psy1

  

Prior to beginning work on this discussion be sure to read Chapters 2 and 3in your text, read the Iurato (2015)  “

A brief comparison of the unconscious as seen by Jung and Levi-Strauss

” article, and review the

Sigmund Freud: The Unconscious mind (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

video and

Carl Jung: Archetypes and Analytical Psychology (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

website. 

https://www.psychologistworld.com/cognitive/carl-jung-analytical-psychology#references

In addition to the required resources, research a minimum of  one scholarly source in the Ashford University Library on this topic.
The unconscious mind is a core concept in most psychoanalytical and psychodynamic theories, but Freud and Jung’s theories are the most developed and prominent. Your text and the required readings and media have presented the two theories. In your initial post of a minimum of 350 words, present an overview of both Freud’s theory and Jung’s theory of the role of the unconscious mind as it pertains to personality and behavior.  Then compare and contrast the basic assumptions of the two theories and note the similarities and the differences as they relate to human behavior.  Based on your reading and research explain which interpretation of the unconscious mind you support.

A Brief Comparison of the Unconscious as Seen
by Jung and L�evi-Strauss

g iu sep pe iurato
University of Palermo,
giuseppe.iurato@unipa.it

ab stract

Retracing the primary common aspects between anthropological and
psychoanalytic thought, in this article, we will further discuss the main
common points between the notions of the unconscious according to Carl
Gustav Jung and Claude L�evi-Strauss, taking into account the thought of
Erich Neumann. On the basis of very simple elementary logic considerations
centered around the basic notion of the separation of opposites, our
observations might be useful for speculations on the possible origins of rational
thought and hence on the origins of consciousness.
k e yword s : analytical psychology, structural anthropology, unconscious,
archetype, classical logic

In the beginning, all the things were together;
then, it came the mind (�o υοὓf) and set them in order

—Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ
(Diogenes Lærtius, Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, Book 2,
Chap. III)

Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) and Claude L�evi-Strauss (1908–2009) were two
of the greatest thinkers and scholars of the last century. The former was an
eminent psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, the first pupil of Sigmund Freud and
then the founder of a new school of psychoanalytic thought called analytical
psychology. The latter was an eminent anthropologist and ethnologist, as well

Anthropology of Consciousness, Vol. 26, Issue 1, pp.

60

–107, ISSN 1053-4202, © 2015 by the
American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1111/anoc.12032

60

as one of the primary leaders of French structuralism; he also made funda-
mental contributions to philosophy and psychology. A brief sketch of the
main lines of their thought will be outlined and compared in the following
sections; in this section, we wish to simply outline the reasons and purposes
for which we invoke them in this article.
Jung was one of the main connoisseurs and supporters of Freudian

thought, having been, for many years, one of Freud’s closest co-workers. Nev-
ertheless, he believed that the entire Freudian framework was not very open
toward other possible applicative perspectives such as, for instance, those
related to anthropological and ethnological thought, in particular toward
mythological thought, although these perspectives also played a fundamental
role in the foundation of Freudian thought itself. So, Jung decided to
approach part of Freudian thought by placing a major emphasis on these
new perspectives, reaching an original and appreciative line of thought with
a notable interdisciplinary valence.
From this viewpoint, it is more than likely that there are common themes

between psychoanalytic and anthropological thought. Moreover, the efficient
results of Jungian psychotherapeutic praxis (Laughlin and Tiberia 2012) might
be taken as indirect proof of the validity of the anthropological ideas that
contributed to creating the Jungian theoretical framework, including certain
L�evi-Straussian ideas that will be briefly recalled herein. More than any other
perspective, Jungian thought has played a fundamental role in explaining the
possible origins of consciousness (Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). In this article,
we would like to revisit some aspects of the known critical comparison
between Jungian and L�evi-Straussian thought while also trying to enlarge this
comparative debate using very elementary concepts of classical logic. In
doing so, it will also be possible to elucidate some fundamental aspects of
human conscious reasoning, in particular, its early origins. To be precise, as
we will see, the L�evi-Straussian and Jungian systems of thought have many
common theoretical backgrounds (D’Aquili 1975); for example, the L�evy-Bru-
hl work on primitive compared with civilized thought has been included in
their theoretical systems. The current anthropological viewpoints say that the
only possible differences between these last two should be searched for in
the different qualitative use of the primary rules of logic rather than in quan-
titative modalities. According to our final considerations, it is in the lack of
some of these very basic logic rules that the substantial differences between
these two types of thought may be retraced. This lack confirms some assump-
tions made by both L�evi-Strauss and Jung on the origins of conscious human
thought, which we would like to descry in the occurrence of the fundamen-
tal dialectic operation of the separation of opposites. In short, the primary
conclusion of this article is that elementary Aristotelian logic, with its very

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 6 1

elementary arguments, also corroborates these common L�evi-Straussian and
Jungian assumptions about the early origins of consciousness.
For an updated re-evaluation of Jung’s thought and its influence on the

anthropology of consciousness, also with the support of the clinical work of
the authors, see the basic article by Charles Laughlin and Vincenza Tiberia
(2012). In this very interesting work, which further highlights the fundamental
importance of analytical psychology in anthropology, Jung’s approach to con-
sciousness is presented from a more modern neuropsychological standpoint
(Laughlin having been, with Eugene G. D’Aquili, one of the founders of the
so-called biogenetic structuralism, a new perspective in psychological anthro-
pology that takes neuroscience results into account). Laughlin and Tiberia
(2012) also explain why Jungian anthropology has been ignored.

&

on some key moment s in the h i s tor y of p s ychoanal y s i s ,
ma inl y freud and jung

In this section, we want to highlight only those aspects of the historical evo-
lution of psychoanalysis that have some relation to the arguments of this arti-
cle. The primary intent of this section and those following (most in the
Appendix) is to outline the aspects of this evolution that have led to psycho-
analytic anthropology, the primary context within which this article has been
worked out. In pursuing this intent, we mainly follow one of the primary ref-
erences on the history of psychoanalysis (i.e., Ellenberger 1970). Along with
Henri Ellenberger’s text, we also follow the biographical dictionary of Aldo
Carotenuto (1991), in which a brief but systematic recall of the primary lines
of thought of each thinker is also presented together with minimal biographi-
cal notes. For further outlines of some other aspects of psychoanalytic theo-
ries primarily concerning the thought of Jung and of Erich Neumann, we
refer to the final Appendix to this article.

Fleshing Out Freudian Thought
Freudian thought evolved from a 20-year pre-psychoanalytic period of gesta-
tion, primarily characterized by a neurological and psychophysical viewpoint,
toward a pure psychological model. Through attempts to dynamically explain
neuroses, Freud reached the first phase of his metapsychological theory,
which was centered around the notions of the unconscious, repression,
drives, and the free-association method. The second phase was characterized
by new notions of transference and counter transference and by the libido
theory of infant sexuality, which in turn centered on the Oedipus complex,
which became the central pillar of his psychodynamic framework. In the
years 1914–1915, Freudian theory underwent a new reorganization in its

62 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

theoretical structure, initially from a topographical standpoint, with the
topography given first by the static constructs of the unconscious, precon-
scious, and conscious; then from a dynamic standpoint, with various psychic
conflicts; and finally from an economic standpoint, with the principles of
pleasure and reality. In the 1920s, the theory underwent another revision
regarding the theory of drives and their classifications, until it reached a sec-
ond definitive topography including the Ego, Super-Ego, and Id (or Es)
agencies. Freud’s last work was the magnificent 1938 Abriß der Psychoanalyse
in which he axiomatically tried to sketch his definitive vision of the structure
of human psychodynamics.

On Jungian Thought, Part One
Carl Gustav Jung started as a psychiatrist at the Zurich Burgh€olzli Hospital
under the supervision of Eugene Bleuler in the early 1900s. He then
attended the Janet’s lessons at the Paris Salpêtri�ere Hospital until his pivotal
meeting with Freud in 1906. Thenceforth, the close and deep relationship
between Freud and Jung led to Jung’s appointment as the first president of
the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) in 1909. The first signifi-
cant disagreements between their ideas started with Jung’s famous publication
Symbols of Transformation in 1912, which underwent successive revisions by
Jung and which constitutes the central conceptual key of his analytical psy-
chology. In 1914, Jung resigned his role as IPA president, retiring himself into
a phase of personal deep inner reflection that led to his knowledge of the
polyhedral nature of the human psyche with its multiple dimensions. To this
end, he started an in-depth study of alchemy, theology, mythology, history of
religions, and shamanism, from whence came the necessary encounter with
anthropological thought. The three primary motivations that led Jung to turn
away from Freudian orthodoxy were: (1) criticism of Freudian pansexualism,
whose theory interprets each symbol only from the sexual individual stand-
point; (2) the Freudian conception of the libido understood exclusively from
a personalistic sexual viewpoint; and (3) the assumption that neuroses date
back only to those phases of libidinal psychosexual evolution of the human
being that go from birth to approximately 6 or 7 years old, ending with the
Oedipus complex.
The Jungian notion of libido is larger than the Freudian one: it denotes

the general psychic energy, which is present in all that “tends toward”
appetitus (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973). Neurosis is no longer relegated
only to infancy, but rather it should be laid out within the wider and
more complex dialectic relationship between the individual and the world
because the former is always continuously growing throughout his life.
According to Jung, human psychic evolution takes place through a partic-
ular dynamic process, called the individuation process, which should be

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 6 3

considered to be a perennial psychic transformation of the human being
in the continuous relationship between themselves and their own uncon-
scious until the realization of the Self. The 1912 Jungian individuation pro-
cess is a pivotal concept around which the entirety of Jungian thought
and its approach to the psychic world is articulated. By means of this
basic process, the human psyche tries to dynamically realize its own self,
which is a totality comprising consciousness and unconsciousness and
which pushes for self-realization in such a manner to determine a new
center of the conscious Ego.
The determination of the Ego is meant to be a process of consciousness

formation by differentiation and integration from an initial original state of
undifferentiation, identification, and promiscuity (with the object1 ) to start-
ing to separate both from the Mother—the latter being understood both
from a personal and archetypical meaning—and from the collective. Jung is
therefore forced to introduce a larger epistemological construct for the
unconscious than the Freudian construct. He distinguishes between a per-
sonal (or individual) and a collective unconscious and then introduces the
notion of archetype. The collective unconscious and an archetype are two
closely related Jungian notions. The former is the result of previous long-
term studies made by Jung on mythology and archaic practices, from which
he inferred that the above-mentioned psychic processes are peculiar to any
human being of any time; that is, they have an ahistorical and an atemporal
structural nature, regardless of culture. Such universal psychic processes are
all potentially available in the collective unconscious and become dynami-
cally active during the psychic evolution of the human being. The structure
of the collective unconscious is given by archetypes, whereas its content is
given by the archetypical (or primordial) images, which never have an indi-
vidual character but rather have a collective nature. The archetypical
images are a type of “historical precipitate” of the collective memory whose
existence is suggested to us, inter alia, by the recurrent mythological themes
that are likely common to every race and all epochs. The archetypes
express themselves by means of symbols or images; they are the same for
every person on the planet and, in modern parlance, are neural circuits that
are genetically organized during the neurogenesis of the young brain
(Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). Depending upon adaptation, the social envi-
ronment, and enculturation, some archetypes develop, while others languish
in a relatively undeveloped state; when archetypes develop into more elabo-
rated structures, they are called complexes. Later, particularly in the Appen-
dix, we will return again to these basic aspects of analytical psychological
thought.

64 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

&

on l�ev i – s t rau s s i an and jung i an unconsc iou s

Herein, we briefly recall the main theoretical points concerning the notions
of the unconscious according to Claude L�evi-Strauss and Carl Gustav Jung
to compare them. Further considerations are in the Appendix.

On L�evi-Straussian Unconscious
According to Ugo Fabietti (2001:Ch. 18) and2 Ino Rossi (1973), the primary
ideas on structural anthropology were first presented in the famous work The
Elementary Structures of Kinship in 1949. In this work, L�evi-Strauss places
the unconscious reciprocity principle, which explains the prohibition of
incest, at the root of the passage from nature to culture. According to L�evi-
Strauss, taking structural linguistics as a primary paradigm (D’Aquili 1975),
every social model is the result of a symbolic process obtained from primary
oppositions between structures that are unconscious elementary entities
devoid of content, so that the symbolic function is the primary result of a
mediation between opposite tendencies. L�evi-Strauss freely acknowledged his
debt to the Prague School, but he never quoted Jung. The first influence
arising from linguistics is the basic concept of linguistic structuralism, that is
to say, that the meaning lies in the relationships of terms. According to
D’Aquili (1975), it appears probable that the origin of this basic concept is an
earlier idea regarding the reconciliation of opposites on a psychological level,
which was then projected onto a social level; this reconciliation clearly
involves a Jungian dynamic. The ultimate origin of structuralism in L�evi-
Strauss, for all its subsequent presentation in linguistic form, may very well
be the dynamics of the resolution of antinomies resembling Jungian arche-
types. The second influence of linguistics and his earliest major conceptual
formulation is the theory of binary opposition. The basic function of the
human mind is the binary contrast, which organizes percepta (or sensory
inputs) into either opposite pairs or into positively opposite pairs (i.e., real psy-
chological antinomies that he later calls contrasting pairs) or both at different
levels. The opposition, then, may also run between two opposite or contrast-
ing pairs, such as Jungian quaternio and so forth.
The passage from nature to culture takes place thanks to the human ten-

dency to symbolically think of biological relationships in terms of systems of
oppositions3; these systems are the fundamental and immediate data for
social and mental reality as well as the crucial starting points of any further
theoretical explanatory attempts. L�evi-Strauss was led to conceive of the struc-
tural unconscious4 as the universal basis for every human thought of every
epoch and every civilization on which the common laws of such a thought
rely. The structural linguistic discipline then highlights the essentially uncon-

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 6 5

scious nature of the fundamental phenomena of the life of mind. The
unconscious would be the intermediary between the Self and Others,5 mak-
ing their integration possible by overcoming their initial opposition. The bin-
ary and oppositional logic molds the representations of social and natural
reality into social models, following a pattern similar to the ethnolinguistic
pattern. The incest prohibition and exogamy rely on this pattern, both having
the formal nature of a reciprocity principle, which fills a gap between two
initially separated worlds, the natural and the cultural world. The reciprocity
principle, as we have said, explains the incest prohibition by means of dualis-
tic organizations (Cressant 1970:Ch. 2). With The Elementary Structures of
Kinship, L�evi-Strauss defines the basis for a psycho-logic, that is to say, the
quest for the a priori universal formal principles of the human mind, which,
though hidden, influence concretely visible data and phenomena (Cipriani
1988:Ch. 3, Sec. 3.1). To pursue this quest, he frequently made reference to
the mathematical sciences.6

According to Comba (2000:Ch. 4, Sec. 1), after L�evi-Strauss’ fieldwork in
Brazil, the relationships between the social relation system and mental repre-
sentations were always the object of his attention. To this end, he was forced
to reach a human thought level deeper than the conscious. L�evi-Strauss,
through the evolution of his thought, reached a notion of the unconscious
quite different from the Freudian one (but from which it started7), which
allows us to apply the reciprocal comparison to different and otherwise incom-
parable cultural contexts. This notion allows communication in every place
and every time between us and others, thus attaining a well-defined concept
of history. Through this notion of the unconscious, its regularities and recur-
rences, as well as its common functional laws, L�evi-Strauss speaks of a univer-
sal soul or mind. According to Marcel H�enaff (1998):Ch. 4), this universal
mind allows us to state the finite number of possible logics with which it oper-
ates as well as to postulate the precedence of the logic rules with respect to
the functional ones. There is a sort of anteriority of the (common) logic rela-
tion systems that structure the unconscious level to give rise to the next sym-
bolic thought and to historical language. According to Francesco Remotti
(1971:Ch. 4, Sec. 2), the unconscious plays a very fundamental epistemological
role in the entire L�evi-Straussian anthropological system, which at different
times touches on Freud’s,8 Jung’s, and (later) Lacan’s ideas. According to San-
dro Nannini (1981:Ch. 7, Sec. 2), L�evi-Strauss considers the unconscious to be
the place of transindividual symbolic order within which the communicating
subjects—who are the protagonists in a game of free choice—recite roles
implied by the dualistic combinatory logic the reciprocal relationships among
them emerge and dominate the individuals. This binary logic is the essence of
the unconscious, which is also the place of the inner human conflict that
forces the Ego to work with the Other, to give rise to the Otherness.

66 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

On Jungian Unconscious
The Freudian unconscious relies on a basic repression mechanism that fur-
nishes an essential character of individuality to this entity. As stated above,
only in old age did Freud turn his attention toward possible transpersonal
and archaic unconscious influences on the human psyche. Instead, Jung was
the first psychoanalyst who gave substantial attention to these aspects, distin-
guishing between a personal (or individual) unconscious and a collective
one. According to Carotenuto (1990, 1991):Ch. 5; see also Laughlin and Tibe-
ria 2012 and Evans 1964), the Jungian collective unconscious is an entity that
is understood to be dynamically structured according to a phylogenetic order
by a set of primary, unobservable, and irreducible elements called archetypes.
The theory of archetypes has also undergone a historical evolution that
deprives it of a unique and definitive formulation, placing the notion of
archetype between the psychological dimension and the somatic reality
(Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). Thus, because the archetype is connected with
instinctual reality, it is an innate predisposition that is devoid of certain psy-
chological attitudes. However, because it is also related to the spiritual
dimension, it is an a priori category of knowledge, a transcendental dimen-
sion that, in turn, may be historically retraced in Platonic ideas, in the Scho-
penhauer prototypes, or in the a priori forms of the transcendental Kantian
logic. The archetype, completely invisible and unconscious, may manifest
itself only by means of archetypical images, whose phenomenology acts
through modalities depending on the cultural and traditional context, giving
rise to the personal unconscious. The collective unconscious, as meant by
Jung, is an objective structural entity conceived of as a universal sediment of
past experiences.9 To support this idea, Jung used the anthropological
method of cultural parallelisms (Kroeber 1948), observing that every ethnic
group, with respect to meaningful universal events such as death, birth, love,
and so on, responds with quite similar behavioral and expressive modalities.
This observation is motivated by comparison among the different mytholo-

gies, religious systems, and artistic and cultural creations, as well as by the
comparison of these with the psychic material emerging from dreams, fanta-
sies, and deliria. Jung considered the collective unconscious to be the result
of a human teleological adaptation, in turn due to a primary biological need
to cope with the anxieties of life (Jacobi 1971:Ch. 3). Jung’s interests in
anthropology and ethnology constitute, therefore, an indispensable premise
to his theory of archetypes: for instance, the L�evy-Bruhl theories had a great
influence on the creation of the Jungian theoretical framework; vice versa,
Jungian theories also had a great influence on anthropological thought (Car-
otenuto 1994:Ch. 6; see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012).

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 67

&

a f i r s t compar i son between the j ung i an and the l�ev i –
s t r au s s i an unconsc ious

Many studies have been conducted that compare the L�evi-Straussian uncon-
scious with the Jungian collective unconscious. These studies discuss many
common points between these two theoretical constructs, which nevertheless
are not equal. Among these articles, we recall Remotti (1971:Ch. 4, Sec. 2);
D’Aquili (1975), John Raphael Staude (1976), Vernon Gras (1981), and
Richard Gray (1991) and the references quoted therein. Gray’s article, among
other objectives, compares the various previous studies conducted regarding
this crucial question, trying to objectively argue that many common points
exist between these two constructs in contrast to those who would prefer to
see a gap between them. Both notions are joined by their common basilar
structural nature as well as by the common laws with which they operate
and that obey a primary binary and oppositional logic; as regards the Jungian
collective unconscious, this last aspect emerges from the study of mythologi-
cal thought, as we will see later.
According to Gray, strict parallelisms exist between the constructs because

both authors were observing the same entity from very similar perspectives.
Both divide the unconscious into dual segments, one personal and one imper-
sonal (or collective); they also see the deeper, impersonal level as providing a
content-free infrastructure upon which to build content. The next element of
similarity is the pattern of oppositions and their resolution (D’Aquili 1975).
L�evi-Strauss sees this opposition as representing the underlying structure of the
unconscious. Again, L�evi-Strauss, in explaining the myth, states that:

The mythical thought always progresses from the awareness of oppositions
toward their resolution . . . We need only assume that two opposite terms
with no intermediary always tend to be replaced by two equivalent terms
which admit a third one as a mediator; then one of the polar terms and
the mediator become replaced by a new triad, and so on. [1955:440]

The patterns of opposing elements were central to Jung’s scheme. The prin-
ciple of oppositions is noted by Jung as an essential characteristic of con-
scious thought and lies at the foundation of two basic psychic mechanisms
devoted to overcoming it, the dialectic process of the coniunctio oppositorum
and the polar process of the enantiodromia law (Galimberti 2006; see also
Section 4.1). Many parts of L�evi-Strauss’ work are similar to these last aspects
of Jungian thought, although Jung himself is never explicitly quoted,
although he preceded L�evi-Strauss by 10 to 20 years10 (D’Aquili 1975). Jung
notes that “there is no consciousness without discrimination of opposites”

68 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

(1969b:96). The previous quote, drawn from Aion, reflects the fact that Jung
saw the heart of the psyche in oppositionally based dynamics. Although
the quotation reflects Jung’s view of psychic organization, it is nevertheless
quite similar to L�evi-Strauss’s own binary opposition. To be precise, Jung says
that:

As opposites never unite at their own level (tertium non datur), a super-
ordinate “third” is always required in which the two parts can come
together. And since the symbol derives as much from the conscious as
from the unconscious, it is able to unite them both, reconciling their
conceptual polarity through its form and their emotional polarity through
its numinosity [1959:180].

In this statement, Jung meant that the archetype concept had an aprioristic
form, but it was not completely rigid; indeed, this form undergoes a continu-
ous mutability, except for its unavoidable dualistic and oppositional nature,
according to a phylogenetic evolution. However, this latter possibility is not
allowed by the L�evi-Straussian unconscious structure. The Jungian archetypes
are neither representable nor visible, being fully unconscious, but they
appear only symbolically—for instance in dreams, in fantasies, and in psy-
chotic deliria—as primeval archetypical images, as stated above. These last
archetypical images provide substantial content to the Jungian archetypes.
Therefore, the first common point between the L�evi-Straussian and Jungian
unconscious stems from their universal structural nature. Another common
point concerns the mythological thought that, in both authors, structurally
takes place through processes of opposition, as recalled above.
According to a famous remark by Paul Ricoeur (Renzi 1965), the L�evi-

Straussian unconscious is conceivably more similar to the Kantian type than
the Freudian type; that is to say, it is of a categorical and combinatorial type
but without thought’s transcendental subject. This last aspect means that in
place of the “I think” (Ego) there exists a well-determined ahistorical and
atemporal formal organization meant as a sort of facultas præformandi (Caro-
tenuto 1991:Ch. 5; 1994;Ch. 6) that is common both to ancient and modern
individuals as well as to primitive and civilized persons, as proved by the
study of symbolic functions, which are one of the primary features of uncon-
scious as well as of human thought. This symbolic function is expressed
through structures and forms meant to be pure ontological modes of being
for the human mind, foregoing all possible structurally organized content.11

According to L�evi-Strauss, this (his) epistemological model of the uncon-
scious represents the primary structure upon which the assumed L�evi-Straus-
sian hypothesis of universality and the objectivity of every possible human
thought is grounded, within the methodological unity of the knowledge

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 69

through which it is possible to reach a type of equal leveling between the
Geisteswissenschaften and the Naturwissenschaften in the celebrated Wilhelm
Dilthey sense.
Moreover, in the L�evi-Straussian unconscious model (Galimberti 2006),

the crucial meeting takes place between the subjective and the objective, on
the one hand, and between the model and the structure on the other. There-
fore, this meeting should be meant as mediation among the various, other-
wise irreconcilable, individual subjectivities, thus making intersubjective
communication and cognition possible. The latter is possible through the
transposition of every individual toward a higher plane that does not tran-
scend that individual in an alienating manner but simply puts him or her
into a relationship with other common forms of knowledge that are, together,
ours and of others. Furthermore, again following L�evi-Straussian thought
(Caldiron 1975), the laws of unconscious activity remain always, on the one
hand, outside of individual cognition (at most, it is possible to be conscious
of them only as a historical object). On the other hand, it is they themselves
that determine the modalities of this cognition, or else, the unconscious war-
rants the objectivity (or the scientificity) of the individual cognition. In this
last sense, it is possible, according to L�evi-Strauss, to speak of the uncon-
scious as the place of the science, or else as the place of every form of rational
knowledge (Rossi 1973). The statement that sees the collective unconscious
as the primary source of philosophy, science, and mythology, which would
originate from successive differentiations, is also expressed by the classical
scholar Francis M. Cornford as well as by many other scholars such as the
physicist Wolfgang Pauli, the historian Arnold J. Toynbee, and so forth, who
based their studies just on the Jungian collective unconscious hypothesis (El-
lenberger 1970:Ch. 9).
Only at the unconscious level (Grampa 1976), as has already been men-

tioned above, does the otherwise unrealizable metahistorical integration takes
place between subjective and objective.12 The unconscious operating modali-
ties are the same for everyone in any time because they represent the condi-
tions of all possible mental lives of all men of all times. Otherwise, the
unconscious is the set of all possible mental and psychic structures that regu-
late every human thought, both normal and pathological. In particular, in
normal conditions, the (abstract) reification of certain symbolic forms takes
place (by means of archetypical images); these forms have a structure leading
to that provided by the Boolean algebra of bivalent logic13 (Piaget 1968). The
L�evi-Straussian unconscious, as a metastructure categorized into pure free-
content forms with a universal, atemporal, and formal character (Fabietti and
Remotti 1997), is above all aimed toward the explication of the unconscious-
science (or knowledge) relationship, if one primarily considers it to be an
entity of all of the possible absolute laws and all of the necessary relationships

70 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

(Moravia 1969). Finally, and according to the epistemological thought of
Mario Ageno, which is derived from Ageno’s work and philosophical medita-
tions on biophysics (hence, by comparing the epistemological patterns of
physics and biology), a substantial unity of nature as well as a communion of
methods and foundations of all of the sciences follows (Ageno 1962:Ch. 1,
Sec. 1).
As has already been said, Jungian and L�evi-Straussian unconscious notions

turn out to be, despite their common aspects, different: among their primary
distinct points, we recall, above all are the diachronic (or historic) dynamicity
of the structure of the former14 as opposed to the utter synchronic (or ahistor-
ical) staticity of the structure of the latter.15 Furthermore, the archetypical
structural forms of the Jungian unconscious may undergo changes in terms
of their dependence on the phylogenetic evolution of the related contents16

and vice versa; that is to say, there is a certain reciprocal relationship
between forms and content. The L�evi-Straussian unconscious, however, is
primarily characterized by the absolute and full predetermination of its struc-
tural forms, which are completely independent of the various contents that
will fill them. Hence, there is a remarkable ontological insufficiency of con-
tents in the L�evi-Straussian unconscious, unlike the Jungian one, because of
the merely symbolic nature that the former must have. However, as has
already been mentioned, we would like to stress again the two notable com-
mon points between these unconscious notions, which may be identified in
their primary structural nature and in their common binary logic. Indeed, a
basic assumption for both is their primary constitution as an entity, formed
by elementary structures according to L�evi-Strauss and by archetypes accord-
ing to Jung. This common structural essence is then carried through elemen-
tary and irreducible entities (i.e., the L�evi-Straussian structures and the
Jungian archetypes), which relate among them through an oppositional bin-
ary logic. These are, in short, the primary common points that we want to
highlight for the purposes delineated in the following sections.

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some further anthropolog ic al cons iderat ion s on
log i c

According to Fabietti and Remotti (1997), the comparison between the logic
of civilized thought and the logic of primitive thought is a vexata quæstio still
open. In-depth studies were conducted by Christopher R. Hallpike (1979)
and Jack Goody (1977). Currently, the general notion of primitive is anthro-
pologically discredited if one considers it in opposition to the modern notion.
In this regard, there was a semantic switch of the term “primitive,” which is
currently understood as referring to the first original structural forms of logi-

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 7 1

cal thought. Therefore, the term “primitive” refers to a previous logic condi-
tion, namely to a logic anteriority rather than a social-historic one (Bonte
and Izard 1991); hence, from this last point of view, the elementary analysis
conducted in this article is quite justified. Nevertheless, there is no full clarity
about the passage from primitive thought to civilized thought, whose borders
appear to be quite vague.17

The first valuable studies on primitive mentality were made by L�evy-Bru-
hl,18 who identified the first core of prelogical thought characterized by the
lack of the elementary basic Aristotelian principles of identity and of non-con-
tradiction, primarily due to the presence of the mystic participation law,19

which establishes relationships on the basis of emotive and mystic links.
Indeed, L�evy-Bruhl himself does not deny that a primitive individual could
rationally and logically think in a manner comparable with the individuals of
civilized society. Nevertheless, it is just the social-cultural context, pervaded
by this participation law and the related collective representations, that hides
these mental potentialities, giving rise to forms of syncretic reasoning. Later,
L�evy-Bruhl abandoned the net contraposition between prelogical and logical
thought, accepting the idea that these may coexist but that only one of them
may be manifested (at the expense of the remaining one) depending on indi-
vidual existential experiences and the related invested affective charge. Thus,
both of these types of thought are present in every society and in any human
being but in different ratios. In our case, we also point to a remark from
L�evi-Strauss in La pens�ee sauvage (of 1962), according to which the logic of
primitive societies is quite fragmented due to the residuals of psychological
and historical processes devoid of the notion of a priori necessity, which must
be discovered only a posteriori. According to L�evi-Strauss, classification by
oppositions and binary relations is one of the primary atemporal characteris-
tics of the universal symbolic function, which explicates itself through the
action of a binary principle on the basis of the structural linguistic pattern. It
relies on oppositional and relational binary logic, which is the central pillar
of the entire theoretical framework of L�evi-Straussian work as well as the
Jungian system, as has been stated above.

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f in al cons iderat ion s

From what has been said above, notwithstanding their few dissimilarities as
entities, it is now possible to conduct further disquisitions on the above-men-
tioned theoretical points common both to the Jungian unconscious and to
the L�evi-Straussian one, which might turn out to be of certain importance as
regards the possible early origins of consciousness. In the L�evi-Straussian con-
ception, the unconscious is seen as the primary location of every possible psy-

7 2 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

chic and mental structure, hence of each form of thought and knowledge.
From the unconscious comes, in particular, all forms of logical structure,
including the bivalent Aristotelian structure, which is typical of common
rational thought (consciousness) but not the only possible structure.20 This
Aristotelian structure is, however, the most elementary and primary one, and
it lies at the foundation of the first forms of conscious reasoning; it arose dur-
ing the passage from mythological to rational thought. On the other hand,
from what has been said above about Jungian and Neumannian ideas, the sep-
aration of opposites plays a very fundamental role in the dawning of the first
forms of consciousness. If this separation were hindered or inhibited, then it
would be possible to verify, with very simple elementary logical arguments,
that logical deduction is possible for any thinkable proposition and rational
statement, thus clearly reaching prelogical forms of syncretic21 reasoning.
To be precise, in that realm of the unconscious resulting from the non-

void intersection between the L�evi-Straussian unconscious and the Jungian
one, which is structurally created by elementary dualistic entities operating
according to an oppositional binary logic, every possible proposition and
statement is valid, as follows from the well-known Pseudo Scoto argument.
In this argument, we find one of the most characteristic theoretical aspects of
the L�evi-Strauss unconscious concerning the presumed unifying uncon-
scious-science relationship; to be precise, as has already been mentioned
above, that it is the unification place of any science and every thought.22

Therefore, only by means of separating opposites, in accordance with Jung
and Neumann, will it be possible to attain rational thought respecting the
usual basic Aristotelian bivalent logic rules and principles, including the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction23 and the principle of identity, as also recalled by
Jung (1969a) himself. However, Freud himself claimed that every human act
of consciousness is basically the result of a dialectic process arising from a
separation of opposites (Akhtar and O’Neil 2011) by negation. Likewise, Imre
Hermann (1989) also argued for the primary role played by the so-called dual
procedure, basically founded on the separation of opposites by negation, in
the formation of the elementary principles of Aristotelian logic.
The simple elementary logic argumentations that lead us to these conclu-

sions are as follows. According to Evert Beth (1959) and Ettore Carruccio
(1971, 1977), if a rational theory is roughly meant to be a coherent and non
contradictory set of premises (i.e., primitive propositions or statements, axi-
oms, or postulates, aprioristically assumed to be true) and consequences (logi-
cally deducted from the premises), then the well-known Pseudo Scoto
theorem, maybe dating back to Scholastics, states the following: if, in a cer-
tain rational theory T, at least two contradictory propositions or statements
coexist, say A and ¬A (=negation of A), forming a pair of opposites,24 then it
is possible to prove within T that every possible proposition or statement X is

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 7 3

also true. This result clearly reaches forms of prelogic and (psychologically)
syncretic reasoning (Malatesta 1982, Ch. 4, Sec. 5) typical of the primary pro-
cess and of primitive thought (see the references to L�evy-Bruhl in the Appen-
dix). We repeat that the elementary basic principles upon which Archimedean
logic relies (i.e., the first logic system to be historically outlined by human
beings both phylogenetically and ontogenetically) are the identity principle
and the principle of non-contradiction. In turn, these are both closely related
to negation and hence to the primary psychological notion of the separation of
opposites. Without this last basic process, the Pseudo Scoto theorem states that
we inevitably fall back into the realm of the undifferentiated. However, accord-
ing to John Sowa (1984:386) and Salman Akhtar and Mary Kay O’Neil (2011),
the basic operations of elementary Aristotelian logic are conjunction, disjunc-
tion, material implication, and biconditional implication, even if Charles S.
Peirce proved that all four of these operations can only be derived from two
primitive operations, conjunction and negation, consistent with the above state-
ments addressing the primary role played by the separation of opposites.
Thus, the origins of the foundation of bivalent classical (Aristotelian) rea-

soning, that is to say, of the first forms of conscious rational thought (as grad-
ually emerging from mythological thought), should be traced in this primary
process of differentiation and separation from the above-mentioned initial
(Neumannian) uroboric undifferentiated state and from the subsequent vari-
ous incest phases, in which simultaneously prevail conditions of opposition
and undifferentiation. However, according to Andrew Samuels, Bani Shorter,
and Fred Plaut (1986), the opposites are the indispensable and unavoidable
precondition of every psychic life. Jung puts the opposition principle at the
root of his framework, as had been done by his predecessors. Alternation
between two irreconcilable extremes of a pair of opposites is the distinctive
trait of an awakening of consciousness. When the corresponding tension
attains its highest degree and becomes intolerable, then a solution must be
found: the only possible solution is placed at a higher level than the initial
opposite elements. At first, this third element is, in itself, irrational, unex-
pected, and incomprehensible to the conscious mind, which feels only two
oppositions contrasting between them. The conscious mind does not know
what will join these two contrasting tendencies together until the symbol
appears and accomplishes the difficult unifying task. This unification is the
result, above all, of a coniunctio oppositorum but, in some cases, also of the e-
nantiodromia law, both of which take place within the unconscious; accord-
ing to D’Aquili (1975), this process is also identifiable within L�evi-Strauss’
work on binary process.
As has already been said, opposites play a fundamental role in Jungian the-

ory, which starts from the principle25 (said to be the compensation principle)
that psychic life is a self-regulating system. This system can attain a condition

74 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

of equilibrium between conscious and unconscious instances only by means
of the accommodation or mediation of opposites, which takes place through
two main principles, the enatiodromia law and, above all, the coniunctio op-
positorum. The first is a psychological law, first formulated by Heraclitus,
denoting the tendency of everything to transform into its opposite. According
to Jung, the essence of psychic dynamics is at first the creation of pairs of
opposites (from the primordial conscious-unconscious opposition), hence the
compensation of their elements; it is then thanks to the enantiodromia law
that the opposite pair takes place, which will remain in an oppositional and
dynamic tension that never reaches a dialectic resolution. The latter, how-
ever, will be overcome thanks to the coniunctio oppositorum with the subse-
quent symbolic formation (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986; Galimberti
2006). These two elementary processes of the general compensation principle
might be invoked to explain the oppositional and relational binary logic of
L�evi-Strauss’s theoretical framework, which is the essential core of Aristote-
lian logic. According to Jung, the unconscious mind is undifferentiated,
whereas the conscious mind can discriminate; the hallmark of consciousness
is therefore discrimination. If consciousness wants to attain awareness of
things, it must separate the opposites, which are always inclined to merge
(Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986). Once the separation has taken place, the
two distinct elements must still maintain a conscious relationship between
them to avoid a nullifying fusion. Erich Neumann (1954) therefore developed
his own theory on the origins and developments of consciousness starting
from these Jungian elements and pursuing a phylo-ontogenetic stance (see
also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). Taking into account the mythological per-
spective, Neumann worked out a development of consciousness according to
individual stages, phylogenetically isomorphic to mythological development,
indicating the centrality of the opposite separation theme. In conclusion,
thanks to very elementary basic logical arguments, it has been possible to
ascertain that the consciousness of the human being can take place only in
that non void realm of the unconscious given by the non empty intersection
between the L�evi-Straussian structural unconscious and the Jung collective
unconscious, through those psychic processes explained by Jung and Neu-
mann.
Finally, these last considerations make use of very basic topics drawn from

elementary logic applied to psychological contexts; they might also undergo
impertinent objections if one accepts, in principle, a certain distinction
between mathematical and psychological logic. We do not consider this dis-
tinction on the basis of the statements of one of the major scholars of mathe-
matical epistemology, Federigo Enriques (1871–1946), who considered, in a
precise sense, formal logic to be part of psychology (Enriques 1985). There-
fore, the few considerations given above should be considered within this

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 7 5

Enriquesian epistemological framework.

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appendix
In this appendix, for the sake of completeness, we gather some further
anthropological and psychoanalytic notes that should be seen as the deepen-
ing, integration, and completion of the main text. These notes have been rel-
egated into an appendix so as not to overload the text and to avoid obscuring
the line of thought that leads to the primary argumentation presented in this
article; that is to say, that the separation of opposites is an unavoidable condi-
tion for the early origins of consciousness. This argumentation is also sup-
ported by very elementary logic considerations.

&

on anal y t i c a l p s ychology, ma inl y c . g . j ung and e .
neumann

In this section, we proceed by delineating the cornerstones of both Jungian
thought—in continuation of what has been said above—and of that of Erich
Neumann. Moreover, further considerations on the relationships between
Jungian and anthropological thought will be briefly outlined, where possible.

On Jungian Thought, Part 2
According to Carotenuto (1991:Ch. 5; 1994:Ch. 6; Samuels, Shorter, and
Plaut 1986; see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012), before Freud and Jung, any
psychopathological event was considered without considering any possible
theoretical meaning. With these thinkers, these apparently meaningless psy-
chic events could acquire a proper meaning with the introduction of a cer-
tain epistemological construct called the unconscious, which was nevertheless
differently defined by these two authors. The primary hypothesis of the
Freudian framework is that of psychic repression, according to which anxious
object representations linked to a given drive are removed from the con-
sciousness field because they contrast with internal or external needs. These
anxious object representations, however, maintain their own energetic charge
at a potential state in the individual unconscious. Therefore, repression is a
fundamental psychic (defense) mechanism through which consciousness sep-
arates from the unconscious: this is one of the central statements of Freudian
thought.
From an epistemological and historical standpoint, the Freudian pattern

has always been the primary basis from which to start laying the foundations
of any subsequent psychoanalytic model. This was the case for Jungian the-

76 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

ory, which, starting from some Freudian ideas, reached a wider construct of
the unconscious, distinguishing between a personal26 and a collective uncon-
scious. The former is ontogenetically included in the latter, which has a phy-
logenetic order. Each of us, then, has their own manner of building a
relationship with the collective unconscious that is dependent on the forces
of the Ego: the stronger the Ego is, the wider the opening toward the collec-
tive unconscious will be. When building this relationship, the personal
unconscious will simultaneously form. Later, we will discuss more deeply the
Jungian notion of unconscious and its features.
According to Laplanche and Pontalis (1973) and Charles Rycroft (1968),

and as briefly recalled above, the essence of Freudian doctrine revolves
around two primary topographies of the human psyche. The first identifies a
conscious, a preconscious, and an unconscious component. The second
defines three agencies, namely the Ego agency, roughly corresponding to the
conscious psychic part; the Super-Ego agency, which roughly corresponds to
the preconscious apprehension of social and normative instances; and the Id
agency, which refers to instinctual unconscious forces. The Ego agency acts
(during the so-called secondary process) as a mediator between strong Id
claims, which are uncompromising and desire immediate satisfaction (plea-
sure principle), and the Super-Ego normative forbiddances and rules, trying
to find an intermediary resolution to achieve satisfaction (principle of reality).
A neurosis takes place when the Ego fails in its fundamental and primary
role, though it does exist and is intact; that is to say, the basic test of reality is
not compromised. Nevertheless, the primary shortcoming of Freudian theory
concerns the lack of consideration of psychoses because the theory was built,
above all, on clinical data provided by the analysis of neurotics whose Egos
are, after all, intact.
Because of this shortcoming, Jung felt the need to rectify this lack by trying

to extend the Freudian framework to include psychosis. In achieving this
extension, Jung was helped by his valuable previous experience as a psychia-
trist at the Burgh€olzi Psychiatric Hospital in Z€urich, which put him in direct
contract with psychotics, in contrast to Freud27 (who was a neurologist).
From this valuable experience, Jung drew fundamental inspiration to formu-
late his new theory of the human psyche, following an epistemological para-
digm quite similar to those of Kuhn’s scientific revolutions. From all of the
material collected through the analysis of deep psychotic suffering, Jung was
led to widen the first Freudian framework. The basic assumptions of his the-
ory are those of the individuation process, of the personal and collective
unconscious, and of the principle of compensation. The personal uncon-
scious is the place of the (Ego’s) complexes that every human being experi-
ences throughout her or his structuring of infant relationships with the
collective unconscious (see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). An Ego complex

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 77

is defined as a set of (object) representations that refer to a given event that
has an affective-emotive charge; that is to say, it is a set of images and ideas
assembled around a central key,28 which are strongly joined together by an
affective tonality. An Ego complex autonomously acts within our personality
and constitutes the basis of our own personal unconscious dimension. Com-
plexes are the sources of dreams and symptoms of personal history, which
symbolically manifest themselves. They constitute autonomous parts of the
human psyche that are variously activated in certain circumstances: for
instance, when one establishes an interpersonal relationship, a particular
complex is activated that manifests, or activates, an aspect of the personality
that may be different from or barely coherent with the usual personality upon
which it prevails. The complex prevails because of its psychic partiality,
which is strictly linked to the splitting attitudes of the human psyche (already
identified by Freud’s work). The prevailing complex will possess the person.
The analytical treatment is turned, by compensation (and then through the
individuation process), toward the integration and assimilation of the various
emerging complexes through the conscious Ego. The variegation of com-
plexes, which are completely split in the primitive spiritual condition, is a
phylogenetic characteristic both of the primitive and the differentiated (civi-
lized) psyche, by means of the collective unconscious, whose structural con-
tent is comprised of well-determined psychic elementary structures called
archetypes. We shall return to these last points later.
With regard to the normal development of the human psyche, the con-

scious Ego gradually acquires its autonomy (enlarging its consciousness) by
assimilating and integrating the various Ego complexes that take place as a
result of those traumatic events that all human beings experience during
their lives (but with particular emphasis on childhood). The complexes’
structure is due to the archetypical images and ideas emerging from the col-
lective unconscious, which are the only ways in which the archetypes may
be manifested. They form the substantial (reified) content of the collective
unconscious. This process for manifesting complexes is necessary to avoid
the Ego’s fascination with the numinous power of the (collective) uncon-
scious, and it takes place thanks to the individuation process, which has its
apex approximately between 30 and 40 years old. Only through such a pro-
cess will it be possible to reach a creative and constructive integral psychic
personality, which is indivisible but quite differentiated from the collective
conscious and unconscious psyche.29 The primary recurrent archetypical
images with which every human being is called to compare herself or him-
self are the Shadow (i.e., the unknown or the unacceptable), the Persona
(i.e., the image of a person proposing a “mask” to the world with which one
often identifies oneself), the Animus and the Anima (as reciprocal sexual
unconscious counterparts), the Puer (i.e., the eternal possibility of becoming

78 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

from the native state), the Great Mother (in both its good and its terrifying
aspects—see the next sections). The Ego must compare itself with them dur-
ing the individuation process to attain its autonomy. Such a primary process,
by compensation, will try to integrate the different psychic parts into a total
Self, beyond which the conflict between opposite tendencies is not elimi-
nated but is used as a creative structural datum of the human psyche.
For Jung, the fundamental categories through which psychic reality devel-

ops are polarization (i.e., the idea of organization by opposites), compensa-
tion, and relation; these are all elements that refer to the basic conflicting
nature of personality (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986). The dialectic of
opposites is connate in the human being and embeds its deep roots into the
Shadow; in particular, Jung assigns a determinant role to the Anima-Animus
opposition. The Self then has the fundamental task of mediation and synthe-
sis between opposite tendencies, whose dualistic nature is a recurrent charac-
teristic of archetypes. The symbolic function—like, for instance, that
inherent to the activity of dreaming—is of just this type, casting a bridge
between the conscious and unconscious dimensions that allow the approach
of opposites, generating a third element—the transcendental function—that
makes possible the passage from one dimension to another. The reunification
of opposites through this transcendental function (by coniunctio oppositorum
or by enantiodromia) is properly called mysterium coniunctionis, a term drawn
from alchemy, which also played a fundamental role in formulating Jungian
thought. According to Galimberti (2006), a basic principle of analytical psy-
chology is consideration of psychic life as a self-regulating principle, by com-
pensation, which can reach a condition of equilibrium only by reconciling
contraries either through coniunctio oppositorum or enantiodromia. At this
point, it is now possible to continue with Neumann’s thought, which is a fur-
ther mythological deepening of Jungian thought.

