Follow the Leader

To prepare for this discussion, please read Chapter 8 of your

textbook (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

(Feenstra, 2013). In addition, read

Milestones in the Psychological Analysis of Social Influence

(Crano, 2000) and watch

Prudential: Everybody’s Doing It (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

(2013). Finally, review Instructor Guidance and Announcements. In this discussion, you will consider social influences on your own behavior. Be sure to use your own

academic voice (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

and apply

in-text citations (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

appropriately throughout your post.

Consider your own social behavior and the various normative and informational social influences you encounter in everyday life. Then, complete the following activities.
Appraise your behavior. For 24 hours, keep a log of every behavior in which you engage that is due to conformity or obedience.
Select one of the following:
Choose one mundane behavior from your log that is based on a social norm. Violate this norm. Be sure you are not breaking any rules or laws or putting yourself at risk in any way. Here is a link to a number of examples, but feel free to come up with your own (or google search for additional ideas): http://www.radford.edu/~jaspelme/social/examples_of_norm_violations.htm (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.
Spend 24 hours living “A Day of Nonconformity”, living each minute as uninfluenced as possible (without infringing on the rights of others). Strive to be your true, unfettered self.
Examine your social influence log and your experience living a day of nonconformity/violating a social norm. Include the following in your summary:
To what extent is your everyday behavior shaped by social influence?
How do people react when you do not conform/obey? What factors influence people to follow?

Post your initial response of 250 words or more by Day 3 (Thursday). Respond to at least two of your peers by Day 7 (Monday). You are encouraged to post one or more of your required replies early each week (e.g., by Saturday) to stimulate more meaningful and interactive discourse in the discussion forum. In addition, strive to provide a response to classmates who replied to your initial post and/or the Instructor (if applicable). Peer responses may vary in length but should be carefully crafted and insightful. Below are some suggestions to assist your thinking.

Guided Response: Reply to at least two or more peers overall. The goal of the discussion forum is to foster continual dialogue, similar to what might occur in a verbal face-to-face exchange. Consider the following in your responses:

What about your peer’s experience was most surprising?
How would you have reacted to the nonconformity of your peer?

Group Dynamics; Theory, Research, and Practice
2000. Vol. 4. No. 1.68-80

Milestones in the Psychological Analysis of Social Influence

William D. Crano
Claremont Graduate University

Social influence research has been, and remains, the defining hallmark of social
psychology. The history of this preoccupation is reviewed selectively, and important
contributions to social influence and persuasion are discussed. The central thesis of the
presentation is that a return to a consideration of the social group, a critical source of
identity and individuality, pays major dividends in understanding the processes of
social influence. Moscovici’s insistence on the importance of minority influence
processes is seen as a harbinger of the return of the group to social influence. Finally, the
leniency contract is proposed as a model that integrates these insights with important
features of social identity, the elaboration likelihood model, and considerations of
structural attitude theory in developing a predictive device that accounts for immediate
and persistent majority attitude change as well as indirect and delayed focal change
attributable to minority persuasion.

More than 100 years ago, Triplett (1898)
published a study whose effects remain evident,
even in today’s analyses of social influence
processes. In his experiment, Triplett demon-
strated that the mere presence of coacting
human beings could have a powerful impact on
people’s behaviors. He found that, when others
were present in the research context, partici-
pants worked harder and faster than when they
worked alone, and he attributed this productivity
enhancement to the fact that “the bodily
presence of another contestant participating
simultaneously in the race serves to liberate
latent energy not ordinarily available” (Triplett,
1898, p. 533). Zajonc’s (1965, 1980) view that
the mere presence of others operated as a
nonspecific, energizing stimulus helped make
sense of the phenomenon, and Baron’s (1986)
later work showed how conflict or distraction
produced by the copresent actors could produce
performance gains or losses. Although social
facilitation research continues to be pursued
(e.g., Aiello & Svec, 1993), the field today is

This research was supported in part by National Institute
on Drug Abuse Grant R01-DAI2578-0I, for which I am
most grateful.

I acknowledge the kindness of Rod Bond, who provided
me a prepublication draft of his meta-analytic work on group
size and conformity.

Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to William D. Crano, Department of Psychology,
Claremont Graduate University, 123 East 8th Street,
Claremont, California 91711. Electronic mail maybe sent to
wilHam.crano@cgu.edu.

more inclined to study the impact of actors who
take a more directive role in shaping beliefs and
actions in the interpersonal context. In this
review I trace some of the major developments
in directed social influence, from Sherif to
today’s studies of majority and minority influ-
ence. Along the way, 1 consider important
questions about the processes that might result
in different influence outcomes and suggest
possibilities that may foster understanding of
this fundamental activity. This review is not a
complete rendering of the literature, nor is it
intended to be. Rather, it highlights some of the
studies that have had an inordinate influence on
the directions the field has taken. Finally, the
review will trace the disappearance and reappear-
ance of the social group in social influence and
document the significance of this reemergence
for integrating developing theories.

The importance that social psychology at-
taches to directed social influence can be
inferred from the field’s continuing preoccupa-
tion with questions surrounding this issue, and
the preeminence of those who have labored on
their solution. Of the great names in social
psychology’s pantheon—-Allport, Asch, Camp-
bell, Festinger, Hovland, McGuire, Moscovici,
Jones, Kelley, and Sherif—all have devoted at
least a portion of their considerable talents to
developing a better comprehension of social
influence. Much of the early research under-
taken by this distinguished company of scholars
was devoted to two tasks: uncovering factors

SPECIAL ISSUE: SOCIAL INFLUENCE 69

that enhanced social influence, and developing
frameworks in which the interplay of these
factors could be understood and mapped onto
existing empirical data. I consider some of these
frameworks over the course of this review, but
before doing so it is reasonable first to consider
some of the early studies on influence that gave
rise to social psychology’s intense interest in the
first place.

S h e r i f s Autokinetic Research Series

Solomon Asch is typically acknowledged as
the father of social influence research, and there
can be little doubt that his impressive series of
reports in the 1950s called attention to the
intriguing and not easily explicable phenom-
enon of compliance. However, to ignore the
equally impressive studies conducted by Muza-
fer Sherif 20 years before Asch’s is to proceed in
extreme peril. Evidence of Sherifs creative
genius is well distributed throughout the litera-
ture of social psychology, but nowhere is it more
obvious than in his autokinetic illusion research
(Sherif, 1935, 1936). The illusion relies on a
pervasive perceptual shortcoming of human
beings. It requires only that a perceiver fixate on
a small pinpoint of light in an otherwise
completely dark room.1 After focusing on the
light for a short period of time, it appears to
move. Even experienced judges are not immune
to this compelling illusion. Sherif (1936) took
advantage of this well-established but poorly
understood human foible to study norm forma-
tion, a theme to which he would return and
augment in the classic Robbers Cave experiment
(Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).
In his initial autokinetic study, Sherif (1936)
required participants merely to estimate the
length of (illusory) movement of the light over a
series of judgment trials. The impressive over-
lap among participants’ judgment patterns laid
the foundation for all of his important work on
social influence. The first study revealed enor-
mous variation in judgments on early trials; but
as perceivers gained task experience, within-
participant oscillations abated. It was as if each
participant had arrived at a self-defined con-
sensus, which, once developed, guided later
judgments.

The across-trials damping of variation in
individual judgments suggested an interesting
possibility. If one could develop a consensus

around one’s own judgments, could not the same
process of consensus-based norm formation be
accelerated when responding in concert with
others? Triplett’s (1898) earlier work suggested
clearly that the implicitly and inadvertently
directive actions of coacting participants in an
autokinetic experiment would have profound
effects. To test this possibility, Sherif (1936)
paired naive respondents in a second autokinetic
judgment study. Over a series of autokinetic
trials, their assignment on each was to estimate
in tandem the movement of the light. Response
order was fixed, and no confederates were used.
Sherif found that the naive participants influ-
enced one another. The influence was attribut-
able to more than mere presence because each
participant’s response bore directly on that of his
or her partner. Attenuation of response variation
was rapid. Participants used one another as
models of reality and moved expeditiously to a
mutually acceptable judgmental accommoda-
tion over the course of their brief interaction.

A third study revealed that this accommoda-
tion was not undertaken in the service of
peaceful coexistence. Recall that each partici-
pant reported a distance estimate on each trial.
Conceivably, a person who actually “saw” the
light move 5 feet might be reluctant to report
this perception if his or her partner had reported
a mere 2 inches. To maintain a more harmonious
situation, the second respondent might report a
much-diminished light movement. The rapid
accommodation of paired participants’ re-
sponses then would be attributable to public
acquiescence (of the second responder in the pair)
rather than a rational weighting of perceptual
and socially supplied information.

To investigate this possibility, Sherif (1935)
conducted a third study, in which participants
who had responded with a given partner were
reassigned to new response groups. Sherif
believed participants formed response norms in
the first session. If so, then subsequently
switching participants into new groups should
have little effect. At least over the short term,
they would continue to respond as they had at
the end of the initial norm-formation session.
Conversely, if the (second-responding) partici-
pants had merely acquiesced to the implicit
demands of their response partners, if nothing

1 The impact of the illusion is enhanced if perceivers do
not know the true dimensions of the setting.

70 CRANO

other than simple accommodation were actually
represented in their behavior, then a similar
form of accommodation would be found in the
second session, when each responded in tandem
with a new partner. Such a pattern of acquies-
cent accommodation, however, was decidedly
absent in the second session of Sherif’s third
experiment. Participants maintained the re-
sponse norm they had formed on the initial
paired trials and remained resistant to the
information/implied influence provided (in the
form of a perceptual judgment) by their new
partners.

This series suggests strongly that the partici-
pants had learned something in the norm-
formation studies and that this learning had
affected either their verbal reports or their
eyesight. It is not possible to choose between
these two alternatives on the basis of the
research reported to this point, but a study
published nearly three decades after the initial
autokinetic studies provides grounds for interest-
ing speculation. In this experiment, Hood and
Sherif (1962) paired a naive participant with a
confederate in an autokinetic light-movement
estimation task. In the initial phase of the
experiment, the confederate made a series of
light movement judgments. The naive partici-
pant simply observed. These confederate-based
judgments were said by the authors to be either
consistently high or consistently low.2 After this
observational session, the naive participant
made an independent series of judgments after
the confederate had left the setting.

The results of this treatment are as important
as they are heuristic. The judgments of naive
participants studied in the condition in which the
confederate responded with high estimates were
significantly greater than those of participants
paired with a low-responding accomplice. Hood
and Sherif (1962) argued that their results
suggested that people pattern their responses so
as to be in accord with those of an influence
source, and when they do so they are not
necessarily responding to pressure. They argued
that interpersonal pressure is probably not a
reasonable term to use in describing the force of
an influence source in an unstructured situation.3

In their experiment, there was no obvious
pressure laid on respondents to adopt the
response norm of their partner. Indeed, by the
time the participant had begun to voice a
response to the apparent light movement, the

confederate had left the building. Sherif argued
that simple compliance cannot provide a reason-
able explanation of this result; there must be
more to the process than acquiescence. He
suggested an approach to understanding confor-
mity that relied on a more rational conception
of social action, a view of people as data-
dependent information processors who used the
responses of others in deciding on the proper
action or the proper judgment, especially in
unusual or novel contexts.4

Asch’s Line Judging Research

It is important to appreciate the historical
context of Hood and Sherif’s (1962) arguments
in defense of their presumption that participants
rationally used socially supplied inputs in
coming to a judgment of belief or appropriate
action. By this time, the conformity research of
Solomon Asch (1951, 1952, 1955, 1956) had
stimulated widespread attention. Asch’s findings
did not appear amenable to Sherif’s desire (or
Asch’s, for that matter; see Campbell, 1990) to
characterize humankind as rational information
processors, as he had argued years before. The
Asch line judgment research series is so well
established that its description is unnecessary;
however, for heuristic purposes, certain features
of this approach deserve emphasis. Recall that
Asch required participants to determine which
of three comparison lines matched a stimulus
line presented over a series of judgment trials.
When studied in isolation, participants’ judg-

2 How one can be sure that an illusory judgment was
perceived by the watching participant as high or low was not
explained compellingly, given the impossibility of knowing
the actor’s perception of an illusion, but even the most
critical reader can accept the fact that the estimates made in
the “high-responding confederate condition” were substan-
tially greater than those made in the low-responding
confederate treatment.

