Groups: A Love/Hate Relationship

 

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To prepare for this discussion, please read Chapter 9 of your

textbook

(Feenstra, 2013).  In addition, read

One Hundred Years of Group Research: Introduction to the Special Issue (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

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 (Forsyth, 2000).  Finally, review Instructor Guidance and Announcements.  In this discussion, you will consider your own experiences in a group setting.  Be sure to use your own

academic voice (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

and apply

in-text citations (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

appropriately throughout your post.

  1. Do you love group work or hate it?  Formulate your position by synthesizing your own experiences, relating specific course concepts and research findings that support the merit of your view. 

    For example, if you believe “two heads are better than one”, you might summarize work on the value of brainstorming.  If, however, you think “too many cooks spoil the broth”, you might relate the negative impact of groupthink.  Any concept in the chapter is appropriate to utilize for this discussion, and you may discuss more than one if applicable.

  2. Explain how you might use this knowledge to influence other members and improve the overall function of a group in which you have been/are currently/will be a member.

Post your initial response of 250 words or more by Day 3 (Thursday).  Respond to at least two of your peers who have taken a position opposite your own by Day 7 (Monday).  You are encouraged to post one or more of your required replies early each week (e.g., by Saturday) to stimulate more meaningful and interactive discourse in the discussion forum.  In addition, strive to provide a response to classmates who replied to your initial post and/or the Instructor (if applicable).  Peer responses may vary in length but should be carefully crafted and insightful.  Below are some suggestions to assist your thinking.

Guided Response:  Reply to at least two or more peers overall.  The goal of the discussion forum is to foster continual dialogue, similar to what might occur in a verbal face-to-face exchange.  Consider the following in your responses:

  • Have you had similar group experiences?  How did you handle them?
  • What additional suggestions might you offer your peer?

Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice
2000, Vol. 4, No. 1 , 3 – 6 ‘

Copyrighi 2000 by the Educational Publishing Foundation
IO89-2699/WV$5.OO DOI: 10.1037//1089-2699AI.3

One Hundred Years of Groups Research: Introduction
to the Special Issue

Donelson R. Forsyth
Virginia Commonwealth University

This special issue looks back at a century of progress in understanding groups and their
dynamics. The articles in the issue, by selectively reviewing topics that dominated
researchers’ efforts over the past century, offer answers to 7 key questions about groups:
What forces bind members to their groups? Who will lead and who will follow? When
do groups excel at the tasks they attempt? How do groups influence their members? Do
groups influence their members’ self-conceptions? How can relationships between
groups be improved? And how can groups be used to enhance psychological adjustment
and well-being?

Sages and scholars have long been fascinated
by groups. A search back through antiquity finds
discussions of the nature and dynamics of
groups in the writings of the Greek philosophers
Plato and Aristotle, who posed questions con-
cerning humanity’s social and political nature
(Ettin, 1992). William Shakespeare filled his
plays with recommendations and analyses of
groups and leadership (Corrigan, 1999). Niccolo
Machiavelli, early in the 16th century, devel-
oped insightful analyses of how power could be
used in groups to influence leaders and the led
(Jinkins, 1998). Tn the 1800s, scholars like Craik
(1837) and Le Bon (1895/1960) published
intriguing analyses of how people, when part of
large groups, can respond unpredictably.

But the scientific study of groups is scarcely a
century old. Ancient scholars may have asked
many questions about the dynamics of groups,
but only in the 20th century did investigators
seek to answer these questions through the
application of scientific methods. Cartwright
and Zander (1968), in their classic analysis of
the roots of the field, suggested that researchers
were slow to take up the study of groups because
many felt that the dynamics of groups was a
private affair, not something that scientists
should lay open to public scrutiny. Others felt
that group behavior was too complex to be
studied scientifically, particularly when the
psychology of individuals remained so little

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Donelson R. Forsyth, Department of Psychology,
Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia
23284-2018. Electronic mail may be sent to jforsyth@vcu.edu.

understood. Still others questioned the reality of
groups, implying that they could be understood
entirely if one only understood the psychology
of the individuals who comprised them (Allport,
1924).

This issue of Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, published as the 20th
century draws to a close, looks back at a century
of progress in understanding groups. Although
that history is checkered with theories and
methods that, after initial promise, ultimately
generated little in the way of concerted empiri-
cal interest, this issue considers topics that have
remained at the center of the field for nearly a
century: group cohesion (Dion, 2000), leader-
ship (Chemers, 2000), performance (Sundstrom,
Mclntyre, Halfhill, & Richard, 2000), social
identity (Hogg & Williams, 2000), influence
(Crano, 2000), intergroup relations (Gaertner et
al., 2000), and group approaches to adjustment
and change (Barlow, Burlingame, & Fuhriman,
2000). It raises, and provides answers to, seven
questions about groups as complex, adaptive,
dynamic interpersonal and task systems (Mc-
Grath, 1997).

What forces bind members to their groups?
Although early theorists speculated about the
foundations of group solidarity, it was Lewin
(1943) who used the term cohesion to describe
the forces that keep groups intact by pushing
members together and countering forces that
push them apart. Since that time, this concept
has been applied by researchers interested in
studying all aspects of groups, including perfor-
mance, development, therapeutic impact, and

FORSYTH

influence. Dion (2000) reviews prior studies of
cohesion, tracing its evolution from a relatively
ambiguous Lewinian concept to current concep-
tual representations. His review contrasts a
group-level approach to cohesion to models
based on one-to-one attraction processes and
offers clear advice for researchers who wish to
assess cohesion in the groups they study.

Who will lead and who will follow? In the
19th century, the historian Thomas Carlyle’s
(1841) “great-man” theory of history asserted
that leaders possess certain characteristics that
mark them for greatness. The contrasting view,
often attributed to the Russian novelist Leo
Tolstoy (1869/1952), argued that leaders come
to prominence because the spirit of the times—
the Zeitgeist—is propitious for the dominance of
a single individual and the qualities of the
person are largely irrelevant to this rise to
power. These two themes, as Chemers (2000)
notes in his review, provided researchers with
their first models for studying leaders, Chemers
traces the influence of these two fundamental
conceptions of leadership through initial contin-
gency approaches to leadership, cognitive ap-
proaches that considered how group members
conceptualize their leaders, and more recent
work looking at the cultural and transforma-
tional nature of leadership. Chemers then offers
a functional model of leadership that stresses the
tasks that leaders must accomplish, including
creating an image of authority and competence,
establishment of positive relationships with
followers, and the strategic management of the
group’s processes given the organizational
environment.

When do groups excel at the tasks they
attempt? The impact of a group on its
individual members is nowhere more apparent
than in work groups. This realization, often
ignored by management methods that focus on
individual incentives, supervision, and worker-
specific goals, was shaken by the Hawthorne
studies of group productivity conducted in the
1920s (Mayo, 1945). As Sundstrom et al. (2000)
note, the Hawthorne researchers initially as-
sumed that physical characteristics of the
workplace determine productivity. But as they
varied conditions with a small group of workers
in an experimental test room, they noted that
group dynamics—not lighting, temperature,
breaks, and so on—determined performance.
Sundstrom and his colleagues review how

researchers have followed in the Hawthorne
tradition by studying groups working in organi-
zational contexts. They focus not on the
voluminous findings obtained in that research
but on the research itself by categorizing the
types of groups that have been studied, the
strategies used by investigators, and the ways
researchers have measured group effectiveness.
Their review concludes by making recommenda-
tions regarding the continued analysis of teams
and other collaborative forms of work structures
in organizations.

How do groups influence their members?
Group members influence one another in many
ways, but these processes were not subjected to
serious analysis until Sherif (1936), Asch
(1955), and Milgram (1963) began to examine
how groups influence the actions of individual
members. These studies provided compelling
evidence of the power of groups, but they also
hinted at the other side of social influence.
Participants often willingly submitted to the
demands of the group situation, but they also
displayed an independence and capacity to
withstand group pressures. In his review of
social influence, Crano (2000) integrates the
work of researchers who focus on the group’s
impact on the individual with the work of
researchers who examine the minority’s impact
on the group. He offers his leniency model as an
overall conceptual framework that can account
for both minority and majority influence. This
model integrates cognitive approaches to atti-
tude change, such as elaboration likelihood
theory, with social identity theory to better
predict the flow of influence in small group
settings.

Do groups influence their members’ self-
conceptions? In the early years of the 20th
century, researchers debated the relative influ-
ence of group and interpersonal forces on
individuals. Although some suggested that
humans are, by nature, individualists whose
self-conceptions are sustained largely through
introspection and personal experiences, other
perspectives suggested that self and identity are
intimately connected to one’s groups and
interpersonal relations. Although individualism
is the hallmark of Western thought, group-
centered approaches have suggested that mem-
bers’ sense of self and identity changes when
they become members of groups, or when their
membership in a group that they already belong

SPECIAL ISSUE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS

to becomes salient to them. Hogg and Williams
(2000) provide a concise review of how these
various lines of theoretical and empirical work
are integrated in social identity theory. This
perspective, which is consistent with models of
self developed by sociological, social psychologi-
cal, and personality theorists, is generally traced
back to the work of Henri Tajfel (1984). Tajfel
argued that group members derive much of their
social identity from their group identities, and
that group membership therefore sets off a
complex of cognitive, affect, and motivational
processes (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987). Hogg and Williams (2000), in
tracing the historical roots of Tajfel’s social
identity theory back to early thinkers, clarify the
relationship between social identity theory and
related work on self-categorization and identify
weaknesses in the general model.

