PSU Business Law Case Report Paper

College of Business AdministrationAVM Department
ACADEMIC YEAR: 2022-2023
BUS-231 Legal Environment of Business
Total: 10%
Project (group):
3-4 students per group
This project is meant to provide students with an understanding of the nature of the legal system
and to improve student understanding of legal concepts, demonstrate the complexity of the law
and illustrate the many ways in which legal issues influence business decision-making.
Topic:
Students are assigned a judicial case from a topic related to the course topics and summarize the
case issues by using the critical thinking approach. Each group is required to analyze the issue for
a report to be submitted.
Grading criteria:
Your project will be evaluated on the following criteria:
a) Problem definition: how well (i.e., thoroughly and concisely) do you describe the context.
b) Accurate and thorough use of course concepts.
c) The students’ ability to identify important legal concepts and link them to different fact patterns
d) Extent to which your analysis is relevant.
1
e) Quality of written analysis.
f) Quality of oral discussion/presentation.
Format for case analysis:
1. The report should include a 1-2 page summary covering the legal concept in a professional
academic format.
2. The report must include: Introduction, case summary, your own conclusion.
3. Time news roman, 12 font size.
4. Include references. (link or original article) References should be detailed at the end of the
assignment; it is highly preferable to rely on 3-5 references to handle the assignment.
How marks allocated of the assignment:
1.
Develops ideas cogently, organizes them logically with paragraphs and connects them with
effective transitions. Clear and specific introduction and conclusion (2 marks).
2.
Employs words with fluency, develops concise standard English sentences, balances a
variety of sentence structures effectively (2 marks).
3.
The writing is essential error-free in terms of spelling and grammar (2 marks).
4.
Explores ideas vigorously, supports points fully using a balance of subjective and objective
evidence, reasons effectively making useful distinctions (2 marks).
5. Proper format as directed in instructions. (2 marks)
Assignment Resources: Students can rely on recorded cases, newspapers, magazines and any other
reliable source on internet or any other periodicals that shed the light on the topic.
Date of assignment submission: May 6, 2023 at 11:59 pm
Additional Instructions
Only one group member needs to submit to prevent inaccuracies in Turnitin system.
No more that 25% of document should be recognized by Turnitin. Over 25% will result in a 1 mark
deduction. Over 30% will result in a 2 mark deduction. I will not accept a paper over 35%.
PSU DOES NOT TOLERATE PLAGIARISM. IF YOU QUOTE A SOURCE, YOU MUST
REFERENCE IT.
2
No. B223542
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
•
137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839
•
12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2285
•
2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2491
Decided Feb 23, 2012
No. B223542.
2012-02-23
Adetokunbo SHOYOYE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and
Appellant.
Casselman Law Offices, Gary S. Casselman, Los
Angeles, and Danielle Casselman for Plaintiff and
Appellant. Hurrell Cantrall LLP, Los Angeles,
Thomas C. Hurrell, and Melinda Cantrall for
Defendant and Appellant.
1
In this case of first impression, we agree and
conclude that not every wrongful detention is a
violation of section 52.1. The evidence here was
insufficient to establish the “threats, intimidation,
or coercion” necessary to implicate section 52.1.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment as to that
cause of action, and reverse the award of attorney
fees made pursuant to that statute. We affirm the
judgment and damage award in favor of Shoyoye
on his claim for false imprisonment.
1 All
further
undesignated
statutory
references are to the Civil Code.
SUZUKAWA
841 *841 Casselman Law Offices, Gary S. Casselman,
Los Angeles, and Danielle Casselman for Plaintiff
and Appellant. Hurrell Cantrall LLP, Los Angeles,
Thomas C. Hurrell, and Melinda Cantrall for
Defendant and Appellant.
SUZUKAWA, J.
