Canadian and International Business Law Case Study Presentation

Topic: Contracts – consensusCase name: Carlil v. Carbolic Smoke Ball, [1892] EWCA Civ 1
[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]
CARLILL v. CARBOLIC SMOKE BALL
COMPANY.
1892 Dec. 6, 7.
LINDLEY, L.J. [The Lord Justice stated the facts, and proceeded:—] I will begin by
referring to two points which were raised in the Court below. I refer to them simply for
the purpose of dismissing them. First, it is said no action will lie upon this contract
because it is a policy. You have only to look at the advertisement to dismiss that suggestion.
Then it was said that it is a bet. Hawkins, J., came to the conclusion that nobody ever
dreamt of a bet, and that the transaction had nothing whatever in common with a bet. I
so entirely agree with him that I pass over this contention also as not worth serious
attention.
Then, what is left? The first observation I will make is that we are not dealing with any
inference of fact. We are dealing with an express promise to pay 100l. in certain events.
Read the advertisement how you will, and twist it about as you will, here is a distinct
promise expressed in language which is perfectly unmistakable — “100l. reward will be
paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the
iufluenza after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the
printed directions supplied with each ball.”
We must first consider whether this was intended to be a promise at all, or whether it
was a mere puff which meant nothing. Was it a mere puff? My answer to that question is
No, and I base my answer upon this passage: “1000l. is deposited with the Alliance Bank,
shewing our sincerity in the matter.” Now, for what was that money deposited or that
statement made except to negative the suggestion that this was a mere puff and meant
nothing at all? The deposit is called in aid by the advertiser as proof of his sincerity in the
matter — that is, the sincerity of his promise to pay this 100l. in the event which he has
specified. I say this for the purpose of giving point to the observation that we are not
inferring a promise; there is the promise, as plain as words can make it.
Then it is contended that it is not binding. In the first place, it is said that it is not made
with anybody in particular. Now that point is common to the words of this advertisement
and to the words of all other advertisements offering rewards. They are offers to anybody
who performs the conditions named in the advertisement, and anybody who does perform
the condition accepts the offer. In point of law this advertisement is an offer to pay 100l. to
anybody who will perform these conditions, and the performance of the conditions is the
acceptance of the offer. That rests upon a string of authorities, the earliest of which is
Williams v. Carwardine 4 B & Ad 621 , which has been followed by many other decisions
upon advertisements offering rewards.
But then it is said, “Supposing that the performance of the conditions is an acceptance
of the offer, that acceptance ought to have been notified.” Unquestionably, as a general
proposition, when an offer is made, it is necessary in order to make a binding contract,
not only that it should be accepted, but that the acceptance should be notified. But is that
so in cases of this kind? I apprehend that they are an exception to that rule, or, if not an
exception, they are open to the observation that the notification of the acceptance need
not precede the performance. This offer is a continuing offer. It was never revoked, and if
notice of acceptance is required — which I doubt very much, for I rather think the true
view is that which was expressed and explained by Lord Blackburn in the case of Brogden
v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App Cas 666, 691 — if notice of acceptance is required, the
person who makes the offer gets the notice of acceptance contemporaneously with his
notice of the performance of the condition. If he gets notice of the acceptance before his
offer is revoked, that in principle is all you want. I, however, think that the true view, in a
case of this kind, is that the person who makes the over shews by his language and from
the nature of the transaction that he does not expect and does not require notice of the
acceptance apart from notice of the performance.
We, therefore, find here all the elements which are necessary to form a binding contract
enforceable in point of law, subject to two observations. First of all it is said that this
advertisement is so vague that you cannot really construe it as a promise — that the
vagueness of the language shews that a legal promise was never intended or contemplated.
The language is vague and uncertain in some respects, and particularly in this, that the
100l. is to be paid to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic after having used
the balls three times daily for two weeks. It is said, When are they to be used? According
to the language of the advertisement no time is fixed, and, construing the offer most
strongly against the person who has made it, one might infer that any time was meant. I
do not think that was meant, and to hold the contrary would be pushing too far the
doctrine of taking language most strongly against the person using it. I do not think that
business people or reasonable people would understand the words as meaning that if you
took a smoke ball and used it three times daily for two weeks you were to be guaranteed
against influenza for the rest of your life, and I think it would be pushing the language of
the advertisement too far to construe it as meaning that. But if it does not mean that, what
does it mean? It is for the defendants to shew what it does mean; and it strikes me that
there are two, and possibly three, reasonable constructions to be put on this
advertisement, any one of which will answer the purpose of the plaintiff. Possibly it may
be limited to persons catching the “increasing epidemic” (that is, the then prevailing
epidemic), or any colds or diseases caused by taking cold, during the prevalence of the
increasing epidemic. That is one suggestion; but it does not commend itself to me.
