Literature Review

Using Bodyworn cameras- releasing evidence/protecting employees

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0091-4169/16/10604-0729
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 106, No. 4
Copyright © 2017 by Barak Ariel Printed in U.S.A.

729

CRIMINOLOGY

POLICE BODY CAMERAS IN LARGE
POLICE DEPARTMENTS

BARAK ARIEL*

Body Worn Cameras are spreading worldwide, under the assumption
that police performance, conduct, accountability, and legitimacy, in the
eyes of the public, are enhanced as a result of using these devices. In
addition, suspects’ demeanor during police–public engagements is
hypothesized to change as a result of the video-recording of the encounter.
For both parties—officers and suspects—the theoretical mechanism that
underpins these behavioral changes is deterrence theory, self-awareness
theory, or both. Yet evidence on the efficacy of Body Worn Cameras
remains largely anecdotal, with only one rigorous study, from a small force
in Rialto, California, validating the hypotheses. How Body Worn Cameras
affect police–public interactions in large police departments remains
unknown, as does their effect on other outcomes, such as arrests. With one
Denver police district serving as the treatment area and five other districts
within a large metropolitan area serving as comparisons, we offer mixed
findings as in the Rialto Experiment, not least in terms of effect magnitudes.

Adjusted odds-ratios suggest a significant 35% lower odds for
citizens’ complaints against the police use of force, but 14% greater odds
for a complaint against misconduct, when Body Worn Cameras are used.
No discernable effect was detected on the odds of use of force at the
aggregate, compared to control conditions (OR=0.928; p>0.1). Finally,
arrest rates dropped significantly, with the odds of an arrest when Body
Worn Cameras not present is 18% higher than the odds under treatment
conditions. The outcomes are contextualized within the framework of
reactive emergency calls for service rather than proactive policing. We
further discuss officers’ decisions and the degree of the necessity of arrest
in policing more broadly, because the burden of proof for tangible evidence
necessary for making a legal arrest can be challenged with the evidence
produced by Body Worn Cameras: officers become “cautious” about

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arresting suspects when Body Worn Cameras are present. Limitations
associated with the lack of randomly assigned comparison units are
discussed, as well, with practical recommendations for future research on
Body Worn Cameras.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………… 730
I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS? ……….. 734
II. TESTING THE EFFECT OF BWCS IN LARGE POLICE DEPARTMENTS ….. 737
III. METHODS AND DATA ……………………………………………………………….. 738

A. Experimental Design ……………………………………………………….. 738
B. Settings and Procedure …………………………………………………….. 738
C. Data Sources …………………………………………………………………… 739
D. Treatment and Comparison Geographic Sites ……………………… 740
E. Apparatus ……………………………………………………………………….. 741

IV. MEASURES ……………………………………………………………………………… 742
A. Use of Force …………………………………………………………………… 742
B. Citizen Complaints ………………………………………………………….. 743
C. Arrests …………………………………………………………………………… 745
D. Citizen-Initiated 911 Calls for Service ……………………………….. 747

V. STATISTICAL PROCEDURE ………………………………………………………….. 747
VI. QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: OFFICERS’ SURVEYS …………………………… 748
VII. RESULTS ……………………………………………………………………………….. 749

A. Descriptive Statistics ……………………………………………………….. 749
B. Treatment Outcomes ……………………………………………………….. 751

VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS …………………………………………….. 754
A. Effect Of BWCs on Use of Force: Accountability and

Transparency ……………………………………………………………….. 756
B. Effect Of BWCs on Complaints: Conditional on

Complaint Type ……………………………………………………………. 760
C. Effect of BWCs on Arrest Decisions………………………………….. 762
D. A Cautionary Note on Nonexperimental Designs in Future

Studies on BWCs ………………………………………………………….. 766
CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………… 767

INTRODUCTION

Police departments have begun using Body Worn Cameras (BWCs) in
daily operations all over the world, in increasing rates.1 BWCs are

1 See Uri Friedman, Do Police Body Cameras Actually Work?, THE ATLANTIC, Dec. 3,
2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/12/do-police-body-cameras-

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hypothesized to minimize the use of force in police–public encounters,
reduce citizens’ complaints, and increase the accountability and the
legitimacy of the police.2 At the same time, the massive growth in
implementation of BWCs is not mirrored by research on their cost-
effectiveness or efficiency.3 Currently, there is a dearth of rigorous
evaluation on the efficacy of BWCs4 with much of the published work
concentrating on implementation processes,5 officers’ perceptions about the
use of BWCs on policing and their professional role,6 the extent to which
officers feel micromanaged in an era of digital surveillance,7 and legal
issues associated with privacy rights in the public domain.8 One noteworthy

work-ferguson/383323 (discussing the increase in federal funding for the technology).

2 See infra notes 20–44 and accompanying text.
3 See MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE

EVIDENCE 32–34 (OJP Diagnostic Center 2014) (speaking generally on costs and time
incurred with storing camera data).

4 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 3, at 29–32 (weighing costs and benefits); Barak Ariel et
al., Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against
the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 528–31
(2015) (weighing the costs and benefits of BWCs); Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young,
The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a
Controlled Experiment in Mesa, Arizona, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 446
(2015).

5 See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMPLEMENTING A
BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM [hereinafter “POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH”] (2014)
(giving an overview of the BWCs, issues with current usage, and recommendations for
implementation moving forward); NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., A PRIMER ON
BODY-WORN CAMERAS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 7–10 (2012) (reviewing implementation
issues on when to use, policies and procedures, training, and data storage and management);
Paul Drover & Barak Ariel, Leading an Experiment in Police Body-Worn Video Cameras,
25 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 80 (2015) (discussing the issues in implementing BWCs).

6 See Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and Cameras: Officer Perceptions of the Use of
Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549, 550 (2014).

7 See Neil Wain & Barak Ariel, Tracking of Police Patrol, 8 POLICING 274, 278, 281
(2014) (“The limited literature on the impact of tracking further raises a number of questions
on how tracking technology can affect officer behaviour or police subculture. For instance,
what will the impact of GPS, body-worn videos and other tracking devices be on officer’s
discretion? On the one hand, there have been recent voices in British policing calling for
increased discretion, including providing officers with the power to implement out of court
disposals. However, if ‘every’ decision is tracked and inspected, would it have an effect on
the willingness of officers to exercise this discretion? Similarly, are officers less inclined to
engage with suspects when they are aware that they are being watched? We believe that
these questions are indeed normative in nature, yet before introducing policies, basic science
must be applied in order to provide policymakers with the necessary evidence about the
scope of these phenomena from an empirical perspective.” (internal citations omitted)).

8 David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for
Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357 (2010). See

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study on the effectiveness of BWCs, in the specific area of use of force and
complaints, was conducted in Rialto, California.9 The “Rialto Experiment”
showed that the likelihood that police use force when officers do not use
BWCs was roughly twice that of when officers use BWCs and that the
number of complaints lodged against officers dropped from 0.7 complaints
per 1000 contacts to 0.07 per 1000 contacts.10

The Rialto Experiment was widely cited in recent cases of police use
of force as a method to reduce the likelihood of these incidents.11 The death
of Eric Gardner in Staten Island, New York after police put him in a
chokehold for several seconds, in contravention of the departmental
prohibition;12 the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, which
resulted in protests in 2014;13 and the shooting of Walter Scott by a white
North Charleston police officer14 are examples thereof. Some, including the
current White House Administration, have argued that BWCs could be used
as a technological advent that would revitalize police–public relations and

generally Helen Nissenbaum, Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of
Privacy in Public, 17 L. & PHIL. 559 (1998) (discussing the legal issues and questions
arising from new privacy concerns).

9 See Ariel et al., supra note 4.
10 Id. at 510. See Barak Ariel et al.,’Contagious Accountability’: A Global Multi-Site

Randomized Controlled Trial on the Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Citizen’s
Complaints against the Police, CRIM. J. & BEHAV. (forthcoming).

11 See EUGENE P. RAMIREZ, A REPORT ON BODY WORN CAMERAS 6–11 (2014),
https://www.bja.gov/bwc/pdfs/14-005_Report_BODY_WORN_CAMERAS ; Kelly
Gates, Body-Worn Devices and Police Media Labor, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO
LABOR AND MEDIA 215 (2015); Fanny Coudert et al., Body-Worn Cameras for Police
Accountability: Opportunities and Risks, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 749, 750–51
(2015); Paul Marks, Body Worn Cameras Mean Police are Always Watching You, 220 NEW
SCIENTIST 21, 21 (2013); Alexandria C. Meetscu & Alex Rosenblat, Police Body-Worn
Cameras, DATA & SOC’Y 17–21 (2015), http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/dcr/Police
BodyWornCameras . But see First Scientific Report Shows Police Body-Worn-Cameras
Can Prevent Unacceptable Use-of-Force, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE [hereinafter “UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE”] (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/first-scientific-report-
shows-police-body-worn-cameras-can-prevent-unacceptable-use-of-force (questioning the
study).

12 See Conor Friedersdorf, Eric Garner and the NYPD’s History of Deadly Chokeholds,
THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/context-
for-the-punishment-free-killing-of-eric-garner/383413/.

13 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE
SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN
WILSON (2015).

14 See Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged with
Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/us/
south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html?_r=0.

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prevent these incidents.15 Had the officers involved in the incidents cited
above been issued BWCs, they may have dealt with these situations
differently. The Rialto Experiment was suggested as the necessary evidence
to support this contention, including a citation by the United States district
judge in the 2013 ruling against the New York Police Department (NYPD)
over stop and search.16 The Rialto Experiment has influenced policy
discussions over improvements in police conduct and legitimacy, including
the recent discussion by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing.17

Yet the Rialto Experiment is only one study; replications are urgently
required in order to show whether these findings represent an anomaly
attributed to the Rialto context, to the novelty of these devices in police
operations, or both.18 Perhaps as important, Rialto is a small department,
with about 50 frontline officers force-wide.19 It remains unknown whether
similar effects on police–public encounters would be detected—in both
directionality as well as magnitude—in large police departments, within
large metropolitan settings.

In the present study, we tested the effect of using BWCs in police
frontline operations on police use of force, complaints lodged against
officers and arrest, in one of the largest state and local law enforcement
agencies in the United States—the Denver Police Department—over a
period of six months. One police district out of six was assigned BWCs,
while all other districts served as comparison sites without BWCs. We
observed the effect of BWCs on these outcomes based on adjusted odds
ratios at the aggregated level: comparing the odds of use of force,
complaints, and arrest in the ‘treatment district’ compared to five other
districts, as a way to estimate the effect of using BWCs.

After reviewing the existing research on BWCs and examining the

15 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE

PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter
“PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE”] (“An increasing number of law enforcement agencies are
adopting BWC programs as a means to improve evidence collection, to strengthen officer
performance and accountability, and to enhance agency transparency.”).

16 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
17 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE, supra note 15, at 31–32.
18 One similar replication was recently conducted in Orlando. See Wesley G. Jennings et

al., Evaluating the Impact of Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras on Response-to-Resistance
and Serious External Complaints: Evidence from the Orlando Police Department
Experience Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 481
(2015).

19 See Ariel et al., supra note 4.

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theoretical mechanisms that underpin the effect of these devices on police–
public encounters, we next lay out the Denver Police Department
experiment and its design. The outcomes of the study are then presented,
broken down into different outcomes of interest. The practical implications,
with an emphasis on avenues for future research, are contemplated in the
discussion chapter, including the methodological limitations of the present
study.

I. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT POLICE BODY WORN CAMERAS?

Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland have recently reported the findings of
what is now commonly referred to as the Rialto Experiment.20 The study,
conducted in the small jurisdiction of Rialto, California, with just over fifty
frontline officers, compared nearly 500 police shifts in which all police–
public encounters were assigned to treatment conditions and an equal
number of police shifts to control conditions.21 During treatment shifts,
officers were asked to videotape all their encounters with members of the
public, to announce to the parties with whom they have engaged that the
encounter was videotaped, and to subsequently store evidence on a secured
cloud.22 In control shifts, the officers were tasked never to use the devices.23
Outcomes were then measured in terms of officially-recorded use of force
incidents and complaints lodged against Rialto police officers.24 Following
this twelve month experiment, Ariel, Farrar, and Sutherland reported a
relative reduction of roughly 50% in the total number of incidents of use of
force compared to control conditions and a 90% reduction in citizens’
complaints, compared to the twelve months prior to the experiment.25

The findings have generated heated debates worldwide, particularly
around the transferability of the findings to other jurisdictions, or to larger
police departments.26 Whether unique circumstances in Rialto jeopardized

20 See id.
21 Id. at 518–19.
22 Id. at 511, 521.
23 Id. at 523 (discussing experimental versus control shifts within a Poisson model).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 523–24.
26 See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH, supra note 5, at 22–24; Kirk Johnson,

Today’s Police Put on a Gun and a Camera, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/28/us/todays-police-put-on-a-gun-and-a-camera.html; see also First
Scientific Report Shows Police Body-Worn-Cameras Can Prevent Unacceptable Use-of-
Force, PHYS.ORG (Dec. 24, 2014), http://phys.org/news/2014-12-scientific-police-body-
worn-cameras-unacceptable-use of force.html.

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the external validity of the test were also raised.27 Major metropolitan cities,
and with them large law enforcement agencies, operate on a different scale
to small or even medium sized forces.28 Larger forces can be exposed to
more diverse problems, including a nighttime economy of a different scale
than small-scale departments, an incomparable volume of calls for service,
and potentially more serious crimes than local agencies.29 Training,
interagency collaborative work and, perhaps, the expertise of officers and
how likely they are to use force are potentially different in large versus
small police departments, not to mention police cultures, promotional
processes, and budgets.30

Despite these discussions, additional research on BWCs is virtually
nonexistent. The most updated literature review when this study was
conducted has concluded that:

Independent research on body-worn camera technology is urgently needed. Most of
the claims made by advocates and critics of the technology remain untested . . . .
Researchers should examine all aspects of the implementation and impact of the
technology—from its perceived civilizing effect, evidentiary benefits, and impact on
citizen perceptions of police legitimacy to its consequences for privacy rights, the law
enforcement agency, and other outside stakeholders.31

At least in theory, the mechanism which underpins the effect of BWCs on
police officers and suspects alike is consistent, regardless of department
size. Deterrence and self-awareness theories suggest that people alter their
behavior once made aware that they are being observed.32 A rich body of
evidence on perceived social surveillance—self-awareness and socially-
desirable-responding—suggests that people adhere to social norms and
change their conduct because of their cognizance that someone else is

27 UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, supra note 11.
28 E.g., Laure Weber Brooks & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Police Stress: Does Department

Size Matter?, 21 POLICING 600, 604 (1998); Gary W. Cordner, Police Agency Size and
Investigative Effectiveness, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 145, 146 (1989); Robert M. Regoli et al.,
Police Cynicism, Job Satisfaction and Work Relations of Police Chiefs: An Assessment of the
Influence of Department Size, 22 SOC. FOCUS 161, 162–63 (1989).

29 See UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, supra note 11.
30 Brooks & Piquero, supra note 28, at 602–15 (researching the different size models in

police stress and how they handle their duties); Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Economies of
Scale in Municipal Police Departments: The Case of Florida, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 352,
352–54 (1987); Regoli et al., supra note 28; see also Victoria M. Follette et al., Mental
Health and Law Enforcement Professionals: Trauma History, Psychological Symptoms, and
Impact of Providing Services to Child Sexual Abuse Surviors, 25 PROF. PSYCHOL. 275, 280–
81 (1994) (discussing impact of a person’s personal history on how they act professionally).

31 WHITE, supra note 3, at 10.
32 See, e.g., id. at 13; Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 516.

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watching.33 We experience public self-awareness, which affects our various
social cognitive processes, when we know with sufficient certainty our
behavior is observed or judged.34

The immediate application of this psychological mechanism is
manifested in deterrence theory. An extensive body of recent rigorous
research, across several categories of criminal behavior, has shown that
when certainty of apprehension for wrongdoing is “strong,” socially and
morally-unacceptable acts are dramatically less likely to occur.35
Particularly in terms of crime and disorder, when the consequences of
apprehension can be bleak (imprisonment, fines, etc.), people simply do not
want to get caught.36 In this framework, getting caught doing something
morally or socially wrong is often registered as behavior that can
potentially lead to negative consequences, which is an outcome that rational
individuals tend to avoid.37 Studies have, nevertheless, uncovered a
propensity to avoid negative outcomes, and findings generally agree that
individuals react compliantly to even the slightest cues indicating that
somebody may be watching.38

33 Delroy L. Paulhus, Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding, in MEASURES OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDES 37, 41–43 (1991); Kristen Munger &
Shelby J. Harris, Effects of an Observer on Hand Washing in a Public Restroom, 69
PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 733, 734 (1989); Robert A. Wicklund, Objective Self-
Awareness, 8 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 233, 261–67 (1975).

34 See Pat Barclay, Trustworthiness and Competitive Altruism Can Also Solve the
“Tragedy of the Commons,” 25 EVOLUTION AND HUM. BEHAV. 209, 217–19 (2004); Will M.
Gervais & Ara Norenzayan, Like a Camera in the Sky? Thinking about God Increases
Public Self-Awareness and Socially Desirable Responding, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 298, 301–02 (2012); Manfred Milinski et al., Donors to Charity Gain in Both
Indirect Reciprocity and Political Reputation, 269 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 881, 881
(2002); Claus Wedekind & Victoria A. Braithwaite, The Long-Term Benefits of Human
Generosity in Indirect Reciprocity, 12 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1012, 1014 (2002).

35 ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY 26–27
(1999); Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis,
in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367, 371–74 (2006); Daniel
Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 201–04 (2013);
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 769, 771, 774–76 (2010).

36 Nagin, supra note 35.
37 Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and

Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 742–744 (1989); Nagin, supra note
35, at 251–52. See generally Daniel Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and
Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74 (2015).

38 See Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOLOGY LETTERS 412, 413 (2006); Kevin J. Haley & Daniel M.T. Fessler,
Nobody’s Watching? Subtle Cues Affect Generosity in an Anonymous Economic Game,
26 EVOLUTION AND HUM. BEHAV. 245, 254 (2005). But cf. Ernst Fehr & Frederic Schneider,

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2016] THE DENVER BWC EXPERIMENT 737

Deterrence and self-awareness work equally on suspects who would
otherwise decide to commit crime and on police officers who might
otherwise break the rules of conduct.39 For this reason, BWCs are
hypothesized to work simultaneously on both actors in a police–public
encounter.40 From this follows a logical conclusion that when officers and
suspects are cognizant of the BWC, they are equally assumed to have no
preference for breaking the rules, as the risk of apprehension and conviction
by the evidence captured on videotape is overwhelming. BWCs—unlike
CCTV, dashboard cameras or bystanders’ mobile-phone cameras—are
viewed as “credible threats.”41 It is therefore logical to assume that both
parties in the interaction are conscious not only of the fact that they are
being watched, but also of the consequences associated with
noncompliance.42 “Getting-away” with rule breaking is thus far less
conceivable if one is being-videotaped and one is cognizant that the
behavior is in fact videotaped.43 The evidence from the Rialto Experiment
supports this model.44

II. TESTING THE EFFECT OF BWCS IN LARGE POLICE DEPARTMENTS

To test whether the Rialto Experiment findings are translatable to
large, metropolitan law enforcement agencies, we turned to Denver Police

Eyes Are on Us, but Nobody Cares: Are Eye Cues Relevant for Strong Reciprocity?, 277
PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y B 1315, 1321–22 (2010) (finding a “null effect” when looking at
implicit eye cues).

39 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 516–18, 527–30.
40 Barak Ariel, Technology in Policing: The Case for Body-Worn Cameras and Digital

Evidence, 83 THE POLICE CHIEF 27 (August 2016); Joshua Young, Implementation of a
Randomized Controlled Trial in Ventura, California: A Body-Worn Video Camera
Experiment 45–46 (Dec. 2014) (unpublished master’s thesis, University of Cambridge) (on
file with the University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology Thesis Database).

41 See e.g., ROBERT JERVIS ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND DETERRENCE 153 (1989) (discussing
deterrence theory and the “role of credible threats in deterring potential aggressors”).

42 See Jennings et al., supra note 19, at 485.
43 Drover & Ariel, supra note 5 at 89 (“[T]here had been a number of instances where a

member of the public had changed their behavior from aggression to reluctant compliance
after being informed they were being videotaped.”).

44 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 526. See also Barak Ariel, et al., Wearing Body Cameras
Increases Assaults Against Officers and Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from
a Global Multi-site Experiment, EUROPEAN J. OF CRIMINOLOGY (2016), currently available at
http://euc.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/05/17/1477370816643734.full +html; Barak
Ariel et al., Report: Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn
Cameras are Driven by Officer Discretion: a Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten
Randomized Experiments, J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (2016), currently available at
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-016-9261-3.

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Department. All response police officers in one district were assigned
BWCs, while the other districts were not given BWCs at all. Officers were
tasked to conduct patrol “as they normally would,” in both treatment and
comparison areas, while the only planned difference between the two arms
was the deployment of BWCs on all frontline officers in one, but not in
other, districts. Official reports of complaints against the police and
specifically of incidents of use of force, as well as other police outputs,
were measured before deploying the BWCs, and then again during the six
months of the experiment, across the entire city. Data was analyzed at the
aggregated geographic level (district level) using adjusted odds ratios.

III. METHODS AND DATA

A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The methodological standard for evaluations of causal estimates is the
randomized controlled trial,45 but these are not always feasible, for practical
or political reasons.46 In this experiment, we were unable to randomly
allocate shifts, officers, cases, or vehicles. Instead, we were able to closely
observe, prospectively, the deployment of BWCs in one district in Denver,
and compare it to the other districts that served as controls. Thus, we were
able to apply a Level 3+ on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale,47 which
can provide informative causal inferences with a fairly satisfactory degree
of internal validity—at least in comparison with before–after studies with
no control groups—about the effect of BWCs on policing.48

B. SETTINGS AND PROCEDURE

Denver, Colorado, is a city that covers approximately 153 square miles
and is home to over 650,000 residents.49 The local population is 46.2% non-

45 WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR
GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 13 (2002).

46 See Jack R. Greene, New Directions in Policing: Balancing Prediction and Meaning
in Police Research, 31 JUST. Q. 193, 194–95, 199 (2014) (discussing the limitations of
controlled experimentation in police research and possible alternative ways of collecting
data about police).

47 David P. Farrington et al., The Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, in EVIDENCE-
BASED CRIME PREVENTION 13–21 (2002); see, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, WHAT’S PROMISING 4 (1998)
[hereinafter “PREVENTING CRIME”] (noting the Scale of Scientific Methods ranks studies
from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest)).

48 See generally PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47.
49 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2014 DENVER COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://www.

census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0820000,08031,00.

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White residents (10.1% African-Americans).50 There are disproportionally
more persons living below the poverty line in the city as compared to the
rest of the state (18.3% vs. 12%); however, residents of Denver County
have a similar per-capita income as the rest of the state—about $34,000 per
annum.51 In terms of crime, Denver experiences normal crime patterns (e.g.,
4.7 homicides per 100,000).52 The police department is one the fifty largest
police departments, with nearly 1500 sworn officers working in six
geographic districts.53 As in most major cities, each district is then broken
down into many precincts, and each precinct is patrolled by up to two
officers in a police car.

BWCs were allocated to all frontline officers in one district (n
officers=119) for a period of six months (July 23, 2014–December 15,
2014), but not to any other frontline officers of the other five geographic
districts (n officers=513). The single geographic district was therefore the
treatment area, while each of the five other districts served as comparison
sites.

C. DATA SOURCES

For the purposes of this study, access was granted to a rich database of
administrative, as well as geospatial data on all outputs reported internally
by police officers, during the six months of the experiment and twelve
months prior to the experiment (974,240 code lines).54 The data was broken
down into six police districts, and within these districts, more granular
analysis of each outcome was then conducted. We were particularly
interested in use of force and complaints as dependent variables, but were
quick to learn that arrests—a dimension that was not covered in the original
Rialto Experiment—could be addressed as well.

For arrests, however, we were concerned that initiatives specific to
individual districts are unique and therefore create statistical noise that
would make it difficult to compare the treatment and control conditions.55
Thus, we did not take into account police-generated arrests resulting from
stop-and-account, street checks or unique operations. While our results

50 See id.
51 See http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/08,48089,0820000,08031,00.
52 See http://www.city-data.com/crime/crime-Denver-Colorado.html (2014 data).
53 See http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd13ppp ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Denver Police_Department.
54 We did not incorporate data prior to twelve months pretreatment as force district

boundaries were changed prior.
55 See generally Ariel et al., supra note 4.

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would therefore be limited to a subset of police–public interactions—
victim-generated and witnesses-reported crimes—this tradeoff enabled us
to make causal inferences with fewer assumptions that are more difficult to
defend.

Another concern was raised when we noticed that the baseline figures
are different for the treatment and control conditions. This baseline
inequality required statistical adjustments, in order to make the groups more
comparable. This comparability is discussed below in more detail. We have
taken into consideration the number of victim-generated emergency calls
for service (911 calls), as a way to stabilize the pre-treatment conditions.
These are the types of calls for service that are less susceptible to data-
recording manipulations by the field officers, as they are recorded by call
takers, rather than the officers—and could be used as controlling variables.

Overall, access was granted to eighteen months of data on 1184
recorded incidents of use of police force, 844 complaints against police
misconduct and 223 complaints against police use of force. The breakdown
of the effect of BWCs on complaint types is novel, as the number of
complaints post-treatment was too small in the Rialto Experiment for
meaningful analyses by complaint type (n=3). Finally, we observed 16,774
unique arrests associated with incidents generated by citizen calls for
service.

D. TREATMENT AND COMPARISON GEOGRAPHIC SITES

As noted, the primary methodological challenge in this study was
baseline imbalance. District 6, the treatment area, was discernibly different
from any other district in the city.56 Over the years there had been more
calls for service to the police, more arrests, more reported incidents of use
of force, and more complaints against officers in the treatment area than in
any other district. For this reason, the raw between-group measures were
insufficient and thus required adjustment to allow for a fair comparison.
One methodological option was to select a comparison district that was as
close as possible to the treatment district.57 However, there was no single
site, similar to the treatment district, in terms of all dependent variables (use
of force, complaints, or arrests). Similarly, a single comparison site might
also have been very different due to variability in terms of intra-district
organizational culture, the socio-demographic characteristics of the
neighborhoods that make up each district, and major policy changes in one

56 See infra Table 1.
57 See PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47, at 4 (“Level 3. A comparison between two or

more comparable units of analysis, one with and one without the [treatment].”).

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2016] THE DENVER BWC EXPERIMENT 741

area of the city versus another, that could intervene in the causal inference.
Given these comparability challenges—which were predominately due

to a lack of the rigorous controlled settings that characterize true
experiments (discussed below)—a more conservative test was selected, in
which the treatment district was compared to all other five districts in the
city, combined within a difference-in-differences test (DID).58 We were
particularly interested in the before–after variations in the outcome
variables while comparing these products between the intervention area and
comparison areas. Therefore, the use of BWCs was compared against the
mean scores of all other districts. This is likely to be referred to as a “Level
4 study” on the Maryland Scale, which is one level shy of the golden
standard of evaluation research: randomized controlled trials.59

E. APPARATUS

TASER Inc.60 provided Denver Police officers with BWCs. These
body-mounted cameras capture evidence from the officer’s perspective;
they were affixed to the collar, so were visible to those people who came
into contact with the police. Like the Rialto study, officers were not given
discretion as to when to use the BWCs, and every enforcement encounter
was required to be recorded.61 The officers were instructed to have the

58 See Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE (2003); Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky,
Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using the Allocations of Police Forces After a Terrorist
Attack, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 115 (2004); Stephen G. Donald & Kevin Lang, Inference with
Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel Data, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 221, 226 (2007).

59 See PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47, at 5 (“Level 4. Comparison between multiple
units with and without the program, controlling for other factors, or using comparison units
that evidence only minor differences.”). See generally SHADISH et al., supra note 45, at 13;
David Weisburd et al., Randomized Experiments in Criminology and Criminal Justice, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4283, 4284 (2014) (“There are a wide
variety of competing methods in experimental research used to strengthen internal validity,
but randomized experiments are considered by many researchers to be the ‘gold standard.’”);
Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance:
Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28–29 (2012); Marcia
L. Meldrum, A Brief History of the Randomized Controlled Trial: From Oranges and
Lemons to the Gold Standard, 14 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY CLINICS N. AM. 745 (2000).

60 We Are TASER, TASER, INC., https://www.taser.com/company (last visited Dec. 30,
2015).

61 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 520–21. If the officer applies discretion and deviates from
the protocol which dictates the videotaping of the encounter—for whatever reason—the
deterrent effect of the camera could be nil. It would convolute the study; lacking differences
between the experimental and control conditions (i.e., in both groups officers do not use
BWCs). In this case, officer discretion becomes an important issue. Indeed, “police work is
complex, . . . police use enormous discretion, discretion is at the core of police functioning.”

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cameras on during every shift and to announce to suspect, victims and
witnesses with whom they engaged that the interaction was videotaped. At
the end of every shift, officers in the treatment site were required to return
to their stations, and to download, tag, and register all the incidents during
which evidence was captured on tape.

Notably, once recording commenced, officers did not have discretion
nor the technical access to delete footage. The footage would automatically
be downloaded to a cloud-based server, with metadata tags for future
access. While officers have had access to their own recorded footage and
ability to input notes, they were not allowed to delete data.

IV. MEASURES

A. USE OF FORCE

The Denver Police Department ordinarily records use of force
incidents, like most U.S. police forces.62 This standardized tracking system
counted the reported incidents during the experimental period in all districts
in the city, during the experimental, as well as pretreatment, period. Similar
to the Rialto Experiment, we were less concerned with the types of force
responses, or the eligibility of the use of force incidents (excessive,

GEORGE L. KELLING, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., “BROKEN WINDOWS” AND
POLICE DISCRETION 6 (1999) [hereinafter “BROKEN WINDOWS”].
Discretion is the essence that underpins policing by consent. Yet, to what extent we
should accord officers discretion when using BWCs is currently unclear, mainly because we
simply do not know when it is appropriate to use BWCs. Should BWCs be used in every
type of incident? When communicating with victims of domestic violence? What data
should be stored as evidence, and for how long should they be kept? At which point of the
interaction should the device be turned on? Therefore, at this stage of the evidence on
BWCs, discretion should not be given to officers. To illustrate, think of the following
scenario: a study on BWCs in which two police districts—one with and one without
BWCs—participate. Assume that the “treatment district” allows full discretion to its officers
on when or how to use the devices. Also assume that BWCs have a cooling off effect that
reduces the use of police force. It is not unlikely, particularly in critical incidents where the
devices would have an effect, officers will not turn the cameras on, or on time. There is risk
that activating a camera during a tense situation may serve to increase aggression in the
citizen/suspect (and thus the officer). Therefore, BWCs should be thought of as one
particular intervention for which on-scene discretion should be relinquished, and every
encounter save certain crime types should be videotaped from the very first moment of the
encounter. No-discretion is contained in police in-car and dash cams, as well as CCTV in
interrogation rooms.

62 See Geoffrey P. Alpert & Michael R. Smith, Police Use of Force Data: Where We Are
and Where We Should Be Going, 2 POLICE Q. 57, 57–58 (1999); see also Matthew J.
Hickman et al., Reliability of the Force Factor Method in Police Use of Force Research,
18 POLICE Q. 368, 369 (2015).

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disproportional, or illegal);63 we operationalized the “use of force”
dependent variable as whether force was used or not.64 We counted the
number of these use of force incidents in each district, during pretreatment
(baseline) as well as post-treatment periods.

B. CITIZEN COMPLAINTS

As in other forces, complaints filed against the police by citizens are
tracked by the Denver Police Department.65 These measures are often used
in policing studies to illustrate how officers adhere to internal rules of
conduct, as deviations from these regulations can potentially be construed
as signals of noncompliance.66 Here, as well, we counted the number of
complaints filed (as opposed to processed) against police officers in the
treatment, as well as comparison, districts, both before and after assignment
to treatment and control conditions.

To be sure, it is not entirely clear how to interpret a high or low
prevalence of complaints, and what, if anything, they represent.67 On the
one hand, complaints may be construed as signs of misbehavior. Whenever

63 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 521–22.
64 Much can be said about the crudeness of this binary measure, which we are unable to

dissect in the limited scope of the present Article. The specific context and the causal
mechanisms in which force is used is still contested, including what party—officer or
suspect—initiated the forceful contact with the other party. See, e.g., Darren Henstock &
Barak Ariel, Testing the Effects of Body-Worn Video on Police Use-of-Force Beyond
Restraint in Arrests: A Randomised Controlled Trial (forthcoming 2016); see also Ariel et
al., supra note 4, at 521–22 (“[I]t is nearly always up to the individual officer to account for
those incidents where force was used. Given the subjectivity of this variable and the
measurement problems . . . we therefore relied on these official written reports, but not
without hesitation. Specifically in our study, our dependent variable only indicates whether
or not force was used, but it does not say ‘how much’ force was used. The ‘amount’ of force
used is also up to the officer to write down, as he or she recollects it.”). Indeed, BWCs may
provide some evidence, as the incident is recorded and can demonstrate, at least from the
officer’s perspective, who “threw the first punch,” why and under which conditions force is
more likely to occur in these encounters, however this qualitative assessment also goes
beyond the scope of the present article. Future research should look more closely at the
context of use of force in light of the use of BWCs, more granularly, by breaking down the
use of force variable into the different types of forces that can be used in police–public
contacts.

65 Andrew J. Goldsmith, What’s Wrong with Complaint Investigations? Dealing with
Difference Differently in Complaints Against Police, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 36 (1996).

66 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 515; see, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Pulling Levers
Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Prevention of Gun Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 332,
335–40 (2008) (comparing incident reports of gun homicide from subject police department
with data from police departments in similar sized cities).

67 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 515, 522.

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a party feels aggrieved, a way to restore these feelings of injustice is by
formally complaining about the conduct, aftermath, and overall attitude of
the officer, in light of what the complainant has perceived was unfair
treatment.68 In this respect, more complaints would be viewed as more
problems for the department to deal with, as a higher prevalence of reports
mirrors a higher prevalence of noncompliance with the rules that govern
officers’ behavior. On the other hand, more complaints could also be
interpreted as a “good” thing, because they suggest that citizens have not
“lost hope in the system” and accept that processes will be revisited,
officers reprimanded as necessary, and restitution will be made.69 While
this interpretation is not mutually exclusive of the first, it is nevertheless
difficult to ascertain what the equilibrium point would be, or the optimal
number of complaints that balances between the two.

There is, however, a third interpretation which must be recognized,
adding yet another layer of complexity: it is not too uncommon for some
members of the public to file a complaint against an officer in spite;
spuriously, frivolously, or, indeed, maliciously.70 Some complaints are filed
when the complainant is cognizant that the outcome of the interaction with
the police, the procedure in which it was conducted, or both, were in fact
legal, proportional, and “professional”; yet the citizen, nevertheless,
complains.71

Regardless of the motivation for lodging a complaint, and whatever
the interpretation of the court might be, it can be agreed that complaints are
costly;72 most departments would be only too happy to reduce them to a

68 See, e.g., MIKE MAGUIRE & CLAIRE CORBETT, A STUDY OF THE POLICE COMPLAINTS

SYSTEM 55–58 (1991) (discussing the various reasons and needs people have for
complaints); Ian Waters & Katie Brown, Police Complaints and the Complainants’
Experience, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 617, 621–622 (2000) (discussing the Police
Complaints Commission and effects it had on alleviating the unfair feelings felt by
individuals).

69 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 515; see MAGUIRE & CORBETT, supra note 68, at 57–58
(examining the reasons why people file police reports and how their complaint experience
impacts their perception of the police); see also Waters & Brown, supra note 68, at 633–35
(finding that the majority of complainants surveyed lost confidence in the police after filing
a complaint).

70 See Tim Prenzler et al., Complaints Against Police: The Complainants’ Experience,
1 J. CRIM. JUST. RES. 1 (2010); Waters & Brown, supra note 68, at 621–622.

71 John Liederbach et al., Is It an Inside Job? An Examination of Internal Affairs
Complaint Investigation Files and the Production of Nonsustained Findings, 18 CRIM. JUST.
POL’Y REV. 353, 370 (2007).

72 See Alan Ray Stafford, Lawsuits Against the Police: Reasons for the Proliferation of
Litigation in the Past Decade, 2 J. POL. & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 30 (1986); see also Goldsmith,
supra note 65.

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2016] THE DENVER BWC EXPERIMENT 745

minimum.73 In the U.S. context especially, complaints can be quite
expensive, and, in large police departments, can engender multimillion-
dollar settlements, not to mention investigative, litigation, and
organizational expenses.74 Thus, any apparatus that can reduce not only the
number of complaints, per se, but also the reasons for lodging a complaint,
can be considered beneficial. Therefore, we used the data captured by the
department to count the number of complaints filed against police officers
as a main outcome of interest. We observed both the total number of
complaints for police misconduct and the total number of complaints filed
against use of force in the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods in all
districts.

C. ARRESTS

We observed the number of arrests (for any offense) made by the
officers in each district (again, before and after treatment assignment).
However, counting arrests is not a straightforward measure in respect to
how BWCs would affect its occurrence. First, arrest should not be
considered an outcome of police actions but, rather, an output, and as such
can change on the basis of local policies, investigative requirements, and
the perceived dangerousness of the suspect.75 The frequency of applying the
alternatives—verbal warnings, requests to meet the police at the station at a
later date, cautions, etc.—can, therefore, change as well based on local
customs, including intradistrict cultures.76

Second, it is not clear whether BWCs would reduce or increase arrest
records: on the one hand, in some instances where previously the police
officer would have applied alternatives to arrest, now the recording “of
everything” might increase an averseness to risk by the officer. Put
differently, officers who would otherwise close the case with a caution or a
warning might instead apply the most common denominator—arrest. Some

73 Id.
74 See, e.g., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/moneytips/largest-legal-settlements_b_

8122202.html.
75 See generally Douglas A. Smith & Christy A. Visher, Street-level Justice: Situational

Determinants of Police Arrest; Decisions, 29 SOC. PROBS. 167, 167–68, 173 (1981); Douglas
A. Smith et al., Equity and Discretionary Justice: The Influence of Race on Police Arrest
Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 235 (1984).

76 William Terrill & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Situational and Officer-Based Determinants
of Police Coercion, JUST. Q. 215, 234–35 (2002) (describing a “control” independent factor
where the Indianapolis police “crackdowns and aggressive stops” differed from the St.
Petersburg “problem solving and community organizing” ways).

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refer to this phenomenon, albeit in a different context, as “net widening.”77
On the other hand, the use of BWCs could, instead, result in fewer

arrests. The need for arrest could potentially decrease, as a result of the
suspect presenting a less confrontational demeanor in response to being
videotaped. A major predictor of both use of force and, more broadly, arrest
is the way in which the suspect responds to the interaction with the
officer.78 Demeanor goes hand in hand with additional facilitators of the
decision to arrest: suspects’ resistance,79 legal cues,80 or disrespect.81
Therefore, if the suspect is non-confrontational, non-threatening, and
compliant, an arrest is less likely.82 BWCs are then hypothesized to have a
“cooling off” effect on the police–public interaction anyway,83 and,
therefore, one conceivable output is fewer arrests.

Furthermore, the decision to arrest may be altered when BWCs are
used as well. Officers’ administrative decisions to arrest often go
uncontested if executed properly. If the arrest follows guidelines, courts
would seldom interfere with the officer’s discretion and subsequently his or
her decision to bring a suspect into custody. In many ways and when
considering the alternatives, making an arrest is the easiest option when
dealing with suspects, especially when the “amount” of evidence necessary
to justify the arrest is actually very minimal.84 More importantly, when

77 Thomas G. Blomberg & Julie Mestre, Net-Widening, in I THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 573, 574–75 (J. Mitchell Miller ed., 2014).

78 See Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST. Q. 241,
242, 262–64 (2004); Terrill & Mastrofski, supra note 76, at 219.

79 Terrill & Mastrofski, supra note 76, at 219.
80 Id. at 217.
81 Reisig et al., supra note 78. But cf. Robin Shepard Engel et al., Further Exploration of

the Demeanor Hypothesis: The Interaction Effects of Suspects’ Characteristics and
Demeanor on Police Behavior, 17 JUST. Q. 235, 237, 255–57 (2000) (finding no statistical
significance in demeanor).

82 Smith & Visher, supra note 75, at 169 (“The demeanor of the suspect also influences
police decisions to invoke the law. . . . [R]esearch indicates that antagonistic or hostile
suspects run a greater risk of being arrested”).

83 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 517.
84 E.g., Lathers v. United States, 396 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1968) (“An officer need not

be astronomically precise before making an arrest.”); Overstock Book Co. v. Barry, 305 F.
Supp. 842, 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (“To arrest someone [sic], a police officer does not have to
determine first that the law under which he is acting will later be found to be constitutional
by a court.”); Joseph G. Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest, 24 VAND. L. REV. 317, 318–38
(1970) (laying out the various methods for proving probable cause to arrest in factual
scenarios); Caleb Foote, Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 402, 402–03 (1960); Wayne A. Logan, An
Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 381, 391–400 (2001); Amanda L. Robinson & Meghan S. Chandek, The

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2016] THE DENVER BWC EXPERIMENT 747

aligning the word of the officer against the word of the suspect, we
axiomatically place more credence to the former rather than the latter.85 Can
this axiom now be challenged when BWCs are introduced? Would officers
think twice before arresting suspects and subsequently use this tool less
frequently when equipped with BWCs?

Ideally, we would observe all arrests during the experimental period.
However, as alluded to earlier, we observed arrest counts associated with
victim-generated calls for service, not arrests following proactive policing,
such as stop-and-account, crackdowns, or street stops. Arrests associated
with proactive policing are policy-dependent (see above), and the
intragroup variance—that is, differences between the conditions in the
treatment site and the comparison sites—was too great and cannot be
controlled statistically. On the other hand, we have made an assumption
that, broadly speaking, arrests following victim-generated calls for service
are less susceptible to proactive policies and the likelihood of an arrest
under no-treatment conditions are broadly stochastic. The decision to
exclude street checks and stop-and-accounts obviously dilutes the potential
magnitude of the effect but, nevertheless, clears out some of the statistical
noise associated with natural variations between the study conditions.

D. CITIZEN-INITIATED 911 CALLS FOR SERVICE

We measured the total calls for service initiated by the public (e.g.,
victims and witnesses) as opposed to events initiated by the police officers
themselves in each district, broken down into pretreatment and post-
treatment periods. This measure, however, was primarily used as a
stabilizing variable for the aggregated data: the number of 911 calls was not
the same across the districts, and this hinges on different workloads the
different geographic regions experienced. With this variable, we were able
to create more balanced groups with less heterogeneity between the groups
at baseline by measuring the outcome variables as a rate of the calls for
service in the district.

V. STATISTICAL PROCEDURE

We used adjusted odds ratios (OR) to assess the differences and to
compare the responses (Y: the outcome variables) according to the value of

Domestic Violence Arrest Decision: Examining Demographic, Attitudinal, and Situational
Variables, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 18, 19, 32–33 (2000); William B. Waegel, Case
Routinization in Investigative Police Work, 28 SOC. PROBS. 263, 263 (1981).

85 Jennifer Groscup & Steven D. Penrod, Battle of the Standards for Experts in Criminal
Cases: Police v. Psychologists, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1141, 1148 n.32 (2002).

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the explanatory variable (X: BWCs or controls). With the aggregated data,
we had two binary variables that each had only two possible levels (counts
of observations at each level), displayed in a 2 x 2 contingency table. We
therefore used the total counts as the denominator (pretreatment + post-
treatment) and the number of events within the post-treatment period only
as the numerator, and computed the OR for each outcome variable.
However, as we were aware that the treatment group was not similar to the
control areas (it is ‘hotter’ than other places), our measures were stabilized
by incorporating the number of 911 calls for service each district
experienced and extracting the rate per 1,000,000 calls. We measured the
outcomes—use of force; complaints for “general” misconduct; complaints
against use of force; and arrests—for the pretreatment and post-treatment
periods for the treatment and control districts. We carried out this procedure
twice, once by comparing each comparison district with the treatment
district (five times) and again by comparing the pooled controls against the
treatment districts.86 We also measured 95% confidence intervals, in order
to assess the significance of these results.

Figure 1

/
/

VI. QUALITATIVE ANALYSES: OFFICERS’ SURVEYS

In order to qualitatively explore the effect of BWCs on police officers,
we conducted surveys in the treatment district. All 119 officers were
approached with a request to fill out an online questionnaire aimed to
understand how they viewed the use of BWCs, what impact the devices
may have on their sense of self-legitimacy, and whether or not they viewed
the devices positively or negatively. Notably, we did not conduct surveys
with officers in the non-treatment conditions, so the results of these surveys
are limited to one arm of the experiment only and, therefore, cannot be used
as measures of treatment outcomes. Still, the findings are informative.

86 We are unable to perform a meta-analysis on the data as combining all five

comparisons meta-analytically violates the assumption that the inter-group comparisons are
independent of one another (they cannot be as the treatment group is always the same). This
approach was not feasible; instead, the pooled sample of all controls was used to show the
overall ORs.