950 *950 INTRODUCTION
Defendant, the County of Los Angeles (County),
appeals from a judgment after jury verdict in favor
of plaintiff Adetokunbo Shoyoye arising out of
Shoyoye’s wrongful detention in County jail. The
County acknowledges that although its initial
detention of Shoyoye was justified, it overdetained him by about 16 days as a result of
unintentional clerical error. The County contends
on appeal that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a verdict in favor of
Shoyoye pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1 (the
Tom Bane Civil Rights Act).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Operative Complaint
Plaintiff’s third amended complaint alleged causes
of action for (1) violations of Penal Code section
1384; (2) false imprisonment; (3) violation of
842 section 52.1; (4) violation of *842 42 United States
Code section 1983; and (5) negligence and
negligence per se. The trial court granted the
County’s motion for nonsuit as to the 42 United
States Code section 1983 cause of action, and
prior to the case being submitted to the jury, the
parties agreed that they would present for the
jury’s consideration only the causes of action for
false imprisonment and violation of section 52.1.
951 *951 Shoyoye’s Arrest and Incarceration
The evidence presented at trial included the
following undisputed facts. Shoyoye was lawfully
arrested on August 19, 2007, when he was
1
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
reporting an unrelated incident to the police, and
the police discovered he had two outstanding
warrants.
2
The first warrant related to his failure to address
a citation he received for riding the subway
without a ticket, and the second warrant arose
when a former roommate stole his identity and
was convicted of grand theft under Shoyoye’s
name. Shoyoye was incarcerated, and shortly
thereafter he appeared in court and was ordered
released on the first warrant. A few days later he
appeared on the second warrant in a different
court, and that matter was also resolved in his
favor. On August 22, 2007, he was ordered
released, subject to any other holds. He was
transported back to Men’s Central Jail, where he
was processed and placed in a dormitory,
expecting to be released at any time.
2 Shoyoye conceded that there was probable
cause for his arrest and initial detention.
The Error
Detention
Resulting
in
Shoyoye’s
Over–
A County employee mistakenly attached to
Shoyoye’s paperwork information pertaining to a
parolee scheduled to be sent to state prison for
violating the terms of his parole. The other
prisoner’s name was Marquis Lance Parsee. A
Department of Corrections (“DCL”) hold intended
for Parsee was entered into the County Sheriff’s
computer system regarding Shoyoye. A
subsequent quality control check failed to detect
the error. If a County employee had looked at the
paper file on Shoyoye rather than the computer
records, he or she would have realized that the
DCL hold did not pertain to Shoyoye.
Shoyoye’s Efforts to Be Released, and the County
Employees’ Treatment of Him
While he was at Men’s Central Jail, Shoyoye
attempted to ask one deputy or another almost
every day about being released, but he received no
assistance. Shoyoye was then transferred to the
Pitchess Detention Center in Castaic, where he
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
was processed and assigned a bed in a dormitory.
He did not understand why he was not being
released.
Shoyoye asked a total of six to eight people for
assistance during his incarceration. At Pitchess
Detention Center, inmates were periodically
permitted to submit one written question on a
“yellow sheet” form. Shoyoye submitted such a
form asking, “Why am I here?” He received the
response that he was subject to a “DCL hold.” He
submitted another form inquiring what a “DCL
hold” was, along with one other question, and
952 received the *952 response that he was only
entitled to ask one question and he had asked two.
He submitted other yellow sheets indicating he
believed he should not be there, but he received no
helpful responses.
Shoyoye told custody assistant Lawrence Wong
that he thought he should be released. Wong
acknowledged that if what he said was true, then
there was a problem. Wong told him to talk to
Deputy Niels Gittisarn. Shoyoye asked him for
assistance, and Gittisarn told him, “Get back to
843 me.” However, when Shoyoye *843 attempted to
speak to him the next day, Gittisarn rebuffed him,
yelling that he was busy. Other inmates accused
Shoyoye of being an informant when they saw
him talking to Gittisarn, and thereafter he was
hesitant to approach any County employees for
fear of being labeled an informant.
Shoyoye asked a deputy named Rodriguez what a
DCL hold was, and Rodriguez replied, “[T]hat
means that you are going to prison, boy.”
Rodriguez asked what he had done, and when
Shoyoye said it was for not having a ticket on the
subway, Rodriguez lost interest.
Shoyoye attended a church service in order to
speak to the jail chaplain about his plight. The
chaplain listened sympathetically, but did not offer
assistance.
2
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
Deputy Oren Son monitored the laundry facility
where Shoyoye worked. Shoyoye told him that he
was being held for a felony he did not commit.