How can relationships between groups be
improved? When two groups meet, the encoun-
ter often ends in conflict rather than cooperation.
This tendency for group relations to be hostile
rather than amicable was confirmed many years
ago by Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif
(1961) in their classic study of two groups of
boys competing for prizes and territory at a
campsite in the United States. Gaertner and his
colleagues (2000) revisit this study, examining
its findings in light of more recent theory and
research. They find that many of the causes of
intergroup conflict highlighted by contemporary
models of intergroup conflict and prejudice were
present at the Robbers Cave, but they also
suggest Sherif et al. were able to reduce conflict
during the study by taking advantage of such
mechanisms as decategorization, recategoriza-
tion, and mutual intergroup differentiation.

How can groups be used to enhance psycho-
logical adjustment and well-being? Group
psychotherapy, like all psychological therapies,
did not become a legitimate means of treating
people with psychological problems until the
20th century. Initially, physicians began to meet
with their patients in groups where members
discussed their illnesses, and these methods
were used with people suffering from both
physical and psychological difficulties. This
early application, as Barlow et al. (2000) note in
their article, was only the beginning of a
concerted and more systematic application of
groups to help people improve their well-being.
Barlow and her colleagues review the history of

group treatment methods, as well as the history
of research efforts aimed at better understand-
ing, and improving, such applications. On the
basis of their analysis, they conclude that group
psychotherapy is a relatively effective treatment,
but they also offer suggestions for future work in
the area.

These articles, although they focus on seven
central domains within the field of groups and
group dynamics, only hint at the tremendous
progress made by theorists and researchers in
the past 100 years. The scientific study of groups
is only reaching its adolescence, but despite its
youth it has compiled an impressive body of
theoretical, empirical, and practical knowledge
about groups. As Shaw (1981, p. 450) concluded
in his comprehensive review of the field,

A beginning has been made, and available data reveal
the great complexity of small group behavior. The
interrelations among the many parts of the group and
the variables that influence group process almost defy
comprehension. But hope springs external; we are
beginning to gain some understanding of this multiplex
phenomenon.

These seven articles summarize the tremendous
advances in understanding gained in the past
century, but they also serve as reminders of how
much more needs to be done.

References

Allport, F. H. (1924). Social psychology. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.

Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressures.
Scientific American, 193(5), 31-35.

Barlow, S. H., Burlingame, G. M., & Fuhriman, A.
(2000). The therapeutic application of groups:
From Pratt’s “thought control classes” to modern
group psychotherapy. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 4, 115-134.

Carlyle, T. (1841). On heroes, hero-worship, and the
heroic. London: Fraser.

Cartwright, D., & Zander, A. (1968). Origins of group
dynamics. Tn D. Cartwright & A. Zander (Eds.),
Group dynamics: Theory and research (3rd ed., pp.
3-21). New York: Harper & Row.

Chemers, M. M. (2000). Leadership research and
theory: A functional integration. Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 27—43.

Corrigan, P. (1999). Shakespeare on management:
Leadership lessons for managers. London: Kogan
Page.

Craik, G. L. (1837). Sketches of popular tumults.
London: Knight.

FOR5YTH

Crano, W. D. (2000). Milestones in the psychological
analysis of social influence. Group Dynamics:
Theory, Research, and Practice, 4, 68-80.

Dion, K. L. (2000). Group cohesion: From “field of
forces” to multidimensional construct. Group
Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice. 4,
7-26.

Ettin, M. F. (1992). Foundations and application of
group psychotherapy: A sphere of influence.
Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. R, Banker, B. S., Houlette,
M., Johnson, K. M., & McGlynn, E. A. (2000).
Reducing intergroup conflict: From superordinate
goals to decategorization, recategorization and
mutual differentiation. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice. 4, 98-114.

Hogg, M. A., & Williams, K. D. (2000). From I to we:
Social identity and the collective self. Group
Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 4,
81-97.

Jinkins, M. (1998). The character of leadership:
Political realism and public virtue in nonprofit
organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Le Bon, G. (1960). The crowd. New York: The Viking
Press. (Original work published 1895)

Lewin, K. (1943). Farces behind food habits and
methods of change. Bulletin of the National
Research Council, 108, 35-65.

Maya, E. (1945). The social problems of an industrial
civilization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.

McGrath, J. E. (1997). Small group research, that
once and future field: An intepretation of the past
with an eye to the future. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 1, 7-27.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67,
371-378.

Shaw, M. E. (1981). Group dynamics: The psychol-
ogy of small group behavior (3rd ed.). New York:
McGraw-Hill.

Sherif, M. (1936). The psychology of social norms.
New York: Harper & Row.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J.,Hood. W. R,, &
Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup conflict and
cooperation. The Robbers Cave Experiment. Nor-
man, OK: Institute of Group Relations.

Sundstrom, E., Mclntyre, M., Halfhill, T., & Richard,
H. (2000). Work groups: From the Hawthorne
Studies to work teams of the 1990s and beyond.
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice,
4, 44-67′

Tajfel, H. (Ed.). (1984). The social dimension:
European developments in social psychology.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tolstoy, L. (1952). Warandpeace. Chicago: Encyclo-
pedia Britannica. (Original work published 1869)

Turner, J. C , Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S.
D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the
social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford,
UK.: Blackwell.

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Chapter 9:

Groups

9.1 Group Ac�ons

What Is a Group?

Social Facilita�on

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

Deindividua�on

9.2 Group Cogni�on

9.3 Social Dilemmas

Commons Dilemma

Resource Dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Chapter Summary

Corbis/Photolibrary

Learning Objec�ves

By the end of the chapter you should be able to:

Define “group” and describe the various types of groups

Explain the posi�ve and nega�ve effects of social facilita�on

Differen�ate social loafing from the Köhler effect

Explain what deindividua�on is and when it occurs

Explain brainstorming techniques that increase or decrease the number of ideas developed

Describe the effect of group polariza�on on group decisions

Explain the antecedents, characteris�cs, and consequences of groupthink

Explain factors in group decision making

Differen�ate the following social dilemmas: tragedy of the commons, resource dilemma, prisoner’s dilemma

Chapter Outline

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Brainstorming

Group Polariza�on

Groupthink

Group Decision Making

* * *

Jury trials were adopted by the United States in 1791, with the 14th Amendment to the Bill of Rights. Jury trials were seen as a way for ci�zens to
be part of the decision-making process and to prevent poli�cal leaders or others who might be in power from unfairly or unjustly prosecu�ng
ci�zens. About 154,000 jury trials take place every year in the United States (Graham, 2009). Almost 30% of Americans have served as a trial juror
in their life�me, with about 32 million Americans being summoned each year to serve on a jury (Burne�, 2009; Read, 2009). Jury trials occur in the
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many other countries around the world. They usually consist of a small group of people,
typically, between 6 and 12 jurors. When juries make decisions, they take about 4 hours for delibera�on (Burne�, 2009).

Juries are just one example of a small group working together to make a decision or accomplish a goal. Every day, groups of people engage in
ac�ons, large and small, that affect their own lives and the lives of others. A family may jointly decide what restaurant to eat at that night. A
group of execu�ves may decide to engage in a hos�le takeover of a rival company. Ci�zens of a na�on may rise up together to overthrow their
leaders, as occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in January and February of 2011. Understanding how groups think and act together is important to
understanding their influence on us.

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Hemera/Thinkstock

This group of golfers enjoying each other’s company would likely be an in�macy
group.

Expand Your Knowledge: Triple�

You can read Triple�’s classic study of social facilita�on at
h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm
(h�p://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triple�/index.htm) . Triple� offers a number
of possible explana�ons for his observa�ons, including theories like
the suc�on theory, the brain worry theory, and the theory of
hypno�c sugges�ons.

9.1

Group Ac�ons

In life, we engage with groups in a variety of se�ngs. A child jumping rope may do so with an audience of other children. A basketball player shoo�ng a free
throw may be affected by the presence of the crowd. A team on a factory floor may produce different amounts of product than would be expected based on
each member’s individual produc�on. A mob of angry protesters may act in ways uncharacteris�c of its individual members. Groups can affect individual behavior
in posi�ve and nega�ve ways. In this sec�on, we inves�gate these types of situa�ons, focusing primarily on the way individuals act, think, and interact.

What Is a Group?

A jury is a fairly clear example of a group. Would a dozen people standing at the bus stop qualify as a group? What about three students studying at the same
library table? A group can be defined as at least two people interac�ng and forming some kind of coherent unit (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Dasgupta, Banaji, &
Ableson, 1999). According to this defini�on, those bus riders or the studying students might qualify as a group if they are doing something together. If the
students are interac�ng and quizzing one another on class material, they would qualify as a group. If the bus riders are simply standing together as they wait for
the bus, they are unlikely to qualify.

