Case Study – Lawsuit

Using reliable Internet sources–, search for and locate a recent court case or lawsuit related to sexual harassment in the workplace (attached). Then, conduct a case study in which you analyze the case, presenting an argument and applicable evidence about your selected court case or lawsuit. Consider the concepts learned in this course as you analyze the case and present your analysis. This assignment will need a thesis in the beginning.

Include the following in your paper:

-a brief description of the conduct that precipitated the selected court case or lawsuit and how Title VII protects against this conduct;

-an analysis of the use of the complaint procedure and the employer’s response to any complaints;

-a discussion of preventive steps that could have been used to prevent the harassment from occurring; and

-a summary of the costs to the employer, financial and otherwise, stemming from the lawsuit and the underlying conduct

Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
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207
CLASS ACTION SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAWSUIT:
A STUDY IN CRISIS COMMUNICATION
Paula J. Pomerenke
Mitsubishi Motors Manufacturing of America’s (MMMA) response to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s lawsuit against it illustrates how management can manipulate and
frighten employees. This study examines how outside constituencies and the media grew increasingly critical of MMMA and its relations with the employees during the first three months after
the suit was filed.
Introduction
On April 9, 1996, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) filed a class
action lawsuit in federal court in Chicago,
charging that sexual harassment is pervasive
at Mitsubishi Motors Manufacturing of
America (MMMA) in Normal, Illinois. This
is the largest suit the EEOC has ever filed with
the potential of over 700 women in the class.
MMMA was built as a joint venture between Mitsubishi Motors Corporation (MMC)
in Japan and Chrysler Corporation. The first
cars came off the line in 1988, and Chrysler
withdrew from the venture in 1995. The plant
now makes the Eagle Talon, Dodge Avenger,
and Chrysler Sebring for Chrysler and the
Galant, Eclipse, and Eclipse Spyder for
Mitsubishi. With 4,000 employees, MMMA
is the second largest employer, next to State
Farm Insurance, in the area. Salaries range
from $35,000 to $100,000 including overtime
(Swoboda, 1996).
The crisis communication literature emphasizes the need for communication with the
employees, perhaps the most important constituency (Argenti, 1998); however, the events
after the lawsuit clearly show that MMMA was
unprepared for a crisis, unprepared for handling a deluge of publicity, and certainly unprepared to deal with all its employees. Lynn
Martin, former labor secretary, said that “there
were a lot of hurt people” in the plant after
the EEOC lawsuit and the “flurry of negative
publicity after the suit was filed” (McKinney,
1996, Nov. 14). Examining the actions of the
company in the first three months, as related
daily by the media, affords an insight into what
can happen to employees in a crisis if they are
not dealt with openly, honestly, and immediately. Furthermore, because the public expects
to get the information through the media, examining the presentation of the crisis through
the local and national media should trace the
establishment of credibility or, as in the case
of MMMA, the rapid destruction of credibility. This study examines what did happen to
the employees of MMMA and how they were
treated by the company as presented in the
media from April 9, 1996 to July 1996. Also
Human Resource Management, Fall / Winter 1998, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pp. 207–219
© 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
The events after
the lawsuit
clearly show that
MMMA was
unprepared for a
crisis,
unprepared for
handling a
deluge of
publicity, and
certainly
unprepared to
deal with all its
employees.
CCC 0090-4848/98/030207-13
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H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
included are some internal documents and
letters from outside constituencies. After examining the literature on crisis communication and advice to companies, I analyze
MMMA’s actions and statements to highlight
the image that the company presented to its
employees and the public. I end with the implications for HR departments that need to
draft a crisis communication plan or update
an existing one.
Survey of the Literature
Companies that
are defensive in
facing a crisis
may find
themselves
making the
situation worse.
According to Argenti (1998, p. 167), “communicating effectively with employees may be
the single most important component of the
corporate communication function.” Furthermore, open and honest communication is crucial when employees get information in a crisis situation (How to Develop, 1984). If employees as well as the public are not “communicated with promptly and accurately, a company may soon see repercussions” (Minetos,
1987, p. 41). Because a crisis is unpredictable, the event itself and the aftermath have
the potential to “significantly damage an organization and its employees, products, services, financial condition, and reputation”
(Barton, 1993).
Companies that are defensive in facing a
crisis may find themselves making the situation
worse. Managers may be angry and eager to
place blame for the situation (Barton, 1993).
When they are misunderstood or defensive, they
want to strike out. Tyler (1997) in her study of
Exxon’s arrogant communication practices
found that, during the Exxon-Valdez disaster,
the officials were immediately on the defensive,
blamed others, and appeared manipulative. They
seemed to lack concern for the local fishermen
damaged by the oil spill.