On Erich Neumann’s Thought
There have been many followers and pupils of Jung and of his thought,
including Gerhard Adler, Luigi Aurigemma, Ernst Bernhard, Aldo Caroten-
uto, Hans Dieckmann, Gustav Dreifuss, Edward F. Edinger, Christou Evan-
gelos, Michael Fordham, Umberto Galimberti, Hester Harding, Joseph L.
Henderson, James Hillman, Jolande Jacobi, Dora Kalff, John W. Layard,
Rafael Lopez-Pedraza, Carl A. Meyer, Erich Neumann, Pierre Solie, Sabrina
Spielrein, Mario Trevi, Marie-Louise Von Franz, Joseph B. Wheelwright,
Edward C. Whitmont, and Hanna Wolff. Each of them originally developed
particular aspects of Jungian thought (see Carotenuto 1992 for brief details).
Furthermore, Jung had fruitful collaborations with the historian Karl Ker�enyi
and the physicist Wolfgang Pauli.30 But for our purposes, we are primarily

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 79

interested in the thought of Erich Neumann, which we will briefly outline
herein.31

According to Carotenuto (1991:Ch. 6; see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012),
Neumann may be considered to be one of the primary authors of analytical
psychology and as a continuer of the Jungian œuvre from the point at which
Jung himself had reached and stopped, as Jung himself stated in the preface
to one of the main works of Neumann, namely The Origins and History of
Consciousness, first published in German in 1949, later in English in 1954
(Neumann 1954). Another notable work of Neumann was The Great Mother,
first published in English in 1955, then in German in 1956 (Neumann 1955).
Neumann worked out his own genetic theory of the personal and collective
psyche, tracing a parallel between the great mythologies and the individual
historic-psychological development; that is to say, according to Neumann,
the ontogenetic development of the human psyche is, in a certain sense,
intertwined with a recapitulation path of the phylogenetic path of the great
mythologies. These transpersonal aspects transcend the personal experiences
in childhood; their roots are deeply embedded in the Jungian collective
unconscious. According to Neumann, it is reductive to consider only per-
sonal events, as in the Freudian viewpoint; in addition to these, it should also
be necessary to consider transpersonal events, according to a phylo-ontoge-
netic perspective.
Starting from Jung’s work and taking into account the Egyptian, Hebraic,

and Greek mythologies, Neumann identifies a parallelism between some fun-
damental themes of these mythological constructions and the formation of
consciousness. As has been said above, Jung considers consciousness to be a
psychic entity or agency that starts from the unconscious by means of the
integration and assimilation of the various Ego complexes understood as
archetypical images emerging from the undifferentiated collective uncon-
scious that everyone activates through their own personal experience. Neu-
mann studied this primary psychic process in depth; he describes it through
a well-defined series of phases that are properly called mythological stages,
through which the Ego acquires its autonomy. In short, Neumann tried to
further explain the Jungian individuation process from a phylo-ontogenetic
viewpoint on the basis of the mythologems32 of Egyptian, Hebraic, and
Greek tradition.
The first stage is that in which the Ego is fully embedded into the uncon-

scious: at birth, the child lives in a totally undifferentiated state, called the
uroboric state, where the individual is fully unconscious and the female and
male are undistinguished, as they were in the original universe in which all
the cosmogonies were one. This state is the place of the All and is repre-
sented by the Ouroboros archetype, that is to say, the snake that circularly
and dynamically bites its own tail. The latter is an ancient Egyptian alchemi-

80 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

cal symbol, the ἓυ sὁ pἃυ (that is, the One-All), representing the union of
opposites, so that it is a symbol of the Jungian coniunctio oppositiorum as
well as of the enantiodromia law (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986; Caroten-
uto 1990; Galimberti 2006), the two main processes through which basic
Jungian compensation is carried out. The uroboric state is the natural dimen-
sion of the unconscious, also configurable as the maternal dimension. From
this primordial state and through the second stage, the consciousness (para-
phrasing Plato’s myth of the cave) gradually elucidates this obscure world,
from which an embryonic Ego starts to form.
In this second stage, these first gleams of consciousness strictly depend on

the Great Mother archetype, which is present in many myths of antiquity.
This archetype represents the first mythological evolution of the original
uroboros archetype and plays a fundamental role in the psychic development
of every human being. This archetype furthermore includes in itself both a
destructive aspect and a protective and hospitable aspect. These aspects psy-
chologically correspond to a tendency to remain in a totally regressive condi-
tion of psychic incorporation (uroboric incest) and to a propulsive and
dynamic tendency toward differentiation. Uroboric incest is a symbolic return
to the Mother, a prefiguration of the hier�os g�amos, that is to say, of the
sacred marriage that reaches its definitive form with the next Hero phase.
With primordial incest, we have a form of entrance into the Mother; hence,
it symbolically denotes death, the dissolution of the son into the Mother. To
acquire the first primordial status of an individual, overcoming this first urob-
oric incest is essential. Once disengaged from this maternal incorporation,
the individual gradually starts to determine his or her own Ego and Self
agencies through a vital process that will persist throughout life.
The psychic evolution phase dominated by the Great Mother archetype

plays either a constructive or a destructive fundamental role in the individ-
ual’s development and in her or his psychic formation. After uroboric incest
follows the orgiastic matriarchal incest, which perpetuates the undifferenti-
ated state and corresponds to the adolescence phase. It corresponds to matri-
archal castration and the dissolution of an adolescent Ego that it is still not
able to cope with the many strong forces symbolized by the Great Mother,
which still manifests itself through different personifications. To this point,
according to the Neumannian perspective, male psychic evolution is quite
different from the female one, so it is necessary to distinguish both cases. We
will briefly sketch (Neumannian) male and female psychic development
later.

Further Remarks and Considerations
For our purposes, some points need to be highlighted regarding the compari-
son between Jungian and Neumannian thought as briefly explained above.

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 8 1

In particular, we are interested, above all, in those phases of human psychic
evolution in which the so-called separation of opposites takes place. The
problem of pairs of opposites has played a primary role since Freud’s work
(Laplanche and Pontalis 1973; Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986; Galimberti
2006), where they are placed at the root of any psychic dialectic. Neverthe-
less, Freud did not give further details on their origins and development.
Instead, Jung and Neumann put them at the root of the symbolic function
as well as at the origins of consciousness. As seen above, this separation is
achieved in both male and female psychic development. The separation of
opposites, which plays a very fundamental role in the formation of conscious-
ness, was already a central point in Jungian thought, although he did not
treat it with the same mythological deepness as his continuer Neumann,
who specified the phases in which it takes place in both female and male
cases. Both authors, however, assign an archetypical origin to this fundamen-
tal psychic process, starting from the assumption of the existence of a collec-
tive unconscious. The dualistic nature of every archetype is also of
fundamental importance. Furthermore, from the Neumannian viewpoint,
this separation of opposites plays a primary role in the phases of first Ego for-
mations, which in turn rely on the fundamental archetypical female-male
comparison, that is to say, the dualistic nature of the archetype. From our
standpoint, after having briefly discussed some points of Jungian and Neu-
mannian thought, we will compare these points with other aspects of anthro-
pological thought. The anthropological motives that underpinned
Neumannian thought are evident, above all, on the mythological side.
Therefore, at this point, it is necessary to briefly outline the main points of
psychoanalytic anthropological thought from a historical viewpoint.

The Erich Neumann View of Male Psychic Development
With regard to boys, once they have overcome uroboric incest, the opposi-
tion of the son to the Great Mother will slowly lead toward the so-called cen-
terversion, which is the tendency33 toward the formation of a totality creating
the (integrated) unity from its various parts (which are due to the fragment-
ing action of the Great Mother archetype). Through centerversion, the Ego
starts to acquire its own (Cartesian) autonomy with respect to the uncon-
scious, reaching the center of the consciousness, which constitutes the cen-
tral place of the Ego’s complexes (according to Jung). So that the Ego may
sustain the hard comparison with the archetypical Great Mother, it must
autonomously consolidate itself as a consciousness of itself, in such a manner
as to be strong enough to separate the original undifferentiated situation into
opposite pairs. To this end, the action of another archetype is necessary, that
of the separation of the world’s parents, which is prodromal to the next phases
concerning the fights, respectively, against the terrible Drake in its two arche-

8 2 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

typical faces of the Great Mother and the Great Father. Thanks to this sepa-
ration archetype, the fundamental separation of opposites takes place, thus
leading to the third phase,34 which will open the way to the Self.
As stated above, the first basic separation takes place between the con-

scious and the unconscious part of the personality (with its center in the
Ego). During this phase, although there are first primordial forms of identity,
the strong ambiguity still present in the previous form (the orgiastic state of
uroboros) will be overcome by matriarchal incest, thanks to which the indi-
vidual acquires the primordial Ego components. Once he has entered this
second phase, it will be possible for the first forms of distinction between
what is good and what is bad to take place, this being possible thanks to the
fundamental dualistic nature of the Great Mother archetype, the good
mother and the bad mother. In this dual nature35 rests the primary impor-
tance played by the Great Mother archetype in the psychic evolution of the
human being. There will be a first identification with only one of this pri-
mary opposition; the other oppositions will fall into the Shadow, that is to
say, into the unconscious, but they will always try to emerge. The psychic
phenomena that appear in this phase are particularly related to states of suf-
fering and loneliness and strong guilt feelings. With disengagement from the
uroboric state by means of the separation of opposites, the Ego is placed in a
position that allows it to experience loneliness and separation, the first basic
elements of the self-emancipation of the Ego. From this point onwards, the
Hero36 starts his autonomous path toward configuring himself as an individ-
ual-man, freeing himself from the unconscious powers that always try to over-
whelm him. The Hero is the archetypical precursor of the man, and the
various initiation rites typical of each culture also contribute to his forma-
tion.
This mythological figure of the Hero, which transvalues the individual

one, undergoes various mythological fights that he must undertake to attain
full autonomy and individuality. The first fight is against the Great Mother,
that is to say, against matriarchal incest, from which the first rudiments of his
Ego will emerge, until the adolescence in which the centerversion of this
agency takes place; at the end of this final process, the Ego will be put at
the center of the consciousness. This fight is also symbolically seen as a fight
against Drake to conquer the Princess with her Treasure, which corresponds
to the creative representation of the New (treasure), which arises only after
the union (of the Hero) with the freed prisoner (the female dimension). The
second fight is against the Great Father archetype to overcome the patriar-
chal incest and determine an exact place in which to locate the incoming
Self. This place, in the end, will be the center of the psyche; the bipolar axes
Ego-Self will then direct growth of the next personal life. Once the Great
Mother is defeated, the unconscious tries again to reincorporate the Hero

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 8 3

(who represents the new consciousness). To this end, the Shadow acts as a
new archetype, that of the Great Father, which symbolizes the patriarchal
authority within the matriarchate, the old law or the hostile old king. The
Great Mother archetype, as we have seen, has two dualistic archetypical
aspects, the good one and the bad one. During the adolescence phase, this
dualism implies a unique castration complex that consists of disengaging
from matriarchal incest, which helps to overcome this ambiguous and bipo-
lar state due to the above-mentioned archetypical duality. Matriarchal incest
contrasts with other further forms of incest. The Great Father archetype,
however, has a unique aspect, that of the old law, but two forms of the castra-
tion complex: imprisonment and possession. The former, on the one hand,
hinders the Ego from completely disengaging from the earthly father values,
who is the bearer of the collective norm, but, at the same time, isolates him
from his own creative abilities. The second form tries to identify the Ego
with the divine father or rather brings him near the transcendental, ascetic,
and spiritual world. These two types of father castration are due to the dou-
ble-parentage nature, both human and divine, of every Hero. Therefore, it is
thanks to the father castration that an individual may uproot himself from
the ancestral instinctual nature to which the Great Mother’s terrifying aspects
try to reduce him. However, these transpersonal fights against the parents are
required for the dawning of personality and for the formation of psychic
agencies, which will give autonomy to the Hero. Last, according to Neu-
mann, three types of Hero exist: the first is the extroverted hero, inclined to
action to change the world and hence primarily devoted to external reality;
the second is the introverted hero, the bearer of culture and hence primarily
interested in inner reality; and the third is more oriented toward a continuous
and ever better modification of himself, independently of the collective
dimension. Indeed, in both the first two types of Hero, the creative dimen-
sion is always at the center of the desire to conquer the princess’s treasure—
that is to say, the discovery of the New—which can take place only after his
union with the freed prisoner (the female); in any case, both accomplish
work aimed toward humanity. The third Hero however, is the only one
turned toward himself and his inner path to an ever better contemplative
perfection.

The Erich Neumann View of Female Psychic Development
Neumann was always greatly interested in the female psychological dimen-
sion because, according to him, the female Self plays a primary and irre-
placeable role in the psychic development of any human being.
Nevertheless, female psychic development is quite different from male. Con-
siderable deficiencies in maternal care imply strong guilt feelings, which, in
turn, will produce an inner emptiness whose consequent anxiety, for defen-

84 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

sive purposes, will lead the individual toward narcissistic satisfaction and
aggressive tendencies. This interest led Neumann to an in-depth study of the
creative dimension because he considered it to be primarily connate with
femininity. This stance is difficult to criticize from a symbolic standpoint,
given the procreative nature of the female.
According to Neumann, only the uroboric stage is common to male and

female psychic development. In this regard, as we have already seen for
males, the second stage takes place with a decisive symbolic fight against the
Great Mother. A male basically considers the Great Mother to be something
different and extraneous to which he opposes himself to overcome matriar-
chal incest. The female, however, sees the mother as someone who is similar
and familiar to herself, hence spontaneously and unconsciously identifying
with her. Such a fusional identity allows the female, in contrast to the male,
to reach her own femininity thanks to the primary identification with the
mother. This process and this primary identification may explain why most
females are more inclined (at least, potentially) toward the relational dimen-
sion of life. Conversely, the male is more driven toward those professions that
require an objective vision of reality and problems, putting himself into a
position of comparison rather than one of identification to better explore.
The second stage of female psychic evolution is called the self-conservation

phase and corresponds to the permanence of the woman in the female group
(maternal clan), separating from the male. Often the female stays a long time
within the Great Mother archetype, and this will mark the next relationship
with the man. The longer the female stays within the maternal clan, the
greater the Shadow projections will be upon the man, with his higher deval-
uation. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned separation and alienation from
the male world will mostly concur with the first formation of the sense of
opposition in females. The degree of the woman’s persistence in the matriar-
chal clan will influence her relation with the man depending on the type to
which she belongs: if the horsewoman type prevails, then we have a sadomas-
ochistic loving relationship in which the woman uses the man only for her
erotic and procreative aims; however, if the puella-woman37 type prevails,
then she is fully subdued by the male power, which nullifies her individuality
and her human dignity. Due to this basic duality, according to Neumann,
this phase is characterized by the myths of Demetra and Kore. The next
phase, called irruption of the patriarchal uroboros, will see the encounter of
the female element (characterized by the above mythological duality) with
the patriarchal element, which is often experienced as a numinous power
(numen).
Both for males and females, the human consciousness may develop and

evolve only through touch with the other (the female with the male, and
vice versa) to form their own Otherness. The female comparison with the

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 8 5

male in the patriarchal uroboros is a determining moment for the develop-
ment of the female consciousness. During this crucial comparison, the role
that will assume the Animus in respect to her counterpart Anima within the
female will be of fundamental importance. The female will maintain her
femininity only when she is able to avoid the strong plagiarism attempts by
the Animus, so that in the next phase (said to be the encounter phase) she
may refute the usual patriarchal values (polygamy by the man and marital
fidelity by the woman) to maintain matriarchal values and not fall into a
female psychic inertia of total male subjection. Only in this way will a com-
plete and normal female psychic development be possible, to be dual to the
male development. So that a right and equilibrated reciprocally constructive
meeting between female and male may take place, each part must respect
the other, abdicating its own exclusive authority upon the other and accept-
ing and respecting the existence of the latter. To this end, Neumann epito-
mizes this last stage with the myth of Eros and Psyche, thanks to which the
female (Psyche) reaches her own (female) individuation process with the
achievement of maturity in her highest consciousness.

&

on some key moment s in the h i s tor y of anthropology

In this section, for a coherent historiographical summary of what has been
stated in the previous sections of the main text, we provide a brief sketch of
the main lines of the history of Western anthropology. The primary intention
of this section is to outline a brief synoptic framework of the history of
anthropology in a manner that coherently and organically lays out the first
elements of L�evi-Straussian thought into a theoretical system that can be eas-
ily compared with what has been said in the main text in relation to Jung’s
and Neumann’s systems of thought.

General Outlines
According to Fabietti (2001), Marvin Harris (2001), Alan Barnard (2000), and
Paul Mercier (1966), the first elements of non-autonomous anthropological
thought may be found in France around the end of the 18th century in that
intersection area between philosophy and history and in the wake of the
Enlightenment. Through regular comparison with the emerging scientific
method, anthropological thought gradually acquired increasingly autonomous
features and started to delineate its own borders as a field of doctrine, partic-
ularly with the coming of the celebrated contrast between creationism and
evolutionism in the first half of the 19th century accompanying the rise of
Darwin’s well-known work. The regular influences of geology, biology, and
archaeology led to the so-called evolutionist anthropology of the Victorian

86 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

epoch. Great Britain was the primary center of the origin of modern anthro-
pology, with the studies of Edward B. Tylor, William R. Smith, and James
G. Frazer, who greatly influenced other foreign scholars such as Adolf Bas-
tian and Johann J. Bachofen. Bastian observed a type of recurrence of similar
cultural phenomena in different cultural contexts, thus elaborating the con-
cepts of elementary ideas (Elementargedanken), primarily subconscious and
hence implicit, and folk ideas (V€olkergedanken), from whose comparison it is
possible to explicate the former; through all of these, it is possible to think
that certain “germs of ideas” or patterns of thought, common to all men,
exist that are developed differently depending on the environmental stimuli
(Barnard 2012:Ch. 7). From its very inception, anthropology has exhibited
bases of structural thought, beginning with Bastian—the father of ethnology
—and continuing through 19th century evolutionism and the psychic unity
of humankind theorists: Durkheim’s social anthropology, Jakobsonian struc-
turalist linguistics, Piagetian genetic epistemology, L�evi-Straussian structural-
ism, and, most recently, Laughlin and D’Aquili’s biogenetic structuralism.
Nevertheless, the history of anthropology during most of the 20th century has
unjustly seen a resistance and rejection of structuralist notions.
The primary idea of structuralism is that underlying the apparent variety of

psychological or cultural forms may be found essential structures that, when
understood, explain external variations. For instance, Bastian held that the
proper research object is the collective mind of a people as iterated in the
experience, thought and actions of individuals. In other words, while the eth-
nographer records the folk ideas of a particular society, he really addresses
the elementary ideas (i.e., the structures from which the former are gener-
ated). From this perspective, the social group has a type of group mind, a
“social soul” (Gesellschaftsseele) in which the individual mind is embedded
and influenced. Bastian believed that the elementary ideas should be scientif-
ically extracted from folk ideas as varying forms of collective representations
(Gesellschaftgedanken). Because one cannot observe the collective represen-
tations per se, Bastian felt that the ethnographic project had to proceed
through an analytical process through which one deduces the elementary
ideas from the data on folk ideas (Laughlin and Tiberia 2012). Bachofen,
however, conducted important studies on kinship systems, in particular on
matriarchate and patriarchate. Noteworthy works were also produced by John
F. McLennan on marital relationships, coining the terms exogamy and endog-
amy. All of these studies were reabsorbed by the incoming American anthro-
pological thought, above all by Lewis H. Morgan and Franz Boas,38 who can
be considered the primary founders of anthropology in the U. S. A first criti-
cism of the evolutionistic trend was raised by Franz Boas, who introduced so-
called historical particularism in anthropology, according to which, roughly,
each culture should be seen as a singular event or phenomenon that opens

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 87

the way to the next diffusionism and Kulturkreislehre (in German). Boas also
focused great attention on the social-psychological motivations underlying
any singularly taken culture. Several of his ideas were developed by some of
his many pupils, including Alfred L. Kroeber and Robert Lowie.
At the same time, French anthropological thought was primarily oriented

toward sociological rather than ethnological aspects so that the French
anthropological reflection on primitive societies did not significantly develop
until the end of the 19th century. One of the primary exponents of the
French sociological school of the time was �Emile Durkheim, who also con-
ducted notable studies on religious thought and its history from a social-
anthropological perspective. Among those who originally developed some of
Durkheim’s ideas from a more ethnological stance, we remember above all
Lucien L�evy-Bruhl, who turned his attention to primitive societies. He tried
to explain the mentality of these societies by means of the so-called collective
representations (d’apr�es Durkheim) and the participation mystique law, criti-
cizing the personal psychology methods previously followed by evolutionists.
In applying sociological investigation methods to studying primitive thought,
he managed to identify possible explanations for their typical social-cultural
aspects, where the evolutionistic tradition failed. L�evy-Bruhl, taking Durk-
heim’s thought to the extreme, came to the hypothesis that collective repre-
sentations influence the entire individual psychology. According to L�evy-
Bruhl, the symbolic primitive universe was the result of a collective mystic
participation with a prominent socially shared emotional character. Neverthe-
less, in contrast to the case at first glance, primitive thought is not only mysti-
cal but also regulated by a certain type of logic that coordinates its mystic
representations according to the above-mentioned basic principle of partici-
pation mystique. Compared to the logic of civilized thought, that of primitive
mentality is a prelogic that coordinates the various mystic representations of
the former. Primitive prelogical thought is insensitive to contradictions as
well as to the impossible (Bonte and Izard 1991; Fabietti and Remotti 1997).
Primitive mystic prelogic must not be understood as lower than civilized
rational logic; they should be compared with great caution. Civilized logical
thought is, according to L�evy-Bruhl, the result of a rebellious tendency of
the individual mind to distinguish itself from the collective mind. L�evy-Bru-
hl’s ideas had great influence on the formulation of later Jungian thought
(Carotenuto 1994:Ch. VI). Furthermore, and this is a remarkable fact in our
view, almost all of the studies on primitive thought (Fabietti and Remotti
1997) have ascertained a great incidence of binary contraposition schema
during the crucial passage from primitive to civilized thought.
The legacy of Durkheim and L�evy-Bruhl was received by Robert Hertz,

Arnold Van Gennep, and Marcel Mauss, founders of the new French ethnos-
ociology. In particular, the work of Mauss on total social fact, classification

88 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

forms, and structural homology was of a certain importance for the subse-
quent work of L�evi-Strauss (D’Aquili 1975) and that of L�evy-Bruhl. The next
transition period between the end of the 19th century and World War I
marked a turning point for anthropology, with the decline of evolutionism
and the development of fieldwork through ethnographic tools. This develop-
ment was of interest above all for British anthropology with the new ethnog-
raphers William H.R. Rivers and Bronisław Malinowski. This interest lasted
until the psychoanalytic anthropology trend (briefly recalled in the next sec-
tions) and, above all, the constitution of the chief dispute between diffusion-
ism and functionalism. The Durkheimian French school gradually made the
great “ethnological jump” thanks to the remarkable work of Mauss, along
with new scholars such as Marcel Griaule, Maurice Leenhardt and Robert
Montagne. At the same time, the American Culture and Personality trend
(see the next sections), the nomothetic rebirth (following M. Harris), and eth-
noscience, as well as the British structural functionalism of Alfred R. Radc-
liffe-Brown and Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, earned their growing influence
among anthropological thought. Thereafter, Claude L�evi-Strauss makes his
appearance with his masterful structural anthropology. L�evi-Strauss, with a
Durkheimian and Maussian basic training, as well as with long fieldwork
experience in Brazil, was considerably influenced in his 1940s American per-
iod by the structural linguistics of Roman Jakobson and others, which led
him to formulate his new anthropological trend (D’Aquili 1975). The con-
temporary anthropological directions were then oriented toward a materialis-
tic and Marxist critical ideology as well as toward an interpretative trend, the
latter also being quite inclined to reevaluate psychoanalytic theories.

On L�evi-Straussian Thought
L�evi-Strauss has built up a complex, variegated, and notable theoretical
framework in which he laid out the fieldwork data gathered from his various
and numerous research missions conducted, above all, in Brazil in the 1930s
after having received philosophical training and having been in touch with
some exponents of the Durkheimian French ethnosociological school of that
time. Subsequently, he stayed in the U. S. in the 1940s, where he came into
contact both with scholars of the Boasian ethnological school (like Alfred L.
Kroeber39 and Leslie A. White) and with notable exponents of American lin-
guistic structuralism (like Roman Jakobson and Nikolai S. Troubetzkoy).
These subjects were only a part of the complex set of disciplines that contrib-
uted to working out his next valuable anthropological trend. Indeed, above
all, psychoanalytic and philosophical disciplines strongly influenced his theo-
retical framework, which, however, always started from the ethnographic data
obtained from fieldwork among natives. His first works concerned kinship
structures and their formal relations (L�evi-Strauss 1967; see also D’Aquili

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 89

1975). On the basis of Freudian theories, L�evi-Strauss placed at the root of
any further theoretical social system the first and universal rule that allowed
the passage from nature to culture, that is to say, incest prohibition. This rule
marked the origins of any further system of human rules. In developing his
notable theoretical framework, he took into account the previous meaning
that the term “structure” had in ethnology (above all, after Radcliffe-Brown).
He then reached a new and more general notion of (anthropological) struc-
ture, taking into account some suggestions and ideas coming from some
exponents both of French Bourbakism (including Andr�e Weil40 and Georges
Th�eodore Guilbaud) and of epistemological structuralism (including Jean
Piaget). We now discuss the main points of L�evi-Strauss’s structural anthro-
pology, according to Mercier (1966:Ch. 4, Sec. III; see also D’Aquili 1975).
According to L�evi-Strauss, social structures are not observable and have no

empirical referents, the latter being the so-called models of social relations,
which are constructed upon the former. The models of social relations are
the only ones that are observable, and they make manifest social structures
through relations.41 The structures, in themselves, are empirically undeter-
minable because they are unconscious and devoid of content. In turn, the
models may be either conscious or unconscious. The reciprocity principle of
complementary opposition is, however, always operating between their compo-
nent structures. Furthermore, the reciprocity principle, closely related to
incest prohibition and lying at the root of the passage from nature to culture,
is also unconscious. On the basis of his structural perspective, L�evi-Strauss
considers totemism to simply be the result of human attempts to classify nat-
ural phenomena through the usual binary logic of oppositions and relations.
According to L�evi-Strauss, totemism must not be understood as the result of
a prelogical primitive thought, as made, for instance, by Durkheim, L�evy-
Bruhl, Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski, and others; instead, it should be simply
considered to be the natural tendency of primitive human thought to classify
as well as to set relations and structures. The only difference between primi-
tive and civilized thought lies in the fact that the former is exercised upon
concrete things rather than on abstract entities. In short, according to L�evi-
Strauss, the primary characteristic of human thought is classification through
an oppositional and binary logic operating among elementary (unconscious)
structures, which, through the principle of reciprocity, give rise to observable
models of relations.
Therefore, primitive thought and (so-called) civilized thought should not

be placed into a hierarchical position but rather they should be meant as
two, in a certain sense, parallel and ahistorical ways in which the human
mind universally thinks the real. Because of this parallelism, both types of
thought should be analyzed on the basis of similar or homologous formal
principles because they operate according to the same logical laws, even if

90 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

oriented toward different objects (that produce history). Totemism is therefore
the result of a mental attitude that assumes the sensitive experience data
building systems of relations and classifications to give rise to a symbolic
codex. The various systems of classifications thus determined are placed into
reciprocal relationships by means of certain transformation systems,42 thanks
to which it is possible to identify the formal analogies and parallelisms
among them. The L�evi-Straussian notion of transformation finds its highest
expression in explaining the mythology that, together with totemism, repre-
sents the main symbolic activities of savage thought (which must not be
understood in the mere literary sense of the term—in this regard, see Fabietti
and Remotti [1997] and Bonte and Izard [1991]). L�evi-Strauss makes a formal
linguistic analysis of the myth on the basis of structural linguistic patterns.
According to L�evi-Strauss, a myth is structurally composed of great constitu-
tive units called mythemes, which formally correspond to linguistic units such
as phonemes, morphemes, semantemes, and so forth. To be precise, he takes
into account above all the phonetic pattern. The meaning of a myth is given
by the various possible oppositions between mythemes, according to laws and
rules similar to the structural linguistic ones. According to L�evi-Strauss, a
myth does not concern any classification of the external world but is aimed
at itself.
With the celebrated works Les structures �el�ementaires de la parent�e (of

1947) (L�evi-Strauss 1967) and Mythologiques (written in the years 1964–1971),
L�evi-Strauss tried to give a scientific explanation of the structure and pur-
poses of general human thought, starting from his experience as an ethnoan-
thropologist, retracing an inverse to the path that goes from nature to
culture. In doing so, he discovered the unconscious structures that determine
the choices of human beings and their cultures; he therefore identified the
so-called unconscious structures of social-cultural institutions. However, with
his other best-seller Tristes Tropiques (of 1955), L�evi-Strauss indulged his deep
affective-existentialistic philosophical vein, nostalgically recalling the contents
of his individual memory that led him to his professional destiny. This is a
dense book of meditations on the sense of human civilization and its fate, on
the tragic comparison between civilized societies and primitive ones, and on
the evidence for the loss of a happy relationship between them; something
that is truer today than ever before!

&

on some key moment s in the h i s tor y of p s ychoanal y t i c
anthropology

For our purposes, we herein also provide a very brief outline of the main
ideas of psychoanalytic anthropology, recalling its main protagonists. For a

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 9 1

deeper analysis of this interesting chapter on anthropology, we refer to Harris
(2001:Ch. 16), Fabietti (2001:Ch. 11), Erica Bourguignon (1979), Robert Paul
(1989), Fabietti and Remotti (1997), and Alessandro Pagnini (1977). In some
respects, we will also follow Carotenuto (1992) in delineating a brief portrait
of the main protagonists. For a modern insight into psychoanalytic anthropol-
ogy and its applications, see the beautiful book by Gananath Obeyesekere
(1990), to which we shall return elsewhere. In this book, among other things,
an interesting comparison is made between the old chapters of Western psycho-
analytic anthropology, above all the Culture and Personality trend, and Eastern
culture (including Hinduism, Buddhism, and other Asiatic cultures). The sym-
bolic dimension and Œdipal problems are the leitmotiv of Obeyesekere’s book,
and the fact that the former is one of the primary characteristics of almost every
Asiatic culture, as Jung himself understood well, is also apparent.

On Sigmund Freud and the Early Origins of Psychoanalytic Anthropology
Psychoanalytic thought has been part of the anthropological field since Sig-
mund Freud’s work on psychocultural and social phenomena, opening the
so-called Culture and Personality trend that is currently included in the inter-
section between psychological anthropology, ethnopsychiatry, and ethnopsy-
choanalysis (Conti and Principe 1989). According to Bourguignon (1979:Chs.
2–3), the dawn of psychoanalytic anthropology should be searched for
attempts to account for the origins of human culture. In pursuing this
search, it was immediately realized that it was not possible to leave the psy-
chological context aside, particularly the new Freudian ideas. The early 20th
century American anthropological community was initially quite critical
toward the Freudian attempts to psychoanalytically explain certain anthropo-
logical phenomena. This aversion, however, disappeared around the 1930s
and 1940s, when psychoanalytical ideas exerted a dominant influence on the
intellectual life of the U. S., in particular being deeply engraved into the cul-
tural anthropology of the time. All of these trends took place after the first
celebrated American Congress on Psychoanalysis held at Clark University in
1909, which marked the birth of psychoanalysis in the U. S. In 1911, the
American Psychoanalytic Association was founded as a part of the Interna-
tional Psychoanalytical Association, and, thenceforth, psychoanalytic ideas
gradually pervaded other knowledge fields. Therefore, the history of the Cul-
ture and Personality trend may be laid out as a type of dialogue between cul-
tural anthropology and psychoanalytic theory, and since then, the
relationships between these two disciplines have had a vicarious nature.
One of the primary meeting points between anthropology and psychoanaly-

sis was the incest taboo and exogamy and their role in the formation of social
groups; their analysis started from the study of primitive societies. This was,
among others, one of the primary research arguments conducted by L�evi-

92 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

Strauss. Since the beginning, however, the psychological dimension has
always been one of the main constitutive elements of anthropological
thought. The evolutionists L. L�evy-Bruhl, E.B. Tylor, W.H.R. Rivers, and
J.G. Frazer put psychology at the foundation of their works on magic and
mythological thought until the attempts to explain the crucial passage from
nature to culture or civilization. Freud, as well as Jung, assiduously read most
of the contemporary anthropological literature. Through an analysis of the
incest taboo, exogamy, and totemism, a first theory on the origins and devel-
opments of culture was proposed by Freud, first in43 Totem and Taboo (of
1913), then in Civilization and Its Discontents (of 1930), Mass Psychology and
the Analysis of the Ego (of 1921), The Future of an Illusion (of 1927), and
Moses and Monotheism (of 1939). According to Ernest Jones, Freud wrote
Totem and Taboo after having read Frazer’s The Golden Bough (of 1890) and
Totemism and Exogamy (of 1910), as well as the first series of W. Robertson
Smith’s Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (of 1894). Freud attempted to
answer two important anthropological questions of that time: What is totem-
ism? What type of relationships do totemism and exogamy have? In Freudian
cultural studies, the anthropological and evolutionary biology ideas of that
time also had great importance. His theory of culture is primarily based on
the (Darwinian) primordial horde notion,44 on which the incipiency of the
Oedipus complex, the main pillar of his theoretical framework, relies. From
the tragic primordial horde event followed exogamy and totemism, hence the
cultural order. With Totem and Taboo, Freud wanted to give an anthropolog-
ical basis to his psychoanalytic theory, and these ideas would play a funda-
mental role in the subsequent work of Jung and L�evi-Strauss. In this article,
we just want to identify a central common point belonging to the complex
thought systems of these latter authors, which turns out to be very useful with
regard to some speculations about the origins of rational thought.

On Adlerian and Eriksonian Thought
According to Alfred Adler (and an analogous criticism was also raised by
Jung), Freud misunderstood the real symbolic and finalistic (or teleological)
nature of the sexual drive, which instead should be correlated to the familiar
context, which, in turn, must be considered within the wider social context.
The Adlerian theory is more pragmatic than the Freudian one, in which a
major weight is given to the individual with her or his neurotic conflicts aris-
ing from the basic opposition of conscious-unconscious. According to Adler,
the human being is born with a connate sense of inferiority that he or she
tries to overcome through an aspiration to personal success driven by a
(Nietzschean) power will in a continuous compensation between individual
and social instances or requests, the latter resulting from many connate social
feelings without which no human constructive agreement could exist. So,

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 9 3

with Adler, the basic role played by the social dimension emerges as a funda-
mental structural component of the human psyche, thereby approaching
anthropological dimensions.
Erik H. Erikson had his first encounter with psychoanalysis when he was a

teacher in a very special school in Vienna where both adults and children
were undergoing psychoanalytical treatment. After undergoing psychoanalyti-
cal training at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute under the supervision of
Anna Freud, he moved to the U. S. where, among other things, he con-
ducted fieldwork with Yurok and Sioux Indian natives in South Dakota. At
the same time, he started a private psychoanalyst practice. His most famous
work was the celebrated Childhood and Society (1950), in which he outlined
the cornerstones around which the entirety of his next thought system would
revolve. He worked out a psychosocial development theory of the human
psyche that covered the entire life cycle, starting from the Freudian one until
old age, through a long series of eight stages in which the individual estab-
lishes her or his own continuous relationship with the environment. The lat-
ter plays a very fundamental role in the psychic formation of an individual,
so that, in the Eriksonian conception, the environment is an unavoidable
structuring element for a human being. From this standpoint, it follows that
the anthropological dimension may influence the human personality and
hence psychoanalytic thought itself, which could not consider such a basic
perspective given its theoretical frame.

On Bronisław Malinowski
On the suggestion of his mentor C.G. Seligman, Malinowski read the above-
mentioned Freudian works when he stayed in the Trobriand Islands in the
1910s for fieldwork. In taking this opportunity, he wanted to examine the
validity of certain psychoanalytic ideas, in particular the Oedipus complex,
within a cultural context quite different from the European one. His field-
work observations led to his writing the celebrated Sex and Repression in
Savage Society (of 1927), in which he compares the patriarchal triadic struc-
ture of the European monogamous family with the matriarchal one of the
Trobriand monogamous family. The former primarily had a patrilineal des-
cent pattern whereas the latter primarily had a matrilineal descent pattern
with a male figure often given by the maternal uncle. For this last familiar
model, Malinowski set up a maternal complex, which was meant to be a type
of Oedipus complex but referred to sister and maternal uncle instead of
mother and father. So, with Malinowski’s work, the Freudian assumption of
the universality of the Oedipus complex was, for the first time, put in a dubi-
ous position, giving rise to criticisms by Ernest Jones toward Malinowski’s
thought as well as to an ad hoc avuncular complex that was thought out just
to reconcile the Freudian Oedipus complex with Malinowski’s ideas. In any

94 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

case, Malinowski’s work noted that the individual psycho-affective dynamics
should be considered in the light of the social and authoritative relationships
typical of the related membership’s social-cultural context. His work did,
however, exercise a non-negligible influence on the subsequent social-anthro-
pological thought (Bourguignon 1979:Ch. 4).

On G�eza R�oheim and Georges Devereux
R�oheim began his training in analysis with Sandor Ferenczi. Later, thanks to
funding from Marie Bonaparte, he was able to conduct some interesting
fieldwork among primitive peoples in Australia, New Guinea, and North
America. In this way, he had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of
Freudian psychosexual evolution within these primitive societies. His observa-
tions and conclusions roughly confirmed Freud’s ideas.
At first he was a close follower of the Freudian ideas exposed in Totem and

Taboo, revealing his psychoanalytic anthropological ideas in The Riddle of
the Sphinx (of 1934) and in The Origin and Function of Culture (of 1943),
but he thereafter gradually showed his own conceptions to be quite far from
Freudian orthodoxy. He ontogenetically interpreted culture as the traumatic
result of a “late childhood” of the human being, to which a given social
group replies with a sort of “collective neurosis.” Culture is thought of as a
structure built up to realize, in a translated form primarily by means of subli-
mation processes, the fantasies of our infancy. He stated that “it seems that
we grow up only to remain children, living trying to realize what was desired
in childhood” (1943:31). In R�oheim’s work, the sublimation process plays a
very fundamental role. For more information on the work of R�oheim, who
should be considered one of the main leaders of so-called psychoanalytic
reductionism, see Bourguignon (1979:Ch. 3).
Devereux first studied physics and later human sciences, including Greek

culture. He is considered the founder of ethnopsychiatry and of ethnopsycho-
analysis (Bourguignon 1979:Ch. 8; Conti and Principe 1989; Carotenuto
1992).

