Business Law Question

Your paper must include: (1) the facts of the case in detail; (2) the legal issue(s) at stake; (3) the court’s analysis of each issue considering the facts and the law; and (4) your opinion of whether the court ruled correctly on each issue and why. Each section should be written in paragraph form, except for the legal issues section, which can be written as a list or bullet points.

Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
568 U.S. 237
133 S.Ct. 1050
185 L.Ed.2d 61
mechanistic inquiries. Requiring the state to
introduce comprehensive documentation of a
dog’s prior hits and misses in the field is the
antithesis of a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach. Field records may sometimes be
relevant, but the court should evaluate all the
evidence, and should not prescribe an
inflexible set of requirements.
FLORIDA, Petitioner
v.
Clayton HARRIS.
No. 11–817.
Supreme Court of the United States
Gregory G. Garre, Washington, DC, for
Petitioner.
Argued Oct. 31, 2012.
Decided Feb. 19, 2013.
Joseph R. Palmore, for the United States as
amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court,
supporting the Petitioner.
Summaries:
Source: Justia
Glen P. Gifford,
Respondent.
Officer Wheetley pulled Harris over for a
routine traffic stop. Wheetley sought consent
to search Harris’s truck, based on Harris’s
nervousness and seeing an open beer can.
When Harris refused, Wheetley executed a
sniff test with his trained narcotics dog, Aldo,
who alerted at the driver’s-side door, leading
Wheetley to conclude that he had probable
cause to search. The search turned up nothing
Aldo was trained to detect, but did reveal
ingredients
for
manufacturing
methamphetamine. Harris was charged with
illegal possession of those ingredients. In a
subsequent stop while Harris was out on bail,
Aldo again alerted on Harris’s truck but
nothing of interest was found. The trial court
denied a motion to suppress. The Florida
Supreme Court reversed, holding that if an
officer failed to keep records of field
performance, including how many times a
dog falsely alerted, he could never have
probable cause to think the dog a reliable
indicator of drugs. The Supreme Court
reversed. Training and testing records
supported Aldo’s reliability in detecting drugs
and Harris failed to undermine that evidence,
so Wheetley had probable cause to search.
Whether an officer has probable cause
depends on the totality of the circumstances,
not rigid rules, bright-line tests, and
Tallahassee,
FL,
for
Gregory G. Garre, Counsel of Record, Brian
D. Schmalzbach, Special Assistant Attorneys
General,
Latham
&
Watkins
LLP,
Washington, DC, Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney
General of Florida, Carolyn M. Snurkowski,
Associate Deputy Attorney General, Robert J.
Krauss, Chief–Assistant Attorney General,
Susan M. Shanahan, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General,
Counsel for Petitioner.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, Second
Judicial Circuit of Florida, Glen P. Gifford,
Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, FL,
for Respondent.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the
Court.
[568 U.S. 240]
In this case, we consider how a court should
determine if the “alert” of a drug-detection
dog during a traffic stop provides probable
cause to search a vehicle. The Florida
Supreme Court held that the State must in
every case present an exhaustive set of
records, including a log of the dog’s
performance in the field, to establish the dog’s
-1-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
reliability. See 71 So.3d 756, 775 (2011). We
think that demand inconsistent with the
“flexible,
common-sense
standard”
of
probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527
(1983).
methamphetamine at his house and could not
go “more than a few days without using” it.
Id., at 68. The State charged Harris with
possessing pseudoephedrine for use in
manufacturing methamphetamine.
While out on bail, Harris had another run-in
with Wheetley and Aldo. This time, Wheetley
pulled Harris over for a broken brake light.
Aldo again sniffed the truck’s exterior, and
again alerted at the driver’s-side door handle.
Wheetley once more searched the truck, but
on this occasion discovered nothing of
interest.
I
William Wheetley is a K–9 Officer in the
Liberty County, Florida Sheriff’s Office. On
June 24, 2006, he was on a routine patrol
with Aldo, a German shepherd trained to
detect certain narcotics (methamphetamine,
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy).
Wheetley pulled over respondent Clayton
Harris’s truck because it had an expired
license plate. On approaching the driver’sside door, Wheetley saw that Harris was
“visibly nervous,” unable to sit still, shaking,
and breathing rapidly. Wheetley also noticed
an open can of beer in the truck’s cup holder.