Another suggested meaning is that you are warranted free from catching this epidemic,
or colds or other diseases caused by taking cold, whilst you are using this remedy after
using it for two weeks. If that is the meaning, the plaintiff is right, for she used the remedy
for two weeks and went on using it till she got the epidemic. Another meaning, and the
one which I rather prefer, is that the reward is offered to any person who contracts the
epidemic or other disease within a reasonable time after having used the smoke ball. Then
it is asked, What is a reasonable time? It has been suggested that there is no standard of
reasonableness; that it depends upon the reasonable time for a germ to develop! I do not
feel pressed by that. It strikes me that a reasonable time may be ascertained in a business
sense and in a sense satisfactory to a lawyer, in this way; find out from a chemist what the
ingredients are; find out from a skilled physician how long the effect of such ingredients
on the system could be reasonably expected to endure so as to protect a person from an
epidemic or cold, and in that way you will get a standard to be laid before a jury, or a judge
without a jury, by which they might exercise their judgment as to what a reasonable time
would be. It strikes me, I confess, that the true construction of this advertisement is that
100l. will be paid to anybody who uses this smoke ball three times daily for two weeks
according to the printed directions, and who gets the influenza or cold or other diseases
caused by taking cold within a reasonable time after so using it; and if that is the true
construction, it is enough for the plaintiff.
I come now to the last point which I think requires attention — that is, the
consideration. It has been argued that this is nudum pactum — that there is no
consideration. We must apply to that argument the usual legal tests. Let us see whether
there is no advantage to the defendants. It is said that the use of the ball is no advantage
to them, and that what benefits them is the sale; and the case is put that a lot of these balls
might be stolen, and that it would be no advantage to the defendants if the thief or other
people used them. The answer to that, I think, is as follows. It is quite obvious that in the
view of the advertisers a use by the public of their remedy, if they can only get the public
to have confidence enough to use it, will react and produce a sale which is directly
beneficial to them. Therefore, the advertisers get out of the use an advantage which is
enough to constitute a consideration.
But there is another view. Does not the person who acts upon this advertisement and
accepts the offer put himself to some inconvenience at the request of the defendants? Is
it nothing to use this ball three times daily for two weeks according to the directions at
the request of the advertiser? Is that to go for nothing? It appears to me that there is a
distinct inconvenience, not to say a detriment, to any person who so uses the smoke ball.
I am of opinion, therefore, that there is ample consideration for the promise.
We were pressed upon this point with the case of Gerhard v. Bates 2 E & B 476 , which
was the case of a promoter of companies who had promised the bearers of share warrants
that they should have dividends for so many years, and the promise as alleged was held
not to shew any consideration. Lord Campbell’s judgment when you come to examine it
is open to the explanation, that the real point in that case was that the promise, if any, was
to the original bearer and not to the plaintiff, and that as the plaintiff was not suing in the
name of the original bearer there was no contract with him. Then Lord Campbell goes on
to enforce that view by shewing that there was no consideration shewn for the promise to
him. I cannot help thinking that Lord Campbell’s observations would have been very
different if the plaintiff in that action had been an original bearer, or if the declaration
had gone on to shew what a société anonyme was, and had alleged the promise to have
been, not only to the first bearer, but to anybody who should become the bearer. There
was no such allegation, and the Court said, in the absence of such allegation, they did not
know (judicially, of course) what a société anonyme was, and, therefore, there was no
consideration. But in the present case, for the reasons I have given, I cannot see the
slightest difficulty in coming to the conclusion that there is consideration.
It appears to me, therefore, that the defendants must perform their promise, and, if
they have been so unwary as to expose themselves to a great many actions, so much the
worse for them.