On John W. Layard
With Layard, psychoanalytic anthropology took its first steps from Freudian
toward Jungian theory. Layard was a pupil of Rivers in the 1920s. Rivers’
attention in his last years was oriented toward the cultural diffusion perspec-
tive (or diffusionism) against the prevailing functionalism, whose two main
exponents were A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski; the former was also
an opponent of the so-called “psychologizing anthropology” (Bourguignon
1979). None of these connections were useful to Layard’s career, which
explains the minimal consideration received by his work and why he
remained a marginal figure in the British anthropology of the time.

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 9 5

After his fieldwork at Malekula, Layard published Stone Men of Malekula
(1942), where the cultural diffusion hypothesis on the origins of local institu-
tions, intertwined with the description of initiation rites, were the outcome of
the twofold influence of Rivers and Jung. Indeed, Layard had worked in
analysis under Jung since the beginning of the 1940s. Through Jungian
thought,45 Layard tried to explain the maki rite, observed at Malekula, calling
into question the Jungian individuation process. For Layard’s work, see Mac-
Clancy (1986). Nevertheless, very few texts quote Layard and his work, and
very few were (or are) attempts to proceed toward a deeper comparison
between aspects of anthropological thought and some of the general Jungian
ideas (Laughlin and Tiberia 2012).

Further Developments
As mentioned above, in the first half of the 20th century, the relationships
between anthropology and psychoanalysis were very deep within the general
(diachronic) evolutionist perspective. In Europe, it was above all anthropology
that influenced psychoanalysis (as witnessed by Freud and Jung’s work), while
in the U. S., psychoanalysis had a considerable influence on anthropology
with the celebrated Personality and Culture trend. Between the 1930s and
1940s, this anthropological school had as its primary protagonists some notable
Neo-Freudians, including Margaret Mead,46 Abram Kardiner, Ralph Linton,
Erik H. Erikson, Karen Horney, Ruth F. Benedict, Edward Sapir, Melford E.
Spiro, Gardner Murphy, Clara M. Thompson, Gregory Bateson, Erich
Fromm, and Leslie A. White. In Europe in the same period, the (synchronic)
British functionalist perspective (d’apr�es Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski) pre-
vailed, whereas psychoanalysis goes back to having its influence loaded with
structural anthropology, whose predominant figure was that of Claude L�evi-
Strauss. Finally, from the end of the 1930s, Alfred I. Hallowell, on the sugges-
tion of the psychologist Bruno Klopfer, introduced and used the Rorschach
projective tests in anthropology; Cora A. Du Bois also used these tools. Never-
theless, these studies were gradually abandoned, unjustly in our view.

&

acknowledgments

My sincere gratitude to Professor Peter Benson and to Professor Rebecca Les-
ter of the Department of Anthropology of the Washington University in St.
Louis for their valuable initial instructions, as editors of the Anthropology of
Consciousness journal, as to how to change the first draft of this article to
achieve the appropriate form. I also thank the anonymous reviewers, who
have followed the evolution of this work since its first submission, for their
useful and interesting comments and hints, which have improved the article.

96 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

&

note s

1. This term is meant in the wider psychoanalytical sense (Laplanche and Pontalis
1973).

2. See also the final Appendix.

3. For instance, the resolution of the basic antinomy Self–Other is conducted at a
social level via the exchange of women.

4. Although some authors point out that such a term was never used by L�evi-Strauss,
nevertheless, we use it to denote the L�evi-Straussian unconscious as a notion in
itself. Furthermore, L�evi-Strauss also provided a preconscious structure as an indi-
vidual counterpart to the structural one, hence, in many respects homologous to
the Jungian personal unconscious.

5. Among other roles, structural anthropology and linguistic ideas played a funda-
mental role in working out the framework of Jacques Lacan’s thought.

6. We shall return to these last interesting points elsewhere.

7. L�evi-Strauss also drew from other notions of the unconscious from previous
anthropologists (including Marcel Mauss).

8. For a careful comparison between the Freudian and the L�evi-Straussian uncon-
scious, see Gould (1978).

9. In this definition, a certain Lamarckism is identifiable (see D’Aquili 1975; Laugh-
lin and Tiberia 2012).

10. D’Aquili (1975) states that there is no certainty whether or not L�evi-Strauss was
acquainted with Jung’s work, but in view of his probable acquaintance with
Jung’s earlier works, the possibility cannot be altogether ruled out. The least we
can say is that there is certainly a remarkable parallelism (recalling the Alfred L.
Kroeber’s concept of the parallel development of culture’s patterns [see Kroeber
1948]), similar to Newton’s and Leibnitz’s well-known parallel development of
infinitesimal calculus.

11. In this regard, with a truly expressive metaphor, L�evi-Strauss picturesquely com-
pares this “with the empty stomach [forms] that assimilates the food [contents]”
(1972:203).

12. Seeing the unconscious as an intermediate term between subjective and objective
was, in a certain sense, suggested to L�evi-Strauss by the famous notion of the
total social fact of Marcel Mauss (Renzi 1965; see also D’Aquili 1975).

13. For this purpose, see also Iurato (2013a).

14. This diachronic dynamicity is primarily as regards the (dualistic) forms of the
archetypes.

15. L�evi-Straussian (dualistic) forms are universal and determined once and for all.

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 97

16. These contents, in turn, are strictly linked to the related social-cultural contexts.

17. This crucial passage is similar to the passage from mythical to rational thought
with the dawning of philosophical thought around the 6th century BC. We
would be tempted to propose the hypothesis that these types of crucial passages
were strictly correlated with the occurrence of some process of separating oppo-
sites, that is to say, with the advent of the first forms of dialectic thought.

18. Further interesting studies on the relationships between primitive and civilized
thought, confirming what has been said in this article, were also made by Remo
Cantoni (1914–1978), one of the primary Italian cultural anthropologists.

19. The mystic participation law had a certain influence on formulating the Jungian
notion of participation mystique, which allowed Jung himself to make some con-
siderations on the dawning of civilized thought from the primitive one. Accord-
ing to Staude (1976), the primitive mentality primarily differs from the civilized
one—says Jung—because the conscious mind is far less developed, in extent and
intensity, in the former case than in the latter. In the primitive mentality, basic
functions such as thinking and willing are not yet differentiated; they are still pre-
conscious. For Jung, the principle of participation is also applied to the internal
development of the human psyche itself, in which, he thought, the contents
move out of the unconscious by a process of differentiation and are gradually
freed from the condition of “participation mystique.” In other words, they move
into the light of consciousness, where they can come under the direction and
control of the Ego’s dialectic and are brought into the service of the entire Self.

20. For instance, the logic of psychotic patients is quite different from the Aristote-
lian one, as witnessed by the fundamental studies conducted by Ignacio Matte
Blanco (1975; see also Iurato 2013a for a very brief recall).

21. In this regard, the notion of syncretism is meant in its wider sense, including,
above all, the psychological one.

22. However, the structural principles of the unconscious in the Freudian sense
(albeit inherent to the individual one) also provide for the possibility of having
contradictions, this being further confirmed by Matte Blanco’s studies (1975).
Moreover, the Matte Blanco bi-logic process might have many common points
with the Jungian notion of compensation (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986 and
Galimberti 2006), in turn related to the Freudian notion of ambivalence (Lap-
lanche and Pontalis 1973).

23. The tertium non datur principle is more general than the non contradiction one,
but implies the latter; indeed, the latter imposes a disjointed choice between one
statement (A) and its negation (¬A), that is to say, only one of these two is true;
nevertheless, this does not exclude the case in which both may be false, hence
the third possibility (eventuality, which is just that forbidden by the tertium non
datur principle).

98 anthropology of consc iousne s s 26 . 1

24. Which is of a dialectic type when it leads to a synthesis, or of a polar type when
a certain state of tension, which is at the basis of every psychic dynamism, is
maintained (Samuels, Shorter, and Plaut 1986 and Galimberti 2006). However,
the notion of opposite pairs, here taken from the Jungian psychoanalytic context
(and, as has been mentioned above, already present in Freudian thought with
the notions of ambivalence and ambitendency, which Freud himself set as the
basis of every rational dialectical thought [Laplanche and Pontalis 1973; see also
Akhtar and O’Neil 2011]) belongs to the wider class of philosophical pairs of gen-
eral dialectic thought. For a good exposition of the various relationships between
dialectics and formal logic, see Malatesta (1982).

25. In formulating this principle, Jung started from a careful historical recognition of
the physical laws of general thermodynamics, addressing the evolution of
dynamic systems and related laws on energetic balance (Samuels, Shorter, and
Plaut 1986). This is another argument that emphasizes the primary historical role
that physics has played in the birth of psychoanalytic theories since Freud’s work.
This last historical remark about the possible role played by physics in the birth
and development of psychoanalysis deserves further attention.

26. The personal unconscious has many common points with the Freudian one,
although they are different.

27. Even Freud himself, in the last years of his life, tried to explain psychosis by
means of the disavowal mechanism. Such an epistemological need had been,
however, felt by Freud since his early works on psychoanalysis. See also Iurato
(2013b,c).

28. The central key may roughly correspond to the cathexis object of Freudian the-
ory (Rycroft 1968).

29. The collective conscious psyche is related to society and its collective representa-
tions. In that, the influence of L�evy-Bruhl on Jungian thought is clear.

30. See Tagliagambe and Malinconico (2011).

31. Erich Neumann’s work on the origins of consciousness also deserves further
attention (see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012).

32. A mythologem is the basic and elementary recurrent theme, or key, of a myth
(Jung and Ker�enyi 1969; see also Laughlin and Tiberia 2012).

33. The Neumannian centerversion is quite comparable with Jungian compensation.

34. This phase is crucial for the development of consciousness because it begins to
form the first nucleus of rational thought, as we have seen in the main text.

35. The Great Father archetype has another type of dualistic nature, as we will see
later.

36. The Hero is the individual in his transpersonal stance in this psychic configura-
tion process.

on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 99

37. With the Latin terms puer-puella (boy-girl), the ancient Romans denoted the
adolescent sons-daughters until 18 years old, still living within the familiar
nucleus (Janssens 1981: Part II, Ch. 1, Sec. 2.b), hence primarily devoid of their
own individuality and autonomy.

38. It is interesting to remember that Boas had very polyhedral academic training,
starting with studying exact and natural sciences through to geography and his-
tory and then anthropology, of which he can be rightly considered one of the
founding fathers.

39. In addition, Kroeber’s unconscious patterns had a certain influence on L�evi-
Strauss’s unconscious patterns and vice versa (Remotti 1971:Ch. 4, Sec. 2; see also
D’Aquili 1975).

40. L�evi-Strauss, aside from Weil, also quotes in L�evi-Strauss (1967), the mathemati-
cian John Von Neumann (Cipriani 1988:Ch. 2, Sec. 2.1; Piaget 1968).

41. In this process, it is not possible to overlook the parallel with the above-men-
tioned elementary and folk ideas of Bastian.

42. These systems are molded on the basis of mathematical transformation groups
(d’apr�es Weil).

43. In this work, inter alia, Freud also proposes a possible mythical origin of the
incest taboo.

44. See Rycroft (1968).

45. Following Giovetti (2006), Jung always loved getting to know new people and
places, undertaking long adventurous travels in North Africa through the Sahara;
Central Africa; the U.S. including New Mexico, where he strictly lived with Pue-
blo Indians; and India. He embedded himself in the soul, in the atmosphere,
and in the history of the various visited environments or places. For him, meet-
ing with different cultures and people was a determining experience both for his
personality formation and for his psychological studies. So, he also had an
unavoidable and non-negligible anthropological attitude.

46. Margaret Mead was the daughter of George Herbert Mead, one of the pioneers of
social psychology at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century.

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on jung i an and l�ev i – s traus s i an unconsc ious 107

Dragonimages/iStock/Thinkstock

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be
able to:

• Identify Sigmund Freud as the father of
psychoanalysis, and explain the significance
of the discovery of the unconscious.

• Define the three intrapsychic components
of id, ego, superego, and explain how Freud
thought they operated.

• Explain Freud’s levels of consciousness and
his theories regarding instincts and defense
mechanisms.

• Identify and explain the psychosexual stages
of development.

• Describe some of the research that supports
and refutes psychoanalytic theory.

• Identify key contributions to psychoanalytic
theory offered by Carl Jung, Alfred Adler,
Karen Horney, and Anna Freud.

• List and describe the psychodynamic methods
of assessment.

Psychoanalytic and Neo-Analytic
Theories of Personality 2

Chapter Outline
Introduction

2.1 Biography and Sociocultural Setting of
Freud and His Early Work

2.2 Psychoanalytic Theory
• The Fundamentals
• The Three Central Tenets of Psychoanalytic

Theory
• The Basic Instincts: Sex and Aggression

2.3 The Structural Components of Personality
• Topography of the Mind
• Structural Components of the Mind
• Anxiety
• Defense Mechanisms
• Neurosis and Symptom Formation

2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development
• Oral Stage
• Anal Stage
• Phallic Stage
• Latency Stage
• Genital Stage
• Character Traits and Disorders in Psycho-

sexual Development
• Critique and Conclusions on Freud’s Theo-

retical Contributions

2.5 The Neo-Analytic Movement
• Carl Jung and the Collective Unconscious
• Alfred Adler and Inferiority Complex
• Anna Freud and Child Psychology
• Karen Horney and Repressed Womanhood

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CHAPTER 2

Introduction
In October of 1998, 21-year-old Matthew Wayne Shepard, a student at the Univer-
sity of Wyoming, was tortured one night by two young men and subsequently died
of the severe head injuries he sustained. This case garnered national attention
when, during the trial, it became apparent that Matthew was targeted because
he was gay. Sadly, this is just one of the many hate crimes that continue to take
place on a daily basis across the country and around the world.

Of course, not all anti-gay behavior manifests as physical violence. In 2009, Mag-
nolia Pictures released the documentary Outrage, which targets political fig-
ures who have an aggressive anti-gay voting record (e.g., against gay marriage,
against adoptions by gay parents, against HIV research, etc.), but who, accord-
ing to the filmmaker, have secret lives involving gay relationships. The film raises
the possibility that the underlying motivation for the aggressive anti-gay voting
records is to express a self-hatred that is turned outward against others.

Examples in the public sphere of such counter-intuitive behaviors are not rare.
Evangelical pastor Ted Haggard, who founded and led a megachurch in Colorado
Springs, CO, preached and threw his political support behind a Colorado amend-
ment that would ban gay marriage. However, in 2006, Mr. Haggard resigned from
his leadership positions after it became widely known that he had been involved
in a gay relationship with a male massage therapist. Additional information sur-
faced to indicate that this was not a one-time event with a single individual, but
rather a broader pattern of behavior that Mr. Haggard ultimately acknowledged
and attributed to a childhood experience of sexual abuse. In another example,
former U.S. Congressman Mark Foley was active in helping to pass laws against
the sexual abuse of minors and was a strong opponent of child pornography. Yet,
in 2006, he resigned from Congress after allegations emerged that he had sent
sexually explicit text messages to underage males who either had served or were
currently serving as male congressional pages.

It is important to note that all of us engage in counter-intuitive behavior at times,
where our motives are hard to discern. (Fortunately, we are not scrutinized in the
same way as public figures.) What can explain such behavior? Why not simply

Introduction

2.6 Psychodynamic Methods of
Assessment
• The Technique of Psychoanalysis
• The Technique of Free Association
• The Technique of Dream Analysis
• The Word Association Task
• The Rorschach Inkblot Test
• The Thematic Apperception Test

Summary

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CHAPTER 2 2.1 Biography and Sociocultural Setting of Freud and His Early Work

steer clear of such issues, rather than publically and vociferously acting in a man-
ner that opposes private behavior and underlying motivation?

This chapter provides a close examination of the psychoanalytic theory that can be
applied to such actions and, in fact, seems to be most applicable to these appar-
ent contradictions. It provides an overview of psychoanalytic theory and identi-
fies the major theoretical contributions. It introduces Sigmund Freud and some of
the pioneering psychoanalytic theorists and clinicians who have shaped the field.
Most importantly, this chapter identifies a series of research questions derived
from psychoanalytic theory, and explores some primary research that attempts to
answer those questions—for example, is there an unconscious and can it influence
our behavior without our awareness? We begin with an introduction to Freud and
the context within which his theory was developed.

2.1 Biography and Sociocultural Setting of
Freud and His Early Work

Cultural and historical influences have much to do with a person’s way of thinking. It is impor-tant, therefore, to place Freud’s work in the context of the time in which he developed his groundbreaking work.
Sigmund Freud was born in Freiburg, Moravia, on May 6, 1856, the oldest of seven children.
Freud was raised in the Victorian era, a time when dignity and restraint were valued. He grew up
in a culture where sexual expression, especially among the bourgeoisie (middle class), was very
restricted, especially in terms of what was publicly acceptable. Freud, growing up, did not experi-
ence open discussion or even recognition of human sexual expression (Gay, 1988).

He entered medical school at the University of Vienna in 1873 and was awarded his medical
degree in 1881. His first position was at the Institute of Cerebral Anatomy, where he conducted
research comparing fetal and adult brains. He entered private practice as a neurologist because
of the limited financial rewards of research and an anti-Semitic attitude (Freud was Jewish) that
was prevalent in academia. He was strongly influenced by his studies with Jean Charcot, a well-
known therapist who specialized in treating hysteria with hypnosis. Hysteria, a condition in which
affected individuals convert their inner conflicts to physical symptoms, which are sometimes quite
crippling, was considered a major disorder at that time. Freud was inspired, as were many others,
by Charcot’s dramatic clinical demonstrations, and his interest in neurology quickly gave way to his
new passion for psychopathology and the study of hysteria. (Note: Psychopathology is the clinical
and scientific study of the disturbed mind. Psyche refers to the mind and pathology means illness.)

Freud was also influenced by Josef Breuer, who he met at the Institute of Physiology in the
1870s, and they became close friends and scientific collaborators. Breuer was an Austrian physi-
cian whose works had begun to lay the foundation for psychoanalysis. As Schwartz (1999) notes,
“Inspired by Charcot and impressed by Breuer’s results, on his return to Vienna from Paris in 1886
Freud actively collaborated with Joseph Breuer on the problem of hysteria” (p. 44).

Freud spent much of the earlier part of his career on the subject of hysteria. Between 1894 and
1896, Freud presented seven papers on the origins of hysteria as the result of sexual trauma

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CHAPTER 2 2.1 Biography and Sociocultural Setting of Freud and His Early Work

(he called this trauma theory). “Freud described severe cases, some coming to him after long
unsuccessful institutional treatment, all of whom suffered trauma which had to be ‘classed as
grave sexual injuries; some of them positively revolting’ ” (Schwartz, 1999, p. 66). Freud’s decision
to relate hysteria to sexual trauma likely had its roots in the early work of Egyptian physicians and
Greek philosophers, who each believed that symptoms of hysteria were due to improper position-
ing of the uterus. Interestingly, the treatment for this supposed misalignment involved fumigating
the vagina (Alexander & Selesnik, 1966).

The patients that he treated, first with hypnosis and then with psychoanalysis, showed the effects
of repressive Victorian society in their own repression of urges. Repression is a psychological
defense mechanism that is used to keep painful experiences and unacceptable impulses out of
conscious awareness. What Freud observed and taught about repression was not entirely novel.
However, Freud systematically studied how repressive forces operate and discovered that when
an individual—or a society—is severely repressed, outbreaks of hysteria are common.

Although less prevalent, symptoms indicative of hysteria are still seen today, and manifest as
either dissociative disorders, which typically involve interrupted memory and some loss of aware-
ness and identity, or somatoform disorders, which involve physical symptoms that either origi-
nate as, or are strongly influenced by, psychological experiences. In fact, in reviewing some of
the historical incidents of hysteria, it is interesting to
note the frequency with which it occurs in gender-
segregated contexts. In Malaysia in the 1970s and 80s,
for example, school-age girls and young women work-
ing in factories were believed to have been affected
by “spirits.” More recently in Mexico in 2007, an out-
break of unusual symptoms occurred for females at a
Catholic boarding school. In 2010 in Brunei (southeast
Asia), adolescents at two all-girl secondary schools
manifested behavior such as screaming, shaking, and
crying due to the belief that they were “possessed.”
Although not exclusive to females in repressed societ-
ies or in female-only contexts, there does appear to
be a greater incidence among women in such repres-
sive settings, and this would parallel the fact that
most of Freud’s patients with hysteria were likewise
female. Freud attributed this female bias to anatomy
(the uterus), but later work focused on the fact that
woman are disproportionately repressed relative to
men in society (see Karen Horney’s work discussed
later in this chapter). Manifestations of group hysteria,
where teenagers’ behavior is overwhelmed by their
impulses, sometimes to the point of fainting, also
illustrate a phenomenon called emotional contagion.
Emotional contagion can sometimes lead a group into
highly destructive and even deadly behaviors, such
as have occurred in the United Kingdom during some
soccer games.

Tom Le Goff/Photodisc/Thinkstock

Hysterical pregnancy (or pseudocyesis),
in which a man or woman exhibits the
symptoms of pregnancy without actually
being pregnant, is one example of a
conversion disorder.

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CHAPTER 2

2.2 Psychoanalytic Theory

Perhaps the closest parallel today to hysteria is conversion disorder, where one manifests a physi-
cal symptom in place of a psychological symptom. One of the more interesting examples of this
can be seen in one of Freud’s most famous cases: Anna O, a young woman who apparently expe-
rienced an hysterical pregnancy, which is when a person experiences the physical symptoms of
pregnancy but is not pregnant. Today, this is somewhat rare and is referred to as pseudocyesis
or false pregnancy. Pseudocyesis, which was first documented by Hippocrates in approximately
300 BCE, can involve such symptoms as amenorrhea, morning sickness, weight gain, and tender
breasts. It has also been documented in men.

Freud wed Martha Bernays in 1886. They had six children, the most prominent of whom, Anna,
became a psychoanalyst. She greatly advanced her father’s work, especially in applying his theory
to the treatment of children.

Freud was forced to leave Austria prior to World War II, and he settled briefly in England. It was at
this later stage in his career that Freud began to emphasize a second instinct underlying human
behavior: a death instinct. (Earlier in his life he had emphasized a sexual instinct, presumably
paralleling his own primary motives.) He suffered tremendously from cancer of the jaw, probably
caused by his prodigious—thirty a day—cigar habit. He endured thirty-two operations but suc-
cumbed to the disease in 1939.

2.2 Psychoanalytic Theory

The “discovery of the unconscious” and the development of the psychoanalytic method as a form of scientific inquiry heralded the birth of modern psychotherapy and stands as one of the intellectual milestones of the twentieth century (Schwartz, 1999). Freud’s terminol-
ogy permeates contemporary language and shapes culture to a remarkable degree. Hardly a day
goes by that one does not hear Freudian terms. Even far outside the professional psychological
community, familiarity with many Freudian concepts, such as defense mechanisms, unconscious
processes, id, ego, and superego, is commonplace. People talk of repressing their feelings or sup-
pressing memories, projecting their issues, sublimating, and so forth. The word ego has become
a mainstay of popular culture. Biographers often use various aspects of psychoanalysis to deepen
our understanding of the people about whom they write. Even popular books, movies, and televi-
sion shows depict or satirize some of Freud’s fundamental concepts.

What Freud set into motion with his unifying theoretical system—his metapsychology, meaning
an attempt to go beyond what was known about the mind—was a new emphasis on our inner
workings, hidden motivations, and primitive instinctual forces. In fact, Freud not only acknowl-
edged these underlying motives, but suggested that they were more important than what could
be found in consciousness. Freud argued that these instinctual forces, primarily sexual and aggres-
sive impulses, are constrained by society, yet they exercise a profound influence on our behav-
ior and our interpersonal relationships. Freud’s theoretical formulations, despite years of intense
scrutiny and a backlash against some of his more controversial ideas, remain influential for many
contemporary personality theories, and they continue to stimulate research.

The Fundamentals
Psychoanalytic theory is a comprehensive metatheory (i.e., going beyond psychology, with what
knowledge we had at the time that it originated). It deals with the structure and operation of the

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CHAPTER 2 2.2 Psychoanalytic Theory

mind, the formation of personality through stages of psychosexual development, the develop-
ment of psychopathologies, and psychoanalytic methods for treating psychological disorders.

Psychoanalysis was born when Freud abandoned hypnosis in favor of the technique of
free association, the uncensored expression of feelings, thoughts, and fantasies. “The patient
talks, tells of his past experiences and present impressions, complains, confesses to his wishes and
his emotional impulses” (Freud, 1966).

In his clinical work, Freud was faced
with many reports of incest, and he ini-
tially took them at face value. This led
him to believe that sexual trauma was
at the root of most psychopathology.
He later modified his trauma theory,
suggesting instead that incest “memo-
ries” were usually fantasies produced by
the patient. In the end, Freud changed
his emphasis from trauma theory to
the Oedipal complex (a son’s desire to
possess his mother and jealousy and
anger toward his father) to account for
the many instances of sexual abuse his
patients disclosed. “Fundamental to
Freud’s thinking about the mind was a
simple assumption: If there is a discon-
tinuity in consciousness—something the
person is doing but cannot report or

explain—then the relevant mental processes necessary to ‘fill in the gaps’ must be unconscious”
(Westen & Gabbard, 1999, p. 59). This assumption was profound and would create considerable
controversy (Schwartz, 1999), which continues today in an emotional debate surrounding the
validity of recovered memories of abuse. Specifically, some psychoanalytically informed theorists
and researchers (e.g., Kluft, 1987) suggest that repressed memories of trauma and abuse can lead
to disorders such as Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID; formerly Multiple Personality Disorder).
However, other researchers have been very critical of this hypothesis, suggesting that there is
considerable fallibility in both those who make the diagnosis of DID (Levitt, 1988) and the process
of recovering any memories (Loftus & Davis, 2006), especially those involving abuse (Lilienfeld et
al., 1999). Resolving the debate of how to best differentiate actual memories of abuse and trauma
from false memories will be of great importance for both clinicians and researchers (e.g., Belli,
2012; Gorman, 2008; Milchman, 2012).

Psychoanalysis was not only a theory of personality; it was also a method of investigation that was
well suited to tapping into the unconscious, as well as a method of treatment (Westen & Gabbard,
1999). Arguably because psychoanalysis simultaneously served all of these functions, it was more
susceptible to tautological errors. Had independent methods been used to tap the unconscious or
treat the patient, this might have allowed for a more thorough testing of Freud’s ideas.

Shironosov/iStock/Thinkstock

Freud believed that the technique of free association
could provide a window into the patient’s unconscious.

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CHAPTER 2

2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

The Three Central Tenets of Psychoanalytic Theory
Psychoanalytic theory has three central tenets. The first is that all human behavior is driven by sex-
ual and aggressive instincts. The second is that people experience conflict, between the individual
and society as well as within each individual. The third is that psychoanalytic theory assumes that
all significant aspects of psychological functioning (including the aforementioned instincts and
conflict) are unknown to the individual.

The Basic Instincts: Sex and Aggression
Instincts are central to Freudian theory. Freud postulated two primary instinctual drives: the sexual
(or libidinal) and the aggressive. He theorized that these were opposing drives. The libido (some-
times referred to as Eros, the Greek god of love and sexual desire) represents the life instinct;
aggression is a form of the death instinct (sometimes called Thanatos, a minor mythological Greek
figure). Psychoanalysis emphasized the sex drive as the main source of psychic energy (Westen &
Gabbard, 1999).

The importance of the sex drive was seen in Freud’s early work. Initially, he believed that psycho-
pathology was due to sexual difficulties, and he even recommended more sexual activity as a cure
for anxiety (e.g., Macmillan, 1997). However, he also suggested that other problems would arise
due to masturbation. Freud had similar views regarding aggression: Too little and the individual
would suffer from a passive personality, but too much might lead to hyper-aggression. Excessive
aggressive impulses can be channeled into various types of psychopathology, such as perversions
or personality disorders such as hysteria, obsessional neurosis, and passive aggression. When indi-
viduals are functioning well, they are able to use aggression in an appropriately competitive, self-
protective, and assertive fashion. Freud believed that the key to mental health is to balance these
forces so that the relationship between our needs and those of others are in equilibrium.

2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

Psychoanalysis is a structural theory, in that it offers us a blueprint of the structure of the psyche and an account of the interplay among the various psychic agents. This section intro-duces the basic structure and the interplay between the unconscious, the preconscious, and
conscious awareness.

Topography of the Mind
Freud’s model of the mind’s topography is depicted in Figure 2.1. This is not a map of the brain,
but a theoretical conception of how the mind organizes experience and how its various compo-
nents interrelate. The main divisions are the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious sectors.
These divisions of mental structure are central to Freud’s theory and are defined as follows:

• Unconscious: Refers to the portion of the mind of which we are unaware. It includes
impulses, fantasy, and primary processes. This represents the vast majority of the mind,
though unconscious material is often completely inaccessible. Indeed, even if material
can be moved from the unconscious to the preconscious and eventually to conscious
awareness, it takes a long time and considerable therapy.

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

Figure 2.1: Topographical representation of Freud’s theory on the mind
and the role of anxiety and repression

Much of Freud’s theory is focused on the interplay between the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious
and how defense mechanisms function.

• Preconscious: The preconscious is the portion of the mind where unconscious material is
transformed or “worked over” by defense mechanisms such as condensation and dis-
placement. Any material that is moving from the unconscious to conscious awareness first
must go through the preconscious. Unlike the unconscious, which requires intensive ther-
apy before an individual can get a glimpse of its contents, the preconscious can be moved
to awareness simply by directing attention to the material. Researchers subsequently
operationalized the term the cognitive unconscious, which was quite distinct from Freud’s
unconscious, and more akin to his concept of the preconscious (see Kihlstrom, 1987). This
is an important issue in the research to be described.

• Conscious: The conscious portion of the mind contains the aspects of ourselves of which
we are aware. Freud believed this represented a very small part of our mind.

Structural Components of the Mind
Freud described three major components of mental structure: the id, ego, and superego (see
Figure 2.2). These structures were characterized as having a developmental sequence, with the id
being present at birth, followed later by the ego, and eventually the superego. Freud also believed
that the id was only influenced by instincts; as other external sources exert their influence, then
the ego and superego can develop. Each of these structures is here described in more detail.

Conscious

Preconscious

Unconscious
Anxiety

Repression

Sexual and aggressive
impulses

Defensive layer

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

Figure 2.2: The interplay of Freud’s id, ego, and superego

Intrapsychic conflict is a staple of Freud’s theory, and the
structures that sustain that conflict are depicted here.

Conscience;
“Ego ideal”

Instinctual
organization
(sexual and
aggressive

drives)

Compromise
and

adaptation
Reality

principle

EGO

ID SUPEREGO

Id

Freud stated that the id is the first of the structures to influence behavior. The id includes the
instincts or drives with which we are born, and it is driven by primary process thinking; that is,
its thinking derives from inner thoughts and fantasies that are egocentric in nature and lacking in
objectivity. Freud argued that the id resides primarily in the unconscious and has no contact with
objective reality.

The id operates by what Freud termed the pleasure principle: the attempt to avoid pain and
maximize pleasure. The id constantly seeks to discharge any buildup of tension and to return
to a state of comfort or homeostasis. When hungry, it compels us to eat, and when there is a
buildup of sexual tension, it looks for release without regard for consequences—hence it is
called a primary process.

Primary process discharges tension by using the imagery of an object to remove the tension. This
can occur because the wish is buried in the unconscious, so its resolution can also be in the uncon-
scious. The resolution imagery (or hallucinatory experience) represents wish fulfillment. Primary
process can be expressed in fantasy or in dreams. Almost everyone engages in some form of sex-
ual or narcissistic (self-gratification) fantasy to reduce tension. For example, after being belittled in
an office meeting by one’s employer, the targeted employee might daydream about the outcome
of an upcoming tennis match in which his boss is humiliated in defeat. Individuals who are overly
dominated by primary process are usually psychotic. They are overly dependent on fantasy as a
way of gaining gratification; in other words, real life is not sufficiently gratifying for them.

Although being dominated by the id can indicate psychopathology for adults, normally functioning
infants are thought to fully experience this primitive stage. Their focus is on the gratification of
instinctual urges, without consideration of the consequences of their actions. Freud also argued

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

that such urges are subject to instant gratification, meaning that the urge or desire must be satis-
fied right away. In fact, a key developmental milestone is when children are able to start delaying
their gratification, meaning that they can put off satisfying an urge, knowing that it can be satisfied
in the future. According to Freud, the id is the structure that creates physical drive (e.g., libido)
and energizes us, and is the original level of personality from which the ego and superego become
differentiated as development proceeds.

Ego

The ego is the psychic structure whose primary function is that of mediation. Freud believed that
our lives are filled with conflict, and he believed that our ability to function effectively was deter-
mined in large part by our ability to mediate these conflicts. Thus, a well-functioning ego is critical
to adaptive behavior.

There are two direct sources of conflict that the ego must mediate. The first is the conflict
between the instinctual, gratification-seeking aims of the id and the demands and restrictions of
the external world (society). In other words, the id seeks instant gratification of basic desires, but
society places practical constraints on one’s ability to address those desires, at least in a public
forum. The second source of conflict is internal, and arises between the self-gratifying demands
of the id and the unrealistic expectations of the superego, which reflects what we should do
(more on this shortly).

The ego functions on the reality principle, which is the recognition that gratification is subject
to what reality makes possible. In a sense, with the development of the ego, reality attempts to
supersede the gratification-seeking pleasure principle of the id. Now the ego incorporates reality
testing into the individual’s functioning so that realistic aims and plans can be carried out in place
of unreasonable desires. Reality testing is essentially an information-processing function in which
the consequences of actions are weighed against the value of gratification. This means that one
of the main functions of the ego is to problem-solve appropriate ways of satisfying the individual’s
needs. The ego works in conjunction with the id, attempting to balance impulses, but also using
the id’s energy to provide drive, creativity, and motivation. When there is a breakdown of the
ego, individuals lose most of their ability to perceive reality adequately and to control the force
of primary process. The result is that constraints on behavior are often temporarily removed, and
individuals may engage in highly unacceptable and even criminal behavior.

Superego

In Freud’s theory, the superego is the mental structure that represents the internalization of soci-
ety’s values and morals, as portrayed by parental figures and social institutions. The superego,
which operates by the morality principle, represents how the individual should behave. It arises as
the child learns to differentiate good and bad behavior, and it is influenced by the punishment and
praise that parents provide and by the consequences of behavior. Importantly, because the super-
ego is, like the id, buried in the unconscious, it also has no contact with reality. Thus, the morality
espoused is not normal morality, but ideal morality and perfection. When over-functioning, it can
lead to what is described as a punitive superego, which may require the self to suffer guilt that can
lead to neurotic behavior and, in its extreme form, can be expressed in psychopathological adap-
tations, such as masochism or self-sabotaging behavior. Our conscience is the part of our superego
that determines the right course of action, trying to balance personal needs and societal-familial
expectations. Guilt arises in the system when we ignore what our conscience tells us.

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

Anxiety
A well-functioning psyche reflects an id and superego that are perfectly balanced by the activities
of the ego. However, when this balance is not achieved (and this was a common outcome, accord-
ing to Freud), the result is the experience of anxiety.

Freud’s described three basic categories of anxiety: moral, realistic, and neurotic. Moral anxiety
refers to the tension generated when the id gains too much control over the ego. This is due to the
fact that the superego demands that the individual live up to the ego ideal; when this does not
occur, the superego induces guilt. Realistic anxiety is a rational response to actual danger, which
triggers a flight-fight-or-freeze response. It reflects how the nervous system evolved to protect us
from danger and is mediated by some of the older systems of the brain (parts of the limbic sys-
tem). Thus, realistic anxiety requires an immediate response: Stay and fight, run and escape, or
freeze and submit to the danger (Sapolsky, 2004). In contrast, neurotic anxiety has a kind of “free-
floating” quality unrelated to any immediate threat. Neurotic anxiety is sometimes converted into
various symptoms, such as obsessional neurosis, where the individual engages in compulsions
that serve to reduce the anxiety so that it does not become overwhelming. This behavior is also
reflected in our modern day diagnostic labels—specifically, obsessive-compulsive disorder.

One of the most common presentations in clinical practice today, especially among women, is
something termed generalized anxiety disorder (Grant et al., 2009) a concept very similar to
Freud’s neurotic anxiety. Generalized anxiety disorder is marked by pervasive feelings of anxiety
that are unrelated to any obvious threat. Freud believed that this type of generalized anxiety (he
also referred to expectant anxiety) was one of the main features of neuroses.

So how do we manage the anxiety? Freud outlined a large number of defense mechanisms
employed by the ego to combat anxiety, and most of the time they work. However, on some
occasions, our defense mechanisms don’t work, and in those instances the unconscious material
slips out. Consider what has become known as “Freudian slips,” where we may say something we
didn’t mean to say, but it may still represent something that was on our mind (see Baars, 1992, for
a review). The defense mechanisms are summarized in the next section.

Defense Mechanisms
One of Freud’s many astute observations was that of defensive functioning. Informed by his clini-
cal case studies, and undoubtedly considerable introspection, Freud catalogued dozens of ways in
which individuals try to protect themselves from the effects of anxiety. Freud came to believe that
these defenses were commonplace, as he observed their occurrence in everyone. His daughter,
Anna Freud, added considerably to the list of defenses, and to date over 100 of them have been
catalogued (Blackman, 2004).

A defense mechanism is a mental operation that protects an individual against anxiety that
might result when primary process material threatens to break through to the conscious or pre-
conscious mind. For example, a recently widowed mother of two may need to defend against
the anxiety that results from being alone, and so she continues to set the dinner table for her
deceased husband. This may be an example of a defense mechanism called denial. Denial reduces
the conflict, but as long as the denial “works,” the problematic behavior continues. In this case,
the widow never really comes to terms with the passing of her husband. Freud considered denial
to be one of the most basic defense mechanisms, and in a sense, it lies at the heart of all other
defenses. That is, we will see that the other defenses seem to involve denial plus some additional
psychological reaction.

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality

One of the more advanced defenses, according to Freud, is sublimation, the defense mechanism
through which the individual finds ways of transforming unacceptable urges into more acceptable
behaviors. Aggression in sports, or even pursuing an art, is sometimes cited as an example of the
sublimation of unacceptable aggressive urges into more appropriate, and even adaptive, outlets.
Freud also wrote about surgeons, who he believed sublimated their aggressive instinct (it is hard
to imagine a more aggressive behavior than cutting someone open with a scalpel) into something
productive—the healing of medical illnesses through surgery.

An especially complicated defense mechanism is reaction formation, in which one adopts atti-
tudes and engages in behaviors that are in direct, overt opposition to threatening unconscious
impulses, in order to defend against those impulses. The theory behind this defense mechanism
is that the threatening internal experience (thought or emotion) is so great that simply denying it
is not only insufficient, but impossible. As a result, the individual must overcompensate by acting
in direct opposition to it (i.e., some of the overt behaviors are in direct opposition to the internal
experience, though the internal experience is unconscious). Several examples of reaction forma-
tion are included in this chapter, beginning with the opening segment (see the experiences of
Ted Haggard and Mark Foley), and this defense mechanism is examined more closely in “Putting
Psychodynamic Theory to the Test: Part 2” in this chapter.

Freud’s identification and elaboration of defense mechanisms has added much to our understand-
ing of personality psychology and continues to contribute to our understanding of how we use
them to adapt (Holi, Sammallahti, & Aalberg, 1999). For a more complete list of Freud’s defense
mechanisms, see Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Common defense mechanisms

Defense Definition Example

Acting out Translating conflicts into action with
little or no intervening reflection.

A student disrupts class because she is
angry over an unfair grade.

Denial Refusing to acknowledge some painful
external or subjective reality obvious
to others.

A woman refuses to acknowledge a
pregnancy despite positive test results.

Devaluation Attributing unrealistic negative
qualities to self or others as a means
of punishing the self or reducing the
impact of the devalued item.

A student suddenly criticizes as a
terrible teacher a formerly admired
professor who has given him a D on a
term paper.

Displacement Displacing conflicts from a threatening
object onto a less threatening one.

A student who has been criticized by
his instructor in history class comes
home from school and starts an
argument with a younger sibling.

Dissociation Dealing with conflict by disrupting the
integration of consciousness, memory,
or accurate perception of the internal
and external world.

After breaking up with a lover, a
suicidal student is suddenly unable to
recall the time during which they were
together.

Fantasy Avoiding conflict by creating imaginary
situations that satisfy drives or desires.

A student from a troubled home
daydreams about going to college to
become a famous psychologist.

(continued)

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CHAPTER 2 2.3 The Structural Components of Personality
Defense Definition Example

Idealization Attributing unrealistic positive qualities
to self or others.

A student worried about his
intellectual ability begins to idolize a
tutor.

Isolation of affect Defusing conflict by separating
ideas from affects, thus retaining
an awareness of intellectual or
factual aspects but losing touch with
threatening emotions.

A biology student sacrifices a
laboratory animal without worrying
about its right to existence, quality of
life, or emotional state.

Omnipotence Creating an image of oneself as
incredibly powerful, intelligent, or
superior to overcome threatening
possibilities or feelings.

A student facing a difficult final exam
asserts that there is nothing about the
material that she doesn’t know.

Projection Disowning unacceptable emotions or
personal qualities by attributing them
to others.

A student attributes his own anger to
the professor, and thereby comes to
see himself as a persecuted victim.

Projection
identification

Projecting unpleasant feelings and
reactions onto others and declaring
that the reaction is in response to the
recipient’s behavior.

A student attributes her own anger to
the professor but sees her response as
a justifiable reaction to persecution.

Rationalization Constructing after the fact an
explanation for behavior to justify
one’s action in the eyes of self or
others.

A professor who unknowingly creates
an impossible exam justifies it on the
basis that it is necessary to shock
students back to serious study.

Reaction formation Containing unacceptable thoughts or
impulses by adopting a position that
expresses the opposite.

A student who hates some identifiable
group writes an article protesting their
unfair treatment by the university.

Repression Withholding forbidden thoughts and
wishes from conscious awareness.

A student’s jealous desire to murder
a rival is denied access to conscious
awareness.

Splitting Maintaining opposite viewpoints about
a single object, keeping these opinions
in deliberately unintegrated opposition,
which results in cycles of idealization
and devaluation as either extreme is
projected onto self and others.

A student vacillates between worship
and contempt for a professor,
sometimes seeing her as intelligent
and powerful and himself as ignorant
and weak, and then switching roles,
depending on their interactions.

Sublimation Channeling unacceptable into socially
acceptable behavior.