Communication in a time of crisis is a tool
of public relations (Barton, 1993), yet few
handle it well. A media relations manager for
Chrysler Corporation described Chrysler as
the bad guys in an environmental crisis in Wisconsin. The company, however, improved its
image “by being honest, open, accurate and
early” (Houston, 1992, p. 40). Likewise, a vice
president of USX urged companies to be open
and honest at all times in dealing with the
media (Straub, 1992). The role of the spokesperson is to “frame the organization’s response
in the most positive and effective manner . . .
and openly present the facts of the situation
in the most advantageous and least damaging
manner” (Troester, 1991, p. 534).
Handling a crisis can be seen as an information-processing system (Egelhoff & Sen,
1992). There must be more judgment in the
early stages of communication, especially
when handling a sociopolitical crisis, such as
sexual harassment charges. The quality of the
information process with external organizations is usually critical in successfully resolving the crisis; however, “firms often approach
crises such as strikes and lawsuits with a rather
routine, formalized approach and an external
communication style that is asymmetrical in
purpose” (p. 479). This approach does not
open the door for creative resolutions to the
crisis, and does not allow for a two-way exchange with the environment, which would
bring in the fears and the views of the other
side.
History of Sexual Harassment at MMMA
A civil lawsuit against MMMA, alleging sexual
and racial harassment and discrimination, was
filed on December 15, 1994, by 26 current
and former female employees. The charges included rape, assaults, fondling, men rubbing
penises against the women, men exposing
themselves, airguns stuck in their crotches,
contests for breast sizes, sexually explicit photographs, and sexual graffiti throughout the
plant. The women charged that if they complained, their jobs were sabotaged and they
were threatened with injury and with death
(McKinney, 1994).
The company spokesperson, Gary Shultz,
vice president and legal counsel, “denied all
allegations of harassment, saying the company
has policies to ensure a comfortable working
environment and that harassment would destroy that environment . . . [MMMA],” Shultz
said, “ is gender and race neutral” (McKinney,
1994). He said that the company had been
aggressive in any litigation against it and would
be in this issue as well. He added that the company investigated all charges of sexual harassment and only a few had resulted in
punishment. On April 12, 1995, after the court
denied attempts to dismiss the case, Shultz
again said, “We deny there’s any cause of ac-
Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
Be as open and honest as possible
Use one spokesperson
Understand role of media
Reassess communication constantly
→
→
→
Source: Adapted from Barton, 1993, and Argenti, 1998.
FIGURE 1. Crisis Communication Model.
→ →
→
Calm, reassure audiences, especially employees
→
→ → →
ACTION
→ →
→
Practice
→
→
→
Choose spokesperson
CRISIS
Companies are advised to plan for crises of
any type—natural or man made. The following model for crisis communication shown in
Figure 1 illustrates how planning for a crisis
allows a company to take action quickly. At
each step of the action after a crisis, the company reassesses both what it has done and the
next step to take.
MMMA’s crisis communication does not
exactly fit the model as shown in Figure 2.
Even though it should have anticipated the
crisis because of the private lawsuit, its actions are not coordinated. Although there is
debate over whether a company facing legal
action can apologize (Tyler, 1997), MMMA
followed the general pattern of denial in sexual
harassment cases (Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995).
The name of Mitsubishi will forever be associated with crisis communication. The communication from MMMA about the crisis will
be studied by corporate communications, crisis communications, management communications, and public relations students and
practitioners for years. The company came out
swinging, denying everything, and frightening
the employees. Furthermore, the company
→
Anticipate
→
209
Study of Crisis Communication
at MMMA
tion here and will continue to defend it”
(Gleason, 1995).
In order to give the litigants in the civil
lawsuit the right to sue, the EEOC had to investigate the charges. Based on what the
agency found and heard from employees, the
EEOC continued to investigate for 15 months.
In July 1995, the deputy director in Chicago
issued a “reasonable cause” finding, signifying there was reasonable cause to believe
sexual harassment was occurring at the plant.
Although the agency tried to work with
MMMA to find an acceptable solution, the
company indicated in its responses that there
would be no conciliation. The members of the
EEOC in Washington, DC, approved filing a
class action suit against MMMA. The charges
included retaliation against women voicing
complaints, allowing an environment in which
sexual harassment was pervasive, and causing
some women to resign (“Sexual harassment,”
1996).
The suit was filed on April 9, 1996. The
deputy director in Chicago said that MMMA
was spreading the idea that the EEOC had
charged that all women had been harassed and
that all the men were the harassers. “It’s part
of their strategy to divide the people”
(McKinney, 1996, June 23).
