Judgment

To prepare for this discussion, please read Chapter 5 of your

textbook

(Feenstra, 2013). In addition, read

Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Finally, review Instructor Guidance and Announcements. In this discussion, you will consider judgment and decision making. Be sure to use your own

academic voice (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

and apply

in-text citations (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site.

appropriately throughout your post. Locate an additional peer-reviewed source to support your ideas.

Outline one of the following options:
Identify an example (not from the textbook) to illustrate one of the following heuristics: availability heuristic and representativeness heuristic, or affect heuristic. Examine the use of heuristics. How are our judgments, including attitudes and behaviors, influenced by social and cognitive factors?
Identify an example (not from the textbook) to illustrate one of the following errors in judgment: belief perseverance, confirmation bias, or illusion of control. Examine errors in judgment. How are our judgments, including attitudes and behaviors, influenced by social and cognitive factors?

Post your initial response of 250 words or more by Day 3 (Thursday).

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 1/52
Chapter 4
A�itudes, A�ributions, and Behavior
4.1 A�tudes
4.2 Behavior and A�tudes
Theory of Planned Behavior
Behavior and A�tude Mismatch
4.5 Explana�ons and Our Behavior
Op�mis�c and Pessimis�c Explanatory Styles
A Hos�le World
Just Like Everybody Else
©IS Stock/Valueline/Thinkstock
Learning Objec�ves
By the end of the chapter you should be able to:
Define a�tude, and differen�ate between implicit and explicit a�tudes
Describe when behaviors and a�tudes are likely to match
Explain the theory of planned behavior
Describe cogni�ve dissonance theory and insufficient jus�fica�on
Describe self-percep�on theory
Define an a�ribu�on, and differen�ate internal and external a�ribu�ons
Define the fundamental a�ribu�on error
Explain how explanatory style works, and differen�ate between op�mis�c and pessimis�c explanatory style
Describe the hos�le a�ribu�on of intent
Differen�ate the false consensus effect and false uniqueness effect
Explain the illusion of transparency and spotlight effect
Chapter Outline

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 2/52
What Is My A�tude?
4.3 Explaining the Behavior of Others
4.4 Fundamental A�ribu�on Error
What Do Others See?
Chapter Summary
* * *
If you have ever tried online da�ng, you are in good company. A study by Match.com reported that 40 million people visited or used an online
da�ng site in the previous year, with an annual revenue of 1.9 billion dollars (Laird, 2012). Most online da�ng sites involve profiles, where poten�al
daters post informa�on about themselves. Others then access that informa�on and decide whether they would like to communicate with or date
the person profiled. People o�en share their likes or dislikes in their profiles, and poten�al online dates look at those a�tudes and form their own
a�tudes about the person. In mee�ng new people, online or face to face, and in interac�ng with those we know, we are constantly trying to
understand the mo�va�ons behind people’s ac�ons—we make a�ribu�ons for behavior. In this chapter we look at both of these phenomena,
a�tudes and a�ribu�ons, and how they interact with our behavior.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 3/52
Expand Your Knowledge: Pew Global
A�tudes Project
If you would like to inves�gate a wide variety of a�tudes from
around the world, take a look at the Pew Global A�tudes Project
website at h�p://pewglobal.org/ (h�p://pewglobal.org/.) . Reports on
a variety of surveys are also available.
Expand Your Knowledge: Implicit Associa�on Test
4.1 A�tudes
From the �me you wake up in the morning to the moment your head hits the pillow at the end of the day, you encounter objects, people, animals, ac�ons, and
situa�ons that require a response. As you face all these things, you must make quick evalua�ons so you know how to react. For example, if you evaluate the
neighbor as mean and cream as good, you would avoid interac�ng with the neighbor and put cream in your coffee. A�tudes are evalua�ons. These evalua�ons
are based on our reac�ons—both in terms of how we feel and what we think—to some a�tude or object. The objects of our a�tudes/evalua�ons can be
physical objects, other people or groups of people, abstract or concrete ideas, animals, behaviors, or even some aspect of ourselves (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). An
online dater might have an a�tude about his online date, as well as about her dislike of football, her love of cats, and her iden�ty as a runner. The woman,
football, cats, and running are all a�tude objects. Your neighbor and cream are also a�tude objects.
A�tudes have long been considered important to social psychology (Allport,
1935). Throughout the years, social psychologists have found the subject of
a�tudes a frui�ul area of research (Crano & Prislin, 2006). The evalua�ons we
make have two measures: strength and valence. A�tudes may be very strong or
very weak. In terms of valence, we may have a�tudes that are on the posi�ve
side of the spectrum (you like cats) or nega�ve side of the spectrum (you hate
elephants). Pu�ng together strength and valence, you might have a fairly weak
posi�ve a�tude toward cats and a very strong nega�ve a�tude toward elephants.
There is also a body of work on ambivalent a�tudes—a�tudes that are
simultaneously posi�ve and nega�ve (Armitage & Conner, 2000; van Harreveld,
van der Plight, de Vries, Wenneker, & Verhue, 2004).
When most of us think of a�tudes, we probably think of how we feel about objects, people, or groups, but researchers have found that consciously known and
reported a�tudes are only part of the a�tude picture (Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). The a�tudes we report, those that rely on our
knowledge and beliefs about an a�tude object, are called explicit a�tudes. Implicit a�tudes—a�tudes that we are unaware we hold—are based on the
automa�c, unconscious reac�ons we have toward an a�tude object.
We learn implicit and explicit a�tudes either through symbolic representa�ons of or through encounters with a�tude objects. Explicit a�tudes are based in
language, logic, or some other symbolic representa�on. Because of this, we can develop explicit a�tudes rela�vely quickly through simple communica�on. For
example, if someone told you about a par�cular group you had not known about before (e.g., pygmies) and shared with you how much he or she liked this
group, you might form a posi�ve explicit a�tude toward the group. Implicit a�tudes are learned as we encounter the a�tude object. For example, if you always
encountered representa�ons of a par�cular group (pictures of pygmies) that were posi�ve, you might develop a posi�ve implicit a�tude toward them (Olson &
Fazio, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This difference in the processing of implicit and explicit
a�tudes allows for people to hold opposite explicit and implicit a�tudes. If people logically believe that a social group is good and report a posi�ve explicit
a�tude but society has a nega�ve view of the group and that has been communicated with individuals, they might hold a nega�ve implicit a�tude.
Implicit a�tudes are frequently communicated by society. The par�cular social environment and culture people are exposed to has a large impact on their
implicit a�tudes (Shepherd, 2011). If representa�ons of a par�cular racial or ethnic group in the media are always paired with violence or poverty, individuals in
that society tend to hold nega�ve implicit a�tudes toward these groups. Because implicit a�tudes are associa�ons that occur outside of conscious awareness,
they are not subject to logic. For example, if you found out that a new friend is in a bowling league, you would know logically that your friend may or may not
have a number of quali�es that you associate with people in bowling leagues. Your explicit a�tude toward this person would, at least for a while, s�ll rely on
what you know about your friend rather than her membership in this group. Your implicit a�tude would, however, not be ruled by logic but would automa�cally
assign the stereotypical characteris�cs of people in bowling leagues to your friend (Ranganath & Nosek, 2008).
Figure 4.1: Implicit associa�on task
An IAT might first prime you for “good” words, and then ask you to match older faces with “good” words.
Based on Project Implicit® (2011). Four-category race-gender IAT. Retrieved from h�ps://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit
Photo credit: Amos Morgan/Digital Vision/Thinkstock
To assess implicit a�tudes, researchers need to measure our automa�c reac�ons
—reac�ons we are not even aware of. Psychologists developed a test to look at
implicit a�tudes called the Implicit Associa�on Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, &

http://pewglobal.org/

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 4/52
Informa�on about implicit a�tudes and the opportunity to take a
variety of implicit associa�on tests can be found at the Project
Implicit website, h�p://www.projec�mplicit.net/
(h�p://www.projec�mplicit.net/.) . You can read research papers, take
an Implicit Associa�on Test, and par�cipate in ongoing research.
Most of the research studies take about 10 to 15 minutes, and
par�cipants must register before taking part in research.
Par�cipants are provided with a summary of their own results at
the end of their par�cipa�on. If you want to see what your scores
might be but do not want to be part of a research study or register,
you can take a demo test.
Schwartz, 1998; Schnabel, Asendorpf, & Greenwald, 2008). The IAT measures
implicit a�tudes by evalua�ng reac�on �mes. Test-takers match characteris�cs
that are flashed in the center of a computer screen to a category of words in the
upper corners of the screen (see Figure 4.1). For example, if “good” is in the le�
corner and “bad” in the right, a word like “joy” should be matched to the le�
corner and “evil” to the right. A�tude objects are placed in the same corners as
those words, and respondents need to quickly match to words for the good and
bad categories and words or faces associated with that a�tude object. For a test
looking at implicit a�tudes toward older adults, “old” might be assigned to the
le� corner and “young” to the right. The respondent would need to quickly switch
from a word (joy) to a face (older adult) and match each with the correct corner
(le�).
A person who has a nega�ve implicit a�tude toward older adults should take
longer to match the picture of an older person with the le� “good” corner than to the right “bad” corner. This delay in matching an older person with a corner
that also contains the category “good” provides evidence of a nega�ve implicit a�tude toward older adults.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Can someone have an a�tude toward a color? A day of the week? Their right big toe? A concept like jus�ce?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Yes to all of these. As stated in the text, a�tude objects can be physical objects, other people or groups of people, abstract or concrete
ideas, animals, behaviors, or even some aspect of ourselves. Almost anything can be an a�tude object.
How is it possible to have a mismatch between an explicit a�tude and implicit a�tude?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Explicit a�tudes are conscious while implicit a�tudes are unconscious. Because they are developed through different systems, they can
develop differently. Because implicit a�tudes are unconscious, we may not even be aware there is a mismatch.

Home Page

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 5/52
4.2 Behavior and A�tudes
Our a�tudes involve evalua�ons of other people, behaviors, and objects. Logically, these evalua�ons should affect how we behave toward these a�tude objects
(Allport, 1935; Droba, 1933). For example, if you have a favorable a�tude toward exercise, you should be more likely to engage in physical ac�vi�es than if you
had a nega�ve a�tude. LaPiere (1934) was one of the first to inves�gate the rela�on of a�tudes to behaviors. In the 1930s, LaPiere traveled around the United
States with some of his Chinese friends. In that �me, many Americans held nega�ve a�tudes toward the Chinese, and LaPiere and his friends were concerned
about the service they might get as they traveled. Despite this fear, they were treated well in all but one loca�on. LaPiere was curious about this reac�on, so
several months later he sent ques�onnaires to the places he and his friends had visited, as well as a number of hotels and restaurants they had not visited.
Almost universally, these businesses reported they would not serve someone who was Chinese. The nega�ve a�tude was present but, happily, LaPiere and his
friends found that behavior did not match these a�tudes.
Since the 1930s, a great deal of work has been done to sort out this problem. Researchers have iden�fied factors that can strengthen and weaken the ability of
a�tudes to predict behaviors. A�tudes that are par�cularly accessible are more likely to determine our behavior (Fazio, 2000). Generally, if people respond
quickly in repor�ng their a�tudes, these a�tudes are highly accessible. If you respond quickly that you hate blind dates, you are unlikely to find yourself on one.
When rela�vely narrow a�tudes are assessed, then rela�vely narrow behavior also needs to be assessed, but when broader a�tudes are assessed, broad
behaviors must be assessed as well (Weigel & Newman, 1976). For example, if you were asked about your a�tude toward sports, your answer may not match
well with your a�endance or lack thereof at the local high school football game. If we asked about your a�tude toward the local high school football team, we
may have be�er luck predic�ng if we will see you at a game. Another factor is whether the behavior is easy or difficult to perform (Wallace, Paulson, Lord, &
Bond, 2005). One might have a nega�ve a�tude toward smoking but con�nue to smoke because qui�ng is difficult. The social pressure one has to join in or
avoid a behavior is also important. If a person feels a strong social pressure to engage in a behavior (wearing a seat belt), that person may engage in the
behavior despite a nega�ve a�tude (Wallace et al., 2005).
Explicit a�tudes can predict consciously controlled behaviors, but implicit a�tudes are the best predictors of nonverbal behaviors. Those with a nega�ve implicit
a�tude toward people of a par�cular racial group tend to show nonverbal behaviors that indicate dislike for a member of the group with which they are
interac�ng, even when their verbal behavior is friendly and welcoming (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Therefore, nega�ve implicit a�tudes can have an
unconscious, adverse effect on our interac�ons. In a study of physicians, those with nega�ve implicit a�tudes toward Black pa�ents had more nega�ve
interac�ons with Black pa�ents. The clinicians tended to dominate the conversa�on, and the pa�ents showed less confidence in and were less trus�ng of the
physician (Cooper et al., 2012).
In contrast, consciously controlled, deliberate behaviors are evidence of explicit a�tudes (Jellison, McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Rydell
& McConnell, 2006). Because implicit a�tudes are less consciously controlled, they are be�er at predic�ng behavior in situa�ons where the ego is depleted and
behavior is more ins�nctual. For example, if you have a nega�ve explicit a�tude about the healthiness of chocolate, when you are trying to eat healthy and have
not already exerted self-control, you would choose to eat fruit over chocolate. However, when you are �red, you might automa�cally reach for the chocolate bar
in the checkout lane, following your posi�ve implicit a�tude toward chocolate (Friese, Hofmann, & Wanke, 2008).
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Has a�tude research been a topic only recently for social psychology?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
No. A�tudes have been studied since the 1930s, including LaPiere’s 1934 study of a�tudes and behavior with his Chinese friends.
What makes explicit a�tudes more likely to match with behaviors?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
A�tudes that are accessible, that match the behavior in specificity, are easy to perform, and are not subject to social pressure are more
likely to match a behavior.
Theory of Planned Behavior
Behaviors may be difficult to predict from a�tudes alone. The theory of planned behavior combines several factors to provide for be�er predic�on (see Figure
4.2). According to this theory, if we want to predict both intent to behave and actual behavior, we need to know three things: (1) a�tude toward that specific
behavior, (2) subjec�ve norms related to that behavior, and (3) perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). Subjec�ve norms involve people’s beliefs about how
other people in their environment perceive their behavior. For example, you might believe that people in your social circle (friends, rela�ves) think healthy ea�ng
is a good idea, but yoga is silly. Perceived behavior control is your belief that you can engage in the behavior. For example, you might think that ea�ng a healthy
diet is a lot of trouble, but going to yoga class is easily accomplished. In this example, your perceived behavioral control would be high for yoga but low for
healthy ea�ng. If someone has a posi�ve a�tude, posi�ve subjec�ve norms, and high perceived behavioral control, we can predict with some accuracy their
inten�ons to engage in that behavior and their eventual behavior. You might join a yoga program if you have a posi�ve a�tude toward yoga, if people in your
environment think it is a good idea, and if you foresee no problems in ge�ng to the studio for classes.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 6/52
Figure 4.2: The theory of planned behavior
The theory of planned behavior relies on several factors for predic�ng
behavior.
Reprinted from Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organiza�onal Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 50(2), 179–211. Copyright © 1991, with permission from
Elsevier.
Stockbyte/Thinkstock
Edward, a long�me smoker, wants to stop smoking, but has
doubts that he will be able to do so. According to the theory of
planned behavior, these doubts might inhibit his actual behavior
of qui�ng.
The theory of planned behavior is an extension of an earlier theory called the theory of
reasoned ac�on. The theory of reasoned ac�on, developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1972),
predicted behaviors using just a�tudes and subjec�ve norms. Ajzen (1991) later added the
element of perceived behavioral control to provide be�er predic�on of behavior. This addi�on
created be�er forecasts about behavior.
Some behaviors are difficult to control. For example, many people find qui�ng smoking a very
difficult thing to do. Taking into account the amount of control people have for such behaviors
is helpful to predic�ng behavior. For behaviors like qui�ng smoking, where a perceived lack of
control interferes with actually engaging in the behavior, assessing smoker’s beliefs about their
control makes predic�ng smoking cessa�on more reliable (Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992).
Since the addi�on of perceived behavior of control to the model, the theory of planned
behavior has been used to help explain an extremely wide variety of behaviors, from smoking
cessa�on (Norman, Conner, & Bell, 1999), to using dental floss (Rise, Astrom, & Su�on, 1998),
to compos�ng (Kaiser, Wolfing, & Fuhrer, 1999). Evalua�ng these behaviors through meta-
analysis, Armitage and Connor (2001) found that this model can accurately predict behavior,
and that a�tudes, subjec�ve norms, and perceived behavioral control are all important to
accurate predic�on.
This theory does not predict behavior perfectly; there are a few factors that may make it
more or less likely to lead to accurate predic�ons. Habitual behaviors, such as driving a car to
work instead of taking the bus, may not be well-predicted by the model. However, habit may
undergo a change if circumstances change, such as when bus �ckets become cheap and a bus stop comes to one’s street (Bamberg, Ajzen, & Schmidt, 2003;
Verplanken, Aarts, van Knippenberg, & van Knippenberg, 1994). The theory of planned behavior also assumes that people make ra�onal decisions about their
ac�ons. This may be true some of the �me, but at the moment of decision, one’s good inten�ons may not be enough to deter behavior. In one study of risky
sexual behavior, an�cipated emo�ons that would occur a�er sex, such as regret, were a strong predictor of actual sexual behavior (Richard, van der Plight, & de
Vries, 1996). For some decisions, emo�ons may rule the day. Overall, the theory of planned behavior does a be�er job of predic�ng behavior over which
individuals have some control. The theory also is more accurate when people are in the process of actually making decisions, rather than relying on habits or
other mindless behaviors to determine their ac�ons (Manstead, 2011).
The theory of planned behavior may be par�cularly helpful to those who want to encourage people
to engage in healthy behaviors by determining what might be standing in the way of the healthy
behavior. As noted previously, research using the model has been done on a number of health-
related behaviors. Other researchers have inves�gated exercise (Spink, Wilson, & Bos�ck, 2012), fruit
and vegetable consump�on (Kothe, Mullan, & Butow, 2012), screening programs (Cooke & French,
2008), and risky drinking behavior (Collins, Witkiewitz, & Larimer, 2011). If an individual believes
ea�ng lots of vegetables is a good idea (posi�ve a�tude) and those in his or her environment also
think so (subjec�ve norm), but this individual feels unable to buy or prepare vegetables, an
interven�on might be targeted at the element of perceived behavioral control— the individual’s
belief in the inability to a�ain and prepare enough veggies. An informa�on campaign might be
launched that gives hints where to find reasonably priced vegetables and provides recipes for
cooking vegetables. On the other hand, if people did not see the value in ea�ng vegetables (nega�ve
a�tude), but others in their environment were encouraging them to eat vegetables (subjec�ve
norm) and vegetables were easy to find and prepare (perceived behavioral control), a campaign to
change a�tudes might be launched.
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
What are the three components of the theory of planned behavior?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
A�tudes, subjec�ve norms, perceived behavioral control