Son looked at him as he spoke, but then returned
to the book he was reading and gave him the silent
treatment for a few minutes, until Shoyoye
eventually gave up and walked away. Shoyoye
knew that if a laundry worker took breaks or
refused to work, he would be subjected to harsh
housing discipline and suspension of privileges.
Shoyoye asked a civilian employee who worked in
the laundry facility, Patsy Hazlett, for assistance
after she praised him for good work performance,
but she said she could not help him.
Asked if any of his efforts resulted in anything
being done to determine his over-detention status,
he replied, “All I got was disinterest, being sent
away. No. Nothing was done.” He felt that he had
failed to make himself heard, that although he was
civil and polite he got nowhere: there was no “
‘customer service,’ if you will.” He described the
deputies as walking and talking tough. Shoyoye
thought about escaping but feared he would get
shot; he never seriously considered doing so.
Incident to his incarceration, Shoyoye was
subjected to strip searches that included anal
cavity searches, required to wait naked in line to
shower in close proximity to other inmates, and
953 shackled. On one occasion, he was *953 showering
when he was approached by an aggressive inmate,
and he immediately fled the shower room, still
covered in soap. He witnessed criminal activity
and fights, and was housed in a large dormitory
with hundreds of inmates, many of whom were
gang members. He did not drink water because the
commode was connected directly to the drinking
fountain. He was exposed to a chicken pox
outbreak. He feared being sent to prison, or put
into “the hole” for further discipline, or having
physical force or violence used against him. He
was mistaken for an informant by other inmates
and feared what they might do to him.
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
Shoyoye’s roommate, Rudy Ramirez, located him
at Pitchess Detention Center and visited him there.
Shoyoye asked Ramirez to contact Shoyoye’s
boss, Benjamin Swett, and Ramirez did so.
Eventually Swett contacted a state assemblyman’s
office, and was put in touch with Renee Hansen,
the Chief of Legislative Affairs for the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR). She located Shoyoye in the County’s
website, and found a reference to a CDCR
number. She telephoned the inmate locator for
CDCR and inquired to whom that CDCR number
pertained, and was told it was Marquis Parsee. She
then ascertained that Parsee was also being held in
the County jail, under the same parole hold
number as Shoyoye. She contacted the County jail
and informed them of her suspicion that they had
844 applied an erroneous *844 parole hold number to
Shoyoye. They concluded she was correct, and
immediately took steps to effect Shoyoye’s
release. Shoyoye was released on September 7,
2007, 16 days after he had been ordered released
on August 22, 2007.
The Verdict, the Judgment, and the Posttrial
Motions
A special verdict form was submitted to the jury.
The jury answered each of the following questions
in the affirmative: (1) “Did the County of Los
Angeles hold [Shoyoye] in custody?”; (2) “Was
there an unnecessary delay in releasing
[Shoyoye]?”; (3) “Was the County of Los Angeles’
conduct a substantial factor in causing harm to
[Shoyoye]?”; (4) “Did the employee(s) of the
County of Los Angeles intentionally act or fail to
act with [respect to Shoyoye’s] right to be free
from the unreasonable seizure by actual or implied
use of threats, intimidation or coercion?”; and (5)
“Was the County of Los Angeles’ employee(s’)
conduct in violating plaintiff [Shoyoye’s] right to
be free from unreasonable seizures a substantial
factor in causing harm to [Shoyoye]?” The jury
awarded Shoyoye $22,700 in economic damages
Shoyoye’s Release
3
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
for past and future lost earnings and property loss,
and $180,000 in noneconomic damages for past
and future pain and suffering.
954 *954 The court pointed out to counsel that “issues
could be raised that the damages go to separate
causes of action. And these are distinctly different
causes of action.” The court inquired whether
counsel wanted to direct the jury to indicate
whether the damages it awarded were as to each
cause of action. Shoyoye’s counsel objected to any
apportionment request, while counsel for the
County was in favor of it. The court decided not to
seek further elaboration or apportionment from the
jury. The court entered judgment in favor of
Shoyoye on February 1, 2010.
The County then filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for new
trial, arguing that the evidence at trial was
insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s
verdict regarding the section 52.1 claim because
Shoyoye failed to present any evidence that
County employees violated his constitutional
rights by the use of threats, intimidation, or
coercion. Extensive briefing of the issue ensued.
