrs Ghandi’s Last Battle
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1985).
Articles and Reports
The website of the James Martin Center for Non Proliferation Studies,
contains numerous useful articles and reports, as well as a database of
terrorist CBRN incidents.
‘The UK’s bin Laden dossier in full’, BBC News Online (4 October 2001)
.
Bady, Thomas J., ‘US anti terrorism policy: the Clinton administration’,
Contemporary Security Policy, 19(2) (August 1998).
Barnaby, Frank, ‘Nuclear terrorism’, Safe Energy, No. 95 (June/July 1993).
Betts, Richard K., ‘The new threat of mass destruction’, Foreign Affairs
(January/February 1998).
Cameron, Gavin, ‘Nuclear terrorism: a real threat?’, Jane’s Intelligence Review
(September 1996).
Corera, Gordon, ‘Unravelling Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda connection’, Terrorism
Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. II, No. 24 (16 December 2004).
Deutch, John, ‘Terrorism’, Foreign Policy (Fall 1997).
Durham, Martin, ‘The American far right and 9/11’, Terrorism and Political
Violence, 15(2) (June 2003).
Ellis, Jason, ‘Nunn-Lugar’s mid-life crisis’, Survival, 39(1) (Spring 1997).
McCutcheon, Chuck, ‘Homeland defence: mobilizing against terrorism’,
Congressional Quarterly Weekly (6 March, 1999).

Bibliography 259
Falkenrath, Richard A., ‘Confronting nuclear, biological and chemical
terrorism’, Survival, 40(3) (Autumn 1998).
Gambill, Gary, ‘Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: a biographical sketch’, Terrorism
Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, Vol. II, No. 24 (16 December 2004).
IPPNW Global Health Watch Report No. 1, Crude Nuclear Weapons:
Proliferation and the Terrorist Threat, International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (1996).
Haworth, Ian, ‘Caring for cult victims’, Carer and Counsellor, 7(3) (Summer
1997)
Hoffman, Bruce, ‘Terrorism and WMD: some preliminary hypotheses’,
Nonproliferation Review (Spring/Summer 1997).
Hoffman, Bruce and Claridge, David, ‘Illicit trafficking in nuclear materials’,
Conflict Studies, No. 314/315, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict
and Terrorism (January/February 1999).
Hubback, Andrew, ‘Apocalypse when? The global threat of religious cults’,
Conflict Studies, No. 300, Research Institute For the Study of Conflict and
Terrorism (June 1997).
Karawan, Ibrahim A., ‘The Islamist impasse’, Adelphi Paper 341, The
International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University
Press, 1997).
Karmon, Ely, ‘Bin Ladin is out to get America’, The International Policy
Institute For Counter Terrorism,
(29 October, 1998).
Langton, James, ‘A plague on all our houses’, Sunday Review, in Sunday
Telegraph (8 March, 1998).
Leitenberg, Milton, ‘Biological weapons arms control’, Contemporary Security
Policy, 17(1) (April 1996).
Muqrin, Abi Hajer Abd al-Azizal, ‘Military sciences – targets inside the
cities’, Mu’askar al-Battar (al-Battar Camp) Magazine, Vol. 7.
Paz, Reuven, ‘Is there an Islamic terrorism?’, International Policy Institute for
Counter Terrorism, (7 September,
1998).
Pearson, Graham S., and Sims, Nicholas, ‘National implementation
measures: an update’, Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Briefing
Paper No. 14 (October 1998), Department of Peace Studies, University
of Bradford.
Preston, Richard, ‘The secret war’, Arena (1998).
Purver, Ron, ‘Chemical and biological terrorism: new threat to public
safety?’, Conflict Studies, No. 295, Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict and Terrorism (December 1996/January 1997).

260 The Changing Face of Terrorism
Rosenbaum, David M., ‘Nuclear terror, International Security, 1:3 (Winter
1977).
Salama, Sammy and Wheeler, David, ‘From the horses mouth: unravelling
al-Qaeda’s target selection calculus’, James Martin Center for Non
Proliferation Studies (17 April 2007) .
Simon, Jeffrey D., Terrorist and the Potential Use of Biological Weapons, A Discussion
of Possibilities (RAND Corporation, December 1989).
Taylor, Robert, ‘All fall down’, Special Report, New Scientist (11 May 1996).
Sopko, John, ‘The changing proliferation threat’, Foreign Policy, No. 103
(Winter 1996–97).
Steinbruner, John, ‘Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses’, Foreign
Policy, No. 109 (Winter 1997–98).
Wilkinson, Paul, ‘Terrorist targets: new risks to world order’, Conflict Studies,
No. 236 (December 1990).
Media Reports
‘US studying truck-bomb defenses at reactors’, New York Times, Special
Edition – Terrorism (23 April 1993).
‘Militias and messiahs’, Economist (5–11 April 1997).
‘NBC weapons cannot be reliably destroyed’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (14 May
1997).
‘USA to develop system to track loose nukes’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (8 October
1997).
‘Agencies to centralise for CBW rapid response’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (12
November 1997).
‘Ministers sound retreat on anthrax warning’, Guardian (25 March 1998).
‘War games show up germ defenses’, Guardian (28 April, 1998).
‘US to guard public from germ attack’, The Times (22 May 1998).
‘Vaccines for all in anti-germ war plan’, Sunday Telegraph (11 October 1998).
‘Jerusalem tightens security against US doomsday cult’, Guardian (24
November 1998).
‘Animal activists face ban as terrorists’, The Times (18 December 1998).
‘US evacuates diplomats in anthrax alert’, The Times (19 December 1998).
‘Muslims told to avenge Iraq strikes’, Daily Telegraph (26 December 1998).
‘Hoax callers spread anthrax scare’, Guardian (29 December 1998).
‘A time of miracles, madness and danger’, Comment, Sunday Telegraph (3
January 1999).