3 The term “unstructured situation” is used advisedly. By
il, Hood and Sherif (1962) implied that the judgment
processes of participants placed in contexts in which they
have little prior experience may be very different from those
exhibited in familiar, well-learned settings (see Gorenflo &
Crano, 1989, for a parallel discussion of the role of judgment
type on social comparison processes).

4 As Sherif and Hovland (1961) suggested in their classic
monograph, human actors were not seen as completely
rational. Biases bom of prior beliefs, especially highly
ego-involved beliefs, were expected to affect perceptions.

SPECIAL ISSUE: SOCIAL INFLUENCE 71

ments, for all practical purposes, were perfect.
The task was so simple, the correct answer so
inescapable, that no mistakes were made. As in
Sherif’s series, Asch’s initial study was a mere
preliminary. A perceptual, rather than social-
psychological, exercise was used to establish
unequivocally that the judgments required of
participants were so transparent that any devia-
tions from the obvious represented more than
mere misperception.

Such deviations, of course, are the stuff of
which Asch’s reputation is made. He found that
naive participants often made egregious errors
of judgment when responding in concert with
two or more trained confederates who had been
coached, unwaveringly, to give the wrong
answer on specified judgment trials. Two
important findings from Asch’s research deserve
comment: Confederates’ impact was evident
only when they were unanimous; further,
enlarging the size of the (unanimous) confeder-
ate majority beyond 3 had little effect. Appar-
ently, the compliance-inducing effect of the
unanimous peer group quickly reached asymp-
tote. Asch’s research suggested that 15 unani-
mous stooges were no more persuasive than 3
were.5

The failure to discover a group size effect
could not easily be made compatible with the
rationalist position of Sherif. Clearly, if 15
people reported a perception at odds with one’s
own, the combined weight of their views should
be greater than that of only 3 other perceivers, if
a rational weighting decision-making process
were occurring. That such findings did not
emerge appeared not to support to Sherif *s
views. Even worse, the simplicity of Asch’s
judgment task, the near-inevitability of a cor-
rect response under nonitifluenced conditions,
as was evident in the control participants’
near-perfect scores, rendered difficult an optimis-
tic, Rousseau-like view of the noble naive
perceiver. A more cynical interpretation ap-
peared justified, one in which perceivers were
viewed as easily swayed by the dictates of a
largely disinterested majority, who apparently
could affect even the most fundamental judg-
ments by mere surveillance and the implied
threat of disapproval. Milgram (1974, 1977)
expanded on this theme in a later and very
influential series of studies.

Early Attempts at Integration

The implications that might be drawn from
the pioneering work of Asch and Sherif
appeared very different, and the research that
followed did not provide an instant solution to
the apparent lack of fit between the two
significant series. Insko, Smith, Alicke, Wade,
and Taylor (1985) found that the size of the
apparent majority did have an impact on
judgments in a color-judging task. This result
was magnified when participants were led to
believe that a verifiable (right-wrong) decision
could be made. The issue of verinability is
important in that it might signal to participants
that their judgments may be adjudged valid or
invalid. If verifiability is at issue, there must be
some consensually agreed-on answer. This
probably is not the impression Asch’s respon-
dents had, if we give credence to the results of
his control group participants. Other research
also produced findings at odds with Asch’s
contention that absolute majority size was
irrelevant (e.g., Gerard, Wilhelmy, & Conolley,
1968; Kumar, 1983), and contemporary models
of social impact or social influence have
resolutely denied Asch’s contention while simul-
taneously attempting to come to grips with his
results (Latane & Wolfe, 1981; Tanford &
Penrod, 1984).

The field’s response to this variation in results
was well considered and persistent. Four years
before dissonance, Festinger (1953) published a
theoretical article that called for the recognition
of the differentiation between public compliance
and private acceptance. Three years later,
Deutsch and Gerard (1955) argued the distinc-
tion between normative and informational social
influence, and Kelman’s (1958) classic tripartite
distinction of compliance, identification, and
intemalization followed close on the heels of
this work. These approaches were all attempts to
make theoretical sense of the wide variations in
response to social influence that had been seen
in the literature and whose conceptual bound-
aries were defined by the findings of Asch and
Sherif.

5 This result should not be overinterpreted. Research
suggests that in persuasion settings involving more complex
issues or that admit to more varied persuasive arguments
than “Line B is the right match,” more sources result in
greater influence (e.g., Harkins & Petty, 1983, 1987).

72 CRANO

The difficulty with Festinger’s, Deutsch and
Gerard’s, and Kelman’s attempts at organization
and synthesis is that the explanatory mechanism
developed to answer the central question,
“Under which conditions will one process
(compliance vs. acceptance; informational vs.
normative influence; compliance, identification,
or internal!zation) occur?” were either ill
formed or incomplete. For all three models, the
answer to the question was usually couched in
terms of variations in source qualities. Source
expertise, competence, attractiveness, skill, abil-
ity, and the like, made for strong influence
effects, which often persisted. Brute force—
number, surveillance, strong social pressure—
also made for influence, but the effects did not
persist, nor did they follow a pattern that
suggested learning or cogent integration of
information.

The problem with all three of these explana-
tory devices is that the postulated source effects
sometimes are reversed; expert sources some-
times produce short-lived (or no) change, and
brute force effects sometimes persist. The
classic models have problems with such rever-
sals. Apotential explanation of this variability in
source effect seems to lie in the interaction of
source and task (which I take to include
variations in message strength). If the task is one
on which the correct answer is inescapable,
there would seem to be little possibility for
information-based influence, socially supplied
or otherwise. Such a task description character-
izes Asch’s line judgment paradigm, if we
believe his control group results. However, it is
not necessarily true of work undertaken on a
Crutchfield-type apparatus, a methodological
variant of Asch’s paradigm that sometimes
tellingly produced results quite at odds with
Asch’s usual result, often more in line with
the results of Sherif’s research (Crutchfield,
1955). The apparent difference between these
two approaches is that Crutchfield mechanized
Asch’s confederates. In most other critical
aspects, Asch’s and Crutchfield’s research con-
texts were identical. The less apparent but more
important difference is that, in mechanizing
Asch’s procedure, Crutchfield incidentally en-
larged the arena of judgments that could be, and
were, required of participants across various
research endeavors. Asch seemed more or less
stuck with a task in which the answers to all
questions were immediately obvious. That

participants sometimes gave the nonobvious
answer was the feature of his studies that made
the research noticeable. Imagine the lack of
interest his research would have generated had
the vast majority of Asch’s participants resisted
influence. Crutchfield’s apparatus was applied in
a much wider variety of judgment contexts.
Far from being constrained to obvious percep-
tual judgments reported under great social
pressure, Crutchfield’s device was used to test
participants’ responses on a host of issues,
ranging from perceptual judgments to answers
to obscure factual items.

The importance of this variation of contexts is
that the required judgments varied in terms of
the apparent inescapability of a valid answer.
Research suggests that the more difficult or
uncertain the judgment, the more likely are
informational social influence and private accep-
tance (e.g., Crano, 1970; Endler, 1965). With
issues of a more objective nature, in which
participants are more certain of the correct
answer, we find (short-term) normative influ-
ence but little, if any, evidence of informational
influence (see Gorenflo & Crano, 1989). The
perception of inevitability plays a role in the
process that will be activated. Considering the
interactive combination of source and context
materially enhances explanatory power.

Campbell’s Framework

This more interactive view suggests a new
way of conceptualizing the influence process.
Who better to systematize this insight than
Campbell (1961, 1963), who developed a gen-
eral framework based on fundamental psy-
chological and social-psychological principles
that could engage the most extreme forms of
acquiescent behavior, from compliance to con-
formity to identification to independence. Camp-
bell’s view acknowledged and made creative
use of long-established principles to produce
a framework that predicted new outcomes while
simultaneously mapping onto existing data. The
vision he presented in his general model of
social influence, proposed in an important set
of theoretical articles in 1961 and 1963,
extended conceptually well beyond the bound-
aries proposed in the theory of social compari-
son (Festinger, 1954). These articles speak for

SPECIAL ISSUE; SOCIAL INFLUENCE 73

themselves and need little expansion. In brief,
Campbell theorized that people differentially
use three broad classes of data when deciding on
a course of action: (a) history or prior experi-
ence, (b) contextual information directly per-
ceived, and (c) socially supplied information
about a person or context that people may or not
have directly experienced themselves. Combin-
ing these factors in an action- or decision-
making context can account for variations in
behavior ranging from complete compliance to
complete anticonformity (Brewer & Crano,
1994; Nail, 1986). Paradigmatically, most social
influence research negates the first source of
behavior-relevant information and assesses the
strength of the factors that affect the relative
weighting of the second and third sources (i.e.,
information directly perceived or socially sup-
plied by an external agent). This framework for
understanding provides a useful structure for
organizing the myriad factors that may impinge
on human social action (Crano, 1970). Camp-
bell’s view requires a departure from a main
effects orientation. By its very structure, it
demands that features of the source and context
be consulted in determining the probable
outcome of an attempt at social influence.

Persuasion and Message-Based
Attitude Change

One might have predicted that this multifacto-
rial framework for conceptualizing features that
affect social influence might have useful and
widespread application to a range of research
endeavors, especially those involved in the
study of people’s actions under pressure. How-
ever, a parallel development in social psychol-
ogy in some ways counteracted Campbell’s
insight, at least for a while. At the time of great
fomentation in social influence research, the
study of persuasion or attitude change also was
moving into high gear.6 Much of this work was
guided by Lasswell’s (1948) mantra, “Who says
what to whom, how, and under which circum-
stances?” a formula that was meant to capture
essential components for a comprehensive
theory of attitude change. Lasswell’s is a good
incantation, and it has served us well over the
past 50 years. However, it does admit to a
serious shortcoming because the interdependent
pieces of the formula can be studied perfectly
well in splendid isolation and, moreover, they

can be tested in circumstances that largely deny
the reality that social influence is often best
conceptualized as an interpersonal, rather than
as a solitary, intrapersonal phenomenon. Thus, if
we were not careful, (a) we might have
developed a literature on source credibility (the
“who” part of the prescription) that was devoid
of considerations of other parts of the formula
(the “what,” “whom,” “how,” and perhaps,
most importantly, the “under what circum-
stances”), (b) we might have attempted to
develop a psychology of susceptibility indepen-
dent of considerations of source or issue or
message or context, (c) we might have at-
tempted to forge an understanding of message
factors (the “what”) that was independent of the
“who” or “whom” and the context in which the
what was delivered, and (d) we might even have
developed a literature of social influence in
which the interaction of influence source, target,
message, and context was not considered a
relevant term in the change equation. In view of
Campbell’s framework and the events leading
up to its development, it is clear that these
attempts would have been ill-advised, but until
recently (with the advent of the dual-process
models of attitude change) they are largely what
we have been doing in persuasion research. This
is not to say that we have been treading water for
the past 40 years. Over this span, we have
identified many factors that positively affect
people’s tendency to weigh socially supplied
inputs relative to independent perceptions.
These factors have to do with the qualities of the
person or group that is laying on the influence,
the personal qualities of the individual receiving
the (socially supplied or directly experienced)
information, and the social-psychological con-
text (external and internal) in which the
information is conveyed or in which the critical
behavior is to take place.