App. 62. Wheetley asked Harris for consent to
search the truck, but Harris refused. At that
point, Wheetley retrieved
Harris moved to suppress the evidence found
in his truck on the ground that Aldo’s alert
had not given Wheetley probable cause for a
search. At the hearing on that motion,
Wheetley testified about both his and Aldo’s
training in drug detection. See id., at 52–82.
In 2004, Wheetley (and a different dog)
completed a 160–hour course in narcotics
detection offered by the Dothan, Alabama
Police Department, while Aldo (and a
different handler) completed a similar, 120–
hour course given by the Apopka, Florida
Police Department. That same year, Aldo
received a one-year certification from Drug
Beat, a private company that specializes in
testing and certifying K–9 dogs. Wheetley and
Aldo teamed up in 2005 and went through
another, 40–hour refresher course in Dothan
together. They also did four hours of training
exercises each week to maintain their skills.
Wheetley would hide drugs in certain vehicles
or buildings while leaving others “blank” to
determine whether Aldo alerted at the right
places. Id., at 57. According to Wheetley,
Aldo’s performance in those exercises was
“really good.” Id., at 60. The State introduced
“Monthly Canine Detection
[133 S.Ct. 1054]
Aldo from the patrol car and walked him
around Harris’s truck for a “free air sniff.” Id.,
at 63. Aldo alerted at the driver’s-side door
handle—signaling, through a distinctive set of
behaviors, that he smelled drugs there.
Wheetley concluded, based principally on
Aldo’s alert, that he had probable cause to
search the truck. His search did not turn up
any of the drugs Aldo was trained
[568 U.S. 241]
to detect. But it did reveal 200 loose
pseudoephedrine pills, 8,000 matches, a
bottle of hydrochloric acid, two containers of
antifreeze, and a coffee filter full of iodine
crystals—all
ingredients
for
making
methamphetamine. Wheetley accordingly
arrested Harris, who admitted after proper
Miranda warnings that he routinely “cooked”
[568 U.S. 242]
Training Logs” consistent with that
testimony: They showed that Aldo always
found hidden drugs and that he performed
“satisfactorily” (the higher of two possible
-2-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
assessments) on each day of training. Id., at
109–116.
meaning of the particular
training and certification, field
performance records (including
any unverified alerts), and
evidence
On cross-examination, Harris’s attorney
chose not to contest the quality of Aldo’s or
Wheetley’s training. She focused instead on
Aldo’s certification and his performance in
the field, particularly the two stops of Harris’s
truck.
Wheetley
conceded
that
the
certification (which, he noted, Florida law did
not require) had expired the year before he
pulled Harris over. See id., at 70–71.
Wheetley also acknowledged that he did not
keep complete records of Aldo’s performance
in traffic stops or other field work; instead, he
maintained records only of alerts resulting in
arrests. See id., at 71–72, 74. But Wheetley
defended Aldo’s two alerts to Harris’s
seemingly narcotics-free truck: According to
Wheetley, Harris probably transferred the
odor of methamphetamine to the door
handle, and Aldo responded to that “residual
odor.” Id., at 80.
[568 U.S. 243]
concerning the experience and
training of the officer handling
the dog, as well as any other
objective evidence known to the
officer
about
the
dog’s
reliability.” Id., at 775.
The court particularly stressed the need for
“evidence of the dog’s performance history,”
including records showing “how often the dog
has alerted in the field without illegal
contraband having been found.” Id., at 769.
That data, the court stated, could help to
expose such problems as a handler’s tendency
(conscious or not) to “cue [a] dog to alert” and
“a dog’s inability to distinguish between
residual odors and actual drugs.” Id., at 769,
774. Accordingly, an officer like Wheetley who
did not keep full records of his dog’s field
performance could never have the requisite
cause to think “that the dog is a reliable
indicator of drugs.” Id., at 773.