BOWEN, L.J. I am of the same opinion. We were asked to say that this document was
a contract too vague to be enforced.
The first observation which arises is that the document itself is not a contract at all, it
is only an offer made to the public.
The defendants contend next, that it is an offer the terms of which are too vague to be
treated as a definite offer, inasmuch as there is no limit of time fixed for the catching of
the influenza, and it cannot be supposed that the advertisers seriously meant to promise
to pay money to every person who catches the influenza at any time after the inhaling of
the smoke ball. It was urged also, that if you look at this document you will find much
vagueness as to the persons with whom the contract was intended to be made — that, in
the first place, its terms are wide enough to include persons who may have used the smoke
ball before the advertisement was issued; at all events, that it is an offer to the world in
general, and, also, that it is unreasonable to suppose it to be a definite offer, because
nobody in their senses would contract themselves out of the opportunity of checking the
experiment which was going to be made at their own expense. It is also contended that
the advertisement is rather in the nature of a puff or a proclamation than a promise or
offer intended to mature into a contract when accepted. But the main point seems to be
that the vagueness of the document shews that no contract whatever was intended. It
seems to me that in order to arrive at a right conclusion we must read this advertisement
in its plain meaning, as the public would understand it. It was intended to be issued to the
public and to be read by the public. How would an ordinary person reading this document
construe it? It was intended unquestionably to have some effect, and I think the effect
which it was intended to have, was to make people use the smoke ball, because the
suggestions and allegations which it contains are directed immediately to the use of the
smoke ball as distinct from the purchase of it. It did not follow that the smoke ball was to
be purchased from the defendants directly, or even from agents of theirs directly. The
intention was that the circulation of the smoke ball should be promoted, and that the use
of it should be increased. The advertisement begins by saying that a reward will be paid
by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing
epidemic after using the ball. It has been said that the words do not apply only to persons
who contract the epidemic after the publication of the advertisement, but include persons
who had previously contracted the influenza. I cannot so read the advertisement. It is
written in colloquial and popular language, and I think that it is equivalent to this:
“100l. will be paid to any person who shall contract the increasing epidemic after having
used the carbolic smoke ball three times daily for two weeks.” And it seems to me
that the way in which the public would read it would be this, that if anybody, after the
advertisement was published, used three times daily for two weeks the carbolic
smoke ball, and then caught cold, he would be entitled to the reward. Then again it
was said: “How long is this protection to endure? Is it to go on for ever, or for what limit
of time?” I think that there are two constructions of this document, each of which is good
sense, and each of which seems to me to satisfy the exigencies of the present action. It
may mean that the protection is warranted to last during the epidemic, and it was during
the epidemic that the plaintiff contracted the disease. I think, more probably, it means
that the smoke ball will be a protection while it is in use. That seems to me the way in
which an ordinary person would understand an advertisement about medicine, and about
a specific against influenza. It could not be supposed that after you have left off using it
you are still to be protected for ever, as if there was to be a stamp set upon your forehead
that you were never to catch influenza because you had once used the carbolic smoke
ball. I think the immunity is to last during the use of the ball. That is the way in which
I should naturally read it, and it seems to me that the subsequent language of the
advertisement supports that construction. It says: “During the last epidemic of influenza
many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold, and in no ascertained case was the
disease contracted by those using” (not “who had used”) “the carbolic smoke ball,”
and it concludes with saying that one smoke ball will last a family several months
(which imports that it is to be efficacious while it is being used), and that the ball can be
refilled at a cost of 5s. I, therefore, have myself no hesitation in saying that I think, on the
construction of this advertisement, the protection was to enure during the time that the
carbolic smoke ball was being used. My brother, the Lord Justice who preceded me,
thinks that the contract would be sufficiently definite if you were to read it in the sense
that the protection was to be warranted during a reasonable period after use. I have some
difficulty myself on that point; but it is not necessary for me to consider it further, because
the disease here was contracted during the use of the carbolic smoke ball.
Was it intended that the 100l. should, if the conditions were fulfilled, be paid? The
advertisement says that 1000l. is lodged at the bank for the purpose. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the statement that 100l. would be paid was intended to be a mere puff. I think
it was intended to be understood by the public as an offer which was to be acted upon.
