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National Responsibility for Social Justice

There is ongoing debate about the responsibility of wealthy nations to remedy social injustice around the globe. Those who argue against offering aid to combat social injustice may point to various failed initiatives as proof that the effort is not worthwhile. Haiti, for instance, represents a bold example of a costly and less than effective humanitarian aid mission. Despite millions of dollars contributed for Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, there is little evidence that the aid helped the country to recover efficiently. However, there are moral issues concerning the need to protect and defend the privileges and freedoms that define basic human rights. Is the answer for wealthy nations to respond to any and all situations where basic human rights are compromised, or should there be a limit established based on the type or severity of the social injustice?

To prepare for this Discussion:

Review the article, “World Poverty and Human Rights.” Consider theories of how nations cause and maintain poverty. Think about reasons why nations may be responsible for providing solutions to poverty.
Review the article, “Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification? Response to World Poverty and Human Rights.” Consider the argument that nations help each other and may not be responsible for global social injustice.
Review the article, “The Humanitarian Illusion.” Reflect on motives for providing aid.
Consider whether it is a moral responsibility for richer nations to help poorer nations.

With these thoughts in mind:

Post by Thursday 2/15/18 a 500-word response regarding your thoughts about whether or not it is a moral responsibility for richer nations to help poorer nations, and explain why. Justify your response with an example that supports your rationale.

Be sure to support your postings and responses with specific references to the Learning Resources.

Learning Resources

Please read and view (where applicable) the following Learning Resources before you complete this week’s assignments.

Readings

· Book Excerpt: Wronka, J. M. (2008).

Chapter 2: Before and beyond the universal declaration of human rights

. In Human rights and social justice: Social action and service for the helping and health professions (pp. 65–96). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications.

· Article: Carr, C. (1993, Sept 16). The humanitarian illusion. The New York Times. A23. (See Attachment)
Use the ProQuest Central database and search using the article title.

· Article: Duke University Libraries. (n. d.). NGO Research Guide. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from

http://library.duke.edu/research/subject/guides/ngo_guide/ngo_database.html

· Article: Davidson, A. (29 June 2010) Haiti: The aid dilemma (Q & A With Adam Davidson) [Optional Material]. Frontline. Arlington, VA: PBS. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/haiti-aid/qa.html

· Article: Pogge, T. (2005). Symposium: World poverty and human rights, Ethics & International Affairs, 19(1), 1–7. (See Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using the article title.

Article: Risse, M. (2005). Do we owe the global poor assistance or rectification? Response to world poverty and human rights. Ethics and International Affairs, 19(1), 9–18. (See Attachment)
Use the Academic Search Complete database and search using the article title.

· Article: United Nations Human Rights. (n. d.). Human Rights Bodies. Retrieved December 9, 2010, from

http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?
Risse, Mathias
Ethics & International Affairs; 2005; 19, 1; ProQuest Central
pg. 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Humanitarian Illusion

Carr; , Caleb . New York Times , Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]16 Sep 1993:

A.23.

ProQuest document link

ABSTRACT (ABSTRACT)

The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing

perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday

Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.

Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would

be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem

unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs

and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia’s troubles.

The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with

heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could

see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status

would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months — or years. Are all the countries in

the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be — and the

conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial.

FULL TEXT
AuthorAffiliation

Caleb Carr is author of “The Devil Soldier.” This is adapted from an article that appears in the fall issue of the World

Policy Journal.

Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid again showed he would stop at nothing when he sent women and children amid his

henchmen into Mogadishu streets to attack members of the United Nations force last week.

The U.N. troops, faced with a physical threat that overrode complex moral considerations, fired back, killing
perhaps 100 civilians and moving the troubled U.N. intervention in Somalia to the brink of disaster. And yesterday
Somali gunmen shot and killed two Italian soldiers.

Only two routes offer hope of changing the deplorable status quo: increased control by the military forces or

speedy withdrawal. As always, the United States will lead the way in making this choice; its decision will have

enormous implications for U.S. policy in other parts of the world.

The U.S. and U.N. entered Somalia believing they could direct the combat troops to ignore the political situation

and pursue an extra-military — that is, extra-political — end: the distribution of humanitarian aid.

The U.N. forces established famine as the enemy, not the gangs of such warlords as General Aidid and Gen.

Mohammed Said Hersi, who is also known as General Morgan. The coalition was unwilling or unable to recognize

that famine in Somalia is not a natural disaster; it is a policy orchestrated by the clan leaders to preserve their

power and to destroy Somalis who will not join their sides.