PLAN
•
The name of
Mitsubishi will
forever be
associated with
crisis
communication.
H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
Private Lawsuit
CRISIS
EEOC Lawsuit
ACTION
Deny all charges
→
Appoint Spokesperson
→
Frighten, agitate employees
→
Deny all charges
→
Change spokesperson and tack
→
→
PLAN
→
Divide workforce, blame victims
→
→
Distract by announcing model workplace
→
→
Confuse by admitting some harassment exists
→
→
Blame media for negative publicity
→
→
Display anger about attention from outside
→
→
•
→
210
→
FIGURE 2. MMMA Crisis Communication Timeline.
played “blame the victims,” turning the majority of the employees against the victims of the
sexual harassment. In fact, the original victims
seemed to disappear for the first month until
criticism about MMMA’s course of action surfaced in the media. By October, Lynn Martin,
hired by MMMA to head a taskforce to create a
model workplace, reported, “I don’t think a lot
of people here are ever going to understand what
happened to them last spring” (McKinney, 1996,
June 23).
Chronological Documentation of
the Crisis Communication
Shultz’s first comments about the announcement were that the company still denied the
charges of sexual harassment. He believed this
case stemmed from the charges leveled in the
private lawsuit. He also said that the EEOC’s
filing of this large suit was just a way of attracting public attention (McKinney, 1996,
April 9).
On April 12, 1996, Shultz and the director
of public relations called a meeting for all em-
ployees. Shultz said that “the distorted picture
put forth by the EEOC this week has resulted
in anger and frustration in our work force”
(McKinney, 1996, April 13). He said he told the
employees that “the damage from the publicity
surrounding the EEOC charges had a damaging effect beyond what the company could be
fined. It was damaging in the marketplace, the
company’s and employees’ characters and reputations. I did say if sales went down, it would
affect our employment security,” he added
(McKinney, 1996, April 13).
On April 14, 1996, The Pantagraph, the
local newspaper, dealt with the employees’
reactions to the charges. A number of employees had called the paper to “express their frustration and anger” (McKinney, 1996, April 14).
Some employees had hired their own attorney to represent them with the EEOC because
it appeared that everyone was implicated in
the allegations. One woman said that because
of the actions of the first litigants, the reputations of all the employees had been slandered.
By April 21, 1996, the workers were reporting a tense, stressful atmosphere at the
Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
plant. The workers were divided as to the existence of harassment in the plant, and many
were afraid that the company and, consequently, their jobs would be affected. These
were the best jobs in the area (McKinney,
1996, April 21). A psychology professor explained that “employees are getting embarrassed in public and pressure from their
employer to make a public statement about
the wrongness of the situation. . . . It’s not
really their fault this happened. The real problem has something to do with management”
(Weakley, 1996). An editorial in The
Pantagraph urged consideration for the “innocent bystanders” who had gotten caught up
in the attention given to the case (“They’re
there to do,” 1996).
Some of the MMMA employees were angry about the charges and the resulting publicity, arguing that the women filing the
charges were too sensitive about what was
probably good-natured teasing. “Workers interviewed outside the plant reacted to the
charges as if they—not a large company headquartered halfway around the world—had
been personally accused. And they were incensed and embarrassed because they felt the
reputation of all workers had been tarred”
(Meredith, 1996).
For a two-page spread on the company, the
Washington Post interviewed 60 employees, none
of whom was involved in the civil lawsuit. Most
of them agreed that there was harassment in
the plant. Some of the men admitted they had
harassed; some saw nothing wrong with it; and
some said they got caught up in the bad or sick
atmosphere (Grimsley, Swoboda, & Brown,
1996). The women described the fear, intimidations, physical, and verbal abuse they had
suffered. Some had quit while others were still
working there; some saw splits in their families
over the accusations. They described how nothing was done whenever they complained. Their
fears seemed justified because a note found in
the locker of one of the private lawsuit litigants
read “Die bitch! You’ll be sorry!” (Grimsley, et
al., 1996; “Bullying doesn’t,” 1996).
On April 21, 1996, employees filled a page
in The Pantagraph with thousands of signatures.
The caption read, “We are proud to be employees of MMMA. We support our company. This
ad placed and paid for by the following employees of MMMA” (“We are proud,” 1996).
•
211
On April 22, 1996, 3000 employees
boarded 59 chartered buses to picket the
EEOC offices in Chicago. The buses, lunches,
and day’s wages were paid by the company.
Many carried signs saying “Employees supporting MMMA,” and one group carried a
banner reading “EEOC please stop slandering me.” The employees tried to explain that
they “are upset not so much about the lawsuit
as about their reputation and the company’s
reputation” (McKinney, 1996, April 23). Many
protesters said that the national press coverage embarrassed them (Millman, 1996b).