A student who is competitive and
aggressive towards his siblings funnels
those impulses into academic efforts
and successes.

*Undoing Attempting to rid oneself of guilt
through behavior that compensates
the injured party actually or
symbolically.

A professor who designs a test that is
too difficult creates an excess of easy
extra-credit assignments.

* The more modern concept of counterfactual thinking is somewhat equivalent to undoing.

Source: Millon, T., & Davis, R. D. (1996a). An evolutionary theory of personality disorders. In J. F. Clarkin, M. F. Lenzenweger (Eds.). Major
theories of personality disorder (pp. 221–346). New York, NY: Guilford Press, p. 226. Reprinted by permission of Guilford Publications.

Table 2.1: Common defense mechanisms (continued)

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CHAPTER 2

2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

Neurosis and Symptom Formation
Freud developed his theory to explain the development of psychological symptoms and clini-
cal syndromes, such as then-common hysterias and phobias. He called all of these conditions
neuroses. A neurosis consists of a cluster of symptoms typified by anxiety or indecision and some
degree of social maladjustment. In a sense, the symptoms are a compromise between urges and
drives and social and environmental constraints. They allow partial expression of the drive, but
also may include an aspect of self-punishment: One needs to suffer when one’s instinctual organi-
zation is activated beyond a level that can be regulated by the psychic structures.

As Freud explains neuroses, they often involve past events that were associated with high anxiety,
fear, or trauma. In time, memory of the event disappears or is repressed, but the energy associ-
ated with it may later be expressed in symptoms of neuroses. Symptoms such as phobias, compul-
sions, and obsessions are the way the unconscious mind transfers energy from the conflict into
something that expresses the energy, but hides the conflict from the affected individual (Freud,
1966, p. 298). For example, if an individual has an obsession with dirt on the hands and a compul-
sion to constantly wash them (obsessive-compulsive disorder), freud might argue that the person
is in fact wracked with guilt over some behavior, and the repetitive act highlights the guilt and the
attempts to cleanse the self of the guilt. The preconscious mind often expresses this “forgotten”
conflict in altered form in dreams, slips of the tongue, or even daydreams.

2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

Freud’s theory represents the first comprehensive developmental or stage model, and he recognized that development progresses in a hierarchical, stage-like manner, in which mastery of the previous stage is important to one’s ability to negotiate subsequent ones.
Freud’s theory of human development and personality formation is reflected in his description of
psychosexual development. The sexual instincts, also referred to as libido, are one of the major
forces in this developmental process, hence the label psychosexual development. Libidinal pres-
sure—the sexually based urged to survive and procreate (also termed the life instinct)—fuels
development.

Freud theorized that individuals progress through a series of psychosexual stages. Each of these
stages emphasizes different developmental tasks and challenges, and Freud suggested that libido
is focused on a particular part of the body during each of these stages. For a variety of reasons,
an individual can become fixated (i.e., stuck) in one of these stages, and this results in different
personality types.

We will here outline each of the stages, and the personality types that might emerge based on
fixations in each stage, keeping in mind that all of the intrapsychic events to be described were
hypothesized to occur in the unconscious (i.e., one would have no awareness of them).

Oral Stage
The first stage of life, lasting until about age 2, is termed by Freud as the oral stage. The term oral
is used because of the infant’s proclivity to explore the world largely through his or her mouth.
Moreover, one of the most important events occurring at this time is breastfeeding (or bottle
feeding), which not only provides nourishment, but also warmth and intimate contact. It is also

Diego Cervo/iStock/Thinkstock

An unresolved oral stage in childhood may
result in an oral fixation in adulthood. Nail
biting is one manifestation of oral fixation.

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CHAPTER 2 2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

named as such because it is marked by the need to
suck, which is a powerful, biologically based survival
reflex. During this stage, gratification and satisfac-
tion are received primarily through other oral activi-
ties, including thumb sucking and swallowing. Hence
the libido is expressed in the oral region. Although
these represent the specific behaviors that the infant
is engaged in, Freud suggested that the greater sig-
nificance is that this establishes a model for satisfying
needs later in life.

Perhaps of greatest importance in the oral stage is the
process of weaning, as this signals the infant’s pro-
gression in life to a more independent state. Freud
believed that weaning might be traumatic if it is too
abrupt or uncaring, and the trauma might later be
apparent in character traits and habits of the adult.
Freud believed that when the infant is either weaned
too soon or too abruptly or, on the other hand, weaned
too late, that the child would become fixated (stuck)
in the oral stage, meaning that the child’s personality
would reflect difficulties negotiating the satisfaction
of basic needs.

Freud identified two personality types that might
result from oral fixations. Oral dependency is thought to occur because the infant was weaned
too late so that they were overly dependent on their mother for too long. Freud predicted
that this dependency would play out in adult relationships, with these individuals requiring
and expecting a great deal of attention and support from others. In contrast, oral aggression
refers to the personality that occurs when the weaning has occurred too soon or too abruptly.
Freud believed that as adults, these individuals would aggress against others in order to
have their needs met because they would feel as though they had been short-changed
in life.

Anal Stage
The next stage, lasting until about age 4, is the anal stage, during which the primary source of
pleasure is derived from the voiding of feces. This period of socialization generally sets the stage
for the first significant conflict between parents and child (i.e., toilet training). Parents want their
children toilet trained, but children are not always willing or able. Parents reward children for
complying and express disappointment when they have “accidents.” Thus, the central theme of
this stage is that the child is developing a sense of how to autonomously manage an important
bodily function, and this is accomplished by negotiating for control with their parents.

Referring back to the development of the structural components of the mind, Freud believed that
it is at this time that the ego starts to differentiate from the id, and the reality principle begins to
appear. There is the beginning of crude superego functioning with the development of the shame
that comes with punishment and with failure to comply with parental wishes. During toilet train-
ing, children can express autonomy or control by refusing to comply and sometimes by deliber-
ately soiling themselves.

Neurosis and Symptom Formation
Freud developed his theory to explain the development of psychological symptoms and clini-
cal syndromes, such as then-common hysterias and phobias. He called all of these conditions
neuroses. A neurosis consists of a cluster of symptoms typified by anxiety or indecision and some
degree of social maladjustment. In a sense, the symptoms are a compromise between urges and
drives and social and environmental constraints. They allow partial expression of the drive, but
also may include an aspect of self-punishment: One needs to suffer when one’s instinctual organi-
zation is activated beyond a level that can be regulated by the psychic structures.
As Freud explains neuroses, they often involve past events that were associated with high anxiety,
fear, or trauma. In time, memory of the event disappears or is repressed, but the energy associ-
ated with it may later be expressed in symptoms of neuroses. Symptoms such as phobias, compul-
sions, and obsessions are the way the unconscious mind transfers energy from the conflict into
something that expresses the energy, but hides the conflict from the affected individual (Freud,
1966, p. 298). For example, if an individual has an obsession with dirt on the hands and a compul-
sion to constantly wash them (obsessive-compulsive disorder), freud might argue that the person
is in fact wracked with guilt over some behavior, and the repetitive act highlights the guilt and the
attempts to cleanse the self of the guilt. The preconscious mind often expresses this “forgotten”
conflict in altered form in dreams, slips of the tongue, or even daydreams.
2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development
Freud’s theory represents the first comprehensive developmental or stage model, and he recognized that development progresses in a hierarchical, stage-like manner, in which mastery of the previous stage is important to one’s ability to negotiate subsequent ones.
Freud’s theory of human development and personality formation is reflected in his description of
psychosexual development. The sexual instincts, also referred to as libido, are one of the major
forces in this developmental process, hence the label psychosexual development. Libidinal pres-
sure—the sexually based urged to survive and procreate (also termed the life instinct)—fuels
development.
Freud theorized that individuals progress through a series of psychosexual stages. Each of these
stages emphasizes different developmental tasks and challenges, and Freud suggested that libido
is focused on a particular part of the body during each of these stages. For a variety of reasons,
an individual can become fixated (i.e., stuck) in one of these stages, and this results in different
personality types.
We will here outline each of the stages, and the personality types that might emerge based on
fixations in each stage, keeping in mind that all of the intrapsychic events to be described were
hypothesized to occur in the unconscious (i.e., one would have no awareness of them).
Oral Stage
The first stage of life, lasting until about age 2, is termed by Freud as the oral stage. The term oral
is used because of the infant’s proclivity to explore the world largely through his or her mouth.
Moreover, one of the most important events occurring at this time is breastfeeding (or bottle
feeding), which not only provides nourishment, but also warmth and intimate contact. It is also
Diego Cervo/iStock/Thinkstock
An unresolved oral stage in childhood may
result in an oral fixation in adulthood. Nail
biting is one manifestation of oral fixation.

Lec81110_02_c02_039-068.indd 53 5/20/15 9:19 AM

CHAPTER 2 2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

As was the case in the oral stage,
the child can either achieve a suc-
cessful balance of having some
control and autonomy or can
struggle to negotiate this stage
and become fixated with control.
The anal expulsive personality
is thought to occur when the
child deals with control by giving
up efforts to control the bow-
els at all. Thus, this might be
marked by a delay in toilet train-
ing. The anal retentive person-
ality reflects the child’s attempt
to deal with anal stage issues
by over-controlling the situa-
tion. As adults, the anal retentive
personality might involve frantic

attempts to control all aspects of one’s own life—and perhaps even those of others. Freud sug-
gested this would also result in hoarding money (i.e., being stingy), because money is a means
of control. In contrast, anal expulsive people want nothing to do with control, allowing others to
make all the decisions, no matter how minor.

Phallic Stage
The third, and arguably most important, stage of psychosexual development is the phallic stage,
which lasts from about 4 to 8 years of age. During this phase, the primary source of gratifica-
tion is derived from the genitals. The child may now touch, rub, or exhibit genitals, as well as
show interest in the anatomy of family members. It is at this time that they more fully develop
ideas concerning sex and birth and pay close attention to the differences (especially anatomical)
between boys and girls. Thus, it is during this time that the child develops his or her sense of gen-
der identity by identifying with the same-sex parent. Again, Freud hypothesized about fixations in
this stage and the possible resulting behavior. He suggested that when children identify with their
same-sex parents, then normal heterosexual adult relationships would occur. In contrast, Freud
believed, if the child identifies with the opposite-sex parent, this would result in homosexuality
(or a homosexual impulse).

As noted, the majority of individuals would experience same-sex identification (i.e., you see your-
self as most similar to, and want to be like, your same-sex parent), and Freud outlined something
he called the Oedipus complex, where children compete with the same-sex parent in an attempt
to gain the attention of or possess the opposite-sex parent. Freud believed that the Oedipus com-
plex begins to unfold in the phallic stage.

Oedipus Complex

Like Oedipus, the mythological Greek figure who unwittingly killed his father and married his
mother, Freud believed that the male child develops sexually based feelings for his mother dur-
ing the phallic stage. The theory assumes that we all initially start with a strong desire to possess
our mothers, but the process differentiates from here forward for males and females. For males,

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

What does it mean when we say, “You’re so anal!”?

In “Character and Anal Erotism” (1908), Freud described an
anal character and how it relates to sexuality and everyday
life. Sometimes reading the works of Freud in his own words
(as opposed to what is conveyed in a textbook) can provide
a better example of his thinking. Read this article online at
http://www.pldocs dat.com/docs/index-95699.html
?page=242.

Reference: Freud, S. (1908b). Character and anal eroticism.
In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The Standard Edition of the
Complete Works of Sigmund Freud. (Vol. 9, pp. 169–175).
London: Hogarth Press.

Lec81110_02_c02_039-068.indd 54 5/20/15 9:19 AM

http://www.pldocs dat.com/docs/index-95699.html?page=242

http://www.pldocs dat.com/docs/index-95699.html?page=242

CHAPTER 2 2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

the son’s desire for his mother places the father in the role of a competing suitor for his mother’s
attentions. Freud also believed that the perceived competition with one’s father would result in
the fear or anxiety of being permanently eliminated as a competitor by means of castration. This
castration anxiety, or fear of the father’s aggression, is ultimately what sets young boys on track to
adult heterosexual relationships, as they learn to identify (rather than compete) with their fathers
and obtain someone like their mother (rather than competing for their actual mother).

Electra Complex

The related experience for females is labeled the Electra complex. Unlike the male who fears
castration, the female, realizing she has no penis, believes she has already been castrated. She
blames her mother for the castration and is drawn to her father because he does possess a penis.
It is theorized that girls then experience penis envy, which Freud defined as the envy of the ana-
tomical structure (not a metaphorical envy of what the penis represented in society at the turn of
the century—that figurative interpretation would emerge from other theorists). Freud believed
that there was no easy resolution for females, though the resolution still involves a fully devel-
oped superego and fully functioning ego. Freud believed that part of the resolution for a female
is to essentially possess a penis by proxy; first by dating, then marrying, and eventually by having
a child (ideally male). Due to this more indirect way of resolving penis envy, Freud considered
females to have less-well-developed personalities, and his belief in the superiority of men was
often the target of feminist writers.

Latency Stage
The latency stage of development (from about age 6 to 12) is a time when preoccupation with
sexuality lessens. The Oedipal complex, despite being unconscious, is traumatizing, and the child
prefers to inhibit and repress sexuality. Freud describes this as a lengthy, innocent interlude, dur-
ing which children prefer being with same-sex peers. During this phase, much energy is devoted
to absorbing cultural and intellectual experiences, socializing with friends, and investing energy in
a wide range of pursuits.

Genital Stage
This final stage of psychosexual development, beginning at approximately age 11 to 14, culmi-
nates in the fullest level of maturity, assuming development was not significantly delayed by ear-
lier fixations. The term genital phase reflects the idea that the primary focus of the individual
is the stimulation of the genitals. Importantly, however, the individual’s main preoccupation is
now no longer the experience of pleasure for its own sake (as it was in the phallic stage), but the
development of mature relationships with others. Freud stated that ideally libidinal energy is now
directed (expressed) toward adult romantic partners of the opposite sex. Freud believed that any
deviations from this course, which might include frigidity, impotence, unsatisfactory relationships,
not dating, or homosexuality, would be an indication of problematic functioning, likely as a result
of earlier fixations. The timing of this last developmental stage is thought to be stimulated by the
hormonal and biochemical changes that prime the individual for puberty (sexual maturity).

During the genital period, the narcissistic (self-centered) seeking of continual pleasure must
be exchanged for mature love and caring for others. If the individual accomplishes this task,
the infant’s earliest expressions of libido—that is, of the sexual instinct—will have been trans-
formed to mature love and the capacity for empathy. But if the individual has had too much
or too little gratification along the way, the outcome may be apparent in one of a variety of
personality disorders.

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CHAPTER 2 2.4 Stages of Psychosexual Development

Character Traits and Disorders in Psychosexual Development
Freud’s conception of the way personality and personality disorders develop was based on his
model of psychosexual development. According to psychoanalytic theory, the development of
character is influenced by how the psychosexual stages are navigated. If there is a normal pro-
gression, the individual will develop a mature and normal character. But if a fixation occurs, there
will be a buildup of excess libidinal energy related to the erogenous zones associated with that
stage, and problems related to that fixation will continue to manifest throughout one’s lifetime.
For example, a person fixated at the oral stage, perhaps because of excessive gratification at that
stage, might later display dependency (recall the oral-dependent personality). Of course, there
would be a difference between the manifestation of a dependent trait (i.e., one who tends to rely
on others) as opposed to dependent personality disorder. The latter would be marked by dysfunc-
tions in daily living due to the pervasive and excessive need to be submissive and dependent on
others and to stay in relationships (even abusive ones) to meet those needs. Table 2.2 provides
an overview of the psychosexual stages of development and the personality disorders that may
result secondary to fixations in each stage. Some of these personality disorders were actually
elaborated by theorists from the neo-analytic movement, which followed Freud (see Chapter 3
for a thorough discussion).

Table 2.2: Stages of psychosexual development and character types

Stage of development Approximate age Character type

Oral stage 0 to 2 years Dependent

Anal stage 2 to 4 years Compulsive

Phallic stage 4 to 8 years Narcissistic

Latency stage 6 to 12 years Passive*

Genital stage 11-14 years – to adulthood Hysterical

*Not included in neo-analytic theory but may be a logical type.

Critique and Conclusions on Freud’s Theoretical Contributions
The breadth of Freud’s theoretical contributions is matched by the fervent and broad-based
nature of the criticisms levied at his theory and at the clinical and assessment tools that are based
on psychodynamic theory (e.g., Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2001). Perhaps the most noteworthy
counterargument is simply that Freud’s theory is often tautological and not open to empirical
investigation. This may be the most salient criticism because it has led some to conclude that psy-
choanalytic theory is more pseudoscience than science (for a review, see Cioffi, 1998).

Due to the complexity of the theory, it is unlikely that any single experiment or set of experiments
could adequately test the entire theory; however, there have been credible attempts to inves-
tigate many important aspects of Freud’s theory (see Westen, 1998). As an example, research-
ers have culled the scientific literature and concluded that although there is scientific support
for some of the defense mechanisms, there is little published research to scientifically support
the functioning of most of the defense mechanisms as forwarded by Freud (i.e., even in some
instances when the phenomenon may be present, it does not appear to function as a defense;
see Baumeister et al., 1998).

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Today, Freud’s standing in the scientific community is generally as an outsider. He clearly has con-
tributed many ideas that have spurred programs of research. Some of his ideas have been empiri-
cally supported, but many have not (see Chapter 3 for a more extensive discussion). However,
what is undeniable is that Freud’s work has had a tremendous and immeasurable impact on the
field, not simply because of the durability of his ideas, but more because of his influence on the
theorists who followed him and based their ideas on his seminal work. These individuals are often
characterized as neo-analytic theorists, and in the next section, we consider some of the more
well-known individuals in this movement.

2.5 The Neo-Analytic Movement

Freud’s work stimulated many other theoreticians who shared some of the basic assumptions of psychoanalytic theory, but who nevertheless established separate schools of thought. Neo-analytic theorists are those whose work was based on, and branched out from, Freud, but
whose work typically differed from (or was even opposed to) Freud on at least one major theoreti-
cal tenet. As a result, each of these schools of thought are sufficiently distinct to merit considering
them separately. We here present a brief overview of some of these individuals and their major
theoretical contributions.

Carl Jung and the Collective Unconscious
Carl Gustav Jung was like Freud in that he was awarded a medical degree and emphasized psy-
chiatry (he was both a psychiatrist and psychotherapist). Jung collaborated with Freud from 1907
to 1912, becoming one of Freud’s favorite followers. But Jung eventually broke with Freud and
began to develop his own theory, which he called analytic psychology, as well as his own method
of practice, in which the primary goal was to integrate conscious and unconscious thought and
experience (termed individuation) while still maintaining some degree of autonomy.

Jung’s theoretical disagreements with Freud largely centered on: (1) a refusal to accept the sexual
instinct as the primary force in mental life and (2) the emphasis on the collective unconscious,
rather than the personal unconscious. According to Jung, the collective unconscious refers to
what is essentially a public-access and universal version of the unconscious that contains memory
traces common to all humans. The collective unconscious refers to the inherited themes that are
represented in symbolic ways by different cultures, and Jung found these themes expressed in
literature, art, and dreams. These themes deal with common experiences, such confronting death,
gaining independence, and striving for mastery. Jung termed these common, recurrent, and sym-
bolically represented themes archetypes of the collective unconscious. Examples of archetypes of
the unconscious include concepts such as God, the self, birth, death, the wise old man, the nurtur-
ing mother, and power symbolized as the sun or a lion.

In his analytic work with patients, Jung sought to bring material from the collective unconscious
into conscious awareness through the use of free association and dream analysis, two techniques
he borrowed from Freud. Indeed, although Freud is widely known for his work on the interpreta-
tion of dreams, Jung also contributed heavily to this practice. One important difference between
the two was that Jung placed a greater emphasis on the manifest content of dreams (the surface
meaning), whereas Freud was more likely to make interpretations of the latent content, the under-
lying meaning (typically sexual or aggressive in nature). Jung also believed that one could examine
the presence of archetypes in dreams and predict the incidence of creativity (i.e., more creative

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CHAPTER 2 2.5 The Neo-Analytic Movement

individuals have more archetypes of the unconscious in their dreams, and creativity comes from
the sampling of this unconscious material).

Jung also introduced the concept of the persona, a term for the identity or mask that individuals
adopt. Jung suggested that we consciously create the persona, but that it is derived from our experi-
ence of the collective unconscious as well as conscious experiences (e.g., socialization). Jung argued
that one of the primary functions of the persona was to serve as a compromise between who we are
and what society expects us to be by both hiding aspects of ourselves that are incongruent with
societal expectations and “creating” aspects of ourselves that are consistent with society’s expecta-
tions. (Note: The persona is similar to the actual and ought self-concepts forwarded by Higgins and
discussed in Chapter 9).

One aspect of Jung’s writings that actu-
ally undermined the proliferation of his
ideas in psychology was that he focused
on mysticism, as indicated by his writ-
ing on religions, philosophy, and the
occult. In fact, Jung believed that these
areas were all central to the process of
individuation.

In what is arguably his most durable
contribution, Jung (1923) developed
the concept of two attitude types: the
extrovert, who tends to be outgoing and
very socially oriented, and the introvert,
who tends to be quiet and withdrawn
and is more interested in ideas than in
people. Jung also described four func-
tions (thinking, feeling, sensing, and
intuiting), which, when crossed with the

two attitudes, result in eight basic types (e.g., extroverted sensing, introverted sensing, extro-
verted feeling, introverted feeling, etc.). These basic types would later serve as the basis for the
famous Myers-Briggs Inventory, which is still widely used in industrial-organizational settings, and
this is where some aspects of Jung’s theory continue to thrive.

Alfred Adler and Inferiority Complex
Like his contemporaries, Alfred Adler was also awarded a medical degree, but he practiced oph-
thalmology and general practice before moving to psychiatry and joining a discussion group with
Freud and Jung. Adler, Freud, and Jung are typically credited as the founding fathers of what is
known as depth psychology, which emphasizes the psychodynamics of the unconscious. However,
Adler was the first to break away from Freud’s inner circle, founding the school of individual psy-
chology (Adler, 1923), which posited that all people were unique and that no theory could capture
their complexity. He also adopted a holistic approach (focusing on the importance of the whole)
in his work, emphasizing the importance of social context. Indeed, Adler identified three funda-
mental social tasks that all people would have to experience; occupational tasks (careers), societal
tasks (e.g., friendships), and love tasks (finding a long-term intimate partner). He also empha-
sized that a social, rather than sexual or aggressive, motive underlies all human behavior. Perhaps
most noteworthy was Adler’s clear emphasis on conscious motivation (i.e., ego psychology), as

WARNER BROS PICTURES/Album/Album/SuperStock

This popular figure is a merging of the traditional hero
archetype and archetypes that represent a darker side.

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CHAPTER 2 2.5 The Neo-Analytic Movement

indicated by the fact that the three fundamental social tasks are explicitly known and pursued.
Of course, Adler still believed in the unconscious and its influence on the individual, but relative
to both Freud and Jung, he attributed considerably more importance to conscious experience.

Adler is probably best known for his formulation of the concept of the inferiority complex. He
believed that all people struggle with feelings of inferiority, which are based on some perceived
organ inferiority. This concept refers to the fact that as children we feel inferior in some way to
others (especially adults), whether physically, intellectually, or even emotionally. As adults we
might continue to experience that perceived inferiority and try to compensate for it (referred to
as compensatory strivings). Thus, the child who felt powerless may become an adult whose only
focus is to obtain power and control over others. Adler thought that overcoming the inferiority
complex did not depend on becoming superior, but rather on a recognizing and coming to terms
with the feelings of low self-esteem underlying the complex.

Adler also differed from Freud with respect to free will, as he thought that humans have an inher-
ent will and power to change, whereas Freud did not. Unlike Freud, who dealt with the dark
side of human nature (our unconscious, deep-seated, conflict-laden urges), Adler emphasized our
more positive aspects and the forces that drive us to become self-actualized—that is, to become
all the good things we can be. In this respect, Adler’s work influenced the later writings of those
in the existential/humanistic movement (e.g., Maslow, May) and also pioneered what would later
become known as the positive psychology movement.

As noted in the discussion of the Oedipus complex, Freud emphasized the relationship between
the child and their parents as the key to character development. Adler, however, suggested that it
was one’s relationships (or lack thereof) with siblings that were of greater relevance to personality
development. This resulted in considerable theoretical contributions to the impact of birth order,
and it laid the groundwork for subsequent researchers to investigate the topic.

Adler believed that first-borns, because they are only children for a period of time, have a favored
status, but must eventually deal with the shared attention once their younger siblings are born
(i.e., they are in essence “dethroned” from their position of privilege). As a result of this experi-
ence, Adler believed that first-borns, relative to later-borns and middle children, would be the most
likely to experience neuroticism and other psychological problems; he even predicted that they
had the highest propensity for being incarcerated or psychiatrically institutionalized. However, on
the more favorable side, Adler believed that first-borns would have higher rates of achievement.

According to Adler, later-borns are seen as pampered, and because they feel some pressure to
meet the standards established by their older siblings, they may adopt a defeatist attitude and be
less effortful. Adler also believed that later-borns would struggle to properly develop empathy,
and as a result, this would inhibit social growth.

Adler thought that middle children were likely to experience the most sibling rivalry with their
older sibling, and because the older child has the age advantage (bringing a physical and mental
advantage), the middle child is likely to fail in this competition more often than not. However, he
believed that the middle child would be the most likely to develop in a healthy manner because
he or she would not have to deal with the psychological consequences of either being displaced
by younger siblings or being overly indulged.

Adler’s ideas on birth order spurred considerable research, and the findings have generally sup-
ported the idea that first-borns are more likely to achieve and are more conscientious (Paulhus,
Trapnell, & Chen, 1999; Sulloway, 1996). However, birth order is a difficult variable to study because

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CHAPTER 2 2.5 The Neo-Analytic Movement

it is not possible to experimentally manipulate it. Thus, many confounds emerge when studying
birth order, because first-borns are more prevalent among wealthier and better-educated individ-
uals who tend to have fewer children. Thus, one problem with much of the birth order literature
is that ultimately it may simply tell us that children from well-educated, wealthy backgrounds are
more likely to succeed relative to those from less wealthy and less-educated backgrounds.

Anna Freud and Child Psychology
Anna Freud was the favorite and youngest of Sigmund and Martha’s six children. As noted earlier,
she is renowned for carrying on and extending her father’s work. Anna Freud ultimately became
the heir apparent to Freud’s school of psychoanalysis, as she maintained an interest in preserving
her father’s theoretical and technical contributions.

Anna Freud is probably most noted for her contributions to child psychology. She expanded the
practice of psychoanalysis to the treatment of emotional disorders of childhood and became a
well-respected clinician in her own right. The classic techniques were not readily adaptable to
child patients. She therefore encouraged the use of play therapy and fantasy with children. In
play, which is natural for children, she believed they might reveal their conflicts and anxieties. The
projection of conflict might occur in part with the child analyst and in part with the play therapy
objects.

Another of Anna Freud’s major contributions was her further elaboration of defense mechanisms,
as she identified many new ones that she observed in clinical practice. Some proved to be critical
aids for understanding both children and adults. When Freud turned 80, Anna presented him with
her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense (Young-Bruehl, 1988).

Karen Horney and Repressed Womanhood
Despite the early domination of this field by men, Karen Horney had a significant impact on both
personality theory and research. In her theory, Horney emphasized the role of unconscious basic
anxiety, suggesting that children repress feelings of hostility towards adults so as not to undermine
their ability to meet their own needs. In order to deal with this basic anxiety, Horney suggested
that any one of three styles might emerge, characterized as: (1) moving toward (a style based on
affiliation and dependence), (2) moving against (a style based on aggression and assertiveness),
and (3) moving away (a style based on detachment and isolation). These styles for coping with
basic anxiety could also become neurotic coping strategies when they are exaggerated secondary
to the individual experiencing alienation. The articulation of these coping styles had a significant
impact on Horney’s clinical work and continues to influence modern psychotherapy.

Arguably, Horney’s most influential contribution was the reinterpretation of penis envy.
Instead of emphasizing the envy of the anatomical structure, Horney focused on the issue of
repressed womanhood, referring to the fact that society made women feel inferior to men
because of their gender. In many respects, this represented the first feminist perspective within
personality psychology, and this metaphoric interpretation is still applicable today. Consider some
examples. At the highest levels of leadership, such as president of the United States, we have
never had a female president, or even a female presidential candidate for either major political
party, despite the fact that over half of the voting public is female. (The latter is an important
point, as it indicates that the driving force behind repressing womanhood is not simply men, but

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CHAPTER 2

2.6 Psychodynamic Methods of Assessment

rather culture, societal norms, and institutional structures.) Women are less likely to achieve the
highest positions in corporations, as they generally top out in middle management, a phenom-
enon sometimes referred to as the “glass ceiling.”

Perhaps the most well-documented gender difference is with respect to pay. Even though women
have been making progress by cutting the wage gap in half from 1980 (when it was 64 cents on
the dollar) to the current 82 cents on the dollar (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013), the difference is
still present. Moreover, the difference continues to exist (i.e., with women earning approximately
82 cents on the dollar) even after accounting for a myriad of possible explanatory factors, such as
occupation, age, experience, education, time in workforce, childcare, average hours worked, and
college grades (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). Thus, repressed womanhood—and
the resulting “envy”—may be alive and well!

Horney’s work also garnered considerable attention for her theoretical concept of the “tyranny of
the shoulds.” We are constantly confronted by the things we should do (e.g., we should be more
proactive, we should be better parents, we should be more caring of the poor and sick, etc.). Hor-
ney suggests that when faced with these shoulds, there is a divide between our actual selves (who
we truly are) and our ideal selves. Horney believed that the exact nature of these shoulds could be
used to clarify our character, and in this respect, the shoulds are much like Freudian fixations, in
that they can highlight the things we are trying most to resolve in our lives. (Note: We will return
to the ideal-self discrepancies in more detail in Chapter 9).

2.6 Psychodynamic Methods of Assessment

There are a number of assessment techniques that are somewhat unique to the psy-chodynamic perspective because of their theoretical origins or some of the theoretical assumptions associated with their use. It should also be noted that many of the tradi-
tional assessments emerging from the psychodynamic perspective have been characterized as
“techniques,” rather than formal tests per se. The rationale for labeling them techniques (or
methods) is that many lack some of the basic psychometric properties of a test (i.e., adequate
reliability and validity). In the absence of these properties, it is certainly reasonable to consider
whether the label of “test” is appropriate (see Dahlstrom, 1993). We here briefly review some
of those techniques and tasks.

The Technique of Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalysis was not only forwarded as a theory of the mind and a method for treating emo-
tional and psychological disorders, but it was also used as a method of assessment. Freud used this
investigative tool he developed to explore various aspects of mental processes, and he believed it
to be especially useful for accessing the unconscious.

In a typical psychoanalytic session, patients would lie on a couch, behind which an analyst, usu-
ally a psychiatrist or a psychologist, sits quietly. The rationale is that lying on a couch provides an
atmosphere that facilitates patients letting their guard down and revealing important information.
Ideally, the analyst says little and responds to everything in a neutral manner so that the patient’s
projection of feelings and thoughts can occur naturally. Psychoanalysis was not to involve the giv-
ing of advice or admonishing of the patient.

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CHAPTER 2 2.6 Psychodynamic Methods of Assessment

Freud’s psychoanalysis was based on his belief that individuals in therapy tend to recreate the
dynamics of their early relationships. In this process, the analyst takes the place of important oth-
ers in those relationships—an event termed transference. By transference, Freud (1966) meant a
transferal of feelings to the doctor. For example, transference can appear as a passionate demand
for love or, in more moderate forms, a wish could emerge from a young female patient that her
older male therapist receives her as a favorite daughter. Current research in cognitive and rela-
tional science suggests that the construct of transference is reasonably robust and appears to be
involved in all our relationships (Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). (Note: There are parallel terms
in other theoretical perspectives that characterize a process very similar to transference. As an
illustration, the behavioral perspective uses the term generalization to indicate when learning in
one context is generalized to another similar context.)

The Technique of Free Association
Although used within the context of psychoanalysis, the technique of free association can stand
on its own as a unique contribution to the process of psychodynamic assessment. Free association
is the uncensored expression of whatever thoughts or feelings come to mind, a sort of stream-of-
consciousness thinking. The theory is that free association can open a window into the intimate
recesses of the patient’s mind because it moves too quickly and too fluently (if someone has
learned to do it well) to allow the normal defenses to catch and prevent any undesirable con-
tent from emerging. With free association, the therapist attempts to identify repetitive patterns,
themes, conflicts, resolutions, and fixations.

The Technique of Dream Analysis
Another of Freud’s pioneering developments involved the analysis of dreams. Freud considered
The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1913) to be the major work of his life. In this book, he pre-
sented his ideas about the symbolic meanings of various elements in dreams. Psychoanalysts con-
tinue to use dreams as a way to access the patient’s unconscious. As is the case with free associa-
tion, the rationale is that in the dream one is less likely to censor (defend against) material because
it is seen as less threatening. Indeed, much of the dream content is perceived as even more benign
when the agent of action in the dream is not the individual, but someone else. Of course, Freud
would still interpret the primary agent of action as the dreamer, at least in most circumstances.

Freud speculated that dreams are based on the residual experiences of the day and reveal uncon-
scious, conflict-laden issues, many of which are expressed symbolically. As noted earlier in the text,
some psychoanalytic therapists, such as Jung, focused on the manifest content of dreams—their
apparent surface meaning. Some
psychoanalysts, such as Freud,
instead focused on the dream’s
latent content—that is, its hid-
den meanings, as they are being
heavily defended. Regardless of
the practitioner or their focus,
the greatest interest tends to be
on recurrent dreams, as they are
thought to be especially salient
to the dreamer, often alerting
the therapist to specific issues of
emotional relevance.

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

For more detailed information on Freud’s views of the sig-
nificance of dreams, consider reading Freud’s (1900/1913)
text, The Interpretation of Dreams (3rd ed.), translated by
A. A. Brill. A version of this text is available at http://psych
classics.yorku.ca/Freud/Dreams/index.htm.

Reference: Freud, S. (1913). The interpretation of dreams
(3rd ed.). (A. A. Brill, Trans.). New York, NY: The Macmillan
Company.

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CHAPTER 2 2.6 Psychodynamic Methods of Assessment

The Word Association Task
Carl Jung believed that individuals make associations between ideas, experiences, and affective
states, and many of these connections exist in the unconscious. Jung labeled these groupings and
connections complexes, and he theorized that they could be uncovered through testing. The word
association task was one means by which he sought to do so. The premise of the task is to provide
the patient with a series of words, and after each word, the patient says the first word that comes
to mind, responding as quickly as possible. The rapid response set is intended to minimize the
individual’s level of monitoring, making it more likely that unconscious material will surface. In
fact, long delays in responding would be interpreted as a defensive posture.

The Rorschach Inkblot Test
In 1921, after studying the responses of hundreds of psychiatric patients and control subjects for
approximately 10 years, Swiss psychologist Hermann Rorschach wrote the book Psychodiagnostik
(Psychodiagnostics, 1921/1942), introducing the Rorschach inkblot test. In his book, Rorschach char-
acterized the 10 cards he selected and outlined a scoring method. However, Rorschach died within
the next year, leaving the Rorschach without an individual to guide its development. Consequently,
several different administration and scoring procedures were developed (e.g., Beck, 1944; Beck,
Beck, Levitt, & Molish, 1961; Klopfer & Kelley, 1942), and an alternative version of the inkblot even

emerged (e.g., The Holtzman Ink-
blot Test; Holtzman, Thorpe,
Swartz, & Herron, 1961). What
all of these approaches had in
common was the rationale of
presenting an ambiguous stimu-
lus, the inkblot, and having the
patient provide a response, with
the primary interpretation focus-
ing on the response content. As
with other projective tests, the
assumption is that the respondent
would project his or her uncon-
scious conflicts into the inkblot.

Although all versions were often variously referred to as the inkblot test, they were each quite
different. As noted in Chapter 1, the lack of standardization for a test seriously undermines its reli-
ability and validity. We will see in Chapter 3 that one of the more recent contributions to the field
was a standardization of the Rorschach.

The Thematic Apperception Test
The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) was first developed by Henry Murray and Christina Morgan
in 1935. Since that time, it has grown in its popularity, and aside from the Rorschach, the TAT is the
most widely used projective test (Wood, Nezworski, Lilienfeld, & Garb, 2003). The test contains
over 30 picture cards that depict individuals of both genders and of varying ages, as well as more
ambiguous figures. Indeed, one picture is blank. Originally, Murray suggested using 20 of the

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

For more detailed information on Jung’s word association
task, read Jung’s (1910) article, “The Association Method,”
originally published in the American Journal of Psychol-
ogy. Find it online at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Jung
/Association/lecture1.htm.

Reference: Jung, C. (1910). The association method. American
Journal of Psychology, 31, 219–269.

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CHAPTER 2 Summary

cards, selecting the subset based on age
and gender of the patient, and adminis-
tering them 10 at a time in two separate
test sessions. Murray also developed a
scoring system for the TAT based on his
need-press theory of personality. How-
ever, in practice, approximately 10 cards
are administered, and there is consid-
erable variability in the specific cards
selected, as well as in how they are
administered and scored. Indeed, there
are even more scoring systems for the
TAT relative to the Rorschach, and most
are qualitative in nature (see Groth-
Marnat, 2009). Thus, although the TAT
instrument is widely used, its psycho-
metric properties remain questionable,
due to the reliance on the clinician’s
judgment and intuition (e.g., Lilienfeld
et al., 2000).

Summary

This chapter describes Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, the most comprehensive personal-ity theory of the 20th century, as well as the ideas of other theorists who shared many of Freud’s basic assumptions. Psychoanalytic theory views the mind as being composed
of three major structures: the id (primary drives of sex and aggression), the ego (reality-based
level of personality), and the superego (conscience). Freud believed that the primary forces that
drive human thought and behavior are sexual (life instinct/libido) and aggressive (death instinct)
in nature. Freud divided the mind into three regions: unconscious, preconscious, and conscious,
though he believed the unconscious to be the most important of these. He believed that the id
reflects our unconscious desires, the superego our unconscious need to be ideal (in morality), and
the ego manages the inevitable conflict through the use of defense mechanisms. In Freud’s sys-
tem, personality development progresses through oral, anal, phallic, latency, and genital stages
of psychosexual development. Personality reflects the extent to which the individual accomplishes
the tasks related to each stage, as well as the possibility of becoming fixated.

The neo-analytics expanded on Freud’s psychodynamic theory and made many lasting and influen-
tial contributions as well, including Carl Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious, Alfred Adler’s
inferiority complex, and Karen Horney’s repressed womanhood.

We also reviewed several research studies testing the viability of the unconscious and its influ-
ence, a defense mechanism, and some aspects of the psychosexual stages of development. In
a broad sense, the reviewed research supports the influence of the unconscious, the defense
mechanisms, and even raises the possibility of some unusual dynamics, though it falls well short
of confirming psychodynamic theory. The methods used to explore the unconscious were also
presented, along with their strengths and weaknesses.

Lewis J Merrim/Science Source/Getty Images

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) requires individuals
to tell a story based on an ambiguous image; the clinician
looks for recurrent themes in the stories from different
images. There are both adult and child versions of this
projective test.

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CHAPTER 2

Key Terms

Of course, psychodynamic theory was never universally accepted, and many continue to be
staunch critics of both the theory and method. The psychodynamic approach is often charac-
terized as philosophical rather than scientific in nature, and it is sometimes considered pseudo-
science. However, despite problems with the methods, many of psychoanalytic concepts have
evolved to fit within modern theories (Luborsky & Barrett, 2006) and they continue to stimulate
research (Westen, 1998).

Key Terms

anal expulsive The personality resulting from
a child who deals with issues of control and
autonomy in the anal stage by giving up efforts
to control situations.

anal retentive The personality resulting from
a child who deals with issues of control and
autonomy in the anal stage by over-controlling
situations.

anal stage Lasting until about age 4, a stage of
development during which the primary source
of pleasure is derived from the voiding and
retention of feces.

cognitive unconscious A modern day concept
that is distinct from Freud’s unconscious and
more akin to his concept of the preconscious.

collective unconscious Refers to what is essen-
tially a public-access and universal version of
the unconscious that contains memory traces
common to all humans.

conscious The portion of the mind of which we
are ordinarily aware; Freud considered this just
a small part of each individual’s mind.

death instinct Represented by aggression, as
one example; sometimes called Thanatos, a
minor mythological Greek figure.

defense mechanism A mental operation that
protects an individual against anxiety that
might result when primary process material
threatens to break through to the conscious or
preconscious mind.

denial A defense mechanism that consists of a
refusal to accept reality.

ego A psychic structure defined by Freud
whose primary role is to utilize defenses to
meet the demands of the superego, and id,
while also balancing the limitations of reality.

Electra complex The related experience of the
Oedipus complex for the female, who believes
she has already been castrated; she blames her
mother for the castration, and is drawn to her
father because he does possess a penis.

extrovert A person who tends to be outgoing
and very socially oriented.

fixated Being stuck in a certain stage of psy-
chosexual development, unable to progress.

genital phase The final stage of psychosexual
development, beginning at approximately age
11–14; libidinal energy is now directed towards
adult romantic partners of the opposite sex,
and the stage culminates in the fullest level of
maturity.

id A psychic structure defined by Freud that is
only driven to maximize pleasure and minimize
pain. The id is hypothesized to be submerged in
the unconscious, so basic drives can be satis-
fied in the unconscious (e.g., fantasy) as well.

inferiority complex Individuals’ struggles with
feelings of inferiority.

introvert A person who tends to be quiet and
withdrawn and is more interested in ideas than
in people.

latency phase A stage of development from
about age 6 to 12; it is a time when preoccupa-
tion with sexuality lessens.

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CHAPTER 2 Key Terms

latent content Underlying meaning (typically
sexual or aggressive in nature).

libido The sexual instinct; referred to as Eros,
the Greek god of love and sexual desire.

life instinct Represented by the libido, the
sexual drive.

manifest content Apparent, surface meaning.

moral anxiety Anxiety that emerges second-
ary to fears that you are violating internalized
moral standards. This is most likely to occur
when the superego gains too much control
over the ego.

neuroses A cluster of symptoms typified by
anxiety or indecision and some degree of social
maladjustment.

neurotic anxiety A kind of “free-floating” ten-
sion that is unrelated to any immediate threat.