87 Per 1,000,000 calls.

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These main findings are more robust elsewhere;88 however, herein we
provide the responses of officers about two open-ended items. First, we
asked officers: “Is there something else you wish to say about your
expectations for BWCs in police work?” This open-ended question was
meant to allow officers to express their perceptions about how BWCs
would affect their performance and police work day-to-day. Second, we
asked officers to tell us whether “there [was] something else [they]
wish[ed] to say about [their] fears for BWCs in police work?” Here, as
well, we were keen to explore the officers’ perceptions about what they see
as threats to their work environment. Hereunder, we report the responses
associated with the effect of BWCs on officers’ decision to arrest.

VII. RESULTS

A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1 presents pretreatment and post-treatment raw figures on the
outcome variables. As shown, there were over 924,457 citizen-initiated 911
calls for service in the study period; however, the counts substantially
varied between the districts, with District 6 (treatment area) situated in the
upper-bound of this range. The area experienced more arrests—in absolute
terms—than any other area. Differences in these two indications—arrests
and calls for service—suggest different levels of activity that took place in
the treatment area compared to other areas and strengthen the need for
adjustments at baseline prior to any testing. Our two major outcomes of
interest—use of force and complaints against the police—were also at the
upper bound of the range of counts at baseline.

88 Barak Ariel & Justice Tankebe, Racial Stratification and Multiple Outcomes in Police

Stops and Searches, POLICING & SOCIETY (forthcoming 2016), currently available at
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2016.1184270.

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Table 1
Before and After Raw Measures Between Treatment (District 6) and Five

Comparison Conditions

District

1
District

2
District

3
District

4
District

5
District

911 Calls for Service

Pre-treatment* 99,647 102,514 121,572 86,548 53,044 105,482

Post-treatment^ 56,471 60,650 76,848 55,393 34,889 71,399

Arrests
Pre-treatment 1,690 1,598 2,132 1,673 1,326 2,718

Post-treatment 854 782 1,053 995 679 1,274

Use of Force Incidents
Pre-treatment 101 118 135 157 58 210

Post-treatment 67 49 57 77 44 111

Misconduct Complaints
Pre-treatment 83 120 91 84 30 109

Post-treatment 44 63 64 41 33 82

Use of Force
Complaints

Pre-treatment 10 17 14 22 6 42

Post-treatment 18 18 23 11 8 34

^ 6 months of data (6/23/14–12/15/14); * Pre-Treatment (7/01/2013–6/23/2014).

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B. TREATMENT OUTCOMES

Use of Force

Looking at the pooled ORs in Table 2, the estimates suggest that the
odds of reporting of use of force by police officers in the treatment area did
not change significantly compared to controlled conditions (OR=0.93, 95%
CI 0.834–1.031). There is considerable variability between the different
districts—ranging between OR=0.67 in District 1 and OR=1.17 in District 3
(Q=98.98; p<0.001); yet, overall, the comparisons show no discernable effect of BWCs in Denver on the likelihood of reporting of use of force.

Complaints Against the Police

When observing the overall fluctuations from the year prior to the
experimental period and the six months of the study, we can see that the

Table 2
Use of Force, Complaints, and Arrests: Treatment Area vs. Control Areas: Odds Ratios (OR)

Complaints –
Misconduct

Complaints – Use of
Force

Use of Force

Arrests

95% CI

Groups

OR
Lower
Limit

Upper
Limit

OR
Lower
Limit
Upper
Limit
OR
Lower
Limit
Upper
Limit
OR
Lower
Limit
Upper
Limit

Dist. 1 1.188** 1.045 1.352 0.375*** 0.289 0.487 0.668*** 0.600 0.743 0.777*** 0.754 0.799

Dist. 2 1.253*** 1.113 1.410 0.668** 0.530 0.843 1.113† 0.995 1.244 0.837*** 0.812 0.863

Dist. 3 0.999 0.878 1.138 0.460*** 0.357 0.592 1.168* 1.042 1.310 0.886*** 0.861 0.913

Dist. 4 1.458*** 1.284 1.656 1.527*** 1.215 1.918 1.019 0.926 1.122 0.745*** 0.725 0.766

Dist. 5 0.665*** 0.582 0.760 0.590*** 0.454 0.767 0.677*** 0.610 0.752 0.889*** 0.866 0.914

Pooled
Controls

1.136* 1.001 1.288 0.650*** 0.512 0.827 0.928 0.834 1.031 0.820*** 0.797 0.844

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001; † =.061

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overall number of complaints (against both misconduct and use of force)
increased by 38%89—or 1105 at pretreatment compared to 1524 post-
treatment. These findings contradict the findings from the Rialto
Experiment, where complaints have declined by nearly 90%.90 Notably,
however, this result is not experimental, as it looks at the overall
fluctuations in complaints, including variations in the control districts. This
increase does not take into account the number of calls either.

When looking at between-groups outcomes, the odds of a complaint
for misconduct filed against officers in the control areas was 14% higher
than in the treatment area (OR=1.136, 95% CI 1.001–1.288). Variations
between the comparison groups emerged as well, with the odds of
complaint ranging from 0.67 in District 5 to 1.46 in District 4, to no
discernable difference between the odds for treatment District 6 and
District 3.

Overall, when looking at the specific subcategory of complaints filed
against the police for use of force, we find that the odds of a complaint in
control districts was 35% higher compared to the treatment district
(OR=0.650, 95% CI 0.512–0.827). The pattern was maintained in the
pairwise comparisons with Districts 1, 2, 3, and 5, but not with District 4,
where odds for complaints against use of force went up compared to the
treatment conditions (Table 2).

Arrests

The overall odds of an arrest was significantly reduced in treatment
conditions compared to controls (OR=0.820, 95% CI 0.797–0.844), and this
pattern emerged across all comparisons. The odds of an arrest was overall
about 18% higher in control conditions compared to treatment area.

Qualitative Outcomes

Officers expressed views that emphasized the causal estimates
described above. Two particular expectations shared by officers are
noteworthy. Speaking about how BWCs are perceived as mechanisms of
control over officers, one officer remarked that: “Big Brother eye in the sky
has just landed on our heads! . . . There is no more honor in this world, only
lawsuits.” Another shared this sentiment, further emphasizing that BWCs

We annualized the number of complaints and observed the ratio between the

pretreatment and post-treatment periods, or 1- ∑
2*npost

npre
.

90 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 523–25.

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“will hinder officer initiated police work.”
More pronounced responses were expressed as fears that BWCs will

impede police work; many officers viewed BWCs as a means of taking
away their discretion and introducing enhanced liability for decisions they
would otherwise make more freely. For instance, one officer claimed that:

Arm chair quarterbacks will dissect every word and every action said and done in
milliseconds. Frame by Frame the officer will be criticized for acting, re acting or not
acting at all. The Youtube community, however, will have a grand ‘ol time bashing
police officers who are working hard to protect the civilian public they are sworn to
protect. Cops are human after all. What’s next, cameras in the cock pit because we
want to make sure the pilot doesn’t have a human moment. We put our lives in the
hands of pilots and doctors and I don’t see doctors or pilots wearing BWV’s, and if
they did, I would be a little disturbed about it. It’s all about private corporations
making money, period.

Another officer commented that: “I would like to be able to review the
footage of my interactions as many times as necessary for me without fear
of being asked to articulate why I did it.” And another officer wrote:

The current [BWCs] policy that has been written by this department gives the Internal
Affairs Bureau the ability to make arbitrary discretion . . . . [T]his seems like a useless
policy unless the goal of the department is to trap officers in false statements due to
differences of perception.

The ability to ‘forgo’ certain decisions was raised as well:

The standard for keeping/deleting video should be the same for police as it is for the
citizens: If anyone with a cell phone camera can delete footage they don’t like, so
should the police. Police should also have the option when to record their interactions
with the public (it shouldn’t be mandatory to record every contact/call).

Mistrust was another key dimension raised by officers: “I fear that the
use of this technology shows an increase in the trend of lack of trust in
police officers both by the public and by those in management. My word
and the fact that I already hold myself to a higher standard no longer
matter.”

Officers also expressed doubt about how footage would be viewed by
the public or line managers, stating “Police work can be messy. Having
actions reviewed from a seat after the fact can be too easily abused by the
public or administration,” and that “the general public may not understand
or like how officers at times have to talk or behave towards the criminal
element to gain their cooperation in following orders.”

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VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The proliferation of the implementation of BWCs in the United States
continues.91 If it is of any indication, the share value of the leading
company in the production of these devices—TASER International Inc.—
has continued to soar since the results of the Rialto Experiment began to
surface.92 The political and public pressure to procure these devices will
continue unabated so long as they are pushed as a panacea to virtually all
issues with policing in the 21st century.93 However, even if they could be a
game-changer, the scope of rigorous evidence currently available is
insufficient to support such a claim. BWCs are promising, but under what
conditions they ‘work’ is still unclear. We must be cautious with our limited
public budgets, and we ought to be hesitant about great promises,
particularly when there is as much a likelihood of a backfiring effect to
using BWCs in police operations as there is to unmitigated success.94
Would BWCs increase the likelihood of use of force in some other forces?
Would police legitimacy be jeopardized? Will the testimony of officers be
conditional of recorded footage?95 In the current state of affairs, when
published evidence is severely lacking, we do not know. While there seems
to be great promise that BWCs can have a “cooling off effect” on police–
public engagements—owed specifically to deterrence theory96—more
research is needed, on as many issues as possible, with as many
jurisdictions as possible.

In this study, we aimed to expand our understanding of the effect of
BWCs in large police departments. The Denver Police Department is an
example of such a force. We complicated the Rialto Experiment findings
further, by adding an additional layers to the use of force and citizens’

91 Research on Body-Worn Cameras and Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST., DEP’T OF

JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/technology/pages/body-worn-cameras.
aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2015).

92 See TASER International, Inc. Stock Chart for Dec. 30, 2014 through Dec. 30, 2015,
NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/tasr/stock-chart (last visited Dec. 30, 2015). But
see id. (noting an overall decline in price since mid-July 2015).

93 Adam Bannister, Body-Worn Cameras: a Panacea for Policing Problems? Or a
Regulatory and Technological Minefield?, IFSEC GLOBAL.COM (June 27, 2014), http://
www.ifsecglobal.com/body-worn-camera-trials-can-police-surmount-regulatory-techno
logical-challenges/.

94 Ariel & Tankebe, supra note 88.
95 See Tim Cushing, Indiana Supreme Court Declares an Officer’s Testimony is More

Reliable Than Video Evidence, TECHDIRT (Apr. 10, 2014, 7:19 AM), https://www.techdirt.
com/articles/20140405/17142626817/indiana-supreme-court-declares-officers-testimony-is-
more-reliable-than-video-evidence.shtml.

96 See Ariel et al., supra note 4.

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complaints dimensions: first, we looked at additional outcomes—the
productivity of policing, measured by arrest counts. We believed there was
logic behind a causal mechanism which stipulates that variations in
productivity would follow the use of BWCs—except we did not know in
which direction: Would BWCs cause officers to “think twice” about the
need for an arrest (i.e., reduction in arrests), would BWCs cause officers to
terminate more encounters with an arrest, being a common denominator for
the risk-averse officer (increase in arrests), or will BWCs reduce the need to
make an arrest, as the interaction between the suspect and the officer would
be less aggressive, thus allowing the officer to continue with a criminal
justice outcome via alternative methods?

The second layer we explored was methodological in nature, and was
to change the unit of analysis from shift-based97 to large aggregated police
district level. This analytical approach looked at the adjusted odds ratio of
any one of these four outcomes (use of force, complaint against
misconduct, complaints on use of force, and arrests), in one district where
BWCs were deployed, in comparison with the odds of these events
occurring in the five other districts that served as controls.

Before we discuss the findings more robustly, we note that taking into
account the number of victim-generated calls for service in order to create
baseline equality between the groups is useful, but not perfect. This
procedure was necessary because the outcome variables at pretreatment
levels were inconsistent across the study conditions. We assumed that
victim-generated 911 calls are exogenous to police policies. As the volume
of calls dictates so much about policing, taking them into consideration was
assumed to take away some of intergroup variance—despite the fact that
variability was expected, given the natural differences that exist between
police districts in large metropolitan cities. Methodologically, this model
will always be susceptible to alternative explanations,98 as we can only rule
out alternative explanations to the causal inference asymptomatically.
Incorporating 911 calls may create some intergroup balance, but it is not
enough for making a relaxed assumption about baseline equilibrium. Future
studies might benefit from other statistical procedures, such as propensity
score matching techniques, to overcome baseline inequality. Another

97 Barak Ariel & William A. Farrar, Rialto Police Department Wearable Cameras
Experiment: A Criminological Protocol for Operating Randomized Trials, in UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH: REGISTRY OF EXPERIMENTS IN POLICING STRATEGY AND TACTICS 5
(2012), http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/research/experiments/rex-post/rialto .

98 PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47; SHADISH ET AL., supra note 45; see Lawrence W.
Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol
in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 689 (1995) (discussing the methodology).

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approach is to use street segments as the unit of analysis and measure the
treatment effect within comparable hotspots; hotspots are stable and
consistent, and can therefore be used to somewhat stabilize baseline
imbalances.99 More broadly, these design concerns illustrate the superiority
of randomized controlled trials (RCT) in the assessment of causal inference:
it is unlikely that a properly designed experiment, with sufficient statistical
power to detect significant effect sizes about the magnitude of the
difference between treatment and control conditions that were randomly
assigned, would face similar jeopardies to the internal validity of the test.100
Our Level 3, possibly 4 study, on the Maryland Scientific Scale faces
baseline imbalance and susceptibility to the effect of outliers (our degrees
of freedom are 5, if the unit of analysis is the geographic district). For this,
among other reasons, we strongly recommend future impact evaluations in
the area of BWCs to endorse RCT methodologies, as discussed more
thoroughly below.

Still, our findings are instructive. We discuss the implications of these
findings below, but begin with a summary of the findings. Overall, we
found that the likelihood of reporting a use of force incident is no different
when BWCs are in use or not; the odds of a misconduct complaint against
police officers when BWCs are present are 14% higher than controls, but
there are 35% greater odds to attract a complaint for the use of force when
BWCs are not present. Finally, the odds of any arrests went down by 18%
in the treatment area compared to control areas—which we sense is the
primary novel contribution this paper makes. We elaborate on these
findings in the following sections.

A. EFFECT OF BWCS ON USE OF FORCE: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY

BWCs in Denver have had a non-significant overall effect on use of
force. However, compared to three out of the five comparison districts, the
odds of officers filing a formal report about the use of force rose
significantly by more than 15% when BWCs were used by officers in the
treatment conditions compared to control conditions. While these increases
are not uniform across all comparisons (odds of use of force went down
compared to two police districts in Denver, which created an overall non-
significant outcome), we find these seemingly counterintuitive increases
particularly important for future research. We interpret these findings

99 Barak Ariel, Increasing Cooperation with the Police Using Body-Worn Cameras, 19

POLICE Q. 326 (2016).
100 PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47, at 4–5.

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within the framework of accountability and transparency.
When officers use “force,” they are nearly always required to file an

official report of such incidents, even if only in their pocketbooks.101 The
challenge, however, is that not every physical action on the part of an
officer is considered force. The very definition can be subjective, memory-
prone, and generally unclear. Adams suggests that use of force occurs “at
least twice as often” as suggested by official reports,102 and it is likely to be
the case particularly in incidents of low-level force that do not amount to
anything the police officer feels he or she needs to account for. In addition,
some ethnographic work in this area suggests that what is construed as a
“reportable incident of force” and how much force is appropriate, is often
predicated by a police department’s organizational culture.103 For example,
police subculture in relation to the reporting of use of force plays a role in
accepting or allowing for force to be applied in certain circumstances.104
Researchers who study police organizations have been claiming for years
that use of force and subsequently its reporting are a function of police
officers’ attitudinal commitment to certain institutional or organizational
cultures around their roles in society and, more broadly, their view of
power.105 Certain institutional and subcultural codes make police agencies
particularly resistant to cultural changes and transparency requirements.106
Feelings of loyalty sustain this code of silence and make it particularly
difficult to investigate purported unnecessary, or excessive, use of force,
especially when it goes unrecorded.107 For example, placing one’s hand on
another’s shoulder in an authoritative way or using aggressive language
may be considered use of force in some instances and for some individuals,
whereas for others they may not.108 Measuring “injury” or “assault” is also

101 Henstock & Ariel, supra note 64, at 15.
102 Kenneth Adams, Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force, in POLICE

VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF FORCE 52, 62 (William A.
Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).

103 Jennifer Hunt, Police Accounts of Normal Force, 13 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 315
(1985); Jeff Rojek et al., Examining Officer and Citizen Accounts of Police Use-of-Force
Incidents, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 301 (2010).

104 See Jerome H. Skolnick, Enduring Issues of Police Culture and Demographics, 18
POLICING & SOC’Y 35 (2008).

105 William Terrill et al., Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force, 40 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 291, 292–93, 308–09 (2003).

106 See Skolnick, supra note 104, at 37 (“[The] unrecorded code [of silence] has been
noted as a feature of policing across continents, wherever commissions of inquiry have
investigated police corruption [or not].”).

107 See id.
108 See Henstock & Ariel, supra note 64.

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likely to be challenged in terms of definitional threshold, as it is open to
interpretation when there are no clear signs of physical contact. Taken
collectively, we see that what needs to be reported or not is not always as
clear-cut as it could be.

What does seem to be clear is that the reporting of use of force is
closely linked to police accountability and transparency. Sound reporting of
use of force is the cornerstone of police accountability. It is essential if
officers are to be held responsible for the actions, regardless of whether or
not their actions are justified.109 As reviewed by other scholars, police
accountability refers to taking responsibility for the actions of the
organization by tracking or measuring its outputs.110 This requirement
demands from the police to be accountable for its performance and to
amend it, when necessary.111 The police must act in the public’s interest,
and therefore is usually assumed to be held to a higher degree of
accountability112—especially given the wide powers they hold in modern
society. For this and other reasons, Samuel E. Walker contends that:

[T]he first accountability procedure to be considered involves the direction and
control officer use of police authority through formal agency policies. This approach,
generically known as administrative rulemaking, is a basic feature of modern police
management, if not all public and private sector organizations. Administrative
rulemaking consists of three elements: specifying approved and forbidden actions in
written policies; requiring officers to file written reports on specific actions; requiring
administrative review of officer reports.113

While deterrence theory would suggest that forceful encounters will be
minimized, it is also logical to see why, once BWCs are mandated in police
operations, reporting of the use of force could increase. Because the cost of
using force without reporting is invariably higher than the cost of the using

109 Stephen D. Mastrofski, The Romance of Police Leadership, in CRIME & SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION 153 (Elin J. Waring & David Weisburd eds., 2002); Prenzler et al., supra
note 70, at 15–16.

110 Mastrofski, supra note 109; Prenzler et al., supra note 70, at 15–16.
111 Wesley G. Skogan, Concern About Crime and Confidence in the Police Reassurance

or Accountability, 12 POLICE Q. 301, 308–13 (2009) (studying the different police and
confidence levels and concerns).

112 Philip Stenning, The Idea of the Political “Independence” of the Police: International
Interpretations and Experiences, in POLICE & GOV’T RELATIONS: WHO IS CALLING THE
SHOTS 183, 187–89, 191 (2007); Philip Stenning, Governance and Accountability in a Plural
Policing Environment—The Story So Far, 3 POLICING 22, 26 (2009).

113 SAMUEL E. WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 94 (2014) (“Critical incidents are a crucial element of police
accountability tools, but if officers fail to complete required reports or do not provide
complete and accurate data the entire accountability system begins to collapse. . . . [T]here is
evidence that officers do not always file required reports.”).

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and subsequently reporting about “using force,” officers in the treatment
condition began filing these administrative reports at an increased rate
compared to some other districts, potentially recording “force” which they
otherwise would have not recorded: compliant handcuffs, hand-to-hand
techniques, and possibly, word commands. What once was left to ad hoc
explanations by officers who did not record “lesser” types of force114 can no
longer be hidden from the radar. BWCs caused officers to become more
accountable, because the odds of “getting caught” using force—now on
videotape—substantially increased, and by implication has caused officers
to file use-of-force records more frequently. Closer observations will be
required in the future about the types of forces that officers are now more
likely to report—data which we did not have access to in the present
study—however, we suspect these behaviors are situated in the lower bands
of the force continuum. Still, if our results are credible, they illustrate the
implication that BWCs have on police accountability and particularly
around the transparency and the reporting of use of force, which continues
to be a contentious area in policing.

Still, why has the Rialto Experiment reported a 50% reduction in the
reported use of force while the present study reports up to 17% increase in
the reported incidents of use of force against some comparison Districts?
We speculate that the discrepancies have to do with the research design and
our decision to exclude police-generated activities. In Rialto, the data
reflected all police actions that were recorded with BWCs, including stop
and search, street stops and various operations initiated by police
officers.115 When Rialto officers proactively engaged with suspects while
using BWCs, they have had far more control over the situation, as they
initiated the contact.116 On the other hand, victim-generated incidents are
more volatile and the severity of force is greater, as officers would reach
offenders in the aftermath of a crime, when the demeanor of suspects is
already adversarial or confrontational—compared to circumstances initiated
by the police.117 Given what we know about demeanor,118 it is likely that

114 Jeff Rojek et al., Policing Race: The Racial Stratification of Searches in Police

Traffic Stops, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 993, 995 (2012).
115 Barak Ariel & William Farrar, The Rialto Police Department Wearable Cameras

Experiment (Experimental Protocol), CRIM-PORT 1.0 (2009), http://www.crim.cam.ac.uk/
research/experiments/rex-post/rialto .

116 Ariel et al., supra note 4, 526–27.
117 Joel H. Garner et al., Characteristics Associated with the Prevalence and Severity of

Force Used by the Police, 19 JUST. Q. 705, 736 (2002) (“In comparison to routine
approaches, when an officer is responding to a priority call, more force is used.”).

118 John D. McCluskey et al., To Acquiesce or Rebel: Predicting Citizen Compliance

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officers in Denver applied force responses to already-heated incidents and
were now more compelled to file these incidents for the reasons reviewed
above. The officers were reactive to an already-existing situation, compared
to proactive policing when officers can manage and govern the interaction
more comprehensively. Future RCTs should review force responses more
closely in police-generated encounters and ascertain who instigates an
aggressive response against whom, whether any ecological factors are at
play in the exacerbation of force responses, such as large audiences (what
can be construed as “theater effects”),119 and to what extent alcohol and
drugs moderate the deterrent effect of BWCs on behavior. As for the latter,
we must be cognizant of the fact that deterrence theory relies heavily on
rational calculations and awareness;120 for this reason, intoxicated offenders
are unlikely to be responsive to deterrent messages or the credible threat of
punishment through their videotaped demeanor. Deterrence requires
rationality, and as intoxicated suspects are often chaotic, deterrence
embodied through BWCs is unlikely to work on them.

In this study, it was not possible to look at police-generated
incidents—stop-and-frisks, crackdowns, hotspot policing, etc.—and to
observe the effect of BWCs in these situations compared to the other
districts. The variations between the districts were too pronounced and
could not be controlled for statistically. A randomized controlled trial, with
random allocation of units into treatment and control conditions would have
created comparable groups in which these baseline differences in proactive
as well as reactive policing tactics can be controlled for.121 This is yet
another example of the advantages of using prospective RCTs compared to
any other methodology,122 and why experimental designs are stronger than
the alternative designs.

B. EFFECT OF BWCS ON COMPLAINTS: CONDITIONAL ON COMPLAINT
TYPE

As the number of complaints in Denver was substantially larger than
in Rialto,123 our experiment can go beyond the crude before–after analyses

with Police Requests, 2 POLICE Q. 389, 404–07 (1999) (discussing the impact demeanor and
citizen action has on the situation).

119 David Schweingruber, Mob Sociology and Escalated Force: Sociology’s
Contribution to Repressive Police Tactics, 41 SOC. Q. 371 (2000).

120 Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in
Criminology, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (1990).

121 E.g., Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 520.
122 PREVENTING CRIME, supra note 47, at 3–5.
123 Ariel & Farrar, supra note 97, at 524 (noting there were only three recorded

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conducted in the original experiment on the effect of BWCs on citizens’
complaints. We are able to report between-group analyses as well. We have
also complicated the story further by looking at the type of complaint filed
against Denver officers.

In the present study, citizens filed more complaints against misconduct
in the treatment district, which may include grievances against cursing,
disrespectful conduct, or what citizens might otherwise consider as police
maltreatment. One interpretation for this finding is that under no-camera
conditions suspects felt they cannot make a claim against officers (in other
words, “it is my word against his”), but with the evidence captured by the
cameras, it is reasonable to assume that citizens have felt they can
corroborate their claims against rude or uncivilized mannerism. Drawing
from the literature on accountability reviewed earlier, BWCs changed the
perceived degree of liability officers can now face and, perhaps, suspects
now feel that officers would be more accountable for their incivilities.
Future research should consider surveys with complainants in both
treatment and control conditions, in order to ascertain their motivation for
lodging a grievance report.

On the other hand, we observed a major reduction in the odds of a
complaint against the use of force, compared to control conditions. A lower
rate of complaints can be viewed as a marker of enhanced perceptions of
police legitimacy and satisfaction with police performance, and we
therefore interpret the significant reductions as increased legitimacy with
District 6 officers compared to control officers, in terms of the application
of force. Complaints allow researchers to assess the extent to which police
legitimacy is influenced by whether community members perceive police–
public encounters that they were treated fairly, with respect and dignity by
police officers.124 It is true that the link between the complaints and
satisfaction and police legitimacy overall is tenuous, but it is not
confounded, particularly when considering the instances in which
reductions in the odds of complaints were observed: use of police force.125

This conclusion deserves a closer look, particularly when we reflect on
the nondiscernable effect in official recordings of use of force made by
officers. One could argue that once BWCs were used, police officers
applied the same force (i.e., made officers not more and not less coercive
when responding to 911 calls for service) and that suspects complained less

complaints during the year of the study).

124 See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches, and the
Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141, 172 (2008).

125 Id.

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about these incidents—however, we find this claim implausible. Instead, we
argue that police officers became more accountable for their use of force in
these instances, and likely in the lower manifestation of the force
continuum such as verbal (commands and threats) and lesser physical
restraint (pat downs or firm grips); and when coercion was applied, it was
both justified and proportional. The fact that the odds for a complaint for
the use of force were substantially lower when BWCs were used, leads us
to conclude that when coercion was applied, it was overall perceived as
more appropriate, otherwise the number of complaints for this category of
behavior would be indistinguishable from control conditions. This was not
the case; as others claim, BWCs serve a “cooling down” mechanism for the
use of force—which our data on complaints on the use of force suggest—
but also that these devices increase transparency and accountability.126 In
future studies, the type of force used should be observed as well in order to
see whether there is evidential merit in our stipulations. We can
nevertheless make a strong claim that the effect of BWCs on complaints is
conditional of the type of citizen complaint: an increase in complaints
against the use of force, and a decrease in complaints for misconduct. This
suggests to us that in future research we should not consider “citizen
complaints” as a homogenous signal of police performance and that more
granular analysis is required.

C. EFFECT OF BWCS ON ARREST DECISIONS

We found support for the claim that the use of BWCs had an effect on
arrests. Our findings suggest that the odds for an arrest were about 18%
higher under no-camera conditions. If these estimates are reliable, we can
conclude BWCs do not cause net-widening but rather a diversion of
encounters that might have led to arrest into alternatives to arrests. An
alternative possibility we entertained earlier was that risk-averse officers
who wear BWCs would be driven into the most-common denominator in
policing—arrest—rather than considering other means to close the case. We
raised the argument because arrests are “easier” than the alternative: they
are often valued positively by many officers as a way to bring offenders to
justice;127 they fulfill the need of many frontline officers’ vision about being

126 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 517–18.
127 See Stephen Armeli et al., Perceived Organizational Support and Police

Performance: The Moderating Influence of Socioemotional Needs, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
288, 293–95 (1998) (discussing similarities with employees helping the company and others
helping the police).

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crime-fighters;128 and they escalate the problem into the criminal justice
system, which is the classic progression from enforcement into prosecution.
However, our evidence did not support this position: arrests went down
when BWCs are in use, even though we excluded police-generated actions.

A discussion of the larger context of arrests is required in order to
better understand their link to BWCs. While variations in both law and
practice exist between different jurisdictions, there are only a very limited
number of scenarios in which a police officer can make an arrest: (a) when
he personally observes a crime; (b) when he possess “probable cause” to
believe the arrestee has committed a crime; (c) when he needs to subdue an
aggressive individual from hurting himself or others; and (d) when he has a
legal arrest warrant issued by the court.129 Clearly, an arrest cannot be made
because the officer has a vague hunch that the suspect is a criminal.130 Thus,
the officer must be able to justify the arrest, often by showing some
“tangible evidence” that led him to probable cause.131 If an arrestee believes
that the arrest was unjustified or incorrect, she may challenge it later, and if
warranted, bring a civil rights case.132 In practice, however, there is a low
burden of proof for police officers to justify their decisions to exercise the
power of arrest.133 Even the smallest subjective cues of resistance—
tampering with evidence, disrespecting the officer, and presenting as a
potentially dangerousness person—provide the necessary justification for
an arrest. This includes a broad list of crime categories that can justify the
legal requirements for probable cause and tangible evidence.134 Unlike
incidents of use of police force (Taser, batons, deadly force, etc.), which
has spurred a fairly elaborate body of case law,135 the decision to arrest—

128 JOAN C. BARKER, DANGER, DUTY, AND DISILLUSION: THE WORLDVIEW OF LOS

ANGELES POLICE OFFICERS 93 (1998).
129 See generally Logan, supra note 84.
130 BARKER, supra note 128, at 93.
131 Id. at 95.
132 See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public

Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1094–96 (1993).

133 Id.
134 Paul Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to

Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 64–67,
70–71 (1966); Myron Moskovitz, Road to Reason: Arizona v. Gant and the Search Incident
to Arrest Doctrine, 79 MISS. L.J.181, 186–88 (2009).

135 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970); Mark S. Bruder, When Police Use Excessive Force:
Choosing a Constitutional Threshold of Liability in Justice v. Dennis, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
735, 741–42 (2012); Petter Gottschalk, Police Criminality and Neutralization: An Empirical

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although far more prevalent—is difficult to challenge, despite public
outcry. It is particularly the case when the distribution of arrests across
races and ethnicities is often argued to be uneven: not all races are arrested
equally.136

Given this framework, one possible interpretation is that BWCs have
an effect on police officers’ decisions to arrest suspects. With the
introduction of BWCs, officers became “cautious” about arresting suspects,
as their decision can more easily be criticized. When the camera records
what the officer views and hears, an arrest that does not pass the tangible
evidence test may be more easily detected. Self-consciousness of being
observed (by a BWC),137 coupled with the credible threat of apprehension
for violating rules and regulations associated with the wrong decision to
arrest,138 has significantly lowered the likelihood that officers would use
arrest.

If this mechanism sticks, what does it say about arrest decisions more
globally, or arrests made in control districts? One critical interpretation
might be that Denver police officers—and we suspect police officers in
general—use arrests far too frequently when many incidents could have
been handled through alternatives to arrest.139 When forced to “think twice”
about arresting suspects, officers are required to ask themselves: “Will I get
in trouble for my decision to arrest?” Under controlled conditions, the
decision to arrest is difficult to oppose and the decision to apply it often
goes uncontested. However, when BWCs are used, officers must provide a
more convincing level of evidence to corroborate their decision to arrest a
person.140 Merely stating “resisting arrest,” “violent demeanor,” or “known
suspect of aggressive behavior” is a necessary, but no longer sufficient,
condition to justifying an arrest. It is particularly the case for officers who
are “more forceful” in the arrest process than others. Collectively, it is
likely that officers in District 6 made fewer arrests because they should
have made fewer arrests in the first place and consider alternatives,

Study of Court Cases, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 501 (2012).

136 Ariel & Tankebe, supra note 88.
137 Gervais & Norenzayan, supra note 34, at 299; Wicklund, supra note 33, at 237, 265.
138 JERVIS ET AL., supra note 41, at 3; Nagin, supra note 35, at 95.
139 Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased Death Rates of Domestic

Violence Victims from Arresting vs. Warning Suspects in Milwaukee Domestic Violence
Experiment, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2014).

140 But cf. Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 367 (Ind. 2014) (holding the trial court’s
finding that an officer’s testimony was more reliable than video evidence was not an abuse
of discretion).

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arguably in a large number of cases.141 Future research should look more
closely at this possibility, potentially through surveys of officers about their
decision to make an arrest or not, in light of the use of BWCs.

There is, however, another plausible explanation, which looks more
closely at suspects’ demeanor and officers’ response to the behavior of the
suspect. Under this prism, arrests went down in the treatment district
compared to the control districts, as a result of using BWCs, because
suspects may have behaved differently when the cameras were pointing at
them, and that caused their behavioral modifications. Relying on a rather
convincing line of research on police–public encounters, a strong predictor
of arrest (especially in cases of a police request to cease misbehavior) is the
suspects’ demeanor.142 Therefore, if the suspect is nonconfrontational,
nonthreatening, and cooperative, an arrest is less likely. In similar ways, as
BWCs have a “cooling off” effect on police–public interactions anyway,143
not only is police force less likely to be needed, but the odds of an arrest
altogether dropped, too. The less the suspect aggressively confronts the
officer and resists, the less likely the officer needs to arrest the suspect. The
antecedent for the decision to arrests, therefore, lies within the suspect.

To be sure, we can only speculate on the reasons for the diminished
propensity for an arrest in the treatment group. We did not conduct
systematic observations or surveys with officers about their decision to
arrest in BWCs-present cases versus BWCs-not-present cases. However,
based on the qualitative data we have from the officers’ surveys, we are
drawn to conclude that the effect of BWCs is mostly on decisions. Officers
argued rather explicitly that they feared their choices would be audited and
reviewed if BWCs were introduced. The ability of line managers to analyze
every decision officers made concerned officers. While officers did not
disagree in principle with the idea of using BWCs in police operations, they
nevertheless expected that the footage would be used as an additional layer
of supervision and accountability. The immediate translation of these
perceptions was a behavioral modification, which manifested in fewer
arrests. Additional analyses and interviews with officers about these choices
seems like the next plausible step in this area of research.

141 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather M. Harris, Increased Homicide Victimization

of Suspects Arrested for Domestic Assault: A 23-Year Follow-Up of the Milwaukee Domestic
Violence Experiment, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 491, 510–11 (2013).

142 McCluskey et al., supra note 118, at 399–411 (discussing the relation to citizen
behavior in a police encounter).

143 Ariel et al., supra note 4, at 517–18.

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D. A CAUTIONARY NOTE ON NONEXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS IN FUTURE
STUDIES ON BWCS

This paper problematizes the kinds of routine activity and outcome
measures that other researchers will assemble to conduct similar studies in
the future. We suspect that in the next few years, the literature on BWCs
will increase dramatically, particularly when funding bodies have awarded
millions of dollars for both implementation and impact evaluation
studies.144 The projected dynamics alluded to in this study must be explored
more granularly in future research, which ought to pay closer attention to
design and method concerns. First, we alluded to the fact that police data
are not necessarily fit for the purpose, because reporting of police behavior
and police behavior per se are difficult to match, and can be viewed as a
form of a reflexivity effect. We rely on official statistics as outcomes and
output variables rather heavily, while some of these data points—recorded
use of force, decision to arrest, decision to prosecute, etc.—make any
causal study challenging to interpret: how should we understand these
interaction effects between behavior and reporting of behavior? What
additional measures are needed in order to accurately capture the effect of
BWCs on policing? Are “reductions” in reporting necessarily a beneficial
outcome, and what do they teach us about the complex and delicate
relationship between police and communities? These are difficult questions
to answer, which future studies will undoubtedly have to face when
interpreting their own results.

The second methodological challenge, beyond determining how to
appropriately measure results in policing studies, is identifying the
appropriate overall research design required to show the causal inference
between BWCs and various outcomes. Despite some recent critiques of
experimental methods,145 science simply does not have a better model for
causal inference. It is true that implementation of experimental methods
“narrow down” the scope of research and they are often quite difficult to
carry out, and thus alternative research methods are necessarily, by
definition, weaker designs for showing a causal effect. 146 Bluntly, when it
comes to studies of cause and effect, we have experiments, and then we
have everything else. Mixed methods should be ventured, particularly

144 See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 91.
145 Greene, supra note 46; Robert J. Sampson, Gold Standard Myths: Observations on

the Experimental Turn in Quantitative Criminology, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 489
(2010).

146 Lawrence W. Sherman, An Introduction to Experimental Criminology, in HANDBOOK
OF QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 399–436 (Alex Piquero & David Weisburd eds., 2010).

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survey methodologies that can capture perceptions and decisionmaking
processes. However, the ideal scientific method we have for singling out a
cause of an effect is still by way of random assignment under controlled
conditions. Everything else is a compromise. We hope that empirical jurists
as well as social scientists become more aware of this important distinction
and seek to implement RCTs more frequently.

With this in mind, answering any question about the effect of BWCs
on any outcome will be particularly challenging without an RCT
methodology, as non-spurious relationships between independent and
dependent variables are difficult to attain. Without proper comparison
groups under controlled conditions, the BWCs’ treatment effect is easily
masked and susceptible to rival explanations. Only true experiments can
comfortably assume that baseline comparability between the intervention
arm of the study (whatever the intervention is) and the comparison arm, has
been achieved—which is the key scientific framework for observing the
causal estimate of the intervention.147 The multiple comparisons in the form
of several police districts in the present study strengthen the internal
validity of the present study, yet future BWCs studies should be cognizant
that the most credible findings will come from multiple or multisite trials,
ideally utilizing cluster randomized controlled trials. Otherwise, it will be
challenging to adequately evaluate the effect of BWCs deployment, and
especially whether in fact they increase desired outcomes, relative to their
cost. Failing that, our knowledge on these fast-entering devices will be
handicapped.

CONCLUSION

The Denver Police Department has shown that deploying BWCs in
one police district caused a significant 35% lower odds for citizens’
complaints against the police use of force, but 14% greater odds for a
complaint against misconduct, compared to other Denver districts that did
not deploy BWCs. The analyses further suggest no discernable effect on use
of force in the aggregate compared to control conditions but suggests
increases against some districts, which are contextualized as enhanced
transparency and accountability as a result of deploying BWCs. Finally, the
odds for arrest were 18% lower than the odds under control conditions,
suggesting that officers become “cautious” about arresting suspects when
BWCs are deployed. Still, methodological challenges of the present study
clearly suggest that more research on these outcomes is needed, using

147

SHADISH ET AL., supra note 45.

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randomized controlled trials.

Reproduced with permission of copyright owner.
Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology

Fall 2016

Police Body Cameras in Large Police Departments

Barak Ariel
Recommended Citation

Microsoft Word – 3. Ariel

ORIGINAL PAPER

The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use
of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police:
A Randomized Controlled Trial

Barak Ariel • William A. Farrar • Alex Sutherland

Published online: 19 November 2014
� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Abstract
Objective Police use-of-force continues to be a major source of international concern,
inviting interest from academics and practitioners alike. Whether justified or unnecessary/

excessive, the exercise of power by the police can potentially tarnish their relationship with

the community. Police misconduct can translate into complaints against the police, which

carry large economic and social costs. The question we try to answer is: do body-worn-

cameras reduce the prevalence of use-of-force and/or citizens’ complaints against the

police?

Methods We empirically tested the use of body-worn-cameras by measuring the effect
of videotaping police–public encounters on incidents of police use-of-force and

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s10940-014-9236-3)
contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

B. Ariel
Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel

B. Ariel (&)
Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK
e-mail: ba285@cam.ac.uk; barak.ariel@mail.huji.ac.il

W. A. Farrar
Rialto Police Department, Rialto, CA, USA
e-mail: ltlojack@aol.com

W. A. Farrar
Cantab, Police Executive Programme, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge,
UK

A. Sutherland
RAND Europe, Westbrook Centre, Milton Road, Cambridge CB4 1YG, UK
e-mail: as2140@cam.ac.uk

A. Sutherland
Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

123

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535
DOI 10.1007/s10940-014-9236-3

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10940-014-9236-3

http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1007/s10940-014-9236-3&domain=pdf

complaints, in randomized-controlled settings. Over 12 months, we randomly-assigned

officers to ‘‘experimental-shifts’’ during which they were equipped with body-worn HD

cameras that recorded all contacts with the public and to ‘‘control-shifts’’ without the

cameras (n = 988). We nominally defined use-of-force, both unnecessary/excessive and

reasonable, as a non-desirable response in police–public encounters. We estimate the

causal effect of the use of body-worn-videos on the two outcome variables using both

between-group differences using a Poisson regression model as well as before-after esti-

mates using interrupted time-series analyses.

Results We found that the likelihood of force being used in control conditions were
roughly twice those in experimental conditions. Similarly, a pre/post analysis of use-of-

force and complaints data also support this result: the number of complaints filed against

officers dropped from 0.7 complaints per 1,000 contacts to 0.07 per 1,000 contacts. We

discuss the findings in terms of theory, research methods, policy and future avenues of

research on body-worn-videos.

Keywords Technology � Deterrence theory � Use-of-force � Police � Randomized
controlled field trial � Body-worn-camera

Introduction

In recent years the use of police body-worn-cameras by police has received extensive

media attention. These devices are commonly believed to achieve several aims, including:

reducing police use-of-force and complaints against officers, enhancing police legitimacy

and transparency, increasing prosecution rates and improving evidence capture by the

police. The publicity has been so great that many go on to assume that cameras can

fundamentally change ‘flawed’ police practices. This was epitomized in a 2013 Manhattan

Federal District Court ruling that ordered officers in a precinct of New York Police

Department with the highest volume of stop-and-frisk to wear body-worn-cameras in order

to prevent racial profiling. In a similar vein across the Atlantic, the College of Policing in

England and Wales identified body-worn-cameras as the mechanism through which

‘‘dented public confidence’’ could be restored (BBC, 10/24/2013).

Despite great promises, there is no research evidence on the benefits of body-worn-

cameras. Other than anecdotal data captured in non-controlled conditions, without com-

parison groups and without systematic gathering of evidence, no causal estimates of the

outcomes of these devices exist. In this paper we report on the first randomized controlled

trial using body-worn-cameras, which tested the effect of body-worn-cameras in Rialto

across 12 months. The study focused specifically on use-of-force and citizens’ complaints,

which were hypothesized to be affected by officers wearing cameras, given the possible

deterrent effect of the devices on noncompliant behavior.

The paper begins with a review of the literature on police use-of-force and citizens’

complaints against the police. These aspects of police behavior and police performance

represent two burning issues in American policing. Mistrust and a lack of confidence may

already characterize some communities’ perception of their local police force. The use of

unnecessary or excessive force by the police serves to further damage this relationship.

Similarly, complaints filed against police officers are central to policing, not only because

scholars consider them a proxy of police–public relations and police misconduct, but also

510 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

123

because of their organizational importance given the tremendous costs associated with

these cases, particularly in an era of austerity where many agencies are on the verge of

bankruptcy (New York Times, 12/28/2013).

We then move on to describe the theoretical grounds for the hypothesized effect of

cameras. A rich body of evidence on perceived social-surveillance—self-awareness and

socially-desirable-responding—proposes that people adhere to social norms and change

their conduct because of the cognizance that someone else is watching. Elaborate research

across several categories of human behavior has shown that when certainty of apprehen-

sion for wrongdoing is ‘‘high’’, socially and morally unacceptable acts are less likely to

occur. Both force and complaints are assumed to be undesirable ‘‘negative’’ events—

though admittedly both can be necessary consequences of volatile police–public encoun-

ters—which should be kept to minimum. The devices are thus hypothesized to decrease the

tension in encounters and consequently reduce these outcomes.

The methodology used to evaluate the body-worn-cameras is described next. We

conducted a randomized controlled trial, where nearly 1,000 officer shifts were randomized

over a 12-month period to treatment and control conditions. During ‘‘treatment shifts’’

officers were required to wear and use body-worn-cameras when interacting with members

of the public, while during ‘‘control shifts’’ officers were instructed not to carry or use the

devices in any way. We observed the number of complaints, incidents of use-of-force, and

the number of contacts between police officers and the public, in the years and months

preceding the trial (in order to establish a baseline) and during the 12 months of the

experiment. We used three statistical methods to analyze the outcomes: first, a Poisson

regression model to estimate the causal effect of the cameras between the treatment and

control conditions. Second, we also conducted an effect size analysis, in order to measure

the magnitude of the difference between the groups in terms of the rate of incidents per

1,000 contacts between the police and the members of the public. Third, we employed

interrupted time-series analysis to assess the city-wide impact of the trial, before and after

the implementation of body-worn-cameras. Finally, we discuss the findings in terms of

theory, police policy and research methods. We pay particular attention to the possible

causal mechanism behind the effect of the cameras on the use-of-force and citizen com-

plaints, and our concerns with violations of the stable unit treatment value assumption

when using the shift as the unit of analysis. Future avenues of research in this area are also

suggested.