We can also differen�ate various types of groups. Rela�ves or friends—that is, groups
of individuals who are related to one another or enjoy one another’s company—are
in�macy groups. In�macy groups help fulfill one’s need for affilia�on. Groups that
engage in tasks together, like juries or work groups, are task groups. Achievement
needs are met by par�cipa�on in task groups. Social categoriza�on, like being a
woman or a Japanese American, can be the basis of a group and provide us with a
sense of iden�ty. Groups might also be described by loose associa�ons, like those
who like hiphop music or football (Johnson et al., 2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman,
2001). When people think about each of these types of groups, they think about
them differently. In�macy groups are assumed to be small and long-lived, involve a lot
of interac�on, and be rela�vely impermeable to outsiders. Social categories, on the
other hand, are likely to be large and involve less interac�on, but, like in�macy
groups, be long-lived and rela�vely closed to outsiders. Because task groups work
together on tasks, we see them as having common goals and interac�ng to meet
those goals, but they are less likely to be of long dura�on. Loose associa�ons are
likely to be short-lived and open to outsiders, with li�le interac�on (Lickel et al.,
2000).

Social Facilita�on

When people are together and interac�ng with one another, they may act differently than if they are alone. In the 1890s, Norman Triple� no�ced that bicycle
riders clocked different �mes depending on whether they were bicycling alone or with others. He saw that when bicyclists competed against the clock and there
were no other bicyclists cycling with them, they went slower than when other bicyclists were there. Triple� began by looking at the records of cyclists, but
discovered that a large number of other variables, extraneous variables, might affect the findings. For example, when bicyclists race together they dra� one
another, allowing the group to go at a faster pace than an individual might be able to achieve. To focus in on the impact of the group and to control extraneous
variables, Triple� looked at the behavior of 40 children. He asked these children to wind up a modified fishing reel. Some�mes the children were alone and
some�mes other children were present, winding up their own fishing reels. On average the children wound most quickly when other people were there. Triple�’s
study is considered by many to be one of the first studies in social psychology.

Later researchers found results similar to Triple�’s. Par�cipants performed be�er when others were present. For example, when people engaged in tasks like
doing easy mul�plica�on problems or crossing out all the vowels in a wri�en passage, they did be�er when others were present (Allport, 1920; 1924). But these
findings were not consistent; some researchers found that the presence of others caused problems. In one study par�cipants did worse on a memory task when
others were present than when they performed the task alone (Pessin, 1933). This le� researchers ques�oning what determined whether the presence of others
actually helped performance or hindered it.

An explana�on for this difference was provided by Robert Zajonc (“Zajonc” rhymes
with “science”). He proposed that the presence of others increases arousal.
Increased arousal, he argued, increases the dominant response tendency, which is
related to the nature of the task. For simple, easy, or well-learned tasks our most
likely (dominant) ac�on (response tendency) is to do the task well. For difficult,
new, or complex tasks, our most likely ac�on is to do the task poorly. If the
presence of others increases our arousal, and arousal increases our dominant
response tendency, then we should do simple or easy tasks par�cularly well in the
presence of others. On the other hand, if the presence of others increases our
arousal and arousal increases our dominant response tendency, then we should do
difficult or new tasks poorly (see Figure 9.1). If you were a star basketball player in

high school and shoo�ng a free throw is a well-prac�ced response, you should be more likely to make the basket in a packed gym because your increased

http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Triplett/index.htm

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arousal due to the audience would drive your dominant response of free-throw shoo�ng behaviors. Alterna�vely, if you have played basketball rarely and making
a basket is a rela�vely new and difficult task for you, an empty gym would provide you with the best chance to make that basket because your arousal would be
lower.

Figure 9.1: Social facilita�on

The presence of others can affect a person’s task performance.
Photo credits: Hemera/Thinkstock;

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

When the presence of others affects task performance, social facilita�on has occurred. Evidence of this can also be found in animal as well as human behavior.
Zajonc and colleagues set up an experiment using cockroaches (Zajonc, Heingartner, & Herman, 1969). They created both complicated and simple mazes for the
cockroaches, and provided �ny Plexiglas audience boxes for observer cockroaches. When other cockroaches were in the audience boxes, the cockroach in the
maze completed the simple maze faster but completed the complicated maze more slowly. Similar effects have been found with rats and chickens (Tolman, 1967;
Wheeler & Davis, 1967; Zentall & Levine, 1972). People show social facilita�on just like these insects and animals. Good pool players play be�er when watched,
but poor players tend to do worse with an audience (Michaels, Bloommel, Brocato, Linkous, & Rowe, 1982).

Zajonc (1980) argued that social facilita�on could occur simply because others are there, what he called mere presence, not because of other factors. Other
researchers suggested that the presence of others creates distrac�on or concern about being evaluated and it is this distrac�on or concern that is the true cause
of the social facilita�on effects (Co�rell, 1972). There is some support for these alternate explana�ons. In one study par�cipants completed a task in a room
where another person was present. The other person either quietly observed or was blindfolded, presumably because the person was wai�ng for a study of
vision to begin soon and needed to have his or her eyes adapt to darkness. If social facilita�on occurs simply because of the presence of others, there should be
no difference in how well the par�cipant completes the task because in both condi�ons the “mere presence” of another exists. This study, however, showed no
social facilita�on effects when the other person was blindfolded (Co�rell, Wack, Sekerak, & Ri�le, 1968). Although this study suggests that social facilita�on
requires more than the mere presence of others, later studies showed that mere presence is enough; the effect of apprehension about evalua�on remains a
ques�on (Platania & Moran, 2001).

Some researchers have ques�oned whether arousal is the mechanism behind social facilita�on (Aiello & Douthi�, 2001). More recent ideas have proposed
cogni�veneuropsychological mechanisms—the presence of others seems to put demands on the frontal lobes of the brain and the cogni�ve system that manages
the other systems (execu�ve system), diminishing the capacity to process new or difficult tasks (Wagstaff et al., 2008). The frontal lobes of the brain are
par�cularly important for planning for the future, a�en�on in the present, and ini�a�on of ac�ons, so such an explana�on makes logical sense.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Of the types of groups discussed, which is most likely to be small, have a long life, and largely be closed to outsiders?
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In�macy groups are o�en small, have longevity, and are not very open to new members.

When learning how to perform tricks with a yo-yo for the first �me would you be be�er off with an audience or without?
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According to research on social facilita�on,when learning to do something new or doing a difficult task, people do be�er when others are
not present, so you would likely do be�er without an audience.

How are the frontal lobes of the brain involved in the performance issues found with social facilita�on?
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The frontal lobes of the brain are important for our engagement in new or difficult tasks, and the presence of others also puts demands
on our frontal lobes.

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Individuals tend to socially loaf when they do not expect their contribu�ons to
lead to something they value.

Social Loafing and the Köhler Effect

In studies involving social facilita�on, the individual performing the ac�on was simply in the presence of others, with the others either doing an ac�on at the
same �me or observing. What happens when the others are working with the individual doing the ac�on? When a group performs ac�ons together to
accomplish a goal, do the members of the group act differently than if they were engaging in that ac�on alone? At about the same �me as Triple�, Max
Ringelmann completed a set of early studies in social psychology to answer these ques�ons. Ringelmann, a French agricultural engineer, inves�gated the amount
of work individuals versus groups put into tasks. He suggested that two or more individuals working together did not accomplish as much as one individual alone
because of a difficulty in coordina�ng their efforts, termed coordina�on loss. Even though, he suspected there might be issues with the mo�va�on of the
members of a group, he le� it to later researchers to inves�gate this possibility (Kravitz & Mar�n, 1986).

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with
others is called social loafing. Social loafing occurs when individuals are working
together toward a shared goal and their efforts are pooled. When our work is
combined we tend to have less mo�va�on or show less effort. In one study of this
phenomenon, par�cipants were asked to pull a rope as hard as they could in a
simulated tug-of-war exercise (Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974). The
researchers measured how hard par�cipants pulled when they were pulling alone and
knew it, as opposed to when they thought they were pulling with others. To separate
coordina�on loss from issues involving mo�va�on, researchers had par�cipants do the
work alone, although they believed they were working with others. In the tug-of-war,
par�cipants completed the task blindfolded so they would not know they wethe only
one pulling. When par�cipants thought a number of other people were pulling, they
pulled with less force than if they thought the task was theirs alone.

If your efforts toward a group goal, like a class project, were pooled, but you knew
that each person’s piece could be clearly iden�fied, would you engage in social
loafing? One key factor in social loafing is the iden�fiability of individual effort. When
one’s work is pooled with others but one’s effort can be iden�fied individually, social
loafing declines or disappears. To determine if iden�fiability was important, research
par�cipants were asked to yell as loud as they could under three condi�ons: when

they were yelling alone and knew they were alone, when they thought they were yelling with one other person, and when they thought they were yelling with
five other people (Williams, Harkins, & Latane, 1981). The par�cipants had headphones and blindfolds on so they could not actually see or hear what others
were doing. The researchers found that when people thought they were yelling with one other person, they produced 69% as much sound as when they were
yelling alone. When par�cipants thought they were part of a group of six, they produced 63% as much sound. The researchers were able to eliminate this
reduc�on in sound produc�on by pu�ng individual microphones on par�cipants and telling them that when they were yelling with others their individual efforts
were iden�fiable.

When individuals do not expect their contribu�ons to ma�er, they are most likely to socially loaf. This could occur either because they perceive that their
contribu�ons are not going to be meaningful, or because they do not value the outcome of the group. In a tug-of-war, you might feel that your addi�onal effort
is not going to add much to the group, so you would pull less when the group is pulling with you. You might also feel that any praise you would get would be
quite small in the tug-of-war, because it would be divided amongst your group members. It follows, then, why individual iden�fiability is important. When your
contribu�on can be recognized, it becomes meaningful and the outcome more valued. When people engage in social loafing while in a group, they are called
free riders. Free riders do not put as much energy or work into a group task, gaining the rewards of the group’s outcome without inves�ng.