Oedipus complex When a young boy com-
pete with his father in an attempt to gain the
attention of or possess his mother. This leads to
fears of being castrated by his father.

oral aggression The personality that occurs
when weaning has occurred too soon or too
abruptly, creating an adult who aggresses
against others to meet his or her needs.

oral dependency The personality that occurs
when an infant has been weaned too late, cre-
ating an adult who requires and expects a great
deal of attention and support from others.

oral stage The first psychosexual stage of
development, lasting until about age 2, in
which an infant explores the world largely
through his or her mouth.

persona An identity or mask that an individual
adopts.

phallic stage Psychosexual period of develop-
ment that lasts from about 4 to 8 years of age,
during which the primary source of gratification
is derived from the genitals.

pleasure principle The attempt to avoid pain
and maximize pleasure.

preconscious The portion of the mind where
unconscious material is transformed or
“worked over” by the defense mechanisms.
Any material that is moving from the uncon-
scious to conscious awareness first must go
through the preconscious.

primary process Thinking derived from inner
thoughts and fantasies that are egocentric in
nature and lacking in objectivity.

psychoanalytic theory A comprehensive
metatheory that deals with the structure and
operation of the mind, the formation of per-
sonality through stages of psychosexual devel-
opment, the development of psychopatholo-
gies, and psychoanalytic methods for treating
psychological disorders.

psychosexual development Freud’s theory of
human development and personality forma-
tion; the sexual instincts to survive and procre-
ate are one of the major forces in this develop-
mental process.

reaction formation The defense mechanism
in which one adopts attitudes and engages
in behavior that defends against threatening
unconscious impulses that are in direct opposi-
tion to the adopted attitudes and behaviors.

realistic anxiety A rational response to actual
danger, which triggers a flight-fight-or-freeze
response.

reality principle The recognition that gratifica-
tion is subject to limitations in reality.

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CHAPTER 2 Key Terms

repressed womanhood Horney’s reinterpreta-
tion of penis envy, in which anatomy is not the
cause of women’s dissatisfaction, but instead it
is the maltreatment of women in our society.

repression A psychological defense mecha-
nism that is used to keep painful experiences
and unacceptable impulses out of conscious
awareness.

sublimation The defense mechanism through
which the individual finds ways of transform-
ing unacceptable urges into more acceptable
behaviors.

superego The mental structure that represents
the internalization of society’s values and mor-
als, as portrayed by parental figures and social
institutions.

topography A theoretical conception of how
the mind organizes experience and how its vari-
ous components interrelate.

transference In therapy, it is when the analyst
takes the place of important others in early
relationships. This can also occur in other areas
of life.

unconscious The portion of the mind of which
we are unaware and the defense mechanisms
actively suppress.

wish fulfillment Imagery (or hallucinatory
experience) that resolves tension.

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ViktorCap/iStock/Thinkstock

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should be
able to:

• Describe the basic elements of object-relations
theory, and describe the process of form-
ing internalized objects and how they shape
personality.

• Explain how attachment theory expanded our
understanding of how personality develops.

• Discuss the main features of Kohut’s self psy-
chology and how it adds to our understand-
ing of narcissism.

• Explain Winnicott’s concept of the good-
enough mother and why he thought infants
could not be studied by themselves.

• Explain the purpose of defenses and what
makes them functional or pathological.

• Describe Erickson’s contributions to identity
development and personality theory.

• Explain how normal personality development
is undermined by narcissism, according to the
contemporary psychodynamic approach.

Contemporary Psychodynamic
Models of Personality 3

Chapter Outline
Introduction

3.1 Early Development of Contemporary
Psychodynamic Approaches:
Object Relations
• Primacy of Attachment
• Attachment in Nonhuman Species
• The Good-Enough Mother
• The Experience of Emptiness
• Psychoneurosis and Normal Development

3.2 Early Development of Contemporary
Psychodynamic Approaches:
Self Psychology
• Mirroring
• Identity Development
• The Significance of Identity and

Identity Crisis
• Development of Narcissism
• Core Effects of Narcissism: Shame and Rage

• Use Malan’s triangle of conflict to describe how emotion-anxiety-defenses depict intrapsychic processes.

• Use Malan’s triangle of persons to describe how patterns from our past attachments are reenacted in our
current relationships.

• Know the assessment strategies and tools for contemporary psychodynamic models.

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CHAPTER 3

Introduction
We love attention, and it seems that our penchant for self-attention is growing
(at least on a societal level). There are now companies you can hire to provide you
with the same paparazzi experience lavished upon Hollywood celebrities; you can
actually be a “celebrity for a day” and have throngs of media taking photos of you
as you go out ( http://www.celeb4aday.com/Home.html). The most popular TV
shows are reality shows that essentially detail and expose our private lives. There
are even companies that will help you develop a more effective personal Face-
book page to help boost your personal image and appear more popular to others.
Although some self-love and attention seeking can be normal and even healthy,
in more extreme manifestations (especially when combined with grandiosity and
selfishness) it is neither healthy nor normal and would be labeled as narcissism.

In psychodynamic terms, narcissism is a personality disorder characterized by
extreme, pathological self-love. In their 2001 book, The Narcissism Epidemic,
psychologists Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell discuss how narcissism in
American culture is on the rise, and they suggest that this will result in problems
such as aggression, materialism, and shallow values. Even primary research has
weighed in on this topic, suggesting that the use of social media can be related
to narcissistic tendencies (e.g., Carpenter, 2012) and can have implications for
self-worth (Stefanone, Lackaff, & Rosen, 2011). For example, greater narcissism
is seen in those who use Facebook the most. Research also suggests that certain
behaviors associated with Facebook use are related to narcissism. Consider the
following questions:

• Do you frequently update your Facebook status?
• When you do post, are the posts self-promoting in nature?
• Do you spend more than an hour per day on Facebook?
• Do you tag yourself in photos?
• Do you have a large number of virtual friends relative to non-virtual

friends, and are you focused on growing that number?
• Do you enhance photos of yourself?

Introduction

3.3 Early Development of Contemporary
Psychodynamic Approaches: Ego
Psychology
• Modes of Normal Functioning
• Interpersonal Functioning
• Making Sense of the World and

Using Defenses

3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of
Integrative Theory
• Malan’s Triangle of Conflict
• Malan’s Triangle of Persons: The Inter-

personal Matrix
• Using the Triangles to Explain Personal-

ity Development and Organization

3.5 Assessment Strategies and Tools
for Contemporary Psychodynamic
Models
• The Clinical Interview
• Projective Tests

Summary

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CHAPTER 3 3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Object Relations

These are just some sample questions, but the more often you answer “yes”
to these questions, the more likely you have more narcissistic traits (and lower
self-esteem), at least according to some survey research of Facebook users
(e.g., Carpenter, 2012).

Of course, we are interested in doing more than just measuring narcissism; we
want to know its causes and consequences, and from a clinical standpoint, we
want to know if such behavior can be modified (i.e., treated). With over one billion
users worldwide, it’s obviously not the case the case that all Facebook users are
narcissists (so don’t close your account just yet). However, even individuals with
no clinical training appear able to identify the Facebook pages of those higher in
narcissism (Buffardi & Campbell, 2008), and it is typically easier to identify nar-
cissistic behavior in others than it is to see it in ourselves. Indeed, our innermost
motivations are not always self-apparent (see the study in Section 3.2 in “Devel-
opment of Narcissism,” which examines narcissism and self-awareness).

In this chapter, we will explore some of the contemporary psychodynamic models
that emerged around the second half of the 20th century and continue to evolve
today. These theoretical systems advanced new concepts that seemed to more
fully characterize the modern human condition. For example, they looked at the
influence of sociocultural factors—an area that was largely overlooked by Freud—
and how these affect the self.

Pine (1990) suggests that there are four basic orientations in psychoanalytic the-
ory. The first, referred to as drive theory, was forwarded by Freud. Drive theory
refers to the instincts that motivate behavior, and as noted in Chapter 2, those
were the defined in terms of sex (life) and aggression (death). The three remaining
orientations—object relations, self psychology, and ego psychology—are grouped
within the contemporary psychodynamic approaches, and are the primary focus
of the current chapter, along with Malan’s psychodynamic model.

3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic
Approaches: Object Relations

An important development in contemporary psychoanalytic theory is object- relations theory—the notion that each of us carries around in our minds certain well-established ideas (referred to as objects), often based on our early relationships with our
mothers or fathers. The theory is founded on the notion that important aspects of how we relate
to people are programmed into us by our early relationships. Thus, object relations refer to the
study of how our minds evolve and grow in the context of our relationships to our early caregivers
or primary attachment figures (for an overview, see Williams, 2012).

Objects are our internalized representations of important aspects of these relationships. For exam-
ple, the mental representation of your mother is the object, and object-relations theory suggests
that the way we relate to people reflects these objects. The theory might suggest that a man who
is immediately suspicious of all the women he meets may be viewing women through an object
that is based on experiences he had with his mother when he was an infant. Perhaps she had
to leave him every day for a brief period of time and his (unconscious) perception might be that

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CHAPTER 3 3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Object Relations

she intentionally abandoned him
(note how reality is less relevant
than the individual’s perception
of reality; the object relation is
a subjective mental representa-
tion). The resulting object, based
on that early relationship, now
guides how he interprets rela-
tionships with other women.
This example could likewise be
extended to paternal objects, as
well as any other relationship the
infant can represent internally.

Among the many psychoanalysts who contributed to the development of object-relations theory
are Otto Rank (who first introduced the concept), Melanie Klein, W. R. D. Fairbairn, Margaret
Mahler, Annie Reich (Buckley, 1986), Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy, Harry Guntrip, and of course, D. W.
Winnicott, who played the most significant role in expanding the concept of object relations.

Winnicott was a pediatrician who, after exposure to the work of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud,
became a child analyst, although he also worked with adult psychotic patients (D. W. Winnicott,
1988). He believed he could learn much about the psychology of early infancy by studying adult
patients who had been made to regress (go back to their childhoods and even infancies).

Object-relations theory was an impor-
tant departure from Freud’s structural
drive theory, in which aggression was
assumed to be a normal human instinct.
Instead, Winnicott viewed aggression as
a result of attachment disruption. Thus,
for Freud, the presence of aggression
would be normal, whereas for Winnicott
aggression would indicate a problem
related to attachment. Object-relations
theory is based on two main assump-
tions: (1) the development of self occurs
in our relationships with significant oth-
ers and (2) interactions with attachment
figures form internalized templates that
serve as working models for future rela-
tionships (Benedict & Hastings, 2002).

The object-relations movement was
stimulated in part by attachment theo-
rists who were beginning to recognize
the importance of relationships in both psychotherapy and individual development. The move-
ment also focused on the processes of symbiosis and individuation and their essential role in iden-
tity development (Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975). Symbiosis refers to the mother–infant unit, of
which the child is initially an undifferentiated part; individuation is the process by which the infant
becomes increasingly separate and self-sufficient (Note: Although traditional object-relations

Joruba/iStock/Thinkstock

Object-relations theory suggests that there is a delicate
balance between the mother and child being integrated
as one unit (symbiosis) and the developmental process of
the infant forming his or her own identity (individuation).

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

In this 1958 paper, “The Nature of Love,” Harry Harlow, who
did pioneering work in the field of maternal attachment in
nonhuman species, describes maternal “love.” Read it at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Harlow/love.htm.

Reference: Harlow, H. F. (1958). The nature of love. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 13, 673–685.

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CHAPTER 3 3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Object Relations

theorists referred to the mother-infant unit, with this language being echoed in this chapter, a
more modern view would refer to the parent–infant unit, as the former may be more tied to the
traditional gender roles of the time. In fact, the absence of fathers—paternal separation—can
also have a toll on the infant; see, for example, Phares & Compas, 1992). Object-relations theory
assumes that separation that is too rapid causes excessive anxiety and can lead to a disruption in
the normal separation-individuation phase, which can then result in more longstanding problems
in later life. Some research provides general support for this association, as children who have
experienced various forms of abuse (e.g., sexual, physical, or emotional) have a heightened risk
for a range of psychiatric conditions, including depression and posttraumatic stress (Felitti et al.,
1998; Gibb, Chelminski, & Zimmerman, 2007). See “Putting Object-Relations Theory to the Test:
Part 1,” in this chapter, for a description of one such study.

In addition to associating early maternal (and in parallel, paternal) separation to problematic
behavior later in life, researchers have also tried to associate it with biological consequences,
such as hormonal changes and other biological markers associated with a stress response. More
recently, the term allostatic load has been introduced into the literature to refer to the biologi-
cal and physiological consequences that result from chronic stress. Importantly, the body has a
physiological threat response that occurs following stress exposure, and although it is adaptive
to respond to the acute stressor, the frequent activation of this system can be harmful to organs
and tissues. Allostatic load is a cumulative account of these strains on the organs and tissues and
can be used to predict later life problems (McEwen & Seeman, 2003). In “Putting Object-Relations
Theory to the Test: Part 2,” in this chapter, we will examine whether the early experience of mater-
nal separation can manifest in terms of physiological or biological outcomes.

Primacy of Attachment
Many of Winnicott’s theoretical constructs developed after World War II and were influenced
by his experience with children separated from their parents during the bombing of England. He
came to believe that the main challenges we deal with have to do with how to maintain balance
in our relationships. This requires balancing the polarities involved in, for example, being autono-
mous but not feeling isolated; cooperating and giving without allowing ourselves to be used; and
both receiving and giving, without being engulfed by the needs of others (Cushman, 1992).

Winnicott’s ideas are very similar to Freud’s with respect to his view of the unconscious, the
importance of early childhood development, and transference. What is unique to Winnicott is that
he did not believe that infants could be viewed outside the context of the maternal–infant dyad.
He thought of the beginning of the child’s life as a mother–infant unit, such that the infant exists
only in the mother–infant dyad (Rayner, 1991). Accordingly, he believed that the self develops in
the context of relationships between child and parent, and that there is a core struggle between
the infant’s need for intimacy and the urge for separation. Some of the theoretical concepts to be
defined next highlight his emphasis on this maternal–child dyad and any disruptions to this dyad.

Attachment in Nonhuman Species
The importance of early attachment was also being explored in other fields. For example, the
animal studies of Harlow (1958; for an overview see Suomi & Leroy, 1982) demonstrated that
attachment involved more than simple feeding, as infant monkeys who had been separated from
their mothers at birth (referred to as “orphaned monkeys”) were exposed to surrogate mothers,
some of which provided warmth and a soft touch (they were made of cloth), while others were
physically uncomfortable (made of wire), but they provided food (i.e., a bottle to mimic breast

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CHAPTER 3 3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Object Relations

feeding). Harlow found that the cloth surrogates were preferred over the wire feeding surrogates.
However, all forms of early separation (i.e., regardless as to whether the orphaned monkeys had
no or simply limited opportunities for attachment) resulted in problematic behavior as they aged,
including, most notably, aggression (Harlow & Zimmerman, 1959). For a more detailed look at
Harlow’s work, see the “Beyond the Text: Classic Writings” box in this section. Subtler forms of
separation have also been shown to result in greater timidity and decreased willingness to explore
one’s environment (Suomi, 1991).

Similarly, the work of developmental psychologists also informed our understanding of attachment
and separation, emphasizing the role of these experiences in personality development (Davidson,
Scherer, & Goldsmith, 2003; Nadel & Muir, 2005; Panksepp, 1998). Especially influential was the
work of John Bowlby (1988) who studied early attachment in primates and forwarded a theory
of attachment, separation, and loss (for a review, see Bretherton, 1992). Bowlby postulated that
there are a number of behavioral systems that function to tie the infant to the mother and keep
her in close proximity. He describes how attachment develops: “The behavioural systems them-
selves are believed to develop within the infant as a result of his interaction with his environment,
of evolutionary adaptedness, and especially of his interaction with the principal figure in that
environment, namely his mother” (pp. 179–180). Bowlby believed that clinging and sucking drive
attachment. Eating, he explained, is only a minor element in the process of attachment, a finding
that was consistent with Harlow’s work, as well (see van der Horst, LeRoy, & van der Veer, 2008).

The aim of attachment behavior, claims Bowlby, is to keep the attachment object close to ensure
protection and food, both of which are essential for survival. Proximity-maintaining behavior can
be seen when a mother leaves the room and the infant cries. Bowlby also studied the experience
of separation and threats of separation, both of which were thought to arouse feelings of anxiety,
anger, and even grief. Bowlby suggested that children are protected from overly painful experi-
ences of loss because they experience a form of amnesia that serves to defend against the pain/
loss, and he suggested that separation does not affect all children in the same way.

Thus, it appears that attachment and the process of separation are both experiences that are some-
what universal, and not limited to humans or just those experiencing problematic functioning.

The Good-Enough Mother
One of Winnicott’s best-known concepts is that of the good-enough mother, which is a very use-
ful concept in understanding the development of healthy and unhealthy selves. This concept
refers to the fact that the mother must be healthy and responsive enough to meet the infant’s
minute-to-minute needs as they occur (Winnicott, Shepherd, & Davis, 1989). It does not mean
that the mother has to be a “perfect” parent to have healthy children, but that it is important to
be available at a critical level of parental functioning in order to fulfill the basic needs of uncom-
plicated developmental progression. Good-enough mothering, then, provides what is necessary
for healthy development.

What is important is not a precise measurement of what is good enough, but rather the idea that
at a certain level of maternal insufficiency, development will be compromised. For example, imag-
ine a chronically depressed mother who is unable to respond emotionally to her infant. In this
case, a sufficiently good attachment or object relationship will not have been established. Accord-
ing to object-relations theory, the infant will then internalize the mother as a distant and nonre-
sponsive object, and this may become a fixed internal representation applied to future relation-
ships. In this case, the mother was not “good enough.” Now take an instance in which a mother

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CHAPTER 3 3.1 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Object Relations

suffers from the “baby blues” or even postpartum depression in the weeks following her child’s
birth. She isn’t perhaps as responsive as she would like to be to her baby’s needs, but with medi-
cation and strong support from family and spouse, she is soon feeling better and able to handle
most of the demands her child poses. Ultimately, the object relation her child will form will be a
positive one. In this case, then, the mother wasn’t perfect, but she was certainly “good enough”
to raise a well-adjusted child.

The Experience of Emptiness
Winnicott’s ideas about object relations enabled him to better understand certain clinical phe-
nomena that were reported by his patients (Winnicott et al., 1989). Among these phenomena
was the fact that some patients reported experiencing what they described as deep emptiness.
Winnicott conceptualized this, along with most phenomena, as a relationship event. He assumed
that the emptiness likely occurred before the person developed language, when there was no
response from the primary attachment object/figure. In relation to Freudian development, this
would be termed pre-Oedipal. Winnicott believed that it was easier for a patient to remember a
traumatic event than to recall a lack of responsiveness from a primary attachment figure. With-
out the benefit of language to form a narrative of what was experienced, the patient is left with
deep emptiness.

What was important in the development of object-relations theory was that it offered a new
way of looking at pre-Oedipal insufficiency, or what might now be termed “emotional neglect.”
In some ways, it provided a better explanation for clinical phenomena. Michael Balint (1968) also
drew attention to the problem of faulty or insufficient parenting—that is, emotional neglect. He
believed this led to a chronic sense that there is something wrong or defective about oneself—
hence sensations of emptiness. The basic fault, explained Winnicott and other object-relations
theorists, has to do with disrupted or unformed infant–caregiver attachment, a fact that under-
lines the importance of early attachment on the development of the self.

The theoretical formulations and research in this area are tremendously important as they
affect an increasing number of individuals. In 2011, the U.S., Department of Health and Human
Services found that approximately three-quarters of a million children were reportedly abused or
neglected in the United States. Victimization rates are approximately 9 for every thousand chil-
dren, with the youngest children (less than 3 years of age) having the highest victimization rates.
For example, children under 1 year of age had victimization rates of over 21 out of every thousand
children. In addition to the incredible toll on the children and their families, the total lifetime eco-
nomic burden for those cases reported in a one-year period (2008) would be between $124 billion
and $585 billion, depending on the type of analysis (Fang, Brown, Florence, & Mercy, 2012). Thus,
a better understanding of this problem and the development of intervention strategies is critical.

A logical extension of object-relations theory is that if we can improve the mental and physical
health of parents, we may minimize problematic attachment, have more mothers who are “good
enough” to meet their children’s needs, and in the long run, avoid the experience of emptiness by
those children when they are adults.

Winnicott provides a theoretical connection between the maternal levels of adjustment and level
of adjustment of their children. Research on this topic suggests that emotional neglect by moth-
ers in childhood increases the incidence of psychopathology for the children later in life (e.g.,
Jaite, Schneider, Hilbert, Pfeiffer, Lehmkuhl, & Salbach-Andrae, 2012; Young, Lennie, & Minni,
2011). The literature also suggests that emotional neglect may predict individual differences in

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CHAPTER 3 3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

physiological responding, such as amygdala reactivity (White et al., 2012) and cerebral infarcts in
old age (Wilson et al., 2012). One logical extension of this body of research and the underlying
theory is to examine the implications of maternal interventions, especially with high-risk mothers.

A study by Mayers, Hager-Budny, and Buckner (2008) involved an intervention study targeting
low-income, teen mothers and their infants enrolled at inner city public high schools. The findings
indicate that mothers who had received treatment had improved interactions with their infants
in the areas of responsiveness, affective availability, and directiveness. Infants in the treatment
group were also found to increase their interest in the mother, respond more positively to physical
contact, and show improved emotional tone relative to the control infants. The findings are also
consistent with object-relations theory.

Psychoneurosis and Normal Development
Winnicott views normal and abnormal personality development in terms of how defenses are uti-
lized (recall that defenses are means of protecting the individual from conflict related to anxiety).
Winnicott suggests that healthy individuals are those who can marshal their defenses to combat
internal conflicts that arise. Like Freud, he believed that healthy individuals employ a wide range
of defenses and can shift defenses in a flexible manner. In contrast, unhealthy individuals tend to
have a more rigid set of defenses (Winnicott et al., 1989). Also, the unhealthy person may resort
to massive repression or denial. In contrast, healthy individuals can tolerate the conflicts inherent
in life and maintain contact with the self; they are less prone to see others in terms of “good” or
“bad” objects, as they are referred to by object-relations theorists.

The work of the object-relations theorists provides important insight into child development and
suggests new ways of understanding adult psychopathology and severe personality disorders.
Another important contribution relates to the emotions we develop toward our selves, especially
our sometimes-extreme self-love, or, as we discussed in the opening to the chapter, narcissism.

3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic
Approaches: Self Psychology

One of the central figures in the self-psychology movement was Heinz Kohut, who believed that all children have a need for someone to affirm and admire their achievements, a role most commonly filled by the parental (and more typically, maternal) figure. We here pres-
ent what Kohut believed to be some of the essential components in the development of the self
and include a discussion of Erik Erikson’s theory, which emphasizes the development of the self
over the lifespan.

Mirroring
The concept of mirroring refers to the act of providing an accurate response to the thoughts,
moods, and feelings of another. Although this clearly involves empathy, mirroring implies more
than just understanding another person’s emotions. An essential aspect in the development of
a healthy self-system includes a relationship with a mirroring figure. Mirroring is the process by
which the primary attachment figure provides feedback in the form of reflection and affirmation
of the positive qualities that a child demonstrates (for a review, see Ornstein, 1991).

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CHAPTER 3 3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

Mirroring is expressed in somewhat different ways, depending on the developmental stage of
the individual. In infancy, it is evident in a kind of synchrony of responses between caregiver and
infant, calibrated to the infant’s needs, such that when the infant is crying the caregiver might
naturally mimic the sad face, or when they are smiling and laughing, the caregiver would likewise
smile broadly. Later in life, when language has developed, mirroring might entail reflecting feel-
ings and thoughts that are discerned through active listening—a process that, in a sense, allows
one person to locate the essence of the other. For example, when you are talking to a close and
trusted friend about your concerns regarding the difficulty of several upcoming exams, they might
reflect back to you that you appear to be expressing a more general fear of failure. Assuming this
is an accurate read, this could function as a form of mirroring.

Kohut believed that the experience of mirroring is key to development (Kohut & Wolf, 1986). The
thesis is that the newborn does not have a self, but has certain prewired adaptations important for
biological survival (breathing, sucking, and coughing reflexes, for example), as well as response
tendencies and needs critical for psychological survival. Psychological survival, Kohut explains,
requires the presence of responsive and empathetic caregivers. In this contemporary psychoana-
lytic view, relationships with caregivers become internalized, give rise to self-objects, and lead to
the development of a mature, normal sense of self. But this does not occur in the absence of an
early stage during which mirroring provides an adequate response to the child’s needs. It requires,
as well, the gradual replacement of self-objects with a more mature, consistent, self-structure.

In his treatment of patients suffering from narcissistic disorders, Kohut emphasized the impor-
tance of empathy on the part of the psychotherapist. He believed that this was a key component
of the healing process, but that it was not sufficient in and of itself. In other words, having some-
one respond to us with empathy will not necessarily change our maladaptive behavior patterns.

Kohut emphasizes the central importance of emotional
attunement in healthy personality development. In
fact, this type of emotional responsiveness on the part
of the parent may be necessary for the development
of healthy brain functions. There is mounting evidence
to suggest that humiliation may actually damage the
brain, negatively influencing brain structure and func-
tion (Cozolino, 2006; Siegel, 1999). The explanation is
that the experience of humiliation can result in a state
of acute stress, leading to the release of the stress hor-
mone cortisol. Excessive production of cortisol over
an extended period of time can have negative effects
on the body (Dickerson & Kemeny (2004). As a result,
early shame experiences can impact brain develop-
ment (Schore, 1998).

Kohut also introduced the concept of transmut-
ing internalization, which refers to the growth-pro-
ducing process by which self-object relationships
become internalized, leading to a normal notion of
self in which the self-concept includes other objects,
yet remains distinct from those objects. In Kohut’s

Stockbyte/Thinkstock

Is this child suffering neurological damage?

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CHAPTER 33.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

language, this results in normal, stable psychic structures. Psychic structures refer to our inter-
nal object relations (simply put, our internalized notions about what relationships with others
are or should be). The current terms schema and template are used interchangeably with psy-
chic structure.

The process of transmuting internalization involves three steps:

1. The psychic structure is receptive to absorb introjects (literally, internalizations of others’
ideas, or the turning of feelings for others toward oneself).

2. These internalizations are, to some extent, frustrating: They don’t satisfy all the infant’s
needs, and this leads to a sense of loss in the infant. This frustration and mourning is
considered essential for the development of normal personality structure as it leads
the infant to replace some of the functions of the lost object. Thus, according to Kohut,
minor parental absences, failures, and disappointments all play a fundamental role in
the infant’s development of self.

3. Finally, minor losses and parental absences prevent total identification with the object
(the parent), allowing for the development of a differentiated self.

What Kohut is saying, basically, is that a child will gradually take in the features of a parent. At
first, the entire parental matrix will be taken in either as “good” or “bad,” and then slowly, over
time, the good and bad parts will be integrated into a coherent picture of the parent. Through this
process, Kohut believes children develop their internal structure. For some, especially those with
delayed emotional development or those with some personality disorders (discussed in Chapter
10), this process is delayed well into adulthood or may never occur.

Identity Development
Kohut believed that the mirroring process is, then, the first step in the long journey of identity for-
mation. Once the infant begins to develop an internal structure, that structure will be challenged
and revised continually according to what the child, and then the adult, experiences across the
lifespan. This global perspective on self psychology brings us to the work of Erik Erikson.

Erik Erikson as an educator, intellectual, and clinician who had a vast influence on both theo-
retical and practical developments in contemporary psychoanalysis (E. H. Erikson, 1970). Erikson
was analyzed and mentored by Anna Freud, who influenced his decision to become a lay analyst.
Although he never received a doctoral degree in medicine or psychology, he held teaching posi-
tions at prestigious universities, including Harvard, and made a major contribution to psycho-
analysis in 1950 with the publication of his book, Childhood and Society.

Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development rests on the assumption that cultural forces are a
vital aspect of an individual’s growth and development. He postulated the epigenetic principle—
the idea that how the biological origins of behavior manifest in a particular individual is influenced
by the available environmental factors. Erikson states that individuals develop through a series of
eight stages, each of which is defined by key developmental tasks that need to be mastered before
proceeding to the next stage. For example, Erikson believed that if the infant was unable to suc-
cessfully negotiate the early stage focusing on the discernment of when to trust others and when
to be more cautious (i.e., trust vs. mistrust), then he or she would likely struggle with properly
negotiating later stages, such as finding a lifelong romantic partner (i.e., intimacy vs. isolation).
Importantly, he viewed personality development as occurring over the entire lifespan, and each
stage as offering a different set of challenges. The stages of life, as Erikson (1959) outlined them,
along with the corresponding Freudian psychosexual stages, are shown in Table 3.1.

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CHAPTER 33.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

Table 3.1: Erikson’s eight stages of personality development and the
corresponding Freudian psychosexual stages

Erikson Freud

Infancy Trust versus mistrust
Autonomy versus shame/doubt

Oral stage
Anal stage

Childhood Initiative versus guilt
Industry versus inferiority

Phallic stage
Latency stage

Adolescence Identity versus confusion Early genital

Adulthood Intimacy versus isolation
Generativity versus stagnation
Ego integrity versus despair

Later genital

According to Erikson, success at one stage of development and the manner in which the life crises
are resolved will necessarily affect the following stages, as the number of positive versus nega-
tive outcomes at each stage will determine the long-term impact of experiences. In each stage
are embedded developmental challenges, such as separating from parents, establishing a career
path, leaving home, and selecting a mate. Progression to the next stage requires overcoming the
challenges of the preceding stage, and there is some support for the contention that successfully
negotiating earlier stages leaves one better able to manage stressful adjustments in the future
(e.g., Marcia, 1966). It should be noted that there have been some attempts to both realign and
even expand Erikson’s basic stages, especially the stages of later life (e.g., Erikson & Erikson, 1997).
However, the original eight-stage theory remains as the most commonly referenced and widely
used model.

The Significance of Identity and Identity Crisis
Identity is a central concept in Erikson’s (1968) theory. It relates to individuals’ sense of self, of
who they are and who they can be. Erikson believed that identity is characterized by a sense of
continuity and integrity, a notion that one’s meaning as an individual is real, identifiable, and rec-
ognizable by significant others. Erikson is also the one who coined the term “identity crisis.”

Erikson believed that the timing of the adolescent identity crisis is driven by a number of dramatic
changes occurring at this stage in life, including sexual and physical maturation, and becoming
more aware of how others view us. As a result, our sense of who we are is challenged. Erikson
believed that the ease with which one navigates this identity crisis is driven in large part by the
negotiation of the earlier stages. Thus, if one successfully masters the discernment of when and
whom to trust and develops a sufficient degree of autonomy and mastery, then they should have
a more coherent sense of self.

It appears that Erikson’s stages are strongly influenced by the social-developmental opportunities
and expectations in our culture. For example, the age at which one deals with intimacy versus isola-
tion has less to do with some invariant developmental milestone, and more to do with social and
cultural norms of when people in a given culture or society typically begin to date or get married.
For example, consider the average age at which people first marry, which tends to be at a later age
in societies where a larger number of individuals attend college (as with most first-world countries).
In contrast, in societies where higher education is a rare occurrence, then the bulk of the population

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CHAPTER 3 3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

is likely to deal with intimacy and isolation (at least when defined by marriage) at a much earlier age
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2000).

Perhaps the most noteworthy of Erikson’s contributions was the suggestion that identity develop-
ment extends well into adulthood (notice that three of Erikson’s stages are hypothesized to occur
post-adolescence, whereas Freud had only one stage during this same period). For example, Erikson
noted that a central task of midlife is that of generativity versus stagnation, where individuals are
focused on assessing their contributions to, and guidance of, future generations. Erikson argued that
engaging in socially valued work is a direct expression of generativity. He argued that generativity
could also be achieved through one’s family; however, having children in and of itself does not neces-
sarily result in generativity. Thus, individuals who believe they have productively contributed to the
next generation will emerge favorably from this stage, whereas a person who has led a more self-
centered life will be unsatisfied with their lack of contributions and experience stagnation.

The final stage of integrity versus despair also involves a life review with a focus on one’s life
achievements. If the life review results in identifying many disappointments and unachieved
goals, then the consequence is depression. Interestingly, a large epidemiological study (Mirowsky
& Ross, 1992) indicates that depression reaches its peak levels in older adults (aged 80 and up),
and the National Institute of Mental Health reports that suicide rates among those aged 80–84
is twice that of the general population (National Institute of Mental Health, n.d.). Although the
higher rates of depression and suicide are likely influenced by factors such as declining health,
losses (e.g., death of spouse), and economic declines, Erikson might argue that this finding
reflects a negative outcome in the integrity versus despair stage.

Regrets may be an inevitable part of life, but how we manage our regrets can determine the
extent to which they influence us negatively (Wrosch, Bauer, & Scheier, 2005). Erikson associated
the last stage of his theory with a life review, in which the individual might compare unachieved
goals with achieved goals to assess integrity versus despair. One approach to conceptualizing this
late life review is to consider regrets. Research suggests that how we think about our regrets can
influence how available they are to us (i.e., how easily they are remembered) and the emotional
pain associated with regrets (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998;
Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & Nishina, 2003).

A study examining 155 older community college students (older community college students
were explicitly targeted because they were reporting significant life changes, such as divorce, job
change, or return to school) used regret and goal ratings to predict psychological well-being (Lecci,
Okun, & Karoly, 1994). The most common regret reported was educational/academic in nature
(nominated by approximately a third of the sample), and this was likely influenced by the fact that
the data were collected in an academic environment. The other two most common categories
were occupational regrets and leisure (i.e., hobby-related) regrets. The relative frequencies of
these content categories were the same regardless of the age of the respondents. The number of
listed regrets did relate positively to depression scores for all participants, but they only related
to life satisfaction for the oldest subjects. That is, for older individuals, the more regrets they had,
the lower their life satisfaction. Part of this can be explained by the fact that as we age, we have
fewer opportunities to make amends for any regrets (i.e., they are more permanent), and thus
they come with a higher cost.

These findings suggest that regrets in later life can be predictive of psychological well-being (as
per Erikson’s theory). However, it is not how many regrets we have, but rather how we think
about them and how they relate to our future goals that is more influential to our level of adjust-
ment (see Wrosch et al., 2005). Importantly, this better reflects the individual difference approach

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CHAPTER 3 3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

adopted in personality, as it highlights the importance of how we interpret these events rather
than their mere occurrence (see also Chapter 6 for a discussion of the cognitive approach and
idiosyncratic interpretations of events).

In the previous sections, we have discussed core aspects of human development, such as mirroring
and identity formation. However, some individuals experience less adaptive outcomes, whether
that be due to the absence of effective mirroring, difficulties negotiating some of Erikson’s theo-
retical stages, or some other traumas in early identity formation. The next section discusses one
area that has received considerable theoretical and research attention.

Development of Narcissism
Kohut developed a model similar to Winnicott’s, in some respects, especially in its emphasis on
the importance of early relationships in the development of self and personality. Kohut’s primary
focus was on the development of the self from the fragile and fragmented state of the infant to
the stable and cohesive adult self-structure. He did not agree with the classical psychoanalytic
view that considered intrapsychic conflicts as the central cause of psychopathology. Instead, Kohut
believed that most psychopathology resulted from deficiencies in the structure of the self (Millon
& Davis, 1996b, p. 52). Kohut also rejected Freud’s conceptualization of psychosexual develop-
ment as being the formative factor in personality development. Instead, he believed that the drive
toward maturation was fueled by an innate potential that he called narcissism.

Like Winnicott, he also believed that
attachment to the primary caretaker is
crucial for this aspect of development.
Kohut’s formulation, following Freud’s
early conceptualization, described narcis-
sism as the investment of libidinal energy
into the self. In pathological states, too
much libidinal energy is invested, result-
ing in an extreme form of self-love, which
limits the possibility of establishing other
loving relationships. He explains that the
child’s early experience is part of the
mother–infant dyad, undifferentiated
from it. It serves as a precursor to the
“I-you” differentiation that occurs in nor-
mal development, but does not occur in
pathological forms of narcissism (Kohut,
1986). When there is an appropriately
responsive caregiver, the self develops
optimally, but when there is a lack of empathic attunement, which is the responsiveness of an
attentive and loving caregiver, the emerging self falters.

Kohut believed that exhibitionism, which is the act or practice of deliberately behaving so as to
attract attention, was the narcissistic manifestation of all drives. That’s because, in the narcissistic
individual, the drives for intimacy and sexual gratification are directed toward the self instead of
toward others. The primary goal that drives exhibitionism is that of re-creating the wished-for
parental response. Children’s normal exhibitionism is motivated by their need to obtain paren-
tal approval. As development proceeds, this normal need is increasingly frustrated, eventually
leading to more mature and socially acceptable behaviors. Yet, the older child still looks for the

Glen Wilson/©Warner Bros./Courtesy Everett Collection

Is this man a narcissist? Kohut argues that for narcissists,
sexual gratification and intimacy comes from focusing
attention on oneself versus someone else.

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CHAPTER 3 3.2 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Self Psychology

mother’s smile, her approval, to maintain the drive toward mastery and more mature functioning.
Kohut (1971) believed that a healthy individual is autonomous and possesses high self-esteem
and self-confidence. In contrast, individuals suffering from narcissism have fluctuations in self-
esteem, often triggered by perceived slights or disapproval. Thus, to maintain consistently high
evaluations of self, they need constant external validation (e.g., praise from others).

Among the hallmark signs of narcissism is that the individual has a self-centered viewpoint,
which can undermine their ability to understand and appreciate the views of others. Indeed, past
research suggests that narcissists often see themselves quite positively (Clifton, Turkheimer, &
Oltmanns, 2004). This can be described as a narcissistic ignorance view (i.e., they do not know the
views of others). Alternatively, it is possible that narcissistic individuals are aware that those that
know them well hold negative views, and as a result, they would see new acquaintances as having
a (relatively) more favorable view of them compared to people who know them well. This can be
described as a narcissistic awareness view.

A study by Carlson, Vazire, and Oltmanns (2011) was designed to compare the narcissistic aware-
ness and ignorance views by comparing how narcissists are seen by others (referred to as others’
perception), to how they view themselves (self-perceptions), to how they believe they are viewed
by others (meta-perceptions)—both those who know them well and new acquaintances. Unac-
quainted participants came to the lab in pairs and completed a self-perception measure and a
standardized narcissism measure: the 16-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Ames, Rose, &
Anderson, 2006), which measures traits such as exhibiting a grandiose sense of self, feelings of
entitlement, lack of empathy for others, and an exploitative interpersonal style. Next, participants
were introduced and instructed to get to know each other by talking for five minutes. Participants
were then taken back to their separate rooms where they provided perceptions of their part-
ner’s personality (i.e., other-perceptions) and perceptions about how they thought their partner
perceived their personality (i.e., meta-perceptions). Individuals also identified three people who
knew them well and they were contacted via email for personality ratings (there was a 67.7%
response rate from these nominated individuals, who were mostly friends and parents).

Self-perceptions, meta-perceptions, and others’ perceptions were all assessed with the same
questionnaire with only a minor change in instructions, and all items were rated on a 7-point
Likert-type scale (1 5 strongly disagree to 7 5 strongly agree). Some key findings indicate that nar-
cissism was associated with holding positive self-perceptions and with being seen more positively
by new acquaintances than by well-acquainted others. Moreover, narcissists’ meta-perceptions
for positive traits appeared to be less positive than their self-perceptions of those traits. A second
study by Carlson and colleagues (Carlson et al., 2011) that was longitudinal in nature also indi-
cated that the ratings changed, such that narcissists had some awareness that their reputation
was deteriorating over time.

Understanding whether narcissists have some self-awareness is important from a practical stand-
point, as poor self-insight makes it less likely that these individuals would be motivated to seek
treatment or would try to effect any change, simply because they would be unaware of the need
for any change. The current research suggests that they do possess some insight, though they are
biased toward assuming that others’ view them somewhat favorably.

Core Effects of Narcissism: Shame and Rage
Kohut’s formulation of narcissism emphasized the emotions of shame and rage. These emotions,
he explains, result from disequilibrium of the intrapsychic system. Shame arises when the paren-
tal figures—self-objects—do not provide the needed mirroring, admiration, and approval of the

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CHAPTER 3 3.3 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Ego Psychology

emergent self of the child. Mirroring, as we saw, is the ability to respond to the affective state of
another person. Through mirroring, children learn that they are distinct from the parental fig-
ure. This allows them to form healthy relationships. Rage, the other core emotion in narcissism,
is a reaction to a range of possible frustrations of the infant’s narcissistic tendencies. It arises
from an unresolved psychic injury related to the infant’s early narcissism. For example, if mothers
are continually unresponsive to their children’s need for admiration, the result may be rage and
developmental fixation. This fixation can last into adulthood, where what had been an age- and
phase-appropriate response—frustration and anger in response to perceived injury—is no longer
appropriate. Kohut refers to this as narcissistic rage and likens it to the fight component of the
flight-or-fight response. The importance of rage and shame within the construct of narcissism is
reflected by the fact that a recently developed measure of narcissism (e.g., the Pathological Nar-
cissism Inventory; Pincus et al., 2009) incorporates these as two central components.

Most of us have experienced episodes of severe anger or rage when we are injured or we are
prevented from reaching our goals. These can sometimes be appropriate responses. But narcis-
sistic rage and anger are different. According to Kohut, narcissistic rage results from injuries to a
person’s self-concept or sense of esteem. As an illustration: When his wife did not serve dinner
at precisely 5:30 pm, a narcissistic male became enraged and smashed his plate of food on the
floor—and then expected his wife to clean it up. He experienced his wife’s failure to comply with
his demands as a major injury and responded with uncontrolled narcissistic rage.

3.3 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic
Approaches: Ego Psychology

Heinz Hartmann who trained as a physician and emigrated from Austria before World War II, elaborated another important development in contemporary psychodynamic theory: ego psychology (1939/1958, 1964). As the label implies, Hartmann attributed greater signifi-
cance to the ego than Freud did.

The ego, as defined by Freud, is the level of personality that mediates between the instinctual
forces of the id and the value system and conscience of the superego. Hartmann was concerned
with presenting a conceptualization that would describe not only pathology but also healthy per-
sonality functioning. His was one of the earliest calls for a psychology of healthy functioning as
opposed to a psychology preoccupied with neurotic adjustment. (This trend has continued with
the current positive psychology movement.) The traditional view had long been that the main cri-
terion of mental health is freedom from the symptoms of abnormality. Hartmann (1964) objected
to this view.