But it was said there was no check on the part of the persons who issued the
advertisement, and that it would be an insensate thing to promise 100l. to a person who
used the smoke ball unless you could check or superintend his manner of using it. The
answer to that argument seems to me to be that if a person chooses to make extravagant
promises of this kind he probably does so because it pays him to make them, and, if he
has made them, the extravagance of the promises is no reason in law why he should not
be bound by them.
It was also said that the contract is made with all the world — that is, with everybody;
and that you cannot contract with everybody. It is not a contract made with all the world.
There is the fallacy of the argument. It is an offer made to all the world; and why should
not an offer be made to all the world which is to ripen into a contract with anybody who
comes forward and performs the condition? It is an offer to become liable to any one who,
before it is retracted, performs the condition, and, although the offer is made to the world,
the contract is made with that limited portion of the public who come forward and
perform the condition on the faith of the advertisement. It is not like cases in which you
offer to negotiate, or you issue advertisements that you have got a stock of books to sell,
or houses to let, in which case there is no offer to be bound by any contract. Such
advertisements are offers to negotiate — offers to receive offers — offers to chaffer, as, I
think, some learned judge in one of the cases has said. If this is an offer to be bound, then
it is a contract the moment the person fulfils the condition.
That seems to me to be sense, and it is also the ground on which all these advertisement
cases have been decided during the century; and it cannot be put better than in Willes,
J.’s, judgment in Spencer v. Harding. Law Rep 5 CP 561, 563 “In the advertisement cases,”
he says, “there never was any doubt that the advertisement amounted to a promise to pay
the money to the person who first gave information. The difficulty suggested was that it
was a contract with all the world. But that, of course, was soon overruled. It was an offer
to become liable to any person who before the offer should be retracted should happen to
be the person to fulfil the contract, of which the advertisement was an offer or tender.
That is not the sort of difficulty which presents itself here. If the circular had gone on, ‘and
we undertake to sell to the highest bidder,’ the reward cases would have applied, and there
would have been a good contract in respect of the persons.” As soon as the highest bidder
presented himself, says Willes, J., the person who was to hold the vinculum juris on the
other side of the contract was ascertained, and it became settled.
Then it was said that there was no notification of the acceptance of the contract. One
cannot doubt that, as an ordinary rule of law, an acceptance of an offer made ought to be
notified to the person who makes the offer, in order that the two minds may come together.
Unless this is done the two minds may be apart, and there is not that consensus which is
necessary according to the English law — I say nothing about the laws of other countries
— to make a contract. But there is this clear gloss to be made upon that doctrine, that as
notification of acceptance is required for the benefit of the person who makes the offer,
the person who makes the offer may dispense with notice to himself if he thinks it
desirable to do so, and I suppose there can be no doubt that where a person in an offer
made by him to another person, expressly or impliedly intimates a particular mode of
acceptance as sufficient to make the bargain binding, it is only necessary for the other
person to whom such offer is made to follow the indicated method of acceptance; and if
the person making the offer, expressly or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be
sufficient to act on the proposal without communicating acceptance of it to himself,
performance of the condition is a sufficient acceptance without notification.
That seems to me to be the principle which lies at the bottom of the acceptance cases,
of which two instances are the well-known judgment of Mellish, L.J., in Harris’s Case Law
Rep 7 Ch 587 , and the very instructive judgment of Lord Blackburn in Brogden v.
Metropolitan Ry. Co. 2 App Cas 666, 691 , in which he appears to me to take exactly the
line I have indicated.
Now, if that is the law, how are we to find out whether the person who makes the offer
does intimate that notification of acceptance will not be necessary in order to constitute a
binding bargain? In many cases you look to the offer itself. In many cases you extract from
the character of the transaction that notification is not required, and in the advertisement
cases it seems to me to follow as an inference to be drawn from the transaction itself that
a person is not to notify his acceptance of the offer before he performs the condition, but
that if he performs the condition notification is dispensed with. It seems to me that from
the point of view of common sense no other idea could be entertained. If I advertise to the
world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings the dog to a particular place will
be paid some money, are all the police or other persons whose business it is to find lost
dogs to be expected to sit down and write me a note saying that they have accepted my
proposal? Why, of course, they at once look after the dog, and as soon as they find the dog
they have performed the condition. The essence of the transaction is that the dog should
be found, and it is not necessary under such circumstances, as it seems to me, that in
order to make the contract binding there should be any notification of acceptance. It
follows from the nature of the thing that the performance of the condition is sufficient
acceptance without the notification of it, and a person who makes an offer in an
advertisement of that kind makes an offer which must be read by the light of that common
sense reflection. He does, therefore, in his offer impliedly indicate that he does not require
notification of the acceptance of the offer.