The trial court concluded that Wheetley had
probable cause to search Harris’s truck and so
denied the motion to suppress. Harris then
entered a no-contest plea while reserving the
right to appeal
[133 S.Ct. 1055]
Judge Canady dissented, maintaining that the
majority’s
“elaborate
and
inflexible
evidentiary requirements” went beyond the
demands of probable cause. Id., at 775. He
would have affirmed the trial court’s ruling on
the strength of Aldo’s training history and
Harris’s “fail[ure] to present any evidence
challenging” it. Id., at 776.
the trial court’s ruling. An intermediate state
court summarily affirmed. See 989 So.2d
1214, 1215 (2008) (per curiam ).
The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding
that Wheetley lacked probable cause to search
Harris’s
vehicle
under
the
Fourth
Amendment. “[W]hen a dog alerts,” the court
wrote, “the fact that the dog has been trained
and certified is simply not enough to establish
probable cause.” 71 So.3d, at 767. To
demonstrate a dog’s reliability, the State
needed to produce a wider array of evidence:
We granted certiorari, 566 U.S. ––––, 132
S.Ct. 1796, 182 L.Ed.2d 615 (2012), and now
reverse.
II
A police officer has probable cause to conduct
a search when “the facts available to [him]
would ‘warrant a [person] of reasonable
“[T]he State must present … the
dog’s training and certification
records, an explanation of the
-3-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
caution in the belief’ ” that contraband or
evidence of a crime is present. Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75
L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) );
see Safford Unified School Dist. # 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–371, 129 S.Ct.
2633, 174 L.Ed.2d 354 (2009). The test for
probable cause is not reducible to “precise
definition or quantification.” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157
L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). “Finely tuned standards
such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or
by a preponderance of the evidence … have
case.” Id., at 230, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
Probable cause, we emphasized, is “a fluid
concept—turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat
set of legal rules.” Id., at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317.
The Florida Supreme Court flouted this
established approach to determining probable
cause. To assess the reliability of a drugdetection dog, the court created a strict
evidentiary checklist, whose every item the
State must tick off.1 Most prominently, an
alert cannot establish
[568 U.S. 245]
[568 U.S. 244]
probable cause under the Florida court’s
decision unless the State introduces
comprehensive documentation of the dog’s
prior “hits” and “misses” in the field. (One
wonders how the court would apply its test to
a rookie dog.) No matter how much other
proof the State offers of the dog’s reliability,
the absent field performance records will
preclude a finding of probable cause. That is
the
antithesis
of
a
totality-of-thecircumstances analysis. It is, indeed, the very
thing we criticized in Gates when we
overhauled our method for assessing the
trustworthiness of an informant’s tip. A gap
as to any one matter, we explained, should
not sink the State’s case; rather, that
“deficiency … may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by
a strong showing as to … other indicia of
reliability.” Id., at 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317. So too
here, a finding of a drug-detection dog’s
reliability cannot depend on the State’s
satisfaction
of
multiple,
independent
evidentiary requirements. No more for dogs
than for human informants is such an
inflexible checklist the way to prove
reliability, and thus establish probable cause.
no place in the [probable-cause] decision.”
Gates, 462 U.S., at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. All we
have required is the kind of “fair probability”
on which “reasonable and prudent [people,]
not legal technicians, act.” Id., at 238, 231,
103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
In evaluating whether the State has met this
practical and common-sensical standard, we
have consistently looked to the totality of the
circumstances. See, e.g., Pringle, 540 U.S., at
371, 124 S.Ct. 795; Gates, 462 U.S., at 232,
103 S.Ct. 2317; Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed.
1879 (1949). We have rejected rigid rules,
bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in
favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered
approach.
[133 S.Ct. 1056]
In Gates, for example, we abandoned our old
test for assessing the reliability of informants’
tips because it had devolved into a “complex
superstructure of evidentiary and analytical
rules,” any one of which, if not complied with,
would derail a finding of probable cause. 462
U.S., at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. We lamented the
development of a list of “inflexible,
independent requirements applicable in every
Making matters worse, the decision below
treats records of a dog’s field performance as
the gold standard in evidence, when in most
cases they have relatively limited import.
-4-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
Errors may abound in such records. If a dog
on patrol fails to alert to a car containing
drugs, the mistake usually will go undetected
because the officer will not initiate a search.