Social loafing is partly determined by the nature of the group and the types of task. We engage in less social loafing when we know the other people in our
group and we have a cohesive group. Perhaps knowing your friends are relying on you is different from having strangers rely on your contribu�ons. We loaf less
when the outcome depends on us in some way (e.g., the project will not be completed without our contribu�on) or the task is meaningful, important, or
enjoyable to us in some way (Hoigaard, Safvenbom, & Tonnessen, 2006; Karau & Hart, 1998; Karau & Williams, 1993; Shiue, Chiu, & Chang, 2010; Smith, Kerr,
Markus, & Stasson, 2001). If you know your group cannot finish the class project without you or you simply enjoy inves�ga�ng the topic or pu�ng together a
report, you may not loaf.

Social loafing varies depending on gender and culture. In general, men are more likely to socially loaf than women (Karau & Williams, 1993; Kugihara, 1999).
Women tend to show more equal inputs whether working alone or with a group. Individuals from more interdependent cultures are also less likely to socially
loaf than those from independent cultures (Gabrenya, Wang, & Latane, 1985; Klehe & Anderson, 2007). Within each culture, though, women are less likely to
loaf than men (Kugihara, 1999). In men and women, social loafing is less likely in people who are high in the personality trait of conscien�ousness (Ferrari &
Pychyl, 2012)

In some instances, groups can posi�vely affect performance by elici�ng mo�va�on to work harder (rather than engage in social loafing). Imagine you were
recruited to be part of a basketball team. Though you know the rules and have played before, your background in basketball is limited. When you are playing
with a team of great players, will you try as hard as you can or not as hard as you can? Most likely you would be mo�vated to work hard and would put a great
deal of effort into your play, hoping you will not let your team down. The tendency for individuals to work harder when they are less capable than the other
group members has been called the Köhler effect (Hertel, Kerr, & Messe, 2000; Kerr, Seok, Poulsen, Harris, & Messe, 2008). That increased mo�va�on may come

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from comparing oneself to other group members and realizing that one’s performance is lacking. It could also come from a realiza�on that the group’s outcome
will only be as good as one’s weaker performance allows (Kerr, Messe, Park, & Sambolec, 2005; Kerr et al., 2008; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996).

The weakest players on a team gain the most from the Köhler effect. For example, on a swim team, the members with the slowest �mes in individual trials show
the greatest declines (and so, the greatest improvement) in their �mes when swimming with their team in the finals (Osborn, Irwin, Skogsberg, & Feltz, 2012).
The effect is also strongest for tasks that are conjunc�ve, where the en�re team can only do as well as its weakest member, rather than addi�ve, where the
weakest team member contributes less to team output than other members (Kerr & Hertel, 2011). Weaker group members tend to do be�er when a group is
con�nually changing rather than when it remains stable, perhaps because the weaker member con�nues to compare his or herself to others and does not simply
get used to being outperformed (Lount, Kerr, Messe, Seok, & Park, 2008).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What factors make social loafing less likely to occur?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Social loafing is less likely when people are individually iden�fiable, when members of a group are cohesive and know one another, when
members are women or from a more interdependent culture, and when members perceive the task as being meaningful, valuable, or
interes�ng.

A�er joining a pub quiz team you discover you are the weakest member of the team. What is likely to happen to your performance as a
result of this situa�on?
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According to the Köhler effect being the weakest member of a team provides people with the mo�va�on to try harder and work to live up
to the level of the other members of the team.

Deindividua�on

Have you ever a�ended a spor�ng event and found yourself yelling at the top of your lungs in a way you would not ever do if you were alone? If you have ever
been in a crowd and found yourself ac�ng in a way you would not act alone, you may have experienced deindividua�on. Deindividua�on is the tendency for
awareness of one’s individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs, o�en leading to engagement in behaviors with a group that one would not engage in alone.
Yelling insults, throwing objects onto the field at a spor�ng event, or loo�ng have all been behaviors par�cipated in when people feel deindividuated.

Researchers have proposed a variety of factors that could lead to deindividua�on. A reduced sense of individual responsibility for ac�on, high physiological
arousal, a lower awareness of personal values and beliefs, novel situa�ons, and a sense of anonymity have all been suggested as factors that increase
deindividua�on (Pren�ce-Dunn & Rogers, 1982; Zimbardo, 1969). Imagine the types of situa�ons where such things are true. When a mob is involved in loo�ng,
individuals know their own behavior is unlikely to be traced back to them. At a spor�ng event people are excited and may be distracted from awareness of their
inner thoughts by the ac�on on the court/field/rink. At a rock concert, low ligh�ng and wearing a band t-shirt like many others may allow one to feel
anonymous. Researchers further inves�gated the factors that may lead to deindividua�on using a technique called meta-analysis. Meta-analysis involves looking
at as many studies as possible on a par�cular topic and using a sta�s�cal technique to summarize those findings. When researchers did this for factors that
promote deindividua�on, they found that feelings of individual responsibility were most important (Postmes & Spears, 1998). This means that, while a novel
situa�on or high physiological arousal might have a small impact on tendency to engage in deindividua�on, feeling like one is not accountable for one’s ac�ons is
essen�al.

Deindividua�on o�en leads to nega�ve behavior, such as stealing and chea�ng (Postmes & Spears, 1998). For example, one Halloween, trick-or-trea�ng children
were told that they were supposed to take only one piece of candy. When the adult who had given the children these instruc�ons le�, researchers watched from
a hidden loca�on to see how many pieces of candy the children actually took. Children who were more anonymous and were in a group were more likely to
steal candy than those who were more iden�fiable or trick-or-trea�ng alone (Diener, Fraser, Beaman, & Kelem, 1976). In another study, Halloween masks that hid
children’s iden��es led to greater stealing of candy (Miller & Rowold, 1979).

Most examples you will find of deindividua�on evaluate behaviors such as yelling insults, stealing, or chea�ng, but this sort of behavior is not inevitable. In a
study by Johnson and Downing (1979) par�cipants were placed either in a situa�on to induce deindividua�on or in a situa�on where their ac�ons were clearly
iden�fied as their own. The par�cipants were asked to put on one of two costumes. For half of the par�cipants, a nurse’s uniform was provided, with the
explana�on that the costumes had been borrowed from the hospital for the study. The other half were asked to put on a robe that the researcher had
supposedly made himself. He said “I’m not much of a seamstress so these ended up looking kind of Ku Klux Klannish” (Johnson & Downing, 1979, p. 1534). The
idea was that the costumes might provide par�cipants with different cues toward behavior. The researchers believed the nurse’s uniform would provide people
with an environmental cue to be helpful, because we generally think of nurses as helpful. The robe could provide people with an environmental cue toward
nega�ve, aggressive behavior, because the KKK is and has been a violent organiza�on.

Par�cipants were asked to select an electrical shock level when another par�cipant responded incorrectly. They had the op�on of either raising the shock level,
up to a posi�ve 3, or reducing it, down to minus 3. By raising the shock level par�cipants were engaging in an ac�on that inflicted addi�onal harm on the other

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par�cipant. By lowering the shock level they were helping the other par�cipant by making the shock less painful. The other par�cipant, who was allegedly being
shocked, did not really exist; no one received a shock in this study. The researchers wondered if deindividua�on could actually create helpful behavior, if the
environmental cues were right, or if anonymity always leads to nega�ve behavior. Table 9.1 shows the results of the study.

Table 9.1: Average shock level increase or decrease of par�cipants in different groups in Johnson and
Downing’s (1979) study of deindividua�on

Individuated Deindividuated

Cue for helpfulness – 0.35 – 1.47

Cue for aggression 0.76 0.95

From Johnson, R. D. & Downing, L. L. (1979). Deindividua�on and valence of cues: Effects on prosocial and an�social behavior. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 37(9), 1532-1538. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.37.9.1532 Copyright © 1979 by the American Psychological Associa�on.

As you can see from the table, deindividuated individuals with the aggressive cue showed more aggressive behavior: They increased the shock level. Those who
had something in their environment that suggested helpfulness tended to do what they could to reduce the pain someone else would experience, par�cularly
when they were deindividuated. Therefore, deindividua�on has the poten�al to create posi�ve behavior if the environment supports it.

Overall, deindividua�on increases the individual’s responsiveness to the situa�on or the group norms (Postmes & Spears, 1998). The person will take on the
norms of the group, the group iden�ty, and engage in behavior that goes along with those norms, good or bad. You can think of the impact individual iden�ty
and group iden�ty has on our behavior as working like a teeter-to�er. When one side of a teeter-to�er goes down, the other goes up; when our reliance on our
individual iden�ty goes down, the iden�ty of the group becomes more important. On the other hand, when we are very aware of our own individual iden�ty,
the group is less of a determinant for our behavior. This is the idea behind the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on effects. As people lose a sense of their
own iden�ty, they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Does deindividua�on always lead to nega�ve behavior?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Deindividua�on tends to lead to nega�ve behavior but, given posi�ve cues in the environment, it is possible for deindividua�on to lead to
prosocial behavior.

