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The paper needs to be in MLA format (I included a template to use), on the Bay of Pigs Invasion using the two sources I have included. I have also included the grading rubric so the paper can be written to fit it. The rest of the instructions are below.
Assignment Instructions
This week, you will write your second essay. Topic choices are described in this week’s Lessons. Use the three-part thesis and five-paragraph essay format you learned during week two.
The topic is Bay of Pigs Invasion
(Three-part thesis example from our topic choices: Though Woodstock is one of the most widely known music festivals of all time, many are unaware of the problems the event posed regarding finding a location, caring for such a large crowd, and cleaning up after the event.)
You must incorporate research from the APUS library into your essay. Use two or three sources—no more, no less. Remember that your essay should be mostly your own writing (~80%) and approximately 20% source material. This is short essay, so use short quotes only. I suggest only a line or two of quoted material in each of your body paragraphs. Don’t forget your Works Cited page.
Download the template and save it as your last name and Essay 2. (Example: Smith_Essay2). The MLA formatting is done for you (e.g., Times New Roman size 12, double-spaced, header, etc.). Update your name, your professor’s name, and date. Don’t forget to put your last name in the header. (Let me know if you don’t know how to get into the header section or type a question into your Word help section.)
Your essay should be between 500 and 750 words. Please do not go under the word count at all. Do not go over the word count by more than 50 words. Following instructions is an important part of any writing assignment, and often you will be asked to adhere to word count guidelines, so this is good practice!
Be sure that all paragraphs are well developed. I suggest 5-8 sentences per paragraph and no less than 100 words per paragraph, including your introduction and conclusion.
(Points saver: as you proof your essay in Word, hit the control [ctrl] key and the “F” key at the same time. This will bring up the search feature. Type in what you wish to find, such as the word you, to be sure you have avoided second person. This works in finding contractions too. Type in an apostrophe and hit enter!)
When you “submit” your paper, it will be uploaded into Turnitin (a plagiarism-detection website) automatically. You do not have to create a Turnitin account yourself. Both you and your instructor will receive the results. (The Turnitin report will be under Assignments and will have a percentage on it, like 22%. Click on the percentage to view your report. Certain parts of your essay will be highlighted. This shows where you have used information from an outside source or material that appears in another student’s essay.)
The
Bay of Pigs Invasion
Publication info: Targeted News Service ; Washington, D.C. [Washington, D.C]18 Apr 2016.
ProQuest document link
FULL TEXT
The Central Intelligence Agency issued the following feature story:
Fifty-five years ago, more than a thousand Cuban exiles stormed the beaches at the Bay of Pigs
(http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/bay-pigs-release), Cuba
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html), intending to ignite an
uprising that would overthrow the government of Fidel Castro. This week, we look back at the events that unfolded
and at the key players whose covert performances played out for all the world to see.
Descent from the Mountains
In the 1950s, a young, charismatic Cuban nationalist named Fidel Castro led a guerrilla army against the forces of
General Fulgencio Batista from a base camp deep within the Sierra Maestra Mountains, the largest mountain
range in Cuba. Castro’s goal was to overthrow Batista, the US-backed leader of Cuba.
After three years of guerrilla warfare, Castro and his ragtag army descended from the mountains and entered
Havana on January 1, 1959, forcing Batista to flee the country. Castro took control of the Cuban Government’s
30,000-man army and declared himself Prime Minister.
For nearly 50 years, Cuba had been America’s playground and agricultural center. Many wealthy Americans lived in
Cuba and had established thriving businesses there. In fact, a significant portion of Cuba’s sugar plantations were
owned by North Americans. With Castro’s self-appointment to Prime Minister, that changed.
In February 1960, Cuba signed an agreement to buy oil from the Soviet Union. When the US-owned refineries in the
country refused to process the oil, Castro seized the firms, and the US broke off diplomatic relations with the
Cuban regime. To the chagrin of the Eisenhower administration, Castro established increasingly close ties with the
Soviet Union while delivering fiery condemnations of the US.
The American-Cuban relationship deteriorated further when Castro established diplomatic relations with our Cold
War rival, the Soviet Union. Castro and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev signed a series of pacts that resulted in
large deliveries of economic and military aid in 1960. Within a year, Castro proclaimed himself a communist,
formally allied his country with the Soviet Union, and seized remaining American and foreign-owned assets.