Ultimately, the court denied the County’s posttrial
motions. Thereafter, the County filed a timely
notice of appeal from both the judgment and the
order denying its posttrial motions.
3
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
constitutional violation occurred and that
Shoyoye
was
unreasonably
detained
beyond the time detention was justified.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Denial of defendant’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed to
determine whether substantial evidence supports
the jury verdict. ( Dell’Oca v. Bank of New York
Trust Co., N.A. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 531, 554–
555, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 737.)
“Under [the substantial evidence] standard of
review, our duty ‘begins and ends’ with assessing
whether substantial evidence supports the verdict.
[Citation.] ‘[The] reviewing court starts with the
845 presumption*845 that the record contains evidence
to sustain every finding of fact.’ [Citation.] We
review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the respondent, resolve all evidentiary conflicts in
favor of the prevailing party and indulge all
reasonable inferences possible to uphold the jury’s
verdict. [Citation.]” ( US Ecology, Inc. v. State of
California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 908, 28
955 Cal.Rptr.3d 894.) However, *955 issues of
statutory interpretation and of application of a
statute to undisputed facts are reviewed de novo. (
Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 280, 284, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 596.)
II. Statutory Interpretation
3 We reject Shoyoye’s contention that the
County admitted liability at trial and has
therefore forfeited any argument to the
contrary. Shoyoye concedes, and the record
makes clear, that defense counsel argued
that
any
violation
of
plaintiff’s
constitutional rights was not intentional,
but due to a mistake, and was not
accomplished
by
means
of
threats,
intimidation, or coercion.
Without specifically deciding the issue, we
assume for purposes of this opinion that a
We begin with the language of section 52.1,
sometimes referred to as the Tom Bane Civil
Rights Act. It provides in relevant part as follows:
“(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting
under color of law, interferes by threats,
intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere
by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the
exercise or enjoyment by any individual or
individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or of the rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of this state, the
Attorney General, or any district attorney or city
attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and
4
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
other appropriate equitable relief in the name of
the people of the State of California, in order to
protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the
right or rights secured….
“(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment
of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of this state, has been
interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with,
as described in subdivision (a), may institute and
prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her
own behalf a civil action for damages, including,
but not limited to, damages under Section 52,
injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable
relief to protect the peaceable exercise or
enjoyment of the right or rights secured.” The
statute further provides in subdivision (h) that “In
addition to any damages, injunction, or other
equitable relief awarded in an action brought
pursuant to subdivision (b), the court may award
the petitioner or plaintiff reasonable attorney’s
fees.”
Throughout the pendency of this matter, Shoyoye
has predicated the County’s liability under section
52.1 solely on a claim of interference with either
the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution or article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution, which both pertain to the
right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
4
4 Although the parties discuss whether the
County is a person within the meaning of
the statute, we do not find it necessary to
answer that question in order to resolve this
appeal.
“The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the
defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e.,
‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did
prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or
she had the right to do under the law or to force
the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not
*956 required to do under the law. ( Jones [ v.
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
956 Kmart Corp. (1998) ] 17 Cal.4th [329,] 334 [70
Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d 941] [ Jones ].)” (
Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist. (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 454.)
The legislative history of section 52.1, enacted in
1987, makes clear that the crucial motivation
behind passage of section 52.1 was to address the
increasing incidence of hate crimes in California.
(Stats.1987, c. 1277, § 3 (A.B.63). See Jones,
supra, at p. 338, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 949 P.2d
941.) However, the statutory language does not
846 limit *846 its application to hate crimes. Notably,
the statute does not require a plaintiff to allege the
defendant acted with discriminatory animus or
intent based upon the plaintiff’s membership in a
protected class of persons. (Cf. § 51.7; Venegas v.
County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820,
841–843, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1 ( Venegas
II ).) A defendant is liable if he or she interfered
with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by the requisite threats,
intimidation, or coercion. ( Venegas II, supra, at p.
843, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.)
In Venegas II, sheriff’s deputies stopped a car in
which a husband and wife were driving, based on
the husband’s resemblance to a suspect in an
ongoing investigation of an automobile theft ring.
The car had no license plates or visible vehicle
identification number. The husband informed the
officers that he was the brother of the person they
were looking for, but when asked to produce
identification he said it was at his home nearby.