We have learned, for example, that sources
that possess greater expertise, competence,
confidence, and other socially valued traits
typically induce greater influence than those that
do not. By the same token, we have learned that
target individuals who lack expertise, compe-
tence, and confidence or who in some other

6 Currently, persuasion and social influence processes are
viewed as guided by the same fundamental principles (see
Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996), but history suggests that
this view has not long been in the majority.

74 CRANO

ways perceive themselves to be subordinate or
inferior to an influence source will prove more
susceptible to the source’s (socially supplied)
information. We have learned that beliefs of
relatively little importance, or of low vested
interest, are easy to influence but have few
implications for behavior, whereas those that
have important personal consequences are
resistant but not impossible to change, and when
they do change, they are strongly directive of
action (Crano, 1995, 1997; Petty & Krosnick,
1995). In addition, we have learned that contexts
involving difficult or ambiguous judgments tend
to incite targets to overweigh socially supplied
information relative to their own direct percep-
tual inputs. Arrangements that anticipate these
empirical regularities are built into all contempo-
rary theoretical models of social influence.
Further, these models typically require us to
consider more than one variable at a time when
gauging the likelihood and extent of persuasion
or social influence. This more multi factored
view of the persuasion process has bled into our
considerations of social influence, conformity,
and compliance, although possibly not as
thoroughly as we might have hoped (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b; Wood, in press).

Moscovici’s Reconsideration

Obviously, we still have far to go in adopting
a more complex view of social influence, but on
the whole the movement of our conceptualizing
is in the right direction. Recent theoretical
treatments of social influence are considerably
more complex than their forebears, and the
complexity makes sense. They are grounded
on reasonable interpretations of regularities in
the literature, and they allow prediction of
complex variations in the data pattern that are
both common and reproducible. This general
movement toward a more multifactorial and
interactive conceptualization of social influence
and the processes that underlie it is a consistent
feature of contemporary theory and research
in social influence with one apparent and
important exception. That exception is seen in
the work of Moscovici, whose conflict-based
theory, along with the dual-process attitude
models, is largely responsible for the revitaliza-
tion of psychology’s interest in social influence.
Moscovici’s model focuses almost entirely on
source and target characteristics and devotes

little attention to contextual factors, no attention
to message effects, and even less to the inter-
action of these features of the influence context
(Moscovici, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1985a, 1985b;
Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Mos-
covici & Personnaz, 1980, 1991). This is not to
say that the model cannot be used. Its very
unidimensionality invites additions and modifi-
cations, and social influence researchers have
shown themselves ready to append interactive
features to the fundamental conflict theory that
both enrich its predictions and expand the realm
of phenomena to which it might apply. Bringing
to bear the insights born of the intersecting
histories of social influence and persuasion,
current models of majority and minority social
influence illustrate the best of integrative
science, the construction of new insights from
earlier regularities.

At its heart, Moscovici’s model is concerned
with factors that affect a minority group’s power
to influence the majority or, from the opposite
perspective, with the majority’s power to move
the minority. The model holds that majorities
and minorities instigate distinct belief-change
processes. Influence targets finding themselves
in disagreement with the majority are thought to
focus on the negative interpersonal ramifica-
tions of their deviance, which can include
ostracism and other sanctions. These negative
ramifications stimulate apparent movement in
the direction of the majority, but the movement
is primarily undertaken in the service of
avoiding censure. It is not based on a well-
considered elaboration and appreciation of the
logic of the source’s position. The majority
persuades because it possesses coercive power,
the capacity to monitor and to punish misbehav-
ior. Overt compliance, but not conversion or
private belief change, resolves source-target
conflict in such cases. Conversely, by virtue of
the unexpectedness of their position, minorities
stimulate targets to try to understand why they
hold a particular view. The outcome of a target’s
quest for understanding can result in minority-
based social influence. However, owing to a
hypothesized reluctance to be identified with the
minority, Moscovici’s theory assumes that
minority influence will be delayed or that it will
be seen on altitudes associated with, but not
identical to, the focus of persuasion (e.g., Perez
&Mugny, 1987, 1990).

By focusing on influence sources specifically

SPECIAL ISSUE: SOCIAL INFLUENCE 75

designated as being of majority and minority
status, Moscovici explicitly obligated research-
ers to include consideration of the social group
as an essential element to understanding social
influence. He was not primarily concerned with
the internal workings of the individuals under
persuasive stress, a common theme of much of
mainline social psychology, especially North
American social psychology. His emphasis
on the group exposed a shortcoming of the
excessively intraindividualistic orientation to
social influence that had come to characterize
much of the field (see Turner, 1991). To
appreciate the way in which Moscovici’s insight
opened the door for progress, consider the
prototypic minority influence study. In the
standard study, participants are exposed to a
persuasive communication that is contrary to
their established beliefs, attributed to a majority
or (typically, in-group) minority. Premeasures
sometimes are taken, and posttest measures on
the targeted or focal attitude are administered
immediately and sometimes after a delay of a
week or 2. Occasionally, associated beliefs are
assessed as well, and, infrequently, message
quality also is manipulated. When the source
represents the majority, Moscovici predicted
immediate change on the targeted (focal)
attitude, with little persistence and no diffusion
of effects to associated attitudes. Resistance is
the predicted response to persuasive messages
attributed to minority sources; however, change
on associated beliefs (sometimes termed indi-
rect change) is expected, as is delayed change
on the focal belief itself.

Leniency Contract

The problem with this set of predictions is
that it often falls short: Majority effects
sometimes persist, and minorities occasionally
produce indirect change without delayed focal
change. Moscovici’s theory was not sufficiently
developed to digest these rich findings, but
models that appeal to the combined literatures of
social influence, social identity, and interper-
sonal relations support provocative and poten-
tially critical insights. Let us consider one such
integration in which these considerations are
commingled in a theoretical model: the leniency

contract (Crano & Chen, 1998).7 The potential
utility of the leniency model is that it integrates
into a single predictive framework important
considerations derived from the social influence,
persuasion, and social identity traditions. As
such, it offers a means by which the rich insights
of the past 100 years may be opportunistically
drawn on in developing a model that is at once
inclusive and parsimonious.

The initial assumption of the leniency con-
tract is that the targets of persuasive attacks
consider the self-relevance of the issue under
debate before deciding on a course of response.
Relevance may be adjudged in terms of the
issue’s perceived vested interest (Crano, 1995,
1997; Crano & Alvaro, 1998; Sivacek & Crano,
1982) or the implications of compliance or
resistance for place maintenance in the social
group. The leniency model assumes that social
identity concerns (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner,
1986) become prominent as a consequence of
the mere specification of source as being of
majority or minority status. Unlike earlier
research on source credibility (e.g., Hovland,
Janis & Kelley, 1953), this particular character-
ization renders the context interpersonal and
relevant to considerations of the self. A majority
source is a representative of the modal opinion
on an issue in an assemblage of individuals that
the target uses as a consequential feature of his
or her self-definition. A source who is a numeric
minority on some subjectively important charac-
teristic (e.g., race, religion, ethnicity) or who
propounds a minority point of view is deviant,
or holds beliefs that are deviant, from the
majority of the reference or membership group.
As such, a description of an influence source as
being of majority or minority status is relational;
it suggests an association or connection between
target and group that is of some consequence for
the target. Depicting a source as of minority or
majority status not only describes features of a
source but also suggests a relationship with the

7 This is only one of a number of new models of social
influence that might have been considered. Models devel-
oped by De Dreu and De Vries (1996) and Mugny’s research
group (e.g., Mugny, Burera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Perez, 1995;
P^rez & Mugny, 1996) might have been profiled just as
profitably, but the pull of paternity is strong, and the leniency
model makes explicit reference to persuasion-based factors
as well as those whose effects usually are examined in the
social influence laboratory and thus facilitates my theoretical
point better than the others.

76 CRANO

target vis-a-vis the group on an issue or
characteristics of potential importance. If this
were not the case, the source and target
classification of majority or minority could not
be expected to have much impact. Such a
characterization would serve as a heuristic
rather than as a systematic cue (see Bohner,
Frank, & Erb, 1998; Chaiken, 1987; De Dreu &
De Vries, 1993, 1996; Erb, Bohner, Schmalzle,
& Rank, 1998). In the leniency model, majority/
minority source characterization may induce
systematic as well as heuristic processing.

A counterattitudinal communication from the
in-group thus presents a relational threat that
may jeopardize the target’s relationship with a
potential source of self-identity. A threat of this
nature is ignored at great peril. Reactions to such
threats can take many forms, but at a minimum
we would expect the target to consider the
issue that is the source of contention with the
identity-endowing source. The leniency contract
suggests that reactions to a message will vary as
a function of features of both the source and its
position relative to the well-being of the group
(Alvaro & Crano, 1996, 1997; Crano, 1994;
Crano & Chen, 1998; Crano & Hannula-Bral,
1994). If the issue under discussion is not one on
which the majority is seen as having a legitimate
position—one on which it has no legitimate
voice—its impact will be greatly attenuated.
Group pressure will be adjudged inappropriate,
and the group will lose stature. If the issue is
relevant to the group, as, for example, a con-
sideration of comprehensive examinations or
tuition would be for a group of students of the
same university, the majority is seen as having a
legitimate voice (Baker & Petty, 1994; Mackie,
1987). In this circumstance, its message will be
considered carefully. If the message is weak and
unpersuasive, the model suggests the majority
might have an impact, but it will be short lived.
If the message is strongly argued, however, it
may have both immediate and long-term effects.
Considerable research supports these proposi-
tions (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994; Crano & Chen,
1998; De Dreu & De Vries, 1993,1996; Mackie,
1987). Thus, depending on the relevance and
strength of its message, a majority may have no
effect, a short-lived result, or a lasting impact.
This complex predictive pattern is not a feature
of any other theory of majority influence, but it
is completely consistent with the theoretical
expectations derived from the leniency contract.

As is shown, this model also provides a
theoretical explication of minority influence that
accounts for both the delayed focal change and
the (immediate) indirect change effects that the
meta-analysis of Wood and her colleagues found
associated with minority sources (Wood,
Lundgren, Oueilette, Busceme, & Blackstone,
1994).

In the case of minority-based persuasion, the
leniency contract assumes that uneasiness or
perceptions of threat do not arise in targets that
find themselves at odds with the counterattitudi-
nal pronouncements of an in-group minority,
unless the minority threatens the very essence of
the group, the group’s raison d’etre. In that case,
the in-group becomes out-group and is marginal-
ized, ostracized, or ignored. In cases in which
the in-group minority’s position does not
threaten the continued existence of the group,
however, the leniency model holds that the
minority will receive courteous and polite
treatment from the majority. Owing to concerns
with group solidarity, maintenance, cohesion,
and stability, in-group minorities are not dero-
gated for holding the position that creates their
minority status in the first place. On these issues
of less critical moment, the minority’s message
is elaborated with little counterargument and
little source derogation. From considerable
research on persuasion, we know that an ideal
formula for change involves the active elabora-
tion of a strong message coupled with little
counterargumentation and no (or minor) source
derogation. This is precisely the formula sug-
gested by the leniency contract in detailing the
majority’s presumed reaction to in-group devi-
ants, at least when the critical issue is not central
to the viability of the group. Such open-minded
and poorly defended elaboration would be
expected to result in continuous oscillation of
the majority’s position and continual instability
in the group’s beliefs. Yet we know from
considerable research that the majority position
often is quite persistent and resistant to change.
How, then, can the theoretical claims of the
leniency model be sustained? How, in this
system, can the group maintain its integrity and
defend the status quo, operations that Moscovici
claimed are central to the majority?