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 7/52
Expand Your Knowledge: A�tude and Behavior
Mismatch
Do your a�tudes and behaviors always match? If you are similar to
most people, you see distracted driving as dangerous, but also
engage in the behavior.
A post on this issue can be found here
(h�p://blog.dansimons.com/2013/06/when-beliefs-and-ac�ons-are-
misaligned.html) . The author describes a study in California in which
almost 60% of par�cipants listed talking on the phone as a serious
distrac�on for drivers while almost 46% admi�ed to making a
driving mistake while talking on the phone.
Behavior and A�tude Mismatch
Imagine you have agreed to be part of a research study. You come to the study and are asked to do two boring, repe��ve tasks for an hour. As you finish, the
researcher looks distressed; there was supposed to be another student coming to introduce the tasks you just completed to the next par�cipant. The researcher
tells you that the next par�cipant is supposed to be told that these tedious tasks you just completed are fun and interes�ng, with the goal of measuring how
expecta�ons influence performance. The researcher asks if you might be willing to help him out and tell the next par�cipant that what you just did was fun. He
is willing to pay you $1 for your effort. You agree and tell the next par�cipant that the task was interes�ng and exci�ng. A�erward, you are asked how interes�ng
the tasks you just did were and whether you’d be willing to par�cipate in similar types of studies in the future. How would you have answered? Would your
answer be different if the researcher had given you $20?
A group of male college students faced exactly this situa�on in a study by Fes�nger and Carlsmith (1959). In their study, one third of par�cipants received $1 to
tell the next par�cipant that the study they were about to par�cipate in was fun and interes�ng, another third received $20 to do so, and the final third, the
control group, was not asked to say anything to a future par�cipant and was not given any money. Unbeknownst to the par�cipants, the hesitant request was
part of the experiment and the other par�cipant was working for the experimenter. What the researchers were really interested in was whether the different
amounts of pay would affect how par�cipants felt about the study. According to Table 4.1, which group thought the research was most interes�ng when later
asked? Who was most interested in par�cipa�ng in similar studies in the future?
Table 4.1: Results from Fes�nger and Carlsmith’s (1959) study of cogni�ve dissonance
Interview Ques�on Experimental Condi�on
$1
Group
$20
Group
Control
Group
Were the tasks interes�ng and enjoyable? (rated from –5, extremely dull and boring, to +5,
extremely interes�ng and enjoyable)
+1.35 –0.05 –0.45
Would you have any desire to par�cipate in another similar experiment? (rated from –5, definitely
dislike to par�cipate, to +5, definitely like to par�cipate)
+1.20 –0.25 –0.62
From Fes�nger, L. & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cogin�ve consequences of forced compliance. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 58(2), 203-210. doi: 10.1037/h0041593.
As you can see, the par�cipants who received $1 seemed to like the study best. Fes�nger and Carlsmith proposed that those par�cipants who received $1 for
lying to another person felt they had insufficient jus�fica�on for doing so. In other words, these par�cipants lied for a very small amount of money and could
not explain (jus�fy) what they did by the monetary reward. These par�cipants were faced with two things: knowledge that the research was boring (the
researchers had deliberately made it mind-numbingly tedious) and a behavior that involved telling someone else it was interes�ng. The gap between what they
believed and what they did created a type of tension known as cogni�ve dissonance. Cogni�ve dissonance is uncomfortable because it indicates an inconsistency
in what people think or feel and do. People are mo�vated to reduce this tension. The par�cipants could not go back in �me and change what they had done, so
their only op�on was to change how they felt about the study. In the $20 condi�on, there was also a gap between what they did and how they truly felt, but
these people did not experience any tension. They had sufficient jus�fica�on for what they did: $20. The people in the $20 condi�on later reported that the
study was boring because they had no need to jus�fy what they did. When the discomfort of cogni�ve dissonance is felt, it results in an a�tude change to
reduce tension.
Cogni�ve dissonance can be reduced without changing one’s a�tude. For example, if you decided you needed to be on a diet but then went to a dinner and
had chocolate mousse, you could change your a�tude toward the diet (maybe you do not really need to diet), but you could also reduce that tension by doing
other things.
One op�on would be to minimize the importance of one of the elements
(Fes�nger, 1957). You could say that die�ng is not that important to you or that
chocolate mousse is not a big deal. Another op�on would be to reduce your
perceived choice (Beauvois & Joule, 1999; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976). You might
tell yourself it would have been rude if you had not eaten your host’s dessert. You
might also add thoughts that support or explain your behavior. You could tell
yourself that chocolate mousse is healthy; a�er all, chocolate contains flavonoids
that are good for your health.
The principle of cogni�ve dissonance can be helpful in understanding or promo�ng
behavior change. Researchers have found that differences between a�tudes about
da�ng aggression and behaviors resulted in a decrease in da�ng aggression over
�me (Schumacher, 2004). In a study involving high school students at risk for
ea�ng disorders like anorexia or bulimia, researchers induced behavior change by
crea�ng dissonance (S�ce, Rohde, Gau, & Shaw, 2009). The students were part of
a program where they were asked to engage in behaviors that went against their
unhealthy a�tudes toward their bodies and food. For example, they were asked to write a le�er to a young girl about the dangers of the thinness ideal, to share
what they like about themselves, and to prac�ce what they would say to others to challenge the thinness ideal. This interven�on decreased risk factors in the
par�cipants for an ea�ng disorder.

http://blog.dansimons.com/2013/06/when-beliefs-and-actions-are-misaligned.html

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 8/52
Cogni�ve dissonance has different manifesta�ons across cultures (Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005). Individuals in independent cultures like the United States are
more concerned about their own individual iden�ty and a�ributes. Therefore, internal consistency is the primary goal for someone in an independent culture.
For example, if Alice had a posi�ve a�tude toward children and disliked her neighbor’s 4-year-old, she would know these two things were inconsistent. Even if
she never told anyone of about her dislike of the child, she would s�ll feel guilty because her a�tudes and feelings were inconsistent. Individuals in
interdependent cultures, like that found in Japan, are more concerned about how they fit with the expecta�ons of others—in par�cular, others that are part of
their own group. The approval of others is, therefore, of great importance.
For interdependent cultures, internal consistency is not as important as consistency between a�tudes or behaviors, especially when others are going to be
appraised of one’s behavior. In a study by Shinobu Kitayama and colleagues (Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, & Suzuki, 2004), Japanese and American college students
were asked to make judgments that revealed the amount of cogni�ve dissonance they felt. The Japanese college students showed greater dissonance when they
were aware of poten�al public scru�ny of their choices. When there was no poten�al of others being made aware of their choices, dissonance did not appear to
come into play. When this study was done on American college students, the results showed that the poten�al for public scru�ny did not ma�er. Because the
American students were a�emp�ng to be internally consistent, they showed a similar degree of dissonance in both situa�ons. The amount of dissonance the
American students showed was not as high as that shown by the Japanese students who thought their choices would be public, but was higher than that of the
Japanese students who believed others would not know of their choices.
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Why did the $1 group in Fes�nger and Carlsmith’s study say they enjoyed the boring study while the $20 group did not?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
The $1 group had insufficient jus�fica�on for the lie they told, so, to reduce cogni�ve dissonance, they changed their a�tude and said the
study was interes�ng. The $20 group had sufficient jus�fica�on for their behavior and therefore had no cogni�ve dissonance and no need to
change their a�tude.
Social Psychology in Depth: Cogni�ve Dissonance, Children, and Monkeys
Where does cogni�ve dissonance come from? In inves�ga�ng the origins of cogni�ve dissonance social psychologists inves�gate whether children
feel cogni�ve dissonance, or if it develops later in life. We may also want to know if cogni�ve dissonance occurs in nonhuman primates, or if it is
unique to humans. This would help us understand the poten�al evolu�onary origin of the phenomenon.
Egan, Sanatos, & Bloom (2007) inves�gated cogni�ve dissonance in children and in monkeys. For both popula�ons, they created cogni�ve
dissonance by having the child or monkey make a choice between two alterna�ves, two different s�ckers for the children or two different M&M
candies for the monkeys. Frequently, when faced with two equally good op�ons, we will reduce our cogni�ve dissonance by increasing our liking
of our chosen op�on, and decreasing our liking of the op�on we did not choose.
In this study, the par�cipants made an ini�al choice and were then asked to make a second choice. The second choice included the op�on not
chosen on the first trial and a new op�on. Presumably, if cogni�ve dissonance was at play, the par�cipants would have decreased their liking of
their un-chosen op�on and be less likely to choose that op�on in the second trial. For example, if children originally rated s�ckers with a flower,
a bird, and a rainbow equally, they might ini�ally be asked if they wanted the flower or the bird s�cker more. Having chosen the flower, they
would then be asked to choose between the bird (the op�on not chosen in the previous trial) and the rainbow. If cogni�ve dissonance is in play,
they should choose the rainbow. The ini�al choice would have created cogni�ve dissonance, leading the children to discount their liking of the
bird s�cker to reduce that dissonance. Even though the par�cipants ini�ally liked all three op�ons equally, the results showed that a�er making a
choice, they were less likely to choose the op�on they had not chosen on the first trial. The authors proposed that due to the fact this effect is
found among young children (4-year-olds) and monkeys, cogni�ve dissonance may be impac�ng us before we have much experience in making
choices; language and socializa�on may not be necessary precursors to cogni�ve dissonance.
What Is my A�tude?
If a�tudes help determine our behaviors, do behaviors ever help us define our a�tudes? If you were wondering about your a�tude toward sushi, one place you
could look to determine your a�tude is your behavior. If you have chosen sushi restaurants over those that do not serve sushi and order sushi when you get the
chance, you are likely to conclude that you have a posi�ve a�tude toward sushi. If you have spent a lot of �me making fun of people who eat sushi, you might
conclude, looking at these ac�ons, that your a�tude toward sushi is nega�ve. This sense that we can figure out our a�tudes by looking at our behaviors is the
basis of self-percep�on theory (Bem, 1967). Self-percep�on theory explains how we might form or enhance par�cular a�tudes, while cogni�ve dissonance
theory explains how our a�tudes change.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5.… 9/52
Hemera/Thinkstock
An example of self-percep�on theory is when you assume that
you don’t like the news just because you repeatedly change the
channel when a news report comes on TV.
To evaluate the extent to which our ac�ons influence our a�tudes, Zak, Gold, Ryckman, & Lenney
(1998) asked 64 da�ng couples to come to their lab. Each member of the couple was asked to
provide informa�on on how much they trusted their partner. The couples were separated and told
one of three things. The first third of par�cipants were told that their partner would be dancing with
a research assistant to a Debbie Gibson or Madonna song. These par�cipants were asked if that was
okay with them—if they trusted their partner to dance with someone else. The next third of
par�cipants were told they would be dancing with a research assistant to a Debbie Gibson or
Madonna song. The researchers told them that their partner had been asked if that was all right,
and their partner had said yes, they trusted their significant other. The final third of par�cipants, the
control group, were told that their partner would be listening to music.
The researchers wanted to measure whether ac�ng in a trus�ng manner, that is, telling the
researcher that they trusted their partner to dance with someone else, would increase trust. When
the researchers assessed levels of trust at the end of the study, they found that both the
par�cipants who acted in a trus�ng way and those who were trusted showed an increase in trust
when compared to the control group. The biggest change, however, was with the par�cipants who
acted in a trus�ng ma�er. The act of trus�ng, it seems, increases trust.
Behavior can be affected in more subtle ways by our self-observa�ons, such as with our rela�onship
to certain colors. The color black is o�en associated with bad things. This fact is evident in our
language. For example, people might be blacklisted or blackmailed, or their reputa�on might be
blackened. Even dark colored chocolate cake is called devil’s food cake. Would members of sports
teams in black uniforms therefore observe themselves in that bad color and be more willing to
engage in aggressive behavior? Frank and Gilovich (1988) inves�gated whether what we are wearing
has an impact on our ac�ons. They found that individuals who donned black were more willing to
engage in aggression, measured by their choice of aggressive games over nonaggressive games, than
those who were asked to wear white. Na�onal Hockey League teams wearing black were more
aggressive on the rink than those wearing other colors; that is, members of teams wearing black
spent more �me in the penalty box than teams wearing other colors. A similar result was found in
online gaming with people whose avatars were wearing black (Yee & Bailenson, 2009).
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Of self-percep�on theory and cogni�ve dissonance theory, which is more focused on a�tude change rather than a�tude forma�on?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Cogni�ve dissonance theory