Literature Review

Police

Use-of-Force

Police use-of-force has received considerable attention in various disciplines. This scho-

lastic interest reflects significant investment by practitioners and decision-makers in better

understanding the ways in which law enforcement institutions exercise their power, and

how such powers can be managed. In democratic civilizations, the police are expected by

the public to use force when the situation justifies the use of ‘‘reasonable’’ power ‘‘nec-

essary’’ to achieve ‘‘legitimate purposes’’ (Alpert and Smith 1994; Bittner 1970). In fact, a

defining characteristic of the policing profession is that it requires potentially using

‘‘reasonable’’ and ‘‘necessary’’ force, including deadly force, in a variety of chaotic situ-

ations that may be both (un)desired and (un)expected by members of the public. (On the

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535 511

123

conditional support for police use-of-force by race, gender and religion, see Halim and

Stiles 2001).

Historically as well as contemporarily, police scholars have argued that there is a

‘‘social contract’’ between the police and the citizens they ‘‘protect and serve’’, an idea

dating back to Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689), Rousseau (1762), and more recently Pettit

(1997) and Shapiro (2003). Collectively, this line of theorization purports that the police

are responsible for safeguarding and protecting the general social order, which includes

protecting the safety of the citizens and other police officers. In exchange for granting

police officers the right, power, and responsibility to use force, citizens expect police to

only exercise force when it is necessary and to only use the amount of force that is

‘‘reasonable’’, ‘‘proportional’’ and ‘‘necessary’’ for that situation. The police are, therefore,

entrusted with the legal and moral responsibility to maintain societal order and these

imperatives are implemented through their legitimized use-of-force. So important is ‘‘that

responsibility, that police use-of-force is believed to involve the execution of perhaps the

essential function of the state and…because it affects the public’s attitudes and behaviors
toward the police and government more generally’’ (Friedrich 1980: 82).

Research in the area of use-of-force by the police has emphasized two distinct situations

viewed as undesirable: the ‘‘use of excessive force’’ by the police (which is when an officer

uses more force than is necessary/justifiable/reasonable in a situation where some force was

justifiable) and/or the ‘‘unnecessary use-of-force’’ (which is when force is used by an

officer but no force was necessary/justifiable/reasonable in the context). These two types of

situation are argued to damage the relationship of the police with the community that they

are expected ‘‘to protect and serve’’ (Reiss 1968; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; Worden 1996).

When the police undermine these expectations and violate their contract with the citizenry

over the use-of-force, police–public tensions rise (King and Waddington 2004; Weitzer

2000, 2002). When these violations amount to outright ‘‘police violence’’, the core

foundation of police legitimacy is undermined (Westley 1970).

Explaining Police Use-of-Force

In the present study we focus on three strands of research that purport to explain police use-

of-force: situational, psychological and organizational. In terms of situational factors, one

leading theory is based on the notion that police behavior is influenced by the social

dynamics of police–citizen encounters. Black’s (1976) sociology of law, for instance,

suggests that the ‘‘quantity of law’’ is associated with the attributes of the parties. Sherman

(1980) developed this point further, by laying out the situational factors that form essential

cues officers use to make an assessment about how an incident should be handled. Most

empirical research that followed suggested that the suspect’s actions and resistance during

a police–public encounter precipitate the force reaction of police officers (Alpert and

Dunham 1997; Alpert et al. 2004; Crawford and Burns 2002; Terrill 2001). This is what

some observers have termed the ‘‘demeanor hypothesis’’ (see review by Engel et al. 2000).

Using self-report data, Garner et al. (2002) have shown that the link between character-

istics of the police–public encounter and police use-of-force is significantly dependent on

resisting arrest (see also Croft and Austin 1987).

Demeanor is just one aspect of the situational dynamics that elicit police use-of-force.

Was the encounter part and parcel of routine police work? Was this a high-crime area or a

known and dangerous offender with whom the police interacted? Was the officer alone and

therefore more easily threatened? These and countless other situational factors and inter-

actions-between-factors may ultimately lead to use-of-force (see Terrill and Mastrofski

512 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

123

2002; Wikström et al. 2012), but we should resist simply listing situational ‘risk factors’

for use-of-force as this does not aid explanation.

Psychological theories of use-of-force suggest that police officers with certain psy-

chological traits are more likely to use excessive use-of-force or use force more broadly.

For instance, the ability to ‘‘endure’’ some stressful situations was found to be associated

with personality types, while some police officers tend to accept some forms of disrespect

but not others (Engel et al. 2000). More broadly, Fabricatore et al. (1978) have shown that

certain personality factors, as measured by the Sixteen Personality Factor (16PF) Ques-

tionnaire, revealed that ‘‘aggressive’’ and ‘‘tough-minded’’ characteristics were consistent

predictors of use-of-force. Burke and Mikkelsen (2005) as well as Phillips and Sobol

(2011) subsequently found that cynical officers held more favorable attitudes towards the

use-of-force, while officers reporting higher levels of professional efficacy held more

favorable attitudes towards the use of social skills to solve problems. We read this body of

instructive literature as suggesting that some psychological variables are important in any

study of police use-of-force.

Finally, police subculture in relation to use-of-force seems to play a role in accepting or

allowing for ‘‘more force’’ to be applied in certain circumstances. Researchers who study

police organizations have been claiming for years that use-of-force is a function of police

officers’ attitudinal commitment to certain institutional or organizational cultures around

their roles in society and, more broadly, their view of power (Terrill et al. 2003; Lester

1996). Certain institutional and subcultural codes make police agencies particularly

resistant to cultural changes; indeed, as Skolnick (2008: 37) observed, the ‘‘unrecorded

code [of silence] has been noted as a feature of policing across continents, wherever

commissions of inquiry have investigated police corruption’’. Feelings of loyalty sustain

this code of silence and make it particularly difficult to investigate purported unnecessary,

or excessive, use-of-force. Similarly, Baker (Baker 1985: 210–213) has shown that there is

a hierarchy of wrongfulness for police misconduct, which sits well with how officers view

excessive or unnecessary use-of-force: ‘‘dead wrong; wrong, but not bad; wrong but

everybody does it’’. So in order to understand police use-of-force, it seems clear that one

must include officers’ individual predisposition to use force, the situational dynamics of

police work and the broader context within which officers’ operate.

Measuring Use-of-Force

How much force is ‘too much’? One possible way to assess levels of police force was

introduced in the ‘‘use-of-force continuum’’ (see review in Garner et al. 1995), and is

utilized by many police agencies worldwide as a standardized tool for measuring responses

to varied types of situations.
1
The continuum has several steps of ‘‘proportional dosage’’,

all the way up to lethal response and down to aggressive verbal response. Any response

that is proportional based on this tool (including no physical force at all), can potentially be

deemed as ‘necessary’ or ‘excessive’. However, there is room for interpretation. In fact,

some would consider the mere presence of a police officer and the concomitant physical

representation of authority as ‘‘some’’ force.

The inherent subjectivity of the use-of-force continuum signifies just how complex and

inflammatory force can be: Just what exactly does a police officer have to do before they

are deemed to have ‘‘used force’’? How much of a grab or a hold, or even a ‘‘come-along

1
Notably, many agencies are moving away from a use of force continuum, making the force determination

even more ambiguous.

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535 513

123

hold,’’ is needed before it becomes ‘‘use-of-force’’? Even more difficult to define is at what

point the use-of-force is either ‘‘unnecessary’’ or ‘‘excessive’’ (see Atherley and Hickman

2014; Alpert and Smith 1994). Adams (1996: 53) cites a famous disagreement between a

team of field researchers led by Reiss (1968) and a panel of experts from the President’s

Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1976), which aptly

describes the measurement problem. The two teams could not agree on what constitutes

‘‘improper use-of-force’’ or ‘‘excessive or unnecessary use-of-force’’, even though they

were both scrutinizing the same incidents. Though dated, the problem they encountered

still persists today. These perceptual differences are important not least because they

indicate the illusiveness of defining (excessive) use-of-force, but they also tend to suggest

just how real the measurement problem is: error has cut through both academic and

professional arenas for more than five decades. In many ways this is because rules and laws

relating to police use-of-force are simply ‘‘too vague to be regarded as a comprehensive set

of operational guidelines’’ (Fyfe 1988: 180; see also Henderson and Wilson 2008).

Yet at the same time, there seems to be widespread agreement that both the rate and

frequency of use-of-force are low (Alpert and Dunham 2004; Croft 1985). Croft and Austin

(1987), Friedrich (1980), and Fyfe (1988), for example, have shown that the rate of use-of-

force is about 5–10 % of police contacts with suspects.
2
Bayley and Garofalo (1989) have

shown that it is when transferring arrestees that the majority of use-of-force incidents

occur, but such activities represent a small proportion of police work. Similarly, Reiss

(1968) has found that the likelihood of an excessive use-of-force incident is far greater

when the police come into contact with suspects, however the police are dramatically more

likely to contact non-criminal-suspects in their daily routines—suggesting that the rate of

use-of-force is very low as well. Garner et al. (1996) have also found that even in cases of

arrest the police used ‘some’ physical force in only one of every five incidents. According

to their data, no force, or only low levels of force, was used in most cases.

When officers do use force they are nearly always required to file an official report of

such incidents, but work by Adams (1996: 62) suggests that use-of-force occurs ‘‘twice as

often’’ as suggested by official reports, particularly when the incident is one of ‘‘low-level

force’’ that does not amount to anything the police officer feels he or she needs to ‘account’

for. Some ethnographic work in this area (e.g., Hunt 1985; Rojek et al. 2012) suggests that

what is construed as a ‘‘reportable incident of force’’ and how much force is appropriate is

often predicated by a police department’s organizational culture (as noted above). For

example, placing one’s hand on another’s shoulder in an authoritative way or using

aggressive language may be considered use-of-force in some instances and for some

individuals, whereas for others they may not. Measuring ‘‘injury’’ or ‘‘assault’’ is also

likely to be challenged in terms of definitional threshold, as it is open to interpretation

when there are no clear signs of physical contact.

Whichever definition one would use for police use-of-force, the fact remains that any

level of force can have detrimental effects on police–public relations. It may take just one

or a handful of cases to damage the legitimacy of the police. The challenge is heightened if

the three parties to the encounter—the officer, the suspect and the public—hold opposing

views about the necessity, reasonableness and ‘‘amount’’ of force that the police apply. It is

particularly the case when most police–public encounters, though they often occur in

2
For a more systematic account of rates and prevalence, see Adams (1996:85–91), see also Hickman et al.

(2009) who estimate, based on three dozen recent publications, that police use or threaten to use force in
1.7 % of all contacts and in 20.0 % of all arrests; but cf. Garner et al (2002) who found that prevalence can
increase to more than 58 % of police–public encounters.

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public (i.e. outside), are often away from the public eye. Therefore, any comprehensive and

effective approach to reducing use-of-force must simultaneously address as many ante-

cedents of police use-of-force as possible, including the suspect’s demeanor, the officer’s

characteristics, and elements of police organizational culture that allow for such incidents

to take place. Completely eradicating illegitimate use-of-force is unlikely as some force

will always be required against some offenders in some circumstances. Likewise, any

approach should still allow for legitimate use-of-force to be used in cases when it is

required to protect the public, but for all other circumstances, a reductionist approach

should aim to dramatically ‘cool down’ encounters.

Citizens Complaints Against the Police

One way to measure police (mis)conduct and how the public view police actions is through

the analysis of complaints lodged against police officers—even though the rate of com-

plaints is usually very low, compared to the number of interactions between the police and

members of the public. Box and Russell (1975: 315) claim that while ‘‘complaints are a

very minor aspect of the administration of justice, they nonetheless concern a very fun-

damental democratic right to have redress against ‘deviants’ in the police force’’. These

complaints refer to allegations made by citizens regarding the conduct of officers, in both

voluntary (e.g., requests for assistance) and involuntary contacts (e.g., traffic violations).

Subsequently, complaint procedures were designed by most police agencies to investigate

these complaints of officer misconduct and punish guilty officers—although Walker (1997)

suggests that punishment is often not the goal of most complainants. Still, the number of

complaints can be used as a measure for how people the police encounter evaluate their

performance, with a lower rate of complaints being a marker of greater public satisfaction,

although there can still be the case of fear or cynicism about future reporting to the police.

Researchers have also used complaint databases to assess various types of legitimacy

and justice-related outcomes. Braga (2008), for example, analyzed police complaint data in

Boston as a proxy of community complaints against the police.
3
Likewise, Greene (1999)

showed that complaints can be used to measure the extent to which focused aggressive

police enforcement strategies can result in police misconduct. Subsequently, as shown in

Braga’s (2008) review, grievances allow researchers to assess just how police legitimacy is

influenced by whether community members perceive police–public encounters that they

were treated fairly, with respect and dignity by police officers (Tyler 2001). Whether

complaints are in fact justified and can be substantiated has always been a matter of

contention. It is not uncommon for some offenders—especially experienced ones—to

complain as a form of retaliation against the police (see Waters and Brown 2000; Prenzler

et al. 2010). Yet it is difficult to defend the argument that most grievances are ‘bogus’ or

erroneous. Furthermore, complaints are a source of public dissatisfaction: literature on the

‘‘complainants’ experience’’ suggests that a substantial proportion of complainants remain

dissatisfied with key aspects of the complaints process (Waters and Brown 2000; Brown

1998; Maguire and Corbett 1991). The implications for police legitimacy are substantial,

which makes reducing the rate of complaints a major goal of a police complaints and

discipline system (Liederbach et al. 2008).

3
Though not without reservations about the utilization of complaint data as a single outcome measure, as

complaints produce low substantiation rates—frequently 10 % or less (Liederbach et al. 2008).

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Cameras as a Deterrence Stimulus to Manage Police Use-of-Force

Several lines of research across many disciplines suggest that most species alter their

behavior once aware they are being observed (Chartrand and Bargh 1999; Dzieweczynski

et al. 2006; Jones and Nisbett 1971). A rich body of evidence on perceived social-sur-

veillance—self-awareness (Wicklund 1975) and socially-desirable-responding (Paulhus

1988)—proposes that people adhere to social norms and change their conduct because of

that cognizance that someone else is watching (Munger and Shelby 1989). It seems that

knowing with sufficient certainty that our behavior is being observed (or judged) affects

various social cognitive processes: We experience public self-awareness (Gervais and

Norenzayan 2012; Duval and Wicklund 1972), become more prone to socially-acceptable

behavior (Sproull et al. 1996) and feel a heightened need to comply with rules (Milinski

et al. 2002; Wedekind and Braithwaite 2002; Barclay 2004).

Getting caught breaking rules is often registered as behavior that can potentially lead to

negative consequences such as sanctions, an outcome most individuals wish to avoid

(Klepper and Nagin 2006; Nagin 2013). Whilst strict rationality in all decision-making is a

rather strong assumption (Kahneman 2011), experimental evidence demonstrates that

individuals work to avoid negative outcomes, and show that individuals react compliantly

to even small cues indicating that somebody may be watching: Priming cues signaling how

we ought to behave can range from reputational concerns (Bateson et al. 2006; Burnham

and Johnson 2005; Haley and Fessler 2005; Fehr and Schneider 2010) and feelings of

shame, to fear of punishment for noncompliance (Boyd et al. 2010). Paradigmatically,

these cues are more broadly explored under deterrence theory.

The theoretical roots of deterrence theory are found in eighteenth century enlightenment

philosophy (Beccaria 1995). An extensive body of recent rigorous research across several

categories of human behavior has since shown that when certainty of apprehension for

wrongdoing is ‘‘high’’ and when the severity of sanction is substantial, socially and

morally-unacceptable acts are dramatically less likely to occur (Von Hirsch et al. 1999;

Nagin 2013). Particularly around crime and disorder, when consequences of apprehension

are perceived as harsh (imprisonment, fines, etc.), people simply do not want to get caught.

Theoretically, cameras are likely to deter people from noncompliance with rules of

conduct. Tilley (1993: 3–5) rightly pointed out that the camera may ‘‘fire a number of

mechanisms’’, but that one prominent preventative mechanism of a cameras is that it

‘‘reduces… [noncompliance] by deterring potential offenders who will not wish to risk
apprehension and conviction by the evidence captured on videotape or observed by an

operator on a screen on which their behavior is shown’’ (see also Wikström et al. 2012 on

the conditional relevance of controls). Much like sentient observers, mirrors, or even

pictures of eyes, cameras not only make us continuously conscious of the fact that we are

being watched, but also drive us to compliance. If we become aware that a video-camera is

recording our actions, we may also become more conscious that unacceptable behaviors

will be captured on film, and that detection is perceived as certain. ‘‘Getting-away’’ with

rule breaking is thus far less conceivable if one is being-videotaped. Cameras can therefore

be viewed as ‘‘credible threats’’ (Jervis et al. 1989: 3) within the wider context of deter-

rence messages, which in both self-awareness studies and deterrence studies has largely

been missing.

This conceptual appeal of the impact of cameras on human behavior and the possible

ramifications of their use on social-control-policies, have led to two primary lines of

rigorous research on their effect. These studies collectively seek to understand how

cameras can potentially deter rule-breaking behaviors, but each has focused on a different

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subtype of recording devices: CCTVs and speed-cameras. Both types are meant to trigger

the perceptual mechanism of self-awareness. First, CCTV (passive) cameras are placed in

public-spaces in order to increase the perceived likelihood of being apprehended by

offenders. The available meta-analysis of the evidence from 44 studies on the use of

public-area CCTV has shown that the mechanism ‘‘works’’ in principle, insofar as cameras

caused a modest (16 %) decrease in crime in experimental areas compared with control

areas. However, this overall result was largely driven by the effectiveness of CCTV

schemes in car parks, which caused a 51 % decrease in crime (Welsh and Farrington 2009)

and not in more serious or violence crimes as these tend not to be deliberative. Second,

speed cameras were found to reduce the incidence of speeding, road traffic crashes, injuries

and deaths. A meta-analysis of 35 rigorous studies has found that, compared with controls,

the relative reduction in the proportion of vehicles speeding was up to 65 % and up to

44 % for fatal and serious injury crashes (Wilson et al. 2010). However, how body-worn-

cameras may be used to affect behavior and—specifically—that of police officers, is as yet

unknown.

Hypotheses

As the literature review suggests, the most ubiquitous type of camera—mobile cameras—

have been virtually ignored. What is their effect on self-awareness? Could they promote

socially desirable behavior? Can they be used as a social-control mechanism? Although

theoretically compelling, research on the link between self-awareness and socially desir-

able behavior in the context of cameras and police use-of-force is virtually non-existent.

The only parallels we can draw are research on how highly-publicized and videotaped

police encounters are perceived by the public and the effect that videotaped negative

encounters have on police reforms. Such studies indicate that videotaped arrests, for

instance, have a negative impact on citizens’ perceptions of force used by police during

such arrest situations (Jefferis et al. 1997). Similarly, the Rodney King incident has led to

significant reforms in the Los Angeles Police Department (Levenson 1993).

Notwithstanding the lack of direct research, we hypothesize that portable cameras

would go beyond the limited impact that CCTV has had on expressive acts of public

violence. We believe that the reason CCTV cameras were found to be weak modifiers of

offenders’ behavior is because the level of certainty of being apprehended necessary for the

self-awareness mechanism to trigger, leading to socially-desirable behavior, is not high

enough in CCTV. If cameras are expected to influence behavior and to serve as cues that

social norms or legal rules must be followed, then the cue ‘‘dosage’’ of awareness must be

high. Mobile cameras, and specifically body-worn-cameras, are likely to have this effect.

They are directly observable by the parties to an encounter whilst conveying a straight-

forward, pragmatic message (‘‘you are being watched, videotaped and expected to follow

the rules’’), and they can almost guarantee apprehension for socially undesirable behavior,

if that behavior is recorded.

Perhaps equally important is that mobile cameras can work on both sides of the police–

public interaction—the police officer and the suspect. Put differently, because the camera

is actually worn by one of the actors in the exchange, it acts as a neutral third eye,

impacting both players’ psyches. Cameras are thus likely to have a ‘‘self-awareness effect’’

that would both deter the police officer from reacting with excessive or unnecessary force,

and cool down the ‘‘aggressive demeanor’’ of the suspect (or deter the police from

interpreting demeanor in this way). In part, this is due to the ‘‘announcement effects’’ of

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surveillance (see Surette 2005). Signage advertising the presence of camera surveillance is

a factor that constrains behavior, which is pertinent in CCTV, gunshot detection tech-

nologies and the red light traffic camera literature (see Ratcliffe 2007). Assuming such

situations are conducted deliberatively (thoughtfully) at least some of the time, neither the

police officer nor the suspect want to get caught engaging in a socially undesirable

behavior that may have costly consequences.
4
Because the encounter is captured on tape, it

makes both parties more accountable, which is likely to reduce the likelihood of unwar-

ranted levels of force—including ‘‘use of excessive force’’, ‘‘unnecessary use-of-force’’,

and certainly ‘‘abusive use-of-force’’—indeed, arguably, any kind of force.

Therefore, cameras sit well (though not without some reservations, explored later on)

with all three major approaches to explaining use-of-force. First, cameras confront situa-

tional dynamics that precipitate suspects’ ‘‘negative actions’’ that could potentially lead to

‘‘force reaction’’ by police officers. Cameras also ‘‘force’’ the officer to endure stressful

situations and arguably accept some forms of disrespect that without the cameras he or she

would normally not. Lastly, even police subcultures of acceptable but illegitimate force

responses are likely to be affected by the cameras, because misconduct cannot go unde-

tected. In essence an external set of behavioral norms is being applied and enforced.

Police–public encounters become more transparent and the curtain of silence that protects

misconduct can more easily be unveiled, which makes misconduct less likely.

In summary, deterrence theory presupposes that effective deterrence requires self-

consciousness of being observed. When the perceived probability-of-apprehension is high,

unacceptable behavior is less likely to occur. But the actualization of this awareness has

rarely been investigated (cf. Nagin 2013). Across various disciplines, research has yet to

unravel the threshold of cognitive attentiveness under which socially-undesirable behavior

will not take place. Body-worn-cameras offer a neat solution to this problem because the

certainty of apprehension for such behavior is apparent when the cameras are on. It follows

that we can directly measure deterrence when the certainty-of-getting-caught for non-

compliance is greatly intensified, if not guaranteed. Cameras can sensitize individuals to

being watched and can therefore elicit desirable behavior. Thus, cameras are hypothesized

to reduce the number of incidents of use-of-force, as well as the number of citizens’

complaints lodged against officers.

Methods

Research Settings

We tested the effect of body-worn-cameras on incidents of use-of-force and

citizens’ complaints against the police in a randomized-controlled field-trial in Rialto,

California. Rialto Police is a mid-sized department that has jurisdiction over 28.5

square-miles and services a population of 100,000 residents. The department employs

115 sworn police officers and 42 non-sworn personnel who deal with approximately

3,000 property and 500 violent crimes per year. In 2009–2011, the department dealt

with six to seven homicides per year, which is nearly 50 % higher than the US national

rate per 100,000.

4
It is worth noting recent research that suggests that both internal and external controls are conditionally

relevant and depend, in part, on the extent to which individuals deliberate (see Wikström et al. 2012).

518 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

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The entire population of Rialto Police Department frontline officers participated in the

experiment (n = 54), though we consider the shift to be the unit-of-analysis (see below).

Frontline officers work 7 days per week, in six shifts of 12 h per-day, or a total 2,038

officer shift-hours per week. Each shift consists of approximately ten armed officers who

patrol the streets of Rialto and interact with offenders, victims, witnesses and members of

the public. When officers were assigned to treatment conditions (see below), they were

instructed to ‘‘wear’’ HD cameras, which would then record all of these interactions, both

visually and aurally, throughout the entire shift.

‘‘Police Shift’’ as the Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis we have utilized in this study is the officer’s shift. Our choice poses a

great deal of reservation on a number of fronts, which deserve scrutiny. However, given the

rule of maximin, our unit of interest poses the best possible option, given the circumstances.

Ideally, we would have randomly allocated half the officers to treatment (wearing the cam-

eras) and half to control (not wearing the cameras). This approach would have made individual

officers the unit of analysis. However, assigning individuals proved impossible for several

practical as well as methodological reasons. First, Rialto officers patrol in revolving teams and

whilst patrols are routinely ‘solo’, patrols also occur in pairs or teams. This means that throughout

the lifecycle of the study we would have introduced uncontrollable noise that we believed we

would not have been able to account for when analyzing the results. A related problem is that

while the ‘‘combinations of officers’’ constantly changes, some officers have shifts they prefer to

work. Some opt for late shifts while others prefer to work night shifts. We could have potentially

randomly allocated individual officers within two statistical blocks of shift type, but there was no

theory behind this procedure that would have made the blocking efficient (see Ariel and Far-

rington2014). Moreover, these shift patterns change over thecourse of a year—particularly when

new recruits join the force and more experienced officers are assigned to mentor them.

Methodologically, planning a treatment group of 27 experimental and 27 control offi-

cers would have resulted in an underpowered study. Statistical power was defined by

Cohen (1988) as the probability of detecting an effect where one exists. Only if we were to

estimate that the anticipated effect of cameras is large, around 0.8 in Cohen’s terms (Cohen

1988), with an alpha of .05 and power at 80 %, would n = 54 suffice. Therefore, we were

reluctant to ‘‘design a study doomed to failure’’ (Clarke and Weisburd 1994: 179), solely

due to an insufficient sample size.

Instead, the unit of interest in this experiment is the patrol shift. Using the shift sits well

with police routine operations because tasking, deployment and resourcing revolve around

the shift. Shifts are also easy to administer in an experimental context because there are a

set number of shifts in any given week, and the number of patrolling officers within every

shift is stable and predictable. In most circumstances, the shift entails a new ‘‘set’’ of

encounters that are normally unrelated to other encounters in other shifts, so we assumed

that each shift is independent of all other shifts. Of course, this assumption is plausible only

in terms of the ‘‘interactees’’, that is the members of the public that the police come in

contact with, not in terms of the police officers,
5
who may ‘carry the effect’ into the control

5
Similarly, officers regularly encounter ‘the usual suspects’ on patrol, meaning that there is some

dependence between shifts in terms of ‘‘interactees’’. Other research (e.g. Wikström et al. 2012) would
suggest that even with variations in ‘actors’, there may be stable environmental cues that are conducive to
specific actions, but the use of force by police still depends on the interaction between individuals and their
settings (the situation).

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shifts as well. We return to these issues in the discussion, though we believe that the shifts

add an element of randomness to the encounters as well. For example, if officers had been

randomly allocated into pairs and then the pairs randomly allocated into experimental and

control conditions, one might have asked whether or not there was something in the pair

dynamic that might have influenced the outcome. With the switching pairs into shifts—as

police officers often do—this dynamic between pairs is randomized as well, thus somewhat

mitigating the potential spillover effect.

Procedure, Random Allocation and Statistical Power

Starting on February 13th 2012 and running for 12 months, the experiment consisted of

randomly assigning all police shifts to either experimental or control conditions.

‘‘Experimental-shifts’’ consisted of shifts in which officers were assigned to wear high

definition (HD) audio-visual recording apparatus (see below). ‘‘Control-shifts’’ consisted

of shifts in which officers were instructed not to wear the HD cameras. Integrity of

assignment was measured by both measuring the number of ‘‘footage-hours’’ against the

assigned shifts as well as dip-sampling dates of footage and monitoring that the officers

wore the cameras as assigned.

The experimental procedure is illustrated in Table 1 below. As shown, there are 19

shifts during any given week and the 54 frontline-officers patrol in six teams: Two teams

work day shifts, three shifts work nights, and two shifts are cover shifts. Shifts were

randomly allocated to treatment and control conditions, using the Cambridge Randomizer

(Ariel et al. 2012), on a weekly basis.
6
In total, we assigned 988 shifts over 12 months into

489 treatment and 499 control conditions. Using G*Power (Faul et al. 2007), we estimated

a priori that this sample size, with alpha at .05 and power at .80, would enable detection of

a standardized-mean-difference of 0.2 (Cohen 1988).

One concern with experimental assignment is equivalence of treatment and control

units. We were not able present an assessment of baseline balance, prior to random

assignment, as the units of analysis—the shifts—were randomly assigned on a weekly

basis over a course of 12 months. Still, in Table 2 we assessed the extent of balance

between the number of shifts allocated and days of the week post-randomization, which

were both statistically non-significant.

Apparatus

We collaborated with Taser Inc.� to provide all frontline officers with their HD body-
worn-cameras. These body-mounted cameras captured video evidence from the officer’s

perspective. Weighing 108 g and small enough to place on the officer’s shirt pocket, the

camera systems were affixed to the collar and could always be seen by people who came

into contact with the police—although in order to make sure people were aware of cam-

eras, officers informed ‘interactees’ with that they were being videotaped. The units were

water resistant, videoed in color, with a battery lasting for at least 12 h, making the

apparatus ideal for the shift patterns of Rialto Police. The officers were instructed to have

the cameras on during every encounter with members of the public, with the exception of

incidents involving sexual assaults of minors and dealing with police informants. All data

6
We acknowledge that prior knowledge of shift assignment might give rise to expectation effects—so that

we would not know whether changes in behavior arise directly because of the presence of a camera, or
anticipation of wearing a camera.

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from the cameras were collated using a web-based computerized video management

system developed by evidence.com�. The software tracked and inventoried all Taser Inc.�
video cameras evidence. The system automatically uploaded the officers’ videos at the end

of their shifts and the research team was granted full access to these rich data.

Measures

Use-of-Force

Rialto Police Department used a system called Blue Team to track ‘‘recorded’’ use-of-force

incidents. This standardized tracking system enabled us to count how many reported

incidents had occurred during the experimental period in both experimental and control

shifts, and to verify the details of the incidents, such as time, date, location, and whether

the officer or the suspect initiated the incident. Rialto Police Department records instances

of use-of-force, which encompasses physical force that is greater than basic control or

‘‘compliance holds’—including the use of (a) OC spray, (b) baton (c) Taser, (d) canine bite

or (e) firearm’’. These are the types of force responses that we considered as eligible use-of-

force incidents. We operationalized the ‘‘use-of-force’’ dependent variable as whether or

not force was used in a given shift.

We acknowledge that police software cannot ‘‘measure’’ the use-of-force, and that it is

nearly always up to the individual officer to account for those incidents where force was

used. Given the subjectivity of this variable and the measurement problems we reviewed

Table 1 Example of Rialto Police Department patrol patterns random assignments

Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun

Day shift Exp’t Exp’t Control Exp’t Exp’t Control Exp’t

Night shift Exp’t Control Control Exp’t Control Exp’t Exp’t

Cover shift Exp’t Control Control Control Control

Table 2 Trial measures by treatment allocation

Day of
week

Treatment Control Total Shifts Treatment Control Total

Sunday 63 72 135 Day 189 177 366

Monday 78 64 142 Night 169 197 366

Tuesday 58 81 139 Cover 141 125 256

Wednesday 75 75 150

Thursday 72 60 132

Friday 72 76 148

Saturday 71 71 142

Total 489 499 988 489 499 98

v2(6) = 6.8845;
p = .332

v2(2) = 2.5752;
p = .276

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above, we therefore relied on these official written reports, but not without hesitation.
7

Specifically in our study, our dependent variable only indicates whether or not force was

used, but it does not say ‘‘how much’’ force was used. The ‘‘amount’’ of force used is also

up to the officer to write down, as he or she recollects it. For instance, if three police

officers use force on one suspect in one event, it would be registered as ‘‘one use-of-force.’’

Because the prevalence data are binary, even if there were one officer but two persons that

the one officer used force on, it would still be counted as ‘‘one use-of-force’’ incident.

Likewise, the variable does not say for how long the person was stunned with a Taser gun,

or how many shots were fired against an aggressive suspect, or how many times he or she

was beaten with a baton before lying down on the ground and being handcuffed.

Another limitation is that we did not know from the data which party instigated the use-

of-force, which seems to be an important aspect of use-of-force (Engel et al. 2000). For this

information, we relied on what the officers had written down (again, in Blue Team), but this

is not necessarily an objective measure. We were also able to capture information on this

question from the videotaped footage, but of course this only covers the experimental arm,

not the control shifts. An alternative would have been to systematically observe all police–

public encounters with research assistants (‘‘ride-a-longs’’), but this option went well

beyond our research budget.

Citizen Complaints

In some ways, complaints compliment data on use-of-force (Pate et al. 1993). It is common

practice for virtually all police agencies to have clear guidelines for citizens to file com-

plaints against officers, though the rates of complaints vary dramatically between different

forces. Nevertheless, analysis of departmental and citizens’ complaints against police

officers was shown to provide somewhat reliable estimates of use-of-force (McCluskey and

Terrill 2005: 513). If this is the case, then we ought to use citizens’ complaints as a proxy

for incidents of use-of-force—though they can also be used as a measure of police behavior

more generally. True, citizens can be very poor judges of what constitutes ‘‘force’’ and

particularly so when it comes to excessive force, but these complaints do provide a glimpse

into what the public perceives as ‘‘force’’.

Rialto Police Department tracked complaints against officers with software called IA-

Pro. Formally, the system records citizens’ complaints where the reporting party has filed a

grievance for alleged misconduct or what they perceive as poor performance. We used the

data captured on this system to count the number of complaints (of any kind) filed against

Rialto police officers.

Contacts with the Public

We measured the total number of contacts between the police and the public in each arm.

Any non-casual interaction with the public was recorded on the Department’s computer-

aided dispatch system (CAD). These included attending calls-for-service, formal advices

given to individuals, collecting evidence and statements during any type of investigation

7
As noted by Adams (1996:65), ‘‘although there are many attractive reasons for using official records in

research on [use of] force, the strategy is not without limitations…some concerns are based on practical
issues of how the data are collected…the quality of data (e.g., accuracy, dependability, and coverage)…can
influence counts dramatically…more significant problem is that of missing data or information that should
be available in record-keeping systems but is not.’’

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and the like. With this variable we were able to compute the rate of incidents per 1,000

police–public contacts.

Baseline Data

Table 3 below lists the outcome variables at baseline, up to 3 years prior to the experiment.

As shown, use-of-force is a relatively rare event, with approximately 65 incidents per year,

or 1.46 incidents for every 1,000 police–public contacts. Similarly, complaints lodged by

citizens against police-officers are very infrequent, with 24 grievances filed against officers

in the year prior to the experiment (about 0.7 for every 1,000 contacts). Police–public

contacts data show that, on average, police officers interacted with members of the public

about 3,600 times-per-month, or approximately 42 recorded contacts per shift.

Statistical Procedure

We employed three analytical approaches to analyze the outcomes. First, we used a

Poisson model to assess differences between experimental and control groups. Group

assignment (‘‘experimental shifts’’ [0]/‘‘control shifts’’ [1]) was set as an explanatory

variable, and the dependent variable was whether or not use-of-force occurred.
8
Second,

for each outcome variable, we assessed the standardized mean difference for the rates of

use-of-force incidents per shift. Third, we observed the number of use-of-force incidents

and citizens’ complaints that were recorded prior to the experiment and compared them to

the figures during the year of the experiment, in order to enrich the analysis. This quasi-

experimental approach was used in order to indicate how the entire police organization

responded to wearing the cameras; assessing the city-wide impact of the trial by comparing

the data before and after the implementation of body-worn-cameras.

Results

Use-of-Force

During the experimental period a total of 25 incidents of police use-of-force were recorded

by Rialto Police Department, of which 17 occurred during control shifts and 8 during

experimental shifts. These represent a mean rate of 0.78 and 0.33 incidents per 1,000

police–public contacts, respectively. Results from the Poisson model suggest a treatment

effect on use-of-force {IRR = 2.08; [95 % CI .91–4.78]}
9
meaning that the incident rate in

the control condition is roughly twice that of the control condition (Table 4). Similarly,

when we measure the magnitude of the difference in terms of rates per 1,000 encounters

(dividing the number of incidents by the total number of contacts in each arm of the

experiment), the effect size was statistically significant {SMD = 0.140; [95 % CI .015–

.265]}.

8
Poisson is appropriate here because each event has a small probability in each shift, and there are many

shifts.
9
Note that we have reverse coded the treatment conditions so that 1 = control and 0 = treatment, meaning

that ratios reflect the incident rate of the outcome occurring for the control condition versus the incident rate
of the outcome occurring in the treatment condition.

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535 523

123

We have also detected large before-after reductions in prevalence of incidents of use-of-

force force (see Table 3; Fig. 1): 64.3 % reduction from 2009, 61.5 % from 2010, and

58.3 % from 2011, with a significant before-after effect based on the interrupted time

series model (Table 5) (the ARIMA model parameter for the phase of intervention is

-3.50 (SE = 0.689); p B .001).

Citizens’ Complaints

In terms of complaints against officers, the between-groups treatment effect was not sta-

tistically significant,
10

largely because of the overall low occurrence in both treatment and

control conditions. We observed only three complaints in total—one complaint lodged for

an incident that occurred during control conditions and two for incidents that occurred

during treatment conditions (all three occurred in August and September). We did, how-

ever, observe a significant, overall reduction of citizens’ complaints, from 24 complaints

filed in the 12 months before the trial to three during the trial period. The raw year-to-year

reductions (Fig. 2) suggest 92 % fewer cases compared to 2009, 94 % compared to 2010,

and 88 % compared to 2011—or 0.7 complaints per 1,000 contacts to 0.07 per 1,000

contacts. These reductions are mirrored by the interrupted time series model (Table 6),

which resulted in a significant estimated parameter for the experimental phase of (-1.750;

SE = .665; p \ 0.01).

Table 3 Use-of-force, citizens complaints and police–public raw figures—baseline and experimental raw
data

2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013
a

Use-of-force 70 65 67 25
b

Complaints 36 51 24 3
c

Police–public contacts

–
d

45,104 43,289

a
Experimental period

b
8 during experimental shifts, 17 during control shifts (n = 499)

c
2 during experimental shifts, 1 during control shifts (n = 489)

d
Data automatically collected starting in 2011

Table 4 Generalized linear model with Poisson distribution and log link for use-of-force (n = 988)

Parameter estimates

IRR Robust SE 95 % CI

Lower Upper

Phase 2.082
�

.883 0.907 2.082

(Intercept) 0.016 .006 0.008 0.016

�
p B .10;

* p B .05; ** p B .01; *** p B .001

10
Results not shown in tabular form, but given here: {B = -0.713; [95 % CI -3.112 to 1.685]; p .560}.

524 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

123

Discussion

In this experiment we tested, for the first time, the effect of mobile cameras on police use-

of-force and citizens’ complaints. The outcomes suggest a reduction in the total number of

incidents of use-of-force in experimental conditions compared to control conditions. We

have also observed nearly ten times more citizens’ complaints in the 12-months prior to the

experiment, compared to any of the 3 years prior to the experiment. In practical terms, the

study provides law enforcement agencies with a methodology that may substantially

reduce force responses, as well as reducing the incidence of complaints. This behavioral

modification may be of real practical significance to the police, especially given the cost-

to-benefit ratios (which we will present below). We therefore envisage that body-worn-

cameras may noticeably affect police–public encounters. We acknowledge that this may

pose ethical concerns, which we discuss below, but we believe that, on average, the

benefits of using body-worn-cameras may outweigh the costs. (Issues that warrant further

attention are whether using cameras reduces the likelihood of victims actually reporting

crimes, and broader questions about victims’ rights and procedural practice.)

0
2

4
6

8
ou

tc
om

e
–

uo
f

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Months: 1-12 baseline during 2011; 13-24 experimental during 2012

Fig. 1 Time series line plot for number of use-of-force incidents over 24 months (12 months pre-
intervention; 12 months during intervention)

Table 5 Time series ARIMA model for use-of-force before/during experimental period (t = 24)

Parameter estimates

B OPG SE 95 % CI

Lower Upper

Phase -3.5*** .689 -4.850 -2.150

(Intercept) 5.583 .427 4.747 6.420

* p B .05; ** p B .01; *** p B .001

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535 525

123

The findings have implications, more broadly, for deterrence theory. Generally speak-

ing, the proposition that videotaped police–public interactions ‘‘experience’’ fewer inci-

dents of use-of-force seems to be supported by the evidence. We interpret this to reflect a

fundamental tendency of humans to exhibit more desirable behaviors when they know they

are under surveillance and subject to rules, but we acknowledge that even this will vary

depending on the situation (see Wikström et al. 2012).

Our study, as far as we can tell, is the first to use the shift as the unit of experimental

analysis. Using police shifts has its disadvantages, but on the other hand the benefits should

not be overlooked. There are clearly more shifts than police officers, which increases the

statistical power of any test. Here, instead of 54 officers split into treatment and control

conditions, we have had 988 shifts, which we estimated using power analyses to be

sufficient in order to detect even relatively small effects (Cohen 1988; Faul et al. 2007). To

be sure, many studies in criminology are believed to be underpowered, thus potentially

concluding that treatments do not work when in in fact they do work (Weisburd et al. 2001;

Ariel 2009). Therefore, using shifts allows researchers to increase power without pro-

longing the study period or increasing the number of cases.

0
1

2
3

4
5

ou
tc

om
e

–
co

m
pl

ai
nt

s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Months: 1-12 baseline during 2011; 13-24 experimental during 2012

Fig. 2 Time series line plot for number of complaints over 24 months (12 months pre-intervention;
12 months during intervention)

Table 6 Time series ARIMA Model for complaints before/during experimental period (t = 24)

Parameter estimates
B OPG SE 95 % CI
Lower Upper

Phase -1.75** .665 -3.053 -.447

(Intercept) 2 .265 1.481 2.519

* p B .05; ** p B .01; *** p B .001

526 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

123

Whatdeservesconsideration,however,isthepotentialspillovereffectthatcamerashavehad

on officers’ behavior during control shifts. The reduction in use-of-force, coupled with a

reductionincitizens’complaints,wasregisteredacrossbothstudyarms,whichsuggeststhatthe

effect of being observed during experimental shifts diffused to control shifts. These findings

present conceptual as well as methodological challenges: How should the spillover be handled,

and what is the right way to interpret these patterns? Answering these questions may also

provide a better understanding of what future research avenues in this area might look like.

Just Another Hawthorne Effect?

Somewhat crudely, we could argue that it is difficult to attribute the reduction in both use-

of-force and complaints to anything but the effect of the cameras. We would argue that

cameras have modified the perception of individuals about what socially acceptable

behavior should be in police–public interactions and, in turn, they have changed their

responses even when officers did not wear the cameras. Critically, however, we must

accept the possibility that the effect may have followed from either Hawthorne/John Henry

(Saretsky 1972) effects or reporting artifacts. At least for reporting bias, it seems that we do

not have a way to address this problem under the current research settings. One method

would be to contact every individual that has interacted with the police during the study

period, and survey his or her views on the encounter. But this approach only minimally

addresses the (non-) reporting bias, as we have no objective way to ascertain that the

recorded police–public encounters represent the entire population of encounters.

In terms of the Hawthorne and John Henry effects, we acknowledge that interference

risks potentially characterize our study. As laid out by Sampson (2010: 492), Rubin (1990:

282), Cox (1958) Holland (1986) and others, the ‘‘stable-unit-treatment-value assumption’’

(SUTVA) may be a real threat to experiments and specifically for the reach of our con-

clusions. SUTVA refers to situations where dependency exists between the units in an

experiment. In other words, units (and their outcomes) are not independent of one another.

Violations of SUTVA create difficulties in making causal claims about the relationship

between the manipulation and the dependent variable. If ignored, SUTVA violations have

the possibility of adding bias to estimated treatment effects, and the bias can go in either a

positive or negative direction (Alvarez and Sinclair 2009: 3). Here, the same participants,

all of whom were participating in the same program, experienced both treatment and

control conditions. This means that we cannot rule out interference and there may be a

spillover of treatment effect to control and within treatment units. In fact, a large body of

knowledge in criminology is clearly suggestive of social processes that could explain the

reduction in use-of-force beyond the manipulation—peer pressure, social desirability,

deterrence, leadership, perceptions of danger and crowd influence are only some of the

micro-social elements that could lead officers to control or not control themselves.

On the one hand, treatment contamination such as in the case of SUTVA ‘simply’

makes it more difficult to detect a significant effect. If control cases are also treated (or,

vice versa, when treatment cases are not treated), then in practice the crossover merely

would require the treatment to exert a stronger effect in order to be observed, above and

beyond the noise created by the violation. Therefore, if a significant outcome is detected

even with SUTVA violations, than essentially it can be argued that the treatment is nev-

ertheless still effective. The trouble is that there is currently no statistical fix for SUTVA

violations (Berk 2005: 7; Sampson 2010) and we cannot ‘‘solve’’ the SUTVA problem with

statistical modeling (Berk 2005). However, we can try to specify how it actually occurs and

supplement the main analyses with additional observations that can, to some extent, address

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the SUTVAviolations in the context ofthe cameras treatment effect. Letus first go back to our

research question: what is the effect of cameras on use-of-force? Does being observed (with a

camera) elicit socially acceptable responses? Now let us return to the Hawthorne bias:

changing participants’ behavior because they are being observed, despite any treatment effect

(work environment, etc.). When considered this way, it looks like the hypothesis and the

observer bias are very similar. If the causal mechanism behind the body-worn-cameras is the

observer effect, then more than anything else, we manipulated a ‘‘Hawthorne treatment’’

under controlled settings, thus concurring with previous research on the effect of focused

attention on outcomes. Similarly, the John Henry effect may actually be construed as a

positive outcome under these settings, as well. ‘‘Members’’ of the control group were fully

cognizant of their status as members and were able to compare their performance with that of

the treatment group, and it seems that they attempted to overcome the ‘‘disadvantage’’ of

being in the control group by ‘‘behaving’’ themselves while not on film. Therefore, if our

interpretation is reasonable, the study provides direct evidence on how repeated and sys-

tematic exposure to a stimulus that elicits deterrence can change behavior, even when the

stimulus has vanished. Put differently, this is learning: it seems that people learn, by their

exposure to observation, of what normative or appropriate reactions are, even when they are

not under surveillance anymore. That both John Henry and Hawthorne effects may be in play

simultaneously and we still find differences suggests that the effect of body-worn cameras

may be much stronger under ‘cleaner’ randomisation designs.