Field data thus may not capture a dog’s false
negatives. Conversely (and more relevant
here), if the dog alerts to a car in which the
officer finds no narcotics, the dog may not
have made a mistake at all. The dog may have
detected substances that were too well hidden
or present in quantities too small for the
officer to locate. Or the dog may have smelled
the residual odor of drugs previously in the
vehicle
program that evaluated his proficiency in
locating drugs. After all, law enforcement
units have their own strong incentive to use
effective training and certification programs,
because only accurate drug-detection dogs
enable officers to locate contraband without
incurring unnecessary risks or wasting
limited time and resources.
A defendant, however, must have an
opportunity to challenge such evidence of a
dog’s reliability, whether by cross-examining
the testifying officer or by introducing his
own fact or expert witnesses. The defendant,
for example, may contest the adequacy of a
certification or training program, perhaps
asserting that its standards are too lax or its
methods faulty. So too, the defendant may
examine how the dog (or handler) performed
in the assessments made in those settings.
Indeed, evidence of the dog’s (or handler’s)
history in the field, although susceptible to
the kind of misinterpretation we have
discussed, may sometimes be relevant, as the
Solicitor General acknowledged at oral
argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23–24 (“[T]he
defendant can ask the handler, if the handler
is on the stand, about field performance, and
then the court can give that answer whatever
weight is appropriate”). And even assuming a
dog is generally reliable, circumstances
surrounding a particular alert may undermine
the case
[568 U.S. 246]
or on the driver’s person.2 Field data thus
may
[133 S.Ct. 1057]
markedly overstate a dog’s real false positives.
By contrast, those inaccuracies—in either
direction—do not taint records of a dog’s
performance in standard training and
certification settings. There, the designers of
an assessment know where drugs are hidden
and where they are not—and so where a dog
should alert and where he should not. The
better measure of a dog’s reliability thus
comes away from the field, in controlled
testing environments.3
For that reason, evidence of a dog’s
satisfactory performance in a certification or
training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide
organization
[133 S.Ct. 1058]
[568 U.S. 247]
In short, a probable-cause hearing focusing
on a dog’s alert should proceed much like any
other. The court should allow the parties to
make their best case, consistent with the
usual rules of criminal procedure. And the
court should then evaluate the proffered
evidence to decide what all the circumstances
for probable cause—if, say, the officer cued
the dog (consciously or not), or if the team
was working under unfamiliar conditions.
has certified a dog after testing his reliability
in a controlled setting, a court can presume
(subject to any conflicting evidence offered)
that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to
search. The same is true, even in the absence
of formal certification, if the dog has recently
and successfully completed a training
[568 U.S. 248]
-5-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
demonstrate. If the State has produced proof
from controlled settings that a dog performs
reliably in detecting drugs, and the defendant
has not contested that showing, then the
court should find probable cause. If, in
contrast, the defendant has challenged the
State’s case (by disputing the reliability of the
dog overall or of a particular alert), then the
court should weigh the competing evidence.
In all events, the court should not prescribe,
as the Florida Supreme Court did, an
inflexible set of evidentiary requirements. The
question—similar to every inquiry into
probable cause—is whether all the facts
surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the
lens of common sense, would make a
reasonably prudent person think that a search
would reveal contraband or evidence of a
crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that
test.
Harris, as also noted above, declined to
challenge in the trial court any aspect of
Aldo’s training. See supra, at 1054 – 1055. To
be sure, Harris’s briefs in this Court raise
questions about
[568 U.S. 249]
that training’s adequacy—for example,
whether the programs simulated sufficiently
diverse environments and whether they used
enough blind testing (in which the handler
does not know the location of drugs and so
cannot cue the dog). See Brief for Respondent
57–58. Similarly, Harris here queries just
how well Aldo performed in controlled
testing. See id., at 58. But Harris never voiced
those doubts in the trial court, and cannot do
so for the first time here. See, e.g., Rugendorf
v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534, 84 S.Ct.
825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964). As the case came
to the trial court, Aldo had successfully
completed two recent drug-detection courses
and maintained his proficiency through
weekly training exercises. Viewed alone, that
training record—with or without the prior
certification—sufficed to establish Aldo’s
reliability. See supra, at 1057 – 1058.
III
And here, Aldo’s did. The record in this case
amply
supported
the
trial
court’s
determination that Aldo’s alert gave Wheetley
probable cause to search Harris’s truck.