A further argument for the defendants was that this was a nudum pactum — that there
was no consideration for the promise — that taking the influenza was only a condition,
and that the using the smoke ball was only a condition, and that there was no
consideration at all; in fact, that there was no request, express or implied, to use the smoke
ball. Now, I will not enter into an elaborate discussion upon the law as to requests in this
kind of contracts. I will simply refer to Victors v. Davies 12 M & W 758 and Serjeant
Manning’s note to Fisher v. Pyne 1 M & G 265 , which everybody ought to read who wishes
to embark in this controversy. The short answer, to abstain from academical discussion,
is, it seems to me, that there is here a request to use involved in the offer. Then as to the
alleged want of consideration. The definition of “consideration” given in Selwyn’s Nisi
Prius, 8th ed. p. 47, which is cited and adopted by Tindal, C.J., in the case of Laythoarp v.
Bryant 3 Scott , 238, 250 , is this: “Any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant
derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by
the plaintiff, provided such act is performed or such inconvenience suffered by the
plaintiff, with the consent, either express or implied, of the defendant.” Can it be said here
that if the person who reads this advertisement applies thrice daily, for such time as may
seem to him tolerable, the carbolic smoke ball to his nostrils for a whole fortnight,
he is doing nothing at all — that it is a mere act which is not to count towards consideration
to support a promise (for the law does not require us to measure the adequacy of the
consideration). Inconvenience sustained by one party at the request of the other is enough
to create a consideration. I think, therefore, that it is consideration enough that the
plaintiff took the trouble of using the smoke ball. But I think also that the defendants
received a benefit from this user, for the use of the smoke ball was contemplated by the
defendants as being indirectly a benefit to them, because the use of the smoke balls would
promote their sale.
Then we were pressed with Gerhard v. Bates. 2 E & B 476 In Gerhard v. Bates 2 E & B
476 , which arose upon demurrer, the point upon which the action failed was that the
plaintiff did not allege that the promise was made to the class of which alone the plaintiff
was a member, and that therefore there was no privity between the plaintiffs and the
defendant. Then Lord Campbell went on to give a second reason. If his first reason was
not enough, and the plaintiff and the defendant there had come together as contracting
parties and the only question was consideration, it seems to me Lord Campbell’s
reasoning would not have been sound. It is only to be supported by reading it as an
additional reason for thinking that they had not come into the relation of contracting
parties; but, if so, the language was superfluous. The truth is, that if in that case you had
found a contract between the parties there would have been no difficulty about
consideration; but you could not find such a contract. Here, in the same way, if you once
make up your mind that there was a promise made to this lady who is the plaintiff, as one
of the public — a promise made to her that if she used the smoke ball three times daily for
a fortnight and got the influenza, she should have 100l., it seems to me that her using the
smoke ball was sufficient consideration. I cannot picture to myself the view of the law on
which the contrary could be held when you have once found who are the contracting
parties. If I say to a person, “If you use such and such a medicine for a week I will give you
5l.,” and he uses it, there is ample consideration for the promise.
A. L. SMITH, L.J. The first point in this case is, whether the defendants’ advertisement
which appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette was an offer which, when accepted and its
conditions performed, constituted a promise to pay, assuming there was good
consideration to uphold that promise, or whether it was only a puff from which no
promise could be implied, or, as put by Mr. Finlay, a mere statement by the defendants of
the confidence they entertained in the efficacy of their remedy. Or as I might put it in the
words of Lord Campbell in Denton v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 5 E & B 860 , whether this
advertisement was mere waste paper. That is the first matter to be determined. It seems
to me that this advertisement reads as follows: “100l. reward will be paid by the
Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who after having used the ball three
times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with such ball
contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds, or any diseases caused by taking cold.