Still, SUTVA is not just about observer’s bias and there may be other mechanisms in place

that cause interference, some of which we have listed above. Because the unit of analysis was

the shift, we can think of a number of officer-based variables, for example, that might explain

the change in behavior. Some officers have ‘‘thick skins’’ and would not respond with ‘‘too

much force’’ to a resisting suspect. Others are more sensitive and would subdue such a suspect

with ‘‘more force’’. The ‘‘amount of response’’ to such demeanor seems largely dependent on

the cognitive and emotional capacities, as well as the training and experience of the officer

(see Paoline and Terrill 2011). Therefore, if the same officer is in the habit of responding with

a particular ‘‘response dosage’’ to certain police–public interactions, then it is likely that he or

she would spill-over such reaction between the study units—that is, from one encounter to the

next.
11

We invite future research to look more closely into this possibility.

Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Body-Worn-Cameras

Combining costs data from the experiment with figures from Finn (2001), the Minneapolis

Civilian Review Authority (1997), Walker et al. (2002) and Metropolitan Police court

settlements (BBC, 11th May 2012) we have crudely estimated the dollar benefit-cost ratio

to be approximately 4:1 (details available as a supplement to this article).
12
That said, there

are wider social and ethical costs to using these cameras. If body-worn-cameras become

11
As Aristotle observed: ‘‘We are what we repeatedly do’’.

12
One benefit which we have overlooked but should be closely observed in the future is the ‘‘training

potential’’ of body-worn-videos. Rialto officers downloaded their own footage in order to view their
interactions on a routine basis. Much like surgery, football or acting, the footage recorded by police body-
worn-videos can be used to ‘‘coach’’ police officers, about how they conduct themselves. We envisage future
police training to incorporate one-on-one sessions in which junior officers train with their own footage,
about police conduct and potentially improve their demeanor when dealing with suspects, victims and
witnesses. The benefits associated with such an impactful evidence-based approach to training through
digital coaching, for procedural justice, distributive justice and police conduct more generally, should be an
area of future investigations.

528 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

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common practice, it means more electronic surveillance, more digitized tagging of indi-

viduals, and more challenges to privacy rights. This was certainly the argument against

CCTV, as there are clear ethical considerations to having a data storage policy that rou-

tinely collects data on citizens in the public domain (Brey 2004; Spinello and Tavani 2004;

Duff and Marshall 2000). CCTV surveillance captures the routine behavior of citizens

whose consent is not obtained prior to their being observed and is now so much a fabric of

life as to be ‘banal’ (Goold et al. 2013). Whilst the moral argument against CCTV is not of

the same scope and magnitude when it comes to police body-worn-cameras, it is an open

question as to whether police–public encounters should be routinely filmed and what

threats to rights this practice might represent.
13

Victims and witnesses might expect that

their communication with officers of the law is well-documented (beyond contempora-

neous note-taking by police). Either way, one area that body-worn-cameras might be a tool

to potentially improve the quality of interaction is when police encounter members of

minority groups, particularly if officers are more mindful of the need procedural fairness

and to be respectful (Tyler 2001). If the ‘‘legitimacy benefits’’ associated with wearing

cameras—economically, socially, and culturally—exceed the ‘‘costs’’ of the cameras, we

sense that body-worn-videos will become increasingly popular amongst officers.

On the other hand, future research should be mindful of at least two ‘‘prices’’ that are

presently unclear. First, what are the direct and indirect costs of storing, sharing and

managing digital evidence? The velocity and volume of data accumulating in police

departments—even if only a fraction of the number of recorded events turn into ‘‘down-

loadable’’ recordings for evidentiary purposes—will exponentially grow over time. User

licenses, storage space, ‘‘security costs’’, maintenance and system upgrades can potentially

translate into billions of dollars worldwide (see Grossman 2009; Nambiar et al. 2014).

Second, the cost of not having video footage may have direct implications on decisions

to prosecute or criminal proceedings more generally. Historically, evidence given by police

officers in court against defendants—particularly testimonies of response officers—carried

tremendous weight. The officer was able to characterize the suspect’s demeanor, explain

what was in the scene of crime and provide overall crucial details pertaining to the case. To

a large degree, the assumption of credibility is generally made by the courts, unless

challenged by the defendant. Yet it is very likely that defense attorneys, judges, the jury

and the public as a whole would steadfastly assign more weight to digital evidence,

arguably even more than officers’ testimonies. This may be viewed as a ‘‘good’’ thing, yet

it has indirect but important costs on policing: would district attorneys in domestic violence

cases be reluctant to prosecute when there is no evidence from body-worn-videos to

corroborate the testimony of the officer (or even the victim)? Would cases be dismissed if

arrests or stop-and-frisk were conducted without a body-worn-video, given the possible

violation of human rights (i.e., a similar approach as the Miranda warning)? Will officers’

credibility in court be assumed to be violated ex ante when police–public encounters are

not recorded? These are substantial effects that future research should be mindful to

explore, that can potentially offset the benefits of body-worn-videos.

Research Limitations

Thus far we have ignored how cameras affected the citizens the police came into contact

with, meaning that our analyses do not directly address the demeanor hypothesis. However,

13
If we assume that all members of public encountered by the police are ‘criminals’ then it might well be

justifiable, but this is obviously untrue.

J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535 529

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we have found that, at least as officially recorded by the police (bearing in mind caveats

associated with this data source), it is nearly always the case that officers responded with

force and did not initiate the force response. We have also found that alcohol is a factor in

more than half of all cases of use-of-force, which merits further attention in future research

(see supplementary material). More broadly, we do not know on which party in an

encounter the cameras have had an effect on, or how the two effects—on officers and on

suspects—interact. This means that the estimated causal effect on officers’ use-of-force

conflates these mechanisms: Do cameras affect the conduct of suspects, which then

moderates the need of officers to react with force to such behavior? Or do cameras affect

the conduct of officers, who might have otherwise acted with unnecessary or excessive

force regardless of the suspects’ demeanor? Does it have a double effect?

Nevertheless, while it is difficult to isolate the mechanism in play, we can at least

suggest that cameras have affected the overall result of police–citizen encounters. Whether

police use-of-force—justified or unwarranted, excessive or proportional, reasonable or

unreasonable—is a function of suspects’ demeanor, or whether it is caused by unprofes-

sional or inexperienced officers, the circumstances in which use-of-force occurred have

changed, and resulted in what can be interpreted as a socially desirable response: force-free

police–public encounters. ‘‘Human beings are norm users,’’ MacCormick (2007: 20)

reminds us, ‘‘whose interactions with each other depend on mutually recognizable patterns

that can be articulated in terms of right versus wrong conduct, or of what one ought to do in

certain settings.’’ Simply put, the cameras communicated the deterrence message, through

self-awareness of being observed, that the acceptable behavioral response in a given sit-

uation was not one of force. In short, whether they affected officers, citizens, or both, body-

worn-cameras resulted in less force.

On the other hand, our unique research settings cannot be overlooked. Rialto, after all, is a

small force with a dedicated Chief who has directly managed the experiment. This model

may work well in a relatively limited force and when the ‘‘pracademic’’ (practitioner-

academic) involved in the study is the director/chief of police, but the effect of body-worn

videos may not work in the same way when the pracademic is less influential in the orga-

nization. More research is therefore needed to replicate our design in larger forces and

different organizational frameworks, when a middle-level manager is directly involved in the

daily affairs of the experiment (see Strang 2012)—which is a more likely context in larger

police departments involved in randomized controlled trials or field research more broadly.

Finally, there is something to be said about treatment fidelity. For the purposes of this

experiment every crime type and virtually all encounters between the police and the public

were assigned to recording as well as to a verbal notification by officers that the encounter

is videotaped. Yet we do not know how well the requirements were implemented, and it is

difficult to estimate the fidelity of the intervention. There are three areas however that

future research should focus on in order to assess the implementation of treatments with

finer integrity: first, by measuring the number of video uploads/downloads during control

condition, researchers would be able to ascertain whether violations of control conditions

were made, and in which cases. As far as we can tell, contemporary back-office digital

storage systems (cloud-based or stand-alone) can enumerate all recorded events by time-

stamps, and so violations of control conditions can be accurately and systematically

measured—hopefully during the experimental period in order to confront these violations

and deal with them as they occur, not ex post facto in the analysis stage. However,

estimating the violations of treatment assignment—that is, when cameras are assigned but

are not used—is trickier and proxies should be used instead. Ride-a-longs, surprise visits

and dip sample interviews with victims or suspects, asking them whether they recall the

530 J Quant Criminol (2015) 31:509–535

123

officers wearing body-worn-videos or not, are equally useful, but they would provide

estimates rather than a comprehensive approach to tracking random assignment fidelity

(see Sherman 2013). Nevertheless, measuring the implementation is undoubtedly crucial in

order to understand the effect of wearing body-cameras—especially in studies that would

provide officers the power of discretion about when to use the devices.
14

Conclusion

Regardless of the reason for the contact—initiated by the member of the public, or

involuntary and initiated by the police—when members of the public sense they have had a

‘‘bad experience’’ during the encounter, they are nearly 15 times more likely to evaluate

the police negatively—and this negative attitude translates into complaints (Skogan 2006;

see also Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Hinds 2009). Similarly, the use-of-force by police, par-

ticularly if excessive, has a lasting effect on public perceptions of police and police-

community relations. Finding ways to ameliorate these two negative outcomes was the

driver for the present study. We have reported results from the first trial in the world to

assess the effects of police body-worn-cameras on use-of-force and complaints against the

police. To handle the small number of officers in Rialto Police, we took the innovative

approach of randomizing police shifts to treatment and control conditions. Based on evi-

dence collected in this randomized controlled field trial, our findings suggest that police

body-worn-cameras reduce the prevalence of use-of-force by the police as well as the

incidence of citizens’ complaints against the police. However, this is but one experiment

and before this policy is considered more widely, police forces, governments and

researchers should invest further time and effort in replicating these findings.

Acknowledgments We wish to alphabetically thank Badi Hasisi, Daniel Nagin, David Weisburd, Joel
Garner, Justice Tankebe, Lawrence Sherman, Neil Wain, Phillip Dawid and the anonymous reviewers of
earlier drafts of this manuscript for their tremendously helpful comments. Funding for this research was
granted by Rialto Police and the Jerry Lee Centre of Experimental Criminology.

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The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Abstract
Objective
Methods
Results
Introduction
Literature Review
Police Use-of-Force
Explaining Police Use-of-Force
Measuring Use-of-Force
Citizens Complaints Against the Police
Cameras as a Deterrence Stimulus to Manage Police Use-of-Force
Hypotheses
Methods
Research Settings
‘‘Police Shift’’ as the Unit of Analysis
Procedure, Random Allocation and Statistical Power
Apparatus
Measures
Use-of-Force
Citizen Complaints
Contacts with the Public
Baseline Data
Statistical Procedure
Results
Use-of-Force
Citizens’ Complaints
Discussion
Just Another Hawthorne Effect?
Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Body-Worn-Cameras
Research Limitations
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References

Joh, Elizabeth E. 2016. Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body Cameras. Surveillance & Society
14(1): 133-137. http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index | ISSN: 1477-7487
© The author, 2016 | Licensed to the Surveillance Studies Network under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives license.

Elizabeth E. Joh

University of California, Davis School of Law, US.
eejoh@ucdavis.edu

Introduction

At a critical moment in American policing, we have embraced body-worn cameras as a tool of police
reform and accountability. After the 2014 fatal shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, as well
as other controversial deaths of African-Americans at the hands of officers, American police have drawn
intense public scrutiny (Lauter and Pearce 2015). While some proposed police reforms in response to
these deaths have been controversial, lawmakers, police chiefs, and activists alike have supported police
adoption of body-worn cameras (Elinson 2015). Of seventy large U.S. police departments recently
surveyed, ninety-five per cent responded that they had or were in the process of adopting body-worn
cameras (Maciag 2016). In May 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the availability of $20
million for local police departments to adopt these cameras (Berman 2015). Without a doubt, police body
cameras “are here to stay” (Hermann and Weiner 2014).

But this rapid adoption has come with a cost. Before 2015, only four states had passed any laws regarding
police body-worn cameras; by 2015, a majority of them had done so (NCSL 2015). Yet a February 2016
study found that only nine states had any explicit guidelines on how body-worn cameras should be used
(Urban Institute 2016). Body-worn cameras collect video data—lots of it—and as a result, civil liberties
groups and scholars have raised questions about increased government surveillance. But the potential use
of these cameras as surveillance tools, while an important concern, ignores an equally pressing problem.

In our big data age, “seeing, monitoring, and recording the digital footprints is quite different from
sharing, releasing, revealing or publicizing the data” (Harcourt 2015). Police body camera policies must
address not only concerns about surveillance, but also data control. The absence of clear data control
policies will result in confusion, both for the police and the public, about who has access to see, share, and
delete data produced from body-worn cameras. And without strong presumptions in favor of sharing the
data with the public, the reform, accountability, and legitimacy potential of body worn cameras will go
unfulfilled.

Who controls the data?

The regulation of new police surveillance technologies—of which body-worn cameras are only one
example—must address data control: the conditions of its production, analysis, storage, and access.
Pervasive data collection of personal information, whether by government agencies or private companies,
is already a reality for most Americans. Third parties use that data, once collected, to make decisions

Debate
Beyond Surveillance: Data Control and Body
Cameras

mailto:eejoh@ucdavis.edu

http://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index

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Surveillance & Society 14(1) 134

about our consumption, health, employability, and creditworthiness. Even the police rely on data collected
in private databases. In this way, the information produced by police body cameras joins the data trails
already surrounding us. And body-worn camera adoption by the police will likely only be a precursor to
other public officials (e.g. teachers) and private actors (insurance adjustors) following suit (Maciag 2015;
Mims 2015). Matters of responsibility, innocence, and liability will depend on who controls the data that
can answer these questions. Thus the “data fate” (Marx 2012) of the information produced by these
cameras will influence the use of this technology well beyond policing.

What are the conditions of data production?
The very design of a police body-worn camera can influence the resulting data (Kaste 2015). Seemingly
mundane questions of equipment design and cost can shape the information produced. These important
questions, however, are dictated by private companies, not public agencies. In the case of surveillance
technologies, the police are purchasers and consumers of third party products (Joh 2016: 38). Two
manufacturers, Taser and VieVu, dominate the police-worn body camera market (Mearian 2015). As a
result, only two companies wield disproportionate influence over the design of police body-worn camera
data collection and control.

Start with the recording decision. If a camera is only subject to manual control, key discretionary
decisions about when and why to record are left up to the individual officer. A failure to record may be the
result of accident, stress, or deliberate misconduct. An affirmative decision to record might be a legitimate
attempt to enhance accountability or, worse, to humiliate or invade privacy felt in an intimate setting like a
home. Any of these outcomes are possible when the recording decision is left to the individual officer. We
could remove that uncertainty through design (Stroud 2015). A different type of camera could take the
recording decision away from the officer altogether, by livestreaming the video images to the agency data-
center (Li 2014).

Next, a body-worn camera that records secretly does little to foster trust in the police and may increase
public suspicion. A requirement that police provide a verbal warning leaves notice up to officer discretion.
A better alternative or supplement would be “visceral notice” by design (Calo 2012), such as a blinking
red light, when a camera is recording. Eliminating secret recording may increase notice, but with other
mixed results. Knowledge of a police body camera in operation may discourage some people from coming
forward or inhibit how they speak to the police. Yet a camera that can operate in “stealth mode” may also
foster public mistrust. These design details affect the ultimate production of the data, and yet few have
recognized their significance. Moreover, if these design elements influence data production, the input
should come from the public, and not only corporate interests and the police.

How will the data be stored?
Those police departments that have already adopted body-worn cameras report that vast amounts of data
result from even limited amounts of camera use. By one estimate, some large police departments are
producing more than 10,000 hours of video data a week (Sanburn 2016). This amount of data created is
often beyond the capacity of most conventional police departments to store themselves.

To meet these needs, private companies offer data storage services—sometimes the very same companies
that supply the cameras. This third party storage is costly: in fact, it is often the most expensive part of
police body-worn camera programs. Profit margins are much higher for video storage than they are for the
cameras themselves (Mearian 2015). Indeed, data storage costs are sometimes cited as a reason why police
departments may be reluctant to adopt body-worn cameras at all (Ryan 2016). Thus data storage costs may
be an unrecognized factor that influences decisions about which kinds of incidents officers will record in
the first place.

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Surveillance & Society 14(1) 135

No matter where police body-worn camera data is stored, there remain questions of when data should be
deleted. Here the values of privacy and accountability may lie in tension. The few states that have
addressed body-worn camera video storage limits have generally erred on the side of limiting video
storage unless it is involved in a criminal investigation (Urban Institute 2016). Shorter storage times
means there is less data (of the innocent as well as the guilty) available for inspection and analysis. Yet
longer data storage periods may enhance public accountability if it means that the public—citizens,
journalists, and researchers—can access video that can illuminate individual cases as well as general
policing practices.

How will the data be processed?
In the age of big data, digital information once collected may be endlessly analyzed, sifted, and sorted for
different purposes (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013: 122). Facebook sends targeted advertising to its
users based on their posts. Tinder, the dating app, now matches its users to presidential candidates (Opam
2016). The data captured by police body-worn cameras will likewise be subject to the same analysis and
reuse.

The data collected by body-worn cameras could be subjected to various software applications that would
further law enforcement interests, not accountability concerns. Body-worn cameras could incorporate
license plate reader or facial recognition technology. Adoption of these technologies raises distinct
questions of police discretion and policy. To what ends should a body-worn camera equipped with facial
recognition technology be used? Most people will probably agree that the police should be able to identify
those suspected of “serious” crimes, but is there a lower limit? Should police be able to use these cameras
to identify, for instance, those persons delinquent on property taxes (Clift 2015)?

How will the data be shared?
Body-worn cameras have been touted as tools of police reform, but if the resulting data is secret, reform is
impossible. Consider the fatal shooting of 17-year-old Laquan McDonald, shot 16 times by Chicago
Police in 2014. Even after journalists raised repeated questions about the circumstances of the shooting,
the city refused to release the video of the shooting for 13 months, until forced to by a judge’s order. Cook
County State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez had taken no action in the case until, on the day of the video’s
release, she announced first degree murder charges against Officer Jason Van Dyke for his role in
McDonald’s death (Glenza 2016). Within days, Mayor Rahm Emanuel fired Police Superintendent Garry
McCarthy. Heavily criticized for her inaction until the release of the video, Alvarez lost a primary
challenge shortly thereafter (Davey 2016). As the McDonald case shows, it is data control as much as
collection that will matter in the use of police body-worn cameras.

Yet departments around the U.S. have not yet developed clear policies about data sharing. Some
departments have adopted internal policies restricting public access to body-worn camera video, while
some state and local governments are considering legislative measures to do the same (Hermann and
Davis 2015). Nearly every state has law enforcement exemptions to public records requests; these may be
invoked to bar most public access to data created by police body cameras (Urban Institute 2016). At the
other end of the spectrum, the Seattle Police Department has posted videos taken during its body-worn
camera pilot project on YouTube, with sensitive images blurred (Kravets 2015).

National questions, local responses

Most of the wide variation in data control policies can be explained by the highly decentralized nature of
American policing. Instead of a national police force, American policing is represented by the
approximately 18,000 state and local agencies that assume responsibility for policing (Bureau of Justice
Statistics 2011). Consequently, it is nearly impossible for uniform policies to be imposed upon such a
large number of distinct police departments. And for some, that variation is desirable. The President’s

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Surveillance & Society 14(1) 136

Task Force on 21st Century Policing, for instance, emphasizes that the implementation of new
technologies, including body-worn cameras, “should remain a local decision to address the needs and
resources of the community” (President’s Task Force 2015: 35).

Will the surveillance and privacy implications of police body-worn cameras be worth any increase in
accountability? The answer, as I have suggested here, depends greatly on questions of data control. While
systematic monitoring alone can affect one’s behavior, equally important are unresolved questions of how
any resulting data is stored, analyzed, and shared. Collected data presents the danger of an endless
surveillance loop: monitoring that results in data that justifies even more monitoring. And as this response
has suggested, these questions will apply with equal force to every new technology the police adopt to
collect information.

Who has power over “controlling the data flows” is the ultimate political question that attends body-worn
camera adoption by the police (Harcourt 2015). Yet in the rush to respond to calls for greater police
accountability, many American police departments lack consistent, clear, or—in some cases—any, formal
policies regarding how to control that data. Without clear limits, body-worn cameras may become just
another tool for law enforcement rather than a mechanism for police accountability.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

F I N A L R E P O R T O F

M A Y 2 0 1 5

Recommended citation:

President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office

of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Published 2015

C O N T E N T S
From the Co-Chairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Members of the Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Task Force Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pillar 1 . Building Trust & Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pillar 2 . Policy & Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Pillar 3 . Technology & Social Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Pillar 4 . Community Policing & Crime Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Pillar 5 . Training & Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Pillar 6 . Officer Wellness & Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Appendix A . Public Listening Sessions & Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Appendix B . Individuals & Organizations That Submitted Written Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix C . Executive Order 13684 of December 18, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Appendix D . Task Force Members’ Biographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Appendix E . Recommendations and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

i i i

F R O M T H E C O – C H A I R S
We wish to thank President Barack Obama for giving us the honor and privilege of leading his Task Force
on 21st Century Policing. The task force was created to strengthen community policing and trust among
law enforcement officers and the communities they serve—especially in light of recent events around
the country that have underscored the need for and importance of lasting collaborative relationships
between local police and the public. We found engaging with law enforcement officials, technical advi-
sors, youth and community leaders, and nongovernmental organizations through a transparent public
process to be both enlightening and rewarding, and we again thank the President for this honor.

Given the urgency of these issues, the President gave the task force an initial 90 days to identify best
policing practices and offer recommendations on how those practices can promote effective crime
reduction while building public trust. In this short period, the task force conducted seven public listen-
ing sessions across the country and received testimony and recommendations from a wide range of
community and faith leaders, law enforcement officers, academics, and others to ensure its recommen-
dations would be informed by a diverse range of voices. Such a remarkable achievement could not have
been accomplished without the tremendous assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), led by Director Ronald L. Davis, who also
served as the executive director of the task force. We thank Director Davis for his leadership, as well as his
chief of staff, Melanca Clark, and the COPS Office team that supported the operation and administration
of the task force.

We also wish to extend our appreciation to the COPS Office’s extremely capable logistical and technical
assistance provider, Strategic Applications International (SAI), led by James and Colleen Copple. In ad-
dition to logistical support, SAI digested the voluminous information received from testifying witnesses
and the public in record time and helped facilitate the task force’s deliberations on recommendations for
the President. We are also grateful for the thoughtful assistance of Darrel Stephens and Stephen Rick-
man, our technical advisors.

Most important, we would especially like to thank the hundreds of community members, law en-
forcement officers and executives, associations and stakeholders, researchers and academics, and civic
leaders nationwide who stepped forward to support the efforts of the task force and to lend their
experience and expertise during the development of the recommendations contained in this report.
The passion and commitment shared by all to building strong relationships between law enforcement
and communities became a continual source of inspiration and encouragement to the task force.

The dedication of our fellow task force members and their commitment to the process of arriving at
consensus around these recommendations is also worth acknowledging. The task force members
brought diverse perspectives to the table and were able to come together to engage in meaningful
dialogue on emotionally charged issues in a respectful and effective manner. We believe the type of
constructive dialogue we have engaged in should serve as an example of the type of dialogue that
must occur in communities throughout the nation.

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

i v

While much work remains to be done to address many longstanding issues and challenges—not only
within the field of law enforcement but also within the broader criminal justice system—this experience
has demonstrated to us that Americans are, by nature, problem solvers. It is our hope that the recom-
mendations included here will meaningfully contribute to our nation’s efforts to increase trust between
law enforcement and the communities they protect and serve.

Charles H. Ramsey Laurie O. Robinson
Co-Chair Co-Chair

President Barack Obama joins members of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing for a group photo in the Oval Office, March 2, 2015.
OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE PHOTO BY PETE SOUZA

M E M B E R S O F T H E T A S K F O R C E

Co-Chairs

Charles Ramsey, Commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department

Laurie Robinson, Professor, George Mason University

Members

Cedric L. Alexander, Deputy Chief Operating Officer for Public Safety, DeKalb County, Georgia

Jose Lopez, Lead Organizer, Make the Road New York

Tracey L. Meares, Walton Hale Hamilton Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Brittany N. Packnett, Executive Director, Teach For America, St. Louis, Missouri

Susan Lee Rahr, Executive Director, Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission

Constance Rice, Co-Director, Advancement Project

Sean Michael Smoot, Director and Chief Counsel, Police Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois

Bryan Stevenson, Founder and Executive Director, Equal Justice Initiative

Roberto Villaseñor, Chief of Police, Tucson Police Department

PHOTO: BRANDON TRAMEL

v i i

T A S K F O R C E S T A F F
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, led by Director Ronald
L. Davis, provided administrative services, funds, facilities, staff, equipment, and other support services as
necessary for the task force to carry out its mission:

Executive Director Ronald L. Davis

Chief of Staff Melanca Clark

Communications Director Silas Darden (Office of Justice Programs)

General Counsel Charlotte Grzebien

External Affairs Liaison Danielle Ouellette

External Affairs Liaison Sheryl Thomas

Legislative Liaison Shannon Long

Project Manager Deborah Spence

Senior Policy Advisor Katherine McQuay

Site Manager Laurel Matthews

Special Assistant Michael Franko

Special Assistant Jennifer Rosenberger

Writer Janice Delaney (Office of Justice Programs)

Writer Faye Elkins

Strategic Applications International (SAI):1 James Copple, Colleen Copple, Jessica Drake,
Jason Drake, Steven Minson, Letitia Harmon, Anthony Coulson, Mike McCormack, Shawnee
Bigelow, Monica Palacio, and Adrienne Semidey

Technical Advisors: Stephen Rickman and Darrel Stephens

Consultant Research Assistants: Jan Hudson, Yasemin Irvin-Erickson, Katie Jares, Erin Kearns,
Belen Lowrey, and Kristina Lugo

1. SAI provided technical and logistical support through a cooperative agreement with the COPS Office.

i x

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
The task force received support from other components of the U.S. Department of Justice, including the
Office of Justice Programs, led by Assistant Attorney General Karol Mason, and the Civil Rights Division,
led by Acting Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta.

The following individuals from across the U.S. Department of Justice also assisted the task force in its
work: Eric Agner, Amin Aminfar, Pete Brien, Pamela Cammarata, Erin Canning, Ed Chung, Caitlin Currie,
Shanetta Cutlar, Melissa Fox, Shirlethia Franklin, Ann Hamilton, Najla Haywood, Esteban Hernandez,
Natalie Hopewell, Arthur Gary, Tammie Gregg, Richard Hughes, Valerie Jordan, Mark Kappelhoff, John
Kim, Kevin Lewis, Robert Listenbee, Cynthia Pappas, Scott Pestridge, Channing Phillips, Melissa Randolph,
Margaret Richardson, Janice Rodgers, Elizabeth Simpson, Jonathan Smith, Brandon Tramel, Donte Turner,
and Miriam Vogel.

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

Cincinnati Police Chief Jeffrey Blackwell welcomes the task force to the University of Cincinnati, January 30, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y
Trust between law enforcement agencies and
the people they protect and serve is essential in a
democracy. It is key to the stability of our communi-
ties, the integrity of our criminal justice system, and
the safe and effective delivery of policing services.

In light of recent events that have exposed rifts
in the relationships between local police and the
communities they protect and serve, on Decem-
ber 18, 2014, President Barack Obama signed an
executive order establishing the Task Force on 21st
Century Policing. The President charged the task
force with identifying best practices and offering
recommendations on how policing practices can
promote effective crime reduction while building
public trust.

This executive summary provides an overview
of the recommendations of the task force, which
met seven times in January and February of 2015.
These listening sessions, held in Washington, D.C.;
Phoenix, Arizona; and Cincinnati, Ohio, brought
the 11 members of the task force together with
more than 100 individuals from diverse stakeholder
groups—law enforcement officers and executives,
community members, civic leaders, advocates,
researchers, academics, and others—in addition to
many others who submitted written testimony to
study the problems from all perspectives.

The task force recommendations, each with action
items, are organized around six main topic areas or
“pillars:” Building Trust and Legitimacy, Policy and
Oversight, Technology and Social Media, Commu-
nity Policing and Crime Reduction, Officer Training
and Education, and Officer Safety and Wellness.

The task force also offered two overarching rec-
ommendations: the President should support the
creation of a National Crime and Justice Task Force
to examine all areas of criminal justice and pro-

pose reforms; as a corollary to this effort, the task
force also recommends that the President support
programs that take a comprehensive and inclusive
look at community-based initiatives addressing
core issues such as poverty, education, and health
and safety.

Pillar One: Building Trust
and Legitimacy

Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both
sides of the police/citizen divide is the founda-
tional principle underlying the nature of relations
between law enforcement agencies and the
communities they serve. Decades of research
and practice support the premise that people are
more likely to obey the law when they believe that
those who are enforcing it have authority that is
perceived as legitimate by those subject to the
authority. The public confers legitimacy only on
those whom they believe are acting in procedur-
ally just ways. In addition, law enforcement cannot
build community trust if it is seen as an occupying
force coming in from outside to impose control on
the community. Pillar one seeks to provide focused
recommendations on building this relationship.

Law enforcement culture should embrace a guard-
ian—rather than a warrior—mindset to build trust
and legitimacy both within agencies and with
the public. Toward that end, law enforcement
agencies should adopt procedural justice as the
guiding principle for internal and external policies
and practices to guide their interactions with rank
and file officers and with the citizens they serve.
Law enforcement agencies should also establish
a culture of transparency and accountability to
build public trust and legitimacy. This is critical to
ensuring decision making is understood and in
accord with stated policy.

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

Law enforcement agencies should also proactively
promote public trust by initiating positive non-
enforcement activities to engage communities
that typically have high rates of investigative and
enforcement involvement with government agen-
cies. Law enforcement agencies should also track
and analyze the level of trust communities have in
police just as they measure changes in crime. This
can be accomplished through consistent annual
community surveys. Finally, law enforcement
agencies should strive to create a workforce that
encompasses a broad range of diversity including
race, gender, language, life experience, and cul-
tural background to improve understanding and
effectiveness in dealing with all communities.

Pillar Two: Policy and Oversight

Pillar two emphasizes that if police are to carry out
their responsibilities according to established poli-
cies, those policies must reflect community values.
Law enforcement agencies should collaborate with
community members, especially in communities
and neighborhoods disproportionately affected
by crime, to develop policies and strategies for
deploying resources that aim to reduce crime by
improving relationships, increasing community
engagement, and fostering cooperation.

To achieve this end, law enforcement agencies
should have clear and comprehensive policies on
the use of force (including training on the im-
portance of de-escalation), mass demonstrations
(including the appropriate use of equipment,
particularly rifles and armored personnel carriers),
consent before searches, gender identification,
racial profiling, and performance measures—
among others such as external and independent
investigations and prosecutions of officer-involved
shootings and other use of force situations and
in-custody deaths. These policies should also in-
clude provisions for the collection of demographic

data on all parties involved. All policies and
aggregate data should be made publicly available
to ensure transparency.

To ensure policies are maintained and current,
law enforcement agencies are encouraged to
periodically review policies and procedures,
conduct nonpunitive peer reviews of critical
incidents separate from criminal and administra-
tive investigations, and establish civilian oversight
mechanisms with their communities.

Finally, to assist law enforcement and the com-
munity achieve the elements of pillar two, the
U.S. Department of Justice, through the Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS
Office) and Office of Justice Programs (OJP), should
provide technical assistance and incentive funding
to jurisdictions with small police agencies that take
steps toward interagency collaboration, shared
services, and regional training. They should also
partner with the International Association of Direc-
tors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training
(IADLEST ) to expand its National Decertification
Index to serve as the National Register of Decerti-
fied Officers with the goal of covering all agencies
within the United States and its territories.

Pillar Three: Technology &
Social Media

The use of technology can improve policing practic-
es and build community trust and legitimacy, but its
implementation must be built on a defined policy
framework with its purposes and goals clearly de-
lineated. Implementing new technologies can give
police departments an opportunity to fully engage
and educate communities in a dialogue about their
expectations for transparency, accountability, and
privacy. But technology changes quickly in terms
of new hardware, software, and other options. Law
enforcement agencies and leaders need to be able

e x e c u t i v e s u m m a R y

to identify, assess, and evaluate new technology
for adoption and do so in ways that improve their
effectiveness, efficiency, and evolution without
infringing on individual rights.

Pillar three guides the implementation, use, and
evaluation of technology and social media by law
enforcement agencies. To build a solid foundation
for law enforcement agencies in this field, the U.S.
Department of Justice, in consultation with the
law enforcement field, should establish national
standards for the research and development of
new technology including auditory, visual, and bio-
metric data, “less than lethal” technology, and the
development of segregated radio spectrum such
as FirstNet. These standards should also address
compatibility, interoperability, and implementation
needs both within local law enforcement agencies
and across agencies and jurisdictions and should
maintain civil and human rights protections. Law
enforcement implementation of technology
should be designed considering local needs and
aligned with these national standards. Finally,
law enforcement agencies should adopt model
policies and best practices for technology-based
community engagement that increases communi-
ty trust and access.

Pillar Four: Community Policing &
Crime Reduction

Pillar four focuses on the importance of com-
munity policing as a guiding philosophy for all
stakeholders. Community policing emphasizes
working with neighborhood residents to co-
produce public safety. Law enforcement agencies
should, therefore, work with community residents
to identify problems and collaborate on imple-
menting solutions that produce meaningful results
for the community. Specifically, law enforcement
agencies should develop and adopt policies and
strategies that reinforce the importance of com-

munity engagement in managing public safety.
Law enforcement agencies should also engage in
multidisciplinary, community team approaches for
planning, implementing, and responding to crisis
situations with complex causal factors.

Communities should support a culture and
practice of policing that reflects the values of
protection and promotion of the dignity of all—
especially the most vulnerable, such as children
and youth most at risk for crime or violence. Law
enforcement agencies should avoid using law
enforcement tactics that unnecessarily stigmatize
youth and marginalize their participation in schools
(where law enforcement officers should have limit-
ed involvement in discipline) and communities. In
addition, communities need to affirm and recog-
nize the voices of youth in community decision
making, facilitate youth participation in research
and problem solving, and develop and fund youth
leadership training and life skills through positive
youth/police collaboration and interactions.

Pillar Five: Training & Education

As our nation becomes more pluralistic and
the scope of law enforcement’s responsibilities
expands, the need for expanded and more
effective training has become critical. Today’s line
officers and leaders must be trained and capable
to address a wide variety of challenges including
international terrorism, evolving technologies,
rising immigration, changing laws, new cultural
mores, and a growing mental health crisis.

Pillar five focuses on the training and education
needs of law enforcement. To ensure the high
quality and effectiveness of training and educa-
tion, law enforcement agencies should engage
community members, particularly those with spe-
cial expertise, in the training process and provide
leadership training to all personnel throughout
their careers.

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

To further assist the training and educational
needs of law enforcement, the Federal Gov-
ernment should support the development of
partnerships with training facilities across the
country to promote consistent standards for high
quality training and establish training innovation
hubs involving universities and police academies.
A national postgraduate institute of policing for
senior executives should be created with a stan-
dardized curriculum preparing participants to lead
agencies in the 21st century.

One specific method of increasing the quality of
training would be to ensure that Peace Officer
and Standards Training (POST ) boards include
mandatory Crisis Intervention Training (CIT ), which
equips officers to deal with individuals in crisis or
living with mental disabilities, as part of both basic
recruit and in-service officer training—as well as
instruction in disease of addiction, implicit bias
and cultural responsiveness, policing in a dem-
ocratic society, procedural justice, and effective
social interaction and tactical skills.

Pillar Six: Officer Wellness & Safety

The wellness and safety of law enforcement
officers is critical not only for the officers, their
colleagues, and their agencies but also to public
safety. Pillar six emphasizes the support and prop-
er implementation of officer wellness and safety as
a multi-partner effort.

The U.S. Department of Justice should enhance
and further promote its multi-faceted officer safety
and wellness initiative. Two specific strategies
recommended for the U.S. Department of Justice
include (1) encouraging and assisting departments
in the implementation of scientifically supported
shift lengths by law enforcement and (2) expand-
ing efforts to collect and analyze data not only on
officer deaths but also on injuries and “near misses.”

Law enforcement agencies should also promote
wellness and safety at every level of the organiza-
tion. For instance, every law enforcement officer
should be provided with individual tactical first aid
kits and training as well as anti-ballistic vests. In
addition, law enforcement agencies should adopt
policies that require officers to wear seat belts and
bullet-proof vests and provide training to raise
awareness of the consequences of failure to do so.
Internal procedural justice principles should be ad-
opted for all internal policies and interactions. The
Federal Government should develop programs
to provide financial support for law enforcement
officers to continue to pursue educational op-
portunities. Finally, Congress should develop and
enact peer review error management legislation.

Implementation Recommendations

The administration, through policies and practices
already in place, can start right now to move
forward on the recommendations contained in
this report. The President should direct all federal
law enforcement agencies to implement the task
force recommendations to the extent practica-
ble, and the U.S. Department of Justice should
explore public-private partnership opportunities
with foundations to advance implementation of
the recommendations. Finally, the COPS Office
and OJP should take a series of targeted actions
to assist the law enforcement field in addressing
current and future challenges.

Conclusion
The members of the Task Force on 21st Century
Policing are convinced that the concrete recom-
mendations contained in this publication will
bring long-term improvements to the ways in
which law enforcement agencies interact with and
bring positive change to their communities.

I N T R O D U C T I O N
“When any part of the American family does not feel like it is being
treated fairly, that’s a problem for all of us.”

— President Barack Obama

Trust between law enforcement agencies and
the people they protect and serve is essential
in a democracy. It is key to the stability of our
communities, the integrity of our criminal justice
system, and the safe and effective delivery of
policing services.

In light of the recent events that have exposed
rifts in the relationships between local police and
the communities they protect and serve, on De-
cember 18, 2014, President Barack Obama signed
Executive Order 13684 establishing the Task Force
on 21st Century Policing.

In establishing the task force, the President spoke
of the distrust that exists between too many
police departments and too many communi-
ties—the sense that in a country where our basic
principle is equality under the law, too many
individuals, particularly young people of color, do
not feel as if they are being treated fairly.

“When any part of the American family does not
feel like it is being treated fairly, that’s a problem
for all of us,” said the President. “It’s not just a
problem for some. It’s not just a problem for a
particular community or a particular demographic
It means that we are not as strong as a country
as we can be. And when applied to the criminal
justice system, it means we’re not as effective in
fighting crime as we could be.”

These remarks underpin the philosophical
foundation for the Task Force on 21st Century
Policing: to build trust between citizens and their
peace officers so that all components of a com-
munity are treating one another fairly and justly
and are invested in maintaining public safety in
an atmosphere of mutual respect. Decades of
research and practice tell us that the public cares
as much about how police interact with them as
they care about the outcomes that legal actions
produce. People are more likely to obey the law
when they believe those who are enforcing it
have the right—the legitimate authority—to tell
them what to do.2 Building trust and legitimacy,
therefore, is not just a policing issue. It involves all
components of the criminal justice system and
is inextricably bound to bedrock issues affecting
the community such as poverty, education, and
public health.

The mission of the task force was to examine ways
of fostering strong, collaborative relationships
between local law enforcement and the commu-
nities they protect and to make recommendations
to the President on ways policing practices can
promote effective crime reduction while building .
public trust. The President selected members of
the task force based on their ability to contribute
to its mission because of their relevant perspec-
tive, experience, or subject matter expertise
in policing, law enforcement and community
relations, civil rights, and civil liberties.

2. T.R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1990); M.S. Frazer, The Impact of the Community Court Model on Defendant
Perceptions of Fairness: A Case Study at the Red Hook Community Justice Center (New
York: Center for Court Innovation, 2006).

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

The task force was given 90 days to conduct
hearings, review the research, and make recom-
mendations to the President, so its focus was
sharp and necessarily limited. It concentrated
on defining the cross-cutting issues affecting
police-community interactions, questioning
the contemporary relevance and truth about
long-held assumptions regarding the nature and
methods of policing, and identifying the areas
where research is needed to highlight examples
of evidence-based policing practices compatible
with present realities.

To fulfill this mission, the task force convened sev-
en listening sessions to hear testimony—including
recommendations for action—from government
officials; law enforcement officers; academic ex-
perts; technical advisors; leaders from established
nongovernmental organizations, including grass-
roots movements; and any other members of the
public who wished to comment. The listening
sessions were held in Washington, D.C., January 13;
Cincinnati, Ohio, January 30–31; Phoenix, Arizona,
February 13–14; and again in Washington, D.C.,
February 23–24. Other forms of outreach included
a number of White House listening sessions to
engage other constituencies, such as people with
disabilities, the LGBTQ community, and members
of the armed forces, as well as careful study of
scholarly articles, research reports, and written
contributions from informed experts in various
fields relevant to the task force’s mission.

Each of the seven public listening sessions ad-
dressed a specific aspect of policing and
police-community relations, although cross-
cutting issues and concerns made their appear-
ance at every session. At the first session, Building
Trust and Legitimacy, the topic of procedural
justice was discussed as a foundational necessity
in building public trust. Subject matter experts
also testified as to the meaning of “community po-

licing” in its historical and contemporary contexts,
defining the difference between implicit bias and
racial discrimination—two concepts at the heart
of perceived difficulties between police and the
people. Witnesses from community organizations
stressed the need for more police involvement in
community affairs as an essential component of
their crime fighting duties. Police officers gave the
beat cop’s perspective on protecting people who
do not respect their authority, and three big-city
mayors told of endemic budgetary obstacles to
addressing policing challenges.

The session on Policy and Oversight again brought
witnesses from diverse police forces (both chiefs
and union representatives), from law and academia,
and from established civil rights organizations and
grass-root groups. They discussed use of force from
the point of view of both research and policy and
internal and external oversight; explained how they
prepare for and handle mass demonstrations; and
pondered culture and diversity in law enforcement.
Witnesses filled the third session, on Technology
and Social Media, with testimony on the use of
body-worn cameras and other technologies from
the angles of research and legal considerations,
as well as the intricacies of implementing new
technologies in the face of privacy issues. They
discussed the ever-expanding ubiquity of social
media and its power to work both for and against
policing practice and public safety.

The Community Policing and Crime Reduction lis-
tening session considered current research on the
effectiveness of community policing on bringing
down crime, as well as building up public trust.
Task force members heard detailed descriptions
of the methods used by chiefs in cities of varying
sizes to implement effective community policing
in their jurisdictions over a number of years. They
also heard from a panel of young people about
their encounters with the criminal justice system

i n t R o d u c t i o n

and the lasting effects of positive interactions
with police through structured programs as well
as individual relationships. The fifth listening
session considered Training and Education in law
enforcement over an officer’s entire career—from
recruitment through basic training to in-service
training—and the support, education, and
training of supervisors, leaders, and managers.
Finally, the panel on Officer Safety and Wellness
considered the spectrum of mental and physical
health issues faced by police officers from the
day-to-day stress of the job, its likely effect on an
officer’s physical health, and the need for mental
health screening to traffic accidents, burnout,
suicide, and how better to manage these issues to
determine the length of an officer’s career.

A listening session on the Future of Community Po-
licing concluded the task force’s public sessions and
was followed by the deliberations leading to the
recommendations that follow on ways to research,
improve, support, and implement policies and
procedures for effective policing in the 21st century.

Many excellent and specific suggestions emerged
from these listening sessions on all facets of polic-
ing in the 21st century, but many questions arose
as well. Paramount among them was how to bring
unity of purpose and consensus on best practices
to a nation with 18,000 separate law enforcement
agencies and a strong history of a preference for
local control of local issues. It became very clear
that it is time for a comprehensive and multifacet-
ed examination of all the interrelated parts of the
criminal justice system and a focused investigation
into how poverty, lack of education, mental health,
and other social conditions cause or intersect with
criminal behavior. We propose two overarching
recommendations that will seek the answers to
these questions.

0.1 Overarching recOmmendatiOn:
The President should support and provide
funding for the creation of a National Crime
and Justice Task Force to review and evaluate
all components of the criminal justice system
for the purpose of making recommendations
to the country on comprehensive criminal
justice reform.

Several witnesses at the task force’s listening
sessions pointed to the fact that police represent
the “face” of the criminal justice system to the
public. Yet police are obviously not responsible for
laws or incarceration policies that many citizens
find unfair. This misassociation leads us to call for a
broader examination of such issues as drug policy,
sentencing and incarceration, which are beyond
the scope of a review of police practices.

This is not a new idea.

In the 1967 President’s Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice report,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, one of the
major findings stated, “Officials of the criminal
justice system . . . must re-examine what they do.
They must be honest about the system’s short-
comings with the public and with themselves.”3

3. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1967), 15, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42 .