Modes of Normal Functioning
Normal functioning, as opposed to neuroses, Hartmann (1939/1958) explained, is a function of
adaptation. And normal, healthy adaptation is largely a function of the ego. After all, the ego is
concerned with self-preservation. In other words, Hartmann was suggesting that the ego is that
part of our internal operating system that adapts to the demands of the world. It learns to adapt
more effectively as we grow and develop. In a sense, this is an example of the gradual evolution of
more mature ways of functioning and solving problems. Clearly, an adaptive solution at one phase
in development might not be adaptive later, as environmental demands and social circumstances
change. For example, crying may be a very effective solution for a frustrated 3-year-old whose

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CHAPTER 3 3.3 Early Development of Contemporary Psychodynamic Approaches: Ego Psychology

parent will give her the coveted toy, but it is a far less adaptive solution for the college student who
covets a new sports car or higher grades (though this hasn’t stopped some from trying this method).

Ego functions are essentially what we would describe as coping mechanisms, explained in terms
of what Hartmann called ego adaptive capacity. Someone with good ego functions (high ego adap-
tive capacity) is able to maintain a balance between demands of the outer world and internal
needs and desires. Good ego functions include the capacity to tolerate frustration, disappoint-
ment, and other forms of stress. According to Hartmann (1939/1958), those with strong ego adap-
tive capacity make limited use of defenses; they have a high capacity to tolerate anxiety without
calling on defense mechanisms. This is in marked contrast to Freud, who viewed the utilization of
a wide range of defenses as a sign of being adaptive.

Interpersonal Functioning
Harry Stack Sullivan, often considered the founder of ego psychology, emphasized the role of
interpersonal factors in ego development. That is, the ego’s primary role is to interpret and adapt
to social demands, expectations, and roles. In fact, his theory was known as the Interpersonal
Theory of Psychiatry, and he launched a movement that later became known as Sullivan’s school
of interpersonal relations (Rioch, 1985).

Like Erikson, Sullivan believed that personality changed throughout our lives, but the impetus for
that change was seen as changing and new relationships with others. Because the primacy of the
social self in ego development is defined in terms of the presence of others, Sullivan believed that
we adopted new ego identities to meet the demands of different social situations. Thus, in com-
ing to college, a student will establish a new identity for that set of relationships. However, when
returning home to be with family and friends, those individuals will engender the emergence of the
identity they knew. In this respect, there is no single or fixed personality. (Consider the last time you
ran into friends from high school. Did an old self emerge that was associated with those friends?)

Sullivan believed that interpersonal interactions drive the development of what he termed
personifications of the self and others. Sullivan defined personifications as mental images (similar
to the idea of object relations) that allow us to better understand ourselves and our world. Sullivan
identified three personifications: (1) the bad-me (the aspects of ourselves that are negative and
hidden), (2) the good-me (the aspects of our self that we like and openly share with others), and
(3) the not-me (everything we consider not part of ourselves, in theory because it would induce too
much anxiety to do so). Thus, focusing on the bad-me or the not-me is one way to increase anxiety.

Interestingly, Sullivan himself published very little theoretical or empirical work, but his ideas
spurred the work of others.

Making Sense of the World and Using Defenses
Jane Loevinger, whose work was based largely on that of Sullivan, believed that the primary func-
tion of the ego is to help make sense of our world and everything we experience (Loevinger, 1976,
1987). As was the case with Sullivan, the bulk of the ego’s work is focused on object relations (i.e.,
it is grounded in interpersonal experiences). The ego helps makes sense of early relationships and
both attachment and separation from one’s primary caregiver. The ego then attempts to make
sense of interdependence and autonomy with respect to others and even society as a whole (note
the overlap with many of the developmental themes outlined by Erikson and other theorists). This
can also include gaining an understanding of societal rules, as these rules typically address issues

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

directly related to social interdependence. Thus, as we age, the ego also increases in complexity
and in its ability to make sense of an increasingly complex world.

Even the ego psychologists spoke at length about defenses, and for the most part, they utilized
the same terms and definitions as those forwarded by Freud. Indeed, Loevinger (1976) suggested
that a primary function of the ego in any interpersonal interaction is to control impulses, and the
ego mechanisms of defense were one of the primary ways of achieving this. Loevinger and more
recent interpretations by Cramer (1987) suggest that as part of normal ego development, there is
a sequencing in the emergence of defenses. Denial is seen as an immature defense that emerges
early in the developmental sequence (i.e., childhood), and projection, which is also an imma-
ture defense, is seen to be prevalent in adolescence. In an interesting study by Cramer (1999),
the author sought to examine a group of subjects in their early 20s to determine if their use
of defenses, such as denial and projection (both reflecting defenses that would indicate devel-
opmental immaturity), could be predicted. Cramer hypothesized that these lower-level defenses
would be associated with lower intellectual functioning (IQ) and with weak impulse control.

The participants in the study were taken from a longitudinal project that began tracking the par-
ticipants at age 3. The current study examined 89 individuals (43 males and 46 females), who were
aged 23 at the time of data collection.

Ego development was assessed using two methods, including the TAT, which is discussed in Chap-
ter 2 and in this chapter. Defense mechanism use was assessed by trained coders using six of the
TAT picture cards. As a brief illustration, denial was coded if the respondent omitted major char-
acters or objects or denied reality. Projection was coded if respondents included magical thinking
in their stories, or if they attributed hostility to other characters. Intelligence was assessed with
a standardized measure during one of the previous waves of evaluation in the longitudinal study.

Results indicated that although IQ and defense mechanism use was unrelated, both variables
predicted ego development. Importantly, the relation between the use of defenses and ego level
varied as a function of IQ. When IQ was lower, use of denial and projection was associated with
higher ego development. However, when IQ was lower, use of denial was associated with lower
ego development.

Cramer (1999) concludes that ego development is influenced by both intelligence and defense
mechanism use but in different ways. Intelligence resulted in a simple linear association, such that
the higher intelligence the higher the ego development. However, the use of defenses appears
to be more complex, with ego development characterized by lower impulse control resulting in
greater use of defenses. This highlights the issue of developmentally appropriate defense use. In
other words, while a young child who uses denial may be developing normally, it is considerably
more problematic if denial is used extensively by an adult.

3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integrative Theory

Contemporary psychodynamic models of personality tend to be increasingly integrative in that they have assimilated many constructs from earlier theories. Psychoanalytic theorists were the first to develop a theory of personality, and contemporary formulations remain
strongly rooted in psychodynamic concepts. Psychodynamic conceptualizations of personality
have emerged primarily from the study and treatment of psychopathological adaptations and per-
sonality disorders. Therefore, the main body of literature emphasizes personality disorders and

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

treatment approaches (Clarkin & Lezenweger, 2004). However, there are important constructs
that can be used to organize and depict how normal personality functions. This section describes
some of those, along with the theoreticians who developed them. David Malan (1979), a pioneer-
ing psychiatrist, theorist, and researcher, has contributed important constructs for understanding
personality and the contemporary psychodynamic treatment model. He developed two triangular
formulations to explain the psychodynamic process. He calls them the triangle of conflict and the
triangle of persons.

Malan’s Triangle of Conflict
Malan’s triangle of conflict was borrowed from Ezriel (1952). It is used to show the processes that
occur in the mind and body. This triangle depicts the interplay among underlying emotions such
as anxiety (affective domain system) and the defensive operations that serve to control emotions
and lessen anxiety. Malan (1979) combined these two representations and applied them to a form
of clinical treatment called short-term dynamic psychotherapy (STDP). The triangles are useful for
depicting the structure and process of many of the component systems that make up personal-
ity. They describe the interrelationship between our intrapsychic and interpersonal functions. In
other words, they show how our internal schema are expressed in our relationships with others,
and the manner in which internal schema are expressed forms the basis of our personality (Mag-
navita, 1997; McCullough Vaillant, 1997).

The triangle of conflict represents the intrapsychic functions (or mental processes) related mainly
to affect-regulation (Westen & Blagov, 2007). The three corners of the triangle are feelings in the
lower corner, anxiety in the upper-right corner, and defense in the upper-left corner. These three
mental processes are hypothesized to be in constant motion within all of us (see Figure 3.1).
The triangle of conflict is essentially a self-regulating feedback system (a cybernetic model). For
example, an individual who has experienced a traumatic episode resulting in painful feelings and
anxiety will tend to re-experience this affective complex in similar situations. Thus, experiences
of physical or sexual abuse, typically associated with a range of emotions such as anger, fear,
shame, and sadness, might result in the same emotions when the individual is confronted with
stimuli that are reminiscent of the abuse. For example, when an adult male who was physically
abused as a child sees another adult acting in a domineering manner with a child, it may trigger
the same emotions he experienced as a child. (Note: These conceptualizations will later be labeled
generalization in the behavioral perspective; see Chapter 5). As this complex of feelings threatens
to surface into conscious awareness in a painful and possibly disorganizing manner, anxiety is trig-
gered; the anxiety signals the intrapsychic system to call forth defenses. The theory assumes that
defenses keep thoughts, images, and intolerable impulses out of consciousness awareness.

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

Figure 3.1: Malan’s triangle of conflict

The figure depicts the interplay among the underlying emotion of anxiety (affective domain system),
and the defensive operations that serve to control emotions and in turn lessen anxiety.

Triangle of Conflict, from Jeffrey Magnavita, Theories of Personality: Contemporary Approaches to the Science of Personality, John Wiley & Sons, 2002, Fig. 6.3, p. 216.
© Jeffrey Magnavita.

In this representation, we can place all the defense mechanisms discussed in Chapter 2 in the
upper left corner of the triangle. In this way, we can begin to illustrate both the individuality we
see in personality and some of the personality types that various theoreticians and researchers
have documented. The array of defenses allows for infinite variation, accounting for individual dif-
ferences. It is hypothesized that certain types of personality use certain constellations or clusters
of defenses (Magnavita, 1997). For example, individuals described as having obsessive personality
traits or, if extreme, an obsessive-compulsive personality disorder will generally use defenses such
as intellectualization, isolation of affect, rumination, repression, and compulsiveness. Of course,
there will be great variation in the specific combination of defenses that individuals will employ,
and this can account for differences at a micro level of analysis. At the same time, at the macro
level, the similarities will make overall obsessive-compulsive traits recognizable.

Defense Categorization

Phoebe Cramer (1998) offers a more contemporary working definition of a defense mechanism:

The term “defense mechanism” refers to a mental operation that occurs outside
of awareness. The function of the defense mechanism is to protect the individual
from experiencing excessive anxiety. According to the older, classical psychoana-
lytic theory, such anxiety would occur if the individual became aware of unaccept-
able thoughts, impulses, or wishes. In contemporary thinking about defenses, an
additional function is seen to be the protection of the self—or self-esteem and, in
more extreme cases, protection of the self. (p. 885)

This definition combines elements of both classical and contemporary psychodynamic thinking.
Anxiety is seen as emerging from threats of perceived danger from the external world. It can also
result from internal threats—conflicts deriving from our fear of expressing our impulses. In addi-
tion, anxiety can be generated by a challenge to our internal schema or object relations. This defi-
nition is in keeping with recent research characterized as Terror Management Theory (TMT), which

Impulse/Feeling

AnxietyDefense
As anxiety
is mobilized,
defenses are
called into
operation to
contain the
anxiety.

When too much feeling
threatens to become
conscious, anxiety
is elicited.

When the anxiety
reaches a certain
threshold, the
defenses contain or
repress the feeling.

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

suggests that anxiety and other negative reactions emerge as a means of preserving one’s own
worldview and meaning of reality (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Sol-
omon, & Greenberg, 2002; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991a). (Recall how the ego was
defined as playing a significant role in understanding the world.) Interestingly, TMT research has
also identified self-esteem as a way to reduce anxiety (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, &
Chatel, 1992), and this too would be consistent with the discussed theories on ego development.

Various authors have placed the defense mechanisms into categories (Meissner, 1981; Perry,
1992; Vaillant, 1992). Doing so gives us another way to understand and measure variability in
personality. Most authors place defenses along a continuum, from psychotic, to immature, to neu-
rotic, to mature (see Figure 3.2). These categories of defenses are not precisely defined, and there
is some overlap among them. However, the general schema does have some empirical validation
(Vaillant, 1992) and can be useful for organizational purposes. Figure 3.2 represents a compilation
of defenses from various sources (Magnavita, 1997).

Figure 3.2: Categories of defenses

A compilation of a number of defenses and their general organization.

Adapted from Magnavita, J. J. (1997). Restructuring personality disorders: A short-term dynamic approach. New York: Guilford Press.

Psychotic
defenses

Immature Neurotic Mature

• Delusional projection
• Severe denial
• Distortion
(cognitive/perceptual)

• Projection
• Schizoid fantasy
• Hypochondriasis
• Passive-aggression
• Acting-out
• Dissociation
• Blocking
• Introjection
• Regression
• Externalization
• Splitting
• Projective Identification
• Devaluation
• Idealization
• Omnipotence
• Withdrawal
• Explosiveness of affect
• Weepiness
• Depression

• Repression
• Displacement
• Reaction formation
• Intellectualization
• Somatization
• Controlling
• Isolation of affect
• Rationalization
• Sexualization
• Undoing
• Detachment
• Avoidance
• Compartmentalization
• Complaining

• Altruism
• Humor
• Suppression
• Anticipation
• Sublimation

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

Anxiety: A Common Aspect of Human Existence

Defenses are one corner of the triangle; anxiety is another. In psychoanalytic theory, anxiety arises
from unacceptable id impulses that would present a serious threat to the superego if they were
to break through to consciousness. In contemporary psychodynamic theory, anxiety can result
from conflict and associated emotions that are not experienced fully at the conscious level. The
individual may fear experiencing certain emotions that could cause anxiety (McCullough, 2003).
Each of us has a different level of emotional tolerance, depending on our ego adaptive capacity.

Anxiety is a universal emotion that is essential for our adaptation. When you walk through a dan-
gerous neighborhood at night, you may experience fear because of potential danger. Simply think-
ing about walking in that neighborhood may arouse the related emotion, anxiety. You may also
experience anxiety when public speaking, even though there is no threat of harm. Rather, there
is a psychological threat to the self, which could result in a narcissistic injury—“I am not good
enough” might be the associated internal negative belief. Most theorists assume that there is a
clear connection between the original manifestations of fear, which are more directly linked to
situations where there is mortal danger, to the psychological sense of fear that develops later in
life, which is focused on an injury to the psychological self, broadly defined.

Anxiety includes both a subjective sense of distress and physiological activation, reflected in
changes such as increased heart rate, palpitations, sweating, need to urinate, sweaty palms, dry
mouth, muscle tension, nausea, tightness in the chest, and restlessness (autonomic arousal).
Most of us can recognize when we are in a state of increased anxiety; we are familiar with our
own constellation of physiological reactions. For many people, imagining being asked to stand up
in front of a class to give an extemporaneous talk is sufficient to bring about autonomic arousal
associated with anxiety.

Various types of anxiety have been described in psychodynamic literature. They include (1) sepa-
ration anxiety—fear relating to loss of a significant other; (2) castration anxiety—fear of damage
to the body, especially to the genitals; (3) moral anxiety—fear of violating one’s values; (4) annihi-
lation anxiety—fear of being destroyed or overwhelmed; (5) fragmentation anxiety—fear of disin-
tegration of the self; and (6) persecutory anxiety—irrational fear of harm to loved ones (PDM Task
Force, 2006). Anxiety includes an emotional and physiological experience as well as a cognitive
component. Over the course of development, anxiety tends to shift from being mostly a somatic
(bodily) experience (e.g., physical symptoms, such as sweating, tingling, heart palpitations, etc.) to
a psychic or mental phenomenon (e.g., thoughts of worry, low sense of control over events, etc.).

Feelings/Affect/Emotions: Our Interpersonal Survival System

Anxiety and defenses are two of the corners of the triangle of conflict; the third relates to feelings
(affect or emotion). Researchers in affective science have identified six probable basic emotions
(anger, fear, sadness, disgust, happiness/joy, and surprise) and three secondary or social emotions
(guilt, shame, and pride) (Davidson et al., 2003; Maine & Bonanno, 2001). In keeping with the
contemporary psychoanalytic models, neuroscientific findings support the belief that both feel-
ings and cognitions can exist at the unconscious level (Anderson, Reznik, & Glassman, 2005; Lane
& Nadel, 2000).

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

The purpose of emotions is to facilitate and guide our responses to environmental circumstances,
and psychopathology reflects a deficit in emotional processing (Newman & Lorenz, 2003). Feelings
orient us to what needs to be attended to in our life and give meaning and importance to various
activities necessary for survival and growth. In this sense, they are our personal navigational sys-
tem. When individuals are out of contact with their feelings, we see them as emotionally flat or
wooden. Like Sheldon, the character from the television series The Big Bang Theory, who seems
to only process his experiences at an intellectual level, these people miss much of the meaning of
social interactions. Instead, emotions should be experienced as bodily reactions and interpreted
through internal cognitive appraisal. They are communicated to others through facial expression
(Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005), gestures, and vocal expression (Davidson, et al. 2003).

The affective system and how it is managed by defenses is an important component system of per-
sonality. All of us can be placed on an emotional continuum with regard to how well our emotional
system functions. We might describe certain people as being emotionally reactive, suggesting that
they have trouble regulating their emotional system. In fact, extreme emotional dysregulation is
a central feature of some forms of severe personality disorders. Other people appear emotionless
and in fact are emotionally inexpressive. And most display emotional reactions that we consider
normal for their social and cultural circumstances.

Malan’s Triangle of Persons: The Interpersonal Matrix
Basing his work on what Karl Menninger (1958) had earlier presented as the triangle of insight,
Malan renamed it the triangle of persons to better describe the hypothesized interpersonal or
dyadic nature of these processes. The model shows how early attachment relationships are
encoded (represented by means of internal schema), and how past relationships (early attach-
ment or object relationships), current relationships (relationships in our current life), and the ther-
apeutic relationship (transference that occurs in the therapeutic process) parallel one another in
terms of core relational themes.

The triangle of persons represents interpersonal relationships. At the lower corner of the triangle
are past relationships, as seen from the adult’s vantage point. This represents core relational
experiences, starting with early attachments that shape the individual’s ideas about trust, inti-
macy, and attachment to others. If an individual has positive, growth-promoting attachments,
the emotional network will develop without the need for excessive or restrictive defensive func-
tioning. Malan’s theory suggests that if the early relational system is disturbed, defenses will be
developed in an attempt to protect the self in the most adaptive way possible.

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CHAPTER 3 3.4 Malan’s Psychodynamic Model of Integration Theory

Figure 3.3: Personality as expressed in the triangle of persons

Malan proposed that personality is created, maintained, and expressed in the context of our mental
representations of interpersonal experiences.

From Jeffrey Magnavita, Theories of Personality: Contemporary Approaches to the Science of Personality, John Wiley & Sons, 2002, Fig. 6.3, p. 216. © Jeffrey Magnavita.

The theory suggests that as individuals mature, the early components of the relational matrix in
which they were immersed will be retained, internalized, and re-created in relationships with oth-
ers (see Figure 3.3). These then become characteristic traits and relational patterns that mark part
of our personality. Psychodynamic therapists also note that these patterns of interpersonal rela-
tionships are brought to the therapeutic relationship and become part of the therapist–patient
dynamic (Luborsky & Crits-Christoph, 1997).

Using the Triangles to Explain Personality Development and Organization
Personality is shaped by our positive and negative experiences in the interpersonal domain
(depicted by the triangle of persons). These interpersonal experiences, interacting with tempera-
ment dispositions, lead to the building of an intrapsychic matrix (depicted by the triangle of con-
flict). Thus, our personality is expressed in our interpersonal patterns as well as in how our intra-
psychic matrix is organized and structured. For example, a father who tends to be authoritarian
and controlling may create angry and hostile feelings in his son. To protect himself, the son may
learn ways of expressing this hostility that are not open to direct attack. For example, the son
might adopt a passive defense system, such as stubbornness, forgetting, and withholding love.
Although he may appear to be compliant and pleasing on the surface, he is expressing hostility
by resisting his father’s control in passive-aggressive ways. He may forget to do something his
father has asked him to do or deliberately underperform in a sport his father values. If this type
of personality pattern is consolidated over time, the son might become an individual who uses
passive-aggressive traits to deal with conflict. This would leave him ill-equipped to deal more
openly or constructively with his feelings of anger. (See Chapter 10 for a complete description of
the personality disorders.)

Past Relationships

Current
Relationships

Transference
Relationship

Past relationship patterns are
re-created in current relationships,
expressing aspects of personality.

Past relationship patterns are
re-created in the relationship
with the therapist.

Personality is expressed in
all interpersonal contexts.

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CHAPTER 3 3.5 Assessment Strategies and Tools for Contemporary Psychodynamic Models

3.5 Assessment Strategies and Tools for Contemporary
Psychodynamic Models

Contemporary models of psychodynamic personality theory utilize a wide array of assessment strategies and tools, though many are similar to the projective tests reviewed in Chapter 2, with the key difference being that some of the assessment tools have since been revised.
Thus, in this chapter, we will emphasize some of the revisions to the Rorschach and TAT, as well as
the literature that evaluates the current status of psychodynamic assessments. We will also review
the clinical interview and attempts to objectify that approach.

The Clinical Interview
Psychodiagnostic interviewing methods and techniques are a mainstay of psychodynamic
approaches. Psychodynamic theory emerged and was later expanded almost exclusively within
the context of clinical settings while working with patients. Therefore, it is not surprising that one
of the most central assessment tools for the contemporary psychodynamic theorists is the clinical
interview to facilitate diagnostic decisions and treatment directions.

The structural interview, which was pioneered by Kernberg (1984) and Davanloo (1980), is used
to assess the integrity and structure of the personality by presenting anxiety-provoking questions
that serve to activate the defense system. This allows for moment-to-moment observation of how
emotions are regulated, how defenses are mobilized when anxiety increases, and how effective
the individual is with respect to interpersonal or object relatedness. Although this approach effec-
tively maps on to contemporary object-relations theory as espoused by Kernberg, it lacks suffi-
cient detail and standardization, thereby undermining some of the basic psychometric properties
necessary to qualify as a formal test. Indeed, it might be argued that it is better characterized as a
technique (see Dahlstrom’s 1993 criteria for what constitutes a psychological test).

More recently, a semi-structured inter-
view was developed to capture Kernberg’s
theoretical formulations, the Structured
Interview of Personality Organization
(Stern et al., 2010), and the data suggest
that it has reasonable psychometric prop-
erties when assessed in a clinical sample.

Although not specifically designed to
capture the constructs forwarded by
object-relations theory, other struc-
tured diagnostic interviews have been
developed, most notably the Structured
Clinical Interview (SCID), described in
Chapter 1, which assesses personality
disorders outlined in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual (DSM) of Psychiatric
Disorders. There have been hundreds of
published studies using the SCID, and it

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Clinical interviews are used to gather background
information on the client and guide the interpretation of
standardized tests.

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CHAPTER 3 3.5 Assessment Strategies and Tools for Contemporary Psychodynamic Models

has been translated into many different languages, indicating its broad acceptance in the field
and diagnostic success. The SCID was designed for use by trained mental health professionals and
represents one of the more successful attempts at converting the DSM’s nosological structure into
a usable diagnostic tool.

However, other attempts to standardize diagnostic interviews have been decidedly less effec-
tive (e.g., Linden & Muschalla, 2012) with low to moderate inter-rater reliability (Rettew, Lynch,
Achenbach, Dumenci, & Ivanova, 2009). One of the primary factors undermining the adaptation
of clinical interviews into more standardized forms and tests is that they are less regimented; they
rely heavily on the clinical skill of the diagnostician, as was noted in Chapter 1. However, research
shows that a systematized assessment is superior to any test that relies primarily on the skills of a
clinician (e.g., Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989).

Projective Tests
Another important assessment approach developed by psychodynamic innovators is a range of
projective techniques. These include projective drawings such as the Draw-a-Person (DAP), House-
Tree-Person, and Kinetic Family Drawing, as well as sentence completion forms such as the Rot-
ter Incomplete Sentences Blank (RISB) and the Washington Sentence Completion Test (Weiner &
Greene, 2008). These methods are based on the assumption that we tend to project our thoughts
and feelings onto ambiguous stimuli—such as when we look at clouds and see fantastic worlds
in them. Survey research suggests that despite their problems, projective tests remain somewhat
popular (Lubin, Larsen, & Matarazzo, 1984; Watkins, Campbell, Nieberding, & Hallmark, 1995).

The Rorschach Test

Probably the most famous of the projective tests is the Rorschach Inkblot Method, which, despite
considerable criticism, still holds an important position in both psychodynamic assessment and
research. Indeed, this instrument continues to be used extensively in the personality assessment
of both children and adults (Goode, 2001) and is the most frequently used among the projective
tests (Lubin et al., 1984).

Developed in the 1920s by Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach (1921/1942), the test was based
on a popular European parlor game that involved making inkblots and then telling a story about
them. Rorschach devised the test by spilling ink on paper and folding it in half, creating symmetri-
cal inkblots, 10 of which were selected for the test.

There are a variety of ways to score responses to Rorschach ink blots. In Chapter 2 we referred
to the earlier scoring methods, but here we will describe one of the more thorough attempts to
standardize the Rorschach. In 1986, John Exner devised a comprehensive scoring system, includ-
ing a full standardization of the administration and scoring criteria, and this is now a widely used
approach. Exner promoted four primary criteria for scoring:

1. The location of the response (i.e., the specific part of the card that is being referred to by
the subject);

2. the rationale for why the subject had that particular interpretation (i.e., did the shape,
color, etc. play a central role in the interpretation of the stimulus), referred to as the
determinant;

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CHAPTER 3 3.5 Assessment Strategies and Tools for Contemporary Psychodynamic Models

3. the extent to which the response reflects popular (i.e., commonly cited) responses; and
4. the content of the response (e.g., does it refer to human, human-like, animal, human or

animal parts, blood, nature, etc.).

Exner also collected extensive norms and developed formulas to facilitate standardized scoring. As
a consequence of these changes, Exner has taken what was a psychometrically inferior test, and
developed an instrument with much improved reliability and validity (Hiller, Rosenthal, Bornstein,
Berry, & Brunell-Neuleib, 1999).

Despite these apparent advances in the scoring, a debate continues as to the best way to utilize
the Rorschach, with many practitioners still adhering to the older methods that rely more on clini-
cal intuition (Moreland, Reznikoff, & Aronow, 1995; Ritzler, 1995).

The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)

Another well-known and widely used projective test is the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) devel-
oped by Christine Morgan (who drew most of the pictures) and Henry Murray (Weiner & Greene,
2008). As discussed in earlier chapters, the TAT uses a series of ambiguous images and subjects
are asked to provide a “dramatic”
story that includes the events
leading up to the image, the
events occurring in the image,
and the outcome (i.e., what will
happen next). Most of those
using the TAT select approxi-
mately 10 cards and they rely
on their own judgment in decid-
ing which cards to use (Cramer,
2000). The rationale is that the
ambiguity of the images will facil-
itate a less defensive response
set because the respondent feels
less personally threatened about
the material (i.e., it is perceived
as a story about the picture, not
about oneself).

The original scoring system is
somewhat laborious and sub-
jective (Vane, 1981), and other
more recent clinical scoring sys-
tems have been developed (see
Holt, 2008). Like the Rorschach,
the TAT has also received con-
siderable criticism, most notable
for its subjective scoring and
questionable validity (Lilienfeld,
Wood, & Garb, 2000).

Beyond The Text: Classic Writings

“What if you were asked to describe images you saw in an
inkblot or to invent a story for an ambiguous illustration—
say, of a middle-aged man looking away from a woman who
was grabbing his arm? To comply, you would draw on your
own emotions, experiences, memories and imagination.
You would, in short, project yourself into the images. Once
you did that, many practicing psychologists would assert,
trained evaluators could mine your musings to reach con-
clusions about your personality traits, unconscious needs
and overall mental health. But how correct would they be?”
(Lilienfeld, Wood, & Garb, 2001, p. 82).

In this thought-provoking paper, Lilienfeld and colleagues
(2001) take a close look at the uses and misuses of projec-
tive tests. Read it at http://www.psychologicalscience.org
/newsresearch/publications/journals/sa1_2 .

Hibbard’s 2003 paper provides an opposing view.

References: Lilienfeld, S. O., Wood, J. M., & Garb, H. N.
(2001). What’s wrong with this picture? Scientific American,
284, 80–97. http://www.psychologicalscience.org/news
research/publications/journals/sa1_2

Hibbard, S. (2003). A critique of Lilienfeld et al.’s (2000)
“The scientific status of projective techniques.” Journal of
Personality Assessment, 80(3), 260–271.

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http://www.psychologicalscience.org/newsresearch/publications/journals/sa1_2

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/newsresearch/publications/journals/sa1_2

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/newsresearch/publications/journals/sa1_2

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/newsresearch/publications/journals/sa1_2

CHAPTER 3 Summary

The Sentence Completion Test

Sentence completion tests provide respondents with sentence stems and ask them to complete
each sentence with whatever comes to mind. The assumption is that the responses will reflect
internal experiences, including attitudes and affect, and that that these responses can be scored
and analyzed to reveal psychological aspects of the respondent (Loevinger, 1979, 1985). Relative
to other projective tests, the sentence completion tests tend to have greater face validity. Like the
other projective approaches, both subjective, clinician-driven scoring and more objective, quanti-
tative scoring methods have been developed.

Summary

This chapter presents a synopsis of contemporary psychodynamic theory along with some of the important developments that later psychodynamic theorists advanced in an effort to expand on Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Object relations emerged as what is arguably the
strongest contemporary branch, and the primacy of attachment was emphasized by a number of
researchers and theoreticians, most notably Winnicott. Object relations describe the process by
which significant attachment figures are internalized and their representation (objects) are carried
around inside each of us. This theoretical model converges with one of the basic assumptions of
cognitive theory, as both emphasize internalized representations of the outside world (see Chap-
ter 6). Winnicott developed the concept of the good-enough mother to explain how most mother-
ing does not need to be perfect to produce satisfactory adjustment—it simply needs to be good
enough. However, if it is not good enough, it may result in psychopathology.

Self psychology was pioneered by Kohut, who suggested that normal identity development
requires the mirroring of emotional experiences from others. Other theorists, such as Erikson,
proposed that normal personality development extends into adulthood. He describes various
stages that need to be mastered before progression to the next stage, and suggested that iden-
tity crises may occur at various developmental transition points. Narcissism is used to explain
how development is derailed when the caretaker’s insufficient mirroring and lack of responsive-
ness causes narcissism. Kohut believed that this narcissism then leads to the core emotions of
shame and rage. In contrast, when narcissistic needs are satisfied, development of a healthy self
is more likely.

Ego psychology focuses on the role of the ego in adapting to the world and the defenses used to
protect the personality. Two foundation constructs, the triangle of conflict and the triangle of per-
sons, can be used to depict the dynamic processes that occur among feelings, anxiety, and defense
mechanisms, as well as patterns of interpersonal relationships.

Additionally, this chapter reviewed some of the primary assessment tools employed by contem-
porary psychodynamic theorists and researchers, including the clinical interview and several pro-
jective tests, whose scoring has been revised to more closely align with object-relations theory.

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CHAPTER 3 Key Terms

Key Terms

ego functions The mechanisms that allow an
individual to maintain a balance between the
demands of the outer world and internal needs
and desires, as well as tolerate various forms of
stress.

epigenetic principle The idea that how biologi-
cal aspects of behavior are expressed in a par-
ticular individual is influenced by the available
environmental factors.

exhibitionism The act or practice of deliber-
ately behaving so as to attract attention; the
narcissistic manifestation of all drives.

good-enough mother The idea that the
mother must be available at a critical level of
parental functioning in order to fulfill the basic
needs of uncomplicated developmental pro-
gression and healthy development.

individuation The process by which the infant
becomes increasingly separate from his/her
primary caretaker in terms of identity and
self-sufficiency.

mirroring The act of providing an accurate
response to the thoughts, mood, and feel-
ings of another, including both reflection and
affirmation.

narcissism A personality disorder character-
ized by extreme, pathological self-love.

object-relations theory The notion that each
of us carries around in our minds certain
well-established ideas (referred to as objects),
often based on our early relationships with our
mothers or fathers, that influence our later
relationships.

personifications Mental images (similar to the
idea of object relations) that allow us to better
understand ourselves and our world.

psychic structures Our internal object rela-
tions; our internalized ideas about what rela-
tionships with others are like or should be like.
Also known as a schema or template.

rage A core emotion in narcissism, that begins
as a reaction to frustrations of the infant’s nar-
cissistic tendencies.

shame A core emotion in narcissism, it rises
when the parental figures—self-objects—do
not provide the needed mirroring, admiration,
and approval of the emergent self of the child.

structural interview Tool used to assess the
integrity and structure of one’s personality by
asking anxiety-provoking questions that serve
to activate the defense system.

symbiosis The mother–infant unit, of which
the child is initially an undifferentiated part.

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Mike Powell/Digital Vision/Thinkstock

Learning Objectives

After reading this chapter, you should
be able to:

• Describe the beginning of personality
psychology.

• Define personality and distinguish among
the related terms of character, trait, factor,
temperament, and mood states.

• Understand the importance of theory
construction as it is related to personality
psychology.

• Explain the importance of using scientific
methodology in the study of personality.

• Identify and describe ways to assess and
measure data and research.

• Identify and describe the tools and methods
used to collect data and conduct research.

• Be familiar with some of the ethical issues
related to psychological testing.

The Science of Personality 1

Chapter Outline
Introduction

1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of
the Major Theories
• Theoretical Perspectives on Personality
• The Early Beginnings of Personality Theory
• Applying Science to Personality

1.2 Defining Personality
• The Stability and Change of Personality
• Personality, Temperament, Character, Traits

and Factors, and Mood States
• Culture
• Nature and Nurture
• How Related Disciplines Have Contributed to

Personality
• Defining Normal

1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex
Phenomena
• Building and Characterizing a Theory
• Testing the Theoretical Components
• Convergence of Theories: Eclecticism,

Integration, and Unification

1.4 The Scientific Method
• Research Methods
• Peer Review

1.5 Measuring and Assessing
• Standard Error of Measure
• Reliability
• Validity
• Ethics and Cultural Bias in Psychometrics
• Tools of Assessment

Summary

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CHAPTER 1

1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

Introduction
A judge is trying to determine whether a defendant is criminally insane. You read
about a celebrity who can’t seem to stop using drugs and getting into legal trouble
and wonder what it is about their character that leads to the repeating of such
mistakes. You wonder what makes people go out of their way to be kind or rude.
Major corporations try to identify the best leaders to hire or employees that will
stay with the company for a long time. Each of these questions (and many more)
fall within the domain of personality psychology. However, there is a lot more to
addressing these issues than simply formulating an opinion as to the answers.
Theories can be developed and scientific studies designed to test the theories and
maximize the prediction of outcomes. That is in essence the science of personal-
ity. In this chapter, the focus will be on how the scientific method is applied to the
study of personality and how it has resulted in the development of a wide range
of theoretical models.

1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

In your everyday life, opportunities arise for you to consider the uniqueness of others. Some-times you have an encounter that leaves you wondering why an individual would choose to act kind or meanspirited. At times, we are even unsure as to the reasoning behind our own behav-
ior. Although it is certainly rational to consider the role of situations in explaining behavior, it is
also reasonable to consider the role of the individual’s character to explain and predict important
outcomes. Indeed, of particular interest is the interaction between the situational influences and
individual differences (also known as personality). This text is dedicated to examining personality
and the important theoretical, research, and applied questions that emerge from its study.

Of course, a broad range of societal issues tend to grab
our attention, especially high-profile criminal behav-
ior, but regardless of the topic, it is typical for societal
questions or problems to motivate the application of
personality theory to real-world issues. Christopher
Dorner, for example, was a former LA police officer
who had also served in the Navy. He allegedly gunned
down three fellow officers, apparently motivated by
revenge for grievances related to his dismissal from
the police force. After several killings and a Facebook
manifesto riddled with threats, a massive manhunt
ensued. Dorner was subsequently found, surrounded,
and killed. Fortunately, such violent responses from
disgruntled employees are relatively rare, even among
the ranks of former police officers and those with mili-
tary backgrounds. Thus, it is reasonable to ask what
caused Dorner to act as he did—and can we predict
and alter such behavior?

This text will provide an overview of some of the major
theories of personality, along with research that in
some instances supports, and in other instances fails

Getty Image News/Getty Images

Christopher Dorner, former LA police
officer who gunned down fellow officers
and was subsequently killed.

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CHAPTER 1 1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

to support, aspects of those theories. Here is an overview of some of the dominant theoretical
accounts of personality and how they might be applied to Dorner.

Theoretical Perspectives on Personality
There are seven primary schools of thought with regard to personality:

• psychodynamic
• neurobiological
• behavioral
• cognitive/social
• interpersonal/relational
• trait
• self-psychology (humanism/existentialism)

Each of these perspectives is covered in detail in the chapters of this text. Here, we present a brief
introduction to each view and how they might apply to the case of Christopher Dorner. For a list of
general treatment considerations for the different perspectives, see Table 1.1.

Psychodynamic Perspective

Psychodynamic theory, which was largely formulated by Sigmund Freud, suggests that we are
driven to act by instincts that are sexual and aggressive in nature. This perspective suggests that

we are constantly in conflict
with ourselves and society. The
theory posits that the rationale
for all adult action can be traced
back to how we related to our
parents. Most importantly, the
theory argues that the presence
and exact nature of our motives
(i.e., why we act in certain ways)
is unknown to us.

Was Dorner preoccupied with
acceptance by his parents? Did
he have a conflict-ridden rela-
tionship with his father, resulting

in the “transference” of blame toward other authority figures? This perspective would also assume
that Dorner would have little knowledge or insight as to the true motives behind his actions.

Neurobiological Perspective

One of the primary contributors to this perspective on personality was Hans Eysenck. He viewed
humans as biosocial animals, and he sought to link the social and biological sciences within his
theoretical framework. Eysenck suggested that the cause of behavior could be traced to brain
functions; he focused specifically on differences in brain activation. For example, he believed that
the ascending reticular activating system was the brain structure responsible for the manifesta-
tion of extraverted or introverted behavior. Significant advances in this perspective have been
achieved with the advent of high resolution imaging techniques.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Freud had a great deal to say about psychopathology,
even suggesting that seemingly benign behaviors could be
interpreted as problematic. Read The Psychopathology of
Everyday Life (1901) at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Freud
/Psycho/.

Reference: Freud, S. (1901). The Psychopathology of Every-
day Life. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

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CHAPTER 1 1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

Did Dorner have some basic brain structural or neurochemical problem that would have resulted
in the incidence of impulsive and aggressive behavior? Was Dorner biologically predisposed to
violence based on the presence of aggressive behavior in his ancestors?

Behavioral Perspective

Rooted heavily in empiricism, the behavioral perspective has been influenced by the works of John
Watson, Burrhus Skinner, John Dollard, and Neal Miller, to name a few. This perspective empha-
sizes the role of learning in personality; that is, it focuses on how we connect certain stimuli with
specific behavioral responses. The concept of conditioning is especially central to this perspec-
tive, and much of the research is
based on animal models (i.e., it
was assumed that basic learning
principles can be applied to all
species of life).

Was Dorner reinforced for vio-
lent behavior in his upbringing
or, more recently, was he given
attention for his extreme actions?
Did he come to equate, through
conditioning, the fear he instilled
with the respect he demanded
from his colleagues?

Cognitive/Social Learning Perspective

This perspective was informed by such individuals as Albert Bandura, Julian Rotter, and George Kelly.
The cognitive perspective emphasizes how individuals uniquely perceive, interpret and recall events
in their lives, and how this can shape their character. That is, this perspective highlights the impor-
tance of how reality is constructed by an individual, rather than being determined by an objective

reality. The cognitive perspec-
tive has also been closely linked
to social learning theory, which
focuses on learning through mod-
eling (i.e., observing the behavior
of others).

Had Dorner been exposed to
examples of violent behavior in
his own home or in popular
media, and so he simply mim-
icked what he saw? What was his
unique way of interpreting the
events that led up to the killings
and his own death?

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Watson wrote a classic paper that applies behaviorism
to mental disease. Not surprisingly, he focuses largely on
behavioral manifestations, but this is an important starting
point. Read Behavior and the Concept of Mental Disease at
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/mental.htm.

Reference: Watson, J. B. (1916). Behavior and the concept
of mental disease. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods, 13(22), 589–597.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

Bandura and colleagues have specifically studied how
aggressive behavior in children is repeated after it is mod-
eled for someone. Modern research has largely confirmed
these findings, even for adults, and here you can read one
of the first classic publications in this area. Read one of
his papers on modeling at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca
/Bandura/bobo.htm.

Reference: Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Trans-
mission of aggression through imitation of aggressive mod-
els. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63(3),
575–582.

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http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Watson/mental.htm

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Bandura/bobo.htm

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CHAPTER 1 1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

Interpersonal/Relational Perspective

The interpersonal perspective emphasizes how interactions with others, especially dyadic inter-
actions, drive personality. This is a departure from theories that largely focus on the individual
because the focus is on the interaction with others. This approach includes the works of Harry
Sullivan, Henry Murray, and Murray Bowen. Relationships, including relationships that may be
more artificial in nature (such as the one that a patient might have with a therapist), are the pri-
mary focus, and these theorists think that they undergird personality development.

Were Dorner’s relationships with his former colleagues marked by deviant exchanges, during
which he experienced confusing and contradictory emotions? Did he have problematic interac-
tions with authority figures in his life?

Table 1.1: Treatment considerations for theoretical perspectives

Theoretical perspective Approaches for treatment

Psychodynamic theory Can conflict in parent-child relationships be used to predict who has the
greatest propensity for violent behavior as an adult? Can we intervene
with therapy in the family of origin to minimize aggressive behavior later
in life? Can making an individual aware of unconscious conflict allow
that individual to redirect aggression toward safer, more appropriate
expressions?

Neurobiological Can the presence of neurochemical or neurostructural abnormalities be
accurately detected? Can those with such problems be identified and
treated to minimize aggressive behavior later in life?

Behavioral Can token economies be employed to help individuals’ value prosocial,
rather than antisocial, behavior? Can individuals who are engaging
in aversive behavior be reconditioned to demonstrate more socially
acceptable behavior?