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 10/52
4.3 Explaining the Behavior of Others
Our daily lives present us with situa�ons where we need to explain the behaviors of others. At work, you might want to know if your boss intended her behavior
as encouragement to pursue a raise or as a clue that your job might be in danger. A�ribu�ng your friend’s late-night phone call to concern will affect the
rela�onship differently than a�ribu�ng it to rudeness. A�ribu�ons are also involved in deciding the proper punishment of a misbehaving child or a criminal.
A�ribu�ons—our explana�ons of the behavior of others and ourselves—have been of interest to psychologists for a long �me. In 1958, Fritz Heider wrote a book
on how we make judgments about one another. According to Heider, and others who came a�er him, we generally explain others’ behavior as due either to
something internal to the person or to something external to the person.
Imagine you are si�ng in a coffee shop wai�ng for a date you met online. Your date is late. If you decide that your date is inconsiderate, you have made an
internal a�ribu�on for your date’s behavior. When you make an internal a�ribu�on, you blame personality, a�tudes, or some other disposi�onal factor for the
ac�on. If, on the other hand, you think your date is late because of the traffic or some emergency at work, you have made an external a�ribu�on. When you
make an external a�ribu�on, you a�ribute situa�onal factors for the ac�on. We do find differences in the pa�erns of a�ribu�ons in different cultures. Generally,
individuals from more independent cultures make more internal a�ribu�ons while those in more interdependent cultures make more external a�ribu�ons
(Triandis, 2001). For example, in the United States, salespeople tend to a�ribute their performance to internal factors—their sales are due to their hard work and
wonderful people skills. In more interdependent cultures, such as that found in India, a�ribu�ons tend to be more external—their sales are due to a good
customer base (DeCarlo, Agarwal, & Vyas, 2007).
A�ribu�ons can make a difference in how we treat people and deal with societal problems. For example, how crime is a�ributed can impact how we handle
criminals. If a society and the people within that society believe that criminals engage in crime because it was their choice or because they have no morals, then
that society will lock up its criminals and try to prevent them from ever ge�ng out to offend again. On the other hand, a society that believes that lack of job
opportuni�es, racism, or peer pressure is primarily to blame for criminal behavior is likely to offer rehabilita�on and educa�on to criminals as well as work to
eradicate societal ills (Templeton & Hartnagel, 2012; Unnever, Cullen, & Jones, 2008).

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec5… 11/52
The nature of the fundamental a�ribu�on error.
Fundamental A�ribu�on Error
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
Why do people assume that hosts are smarter than
contestants?
How have you seen the fundamental a�ribu�on error
play out in your own life?
4.4 Fundamental A�ribu�on Error
Daily life offers many opportuni�es to make a�ribu�ons. When a neighbor fails to greet or wave at you while passing in the hallway or street, you might declare
your neighbor rude and unfriendly. Blaming a behavior on a disposi�onal factor, like rudeness, may not be accurate. Your neighbor might not have seen you
because of the large bag of groceries you were holding, or been distracted by a fight she just had with her child. When people a�ribute behavior to disposi�onal
factors when there are clear situa�onal factors at work, they are engaging in correspondence bias, also known as the fundamental a�ribu�on error (Gilbert &
Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977). See Figure 4.3 for an example.
Figure 4.3: The fundamental a�ribu�on error
O�en when we a�ribute behavior to disposi�onal factors, we engage in the fundamental a�ribu�on error.
Based on Wade, C., & Tavris, C. (2004). Interac�ve lectures. In Psychology, Media and Research Update (7th ed., Chapter 8). Retrieved from
h�p://wps.prenhall.com/hss_wade_psychology_7_mru/21/5605/1434950.cw/content/index.html
(h�p://wps.prenhall.com/hss_wade_psychology_7_mru/21/5605/1434950.cw/content/index.html) .
In Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz’s (1977) study on the subject, par�cipants were randomly assigned the role of ques�oner or contestant in a quiz game. The
ques�oners came up with ques�ons from their own storehouse of esoteric knowledge. Depending on the background of the ques�oners, they might develop
ques�ons on geography or cars or breeds of cows or any number of other odd topics. Contestants completed the quiz and rated the general knowledge of the
ques�oner. Given the freedom of the ques�oner to develop difficult ques�ons from any realm, most contestants did not do very well. When ra�ng the general
knowledge of the ques�oner, they overes�mated that knowledge. The contestants overes�mated the effect of disposi�onal factors (knowledge) and
underes�mated the effect of the situa�on (freedom to ask any ques�on).
Various factors make the fundamental a�ribu�on error more likely. People make the fundamental a�ribu�on error more when they are happy versus when they
are sad. Because happy people process less informa�on from their environment, they tend to make quick and easy decisions about the cause of the behavior of
others (Forgas, 1998). The a�ribu�ons people make with the fundamental a�ribu�on error grow more situa�onal over �me. When making an immediate
a�ribu�on, we tend to show the bias toward disposi�onal a�ribu�ons predicted by the fundamental a�ribu�on error. When �me has passed, our judgments take
the situa�on into account to a greater degree (Burger & Pavelich, 1994; Truchot, Maure, & Pa�e, 2003). Over �me, then, the power of the fundamental
a�ribu�on error diminishes. The likelihood of making the fundamental a�ribu�on error also diminishes from young adulthood to middle age. A�er middle age,
the likelihood of making the error begins to increase again (Folle� & Hess, 2002).
There are certainly �mes when behavior is due to rudeness, so your decision that your neighbor is
inconsiderate could be appropriate. The fundamental a�ribu�on error is an error because we make
these kinds of decisions about someone’s disposi�on even when clear situa�onal factors are at work.
But you don’t make this error, do you? Most people believe themselves to be less vulnerable to the
fundamental a�ribu�on error than others, even though we are generally similar to others like us in
our tendency to make the error (Van Boven, Kamada, & Gilovich, 1999; Van Boven, White, Kamada, &
Gilovich, 2003).
One context where the fundamental a�ribu�on error is par�cularly likely is in communica�on using a
computer. Messages in one’s email inbox provide few cues as to the situa�on of the writer. Without
these cues, it is easy to misjudge details about the sender and the message. For example, if you
received a message with a number of misspellings and grammar mistakes, it is likely you would judge
the writer of that message as not very intelligent or competent. Without knowing the writer was pressed for �me, distracted by a crying child, and dealing with a
faulty computer keyboard, you may judge that disposi�onal, rather than situa�onal, factors were at work (Cramton, 2001). It is only when we are made aware of
some of these situa�onal forces that we change our judgments. One study found that when people are told that the sender of an email is from a different
culture, the email recipients are less harsh in their disposi�onal judgments for language errors like misspellings, although disposi�onal judgments are s�ll made
for e�que�e errors (Vignovic & Thompson, 2010).
With a name like fundamental a�ribu�on error, one would assume that this error is common in all people in all cultures. Not so. When comparing European
Americans, researchers have found that East Asians are more aware of situa�onal constraints on behavior.

http://wps.prenhall.com/hss_wade_psychology_7_mru/21/5605/1434950.cw/content/index.html

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 12/52
Hemera/Thinkstock
When a driver assumes the person who cut
him off is inconsiderate and incompetent, even
though they may have had to switch lanes to
avoid an accident, it is an example of the
fundamental a�ribu�on error.
When situa�ons are powerful or easily recognized, East Asians are more likely to a�ribute behavior to those situa�onal factors (Choi, Nisbe�, & Norenzayan,
1999; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002; Morris & Peng, 1994). When research par�cipants were told that the person whose behavior they were evalua�ng had no
choice in his behavior, and simply followed the direc�ons of the experimenter, Korean par�cipants were more likely to take into account the situa�onal
constraints on the person, whereas American par�cipants largely ignored the situa�onal factors (Choi & Nisbe�, 1998). For example, someone raised in an East
Asian culture might say that a person is rude because his parents never taught him manners rather than rude because it is part of his nature. East Asians also
think more holis�cally about the person (Choi, Nisbe�, & Norenzayan, 1999). Even if someone’s behavior is blamed on internal factors, these internal factors are
explained situa�onally. Although the phenomenon came to be known as the fundamental a�ribu�on error because so many researchers found similar results
over a number of years (Jones, 1998), it turns out the fundamental a�ribu�on error is not as fundamental as we thought.
A related concept to the fundamental a�ribu�on error is the actor-observer bias. The fundamental a�ribu�on
error suggests that as observers, people discount situa�onal factors and overes�mate disposi�onal factors. The
actor-observer bias expands this tendency to explain our own behavior as actors. Actors tend to make more
situa�onal a�ribu�ons for behavior (Jones & Nisbe�, 1972). The situa�onally based explana�ons for our own
behavior are stronger when we are explaining nega�ve rather than posi�ve events (Green & McClearn, 2010).
When explaining posi�ve events, like doing well on a test, the self-serving bias leads us to account for our
behavior using more disposi�onal explana�ons, such as our own intelligence.
Recent research has called into ques�on the tradi�onal formula�on of the actor-observer bias. In a meta-
analysis, Bertram Malle (2006) found that actors are not more likely to make situa�onal inference, and
observers are not more likely to make disposi�onal inferences. Actors and observers do, however, explain
behaviors differently. Malle and colleagues (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007) proposed an asymmetry in
explana�ons based in different desires and different knowledge. Actors know the reasons behind a decision and
are mo�vated to present themselves as ra�onal people. Imagine Jill cleaned out the work refrigerator and in
the process threw out several people’s lunches. She would describe her ac�on as due to the boss’s request to
clean the refrigerator, the lack of clear markings on containers about who they belonged to, and her overall
helpfulness in keeping the office clean.
Observers can only guess at the reasons for a behavior and must instead rely on their general knowledge of
situa�ons and their ability to mentally simulate the thought process of the actor.
Observers have no par�cular need to present the actor in a posi�ve light. Jill’s coworkers might explain her
ac�ons as irra�onal, making the argument that the refrigerator did not need to be cleaned and Jill should not
throw out things that do not belong to her. The coworkers would describe Jill’s ac�ons as due to her rude and inconsiderate nature. Observers are more likely to
distance themselves from an actor’s ac�ons by making note of a belief or mo�ve rather than just the reason itself. Jill might say, “The food in the refrigerator
was old; that’s why I threw it out.” A coworker would say, “Jill believed the food in the refrigerator was old; that’s why she threw it out.” Malle and colleagues’
explana�ons for differences between actors and observers provide a more nuanced approach to these differences and help explain inconsistencies in past
research.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Someone cuts in line in front of you at the grocery store. Describe some internal a�ribu�ons for that behavior. Describe some external
a�ribu�ons for that behavior.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Examples might include: Internal a�ribu�ons—the person is rude, a jerk, inconsiderate; External a�ribu�ons—the person is distracted by
his/her children, cannot see me because of large display, was directed to my line by a store employee
Which of these people may have made the fundamental a�ribu�on error?
Janelle believes the clown she hired for her son’s birthday party is a happy and joyful person.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Janelle may be making the fundamental a�ribu�on error. The clown’s job, a situa�onal factor, requires joyful behavior. The happy behavior
the clown shows may not be due to disposi�onal factors but to situa�onal factors.
Kim a�ributes the store clerk’s rude behavior toward her to the crankiness of the customer in front of her.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Kim is not making the fundamental a�ribu�on error because she is a�ribu�ng the clerk’s behavior to a situa�onal factor, the previous
customer, rather than something about the clerk him/herself.
Ted a�ributes his friend’s service at the soup kitchen to his kind and giving nature, not a requirement of the social work major his friend
is pursuing.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 13/52
Ted is making the fundamental a�ribu�on error. He is ignoring situa�onal influences on his friend’s behavior and describing the behavior as
due to something disposi�onal.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 14/52
4.5 Explana�ons and our Behavior
As we make a�ribu�ons day a�er day, we may develop pa�erns for making these judgments. These pa�erns then influence how we approach others and react
to events. Two of the major pa�erns inves�gated by researchers are those surrounding whether we explain events in an op�mis�c or pessimis�c way and the
extent to which we expect hos�lity from others in our interac�ons. The a�ribu�ons we make are influenced by our need to fit in with others but also by our
need to differen�ate and stand out from the crowd. However, we tend to overes�mate the amount we stand out and are no�ced by others. The behaviors we
engage in are influenced by these various pa�erns of a�ribu�ons.
Op�mis�c and Pessimis�c Explanatory Styles
Every day we interpret the ac�ons of others and the events that occur. As we do so, we may fall into a certain pa�ern of explana�on. One pa�ern of a�ribu�ons
is op�mis�c and leads us to expect posi�ve outcomes from our interac�ons. Another pa�ern is more pessimis�c and leads us to expect nega�ve outcomes from
our interac�ons. Consider how you would explain these two events: your date complimen�ng you on your appearance and your inability to find a job. According
to researchers, you have three decisions to make as you interpret those events (Seligman & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Seligman & Schulman, 1986). When you are
explaining a compliment you receive, you could assume the other person was just having a good day and complimented everyone. On the other hand, you could
assume that the compliment was prompted by your own appearance. In this case you are a�ribu�ng the compliment to either an external cause, something
about the other person or the circumstance, or an internal cause, something about you. Your second choice involves whether you consider the compliment to be
an event that will likely never or rarely happen again, like a free makeover you just had, or something that will always be around, your a�rac�ve face. In this
case, you are making an a�ribu�on that is either unstable, meaning that the cause is there rarely or only some of the �me, or stable, meaning that the cause is
always there. You need to decide whether the compliment just applies to your present appearance at the mall where you got the makeover, or whether you will
likely get compliments in all situa�ons in your life. In this case you are making a decision of whether the cause is specific, applying only in this par�cular
situa�on, or global, applying to all situa�ons. Pu�ng this all together: When you decide on the cause for a behavior or event, you decide whether it is external
or internal, unstable or stable, and specific or global.
People tend to have rela�vely stable pa�erns in making such decisions. These pa�erns characterize a person’s explanatory style. If you received a compliment,
what kind of a�ribu�on do you think would make you feel the best? If you consider the cause of the compliment to be internal (something about you), stable
(something that will always be there), and global (something that will be found in all situa�ons), you are likely to feel be�er about yourself.
Would the same be true in explaining long-term unemployment? If you think about a nega�ve event like long-term unemployment, an explana�on that will make
you feel best about yourself is one that says the cause is external (something about the job market), unstable (a job market that will change), and specific
(applies only to the job market).
People with an op�mis�c explanatory style show exactly this pa�ern. Someone who is op�mis�c will explain posi�ve events as internal, stable, and global.
Nega�ve events, on the other hand, will be explained as external, unstable, and specific.
Individuals with a pessimis�c explanatory style have exactly the opposite pa�ern. Pessimis�c people generally blame themselves for nega�ve events and believe
those events are typical of what is likely to happen in many aspects of their lives. They also tend to imagine such events con�nuing in the future. Op�mis�c
people generally blame outside influences for nega�ve events and interpret these events as temporary. See Figure 4.4 for examples of how op�mists and
pessimists may respond to certain events.
Figure 4.4: Explanatory style
Op�mis�c people see bad events in the same way as pessimis�c people see good events. Conversely, pessimis�c people
see bad events in the same way as op�mis�c people see good events.
Op�mis�c explanatory style is related to more posi�ve well-being in both younger and older adults (Forgeard & Seligman, 2012; Mohanty & Begum, 2012).
Individuals with op�mis�c explanatory styles are more likely to persist in the face of failure. This can be seen in the case of sales agents. Sales agents experience