The need to establish a formal structure to take a
continuous look at criminal justice reform in the
context of broad societal issues has never faded
from public consciousness. When former Senator
Jim Webb (D-VA) introduced legislation to create
the National Criminal Justice Commission in 2009,
a number of very diverse organizations from the
Major Cities Chiefs Association, the Fraternal Order
of Police, the National Sheriffs Association, and the
National District Attorneys Association to Human
Rights Watch, the American Civil Liberties Union,

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

and the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People all supported it. This legislation
would have authorized a national criminal justice
commission to conduct a comprehensive review
of the criminal justice system by a bipartisan panel
of stakeholders, policymakers, and experts that
would make thoughtful, evidence-based recom-
mendations for reform. The bill received strong
bipartisan support and passed the House but
never received a final vote.

More recently, a number of witnesses raised the
idea of a national commission at the task force’s
listening sessions—notably Richard Beary, presi-
dent of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (IACP), who said,

For over 20 years, the IACP has called for the

creation of a National Commission on Criminal

Justice to develop across-the-board improvements

to the criminal justice system in order to address

current challenges and to increase the efficiency

and effectiveness of the entire criminal justice

community. A deep dive into community-police

relations is only one part of this puzzle. We must

explore other aspects of the criminal justice system

that need to be revamped and further contribute to

today’s challenges.4

4. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy (oral testimony of Richard
Beary, president, IACP, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, January 13–14, 2015).

And Jeremy Travis, president of John Jay
College of Criminal Justice, added, in the final
listening session,

You said it is time to look at the criminal justice

system, and actually I would broaden the scope. We

have this question of how to reintegrate into our

society those who have caused harms . . . . It is not

just the system but these big, democratic, societal

questions that go to government functions and how

we deal with conflict as well.5

A panel of community voices with Allie Bones, Renaldo Fowler, Keeshan Harley, Andrea Ritchie, and Linda Sarsour, Phoenix, February 14, 2015.
PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

0.2 Overarching recOmmendatiOn:
The President should promote programs
that take a comprehensive and inclusive look
at community-based initiatives that address
the core issues of poverty, education, health,
and safety.

As is evident from many of the recommendations
in this report, the justice system alone cannot
solve many of the underlying conditions that give
rise to crime. It will be through partnerships across
sectors and at every level of government that we
will find the effective and legitimate long-term
solutions to ensuring public safety.

5. Listening Session on the Future of Community Policing (oral testimony of
Jeremy Travis, president, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, for the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, January 24, 2015).

PILLAR 1 . BUILDING TRUST & LEGITIMACY
People are more likely to obey the law when they believe that those
who are enforcing it have the legitimate authority to tell them what
to do . . . . The public confers legitimacy only on those they believe
are acting in procedurally just ways.

Figure 1. Confidence in police to protect them from violent crime, U.S. Whites vs. non-Whites

Source: Justin McCarthy, “Nonwhites Less Likely” (see note 6).
Copyright © 2014 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved. The content is used with permission; however, Gallup retains all rights of republication.

Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both
sides of the police-citizen divide is not only the first
pillar of this task force’s report but also the foun-
dational principle underlying this inquiry into the
nature of relations between law enforcement and
the communities they serve. Since the 1990s, po-
licing has become more effective, better equipped,
and better organized to tackle crime. Despite this,
Gallup polls show the public’s confidence in police
work has remained flat, and among some popula-
tions of color, confidence has declined.6

6. Justin McCarthy, “Nonwhites Less Likely to Feel Police Protect and Serve
Them,” Gallup: Politics, November 17, 2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/179468/
nonwhites-less-likely-feel-police-protect-serve.aspx.

This decline is in addition to the fact that non-
Whites have always had less confidence in law
enforcement than Whites, likely because “the
poor and people of color have felt the greatest
impact of mass incarceration,” such that for “too
many poor citizens and people of color, arrest
and imprisonment have become an inevitable
and seemingly unavoidable part of the American
experience.”7

7. Bryan Stevenson, “Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to
Collateral Review of Criminal Cases,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
41 (Summer 2006): 339–367.

Decades of research and practice
support the premise that people are more likely to
obey the law when they believe that those

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

1 0

who are enforcing it have the legitimate authority
to tell them what to do. But the public confers
legitimacy only on those they believe are acting in
procedurally just ways.

Procedurally just behavior is based on four central
principles:

1. Treating people with dignity and respect

2. Giving individuals “voice” during encounters

3. Being neutral and transparent in
decision making

4. Conveying trustworthy motives8

Research demonstrates that these principles lead
to relationships in which the community trusts
that officers are honest, unbiased, benevolent, and
lawful. The community therefore feels obligated to
follow the law and the dictates of legal authorities
and is more willing to cooperate with and engage
those authorities because it believes that it shares a
common set of interests and values with the police.9

There are both internal and external aspects to
procedural justice in policing agencies. Internal
procedural justice refers to practices within an
agency and the relationships officers have with
their colleagues and leaders. Research on internal
procedural justice tells us that officers who feel
respected by their supervisors and peers are more
likely to accept departmental policies, understand
decisions, and comply with them voluntarily.10

8. Lorraine Mazerolle, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant,
and Matthew Manning, “Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review,” The
Campbell Collection Library of Systematic Reviews 9 (Oslo, Norway: The Campbell
Collaboration, 2013).
9. Tom Tyler, Jonathon Jackson, and Ben Bradford, “Procedural Justice and
Cooperation,” in Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, eds. Gerben
Bruinsma and David Weisburd (New York: Springer, 2014), 4011–4024.
10. Nicole Haas et al., “Explaining Officer Compliance: The Importance of
Procedural Justice and Trust inside a Police Organization,” Criminology and
Criminal Justice (January 2015), doi: 10.1177/1748895814566288; COPS Office,
“Comprehensive Law Enforcement Review: Procedural Justice and Legitimacy,”
accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/
Procedural-Justice-and-Legitimacy-LE-Review-Summary .

follows that officers who feel respected by their
organizations are more likely to bring this respect
into their interactions with the people they serve.

External procedural justice focuses on the ways
officers and other legal authorities interact with
the public and how the characteristics of those in-
teractions shape the public’s trust of the police. It
is important to understand that a key component
of external procedural justice—the practice of fair
and impartial policing—is built on understanding
and acknowledging human biases,11 both explicit
and implicit.

All human beings have biases or prejudices as
a result of their experiences, and these biases
influence how they might react when dealing
with unfamiliar people or situations. An explicit
bias is a conscious bias about certain populations
based upon race, gender, socioeconomic status,
sexual orientation, or other attributes.12 Common
sense shows that explicit bias is incredibly dam-
aging to police-community relations, and there is
a growing body of research evidence that shows
that implicit bias—the biases people are not even
aware they have—is harmful as well.

Witness Jennifer Eberhardt said,

Bias is not limited to so-called “bad people.” And

it certainly is not limited to police officers. The

problem is a widespread one that arises from history,

from culture, and from racial inequalities that still

pervade our society and are especially salient in the

context of criminal justice.13

11. Lorie Fridell, “This is Not Your Grandparents’ Prejudice: The Implications of
the Modern Science of Bias for Police Training,” Translational Criminology (Fall
2013):10–11.
12. Susan Fiske, “Are We Born Racist?” Greater Good (Summer 2008):14–17.
13. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy (oral testimony of Jennifer
Eberhardt for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC,
January 13, 2015).

1 1

p i l l a R 1 . B u i l d i n g t R u s t & l e g i t i m a c y

To achieve legitimacy, mitigating implicit bias
should be a part of training at all levels of a law
enforcement organization to increase awareness
and ensure respectful encounters both inside the
organization and with communities.

The first witnesses at the task force sessions on
the first pillar also directly addressed the need for
a change in the culture in which police do their
work: the use of disrespectful language and the
implicit biases that lead officers to rely upon race
in the context of stop and frisk. They addressed
the need for police officers to find how much they
have in common with the people they serve—
not the lines of authority they may perceive to
separate them—and to continue with enduring
programs proven successful over many years.

Several speakers stressed the continuing need
for civilian oversight and urged more research
into proving ways it can be most effective. And
many spoke to the complicated issue of diversity
in recruiting, especially Sherrilyn Ifill, who said of
youth in poor communities,

By the time you are 17, you have been stopped

and frisked a dozen times. That does not make that

17-year-old want to become a police officer . . . .

The challenge is to transform the idea of policing in

communities among young people into something

they see as honorable. They have to see people

at local events, as the person who lives across the

street, not someone who comes in and knows

nothing about my community.14

The task force’s specific recommendations that
follow offer practical ways agencies can act to
promote legitimacy.

14. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy (oral testimony
of Sherrilyn Ifill, president and director-counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc., for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, January 13, 2015); “Statement by the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund, Inc.” (written testimony submitted for listening session at
Washington, DC, January 13, 2015).

1.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
culture should embrace a guardian mindset to
build public trust and legitimacy. Toward that
end, police and sheriffs’ departments should
adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle
for internal and external policies and practices to
guide their interactions with the citizens they serve.

How officers define their role will set the tone
for the community. As Plato wrote, “In a republic
that honors the core of democracy—the great-
est amount of power is given to those called
Guardians. Only those with the most impeccable
character are chosen to bear the responsibility of
protecting the democracy.”

Law enforcement cannot build community trust
if it is seen as an occupying force coming in from
outside to rule and control the community.

As task force member Susan Rahr wrote,

In 2012, we began asking the question, “Why are we

training police officers like soldiers?” Although police

officers wear uniforms and carry weapons, the similarity

ends there. The missions and rules of engagement

are completely different. The soldier’s mission is that

of a warrior: to conquer. The rules of engagement are

decided before the battle. The police officer’s mission is

that of a guardian: to protect. The rules of engagement

evolve as the incident unfolds. Soldiers must follow

orders. Police officers must make independent

decisions. Soldiers come into communities as an

outside, occupying force. Guardians are members of

the community, protecting from within.15

15. Sue Rahr, “Transforming the Culture of Policing from Warriors to Guardians
in Washington State,” International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement
Standards and Training Newsletter 25, no. 4 (2014): 3–4; see also Sue Rahr and
Stephen K. Rice, “From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police
Culture to Democratic Ideals,” New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin (Washington,
DC: National Institute of Justice, 2015), NCJ 248654, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/
content/download/76023/1708385/version/1/file/WarriorstoGuardians .

There’s an old saying, “Organizational culture
eats policy for lunch.” Any law enforcement

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

1 2

organization can make great rules and policies
that emphasize the guardian role, but if policies
conflict with the existing culture, they will not be
institutionalized and behavior will not change. In
police work, the vast majority of an officer’s work is
done independently outside the immediate over-
sight of a supervisor. But consistent enforcement
of rules that conflict with a military-style culture,
where obedience to the chain of command is the
norm, is nearly impossible. Behavior is more likely
to conform to culture than rules.

The culture of policing is also important to the
proper exercise of officer discretion and use of
authority, as task force member Tracey Meares has
written.16 The values and ethics of the agency will
guide officers in their decision-making process;
they cannot simply rely on rules and policy to act
in encounters with the public. Good policing is
more than just complying with the law. Some-
times actions are perfectly permitted by policy,
but that does not always mean an officer should
take those actions. Adopting procedural justice
as the guiding principle for internal and external
policies and practices can be the underpinning
of a change in culture and should contribute to
building trust and confidence in the community.

1.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should acknowledge the role of
policing in past and present injustice and
discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the
promotion of community trust.

At one listening session, a panel of police chiefs
described what they had been doing in recent
years to recognize and own their history and to
change the culture within both their police forces
and their communities.

16. Tracey L. Meares, “Rightful Policing,” New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin
(Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2015), NCJ 248411,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/74084/1679313/
version/4/file/RightfulPolicing .

Baltimore Police Commissioner Anthony Batts
described the process in his city:

The process started with the commissioning of a

study to evaluate the police department and the

community’s views of the agency . . . . The review

uncovered broken policies, outdated procedures,

outmoded technology, and operating norms that

put officers at odds with the community they are

meant to serve. It was clear that dramatic and

dynamic change was needed.17

Ultimately, the Baltimore police created the
Professional Standards and Accountability Bureau,
tasked with rooting out corruption, holding offi-
cers accountable, and implementing national best
practices for polices and training. New department
heads were appointed and a use of force review
structure based on the Las Vegas model was
implemented. “These were critical infrastructure
changes centered on the need to improve the in-
ternal systems that would build accountability and
transparency, inside and outside the organization,”
noted Commissioner Batts.18

1.2.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should develop and disseminate case studies
that provide examples where past injustices were
publicly acknowledged by law enforcement agen-
cies in a manner to help build community trust.

1.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should establish a culture of
transparency and accountability in order to
build public trust and legitimacy. This will help
ensure decision making is understood and in
accord with stated policy.

17. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Building
Community Policing Organizations (oral testimony of Anthony Batts, commissioner,
Baltimore Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
18. Ibid.

1 3

p i l l a R 1 . B u i l d i n g t R u s t & l e g i t i m a c y

1.3.1 actiOn item: To embrace a culture of
transparency, law enforcement agencies should
make all department policies available for public
review and regularly post on the department’s
website information about stops, summonses, ar-
rests, reported crime, and other law enforcement
data aggregated by demographics.

1.3.2 actiOn item: When serious incidents
occur, including those involving alleged police
misconduct, agencies should communicate

with citizens and the media swiftly, openly,
and neutrally, respecting areas where the law
requires confidentiality.

One way to promote neutrality is to ensure that
agencies and their members do not release back-
ground information on involved parties. While a
great deal of information is often publicly avail-
able, this information should not be proactively
distributed by law enforcement.

Figure 2. Community members’ confidence in their police officers

Note: Survey conducted August 20–24, 2014. Voluntary responses of “None” and “Don’t know/Refused” not shown. Blacks and Whites include only non-Hispanics.
Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Latino Confidence in Local Police Lower than among Whites,” Pew Research Center, August 28, 2014,
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/08/28/latino-confidence-in-local-police-lower-than-among-whites/.

F i n a l R e p o R t o F t h e p R e s i d e n t ’ s t a s k F o R c e o n 2 1 s t c e n t u R y p o l i c i n g

1 4

1.4 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should promote legitimacy internally
within the organization by applying the
principles of procedural justice.

Organizational culture created through employee
interaction with management can be linked to
officers’ interaction with citizens. When an agency
creates an environment that promotes internal
procedural justice, it encourages its officers to
demonstrate external procedural justice. And just
as employees are more likely to take direction
from management when they believe manage-
ment’s authority is legitimate, citizens are more
likely to cooperate with the police when they
believe the officers’ authority is legitimate.

Internal procedural justice begins with the clear
articulation of organizational core values and
the transparent creation and fair application
of an organization’s policies, protocols, and
decision-making processes. If the workforce is
actively involved in policy development, workers
are more likely to use these same principles of
external procedural justice in their interactions
with the community. Even though the approach
to implementing procedural justice is “top down,”
the method should include all employees to best
reach a shared vision and mission. Research shows
that agencies should also use tools that encour-
age employee and supervisor collaboration and
foster strong relationships between supervisors
and employees. A more effective agency will result
from a real partnership between the chief and the
staff and a shared approach to public safety.19

1.4.1 actiOn item: In order to achieve
internal legitimacy, law enforcement agen-
cies should involve employees in the process
of developing policies and procedures.

19. Tim Richardson (senior legislative liaison, Fraternal Order of Police), in
discussion with Ajima Olaghere (research assistant, COPS Office, Washington, DC),
October 2014.

For example, internal department surveys should
ask officers what they think of policing strategies
in terms of enhancing or hurting their ability to
connect with the public. Sometimes the lead-
ership is out of step with their rank and file, and
a survey like this can be a diagnostic tool—a
benchmark against which leadership can measure
its effectiveness and ability to create a work envi-
ronment where officers feel safe to discuss their
feelings about certain aspects of the job.

1.4.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agency
leadership should examine opportunities to incor-
porate procedural justice into the internal discipline
process, placing additional importance on values
adherence rather than adherence to rules. Union
leadership should be partners in this process.

1.5 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should proactively promote public
trust by initiating positive nonenforcement
activities to engage communities that
typically have high rates of investigative and
enforcement involvement with government
agencies.

In communities that have high numbers of inter-
actions with authorities for a variety of reasons,
police should actively create opportunities for
interactions that are positive and not related to
investigation or enforcement action. Witness
Laura Murphy, for example, pointed out that when
law enforcement targets people of color for the
isolated actions of a few, it tags an entire com-
munity as lawless when in actuality 95 percent
are law abiding.20

20. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy (oral testimony of Laura
Murphy to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC,
January 13, 2015).

This becomes a self-reinforcing
concept. Another witness, Carmen Perez, provided
an example of police engaging with citizens in
another way:

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p i l l a R 1 . B u i l d i n g t R u s t & l e g i t i m a c y

In the community [where] I grew up in southern

California, Oxnard, we had the Police Athletic League.

A lot of officers in our communities would volunteer

and coach at the police activities league. That

became our alternative from violence, from gangs

and things like that. That allows for police officers

to really build and provide a space to build trusting

relationships. No longer was that such and such over

there but it was Coach Flores or Coach Brown.21

In recent years, agencies across the county have
begun to institutionalize community trust building
endeavors. They have done this through programs
such as Coffee with a Cop (and Sweet Tea with the
Chief ), Cops and Clergy, Citizens on Patrol Mobile,
Students Talking It Over with Police, and the West
Side Story Project. Joint community and law dia-
logues and truth telling, as well as community and
law enforcement training in procedural justice and
bias, are also occurring nationally. Some agencies
are even using training, dialogues, and workshops
to take steps towards racial reconciliation.

Agencies engaging in these efforts to build re-
lationships often experience beneficial results.22
Communities are often more willing to assist law
enforcement when agencies need help during in-
vestigations. And when critical incidents occur, those
agencies already have key allies who can help with
information messaging and mitigating challenges.

1.5.1 actiOn item: In order to achieve
external legitimacy, law enforcement agencies
should involve the community in the process of de-
veloping and evaluating policies and procedures.

21. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy—Community
Representatives: Building Community Policing Organizations (oral testimony of
Carmen Perez, executive director, The Gathering for Justice, for the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, January 13, 2015).
22. Constance Rice and Susan K. Lee, Relationship-Based Policing: Achieving
Safety in Watts (Los Angeles: The Advancement Project, February 2015),
http://67.20.108.158/sites/default/files/imce/President%27s%20Task%20
Force%20CSP%20Policy%20Brief%20FINAL%2002-27-15 .

1.5.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should institute residency incentive programs
such as Resident Officer Programs.

Resident Officer Programs are arrangements
where law enforcement officers are provided
housing in public housing neighborhoods as
long as they fulfill public safety duties within
the neighborhood that have been agreed to
between the housing authority and the law
enforcement agency.

1.5.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should create opportunities in schools and
communities for positive nonenforcement interac-
tions with police. Agencies should also publicize
the beneficial outcomes and images of positive,
trust-building partnerships and initiatives.

For example, Michael Reynolds, a member of the
Youth and Law Enforcement panel at the Listening
Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduc-
tion, told the moving story of a police officer who
saw him shivering on the street when he was six
years old, took him to a store, and bought him a
coat. Despite many negative encounters with po-
lice since then, the decency and kindness of that
officer continue to favorably impact Mr. Reynolds’
feelings towards the police.23

23. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Youth and
Law Enforcement (oral testimony of Michael Reynolds, co-president, Youth Power
Movement, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ,
February 13, 2015).

1.5.4 actiOn item: Use of physical control
equipment and techniques against vulnerable
populations—including children, elderly persons,
pregnant women, people with physical and men-
tal disabilities, limited English proficiency, and
others—can undermine public trust and should
be used as a last resort. Law enforcement agencies

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should carefully consider and review their policies
towards these populations and adopt policies if
none are in place.

1.6 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should consider the potential
damage to public trust when implementing
crime fighting strategies.

Crime reduction is not self-justifying. Overly
aggressive law enforcement strategies can poten-
tially harm communities and do lasting damage to
public trust, as numerous witnesses over multiple
listening sessions observed.

1.6.1 actiOn item: Research conducted
to evaluate the effectiveness of crime fighting
strategies should specifically look at the potential
for collateral damage of any given strategy on
community trust and legitimacy.

1.7 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should track the level of trust in
police by their communities just as they
measure changes in crime. Annual community
surveys, ideally standardized across
jurisdictions and with accepted sampling
protocols, can measure how policing in that
community affects public trust.

Trust in institutions can only be achieved if the
public can verify what they are being told about
a product or service, who is responsible for the
quality of the product or service, and what will be
done to correct any problems. To operate effec-
tively, law enforcement agencies must maintain
public trust by having a transparent, credible
system of accountability.

Agencies should partner with local universities
to conduct surveys by ZIP code, for example, to
measure the effectiveness of specific policing
strategies, assess any negative impact they have
on a community’s view of police, and gain the
community’s input.

1.7.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment should develop survey tools and
instructions for use of such a model to prevent
local departments from incurring the expense and
to allow for consistency across jurisdictions.

A model such as the National Institute of
Justice-funded National Police Research Platform
could be developed and deployed to conduct
such surveys. This platform seeks to advance the
science and practice of policing in the United
States by introducing a new system of measure-
ment and feedback that captures organizational
excellence both inside and outside the walls of
the agency. The platform is managed by a team
of leading police scholars from seven universi-
ties supported by the operational expertise of a
respected national advisory board.

1.8 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should strive to create a workforce
that contains a broad range of diversity
including race, gender, language, life
experience, and cultural background to
improve understanding and effectiveness in
dealing with all communities.

Many agencies have long appreciated the critical
importance of hiring officers who reflect the
communities they serve and also have a high
level of procedural justice competency. Achieving
diversity in entry level recruiting is important,
but achieving systematic and comprehensive
diversification throughout each segment of the

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p i l l a R 1 . B u i l d i n g t R u s t & l e g i t i m a c y

department is the ultimate goal. It is also import-
ant to recognize that diversity means not only
race and gender but also the genuine diversity
of identity, experience, and background that has
been found to help improve the culture of police
departments and build greater trust and legitima-
cy with all segments of the population.

A critical factor in managing bias is seeking
candidates who are likely to police in an unbiased
manner.24 Since people are less likely to have biases
against groups with which they have had positive
experiences, police departments should seek can-
didates who have had positive interactions with
people of various cultures and backgrounds.25

1.8.1 actiOn item: The Federal Government
should create a Law Enforcement Diversity Initiative
designed to help communities diversify law en-
forcement departments to reflect the demographics
of the community.

24. Lorie Fridell, “Racially Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to the
Implicit Black-Crime Association,” in Racial Divide: Racial and Ethnic Bias in the
Criminal Justice System, eds. Michael J. Lynch, E. Britt Patterson, and Kristina K.
Childs (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2008), 51.
25. Ibid., 51–52.

Task force members, along with Executive Director Ronald L. Davis, listen to testimony, Washington, D.C., February 23, 2015.

1.8.2 actiOn item: The department
overseeing this initiative should help localities
learn best practices for recruitment, training,
and outreach to improve the diversity as well as
the cultural and linguistic responsiveness of law
enforcement agencies.

National and local affinity police organizations
could be formally included in this effort. This
program should also evaluate and assess diversity
among law enforcement agencies around the
country and issue public reports on national trends.

1.8.3 actiOn item: Successful law en-
forcement agencies should be highlighted and
celebrated and those with less diversity should be
offered technical assistance to facilitate change.

Law enforcement agencies must be continuously
creative with recruitment efforts and employ the
public, business, and civic communities to help.

1.8.4 actiOn item: Discretionary federal
funding for law enforcement programs could be influ-
enced by that department’s efforts to improve their
diversity and cultural and linguistic responsiveness.

PHOTO: BRANDON TRAMEL

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1.8.5 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should be encouraged to explore more
flexible staffing models.

As is common in the nursing profession, offering
flexible schedules can help officers achieve better
work-life balance that attracts candidates and
encourages retention, particularly for officers with
sole responsibility for the care of family members.

1.9 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should build relationships based
on trust with immigrant communities. This is
central to overall public safety.

Immigrants often fear approaching police offi-
cers when they are victims of and witnesses to
crimes and when local police are entangled with
federal immigration enforcement. At all levels of
government, it is important that laws, policies,
and practices not hinder the ability of local law
enforcement to build the strong relationships nec-
essary to public safety and community well-being.
It is the view of this task force that whenever possi-
ble, state and local law enforcement should not be
involved in immigration enforcement.

1.9.1 actiOn item: Decouple federal immi-
gration enforcement from routine local policing
for civil enforcement and nonserious crime.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security should
terminate the use of the state and local criminal
justice system, including through detention,
notification, and transfer requests, to enforce civil
immigration laws against civil and nonserious
criminal offenders.26

26. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy: Civil Rights/Civil Liberties
(oral testimony of Maria Teresa Kumar, president and CEO, Voto Latino, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, January 13, 2015).

In 2011, the Major Cities Chiefs Association
recommended nine points to Congress and the
President on this issue, noting that “immigration
is a federal policy issue between the U.S. gov-
ernment and other countries, not local or state
entities and other countries. Any immigration
enforcement laws or practices should be national-
ly based, consistent, and federally funded.”27

1.9.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should ensure reasonable and equitable
language access for all persons who have encounters
with police or who enter the criminal justice system.28

1.9.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should not include civil immigration
information in the FBI’s National Crime Informa-
tion Center database.29

The National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
database is an electronic clearinghouse that law
enforcement officers can access in the field. It
contains data submitted by agencies across the
country aimed at helping officers identify people,
property, and criminal histories. At one time, NCIC
also included civil immigration detainers (nonman-
datory temporary hold requests issued by a federal
immigration officer), although the FBI has indicated
that the practice of accepting this information was
discontinued and that the information does not
currently exist in the database. The U.S. Department
of Justice should ensure that this remains the case.

27. “Major Cities Chiefs Association Immigration Position October 2011,” accessed
February 26, 2015, http://majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/news/immigration_
position112811 .
28. Listening Session on Building Trust and Legitimacy (written testimony of
Nicholas Turner, president and director, Vera Institute of Justice, for the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, January 13, 2015).
29. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction (written
testimony of Javier Valdes, executive director, Make the Road New York, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13–14, 2015).

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P I L L A R 2 . P O L I C Y & O V E R S I G H T
Citizens have a constitutional right to freedom of expression, including the
right to peacefully demonstrate.

The issues addressed in the first pillar of this report,
building trust and legitimacy between law enforce-
ment agencies and the communities they serve,
underlie all questions of law enforcement policy
and community oversight. If police are to carry
out their responsibilities according to established
policies, these policies must be reflective of
community values and not lead to practices that
result in disparate impacts on various segments
of the community. They also need to be clearly
articulated to the community and implemented
transparently so police will have credibility with
residents and the people can have faith that their
guardians are always acting in their best interests.

Paramount among the policies of law enforcement
organizations are those controlling use of force.
Not only should there be policies for deadly and
nondeadly uses of force but a clearly stated “sanc-
tity of life” philosophy must also be in the forefront
of every officer’s mind. This way of thinking should
be accompanied by rigorous practical ongoing
training in an atmosphere of nonjudgmental and
safe sharing of views with fellow officers about
how they behaved in use of force situations. At
one listening session, Geoffrey Alpert described
Officer-Created Jeopardy Training, in which officers
who had been in situations where mistakes were
made or force was used came to explain their
decision making to other officers. Some explained
what they did right and how potentially violent
situations were resolved without violence. Other
officers told what they did wrong, why they made

mistakes, what information was missing or misin-
terpreted, and how they could have improved their
behavior and response to suspects.30

Data collection, supervision, and accountability
are also part of a comprehensive systemic ap-
proach to keeping everyone safe and protecting
the rights of all involved during police encounters.
Members of the Division of Policing of the Ameri-
can Society of Criminology recently wrote, “While
the United States presently employs a broad
array of social and economic indicators in order
to gauge the overall ‘health’ of the nation, it has a
much more limited set of indicators concerning
the behavior of the police and the quality of
law enforcement.”31

That body noted that Section 210402 of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 requires the U.S. Attorney General to “acquire
data about the use of excessive force by law
enforcement officers” and to “publish an annual
summary of the data acquired under this section.”32

30. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Use of Force Research and Policies
(oral testimony of Geoffrey Alpert, professor, University of South Carolina, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).
31. “Recommendations to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,”
Listening Session on Training and Education (written testimony of Anthony Braga
et al., Ad Hoc Committee to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Division of Policing, American Society of Criminology, February 13–14, 2015).
32. Ibid.

But the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has never
been allocated the funds necessary to undertake
the serious and sustained program of research and
development to fulfill this mandate. Expanded
research and data collection are also necessary
to knowing what works and what does not work,
which policing practices are effective and which

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ones have unintended consequences. Greater
acceptance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) National Incident-Based Reporting
System could also benefit policing practice
and research endeavors.

Mass demonstrations, for example, are occasions
where evidence-based practices successfully ap-
plied can make the difference between a peaceful
demonstration and a riot. Citizens have a consti-
tutional right to freedom of expression, including
the right to peacefully demonstrate. There are
strong examples of proactive and positive com-
munication and engagement strategies that can
protect constitutional rights of demonstrators and
the safety of citizens and the police.33

33. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Mass Demonstrations (oral
testimony of Garry McCarthy, chief of police, Chicago Police Department, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015);
Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Mass Demonstrations (oral testimony of
Rodney Monroe, chief of police, Charlotte-Mecklenberg [NC] Police Department, for
the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).

2.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should collaborate with community
members to develop policies and strategies
in communities and neighborhoods
disproportionately affected by crime for
deploying resources that aim to reduce crime
by improving relationships, greater community
engagement, and cooperation.

The development of a service model process that
focuses on the root causes of crime should include
the community members themselves because
what works in one neighborhood might not be
equally successful in every other one. Larger de-
partments could commit resources and personnel
to areas of high poverty, limited services, and at-risk
or vulnerable populations through creating priority
units with specialized training and added status
and pay. Chief Charlie Beck of the Los

Angeles Police Department (LAPD) described the
LAPD’s Community Safety Partnership, in which
officers engage the community and build trust
where it is needed most, in the public housing
projects in Watts. The department has assigned 45
officers to serve for five years at three housing proj-
ects in Watts and at an additional housing project
in East Los Angeles. Through a partnership with the
Advancement Project and the Housing Authority
of the City of Los Angeles, the program involves
officers going into the housing developments with
the intent not to make arrests but to create part-
nerships, create relationships, hear the community,
and see what they need—and then work together
to make those things happen.34 The work in Watts
has been documented in an Advancement Project
report presented to the task force.35

2.1.1 actiOn item: The Federal
Government should incentivize this collaboration
through a variety of programs that focus on public
health, education, mental health, and other
programs not traditionally part of the criminal
justice system.

2.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should have comprehensive policies
on the use of force that include training,
investigations, prosecutions, data collection,
and information sharing. These policies must
be clear, concise, and openly available for
public inspection.

2.2.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agency policies for training on use of force should
emphasize de-escalation and alternatives to arrest
or summons in situations where appropriate.

34. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Civilian Oversight (oral testimony
of Charlie Beck, chief, Los Angeles Police Department, for the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).
35. Rice and Lee, Relationship-Based Policing (see note 22).

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p i l l a R 2 . p o l i c y & o v e R s i g h t

As Chuck Wexler noted in his testimony,

In traditional police culture, officers are taught never

to back down from a confrontation, but instead to

run toward the dangerous situation that everyone

else is running away from. However, sometimes the

best tactic for dealing with a minor confrontation

is to step back, call for assistance, de-escalate, and

perhaps plan a different enforcement action that can

be taken more safely later.36

Policies should also include, at a minimum, annual
training that includes shoot/don’t shoot scenarios
and the use of less than lethal technologies.

36. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Use of Force Investigations and
Oversight (oral testimony of Chuck Wexler, executive director, Police Executive
Research Forum, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati,
OH, January 30, 2015).

2.2.2 actiOn item: These policies should
also mandate external and independent criminal
investigations in cases of police use of force result-
ing in death, officer-involved shootings resulting
in injury or death, or in-custody deaths.

One way this can be accomplished is by the
creation of multi-agency force investigation task
forces comprising state and local investigators.
Other ways to structure this investigative process
include referring to neighboring jurisdictions or to
the next higher levels of government (many small-
er departments may already have state agencies
handle investigations), but in order to restore and
maintain trust, this independence is crucial.

In written testimony to the task force, James
Palmer of the Wisconsin Professional Police Asso-
ciation offered an example in that state’s statutes
requiring that agency written policies “require an
investigation that is conducted by at least two
investigators . . . neither of whom is employed by

a law enforcement agency that employs a
law enforcement officer involved in the officer-
involved death.”37 Furthermore, in order to es-
tablish and maintain internal legitimacy and
procedural justice, these investigations should
be performed by law enforcement agencies with
adequate training, knowledge, and experience
investigating police use of force.

37. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight (written testimony of James
Palmer, executive director, Wisconsin Professional Police Association, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30–31,
2015).

2.2.3 actiOn item: The task force encour-
ages policies that mandate the use of external and
independent prosecutors in cases of police use of
force resulting in death, officer-involved shootings
resulting in injury or death, or in-custody deaths.

Strong systems and policies that encourage use
of an independent prosecutor for reviewing
police uses of force and for prosecution in cases of
inappropriate deadly force and in-custody death
will demonstrate the transparency to the public
that can lead to mutual trust between community
and law enforcement.

2.2.4 actiOn item: Policies on use of force
should also require agencies to collect, maintain,
and report data to the Federal Government on
all officer-involved shootings, whether fatal or
nonfatal, as well as any in-custody death.

In-custody deaths are not only deaths in a prison
or jail but also deaths that occur in the process
of an arrest. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
implemented the Arrest Related Deaths data
collection in 2003 as part of requirements set forth
in the Deaths in Custody Reporting Act of

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2000 and reenacted in 2014. Although states
receiving grants under the Edward Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance Grant Program are required to
provide this data to BJS, the Arrest Related Deaths
data collection is a voluntary reporting program
for law enforcement agencies. Access to this data
is important to gain a national picture of police use
of force as well as to incentivize the systematic and
transparent collection and analysis of use of force
incident data at the local level. The agency-
reported data should include information on the
circumstances of the use of force, as well as the
race, gender, and age of the decedents. Agency
data should be reported to the U.S. Department of
Justice through the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting
System or an expansion of collections managed
by the BJS.

2.2.5 actiOn item: Policies on use of force
should clearly state what types of information
will be released, when, and in what situation, to
maintain transparency.

This should also include procedures on the release
of a summary statement regarding the circum-
stances of the incident by the department as soon
as possible and within 24 hours. The intent of this
directive should be to share as much information
as possible without compromising the integrity of
the investigation or anyone’s rights.

2.2.6 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should establish a Serious Incident Review
Board comprising sworn staff and community
members to review cases involving officer-
involved shootings and other serious incidents
that have the potential to damage community
trust or confidence in the agency. The purpose of
this board should be to identify any administra-
tive, supervisory, training, tactical, or policy issues
that need to be addressed.

2.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement agencies are encouraged to
implement nonpunitive peer review of
critical incidents separate from criminal
and administrative investigations.

These reviews, sometimes known as “near miss”
or “sentinel event” reviews, focus on the improve-
ment of practices and policy. Such reviews already
exist in medicine, aviation, and other industries.
According to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ),
a sentinel event in criminal justice would include
wrongful convictions but also “near miss” acquit-
tals and dismissals of cases that at earlier points
seemed solid; cold cases that stayed cold too long;
wrongful releases of dangerous or factually guilty
criminals or of vulnerable arrestees with mental
disabilities; and failures to prevent domestic
violence within at-risk families.

Sentinel events can include episodes that are
within policy but disastrous in terms of commu-
nity relations, whether or not everyone agrees
that the event should be classified as an error. In
fact, anything that stakeholders agree can cause
widespread or viral attention could be considered
a sentinel event.38

38. James M. Doyle, “Learning from Error in the Criminal Justice System: Sentinel
Event Reviews,” Mending Justice: Sentinel Event Reviews (Special Report from the
National Institute of Justice, September 2014): 3–20.

What distinguishes sentinel event reviews from
other kinds of internal investigations of apparent
errors is that they are nonadversarial. As task force
member Sean Smoot has written,

For sentinel event reviews to be effective and

practical, they must be cooperative efforts that

afford the types of protections provided in the

medical context, where state and federal laws

protect the privacy of participants and prevent the

disclosure of information to anyone outside of the

sentinel event review . . . . Unless the sentinel event

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p i l l a R 2 . p o l i c y & o v e R s i g h t

process is honest and trustworthy, with adequate

legal protections—including use immunity,

privacy, confidentiality, and nondisclosure, for

example—police officers, who have the very best

information about how things really work and what

really happened, will not be motivated to fully

participate. The sentinel event review approach will

have a better chance of success if departments can

abandon the process of adversarial/punitive-based

discipline, adopting instead “education-based”

disciplinary procedures and policies.39

2.4 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies are encouraged to adopt
identification procedures that implement
scientifically supported practices that
eliminate or minimize presenter bias
or influence.

39. Sean Smoot “Punishment-Based vs. Education-Based Discipline: A
Surmountable Challenge?” in Mending Justice: Sentinel Event Reviews (Special
Report from the National Institute of Justice, September 2014): 48–50.

A recent study by the National Academy of
Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness
Identification, studied the important role played
by eyewitnesses in criminal cases, noting that
research on factors affecting the accuracy of
eyewitness identification procedures has given an
increasingly clear picture of how identifications are
made and, more important, an improved under-
standing of the limits on vision and memory that
can lead to failure of identification.40 Many factors,
including external conditions and the witness’s
emotional state and biases, influence what a
witness sees or thinks she sees. Memories can
be forgotten, reconstructed, updated, and
distorted. Meanwhile, policies governing law
enforcement procedures for conducting and
recording identifications are not standard, and
policies and practices to address the issue of
misidentification vary widely.

40. Samuel R. Gross et al., “Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who
are Sentenced to Death,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 111, no. 20 (2014): 7230–7235. http://www.pnas.org/
content/111/20/7230.full +html.

Barbara O’Connor, President of the National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives, speaks during a panel on diversity in law enforcement,
Cincinnati, January 30, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

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2.5 recOmmendatiOn: All federal, state,
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies
should report and make available to the
public census data regarding the composition
of their departments including race, gender,
age, and other relevant demographic data.

While the BJS collects information on many
aspects of police activities, there is no single data
collection instrument that yields the information
requested in this recommendation. Demographic
data should be collected and made available to
the public so communities can assess the diver-
sity of their departments and do so in a national
context. This data will also be important to better
understand the impact of diversity on the func-
tioning of departments. Malik Aziz, National Chair
of the National Black Police Association (NBPA),
reminded the task force that the NBPA not only
urges all departments to meet the demographics
of the community in which they serve by main-
taining a plan of action to recruit and retain police
officers of color but also has called for the DOJ to
collect the annual demographic statistics from
the 18,000 police agencies across the nation. “It is
not enough to mandate diversity,” he stated, “but
it becomes necessary to diversify command ranks
in departments that have historically failed to de-
velop and/or promote qualified and credentialed
officers to executive and command ranks.”41

41. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Law Enforcement Culture and
Diversity (oral testimony of Malik Aziz, chairman, National Black Police Association,
for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30,
2015).

2.5.1 actiOn item: The Bureau of Justice
Statistics should add additional demographic
questions to the Law Enforcement Management
and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey in
order to meet the intent of this recommendation.

2.6 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should be encouraged to collect,
maintain, and analyze demographic data
on all detentions (stops, frisks, searches,
summons, and arrests). This data should be
disaggregated by school and non-school
contacts.

The BJS periodically conducts the Police-Public
Contact Survey, a supplement to the National
Crime Victimization Survey. The most recent
survey, released in 2013, asked a nationally
representative sample of U.S. residents age 16
or older about experiences with police during
the prior 12 months.42 But these surveys do not
reflect what is happening every day at the local
level when police interact with members of the
communities they serve. More research and tools
along the lines of Lorie Fridell’s 2004 publication,
By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data
From Vehicle Stops—to help local agencies collect
and analyze their data, understand the importance
of context to the analysis and reporting process,
and establish benchmarks resulting from their
findings—would improve understanding and lead
to evidence-based policies.

42. Lynn Langton and Matthew Durose, Police Behavior during Traffic and Street
Stops, 2011, Special Report (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2013), NCJ 242937; Matthew Durose and Lynn Langton, Requests
for Police Assistance, 2011, Special Report (Washington, DC: Office of Justice
Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2013), NCJ 242938.

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p i l l a R 2 . p o l i c y & o v e R s i g h t

2.7 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should create policies and
procedures for policing mass demonstrations
that employ a continuum of managed tactical
resources that are designed to minimize the
appearance of a military operation and avoid
using provocative tactics and equipment that
undermine civilian trust.

Policies should emphasize protection of the First
Amendment rights of demonstrators and effective
ways of communicating with them. Superin-
tendent Garry McCarthy of the Chicago Police
Department detailed his police force training and
operations in advance of the 2012 NATO Summit
at the height of the “Occupy” movement. The
department was determined not to turn what it
knew would be a mass demonstration into a riot.
Police officers refreshed “perishable” skills, such
as engaging in respectful conversations with
demonstrators, avoiding confrontation, and using
“extraction techniques” not only on the minority
of demonstrators who were behaving unlawfully
(throwing rocks, etc.) but also on officers who
were becoming visibly upset and at risk of losing
their composure and professional demeanor.43

43. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight (oral testimony of Garry McCarthy,
Chicago Police Department, to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).

2.7.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cy policies should address procedures
for implementing a layered response to mass
demonstrations that prioritize de-escalation
and a guardian mindset.

These policies could include plans to minimize
confrontation by using “soft look” uniforms, having
officers remove riot gear as soon as practical,
and maintaining open postures. “When officers
line up in a military formation while wearing full
protective gear, their visual appearance may have
a dramatic influence on how the crowd perceives
them and how the event ends.”44

2.7.2 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should create a mechanism for investigating
complaints and issuing sanctions regarding the
inappropriate use of equipment and tactics during
mass demonstrations.

There has been substantial media attention in
recent months surrounding the police use of
military equipment at events where members of
the public are exercising their First Amendment
rights. This has led to the creation of the Presi-
dent’s Interagency Law Enforcement Equipment
Working Group.

That group has been tasked by the Executive
Order 13688 of January 16, 2015 with a number of
issues, including ensuring that law enforcement
agencies adopt organizational and operational
practices and standards that prevent the misuse
or abuse of controlled equipment and ensuring
compliance with civil rights requirements resulting
from receipt of federal financial assistance.

44. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight (written testimony of Edward
Maguire, American University, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).

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2.8 recOmmendatiOn: Some form
of civilian oversight of law enforcement is
important in order to strengthen trust with
the community. Every community should
define the appropriate form and structure
of civilian oversight to meet the needs of
that community.

Many, but not all, state and local agencies operate
with the oversight or input of civilian police boards
or commissions. Part of the process of assessing
the need and desire for new or additional civilian
oversight should include input from and collabora-
tion with police employees because the people to
be overseen should be part of the process that will
oversee them. This guarantees that the principles
of internal procedural justice are in place to benefit
both the police and the community they serve.

We must examine civilian oversight in the com-
munities where it operates and determine which
models are successful in promoting police and
community understanding. There are important ar-
guments for having civilian oversight even though
we lack strong research evidence that it works.
Therefore we urge action on further research,
based on the guiding principle of procedural jus-
tice, to find evidence-based practices to implement
successful civilian oversight mechanisms.

As noted by witness Brian Buchner at the Policy
and Oversight Listening Session on January 30,

Citizen review is not an advocate for the community

or for the police. This impartiality allows oversight to

bring stakeholders together to work collaboratively

and proactively to help make policing more effective

and responsive to the community. Civilian oversight

alone is not sufficient to gain legitimacy; without

it, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the

police to maintain the public’s trust.45

45. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight (oral testimony of Brian Buchner,
president, National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).

2.8.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice, through its research arm, the National In-
stitute of Justice (NIJ), should expand its research
agenda to include civilian oversight.

NIJ recently announced its research priorities in
policing for FY 2015, which include such topics as
police use of force, body-worn cameras, and proce-
dural justice. While proposals related to research on
police oversight might fit into several of these top-
ical areas, police oversight is not highlighted by NIJ
in any of them. NIJ should specifically invite research
into civilian oversight and its impact on and relation-
ship to policing in one or more of these areas.

2.8.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS Office) should provide technical
assistance and collect best practices from existing
civilian oversight efforts and be prepared to help
cities create this structure, potentially with some
matching grants and funding.

2.9 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies and municipalities should refrain
from practices requiring officers to issue a
predetermined number of tickets, citations,
arrests, or summonses, or to initiate
investigative contacts with citizens for reasons
not directly related to improving public safety,
such as generating revenue.

Productivity expectations can be effective
performance management tools. But testimony
from Laura Murphy, Director of the Washington
Legislative Office of the American Civil Liberties
Union, identifies some of the negative effects
of these practices:

One only needs to paint a quick picture of the state

of policing to understand the dire need for reform.

First, there are local and federal incentives that

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p i l l a R 2 . p o l i c y & o v e R s i g h t

instigate arrests. At the local level, cities across the

country generate much of their revenue through

court fines and fees, with those who can’t pay

subject to arrest and jail time. These debtors’ prisons

are found in cities like Ferguson, where the number

of arrest warrants in 2013—33,000—exceeded its

population of 21,000. Most of the warrants were for

driving violations.46

2.10 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement officers should be required
to seek consent before a search and explain
that a person has the right to refuse consent
when there is no warrant or probable
cause. Furthermore, officers should ideally
obtain written acknowledgement that
they have sought consent to a search
in these circumstances.