The establishment of a Communist state 90 miles off the coast of Florida raised obvious security concerns in
Washington and did not sit well with President Eisenhower.
Eisenhower authorized the CIA to conduct a covert operation to rid the island of its self-appointed leader. The CIA
formulated a plan to recruit Cuban exiles living in the Miami area. It would train and equip the exiles to infiltrate
Cuba and start a revolution to ignite an uprising across the island and overthrow Castro.
At least that was the intended outcome.
Top US Government officials watched as their decisions led to an entirely different outcome: one that would leave
a covert operation exposed, embarrass the new Kennedy administration, end the career of the longest serving
Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and, ultimately, leave Fidel Castro in power for decades to come.
The Recruits
In April 1960, several CIA officers traveled to Miami, Florida. They were searching for members of the Frente
Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), an active group of Cuban exiles who had fled Cuba when Castro took power.
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These revolutionaries were the ideal individuals to lead an uprising in Cuba, and the CIA, operating with a $13
million budget, recruited 1,400 of them to form Brigade 2506.
The Brigade was taken to Useppa Island, a private island off the coast of Florida that was secretly leased by the
CIA.
Once there, they received training in weapons, infantry tactics, land navigation, amphibious assault tactics, team
guerrilla operations, and paratrooping. Their instructors were from the Army Special Forces, Air Force, Air National
Guard, and the CIA. Thirty-nine of the recruits were pilots who had flown in Cuba’s military or as commercial pilots.
The pilots were trained at an air training base in Guatemala.
Unbeknownst to the trainers, although likely suspected, sprinkled amongst the recruits were double-agents,
working in tandem for Castro, sharing the intelligence that they collected on the upcoming invasion.
The Plan
For simplicity, the Bay of Pigs invasion plan can be broken down into three phases:
Phase One: Destroy as many of Castro’s combat aircraft as possible so that when the Brigade invaded the beach,
Castro’s air force would have no retaliatory capabilities. To do this, pilots of Brigade 2506 planned to bomb three of
Castro’s air force bases. The cover story for these bombings was simple. Pilots in the Brigade would pose as pilots
in the Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria (FAR), Castro’s Air Force. Allegedly, they would become disgruntled, take their
aircrafts, shoot up their own air force bases, and then fly to the US to defect. This first airstrike was supposed to
take place two days prior to the invasion (phase three).
Phase Two: Destroy any remaining combat planes in Castro’s fleet that weren’t taken out during phase one. Pilots
in Brigade 2506 planned to drop bombs on Castro’s air force bases in the morning hours prior to the main invasion
(phase three) to destroy any remaining combat planes in Castro’s fleet. This would ensure the Brigade members
invading the beach would not have to contend with Castro’s aircraft dropping bombs and firing mercilessly on
them from above during the actual invasion.
Phase Three: The invasion. The Brigade would invade Cuba by sea and air. Some members would invade Cuba on
the beaches of Trinidad; others would parachute in farther inland. The Brigade pilots would fly air cover missions
over the beach. The old colonial city of Trinidad was chosen as the invasion site because it offered many
significant features. It was an anti-Castro town with existing counter-revolutionary groups. It had good port
facilities. The beachhead was easily defensible and, should the Brigade need to execute their escape plan, the
Escambray Mountains were there to offer solitude.
Location, Location, Location
As the number of days till the invasion shortened, Kennedy’s concern that the operation would not remain covert
grew. He was adamant the hand of the US Government remain hidden at all costs. Kennedy thought changing the
invasion site from Trinidad would make future deniability of US involvement more plausible, so he gave the CIA
four days to come up with a new one.
And so, a month before the operation was set to get underway, the landing location changed from Trinidad to the
Bay of Pigs.
This presented an array of problems, namely, the Bay of Pigs was one of Castro’s favorite fishing holes. He knew
the land like the back of his hand. He vacationed there frequently and invested in the Cuban peasants surrounding
the bay, garnering their loyalty and admiration.
Additionally, the Escambray Mountains, the designated escape site, was 50 miles away through hostile territory.
The bay was also far from large groups of civilians, a necessary commodity for instigating an uprising, which may
be a moot point, as the bay was surrounded by the largest swamp in Cuba, making it physically impossible for any
Cubans wanting to join the revolt to actually do so.