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 15/52
Lewis J Merrim/Photo Researchers/Ge�y Images
As part of their study, Peterson and Ulrey gave par�cipants Thema�c
Appercep�on Tests. Subjects were given an ambiguous scene and asked to
describe what was happening in the scene.
Expand Your Knowledge: Mar�n Seligman
Mar�n Seligman, a prominent researcher in the area of explanatory
style, has a website dedicated to his research. The website is
primarily focused on his work on posi�ve psychology, but some
references to work on explanatory style and learned helplessness
are provided.
Seligman’s website: h�p://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/index.html.
(h�p://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/index.html)
Opportuni�es to par�cipate in Seligman’s ongoing research are
available. Seligman is known for his work on explanatory style, so
there may be some related to the material within the text.
Seligman also does research in the area of posi�ve psychology,
studying human flourishing.
a lot of failure, as the majority of their poten�al clients say no to their product. Researchers assessed the explanatory style of beginning life insurance agents
using a ques�onnaire and followed them to see how much life insurance they would sell and how long they would remain in their jobs (Seligman & Schulman,
1986). Those agents who were most op�mis�c sold the most insurance. At the end of the first year, those who were the most op�mis�c were twice as likely to
s�ll be selling insurance.
In contrast, individuals with a pessimis�c explanatory style are more likely to get sick when they encounter stressful events (Benne� & Ellio�, 2005; Jackson,
Sellers, & Peterson, 2002). Pessimis�c explanatory styles have been linked to depression and suicide (Hirsch, Wolford, LaLonde, Brunk, & Parker-Morris, 2009;
Peterson & Seligman, 1984). When people with nega�ve explanatory styles encounter a bad event, like losing a job, they are likely to explain it as due to
something about them, such as having unmarketable skills—something that will always be there, such as no one will ever hire someone with their skills, and
something that is global, such as that all of their skills are useless. These explana�ons lead to a state of learned helplessness. Learned helplessness occurs when
we have acquired through our experiences a sense that no ma�er what we do, our ac�ons will not have a posi�ve impact on nega�ve experiences (Seligman &
Maier, 1967). When a job loss is explained as internal, stable, and global, it is unlikely anything the person does will change the situa�on; so giving up is the
most ra�onal response to the problem.
Nega�ve explanatory styles are linked to poorer academic performance (Peterson
& Barre�, 1987). Researchers found that first-year university students who
interpreted nega�ve events as internal, stable, and global received lower grades.
These lower grades seemed to be due to a reluctance to seek help when
struggling (why do so if you believe your poor performance is due to your lack of
intelligence?) and a lack of academic goal se�ng. Similarly, college students with a
pessimis�c explanatory style were less likely to ac�vely deal with their symptoms
when they got ill, prolonging or exacerba�ng their illnesses (Lin & Peterson, 1990).
Pessimism does not always link to poor performance. In a longitudinal study of law
students, researchers assessed explanatory style with a survey at the beginning of
law school and revisited the students throughout their �me in school (Sa�erfield,
Monahan, & Seligman, 1997). The students with a more pessimis�c style at the
beginning of school ended up with higher grade point averages and did be�er in
publishing in law journals. The difference may come from the fact that the law
students had already proven to be resilient in the face of problems, given their
ability to get into law school, as well as a profession that rewards skep�cism and
cau�ous decision making.
Social Psychology in Depth: A�ribu�on, Story, and Depression
Our explana�ons for behavior influence how we feel about ourselves. Adler,
Kissel, and McAdams (2006) interviewed adults within the community, asking
them to tell about eight different episodes in their life (e.g., childhood
memory, high point, low point) as well as themes they saw in their life and
how they would divide their life into chapters. When the researchers looked
at a�ribu�ons made in the stories, they found that when individuals
explained nega�ve events in their stories as stable and global, they were
more likely to report symptoms of depression in a depression scale. Keep in
mind that these were a�ribu�ons that appeared spontaneously and were not
solicited by the researchers through a ques�onnaire or direct ques�ons.
Depression was also related to contamina�on sequences in stories. A
contamina�on sequence occurs when a story begins well but is ruined or
spoiled by nega�ve events. For example, someone might tell a story about a
fun day at the beach that was spoiled by a fight and ended in a car ride
home in stony silence. The presence of these types of stories independently
predicted depression, apart from a�ribu�onal style.
Other evidence linking stories with a�ribu�onal style and depression was found by Peterson and Ulrey (1994). In their study, they showed people
pictures of ambiguous scenes and asked them to describe what was happening in the picture. The researchers then analyzed the stories that
were told. They found that individuals who used a nega�ve a�ribu�onal style to tell stories explaining the events were at greater risk for
depression. We may o�en think of depression as simply feeling bad about oneself and the world, but these studies reveal that depression is
related to the way we view and describe the world around us.

http://www.ppc.sas.upenn.edu/index.html

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 16/52
Test Yourself
For each of the following indicate whether the explana�on is internal or external, stable or unstable, global or specific. Click on each explana�on
below to reveal the answer.
Karen blames her own stupidity for her bad grade on the history test. For all of her classes she says that any studying she does goes to
waste because she never does any be�er.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Internal, stable, global
Andrew believes his disastrous date on Friday night was due to a cold he is developing that made him a bad conversa�on partner. Once
he recovers he’s certain future dates will go be�er. His cold might also be to blame for a fight he had with his roommate in the morning
and the bad day at work he had on Friday.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Internal, unstable, global
Jeremy blames his bad day at work on his computer losing the project he worked so hard on. Fortunately, all his other work is going
well, and the technology department promised to have his computer fixed tomorrow.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
External, unstable, specific
Shawna celebrates her new job. She believes her great interviewing skills landed her the job, skills she has honed over the years and
uses in all kinds of situa�ons.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
Internal, stable, global
A Hos�le World
Some individuals view the world as a hos�le place. In making judgments about the ac�ons of others, we can decide that others engaged in those ac�ons to
deliberately harm us. People who chronically make these kinds of judgments have a hos�le a�ribu�on of intent, some�mes called hos�le a�ribu�on bias (de
Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). If you believe someone has deliberately stepped on your toes or cut in front of you in line, your reac�on
is likely to be different than if you believe these ac�ons were uninten�onal. Hos�le a�ribu�on of intent does tend to lead to more aggressive behavior, at least in
children, where this has been studied the most (de Castro et al., 2002). One source of these a�ribu�ons may be peer interac�ons or interac�ons in the home.
Freeman and colleagues (Freeman, Hadwin, & Halligan, 2011) conducted a study in which kids in their early teenage years communicated with hos�le or non-
hos�le teens in an online chat room. Some of the teens from this chat room explained behavior of others in a hos�le way, but for others the explana�ons were
more benign. For example, when explaining why a group of unknown kids stood up when approached, some said it was a desire to defend territory, a hos�le
a�ribu�on. For others a more nonthreatening explana�on was given—that the kids were going to give a gree�ng. The teens that interacted with more hos�le
peers were more likely to make hos�le a�ribu�ons.
For children, a rejec�on by their peers can ac�vate the hos�le a�ribu�on of intent and lead to aggressive ac�on. Kids who thought others rejected a personal
profile they posted online believed that others had more hos�le intent toward them and were angrier and more aggressive toward the rejecters (Reijntjes et al.,
2011). Family also plays a role. Nega�ve interac�ons within the home are related to more hos�le a�ribu�ons (Bicke�, Milich, & Brown, 1996; Gomez & Gomez,
2000). For example, parents who reported using harsh discipline tac�cs had children with more hos�le interac�on goals and more aggressive behavior
(Heidgerken, Hughes, Cavell, & Willson, 2004). Children’s exposure to violent video games also increases hos�le a�ribu�ons, both immediately a�er they play and
over �me (Hasan, Bégue, Scharkow, & Bushman, 2013).
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Given the factors that contribute to and are related to a hos�le a�ribu�on of intent, describe a person who is likely to show a hos�le
a�ribu�on of intent.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
The person has peers that act in a hos�le way or make hos�le a�ribu�ons, has been rejected by peers, has nega�ve interac�ons at home,
and has recently played a violent video game.
Just Like Everybody Else