The State, as earlier described, introduced
substantial evidence of Aldo’s training and his
proficiency in finding drugs. See supra, at
1053 – 1055. The State showed that two years
before alerting to Harris’s truck, Aldo had
successfully completed a 120–hour program
in narcotics detection, and separately
obtained a certification from an independent
company. And although the certification
expired after a year, the Sheriff’s Office
required continuing training for Aldo and
Wheetley. The two satisfied the requirements
of another, 40–hour training program one
year prior to the search at issue. And
Wheetley worked with Aldo for four hours
each week on exercises designed to keep their
skills sharp. Wheetley testified, and written
records confirmed, that in those settings Aldo
always performed at the highest level.
And Harris’s cross-examination of Wheetley,
which focused on Aldo’s field performance,
failed to rebut the State’s case. Harris
principally contended in the trial court that
because Wheetley did not find any of the
substances Aldo was
[133 S.Ct. 1059]
trained to detect, Aldo’s two alerts must have
been false. See Brief for Respondent 1; App.
77–80. But we have already described the
hazards of inferring too much from the failure
of a dog’s alert to lead to drugs, see supra, at
1056 – 1057; and here we doubt that Harris’s
logic does justice to Aldo’s skills. Harris
cooked and used methamphetamine on a
regular basis; so as Wheetley later surmised,
Aldo likely responded to odors that Harris
had transferred to the driver’s-side door
-6-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
handle of his truck. See supra, at 1054 –
1055. A well-trained drug-detection dog
should alert to such odors; his response to
them might appear a mistake, but in fact is
not. See n. 2, supra . And still more
fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable
cause in hindsight, based on what a search
does or does not turn up. See United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92
L.Ed. 210 (1948). For the reasons already
stated, Wheetley had good cause to view Aldo
as a reliable detector of drugs. And no special
circumstance here gave Wheetley reason to
759, 771, 775 (Fla.2011) (holding that the
State “must” present the itemized evidence).
See U.S. Dept. of Army, Military Working
Dog Program 30 (Pamphlet 190–12, 1993)
(“The odor of a substance may be present in
enough concentration to cause the dog to
respond even after the substance has been
removed. Therefore, when a detector dog
responds and no drug or explosive is found,
do not assume the dog has made an error”); S.
Bryson, Police Dog Tactics 257 (2d ed. 2000)
(“Four skiers toke up in the parking lot before
going up the mountain. Five minutes later a
narcotic detector dog alerts to the car. There
is no dope inside. However, the dog has
performed correctly”). The Florida Supreme
Court treated a dog’s response to residual
odor as an error, referring to the “inability to
distinguish between [such] odors and actual
drugs” as a “facto[r] that call[s] into question
Aldo’s reliability.” 71 So.3d, at 773–774 ; see
supra, at 1055. But that statement reflects a
misunderstanding.
A
detection
dog
recognizes an odor, not a drug, and should
alert whenever the scent is present, even if the
substance is gone (just as a police officer’s
much inferior nose detects the odor of
marijuana for some time after a joint has
been smoked). In the usual case, the mere
chance that the substance might no longer be
at the location does not matter; a well-trained
dog’s alert establishes a fair probability—all
that is required for probable cause—that
either drugs or evidence of a drug crime (like
the precursor chemicals in Harris’s truck) will
be found.
2
[568 U.S. 250]
discount Aldo’s usual dependability
distrust his response to Harris’s truck.
or
Because training records established Aldo’s
reliability in detecting drugs and Harris failed
to undermine that showing, we agree with the
trial court that Wheetley had probable cause
to search Harris’s truck. We accordingly
reverse the judgment of the Florida Supreme
Court.
It is so ordered .