MMMA’s Response to March
and to Employees’ Actions
The Chicago Tribune reported on the “battleground where 4,000 workers are being forced
to choose sides” (Millman, 1996a). The article addressed the “support march” outside
the EEOC’s offices. In reply to complaints
from some employees that the trip was singling out those who weren’t going to go, Shultz
explained, “we feel the system that has been
worked out is very supportive of the employees. It’s not a vacation day, it’s a work day, and
we’ve decided if employees want to take a work
day to demonstrate their support, to allow
them to do that” (McKinney, 1996, April 19).
A message from Tsuneo Ohinouye, CEO,
was on the front page of Motor News, the
MMMA newsletter, May 1996. The headlines
were “A MESSAGE FROM THE CHAIRMAN—PRIDE! EXHILARATION! CONVICTION! RESPECT! INCREDIBLE
TEAMWORK!” Excerpts from the message
follow:
These are just a few of the spirited feelings
so many others and I witnessed this past
Monday during the “Employees Supporting MMMA” support rally. Let me begin
this message by telling each and every one
of you who prepared, contributed, supported, and participated in the support rally
that I am quite proud of you. To say I did
not share some concern about the activity
would be untrue. However, the organization, dedication, incredible attention to
detail and professional manner in which
you handled this enormous undertaking are
a tribute to you, the Employees and eased
The workers were
divided as to the
existence of
harassment in the
plant, and many
were afraid that
the company and,
consequently,
their jobs would
be affected.
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H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
my concerns regarding the risks involved.
You demonstrated the strength of your
convictions by showing the American public that you respect your co-workers, you
appreciate your working environment, and
feel uncomfortable with the EEOC allegations made against Mitsubishi Motor
Manufacturing of America, Inc. . . . your
company (“A message from,” 1996).
Media Reactions to the March
The headline on page one of The Wall Street
Journal on April 22, 1996, read: “A Mitsubishi
U.S. Unit Is Taking a Hard Line in Harassment Battle: Today’s Car Workers’ Rally at
EEOC Is One Phase of Grass-Roots Attack:
A Coordinated Backlash”. Shultz was quoted
as saying he wanted a backlash. The paper
describes Shultz’s statement:
When the class
action suit was
first filed,
management let
it be known that
it would affect
the economics of
the plant.
Mr. Shultz says Mitsubishi is responding to
a spontaneous wave of outrage among its
loyal work force. But some workers sympathetic to the suit say the company is pressuring them to participate in the fight-back,
public-relations campaign. Phone banks
were set up in the plant and workers were
encouraged to call lawmakers and to defend Mitsubishi in the media—all on company time. The company will have a tally
of who attends the EEOC rally and who
doesn’t. . . .
Shultz says his company has nothing to
lose with a high-profile campaign. “Our
story is boring. Theirs is sexy,” he says, referring to the EEOC.
Within days following the EEOC’s announcement of its lawsuit Mr. Shultz
launched a forceful counterattack. He held
a meeting in the company cafeteria, saying
management decided that one way to help
employees was to keep them fully informed.
But according to a transcript of a tape of
one meeting, Mr. Shultz spent most of the
forum encouraging employees to take public actions on the company’s behalf. Telling them the lawsuit was making the company look like a ‘band of sex maniacs,’ he
announced an employee suggestion for the
bus trip to the EEOC.
“We’ve got to win the media by parading thousands strong in Chicago,” he said,
warning at one point: “We can’t tell you
what to do because if we do it comes across
as so biased that it loses its effect. . . . You
are all clever people. . . . I ask you to think
of things that will help to get us through
this” (Sharpe, 1996).
An editorial in the Chicago Tribune pointed
out that the march was not likely to sway anyone in favor of the corporation. It appeared that
the march put pressure on the EEOC and that
the employees were coerced to attend. “The corporation has every right to defend itself against
the claims made against it. But the way it has
chosen to do so does not inspire confidence”
(“Mitsubishi’s not-so,” 1996).
Ellen Goodman, in The Boston Globe, described a recurring theme of how MMMA had
“blamed the victim” and the EEOC for the
problem (Goodman, 1996). When the class
action suit was first filed, management let it
be known that it would affect the economics
of the plant. As reporters came to the plant
and the community, many at the company
turned their embarrassment and fears against
the harassed.
Business Week ran feature articles on
MMMA for at least four weeks. The May 6,
1996, article questioned whether MMMA did
the right thing in taking such a strong stand
against the EEOC. Experts explained that setting up such a hostile atmosphere in the plant
could backfire and bring charges of retaliation against MMMA. An editorial in the same
issue contains harsh criticism of MMMA:
What cannot be denied is that the company has created an angry, threatening atmosphere against the plaintiffs. Many of
them still work on the line. Responsible
companies go out of their way to institute
policies that reassure women they will get
a fair and safe hearing on any complaint,
including one of sexual harassment.