Because you are wearing your favorite team’s colors and are in the stands with hundreds of others in that color, you lose some sense of
your unique iden�ty. According to the social iden�ty model, what is likely to occur?
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According to the social iden�ty model, when you lose some of your own iden�ty you take on the iden�ty of the group.

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9.2

Group Cogni�on

In the previous sec�on we explored how groups affect the ac�ons of individuals. When in groups, people do not simply act differently, they also think differently.
Individuals in groups may think together to generate ideas or make decisions. The number and quality of ideas and the quality of the decisions may be
influenced by the group. Group discussions can also affect individual a�tudes.

Brainstorming

When groups think together, coming up with ideas as a group, it is called brainstorming. Brainstorming has been proposed as a way to develop a wide variety of
solu�ons or new and crea�ve ideas (Osborn, 1957). Common brainstorming prac�ces include trying to generate as many ideas as possible, with encouragement
to combine, improve, or expand on previous ideas. Brainstorming seems, to many, to generate more ideas than the same individuals would generate working
alone (Paulus, Dzindolet, Poletes, & Camacho, 1993). In fact, overall, brainstorming actually provides fewer ideas per person than the same number of individuals
would provide on their own. This may be because of issues related to produc�on within a group. Individuals might interrupt one another or spend �me in social
conversa�ons unrelated to the task at hand (Diehl & Strobe, 1987). As groups get bigger and there are more people to interrupt or get off topic, groups show a
greater loss of produc�vity (Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). Brainstorming groups also tend to become fixated on par�cular realms of ideas, leading to lower
diversity of ideas (Kohn & Smith, 2009).

Some people are anxious in social situa�ons and may put a damper on group brainstorming interac�ons. Researchers have found that people who find
interac�ng with others a stressful and anxiety-provoking experience were not as helpful in brainstorming sessions because they were unwilling to par�cipate
orally. When highly anxious people were in a group with those who were not anxious, the low-anxiety individuals tended to show poorer performance as well
(Camacho & Paulus, 1995). Feeling anxious in interac�ons puts a damper on both those who feel the anxiety and those with whom they interact.

To maximize the poten�al of brainstorming, the standard technique of ge�ng all members of the group into a room and speaking their minds may not be most
effec�ve. Combining individual ideas and group brainstorming can be helpful. Studies show that the greatest number of ideas are developed when the group
brainstorms together, and then each person brainstorms alone (Brown & Paulus, 2002). The group may prompt individuals to think in direc�ons the individuals
would not have thought about on their own. Following a group session with an individual session allows individuals to come up with a number of ideas without
the loss of produc�vity due to interrup�ons by other members of the group, and without the social anxiety of the group context. Talking over other group
members can also be avoided by having members write down their ideas and read rather than speak the ideas of others, or by using a computer to type up
one’s ideas and sending them electronically to other group members (Brown & Paulus, 2002).

Group Polariza�on

Do group discussions change the way people think? When the opinions of individuals are surveyed before and a�er a group discussion of opinion-related topics,
opinions tend to shi� farther toward an extreme. If we think of opinions on a con�nuum, with strong agreement on one pole and strong disagreement on the
other pole, people tend to polarize. Polariza�on involves a shi� closer to whichever pole people were ini�ally leaning toward.

There are a variety of possible reasons why this occurs. During a group discussion, individuals might hear arguments in favor of their own posi�on that they had
not heard or thought of before (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1977). People might also realize that their opinion is more common than they thought (Myers & Lamm,
1976). Such a realiza�on may lead us to make our own a�tude more extreme as we strive to be dis�nc�ve from the group. Thus, group discussion may provide
us with more arguments bolstering an already held opinion and the mo�va�on to make that opinion stronger.

In general, people are more persuaded by their ingroups than by an outgroup, par�cularly when the ingroup and outgroup are in conflict, and are more
persuaded by unanimous groups than by groups with a dissenter (Kunovich & Deitelbaum, 2004; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; Williams & Taormina, 1993). Greater
polariza�on occurs during deindividua�on (Lee, 2007). According to the social iden�ty model of deindividua�on, people take on the iden�ty of the group when
personal iden�ty is lowered, leading to greater iden�fica�on with the a�tudes of the group and therefore greater polariza�on.

Polariza�on can occur not only within group discussion, but also as a result of repeated exposure to an a�tude, or with dedicated �me spent thinking about the
a�tude (Brickman, Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972; Downing, Judd, & Brauer, 1992; Tesser, 1978). Part of the effect of polariza�on may, therefore, come not
because of the group but because the interac�on allows individuals to state their own opinion and �me to think about their a�tude (Van Boven, Judd, &
Sherman, 2012). Polariza�on also occurs with juries. In general, individuals who ini�ally want to be lenient have a greater slant toward leniency a�er some jury
delibera�on. Those whose ini�al leaning is toward a severe punishment have an even more severe stance a�er discussion (Bray & Noble, 1978). When juries
deliberate, the first vote o�en predicts the outcome of the delibera�on, par�cularly when the ini�al vote favors acqui�al rather than convic�on (Kalven & Zeisel,
1966; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Sandys & Dillehay, 1995).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Do group members come up with more ideas collec�vely in a group brainstorming session or individually?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Combining the efforts of many individuals outside of a group usually leads to more ideas being generated than a group brainstorming
session.

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In the Challenger space shu�le incident, the push to launch
overrode the warnings of concerned engineers.

A�er group discussion do people’s a�tudes tend to remain the same, become less extreme, or become more extreme?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Individual a�tudes tend to become more extreme a�er group discussion than they had been before, a phenomenon called group
polariza�on.

Groupthink

In 1961 a group of 1,600 U.S. funded and trained Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. The mission was to lead a popular movement to overthrow Fidel
Castro and his communist regime. The mission failed en�rely, and the exiles were captured or killed. The world was outraged that the United States invaded a
sovereign country. Far from being overthrown, Castro remained in power for nearly 50 years, and only ceded power to his brother in 2008 because of ill health.

Groups are o�en involved in decision making. With the adage “two heads are be�er than one,”
many of us believe that a decision made with others is be�er than a decision made by an individual.
President Kennedy and a small group of advisors made the decision to move forward with the
invasion plan, hatched during the Eisenhower administra�on. Neither Kennedy nor his advisors
seemed to have understood the hazards of invading with such a small force. The tac�cs, the
numbers, the weapons, and even the intelligence from Cuba added up to a flawed plan doomed to
failure (Sidey, 2001). Despite the characteriza�on of Kennedy’s group of advisors as “the best and
brightest” (Halberstam, 1972), Kennedy later described their ac�ons as stupid (Sorensen, 1966).

The Bay of Pigs Invasion shows that groups can and do make bad decisions. Similarly, disastrous
decisions were made by various groups in the failure of the United States to prepare for the a�ack
on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the escala�on of the Viet Nam war, and even in the Challenger space
shu�le disaster. Many of these group decisions share common characteris�cs. Researcher Irving Janis
studied these types of group decisions, and developed a model to describe how groups could make
such poor choices (Janis, 1972; 1982). Janis’s model involves a process including the antecedents,
characteris�cs, and consequences of this type of group decision making. He named it groupthink, a
decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group
interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking, and leads to bad decision making.

According to this model, the antecedents are the condi�ons that must be in place for groupthink to
occur. The group needs to

be highly cohesive,

be insulated from other viewpoints,

have a direc�ve leader,

have poor procedures for searching out and evalua�ng alterna�ves, and

be under high stress or feel threatened.

No�ce that these condi�ons revolve around an insular, cohesive group that follows a leader with a certain plan. The group does not seek outside input, but looks
into itself for answers.

The antecedents lead to a group decision-making process with par�cular characteris�cs. These characteris�cs are the natural outgrowth of such an insular group,
where the group

feels invulnerable;

assumes the moral correctness of its viewpoint;

stereotypes outsiders, par�cularly opponents;

engages in self-censorship, not sharing concerns, doubts, or disagreements;

pressures dissenters to conform to group opinion;

has an illusion of unanimity; and

has members who act as mindguards—individuals who protect leaders from hearing a viewpoint contrary to their own.

When a group is showing characteris�cs of groupthink, that group supports its own viewpoint and dismisses or ignores those of others. Even those within the
group who disagree are silenced. Because of mindguards, the leader never hears about dissen�ng opinions. For example, had Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon appointed at least one person whose job it was to challenge proposed decisions, historical courses of ac�on may have been different.

The consequences of such a process can be devasta�ng, as the historic examples illustrate. The par�cular consequences of groupthink for the group are that the
group does not

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fully consider its true objec�ves,

consider alterna�ves to the proposed course of ac�on,

fully examine risks of the proposed course of ac�on,

thoroughly search for informa�on, and

develop appropriate con�ngency plans.

Because the group does not consider alterna�ves, risks, or develop a con�ngency plan, when things go wrong the group is surprised and le� scrambling for
answers.

Though we would expect to find groupthink when the antecedents for groupthink are present, this does not always happen. The antecedents set the stage, but a
group might s�ll avoid groupthink. Not all antecedents are necessary for groupthink to occur. Cohesive groups that are insulated from other viewpoints and have
direc�ve leaders are the most vulnerable (Ahlfinger & Esser, 2001; McCauley, 1989). Since the Bay of Pigs and Janis’ work, these insulated cohesive groups have
con�nued to make poor decisions in circumstances, such as in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in Iraq, the space shu�le Challenger accident, and a series of
decisions a group of NBC execu�ves made regarding Jay Leno and The Tonight Show (Moorhead, Ference, & Neck, 1991; Neck, 1996; Post, 2011).