The Operation Begins
Phase One, April 15: Early on the morning of April 15, phase one was deployed. Six Cuban-piloted B-26 bombers
struck two airfields, three military bases, and Antonio Maceo Airport in an attempt to destroy the Cuban air force.
Their planes had been refurbished to match those of the FAR; each equipped with bombs, rockets and machine
guns.
About 90 minutes later a “defecting” pilot, a member of Brigade 2506, took off in his American-made getaway
plane, also disguised as a FAR aircraft. His plane, however, received extra attention. Dirt was rubbed on the
markings to make it look worn. A phony flight log was in the cockpit along with various other items typically found
in Cuban military aircraft. Finally, because a defector shooting up his own base would most likely encounter
resistance, his plane was shot full of bullet holes.
The “defector’s” destination was the Miami International Airport. He radioed a “may day” distress signal from off
the coast of Florida and informed US authorities that he was defecting from the Cuban Air Force, having engine
trouble, and requested permission to land. Upon landing, he was taken into custody by US Customs and
Immigration and Naturalization.
Reciting his cover story, he explained that he was defecting from Cuba, but before doing so had attacked his own
air base and that two colleagues had also defected and had attacked other Cuban air bases.
Damage assessments of the airstrikes vary, but it is believed that 80 percent of Castro’s combat aircraft were
disabled. Assuming Castro had an inventory of as many as 30 combat aircraft, that left six functioning aircraft
available at his disposal on the day of the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Castro vehemently denied that the attacks on his airfields had been by rebellious members of the FAR and
immediately blamed the US. He also quickly concluded that these strikes were an indication of something larger
brewing. He preemptively rounded up thousands of potential dissidents and herded them into theatres, stadiums
and military bases to squelch the possibility of a spontaneous uprising to overthrow his regime.
Following Castro’s orders, Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, called an emergency session of the United
Nations Political and Security Committee in New York on the afternoon of April 15. The session was attended by
US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson.
Stevenson held up pictures of the planes as he adamantly stated the US had nothing to do with the airstrikes. He
insisted that the attacks were conducted by defectors from Castro’s own air force. The pictures, however, proved
to be the unraveling of the cover story.
On close inspection, one could make out a metal nose on the plane flown by the defector; FAR aircraft noses were
plastic. Ambassador Stevenson, who was unaware of the covert operation, was furious when the truth was
revealed.
Cancel the Strikes!
Phase Two, April 16: This was bad news for President Kennedy whose number one priority was hiding the hand of
the US Government, which was becoming more exposed as the operation proceeded. Lying to the UN had serious
consequences and a second strike would put the United States in an awkward position internationally. Political
considerations trumped the military importance of a “D-Day” air strike.
Late in the evening of April 16, Kennedy made the decision to cancel the air strikes set to destroy the remaining
fleet of Cuban bombers. The decision was so last minute that the Brigade pilots were sitting on the runway, taxied
in position for takeoff when they were told to stand down.
Ironically, however, the air support scheduled to provide cover to the invading Brigade on the beach could proceed
as planned. This last minute cancellation forced leadership to work furiously through the midnight hours,
reworking and revising their plans, racing the sun as it climbed into a cloudless sky the morning of April 17, 1961:
D-Day.
Bay of Pigs Invasion
Phase Three, April 17: The Bay of Pigs invasion began with the launch of eight pairs of aircraft flown by Brigade
pilots over the Bay of Pigs. But, like all else, that number too had been scaled back at the last minute, which left
large patches of time when no aircraft would be providing air support for the invading
Brigade.
The FAR had read the remnants of the April 15 strikes like tea leaves and correctly predicted a second attack. This
time, they were prepared.
As the sun’s orange rays stretched across the Caribbean Sea, the members of Brigade 2506 prepared to return
home. Not as citizens, not as vacationers, but as invaders. As their vessels drew ever nearer to shore, they saw
their island as never before: not as a warm, welcoming place, but as a hostile, yet, strangely familiar territory.
They had been training for this moment, anticipating it and envisioning it for the past year. Now it was upon them.
This was their opportunity to make a difference in the country in which they had lived, the country which they had
loved, the country from which they had fled. This was their chance to turn the tide.