To respond to this legitimate issue, we must
consider one additional feature of the leniency
contract. As with all contracts, the leniency
contract specifies a quid pro quo. In recompense

SPECIAL ISSUE; SOCIAL INFLUENCE 77

for the open-minded elaboration of the minori-
ty’s appeal and the non-derogatory treatment
that is provided, the model posits a cost. That
cost is paid in terms of an implicit understanding
that no change will ensue from the persuasive
interchange. This implicit agreement is a pivotal
theoretical feature of the model. It allows for the
maintenance of the majority’s core beliefs while
assuaging or, at a minimum, not alienating a
significant factor in the group, the in-group
minority. The model provides an ecologically
appurtenant prescription for group survival. It
allows for considerable attitudinal variation
within groups on all issues except those that put
the viability of the group into jeopardy. Re-
search on intragroup relations suggests that such
apparent beneficence is a common feature of
cohesive groups. The leniency model thus
provides the means for the group to tolerate
some degree of freedom of expression while
simultaneously protecting and maintaining the
status quo. At least on the surface, such a
complex process would appear to offer the best
of all possible worlds, except for those indi-
vidual group members who, as minority voices,
are truly intent on influencing the character of
the majority.

All is not lost for the minority, however.
Although the contractual feature of the leniency
model appears to account for stability in
established groups, it also offers the means by
which the minority can move the majority. The
mutually agreed-on understanding that majority
group members will not change as a result of an
open-minded elaboration of the minority’s
position does not negate the fact that strong
change pressures have been introduced as a
function of the manner in which the minority’s
message is elaborated. How is this pressure
diffused? The leniency model suggests that, by
spreading activation, beliefs in close cognitive
contiguity to the targeted issue are put at risk as
a consequence of the majority’s leniency
(Anderson, 1983), because, although targeted
(focal) beliefs are strongly defended in this
system, related beliefs are not. The change
pressure experienced as a result of the hypoth-
esized lenient responses to minority influence is
diffused to these related beliefs, which, unde-
fended, are easy prey for attitude change
pressures. This process suggests a means by
which indirect attitude change, a relatively
consistent feature of minority influence (see

Wood et al., 1994), comes about. The model also
suggests a mechanism for delayed focal change,
another consistent feature of the literature.

The leniency model’s account of indirect
attitude change requires acceptance of the
possibility that attitudes are not held in isolation
but rather are related to a greater or lesser extent
to all other beliefs that constitute the cognitive
system. The model assumes that the greater the
cognitive contiguity, the greater is the possibil-
ity for indirect change, and research supports
this expectation (e.g., Alvaro & Crano, 1997;
Crano & Chen, 1998). This structural account
of indirect change also provides a means of
understanding delayed focal change. If an atti-
tude is changed, then those that are (or were)
contiguous in cognitive space will be put under
pressure to change as well, if attitudes are linked
in some form of structure, as proposed. Thus, if
indirect attitude change occurs in circumstances
compatible with those described by the leniency
contract, we would expect delayed focal change
if the attitude altered by indirect attitude change
processes was sufficiently moved to affect the
equilibrium of the overall structure of beliefs. In
other words, when a minority source induces
major indirect attitude change, we would expect
subsequent (delayed) change on the focal issue,
especially if the indirect change were a conse-
quence of a strongly argued focal message. This
is precisely the result discovered by Crano and
Chen (1998). The leniency model, then, can
account for both indirect, minority-induced
attitude change and delayed focal change. It
provides a theoretically plausible account of the
manner in which minorities and majorities
persuade while simultaneously supplying a
reasonable method of accounting for prior
results in minority/majority influence. Perhaps
most importantly, the leniency contract is in
close accord with a changing emphasis in the
field of social influence, a return to earlier days
when the centrality of the social group in
influence was widely acknowledged.

Over the years, social influence had departed
from its roots as an interpersonal process. The
integration of considerations of group identity,
intergroup process, persuasion, belief structure,
and message elaboration, central building blocks
of the leniency contract, all combine to move
our consideration of social influence back to its
heritage. Although the model clearly makes use
of recent results in social cognition, the leniency

78 CRANO

contract also acknowledges—indeed is depen-
dent on—intergroup processes to provide a
better and more precise account of the ways in
which majorities and minorities persuade.

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Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. T. (1986). The social identity
theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W.
Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations
(pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tanford, S., & Penrod, S. (1984). Social influence
model: A formal integration of research on majority
and minority influence. Psychological Bulletin, 95,
189-225.

Triplett, N. (1898). The dynamogenic factors in
pacemaking and competition. American Journal of
Psychology, 9, 507-533.

Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Milton Keynes,
England: Open University Press.

Wood, W. (in press). Attitude change: Persuasion and
social influence. Annual Review of Psychology.

Wood, W., Lundgren, S., Ouellette, J. A., Busceme,
S., & Blackstone, T. (1994). Minority influence: A
meta-analytic review of social influence processes.
Psychological Bulletin, 115, 323-345.

Zajonc, R. B. (1965). Social facilitation. Science, 149,
269-274.

Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Comprescence. In P. B. Paulus
(Ed.), Psychology of group influence (pp. 35-60).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

EXAMPLES OF NORM VIOLATIONS

PUBLIC BEHAVIOR

� WALK ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE SIDEWALK

� HAVE A ANIMATED CONVERSATION WITH YOURSELF IN PUBLIC

� LOOK UP ALL THE TIME

� SAY HELLO TO EVERYONE

� WHEN PEOPLE ASK YOU HOW YOU ARE DOING, TELL THEM ABOUT YOUR WHOLE DAY

� WEAR YOUR CLOTHES BACKWARDS

� DON�T TAKE YOUR HAT, COAT, & GLOVES OFF, EVEN INSIDE.

� VIOLATE PEOPLES PERSONAL SPACE

� WHISPER TO WHEN YOU TALK

� YELL WHEN YOU TALK

� ASK STRANGERS IF YOU CAN CUT IN LINE. IF THEY ASK WHY YOU NEED TO, THEN SAY
YOU DON�T REALLY FEEL LIKE WAITING FOR VERY LONG.

� AT YOUR PARENTS

HOME

ASK FOR PERMISSION TO DO EVERYTHING (GET A DRINK, USE
THE BATHROOM, WATCH TV, ETC)

BATHROOMS

� DON�T FLUSH WHEN YOU ARE DONE

� TALK TO OTHERS WHILE THEY ARE BUSY

� TALK TO SOMEONE IN ANOTHER STALL

� ASK FOR THEIR TOILET PAPER

ELEVATORS

� TALK TO STRANGERS

� FACE THE BACK OF THE ELEVATOR

� PUSH THE BUTTONS FOR FLOORS YOUR NOT GOING TO

NEVER GET OFF

� SAY YOU WILL “WAITE FOR THE NEXT ONE” WHEN ONLY ONE PERSON IS ON IT

� GO ELEVATOR SURFING

� STAND RIGHT BY SOMEONE EVEN WHEN YOU ARE THE ONLY 2 PEOPLE IN THE ELEVATOR

CLASSROOM

� SIT IN OTHER PEOPLE�S CHAIRS EVERY DAY

� MAKE CONSTANT EYE CONTACT WITH THE INSTRUCTOR

� NEVER MAKE EYE CONTACT WITH THE INSTRUCTOR / NEVER BREAK EYE CONTACT WITH
THE INSTRUCTOR

� TALK AND THEN RAISE YOUR HAND

� SIT ON THE FRONT ROW AND PICK YOUR NOSE

� NEVER BRING A BOOK, PENCIL, OR PAPER

� READ A NOVEL DURING CLASS

DINNING

� EAT SOUP WITH A FORK

� EAT DESERT FIRST

� EAT STEAK WITH A KNIFE AND SPOON

� EAT WITH YOUR HANDS

� EAT OFF OTHER PEOPLE�S PLATES

� USE OVERLY FORMAL EATING ETIQUETTE WHEN EATING WITH FRIENDS OR FAMILY

� BE RUDE TO THE WAITER AND THEN APOLOGIZE AND THEN BE RUDE AGAIN

� BRING YOUR OWN CHEESE AND ASK THEM TO PUT IT ON YOUR HAMBURGER.

� WALK THROUGH THE DRIVE THROUGH

� DRIVE BACKWARDS THROUGH THE DRIVE THROUGH

� ORDER FOOD THAT IS NOT ON THE MENU

� ASK FOR SUBSTITUTIONS EVEN WHEN IT SAYS “NO SUBSTITUTIONS”

PHONE

� SAY GOODBYE WHEN YOU ANSWER THE PHONE

� SAY HELLO WHEN YOU HANG UP

� SAY “I LOVE YOU” WHEN ENDING A CONVERSATION EVEN WITH FRIENDS AND STRANGERS

� REFUSE TO TAKE A MESSAGE

� ANSWER THE PHONE AND WAIT FOR THE OTHER PERSON TO SPEAK FIRST.

� DON�T ATTEMPT TO FILL IN, UNCOMFORTABLE PAUSES IN CONVERSATIONS

� PRETEND YOU ARE AN ANSWERING MACHINE

� WHEN PEOPLE CALL WITH WRONG NUMBER TELL THEM THAT THE PERSON THEY ARE
LOOKING FOR WAS ARRESTED, THAT YOU�RE A COP, AND YOU HAVE SOME QUESTIONS YOU
WOULD LIKE TO ASK

� ASK TELE- MARKETERS IF YOU CAN CALL THEM BACK

[HOME]

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Chapter 8

Conformity and Obedience

8.1

Conformity

Norms

Norma�ve and Informa�onal Influence

Minority Influence

8.2 Obedience to Authority

8.3

Leadership

Chapter Summary

Jupiterimages/Thinkstock

Learning Objec�ves

A�er reading this chapter, you should be able to:

Explain Solomon Asch’s study of conformity

Differen�ate injunc�ve norms from descrip�ve norms and norma�ve influence from
informa�onal influence

Describe how conformity may result in either acceptance or compliance

Explain the power of minori�es

Describe Milgram’s study of obedience and the factors that make obedience more or less likely to occur

Explain factors that predict disobedience

Describe the ethical issues with Milgram’s study and Milgram’s response to those concerns

Define leadership and differen�ate the three main types of leadership

Define implicit leadership theories

Chapter Outline

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What Predicts Obedience?

Disobedience

Ethics of Obedience Research

* * *

In 1956, Jim Jones, an untrained but charisma�c pastor, started the “People’s Temple,” a racially integrated, socially minded church in Indiana. Ten
years later, he and his congrega�on moved to California and grew in size and power. Here, pressures toward conformity helped align individuals’
behavior with group expecta�ons. Jones used social influence in services to punish members for undesirable behavior, bringing members up during
gatherings and publicly shaming them for their ac�ons. Church members were expected to obey Jones’ edicts without ques�on. Feeling persecuted
for the good work he was doing Jones moved his en�re church to Guyana, in South America, to a se�lement he named Jonestown. He dreamed of
crea�ng a utopian community, where young and old were treated with dignity and respect and the color of one’s skin did not ma�er. But Jones
became increasingly paranoid and controlling. Members worked long days, o�en listening to Jones speak over the loudspeaker, and were not
allowed to leave. Concerned families back home asked U.S. Representa�ve Leo Ryan to check out the situa�on.

In November 1978, Ryan, some of his staff, and a news crew traveled to Guyana to meet with Jones and members of the People’s Temple. Some of
the Jonestown residents decided to leave with the congressman and as they waited for the planes to be readied other members of Jonestown
a�acked the group, killing the congressman and several others. Fearing retalia�on Jones asked his followers to commit suicide in what he called a
revolu�onary act. They mixed up vats of flavored drink laced with cyanide and gave it to the children first, then the adults. Those who refused were
encouraged by guards with guns. In the end, 918 people died, either in the a�ack at the airport or in the mass suicide. Jones died of a gunshot to
the head (Hall, 1987). The People’s Temple relied on pressure from the group and obedience to authority to do its work and to grow. The story of
Jonestown is a drama�c example of the power of conformity and obedience, forces we will explore in greater depth in this chapter.