Mitsubishi management has failed to do so.
Neither the company’s Japanese chief executive, nor top executives at its Japanese
parent in Tokyo have publicly commented.
It is time for them to act responsibly (“Bullying doesn’t,” 1996).
In another editorial about sexual harassment, Business Week concluded with “Corpo-
Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
rations, not governments, are primarily responsible for the people who work for them—and
they must act to protect their dignity wherever they live” (“The cult,” 1996). By May 15,
1996, however, the retaliation had accelerated.
For example, the same woman who received
the death threat had a second note reading
“Accidents happen, watch your—” (Faklaris,
1996). Car windows had been broken, houses
defaced, threats yelled at the women, and one
woman had been followed by a van with a camera mounted inside.
An editorial in The Pantagraph on May 25,
1996, clearly illustrated the mounting antagonism between the company and the press,
again putting the employees in the middle.
United Auto Workers
Even the UAW was unimpressed by the
march. Stephen Yokich, president, released the
following statement:
As leaders of a union proud of its decadesold tradition of combating discrimination
in the workplace and in society, we believe
that Mitsubishi’s efforts to pressure its employees into demonstrating against the
EEOC’s efforts to provide all of Mitsubishi’s
workforce with a work environment free of
sexual harassment is just plain wrong
(“Mitsubishi’s not-so,” 1996).
Changing Stand on Lawsuit
Every once in a while we feel compelled to
say “enough is enough.” And this is one of
those times . . .
The Pantagraph quoted from a memorandum Ohinouye sent to employees. The memo,
in part, read that Ohinouye
“states his regrets that the intent of the employee trip to EEOC was misinterpreted in
the media and that reporting has created an
additional hardship for our employees.”
We beg to differ.
In all its reporting of the trip to Chicago and informational protest at the Employees Equal Opportunity [sic] Commission office, The Pantagraph has correctly
reported the trip was initiated by employees and paid for by the company.
The Pantagraph has also reported on
the hardships on the bulk of the employees
because of the alleged actions of a few.
Let’s be accurate, Mr. Ohinouye. You
paid for the march on the EEOC. We reported on it.
If you have regrets, have them for paying workers to protest against EEOC. We
have no regrets for our objective coverage
of the protest.
Don’t take the easy and diversionary
way out by heaping blame on the media for
reporting on what may well be human resource and public relations shortcomings
at your company.
To do so is beneath the dignity of all of
us (“MMMA can’t blame,” 1996).
On April 25, 1996, The New York Times was the
first to announce that MMMA had changed its
stand on the suit. “After indignantly protesting
the harassment charges—and encouraging
workers here to do the same—Mitsubishi
changed its tack Thursday. Tsuneo Ohinouye,
the company’s chairman and chief executive,
said it wanted to settle the EEOC lawsuit”
(Meredith, 1996). He also admitted there had
been cases of harassment at the plant; since
1987 when the plant opened, Mitsubishi had
investigated 89 cases of sexual harassment, and
10 American men had been dismissed. Only four
complaints had been found with no merit at all.
The Wall Street Journal on April 29, 1996,
wrote that until now the executives of MMC
had declined to say how the suit should be
settled. Now Hirokazu Nakamura, chairman
of Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, said, “‘We
would like to settle this issue as soon as possible in a friendly manner . . . because it has
disturbed the society and also because it
caused trouble for other Mitsubishi companies” (Grimsley et al., 1996). On May 1, 1996,
Shultz emphasized that Japan had given no
conditions to settling the suit. He said the key
term is pervasiveness of sexual harassment,
which the company and the employees deny
(McKinney, 1996, May 1).
Reactions from Outside Constituencies
MMMA also received letters and visits from
congresswomen and organizations such as National Organization of Women (NOW) and the
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H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
All of these
people were
critical of
MMMA and how
it had handled
the crisis,
including its
employees, so far.
Rainbow Coalition. All of these people were
critical of MMMA and how it had handled
the crisis, including its employees, so far.
For example, Patricia Schroeder and
nine other congresswomen sent a letter to
MMMA, dated April 22, 1996. Portions of
the letter addressed to Takahisa Komoto,
president, follow:
We are also willing to work towards a more
comprehensive resolution of these issues.
We share your concern over protecting
those who have been victimized. Unfortunately, however, some of the positions and
actions have been distorted in the media
(T. Komoto, personal communication, April
30, 1996).