Yet, it was an ocean tide and unforeseen coral reefs that made it increasingly difficult for the Brigade to even reach
the shore. Most of the men lost their weapons and equipment to the turquoise waters.
Once ashore, they were met instantly by Cuban armed forces who outnumbered them. The salvaged and
undamaged Cuban planes that had survived the April 15 strikes, the very planes that should have been destroyed
that morning had Kennedy not canceled the planned strike, were now flying overhead wreaking mayhem on the
Brigade.
The invasion did not go as planned, and the exiles soon found themselves outgunned, outmanned, outnumbered
and outplanned by Castro’s troops.
Castro’s first priority was sinking the ships that invaded Cuban waters. The USS Houston, an American troop and
supply vessel, was damaged by several FAR rockets, its captain then intentionally beached it on the western side
of the bay. The FAR also machine gunned the two landing craft and other supply vessels that had brought the
Brigade into the Bay of Pigs. They hit the USS Rio Escondido, which was loaded with aviation fuel, causing a
terrific explosion before it sank like a stone.
Meanwhile, the paratroopers dropped in. One set missed their target and lost most of their equipment, and two
other men were injured when their static line cable broke. A portion of the equipment that was airdropped sank in
the swamps.
The Brigade did have some successes. Several paratroopers hit their targets and were able to hold their positions
and block roads for two days. The Brigade pilots providing air cover support successfully destroyed tanks and
other armor and halted an advancement of Cuban militia cadets.
Neither side made any significant advances as the invasion and fighting continued into the third day.
The Situation Falters:
The deteriorating operation convinced President Kennedy to authorize six unmarked fighter jets from the aircraft
carrier USS Essex to provide combat air patrol for the Brigade’s aircraft for one hour on April 19. But not without
strict limitations; they could not instigate air combat or attack ground targets. Limitations, however, wasn’t the
biggest problem: timing was.
Somewhere, among the last minute changes and cables going back and forth, there was a miscommunication. As
the six jets sat on deck awaiting their scheduled departure time, the Brigade’s aircraft flew over them an hour
ahead of schedule. The jets immediately launched after them, but they were unable to reach the invasion area in
time to protect the Brigade’s aircraft.
Brigade 2506’s pleas for air and naval support were refused at the highest US Government levels, although several
CIA contract pilots dropped munitions and supplies, resulting in the deaths of four of them: Pete Ray, Leo Baker,
Riley Shamburger, and Wade Gray.
Kennedy refused to authorize any extension beyond the hour granted. To this day, there has been no resolution as
to what caused this discrepancy in timing.
Without direct air support–no artillery and no weapons–and completely outnumbered by Castro’s forces, members
of the Brigade either surrendered or returned to the turquoise water from which they had come.
Two American destroyers attempted to move into the Bay of Pigs to evacuate these members, but gunfire from
Cuban forces made that impossible.
In the following days, US entities continued to monitor the waters surrounding the bay in search of survivors, with
only a handful being rescued. A few members of the Brigade managed to escape and went into hiding, but soon
surrendered due to a lack of food and water. When all was said and done, more than seventy-five percent of
Brigade 2506 ended up in Cuban prisons.
Wondering what became of the imprisoned members of Brigade 2506? Read The Negotiator
(https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2016-featured-story-archive/the-negotiator.html),
part two of our Bay of Pigs series, to find out how American attorney James Donovan spent months in one-on-one
negotiations with Fidel Castro over the fate of those 1,113 Brigade members.
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Publication title: Targeted News Service; Washington, D.C.
Publication year: 2016
Publication date: Apr 18, 2016
Dateline: WASHINGTON
Publisher: Targeted News Service
Place of publication: Washington, D.C.
Country of publication: United States, Washington, D.C.
Publication subject: Public Administration
Source type: Newspapers
Language of publication: English
Document type: WIRE FEED
ProQuest document ID: 1781719743
Document URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1781719743?accountid=8289
Copyright: Copyright © Targeted News Service. All Rights Reserved.
Last updated: 2016-04-19
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- The Bay of Pigs Invasion
from Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations
View article on Credo
Originally name d Ope ration T rinidad, the Bay of Pigs was a faile d ope ration planne d by the Ce ntral
Inte llige nce Age ncy to bring down Fide l Castro’s re gime . Amidst growing te nsions be twe e n the Unite d
State s and Cuba ove r the dire ction of the Cuban Re volution, in March 1960, Pre side nt Dwight D.