The ball will last a family several months, and can be refilled at a cost of 5s.” If I may
paraphrase it, it means this: “If you” — that is one of the public as yet not ascertained, but
who, as Lindley and Bowen, L.JJ., have pointed out, will be ascertained by the performing
the condition — “will hereafter use my smoke ball three times daily for two weeks
according to my printed directions, I will pay you 100l. if you contract the influenza within
the period mentioned in the advertisement.” Now, is there not a request there? It comes
to this: “In consideration of your buying my smoke ball, and then using it as I prescribe,
I promise that if you catch the influenza within a certain time I will pay you 100l.” It must
not be forgotten that this advertisement states that as security for what is being offered,
and as proof of the sincerity of the offer, 1000l. is actually lodged at the bank wherewith
to satisfy any possible demands which might be made in the event of the conditions
contained therein being fulfilled and a person catching the epidemic so as to entitle him
to the 100l. How can it be said that such a statement as that embodied only a mere
expression of confidence in the wares which the defendants had to sell? I cannot read the
advertisement in any such way. In my judgment, the advertisement was an offer intended
to be acted upon, and when accepted and the conditions performed constituted a binding
promise on which an action would lie, assuming there was consideration for that promise.
The defendants have contended that it was a promise in honour or an agreement or a
contract in honour — whatever that may mean. I understand that if there is no
consideration for a promise, it may be a promise in honour, or, as we should call it, a
promise without consideration and nudum pactum; but if anything else is meant, I do not
understand it. I do not understand what a bargain or a promise or an agreement in honour
is unless it is one on which an action cannot be brought because it is nudum pactum, and
about nudum pactum I will say a word in a moment.
In my judgment, therefore, this first point fails, and this was an offer intended to be
acted upon, and, when acted upon and the conditions performed, constituted a promise
to pay.
In the next place, it was said that the promise was too wide, because there is no limit
of time within which the person has to catch the epidemic. There are three possible limits
of time to this contract. The first is, catching the epidemic during its continuance; the
second is, catching the influenza during the time you are using the ball; the third is,
catching the influenza within a reasonable time after the expiration of the two weeks
during which you have used the ball three times daily. It is not necessary to say which is
the correct construction of this contract, for no question arises thereon. Whichever is the
true construction, there is sufficient limit of time so as not to make the contract too vague
on that account.
Then it was argued, that if the advertisement constituted an offer which might
culminate in a contract if it was accepted, and its conditions performed, yet it was not
accepted by the plaintiff in the manner contemplated, and that the offer contemplated
was such that notice of the acceptance had to be given by the party using the carbolic ball
to the defendants before user, so that the defendants might be at liberty to superintend
the experiment. All I can say is, that there is no such clause in the advertisement, and that,
in my judgment, no such clause can be read into it; and I entirely agree with what has
fallen from my Brothers, that this is one of those cases in which a performance of the
condition by using these smoke balls for two weeks three times a day is an acceptance of
the offer.
It was then said there was no person named in the advertisement with whom any
contract was made. That, I suppose, has taken place in every case in which actions on
advertisements have been maintained, from the time of Williams v. Carwardine 4 B & Ad
621 , and before that, down to the present day. I have nothing to add to what has been
said on that subject, except that a person becomes a persona designata and able to sue,
when he performs the conditions mentioned in the advertisement.
Lastly, it was said that there was no consideration, and that it was nudum pactum.
There are two considerations here. One is the consideration of the inconvenience of
having to use this carbolic smoke ball for two weeks three times a day; and the other
more important consideration is the money gain likely to accrue to the defendants by the
enhanced sale of the smoke balls, by reason of the plaintiff’s user of them. There is ample
consideration to support this promise. I have only to add that as regards the policy and
the wagering points, in my judgment, there is nothing in either of them.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors: J. Banks Pittman; Field & Roscoe.
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precedents (previously decided cases) the court felt were applicable, are all part of the
rationale. For any opinion to have any meaning at all, the court must demonstrate how it
applied the facts to the rules. Often this portion of a case demonstrates which facts the
court found to be most important. Discuss the key reasons for the decision of the court.
Concisely summarize the reasoning and set forth what you believe are the critical reasons
for the decision.
• Comments: Provide your own perspective on the case. Consider the importance of the case
to the development of the law. Consider the implications of the rule on society and
business. You may also relate the case to your own business or personal experiences.
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