We are dismayed by the course of events
taking place at your plant in response to
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission class action suit filed against
your company on behalf of up to 500
women claiming sexual harassment.
Instead of taking the charges seriously,
it appears your company is embarked on a
campaign to punish the women who are
alleging they were victimized. . . .
We call upon Mitsubishi to cease such
retaliatory behavior and instead demonstrate good corporate leadership and citizenship in this matter. Judicious behavior
is more likely to boost sales than the low
road you are now taking. Keep in mind that
a growing number of new car purchases are
made by women (50 percent in 1994, up
from 18 percent in 1987).
The women of America will be watching your actions in this matter (P.
Schroeder, personal communication, April
22, 1996).
On May 2, 1996, Ohinouye, the CEO, released a statement, hinting at the changes that
were occurring at MMMA. The following article discusses his memo:
Komoto, in his reply to Schroeder, explained that the employees’ jobs were not
threatened at the very beginning and that the
employees were the ones who wanted to
picket, make phone calls, etc. Part of his letter follows:
Before responding to the specific items you
enumerated, let me assure you that
Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of
America takes the charges made by the
EEOC most seriously. We have attempted
to cooperate with the EEOC in responding
to its investigation, including furnishing all
requested data and responding to specific
charges and recommendations for action
to improve our program of dealing with the
subject of sexual harassment. In the process, we expressed our willingness to meet
with the Commission to discuss its findings.
In a lengthy statement, he said MMMA’s
sexual harassment policy is designed “to
maintain a working environment wherein
every employee is treated with dignity and
mutual respect. Sexual harassment is inconsistent with this philosophy . . . .”
All executives, supervisors, middle
management and staff have received or are
scheduled to receive sexual harassment
training, he added, and all new employees
are trained during a company orientation.
“However, despite these policies and
procedures, we find ourselves the subject
of EEOC litigation. It is clear we have more
work to do,” Ohinouye said.
“We know that policies are only as good
as the people who uphold them—that one
incident of sexual harassment is one too
many—that pain is real.
“Be assured the company is not standing idly by,” he commented. “We are taking
a number of steps to ensure this situation is
resolved quickly and equitably, and that we
will not experience similar events again in
the future.”
MMMA, the chairman said, “will cooperate fully with EEOC to resolve this issue fairly and completely.
“We will take steps to have a fair and
independent review of our current policies
and procedures and take whatever action
is necessary to strengthen those efforts and
ensure the women of MMMA understand
that their company backs its policies with
action” (McKinney, 1996, May 2).
After a meeting with EEOC Chairman
Gilbert Casellas, Schroeder said they had discussed the possibility of retaliation against the
Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
women who had filed complaints and the
company’s aggressiveness. She commented,
“Everyone of us said we’re a pretty tough
bunch of old birds . . . but we wouldn’t want
to be working in that plant in that kind of an
environment” (“NOW urges,” 1996).
NOW and Jesse Jackson announced national campaigns of May 7, 1996. Patricia Ireland, president of NOW, announced a
campaign of information pickets outside
Mitsubishi dealerships while Jackson called
for a boycott of cars made by MMMA. Their
press release included the following statement:
Mitsubishi’s response to complaints of
sexual abuse and harassment has been abhorrent. While the Japanese parent corporation has already written off more than
$300 million in losses at the plant, the U.S.
company has tried to hide its own bad management by scapegoating the women who
have brought the charges, claiming that
they may bring the company down and cost
their co-workers their jobs. The manufacturer had resorted to attempts to intimidate
the women and to pit employee against employee, effectively increasing hostility on the
job.
Harassment in the workplace is rampant, it’s against the law, and it has to be
taken seriously. This weekend, NOW activists will start our national campaign, and
we won’t stop until Mitsubishi resolves the
critical issue of abuses against women and
people of color at its plant (“NOW
launches,” 1996).
On May 22, 1996, Ireland and Jackson
visited the MMMA plant, talked with the
CEO, and met with a small group of employees. They said the employees told them that
not only was the sexual harassment continuing in the plant but so was the fear of retribution. Employees asked them to keep the public
pressure on until management resolved the
suit and eliminated the ongoing harassment
(NOW, 1996).
Model Workplace
On May 14, 1996, MMMA announced the
hiring of former Labor Secretary, Lynn Martin, to “conduct a third-party review of all the
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company’s workplace policies and procedures,
including those related to sexual harassment,
discrimination and diversity” (Mitsubishi
Motor Manufacturer, personal communication, May 14, 1996). In a memorandum to
the employees, Martin told them that she
would try to keep them informed beforehand
about any media interviews she would do. She
sympathized with their experiences by writing, “I know that many of you wish the media would simply go away. But they won’t. . . .