Although a decision-making process characterized by groupthink does not use the best decision-making strategies, decisions made this way are not always
disastrous. It is possible for a groupthink decision to turn out well if the group happens to stumble on a good solu�on or gets lucky in the outcome of its ac�ons.
Groups making decisions without groupthink do not always make the best decisions either (Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992). However, a decision
made when groupthink is in play is more likely to turn out badly than one made by a group not involved in groupthink.

Social Psychology in Depth: The Wisdom of Crowds

Want to know what movie will be big at the box office this weekend?

Want to know the answer to that tough ques�on on the game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?

Want to know how many jelly beans are in the jar?

All these ques�ons are best answered by combining the answers of many rather than relying on the response of one person. The average
es�mate for the group is usually closer to the real number of jelly beans in a jar than any individual es�mate. The studio audience picks the right
answer 91% of the �me on Who Wants to Be a Millionaire? Friends give correct answers only 65% of the �me (Surowiecki, 2004).

Predic�on markets use the wisdom of the group to predict events. Within these markets, individuals use real or fake money to bet on the
likelihood of an event (though other types of predic�ons are also used, see Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004) and their collec�ve wager is o�en quite
accurate. The Iowa Electronics Market (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/ (h�p://�ppie.uiowa.edu/iem/) ) correctly predicted Obama’s presiden�al
victory in 2008 with closer accuracy than any of the major polling companies (Rowe, 2010). This was not a fluke; such markets have been more
accurate than polls for a variety of poli�cal races (Berg, Forsythe, Nelson, & Reitz, 2001).

According to James Surowieci, author of The Wisdom of Crowds, groups are helpful with three types of problems: cogni�ve, coordina�on, and
coopera�on. Cogni�ve problems are those that require judgment. If you poll 100 people about the month and year humans first set foot on the
moon, the group will get closer than almost all of the members of that group. This holds true for predic�on as well as facts. Want to know who
will be awarded an Oscar? Take a look at the Hollywood Stock Exchange (h�p://www.hsx.com/ (h�p://www.hsx.com/) ) to find out (Pennock,
Lawrence, Giles, & Nielsen, 2003).

Groups also show wisdom in their coordina�on. Walking down a sidewalk, you might find yourself dri�ing to the right side while the foot traffic
coming toward you inhabits the le�. Because of this coordinated ac�on, you rarely crash into another pedestrian. Finally, crowds show
coopera�on. At the beach, the group may collec�vely watch over one another’s possessions and the small children playing the waves, all without
talking about the task or knowing one another.

Not all crowds are wise. The key to good collec�ve decision making is independence (Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Surowiecki, 2004). Each
member of a group needs to make an independent judgment for the collec�ve response to be accurate. Solomon Asch, who performed his
classic studies of conformity, would agree. In comments about Asch’s work, Levine (1999) wrote,

[T]he bo�om line is that, because people are involved in coopera�ve efforts to understand the world, they have a responsibility
both to assert their own viewpoint, which involves independence, and to pay a�en�on to others’ viewpoints, which can lead to
conformity. (p. 360)

Group Decision Making

Research on juries, as well as other groups, has revealed that a variety of factors can affect the process and the outcome of group decisions. Beyond the
decision-making defects of groupthink, groups that make decisions together are affected by the informa�on individuals bring to the table and whether or not

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Stock Connec�on/SuperStock

The U.S. Congress illustrates how group size and majority rules can affect decision
making.

they share that informa�on, the size of the group, and if the group is required to make unanimous decisions.

Unique Knowledge

When a group comes together, each member brings a unique perspec�ve. For example, if your work group was making a decision and you were the only one
who knew about a new product the rival company was developing, it would be useful to your group if you shared that informa�on. For many group decisions,
each member could help the group most by clearly and concisely sharing his or her unique knowledge. Yet o�en �mes group members focus on what all of them
know or hold in common, ignoring the unique, poten�ally useful, informa�on they possess as individuals (Stasser & Titus, 1985). For example, a commi�ee might
primarily discuss the aspects of a situa�on they all best understand. Commi�ee members who have other exper�se or knowledge that could help the group are
less likely to bring those up, at least ini�ally. Because they do not readily share unique informa�on, some groups fail to find a solu�on to the problem they face
(Lu, Yuan, & McLeod, 2012).

Unique informa�on is more likely to come up later in a group discussion, sugges�ng that longer discussions are more likely to yield diverse informa�on (Fraidin,
2004; Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbo�, 1998). People also tend to bring up informa�on when they know it is their task to do so. By giving different members
of the group different tasks and asking them to report on those tasks, groups can amass a greater depth of informa�on (Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996;
Stasser, 2000). Groups that are persuaded of the value of diverse opinions are also more likely to share diverse informa�on amongst themselves (Homan, van
Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007). When members of a group are in a good mood, they tend to broaden the focus of their informa�on search and share
more unique informa�on (Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008). Happy groups, therefore, are less likely to rely on shared informa�on to make decisions and are more
likely to use the unique knowledge that various members bring to the group.

Unanimous Versus Nonunanimous Decision Rules

Groups that are required to come to a unanimous decision act differently than those
who can quit delibera�on when a majority agrees. With majority rule, group members
who hold alterna�ve opinions can be outvoted. Tradi�onally, unanimous decisions
were required of juries. In research on juries, a nonunanimous verdict is associated
with taking less �me to reach a verdict (Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt, & Meek, 1975; Foss,
1981; Has�e, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). Given that longer group delibera�on is
more likely to include discussion of informa�on unique to par�cular members, it is
likely that these nonunanimous juries are making decisions having not fully explored
the knowledge of all members. Nonunanimous juries are more likely to be able to
come to a decision because they do not need to convince those final few people to
agree with the majority (Nemeth, 1977; Padawer-Singer, Singer, & Singer, 1977).

Group Size and Diversity

Both small groups and large groups have their advantages. When groups get too big,
unanimous decisions can be virtually impossible (Romme, 2004). In general, smaller
groups tend to share more informa�on (Cruz, Boster, & Rodriguez, 1997; Waller, Hope,
Burrowes, & Morrison, 2011). Small groups are also more efficient, and members may
have more chance to par�cipate. However, larger groups offer more diversity of opinion and are more likely to include people with a diversity of backgrounds or
ideas (Cummings, Huber, & Arendt, 1974). For example, larger juries are more likely to contain members of ethnic and racial minori�es (Saks & Mar�, 1997).

How does diversity affect decision making? Overall, diverse groups tend to have less group cohesiveness and lower morale (Jackson, 1991; O’Reilly, Cadwell, &
Barne�, 1989). At �mes, diverse groups do not perform as well as less diverse groups (Ancona & Cadwell, 1992; Mullen & Copper, 1994). However, diverse
groups tend to do be�er with complex decisions, or decisions that require crea�ve thinking as opposed to decisions that require se�ling on one answer or
performing a simple task (Levine & Moreland, 1998). One important factor in this dis�nc�on is the ways individuals from different backgrounds share informa�on
and in their willingness to share. When diverse groups are encouraged to share diverse informa�on, they can make good decisions (Kooij-de Bode, van
Knippenberg, & van Ginkel, 2008). Going back to jury research, juries with minority members were found to spend more �me delibera�ng, discussed a wider
range of informa�on, and made fewer errors in their discussion of the case. This was not solely due to the contribu�ons of the minority members of the groups.
Majority members brought up more informa�on and made fewer errors in the diverse groups than similar members in homogeneous groups (Sommers, 2006).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What are some characteris�cs of groups that make them vulnerable to groupthink?
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Groups that are cohesive, insulated from outside influences, and have direc�ve leaders are par�cularly vulnerable to groupthink.

What characteris�cs of group discussions make it more likely that group members will bring up informa�on they know uniquely?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

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When groups meet for a longer �me, members are more likely to bring up unique informa�on. Groups in which individuals know it is their
task to bring their unique knowledge and value diverse opinions are also more likely to have unique informa�on brought out in discussion.

What are one posi�ve and one nega�ve about the requirement that a group reach a unanimous decision?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups required to come to unanimity tend to talk longer and listen to all members to a greater degree but they are also more likely to
encounter an inability to come to a final decision.

How is diversity within a group helpful to decision making?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Groups with diverse members spend more �me digging into complex ques�ons, discuss a wider range of informa�on, and make fewer
errors in their discussions.

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iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Ocean pollu�on is one example of a commons dilemma. What other examples can
you think of?

9.3

Social Dilemmas

A�er emptying a can of soda, what do you do with the can? Throwing it in the trash might be easiest. The trash bin is right there, and you are taking out the
trash soon anyway. But if you throw it in the trash, you know that the can will end up in a landfill. The recycling bin might be harder to get to and require a
special trip; however, recycling is be�er for the environment, saves energy and landfill space, and reduces pollu�on. Do you do what is best or easiest for you, at
least in the short term, or do what is best for the larger group? You are facing a social dilemma.

When individuals face decisions whose outcomes create a tension between what is best for the individual and what is best for the collec�ve (or group), they are
facing a social dilemma. For these dilemmas, what is best for the individual is not what is best for the group. The individual would be best served by being
selfish. But those individual behaviors are harmful to the collec�ve and may, in the end, come back to harm the individual.