Eise nhowe r approve d the CIA proposal to train Cuban e xile s in Guate mala for an invasion of Cuba.
According to the CIA plan, the anticipate d e arly military succe sse s of the Cuban e xile brigade would
le ad to popular uprisings that would topple Castro.
Pre side nt-e le ct John F. Ke nne dy le arne d of the CIA plan in late Nove mbe r 1960 during a brie flng from
the age ncy’s dire ctor, Alle n Dulle s. In discussions with Ke nne dy on De ce mbe r 6, 1960, and January 11,
1961, outgoing Pre side nt Eise nhowe r e ncourage d the acce le ration of the plan’s imple me ntation. Like
Eise nhowe r, Ke nne dy came to office de te rmine d that Castro had to be re move d from powe r and that
whate ve r the plan to accomplish that obje ctive , the Unite d State s should be distance d from it.
Afte r taking office on January 28, 1961, Ke nne dy dire cte d the Pe ntagon to asse ss the planne d invasion
and the State De partme nt to asse ss the political conse que nce s of the propose d ope ration. On March
19, the joint chie fs of staff’s (JCS) e valuation of the plan, which include d an on-site visit to the Cuban
e xile s’ training base in Guate mala, was submitte d to the State De partme nt. T he JCS conclude d that the
plan could be carrie d out with the re quire d se cre cy but that its ultimate succe ss de pe nde d upon the
anticipate d inte rnal uprising in Cuba. T he State De partme nt was le ss e nthusiastic, conce rne d ove r the
possible political fallout in Latin Ame rica and at the Unite d Nations. T he State De partme nt pre fe rre d the
diplomatic isolation of Cuba. Pre side ntial advisor Arthur Schle singe r Jr. cautione d that the Cuban e xile s
could not re main in Guate mala inde finite ly and that the U.S. might be rushe d into a course of action
be cause the CIA had no othe r plans for the Cuban brigade e xce pt to bring the m back to the Unite d
State s, whe re the ir pre se nce would be a political e mbarrassme nt. Finally, dome stic conside rations
Influe nce d Ke nne dy’s de cision. At home , he face d charge s of be ing “soft on communism.” At a National
Se curity Council me e ting on March 11, 1961, Ke nne dy dire cte d the CIA to de vise a plan to transport the
Cuban brigade to Cuba and for the State De partme nt to pre pare a white pape r on Cuba and a
pre se ntation to the Organization of Ame rican State s (OAS).
With appare nt he sitancy, the Ke nne dy administration move d toward the imple me ntation of the invasion
plan. While the CIA proce e de d with the se le ction of possible landing site s in Cuba, othe r civilian
advisors cautione d the pre side nt in White House me e tings on April 4 and 11, 1961. In addition to
Schle singe r, Che ste r Bowle s and J. William Fulbright fore warne d of the adve rse impact that such an
invasion would have upon U.S. re lations with Latin Ame rica, that such an invasion contrave ne d the OAS
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charte r, and that the y doubte d if the U.S. role in the affair could be ke pt se cre t.
Ke nne dy approve d the ope ration on the assumption that U.S. support would re main cove rt. He made it
cle ar that U.S. troops would not be committe d if the invasion ran into trouble . T he brigade de parte d
Pue rto Cabe zas, Nicaragua, on April 12 and lande d on April 17 at Playa de Giron (Bay of Pigs). T he
invasion quickly be came a comple te de bacle . Within two days, and without additional supplie s or air
cove r, Castro’s army capture d 1,200 me n. Anothe r 114 e xile s die d in battle . T he anticipate d inte rnal
uprising ne ve r occurre d.
At the time , se ve ral re asons we re give n for the invasion’s failure . Castro had long anticipate d some kind
of attack. U.S. ne ws me dia and Castro’s age nts, who pe ne trate d the Cuban-e xile community in Miami,
re porte d on the e xile training in Guate mala. In the days just prior to the invasion, Castro dire cte d the
rounding up and de te ntion of all known oppone nts in Cuba. On the military side , a dive rsionary landing,
sche dule d for April 14 and 15 to distract from the main invasion, was aborte d. Also, Ke nne dy de laye d a
se cond bomb run ove r Cuba to e liminate Castro’s air force . Whe n that attack finally came on April 18,
Cuba’s shore batte rie s shot down the thre e B26 aircraft se nt on the mission. T he batte rie s also
de stroye d two supply ships waiting offshore .