He declined to sign an entry and search waiver
form to allow the officers to enter his home and
retrieve his identification, instead agreeing the
officers could accompany his wife to their home to
get it. One officer assured the couple their home
would not be searched. However, upon reaching
the home, the officers convinced the wife to sign a
broadly worded entry and search waiver form
granting them authority to enter the house and
conduct a search. Officers searched the entire
house and found papers showing the husband was
on felony probation. They directed the officers
5
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
detaining the husband to arrest him for a
misdemeanor Vehicle Code violation and for
violating his probation; he was later booked into
custody. The officers detained the wife for two
hours but did not arrest her or charge her with
anything. They determined the following day that
the car was not stolen, and directed that the
husband be released from custody. He was
released two days later; no charges were ever filed
against him. The husband and wife filed an action
against individual officers involved in the
incident, the City and County, and the County
sheriff’s department. The plaintiffs’ complaint
included causes of action on the husband’s behalf
under section 52.1, and for false detention and
arrest. ( Venegas II, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 827–
828, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.) The matter
was tried, and the trial court granted nonsuit in
favor of defendants. ( Id. at p. 828, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d
692, 87 P.3d 1.)
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial
court erred in requiring the plaintiffs to allege they
were members of a protected class in order to
maintain a cause of action under section 52.1
957 based on unreasonable search *957 and seizure.
“According to County, the section applies only to
so-called hate crimes and requires a showing, not
alleged here, that the defendants acted with
‘discriminatory animus,’ i.e., an intent to threaten
or coerce another in violation of their
constitutional rights, based on the victim’s actual
or apparent racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
orientation or other minority status. [Citation.] We
disagree, as nothing in Civil Code section 52.1
requires any showing of actual intent to
discriminate.” ( Venegas II, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p.
841, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.) The Supreme
Court noted that section 52.1, subdivision (g)
states that an action brought under that section is
“independent of any other action, remedy, or
procedure that may be available to an aggrieved
individual under any other provision of law,”
including section 51.7, which does require
allegations of violence or intimidation because of
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
the victim’s actual or apparent characteristics (for
example, race, sexual orientation, or disability).
847 *847 ( Venegas II, supra, at pp. 841–842, 11
Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.) Indeed, section 52.1
was amended in 2000 to add language to
subdivision (g) in order to clarify that the section
applies to an affected plaintiff without regard to
his or her membership in a protected class.
(Stats.2000, ch. 98, § 3; Venegas II, supra, at p.
842, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.)
The Venegas court acknowledged that in Jones,
supra, 17 Cal.4th 329, 338, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844,
949 P.2d 941, it had stated that section 52.1 was
adopted “ ‘to stem a tide of hate crimes’ ” (
Venegas II, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 843, 11
Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1), but asserted that “our
statement did not suggest that section 52.1 was
limited to such crimes, or required plaintiffs to
demonstrate that County or its officers had a
discriminatory purpose in harassing them, that is,
that they committed an actual hate crime.” (
Venegas II, supra, at p. 843, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692,
87 P.3d 1.) The court disagreed, however, with the
County’s assertion that such an interpretation
would mean that section 52.1 would apply in all
tort actions. “Civil Code section 52.1 does not
extend to all ordinary tort actions because its
provisions are limited to threats, intimidation, or
coercion that interferes with a constitutional or
statutory right…. [W]e need not decide here
whether section 52.1 affords protections to every
tort claimant, for plaintiffs in this case have
alleged unconstitutional search and seizure
violations extending far beyond ordinary tort
claims. All we decide here is that, in pursuing
relief for those constitutional violations under
section 52.1, plaintiffs need not allege that
defendants acted with discriminatory animus or
intent, so long as those acts were accompanied by
the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion. The
Court of Appeal was correct in holding that
plaintiffs adequately stated a cause of action under
section 52.1.” ( Venegas II, supra, at p. 843, 11
Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1.)
6
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
Unlike the Supreme Court in Venegas II, we are
indeed required to decide here whether section
52.1 affords protection to every claimant who
alleges interference with his or her right to be free
of an unreasonable seizure, i.e., over-detention
beyond the time lawfully permitted, where the
over-detention occurs because of mere negligence
958 rather than a volitional act intended to *958
interfere with the exercise or enjoyment of the
constitutional right. In other words, if the
circumstances of the over-detention are
coextensive with those that would support a tort
claim for negligent false imprisonment, and do not
involve any additional showing of ill will or
blameworthy conduct, is section 52.1 applicable?