Recognition of this fact came too late in the international effort, and acknowledgment of its implications is proving

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just as tardy. We now hunt General Aidid like the criminal he has always been; yet our delay in beginning that hunt,

and our willingness to seat him and the other gang leaders at an internationally sanctioned peace conference in

Addis Ababa earlier this year, have given him the time, media attention and the setting in which to portray himself

as a legitimate leader.

Seizing Generals Aidid and Morgan and other gang leaders and disarming their followers should have been the first

order of business. If our troops are to stay, we should pursue that goal more aggressively. If famine remains the

enemy, its agents must be quickly and severely stopped.

Many in the West are uncomfortable with such an approach, echoing General Aidid’s inevitable claim that it

amounts to colonialism. That may be so, but it is also the only cure for Somalia’s ills. Proof is evident all over the

country, notably in towns like Baardheere, where marines quickly established a weapons-free zone, neutralized the

gangs and helped the citizens rebuild their lives. This is colonialism, no doubt — but, after all, the local leaders were

the agents of famine and disease.

Should the U.N. troops leave Somalia now, we can expect man-made disasters to return in full force. Retreat would
be a practical choice. But we ought to acknowledge honestly where retreat would lead. U.S. and U.N. leaders seem
unwilling to abandon Somalia to such a fate. The military seems to be increasing its efforts to disarm the gangs
and to jail leaders who, like General Aidid, obstruct the path to an effective solution to Somalia’s troubles.

The U.N. leadership is not swayed by their accusations of imperialism. If the multinational force moves with
heightened vigor, Somalia could be a U.N. protectorate within the year. Freed from the fighting, U.N. officials could
see whether there are leaders who care more about Somalis than personal power. If not, the protectorate status
would have to be extended until such leaders emerged. That might take months — or years. Are all the countries in
the U.N. force ready for such a delay and commitment? Domestic signals indicate that they may not be — and the
conclusion of these debates, most importantly the one getting under way in Washington, will be crucial.

For the consequences of Somalia extend far beyond the fate of that nation and beyond troubled Africa. In U.S.

foreign policy, they encompass the long overdue recognition that military intervention cannot be nonpolitical.

If we send U.S. and U.N. forces abroad because of a humanitarian crisis, we will come into conflict with political

leaders who are not capably addressing that crisis or are abetting it. Before going in, we must determine the

legitimacy of those leaders and whether we are prepared to remove them.

Such a policy shift would have regional implications, not only in the developing world but more importantly in the

former Yugoslavia. The Bosnian-Serb-Croat conflict is not a natural disaster or a humanitarian crisis. It is a crude

display of power politics that drags on because the factional leaders and their followers care more about winning

than showing mercy to innocent civilians.

In deciding whether or not to intervene in any way in that conflict, we must ask ourselves questions we did not

grapple with before the start of the Somali expedition: Do we accept the legitimacy of the leaders of the conflict?

Do we believe that the ethnic and religious basis of their dispute is valid grounds for war and slaughter?

If not, we must be prepared, should we choose military intervention, to arrest all such leaders, disarm their

followers and create a U.N. protectorate whose term may be far longer than that in Somalia.

For there may be no leaders who truly believe in peace and compromise in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia, and it may

take generations to foster such changes. The alternative, of course, is to stay out of the fight — a course that

dooms many civilians to violent death and the rest to an almost medieval way of life.

Gen. Colin L. Powell was thus quite right to say that if we withdrew from Somalia, our chances of creating any true

new world order would be severely diminished. Yet if we backed down from the responsibility of creating a full-

scale U.N. protectorate, withdrawal would be the only sensible, workable solution that remained.

There is no middle road in such conflicts, as we saw in the largely symbolic airlift of medical supplies to Bosnia

earlier this year, and as the stalemate in Somalia continues to demonstrate.

If we enter the fray, we become political players. Any attempt to portray a political conflict as a humanitarian crisis

is simply sidestepping the terrible choice before us.

DETAILS

Subject: ARMAMENT, DEFENSE AND MILITARY FORCES; FAMINE; POLITICS AND

GOVERNMENT; CIVIL WAR AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

Location: SOMALIA

People: CARR, CALEB

Company / organization: Name: United Nations; NAICS: 928120

Publication title: New York Times, Late Edition (East Coast); New York, N.Y.

Pages: A.23

Publication year: 1993

Publication date: Sep 16, 1993

Section: A

Publisher: New York Times Company

Place of publication: New York, N.Y.

Country of publication: United States, New York, N.Y.

Publication subject: General Interest Periodicals–United States

ISSN: 03624331

CODEN: NYTIAO

Source type: Newspapers

Language of publication: English

Document type: Op-Ed

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The Humanitarian Illusion

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World Poverty and Human Rights
Pogge, Thomas
Ethics & International Affairs; 2005; 19, 1; ProQuest Central
pg. 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

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