——-Notes:
1 By the time of oral argument in this case,
even Harris declined to defend the idea that
the Fourth Amendment compels the State to
produce each item of evidence the Florida
Supreme Court enumerated. See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 29–30 (“I don’t believe the Constitution
requires [that list]”). Harris instead argued
that the court’s decision, although “look[ing]
rather didactic,” in fact did not impose any
such requirement. Id., at 29; see id., at 31
(“[I]t’s not a specific recipe that can’t be
deviated from”). But in reading the decision
below as establishing a mandatory checklist,
we do no more than take the court at its (oftrepeated) word. See, e.g., 71 So.3d 756, 758,
See K. Furton, J. Greb, & H. Holness,
Florida Int’l Univ., The Scientific Working
Group on Dog and Orthogonal Detector
Guidelines
1,
61–62,
66
(2010)
(recommending as a “best practice” that a
dog’s reliability should be assessed based on
“the results of certification and proficiency
assessments,” because in those “procedure[s]
you should know whether you have a false
positive,” unlike in “most operational
situations”).
3
-7-
Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61, 568 U.S. 237 (2013)
——–
-8-
Sample Final Paper Format
Students should use this sample writing assignment format for the Final Paper.
However, you do not have to follow this format exactly if you prefer to complete the
assignment in a different way, as long as you include all of the material required.
[Student’s Name]
Business Law I (BLAW-2100-01)
[Date]
Case Analysis: [Name of Case]
I.
Facts
The facts of this case …. (include the facts that occurred before the initial lawsuit
was filed, who brought the initial lawsuit, the arguments of the parties in the lawsuit, and
the trial court’s reasoning and ruling, and, if appropriate, any appellate court rulings
issued before the current appeal.)
II.
Issues of Law
The legal issue(s) at stake in this case is/are …. (include all of the issues of law
that are raised by the case before the appellate or supreme court. This is the only
section of the Final Paper that should be written as a list or using bullet points.)
III.
The Court’s Ruling and Holding
(The court’s ruling on each issue listed in the Issues of Law, above, must be
included here. The number
On the first issue, the Court ruled that …. (include the appellate or supreme
court’s analysis of the facts, their application of the law to the facts of the case, the
court’s reasoning, and any other pertinent information about the court’s analysis.)
On the second issue, the Court ruled that …. etc.
The Court held …. (include the Court’s actual holding, e.g., trial court’s ruling is
affirmed, reversed and remanded, reversed and judgment is entered on behalf of
[plaintiff, defendant, appellant, appellee], etc.)
IV.
The Court’s Ruling Was Correct/Incorrect
The Court’s ruling in this case was correct/incorrect because ….
Rubric for Final Paper
Criteria
Excellent
Facts of the All relevant facts of
Case
the case included in
detail.
Issues of
Law
Court’s
Analysis &
Ruling
Good
Most relevant facts of
the case included in
detail or all relevant
facts, but without
detail
Most issues of law
identified.
Most of the court’s
analysis of the legal
issues are set forth
with some detail and
incorporating some
of the relevant facts
and law, and the
court’s final ruling is
included.
Fair
Poor
Some relevant facts Limited relevant facts
of the case included. of the case included,
or facts set out were
irrelevant to case.
No credit*
No facts identified.
All issues of law
Some issues of law Few issues of law
No issues of law
identified.
identified.
identified.
identified.
The court’s analysis
Some of the court’s Limited portions of
None of the court’s
of each legal issue
analysis of the legal the court’s analysis
analysis of the
in the case is fully
issues is included
of the legal issues
legal issues is
and separately set
with some relevant
are included and/or
included and the
forth in detail
facts and law, and
the court’s final ruling court’s final ruling
incorporating the
the court’s final
is not included.
is not included.
relevant facts and
ruling is included.
law, and the court’s
final ruling is
included.
Opinion of The author’s opinion The author’s opinion The author’s opinion The author’s opinion The author’s
Ruling
of the court’s
of the court’s
of the court’s
of the court’s
opinion of the
analysis of each
analysis of most legal analysis of some
analysis of one legal court’s analysis is
legal issue and final issues and final
legal issues and
issue and the court’s not included.
ruling is set forth in
ruling is set forth with final ruling is set
ruling is set forth with
great detail and with some detail, support, forth with limited
no detail, support,
substantial support
and analysis.
detail, support, and
and analysis.
and analysis.
analysis.
Points
80
60
40
20
0
*No credit will be given for the Final Paper if the student has not completed the Academic Honesty quiz with the minimum score
when the Final Paper is submitted. If any student commits plagiarism or any other form of academic dishonesty is discovered, that
student will receive a failing grade in this class.