Shoyoye contends that the intimidation and
coercion inherent in being incarcerated is
sufficient to show that defendant interfered by
threats, intimidation, or coercion with his right to
be free from an unreasonable seizure. Naturally
the County disagrees. We are thus called upon to
decide this issue of first impression, which we
conceptualize as involving two related questions:
What type of interference is contemplated by the
statute—intentional and callous interference only
or also incidental interference brought about by
negligent conduct? As applicable here, where
coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation
alleged, as it is in an unreasonably prolonged
detention, is the statutory requirement satisfied or
does the statute require a showing of coercion
independent from the coercion inherent in the
wrongful detention itself?
A. Intentional Interference With a Constitutional
Right
“ ‘The objective of statutory interpretation, of
course, is to ascertain and effectuate legislative
intent. If the words are clear, a court may not alter
them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear
848 on *848 the face of the statute or from its
legislative history. [Citation.] At the same time,
however, a statute is not to be read in isolation; it
must be construed with related statutes and
considered in the context of the statutory
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
93
framework as a whole. [Citation.] A court must
determine whether the literal meaning of a statute
comports with its purpose or whether such a
construction of one provision is consistent with
other related provisions.’ ( Gomes v. County of
Mendocino (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977, 986 *93 .)”
( Hicks v. E.T. Legg & Associates (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 496, 505, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 10.)
The statutory framework of section 52.1 indicates
that the Legislature meant the statute to address
interference with constitutional rights involving
more egregious conduct than mere negligence.
Subdivision (e) contains a provision that directs
the plaintiff to inform his or her local law
enforcement agency of orders made pursuant to
the section, such as for injunctive relief, in
“locations where the court determines that acts of
violence against the plaintiff are likely to occur.”
(Italics added.) Similarly, subdivision (j) states
that: “Speech alone is not sufficient to support an
action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b),
except upon a showing that the speech itself
threatens violence against a specific person or
group of persons; and the person or group of
persons against whom the threat is directed
reasonably fears that, because of the speech,
violence will be committed against them or their
property and that the person threatening violence
959 had the apparent ability to *959 carry out the
threat.” (Italics added.) While we are not prepared
to and need not decide that every plaintiff must
allege violence or threats of violence in order to
maintain an action under section 52.1 (see e.g.,
Cabesuela v. Browning–Ferris Industries of
California, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 80
Cal.Rptr.2d 60), we conclude that the multiple
references to violence or threats of violence in the
statute serve to establish the unmistakable tenor of
the conduct that section 52.1 is meant to address.
The apparent purpose of the statute is not to
provide relief for an over-detention brought about
by human error rather than intentional conduct.
7
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
We further note that when section 52.1 was
amended in 1990 to allow plaintiffs to recover
monetary damages in addition to the remedy of
injunctive relief the statute originally provided
(Stats.1990, ch. 392 (A.B.2683), § 1), the
Legislature also considered, but rejected, a
proposal to delete the language requiring
interference “by threats, intimidation, or
coercion.” A bill analysis prepared by the
Department of Justice commented that “As a
general proposition, statutory or common law
remedies are already available to redress
interference with rights protected by state or
federal constitutions or laws (e.g., tort). Civil
Code § 52.1 focuses specifically on the additional
element present especially in hate violence, viz.,
putting persons in fear of their safety. It is the
element of threat, intimidation, or coercion that is
being emphasized in Civil Code § 52.1. [¶] The
proposed deletion would, in effect, make the civil
rights remedy as an alternative cause of action in
virtually every tort action: Any tort (and, perhaps,
some contractual interferences) could be
characterized as interference with ‘rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States or
of rights secured by the Constitution of laws of
this state.’ ” (March 1, 1990 Department of Justice
Bill Analysis at p. 2. See also Assembly
Committee on Judiciary hearing March 7, 1990 at
pp. 2–3: “Does not the inclusion of the terms
[threats, intimidation, or coercion] clearly define
the types of interferences that the Act originally
849 intended to curb (i.e. hate *849 violence)?”) The
legislative history thus supports our conclusion
that the statute was intended to address only
egregious interferences with constitutional rights,
not just any tort. The act of interference with a
constitutional right must itself be deliberate or
spiteful.