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Figure 8.1: Visual percep�on test

Asch used this visual percep�on test. Par�cipants
were asked which comparison line was the same
length as the standard line. The par�cipants were
unknowingly mixed with confederates. The
confederates purposefully agreed on the wrong
answer. Asch measured how many par�cipants
agreed with the confederates (even though they
were wrong) and how many did not.
From Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scien�fic
American, 193, 31–35. doi: 10.1038/scien�ficamerican1155-31

Figure 8.2: Par�cipant conformity rates
with confederate(s)

8.1 Conformity
You have been invited to be a par�cipant in a research study. When you show up, you find that seven other par�cipants have already arrived. All of you are
seated around a table and are asked to be part of a study that, at least by appearances, is inves�ga�ng visual percep�on. You are shown a line, called the
s�mulus line, and are asked which of three other lines the s�mulus line matches. This looks to be a simple task; you expect to be a li�le bored. For the first
couple of rounds, the study goes as expected, with each person around the table choosing the line that obviously matches the s�mulus line. Then something odd
happens. The first person chooses the wrong line. You are surprised; the line the person chooses is obviously not the right one. You wait for the second person
to choose the right line. But the second person agrees with the first person. The third and fourth also agree. The fi�h person chooses the same wrong line and
then the sixth. Finally, it is your turn. You need to decide whether to go along with the group, a group that is unanimous, or trust your eyes and choose what
you perceive is the right line. What do you do?

This scenario was experienced by par�cipants in Solomon Asch’s (1958) study of conformity. Conformity can be
defined as going along with a group’s ac�ons or beliefs. The study was designed to pit individuals against a
unanimous group to see whether people would go along with the group or s�ck with what their senses were
telling them was right. In this study, one third of judgments made by par�cipants went along with the majority
opinion. Looking at how likely individual par�cipants were to conform, Asch found that one quarter of all
par�cipants never went along with the majority. On the other side, one third of par�cipants conformed 50% of
the �me or more. The rest of the par�cipants showed at least occasional conformity. Altogether, three quarters
of par�cipants conformed to the group judgment at least once. See Figures 8.1 and 8.2 for more on the specific
test Asch used and the results.

Par�cipants who did not go along with the group were not unaffected by the fact that their judgments were
going against the group. Some seemed confused or hesitant in their answers, but persevered anyway. Even those
who were more certain of their judgments were chagrined at their own deviance. Of those who went along with
the group, some thought that the answers they and the group were giving were wrong, but nevertheless went
along with the group. Others came to believe that the group was right.

Asch followed up his original study with a few varia�ons. When he varied the size of the group, he found that a
unanimous group of one or two others was not as persuasive as three, but there were only minimal gains a�er
adding the third person. He also had a varia�on in which another person in the group gave an accurate
judgment. The presence of another person who went against the group and gave the right answer decreased
conformity. Even when it goes against the majority opinion, having one other person around who agrees with us
gives us more confidence to express what we believe is right.

Conformity occurs in all cultures, although rates may be slightly different. In independent cultures, we generally
find less conformity than in interdependent cultures (Bond & Smith, 1996). One caveat to this is the rates of
conformity in Japan. In a study using a similar conformity task to Asch’s, rates of conformity were lower in Japan
than in the United States, a surprising finding given that Japanese culture is more interdependent than U.S.
culture (Frager, 1970). Later researchers found that in Japan, when the group was made up of friends,
conformity was much higher (Williams & Sogon, 1984). It seems that in an interdependent culture, people
conform more to the ingroup but less to the outgroup. Conformity has declined slightly since Asch did his study
in the early 1950s, perhaps because of a cultural shi� increasingly emphasizing individuality and the ques�oning
of authority (Bond & Smith, 1996).

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When par�cipants were grouped with a single
confederate in Asch’s study, they were generally as
accurate as if they had been alone. When they were
grouped with four confederates, they agreed with the
incorrect confederates more than 30% of the �me.
Adapted from Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure.
Scien�fic American, 193, 31–35. doi: 10.1038/scien�ficamerican1155-
31

Both injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms can influence
our behavior.

Norms

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

What is an example of an injunc�ve norm and a
descrip�ve norm?

Which type of norm do you think influences your
behavior more?

If recycling is a norm in your neighborhood, you might be more likely to recycle.

Test Yourself

Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

Did all of the par�cipants in Asch’s study go along with the group?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

No. About a quarter of the par�cipants never went along with the group. The rest conformed at least once.

What effect did the presence of someone else who went against the group have on the par�cipants in Asch’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

When there was another person who did not conform, conformity of the par�cipant declined as well.

Norms

Even though most of us do not find ourselves in a room with a group of people answering targeted ques�ons, we can s�ll develop ideas based on what the
collec�ve group is thinking or doing. For example, you might believe that the majority of people brush their teeth at least twice a day, and that most people are
against removing educa�onal services for children with disabili�es. These beliefs about what the group is thinking or doing are called norms.

Two types of norms may influence our behavior. Norms for what is approved or disapproved of are
called injunc�ve norms. Norms describing what most people do are descrip�ve norms (Cialdini,
Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Some�mes these two types of norms are in conflict; for example, a high
school student may believe that the majority of people are not in favor of underage drinking
(injunc�ve norm) but may also believe that the majority of teens engage in underage drinking
(descrip�ve norm). O�en the injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms are similar. Most people agree that we
should not steal from one another (injunc�ve norm) and that most people do not steal (descrip�ve
norm). We can also be wrong about one or both of these norms. The high school student may be
right that most people disapprove of underage drinking but wrong that most students engage in it
(Borsari & Carey, 2003).

One place we get informa�on about norms is the environment itself. For example, if you are in a
public place and see trash all around, the descrip�ve norm the environment is providing is that

everyone li�ers. This may lead you to li�er as well (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990). If the injunc�ve norm against li�ering were more prominent, for example, if
there were signs asking you not to li�er and easily accessible trash cans were available, you may not li�er (Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993).
Norms that come from the environment will differ from place to place and culture to culture.

Telling people about descrip�ve norms can be helpful in encouraging posi�ve
behaviors. In a study of energy consump�on, households that used more than the
average amount of energy reduced energy consump�on when informed of the
descrip�ve norm. However, households that were below the average for energy
consump�on actually increased consump�on when told about the descrip�ve norm,
crea�ng a boomerang effect. This can be moderated by including the injunc�ve norm
along with the descrip�ve norm. Households that were told they were lower than
average in energy consump�on (told of the descrip�ve norm) and then praised for
their conserva�on (indica�ng an injunc�ve norm) maintained their low rate of energy
consump�on (Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). An adver�sing
campaign in Montana that targeted drinking and driving among 21-to-34-year-olds
used informa�on about social norms to encourage this age group to reduce drinking
and driving, and encourage the use designated drivers (Perkins, Linkenbach, Lewis, &
Neighbors, 2010).

General descrip�ve norms about posi�ve behaviors are helpful for encouraging those
behaviors, but more specific norms are even more helpful. If you have stayed in a
hotel recently, you have probably seen a sign about towel reuse. The hotel will replace your towel but, if you want to save water and electricity, you can choose
to reuse your towel. Does it ma�er if you know what others do in this situa�on? When told that the majority of other guests in the hotel reuse their towels,

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guests were more likely to reuse their towels. But this can be strengthened with greater specificity. When told that 75% of people who stayed in their specific
room (e.g., Room 201) reused their towels, guests were more likely to reuse their towels than if they were told 75% of people staying in the hotel reused their
towels (Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 2008). Greater specificity of a norm leads to greater conformity to that norm.

Social Psychology in Depth: Drinking Norms

Drinking on college campuses is an epidemic. Nearly 80% of college students report drinking. Despite a minimum legal drinking age in the United
States of 21, almost 60% of students aged 18 to 20 report drinking. Much of this drinking is binge drinking, which involves consuming at least
four drinks (for women) or five drinks (for men) in a 2-hour period. More than 40% of college students report binge drinking at least once in a 2-
week period (Na�onal Ins�tute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2011). In addi�on to alcohol poisoning, such behavior contributes to injuries,
assaults, unsafe sex and sexual assault, academic problems, and vandalism (Centers for Disease Control and Preven�on, 2010; Na�onal Ins�tute
on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2011).

Alcohol use for college students depends, in part, on perceived injunc�ve and descrip�ve norms (Park, Klein, Smith, & Martell, 2009). Approval of
drinking is an injunc�ve norm; the percep�on of how much drinking is being done is a descrip�ve norm. Not all norms are created equal.
Researchers have found that people closer to a student are more likely to influence that student’s behavior. Perceived approval for drinking
(injunc�ve norm) by close friends and parents is more important than the approval for drinking of typical students, even same-sex students (Lee,
Geisner, Lewis, Neighbors, & Larimer, 2007; Neighbors et al., 2008). Similarly, students’ beliefs about how much their friends drink has more of
an impact than the perceived behaviors of others (Cho, 2006; Lee et al., 2007). Descrip�ve norms seen on social media (Facebook) predicted
alcohol-related thinking pa�erns that are related to alcohol use (Li� & Stock, 2011). In other words, believing that others in one’s social network
are drinking makes you more willing to drink, have more posi�ve a�tudes toward drinking, and perceive your own use of alcohol as more likely.

Norms involve what we believe others approve of or are doing, but beliefs are not always accurate. In the case of norms about drinking, U.S. and
Canadian students overes�mate the quan�ty and frequency of drinking by other students. Along with this, personal alcohol use is more
influenced by the inaccurate norm than by the real norm for drinking on campus (Perkins, 2007; Perkins, Haines, & Rice, 2005).

Does correc�ng these mispercep�ons reduce drinking? Overall, yes. At schools where the perceived norm is more in line with the lower actual
norm, there is less problema�c drinking (Perkins et al., 2005). Campaigns to change social norms tend to change perceived norms and bring
down problema�c drinking behaviors (Perkins et al., 2010). For binge drinkers, the descrip�ve norms for friends influence behavior more than
descrip�ve campus norms or injunc�ve norms. People who were not binge drinkers were more influenced by campus descrip�ve norms (Cho,
2006). Unfortunately, interven�ons with those most at risk, high binge drinkers, can backfire if students perceive the messages as restric�ng their
freedom to do as they like (Jung, Shim, & Mantaro, 2010).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

When a friend tells you everyone is doing it so you should too, that friend is talking about what kind of norm?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Descrip�ve norm. Descrip�ve norms are norms that describe what most people are doing.

What is the difference between an injunc�ve and a descrip�ve norm?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Injunc�ve norms focus on what people think you should do–what is approved of, while descrip�ve norms focus on what most people are
actually doing.

Norma�ve and Informa�onal Influence

Why do we conform? Conformity may occur because we believe that a group has some knowledge we do not. Imagine yourself at the zoo. You walk up to the
lion enclosure and no�ce there are a lot of people standing over on the right side, and no one is on the le�. If you want to see the lion, where do you go? Your
best bet is to the right, where all the people are. It’s likely that no one is on the le� because the lion not there. The crowd knows something you do not–where
the lion is–and so by following the crowd you are more likely to see the lion. When we conform because we believe the crowd knows something, we are
experiencing informa�onal influence (Castelli, Vanze�o, Sherman, & Luciano, 2001). Conformity may also occur because we want to be liked and accepted by the
group. In high school, you might have worn a certain style of clothing or acted in a par�cular way not because you believed it was the right thing to do but
because you wanted to be liked and accepted. When we conform because we want to be liked and accepted by others, we are experiencing norma�ve influence
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).