46. Listening Session on Trust and Legitimacy (oral testimony of Laura Murphy,
director of the Washington Legislative Office, American Civil Liberties Union, for
the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, January 13,
2015); Joseph Shapiro, “In Ferguson, Court Fines and Fees Fuel Anger,” NPR.com,
last updated August 25, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/
in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger; In For A Penny: The Rise of
America’s Debtors’ Prisons (New York: American Civil Liberties Union, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web .

2.11.1 actiOn item: One example of how
to do this is for law enforcement officers to carry
business cards containing their name, rank, com-
mand, and contact information that would enable
individuals to offer suggestions or commenda-
tions or to file complaints with the appropriate
individual, office, or board. These cards would be
easily distributed in all encounters.

Co-chair Laurie Robinson asks a panelist a question, Phoenix, February 13, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

2.12 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement agencies should establish search
and seizure procedures related to LGBTQ and
transgender populations and adopt as policy
the recommendation from the President’s

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Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) to
cease using the possession of condoms as the
sole evidence of vice.

2.13 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement agencies should adopt and
enforce policies prohibiting profiling and
discrimination based on race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, age, gender, gender
identity/expression, sexual orientation,
immigration status, disability, housing status,
occupation, or language fluency.

The task force heard from a number of witnesses
about the importance of protecting the safety and
dignity of all people. Andrea Ritchie noted that

gender and sexuality-specific forms of racial profiling

and discriminatory policing [include] . . . . Failure to

respect individuals’ gender identity and expression

when addressing members of the public and

during arrest processing, searches, and placement

in police custody.47

47. Listening Session on Training and Education (oral testimony of Andrea Ritchie,
founder of Streetwise and Safe, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).

Invasive searches should never be used for the
sole purpose of determining gender identity, and
an individual’s gender identity should be respect-
ed in lock-ups and holding cells to the extent that
the facility allows for gender segregation. And
witness Linda Sarsour spoke to how

an issue plaguing and deeply impacting Arab-

American and American Muslim communities across

the country is racial and religious profiling by local,

state, and federal law enforcement. We have learned

through investigative reports, Freedom of Information

Act (FOIA) requests, and lawsuits that agencies target

communities by religion and national origin.48

2.13.1 actiOn item: The Bureau of Justice
Statistics should add questions concerning
sexual harassment of and misconduct toward
community members, and in particular LGBTQ
and gender-nonconforming people, by law
enforcement officers to the Police Public
Contact Survey.

2.13.2 actiOn item: The Centers for
Disease Control should add questions concerning
sexual harassment of and misconduct toward
community members, and in particular LGBTQ and
gender-nonconforming people, by law enforce-
ment officers to the National Intimate Partner and
Sexual Violence Survey.

2.13.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should promote and disseminate
guidance to federal, state, and local law enforce-
ment agencies on documenting, preventing, and
addressing sexual harassment and misconduct by
local law enforcement agents, consistent with the
recommendations of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police.49

2.14 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice, through the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services and
Office of Justice Programs, should provide
technical assistance and incentive funding to
jurisdictions with small police agencies that
take steps towards shared services, regional
training, and consolidation.

48. Listening Session on Training and Education (oral testimony of Linda Sarsour,
Advocacy And Civic Engagement coordinator for the National Network for Arab
American Communities, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).
49. IACP, Addressing Sexual Offenses and Misconduct by Law Enforcement:
Executive Guide (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2011).

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p i l l a R 2 . p o l i c y & o v e R s i g h t

Half of all law enforcement agencies in the United
States have fewer than ten officers, and nearly
three-quarters have fewer than 25 officers.50 Law-
rence Sherman noted in his testimony that “so many
problems of organizational quality control are made
worse by the tiny size of most local police agencies
. . . less than 1 percent of 17,985 U.S. police agencies
meet the English minimum of 1,000 employees or
more.”51 These small forces often lack the resources
for training and equipment accessible to larger
departments and often are prevented by municipal
boundaries and local custom from combining
forces with neighboring agencies. Funding and
technical assistance can give smaller agencies the
incentive to share policies and practices and give
them access to a wider variety of training, equip-
ment, and communications technology than they
could acquire on their own.

50. Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008,
Bulletin (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2011), NCJ 233982.
51. Listening Session on the Future of Community Policing (oral testimony of
Lawrence Sherman, Cambridge University, for the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 24, 2015).

Table 1. Full-time state and local law enforcement employees, by size of agency, 2008

Size of agency Number of agencies Total number of full-time employees

All agencies 17,985 1,133,915

1,000 or more officers 83 326,197

500–999 89 94,168

250–499 237 133,024

100–249 778 174,505

500–99 1,300 136,390

25–49 2,402 124,492

10–24 4,300 98,563

5–9 3,446 32,493

2–4 3,225 11,498

0–1 2,125 2,585

Source: Brian A. Reaves, “State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies” (see note 50).

2.15 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice, through the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, should
partner with the International Association
of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards
and Training (IADLEST) to expand its National
Decertification Index to serve as the National
Register of Decertified Officers with the goal
of covering all agencies within the United
States and its territories.

The National Decertification Index is an aggrega-
tion of information that allows hiring agencies to
identify officers who have had their license or cer-
tification revoked for misconduct. It was designed
as an answer to the problem “wherein a police
officer is discharged for improper conduct and
loses his/her certification in that state . . . [only to
relocate] to another state and hire on with another
police department.”52

52. “National Decertification Index—FAQs,” accessed February 27, 2015,
https://www.iadlest.org/Portals/0/Files/NDI/FAQ/ndi_faq.html.

Peace Officer Standards and

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Training (POST ) boards can record administrative
actions taken against certified police and correc-
tional officers. Currently the criteria for reporting
an action on an officer is determined by each
POST independently, as is the granting of read-
only access to hiring departments to use as part
of their pre-hire screening process. Expanding this
system to ensure national and standardized re-
porting would assist in ensuring that officers who

have lost their certification for misconduct are not
easily hired in other jurisdictions. A national regis-
ter would effectively treat “police professionals the
way states’ licensing laws treat other professionals.
If anything, the need for such a system is even
more important for law enforcement, as officers
have the power to make arrests, perform searches,
and use deadly force.”53

53. Roger L. Goldman, “Police Officer Decertification: Promoting Police
Professionalism through State Licensing and the National Decertification Index,”
Police Chief 81 (November 2014): 40–42, http://www.policechiefmagazine.
org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=3538&issue_
id=112014.

Bill Schrier of the Office of the Chief Information Officer for the state of Washington used PowerPoint to demonstrate how agencies
can use Twitter for engagement, Cincinnati, January 31, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

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P I L L A R 3 . T E C H N O L O G Y & S O C I A L
M E D I A
Implementing new technologies can give police departments an
opportunity to fully engage and educate communities in a dialogue
about their expectations for transparency, accountability, and privacy.

We live in a time when technology and its many
uses are advancing far more quickly than are
policies and laws. “Technology” available to law
enforcement today includes everything from
body-worn cameras (BWC) to unmanned aircraft to
social media and a myriad of products in between.

The use of technology can improve policing prac-
tices and build community trust and legitimacy,
but its implementation must be built on a defined
policy framework with its purposes and goals
clearly delineated. Implementing new technologies
can give police departments an opportunity to fully
engage and educate communities in a dialogue
about their expectations for transparency, account-
ability, and privacy. But technology changes quickly
in terms of new hardware, software, and other
options. Law enforcement agencies and leaders
need to be able to identify, assess, and evaluate
new technology for adoption and do so in ways
that improve their effectiveness, efficiency, and
evolution without infringing on individual rights.

Thus, despite (and because of ) the centrality of
technology in policing, law enforcement agencies
face major challenges including determining the
effects of implementing various technologies;
identifying costs and benefits; examining unintend-
ed consequences; and exploring the best practices
by which technology can be evaluated, acquired,
maintained, and managed. Addressing these tech-
nology challenges by using research, accumulated

knowledge, and practical experiences can help
agencies reach their goals,54 but law enforcement
agencies and personnel also need to recognize that
technology is only a tool for doing their jobs: just
because you have access to technology does not
necessarily mean you should always use it.55

54. Elizabeth Groff and Tom McEwen, Identifying and Measuring the Effects
of Information Technologies on Law Enforcement Agencies: The Making Officer
Redeployment Effective Program (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2008), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/e08084156-IT ;
Christopher S. Koper, Cynthia Lum, James J. Willis, Daniel J. Woods, and Julie
Hibdon, Realizing the Potential of Technology in Policing: A Multi-Site Study of the
Social, Organizational, and Behavioral Aspects of Implementing Police Technologies
(Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2015), http://cebcp.org/wp-
content/evidence-based-policing/ImpactTechnologyFinalReport.
55. IACP Technology Policy Framework (Alexandria, VA: International Association
of Chiefs of Police, 2014), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/
IACP%20Technology%20Policy%20Framework%20January%202014%20Final .

BWCs are a case in point. An increasing number of
law enforcement agencies are adopting BWC pro-
grams as a means to improve evidence collection,
to strengthen officer performance and account-
ability, and to enhance agency transparency. By
documenting encounters between police and the
public, BWCs can also be used to investigate and
resolve complaints about officer-involved incidents.

Jim Bueermann, retired chief of the Redlands
(California) Police Department and President of
the Police Foundation, told the task force about
a seminal piece of research that demonstrated a
positive impact of BWCs in policing. The research-
ers used the gold standard of research models, a
randomized control trial, in which the people

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being studied are randomly assigned either to
a control group that does not receive the treat-
ment being studied or to a treatment group that
does. The results of this 12-month study strongly
suggest that the use of BWCs by the police can
significantly reduce both officer use of force and
complaints against officers. The study found that
the officers wearing the cameras had 87.5 percent
fewer incidents of use of force and 59 percent
fewer complaints than the officers not wearing
the cameras. One of the important findings of the
study was the impact BWCs might have on the
self-awareness of officers and citizens alike.
When police officers are acutely aware that their
behavior is being monitored (because they turn
on the cameras) and when officers tell citizens
that the cameras are recording their behavior,
everyone behaves better. The results of this
study strongly suggest that this increase in self-
awareness contributes to more positive outcomes
in police-citizen interaction.56

56. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media: Body Cameras-Research
and Legal Considerations (oral testimony of Jim Bueermann, president, Police
Foundation, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH,
January 31, 2015); Ariel Barak, William A. Farrar, and Alex Sutherland, “The Effect
of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the
Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 2014.

But other considerations make the issue of BWCs
more complex. A 2014 Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF) publication, funded by the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Of-
fice), reporting on extensive research exploring the
policy and implementation questions surrounding
BWCs noted:

Although body-worn cameras can offer many

benefits, they also raise serious questions about how

technology is changing the relationship between

police and the community. Body-worn cameras

not only create concerns about the public’s privacy

rights but also can affect how officers relate

to people in the community, the community’s

perception of the police, and expectations about

how police agencies should share information with

the public.57

Now that agencies operate in a world in which
anyone with a cell phone camera can record
video footage of a police encounter, BWCs help
police departments ensure that events are also
captured from an officer’s perspective.58 But when
the public does not believe its privacy is being
protected by law enforcement, a breakdown in
community trust can occur. Agencies need to
consider ways to involve the public in discussions
related to the protection of their privacy and civil
liberties prior to implementing new technology,
as well work with the public and other partners in
the justice system to develop appropriate policies
and procedures for use.

Another technology relatively new to law
enforcement is social media. Social media is a
communication tool the police can use to engage
the community on issues of importance to both
and to gauge community sentiment regarding
agency policies and practices. Social media can
also help police identify the potential nature and
location of gang and other criminal or disorderly
activity such as spontaneous crowd gatherings.59

57. Lindsay Miller and Jessica Toliver, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera
Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014), vii, http://ric-zai-inc.com/
Publications/cops-p296-pub .
58. Ibid., 1.
59. Police Executive Research Forum, Social Media and Tactical Considerations for
Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
2013), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p261-pub .

The Boston Police Department (BPD), for example,
has long embraced both community policing and
the use of social media. The department put its
experience to good and highly visible use in April
2013 during the rapidly developing investigation
that followed the deadly explosion of two bombs
at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. The

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p i l l a R 3 . t e c h n o l o g y & s o c i a l m e d i a

BPD successfully used Twitter to keep the public
informed about the status of the investigation, to
calm nerves and request assistance, to correct mis-
taken information reported by the press, and to
ask for public restraint in the tweeting of informa-
tion from police scanners. This demonstrated the
level of trust and interaction that a department
and a community can attain online.60

While technology is crucial to law enforcement,
it is never a panacea. Its acquisition and use can
have unintended consequences for both the
organization and the community it serves, which
may limit its potential. Thus, agencies need clearly
defined policies related to implementation of
technology, and must pay close attention to
community concerns about its use.

60. Edward F. Davis III, Alejandro A. Alves, and David Alan Sklansky,
“Social Media and Police Leadership: Lessons from Boston,” New Perspectives
in Policing (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, March 2014),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/content/download/67536/1242954/version/1/file/
SocialMediaandPoliceLeadership-03-14 .

3.1 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice, in consultation with
the law enforcement field, should broaden the
efforts of the National Institute of Justice to
establish national standards for the research
and development of new technology. These
standards should also address compatibility
and interoperability needs both within law
enforcement agencies and across agencies
and jurisdictions and maintain civil and human
rights protections.

The lack of consistent standards leads to a con-
stantly spiraling increase in technology costs. Law
enforcement often has to invest in new layers of

technology to enable their systems to operate with
different systems and sometimes must also make
expensive modifications or additions to legacy
systems to support interoperability with newer
technology. And these costs do not include the
additional funds needed for training. Agencies are
often unprepared for the unintended consequenc-
es that may accompany the acquisition of new
technologies. Implementation of new technologies
can cause disruptions to daily routines, lack of
buy-in, and lack of understanding of the purpose
and appropriate uses of the technologies. It also
often raises questions regarding how the new
technologies will impact the officer’s expectations,
discretion, decision making, and accountability.61

Inconsistent or nonexistent standards also lead
to isolated and fractured information systems
that cannot effectively manage, store, analyze, or
share their data with other systems. As a result,
much information is lost or unavailable—which
allows vital information to go unused and have
no impact on crime reduction efforts. As one
witness noted, the development of mature crime
analysis and CompStat processes allows law
enforcement to effectively develop policy and
deploy resources for crime prevention, but there is
a lack of uniformity in data collection throughout
law enforcement, and only patchwork methods
of near real-time information sharing exist.62 These
problems are especially critical in light of the
threats from terrorism and cybercrime.

61. Koper et al., Potential of Technology in Policing (see note 54).
62. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media (oral testimony of Elliot
Cohen, Maryland State Police, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015).

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3.1.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment should support the development and
delivery of training to help law enforcement
agencies learn, acquire, and implement technol-
ogy tools and tactics that are consistent with the
best practices of 21st century policing.

3.1.2 actiOn item: As part of national stan-
dards, the issue of technology’s impact on privacy
concerns should be addressed in accordance with
protections provided by constitutional law.

Though all constitutional guidelines must be
maintained in the performance of law enforce-
ment duties, the legal framework (warrants, etc.)
should continue to protect law enforcement

access to data obtained from cell phones, social
media, GPS, and other sources, allowing officers to
detect, prevent, or respond to crime.

3.1.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should deploy smart technology that is
designed to prevent the tampering with or manip-
ulating of evidence in violation of policy.

All of the task force listening sessions were streamed live and can still be viewed at the task force website. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

3.2 recOmmendatiOn: The
implementation of appropriate technology by
law enforcement agencies should be designed
considering local needs and aligned with
national standards.

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p i l l a R 3 . t e c h n o l o g y & s o c i a l m e d i a

While standards should be created for develop-
ment and research of technology at the national
level, implementation of developed technologies
should remain a local decision to address the
needs and resources of the community.

In addition to the expense of acquiring technology,
implementation and training also requires funds,
as well as time, personnel, and physical capacity.
A case in point is the Phoenix Police Department’s
adoption of BWCs mentioned by witness Michael
White, who said that the real costs came on the
back end for managing the vast amount of data
generated by the cameras. He quoted the Chief
of the Phoenix Police Department as saying that
it would cost their department $3.5 million to not
only outfit all of their officers with the cameras but
also successfully manage the program.

3.2.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should encourage public engagement and
collaboration, including the use of community
advisory bodies, when developing a policy for the
use of a new technology.

Local residents will be more accepting of and
respond more positively to technology when they
have been informed of new developments and
their input has been encouraged. How police use
technology and how they share that information
with the public is critical. Task force witness Jim
Bueermann, president of the Police Foundation,
addressed this issue, noting that concerns about
BWCs include potential compromises to the priva-
cy of both officers and citizens, who are reluctant
to speak to police if they think they are being
recorded. And as the task force co-chair, Charles
Ramsey, noted, “Just having the conversation can
increase trust and legitimacy and help depart-
ments make better decisions.”

3.2.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should include an evaluation or assessment
process to gauge the effectiveness of any new
technology, soliciting input from all levels of the
agency, from line officer to leadership, as well as
assessment from members of the community.63

Witnesses suggested that law enforcement
agencies create an advisory group when adopting
a new technology.64 Ideally, it would include line
officers, union representatives, and members from
other departmental units, such as research and
planning, technology, and internal affairs. External
stakeholders, such as representatives from the
prosecutor’s office, the defense bar, advocacy
groups, and citizens should also be included, giv-
ing each group the opportunity to ask questions,
express their concerns, and offer suggestions on
policy and training.

3.2.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should adopt the use of new technolo-
gies that will help them better serve people with
special needs or disabilities.

63. Sharon Stolting, Shawn Barrett, and David Kurz, Best Practices Guide for
Acquisition of New Technology (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of
Police, n.d.), http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/BP-NewTechnology .
64. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media: Body Cameras—Research
and Legal Considerations (oral testimony of Michael White, professor, Arizona State
University, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH,
January 31, 2015).

3.3 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should develop
best practices that can be adopted by state
legislative bodies to govern the acquisition,
use, retention, and dissemination of
auditory, visual, and biometric data by
law enforcement.

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These model policies and practices should at
minimum address technology usage and data
and evidence acquisition and retention, as well as
privacy issues, accountability and discipline. They
must also consider the impact of data collection
and use on public trust and police legitimacy.

3.3.1 actiOn item: As part of the process
for developing best practices, the U.S. Department
of Justice should consult with civil rights and civil
liberties organizations, as well as law enforcement
research groups and other experts, concerning
the constitutional issues that can arise as a result
of the use of new technologies.

3.3.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should create toolkits for the most
effective and constitutional use of multiple
forms of innovative technology that will provide
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies
with a one-stop clearinghouse of information
and resources.

3.3.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should review and consider the Bureau
of Justice Assistance’s (BJA) Body Worn Camera
Toolkit to assist in implementing BWCs.

A Body-Worn Camera Expert Panel of law enforce-
ment leaders, recognized practitioners, national
policy leaders, and community advocates con-
vened a two-day workshop in February, 2015 to
develop a toolkit and provide guidance and model
policy for law enforcement agencies implementing
BWC programs. Subject matter experts contributed
ideas and content for the proposed toolkit while a
panel composed of privacy and victim advocates
contributed ideas and content for the toolkit to
broaden input and ensure transparency.

3.4 recOmmendatiOn: Federal, state,
local, and tribal legislative bodies should be
encouraged to update public record laws.

The quickly evolving nature of new technologies
that collect video, audio, information, and biomet-
ric data on members of the community can cause
unforeseen consequences. Public record laws,
which allow public access to information held by
government agencies, including law enforcement,
should be modified to protect the privacy of
the individuals whose records they hold and to
maintain the trust of the community.

Issues such as the accessibility of video captured
through dashboard or body-worn cameras are
especially complex. So too are the officer use of
force events that will be captured by video camera
systems and then broadcast by local media outlets.
Use of force, even when lawful and appropriate,
can negatively influence public perception and
trust of police. Sean Smoot, task force member, ad-
dressed this by recalling the shooting of a Flagstaff,
Arizona, police officer whose death was recorded
by his BWC. Responding to public record requests
by local media, the police department released
the graphic footage, which was then shown on
local TV and also on YouTube.65 This illustration also
raises questions concerning the recording of police
interactions with minors and the appropriateness
of releasing those videos for public view given their
inability to give informed consent for distribution.

65. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media (Sean Smoot, task force
member, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH,
January 31, 2015).

3.5 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should adopt model policies
and best practices for technology-based
community engagement that increases
community trust and access.

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p i l l a R 3 . t e c h n o l o g y & s o c i a l m e d i a

These policies and practices should at a minimum
increase transparency and accessibility, provide
access to information (crime statistics, current
calls for service), allow for public posting of policy
and procedures, and enable access and usage for
persons with disabilities. They should also address
issues surrounding the use of new and social
media, encouraging the use of social media as a
means of community interaction and relationship
building, which can result in stronger law enforce-
ment. As witness Elliot Cohen noted,

We have seen social media support policing efforts

in gathering intelligence during active assailant

incidents: the Columbia Mall shooting and the

Boston Marathon bombing. Social media allowed for

a greater volume of information to be collected in an

electronic format, both audibly and visually.66

66. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media: Technology Policy (oral
testimony of Elliot Cohen, lieutenant, Maryland State Police, for the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015).

But to engage the community, social media must
be responsive and current. Said Bill Schrier, “Regu-
larly refresh the content to maintain and engage
the audience, post content rapidly during inci-
dents to dispel rumors, and use it for engagement,

not just public information.”67 False or incorrect
statements made via social media, mainstream
media, and other means of technology deeply
harm trust and legitimacy and can only be over-
come with targeted and continuing community
engagement and repeated positive interaction.
Agencies need to unequivocally discourage falsi-
ties by underlining how harmful they are and how
difficult they are to overcome.

Agencies should also develop policies and prac-
tices on social media use that consider individual
officer expression, professional representation,
truthful communication, and other concerns that
can impact trust and legitimacy.

Table 2. What types of social media does your agency currently use, and what types of
social media do you plan to begin using within the next 2 to 5 years?

Social media type Percent of responding agencies
currently using

Percent of responding agencies plan-
ning to begin using in 2 to 5 years

Agency website 100 —

Facebook 82 14

Twitter 69 18

YouTube 48 20

LinkedIn 34 20

Note: PERF, with the support of the COPS Office and Target Corporation, disseminated a “Future of Policing” survey in 2012 to more than 500 police agencies; nearly
200 responded.

Source: Police Executive Research Forum, Future Trends in Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2014),
http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p282-pub .

3.6 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should support the development
of new “less than lethal” technology to help
control combative suspects.

The fatal shootings in Ferguson, Cleveland, and
elsewhere have put the consequences of use of
force front and center in the national news.

67. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media: Technology Policy (oral
testimony of Bill Schrier, senior policy advisor, Office of the Chief Information
Officer, State of Washington, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015).

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Policies and procedures must change, but so
should the weaponry. New technologies such as
conductive energy devices (CED) have been devel-
oped and may be used and evaluated to decrease
the number of fatal police interventions. Studies of
CEDs have shown them to be effective at reducing
both officer and civilian injuries. For example, in
one study that compared seven law enforcement
agencies that use CEDs with six agencies that do
not, researchers found a 70 percent decrease in
officer injuries and a 40 percent decrease in sus-
pect injures.68

68. Bruce Taylor et al., Comparing Safety Outcomes in Police Use-Of-Force Cases
for Law Enforcement Agencies That Have Deployed Conducted Energy Devices and
A Matched Comparison Group That Have Not: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation
(Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2009), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237965 ; John M. MacDonald, Robert J. Kaminski,
and Michael R. Smith, “The Effect of Less-Lethal Weapons on Injuries in Police Use-
of-Force Events,” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 12 (2009) 2268–2274,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2775771/pdf/2268 ; Bruce G.

But new technologies should still be

subject to the appropriate use of force continuum
restrictions. And Vincent Talucci made the point in
his testimony that over-reliance on technological
weapons can also be dangerous.69

3.6.1 actiOn item: Relevant federal agen-
cies, including the U.S. Departments of Defense
and Justice, should expand their efforts to study
the development and use of new less than lethal
technologies and evaluate their impact on public
safety, reducing lethal violence against citizens,
constitutionality, and officer safety.

Taylor and Daniel J. Woods, “Injuries to Officers and Suspects in Police Use-of-
Force Cases: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation,” Police Quarterly 13, no. 3 (2010):
260–289, http://pqx.sagepub.com/content/13/3/260.full .
69. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media (oral testimony of Vincent
Talucci, International Association of Chiefs of Police, for the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015).

Rev. Jeff Brown speaks on restoring trust between police and communities, Phoenix, February 13, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

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p i l l a R 3 . t e c h n o l o g y & s o c i a l m e d i a

3.7 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should make the development
and building of segregated radio spectrum
and increased bandwidth by FirstNet
for exclusive use by local, state, tribal,
and federal public safety agencies a
top priority.70

70. Listening Session on Technology and Social Media: Technology Policy (oral
testimony of Bill Schrier, senior policy advisor, Office of the Chief Information
Officer, State of Washington, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Cincinnati, OH, January 31, 2015).

A national public safety broadband network
which creates bandwidth for the exclusive use of
law enforcement, the First Responder Network
(FirstNet) is considered a game-changing public
safety project, which would allow instantaneous
communication in even the most remote areas
whenever a disaster or incident occurs. It can also
support many other technologies, including video
transmission from BWCs.

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President Barack Obama delivers remarks to the press following a meeting with members of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing in the
Roosevelt Room of the White House, March 2, 2015. OFFICIAL WHITE HOUSE PHOTO BY CHUCK KENNEDY

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P I L L A R 4 . C O M M U N I T Y P O L I C I N G
& C R I M E R E D U C T I O N
Community policing requires the active building of positive relation-
ships with members of the community.

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes
organizational strategies that support the
systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving
techniques to proactively address the immediate
conditions that give rise to public safety issues such
as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.71

Over the past few decades, rates of both violent
and property crime have dropped dramatically
across the United States.72 However, some com-
munities and segments of the population have not
benefited from the decrease as much as others, and
some not at all.73 Though law enforcement must
concentrate their efforts in these neighborhoods
to maintain public safety, sometimes those specific
efforts arouse resentment in the neighborhoods
the police are striving to protect.

Police interventions must be implemented with
strong policies and training in place, rooted in an
understanding of procedural justice. Indeed, with-
out that, police interventions can easily devolve
into racial profiling, excessive use of force, and
other practices that disregard civil rights, causing
negative reactions from people living in already
challenged communities.

71. Community Policing Defined (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented
Policing Services, 2014), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p157-pub .
72. “Crime Statistics for 2013 Released: Decrease in Violent Crimes and Property
Crimes,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, last modified November 10, 2014,
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/november/crime-statistics-for-2013-
released/crime-statistics-for-2013-released.
73. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Building
Community Policing Organizations (oral testimony of Chris Magnus, chief,
Richmond [CA] Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

Yet mutual trust and cooperation, two key
elements of community policing, are vital to
protecting residents of these communities from
the crime that plagues them. Community policing
combines a focus on intervention and prevention
through problem solving with building collab-
orative partnerships between law enforcement
agencies and schools, social services, and other
stakeholders. In this way, community policing not
only improves public safety but also enhances
social connectivity and economic strength, which
increases community resilience to crime. And, as
noted by one speaker, it improves job satisfaction
for line officers, too.

In his testimony to the task force, Camden County,
New Jersey, Police Chief J. Scott Thomson noted
that community policing starts on the street
corner, with respectful interaction between a
police officer and a local resident, a discussion that
need not be related to a criminal matter.74 In fact,
it is important that not all interactions be based on
emergency calls or crime investigations.

74. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Using
Community Policing to Reduce Crime (oral testimony of J. Scott Thomson, chief,
Camden County [NJ] Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

Another aspect of community policing that was
discussed in the listening session on this topic is
the premise that officers enforce the law with the
people not just on the people. In reflecting this
belief, some commented on the negative

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results of zero tolerance policies, which mete out
automatic and predetermined actions by officers
regardless of extenuating circumstances.

Community policing requires the active building
of positive relationships with members of the
community—on an agency as well as on a per-
sonal basis. This can be done through assigning
officers to geographic areas on a consistent basis,
so that through the continuity of assignment they
have the opportunity to know the members of
the community. It can also be aided by the use
of programs such as Eagle County, Colorado’s
Law Enforcement Immigrant Advisory Commit-
tee, which the police department formed with
Catholic Charities to help the local immigrant
community.75 This type of policing also requires
participation in community organizations, local
meetings and public service activities.

To be most effective, community policing also
requires collaborative partnerships with agencies
beyond law enforcement, such as Philadelphia’s
successful Police Diversion Program described
by Kevin Bethel, Deputy Commissioner of Patrol
Operations in the Philadelphia Police Department
in his testimony to the task force.76 This partner-
ship with the Philadelphia Department of Human
Services, the school district, the District Attorney’s
office, Family Court, and other stakeholders signifi-
cantly reduced the number of arrests of minority
youths for minor offenses.

75. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Building
Community Policing Organizations (oral testimony of Chris Magnus, chief,
Richmond [CA] Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
76. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Using
Community Policing to Reduce Crime (oral testimony of Kevin Bethel, deputy police
commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

Problem solving, another key element of com-
munity policing, is critical to prevention. And
problems must be solved in partnership with the

community in order to effectively address chronic
crime and disorder problems. As Office of Com-
munity Oriented Policing Services Director Ronald
L. Davis has said, “We need to teach new recruits
that law enforcement is more than just cuffing
‘perps’—it’s understanding why people do what
they do.”77

In summary, law enforcement’s obligation is not
only to reduce crime but also to do so fairly while
protecting the rights of citizens. Any prevention
strategy that unintentionally violates civil rights,
compromises police legitimacy, or undermines
trust is counterproductive from both ethical and
cost-benefit perspectives. Ignoring these consider-
ations can have both financial costs (e.g., lawsuits)
and social costs (e.g., loss of public support).

It must also be stressed that the absence of crime
is not the final goal of law enforcement. Rather, it
is the promotion and protection of public safety
while respecting the dignity and rights of all. And
public safety and well-being cannot be attained
without the community’s belief that their well-
being is at the heart of all law enforcement activ-
ities. It is critical to help community members see
police as allies rather than as an occupying force
and to work in concert with other community
stakeholders to create more economically and
socially stable neighborhoods.

77. Faye Elkins, “Five COPS Office Directors Look Back and Think Forward at the
20th Anniversary Celebration,” Community Policing Dispatch 8, no. 1 (January
12, 2014), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/01-2015/cops_office_20th_
anniversary.asp.

4.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should develop and adopt policies
and strategies that reinforce the importance
of community engagement in managing
public safety.

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p i l l a R 4 . c o m m u n i t y p o l i c i n g & c R i m e R e d u c t i o n

Community policing is not just about the relation-
ship between individual officers and individual
neighborhood residents. It is also about the rela-
tionship between law enforcement leaders and
leaders of key institutions in a community, such as
churches, businesses, and schools, supporting the
community’s own process to define prevention
and reach goals.

Law enforcement agencies cannot ensure the safety
of communities alone but should seek to contribute
to the strengthening of neighborhood capacity to
prevent and reduce crime through informal social
control. More than a century of research shows
that informal social control is a much more powerful
mechanism for crime control and reduction than is
formal punishment. And perhaps the best evidence
for the preventive power of informal social control
may be the millions of unguarded opportunities to
commit crime that are passed up each day.78

78. Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson, “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends:
A Routine Activities Approach,” American Sociological Review 44 (August 1979):
588–607.
79. Tracey Meares, “Praying for Community Policing,” California Law Review 90
(2002): 1593–1634, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/518/.

4.1.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should consider adopting preferences for
seeking “least harm” resolutions, such as diversion
programs or warnings and citations in lieu of
arrest for minor infractions.

4.2 recOmmendatiOn: Community
policing should be infused throughout the
culture and organizational structure of law
enforcement agencies.

Community policing must be a way of doing
business by an entire police force, not just a
specialized unit of that force.79 The task force heard
testimony from Police Chief J. Scott Thomson of
Camden County, New Jersey, who noted:

Community policing cannot be a program, unit,

strategy or tactic. It must be the core principle that

lies at the foundation of a police department’s

culture. The only way to significantly reduce fear,

crime, and disorder and then sustain these gains is

to leverage the greatest force multiplier: the people

of the community.80

This message was closely echoed by Chris Mag-
nus, the police chief in Richmond, California. To
build a more effective partnership with residents
and transform culture within the police depart-
ment as well as in the community, the Richmond
police made sure that all officers, not just a
select few, were doing community policing and
neighborhood problem solving. Every officer is
expected to get to know the residents, businesses,
community groups, churches, and schools on their
beat and work with them to identify and address
public safety challenges, including quality of life
issues such as blight. Officers remain in the same
beat or district for several years or more—which
builds familiarity and trust.81

Testimony from a number of witnesses also made
clear that hiring, training, evaluating, and promot-
ing officers based on their ability and track record
in community engagement—not just traditional
measures of policing such as arrests, tickets, or
tactical skills—is an equally important component
of the successful infusion of community policing
throughout an organization.

80. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Using
Community Policing to Reduce Crime (oral testimony of J. Scott Thomson, chief,
Camden County [NJ] Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
81. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Building
Community Policing Organizations (oral testimony of Chris Magnus, chief,
Richmond [CA] Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

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4.2.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should evaluate officers on their efforts
to engage members of the community and the
partnerships they build. Making this part of
the performance evaluation process places an
increased value on developing partnerships.

4.2.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should evaluate their patrol deployment
practices to allow sufficient time for patrol officers
to participate in problem solving and community
engagement activities.

4.2.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice and other public and private entities
should support research into the factors that
have led to dramatic successes in crime reduction
in some communities through the infusion of

non-discriminatory policing and to determine
replicable factors that could be used to guide law
enforcement agencies in other communities.

4.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should engage in multidisciplinary,
community team approaches for planning,
implementing, and responding to crisis
situations with complex causal factors.

Collaborative approaches that engage profession-
als from across systems have emerged as model
practices for addressing community problems
that are not resolvable by the police alone. These
team approaches call upon law enforcement
agencies, service providers, and community
support networks to work together to provide the
right resources for the situation and foster sustain-
able change. Multiple witnesses before the task
force spoke of departments coordinating mental
health response teams that include mental health
professionals, social workers, crisis counselors, and

other professionals making decisions alongside
the police regarding planning, implementing, and
responding to mental health crisis situations. But
this model is applicable to a number of com-
munity problems that regularly involve a police
response, including homelessness, substance
abuse, domestic violence, human trafficking,
and child abuse. Ultimately, the idea is for
officers to be trained and equipped to make
use of existing community resources in the
diffusion of crisis situations.

4.3.2 actiOn item: Communities should
look to involve peer support counselors as part
of multidisciplinary teams when appropriate.
Persons who have experienced the same trauma
can provide both insight to the first responders
and immediate support to individuals in crisis.

4.3.3 actiOn item: Communities should be
encouraged to evaluate the efficacy of these crisis
intervention team approaches and hold agency
leaders accountable for outcomes.

4.4 recOmmendatiOn: Communities
should support a culture and practice of
policing that reflects the values of protection
and promotion of the dignity of all, especially
the most vulnerable.

The task force heard many different ways of
describing a positive culture of policing. David
Kennedy suggested there could be a Hippocratic

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p i l l a R 4 . c o m m u n i t y p o l i c i n g & c R i m e R e d u c t i o n

Oath for Policing: First, Do No Harm.82 Law en-
forcement officers’ goal should be to avoid use
of force if at all possible, even when it is allowed
by law and by policy. Terms such as fair and
impartial policing, rightful policing, constitutional
policing, neighborhood policing, procedural justice,
and implicit bias training all address changing the
culture of policing. Respectful language; thought-
ful and intentional dialogue about the perception
and reality of profiling and the mass incarceration
of minorities; and consistent involvement, both
formal and informal, in community events all help
ensure that relationships of trust between police
and community will be built. The vision of policing
in the 21st century should be that of officers as
guardians of human and constitutional rights.

82. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Using
Community Policing to Reduce Crime (oral testimony of David Kennedy, professor,
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

4.4.1 actiOn item: Because offensive or
harsh language can escalate a minor situation,
law enforcement agencies should underscore the

importance of language used and adopt
policies directing officers to speak to individuals
with respect.

4.4.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should develop programs that create op-
portunities for patrol officers to regularly interact
with neighborhood residents, faith leaders, and
business leaders.

Chief Edward Flynn of the Milwaukee Police Department, Phoenix, February 14, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

4.5 recOmmendatiOn: Community
policing emphasizes working with
neighborhood residents to co-produce public
safety. Law enforcement agencies should
work with community residents to identify
problems and collaborate on implementing
solutions that produce meaningful results for
the community.

As Delores Jones Brown testified, “Neighborhood
policing provides an opportunity for police
departments to do things with residents in the
co-production of public safety rather than doing

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things to or for them.”83 Community policing is not
just about the behavior and tactics of police; it is
also about the civic engagement and capacity
of communities to improve their own neighbor-
hoods, their quality of life, and their sense of safety
and well-being. Members of communities are key
partners in creating public safety, so communities
and police need mechanisms to engage with each
other in consistent and meaningful ways. One
model for formalizing this engagement is through
a civilian governance system such as is found in
Los Angeles. As Chief Charlie Beck explained in
testimony to the task force,

The Los Angeles Police Department is formally

governed by the Board of Police Commissioners,

a five-person civilian body with each member

appointed by the mayor. The commission has formal

authority to hire the chief of police, to set broad policy

for the department, and to hold the LAPD and its

chief accountable to the people.84

83. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Community
Policing and Crime Prevention Research (oral testimony of Delores Jones Brown,
professor, Department of Law, Police Science & Criminal Justice Administration,
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
84. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight: Civilian Oversight (oral testimony
of Charles Beck, chief, Los Angeles Police Department, for the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January 30, 2015).

Community policing, therefore, is concerned with
changing the way in which citizens respond to
police in more constructive and proactive ways.
If officers feel unsafe and threatened, their ability
to operate in an open and shared dialogue with
community is inhibited. On the other hand, the
police have the responsibility to understand the
culture, history, and quality of life issues of the
entire community—youth, elders, faith commu-
nities, special populations—and to educate the
community, including its children, on the role and
function of police and ways the community can

protect itself, be part of solving problems, and
prevent crime. Community and police jointly share
the responsibility for civil dialogue and interaction.

4.5.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should schedule regular forums and meetings
where all community members can interact with
police and help influence programs and policy.

4.5.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should engage youth and communities in joint
training with law enforcement, citizen academies,
ride-alongs, problem solving teams, community
action teams, and quality of life teams.

4.5.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should establish formal community/citizen
advisory committees to assist in developing crime
prevention strategies and agency policies as well
as provide input on policing issues.

Larger agencies should establish multiple com-
mittees to ensure they inform all levels of the
organization. The makeup of these committees
should reflect the demographics of the communi-
ty or neighborhood being served.

4.5.4 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should adopt community policing strategies
that support and work in concert with economic
development efforts within communities.

As several witnesses, including Bill Geller, testified,
public safety and the economic health of commu-
nities go hand in hand.85

85. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Community
Policing and Crime Prevention Research (oral testimony of Bill Geller, director, Geller
& Associates, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ,
February 13, 2015).

It is therefore important

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for agencies to work with local, state, and federal
partners on projects devoted to enhancing the
economic health of the communities in which
departments are located.

4.6 recOmmendatiOn: Communities
should adopt policies and programs that
address the needs of children and youth
most at risk for crime or violence and reduce
aggressive law enforcement tactics that
stigmatize youth and marginalize their
participation in schools and communities.

The past decade has seen an explosion of
knowledge about adolescent development and
the neurological underpinnings of adolescent
behavior. Much has also been learned about
the pathways by which adolescents become
delinquent, the effectiveness of prevention and
treatment programs, and the long-term effects
of transferring youths to the adult system and
confining them in harsh conditions. These findings
have raised doubts about a series of policies and
practices of “zero tolerance” that have contributed
to increasing the school-to-prison pipeline by
criminalizing the behaviors of children as young
as kindergarten age. Noncriminal offenses can
escalate to criminal charges when officers are
not trained in child and adolescent development
and are unable to recognize and manage a child’s
emotional, intellectual, and physical development
issues. School district policies and practices that
push students out of schools and into the juvenile
justice system cause great harm and do no good.

One witness told the task force a stunning story
about what happened to him one day when he
was a high school freshman:

As I walked down the hall, one of the police officers

employed in the school noticed I did not have my

identification badge with me. Before I could explain

why I did not have my badge, I was escorted to the

office and suspended for an entire week. I had to

leave the school premises immediately. Walking to

the bus stop, a different police officer pulled me over

and demanded to know why I was not in school. As

I tried to explain, I was thrown into the back of the

police car. They drove back to my school to see if I was

telling the truth, and I was left waiting in the car for

over two hours. When they came back, they told me

I was in fact suspended, but because the school did

not provide me with the proper forms, my guardian

and I both had to pay tickets for me being off of

school property. The tickets together were 600 dollars,

and I had a court date for each one. Was forgetting

my ID worth missing school? Me being kicked out of

school did not solve or help anything. I was at home

alone watching Jerry Springer, doing nothing.86

4.6.1 actiOn item: Education and
criminal justice agencies at all levels of
government should work together to reform
policies and procedures that push children into
the juvenile justice system.87

86. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Prevention (oral
testimony of Michael Reynolds for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
87. For more information about such policies and procedures, see the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division and U.S. Department of Education’s
Office for Civil Rights, “Joint ‘Dear Colleague’ Letter,” last updated February 4, 2014,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.html.

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4.6.2 actiOn item: In order to keep youth
in school and to keep them from criminal and vi-
olent behavior, law enforcement agencies should
work with schools to encourage the creation of
alternatives to student suspensions and expulsion
through restorative justice, diversion, counseling,
and family interventions.

4.6.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should work with schools to encourage the
use of alternative strategies that involve youth in
decision making, such as restorative justice, youth
courts, and peer interventions.

The Federal Government could incentivize schools
to adopt this practice by tying federal funding to
schools implementing restorative justice practices.

4.6.5 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with schools to develop and
monitor school discipline policies with input and
collaboration from school personnel, students,

families, and community members. These policies
should prohibit the use of corporal punishment
and electronic control devices.

4.6.6 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with schools to create a
continuum of developmentally appropriate and
proportional consequences for addressing ongo-
ing and escalating student misbehavior after all
appropriate interventions have been attempted.

4.6.7 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with communities to play
a role in programs and procedures to reintegrate
juveniles back into their communities as they
leave the juvenile justice system.

Although this recommendation—and therefore
its action items—specifically focuses on juveniles,
this task force believes that law enforcement
agencies should also work with communities to
play a role in re-entry programs for adults leaving
prisons and jails.

4.6.8 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies and schools should establish memoranda of
agreement for the placement of School Resource
Officers that limit police involvement in student
discipline.

Such agreements could include provisions for
special training for School Resource Officers to
help them better understand and deal with issues
involving youth.

4.6.9 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should assess and evaluate zero tolerance
strategies and examine the role of reasonable
discretion when dealing with adolescents in
consideration of their stages of maturation
or development.

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p i l l a R 4 . c o m m u n i t y p o l i c i n g & c R i m e R e d u c t i o n

Task force executive director Ronald L. Davis and co-chairs Laurie Robinson and Charles Ramsey, Washington, D.C., February 23, 2015.
PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

4.7 recOmmendatiOn: Communities
need to affirm and recognize the
voices of youth in community decision
making, facilitate youth-led research and
problem solving, and develop and fund
youth leadership training and life skills
through positive youth/police collaboration
and interactions.

Youth face unique challenges when encountering
the criminal justice system. Law enforcement
contacts for apparent infractions create trauma
and fear in children and disillusionment in youth,
but proactive and positive youth interactions with
police create the opportunity for coaching, men-
toring, and diversion into constructive alternative
activities. Moving testimony from a panel of young
people allowed the task force members to hear
how officers can lead youth out of the conditions
that keep them in the juvenile justice system and
into self-awareness and self-help.

Phoenix native Jose Gonzales, 21, first went to jail
at age nine and had a chaotic childhood, but in
turning his life towards a productive and healthy
future, he vividly remembers one officer who
made a difference:

Needless to say, I have had a fair amount of

interaction with law enforcement in my youth. Some

has been very positive. Like the time that a School

Resource Officer got me involved in an after school

club. Officer Bill D. helped me stop being a bad

kid and assisted with after school activities.

sought me out to be a part of a club that included

all sorts of youth—athletes, academics—and

helped me gain confidence in reaching out to

other social circles beyond my troubled community.

The important idea I’d like to convey is that approach

is everything.88

88. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Youth and
Law Enforcement (oral testimony of Jose Gonzales for the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).

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4.7.1 actiOn item: Communities and law
enforcement agencies should restore and build
trust between youth and police by creating pro-
grams and projects for positive, consistent, and
persistent interaction between youth and police.

4.7.2 actiOn item: Communities
should develop community- and school-based
evidence-based programs that mitigate punitive
and authoritarian solutions to teen problems.

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P I L L A R 5 . T R A I N I N G & E D U C AT I O N
Hiring officers who reflect the community they serve is important not
only to external relations but also to increasing understanding within
the agency.