Cognitive/social learning Can long-term exposure to violence in television, movies, video games,
and other forms of media entertainment predict the incidence of
violence, and can we curb such violence by minimizing exposure? Is it
possible to intervene by helping individuals interpret events differently
(i.e., in a more favorable light)?

Interpersonal/relational Can we examine an individual’s interpersonal style with others to identify
signs of problematic behavior? Is an individual routinely involved in
attempts to control and blame others? Could complementary relationships
be used to alter the structure of more problematic relationships?

Trait Can the personality traits that predict the incidence of various forms of
mental illness or violent and aggressive behavior be detected? Can we
find more adaptive outlets for these traits?

Self-psychology
(human/existential)

If an individual is provided with support and acceptance, is violence, or
even the thought of violence, mitigated? Are feelings of isolation the root
of anxiety and other disorders, and do feelings of isolation exacerbate
extremist thinking?

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CHAPTER 1 1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

Trait Perspective

The trait perspective has had many significant contributors, including Gordon Allport and Ray-
mond Cattell in the early years and researchers such as Paul Costa and Robert McCrae more
recently. This perspective assumes that there is a broad framework for organizing traits, which are
essentially descriptive terms or labels used to characterize a person’s personality. Trait theorists
focus largely on measuring traits, understanding the associations between them, and investigating
their underlying causes (most typically linked to biological mechanisms). In order to help organize
the great many traits that have been employed to describe human behavior, researchers in this
area have used advanced statistical techniques, such as factor analysis. In many ways, traits also
represent the vernacular most used by lay individuals when describing personality.

What traits would have made Dorner most susceptible to turning to violence? Did he have a long-
standing tendency for violence or aggression that could have been predicted from other traits,
such as dominance or poor frustration tolerance?

Self-Psychology (Humanistic/Existential) Perspective

This perspective reflects an attempt to conceptualize human behavior in a more favorable light,
emphasizing our tendencies for growth, achieving our highest potential (ideal self), and under-
standing our existence (why we are here). Key early contributors included Carl Rogers, Abraham
Maslow, and Rollo May. More recently, the positive psychology movement, which is dedicated to
building thriving individuals and communities, has represented a resurgence of this perspective.

Was Dorner feeling powerless until he began to take matters into his own hands by killing others
and drawing attention to his cause? Had Dorner lost the ability to value life? Had he been placed
in a situation where those around him only valued him if he engaged in specific behaviors?

These general theoretical applications establish a framework upon which more specific ques-
tions can emerge. There are also important questions that can be applied to all perspectives.
For example, to what extent was Dorner fully aware of his actions and their consequences? Was
there anything that could have been done to intervene and alter Dorner’s behavior? Was there a
point in the sequence of events leading up to the first shooting after which no intervention was
possible? Contemporary personality theorists and researchers provide us with a scientific basis to
understand the most essential questions in life. The goal of this text is to not only demonstrate the
importance of these questions, but more importantly, to establish a structure for how to optimally
frame the questions and how to devise the best way to scientifically answer them.

The Early Beginnings of Personality Theory
The earliest pioneers of scientific work that has been associated with the field of psychology
include Wilhelm Wundt, who used quantitative methods in studying perceptions, sensations,
cognitions, and feelings. He considered these the “atoms” of conscious experience and thought
that by understanding them he would understand the structure of the mind—hence the label
structuralism for his school of thought. William James considered psychology to be a natural sci-
ence and was largely responsible for introducing experimental psychology to the United States.

However, the field of personality psychology began to coalesce in the 1930s, with the publication
in 1937 of Gordon Allport’s Personality: A Psychological Interpretation. During this same decade,
the journal Character and Personality was established, which was one of the first psychology jour-
nals to use the term personality in its name, and the comprehensive works of Kurt Lewin and

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CHAPTER 1 1.1 Why Study Personality? An Overview of the Major Theories

Henry Murray, two of the founding fathers of contemporary personality research, were published.
Although individuals, such as Sigmund Freud and William James, whose life work would later be
included in the personality domain, predated this time period, it was in the 1930s that the special-
ization of personality psychology emerged, growing out of the primary area of clinical psychology
(see also Barenbaum & Winter, 2013).

The earliest roots of personality theory emerged from clinical experience. Indeed, much of what
we have come to understand about personality comes from clinical observation and psychometric
testing of individuals with disordered personalities (abnormal psychology or psychopathology).
Clinical observations, in the form of thousands of published case summaries, make up the founda-
tion of some of the more well-known theories of personality, and these theories have contributed
to the current system of classification of mental disorders. The understanding and advancement
of personality theory is inextricably linked to developments in the field of psychotherapy, and a
wide range of models have been proposed to explain the association between these two fields
(see Mayer, 2004). Psychotherapy became a branch of psychology during the 20th century, and
the birth of modern psychotherapy can be traced to Freud’s developing a comprehensive theory
of psychic functioning. Moreover, many important personality theorists were psychiatrists (Freud,
Jung, Sullivan) or clinical psychologists (Carl Rogers, George Kelly). This resulted in a marriage
between psychotherapy, one branch of clinical science, and the study of what makes us unique.

The clinical perspective continues to be an important lens through which to view personality,
largely because clinical work is concerned with behavior or personality change. Psychotherapy
has traditionally provided one means of observing, measuring, diagnosing, and treating person-
ality and related disturbances. However, personality is also relevant to nonclinical functioning,
and has more recently been associated with the positive psychology movement, reflecting the
optimal experience of life (e.g., Sheldeon, Kashdan, & Steger, 2011). In this respect, modern per-
sonality psychology is much broader than its predecessor, as it has been applied to all aspects of
human experience.

Applying Science to Personality
Although humans have been conducting experiments in various less formal ways since appearing
on the earth, it isn’t until recent history that science has become more widely accepted (Lathrop,
1969). Science presents ways of experimenting that are potentially far less costly and more effi-
cient than our primitive “trial and error” methods.

Gordon Allport was one of the first to focus on the study of the personality, though his big-
gest contribution was not so much what would be the target of study in personality psychol-
ogy, but, more importantly, how it would be studied. Allport advocated a clear shift toward
studying the individual person within a social science framework (see Allport, 1937).

The term personology, which was coined by Murray (1938), refers to the development of theoreti-
cal systems for explaining and understanding human behavior. As examples, consider the theo-
retical perspectives briefly introduced in this chapter that were used to explain the behavior of
Christopher Dorner. These diverse theories offer markedly different explanatory frameworks for
the same observations, and they emphasize different factors. Psychologists or social scientists
who engaged in personology were identified as personologists. Murray specified that the methods
of personologists are those of science, in that they make systematic observations and use scien-
tific methods to test hypotheses. Although the term personology is used less frequently today,
an emphasis on scientific methods remains central to the field (see Section 1.4, “The Scientific
Method,” for more details).

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CHAPTER 1

1.2 Defining Personality

Theoretical systems are generally based on scientifically established constructs. A construct is a
tool—usually a concept, model, or idea—that is useful for organizing observations and making
them meaningful. For example, conditioning is a construct (a model) that is used to understand
various forms of learning. An important construct for understanding both normal and abnormal
human behavior, the central subject of this volume, is the concept we know as personality (and,
in pathological versions, personality disorders or dysfunctions).

Personality theorists study personality using tools of psychological science to assist in the devel-
opment of theoretical paradigms, or models, that attempt to explain human behavior. Research-
ers have developed a variety of theoretical models, reflecting their different perspectives, to
explain how personality operates. These theories will be discussed in the chapters of this text,
along with the scientific research used to establish, evaluate, and expand those theories. This
first chapter will also introduce you to some of the primary scientific methods employed by
researchers in this field.

1.2 Defining Personality

The term personality is a well-established part of everyday speech. Countless popular maga-zines feature articles about personality, promising to help us learn how to deal with difficult people, how to live with those who have personality disorders, how to become leaders and
heroes and wonderfully thin and attractive people. We use the term personality in day-to-day
language, and we invoke a wide range of adjectives to characterize others and ourselves. In this
sense, personality has become an implicit construct for the general public; it is not fully or specifi-
cally defined in that context, but it is commonly understood and accepted, nonetheless. However,
when we use the term within the scientific field, personality should be seen as a theoretical con-
struct, invoked to help us understand individual differences.

From a more formal standpoint, theorists and researchers have defined personality as a pattern
of behavior, affect (emotional experience), or cognition (thoughts) that is typical of the individual,
evidencing some degree of stability over time and across situations. The references to behavior,
affect, and cognition in the definition also speak to the breadth of personality psychology as it
attempts to encompass diverse contributions from subdisciplines within psychology as well as
influences from other fields.

The Stability and Change of Personality
Our intuitive notions suggest that personality is stable, and this would be in keeping with most
theoretical models of personality and its operational definition. Moreover, several researchers
have devoted a significant part of their careers to establishing that personality is stable (e.g.,
Block, 1971; Kogan & Block, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1994; see also Bleidorn, Kandler, Riemann,
Angleitner, & Spinath, 2012), and this is now widely accepted as a central component of most
personality theories.

Of course, personality can change, even dramatically, though typically there are some unusual
events that lead to such change. For example, in one of the most famous cases in neuroscience,
Phineas Gage, while working on a railroad, had a steel tamping rod shoot right through the frontal
lobe of his brain. As a result, he apparently experienced a dramatic change in personality. Whereas
he had previously been a quiet, hard-working, dependable employee, he became childish, obsti-
nate, self-indulgent, and given to excessive profanity. In some cases, brain-injured individuals

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CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

who had been severely aggres-
sive became more docile; others,
like Phineas Gage, who were ini-
tially gentle and pacific, became
extremely violent after suffering
brain trauma. Case studies have
also shown that the long-term
influence of alcohol or drugs
can change personality, and
progressing dementia, such as
Alzheimer’s, can result in person-
ality changes, such as individuals
becoming more paranoid and
even aggressive.

Personality, Temperament, Character, Traits and Factors, and Mood States
Central to the notion of personality are the related, but theoretically distinct, constructs of tem-
perament, character, traits and factors, and mood states.

Temperament

Temperament generally refers to an individual’s basic biological predispositions, which are thought
to be present at birth. For example, most parents can discern clear temperamental differences in
their children, despite their genetic relatedness. Some infants appear to be “difficult,” whereas
others are seen as being “easy.” Some are outgoing and tend to explore the world easily, whereas
others are more shy and introverted. Dimensions of temperament are thought to reflect a strong
genetic basis, largely because the infant has had relatively little time for the environment to be a
major influence.

Given that temperament is defined as one’s natural tendency to behave outside of extended envi-
ronmental influence, there has been some debate as to whether temperament is actually synony-
mous with personality—whether the two are in fact one and the same. Recently, the argument has
been made that the two concepts are more alike than they are different (e.g., Caspi, Roberts, &
Shiner, 2005; McCrae et al., 2000). Specifically, Caspi and colleagues cite a confluence of research
suggesting that personality and temperament both (1) show moderate genetic influence, (2) are
influenced by environmental factors, (3) focus on differences in the experience of positive and neg-
ative emotions for the most central traits, and (4) characterize traits that overlap with nonhuman
species. In fact, the more interesting question no longer appears to be whether personality changes
during the lifespan (the general consensus is that it changes very little), but, instead, the focus is on
determining the points in one’s life where change is most likely to occur (Caspi et al., 2005).

Character

Character is a commonly used term that generally refers to basic, enduring traits related to moral
or ethical qualities. Character might be described in terms of characteristics such as integrity,
honesty, morality, and stability. Character assessment judges how a person acts in various con-
texts. For example, what type of character would explain an apparently remorseless individual?
Explanations based on character are most often seen in the psychodynamic literature to describe
the inner workings of such people. The term character was used early in the literature, whereas
personality is now much more common.

Beyond the Text: Research Spotlight

How do researchers determine if your personality is gener-
ally stable or variable across the lifespan? In a recent study
conducted by Terracciano, McCrae, & Costa (2010), a new
approach to answering this question was employed. Their
findings suggest that the stability of personality appears to
increase with age, though this association stops at approxi-
mately age 30. After reading about this study, discuss the
relative advantages and disadvantages to the approach
used to answer this question. Read the article at http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2839250/.

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http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2839250/

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2839250/

CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

Traits and Factors

Traits are specific, stable features of personality such as persistence, integrity, and honesty. Using
factor analysis, trait psychologists have done extensive studies to group related specific traits into
broader factors that can account for variations in personality. For example, the traits kind, affec-
tionate, and sympathetic have been grouped into the main factor agreeableness in the “big five”
factors of personality (Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991). Thus, the primary distinction between traits
and factors is the level of study, with traits at the lower level, reflecting more specific constructs.
In contrast, factors reflect broad aggregates of related traits, and they provide an organizational
framework for traits.

Mood States

Mood states refer to conditions that fluctuate over time and across situations. Recall that a trait is
a stable and predictable personality characteristic that is consistent in various situations and over
time. These distinctions are important for understanding personality. For example, George, who
is depressed today, may withdraw and appear preoccupied and difficult to engage interperson-
ally. If we assess his personality at this time, his depressed state (or mood) might lead us to the
inaccurate conclusion that he is introverted (trait). Later, when he is no longer depressed, George
might become more outgoing and socially responsive. Thus, a personality trait may be profoundly
influenced by an affective state, or mood state.

Although we can make a conceptual distinction between a state and a trait, there is some ambiguity
when considering the extent to which behavioral, affective, and cognitive patterns must be pres-
ent before they are labeled as personality, as opposed to the more transient mood state (Lecci &
Wirth, 2006). In fact, no clear definition of stability has been articulated, but clearly the longer a
behavior, affect, or cognition lasts, the more likely it would be characterized as personality. One
can also examine measures of personality relative to measures of mood to find some of the prac-
tical differences. For example, when assessing personality, researchers will often ask how people
think, feel, and act “in general.” Whereas when focusing on mood-type constructs, the assess-
ment tools might ask how people are thinking, feeling, and acting at that particular moment.

Culture
While temperament, character, traits and factors, and mood states are all important constructs,
culture is another component that must be considered in the study of personality. Most of the
theories we will cover in this text emphasize to varying degrees the importance of early expe-
riences in the development of personality, and many scholars believe that parenting styles are
determined to a high degree by the dominant culture of the parents (Chang, 2007; Keshavarz &
Baharudin, 2013).

Part of the socialization (parenting) process is passing on cultural values (Corsaro & Elder, 1995).
Emile Durkheim’s (1912) seminal work “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” sheds some light
on this process. Durkheim’s basic argument is that shared enacted social practice is the foun-
dation of both cognition and morality, and that religious practice is the best illustration of this
dynamic. While the predominant thinking of his day was pragmatism, for Durkheim, the dynamic
relation was inherently socially based, and the critical action was social action (mostly in the form
of enacted social practice), not individualized problem solving. Social practice (which included reli-
gious practice) was a way for people to meet their personal as well as their social needs, and had
a fundamental impact on the individual life experiences of the members of the social group. He

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CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

believed that socially enacted practices create the individual experiences. Thus, the personalities
of a child raised in a devout Amish community, one raised in a Jewish home, one raised in a com-
mune, and one raised by atheists in a high-rise in Manhattan are bound to have differences based
on their cultural environment. And those are just examples from American culture.

Bronfenbrenner’s (1972) research demonstrated how the then powerful communist culture
impacted the socialization of Russian children. It is interesting to note that after a few generations,
the family, the state, the school, and the peer group all participated in socializing the conformity
necessary to maintain the communist system.

Even perceptions of temperament are affected by culture. What is considered an easy or a dif-
ficult temperament in children depends on cultural values. Dworetszky and Davis (1989) cite a
study of easy and difficult children done in 1984 among the Masai, a nomadic tribe of African
warriors. They found that, because of the harsh environmental conditions, those children that
Westerners would consider difficult were actually more highly valued by their parents and had
much lower rates of childhood mortality. In this case, the “difficult” behaviors actually increased
the child’s chances of surviving to adulthood, while the easy (more passive—less demanding) chil-
dren received less attention and died with much greater frequency. More recently, Haase, Jome,
Ferreira, Santos, Connacher, and Sendrowitz (2014) found that culture influences individuals’
capacity for tolerating information overload. Even idioms and proverbs in different cultures may
reflect variations in what characteristics of the individual are most valued. We are familiar with the
saying “the squeaky wheel gets the grease,” which suggests that an extroverted individual who is
self-focused in their approach may be more adaptable. However, the Japanese proverb “the nail
that stands out gets hammered down” might suggest that a more introverted and group-focused
mentality is preferable.

But culture is a difficult construct to include in a concise theory because culture does not describe
one way of being; it describes thousands of diverse and nuanced ways of being that can change
or be changed. Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored when looking at the development of personal-
ity (see Chapters 6–9 for specific examples of cultural considerations as they apply to different
theoretical perspectives).

A second way that culture impacts our study of theories of personality is to look at who is doing
the theorizing. For the most part, the predominant theories in personality development come
from Western thinkers. The inclusion of other cultures is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact,
a meta-analysis done by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) noted that “behavioral scientists
routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals
based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic
(WEIRD) societies. Researchers—often implicitly—assume that there is little variation across
human populations or that the ‘standard’ subjects are as representative of the species as any
other population” (p. 1). This does not negate the value of psychological studies and their result-
ing theories. It is, however, important to understand the lens through which those theories were
conceived.

Nature and Nurture
One of the oldest debates about human nature concerns how much of our personality can be
traced to biology and genetics (nature) and how much depends on our upbringing, environment,
and culture (nurture). Research suggests that part of this answer depends on which aspect of
personality is being studied. For example, when considering the trait of neuroticism, it appears

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CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

that there is a relatively strong genetic component, with genetics accounting for upwards of 60%
of the variability in neurotic behavior (e.g., Saudino & Plomin, 1996; see also Plomin, Haworth,
Meaburn, Price, & Davis, 2013). In contrast, traits like creativity (also referred to as openness to
new experience) appear to be influenced to a greater degree by one’s environment.

However, the trend has been to move away from the traditional contrast of nature versus nur-
ture. In fact, the nature-nurture debate has more recently been referred to as a false duality
(Traynor & Singleton, 2010), such that, with few exceptions, we have come to understand that
both the environment of the individual and the individual him- or herself are significant contribu-
tors to the resulting action. Indeed, taking the above examples of neuroticism and creativity, it
is still the case that the environment plays a substantial role in neuroticism, and genetics are still
influential with creativity.

Within the field of personality psychology, the nature-nurture distinction was captured by the
“person-situation” debate, which examined how stable a person’s personality is across varied con-
texts. Researchers initially vied for who could explain more variability in human behavior (e.g.,
Bem & Allen, 1974; Epstein & O’Brien, 1985; Mischel, 1968). However, more nuanced questions
subsequently emerged, focusing instead on the circumstances under which either nature or nur-
ture may have a greater influence on behavior. The latter includes defining complex interactions,
such as how some traits are especially salient for certain individuals and therefore demonstrate
greater cross-situational consistency compared to those same traits in others for whom the traits
are less salient (e.g., Cheek, 1982; Zuckerman, Koestner, Deboy, Garcia, Maresca, & Sartoris, 1988).
Currently, the person-situation debate adopts an integrative perspective with a focus on the
interaction between the two (e.g., Donnellan, Lucas, & Fleeson, 2009; Webster, 2009).

Epigenetics

While the nature verse nurture question has been a staple of psychological debate and research
for years, the emerging field of epigenetics is rendering that dichotomy obsolete. Sigmund Freud
believed that “anatomy is destiny,” that our gender and our genes determine who we become.
On the other extreme, the early behaviorists believed that the environment was king, that we are
little more than the response to whatever stimuli we encounter. If you want a different response,
just change the stimulus. However, we now know that the two are not distinct and mutually exclu-
sive forces leaving their mark on our development, but that environment actually triggers or lays
dormant the expression of our genes.

Epigenetics is a revolutionary and burgeoning field of scientific study. Scientists have discovered
that our environment creates chemicals that work on the genetic code of our DNA, and it is the
process of our DNA sending a message to our RNA (known as transcription) that becomes the
template for protein synthesis. This is where the action and the outcomes occur. In Epigenetics:
How Environment Shapes our Genes, Frances describes the process like this. Rather than the gene
being the controlling executive in this process, think of it more like the gene is a “member of an
ensemble cast of biochemicals, the interaction of which constitutes a cell. The executive function
resides at the cell level; it cannot be localized in its parts. Genes function as material resources for
the cell. In this view, each stage of protein synthesis is guided at the cellular level. But most fun-
damentally, the ‘decisions’ as to which genes will engage in protein synthesis at any point in time
is a function of the cell, not the genes themselves” (Francis, R.C., 2011, p. 19). And these cellular
decisions are affected by our environment and, in some cases, the environments of our ancestors
(Simmons, 2008).

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CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

So it is really the interplay between our nature (our genes) and our nurture (our environment),
rather than each one’s impact on us, that is important. Twin studies have long been used to study
heritability. Monozygotic twins (identical twins) share exactly the same DNA, yet they don’t always
develop exactly the same way. Epigenetics provides the explanation as to why one twin might
develop schizophrenia while the other does not, even though they both would have inherited the
predisposition and most likely share similar environments, at least in infancy (Carey, N., 2012). We
will explore more about emerging neurosciences like epigenetics in Chapter 4.

How Related Disciplines Have Contributed to Personality
Personality is not only the province of the behavioral sciences and personality theorists. Other
disciplines are also concerned with personality and character and seek to understand the basic
forces that operate within all human beings. Here we briefly touch upon a few of the fundamental
disciplines underpinning the foundation of personality psychology.

Philosophy

Psychology emerged from its sister discipline, philosophy, which is concerned with understand-
ing human nature. Strong philosophical underpinnings are apparent in various systems of psy-
chological thought. In fact, the word psychology was derived from psyche, a term used by the
Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, each of whom speculated on the nature of humankind.
The term psyche remains a frequently used concept today in both psychology and philosophy, and
it is generally meant to capture the essence of the human mind: “To Aristotle, psyche basically
meant living” (Watson, 1963/1971, p. 54). The influence of philosophy was prominent early on,
with Aristotle’s theoretical account of the three psyches (also known as souls: rational, animal,
and vegetal) reflecting the essence of psychology until the 19th century (Rohde, 1925). However,
psychology and the specialty of personality began experiencing a shift in the primary methods to
investigate the psyche, with a clear preference for the scientific methods used in the natural sci-
ences. Thus, philosophical reasoning eventually gave way to observation (both introspection and
case studies) and rigorous experimentation as the primary means of collecting data and revising
theories. In this respect, personality theories have their roots in two disciplines: philosophy and
natural science (see Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Personality theory and its relation to other disciplines

Philosophy

Personality
Theory

Natural Science

Personality theory emerged largely and borrows
heavily from philosophy and the natural sciences.

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CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

Literature

Literature reveals much about human nature. Writers offer a view of human beings that often
shows profound insight into the struggles of existence and how people from various ethnic and
cultural backgrounds and historical periods navigate through these conflicts. Much of our fas-
cination with literature is based on our desire to understand ourselves. In the lives of
fictional characters, we see the influence that environmental, family, and genetic factors can
exert on people.

Elements of classical literature can be
seen in many theories of personality. In
the development of psychoanalytic the-
ory, Freud drew from Greek mythology
and from Shakespeare. For example, the
notion of the Oedipus complex is bor-
rowed from multiple sources, including
Hamlet, and Sophocles’ play, Oedipus
Tyrannus, and our current term narcis-
sism comes from the Greek myth of Nar-
cissus. Some of the earliest work of trait
psychologists also focused on the analy-
sis of language (i.e., adjectives used to
describe human behavior) as the start-
ing point for identifying the most fun-
damental factors that underlie all traits
(Goldberg, 1981; see also Ashton, Lee, &
Goldberg, 2004).

Theology

Religion offers another valuable perspective on the nature of humankind. Theology attempts to
understand our relationship to a greater power. Various religions make assumptions about the
nature of good and evil and about which traits we should strive to emulate that will bring us closer
to a divine being. Theological systems offer alternative understandings about human nature and
the possibility of transformation.
For example, a key figure in per-
sonality psychology, Carl Rogers,
forwarded a theoretical perspec-
tive that was clearly influenced
by his exposure to Christianity
and two years in seminary. Rogers
developed the person-centered
approach to understanding peo-
ple and was also one of the found-
ers of what has become known as
the humanistic perspective (see
Chapter 9). At the heart of his
theory was the belief that we are
good, even ideal, individuals, who

Peter Barritt/SuperStock

Our modern-day term narcissism is based on the ancient
Greek myth of Narcissus, who could not leave his reflection
and wasted away, gazing at it, so much that he eventually
fell into a river and drowned.

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

We discuss in this text how other disciplines contribute to
psychology, but other authors have debated which disci-
pline psychology most closely matches and tried to deter-
mine the one with which it should be affiliated. See, for
example, a summary of James Hume’s (1909) view by visit-
ing http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Hume/affiliation.htm.

Reference: Hume, J. G. (1909). The proper affiliation of psy-
chology: With philosophy or the natural sciences. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 6, 65–67.

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http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Hume/affiliation.htm

CHAPTER 1 1.2 Defining Personality

only evidence problematic behavior when placed in forced circumstances (known as conditions of
worth). His theory assumed that the ideal self would emerge when given unconditional positive
regard, and this represented a central aspect of his clinical interventions. Similarly, the concept of
the unconscious resembles ideas reflected in Buddhism and Taoism (see Harvey, 1995). For example,
the concept of Tao, or “no mind,” emphasizes that which cannot be known in oneself. More recently,
clinicians have borrowed the Buddhist concept of mindfulness (i.e., being completely aware of the
present moment, with a nonjudgmental framework) for therapeutic gain. From these examples, it is
evident that psychology has roots in ideas from religions around the world.

Defining Normal
Throughout this text, we will be looking at normal and abnormal behavior, so it is important to
take a step back and ask the question: Who gets to decide what is normal and what is not? And
who decides who gets to decide?

This is an important question and one that social scientists need to keep in mind. What is consid-
ered to be normal human behavior has been defined differently by different cultures in different
times. There is no constant “normal.” Normal is an interpretation. In ancient Aztec culture, it was
normal to cut out and eat people’s hearts (Harner, 1977); such behavior now would be considered
deviant and criminal. Homosexuality was common and considered normal through much of the
history of the world. It is well known that homosexuality was practiced and accepted in ancient
Rome, and there is ample evidence that the same was true in places as diverse as Africa, Peru,
and China. Homosexuality was a normal part of many societies (Aldrich, 2004; Nussbaum, 2002;
Tomso, 2002). Yet, the first version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1952 classified homosexuality
as deviant and abnormal. Why? Probably because the membership of the APA was overwhelm-
ingly White, middle-aged males from a culture where homosexuality was considered wrong or
even criminal—a product of the time and the culture.

We have witnessed the change in thinking on this issue with the evolution of social norms. In
1973, homosexuality was taken out of the DSM and no longer considered “abnormal” behav-
ior. However, in 1980, due to pressure from conservative psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, a new
diagnosis, ego-dystonic homosexuality, was added back into the DSM as a disorder. The diagnosis
criteria included symptoms of “unwanted” homosexual urges and lack of heterosexual desire. This
move was widely criticized as political, and in 1986, any reference to homosexuality was removed
for good. The evolution of the APA’s perspective on homosexuality is a strong illustration of the
point that normal is relative.

As we have just read, philosophy, literature, and religion have all contributed to the evolution of
psychology. The work of two French philosophers, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, is ger-
mane to this discussion. Both men focused on the idea of who gets to define “normal,” and both
concluded that it had a lot to do with social power. Foucault wrote about prisons and mental
institutions (who ends up there and why), and Bourdieu wrote about language (who gets to define
legitimate language), but their ideas were similar. Those societies with power and those in the
society who have power define what is normal and what is not.

Foucault became interested in power while writing his histories of phenomena such as madness,
imprisonment and punishment, and sexuality. He was actually one of the first to view these as
historical objects of study, and he found that when he listened to the perspective of the mad,

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CHAPTER 1

1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

the imprisoned, the punished, or the sexually deviant, he heard a very different history than that
which might be presented by the doctor or lawyer. Foucault postulated an analogous relationship
between knowledge and power and began to question the epistemological bases of the “produc-
tion of truth.” He believed that just as a minority can physically force its will on the majority, so too
can a minority mentally force its conception of truth on the majority (McHoul, 1993).

He was especially interested in looking at normal and abnormal as created categories. He stud-
ied madness, illness, criminality, sexual perversions, and other behaviors that were considered
abnormal in his time and showed through his historical studies that these same behaviors had
not always been so defined. “Behavior that got people locked up or put in hospitals at one time
was glorified in another” (Fillingham, 1993, p. 16). Foucault believes that the abnormalization of
madness arose to fill the void created by the disappearance of leprosy at the end of the middle
ages (Sarup, 1993).

While other people were studying the normality or abnormality of certain behaviors, Foucault was
asking questions on a much higher level. He wanted to know how “normal” was being defined
and by whom. He believed the definition and study of abnormality was a primary method of the
establishment of power in society, because “when an abnormality and its corresponding norm are
defined, somehow it is always the normal person who has power over the abnormal” (Fillingham,
1993, p. 18).

Similarly, Bourdieu argued that those groups within the society who wield the most political and
social power control the use of and assign value to language within that society. “The social uses
of language owe their specifically social value to the fact that they tend to be organized in systems
of differences (between prosodic and articulatory or lexical and syntactic variants) which repro-
duce, in the symbolic order of differential deviations, the system of social differences” (Bourdieu,
1991, p. 54).

In a 1980 essay entitled “The Production and Reproduction of Legitimate Language” (later trans-
lated into English and included in his 1991 work Language and Symbolic Power), he argues that
language and power (he refers here to both political and social power) are inextricably intertwined.

So while normal and abnormal in psychology are clearly defined in the DSM-5, it is important to
note that it is highly influenced by western predominantly male thinking and has been criticized
by many for its lack of cultural inclusiveness. Pretty interesting stuff.

1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

The root word for theory is the Greek work theoria, meaning to view or contemplate. Theories, which are a system of ideas used to explain any phenomena, are important to any scientific study because they provide a context within which to interpret findings. Personality theories
allow one to develop relevant research, establish a framework for interrelating different research
findings, and, most importantly, allow for a priori predictions. The term a priori refers to the abil-
ity to make predictions based on theoretical deduction rather than empirical observation. That is,
theories allow researchers to predict the outcome of a research study before actually seeing the

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

data. When a theory results in a priori predictions, this allows the researcher to design a study
that could, depending on the outcome, disprove (or falsify) the theory that generated the predic-
tions (Popper, 1963). Thus, ideally, theories should result in very specific predictions, and when
one designs an experiment to test the accuracy of the theory, then this can be described as strong
inference (see Platt, 1964; see also Davis, 2006). This can be contrasted with research that does
not generate specific hypotheses in advance, and instead simply explains all or many outcomes
after the fact.

As an illustration, consider the theories we described earlier in this chapter to account for
Dorner’s actions. Hypothetically, if psychodynamic theory predicts that such violent behavior
would have to result from a strained or absent relationship with one’s parents (operationally
defined as either a divorce or having an estranged parent), then one could make a specific predic-
tion regarding the nature of Dorner’s family of origin. If, however, it turned out that his parents
remained happily married and were both present and supportive during his formative years, then
this would serve to refute the theory. The ability to make such specific predictions is less typical of
some psychological theories, and as a result, those theories would not result in strong inference.

In order for a discipline to advance scientific knowledge, there is a need for strong inference.
Wilson (1998) describes the importance of theory in the practice of science: “Nothing in science—
nothing in life, for that matter—makes sense without theory. It is our nature to put all knowledge
into the context in order to tell a story, and to recreate the world by this means” (p. 52).

All branches of science require a way to make observations and classify data, a set of propositions,
and a theory for organizing the data into a comprehensible framework that can guide further
developments and generate testable hypotheses. The theory must then stand the test of empirical
examination, which will either confirm or refute it and may lead to outright rejection or modifica-
tion. The need for empirical proof is one of the features of science that separates it from other
disciplines, such as theology and philosophy.

Building and Characterizing a Theory
Advanced development of a discipline usually requires building a theoretical model that explains
and predicts observations. For example, major advances were made in the biological sciences
when investigators began to develop theoretical models showing how pathogens cause disease.
Even though the viruses and bacteria responsible for the spread of disease had been identified,
little progress was made until theories were advanced.

Theories provide a kind of map for organizing knowledge. One of the major advancements in knowl-
edge was achieved by Charles Darwin when, after spending years observing and classifying the nat-
ural world, he proposed the theory of evolution. Not only did this model explain biological diversity
on the basis of natural selection, but it continues to influence many disciplines, including the study
of personality (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of evolution’s role in the structure of the brain).

Theories can be evaluated along a number of dimensions or features. For example, Rychlak (1968)
describes the main features of theoretical systems of personality (see also Rychlak, 2000). These
are presented in Table 1.2.

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

Table 1.2: Possible descriptive features of theories

Abstract Concrete

Concepts tend to be esoteric and can be
interpreted in different ways.

Observable data are emphasized and constructs
follow in the form of laws.

Realistic Idealistic

There is an observable external world that is
unchanging.

Reality is in the mind of the observer.

Objective Subjective

Experience can be reliably observed when the
proper criteria are used.

There is a level of knowledge that is personal and
not observable.

Introspective Extrospective

The observer can realistically observe the self. The observer cannot accurately observe the
self and must be detached from the point of
observation.

Formal Informal

Laws and postulates are clearly articulated and
logically connected.

Laws and postulates are loosely formulated and
connected.

Abstract Versus Concrete

Theoretical constructs are abstractions, but the level of abstraction can vary considerably. Behav-
ior theory and psychoanalytic theory were at odds with one another early in the evolution of
personality theory; comparing and contrasting them can be useful. For example, as shown in Table
1.3, classic behavior theory tried to deal with concrete, observable data, using as little abstrac-
tion as possible. In contrast, psychoanalytic theory is highly abstract and is often accused of using
terminology so vague that the meanings of its own terms are undermined. The level of abstraction
presents advantages and disadvantages. For example, behavior theory stays close to empirical
truths by limiting abstraction, but it is less able to describe the complexity of human personality.
On the other hand, psychoanalysis presents a theory and a vocabulary rich in explanatory poten-
tial, but the explanations it provides are sometimes too abstract to allow for scientific study, and
its vocabulary is frequently burdened with multiple meanings for the same terms.

Table 1.3: Comparison of behavioral and psychoanalytic models

Behavior theory Psychoanalytic theory

Little abstraction, terms precisely defined Highly abstract, terms loosely defined and
esoteric

Close to empirical observation Removed from empirical observation

Avoids theory and derives laws from data Develops complicated theory and fits data into
theory

Our theories of personality need a vocabulary to both describe and organize what we see. Dif-
ferent theorists have invented different terms to describe their beliefs and observations, and

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

these are often not interchangeable among theories. Learning how to use the tools of a discipline
requires learning its vocabulary.

Realism Versus Idealism

Theories can also be assessed with respect to their reflection of realism versus idealism. Realism
refers to the position that the world of perception and cognition has a fixed and stable existence
independent of the perceiver. Idealism refers to the belief that there is no external reality apart
from the perceiver. Humans, the idealists insist, view the world through their unique and limited
perceptions and senses. Reality is created between observer and subject. This can be illustrated by
considering the meaning of a word as it relates to concepts we already understand. For example,
the meaning of a word such as friendship depends on a range of personal experiences, including
interactions with people, participation in activities, and feelings of loneliness or of kinship. In
their search for meaning and understanding, personality theorists look for relationships that exist
among complex sets of data.

Objective Versus Subjective

Theories also vary with respect to their objectivity and subjectivity. Objective theories are
thought to be independent of the theorist and may be understood in the same way by anyone.
Subjective theories, on the other hand, imply that our abstractions and constructs are unique and
cannot easily be generalized. Importantly, the methods of scientific investigation can be greatly
affected by this distinction, and each results in very different assumptions about what can be stud-
ied. Two concepts relevant to notions of objectivity and subjectivity are expressed by the terms,
nomothetic and idiographic. Nomothetic study is the study of groups to arrive at general laws or
traits applicable to groups of individuals. Idiographic study is the study of individuals in a way that
emphasizes their uniqueness.

Introspection Versus Extrospection

The basic orientation of the observer is also important in the development of personality theory.
Theorists who assume an introspective stance formulate theory from their own personal points
of view. They observe and examine their own mental and emotional states and processes and
generalize from these. This approach was especially common in the formative years of the field, as
individuals such as Sigmund Freud and William James often engaged in introspection to generate
hypotheses. When theorists take an extrospective perspective, they assume a detached and neu-
tral position, basing their theories on observations of the behaviors and thoughts of others. With
the development of highly objective scientific approaches in the second half of the 20th century,
academic psychologists have generally rejected the use of introspection.

Formal Versus Informal

Formal theory is stated as clearly and objectively as possible and is expressed so as to maximize
consistency and interdependence. Formal theory can be expressed as fundamental ideas and the
axioms that logically flow from them (not unlike the theories commonly seen in the natural sci-
ences). Thus, highly formal theories tend to be more specific and narrower than less formal theo-
ries. In contrast, informal theory is less explicitly stated, often lacks clear and concise operational
definitions, is not (or is less) fully unified, and is therefore more difficult to test directly. Informal
theory does not lend itself to what we have referred to as strong inference—that is, theories that
allow for direct refutation through experimentation.

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

These various features of any theory may be helpful to evaluating the usefulness of a theory
and for comparing different theoretical perspectives (e.g., Rychlak, 1968). In the end, however,
there is no correct or incorrect way in which personality theory must be constructed. Different
theories may serve very different purposes. For example, behavior theories are often better
suited at predicting behavior than is psychodynamic theory. Thus, disorders that are largely
defined by problematic behavior, such as simple phobias, are better explained by behavior
theory—and behavioral approaches are also better suited to changing that behavior (e.g.,
systematic desensitization is a behaviorally-based intervention that tends to have reason-
ably good efficacy for treating phobias). In contrast, psychoanalytic approaches may be
better suited for clinicians who are attempting to understand complex psychiatric disorders
that involve more than just behavior (e.g., disordered thinking and affect), and where the
patient has little insight into the nature and etiology of their problematic functioning (e.g., an
endogenous form of depression).

Testing the Theoretical Components
Before a theory is accepted, it needs to be subjected to scientific inquiry and to systematic review
by the community of scholars. If the principles of the theory are not validated, the theory will
eventually fall out of favor. In a sense, this is a process of scientific evolution. Theories that are
useful continue to spawn new research; they survive because they make specific predictions and
the research fails to disprove them. Thus, they survive to see another day, and in this manner,
one can say that they are “selected.” Many theories don’t fare well in this “survival of the fittest”
game. They lose their credibility over time and fade away. Some fail because of limitations specific
to the era in which they were developed—limitations such as those related to inadequate mea-
surement capabilities and flawed methodologies. This is what happened to the theory of phrenol-
ogy, the belief that personality traits can be assessed by studying the contours of an individual’s
head. This belief seemed to make sense at the time, but its propositions were not supported and
phrenology became an extinct theory of personality.

Still, many early—and apparently extinct—theories contained an element of truth, and this aspect
of the theories is sometimes apparent in current theories. For example, although the basic propo-
sition of phrenology was faulty, its emphasis on quantification and localization of functioning were
important advancements that are reflected in current theories.

Convergence of Theories: Eclecticism, Integration, and Unification
There are many theories of personality. A number of individuals throughout the past century have
recognized the need for integration across disciplines. But it was not until the last quarter of the
20th century that the movement really began to emerge as a major force in many disciplines. The
reason for this delay may have been the need to wait for sufficient empirical evidence and theory
building to accrue. After all, psychology is barely more than 100 years old.

James and Murray: Early Calls for Integration

William James (1890), who was in part responsible for the birth of psychology as an indepen-
dent scientific discipline, was one of the earliest proponents of integrating psychological theories.
Unlike many of his contemporaries, he thought there would be value in integrating different ideas

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

even if it meant that resulting theories would not always stay close to the data. According to
Allport (1968), “More than any other psychologist James agonized over problems of systematic
eclecticism” (p. 16).

Another prominent figure in personology was Henry Murray (1959) who systematically attempted
to provide empirical support for a highly integrative theory of personality. As ambitious as this
effort was, it lacked important aspects of the component systems discovered later that would
have afforded him the opportunity to succeed in this daunting task. Without today’s computer
technology and statistical methods, he collected much more data from those he interviewed and
tested than he could possibly analyze. Although many of his concepts did not achieve an enduring
place in psychology, his ambitious attempt to develop a comprehensive integration of personality
theory continues to inspire many researchers, such as Silvan Tomkins, who is widely known for his
theory of affect (Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1991).

Later, another important figure in psychology, Gordon Allport, also called for integration.

Allport’s Call for Systematic Eclecticism

Gordon Allport (1968) was among the early proponents of what he called systematic eclecticism.

Allport’s uses the term eclectic to refer to a systematic attempt to bring together—that is, to
integrate—various ideas to arrive at better explanations. He describes eclecticism as “a system
that seeks the solution of fundamental problems by selecting and uniting what it regards as true
in the specialized approaches to psychological sciences” (pp. 5–6). He believed that it was not
possible to synthesize all plausible theories, but that trying to do so was a challenge psycholo-
gists should accept.

Eclecticism was not a concept invented by Allport; it had been used by a variety of philosophers
in their search for truth (Janet, 1885). He revived the concept because of what he described as a
lack of synthesis in psychology. “The situation at present,” he writes, “is that each theorist typically
occupies himself with one parameter of human nature, and builds himself a limited model to fit his
special data and personal style. Those who concern themselves with either the brain or phenom-
enology may be said to focus on one important parameter (body-mind); depth psychologists on
the conscious-unconscious parameter; trait theorists on the stability-variability parameter; others
on self and non-self. Trouble arises when an investigator maintains that his preferred parameter,
or his chosen model, overspreads the whole of human personality” (Allport, 1968, p. 10).

What the social sciences need, explained Allport (1968), is theoretical assimilation, “the absorp-
tion of great ideas into the stream of intellectual history” (p. 14). Among the “great ideas” he
identifies are those of Darwin, Galton, Pavlov, Freud, and the general systems theory.

Allport thought general systems theory offered great promise: “properly employed the basic prin-
ciple of open system is, I believe, the most fruitful approach to systematic eclecticism” (p. 17). An
“open system,” as opposed to a “closed system,” is one where outcomes of the functioning of the
system are never entirely predictable. That clearly seems to be the case with respect to human
personality. “Personality is the most eclectic concept in psychology, and an open system view the
most eclectic interpretation of this concept” (Allport, 1968, p. 22).