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iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Informa�onal influence might compel you to join a crowd of onlookers—these
people may know something you don’t.

These different forms of influence can lead to different types of persuasion. If you
believed the group knew informa�on, you would likely act as the group does, as well
as come to believe as the group does. If you were in a theater and suddenly everyone
started running for the exits yelling “Fire!,” you may follow the crowd, truly believing
there is a fire somewhere, even if you have not seen any evidence of it. When we
both behave and believe as the group does we have experienced acceptance of the
social norm. We more o�en find acceptance in the case of informa�onal influence. On
the other hand, if you were in that theater following everyone as they rushed toward
the exits but you did not believe there was a fire, you would be ac�ng in a way that
goes along with the group norms while privately disagreeing. Such ac�on without
belief is called compliance. We find more compliance in the case of norma�ve
influence. In the case of the tragedy at Jonestown it seems both of these were at
work. Based on recordings made during the mass suicide in Jonestown it appears
many of Jim Jones’ followers truly believed in him and in his dire predic�ons, readily
and willingly drinking the poisoned beverage. These people accepted the social norm.
Others seem to have drunk the cyanide while not truly believing that such an act was
necessary (Federal Bureau of Inves�ga�on, 1978).

Adver�sers use conformity to their advantage. By telling us how many people switched their car insurance, an insurance company is sugges�ng that these other
people know something we do not. If everyone else discovered cheaper insurance, perhaps we should join them and switch too; informa�onal influence is at
work. Another adver�ser might show us a lot of happy people wearing a par�cular brand of jeans, sugges�ng that if we want to fit in we should buy and wear
these jeans. When we buy what others do to be liked or accepted, we are conforming due to norma�ve influence. There are �mes when we are more
suscep�ble to conformity pressures. For example, individuals are more likely to go along with the crowd when they are in a good mood (Tong, Tan, Latheef,
Selamat, & Tan, 2008) and are more involved with the topic at hand (Huang & Min, 2007). Norma�ve influence can help self-managed teams in businesses to
manage themselves. Team members who feel they belong and are commi�ed to the team can show greater produc�vity (Stewart, Courtright, & Barrick, 2012).

Test Yourself

Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How are acceptance and compliance related to norma�ve and informa�onal influence?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

When we conform because of informa�onal influence we are more likely to show acceptance, not just compliance. Compliance is more
likely with norma�ve influence because we are going along with the crowd to be accepted, but not necessarily because we believe the
crowd is right.

Minority Influence

So far, this chapter has discussed the ways in which norms can have a powerful influence on the individual, causing them to go along with what everyone else is
doing. But individuals are not powerless. When an individual goes against the majority, that ac�on can influence the majority. In the 1957 film 12 Angry Men,
one juror persuades the other 11 jurors to his side of thinking. While, at the beginning of the film, he is the only one who believes in the innocence of the
accused, by the end they all believe the young man accused of the crime is not guilty. The majority is more likely to find a minority viewpoint persuasive if the
minority viewpoint is dis�nct and the posi�on is held consistently. When a minority holds one point of difference from the group but agrees with the majority on
other points, this creates dis�nc�veness. If a friend shares your beliefs concerning school reform except for the use of student achievement for teacher
evalua�on, you might be more willing to entertain that friend’s perspec�ve and poten�ally be convinced by his arguments (Bohner, Frank, & Erb, 1998).
Consistently held posi�ons are also more persuasive. If your friend waivered in his beliefs about teacher evalua�ons, you would be less willing to hear his
arguments (Moscovici & Lage, 1976). Minori�es can also become more persuasive when there are defec�ons from the minority. If your friend were to convince
someone who used to agree with you to now agree with his line of thinking, you would be more likely to also change your opinion (Clark, 2001).

Whether or not minori�es actually lead the majority to change beliefs, minori�es do create greater crea�vity and complexity in the thinking of the majority
(Legrenzi, Butera, Mugny, & Perez, 1991; Nemeth, Mayseless, Sherman, & Brown, 1990). The alterna�ve perspec�ve of the minority causes the majority to
consider other viewpoints and approaches to an issue. The minority viewpoint allows them to think about their ideas from other angles they may not have
accounted for before. When minori�es do change the opinion of the majority, that changed belief tends to be more stable and more resistant to future change
(Mar�n, Hewstone, & Mar�n, 2008). In this way, minori�es perform a service for the majority, even if they do not convince anyone in the majority to their way
of thinking.

Having a group move from agreeing with you on an issue to disagreeing with you is an unse�ling experience. Individuals who began in the majority and maintain
their opinion as the rest of the group joins the minority opinion tend to have hos�le feelings toward the group. On the other hand, those who began in the
minority and have a group adopt their opinion tend to like the group more and expect posi�ve interac�ons with the group in the future (Prislin, Limbert, &
Bauer, 2000). Being in the minority is an uncomfortable experience that can improve if others come to see things as we do.

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Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

When are minori�es more persuasive? In other words, what quali�es in the minority make it more likely to persuade the majority to
change?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Minori�es who offer a dis�nc�ve viewpoint, are consistent in their viewpoint, and gain defec�ons from the majority are most persuasive.

Without convincing members of the majority to their side do minori�es do anything to or for the majority by holding a minority view?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Minori�es create more crea�vity and complexity in the majority, even when the majority does not change its viewpoint.

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The impact of Stanley Milgram’s experiment.

Stanley Milgram

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

What mo�vated Stanley Milgram’s famous
experiment?

What is a contemporary example of how authority
influences behavior?

iStockphoto/Thinkstock

We are required to display obedience on a daily basis. For example, drivers are
expected to stop at red lights and pedestrians must wait for a signal before
crossing an intersec�on.

8.2

Obedience to Authority

It began like many other research studies. Having answered a newspaper adver�sement, male research par�cipants entered the research laboratory and were
told they were going to be part of a study of performance and punishment. Each par�cipant was paired with another par�cipant, and both were told they would
each be taking on the role of teacher or the role of learner. These roles were chosen randomly, from li�le slips of paper in a hat. The learner was brought to a
separate room. Electrodes were connected to the learner’s arm and the learner was strapped to a chair. Learners were told, in the presence of the teacher, the
shocks would be painful but they would cause no permanent damage. The teachers returned with the experimenter to the other room and were told they would
be teaching the learner a series of words, using electrical shocks to punish the leaner for wrong answers.

As the teacher and learner worked through the word list, the teacher increased the shock level by 15
volts for every wrong answer, as instructed by the experimenter. At first the experiment was
uneven�ul, but at 75 volts the learner u�ered an “Ugh!” a�er the shock. A�er several more of these
sorts of verbaliza�ons from the learner at the 150-volt level, the leaner said “Ugh! Experimenter!
That’s all. Get me out of here. I told you I had heart trouble. My heart’s star�ng to bother me now.
Get me out of here please. My heart’s star�ng to bother me. I refuse to go on. Let me out”
(Milgram, 1974, p. 56). When the teacher asked the experimenter what to do, the experimenter
replied that he should go on. A�er that, if the teacher con�nued the learner protested un�l the 330-
volt level. A�er the 330-volt level the learner fell silent, not providing any further protests, but also
not answering any ques�ons. The highest shock level possible was 450, a level denoted with XXX,
past the denota�on of Danger: Severe Shock.

Before the study began, psychology undergraduates, adults, and psychiatrists were asked to predict how far on the shock generator the teachers would go. They
predicted that only 1 in 1,000 would go all the way to the end of the shock generator, with about 4% even making it to the 300-volt level (Milgram, 1974). In the
study, 62.5% of the par�cipants (25/40) went to the end. Many teachers protested along the way, showing signs of extreme stress, but con�nued to the end.
None of the teachers dropped out before the 135-volt level, and 80% con�nued to give shocks un�l the 285-volt level, having given 18 shocks and heard 14
separate protests by the learner. What the par�cipants did not know was that the learner was not ge�ng any electrical shocks; he was working with the
experimenter, his “random” assignment as learner was rigged, and his verbaliza�ons throughout the study were recordings. The study was designed to inves�gate
obedience, and the primary interest of the researcher was whether the par�cipant (the teacher) would obey, even when it meant harming another person.

Milgram undertook his study, in part, to try to be�er understand the events that
occurred in Nazi Germany, where many ordinary people went against their own moral
codes and their own ethics and par�cipated in the degrada�on, imprisonment, and
killing of Jewish civilians and other innocent people (Milgram, 1963). Milgram argued
that one reason for that behavior was obedience. But could obedience be so
powerful? Milgram’s study suggests it is. Even given immoral orders to con�nue to
hurt another person, people tend to obey. Many, including Stanley Milgram, the
researcher, found these results surprising (Milgram, 1963). The findings of this study
suggest that people are willing to harm another person if told to do so by an
authority. They may protest, express disapproval, and ask the authority figure to let
them stop, but when the authority figure says they should con�nue, they will.

Obedience is a deeply engrained tendency–one that we are taught early on in life.
Most of the �me, obedience is a posi�ve behavior. Driving your car through an
intersec�on at a green light, you hope that those stopped for the red light on the
cross street will obey traffic laws and stop. Obedience to authority prevents many
the�s, murders, and kidnappings. In fact, we may wish for more obedience in regards
to violent and nonviolent crimes. But, as Milgram showed, and as history has taught
us, there is also a dark side to obedience. This dark side can be clearly seen in the
events at Jonestown. Jim Jones demanded obedience from his followers and, in the end, received ul�mate obedience from many–they killed themselves on his
command.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

In Milgram’s study, did most of the par�cipants obey or did most disobey?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

In Milgram’s original study more than half, 62.4% or 25/40, obeyed and gave powerful electrical shocks to an innocent vic�m.

Were the findings of Milgram’s study expected by people asked to predict the results?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

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Expand Your Knowledge: Zimbardo on Evil

Phillip Zimbardo described the social psychological factors in
destruc�ve behaviors in his book The Lucifer Effect. Although
obedience is only a part of the explana�on, if you are interested in
learning more about why people act in ways that hurt others, read
this book. Zimbardo also wrote two shorter pieces on this topic: a
chapter in an edited book �tled The Social Psychology of Good and
Evil: Understanding Our Capacity for Kindness and Cruelty and a
short ar�cle for the magazine Eye on Psi Chi. The book chapter
explores what Zimbardo calls a situa�onist perspec�ve on evil.

Zimbardo, P. G. (2008). The Lucifer effect: Understanding how good
people turn evil. New York: Random House. Informa�on on the
Lucifer Effect is available here (h�p://www.lucifereffect.com) .

No. People told about the study but not the results predicted very few would obey to the end.

Social Psychology in Depth: Bad Apples or Vinegar Barrels?

When we hear about some of the bad events that happen in our world, we o�en describe the perpetrators as “bad people.” Yet prominent
psychologist Philip Zimbardo argues that we apply such terms too liberally, failing to recognize the capacity for evil that we all hold, given the
right set of circumstances (Zimbardo, 2004; 2008).

Take, for example, the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal. In 2004, pictures began to emerge of U.S. prison guards (Army reservists) at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq abusing the Iraqi prisoners. The images were graphic. Prisoners were shown naked, in humilia�ng poses, on leashes, and
being threatened by dogs. Our ini�al ins�nct is to say the guards were bad people–bad apples who should never have been allowed into the
Army (Shermer, 2007). In making such a conclusion we make a fundamental a�ribu�on error, ignoring situa�onal factors and blaming
disposi�onal factors for behavior.

Milgram’s experiment shows us how powerful situa�onal factors can be. Normal, ordinary Americans were willing to inflict great harm on
another person simply because of the orders of a man in a white lab coat. If such behavior can be elicited in a rela�vely short period in a largely
innocuous psychology laboratory situa�on, might even more brutal behavior be expected over a longer period in a frightening and unfamiliar
scenario?