Commons Dilemma

Imagine you live in a village with a common grazing field. Each person in your village could graze one cow on that common green space. As you evaluate the
space, you realize that adding one more cow would harm the field only a small amount. You need the milk to get you through the winter, so you add one or two
more cows. Your neighbor comes to the same conclusion, as do a number of other villagers. With the addi�on of many animals the common field becomes a
field of mud and no cows are able to graze. In situa�ons like these, the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource, but if
too many in the group take advantage of the resource, it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This phenomenon is called the commons
dilemma or tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968).

Commons dilemmas are a part of a variety of social problems: overfishing, pollu�on,
overpopula�on, forest deple�on, and overuse of energy. For each of these scenarios,
what is best for the individual, at least in the short term, is to act in a self-interested
way. A fisherman needs to make a living, so making a large catch is important. If only
a few individuals took advantage of a collec�ve resource, the outcomes might not be
as good for the collec�ve but the resource would be sustained. If only a few
fishermen take large catches, there will s�ll be fish to reproduce and provide future
fishing opportuni�es. The tragedy occurs when large numbers act in a self-interested
way. This depletes the resource. For a commons dilemma, fairness means equal
outcomes for all (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995). Even if a fishing resource could sustain
some addi�onal catches by some fisherman, what we view as fair is for each
fisherman to have equal access or take an equal amount of fish from that resource.

O�en �mes decisions can be win-lose situa�ons. For example, if you buy the house
on the corner that I was looking at, you win and I lose because we cannot both have
the house. Many of the games we play, everything from Monopoly to Jeopardy, are
zero-sum games—games where the gains or losses of the one person are balanced
out by the gains or losses of another. So if I win $100 dollars, you lose $100 dollars.
Social dilemmas are of a different type. Social dilemmas like the commons dilemma are non-zero-sum games. Within a social dilemma, played as a game or lived
out in real life, the outcome does not need to sum to zero. If everyone cooperates, everyone can win, but if everyone competes, everyone will lose.

Resource Dilemma

With the tragedy of the commons, individuals have the op�on of gaining from a collec�vely owned resource that will naturally renew itself. A related social
dilemma is called the resource dilemma. With the resource dilemma, individuals contribute to a resource from which all may benefit. Public television and public
radio in the United States are funded, to a large extent, by those who watch or listen, but everyone with a radio or television within range has access to PBS and
public radio, regardless of their contribu�ons. The best individual strategy would be to not contribute and take advantage of the resource. Blood banks also
encounter a resource dilemma. We all hope that blood is available when we need it, but what is best for us as individuals is to avoid the �me and discomfort
associated with blood dona�on. The dilemma is that if no one were to contribute, the resource would not exist. For resource dilemmas, we view fairness in
terms of equity. Those who benefit most from a resource should contribute the most and those who benefit li�le can contribute li�le and be seen as being fair
in their contribu�ons (van Dijk & Wilke, 1995).

Prisoner’s Dilemma

The commons dilemma and the resource dilemma involve groups of people, whereas the prisoner’s dilemma only involves two people. The prisoner’s dilemma is
a scenario that demonstrates that two individuals might not cooperate, even when it is in their collec�ve best interest to do so (Axelrod, 1984). To understand
how this dilemma works, imagine you are a thief. The police caught you and your partner engaging in a minor crime. The police take the two of you into
separate interroga�on rooms and offer you this deal: If you confess to a major crime they suspect you of and implicate your partner, you will go free and your
partner will spend 20 years in jail. The police tell you they are offering the same deal to your partner: If your partner confesses to the major crime, you will go
to jail for 20 years and your partner will go free. If you both confess to the major crime, you will both spend 5 years in jail. If neither one of you confesses to the
major crime, you will both be charged with the minor crime you were arrested for and spend a year in jail. (See Table 9.2.) What do you do?

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Table 9.2: Prisoner’s dilemma matrix

Partner

Confess
(does not cooperate with you)

Do not confess
(cooperates with you)

You

Confess
(do not cooperate with partner)

Partner 5 years
You 5 years

Partner 20 years
You 0 years

Do not confess
(cooperate with partner)

Partner 0 years
You 20 years

Partner 1 year
You 1 year

It would be best for you if you confessed and your partner did not. Collec�vely, it would be best if the two of you cooperated and spent only a year in jail each.
If you both try to get the good deal, both of your sentences will be appreciably longer than if you had cooperated with one another.

When the prisoner’s dilemma is played by two players several �mes in a row, called the “iterated prisoner’s dilemma,” players can use a number of different
strategies. One strategy would be to always cooperate with one’s partner no ma�er what the partner did. If the partner always cooperates this is a good
strategy. By always coopera�ng the two of you are able to, collec�vely, get the best outcome. The drawback comes if the partner realizes you always cooperate
and is willing to take advantage of that. If so, you will get the worst outcome while your partner gets the best. Another strategy would be to always compete.
Such a strategy would avoid the danger that you will be taken advantage of and may get you the best outcome (0 years) if your partner cooperates. If your
partner is willing to cooperate consistently, compe��on prevents the best collec�ve outcome.

Another strategy for the prisoner’s dilemma game is the �t-for-tat strategy. With �t-for-tat you would use whichever strategy your partner did on the previous
turn. If your partner cooperated on turn 2 you would cooperate on turn 3. If your partner competed on turn 3 you would compete on turn 4. If your partner
cooperated on every turn you would also cooperate on every turn. If your partner consistently competed you would also compete. A problem with the �t-for-tat-
strategy is that if both members are using it and compe��on becomes the norm, each side reciproca�ng with compe��on, you have a nega�ve outcome,
individually and collec�vely. Because �t-for-tat can result in this nega�ve cycle of responding, some have proposed a generous �t-for-tat strategy, where the
individual cooperates more than would be strictly done in response to a partner’s compe��on (Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Another strategy where you change depending on what your partner does is called the win-stay, lose-shi� strategy. With this strategy, you would con�nue with
whatever strategy is providing you with the best outcome. If coopera�ng is ge�ng you the best outcome, you would con�nue to use it un�l it starts to be a
problem, then you shi� to compe��on (Nowak & Sigmund, 1993). Other strategies exist, but overall, the generous �t-for-tat and win-stay, lose-shi� strategies
have consistently had the best outcomes (Axlerod, 1984; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Wedekind & Milinski, 1996).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What is the difference between a commons dilemma and a resource dilemma?
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A commons dilemma occurs when collec�vely owned resources are destroyed because everyone takes more than their fair share; whereas,
a resource dilemma occurs when everyone must contribute for the resource to exist. One relies on the group’s good stewardship of a pre-
exis�ng resource to con�nue, the other relies on the group’s collec�ve generosity for the resource to exist.

How is a zero-sum game different from a non-zero-sum game?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

With a zero-sum game one person wins in propor�on to what the other person loses, so the total sums to zero. With a non-zero-sum
game it is possible for all par�es to win or for all par�es to lose.

If you were to play the prisoner’s dilemma game what would be the danger of coopera�ng with your partner?
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Coopera�ng with your partner is a good idea if your partner cooperates with you, but if your partner competes you will end up with a
much worse outcome than if you had also competed.

Dealing With Social Dilemmas

Pi�ng self-interest against collec�ve interest, social dilemmas are difficult to solve. There are some factors, however, that make coopera�on more likely. One
factor that increases coopera�on most of the �me is communica�on (van de Kragt, Dawes, Orbell, Braver, & Wilson, 1986). Individuals playing the prisoner’s
dilemma game or engaging in a laboratory simula�on of the tragedy of the commons are more likely to cooperate with one another if they can communicate
with one another. There is some evidence that communica�on does not even need to take place for coopera�on to be increased. When people simply thought
about the kinds of things that might be said concerning a social dilemma during a group discussion, they showed more coopera�on than without the imagined
discussion (Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2012).

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Coopera�ve behavior is more likely when payoffs make coopera�on more a�rac�ve, either through punishment for selfish behavior or through rewards for
coopera�ve behavior (Dawes, 1980; Shaw, 1976; van de Kragt et al., 1986). Changing payoffs to punish self-interested behavior or reward coopera�on may
involve oversight by a government or other organiza�on. For example, most states issue a limited number of hun�ng and fishing licenses to make certain
overhun�ng and overfishing do not occur. The problem with oversight is that it can cost resources to implement, police, and maintain; socie�es need to be sure
such oversight does not cost more resources than it saves. Even when authori�es impose regula�ons in service of the common good, if the people do not trust
the authority or feel like the authority is not listening to their concerns, they are unlikely to follow the regula�on (Van Vugt, 2009).

Social dilemmas con�nue because we do not see the effect our behavior is having on the collec�ve, or do not know the people our behavior would impact. In a
tragedy of the commons, if people see that the common resource is likely to soon be depleted, they will typically diminish their use of that resource (Messick et
al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Ru�e, & Wilke, 1984). If fishermen were able to see how many fish were in the sea, they might reduce consump�on of fish when
supplies were low. Accurate informa�on shared with all of the stakeholders is important for encouraging coopera�on (Van Vugt, 2009). In addi�on, if we know
the people that may be affected by our self-interested behavior, we are less likely to compete. Therefore, we tend to find more coopera�on in social dilemmas
that involve smaller groups (Seijts & Latham, 2000). We might iden�fy with the group more when the group is small, which is important for our coopera�on (Van
Vugt, 2009); we are more likely to cooperate with friends than with strangers (Majolo et al., 2006).