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CHAPTER 1 1.3 Theory: A Way of Organizing Complex Phenomena

Allport (1968) realized that systems theory was critical, but he did not expand his frame of refer-
ence to take into account all that happens outside the brain. He was concerned about reduction-
ism and reminded us that a model is an analogue: Like a picture; it is not the entity itself. He uses
an Indian proverb about blind men attempting to describe an elephant as an example of myopic
theorizing:

One finds its tail very like a rope; another his hoof like a pillar; to a third the ear
is like a saddle. But none is able to characterize the elephant. Similarly, modelists
who say man is very like a machine, a pigeon, a mathematical theorem, mistake
the part for the whole, and sometimes even mistake the simulata for the thing
simulated. Systematic eclecticism works less with models than with theories. And
its eventual aim is a comprehensive metatheory of the nature of man. (p. 11)

The integrative movement, like other movements in psychology, has multiple tributaries that feed
it. One major contributor to the development of integration was a new spirit of collaboration
among innovators searching for more effective models to guide psychotherapy.

The Influence of the Integrative Psychotherapy Movement

As Norcross and Newman (1992) note, “Rivalry among various theoretical orientations has a long
and undistinguished history in psychotherapy, dating back to Freud” (p. 3). And rivalry among
personality theories has been no less apparent. In both of these fields, the concept of theoreti-
cal integration was not new, but no serious formal attempts at synthesizing competing positions
occurred until the late 1970s (Arkowitz, 1992). In the 1980s, there was a “geometric increase” in
this movement with more than 200 publications during this decade devoted to psychotherapy
integration (Goldfried & Newman, 1992). This explosion of publications on theoretical integration
in the 1980s marked the end of an era of parochialism and ushered in a new era of interdisciplin-
ary collaboration (Arkowitz & Messer, 1984; Goldfried, 1982; Marmor & Woods, 1980; Norcross &
Newman, 1992; Wachtel, 1987).

This interest culminated in the formation of The Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Inte-
gration in 1983. The importance of this movement toward integration was summarized by Arkow-
itz (1992): “By expanding our scope beyond theories of psychotherapy and by looking toward
areas of theory and research in other areas of psychology (e.g., cognitive sciences, social psychol-
ogy, health psychology and psychobiology), psychotherapy integration promises to bring psycho-
therapy back to the field of psychology from which it has become somewhat isolated” (p. 293).

Assimilation and Integration

There are basically two ways a theory can coalesce: theoretical assimilation and theoretical inte-
gration. Assimilation, as we saw in the earlier section on Allport, occurs when features of other
systems are unwittingly absorbed into a model. This is often an ongoing, unconscious process
where aspects of various theoretical models are absorbed and added to a new synthesis (Messer,
1992). For example, aspects of evolutionary theory have been assimilated into sociobiology as
well as into various personality theories.

The integration of theoretical models is a more active process. It typically involves deliberate and
conscious attempts to blend constructs of one model with those of another to create a more use-
ful synthesis. This is similar to Allport’s concept of systematic eclecticism.

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CHAPTER 1

1.4 The Scientific Method

1.4 The Scientific Method

The scientific method is a systematic approach to inquiry that uses careful observation and a formal process of gathering objective data. The scientific method is essential to theory build-ing. This section discusses its applications.
Research Methods
Science within the field of personality psychology unfolds much like science in any other discipline
or subdiscipline. The term science refers to the accumulation of knowledge, and knowledge is
accumulated using a variety of methods in psychology. These techniques have various strengths
and weaknesses and have developed over the years as the field has matured. For example, early
in the history of psychology, information was largely accumulated by the methods of introspec-
tion (i.e., self-examination) and case study (the intensive examination of a small number of clini-
cal cases). These approaches provided a wealth of information, but they were less structured and
standardized, and the information was gathered from a limited number of individuals. Although
case studies are still sometimes used to advance knowledge, the method of introspection has
generally fallen out of favor, despite its early utility in the field.

The survey approach eventually became the workhorse of the field, as surveys could be easily
employed and were an optimal way of conveniently gathering information from a diverse popula-
tion. Surveys were also collected longitudinally in order to allow for a consideration of changes in
scores over time, and this approach has become increasingly popular, as powerful statistical tools
have been developed to examine the data.

Researchers have also adopted advanced statistical methods for the study of personality,
including meta-analysis, multivariate analysis, and perhaps most germane to the study of per-
sonality, factor analysis. Factor analysis is a statistical technique used to organize and reduce
data that has emerged as a method of developing theoretical models from the empirical analy-
sis of descriptive language (also referred to as the lexical study of personality). This approach
first became prominent with the work of Raymond Cattell, but as advanced statistical software
emerged, its practice has proliferated (see also the advent of confirmatory factor analysis, in
addition to exploratory factor analysis) and resulted in the identification of multifactorial mod-
els of personality (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1985; McCrae & Costa, 1992). Even though this method
provides a more data-driven, rather than theory-driven, approach to the study of personality, it
still fails to provide us with the opportunity to draw causal conclusions (More on statistics and
the trait perspective in Chapter 8).

The pinnacle of the research model is the experiment, in which the researcher manipulates one
or more variables of interest and exposure to the manipulated variables is done through random
assignment. It is the experimental method that has established personality psychology as a field
with a truly scientific model of study. See Table 1.4 for a description of each method and some of
the corresponding advantages and disadvantages.

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CHAPTER 1 1.4 The Scientific Method

Table 1.4: Overview of six basic methods used in psychological research

Method Advantages Disadvantages

Introspection • Extensive detail
• Access to a great deal of info
• Subject is always available

• Less standardized and
structured

• Investigator and subject
share the same biases

• Least representative data
• Data drawn from one

individual

Case study • Extensive detail
• Access to a great deal of info
• Investigator and subject are

different individuals

• Less standardized and
structured

• Not optimally representative
data

• Data drawn from a small
number of individuals

Survey • Data collection can still be
broad

• Very large and
representative samples

• More limited amount of
information

• Less is known about the
response tendencies of the
subjects (e.g., honesty in
responding)

Longitudinal survey • Provides the same
advantages as the survey,
along with the opportunity
to establish a temporal
line (i.e., establish if one
construct precedes another)

• Similar disadvantages as the
survey method

Statistical methods
(i.e., exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis)

• Not as tied to any
theoretical model

• Data driven
• Can contrast theory with

data to critique the accuracy
of some theories

• Still requires some basic
assumptions for testing

• Analyses are limited by
the problems with the
constructs that are being
assessed

Experiment • Minimizes the influence of
any unmeasured variables
due to random assignment

• The only method that allows
for causal conclusions

• Tight experimental control
can have a trade-off with
how well the findings
generalize outside the lab

Modern-day personality psychologists rely primarily on the survey and experimental methods. It
is with these more modern scientific methods that researchers can advance the field by predict-
ing outcomes and exercising experimental control over phenomena. The abilities of researchers to
predict something before it occurs, control each variable of interest, and manipulate outcomes by
altering a variable of interest—these are the best indicators that we understand something well.
In Chapter 2, we will apply these criteria to psychodynamic theory and, after operationally defin-
ing the unconscious, test whether there is evidence of its existence, its influence on our behavior,
and its ability to do so outside of our awareness.

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CHAPTER 1 1.4 The Scientific Method

Of course, one natural limitation in the field of personality psychology is that personality, per se,
is not something that can be manipulated with random assignment. Thus, sometimes research-
ers must focus on related constructs (concepts) that are more directly accessible to help advance
the field. As an illustration, consider the personality trait of perceived control. Early work focused
on its operational definition (e.g., in the 1950s, Julian Rotter introduced the concept of locus of
control), and over the span of many years, researchers developed a theory to better understand
control perceptions and how they work (e.g., see self-efficacy theory, Bandura, 1977; the theory
of planned behavior, Ajzen, 1985, etc.). After several researchers developed measures of con-
trol (e.g., Paulhus, 1983; Paulhus & Van Selst, 1990; Rotter, 1966), survey research established a
consistent and reasonably strong association between control perceptions and a number of out-
comes. For example, higher perceived control is associated with better psychological well-being
(Hortop, Wrosch, & Gagné, 2013; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Stupnisky, Perry, Renaud, & Hladkyj,
2013) and better physical health (e.g., Infurna & Gerstorf, 2012; Thompson & Spacapan, 1991).
Researchers have also manipulated perceived control and demonstrated that it can cause changes
in health-related behavior (Lecci & Cohen, 2007) and improve how we respond to stress (e.g.,
Glass & Singer, 1972). The entire body of research gives us a better understanding of the phenom-
enon and even allows for some causal conclusions.

Peer Review
The scientific method requires that findings be subjected to peer review and that the specific
steps that led to the conclusions be made public so that other investigators can confirm the
findings. Peer review often involves “blind review,” where research is examined by independent
reviewers who have no connection with the researchers. The reviewers are experts in the content
area as well as experts in the scientific method. Ideally, the review process improves the quality
of published research by critiquing it (i.e., identifying the strengths and weaknesses of any sub-
mitted manuscript), which in turn culls poorer research and strengthens the studies that do get
published. The goal is to seek out a consensus among the reviewers for the most relevant issues
to critique, although the level of agreement among reviews varies, and other factors may also
influence the critique (e.g., Petty, Fleming, & Fabrigar, 1999).

Based on the collective merits of the research and the critique, the journal editor decides whether
to reject the manuscript, encourage a revision, or accept it outright. The most common outcome
is a “revise and resubmit,” in which the authors are provided the critiques of multiple reviewers
and must then respond to the critiques with counterarguments, additional data, or analyses that
address the critiques. The journal editor, along with additional reviewers, will determine whether
the authors have succeeded in addressing the concerns raised in the critiques. Such scrutiny by
one’s peers in the field further bolsters the legitimacy of psychological findings, as the review
process is rigorous and aimed at expanding our knowledge and better understanding phenomena.

Although books can offer rich and useful information, publications in primary research journals
are generally considered the venue for cutting-edge science. In psychology, and specifically per-
sonality psychology, there are a number of well-respected journals that involve rigorous peer
review, and only a small handful of studies (e.g., typically less than 20% of those submitted) actu-
ally succeed in being published. Some journals in which you will find interesting research specific
to the area of personality include the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, the Journal of Personality, the Journal of Research in Personality, and
Personality and Individual Differences, to name a few.

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CHAPTER 1

1.5 Measuring and Assessing

1.5 Measuring and Assessing

Psychological measurement, broadly referred to as psychometrics, is an essential part of the scientific study of personality. Psychometrics involves both the construction of instruments and procedures used in measurement and the development of measurement theory. As with
any scientific discipline, measurement—and the accuracy of that measurement—undergirds the
effectiveness of how science is to be carried out in the field of personality psychology. Assessment
implies that there is an actual construct to be assessed and that it can be quantified and assessed
with reasonable accuracy. There are several important technical terms used to assess the quality
of any assessment tool, and some of the key terms, such as standard error of measure and the
various forms of reliability and validity, will be defined.

Standard Error of Measure
All assessment tools have error, but not all tools of assessment have equal amounts of error.
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the efficacy of any and all assessment tools employed by
quantifying their error. The term used to represent the error associated with any form of assess-
ment is the standard error of measure (SEM).

The SEM is defined as the standard deviation of the sampling distribution. Imagine that we are
trying to measure your level of extraversion using an instrument called the E-scale, which yields a
score between 0 and 50, with higher scores denoting greater extraversion. Each time we adminis-
ter this test to you, it results in a score, but not every one of your scores is identical. If we were to
repeat this process, a number of estimates of your level of extraversion would emerge (each rep-
resented by a score). Once we had sampled your extraversion score a very large number of times
(theoretically, an infinite number of times), we could then plot all of the scores, calculate a mean
of all the scores, and find the standard deviation of the distribution of scores. The latter value
(the standard deviation of all the score estimates) is the standard error of measure, and smaller
values indicate less error (in this case, less variability in the estimates of your extraversion). If an
instrument is well constructed, and the construct being assessed is reasonably stable (something
that is assumed to be true for personality), then the SEM should be relatively small. The SEM also
provides some important information about the reliability of the measure.

Reliability
Conceptually speaking, the construct of reliability is essentially synonymous with consistency.
So when someone is discussing the reliability of a measure, they are talking about the extent
to which it produces consistent scores. Reliability can be maximized through standardization—
that is, by ensuring that the measure is administered, scored, and interpreted in the same way
every time. This even applies to survey measures, with standardization referring to, for example,
whether the items are written in such a way that they will be interpreted in the same way by dif-
ferent individuals.

Reliability figures (referred to as reliability coefficients) can range from zero, indicating no reliabil-
ity, to 1.0, indicating perfect reliability. Typically, a reliability value of at least 0.70 is needed for the
measure to be considered reliable enough to use. There are several different types of reliability,
and we will here define four common types that are useful when evaluating a measure and the
research that uses it.

• Test-retest reliability refers to how consistently a measure produces the same score for
the same individual over time. To calculate this value, a test or scale is administered and

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

then, after a predetermined period of time (for measures of personality, the interval
between administrations is usually anywhere from 30 days to one year), it is administered
again and the two scores are compared. Given that personality is a construct that is in the-
ory supposed to be stable, the inter-rater reliability can be used to provide some validation
that it is, in fact, stable. In fact, this form of reliability can be used to differentiate between
constructs like mood states (which will have lower test-retest reliability) and traits.

• Internal reliability refers to the extent to which half of the randomly selected items on
a test relate to the remaining half of the items. Assuming the scale measures only one
construct, then the internal reliability should be reasonably high if it is a good instru-
ment. One of the more widely accepted ways of assessing the internal reliability of an
instrument is by taking every possible split-half reliability (all possible combinations of
half the items on a measure) and calculating the average of these values. This is also
known as the Cronbach’s alpha of the instrument. In general, as a measure adds items
(assuming the items are of equal quality), the measure will increase its internal reliabil-
ity. Increasingly, researchers have turned to other statistical tools, such as factor analysis,
to not only provide information on a measure’s internal reliability, but also its construct
validity (see next section).

• Parallel (or alternate) forms reliability is used when researchers have two different ver-
sions of the same test, and the goal is to make the two versions as similar as possible.
Typically, researchers will generate a large pool of items, divide them at random into two
versions, and assess the target population. If the parallel forms reliability is high, then
both forms should yield similar scores. Parallel forms reliability is important if you have
to evaluate someone twice and you want to avoid giving them the same test twice. Par-
allel forms reliability is similar to the above-mentioned split-half reliability, except that
for parallel forms, you are planning to use the two forms as independent measures.

• Inter-rater reliability refers to the agreement between raters whenever a measurement
requires people to score it. This value is especially important the more subjective the
scoring of the measure is. For example, later in the text, we will report on studies that
involve rating the behaviors of children as they explore a room. It is reasonable to ques-
tion whether different individuals (raters) would rate those behaviors in the same way,
and the inter-rater reliability figure provides a way to quantify the rate of agreement.

Validity
Validity is a complex term because it can have many meanings. However, in all cases, the basic
definition refers to the extent to which reality is captured by a measure, an experiment, or even a
clinical trial. Validity is also related to the type of data that is collected to help give meaning to test
scores. That is, any test score is essentially meaningless unless there is a standard of comparison to
interpret the scores. For example, when you obtain a score of 50 on a trait measure of neuroticism,
the interpretation of that score depends on how others have scored on the same measure. Tests,
therefore, usually have extensive norms: a database of how other individuals have scored, some-
times separated by gender, age, or other relevant demographics. For neuroticism, there are some
differences for males as opposed to females, so the scores may be norm-referenced by gender
(i.e., males compare their scores to other males, whereas females compare their scores to other
females). All tests are either norm-referenced tests, criterion-referenced tests (for which an individ-
ual’s score is compared to a specific score that has some relation to standards or criteria—often a
cutoff score), or ipsative tests, for which a score is compared to the same individual’s performance
on the measure under other circumstances or at a different point in time.

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

Validity is also related to the previous psychometric concepts introduced in this chapter, as a
measure cannot be valid unless it is first shown to be reliable. That is, reliability is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition to achieve validity. We will here define some of the most common
forms of validity.

Construct validity refers to the extent to which a measure captures what it purports to measure.
This is the most central form of validity, and it is typically established by both theory and empirical
evidence. There are several ways to determine if a measure assesses what it is supposed to mea-
sure, and these too are forms of validity. That is, construct validity is achieved by demonstrating
criterion, convergent, and discriminant validity.

• Criterion validity refers to a measure’s ability to predict a related outcome that is mea-
sured at some future point in time. For example, a measure of child aggression might be
shown to predict aggressive behavior as an adult, thereby demonstrating criterion validity.

• Convergent validity is the extent to which a score on one measure converges with a
score on a conceptually related measure. Thus, when similar constructs converge, it is
said that convergent validity is achieved.

• Discriminant validity refers to when a score on one measure diverges from a score on a
conceptually distinct measure. That is, measures that are supposed to be assessing
different things do, in fact, show divergence.

As noted, there are other forms
of reliability and validity, but for
the purpose of this text, these
represent some of the more com-
mon psychometric terms needed
to evaluate the quality of an
assessment tool, and these con-
cepts can also be used when eval-
uating some of the research that
the following chapters present.

Ethics and Cultural Bias in Psychometrics
Testing must always be conducted in an ethical manner, and this is especially critical because the
results of personality assessments can have important consequences for individuals. For example,
someone who is inappropriately diagnosed with a psychopathic personality disorder might be
denied parole because of a perceived potential danger to society. Scores on tests like the MMPI®-2
have been used to determine custody or influence whether a patient is released from an inpatient
psychiatric facility.

Sue and Sue (2008) have raised objections to the use of testing and the classification that often
results from testing. They suggest that it is a dangerous practice when psychometric instru-
ments that favor white, Euro-American, middle-class persons—and thus are biased against
minorities—are used to measure personality and intelligence. We need to keep in mind that
definitions of health are often based on dominant cultural values and attitudes. How we define
what is “normal” or “pathological” or even what is relevant to these definitions is influenced

Beyond the Text: Classic Writings

For additional discussion and overview of the concept
of validity, please see this classic paper by Cronbach and
Meehl, published in 1955 in Psychological Bulletin. Read it
at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Cronbach/construct.htm.

Reference: Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct
validity in psychological tests. Psychological Bulletin, 52,
281–302.

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

by culture, religion, and ethnic factors
(Draguns, 2009; Hogan & Bond, 2009).
Sue and Sue (2008) suggest that when
tests that have been developed for the
majority group are used for the patho-
logical labeling and hospitalization of
minority group members, this can be
interpreted as a form of political con-
trol. This practice has been labeled
ethnocentric monoculturism, a phe-
nomenon they view as dysfunctional
in a pluralistic society (see Sue & Sue,
2008). We must be especially cautious
when using tests that were developed,
validated, and normed on majority
group members and making decisions
for minorities or those of other cultures
(see Gould, 1996, and for a more recent
discussion, see Ossorio, 2011).

The American Psychological Association’s (APA) Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of
Conduct is intended to guide psychologists in all aspects of their work, including, but not limited
to, testing. These ethical principles cover such issues as:

• Test competence: The individual administering and interpreting the test should be
properly trained and supervised in the use of that test.

• Privacy and confidentiality: The psychologist’s need to take reasonable precautions
in protecting confidential information. This also applies to the storage of test data in
any medium.

• Informed consent: The person being tested has knowledge of what is involved in the
testing, how the test results might be used, and that they voluntarily agree to testing
without being coerced. This issue is more complex when testing minors or those who
might not be legally competent to give consent.

The APA Ethics Code only applies to a psychologist’s activities that relate to scientific, educational,
or professional roles. Misuse of psychological tests by psychologists continues to be a problem,
though most of the violations involve issues of competence (i.e., that the professional improperly
used the test; see McIntire & Miller, 2007 for a more extensive discussion).

For complete coverage of the ethical issues on testing, as well as the ethics for therapy and
research, the American Psychological Association has made its guidelines available to the general
public. See http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx.

Personality and Culture

Theoreticians and researchers have increasingly recognized the fact that the study of psychology
has largely been limited to a culturally and ethnically limited perspective (e.g., Cheung, 2012).
In keeping with this conclusion, the American Psychological Association (2003) published guide-
lines to promote multiculturalism and the globalization of psychological research, practice, and
training. Nevertheless, the conclusion continues to be that the scientists and the subjects they

Comstock/Stockbyte/Thinkstock

It is important to be aware of the potential bias of
assessments that were developed and validated based
on a majority group but are administered or used to
make decisions regarding a minority group.

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http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx

CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

study are typically drawn from Western, industrialized, and democratic nations, and individually
they are educated, wealthy, and usually white (e.g., Guthrie, 2004; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010; Jones, 2010). As a result, it is questionable whether basic psychological research adequately
captures the diversity of human psychological functioning. As an example, consider the very con-
cept of personality psychology, which is, in essence, the emphasis of individual differences. Many
cultures minimize such differences and instead emphasize the study of groups. Thus, even the pro-
cess of imposing from a Western industrialized perspective what is relevant to be studied reflects
a significant bias.

Although the issue of culture will be addressed to some degree in Chapters 4 and 8, where
researchers attempt to determine what can be attributed to genetic influences and what can be
attributed to other factors, it is important to understand that culture, ethnicity, and race are rel-
evant to all areas of personality psychology.

Tools of Assessment
There are two main groups of psychometric instruments: those that were developed for and are
primarily used to measure personality in the clinical population and those developed and used to
assess personality in the nonclinical population. Because of the greater need for assessment in
answering clinical questions, the vast majority of the personality measures were developed for
use in this setting. For example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2 (MMPI–2),
the Millon/ Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III/), and the Personality Assessment Inven-
tory/ (PAI-) are some of the more commonly employed objective measures in clinical settings. In
contrast, the NEO/ Personality Inventory-3 (NEO/-PI-3) and the Myers Briggs Type Indicator-
(MBTI-) are some of the more commonly used measures in the nonclinical settings. Thus, many
instruments have been specifically validated to function in just one population.

One of the primary differences between measures developed for clinical and nonclinical set-
tings is the extent to which the assessment is direct in its approach. Burisch (1984) suggests
that a measure should adopt the most straightforward and unambiguous method of assessment
(i.e., simple, obvious questions) provided that the researcher can assume that the respondent:
(a) understands the construct being assessed, (b) has no reason to misrepresent the truth, and
(c) demonstrates sufficient psychological insight to respond. Obviously, in clinical settings, at least
one of these assumptions is likely to not hold true, and therefore more indirect methods are typi-
cally employed.

In this section, some of the different measures used in personality psychology will be introduced.
More detail for each measure will be presented in the chapters reflecting their theoretical origins.

Structured Interviews

Structured interviews consist of predetermined questions that are put to the subject by an inter-
viewer, with the end result being a diagnostic tool that matches the DSM’s nosological structure.
Some structured interviews are designed to assess a wide range of personality traits; others focus
on a specific type of personality disorder. Structured interviews are often pathology-based assess-
ment instruments used in research. One commonly used instrument developed by First, Spitzer,
Gibbon, & Williams (1996) is the Structured Clinical Interview (SCID-I) that was aligned with the
Axis I clinical disorders of the version of the DSM at that time (the DSM-IV). This semi-structured
interview is designed specifically to be administered by clinicians or trained mental health profes-
sionals (see also Ventura, Liberman, Green, Shaner, & Mintz, 1998). The SCID-II was developed to

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

assess the Axis II personality disorders from the DSM-IV. It contains a standardized interview for
those 11 personality disorders along with a questionnaire format that can be used by clinicians
to guide a shortened clinical interview (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997). Fur-
ther updates to the SCID are under way to match the recently published DSM-5, which no longer
divides disorders in terms of Axes (see Chapter 10 for more information). The widespread use and
acceptance of the SCID family of tests is indicated by the fact that it has been translated into many
different languages, and numerous empirical studies have demonstrated its validity.

Self-Report Inventories and Objective Tests

Objective tests are standardized instruments that may be self-administered, but are often
administered by a clinician or researcher. Most consist of many scales that are derived
through empirical research. These instruments are often computer scored because of
the complexity of hand scoring. The oldest and best known of them is the widely used
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory®-2 (MMPI®-2), which has been extensively vali-
dated. The MMPI–2 has resulted in over 2,800 published journal articles, book chapters, and
textbooks, making it one of the most extensively studied tools of assessment (e.g., Graham, 2006).
It is also used in a wide range of clinical, personnel, and forensic settings. It went through a major
revision in 1989, and the revised version (MMPI–2) is a 567-item, true/false test (Butcher, Dahl-
strom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) that is used with adults. The MMPI–A is an alternate
version that is used for adolescents between the ages of 14 and 18. More recently, the MMPI–2
Restructured Clinical (RC) scales were developed (Tellegen, Ben-Porath, McNulty, Arbisi, Graham,
& Kaemmer, 2003), and this was the centerpiece of the MMPI–2 RF (Restructured Form; see Ben-
Porath, 2012). These latest MMPI–2 scales were changed to improve the psychometrics of the
tests and address the high degree of overlap among the original scales.

The widespread use of the MMPI–2 is due, in large part, to the extensive research conducted on
this instrument, including research to illustrate “fake good” and “fake bad” profiles, and scales
to assess such constructs as defensiveness, superlative responding, inconsistent responding, and
the endorsement of odd/unusual items, reflecting both rare items in the nonclinical population
and rare items even among psychiatric patients. In fact, much research on the original and revised
MMPI- has focused on the identification of those who intentionally manifest symptoms for some
external gain (known as malingering).

A similar instrument is the Millon/ Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III (MCMI-III/), which has been
through a number of revisions since its inception (Millon, 1977). The current version of this instru-
ment, the MCMI-III/, which consists of 175 true/false questions, was developed to measure per-
sonality disorder and psychopathology based on Millon’s evolutionary framework of personal-
ity. The MCMI-III/ also has some measures of validity (e.g., defensiveness), though these are
less extensive than the MMPI–2. The one significant advantage of this instrument is that it was
designed to yield diagnostic conclusions that closely match the nosological structure of the diag-
nostic tool used in the United States. This was the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric
Disorders IV (DSM-IV), and it has now become the fifth version, the DSM-5. MCMI/ revisions are
pending that will closely parallel changes occurring in the DSM-5.

The Personality Assessment Inventory/ (PAI-) is a 344-item measure that includes 22 scales
focusing on psychiatric disorders and several validity indexes (Morey, 2007). The PAI- has 11 clini-
cal scales that are grouped within the neurotic and psychotic spectrum, scales to assess behav-
ioral disorders and problems of impulse control, and other scales to assess complications and
motivation for treatment, harm potential, interpersonal relations, and personality disorder traits.

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

The PAI- has normative data from patients, students, and the population at large, and reliability
and validity figures are adequate for both clinical and nonclinical settings. Recent studies have
attempted to validate the PAI- for use in various settings, including forensic populations (e.g.,
Newberry & Shuker, 2012) and neuropsychological settings (Aikman & Souheaver, 2008).

There are many other objective instruments developed for measuring normal and abnor-
mal personality. Currently, the best known and widely used in the nonclinical population is the
NEO/ Personality Inventory-3 (NEO/-PI-3), originally developed by Costa and McCrae (1985). It
is based on the five-factor model of personality (see Chapter 8). The NEO/-PI-3 and the shorter
form, the NEO/-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1989), both measure the five factors of personality in nor-
mal adults: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness (A), and
Conscientiousness (C). Another instrument that has been widely used is the Myers Briggs Type
Indicator- (MBTI-). Even though it assesses the personality constructs of introversion and extra-
version, this instrument is more widely used in the field of industrial-organization psychology, as
its primary application has been to predict behavior in work settings involving teams.

Projective Tests

These instruments are based on the assumption that people perceive the world from their own,
idiosyncratic point of view (Weiner & Greene, 2008). The basic assumption is that if you show
individuals an ambiguous stimulus, they project unconscious wishes, fears, and thoughts into their
description of the stimulus (see Chapter 2 for an expanded definition of the defense mechanism
of projection). These descriptions can then be analyzed to discover common themes that might
reveal something of the unconscious mind. By far the most popular of these instruments is the
Rorschach Inkblot Method developed by Hermann Rorschach (1921/1942), a Swiss psychiatrist.
Indeed, the Rorschach is consistently among the most frequently used personality test in inpatient
psychiatric settings and second only to the MMPI–2 (e.g., Camara, Nathan, & Punete, 2000; Lubin,
Larsen, Matarazzo, & Seever, 1985).

The Rorschach consists of 10 inkblots
on cards. They are primarily shades of
gray and black, with some of the cards
including color. Subjects are asked to tell
the examiner what the card brings to
mind (i.e., what they see in each card).
Responses are recorded verbatim. Sub-
jects are also asked to provide more
detail to their responses by, for example,
explaining what they perceived and why.
Subjects’ responses are analyzed on a
number of variables, although in the
earliest scoring methods, the content of
the responses was emphasized.

Despite its popularity in psychiatric hos-
pitals, there has been and continues
to be considerable controversy over
its use (Goode, 2001; Lanyon & Good-
stein, 1997). The most obvious con-
troversy is that its use requires that one accept at least some assumptions of psychodynamic
theory (described in more detail in Chapter 2). Another problem is that after Herman Rorschach

Zizar2002/iStockphoto/Thinkstock

One controversy regarding the Rorschach inkblot test is
that, often, the test is administered and scored in varying
ways, which calls into question its validity.

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CHAPTER 1 1.5 Measuring and Assessing

developed the test, several different administration and scoring methods were developed, result-
ing in a test that, while each carried the same name, had many different versions. For example,
different administrations did not always involve all 10 cards, they did not always generate a mini-
mum number of responses from the subjects, and the cards were not necessarily administered
in the same order. The scoring also varied, especially when the analysis of the response content
was the primary focus. Thus the Rorschach suffered from poor standardization, low reliability,
and inadequate validity. However, in the mid 1980s, John Exner, as a follow-up to his doctoral
dissertation, attempted to standardize the Rorschach by establishing some common standards,
including always administering all 10 cards in the same order, using the same prompts to get initial
responses and elaborations on those responses, using further queries to ensure a minimum num-
ber of responses from all subjects, and identifying a common set of scoring criteria. In Chapter 2
(Section 2.6, “Psychodynamic Methods of Assessment”), these criteria will be outlined in detail.

A second projective instrument still widely used in research and clinical practice is the
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), developed by Murray and Morgan (1935). In fact, the TAT is
also among the most commonly administered test in psychiatric settings (Camara et al., 2000;
Lubin et al., 1985). The TAT involves a series of black-and-white pictures depicting ambiguous situ-
ations, many of which include people, and having the subject come up with a brief story that goes
along with the picture. The scoring for this instrument typically involves identifying the main agent
of action (e.g., the main character of the story) and assuming that the subject is projecting her- or
himself into the story as the main agent of action. The scoring also involves identifying the primary
needs of the main agent of action (e.g., need for affiliation, power, independence, etc.) and the
press (e.g., any external contingences on the main character, including the demands placed on the
main character by other individuals in the story). Although this scoring system is more structured
than the original scoring methods for the Rorschach, it is less complex than Exner’s scoring system,
and therefore the psychometric qualities of this test are less robust.

Another projective personality measure sometimes used for assessment and research is the
sentence completion exercise, in which the subject is asked to finish a sentence stem with the
first thing that comes to mind (e.g., “I LIKE ____”). These responses are then content analyzed for
their meaning, and in the case of tests administered to children and adolescents, they are also
interpreted for their developmental appropriateness. This and other similar projective measures
(e.g., figure drawing tests, the Bender-Gestalt, etc.) are generally less psychometrically sound, and
so they are less widely used today.

Rating Scales and Checklists

Rating scales and checklists may be administered by an examiner or, more typically, they can be
self-administered. They generally consist of lists of items that the subject or examiner is asked
to check if appropriate. If the measure is a rating scale, then the subject is asked to indicate the
extent of their agreement to an item. For example, the options might include “I am always, often,
sometimes, or never . . . afraid/careful/calm/etc.” Response formats for these types of measures
often use Likert scales, in which the anchor points are labeled, but the rest of the scale is repre-
sented numerically. An illustration of this response format might be a series of items where the
subject is asked to indicate the extent of their agreement using a 0 (meaning “completely dis-
agree”) to 5 (meaning “completely agree”) scale.

One of the more widely used rating scales in research and applied settings is the
Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R), which was developed by Hare (1991) to measure two
factors (lack of empathy and erratic behavior) present in antisocial or psychopathic personalities.
Another commonly used instrument is the Positive Affect/Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) and

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the expanded PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1994), which has a version that uses the prompt of how
do you feel “in general” to assess the construct of personality.

The use of psychological instruments to determine personality types, characteristics, and disorders
has been a major challenge and stimulus to the growth of both academic and professional psy-
chology. Psychological testing is a huge business, with many companies offering a wide selection
of instruments that can be used in many settings and for many purposes. Sophisticated computer
programs, powerful personal computers, and advanced statistical methods allow researchers and
clinicians to measure personality in efficient and cost-effective ways (e.g., using Internet-based
administration and scoring), with results often available immediately. This was seldom the case
when tests had to be hand-scored. These types of instruments are now widely used in many sec-
tors of society, including assessing candidates for the police force, clergy, and military recruits.
Personality testing is also widely used to inform child custody disputes and parental competency
evaluations (see Lecci & Resendes, 2012), executive placement decisions, student assessments,
personnel placement, and employee assistance programs.

Summary

This chapter introduced the concept of personality, the characteristics of personality the-ory, the methods of science, and the tools of assessment, including psychometric concepts. These represent the basic building blocks of the field, and once you understand these terms,
you can evaluate new studies and advances, much as a scientist would do. However, this is not
just the domain of science, as we all use personality theory in our everyday lives. Consciously or
otherwise, we continually assess, rate, and categorize the people with whom we interact. Our
assessments guide our beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. This is a normal and natural process.

Personality theorists attempt to organize their knowledge about people to arrive at a better
understanding of our complexity. Theory represents a formal attempt to arrange observations in
a coherent fashion that explains and allows prediction. One important way that the study of per-
sonality diverges from philosophy is in its emphasis on scientific theory building and the scientific
method. Murray, who coined the term personology, attempted to establish personality as a cred-
ible discipline, reflecting interest in the study of human lives and individual differences.

It is important to differentiate between the key concepts of trait (a stable personality factor) and
state (a fluctuating element of the personality system). The main elements of a psychological sci-
ence of personality include a system of classification for the data, a set of propositions, a theory
model, and a means by which to test the theory’s integrity. We can also view the multiple factors
that make up personality through various levels of abstraction. These factors range from biologi-
cal underpinnings to cultural influences. Personality variables can be looked at microscopically or
macroscopically, as can any complex biological and social system. Thus, at a microscopic level, we
can focus on the action of neurons and their various neurotransmitters (see Chapter 4); at a mac-
roscopic level, we can study the cultural impact of a phenomenon such as immigration.

As more interdisciplinary cross-fertilization has taken place, a strong trend toward convergence
in personality theory has occurred. In addition, we have also seen an integrative-eclectic process
in which elements from various theories have sometimes been unified. Various instruments used
to measure normal and abnormal personality serve to unify related disciplines within psychology.
The development of these psychometric instruments has been a major advancement in scientific
psychology. Unfortunately, many current measures may be biased against minorities and may be

Summary

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CHAPTER 1

representative of ethnocentric monoculturism. Each of these challenges should be considered as
we delve into the topics in each chapter of this book.

How do we address the complex issues raised at the beginning of this chapter? Can we know who
is prone to aggress and act violently toward others? Can we change such behavior? Personality
theory provides a lens through which we may attempt to make sense out of what we know about
the functioning—and dysfunctioning—of individuals, dyads, families, and larger systems.

Key Terms

case study The intensive examination of an
individual in a clinical situation or a small group
of individual cases.

character Term used in common speech to
describe basic, enduring traits, moral or ethical
qualities; also used in early psychodynamic
literature, where it has more recently been
replaced by the term personality.

Cronbach’s alpha A coefficient that provides
a measure of internal reliability. Items are
compared to each other to assess if they are
measuring the same thing.

construct validity The extent to which a mea-
sure captures what it purports to measure. This
is the most central form of validity, and it is
typically established by both theory and empiri-
cal evidence—by demonstrating criterion,
convergent, and discriminant validity.

convergent validity The extent to which a
score on one measure converges with a score
on a conceptually related measure.

criterion-referenced Tests for which an indi-
vidual’s score is compared to a specific score
that has some relation to standards or criteria—
often a cutoff score.

criterion validity A measure’s ability to predict
a related outcome that is measured at some
future point in time.

discriminant validity The extent to which a
score on one measure diverges from a score
on a conceptually distinct measure, showing
that the two measures do, in fact, measure
distinct things.

ethnocentric monoculturism The over-valu-
ing of one’s own cultural practices and beliefs.
This can also result in the pathological labeling
and hospitalization of minority group mem-
bers, which can be interpreted as a form of
political control.

experiment The pinnacle of the research
model, in which the researcher manipulates
one or more variables of interest, and exposure
to the manipulated variables is done through
random assignment.

extrospective Methods in which theorists
assume a detached and neutral position, basing
their theories on observations of the behaviors
and thoughts of others.

formal theory A theory that is stated as
clearly and objectively as possible and is
expressed so as to maximize consistency and
interdependence.

idealism The belief that there is no external
reality apart from the perceiver.

idiographic The study of individuals in a way
that emphasizes their uniqueness.

informal theory A theory that is less explicitly
stated, often lacks clear and concise opera-
tional definitions, is not (or is less) fully unified,
and is therefore more difficult to test directly.

internal reliability The extent to which items
on a measure are measuring the same thing.
This is typically assessed by comparing half of
the randomly selected items on a test relate to
the remaining half of the items.

Key Terms

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CHAPTER 1

inter-rater reliability The agreement between
raters whenever a measurement requires
people to score it, especially when the scoring
is more subjective.

introspective Methods in which theorists rely
on their own personal points of view, observing
and examining their own mental and emotional
states and processes and generalize from these.

ipsative Tests for which a score is compared
to the same individual’s performance on the
measure under other circumstances or at a dif-
ferent point in time.

longitudinally A way of collecting survey infor-
mation that allows for evaluating the changes
in scores over time.

malingering Those who intentionally manifest
symptoms for some external gain.

Millon/ Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III
(MCMI-III/) An assessment that consists of
175 true/false questions; it was developed to
measure personality disorders and psychopa-
thology based on Millon’s evolutionary frame-
work of personality.

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory–2 (MMPI–2) A 567-item, true/false test
that is used with adults to assess such con-
structs as defensiveness, superlative respond-
ing, inconsistent responding, and the endorse-
ment of odd/unusual items.

mood states Refer to emotions that fluctuate
over time and across situations.

Myers Briggs Type Indicator® (MBTI®)
A personality assessment that studies the
two attitudes (extraversion, introversion) and
four functions (sensing, feeling, thinking, and
intuiting).

NEO/ Personality Inventory-3 (NEO/-PI-3)
An assessment originally developed by Costa
and McCrae (1985), that is best known and
widely used in the nonclinical population. Along
with the shorter form, the NEO-FFI (Costa &
McCrae, 1989), it measures the five factors of
personality in normal adults: Neuroticism (N),
Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O),
Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C).

nomothetic The study of groups to arrive at
general laws or traits applicable to groups of
individuals.

norm-referenced Tests for which an individu-
al’s score is compared to others’ scores (often
people in their demographic group).

objective theories Theories that are indepen-
dent of the theorist and may be understood in
the same way by anyone.

observable data Data that are concrete and
can be collected with minimal use of inference.

parallel (or alternate) forms reliability Used
when one has two different versions of the
same test, and the goal is to make the two ver-
sions as similar as possible. Typically, research-
ers will generate a large pool of items, divide
them at random into two versions, and assess
the target population.

personality Pattern of behavior, affect (emo-
tional experience), and/or cognition (thoughts)
that is typical of the individual, evidencing
some degree of stability over time and across
situations.

Personality Assessment Inventory/ (PAI-)
A 344-item measure that includes 22 scales
focusing on psychiatric disorders and several
validity indexes. It has eleven clinical scales that
are grouped within the neurotic and psychotic
spectrum, scales to assess behavioral disorders
and problems of impulse control, and other
scales to assess complications and motivation
for treatment, harm potential, interpersonal
relations, and personality disorder traits.

Key Terms

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CHAPTER 1

personology An early term for the develop-
ment of theoretical systems for explaining and
understanding human behavior.

Positive Affect/Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS) A rating scale that assesses the con-
struct of personality.

psychometrics Psychological measurement,
involving both the construction of instruments
and procedures used in measurement and the
development of measurement theory.

Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (PCL-R)
Rating scale developed by Hare (1991) to mea-
sure two factors (lack of empathy and erratic
behavior) present in antisocial or psychopathic
personalities.

realism The position that the world of per-
ception and cognition has a fixed and stable
existence independent of the perceiver.

Rorschach Inkblot Method Developed by
Hermann Rorschach (1921/1942), a Swiss
psychiatrist. One of the most frequently used
personality tests in inpatient psychiatric set-
tings; it consists of 10 inkblots on cards.

scientific method A systematic approach to
inquiry that uses careful observation and a for-
mal process of gathering objective data.

sentence completion An exercise in which the
subject is asked to finish a sentence stem with
the first thing that comes to mind (for example,
“I LIKE ____”).

standard error of measure (SEM) The standard
deviation of the sampling distribution, which is
a measurement of how much error occurs in a
particular form of assessment.

standardization The process that maximizes
reliability (the consistency of scores) that
involves using the exact same procedure.

statistical methods Ways of compiling and pro-
cessing data, including meta-analysis, multivari-
ate analysis, and factor analysis.

structuralism Wilhelm Wundt’s term for his
theory that by understanding the “atoms” of
conscious experience, he could understand the
structure of the mind.

subjective theories Theories that imply that
our abstractions and constructs are unique and
cannot easily be generalized.

survey approach A way of conveniently gath-
ering information from a diverse population.

temperament An individual’s basic biological
predispositions, which are thought to be pres-
ent at birth.

test-retest reliability How consistently a
measure produces the same score for the same
individual over time.

Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) Developed
by Murray and Morgan (1935), a commonly
administered projective test that consists of
a series of black-and-white pictures depicting
ambiguous situations, many of which include
people, and having the subject come up with a
brief story that goes along with the picture.

theoretical models Sets of interrelated con-
cepts that have attempted to explain how
personality operates.

theory A system of ideas used to explain any
phenomena.

traits Specific, stable features of personality,
such as persistence, integrity, and honesty.
Traits are units of analysis that are used to
predict behavior.

Key Terms

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