Despite focusing on the situa�on in explaining evil events, Zimbardo does not advocate excusing bad behavior. Understanding the situa�on that
brought about the behavior does not condone it. Those who do bad things should be punished for what they have done. But without some
a�en�on to the situa�on, more people will engage in the behaviors, crea�ng more pain and suffering in the world.

Zimbardo (2004) writes:

‘While a few bad apples might spoil the barrel (filled with good fruit/people), a barrel filled with vinegar will always transform
sweet cucumbers into sour pickles–regardless of the best inten�ons, resilience, and gene�c nature of those cucumbers.’ So, does it
make more sense to spend our resources on a�empts to iden�fy, isolate, and destroy the few bad apples or to learn how vinegar
works so that we can teach cucumbers how to avoid undesirable vinegar barrels? (p. 47)

What Predicts Obedience?

Milgram (1974) completed a variety of related experiments to learn what factors contribute to obedience. Unlike many studies in social psychology, Milgram used
community members for his research, not college undergraduates. His par�cipants were from a variety of educa�on levels, ranging from not comple�ng high
school to having obtained doctoral degrees, and varied from age 20 to age 50. Milgram’s original studies used only male par�cipants; when Milgram expanded
his study to include women, though, he found no appreciable differences between men and women (Shanab & Yahya, 1977). Age does not seem to ma�er in
level of obedience in this type of study either. Children aged 6 to 16 years were about as obedient in a replica�on of Milgram’s study, with no differences based
on age (Shanab & Yahya, 1977).

Proximity of the Vic�m

Milgram found that the proximity between the learner (the vic�m) and the
teacher (the par�cipant) was an important factor in obedience. In one study, the
learner was in another room and had no communica�on with the teacher, except
in providing answers and, at the 300- and 315-volt level, banging on the wall. In
this instance, obedience was raised only to 65% (26 out of 40 par�cipants) from
62.5% in the first study. In another study, the learner was in the same room as the
teacher. In another, the learner and teacher were next to one another. In this
second experiment the learner had to touch a shock plate every �me he got an
answer wrong. He eventually refused to touch the plate and the teacher had to
physically move his hand and force it down on the shock plate. In these studies,
Milgram found that the closer the learner was to the teacher, the lower the
obedience. When the learner was far removed, obedience was very high; more
than half of the par�cipants obeyed the experimenter. When the learner was in
the same room as the teacher, obedience declined to 40%, and it further declined
to 30% when physical contact was required. When someone is ordered to hurt
another, the closer the vic�m is the lower the likelihood of obedience.

Would we harm those we know well? In one of Milgram’s studies, par�cipants brought a friend along. The friend was enlisted as the experimenter’s helper and
fulfilled the role of learner, including giving all the protests the confederate learner had offered in the original study. The researchers found much lower

http://www.lucifereffect.com/

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Expand Your Knowledge: Video Clips of Obedience

The Heroic Imagina�on project (h�p://heroicimagina�on.org/research
/situa�onal-awareness/social-influence-forces /obedience-to-authority/)

provides an interes�ng set of clips on obedience. The collec�on
includes some archival footage from Milgram’s study and videos of
obedience in situa�ons where the authority figure had li�le
authority, including an amusing Candid Camera clip asking people
at a lunch counter to follow the direc�ons of a light for when they
could and could not eat.

obedience in this condi�on. Only 15% (3 out of 20) of par�cipants were willing to go all the way to the end of the shock generator when their friend protested
(Rochat & Modigliani, 1997).

Proximity of the Authority

In another set of studies, the distance between the experimenter (the authority figure) and the teacher was varied. In one study, the experimenter provided
direc�ons by telephone or through a prerecorded message. When the authority figure was distant, the par�cipants were less likely to obey. The legi�macy of the
authority was also varied. Milgram moved the study to an office building in Bridgeport, Connec�cut, out of the Yale University laboratory he had been using.
Par�cipants believed they were par�cipa�ng in a study for the “Research Associates of Bridgeport” and saw no connec�on of the study to pres�gious Yale
University. In this study obedience declined some, from 65% to 48%. Other researchers found similar results with an authority figure without legi�mate authority
(Mantell, 1971; Rosenhan, 1969). The implica�ons are frightening: nearly half of par�cipants s�ll obey immoral orders from authority figures who have very li�le
legi�macy.

The appearance of authority can be enough to convince us to obey. Outside of the
laboratory se�ng, this concept was demonstrated in a study of nurses in a
hospital in the 1960s. In this study, a physician, who the nurses on duty were not
familiar with, called on the phone and asked them to give a pa�ent what they
would have known to be an unsafe level of a drug. The study found 95% of the
nurses obeyed before being intercepted on their way to give the drug (Hofling,
Brotzman, Dalrymple, Graves, & Pierce, 1966). If a security guard asked you to
stand on the other side of a bus stop sign, would you do it? Even though the
request was not part of the security guard’s domain, most people asked by a
uniformed person to do a simple act, did so (Bickman, 1974).

Compliant or Defiant Others

When groups of people were part of the study, Milgram found that compliant
others led to compliant par�cipants, and defiant others led to defiant par�cipants. In these studies Milgram had confederates who appeared to be other
par�cipants do a variety of teaching tasks. In one study the par�cipant watched as a confederate gave shocks. In this study 90% of par�cipants were fully
obedient. In another study two confederates and one par�cipant were assigned to give shocks. At the 150-volt level, when the learner makes his first long
protest, the confederate giving the shocks refused to con�nue. The second confederate was then given the job of giving shocks. At the 210-volt level this second
confederate joined in the protest, ge�ng up from his chair near the shock generator and refusing to con�nue the study. At that point the actual par�cipant was
asked to con�nue the study on his own. When the two other teachers (the confederates) quit, obedience declined significantly, to 27.5% (Milgram, 1965).

Culture

Culture can also contribute to obedience. In the United States, independence is a dominant value and parents tend to pass on those values to children through
childrearing. For example, researchers found that when mothers encourage their children to recount a story, U.S. children are encouraged to describe events that
illustrate their own opinions and quali�es, while Chinese children are encouraged to describe ac�vi�es that they did with others or that relate them to others
(Wang, 2006). Because social harmony is highly valued in interdependent cultures like Chinese culture, children are more socialized to be obedient (Xiao, 1999).
Even within cultures there are varia�ons in the value of obedience. Researchers find that middle-class parents in the United States are more likely to be
concerned with emphasizing independence in their children, while working-class parents tend to focus more on obedience (Gecas & Nye, 1974; Xiao, 2000). In
cultures where authority is highly valued, we are more likely to see the kind of destruc�ve obedience that Milgram studied–obedience without cri�cal
examina�on–that is evidenced in genocide and other violent human acts (Staub, 1999).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What effect did the closeness of the learner/vic�m have on obedience in Milgram’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

The closer the teacher was to the learner/vic�m the lower the obedience.

In situa�ons of obedience do we conform to the ac�ons of others in their obedience to authority?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Yes. In studies where confederates posing as par�cipants also obeyed, the par�cipant obeyed as well. In studies where confederates posing
as par�cipants disobeyed, fewer par�cipants obeyed the authority figure.

Disobedience

http://heroicimagination.org/research%20/situational-awareness/social-influence-forces%20/obedience-to-authority/

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William Warren/Science Fac�on/SuperStock

In an act of civil disobedience, Vietnam veterans protest against the war.

In Milgram’s original study, 35% of par�cipants disobeyed the authority figure and discon�nued the study. There are �mes in life when disobedience is a more
just and moral choice than obedience. Can we predict who will disobey? In many ways, obedient and disobedient par�cipants are indis�nguishable. In later
studies on obedience, no difference in stress levels were found–all par�cipants showed physical and psychological markers of stress as the study con�nued. As
par�cipants con�nued to be obedient, they tended to reach a point of compliant resigna�on, offering fewer and shorter disagreements and con�nuing to engage
in the behavior. However, when the amount of �me people were part of the study was taken into account (disobedient par�cipants obviously finished more
quickly), the number of disagreements were no different between those who con�nued to be obedient and those that disobeyed. No differences in personality
were found between obedient and disobedient par�cipants (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010; Bocchiaro, Zimbardo, & Van Lange, 2012).

Disobedience tends to occur at a cri�cal juncture. In studies using Milgram’s
paradigm, par�cipants who disobeyed tended to do so when the confederate first
protested or when the confederate’s protests changed in content or tone (Meeus &
Raaijmakers, 1986; Packer, 2008). A�er disobeying, most par�cipants believed they did
what others would have done. In other words, they did not see their behavior as
unusual, showing false consensus, and were surprised that anyone would have
con�nued to obey. Par�cipants reported they made a quick decision when they chose
to disobey; for some it was a moral or an ethical decision. These par�cipants
men�oned that it would not be right or fair to con�nue when the other person is
clearly suffering. Other par�cipants worried about the other person, or felt empathy
for his/her suffering. Others simply did not see the point of con�nuing within the
situa�on (Bocchiaro & Zimbardo, 2010). Overall, it is difficult to predict who will
disobey and who will obey authority in these types of situa�ons. It appears decisions
are made quickly at cri�cal points within a situa�on, and are made for a variety of
reasons. These reasons are not reflec�ve of personality differences, or differences in
reac�vity to stress. Future research on obedience is needed to help us be�er predict
disobedience.

One type of disobedience that occurs in response to poten�ally illegi�mate authority
is legal disobedience. Legal disobedience may take the form of conscien�ous
objec�on, civil disobedience, or outright rebellion against a government or leader
(Herr, 1974; Raz, 1975). This form of disobedience occurred as people in communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe overthrew their governments in 1989 and in a
variety of Arab countries in 2011, which came to be known as the Arab Spring.

Conscien�ous objec�ons and civil disobedience helped free India from rule by the Bri�sh Empire, bring about civil rights in the United States in the 1960s, and
help end the Vietnam war in the 1970s. In such circumstances, people may feel an en�tlement or a responsibility to disobey as an act of ci�zenship (Ra�ner,
Yagil, & Sherman-Segal, 2003). In fact, people most commi�ed to democracy are o�en those who are most likely to disobey in the face of poten�ally illegi�mate
authority (Passini & Morselli, 2011). For these people democracy provides both an opportunity and a responsibility to disobey when democracy is threated. This
disobedience prevents authoritarian governments to take hold, preserving or bringing about democra�c rule.

Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.

How are those who disobey different from those who obey authority?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

For the most part they are not different. There is no difference in personality or in the distress they show or the protests they make.

Ethics of Obedience Research

The par�cipants in Milgram’s studies underwent an experience that was very stressful. According to an observer of the study:

I observed a mature and ini�ally poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident. Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching,
stu�ering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse. He constantly pulled on his earlobe, and twisted his hands. At one
point he pushed his fist into his forehead and mu�ered: “Oh God, let’s stop it.” And yet he con�nued to respond to every word of the
experimenter, and obeyed to the end (Milgram, 1963, p. 377).

When entering into an experimental situa�on, research par�cipants put themselves into the hands of the experimenter. A�er Milgram’s study, other researchers
asked if placing unsuspec�ng people into these kinds of situa�ons was ethical. The main problems iden�fied were that par�cipants had a very stressful
experience, and that they would have to live with the knowledge of the lengths to which they would obey, all within a situa�on based on trust (Baumrind, 1964).

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Milgram (1964) responded to these cri�cisms by no�ng that the findings of his studies and the reac�ons of the par�cipants were unexpected. When he asked
psychologists and others what to expect, they did not believe par�cipants would go all the way to the end of the shock generator and be as obedient as they
were. At the end of the experimental session, the experimenter reunited the confederate with the par�cipant so the par�cipant could see that he was not
harmed in any way. The experimenter was suppor�ve of whatever decision the par�cipant made in terms of obedience.