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 17/52
As we observe others, we look for clues concerning what they think or feel. One way in which we fill in the gaps of our knowledge is to overes�mate the extent
to which people have similar interests and preferences, a phenomenon called the false consensus effect. For example, we assume that our friend will love going
to our favorite coffee shop; we love the place, surely our friend will as well!
When research par�cipants were asked about something they liked, such as movies or par�cular types of music, and then asked to es�mate the degree to which
others like those things, they tended to overes�mate the extent to which their own preferences are shared by other people (Gilovich, 1990; Ross, Greene, &
House, 1977). False consensus is stronger for our likes than our dislikes (Gershoff, Mukherjee, & Mukhopadhyay, 2008). We more easily come up with reasons for
liking what we like, so we may overes�mate how common those opinions are (Mullen et al., 1985). We engage in the false consensus effect for a wide variety of
opinions, from favorite ice cream sundae toppings or movie posters (Gershoff et al., 2008) to favorite celebri�es (Bui, 2012), from sexual behavior (Whitley, 1998)
to illegal drug use among both college students and elite athletes (Dunn, Thomas, Swi�, & Burns, 2012; Wolfson, 2000).
False consensus comes, in part, from selec�ve exposure to others that are like us and agree with us (Whitley, 1998). Online groups are one way people connect
with others who are like-minded. Being part of one of these groups may increase false consensus by giving one a feeling that there are many people who share
one’s opinions, even though there may be few in the general popula�on (Wojcieszak, 2008, 2011). When trying to es�mate how many other people share our
opinions, instances where we remember others agreeing with us (e.g., I like cats too!) more easily come to mind and may therefore lead us to overes�mate how
many others do agree (Marks & Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985). Another source of our overes�ma�ons comes from our desire to see ourselves as part of the
group (Marks & Miller, 1987; Sherman, Presson, & Chassin, 1984). People who have a greater need to belong show a greater tendency toward false consensus
(Morrison & Ma�hes, 2011). In a desire to see our behavior as normal, we may overes�mate the extent to which others are engaging in that behavior. For
example, college women who were sexually experienced gave higher, and less accurate, assessments of peer sexual behavior; the further their own behavior was
from the norm, the higher their es�mates of their peers’ behavior (Whitley, 1998).
False consensus may lead us to make judgments about others that can create later problems. For example, not knowing if your online date likes the singer
Beyoncé or not, you may simply assume he or she does because you do. This can make addi�onal conversa�ons and face-to-face mee�ngs problema�c when
one’s illusions about the other person’s thoughts and a�tudes are revealed (Bridges, 2012; Finkel, Eastwick, Karney, Reis, & Sprecher, 2012). Even more serious,
false consensus has been shown to lead to inaccurate judgments about HIV risk in in�mate rela�onships (Harman, O’Grady, & Wilson, 2009). If judgments based
on false consensus translate into risky behavior, severe consequences can result.
In contrast, we also have behaviors or beliefs that we view as unique. The tendency for people to underes�mate the extent to which their opinions or behaviors
are shared by others is the uniqueness bias, or the false uniqueness effect. This underes�ma�on usually involves beliefs or behaviors that are desirable or a
source of pride. When we perceive our a�ributes to be more unique than they really are, we make ourselves feel even be�er about our rare and wonderful
quali�es. For example, if you give blood on a regular basis, you may underes�mate the number of people who also give blood so that you feel par�cularly
virtuous (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989; Goethals, 1986; Monin & Norton, 2003).
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
When are we likely to find the greatest false consensus?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
We should find the greatest false consensus about things that we like or about behaviors we may think of as wrong or that others
disapprove of (chea�ng on a test). We should also find greater false consensus when we are high in need to belong.
What do Others See?
When people feel a strong emo�on, they o�en overes�mate others’ ability to discern that emo�on. For example, if your new roman�c interest baked you
terrible-tas�ng cookies, your feeling of disgust as you ate them might not be as clear to your date as you think it is (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; Holder &
Hawkins, 2007). This tendency to believe that our thoughts or feelings can be more clearly seen by others than they actually are is called the illusion of
transparency. If you have ever been surprised that a family member did not know you were upset or that your boss did not no�ce how hard you worked, blame
the illusion of transparency (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1999). Because we believe those we are closest to can read us well, or at least be�er than others can, we are
more likely to have an illusion of transparency among those we know well, such as a friend or roman�c partner (Kudo, 2007). This principle also applies to our
beliefs about our ability to lie. People generally believe that their lies are easier to spot than they actually are (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998; Rai, Mitchell,
& Faelling, 2012). In truth, the emo�ons or behaviors that we thought were so apparent to others are not so clear.
Evidence for the illusion of transparency has proven helpful to those who suffer from speech anxiety. Although most people who suffer from speech anxiety
believe their anxiety is evident to the audience, most people listening to a speech are unaware of the extent of the anxiety the speaker suffers. A�er realizing
this, those high in speech anxiety gave be�er speeches (Savitsky & Gilovich, 2003). The vicious cycle of being anxious, believing others know we are anxious, and
therefore becoming more anxious can be broken by knowledge of this illusion.
Along with our illusion of transparency comes a sense that others are aware of our
triumphs and our trials. This tendency to believe that others no�ce our behaviors and
appearance to a greater extent than they actually do is known as the spotlight effect.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 18/52
Hans Neleman/Ge�y Images
Some�mes you might feel that everyone no�ces your behaviors or appearance,
when in reality, most people aren’t paying a�en�on. This is called the spotlight
effect.
Imagine you arrange to meet a new friend at a restaurant. When you get to the
restaurant, you realize you have a spot of spaghe� sauce on your sleeve. Although
you believe your friend will quickly zero in on the spilled sauce, the likelihood is that
person is too focused on making a good impression to no�ce such a small spot.
In one study of the spotlight effect, college students were asked to don a T-shirt with
a depic�on of Barry Manilow on the front. Manilow is a singer-songwriter who is well
known but not very popular with college students. The Manilow T-shirt was chosen
because college students reported that they would be embarrassed to be known as a
Manilow fan. A�er the students had put on the shirt, they were brought to a room
where other students were working, staying there briefly before leaving again. A�er
leaving the room, the students were asked how many of the other students no�ced
their T-shirt. The T-shirt wearers believed, on average, that about 45% of the people in
the room would no�ce their Manilow shirt. The other students were also asked if
they no�ced the Manilow shirt. Of the students in the room, on average, just over
20% of the students actually did no�ce (Gilovich, Medvic, & Savitsky, 2000).
Along with this sense that we are no�ced, we generally believe that others judge us
more harshly than they actually do. For example, if you accidentally set off an alarm
by taking the fire exit as you le� a university library, you might assume everyone
thinks you are stupid. While there may be a few who think so, the vast majority of students are much less harsh in their judgments and are likely to be
sympathe�c to your plight (Savitsky, Epley, & Gilovich, 2001). Embarrassment caused by the behavior of a friend or rela�ve is also o�en more acutely felt than is
necessary. When someone we are known to be associated with makes a blunder, others generally do not connect that ac�on with us, contrary to what we might
think (Fortune & Newby-Clark, 2008). Just because your brother picks his nose in public does not mean that others think you are disgus�ng by associa�on.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Why is the illusion of transparency called an illusion?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
With the illusion of transparency people believe that others readily see what they feel and believe, but they do not. Our perceived
transparency is an illusion, a false belief.
If you dropped your books all over the sidewalk, what would the spotlight effect predict you would feel and others would no�ce?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
The spotlight effect predicts you would feel like a spotlight was shining on you and your mistake, like everyone would no�ce. Most other
people would fail to no�ce your blunder.
Conclusion
Our lives are full of things that demand explana�on. People form a�tudes by evalua�ng the things and objects in their environment. Although we may not
always be aware of the a�tudes we hold, they may s�ll affect our behavior. These a�tudes can be helpful in predic�ng our behavior, although many other
factors come into play. Our a�tudes can change because of our behavior (as in cogni�ve dissonance theory), or be formed because of our behavior (as in self-
percep�on theory). As we make judgments, our a�ribu�ons tend to follow certain pa�erns. Those pa�erns can be fairly common across a culture, as is so with
the fundamental a�ribu�on error, or be based on our experiences in life, as is so with the hos�le a�ribu�on of intent.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 19/52
Chapter Summary
Defini�on of A�tudes
A�tudes involve an evalua�on of an en�ty or behavior. A�tudes can be placed on a con�nuum from weak to strong, and on a con�nuum from posi�ve to
nega�ve. When people report on an a�tude, they are describing an a�tude that they are consciously aware of, called an explicit a�tude. A�tudes that emerge
from automa�c processes are implicit a�tudes. Implicit a�tudes can be assessed with the Implicit Associa�on Test (IAT).
Behavior and A�tudes
A�tudes and behaviors are o�en misaligned. We are more likely to see an agreement between a�tude and behavior when the a�tude is accessible and it
matches the behavior in level of specificity, the behavior is easy to perform, and social pressures support an alignment. The theory of planned behavior allows
for the predic�on of behaviors from a�tudes, subjec�ve norms, and perceived behavioral control. Cogni�ve dissonance theory proposes that when our a�tudes
and behaviors do not match up and we have insufficient jus�fica�on, we are likely to change our a�tude. Self-percep�on theory involves figuring out our
a�tudes from observing our own behavior.
Explaining the Behavior of Others
When making a�ribu�ons, we a�empt to explain the behavior of others. Internal a�ribu�ons involve a�ribu�ng an ac�on to something internal to the person,
such as personality. When we make external a�ribu�ons, on the other hand, we a�ribute ac�ons to something outside the person, such as current
circumstances. When we make internal a�ribu�ons despite plausible external causes we are making the fundamental a�ribu�on error. The actor-observer bias
adds the idea that as actors we point to situa�onal factors in our behavior.
Explana�ons and Our Behavior
Our habitual pa�erns of making a�ribu�ons can vary in terms of whether we make an internal versus external, a stable versus unstable, and a global versus
specific a�ribu�on. When we make internal, stable, and global a�ribu�ons for posi�ve things, and external, unstable, and specific a�ribu�ons for nega�ve things,
we are showing an op�mis�c explanatory style. Pessimis�c explanatory styles are directly opposite op�mis�c styles. Pa�erns of a�ribu�ons can also involve how
much hos�lity one expects from others and therefore sees in ac�ons, known as hos�le a�ribu�on of intent. At �mes we overes�mate the extent to which our
a�ribu�ons or abili�es are shared, engaging in false consensus. At �mes we overes�mate how rare our abili�es or beliefs are, engaging in false uniqueness. With
an illusion of transparency we think that when others look at us they see more than they actually do.
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
1. How might making the fundamental a�ribu�on error affect your rela�onships? Are there �mes when the effect might be posi�ve and �mes when the effect
might be nega�ve?
2. Within your own cultural tradi�on, is the fundamental a�ribu�on error common?
3. An op�mis�c explanatory style was represented as generally posi�ve for well-being and persistence. When might an op�mis�c explanatory style be
detrimental to a person?
4. The text points out one posi�ve to knowing about the illusion of transparency, lower speech anxiety. What might be some nega�ve effects of knowing about
the illusion? In other words, why might it be good for us to believe others see more than they actually do?
5. If implicit a�tudes are something we are not even aware of, do they ma�er?
6. What other influences on a�tudes and behaviors might researchers study?
7. If you were to add a factor to the theory of planned behavior, what might it be? What addi�onal variable might be added to be�er predict behavior?
8. Have you ever had an experience where your a�tudes and ac�ons did not match? Did you do any of the things suggested to reduce cogni�ve dissonance?
Key Terms
Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.
actor-observer bias
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency for people to explain their own behavior (as actors) as due to situa�onal factors and the behaviors of others (as observers) as due to disposi�onal
factors.
a�tudes
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 20/52
Evalua�ons based on reac�ons, in terms of how one feels toward and what one thinks about some a�tude object. The evalua�ons we have involve two aspects,
strength and valence. Valence is how posi�ve or nega�ve that a�tude may be.
a�ribu�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
An explana�on of the behavior of others or one’s own behavior.
cogni�ve dissonance
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tension felt when there is a gap between a�tudes or between a�tudes and ac�ons. O�en results in a change of a�tudes when faced with a high level of
dissonance.
explanatory style
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The way a person explains events. Explana�ons include whether the event is explained as internal or external, stable or unstable, and global or specific.
explicit a�tudes
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A�tudes that are conscious and can be reported. Contrast with implicit a�tudes.
external a�ribu�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A�ribu�on of an ac�on that involves something external to the person, such as an unforeseen circumstance.
false consensus effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency for people to overes�mate how much their opinions or behaviors are shared by others.
false uniqueness effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency for people to underes�mate the extent to which their opinions or behaviors are shared by others. Also known as the uniqueness bias.
fundamental a�ribu�on error
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A�ribu�ng behavior to disposi�onal factors when there are clear situa�onal factors at work. Also known as correspondence bias.
hos�le a�ribu�on of intent
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A way of a�ribu�ng the ac�ons of others as having the intent of harm, even when those ac�ons are friendly or ambiguous. Also known as hos�le a�ribu�on
bias.
illusion of transparency
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to believe that one’s thoughts or feelings can be more clearly seen by others than they actually are.
implicit a�tudes
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A�tudes that are based in the automa�c, unconscious reac�ons one has toward an a�tude object. Contrast with explicit a�tudes.
insufficient jus�fica�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
When a�tudes and behaviors are in conflict, and the person has no adequate explana�on for why. Important for cogni�ve dissonance theory.
internal a�ribu�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A�ribu�on for an ac�on that involves something internal to the person, such as personality or a�tude.
learned helplessness
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 21/52
The belief that nothing one does will have an impact on events. Learned through repeated experience of helplessness.
op�mis�c explanatory style
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Someone with an op�mis�c explanatory style will explain posi�ve events as internal, stable, and global, and nega�ve events as external, unstable, and specific.
perceived behavior control
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The belief that one can engage in the behavior. Part of the theory of planned behavior.
pessimis�c explanatory style
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Someone with a pessimis�c explanatory style will explain posi�ve events as external, unstable, and specific, and nega�ve events as internal, stable, and global.
self-percep�on theory
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The idea that a�tudes can be determined by looking at one’s behavior.
spotlight effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to believe that others no�ce one’s behaviors and appearance to a greater extent than they actually do.
subjec�ve norms
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Beliefs of important people in one’s environment. Important aspect of the theory of planned behavior.
theory of planned behavior
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A theory predic�ng behavior from (1) a�tude toward that behavior, (2) subjec�ve norms related to that behavior, and (3) perceived behavioral control.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 22/52
Chapter 5
Making Judgments
5.1 Conscious and Automa�c Processes
5.2 Schemas and Scripts
Schemas
Scripts
5.3 Heuris�cs
Availability Heuris�c
Representa�veness Heuris�c
Affect Heuris�c
5.4 Errors in Judgment
Belief Perseverance
Confirma�on Bias
Illusion of Control
5.5 Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Chapter Summary
©2012 NBCUniversal Media, LLC/NBCU Photo Bank via Ge�y Images/NBCUinversal/Ge�y Images
Learning Objec�ves
By the end of the chapter you should be able to:
Contrast conscious and automa�c processes
Define schemas and scripts and discuss their importance
Describe the value of heuris�cs
Iden�fy and explain the availability heuris�c, representa�veness heuris�c, and affect heuris�c
Describe how the conjunc�on fallacy and the base rate fallacy contribute to errors in judgment
Define belief perseverance, confirma�on bias, and illusion of control
Describe how the self-fulfilling prophecy can affect behavior
Chapter Outline

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 23/52
* * *
Many a disastrous date is doomed from the beginning. A few minutes on a blind date can o�en be enough to determine whether a second date is
warranted. In the 1990s, Rabbi Yaacov Deyo was working as the educa�onal director for a Jewish resource group and wanted to encourage the
single men and women he worked with to get married, but the tradi�onal one-on-one dinner and a movie seemed cumbersome and �me
consuming. His solu�on was to introduce a large number of men and women to one another, and to limit their interac�on to 7 minutes (Deyo &
Deyo, 2003). And thus, speed da�ng was born. Speed da�ng had the advantage of introducing a large number of men to a large number of
women and to weed out unlikely pairings without either party inves�ng a great deal of �me.
From the more rou�ne to the more specific situa�ons of our daily life, we need to make a number of decisions and judgments. Our cogni�ve
systems are built to help us make those decisions efficiently, though, at �mes, those efficiencies lead us to errors. In this chapter, we will discuss
both the conscious processing of informa�on we all engage in and the unconscious, automa�c processing our cogni�ve systems allow for. Some of
our quick assessments of objects and events, and our quick decision making, rely on the work of unconscious systems. But such judgments lead to
errors and can influence how others respond.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 24/52
Expand Your Knowledge:
Stroop Effect
To try out the Stroop effect for yourself by clicking here
(h�p://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/java/ready.html) . The program will
5.1 Conscious and Automa�c Processes
When you make a decision do you weigh your op�ons, carefully sor�ng out pros from cons? Have you ever made a decision because you had a gut feeling?
Psychologists believe that our cogni�ve processes operate at two levels: the conscious and the automa�c. The thought processes we are aware of and tend to
direct are on the conscious level. We might involve conscious thought when we make a decision by carefully weighing our op�ons. Processes that are done
without our inten�on or awareness, such as when we make a decision based on our gut feeling, occur on the automa�c level. Researchers have called these
principles a variety of names, but they all focus on some kind of ra�onal, conscious process and another more emo�onal or experien�ally-based unconscious
process (Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003; Peters, Hess, Vas�jall, & Auman, 2007; Reyna, 2004).
Table 5.1 summarizes the basic differences between these systems. As you can see from the table, the processing of the automa�c system is something that we
are generally not aware of. It processes or interprets s�muli that come from our environment, and when it has completed processing or gets stuck, something
researchers call disfluency, it alerts the conscious system (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007). The capacity of the conscious system is much smaller than
that of the automa�c system but it is a system we can direct. The unconscious system may be processing something you are not interested in working on; it is
only the conscious system that allows you to deliberately focus on a par�cular idea, situa�on, or problem.
Table 5.1: Characteris�cs of the automa�c and conscious systems
Automa�c System Conscious System
Fast Slow
Outside of conscious awareness Within conscious awareness
Effortless Effor�ul
Large capacity Limited capacity
May do many tasks at once Limited to very few tasks at once
Imprecise, general responses Nuanced responses
Some�mes these systems conflict with one another. An example of the conscious and the unconscious system working against one another can be seen in the
Stroop Color–Word Task (Stroop, 1935). In this task, people are asked to iden�fy the color in which le�ers or words are printed. When the le�ers are
meaningless, such as the lines of Xs in Column 1 of Table 5.2, the task is easy and people go through the list quickly. However, when the le�ers spell a color that
is not the same as the color of the ink, people tend to stumble. The �me it takes someone to go through the second list is much longer than the �me it takes to
go through the first list. The reason for this is the fact that reading color words is a well-prac�ced skill for most adults; most of us read the word whether we
want to or not. When the two do not match, there is a fight between the automa�c system, which says “Green! The word is green!” and the conscious system,
which focuses on the color of the blue ink (although, not everyone agrees with this interpreta�on; see Besner, Stolz, & Bou�lier, 1997). This slower response
when dealing with two conflic�ng s�muli is called the Stroop effect. The Stroop effect was named a�er J. R. Stroop who developed the task in the 1930s and
wrote about the phenomenon. Since then, a variety of other tasks have been developed that have similar findings (MacLeod, 1991).
Table 5.2: The Stroop color–word task
For each column iden�fy the color of the ink in which the le�ers are wri�en. For example, in the first column the first set of
le�ers is red.
Column 1 Column 2
XXXX Green
XXXX Blue
XXXX Red
XXXX Blue
XXXX Brown
XXXX Red
XXXX Green
The conscious and automa�c systems do work together at �mes. Imagine you are
at a busy and boisterous bar and are talking with a small group of people.
Suddenly, in the next group over you hear your name being spoken. You were not
ac�vely listening for your name and were engrossed in your conversa�on, yet, you
somehow heard it. This o�en occurs when we recognize our own name or other
self-relevant informa�on amidst other distrac�ng s�muli without consciously