B. Coercion Inherent in a Detention Is
Insufficient
Thus, we conclude that where coercion is inherent
in the constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an
over-detention in County jail, the statutory
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
requirement of “threats, intimidation, or coercion”
is not met. The statute requires a showing of
coercion independent from the coercion inherent
in the wrongful detention itself.
960 *960 The issue was squarely presented in a federal
district court case, Gant v. County of Los Angeles
(C.D.Cal.2011) 765 F.Supp.2d 1238 ( Gant ).
There, several plaintiffs alleged federal and state
constitutional violations arising from their arrests
and subsequent detentions on warrants intended
for different people. Having determined that there
was no California case law addressing the issue,
the Gant court looked to a Massachusetts decision,
Longval v. Commissioner of Correction (1989)
404 Mass. 325, 535 N.E.2d 588 ( Longval ),
appropriately so because section 52.1 was
modeled closely on the Massachusetts Civil
Rights Act of 1979. ( Gant, supra, at p. 1253. See
Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 335, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d
844, 949 P.2d 941.) The court in Gant observed: “
Massachusetts case law suggests that the statute’s
coercion element is not met merely because the
constitutional violation itself is inherently
coercive. In [ Longval ], the Massachusetts
Supreme [Judicial] Court considered a prisoner’s
claim under the corresponding state civil rights
law that his rights were violated when he was
unlawfully transferred to an administrative
segregation unit in another prison without a
hearing. [ ( Longval, supra, at p. 590.) ] There, the
court held that ‘[a] direct violation of a person’s
rights does not by itself involve threats,
intimidation, or coercion and thus does not
implicate the Act.’ [Citation.] Thus, it held, ‘we
see no coercion, within the meaning of the … Act,
simply from the use of force by prison officials,
authorized to use force, in order to compel a
prisoner to do something he would not willingly
do, even if it turns out that the official had no
lawful right to compel the prisoner to take that
action.’ [Citation.] Because the use of force was
intrinsic to the alleged violation itself, it did not
also satisfy the additional ‘force’ or ‘coercion’
element of the statute.” ( Gant, supra, 765
8
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
F.Supp.2d at p. 1253; citing Longval, supra, at p.
593.) The Longval court observed: “Shackling and
handcuffing Longval and taking him to Concord
was not by itself coercive under the Civil Rights
Act, as Longval claims. If the officials had some
further purpose in treating Longval as they did,
threats, intimidation, or coercion might be
involved. Conduct, even unlawful conduct,
however, lacks these qualities when all it does is
take someone’s rights away directly. [Citation.]” (
Longval, supra, at p. 593; italics added.)
The Gant court adopted this analysis and rejected
the section 52.1 claims of the wrongfully arrested
plaintiffs, holding that: “[A] wrongful arrest and
detention, without more, cannot constitute ‘force,
intimidation, or coercion’ for purposes of section
52.1.” ( Gant, supra, 765 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1253–
1254.) “[S]ection 52.1 requires a showing of
coercion independent from the coercion inherent
in a wrongful detention itself.” ( Id. at p. 1258.)
850 We agree.*850
We note the contrary holding in Cole v. Doe
(N.D.Cal.2005) 387 F.Supp.2d 1084 in which the
federal district court held that the “[u]se of law
enforcement authority to effectuate a stop,
detention (including use of handcuffs), and search
can constitute interference by ‘threat[ ],
961 intimidation, or coercion’ *961 if the officer lacks
probable cause to initiate the stop, maintain the
detention, and continue a search.” ( Id. at p. 1103.)
However, we do not find the case persuasive
because the Cole court’s analysis focused on
whether the use or attempted use of excessive
physical force or violence must be alleged
(concluding that it did not). ( Id. at pp. 1103–
1104.) Our focus is not so limited.