The study involved a great deal of decep�on. The par�cipants were lied to about the purpose of the study, about the complicity of the other par�cipant, and
about what was actually happening. Cri�cs of the study argued that this type of decep�on may have an impact on the par�cipants themselves, as they feel
duped by the researcher. This form of decep�on in psychological experiments can poten�ally impact the general public’s view of psychological research. When
researchers use decep�on a great deal, the public may become suspicious of all research studies, and wary of par�cipa�ng in research, even research that does
not in fact involve decep�on. Milgram (1974) contacted par�cipants a�er their par�cipa�on to ask how they felt about the study. The vast majority said they
were glad or very glad to have been part of the study (83.7%). Only 1.3% of the par�cipants reported being sorry or very sorry to have par�cipated. Almost
three fourths of par�cipants reported learning something of personal importance.

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

What were some ethical issues with Milgram’s study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

Par�cipants in Milgram’s study experienced a great deal of distress and were deceived about the nature of the study in a situa�on of
trust. In the end, they may have learned something unpleasant about their own tendencies that they would have to live with.

Did Milgram find any long-term nega�ve effects in the par�cipants who were part of his study?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

For the most part, no. In follow-up work he found that most people were happy to have been part of the study.

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iStockphoto/Thinkstock

Leaders can use different strategies and tac�cs to achieve goals.

8.3 Leadership
The influences of conformity and obedience sway our beliefs and ac�ons. Cult leader Jim Jones expected obedience from his followers and used conformity to
keep his followers in line. Leaders–good and bad–make a difference in what people think and do, contribu�ng to or breaking from conformity. Obedience to
leaders has led to some of the most inspiring and heartbreaking events in history. Leadership involves influencing a group and its members to contribute to the
goals of the group and coordina�ng and guiding those efforts (Kaiser, Hogan, & Craig, 2008). If leaders are good leaders who make good decisions, then
obedience is appropriate.

What makes a good leader? When are leaders most effec�ve? A number of models for describing types of leadership exist. One model offers two main
categories of leadership: transac�onal and transforma�onal leadership. In transac�onal leadership, leaders can lead by offering an exchange of rewards for effort
from followers. By contrast, some leaders offer their followers a common purpose and ask that individual interest be put aside so the group can work together
toward that goal. This leadership style is called transforma�onal leadership (Bass, 1985). An addi�onal type of leadership, called laissez-faire leadership, is
characterized by a hands-off approach, with the leader simply allowing the followers to do what they would like without substan�al input from the leader
(Yammarino, Spangler, & Bass, 1993).

Transac�onal leaders focus on con�ngent rewards and ac�ve management. These leaders work out agreements with their followers that will sa�sfy both par�es.
People obey transac�onal leaders because they desire the rewards the transac�onal leader can provide. Con�ngent rewards are provided once the followers have
fulfilled their end of the bargain.

This type of leadership may also involve ac�ve management, where the leader
monitors what the follower is doing to redirect, if needed, and enforce the rules that
have been agreed upon. Transac�onal leaders do not always ac�vely manage their
followers. At �mes, they take a passive management approach, intervening when
problems are brought to their a�en�on (Bass, 1997). These leaders do not necessarily
inspire their followers, but they do get the job done. Many leaders of businesses,
coaches of sports teams, and poli�cians would best be described as transac�onal
leaders.

Transforma�onal leaders are characterized by charisma, inspira�onal mo�va�on,
intellectual s�mula�on, and individualized considera�on. Charisma, in this context,
means influence toward an ideal that can be accomplished through the leader
displaying convic�on about the goal, presen�ng and taking stands on important
issues, and emphasizing trust. When leaders clearly ar�culate a vision, provide
encouragement, and show op�mism, they display inspira�onal mo�va�on. Nelson
Mandela, an�-apartheid leader and former president of South Africa, was such a
transforma�onal leader, as was Winston Churchill, prime minister of the United
Kingdom during World War II. Intellectual s�mula�on within transforma�onal leadership is modeled by leaders in their welcoming of new ideas and perspec�ves.
Finally, transforma�onal leaders tend to focus on individual gi�s, abili�es, and needs, offering individual considera�on for followers (Bass, 1997). Along with these
quali�es, transforma�onal leaders are generally self-confident and are able to handle pressure and uncertainty well. Op�mis�c and self-determined, such leaders
are able to cast a vision for their followers (van Eeden, Cilliers, & van Deventer, 2008). Not all transforma�onal leaders bring about peace and reconcilia�on. Jim
Jones would likely fit in the category of transforma�onal leadership. Jones a�racted his followers to his vision for a color-blind world where people worked
together to create a modern-day utopia.

People differ in what they consider to be ideal in a leader. Because of past experiences, values, and personality differences, people develop schemas for what
they consider good leadership quali�es and these schemas are rela�vely stable over �me (Epitropaki & Mar�n, 2004; Keller, 1999; Keller, 2003; Kriger & Seng,
2005). These schemas are called implicit leadership theories. Individuals who show quali�es that people expect in leaders–those that fit the implicit leadership
theories people hold–are more likely to be viewed as leaders (Melwani, Mueller, & Overbeck, 2012). Interac�ons between a follower and a leader will be largely
impacted by the follower’s implicit leadership theories (Epitropaki & Mar�n, 2005; Fraser & Lord, 1988). Some leaders may be considered bad leaders not
because they intend to do any harm to their followers or because they are inherently bad leaders, but because the implicit leadership theories of the followers
do not match the leadership quali�es and ac�ons of the leader (Peus, Braun, & Frey, 2012).

Success of a leader can be defined in a variety of ways. Successful leaders might be those who have helped their followers to reach a goal (Kaiser & Hogan,
2007). Even without reaching or moving toward obtaining a goal, leaders might be defined as successful if their group is sa�sfied or mo�vated or, simply, if
followers rate the leader as successful (Tsui, 1984). Looking from a strict monetary perspec�ve, 14% of the variance in the financial results of a business is due to
the leadership provided by the CEO (Joyce, Nohria, & Robertson, 2003). Although we o�en think of transforma�onal leaders as be�er leaders, generally there are
no overall differences in effec�veness of transforma�onal versus transac�onal leaders (Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004).

Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.

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A leader who seeks to inspire followers and cast a vision for where those followers might go is using what type of leadership?
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Transforma�onal leadership.

Joe believes a leader should be kind and compassionate to followers. Marcus thinks leaders should be clear about expecta�ons but
uninvolved in the lives of their followers. Joe and Marcus are different in what way?
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Joe and Marcus are different in their implicit leadership theories, they have different schemas regarding the appropriate quali�es of
leaders.

Conclusion

Conformity affects our everyday behavior. We might follow what everyone else is doing or what we think others would like us to do. We might follow because
the crowd seems to know something we do not know, or because we want acceptance from the crowd. But minority groups can also influence behavior,
par�cularly when they maintain a consistent, dis�nc�ve posi�on. Overall, people tend to be obedient, a posi�ve tendency that allows for a well-ordered and safe
society. But rates of obedience are o�en s�ll high even when it involves harming others, as found in Stanley Milgram’s famous study of obedience. Obedience is
even more common when the authority figure is close, the vic�m is distant, and others are also obeying. Milgram’s studies were a�acked for being unethical, as
his par�cipants were put under extreme stress and were deceived within a context where trust is important. Authority figures or leaders come in a variety of
styles, showing effec�veness in their roles depending on expecta�ons of followers and the situa�on in which they lead.

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Chapter Summary

Conformity

When we do as others do, we are conforming to the behavior of the group. At �mes our conformity is due to what we believe others want us to do. In this
instance we are influenced by injunc�ve norms. Descrip�ve norms refer to what most people do, not necessarily what most people approve of. When we
conform we may do so to be liked or accepted by the group. Norma�ve influence produces this type of conformity. When we conform to be liked or accepted
we may act as others do without believing that ac�on is right; we show compliance to the social norm. Informa�onal influence brings about conformity because
we believe the group knows something we do not. At such �mes we may act and believe as the group does, showing acceptance of the social norm. Majori�es
are powerful, but minori�es can have an influence too. Minori�es with dis�nc�ve posi�ons, that are consistent in their posi�on, and that gain defec�ons from
the majority are most persuasive.

Obedience to Authority

Stanley Milgram completed a study of obedience where par�cipants were asked to follow the orders of an experimenter despite the protests of a vic�m. In his
study, 62.5% of par�cipants were fully obedient. When Milgram varied the distance of the authority figure from the par�cipant, obedience declined as the
authority figure’s presence was less prominent. The vic�m’s presence led to a decrease in obedience. When the legi�macy of the authority figure was lessened,
obedience was lower, although s�ll quite high. More recent research has shown that obedience has not declined significantly. Disobedience is hard to predict on
the individual level, although some situa�onal factors do predict when people are likely to disobey. Milgram’s study of obedience placed par�cipants in a
situa�on of great stress in an environment of trust. Milgram’s follow-ups with his par�cipants indicated that most were happy to have par�cipated and had no
long-term ill effects from the study.

Leadership

Leadership styles may involve a transac�on of rewards for effort, known as transac�onal leadership, or inspira�on toward a common goal and purpose, known as
transforma�onal leadership. Laissez-faire leadership involves leadership without substan�al input from the leader. Followers have par�cular ways of thinking
about leadership, influencing how they evaluate leaders. Generally, leaders do ma�er and a variety of leadership styles are poten�ally effec�ve.

Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons

1. Have you been in a situa�on where you changed your behavior, or observed others changing their behavior, due to conformity? What was that situa�on
like?

2. In your own life, where might you have seen injunc�ve norms and descrip�ve norms?

3. If you held a minority opinion in a group and wanted to convince the rest of the group to join you in that opinion, what might you do to convince them?

4. Milgram inves�gated the closeness and legi�macy of the authority figure, the closeness to and iden�ty of the vic�m, and the ac�ons of others in rela�on to
degree of obedience. What other factors might influence obedience?

5. If you had been part of Milgram’s study of obedience, what do you think you would have done?

6. What do you think about the ethics of Milgram’s studies of obedience? Do you think they should have been done, or are the ethical implica�ons too great?

7. How might you describe your own implicit leadership theories? What effect have these had on your interac�ons with leaders?

8. The chapter begins with a discussion of the mass suicide of the people at Jonestown. Based on what you now know about conformity and obedience what
do you think could have been done to prevent this tragedy or others like it?

Key Terms

Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.

acceptance
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When both ac�ons and beliefs are in line with the social norm.

compliance
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

When ac�ons are in line with the social norm, but belief remains dis�nct.

conformity
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

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Going along with a group in ac�ons or beliefs.

descrip�ve norms
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Norms describing what most people do.

dis�nc�veness
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

That which gives minori�es power despite their minority status. This occurs when one point of differences from the group is held by a minority, but the minority
agrees with the majority on other points.

implicit leadership theories
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

The schemas people have for good leadership quali�es.

informa�onal influence
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A type of social influence toward conformity that occurs when the individual believes the crowd possesses knowledge that the individual does not.

injunc�ve norms
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Norms for what is either approved of or disapproved of.

laissez-faire

leadership
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Characterized by a hands-off approach, with the leader simply allowing the followers to do what they would like without substan�al input from the leader.

leadership
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Influencing a group and its members to contribute to the goals of the group and coordina�ng and guiding those efforts.

norma�ve influence
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

A type of social influence toward conformity that occurs when the individual conforms to avoid social rejec�on and to be liked or accepted by the group.

transac�onal leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Leadership involving offering an exchange of rewards for effort from followers.

transforma�onal leadership
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

Leadership where the leader offers followers a common purpose and asks that individual interests be put aside so the group can work together toward that goal.

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