http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/java/ready.html

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 25/52
�me you as you iden�fy the ink color in two different tasks. You
can compare those �mes to see if naming an ink color in a
contras�ng color word slows you down.
listening for it (Moray, 1959; Wood & Cowan, 1995). In this scenario, our conscious
system is oblivious to what those in the other group are talking about, but your
automa�c system is monitoring what is going on around you. When your name is
spoken, your unconscious system alerts the conscious system to pay a�en�on and
suddenly you are straining to hear what is being said about you (Alexopoulos,
Muller, Ric, & Marendaz, 2012; MacLeod, 1998). Similarly, our own faces jump out at us from a sea of others faces; you may have no�ced this phenomenon if
you have ever looked at a group picture and quickly no�ced your own face (Tacikowski & Nowicka, 2010).
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
What are some characteris�cs of the conscious system?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
The conscious system is slow, operates within conscious awareness, is effor�ul, has a limited capacity, is limited to very few tasks at once,
and provides nuanced responses.
What are some characteris�cs of the unconscious system?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
The unconscious system is fast, operates outside conscious awareness, is effortless, has a large capacity, may do many tasks at once, and
provides imprecise, general responses.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 26/52
Figure 5.1: Schemas
Your schema for a baseball game may include a baseball
diamond, a salute to the American flag, and peanuts.
Dorling Kindersley RF/Thinkstock, iStockphoto/Thinkstock, iStockphoto/Thinkstock
How schemas influence behavior.
Schemas
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
Why are schemas considered a fundamental part of
social psychology?
How does a vic�m’s schema put people at a higher
risk of being vic�mized?
5.2 Schemas and Scripts
Our automa�c system allows us to make shortcuts and come to conclusions without taxing the conscious system (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). In fact, when our
resources are depleted we are more likely to use the shortcuts offered by the automa�c system (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). The automa�c system has two
ways of doing this; one focuses on things like objects or people, while the other focuses on events, what they include, and how they are sequenced.
Schemas
Chapter 2 introduced the idea of schemas as knowledge structures that organize what we know and
that can affect how we process informa�on. Self-schemas are knowledge structures about the self, but
we can have schemas about many other things in our world, such as animals, objects, places, and
concepts (see Figure 5.1). When we are making judgments, schemas may affect those judgments. For
example, a boss might have a schema about an employee as a good, reliable worker. If that employee
is late one day, the boss makes a different judgment about that employee than she would if the boss
had a schema about that employee as lazy and irresponsible. Because of the posi�ve schema about her
employee, the boss might also quickly remember the employee’s contribu�ons to past projects,
eventually concluding that the employee had a good reason to be late. While schemas can help us
remember things by organizing them into preconceived structures, they may also create false memories
for us (Lampinen, Copeland, & Neuschatz, 2001). If you were to sit in a professor’s office for several
minutes and then, outside of the office hours later were asked what you saw in that office, your
schema could help you answer. You expect to see bookshelves with books, a desk, a computer, a
stapler, and some pens in a professor’s office. As you remember what was in the office, your exis�ng
schema might help you remember that you saw a bookshelf. But the schema may lead you to
remember something that was not there. If you expected to see a stapler, you might report that a
stapler was there, even if it was not.
Schemas can also help us remember items because they violate a schema. If you were to see a
stuffed teddy bear in a professor’s office, you might remember and recall it because it was outside of
your typical professor’s-office schema. This type of effect may have serious consequences when we
examine the role of schemas in eyewitness tes�mony in court. Researchers have found that schemas
for crimes can influence the details people remember about crimes they witness (Tuckey & Brewer,
2003). For example, you would expect a bank robbery to include a thief with a bag; a bag is a
schema-consistent element. You would not expect the thief to wear bright clothing; bright clothing is
a schema-inconsistent element. People tend to be accurate about schema-relevant and schema-
inconsistent informa�on. Informa�on that is irrelevant to the schema is most likely to be forgo�en.
Schemas can be fairly broad, applicable in a wide variety of situa�ons or with a wide variety of
objects or people, or rela�vely narrow, being very specific to one or two objects, people, or
situa�ons. Broader schemas take us longer to learn, as we encounter different ways to think about and view a par�cular en�ty or problem. But these broader
schemas may allow us to be more flexible (Chen & Mo, 2004). For example, as a child you might have learned the concept of sharing toys and applied it when
playing at home with friends. But, if you were provided with examples of a variety of ways to share over the course of your life, including sharing resources and
�me with others, you may be more able to recognize when someone needed your help and know how to provide it.
Scripts
How do you know what to do when you go into a restaurant? How do you know what is expected on a first date? In our lives it is helpful to know how to act
and respond in social situa�ons. Psychologists call expected series of events scripts, like the scripts in a movie or play that tell the actors what is going to occur
next. Scripts can be very helpful to us. When a restaurant follows a script, both the server and the diner know what to do and what is expected of them without
having to discuss the process. If you have ever lived or traveled in a different country, or if you are part of a dis�nc�ve subculture in your own country, you know
that others do things differently. For example, in Chinese culture when someone shows admira�on for something done well, the appropriate response in the
Chinese social script is to respond with modesty. According to the script, the admirer’s next response should show even greater admira�on for the
accomplishment (Han, 2011). If you are new to a culture or situa�on, you may find yourself confused and unsure. In those kinds of situa�ons you may feel like
everyone knows what is going on but you—you do not know the script.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 27/52
©Ge�y Images/Hemera Technologies/AbleStock.com/Thinkstock
Adhering to your script of grocery shopping, what might occur next in the sequence
of events? What next event would violate your script for grocery shopping?
In a da�ng scenario between a heterosexual couple, it is likely the man will pick the woman up at her home for the first date, they will go to a restaurant, talk
about their lives, hope to impress one another, and perhaps then a�end a movie. The man will likely offer to pay for both the dinner and the movie. Not all first
dates follow this pa�ern, but many do (Eaton & Rose, 2012; Laner & Ventrone, 2000). Like schemas, we use scripts to make sense of and organize our
experience. Schemas involve our expecta�ons for things or concepts, while scripts involve our expecta�ons for events or sequences of events.
Da�ng scripts can be quite detailed and can include behaviors that are different for men and women. In a 1989 study, undergraduate students listed 19 different
ac�ons that women would engage in and 27 different ac�ons for men. Most of these students agreed on what belonged in the script, indica�ng that scripts are
shared within a culture (Rose & Frieze, 1989). Students noted that certain foods were date foods and others were not; foods that could be eaten neatly, foods
that were not too smelly, and foods that were not likely to cause bad breath were suggested date foods (Amiraian & Sobal, 2009). Da�ng scripts go beyond the
first date, implica�ng how a rela�onship should develop over �me. When partners share a script for how the rela�onship should develop, they show greater
rela�onship sa�sfac�on (Holmberg & MacKenzie, 2002). For example, if both partners expect to call one another daily and go out on a date every Friday night,
each will be more sa�sfied than if one is expec�ng only a couple phone calls a week and a date every other Saturday night.
The effects of scripts on our lives are not always benign or helpful. A script that supports risky sexual behavior, such as not using a condom, may lead to high-risk
behavior and, therefore, increased rates of infec�on with sexually transmi�ed diseases (Bowleg, Lucas, & Tschann, 2004; Hussen, Bowleg, Sangaramoorthy, &
Malebranche, 2012). Sexual scripts come from parents, peers, school, television and the movies, as well as pornography (Hussen, et al., 2012). Sexual scripts
might also be learned from romance novels. Such novels generally have very similar sexual scripts and these scripts have changed li�le over the last 20 years
(Menard & Cabrera, 2011). A sexual script includes when and where a couple has sex. For example, some might expect sex a�er a few dates while others may
need to know their partner for months or be engaged or married before engaging in sexual intercourse. Partners might expect to have sex in a bed in one of
their bedrooms or in some other loca�on in their living space, their car, or in a hotel. The script will also include elements of the encounter itself such as who
ini�ates sex, length of foreplay, type of ac�vi�es expected in foreplay, and the use of condoms or other barriers that reduce the risk of sexually transmi�ed
diseases or pregnancy.
The ability to describe a script or put events in a script in the correct order seems to lie in the frontal lobe of the brain, directly behind the forehead. People
with brain damage to this part of the brain some�mes show difficul�es with scripts (Grafman, 1989). Our ability to work with scripts can also be influenced by
age. Older adults had more difficulty correctly ordering extensive scripts than younger adults (Allain et al., 2007). For example, an older adult may have more
difficulty accurately describing the sequence of events needed to change a flat �re.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
How are schemas and scripts similar? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Both are knowledge structures that help us make sense of and organize our experiences.
How might schemas lead to false or mistaken memories?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Schemas may cause us to remember that something was there because we expected it to be there and because it was part of our schema
even if it was not actually there.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 28/52
Heuris�cs and their impact on our lives.
Heuris�cs
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
How do heuris�cs func�on in daily life?
How are heuris�cs studied in social psychology?
Expand Your Knowledge:
Heuris�c Simula�on
5.3 Heuris�cs
Quick processing is a theme of our cogni�ve systems. As discussed, schemas help us keep informa�on organized and can help in memory, and scripts help us
know what to do without expending a lot of energy trying to figure out what is appropriate in a given situa�on. When making judgments we also a�empt to get
quick answers. The shortcuts we use in making judgments are heuris�cs. If you were having trouble answering an abstract problem, you might try to think about
it concretely, or draw a picture in an a�empt to answer the ques�on quickly, without further taxing your cogni�ve system. Just as schemas and scripts can be
helpful to us, heuris�cs can also be helpful—we are likely to quickly come up with a pre�y good answer. But just as schemas can cause us to remember
something was there when it was not, heuris�cs can lead to incorrect judgments. Researchers who evaluate heuris�cs most o�en focus on what happens when
heuris�cs fail us and we make incorrect judgments. Despite the problems they some�mes create, heuris�cs quickly provide us with a good-enough answer most
of the �me.
Availability Heuris�c
Are there more words in the English language that begin with the le�er “R,” or that have the le�er
“R” as the third le�er of the word? Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked par�cipants in their study to
respond to this ques�on. Most people responded that there are more words with “R” as the first
le�er, es�ma�ng that there are about twice as many with “R” as the first le�er than with “R” as the
third le�er. How do people make this judgment? If you solved this like most people do, you thought
briefly about how many words you knew that had “R” as the first le�er (rela�ves, rainbow, rich, run).
Then you thought about how many words you knew that had “R” as the third le�er (park, more,
marshmallow). As you made those calcula�ons, you realized that you were able to come up with
many more words with “R” as the first le�er than “R” as the third le�er. Words star�ng with “R” were more available to you in your memory.
Making a judgment this way, you and the research par�cipants were using the availability heuris�c. The availability heuris�c involves the tendency to make
judgments about the frequency of something or the likelihood of an event occurring by considering how available it was in memory. Instances that come more
easily to mind, and thus are more available, are judged to be more likely. As noted earlier, these strategies o�en get us the right answer, but in the case of the
posi�on of the “R” our judgment is wrong. There are actually more words in the English language with “R” as the third le�er than “R” as the first le�er. O�en
this type of judgment will provide you with the right answer, but, as in this instance, there is room for error.
We can apply this to other realms and other experiences. How successful is online da�ng? Many people will tell you about a cousin or coworker who met and is
happily married to someone found on an online da�ng site. You may have such a story yourself. But how o�en do you hear the stories about unsuccessful
searchers who gave up on online da�ng in frustra�on? Occasionally, perhaps, but because we hear more of the happily-ever-a�er stories and fewer stories of
frustra�on, many of us assume online da�ng is successful for the majority of those who engage in it.
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Why does the availability heuris�c have the word availability in its name?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
With the availability heuris�c we make judgments based on how easily things come to mind, that is, how available these things are in our
memory.
Representa�veness Heuris�c
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimina�on and
social jus�ce, and also par�cipated in an�nuclear demonstra�ons” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 297). Which of the following is more likely?
a. Linda is a bank teller.
b. Linda is a bank teller and ac�ve in the feminist movement.
If you are like most people you chose answer b. Why? Most people say they chose b because Linda sounds to them like someone who would be ac�ve in the
feminist movement who happens to be a bank teller rather than just a stereotypical bank teller. If you answered this way, for this reason, you were using
something called the representa�veness heuris�c. The representa�veness heuris�c involves making decisions based on how similar someone or something is to
the typical, or representa�ve, person or situa�on. Because Linda seems like your typical vision of someone in the feminist movement, you choose b.
The representa�veness heuris�c will o�en get you to the right answer when you
are making quick decisions. But in the above example, Linda is more likely to be
just a bank teller than to be both a bank teller and ac�ve in the feminist
movement. There are more bank tellers than there are bank tellers who are ac�ve

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 29/52
Want to think more about the representa�veness and availability
heuris�cs? You can par�cipate in simula�ons of heuris�cs at
h�p://cat.xula.edu/thinker/decisions/heuris�cs/
(h�p://cat.xula.edu/thinker/decisions/heuris�cs/) . Other heuris�cs are
described as well. A�er making your own judgments, you can read
about usual answers and explana�ons for these answers.
Expand Your Knowledge:
Affect Heuris�c
Research on how people understand numbers shows that while
frequencies and percentages are easily understood, absolute
frequencies are given greater weight. Absolute frequencies are
perceived to be larger than equivalent frequencies or percentages.
Although there may be other things going on, the text explains this
as at least partly due to the affect heuris�c. We connect
emo�onally to absolute frequencies (30 people with cancer) in a
way we do not with percentages (30% of the group has cancer).
Click here
(h�p://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080422150652.htm) for an
ar�cle explaining the research “Numerical Informa�on Can Be
Persuasive or Informa�ve Depending on How it’s Presented.”
Source: Science Daily/University of Toronto.
in the feminist movement. When we rate two things occurring together as more
likely than one of those things occurring alone, we engage in the conjunc�on
fallacy. The conjunc�on fallacy is the error of believing that two events occurring
together are more likely than either of those events occurring by themselves. It is
a fallacy because logic dictates a single event is more likely than that same event
happening with another event.
Another piece of faulty reasoning that may be behind these heuris�cs is the base
rate fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Consider the following: Walter is a 47-
year-old man who reads poetry, watches PBS, and plays golf in his spare �me. Which is more likely: that Walter is an Ivy League professor or that Walter is a
truck driver? For most of us, Walter sounds like an Ivy League professor. Using the representa�veness heuris�c, we solve this problem by thinking about whether
Walter is more like a typical Ivy League professor than a typical truck driver. But Walter is more likely to be a truck driver. Why? According to the Bureau of
Labor Sta�s�cs (2012) 1.6 million heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers are employed in the United States, to say nothing of elsewhere in the world. Consider
how many Ivy League professors there are. With only eight Ivy League schools, with between a li�le under 1,000 faculty (Dartmouth and Brown) to just over
4,000 (Pennsylvania and Columbia) per school, there are about 19,500 Ivy League professors. Given the very large number of truck drivers and rela�vely small
number of Ivy League professors, it is much more likely that Walter is among the large group than the small group. When we make a decision about the
likelihood of something and ignore the number of instances of that in the popula�on (of people, ac�ons, diagnoses, etc.) we are vic�ms of the base rate fallacy.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Why is the conjunc�on fallacy called a fallacy?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
It is a logical impossibility, that is, a fallacy or error in judgment, for two things to both be true than for either one of those alone to be true.
How does the base rate fallacy contribute to making an incorrect judgment when using the representa�veness heuris�c?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
With the base rate fallacy we place too much weight on how typical or representa�ve something appears to be and not enough weight on
the base rate, or the actual number of instances of the item of interest.
Affect Heuris�c
Imagine you are on a parole board deciding whether to parole an inmate. You are
told that 20 in every 100 people released under similar circumstances as this
inmate go on to commit a violent crime. Would you parole the person or deny
parole? What if you were told that 20% of people released who are like this
inmate go on to commit a violent crime? Research par�cipants have been asked
similar ques�ons. Those given informa�on using rela�ve frequency, the first form
of ques�on, believed there was greater danger than those with informa�on in
sta�s�cal form (Slovic, Monahan, & MacGregor, 2000). Ra�onally, we know that 20
out of every 100 people is equivalent to 20%, but we process these bits of
informa�on differently. When this informa�on is presented in rela�ve frequency
form, in this case the number of instances out of 100, people imagine 20
perpetrators of violent crimes—a disturbing image. These images lead to a gut-
level nega�ve emo�onal reac�on. The sta�s�cal form, a percentage in this case,
seems to separate us from that image, and therefore reduces the nega�ve affect
(emo�onal reac�on). We use our gut-level reac�ons to help us make decisions
(Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). This tendency to use affec�ve
reac�ons (gut-level emo�onal reac�ons) as informa�on to make judgments is
called the affect heuris�c. Someone looking for a home might use the affect
heuris�c. Although price, square footage, school district, and neighborhood may all
be part of the judgment, if the affect heuris�c is in play homebuyers might report that the home they chose just felt right.
These heuris�cs are not just a novelty of research studies. They can affect our lives. In a study of women who were being tested for gene�c vulnerability for
breast and ovarian cancer, researchers found extensive use of the availability heuris�c and the representa�veness heuris�c (Kenen, Ardern-Jones & Eeles, 2003).
The women described vivid stories of others they knew who had been treated for or died of cancer, which affected how vulnerable these women felt in terms of
their cancer risk. The representa�veness heuris�c caused the women to judge their own cancer risk by how similar they felt they were to others who had died of
cancer.