If people are unable to engage in a behavior for reasons beyond their control, they may be unlikely to engage in coopera�ve behaviors. If one’s recycling is only
sporadically picked up or if the transporta�on system keeps changing the bus route, one may cease to recycle or take public transporta�on (Brucks & Van Lange,
2008). Difficulty in ac�ng posi�vely in an earlier situa�on can lead to less coopera�on in a later situa�on, even when the barriers are gone. Encountering
problems seems to lower mo�va�on to act in posi�ve ways. However, when prosocial behavior is difficult social forces can be powerful in encouraging
coopera�ve behavior. Individuals might recycle, despite the trouble, if it becomes a norm. Knowing one’s friends and neighbors would be disappointed or
disapproving may mo�vate the individual to do what is best for the collec�ve and make a personal sacrifice (Dawes, 1980).

Is there any reason to do what is best for the collec�ve, despite the costs to oneself? Some people put greater value on minimizing differences in outcomes
between themselves and others and maximizing collec�ve outcomes. These individuals are described as having a high prosocial value orienta�on. Others put
greater value on maximizing their own outcomes, even at the expense of others. Those high in prosocial value orienta�on are more likely to engage in
coopera�ve behavior, such as carpooling or taking public transporta�on, par�cularly when their trust in others is high and others have also shown coopera�ve
behavior. (Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Van Vugt, Meertens, & Ruiter, 1998).

Individuals who always cooperate may be taken advantage of, gaining li�le self-benefit for their ac�ons (Deutsch, Epstein, Canavan, & Gumpert, 1967; Solomon,
1960). However, their ac�ons as consistent contributors may influence their fellow group members toward be�er behavior. When their coopera�ve ac�ons tell
the rest of the group that coopera�on is valued and expected, it may spark reciprocal coopera�on and, in the end, lead the en�re group to be�er behavior
(Weber & Murnighan, 2008). Crea�ng a norm of coopera�on can be powerful. Even when social sanc�ons, such as expressions of disapproval from the group,
are removed, people tend to con�nue their prosocial behavior well beyond what they do when financial sanc�ons encouraged prosocial behavior (Nelissen &
Mulder, 2013). Our strongest mo�vators for coopera�on are other people.

Test Yourself

Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How might a business encourage more carpooling among its employees?
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If the company makes carpooling parking spots more available or allows carpoolers to come a li�le later to work, thus changing payoffs,
that may encourage coopera�on. Encouraging communica�on among employees, making carpooling the norm, and helping employees see
the effect of their driving alone may also have a posi�ve impact on behavior.

Conclusion

Although groups are made up of individual people, groups are qualita�vely different from individuals. We cannot predict group behavior by simply combining
individual behavior. Groups need to be studied as en��es in and of themselves. Groups affect how the individual acts and thinks. In some instances, the person
needs to sort out group interests from individual interests to determine behavior. Given the amount of �me most of us spend in groups and how the decision of
groups affect our lives, understanding groups is important.

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Chapter Summary

Group Ac�ons

A group is a collec�on of at least two individuals who are interac�ng in some way. A group can affect individual performance posi�vely or nega�vely depending
on the task. This is called social facilita�on. Being in a group can also affect a person’s produc�on. When individual inputs cannot be iden�fied, people tend to
engage in social loafing, that is, not pu�ng in full effort. The group can have posi�ve effects on individual performance, as proposed by the Köhler effect, when
an individual a�empts to rise to the level of performance common in their group. Groups may also induce individuals to act in ways they normally would not.
When individuals feel they cannot be iden�fied they tend to take on the iden�ty of the group and engage in ac�ons with the group.

Group Cogni�on

Although some believe that brainstorming as a group can provide the greatest number of ideas, in actuality, a combina�on of both individual and group
brainstorming is best for idea genera�on. When groups discuss a�tudes, the a�tudes of individual members tend to polarize. With polariza�on, individuals
become more extreme in their a�tudes a�er a discussion than they were before. When groups get together to make a decision, specific weaknesses in decision
making can be iden�fied amongst cohesive groups with strong direc�ve leaders. Group decision making in general is affected by the willingness of individual
members to share unique knowledge, by the decision rules imposed on the group, by the size of the group, and by the diversity within the group.

Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas pit individual self-interest against the interest of the group. In the commons dilemma, a common resource can sustain a minimal amount of
selfish behavior, but too much self-interest will destroy the resource. When individuals can contribute to a common resource that all, regardless of contribu�on,
benefit from, a resource dilemma might develop. It is advantageous to the individual to take advantage of the resource without contribu�ng, but the resource
disappears without some individual contribu�ons. The prisoner’s dilemma involves a situa�on where coopera�on yields the best collec�ve outcome, but
compe��on can provide the individual with a be�er outcome, provided that coopera�on is present on the other side. Mutual compe��on results in a poor
outcome for both. Social dilemmas can be tamed by allowing for communica�on among the par�es by: making coopera�on more a�rac�ve and self-interested
behavior more costly, making individuals aware of their effect on a common resource, and by using norms that encourage coopera�ve behavior.

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

1. If you were assigned to do a group project for a class, how might the research on social loafing help you encourage equal par�cipa�on in your group?

2. Have you experienced deindividua�on? What forces lead you to deindividua�on? Were the effects posi�ve or nega�ve?

3. When might group polariza�on have a posi�ve effect? When might group polariza�on have a nega�ve effect?

4. If you were concerned a group was likely to engage in groupthink, what might you do to combat that?

5. Social dilemmas are common in a variety of venues, from friendships to interna�onal rela�ons. Where have you seen social dilemmas at work? How might
they be sa�sfactorily resolved?

Key Terms

Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.

brainstorming
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A strategy for developing ideas as a group involving genera�ng as many ideas as possible, with encouragement to combine, improve, or expand on previous
ideas.

commons dilemma
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A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource; however, if too many in the group take
advantage of the resource it will not be sustainable and will no longer be available. This is also called the tragedy of the commons.

coordina�on loss
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The loss of produc�on that occurs in groups because of difficulty in coordina�ng efforts.

deindividua�on
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The tendency for awareness of one’s individual iden�ty to decline in group se�ngs.

free rider
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An individual who does not put as much �me or energy into a group task, relying on others to invest in the ac�vity.

group
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Two or more people who are interac�ng to form some type of coherent unit.

groupthink
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A decision-making process that occurs when a desire for harmony and consensus within the group interferes with appropriate informa�on seeking and leads to
poor decision making.

in�macy group
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A group made up of rela�ves or friends, that is, people who are related to or who enjoy one another’s company. In�macy groups are viewed as small, long-lived,
having a great deal of interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

Köhler effect
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The tendency for individuals who are less capable than their group to work harder in a group context than they would if they were working alone.

loose associa�on
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A group made up of individuals who are connected by common a�tudes, experiences, or apprecia�ons (such as an affinity for dogs). Loose associa�ons are
viewed as large, poten�ally short-lived, having li�le interac�on, and being very open to outsiders.

mindguards
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Individuals who protect the leader of a group from hearing a viewpoint contrary to his or her own, resul�ng in the leader never hearing about dissen�ng
opinions.

non-

zero-sum games
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Games or situa�ons where the outcome is not a win-or-lose scenario but one where everyone could win or everyone could lose. The tragedy of the commons
and resource dilemmas are both non-zero-sum games.

polariza�on
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The tendency for people to move toward more extremes in their opinions a�er group discussion or more a�en�on to a topic. It involves a shi� closer to
whichever pole they were ini�ally leaning.

prisoner’s dilemma
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A social dilemma involving two individuals in which if both individuals compete, both lose. If both cooperate, they have the best collec�ve outcome. The best
individual outcome comes when one competes and the partner cooperates.

resource dilemma
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A social dilemma in which the individual can gain the best outcome by taking advantage of a collec�ve resource without contribu�ng, but the collec�ve does
best if everyone contributes.

social categoriza�on
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A group made up of individuals with similar characteris�cs (such as Army veterans). Social categoriza�on is characterized as large, long-lived, poten�ally having
li�le interac�on, and being rela�vely impermeable to outsiders.

social facilita�on
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1/30/2018 Imprimir

https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch09,sec9.1,sec9.2,sec9.3,ch09summary&content=all&clientToken=17a64963-eab6-fa0… 18/18

The tendency for the presence of others to increase the dominant response tendency. For an easy or well-learned task the dominant response tendency is to do
well. For a difficult or new task the dominant response tendency is to do poorly.

social iden�ty model
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A model for deindividua�on that proposes that as people lose their individual iden�ty they take on the iden�ty of the group around them.

social loafing
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The tendency for individuals to produce less or not work as hard when working with others.

task group
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A group that engages in a task together. Task groups are typically small and short-lived, and have a great deal of interac�on.

�t-for-tat strategy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner’s dilemma game that involves adop�ng the strategy used by one’s partner on the previous turn.

win-stay, lose-shi� strategy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Strategy used in the prisoner’s dilemma game that involves using whatever strategy is providing the best outcome. If coopera�on is providing the best outcome,
the individual stays with that and changes when that strategy is no longer helpful.

zero-sum games
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Games where the outcome must sum to zero. One individual or group will gain in propor�on to the amount another loses.

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