And we have promised the media that we
would be open with them and the public about
our work” (L. Martin, personal communication, May 24, 1996).
The June issue of Motor News contained
an article on Martin and her work at the Department of Labor. The closing paragraph perhaps best summarizes the changes that had
occurred in less than three months at MMMA:
In doing so, the changes made here will
change the nation’s work force. What has
happened at MMMA has opened the eyes
of companies worldwide. Many will be
watching closing [sic] and learning from
the changes made here and implementing
similar workplace initiatives. We are working together to change our work environment for the better and to establish how it
will be in the years to come. Good luck to
everyone as we embark on this landmark
journey (“Turning the page,” 1996)
The reactions of the exterior environment
ranged from guardedly cautious to cynical.
Business Week in an article entitled “Ethics
for Hire,” wrote that Martin’s hiring seemed
to follow the pattern set by companies that
have ethics problems. They spend large
amounts of money to hire a “big name” to conduct an independent investigation; however,
there is a conflict of interests because these
investigators, such as Martin, are paid by the
companies (France, 1996).
While applauding what, on the surface,
seemed admirable for the company to undertake, the “outsiders” were wary. The company
had done nothing to help the original victims of
sexual harassment nor had it done anything that
looked like an attempt to settle the lawsuit. The
lawyer for the original private lawsuit called the
announcements “window dressing” because the
Schroeder
commented,
“Everyone of us
said we’re a
pretty tough
bunch of old
birds . . . but we
wouldn’t want to
be working in
that plant in that
kind of an
environment.
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H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
training and posting of new jobs were nothing
“revolutionary or unusual in corporate America”
(“Mitsubishi announces,” 1996). Casellas of the
EEOC said that very serious charges must be
addressed or acknowledged by the company. A
NOW spokesperson said that the millions being spent on consultants should be spent on
investigating the allegations and bringing the
suit to a rapid end (Allen, 1996). Jackson said
that hiring consultants and setting up a “model
workplace environment” were a diversion, not
a solution to the accusations of harassment
(McKinney, 1996, July 24). The Pantagraph
concluded an editorial by questioning whether
the male-dominated corporation would be willing to let Martin and the other new employees
do their jobs “without interference—and then
support their ideas.” (“MMMA lands” 1996).
Discussion
By the end of the
first week, not
only were the
media criticizing
the company in
their own
editorials but
also including in
their coverage
the criticism of
outside
constituencies.
Most of us today “judge corporate behavior
from our interpretation of news events, and
the electronic and print press has considerable leverage in how they ‘rate’ individual performances by leading executives” (Barton,
1993, p. 6). In the case of MMMA, performances were rated low. The company was not
presented favorably in the media coverage
from April 1996 to the end of July 1996. By
the end of the first week, not only were the
media criticizing the company in their own
editorials but also including in their coverage
the criticism of outside constituencies.
The author of a Chicago Tribune column,
an attorney, believed the company’s actions
could be divided into two phases. Phase one:
the “How Dare You?” phase—blamed the victims, protested at the EEOC’s offices, contacted the media and legislators, and implied
that employee jobs would be lost. Phase two:
the “Oh, my gosh, maybe we’re not perfect
after all” phase—came after the media and the
legislators criticized what MMMA was doing
and the public was not taken in by protests
and phone calls. MMMA betrayed the employees after creating such a tense atmosphere at
the plant that there were death threats, after
telling them to defend their innocence to the
EEOC and Washington, and then admitting
that maybe MMMA itself had not been totally innocent in the sexual harassment
charges (Strubbe, 1996).
Shultz, the first company spokesperson, was
a lawyer who worked in the public relations
department. Until May 1996 he had been the
spokesperson with a pattern of always denying
any fault of the company. By his denial and defensiveness about the EEOC lawsuit, he may
have distorted the messages sent first to employees and then to the public. That defensiveness in one person, then, “tends to cause
defensiveness in others” (Baker, 1980). It is clear
that after Shultz talked to the employees, they
were on a crusade to defend their honor and
that of the company. They made phone calls,
wrote letters to newspapers, planned a protest
march in Chicago, and waved banners protesting their innocence. In a month, Shultz was gone
as spokesperson, the National Organization for
Women was picketing, the Reverend Jesse Jackson was boycotting, congresswomen were writing, and the United Auto Workers was
unimpressed by their actions.
Some analysts described all this activity
as “a public relations disaster” (McKinney,
1996, April 27). A columnist in the Chicago
Tribune described the actions in this way:
Workers worry that Mitsubishi’s image has
been tarnished, that consumers will stop
buying its cars, and that the factory will
have to start laying off workers as a result,
putting good, honest folk out of work.