As our nation becomes more pluralistic and the
scope of law enforcement’s responsibilities ex-
pands, the need for more and better training has
become critical. Today’s line officers and leaders
must meet a wide variety of challenges including
international terrorism, evolving technologies,
rising immigration, changing laws, new cultural
mores, and a growing mental health crisis. All
states and territories and the District of Columbia
should establish standards for hiring, training,
and education.

The skills and knowledge required to effectively
deal with these issues requires a higher level of
education as well as extensive and ongoing train-
ing in specific disciplines. The task force discussed
these needs in depth, making recommendations
for basic recruit and in-service training, as well as
leadership development in a wide variety of areas:

y Community policing and problem-solving
principles

y Interpersonal and communication skills

y Bias awareness

y Scenario-based, situational decision making

y Crisis intervention

y Procedural justice and impartial policing

y Trauma and victim services

y Mental health issues

y Analytical research and technology

y Languages and cultural responsiveness

Many who spoke before the task force recom-
mended that law enforcement partner with
academic institutions; organizations such as the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), the
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
Executives (NOBLE), and the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF); and other sources
of appropriate training. Establishing fellowships
and exchange programs with other agencies was
also suggested.

Other witnesses spoke about the police edu-
cation now offered by universities, noting that
undergraduate criminal justice and criminology
programs provide a serviceable foundation but
that short courses of mixed quality and even
some graduate university degree programs do
not come close to addressing the needs of
21st-century law enforcement.

In addition to discussion of training programs
and educational expectations, witnesses at the
listening session made clear that new approaches
to recruitment, hiring, evaluation, and promotion
are also essential to developing a more highly
educated workforce with the character traits and
social skills that enable effective policing and
positive community relationships.

To build a police force capable of dealing with the
complexity of the 21st century, it is imperative
that agencies place value on both educational
achievements and socialization skills when making
hiring decisions. Hiring officers who reflect the

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community they serve is also important not only
to external relations but also to increasing under-
standing within the agency. On the other hand,
task force member Constance Rice described the
best line officer she knew—White, but better at
relating to the African-American community than
his Black colleagues. Her recommendation was to
look for the character traits that support fairness,
compassion, and cultural sensitivity.89

The need for understanding, tolerance, and
sensitivity to African Americans, Latinos, recent
immigrants, Muslims, and the LGBTQ community
was discussed at length at the listening session,
with witnesses giving examples of unacceptable
behavior in law enforcement’s dealings with all
of these groups. Participants also discussed the
need to move towards practices that respect all
members of the community equally and away
from policing tactics that can unintentionally lead
to excessive enforcement against minorities.

Witnesses noted that officers need to develop the
skills and knowledge necessary in the fight against
terrorism by gaining an understanding of the links
between normal criminal activity and terrorism,
for example. What is more, this training must be
ongoing, as threats and procedures for combat-
ting terrorism evolve.

The need for realistic, scenario-based training to
better manage interactions and minimize using
force was discussed by a number of witnesses.
Others focused more on content than delivery:
Dennis Rosenbaum suggested putting proce-
dural justice at the center of training, not on the

89. Listening Session on Training and Education (Constance Rice, task force
member, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ,
February 14, 2015).

fringes.90 Ronal Serpas recommended training on
the effects of violence not only on the community
and individual victims but also on police officers
themselves, noting that exposure to violence can
make individuals more prone to violent behavior.91
And witnesses Bruce Lipman and David Friedman
both spoke about providing officers with historical
perspectives of policing to provide context as to
why some communities have negative feelings
toward the police and improve understanding of
the role of the police in a democratic society.92

Though today’s law enforcement professionals
are highly trained and highly skilled operationally,
they must develop specialized knowledge and un-
derstanding that enable fair and procedurally just
policing and allow them to meet a wide variety
of new challenges and expectations. Tactical skills
are important, but attitude, tolerance, and inter-
personal skills are equally so. And to be effective
in an ever-changing world, training must continue
throughout an officer’s career.

The goal is not only effective, efficient policing but
also procedural justice and fairness. Following are
the task force’s recommendations for implement-
ing career-long education and training practices
for law enforcement in the 21st century.

90. Listening Session on Community Policing and Crime Reduction: Community
Policing and Crime Prevention Research (oral testimony of Dennis Rosenbaum,
professor, University of Illinois at Chicago, for the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13, 2015).
91. Listening Session on Training and Education: Special Training on Building Trust
(oral testimony of Ronal Serpas, advisory board member, Cure Violence Chicago, for
the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).
92. Listening Session on Training and Education: Special Training on Building Trust
(oral testimony of David C. Friedman, director of National Law Enforcement Initiatives,
Anti-Defamation League, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix,
AZ, February 14, 2015); Listening Session on Training and Education: Special Training
on Building Trust (oral testimony of Bruce Lipman, Procedural Justice Training, for the
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).

To be effective in an ever-changing world, training must continue
throughout an officer’s career.

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p i l l a R 5 . t R a i n i n g & e d u c a t i o n

Task force members Jose Lopez and Brittany Packnett listen to testimony, Phoenix, February 14, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

5.1 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should support the development
of partnerships with training facilities across
the country to promote consistent standards
for high quality training and establish training
innovation hubs.

A starting point for changing the culture of polic-
ing is to change the culture of training academies.
The designation of certain training academies as
federally supported regional “training innovation
hubs” could act as leverage points for changing
training culture while taking into consideration
regional variations. Federal funding would be a
powerful incentive to these designated academies
to conduct the necessary research to develop and
implement the highest quality curricula focused
on the needs of 21st century American policing,
along with cutting-edge delivery modalities.

5.1.1 actiOn item: The training innovation
hubs should develop replicable model programs
that use adult-based learning and scenario-based
training in a training environment modeled less
like boot camp. Through these programs the hubs
would influence nationwide curricula, as well as
instructional methodology.

5.1.2 actiOn item: The training innovation
hubs should establish partnerships with academic
institutions to develop rigorous training practices,
evaluation, and the development of curricula
based on evidence-based practices.

5.1.3 actiOn item: The Department of
Justice should build a stronger relationship with
the International Association of Directors of Law

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Enforcement (IADLEST) in order to leverage their
network with state boards and commissions of
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

The POSTs are critical to the development and
implementation of statewide training standards
and the certification of instructors and training
courses, as well as integral to facilitating commu-
nication, coordination, and influence with the
more than 650 police academies across the nation.
This relationship would also serve as a pipeline for
disseminating information and creating discussion
around best practices.

5.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should engage community members
in the training process.

Not only can agencies make important contri-
butions to the design and implementation of
training that reflects the needs and character of
their communities but it is also important for po-
lice training to be as transparent as possible. This
will result in both a better informed public and a
better informed officer.

Where appropriate and through managed pro-
grams, the community would

y learn about and evaluate the existing training
within departments;

y provide input into shaping that some training
content and delivery;

y in some cases, participate in training alongside
officers.

5.2.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should conduct research to develop and
disseminate a toolkit on how law enforcement
agencies and training programs can integrate
community members into this training process.

5.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should provide leadership training
to all personnel throughout their careers.

Standards and programs need to be established
for every level of leadership from the first line to
middle management to executive leadership. If
there is good leadership and procedural justice
within the agency, the officers are more likely to
behave according to those standards in the com-
munity. As Chief Edward Flynn of the Milwaukee
Police Department noted, “Flexible, dynamic, in-
sightful, ethical leaders are needed to develop the
informal social control and social capital required
for a civil society to flourish.”93 One example of
leadership training is Leading Police Organizations,
a program developed by the IACP and modeled
after the West Point Leadership Program, which
offers training for all levels of agency manage-
ment in programs based on a behavioral science
approach to leading people groups, change, and
organizations, focusing on the concept of “every
officer a leader.”

93. Listening Session on Training and Education (oral testimony of Edward Flynn,
chief, Milwaukee Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).

5.3.1 actiOn item: Recognizing that
strong, capable leadership is required to create
cultural transformation, the U.S. Department of
Justice should invest in developing learning goals
and model curricula/training for each level of
leadership.

This training should focus on organizational
procedural justice, community policing, police
accountability, teaching, coaching, mentoring, and
communicating with the media and the public.
Chief Kim Jacobs noted this in her testimony
discussing current issues with training on review-
ing investigations of police actions and prepare
comprehensive reports for all stakeholders,

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p i l l a R 5 . t R a i n i n g & e d u c a t i o n

including the media and citizens.94 These standards
should also influence requirements for promotion
and continuing/ongoing education should also be
required to maintain leadership positions.

94. Listening Session on Training and Education (oral testimony of Kim Jacobs,
chief, Columbus [OH] Division of Police, for the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).

5.3.2 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should encourage and support partnerships
between law enforcement and academic
institutions to support a culture that values
ongoing education and the integration of
current research into the development of
training, policies, and practices.

5.3.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should support and encourage
cross-discipline leadership training.

This can be within the criminal justice system
but also across governments, nonprofits, and the
private sector, including social services, legal aid,
businesses, community corrections, education,
the courts, mental health organizations, civic and
religious organizations, and others. When people
come together from different disciplines and
backgrounds, there is a cross-fertilization of ideas
that often leads to better solutions. Furthermore,
by interacting with a more diverse group of pro-
fessionals, police can establish a valuable network
of contacts whose knowledge and skills differ from
but complement their own. This opportunity does
exist for front-line staff on a variety of specialized
topics but also needs to happen at decision/policy
maker levels. For example, the National Alliance
for Drug Endangered Children is an especially
appropriate model for the value of cross-discipline
training. Their written testimony to the task force
explains how their training approach focuses on
the formation of community partnerships that

engage law enforcement and professionals
from multiple disciplines to collaboratively
identify and protect drug endangered children
and their families.95

5.4 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should develop,
in partnership with institutions of higher
education, a national postgraduate institute
of policing for senior executives with a
standardized curriculum preparing them to
lead agencies in the 21st century.

To advance American law enforcement, we must
advance its leadership. To that end, the task force
recommends the establishment of a top quality
graduate institute of policing to provide ongo-
ing leadership training, education, and research
programs which will enhance the quality of law
enforcement culture, knowledge, skills, practices
and policies. Modeled after the Naval Postgrad-
uate School in Monterey, California, this institute
will be staffed with subject matter experts and
instructors drawn from the nation’s top educa-
tional institutions, who will focus on the real world
problems that challenge today’s and tomorrow’s
law enforcement, teaching practical skills and pro-
viding the most current information for improving
policing services throughout the nation. This
institute could even, as witness Lawrence Sher-
man proposed, “admit qualified applicants to a
three-month residential course for potential police
executives, concluding in an assessment center
and examination that would certify qualified grad-
uates to serve as chief police executives anywhere
in the United States.”96

95. Listening Session on Training and Education (written testimony of the
National Alliance for Drug Endangered Children for the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 14, 2015).
96. Listening Session on The Future of Community Policing (oral testimony of
Lawrence Sherman, Wolfson Professor of Criminology, University of Cambridge, and
Distinguished University Professor, University of Maryland, for the President’s Task
Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 24, 2015).

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5.5 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should instruct the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to modify
the curriculum of the National Academy at
Quantico to include prominent coverage of
the topical areas addressed in this report.
In addition, the COPS Office and the Office
of Justice Programs should work with law
enforcement professional organizations to
encourage modification of their curricula in a
similar fashion.97

The Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS Office) and the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP) should work with the law enforce-
ment professional organizations to encourage
modification of their curricula—for example, the
Senior Management Institute for Police run by
PERF and the Police Executive Leadership Institute
managed by the Major Cities Chiefs Association.

5.6 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
make Crisis Intervention Training (CIT)
a part of both basic recruit and in-service
officer training.

Crisis intervention training (CIT ) was developed in
Memphis, Tennessee, in 1988 and has been shown
to improve police ability to recognize symptoms
of a mental health crisis, enhance their confidence
in addressing such an emergency, and reduce
inaccurate beliefs about mental illness.98

97. Listening Session on Training and Education: Supervisory, Leadership and
Management Training (oral testimony of Kimberly Jacobs, chief, Columbus [OH]
Division of Police, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ,
February 14, 2015); Listening Session on Training and Education (e-mail of Annie
McKee, senior fellow, University of Pennsylvania, for the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13–14, 2015); Listening Session on
Training and Education (written testimony of Anthony Braga et al. for the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February 13–14, 2015).
98. Natalie Bonfine, Christian Ritter, and Mark R. Munetz, “Police Officer
Perceptions of the Impact of Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Programs,” International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 37, no. 4 (July–August 2014): 341–350,
doi:10.1016/j.ijlp.2014.02.004.

It has

been found that after completing CIT orientation,
officers felt encouraged to interact with people
suffering a mental health crisis and to delay their
“rush to resolution.”99 Dr. Randolph Dupont, Chair
of the Department of Criminology and Criminal
Justice at the University of Memphis, spoke
to the task force about the effectiveness
of the Memphis Crisis Intervention Team (CIT ),
which stresses verbal intervention and other
de-escalation techniques.

Noting that empathy training is an important
component, Dr. Dupont said the Memphis CIT
includes personal interaction between officers and
individuals with mental health problems. Officers
who had contact with these individuals felt more
comfortable with them, and hospital mental
health staff who participated with the officers
had more positive views of law enforcement. CIT
also provides a unique opportunity to develop
cross-disciplinary training and partnerships.

99. Kelly E. Canada, Beth Angell, and Amy C. Watson, “Crisis Intervention Teams in
Chicago: Successes on the Ground,” Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations 10, no. 1–2
(2010), 86–100, doi:10.1080/15332581003792070.

5.6.1 actiOn item: Because of the impor-
tance of this issue, Congress should appropriate
funds to help support law enforcement crisis
intervention training.

5.7 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure that basic officer training includes
lessons to improve social interaction as well as
tactical skills.

These include topics such as critical thinking,
social intelligence, implicit bias, fair and impartial
policing, historical trauma, and other topics that
address capacity to build trust and legitimacy in
diverse communities and offer better skills for
gaining compliance without the use of physical

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p i l l a R 5 . t R a i n i n g & e d u c a t i o n

force. Basic recruit training must also include tacti-
cal and operations training on lethal and nonlethal
use of force with an emphasis on de-escalation
and tactical retreat skills.

Task force member Bryan Stevenson asks a panelist a question, Phoenix, February 13, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

5.8 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure that basic recruit and in-service officer
training include curriculum on the disease of
addiction.

It is important that officers be able to recognize
the signs of addiction and respond accordingly
when they are interacting with people who may
be impaired as a result of their addiction. Science
has demonstrated that addiction is a disease
of the brain—a disease that can be prevented
and treated and from which people can recover.

The growing understanding of this science has
led to a number of law enforcement agencies
equipping officers with overdose-reversal drugs
such as naloxone and the passage of legislation in
many states that shield any person from civil and
criminal liability if they administer naloxone.

The Obama Administration’s drug policy reflects
this understanding and emphasizes access to
treatment over incarceration, pursuing “smart on
crime” rather than “tough on crime” approaches to
drug-related offenses, and support for early health
interventions designed to break the cycle of drug
use, crime, incarceration, and re-arrest.100

100. A Drug Policy for the 21st Century, July 2014, accessed February 27, 2015,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/drugpolicyreform.

And the
relationship between incarceration and addiction
is a significant one. A 2004 survey by the U.S.

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Department of Justice estimated that about 70
percent of state and 64 percent of federal prison-
ers regularly used drugs prior to incarceration.101

5.9 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure both basic recruit and in-service
training incorporates content around
recognizing and confronting implicit bias and
cultural responsiveness.

As the nation becomes more diverse, it will become
increasingly important that police officers be
sensitive to and tolerant of differences. It is vital that
law enforcement provide training that recognizes
the unique needs and characteristics of minority
communities, whether they are victims or witnesses
of crimes, subjects of stops, or criminal suspects.

Keeshan Harley, a young Black man, testified that
he estimates that he’s been stopped and frisked
more than 100 times and that he felt that the
problem is not just a few individual bad apples,
but the systemic way policing treats certain
communities—including low-income and young
people, African Americans, LGBTQ people, the
homeless, immigrants, and people with psychiatric
disabilities. In so doing, police have produced
communities of alienation and resentment.102

101. C. Mumola and J.C. Karberg, Drug Use and Dependence, State and Federal
Prisoners, 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/dudsfp04 .
102. Listening Session on Training and Education: Voices in the Community (oral
testimony of Keeshan Harley, member, Communities United for Police Reform,
for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Phoenix, AZ, February
14, 2015); see also Tracey L. Meares, “Programming Errors: Understanding the
Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident,” University of
Chicago Law Review (forthcoming).

He is
arguably not alone in his opinions, given that

research has shown that “of those involved in traf-
fic and street stops, a smaller percentage of Blacks
than Whites believed the police behaved properly
during the stop.”103

And in a 2012 survey of LGBTQ/HIV contact with
police, 25 percent of respondents with any recent
police contact reported at least one type of
misconduct or harassment, such as being accused
of an offense they did not commit, verbal assault,
being arrested for an offense they did not commit,
sexual harassment, physical assault, or sexual
assault.104

5.9.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should implement ongoing, top down
training for all officers in cultural diversity and

related topics that can build trust and legitimacy
in diverse communities. This should be accom-
plished with the assistance of advocacy groups
that represent the viewpoints of communities that
have traditionally had adversarial relationships
with law enforcement.

5.9.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should implement training for officers that
covers policies for interactions with the LGBTQ
population, including issues such as determining
gender identity for arrest placement, the Muslim,
Arab, and South Asian communities, and immi-
grant or non-English speaking groups, as well as
reinforcing policies for the prevention of sexual
misconduct and harassment.

103. Langton and Durose, Traffic and Street Stops, 2011 (see note 42).
104. Listening Session on Policy and Oversight (written testimony of Lambda
Legal for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Cincinnati, OH, January
30–31, 2015); Lambda Legal, Protected and Served? Survey of LGBT/HIV Contact
with Police, Courts, Prisons, and Security, 2014, accessed February 28, 2015, http://
www.lambdalegal.org/protected-and-served.

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p i l l a R 5 . t R a i n i n g & e d u c a t i o n

5.10 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
require both basic recruit and in-service
training on policing in a democratic society.

Police officers are granted a great deal of authority,
and it is therefore important that they receive train-
ing on the constitutional basis of and the proper
use of that power and authority. Particular focus
should be placed on ensuring that Terry stops105
are conducted within constitutional guidelines.

5.11 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government, as well as state and local
agencies, should encourage and incentivize
higher education for law enforcement officers.

While many believe that a higher level of re-
quired education could raise the quality of officer
performance, law enforcement also benefits from
a diverse range of officers who bring their cul-
tures, languages, and life experiences to policing.

105. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

Offering entry level opportunities to recruits
without a college degree can be combined with
the provision of means to obtain higher education
throughout their career, thereby ensuring the
benefits of a diverse staff with a well-educated
police force and an active learning culture. Current
student loan programs allow repayment based on
income, and some already provide tuition debt
forgiveness after 120 months of service in the
government or nonprofit sector.

5.11.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment should create a loan repayment and
forgiveness incentive program specifically for
policing.

This could be modeled on similar programs that
already exist for government service and other
fields or the reinstitution of funding for programs
such as the 1960s and 70s Law Enforcement
Education Program.

Table 3. College degree requirements for full-time instructors in state and local law enforce-
ment training academies, by type of operating agency, 2006

Primary operating agency Total percentage of acad-
emies with a minimum
educational requirement that
included a college degree

Percentage of academies
requiring a 4-year degree

Percent of academies
requiring a 2-year degree

All types 19 11 8

State Peace Officer Standards
and Training

13 13 0

State police 11

7 5

Sheriff ’s office 2 0 2

County police 5 0 5

Municipal police 7 4 3

College/university 35 22 13

Multiagency 15 2 13

Other types 8

8 0

Source: Brian A. Reaves, State and Local Law Enforcement Training Academies, 2006, Special Report (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2009),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta06 .

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5.12 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should support research into
the development of technology that
enhances scenario-based training,
social interaction skills, and enables
the dissemination of interactive distance
learning for law enforcement.

This will lead to new modalities that enhance the
effectiveness of the learning experience, reduce
instructional costs, and ensure the broad dissem-
ination of training through platforms that do not
require time away from agencies.

This would be especially helpful for smaller and
more rural departments who cannot spare the
time for their officers to participate in residential/
in-person training programs. Present day
technologies should also be employed more
often—web-based learning, behavior evaluations
through body worn camera videos, software pro-
grams for independent learning, scenario-based
instruction through videos, and other methods.
This can also increase access to evidence-based
research and other sources of knowledge.

5.13 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should support
the development and implementation of
improved Field Training Officer programs.

This is critical in terms of changing officer culture.
Field Training Officers impart the organizational
culture to the newest members. The most com-
mon current program, known as the San Jose
Model, is more than 40 years old and is not based
on current research knowledge of adult learning
modalities. In many ways it even conflicts with
innovative training strategies that encourage
problem-based learning and support organiza-
tional procedural justice.

5.13.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should support the development of
broad Field Training Program standards and
training strategies that address changing police
culture and organizational procedural justice
issues that agencies can adopt and customize to
local needs.

A potential model for this is the Police Training
Officer program developed by the COPS Office in
collaboration with PERF and the Reno (Nevada)
Police Department. This problem-based learning
strategy used adult learning theory and problem
solving tools to encourage new officers to
think with a proactive mindset, enabling the
identification of and solution to problems
within their communities.

5.13.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should provide funding to incentivize
agencies to update their Field Training Programs
in accordance with the new standards.

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P I L L A R 6 . O F F I C E R W E L L N E S S &
S A F E T Y
The wellness and safety of law enforcement officers is critical not
only to themselves, their colleagues, and their agencies but also to
public safety.

Most law enforcement officers walk into risky
situations and encounter tragedy on a regular basis.
Some, such as the police who responded to the
carnage of Sandy Hook Elementary School, witness
horror that stays with them for the rest of their lives.
Others are physically injured in carrying out their du-
ties, sometimes needlessly, through mistakes made
in high stress situations. The recent notable deaths
of officers are stark reminders of the risk officers face.
As a result, physical, mental, and emotional injuries
plague many law enforcement agencies.

However, a large proportion of officer injuries and
deaths are not the result of interaction with crim-
inal offenders but the outcome of poor physical
health due to poor nutrition, lack of exercise, sleep
deprivation, and substance abuse. Yet these caus-
es are often overlooked or given scant attention.
Many other injuries and fatalities are the result of
vehicular accidents.

The wellness and safety of law enforcement
officers is critical not only to themselves, their
colleagues, and their agencies but also to public
safety. An officer whose capabilities, judgment,
and behavior are adversely affected by poor
physical or psychological health not only may be
of little use to the community he or she serves but
also may be a danger to the community and to
other officers. As task force member Tracey Meares
observed, “Hurt people can hurt people.”106

106. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (comment of Tracey
Meares, task force member, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).

Commenting on the irony of law enforcement’s
lack of services and practices to support wellness
and safety, Dr. Laurence Miller observed in his
testimony that supervisors would not allow an of-
ficer to go on patrol with a deficiently maintained
vehicle, an un-serviced duty weapon, or a mal-
functioning radio—but pay little attention to the
maintenance of what is all officers’ most valuable
resource: their brains.107

Officer suicide is also a problem: a national study
using data of the National Occupational Mortality
Surveillance found that police died from suicide
2.4 times as often as from homicides. And though
depression resulting from traumatic experiences
is often the cause, routine work and life stress-
ors—serving hostile communities, working long
shifts, lack of family or departmental support—are
frequent motivators too.

In this pillar, the task force focused on many of
the issues that impact and are impacted by officer
wellness and safety, focusing on strategies in
several areas: physical, mental, and emotional
health; vehicular accidents; officer suicide; shoot-
ings and assaults; and the partnerships with social
services, unions, and other organizations that can
support solutions.

107. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (oral testimony of Laurence
Miller, psychologist, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).

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Physical injuries and death in the line of duty,
while declining, are still too high. According to
estimates of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, more
than 100,000 law enforcement professionals
are injured in the line of duty each year. Many
are the result of assaults, which underscores
the need for body armor, but most are due to
vehicular accidents.

To protect against assaults, Orange County (Flori-
da) Sheriff Jerry Demings talked about immersing
new officers in simulation training that realistically
depicts what they are going to face in the real
world. “I subscribe to an edict that there is no sub-
stitute for training and experience . . . deaths and
injuries can be prevented through training that is
both realistic and repetitive.”108

But to design effective training first requires col-
lecting substantially more information about the
nature of injuries sustained by officers on the job.
Dr. Alexander Eastman’s testimony noted that the
field of emergency medicine involves the analysis
of vast amounts of data with regard to injuries in
order to improve prevention as well as treatment.

In order to make the job of policing more safe, a

nationwide repository for [law enforcement officer]

injuries sustained is desperately needed. A robust

database of this nature, analyzed by medical providers

and scientists involved in law enforcement, would

allow for recommendations in tactics, training,

equipment, medical care and even policies/procedures

that are grounded in that interface between scientific

evidence, best medical practice, and sound policing.109

108. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness: Officer Safety (oral
testimony of Jerry Demings, sheriff, Orange County, FL, for the President’s Task Force
on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).
109. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness: Officer Safety (oral
testimony of Dr. Alexander Eastman, lieutenant and deputy medical director,
Dallas Police Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).

Poor nutrition and fitness are also serious threats, as
is sleep deprivation. Many errors in judgment can
be traced to fatigue, which also makes it harder to
connect with people and control emotions. But ad-
ministrative changes such as reducing work shifts
can improve officer’s feelings of well-being, and
the implementation of mental health strategies
can lessen the impact of the stress and trauma.

However, the most important factor to consid-
er when discussing wellness and safety is the
culture of law enforcement, which needs to be
transformed. Support for wellness and safety
should permeate all practices and be expressed
through changes in procedures, requirements,
attitudes, and behaviors. An agency work envi-
ronment in which officers do not feel they are
respected, supported, or treated fairly is one of
the most common sources of stress. And research
indicates that officers who feel respected by their
supervisors are more likely to accept and volun-
tarily comply with departmental policies. This
transformation should also overturn the tradition
of silence on psychological problems, encourag-
ing officers to seek help without concern about
negative consequences.

Partnerships are another crucial element. An agen-
cy cannot successfully tackle these issues without
partners such as industrial hygienists, chaplains,
unions, and mental health providers. But no
program can succeed without buy-in from agency
leadership as well as the rank and file.

The “bulletproof cop” does not exist. The officers
who protect us must also be protected—against
incapacitating physical, mental, and emotional
health problems as well as against the hazards of
their job. Their wellness and safety are crucial for
them, their colleagues, and their agencies, as well
as the well-being of the communities they serve.

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p i l l a R 6 . o F F i c e R W e l l n e s s & s a F e t y

6.1 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should enhance and
further promote its multi-faceted officer
safety and wellness initiative.

As noted by all task force members during the lis-
tening session, officer wellness and safety supports
public safety. Officers who are mentally or physically
incapacitated cannot serve their communities
adequately and can be a danger to the people they
serve, to their fellow officers, and to themselves.

6.1.1 actiOn item: Congress should estab-
lish and fund a national “Blue Alert” warning system.

Leveraging the current Amber Alert program used
to locate abducted children, the Blue Alert would
enlist the help of the public in finding suspects
after a law enforcement officer is killed in the line
of duty. Some similar state systems do exist, but
there are large gaps; a national system is needed.
In addition to aiding the apprehension of suspects,
it would send a message about the importance of
protecting law enforcement from undue harm.

6.1.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice, in partnership with the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, should establish a
task force to study mental health issues unique to
officers and recommend tailored treatments.

Law enforcement officers are subject to more
stress than the general population owing to the
nature of their jobs. In addition to working with
difficult—even hostile—individuals, responding
to tragic events, and sometimes coming under fire
themselves, they suffer from the effects of everyday
stressors—the most acute of which often come
from their agencies, because of confusing messages
or non-supportive management; and their families,
who do not fully understand the pressures the offi-
cers face on the job. And as witness Laurence Miller
said, “When both work and family relations fray, the
individual’s coping abilities can be stretched to the
limit, resulting in alcohol abuse, domestic violence,
overaggressive policing, even suicide.”110

110. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (oral testimony of Laurence
Miller, psychologist, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing,
Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).

Elliot Cohen of the Maryland State Police speaks about technology usage while Madhu Grewal of the Constitution Project waits her turn to testify,
Cincinnati, January 31, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

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To add to the problems of those suffering from
psychological distress, law enforcement culture
has not historically supported efforts to treat or
even acknowledged mental health problems,
which are usually seen as a sign of “weakness.”
The challenges and treatments of mental health
issues should therefore be viewed within the
context of law enforcement’s unique culture and
working environment.

This task force should also look to establish a na-
tional toll-free mental health hotline specifically for
police officers. This would be a fast, easy, and confi-
dential way for officers to get advice whenever they
needed to; and because they would be anonymous,
officers would be more likely to take advantage of
this resource. Since nobody understands the chal-
lenges an officer faces like another officer, it should
be peer driven—anonymously connecting callers
to officers who are not in the same agency and who
could refer the caller to professional help if needed.
An advisory board should be formed to guide the
creation of this hotline service.

6.1.3 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should support the continuing research into
the efficacy of an annual mental health check for
officers, as well as fitness, resilience, and nutrition.

Currently, most mental health checks are ordered
as interventions for anger management or sub-
stance abuse and are ordered reactively after an
incident. Mental health checks need to be more
frequent to prevent problems. Because officers are
exposed to a wide range of stressors on a continu-
ous basis as part of their daily routines, mental and
physical health check-ups should be conducted
on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, officer nutrition
and fitness issues change with time, varying wide-
ly from those of the new academy graduate

to those of the veteran who has spent the last five
years sitting in a squad car. Many health prob-
lems—notably cardiac issues—are cumulative.

6.1.4 actiOn item: Pension plans should
recognize fitness for duty examinations as definitive
evidence of valid duty or non-duty related disability.

Officers who have been injured in the line of
duty can exist in limbo, without pay, unable to
work but also unable to get benefits because
the “fitness for duty” examinations given by their
agencies are not recognized as valid proof of
disability. And since officers, as public servants,
cannot receive social security, they can end up in
a precarious financial state.

6.1.5 actiOn item: Public Safety Officer
Benefits (PSOB) should be provided to survivors of
officers killed while working, regardless of wheth-
er the officer used safety equipment (seatbelt or
anti-ballistic vest) or if officer death was the result
of suicide attributed to a current diagnosis of
duty-related mental illness, including but not
limited to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Families should not be penalized because an offi-
cer died in the line of duty but was not wearing a
seat belt or body armor. Though these precautions
are very important and strongly encouraged, there
are occasions when officers can be more effective
without them.111

111. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness: Voices from the Field (oral
testimony of William Johnson, executive director, National Association of Police
Organizations, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington,
DC, February 23, 2015).

A couple of situations were mentioned by task
force member Sean Smoot, who described the
efforts of an officer who took off his seat belt to
tend to the injuries of a victim in the back of the
car as his partner sped to the hospital. Another

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p i l l a R 6 . o F F i c e R W e l l n e s s & s a F e t y

scenario he mentioned was the rescue of a drown-
ing woman by an officer who shed his heavy
body armor to go into the water. Charles Ramsey,
task force co-chair, also noted that these types
of situations could be further mitigated by the
invention of seatbelts that officers could quickly
release without getting tangled on their belts,
badges, and radios, as well as body armor that is
lighter and more comfortable.

6.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should promote safety and wellness
at every level of the organization.

Safety and wellness issues affect all law en-
forcement professionals, regardless of their
management status, duty, or tenure. Moreover,
line officers are more likely to adopt procedures
or change practices if they are advised to do so
by managers who also model the behavior they
encourage. According to witness David Orr, buy-in
from the leaders as well as the rank and file is
essential to the success of any program.112

6.2.1 actiOn item: Though the Fed-
eral Government can support many of the
programs and best practices identified by the
U.S. Department of Justice initiative described in
recommendation 6.1, the ultimate responsibility
lies with each agency.

112. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (oral testimony of David Orr,
sergeant, Norwalk [CT] Police Department, to the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).

Though legislation and funding from the Federal
Government is necessary in some cases, most of
the policies, programs, and practices recommended
by the task force can and should be implemented
at the local level. It is understood, however, that
there are no “one size fits all” solutions and that
implementation will vary according to agency size,
location, resources, and other factors.

6.3 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should encourage and
assist departments in the implementation of
scientifically supported shift lengths by law
enforcement.

It has been established by significant bodies of
research that long shifts can not only cause fa-
tigue, stress, and decreased ability to concentrate
but also lead to other more serious consequenc-
es.113 Fatigue and stress undermine not only the
immune system but also the ability to work at full
capacity, make decisions, and maintain emotional
equilibrium. Though long shifts are understand-
able in the case of emergencies, as a standard
practice they can lead to poor morale, poor job
performance, irritability, and errors in judgment
that can have serious, even deadly, consequences.

6.3.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should fund additional research into the
efficacy of limiting the total number of hours an
officer should work within a 24–48-hour period,
including special findings on the maximum num-
ber of hours an officer should work in a high risk
or high stress environment (e.g., public demon-
strations or emergency situations).

113. Bryan Vila, Tired Cops: The Importance of Managing Police Fatigue,
(Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, 2000); Mora L. Fiedler,
Officer Safety and Wellness: An Overview of the Issues (Washington, DC: Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2011), 4, http://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/OSWG/
e091120401-OSWGReport .

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Christina Brown of Black Lives Matter Cincinnati speaks about mass demonstrations while Superintendent Garry McCarthy of the Chicago Police
Department looks on, Cincinnati, January 30, 2015. PHOTO: DEBORAH SPENCE

6.4 recOmmendatiOn: Every law
enforcement officer should be provided with
individual tactical first aid kits and training as
well as anti-ballistic vests.

Task force witness Dr. Alexander Eastman, who is
a trauma surgeon as well as a law enforcement
professional, noted that tactical first aid kits would
significantly reduce the loss of both officer and
civilian lives due to blood loss. Already available
to members of the military engaged in combat
missions, these kits are designed to save lives by
controlling hemorrhaging. They contain tourni-
quets, an Olaes modular bandage, and QuikClot
gauze and would be provided along with training in
hemorrhage control. Dr. Eastman estimated that the
kits could cost less than $50 each and require about
two hours of training, which could be provided
through officers who have completed “train the
trainer” programs.114

114. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness: Officer Safety (oral testimony
of Dr. Alexander Eastman, lieutenant and deputy medical director, Dallas Police
Department, for the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington,
DC, February 23, 2015).

This would be a national adoption of the Hartford
Consensus, which calls for agencies to adopt hem-
orrhage control as a core law enforcement skill and

to integrate rescue/emergency medical services
personnel into community-wide active shooter
preparedness and training. These activities
would complement the current “Save Our
Own” law enforcement-based hemorrhage
control programs.115

To further reduce officer deaths, the task force also
strongly recommends the provision of body armor
to all officers with replacements when necessary.

115. M. Jacobs Lenworth, Jr., “Joint Committee to Create a National Policy to
Enhance Survivability from Mass Casualty Shooting Events: Hartford Consensus II,”
Journal of the American College of Surgeons 218, no. 3 (March 2014): 476–478.

6.4.1 actiOn item: Congress should
authorize funding for the distribution of law
enforcement individual tactical first aid kits.

6.4.2 actiOn item: Congress should
reauthorize and expand the Bulletproof Vest
Partnership (BVP) program.

Created by statute in 1998, this program is a
unique U.S. Department of Justice initiative
designed to provide a critical resource to state and
local law enforcement. Based on data collected
and recorded by Bureau of Justice Assistance staff,

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p i l l a R 6 . o F F i c e R W e l l n e s s & s a F e t y

in FY 2012 protective vests were directly attributed
to saving the lives of at least 33 law enforcement
and corrections officers.

6.5 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should expand efforts
to collect and analyze data not only on officer
deaths but also on injuries and “near misses.”

Another recommendation mentioned by multiple
witnesses is the establishment of a nationwide
repository of data on law enforcement injuries,
deaths, and near misses. Though the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) does maintain a
database of information pertinent to police
procedures on officers killed in the line of duty, it
does not contain the medical details that could
be analyzed by medical providers and scientists to
improve medical care, tactics, training, equipment,
and procedures that would prevent or reduce
injuries and save lives. The Police Foundation, with
the support of a number of other law enforce-
ment organizations, launched an online Law
Enforcement Near Miss Reporting System in late
2014, but it is limited in its ability to systematically
analyze national trends in this important data by
its voluntary nature.116

6.6 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should adopt policies that require
officers to wear seat belts and bullet-proof
vests and provide training to raise awareness
of the consequences of failure to do so.

According to task force witness Craig Floyd, traffic
accidents have been the number one cause of
officer fatalities in recent years, and nearly half of
those officers were not wearing seat belts.117

116. Deborah L. Spence, “One on One with LEO Near Miss,” Community Policing
Dispatch 8, no. 2 (February 2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/02-2015/
leo_near_miss.asp.
117. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (oral testimony of Craig
Floyd, National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Foundation, for the President’s

suggests in-car cameras and seat belt sensors
to encourage use along with aggressive safety
campaigns. Some witnesses endorsed mandatory
seat belt policies as well.

The Prince George’s County (Maryland) Arrive Alive
Campaign initiated by task force witness Chief
Mark Magraw to promote 100 percent seat belt
usage relied on incentives and peer pressure for
success. The message was, “it is not just about you,
it is also about your family and your department.”118

There were also many calls for mandatory
requirements that all officers wear soft body
armor any time they are going to be engaging
in enforcement activities, uniformed or not. It
was also suggested that law enforcement
agencies be required to provide these for
all commissioned personnel.

6.7 recOmmendatiOn: Congress
should develop and enact peer review error
management legislation.

The task force recommends that Congress enact
legislation similar to the Healthcare Quality
Improvement Act of 1986119 that would support
the development of an effective peer review error
management system for law enforcement similar
to what exists in medicine.

Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).
118. Listening Session on Officer Safety and Wellness (oral testimony of Mark
Magraw, chief, Prince Georges County [MD] Police Department, for the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Washington, DC, February 23, 2015).
119. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 USC §11101
et seq., sets out standards for professional review actions. If a professional review
body meets these standards, then neither the professional review body nor any
person acting as a member or staff to the body will be liable in damages under
most federal or state laws with respect to the action. For more information, see
“Medical Peer Review,” American Medical Association, accessed February 28, 2015,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/medical-
peer-review.page.

A robust but nonpuni-
tive peer review error management program—in
which law enforcement officers could openly and
frankly discuss their own or others’ mistakes or

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6 8

near misses without fear of legal repercussions—
would go a long way toward reducing injuries and
fatalities by improving tactics, policies, and proce-
dures. Protecting peer review error management
findings from being used in legal discovery would
enable the widespread adoption of this program
by law enforcement.

The Near Miss anonymous reporting system de-
veloped by the Police Foundation in Washington,
D.C., currently collects anonymous data that can
be very helpful in learning from and preventing
mistakes, fatalities, and injuries—but a program
that enabled peer review of errors would provide
even more valuable perspectives and solutions.

6.8 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Transportation should
provide technical assistance opportunities for
departments to explore the use of vehicles
equipped with vehicle collision prevention
“smart car” technology that will reduce the
number of accidents.

Given that the FBI’s 2003 to 2012 Law Enforcement
Officers Killed in Action report showed that
49 percent of officer fatalities were a result of
vehicle-related accidents, the need for protective
devices cannot be understated. New technologies
such as vehicle collision prevention systems should
be explored.

Figure 3. Total law enforcement fatalities from 1964–2014

Source: “126 Law Enforcement Fatalities Nationwide in 2014,” Preliminary 2014 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Report (Washington, DC: National Law
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, December 2014), http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-2014-Officer-Fatalities-Report .

6 9

I M P L E M E N T AT I O N
The members of the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing are convinced that these 59
concrete recommendations for research, action,
and further study will bring long-term improve-
ments to the ways in which law enforcement
agencies interact with and bring positive change
to their communities. But we also recognize that
the Administration, through policies and practices
already in place, can start right now to move
forward on the bedrock recommendations in this
report. Accordingly, we propose the following
items for immediate action.

7.1 recOmmendatiOn: The President
should direct all federal law enforcement
agencies to review the recommendations
made by the Task Force on 21st Century
Policing and, to the extent practicable, to
adopt those that can be implemented at the
federal level.

7.2 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should explore
public-private partnership opportunities,
starting by convening a meeting with local,
regional, and national foundations to discuss
the proposals for reform described in this
report and seeking their engagement and
support in advancing implementation of
these recommendations.

7.3 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should charge its
Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS Office) with assisting the law
enforcement field in addressing current and
future challenges.

For recommendation 7.3, the COPS Office should
consider taking actions including but not limited
to the following:

y Create a National Policing Practices and
Accountability Division within the COPS Office.

y Establish national benchmarks and best
practices for federal, state, local, and tribal
police departments.

y Provide technical assistance and funding to
national, state, local, and tribal accreditation
bodies that evaluate policing practices.

y Recommend additional benchmarks
and best practices for state training and
standards boards.

y Provide technical assistance and funding
to state training boards to help them meet
national benchmarks and best practices in
training methodologies and content.

y Prioritize grant funding to departments
meeting benchmarks.

y Support departments through an expansion of
the COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative.

y Collaborate with universities, the Office of
Justice Programs and its bureaus (Bureau of
Justice Assistance [BJA], Bureau of Justice
Statistics [BJS], National Institute of Justice
[NIJ], and Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP]), and others
to review research and literature in order
to inform law enforcement agencies about
evidence-based practices and to identify areas
of police operations where additional research
is needed.

y Collaborate with the BJS to

� establish a central repository for data
concerning police use of force resulting
in death, as well as in-custody deaths,
and disseminate this data for use by both
community and police;

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� provide local agencies with technical
assistance and a template to conduct
local citizen satisfaction surveys;

� compile annual citizen satisfaction
surveys based on the submission of
voluntary local surveys, develop a
national level survey as well as surveys
for use by local agencies and by small
geographic units, and develop questions
to be added to the National Crime
Victimization Survey relating to citizen
satisfaction with police agencies and
public trust.

y Collaborate with the BJS and others to
develop a template of broader indicators of
performance for police departments beyond
crime rates alone that could comprise a
Uniform Justice Report.

y Collaborate with the NIJ and the BJS to publish
an annual report on the “State of Policing” in
the United States.

y Provide support to national police
leadership associations and national rank
and file organizations to encourage them to
implement task force recommendations.

y Work with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to ensure that community
policing tactics in state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies are incorporated into
their role in homeland security.

PHOTO: BRANDON TRAMEL

7 1

A P P E N D I X A . P U B L I C L I S T E N I N G
S E S S I O N S & W I T N E S S E S
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing hosted multiple public listening sessions
to gain broad input and expertise from stakehold-
ers. The information collected in these meetings
informed and advised the task force in developing
its recommendations.

Listening Session 1. Building
Trust & Legitimacy
Washington, D.C., January 13, 2015
Panel One: Subject Matter Experts
Jennifer Eberhardt, Associate Professor of Psychology,

Stanford University

Charles Ogletree, Jesse Climenko Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School

Tom Tyler, Macklin Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of
Psychology, Yale Law School

Samuel Walker, Emeritus Professor of Criminal Justice, University
of Nebraska Omaha

Panel Two: Community Representatives
Carmen Perez, Executive Director, The Gathering for Justice

Jim St. Germain, Co-Founder, Preparing Leaders of
Tomorrow, Inc.