http://cat.xula.edu/thinker/decisions/heuristics/

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/04/080422150652.htm

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 30/52
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
Why would informa�on about a new literacy program that helps 60 out of every 100 children sound be�er to people than if the new
literacy program were described as helping 60% of children?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�
According to the affect heuris�c, thinking about 60 children helped by a program provides more of an emo�onal reac�on whereas the
percentage separates us from the image of the happy children, and therefore lessens our emo�onal reac�on, and our subsequent evalua�on
of the program.
Social Psychology in Depth: Heuris�cs and Poli�cs
When you vote, do you spend all the �me and energy required to consider all the issues for all the candidates? If not, you are not alone. Voters
o�en use heuris�cs to make judgments about poli�cal candidates. The �me required to find, sort through, and evaluate informa�on on all the
candidates is more than many people can afford. How, then, does that affect the decisions themselves?
R. R. Lau and D. P. Redlawsk (2001) note that voters o�en use party affilia�on or candidate ideology to make quick decisions in vo�ng. Most of
the �me such decision-making strategies get the voters what they want, but there are �mes when party affilia�on or ideology can lead a voter
astray. A candidate might be categorized incorrectly. For example, the media may say that a candidate for governor is a conserva�ve when she is
actually more of a moderate in her policies. Candidates may also differ from the party line. A voter may assume that because the candidate is
Republican she is pro-life, but she may actually be pro-choice.
Beyond party affilia�on and ideology, a voter might also use endorsements to make decisions. If a favorite celebrity shows support for a
par�cular candidate, that voter might choose to vote for that candidate. Endorsements may come from individuals one trusts, like a close friend
or a celebrity, or from organiza�ons one believes in, like the Na�onal Rifle Associa�on or the Na�onal Organiza�on for Women.
Polling data also provides a simple cue to a voter. When a par�cular candidate is ahead in the polls, voters might vote for that candidate because
that candidate is popular or because they perceive that candidate will win. Candidate appearance can also influence voters.
The researchers found that less sophis�cated voters made poorer decisions when they relied on these heuris�cs. These voters would have been
be�er served if they had examined the issues the candidates stood for and made a logical, ra�onal choice rather than relying on heuris�cs. Using
a shortcut was detrimental to decision making. More sophis�cated voters, those with greater interest and knowledge of the poli�cal system,
made good decisions while using heuris�cs. This finding is somewhat ironic given that sophis�cated voters are least likely to need heuris�cs, but
they were the ones whose decisions making did not suffer from using them.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 31/52
©Be�man/Corbis/AP Images
A person’s pre-exis�ng belief might be confirmed by reading a newspaper that
supports his or her opinions.
5.4 Errors in Judgment
Heuris�cs o�en get us the correct answer and do so quickly. At �mes, however, our cogni�ve systems use shortcuts that make it more difficult for us to find the
right answer. These ways of thinking create and perpetuate errors by leading us to keep believing in something even a�er our reasons for believing have been
disconfirmed. The cogni�ve shortcuts might also cause us to ignore or discount informa�on that goes against our beliefs. When we believe we have more control
than we actually do, we are making an error in our judgment.
Belief Perseverance
Imagine you were presented with evidence that firefighters who are risk takers are be�er firefighters. These firefighters are willing to do risky things like climb up
tall ladders and run into burning buildings. Their risk-taking tendencies also help them to find new and inven�ve ways to fight fires. A�er you have seen this
evidence you are then told it is completely false. There is no rela�onship be�er firefighters’ ability to fight fires and their risk-taking tendencies. Would you
con�nue to believe what you were told? Researchers found that research par�cipants presented with evidence did con�nue to believe, even a�er the
researchers told them they had falsified the data. They con�nued to believe it when the researchers checked with them one week later (Anderson, 1983). Maybe
because the idea that risk taking is needed in firefigh�ng is so self-evident, it is the logical thing to believe, even when the story is debunked. The problem with
this conclusion is that the researchers only told half of the par�cipants that good firefighters are risk takers. The other half were told that risk aversion was a
good quality in firefighters. Firefighters need to carefully analyze situa�ons and only go into a burning building when they know the risks, so they can get
themselves and others out safely. The par�cipants told about the posi�ve effects of risk avoidance con�nued to believe the story they had been told even a�er
they found out it was fabricated.
The tendency to believe something even a�er the ini�al reasons for that belief are discredited is called belief perseverance. Belief perseverance can be
problema�c in many situa�ons. For example, if your roman�c interest becomes secre�ve, you might suspect him or her of chea�ng on you. Even when you find
out the secre�veness was part of planning a roman�c surprise for you, your suspicion might remain. Students who come to believe they lack a certain ability
may persevere with that belief despite evidence that their poor performance is a result of poor instruc�on, rather than inability (Lepper, Ross, & Lau, 1986).
One way to counteract belief perseverance is to come up with explana�ons that are opposite of that belief. When research par�cipants had to explain why risk-
averse firefighters might be good firefighters, the opposite of their ini�al belief, they showed less belief perseverance (Anderson, 1982). However, if people try to
come up with an alterna�ve for their ini�al belief and find it difficult to do so, they come to hold their ini�al belief more strongly. When using the availability
heuris�c, people assume that an explana�on that is difficult to think of is an unlikely explana�on. Another, counterintui�ve way to fight against belief
perseverance is to ask people to come up with a large number of explana�ons for the ini�al belief (Nestler, 2010). If it is difficult to develop 10 reasons why risk-
taking firefighters might be be�er firefighters, then people come to believe that conclusion less.
Confirma�on Bias
Once a belief is established, people tend to search for informa�on that will confirm that belief, a phenomenon called the confirma�on bias. This is not
something people do consciously or deliberately (Gibson, Sanbonmatsu, & Posavac, 1997). Nonetheless, when informa�on is presented, the material that
supports a preexis�ng belief is seen as convincing while material that refutes a belief is examined closely and cri�cized (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). For example,
a professor might evaluate a student paper whose argument is in line with his beliefs on economic policy very favorably. However, he might a�ack the logic or
arguments of a paper that goes against his posi�on on economic policy, even if it is as well-wri�en as the other paper.
This tendency might be par�cularly dangerous in criminal cases. When someone
commits a crime, police and lawyers need to find the person responsible and make a
case against that person. If the police and prosecutors believe a par�cular person is
guilty they are likely to search for informa�on that confirms that belief and may
discount or ignore informa�on that goes against their belief. If they are correct in the
guilt of the person, belief perseverance is not too problema�c. It is when an innocent
person is accused that belief perseverance is most dangerous. For example, early
iden�fica�on of a par�cular suspect colors percep�ons of later evidence, even when
that iden�fica�on was made with li�le confidence in its accuracy (O’Brien, 2009).
Police officers might push harder in interroga�on for someone they believe to be
guilty than someone they are less sure of and see evidence of someone’s innocence
as less reliable (Ask, Rebelius, & Granhag, 2008; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003;
Kerstholt, & Eikelboom, 2007). Also, when a poten�ally guilty suspect has been
iden�fied, fewer alterna�ve avenues may be pursued (O’Brien, 2009; Rassin, Eerland,
& Kuijpers, 2010).
Keep in mind that this is an unconscious process. Serious, well-meaning, and ethical
police and lawyers may fall vic�m to this general human tendency. Individuals in other
professions are just as likely to experience belief perseverance. Psychiatrists, for example, may seek informa�on to confirm a certain diagnosis they believe to be
true (Mendel, et al., 2011). One technique that can be helpful to fight against the confirma�on bias is to deliberately discuss evidence both for the belief and
against it (O’Brien, 2009). Arguing against a belief can help make people aware of other possibili�es and explana�ons.
Illusion of Control

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 32/52
Our cogni�ve shortcuts do not only allow us to maintain and persevere in our beliefs—even when reasons behind our beliefs are no longer valid, they also cause
us to make errors in our judgments about the control we have in situa�ons that involve chance. Despite knowledge to the contrary, we treat many chance
situa�ons as circumstances in which our choice, skill, or hard work will make a difference—a phenomenon shown in Ellen Langer’s studies of illusion of control.
In the 1970s, Ellen Langer did a series of studies inves�ga�ng the amount of control people believe they have in situa�ons involving chance. In one of these
studies, Langer asked people if they would like to buy a $1 card to par�cipate in a $50 lo�ery. Half of the par�cipants were allowed to choose the card from a
deck of cards, the other half were handed a card from that same deck. When Langer came back later to ask if they would be willing to sell the card they owned,
those who had chosen their card wanted an average of $8.67 for the card. Those who were handed a card said they would sell for $1.96. Why the difference?
Langer proposed that choice gave people a sense that they had some control over the outcome of the lo�ery, even though all cards were equally likely to win.
When people par�cipate in a game of chance and believe that their ac�ons somehow influence the outcome, they have an illusion of control. An illusion of
control occurs any �me we approach a situa�on believing and ac�ng as though we have more control that we actually have. This is true when we have no
control and act as though we have some control, or when we have some control and act as though we have more control than we do (Presson & Benassi, 1996).
The illusion is greater when people are more involved in the task and when the task or aspects of it are more familiar (Langer, 1975; Thompson, 1999; Wohl &
Enzle, 2002). A state lo�ery that allows you to choose your own numbers is using both of these to increase your sense of control. By choosing your own
numbers you are more involved. Many people who play the lo�ery play with familiar, some�mes much loved, numbers such as birth dates or wedding
anniversaries. Success at a task also increases illusion of control. When people get the outcome they desire, par�cularly at the beginning of a string of outcomes,
their illusion of control is greater (Langer & Roth, 1975; Thompson, 1999). For example, if someone was playing a slot machine and had a string of wins early on,
that person would have a stronger illusion of control and may, with that illusion, be more likely to con�nue to play.
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
While doing an Internet search on the topic of gun control, Andy quickly zeroes in on a story that is consistent with his views, and
ignores a different story that goes against his point of view. Which of the concepts discussed in this sec�on best describes Andy’s
behavior? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Confirma�on bias. Andy paid a�en�on to informa�on that went along with his pre-exis�ng belief and ignored or discounted material that
contradicted his belief.
Before rolling the dice in a game, Sue always blows on the dice and whispers what she wants them to be. Which of the concepts above
best describes Sue’s behavior? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Illusion of control. Sue seems to believe that her behavior will change the outcome of the roll of the dice, but the outcome of a roll of the
dice is random.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 33/52
DeAgos�ni/SuperStock
Self-fulfilling prophecy is even prevalent in ancient mythology.
Oedipus, a Greek king, was told that he would one day kill his
biological father and marry his biological mother. This dated
pain�ng depicts Oedipus killing his father.
5.5 Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Can our judgments about another person affect that person’s behavior? In other words, can one
person’s expecta�ons affect how another person acts? This was a ques�on inves�gated by Robert
Rosenthal in a study involving teachers and students (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1966). A�er giving
students what appeared to be a test of intelligence, Rosenthal told teachers that certain students
were predicted to “bloom” over the school year; that is, these students were expected to make
great intellectual gains. In reality these students’ names were randomly chosen from each classroom.
The students were not told anything about the tests or what their teachers expected of them. When
the researchers returned at the end of the school year, they found that these randomly chosen
students did indeed make gains. The researchers concluded that because the students were no
different from their classmates at the beginning of the study, it must have been the teachers’
expecta�ons that affected the students’ performance.
This tendency for our expecta�ons to affect the behaviors of others is called the self-fulfilling
prophecy. We “prophesy” someone else’s behavior, that is, we believe something will happen, and
through our ac�ons resul�ng from that belief, we make it come true (see Figure 5.2). The behaviors
we engage in to make these prophecies come true is behavioral confirma�on. Le� alone, the
prophesied behavior would likely not have happened; these students would not have made the gains
they did. Because of the prophecy and the teacher’s subsequent behavior, the teacher managed to
create a situa�on where the prophecy would come true. The teachers called on the students they
expected to make gains more o�en, gave them more feedback, and created a generally more
welcoming learning environment. Researchers themselves can fall vic�m to the self-fulfilling
prophecy. When doing an experiment a researcher has expecta�ons for how the study will turn out,
stated in the hypothesis for the study. If controls are not put in place, the researcher might act in a
way that leads the par�cipants to behave in a way that fulfills the experimenter’s expecta�ons.
Figure 5.2: The self-fulfilling prophecy
The self-fulfilling prophecy demonstrates that our beliefs about others and subsequent ac�ons toward them can
influence the beliefs and ac�ons of others.
One theory that helps explain how individuals come to behave in ways others expect them to is self-verifica�on theory. According to self-verifica�on theory
people want to confirm or verify what they believe to be true about themselves (Swann, 1987). Even when our beliefs about ourselves are nega�ve we desire to