Subse que ntly, the re sults of two se cre t asse ssme nts of the Bay of Pigs invasion be came public. T he se
mate rials are available at the private ly funde d National Se curity Archive locate d at the Ge llman Library
of Ge orge Washington Unive rsity in Washington, D.C. T he first is a sanitize d copy of the CIAs Inspe ctor
Ge ne ral’s 1961 inve stigation into the ope ration’s failure . It provide s a de taile d asse ssme nt of the plan’s
ope ration and imple me ntation but place s re sponsibility for its failure upon the “Unite d State s
Gove rnme nt,” me aning the Ke nne dy administration, for thre e re asons:
1. an ove rall lack of re cognition on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt as to the magnitude of the
ope ration re quire d to ove rthrow the Fide l Castro re gime ;
2. the failure on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt to plan for all continge ncie s at the time of the
Cuban ope ration including the ne ce ssity for using re gular U.S. military force s in the e ve nt that the
e xile d Cubans could not do the job the mse lve s; and
3. the failure on the part of the U.S. gove rnme nt to be willing to commit to the Cuban ope ration, as
planne d and e xe cute d, those ne ce ssary re source s re quire d for its succe ss.
T he se cond, ide ntifie d as the T aylor Commission Re port, re sulte d from an ad hoc group appointe d by
Ke nne dy on April 22, 1961. T he commission was name d afte r its he ad, Ge ne ral Maxwe ll T aylor, and it
include d Attorne y Ge ne ral Robe rt F. Ke nne dy, CIA Dire ctor Alle n Dulle s, and Chie f of Naval Ope rations
Arle igh Burke . From April 22 until May 25, the T aylor Commission he ld twe nty me e tings and inte rvie we d
more than fifty witne sse s. A sanitize d ve rsion, re le ase d in 1977, re fle cte d the positions he ld by those
inte rvie we d. T hose close st to the pre side nt e xone rate d Ke nne dy, pointing to the inaccuracy of the
information supplie d by the CIA and the approval give n to the plan by the JCS. Witne sse s for the CIA
focuse d upon the justification for the invasion rathe r than its ope rational de tails. T he comple te re port
was re le ase d in 2000. Its most significant ne w disclosure re ve ale d that on April 9, 1961, the CIA le arne d
that the Sovie t Union kne w the e xact de tails of the plan, including time and place , and pre sumably
passe d this information on to Castro.
In the afte rmath of the faile d attack, Castro stre ngthe ne d his hand in Cuba. Picture s of him dire cting
military activitie s at the Bay of Pigs e nhance d his popularity and e nable d him to consolidate his political
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base . Both at home and abroad, Ke nne dy and the Unite d State s suffe re d se ve re criticism for
imple me nting the plan, but it did not dissuade Ke nne dy from continuing to se e k Castro’s ouste r. In
De ce mbe r 1962, the 1,197 brigade prisone rs we re re le ase d from Cuba in e xchange for $35 million in
U.S. food, me dicine , and supplie s. Se e also Ke nne dy, John F.; Trac t ors f or Fre e dom Commit t e e
© 2010 [2004] McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers
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APA
Bay of pigs invasion. (2010). In T . M. Le onard, Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States relations. Je ffe rson,
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Chicago
“Bay of Pigs Invasion.” In Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations, by T homas M. Le onard.
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Harvard
Bay of pigs invasion. (2010). In T .M. Le onard, Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States relations. [Online ].
Je ffe rson: McFarland. Available from: http://e zproxy.apus.e du/login?
url=https://se arch.cre dore fe re nce .com/conte nt/e ntry/mcfcubus/bay_of_pigs_invasion/0?
institutionId=8703 [Acce sse d 31 January 2018].