Jim Winkler, President and General Secretary, National
Council of Churches of Christ in the USA

Panel Three: Law Enforcement

Organizations

Richard Beary, President, International Association of Chiefs

of Police

Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order of Police

Andrew Peralta, National President, National Latino Peace
Officers Association

Richard Stanek, Immediate Past President, Major County
Sheriffs’ Association

Panel Four: Civil Rights / Civil Liberties
Sherrilyn Ifill, President and Director-Counsel, National Associ-

ation for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense and
Educational Fund

Maria Teresa Kumar, President and CEO, Voto Latino

Laura Murphy, Director, Washington Legislative Office, American
Civil Liberties Union

Vikrant Reddy, Senior Policy Analyst, Texas Public Policy Founda-
tion Center for Effective Justice

Panel Five: Mayors
Kevin Johnson, Sacramento

Michael Nutter, Philadelphia

Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, Baltimore

Listening Session 2. Policy
& Oversight
Cincinnati, Ohio, January 30, 2015
Panel One: Use of Force Research and
Policies
Geoffrey Alpert, Professor, University of South Carolina

Mick McHale, President, National Association of
Police Organizations

Harold Medlock, Chief, Fayetteville (North Carolina)

Police Department

Rashad Robinson, Executive Director,

Color of Change

Panel Two: Use of Force Investigations
and Oversight
Sim Gill, District Attorney, Salt Lake County, Utah

Jay McDonald, President, Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio

Kirk Primas, Assistant Sheriff, Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department

Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

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Panel Three: Civilian Oversight
Charlie Beck, Chief, Los Angeles Police Department

Brian Buchner, President, National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement

Darius Charney, Senior Staff Attorney, Center for
Constitutional Rights

Panel Four: Mass Demonstrations
Christina Brown, Founding Organizer, Black Lives

Matter: Cincinnati

Garry McCarthy, Superintendent, Chicago Police Department

Rodney Monroe, Chief, Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina)
Police Department

Sean Whent, Chief, Oakland (California) Police Department

Panel Five: Law Enforcement Culture
and Diversity
Malik Aziz, National Chairman, National Black Police Association

Hayley Gorenberg, Deputy Legal Director, Lambda Legal

Kathy Harrell, President, Fraternal Order of Police, Queen City
Lodge #69, Cincinnati, Ohio

Barbara O’Connor, President, National Association of Women
Law Enforcement Executives

Listening Session 3. Technology
& Social Media
Cincinnati, Ohio, January 31, 2015
Panel One: Body Cameras—Research
and Legal Considerations
Jim Bueermann, President, Police Foundation

Scott Greenwood, Attorney

Tracie Keesee, Co-Founder and Director of Research Partnerships,
Center for Policing Equity

Bill Lewinski, Founder and Director, Force Science Institute

Michael White, Professor, School of Criminology and Criminal
Justice, Arizona State University

Panel Two: Body Cameras—Implemen-
tation
Johanna Miller, Advocacy Director, New York Civil Liberties Union

Ken Miller, Chief, Greenville (South Carolina) Police Department

Kenton Rainey, Chief, Bay Area Rapid Transit, San Francisco

Richard Van Houten, Sergeant, Fort Worth (Texas) Police
Officers Association

Panel Three: Technology Policy
Eliot Cohen, Lieutenant, Maryland State Police

Madhu Grewal, Policy Counsel, The Constitution Project

Bill Schrier, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Chief Information
Officer, State of Washington

Vincent Talucci, Executive Director / Chief Executive Officer,
International

Association of Chiefs of Police

Panel Four: Social Media, Community
Digital Engagement and Collaboration
Hassan Aden, Director, Research and Programs, International

Association of Chiefs of Police

DeRay McKesson, This is the Movement

Steve Spiker, Research and Technology Director, Urban
Strategies Council

Lauri Stevens, Founder and Principal Consultant,
LAwS Communications

Listening Session 4. Community
Policing & Crime Reduction
Phoenix, Arizona, February 13, 2015
Panel One: Community Policing and
Crime Prevention Research
Bill Geller, Director, Geller & Associates

Dr. Delores Jones-Brown, Professor, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, City University of New York

Dr. Dennis Rosenbaum, Professor, University of Illinois
at Chicago

Dr. Wesley G. Skogan, Professor, Northwestern University

Panel Two: Building Community
Policing Organizations
Anthony Batts, Police Commissioner, Baltimore

Police Department

Jeffrey Blackwell, Chief, Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department

Chris Magnus, Chief, Richmond (California) Police Department

Patrick Melvin, Chief, Salt River Police Department (Salt River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community)

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a p p e n d i x a

Panel Three: Using Community Policing
to Reduce Crime
Kevin Bethel, Deputy Police Commissioner, Philadelphia

Police Department

Melissa Jones, Senior Program Officer, Boston’s Local Initiatives
Support Corporation

David Kennedy, Professor, John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York

J. Scott Thomson, Chief, Camden County (New Jersey)
Police Department

George Turner, Chief, Atlanta Police Department

Panel Four: Using Community Policing
to Restore Trust
Rev. Jeff Brown, Rebuilding Every City Around Peace

Dwayne Crawford, Executive Director, National Organization of
Black Law Enforcement Executives

Justin Hansford, Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis
University School of Law

Cecil Smith, Chief, Sanford (Florida) Police Department

Panel Five: Youth and Law Enforcement
Delilah Coleman, Member, Navajo Nation (Senior at Flagstaff

High School)

Jose Gonzales, Alumnus, Foster Care and Crossover Youth

Jamecia Luckey, Youth Conference Committee Member, Cocoa
(Florida) Police Athletic League

Nicholas Peart, Staff Member, The Brotherhood-Sister Sol (Class
Member, Floyd, et al. v. City of New York, et al.)

Michael Reynolds, Co-President, Youth Power Movement

Listening Session 5. Training
& Education
Phoenix, Arizona, February 14, 2015
Panel One: Basic Recruit Academy
Arlen Ciechanowski, President, International Association of

Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training

William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National Association of
Police Organizations

Benjamin B. Tucker, First Deputy Commissioner, New York City
Police Department

Dr. Steven Winegar, Coordinator, Public Safety Leadership
Development, Oregon Department of Public Safety Standards
and Training

Panel Two: In-Service Training
Dr. Scott Decker, Professor, Arizona State University

Aaron Danielson, President, Public Safety Employee Association/
AFSCME Local 803, Fairbanks, Alaska

Dr. Cheryl May, Director, Criminal Justice Institute and National
Center for Rural Law Enforcement

John Ortolano, President, Arizona Fraternal Order of Police

Gary Schofield, Deputy Chief, Las Vegas Metropolitan
Police Department

Panel Three: Supervisory, Leadership
and Management Training
Edward Flynn, Chief, Milwaukee (Wisconsin) Police Department

Sandra Hutchens, Sheriff, Orange County (California)
Sheriff ’s Department

Kimberly Jacobs, Chief, Columbus (Ohio) Division of Police

John Layton, Sheriff, Marion County (Indiana) Sheriff ’s Office

Dr. Ellen Scrivner, Executive Fellow, Police Foundation

Panel Four: Voices in the Community
Allie Bones, MSW, Chief Executive Officer, Arizona Coalition to End

Sexual and Domestic Violence

Renaldo Fowler, Senior Staff Advocate, Arizona Center for
Disability Law

Keeshan Harley, Member, Communities United for Police Reform

Andrea Ritchie, Senior Policy Counsel, Streetwise and Safe

Linda Sarsour, Executive Director, Arab American Association of
New York

Panel Five: Special Training on Building
Trust
Lt. Sandra Brown (retired), Principal Trainer, Fair and

Impartial Policing

Dr. Randolph Dupont, Professor and Clinical Psychologist,
University of Memphis

David C. Friedman, Regional Director of National Law
Enforcement Initiatives, Anti-Defamation League

Lt. Bruce Lipman (retired), Procedural Justice /Police Legitimacy
Training

Dr. Ronal Serpas, Advisory Board Member, Cure Violence Chicago

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Listening Session 6. Officer Safety
& Wellness
Washington, D.C., February 23, 2015
Panel One: Officer Wellness
Dr. Laurence Miller, Clinical Forensic Psychologist and Law

Enforcement Educator

David Orr, Sergeant, Norwalk (Connecticut) Police Department

Dr. Sandra Ramey, Assistant Professor, University of Iowa
College of Nursing

Dr. John Violanti, Research Professor, State University of New
York Buffalo

Yost Zakhary, Public Safety Director, City of Woodway, Texas

Panel Two: Officer Safety
Jane Castor, Chief, Tampa (Florida) Police Department

Jerry L. Demings, Sheriff, Orange County (Florida) Sheriff ’s Office

Dr. Alexander L. Eastman, Lieutenant and Deputy Medical
Director, Dallas Police Department

Craig W. Floyd, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, National
Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund

Panel Three: Voices from the Field
Dianne Bernhard, Executive Director, Concerns of

Police Survivors

Robert Bryant, Chief, Penobscot Nation

Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order of Police
William J. Johnson, Executive Director, National Association of
Police Organizations

Jonathan Thompson, Executive Director, National
Sheriffs’ Association

Panel Four: Labor/Management
Relations
Dr. Chuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive

Research Forum

Karen Freeman-Wilson, Mayor, Gary, Indiana

Mark Magaw, Chief, Prince George’s County (Maryland)
Police Department

James Pasco, Executive Director, Fraternal Order of Police

Dustin Smith, President, Sacramento (California) Police
Officers Association

Listening Session 7. Future of
Community Policing
Washington, D.C., February 24, 2015
Panel: Future of Community Policing
Dr. Phillip Goff, Professor, University of California, Los Angeles

Jim McDonnell, Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department

Dr. Daniel Nagin, Teresa and H. John Heinz III Professor of Public
Policy, Carnegie Mellon University

Dr. Lawrence Sherman, Director of the Institute of Criminology
of the University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

Jeremy Travis, President, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York

7 5

A P P E N D I X B . I N D I V I D U A L S
& O R G A N I Z AT I O N S T H AT
S U B M I T T E D W R I T T E N T E S T I M O N Y
In addition to receiving testimony from those
individuals that appeared as witnesses during public
listening sessions, the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing accepted written testimony from
any individual or organization to ensure that its infor-
mation gathering efforts included as many people
and perspectives as possible. The task force thanks
the individuals and organizations who submitted
written testimony for their time and expertise.

This list reflects organizational affiliation at the time
of testimony submission and may not represent
submitters’ current positions.

Individuals

Robert Abraham, Chair, Gang Resistance Education & Training
(GREAT) National Policy Board

Phillip Agnew, Executive Director, Dream Defenders

Kilolo Ajanaku, National Executive Director, World Conference of
Mayors’ Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. American Dream Initiative

Barbara Attard, Past President, National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement

Paul Babeu, Vice President, Arizona Sheriffs Association

Monifa Bandele, Communities United for Police Reform

Dante Barry, Executive Director, Million Hoodies

David Bayley, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University
of Albany

Michael Bell, Lt. Colonel (retired), United States Air Force

Michael Berkow, Chief, Savannah (Georgia) Police Department

Greg Berman and Emily Gold LaGratta, Center for
Court Innovation

Angela Glover Blackwell, Founder and CEO, PolicyLink

Mark Bowman, Assistant Professor of Justice Studies,
Methodist University

Eli Briggs, Director of Government Affairs, National Association of
County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)

Cherie Brown, Executive Director, National Coalition
Building Institute

Steven Brown, Journalist / Public Relations Consultant

Chris Calabrese, Senior Policy Director, Center for Democracy
and Technology—with Jake Laperruque, Fellow on Privacy,
Surveillance, and Security

Melanie Campbell, President and CEO, National Coalition on
Black Civic Participation

Mo Canady, Executive Director, National Association of School
Resource Officers (NASRO)

Hugh Carter Donahue, Adjunct Professor, Department of
History, Rowan University

Anthony Chapa, President, Hispanic American Police Command
Officers Association

Lorig Charkoudian, Executive Director, Community
Mediation Maryland

Ralph Clark, President and CEO, SST Inc.

Faye Coffield CJ Federal Task Force

The Hon. LaDoris Cordell, Office of the Independent Police
Auditor, San Jose, California

Jill Corson Lake, Director of Global Advising, Parsons The New
School for Design

David Couper, Chief of Police (retired), Madison (Wisconsin)
Police Department

Madeline deLone, Executive Director, The Innocence Project—
with Marvin Anderson, Board Member

Jimmie Dotson, Police Chief (retired), Houston Independent
School District / GeoDD GeoPolicing Team

Ronnie Dunn, Professor, Cleveland State University

Lauren-Brooke Eisen and Nicole Fortier – Counsel,
Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law

Christian Ellis, CEO, Alternative Ballistics

Jeffrey Fagan, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School

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Mai Fernandez, Executive Director, National Center for Victims
of Crime

Johnny Ford, Founder, Alabama Conference of Black Mayors and
Mayor, Tuskegee, Alabama

Lisa Foster, Director, Access to Justice Initiative, U.S. Department
of Justice

Neill Franklin, Executive Director, Law Enforcement
Against Prohibition

S. Gabrielle Frey, Interim Executive Director, National Association
of Community Mediation

Lorie Fridell, Associate Professor of Criminology, University of
South Florida

Allen Frimpong, Activist–Malcolm X Grassroots Movement:
New York’s Self Defensive Campaign

Ethan Garcia, Youth Specialist, Identity Inc.

Michael Gennaco, Principal, OIR Group

Al Gerhardstein, Civil Rights Attorney

James Gierach, Executive Board Vice Chairman, Law Enforcement
Against Prohibition

Fred Ginyard, Organizing Director, Fabulous Independent
Educated Radical for Community Empowerment (FIERCE)

Mark Gissiner, Past President, International Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement

Becca Gomby, SDR Academy

Rev. Aaron Graham, Lead Pastor, The District Church

Fatima Graves, Vice President, National Women’s Law Center—
with Lara S. Kaufmann, Senior Counsel and Director of
Education Policy for At-Risk Students

Virgil Green, Chairman, Future America National Crime
Solution Commission

Sheldon Greenberg, Professor, School of Education, Division of
Public Safety Leadership, The Johns Hopkins University

Robert Haas, Police Commissioner, Cambridge (Massachusetts)
Police Department

David Harris, Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law
Associates Dean for Research, University of Pittsburgh School of Law

W. Craig Hartley, Executive Director, CALEA

Steven Hawkins, Executive Director, Amnesty International USA

Louis Hayes, The Virtus Group, Inc.

Wade Henderson, President and CEO, The Leadership Conference
on Civil and Human Rights—with Nancy Zirkin, Executive
Vice President

Maulin Chris Herring, Trainer/Consultant, Public Safety

Sandy Holman, Director, The Culture CO-OP

Zachary Horn and Kent Halverson, Aptima, Inc.—
with Rebecca Damari and Aubrey Logan-Terry,
Georgetown University

Tanya Clay House, Director of Public Policy, Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law

Susan Hutson, Office of the Independent Police Monitor,
New Orleans

Ingram Janaye, Executive Director, National Action Network

Melanie Jeffers

Megan Johnston, Executive Director, Northern Virginia
Mediation Service

Nola Joyce, Deputy Commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department

Keith Kauffman, Captain, Hawthorne (California)
Police Department

Gwendolyn Puryear Keita, Executive Director, American
Psychological Association, Public Interest Directorate

Stanley Knee, Chief, Austin (Texas) Police Department

Laura Kunard, Senior Research Scientist, CNA Corporation

David Kurz, Chief, Durham (New Hampshire) Police Department

Deborah Lauter, Director of Civil Rights, Anti-Defamation
League—with Michael Lieberman, Washington Counsel

Cynthia Lum and Christopher Koper, George Mason
University, Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy

Bruce Lumpkins

Edward Maguire, Professor of Justice, Law & Criminology,
American University

Baron Marquis, Member, Riverside Church, New York

Travis Martinez, Lieutenant, Redlands (California)
Police Department

Mike Masterson, Chief, Boise (Idaho) Police Department

Andrew Mazzara, Executive Director, International Law
Enforcement Forum—with Colin Burrows QMP (U.K.), ILEF
Advisory Board Chair

R. Paul McCauley, Past President, Academy of Criminal
Justice Sciences

7 7

a p p e n d i x B

V. Michael McKenzie

Harvey McMurray, Chair, Department of Criminal Justice, North
Carolina Central University

Pamela Meanes, President, National Bar Association

Doug Mellis, President, Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Associa-
tion—with Brian Kyes, President, Massachusetts Major City
Chiefs Association

Seth Miller, President, The Innocence Network

Charlene Moe, Program Coordinator, Center for Public Safety
and Justice, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University
of Illinois

Marc Morial, CEO, National Urban League

Richard Myers, Chief, Newport News (Virginia) Police Department

Toye Nash, Sergeant, Phoenix Police Department

Rebecca Neri and Anthony Berryman – UCLA
Improvement by Design Research Group

Chuck Noerenberg, President, National Alliance for Drug
Endangered Children

Newell Normand, Sheriff, Jefferson Parish (Louisiana) Sherriff ’s
Office—submitted with Adrian Garcia, Sheriff, Harris County
(Texas) Sheriff ’s Office; David Mahoney, Sheriff, Dane County
(Wisconsin) Sheriff ’s Office; Anthony Normore, Ph.D., Crim-
inal Justice Commission for Credible Leadership Development; and
Mitch Javidi, Ph.D., International Academy of Public Safety

Gbadegesin Olubukola, St. Louis University

Patrice O’Neill, CEO/Executive Producer, Not In Our Town

Jim Palmer, Executive Director, Wisconsin Professional
Police Association

Julie Parker, Media Relations Division Director, Prince George’s
County (Maryland) Police Department

George Patterson, Associate Professor, City University
of New York

David Perry, President, International Association of Campus Law
Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA)

Megan Price, Director, Insight Conflict Resolution Program, School
for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

Sue Quinn, Past President, National Association for Civilian
Oversight of Law Enforcement

Tess Raser, Teacher, Brooklyn, New York

Darakshan Raja, Program Manager, Washington Peace Center

Sir Desmond Rea and Robin Masefield, Northern Ireland
Policing Board

Nuno Rocha

Edwin Roessler, Jr., Chief, Fairfax County (Virginia)
Police Department

Jeffrey Rojek, University of Texas at El Paso

Iris Roley, Black United Front of Cincinnati

Julia Ryan, Community Safety Initiative Director, LISC

Robert Samuels, Former Acting Director, DOJ Executive Office for
Weed and Seed

Kami Chavis Simmons, Professor of Law and Director of the
Criminal Justice Program, Wake Forest University School of Law

Russell Skiba, Professor and Director, Equity Project at
Indiana University

Ronald Sloan, President, Association of State Criminal
Investigative Agencies

Samuel Somers, Jr., Chief, Sacramento Police Department

Brett Stoudt, Morris Justice Project and Professor, John Jay College
of Criminal Justice

“Think Tank Johnny”

Don Tijerina, President, Hispanic American Police Command
Officers Association

Nicholas Turner, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice

James Unnever, Professor of Criminology, University of
South Florida

Javier Valdes, Executive Director, Make the Road New York

Kim Vansell, Director, National Center for Campus Public Safety

Nina Vinik, Program Director, Gun Violence Prevention,
The Joyce Foundation

Vincent Warren, Executive Director, Center for
Constitutional Rights

Barbara Weinstein, Associate Director, Religious Action Center
of Reform Judaism

Jenny Yang, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission

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Organizations

American Friends Service Committee

American Society of Criminology, Division of Policing, Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Anthony
Braga, Rod K. Brunson, Gary Cordner, Lorie Fridell, Matthew
Hickman, Cynthia Lum, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jack McDevitt, Dennis
P. Rosenbaum, Wesley G. Skogan, and William Terrill)

Brooklyn Defender Services

The Bronx Defenders

Center for Popular Democracy

Civil Rights Coalition on Police Reform

CNA Corporation (George Fachner, Michael D. White, James R. Coldren,
Jr., and James K. Stewart)

Color of Change

Dignity in Schools Campaign

Ethics Bureau at Yale (Lawrence Fox, Supervising Lawyer)

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

Harvard Kennedy School (John F. Kennedy School of Government)

Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights

Immigrant Defense Project

International Association for Human Values (IAHV) / Works of
Wonder International

Latino Justice

Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (including A. Phillip
Randolph Institute, Black Youth Vote, Empowerment Movement,
Hip Hop Caucus, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights,
Muslim Advocates, National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People [NAACP], NAACP Legal Defense Fund, National
Coalition on Black Civic Participation, National Council of
Churches of Christ in the USA, PICO National Network, and
Rainbow PUSH Coalition)

Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC)

Major County Sheriffs’ Association

Make the Road New York

National Action Network (NAN)

National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement

National Association of Counties

National Association of Police Organizations

National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives

National Collaborative for Health Equity, Dellums Commission

National Day Laborer Organizing Network

National Immigration Law Center

National Fraternal Order of Police

National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE)

National Sheriffs’ Association

New Sanctuary Coalition of New York

Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights

Northwest Immigrant Rights Project

PICO National Network

Public Science Project

Santa Fe College and the Santa Fe College Police Department,
Gainesville, Florida

Southern Poverty Law Center

Streetwise & Safe

Team Kids

Works of Wonder International

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A P P E N D I X C . E X E C U T I V E O R D E R
1 3 6 8 4 O F D E C E M B E R 1 8 , 2 0 1 4
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of
America, and in order to identify the best means
to provide an effective partnership between law
enforcement and local communities that reduces
crime and increases trust, it is hereby ordered
as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is established a
President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
(Task Force).

Sec. 2. Membership. (a) The Task Force shall be
composed of not more than eleven members
appointed by the President. The members shall
include distinguished individuals with relevant
experience or subject-matter expertise in law
enforcement, civil rights, and civil liberties.

(b) The President shall designate two members of
the Task Force to serve as Co-Chairs.

Sec. 3. Mission. (a) The Task Force shall, consistent
with applicable law, identify best practices
and otherwise make recommendations to
the President on how policing practices can
promote effective crime reduction while
building public trust.

(b) The Task Force shall be solely advisory and shall
submit a report to the President by March 2, 2015.

Sec. 4. Administration. (a) The Task Force shall hold
public meetings and engage with Federal, State,
tribal, and local officials, technical advisors, and
nongovernmental organizations, among others, as
necessary to carry out its mission.

(b) The Director of the Office of Community
Oriented Policing Services shall serve as Executive
Director of the Task Force and shall, as directed by
the Co-Chairs, convene regular meetings of the
Task Force and supervise its work.

(c) In carrying out its mission, the Task Force shall
be informed by, and shall strive to avoid duplicat-
ing, the efforts of other governmental entities.

(d) The Department of Justice shall provide
administrative services, funds, facilities, staff,
equipment, and other support services as may be
necessary for the Task Force to carry out its mission
to the extent permitted by law and subject to the
availability of appropriations.

(e) Members of the Task Force shall serve without
any additional compensation for their work on the
Task Force, but shall be allowed travel expenses,
including per diem, to the extent permitted by law
for persons serving intermittently in the Govern-
ment service (5 U.S.C.5701-5707).

Sec. 5. Termination. The Task Force shall terminate
30 days after the President requests a final report
from the Task Force.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order
shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to a department,
agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget relating to budgetary,
administrative, or legislative proposals.

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(b) This order is not intended to, and does not,
create any right or benefit, substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party
against the United States, its departments, agen-
cies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents,
or any other person.

(c) Insofar as the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
as amended (5 U.S.C. App.) (the “Act”) may apply
to the Task Force, any functions of the President
under the Act, except for those in section 6 of the
Act, shall be performed by the Attorney General.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 18, 2014.

8 1

A P P E N D I X D . T A S K F O R C E
M E M B E R S ’ B I O G R A P H I E S
Co-Chairs

Charles Ramsey
Charles Ramsey is the commissioner of the
Philadelphia Police Department (PPD), a position
he has held since 2008. Since 2010, he has served
as president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association
and the Police Executive Research Forum. Commis-
sioner Ramsey began his law enforcement career
in 1968 as a cadet with the Chicago Police Depart-
ment (CPD). Over the next 30 years, he held various
positions with the CPD, including commander of
the Narcotics Division, deputy chief of the Patrol
Division, and deputy superintendent, a role he held
from 1994 to 1998. In 1998, he was named chief of
the Metropolitan Police Department of the District
of Columbia (MPDC), where he served until early
2007. In 2007, Commissioner Ramsey served on
the Independent Commission on Security Forces
of Iraq, leading a review of the Iraqi Police Force.
In addition to his current role at the PPD, he also
serves as a member of the Homeland Security
Advisory Council. Commissioner Ramsey received a
BS and MS from Lewis University.

Laurie Robinson
Laurie Robinson is the Clarence J. Robinson
Professor of Criminology, Law and Society at
George Mason University, a position she has
held since 2012. She served as assistant attorney
general for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) in
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) from 2009
to 2012. Prior to that, Ms. Robinson served as the
Principal deputy assistant attorney general for
OJP and acting assistant attorney general for OJP.
Previously, she was a member of the Obama-Biden
Transition Team. From 2003 to 2009, Ms. Robinson
was the director of the Master of Science Program
in Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania.
From 1993 to 2000, she served her first term as
assistant attorney general for OJP. Before joining
DOJ, Ms. Robinson spent over 20 years with the
American Bar Association, serving as assistant staff
director of the Criminal Justice Section from 1972
to 1979, director of the Criminal Justice Section
from 1979 to 1993, and director of the Professional
Services Division from 1986 to 1993. She is a senior
fellow at the George Mason University Center for
Evidence-Based Crime Policy and serves as co-
chair of the Research Advisory Committee for the
International Association of Chiefs of Police. She
also serves on the board of trustees of the Vera
Institute of Justice. Ms. Robinson received a BA
from Brown University.

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Members

Cedric L. Alexander
Cedric L. Alexander is the deputy chief operating
officer for Public Safety in DeKalb County, Georgia,
a position he has held since late 2013. Dr. Alexan-
der is also the national president of the National
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives.
In 2013, he served as chief of police for the DeKalb
County Police Department. Prior to this, Dr. Alex-
ander served as federal security director for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Dal-
las/Fort Worth International Airport from 2007 to
2013. And from 2006 to 2007, he was deputy com-
missioner of the New York State Division of Criminal
Justice Services. From 2005 to 2006, Dr. Alexander
was chief of the Rochester (New York) Police
Department (RPD), where he previously served as
deputy chief of police from 2002 to 2005. Before
joining RPD, Dr. Alexander was a faculty member
in the Department of Psychiatry at the University
of Rochester Medical Center from 1998 to 2002.
He began his career as a deputy sheriff in Florida
from 1977 to 1981, before joining the Miami-Dade
Police Department, where he was as an officer and
detective from 1981 to 1992. He received a BA and
MS from St. Thomas University in Miami, Florida,
and a PsyD from Wright State University.

Jose Lopez
Jose Lopez is currently the lead organizer at Make
the Road New York (MRNY ), a Brooklyn-based
non-profit community organization focused on
civil rights, education reform, and combating
poverty. He became lead organizer of MRNY in
2013. Mr. Lopez began his career in 2000 as youth
organizer with Make the Road by Walking, which
later merged with the Latin American Integration
Center to form MRNY in 2007. He continued to
serve as youth organizer with MRNY until 2009
when he became senior organizer. Since 2011,
Mr. Lopez has represented MRNY on the steering

committee of Communities United for Police
Reform, a New York City organization advocating
for law enforcement reform. From 2001 to 2004,
he was an active contributor to the Radio Rookies
Project, an initiative of New York Public Radio. He
received a BA from Hofstra University.

Tracey L. Meares
Tracey Meares is the Walton Hale Hamilton
Professor of Law at Yale Law School, a position she
has held since 2007. From 2009 to 2011, she also
served as deputy dean of Yale Law School. Before
joining the faculty at Yale, she served as a profes-
sor at the University of Chicago Law School from
1995 to 2007. She has served on the Committee
on Law and Justice, a National Research Council
Standing Committee of the National Academy
of Sciences. She was appointed by Attorney
General Eric Holder to serve on the inaugural U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs
Science Advisory Board. She also currently serves
on the board of directors of the Joyce Foundation.
Ms. Meares began her legal career as a law clerk
for Judge Harlington Wood, Jr. of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. She later served
as a trial attorney in the Antitrust Division at the
U.S. Department of Justice. Ms. Meares received a
BS from the University of Illinois and a JD from the
University of Chicago Law School.

Brittany N. Packnett
Brittany Packnett is currently executive director of
Teach For America in St. Louis, Missouri, a position
she has held since 2012. From 2010 to 2012, she
was a director on the Government Affairs Team at
Teach For America. Ms. Packnett was a legislative
assistant for the U.S. House of Representatives
from 2009 to 2010. From 2007 to 2009, she was a
third grade teacher in Southeast Washington, D.C.,
as a member of the Teach For America Corps. Ms.
Packnett has volunteered as executive director

8 3

a p p e n d i x d

of Dream Girls DMV, a mentoring program for
young girls, and was the founding co-chair of The
Collective-DC, a regional organization for Teach For
America alumni of color. She currently serves on
the board of New City School, the COCA (Center of
Creative Arts) Associate Board, the Urban League of
Metro St. Louis Education Committee, and the John
Burroughs School Board Diversity Committee. Ms.
Packnett received a BA from Washington University
in St. Louis and an MA from American University.

Susan Lee Rahr
Susan Rahr is executive director of the Washington
State Criminal Justice Training Commission, a
position she has held since 2012. From 2005 to
2012, she served as the first female sheriff in King
County, Washington. Ms. Rahr spent over 30 years
as a law enforcement officer, beginning as a patrol
officer and undercover narcotics officer. While
serving with the King County Sheriff’s Office, she
held various positions including serving as the
commander of the Internal Investigations and
Gang Units; commander of the Special Investi-
gations Section; and police chief of Shoreline,
Washington. Ms. Rahr received a BA from Washing-
ton State University. She has served as a member
of the National Institute of Justice and Harvard
Kennedy School Executive Session on Policing
and Public Safety; president of the Washington
State Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs,
and an executive board member of the National
Sheriffs’ Association.

Constance Rice
Constance Rice is a civil rights attorney and
co-director of the Advancement Project, an
organization she co-founded in 1999. In 2003, Ms.
Rice was selected to lead the Blue Ribbon Ram-
part Review Panel, which investigated the largest
police corruption scandal in Los Angeles Police
Department history. In 1991, Ms. Rice joined the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and
she became co-director of the Los Angeles office
in 1996. She was previously an associate at Morri-
son & Foerster and began her legal career as a law
clerk to Judge Damon J. Keith of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Ms. Rice received a BA
from Harvard College and a JD from the New York
University School of Law.

Sean Michael Smoot
Sean Smoot is currently director and chief counsel
for the Police Benevolent & Protective Association
of Illinois (PB&PA) and the Police Benevolent Labor
Committee (PBLC), positions he has held since
2000. He began his career with PB&PA and PBLC
as a staff attorney in 1995, before becoming chief
counsel of both organizations in 1997. Since 2001,
Mr. Smoot has served as the treasurer of the Na-
tional Association of Police Organizations and has
served on the Advisory Committee for the Nation-
al Law Enforcement Officers’ Rights Center since
1996. From 2008 to 2009, he was a policy advisor
to the Obama-Biden Transition Project on public
safety and state and local police issues and was
a member of the National Institute of Justice and
Harvard Kennedy School of Government Executive
Session on Policing and Public Safety from 2008
to 2011. Mr. Smoot served as police commissioner
of Leland Grove, Illinois, from 1998 to 2008. He
received a BS from Illinois State University and a JD
from Southern Illinois University School of Law.

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8 4

Bryan Stevenson
Bryan Stevenson is founder and executive director
of the Equal Justice Initiative (EJI), a private, non-
profit organization headquartered in Montgomery,
Alabama. In addition to directing the EJI since
1989, he is a clinical professor at New York Uni-
versity School of Law. He previously has served as
a visiting professor of law at the University of Mich-
igan School of Law. Mr. Stevenson has received
the American Bar Association’s Wisdom Award
for public service, the ACLU’s National Medal
of Liberty, and the MacArthur Foundation
“Genius” Award Prize. Mr. Stevenson received a
BA from Eastern College (now Eastern University),
a JD from Harvard Law School, and an MPP from
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University.

Roberto Villaseñor
Roberto Villaseñor is chief of police for the Tucson
(Arizona) Police Department (TPD), a position he
has held since 2009. He joined the TPD in 1980
and has served as officer, sergeant, lieutenant, and
captain and as assistant chief from 2000 to 2009.
Chief Villaseñor was named Officer of the Year
for the TPD in 1996 and has been awarded the
TPD Medal of Merit three times. He also received
the TPD Medal of Distinguished Service. Chief
Villaseñor is the incoming president of the Arizona
Association of Chiefs of Police and a board mem-
ber of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).
He received a BS from Park University and a MEd
from Northern Arizona University.

8 5

A P P E N D I X E . R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
A N D A C T I O N S
0.1 Overarching recOmmendatiOn:
The President should support and provide
funding for the creation of a National Crime
and Justice Task Force to review and evaluate
all components of the criminal justice system
for the purpose of making recommendations
to the country on comprehensive criminal
justice reform.

0.2 Overarching recOmmendatiOn:
The President should promote programs that
take a comprehensive and inclusive look at
community-based initiatives that address
the core issues of poverty, education, health,
and safety.

1.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
culture should embrace a guardian mindset to
build public trust and legitimacy. Toward that
end, police and sheriffs’ departments should
adopt procedural justice as the guiding
principle for internal and external policies and
practices to guide their interactions with the
citizens they serve.

1.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should acknowledge the role of
policing in past and present injustice and
discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the
promotion of community trust.

1.3.2 actiOn item: When serious incidents
occur, including those involving alleged police
misconduct, agencies should communicate
with citizens and the media swiftly, openly, and
neutrally, respecting areas where the law requires
confidentiality.

1.4 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should promote legitimacy internally
within the organization by applying the
principles of procedural justice.

1.4.1 actiOn item: In order to achieve
internal legitimacy, law enforcement agencies
should involve employees in the process of
developing policies and procedures.

1.4.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agency leadership should examine
opportunities to incorporate procedural justice
into the internal discipline process, placing

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additional importance on values adherence
rather than adherence to rules. Union
leadership should be partners in this process.

1.5.1 actiOn item: In order to achieve
external legitimacy, law enforcement agencies
should involve the community in the process of
developing and evaluating policies and proce-
dures.

1.5.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should institute residency incentive programs
such as Resident Officer Programs.

1.6 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should consider the potential
damage to public trust when implementing
crime fighting strategies.

1.8.1 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should create a Law Enforcement Diversity
Initiative designed to help communities diversify
law enforcement departments to reflect the
demographics of the community.

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a p p e n d i x e

1.8.3 actiOn item: Successful law en-
forcement agencies should be highlighted and
celebrated and those with less diversity should be
offered technical assistance to facilitate change.

1.8.4 actiOn item: Discretionary federal
funding for law enforcement programs could
be influenced by that department’s efforts to
improve their diversity and cultural and linguistic
responsiveness.

1.8.5 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should be encouraged to explore more
flexible staffing models.

1.9 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should build relationships based
on trust with immigrant communities. This is
central to overall public safety.

1.9.1 actiOn item: Decouple federal immi-
gration enforcement from routine local policing
for civil enforcement and nonserious crime.

1.9.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should ensure reasonable and
equitable language access for all persons who
have encounters with police or who enter the
criminal justice system.

1.9.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should not include civil immigration
information in the FBI’s National Crime Informa-
tion Center database.

2.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should collaborate with community
members to develop policies and strategies
in communities and neighborhoods
disproportionately affected by crime for
deploying resources that aim to reduce
crime by improving relationships, greater
community engagement, and cooperation.

2.1.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment should incentivize this collaboration
through a variety of programs that focus on public
health, education, mental health, and other
programs not traditionally part of the criminal
justice system.

2.2.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agency policies for training on use of force should
emphasize de-escalation and alternatives to arrest
or summons in situations where appropriate.
2.2.2 actiOn item: These policies should
also mandate external and independent criminal
investigations in cases of police use of force result-
ing in death, officer-involved shootings resulting
in injury or death, or in-custody deaths.

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2.2.5 actiOn item: Policies on use of force
should clearly state what types of information
will be released, when, and in what situation, to
maintain transparency.

2.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies are encouraged to implement
nonpunitive peer review of critical incidents
separate from criminal and administrative
investigations.

2.4 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies are encouraged to adopt
identification procedures that implement
scientifically supported practices that eliminate
or minimize presenter bias or influence.

2.6 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should be encouraged to collect,
maintain, and analyze demographic
data on all detentions (stops, frisks,
searches, summons, and arrests). This
data should be disaggregated by school
and non-school contacts.

2.6.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment could further incentivize universities
and other organizations to partner with police
departments to collect data and develop knowl-
edge about analysis and benchmarks as well as
to develop tools and templates that help depart-
ments manage data collection and analysis.
2.7 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should create policies and
procedures for policing mass demonstrations
that employ a continuum of managed tactical
resources that are designed to minimize the
appearance of a military operation and avoid
using provocative tactics and equipment that
undermine civilian trust.

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a p p e n d i x e

2.7.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agency policies should address procedures
for implementing a layered response to mass
demonstrations that prioritize de-escalation and a
guardian mindset.

2.8 recOmmendatiOn: Some form
of civilian oversight of law enforcement is
important in order to strengthen trust with
the community. Every community should
define the appropriate form and structure of
civilian oversight to meet the needs of that
community.

2.8.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice, through its research arm, the National In-
stitute of Justice (NIJ), should expand its research
agenda to include civilian oversight.

2.8.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS Office) should provide technical
assistance and collect best practices from existing
civilian oversight efforts and be prepared to help
cities create this structure, potentially with some
matching grants and funding.

investigative contacts with citizens for reasons
not directly related to improving public safety,
such as generating revenue.

2.10 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement officers should be required to
seek consent before a search and explain
that a person has the right to refuse consent
when there is no warrant or probable
cause. Furthermore, officers should ideally
obtain written acknowledgement that they
have sought consent to a search in these
circumstances.

2.11 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement agencies should adopt policies
requiring officers to identify themselves
by their full name, rank, and command (as
applicable) and provide that information in
writing to individuals they have stopped. In
addition, policies should require officers to
state the reason for the stop and the reason
for the search if one is conducted.
2.11.1 actiOn item: One example of how
to do this is for law enforcement officers to carry
business cards containing their name, rank, com-
mand, and contact information that would enable
individuals to offer suggestions or commenda-
tions or to file complaints with the appropriate
individual, office, or board. These cards would be
easily distributed in all encounters.

2.12 recOmmendatiOn: Law
enforcement agencies should establish search
and seizure procedures related to LGBTQ and
transgender populations and adopt as policy
the recommendation from the President’s
Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS (PACHA) to
cease using the possession of condoms as the
sole evidence of vice.

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2.13.1 actiOn item: The Bureau of
Justice Statistics should add questions concerning
sexual harassment of and misconduct toward
community members, and in particular LGBTQ and
gender-nonconforming people, by law enforce-
ment officers to the Police Public Contact Survey.

2.13.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should promote and disseminate guidance
to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
on documenting, preventing, and addressing sexual
harassment and misconduct by local law enforce-
ment agents, consistent with the recommendations
of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

3.1.2 actiOn item: As part of national stan-
dards, the issue of technology’s impact on privacy
concerns should be addressed in accordance with
protections provided by constitutional law.

3.1.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should deploy smart technology that is
designed to prevent the tampering with or manip-
ulating of evidence in violation of policy.

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a p p e n d i x e

3.2 recOmmendatiOn:
The implementation of appropriate
technology by law enforcement agencies
should be designed considering local needs
and aligned with national standards.

3.2.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should adopt the use of new technolo-
gies that will help them better serve people with
special needs or disabilities.

3.3 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should develop
best practices that can be adopted by
state legislative bodies to govern the
acquisition, use, retention, and dissemination
of auditory, visual, and biometric data by
law enforcement.

3.3.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should create toolkits for the most effective
and constitutional use of multiple forms of innova-
tive technology that will provide state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies with a one-stop
clearinghouse of information and resources.

3.3.3 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should review and consider the Bureau
of Justice Assistance’s (BJA) Body Worn Camera
Toolkit to assist in implementing BWCs.

3.4 recOmmendatiOn: Federal, state,
local, and tribal legislative bodies should be
encouraged to update public record laws.

3.5 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should adopt model policies
and best practices for technology-based
community engagement that increases
community trust and access.

3.6 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should support the development
of new “less than lethal” technology to help
control combative suspects.

3.7 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should make the development
and building of segregated radio spectrum

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and increased bandwidth by FirstNet for
exclusive use by local, state, tribal, and federal
public safety agencies a top priority.

4.1 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should develop and adopt policies
and strategies that reinforce the importance
of community engagement in managing
public safety.

4.1.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should consider adopting preferences
for seeking “least harm” resolutions, such as diver-
sion programs or warnings and citations in lieu of
arrest for minor infractions.

4.2 recOmmendatiOn: Community
policing should be infused throughout the
culture and organizational structure of law
enforcement agencies.
4.2.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should evaluate officers on their efforts
to engage members of the community and the
partnerships they build. Making this part of
the performance evaluation process places an
increased value on developing partnerships.
4.2.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should evaluate their patrol deployment
practices to allow sufficient time for patrol officers
to participate in problem solving and community
engagement activities.

4.2.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice and other public and private entities
should support research into the factors that have
led to dramatic successes in crime reduction in
some communities through the infusion of

non-discriminatory policing and to determine
replicable factors that could be used to guide law
enforcement agencies in other communities.

4.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should engage in multidisciplinary,
community team approaches for planning,
implementing, and responding to crisis
situations with complex causal factors.

4.3.1 actiOn item: The U.S. Department of
Justice should collaborate with others to develop
and disseminate baseline models of this crisis
intervention team approach that can be adapted
to local contexts.
4.3.2 actiOn item: Communities should
look to involve peer support counselors as part
of multidisciplinary teams when appropriate.
Persons who have experienced the same trauma
can provide both insight to the first responders
and immediate support to individuals in crisis.

4.3.3 actiOn item: Communities should be
encouraged to evaluate the efficacy of these crisis
intervention team approaches and hold agency
leaders accountable for outcomes.

4.4 recOmmendatiOn: Communities
should support a culture and practice of
policing that reflects the values of protection
and promotion of the dignity of all, especially
the most vulnerable.

4.4.1 actiOn item: Because offensive or
harsh language can escalate a minor situation,
law enforcement agencies should underscore the
importance of language used and adopt policies di-
recting officers to speak to individuals with respect.

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4.4.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should develop programs that create op-
portunities for patrol officers to regularly interact
with neighborhood residents, faith leaders, and
business leaders.

4.5.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should schedule regular forums and meetings
where all community members can interact with
police and help influence programs and policy.

4.5.2 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should engage youth and communities
in joint training with law enforcement, citizen
academies, ride-alongs, problem solving teams,
community action teams, and quality of life
teams.

4.5.4 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies should adopt community policing strategies
that support and work in concert with economic
development efforts within communities.

4.6.1 actiOn item: Education and criminal
justice agencies at all levels of government should
work together to reform policies and procedures
that push children into the juvenile justice system.

4.6.4 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with schools to adopt an
instructional approach to discipline that uses
interventions or disciplinary consequences to help
students develop new behavior skills and positive
strategies to avoid conflict, redirect energy, and
refocus on learning.
4.6.5 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with schools to develop and
monitor school discipline policies with input and
collaboration from school personnel, students,

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families, and community members. These policies
should prohibit the use of corporal punishment
and electronic control devices.
4.6.6 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should work with schools to create a
continuum of developmentally appropriate and
proportional consequences for addressing ongo-
ing and escalating student misbehavior after all
appropriate interventions have been attempted.

4.6.8 actiOn item: Law enforcement agen-
cies and schools should establish memoranda of
agreement for the placement of School Resource
Officers that limit police involvement in student
discipline.

4.7 recOmmendatiOn: Communities
need to affirm and recognize the voices
of youth in community decision making,
facilitate youth-led research and problem
solving, and develop and fund youth
leadership training and life skills
through positive youth/police
collaboration and interactions.

4.7.2 actiOn item: Communities should
develop community- and school-based
evidence-based programs that mitigate punitive
and authoritarian solutions to teen problems.

5.1.3 actiOn item: The Department of
Justice should build a stronger relationship with
the International Association of Directors of Law
Enforcement (IADLEST) in order to leverage their
network with state boards and commissions of
Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST).

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5.2 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should engage community members
in the training process.

5.3 recOmmendatiOn: Law enforcement
agencies should provide leadership training
to all personnel throughout their careers.

5.3.1 actiOn item: Recognizing that strong,
capable leadership is required to create cultural
transformation, the U.S. Department of Justice
should invest in developing learning goals and
model curricula/training for each level of leadership.

5.3.2 actiOn item: The Federal Government
should encourage and support partnerships be-
tween law enforcement and academic institutions
to support a culture that values ongoing education
and the integration of current research into the
development of training, policies, and practices.

5.3.3 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should support and encourage
cross-discipline leadership training.

5.5 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should instruct the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to modify the
curriculum of the National Academy at Quantico
to include prominent coverage of the topical
areas addressed in this report. In addition, the
COPS Office and the Office of Justice Programs
should work with law enforcement professional
organizations to encourage modification of
their curricula in a similar fashion.

5.6 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
make Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) a part of
both basic recruit and in-service officer training.

5.6.1 actiOn item: Because of the impor-
tance of this issue, Congress should appropriate
funds to help support law enforcement crisis
intervention training.

5.7 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure that basic officer training includes
lessons to improve social interaction as well as
tactical skills.

5.8 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure that basic recruit and in-service officer
training include curriculum on the disease of
addiction.

5.9 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
ensure both basic recruit and in-service
training incorporates content around
recognizing and confronting implicit bias and
cultural responsiveness.

5.9.1 actiOn item: Law enforcement
agencies should implement ongoing, top down
training for all officers in cultural diversity and

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5.10 recOmmendatiOn: POSTs should
require both basic recruit and in-service
training on policing in a democratic society.

5.11 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government, as well as state and local
agencies, should encourage and incentivize
higher education for law enforcement officers.

5.11.1 actiOn item: The Federal Gov-
ernment should create a loan repayment and
forgiveness incentive program specifically for
policing.

5.12 recOmmendatiOn: The Federal
Government should support research into the
development of technology that enhances
scenario-based training, social interaction
skills, and enables the dissemination
of interactive distance learning for law
enforcement.

5.13 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should support
the development and implementation of
improved Field Training Officer programs.

5.13.2 actiOn item: The U.S. Department
of Justice should provide funding to incentivize
agencies to update their Field Training Programs
in accordance with the new standards.

6.1 recOmmendatiOn: The U.S.
Department of Justice should enhance and
further promote its multi-faceted officer
safety and wellness initiative.

6.1.1 actiOn item: Congress should
establish and fund a national “Blue Alert” warning
system.

6.1.3 actiOn item: The Federal Govern-
ment should support the continuing research into
the efficacy of an annual mental health check for
officers, as well as fitness, resilience, and nutrition.

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6.1.4 actiOn item: Pension plans should
recognize fitness for duty examinations as defin-
itive evidence of valid duty or non-duty related
disability.