C. Shoyoye Did Not Prove Coercion Independent
from that Inherent in a Wrongful Detention
The evidence presented at trial showed only that
County employees were negligent in assigning to
Shoyoye a parole hold in the computer system,
and in failing to detect the error during the
subsequent quality control procedure. None of the
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
County employees here wrongfully detained
Shoyoye with actual or presumed knowledge that
he should have been released. Early on, someone
followed through on his inquiry and ascertained
that he had a DCL hold. The employees could
reasonably rely on the information in the computer
system, based on the reasonable assumption that
the quality control check would catch errors. As a
result, the County employees thought he should be
there. Any intimidation or coercion that occurred
was simply that which is reasonable and incident
to maintaining a jail. The coercion was not carried
out in order to effect a knowing interference with
Shoyoye’s constitutional rights. This is in stark
contrast to Venegas II, for example, in which the
evidence presented could support a finding that
the probable cause that initially existed to justify
stopping the plaintiffs eroded at some point, such
that the officers’ conduct became intentionally
coercive and wrongful, i.e., a knowing and
blameworthy interference with the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights. ( Venegas II, supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 843, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1
[“plaintiffs in this case have alleged
unconstitutional search and seizure violations
extending far beyond ordinary tort claims”].)
Here, County employees certainly were rude to
him at times, but they did not threaten or
intimidate Shoyoye for voicing his opinion that he
should be released. They coerced him to remain
incarcerated, but they did not for example coerce
him to stop inquiring about his release, threaten
him for doing so, or punish him in any way. No
one ignored him deliberately, knowing that he
should in fact be released, let alone purposefully
threaten or intimidate him. At worst they were
rude and indifferent to his inquiries. But jail
officials do not have a duty to be polite. There is
no evidence that Shoyoye was treated differently
than other inmates who were lawfully
incarcerated, or that any conduct directed at him
was for the purpose of interfering with his
constitutional rights. He felt physically threatened
by other prisoners who thought he might be an
9
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
informant, not by County officials. No doubt the
experience was traumatic and frightening, but
962 there *962 was no evidence of any coercion
independent of that inherent in a wrongful
detention itself. We therefore conclude, as a matter
of law based on the undisputed facts, that Shoyoye
did not establish a violation of section 52.1. We
reverse that portion of the judgment finding
against the County on the cause of action pursuant
to section 52.1. Accordingly, we also reverse the
award of attorney fees in favor of Shoyoye that
851 were *851 awarded pursuant to subdivision (h) of
the statute.
5
5 This conclusion of course renders moot
Shoyoye’s
cross-appeal
regarding
the
amount of the attorney fee award.
III.
Reversal
of
the
False
Imprisonment Verdict and Associated
Damage Award Is Not Required
The County asserts that if the judgment in favor of
Shoyoye under section 52.1 is reversed, we must
reverse the entire judgment because the jury did
not apportion the damage award between the
section 52.1 cause of action and the false
imprisonment claim. We conclude under the
factual circumstances present here, where the
damages attributable to each cause of action are
identical, that reversal of the false imprisonment
verdict and associated damage award is not
required.
“The elements of a tortious claim of false
imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual,
intentional confinement of a person, (2) without
lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period
of time, however brief.” ( Easton v. Sutter Coast
Hospital (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 485, 496, 95
Cal.Rptr.2d 316.) The evidence presented at trial
was clearly sufficient to establish those elements.
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
Shoyoye did not present evidence at trial of any
threats, intimidation, or coercion apart from that
which is incident to detention in County jail.
Indeed, he vehemently argued that the
intimidation and coercion inherent in his wrongful
detention were alone sufficient to support his
claim. Plaintiff’s counsel did not suggest to the
jury that they should award damages for each
cause of action separately, or award additional
damages because of the section 52.1 claim. Under
these circumstances, we need not reverse the
entire judgment because the measure of damages
for false imprisonment, as this case was presented
to the jury, was identical to the measure of
damages for violation of section 52.1. We do not
decide whether an additional award would be
warranted to compensate a plaintiff for the more
egregious conduct which we have concluded is
necessary to establish a violation of section 52.1.
But we do find that the verdict here included no
such augmentation.
963 *963
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Shoyoye as to the
section 52.1 cause of action is reversed, as is the
award of attorney fees in favor of Shoyoye, which
was granted under the authority of that section.
The judgment in favor of Shoyoye is affirmed as
to the cause of action for false imprisonment, and
the associated monetary damage award is
affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P.J., and
MANELLA, J.
10
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
203 Cal.App.4th 947 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)
11