Bibliography 261
‘Israelis fear worst as the “end of time” draws near’, Sunday Telegraph (3
January 1999).
‘Cultists to be deported’, Guardian (5 January 1999).
‘The domes-day cult’, Daily Mail (16 January 1999).
‘Millennium death wish cults put the dome under siege’, Sunday Telegraph (17
January 1999).
‘US plans force to beat germ terrorists’, The Times (2 February 1999).
‘The global terrorist’, Sunday Times (7 February 1999).
‘US foils spate of bin Laden bomb attacks’, The Times (25 February 1999).
‘We’re at war and if that means more bombs, so be it …’, Guardian G2 (27
April 1999).
‘Water terror plot foiled’, Observer (11 July 1999).
‘Ex-soldier held over poison threat’, Daily Telegraph (12 July 1999).
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non Proliferation, Newsbrief (1994–99).
Nasra Hassan, ‘An arsenal of believers: talking to suicide bombers’, New
Yorker (19 November 2001).
Agence France Press (12 February 2004).
‘Deadly sect attack Kills 200’, BBC News Online (15 August 2007) .
‘Al-Qaeda denies Jordan WMD plot’, BBC News Online (30 April 2004)
.
‘bin Laden prompted Bali bombers’, BBC News Online (2 April 2004) .
Hamid Mir, ‘Osama claims he has nukes: if US uses N-arms it will get same
response’, Dawn (10 November 2001).
‘Bin Laden: yes, I did it’, Sunday Times (11 November 2001).
‘Chlorine bomb hits Iraq village’, BBC News Online (16 May 2007).
‘Concern over Iraqi chemical bombs’, BBC News Online (22 February 2007).
‘Our holy war by bin Laden’, Metro (25 September 2001).
‘Bin Laden targets Christians’, The Times (2 November 2001).
‘Arab chiefs say bin Laden is at war with world’, The Times (5 November
2001).
‘Call for jihad reaches fever pitch’, Daily Telegraph (29 September 2001)
‘Islamic leader threatens civil war with US forces in Pakistan’, Daily Telegraph
(24 September 2001).
‘Three die in anti US protests across Pakistan’, The Times (22 September
2001).
‘Low key demo disguises climate of fear’, Daily Telegraph (13 October 2001).
‘The liberals hour’, Economist (22 December 2001).
Aatish Taseer, ‘A British jihadist’, Prospect Magazine, 113 (August 2005).

262 The Changing Face of Terrorism
‘Four ex-members admit Jemaah Islamiah is deviant’, Bernama (2 April 2004).
‘Hassan Butt tells Bob Simon killing in the name of Islam is a “cancer”’,
CBS News (25 March 2007) .
‘I didn’t think abduction would lead to war, says Hezbollah chief ’, Daily
Telegraph (28 August 2006).
‘Follow these steps to commit mass murder’, Metro (14 September 2001).
‘Bin Laden issues fresh threat of suicide attacks’, Sunday Telegraph (14
October 2001).
‘Timeline: Oklahoma bomb’, BBC News Online (2 March 2007). .
‘The Middle East’s bloodstained spiral’, Economist (9 March 2002).
Richard Engel, ‘Egypt digs for the truth’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (24 February
1999).
‘IRA arms may go to rogue factions’, Sunday Telegraph (4 July 1999).
‘Two jailed for vodka poison plot’, BBC News Online (25 January 2008)
.
‘Attack is tip of hate crime iceberg’, Guardian (11 August 1999).
‘Al-Qaeda rift over murder of muslims’, Daily Telegraph (8 October 2005).
‘Al-Qaeda leaders admit: we are in crisis. There is panic and fear’, The Times
(11 February 2008).
Siegfried Buschschluter, ‘Bacteria lab found in terrorist hideout’, Guardian
(8 November 1980).
Norman Crossland, ‘Mustard gas theft follows terrorist threat to Stuttgart’,
Guardian (13 May 1975).
‘Terror on the doorstep’, Sunday Times (12 January 2003).
‘Sergeyev: troops won’t stop at Terek’, Moscow Times (13 October 1999)