MLA
“Bay of Pigs Invasion.” Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations, T homas M. Le onard, McFarland, 1st
e dition, 2010. Credo Reference, http://e zproxy.apus.e du/login?
url=https://se arch.cre dore fe re nce .com/conte nt/e ntry/mcfcubus/bay_of_pigs_invasion/0?
institutionId=8703. Acce sse d 31 Jan 2018.
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- Bay of Pigs Invasion
from Encyclopedia of Cuban-United States Relations
View article on Credo
APA
Chicago
Harvard
MLA
ENGL101
Rubric
Essays 2-3
Exemplary
Accomplishe
d
Developing
Beginning
Did Not
Attempt
Paper Set Up
(MLA Style)
5%
Paper is
formatted in
perfect MLA
style
(margins,
spacing,
header, etc.)
1-2 errors in
MLA
formatting
exist.
3-4 errors in
MLA
formatting
exist.
More than 4
errors in MLA
formatting
exist.
Student did
not attempt.
Introduction
5%
Introduction
is engaging,
properly
introduces
the thesis
statement,
and is well
developed.
Introduction
is engaging
and relates
to the thesis
but is too
short.
Introduction
is mildly
engaging,
somewhat
relates to
the thesis,
and is too
short.
Introduction
is not
engaging,
does not
introduce the
thesis well,
and is too
short.
Student did
not attempt.
Thesis
Statement
5%
Thesis is
clear and
contains
three parts
and is
located at
the last of
paragraph
one.
Thesis only
contains two
clear topics.
Thesis only
contains one
clear topic.
Student
attempted to
write a
thesis, but it
is weak and
unclear as to
which
sentence is
the intended
thesis.
Student did
not attempt.
Body Topic
Sentences
(Paragraphs
Two, Three,
Four)
15%
All three
body
paragraph
topic
sentences
coordinate
closely with
the thesis.
Only two
body
paragraph
topic
sentences
coordinate
closely with
the thesis.
Only one
body
paragraph
topic
sentence
coordinates
closely with
the thesis.
Student
attempted
topic
sentences,
but they do
not
coordinate
with the
thesis.
Student did
not attempt.
Body
Paragraph
Development
(Paragraphs
Two, Three,
Four)
15%
All three
body
paragraphs
are well
developed.
All sentences
support their
respective
topic
sentences.
Only two
body
paragraphs
are well
developed.
Most
sentences
support their
respective
topic
sentences.
Only one
body
paragraph is
well
developed.
Some
sentences
support their
respective
topic
sentences.
Body
paragraphs
are present
but are too
short and do
not support
their
respective
topic
sentences.
Student did
not attempt.
Conclusion
5%
Conclusion is
effective,
restates the
thesis, and is
well
developed.
Conclusion is
effective and
restates the
thesis but is
too short.
Conclusion is
mildly
effective,
somewhat
restates the
thesis, and is
too short.
Conclusion is
not effective,
does not
restate the
thesis, and is
too short.
Student did
not attempt.
Grammar
20%
There are no
grammatical
errors.
1-2
significant
grammatical
errors exist.
3-4
significant
grammatical
errors exist.
More than 4
significant
grammatical
errors exist.
Student did
not attempt.
MLA
Documentati
on
15%
Student
included
signal
phrases,
quotes
and/or
paraphrases,
and in-text
citations in
perfect MLA
style.
Student
demonstrate
s a mix of all
of the above.
1-2 errors
occur among
the
following:
signal
phrases,
quotes
and/or
paraphrases,
and in-text
citations with
author name
and page
number.
3-4 errors
occur among
the
following:
signal
phrases,
quotes
and/or
paraphrases,
and in-text
citations with
author name
and page
number.
Multiple
errors occur
among the
following:
signal
phrases,
quotes
and/or
paraphrases,
and in-text
citations with
author name
and page
number.
Student did
not attempt.
Works
Cited
15%
Student used
2-3 sources
from the
APUS library.
The Works
Cited is
formatted
perfectly.
1-2 errors
are present,
but the
student used
the required
number of
sources from
the APUS
library.
3-4 MLA
errors are
present, and
the student
used less
than the
required
number
sources from
the APUS
library.
Entries are
incomplete,
such as a
mere
copy/paste
of the URL.
Sources are
not from the
APUS library.
Student did
not attempt.
Yourlastname 1
Your Name
Professor Name
English 101
21 August 2017
Your Title Here
Works Cited