A noble concern, though it would have
been just as noble, perhaps more so, if those
folks who are worried about image had worried a bit more about those being groped
and undertaken self-policing to get the
gropers to clean up their act and put their
physical agility to better use, such as building cars.
Mitsubishi lit the fuse rather than snuff
it out by such theatrics as busing workers
to the EEOC in Chicago to protest the suit.
If Mitsubishi was looking for sympathy, it
got none when word got out that those bused
for the day off work with pay, plus a meal.
And those who refused to go on the bus ride
had to come up with a valid reason why
(Mateja, 1996).
Argenti (1998, p. 169) advises corporations to “create an atmosphere of respect for
all employees within the organization.” These
employees, however, were positioned between
Class Action Sexual Harassment Lawsuit: A Study in Crisis Communication
management—which was stirring them up to
rally—and the world outside the plant, which
did not believe them. Is it little wonder then
that they began to plead for everyone to leave
them alone? They feared for their jobs. And
what about the original victims? They were
never mentioned until outsiders such as congresswomen began to call for protection for
them. Those women feared for their lives.
When it realized that public sentiment was
against it, MMMA followed the pattern of
many companies today to hire an authority to
investigate the company. According to the
Washington Post, Martin said, “‘Early on, looking around, it was quite clear that there were
programs that should be there” (Grimsley,
1996a); however, the Washington Post described MMMA as a “striking example of a
company that turned to sexual harassment
training only after [italics added] it got into
serious trouble” (Grimsley, 1996b). The trainers hired to organize the MMMA program said
they would literally work round the clock to
reach all 4,200 employees by January 1997.
After 20 months, however, Newsweek reported that the harassment had become more
subtle, and many women were still frightened
and were threatened for speaking up (Annin &
McCormick, 1997). The Newsweek investigation found that although MMMA had made
serious reforms, the company had discovered
that turning around the workplace is harder than
anticipated. While 16 offenders had been fired,
the company was still trying to figure out how
to change its culture. I believe that only time
will tell if all these changes are a smokescreen
or sincere attempts by the company to change
its image and indeed make its workplace a safe
place for all its employees. What is clear so far,
however, is that much confusion, pain, fear, retaliation, and media attention could have been
avoided by honesty in the beginning.
Implications for HR
For HR professionals who so often are called
to work on/advise on/prepare the statements
for difficult communications in situations such
as that at Mitsubishi, there are many useful
lessons that can be drawn from this case. Consider the following:
Prepare for a crisis with a communication
plan. After the crisis hits is too late to make
plans.
Have one spokesperson who embodies
the trust of the public and the employees.
That spokesperson should be trained to deal
with the media—to be honest, not combative.
Understand that there are many audiences to communicate with during a crisis—employees, public, shareholders, residents of area, etc. Each has specific needs
and agendas. For example, the employees
must be told as much information as possible as quickly as possible to calm and reassure them.
Understand that the media is not the
enemy; they have a job to do. In this day of
rapid technology, the news of the crisis will
be spread rapidly. If a company does not
deal with the crisis immediately, that weakness will also be spread rapidly and dissected
again and again.
Don’t make rash decisions—consider
how each action will look when detailed
in the media. For example, the MMMA
march on the EEOC offices in Chicago may
have been planned in all sincerity; however, none of the media, and little of the
public, perceived it that way. Instead, it was
viewed as manipulative.
Beware of hiring a personality to deflect attention from the crisis or to serve as
spokesperson. That practice may backfire
in the eyes of the media and the public if
the “name” is paid by the company.
Consider that honesty is probably the
best policy in a crisis situation. Even if there
are no immediate answers, a sincere “We
don’t know yet, but are checking everything
we can” will be accepted before a “We deny
everything” answer.
Remember that there are victims in
crisis situations such as Mitsubishi’s.
MMMA appeared to ignore the victims
and perhaps even put them in danger by
hinting to the rest of the employees that
the plant could close. There was no mention of concern for the victims for over
a month, not until Shultz’s farewell
message.
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217
After 20 months,
however,
Newsweek
reported that the
harassment had
become more
subtle, and many
women were still
frightened and
were threatened
for speaking up.
218
•
H UMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, Fall / Winter 1998
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PAULA J. POMERENKE is a professor of business communications in the Management
and Quantitative Methods Department, College of Business, Illinois State University,
Normal, Illinois. Her research interests include crisis communication, gender language
in the workplace, and Plain English. Her sabbatical research, fall 1998, includes working with the Securities and Exchange Commission to learn how companies required to
rewrite their prospectuses in Plain English have handled the task—by training personnel or by hiring freelance writers. She is also studying the activity of the Plain English
Network to track which government agencies are rewriting their documents.
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