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 34/52
confirm those beliefs because it allows for a stable self-concept and a predictable social world (North & Swann, 2009). For example, if you believed you were
awkward in social situa�ons, you would want others to acknowledge that because then you would not have to change your self-concept and others would not
expect you to be suave and self-confident in social situa�ons. Self-verifica�on interacts with self-fulfilling prophecy when the behaviors of the person making the
prophecy lead the person to internalize those beliefs and then work to fulfill that sense of self. For example, in a longitudinal study of teens and their mothers,
Madon et al. (2008) found that a mother’s beliefs about her child’s future drinking behavior influenced the child’s belief about his or her future drinking
behavior. The child’s belief lead to self-verifica�on behaviors and, therefore, the fulfillment of the mother’s drinking prophecies.
Self-fulfilling prophecies have mul�farious effects. As noted, parent’s beliefs about their child’s underage drinking can create a self-fulfilling prophecy, leading to
greater or lesser drinking later on depending on the prophecy (Madon, Guyll, Spoth, Cross, & Hilbert, 2003; Madon, Willard, Guyll, Trudeau, & Spoth, 2006).
Within rela�onships, researchers found that women with high rejec�on sensi�vity—in other words, those who expect that the other person will reject them—act
in ways that lead to rejec�ng responses. These women prophesied rejec�on and, by their ac�ons, created rejec�on in their roman�c partners (Downey, Freitas,
Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998). Self-fulfilling prophecy has even been proposed as par�ally responsible for the extreme violence found in the Pelican Bay State Prison,
a super-maximum security prison for extremely violent and dangerous prisoners (King, Steiner, & Breach, 2008). Researchers argue that the expecta�on of
prisoners to be very violent in the prison environment creates behavior that leads to a fulfillment of that prophecy.
The self-fulfilling prophecy may influence our experiences of pain or illness. Teens who believed they would have more pain a�er surgery ended up feeling more
pain and using more pain medica�on than those who believed their pain would be minimal (Logan & Rose, 2005). It may be that the teens who were expec�ng
pain were more anxious and paid more a�en�on to every twinge of discomfort, leading to a more severe experience of pain. In a similar way, naval cadets who
believed they would experience less sea sickness and any sea sickness they experienced would be unlikely to affect their work did be�er when at sea (Eden &
Zuk, 1995). In neither of these situa�ons did the prophecy eliminate the pain or sickness, but it did make it be�er for both.
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
How is it that self-fulfilling prophecies come true? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Self-fulfilling prophecies come true because people engage in behaviors that make them come true. The teachers created a be�er learning
environment for the students they expected to make gains and so those students actually made the prophesied gains.
Conclusion
Our cogni�ve systems are designed to work as efficiently as possible, with the automa�c system taking over as much as it can, while the conscious system deals
with the nuanced and difficult problems that the automa�c system cannot handle. The use of schemas and heuris�cs helps make this possible. These mental
shortcuts can be helpful to us, but, at �mes, do lead to errors.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 35/52
Chapter Summary
Conscious and Automa�c Processes
The human cogni�ve system operates on two levels, a conscious level and an automa�c level. The conscious system is directed by the individual and works
slowly and deliberately on problems to provide nuanced answers. The automa�c system works outside of conscious awareness and without inten�on. The
automa�c system works quickly, is largely effortless, and provides general answers.
Schemas and Scripts
Schemas are knowledge structures that allow for organiza�on of informa�on. Schemas can be helpful in memory but can also provide misleading cues when
something we expect because of our schema is not present. Scripts are knowledge structures about events. Scripts can be helpful by allowing individuals to
predict what will happen and to, therefore, engage in expected behavior.
Heuris�cs
The automa�c system allows us to make quick judgments through the use of mental shortcuts called heuris�cs. When we use the availability heuris�c, we judge
the likelihood of an event based on how available that event is in memory. The representa�veness heuris�c involves judging the likelihood of an event based on
how closely it resembles the typical case. When we make errors in judgments using these heuris�cs it may be due, in part, to the conjunc�on fallacy or the base
rate fallacy. With the conjunc�on fallacy, we judge the likelihood of two things occurring together as more likely than one of those occurring alone. When we
ignore the rate of events and make judgments that suggest the unlikely event is more likely, we have engaged in the base rate fallacy. The affect heuris�c occurs
when we make judgments based on gut-level emo�onal reac�ons to events.
Errors in Judgment
Par�cular ways of thinking can contribute to errors in judgment. When we engage in belief perseverance we con�nue to believe in something even a�er our
reasons for believing have been disconfirmed. Confirma�on bias occurs when we ignore or discount informa�on that goes against our beliefs and search for and
pay a�en�on to informa�on that fits with our beliefs. When we believe we have more control in a situa�on we have an illusion of control.
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
Others’ expecta�ons of us can influence our behavior. Researchers have found that prophecies for behavior—in other words, what people think others will do—
can become self-fulfilling when individuals act in ways that elicit that behavior from the other.
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
1. How might schemas be helpful and harmful in one’s life?
2. What might your life be like if there were no scripts?
3. Consider a �me when you might have used the availability, representa�veness, or affect heuris�c in making a judgment. How did that affect the accuracy of
your judgment?
4. Although the examples in the chapter concern �mes when heuris�cs lead us to incorrect answers, why are heuris�cs helpful and used regularly by us?
5. What might you do to recognize and fight against belief perseverance and confirma�on bias?
6. Have self-fulfilling prophecies ever affected your life?
Key Terms
Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.
affect heuris�c
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A shortcut in making judgments that involves the use of automa�c (gut level) emo�onal reac�ons to make decisions.
automa�c system
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The part of the cogni�ve system that processes informa�on outside of consciousness. Processing occurs quickly, is rela�vely effortless, has a large capacity, and
allows people to do many things at once.
availability heuris�c
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 36/52
A shortcut in making judgments that involves assessing the frequency of something or the likelihood of an event occurring by how available it is in memory.
Instances that come more easily to mind, and thus are more available, are judged to be more likely.
base rate fallacy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The error people make when they ignore the number of instances of an event in the popula�on and base a judgment on other characteris�cs of the situa�on
such as representa�veness.
behavioral confirma�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The behaviors engaged in to make self-fulfilling prophecies come true.
belief perseverance
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to believe something even a�er the ini�al reasons for that belief are discredited.
confirma�on bias
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to search for informa�on that will confirm a pre-exis�ng belief.
conjunc�on fallacy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The error of believing that two events occurring together is more likely than one of the events occurring alone.
conscious system
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The part of the cogni�ve system that people are consciously aware of and can direct. Processing occurs slowly and is effor�ul. The conscious system has a limited
capacity, but allows for nuanced responses.
heuris�cs
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The shortcuts used in making judgments.
illusion of control
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
An inaccurate judgment about the amount of control one has. Shown when people approach a situa�on believing and ac�ng as though they have more control
that they actually do.
representa�veness heuris�c
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A shortcut in making judgments that involves making decisions based on how similar someone or something is to the typical, or representa�ve, person, thing, or
situa�on.
schema
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Knowledge structure that organizes what people know and may affect how they process informa�on.
scripts
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Knowledge structures that allow people to predict what is likely to occur in a situa�on (e.g., first date) and therefore engage in expected and appropriate
behavior.
self-fulfilling prophecy
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Predic�ons individuals make about the behaviors of others that become self-fulfilling when the individual who has the belief acts in a way that leads the other to
act in the expected manner.
self-verifica�on theory
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The theory that proposes that people want to confirm the characteris�cs they believe they possess.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 37/52
Stroop effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The slowdown in response �me found when dealing with two conflic�ng s�muli. Originally found when people were asked to the color of the ink with
contras�ng color names.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 38/52
Chapter 6
Prejudice
6.1 Prejudice, Stereotypes, and Discrimina�on
6.2 Social/Cogni�ve Origins
Categoriza�on
Ingroup Favori�sm
Outgroup Homogeneity Effect
6.3 Societal Origins
Norms
6.4 Influences on Those Stereotyped
6.5 Reducing Prejudice
Chapter Summary
© 2013 AFP/Timothy Clary/Staff/Ge�y Images
Learning Objec�ves
By the end of the chapter you should be able to:
Differen�ate prejudice, bias, stereotypes, and discrimina�on
Define s�gma and s�gma by associa�on
Describe how and why categoriza�on occurs
Define ingroup favori�sm and the outgroup homogeneity effect
Describe how stereotypes and prejudice originate in social norms, conflict, and social inequali�es
Describe how stereotype threat affects performance
Describe how interac�ons between people are affected by prejudice
Explain how prejudice can be reduced
Chapter Outline

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 39/52
Compe��on for Resources
Social Inequali�es
* * *
Many social groups are the subject of stereotypes, as well as the prejudice and discrimina�on that o�en accompanies it. For years women have
faced barriers in rising to leadership posi�ons, and even today face a gap in pay of 23¢ on every dollar earned by a man (American Associa�on of
University Women, 2013; Wirth, 2001). In 2013, Jason Collins came out as the first openly gay NBA athlete. In his interview with Sports Illustrated,
Collins describes his fear of being the target of prejudice and discrimina�on because of his sexual orienta�on (Collins & Lidz, 2013). Minority ethnic
and racial groups face prejudice and discrimina�on as well. Just under half of the hate crimes commi�ed in the United States are racially mo�vated
(46.9%), with 72% of those mo�vated by an�-Black prejudice (Federal Bureau of Inves�ga�on, 2013). Prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina�on are
predominant issues in our world today, affec�ng many lives in profound ways.

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 40/52
Expand Your Knowledge:
Weight Bias and S�gma
Excess weight affects more than one-third of the U.S. popula�on,
causing a number of health problems (Centers for Disease Control,
2012). Those who are overweight (with a body mass index over 25
and under 30) and obese (with a body mass index over 30) do not
just deal with weight issues; they are also targets of prejudice and
discrimina�on. Being overweight or obese is a s�gma�zing
condi�on linked to ridicule and shame (Farrell, 2011). To read more
about weight bias and s�gma visit the Yale Rudd Center for Food
Policy & Obesity website. The site offers a variety of resources and
readings: h�p://www.yaleruddcenter.org
(h�p://www.yaleruddcenter.org/) .
SuperStock/SuperStock
Prejudice and discrimina�on towards African Americans sparked the Civil Rights
Movement.
Expand Your Knowledge:
Beyond Prejudice
The website Beyond Prejudice (h�p://www.beyondprejudice.com/)
provides a great deal of interes�ng and accurate informa�on on
prejudice. The author differen�ates between automa�c prejudice
and uninten�onal prejudicial responses, and conscious and
inten�onal prejudicial responses. Sugges�ons are provided for
reducing prejudice.
6.1 Prejudice, Stereotypes, and Discrimina�on
Most people know about and have experienced prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimina�on. Social psychologists differen�ate among these terms by focusing on
whether they involve feelings (affect), cogni�on, or behaviors. The judgments we make about others can result in stereotypes. Stereotypes are beliefs about the
characteris�cs of par�cular groups or members of those groups. For example, stereotypes about people who are overweight are that they are lazy and
unsuccessful, and that they are not as a�rac�ve or popular as people of average weight (Cossrow, Jeffery, & McGuire, 2001; Greenleaf, Starks, Gomez, Chambliss,
& Mar�n, 2004). Our tendency to form judgments about people based on a characteris�c such as skin color, sexual orienta�on, or personal characteris�cs is
known as a bias. When people engage in weight bias, they make judgments about others based on their weight, not taking into account other characteris�cs of
the person.
While stereotypes refer to our cogni�ve processes, prejudice describes our
emo�onal experience. Prejudice involves a nega�ve a�tude toward individuals
based on their membership in a par�cular group. Prejudice may be aimed at those
from different racial or ethnic groups, those with a par�cular sexual orienta�on, or
individuals with mental or physical challenges, and many more. For example,
prejudice against those who are overweight involves feelings of dislike or disgust
toward a person who is heavy. As with a�tudes, prejudice can come in an explicit
form and as implicit prejudice. Explicit prejudice is prejudice that is conscious and
can be reported. Someone who engages in a hate crime and states that he did so
because he hates that group is engaging an ac�on because of explicit prejudice.
Implicit prejudice is unconscious and requires tests like the Implicit Associa�ons
Test described in Chapter 4 to assess. Implicit prejudice tends to control
unconscious and nonverbal behavior, such as nonverbal expression of discomfort in
the presence of someone from another racial group.
Similarly, discrimina�on is nega�ve behavior toward individuals or groups based on
beliefs and feelings about those groups. Job applicants who are obese are less likely
to be hired than those who are of normal weight, and once they are employed they
are o�en given less desirable assignments, paid less, and disciplined more harshly
(Fikkan & Rothblum, 2005). Part of that discrimina�on may come from a s�gma
associated with membership in a par�cular group. A s�gma is a sign of disgrace or
shame that taints the en�re person. Others might avoid or limit contact because of a
s�gma, or ridicule or denigrate the person carrying the s�gma. People who are
overweight report feeling that their weight s�gma�zes them, with the worst
experiences of s�gma�za�on coming from family and friends (Puhl & Brownell, 2006;
Puhl, Moss-Racusin, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2008). S�gma�za�on from friends and
family might come in the form of denigra�ng remarks or ridicule of ea�ng, exercise,
or die�ng habits as well as other nega�ve behaviors.
S�gmas do not just affect the s�gma�zed target. If you were associated with a
person who has been s�gma�zed, that s�gma is par�ally transferred to you. This
phenomenon is called s�gma by associa�on. For example, in some cultures
someone who is HIV-posi�ve carries the s�gma of AIDS, and the family of the
person would be seen as tainted or is shameful by associa�on (Pryor, Reeder, &
Monroe, 2012). Generally, the closer the associa�on (family versus friends versus
acquaintance), the greater the s�gma by associa�on experienced. However,
researchers found that simply si�ng next to someone who is overweight in a job
interview leads to s�gma�za�on of the job applicant of average weight (Hebl &
Mannix, 2003).
Test Yourself

หน้าแรก

Home

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 41/52
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
How do affect (feeling), behavior, and cogni�on match up with prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina�on?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Affect relates to prejudice, behavior relates to discrimina�on, and cogni�on relates to stereotypes.
How are s�gma by associa�on and s�gma related?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
S�gma involves a stain or sign of disgrace for an individual. With s�gma by associa�on that sign of disgrace is transferred because of an
associa�on, either by rela�onship or proximity, to others.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 42/52
Labels can influence how people are perceived.
Labeling
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
How does labeling impact behavior?
How have you seen this demonstrated?
6.2 Social/Cogni�ve Origins
A variety of factors are responsible for our prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina�on. One group of factors relates to how we cogni�vely process informa�on.
Overall, our processes lead to generaliza�ons about other people—generaliza�ons that do not take into account the uniqueness of the individual. In this sec�on,
we will examine the ways in which our processes lead to conscious or unconscious prejudice and stereotypes.
Categoriza�on
Sor�ng people into categories has long been related to stereotyping and prejudice (Allport, 1954).
Categories are helpful because they allow us to deal with large amounts of informa�on in an efficient
way. The cogni�ve energy-saving nature of categories was demonstrated in a study by Macrae, Milne,
and Bodenhausen (1994). In their work, they asked par�cipants to remember a list of characteris�cs
of people that were flashed on a computer screen. The par�cipants were simultaneously asked to
remember informa�on on an unrelated topic from a recorded message. The researchers were
a�emp�ng to tax the par�cipants’ ability to process all the informa�on they were seeing and hearing.
The researchers wondered if having category labels would be helpful in helping the par�cipants’
memory. To test this, half of the par�cipants were shown a category label that might help them
remember some of the characteris�cs on the list of names they were supposed to remember. For
example, “Julian” was labeled as an ar�st, and then characteris�cs like “crea�ve,” “temperamental,” and “sensi�ve” were flashed on the screen, to go along with
our general stereotype of ar�st. Par�cipants also saw characteris�cs that were not necessarily related to the category label, like cordial and generous. The other
half of the par�cipants saw the same names and characteris�cs, but they were not shown a category label such as “ar�st.” When all the par�cipants had seen all
the different names and characteris�cs, the researchers quizzed them on how many of the characteris�cs they remembered for each name. They also quizzed the
par�cipants on how much they remembered about the unrelated recorded message.
Did having a category label help par�cipants remember more of the category-related words? Par�cipants who saw a category label remembered 4.42 category-
consistent words, on average, while those who did not see the label remembered only 2.08. This shows that the label helped people remember things related to
the label. In addi�on, the par�cipants who saw a label also did be�er on the quiz about the unrelated message they heard. This suggests that being able to
categorize freed up energy to listen to and process the unrelated message. Categories help us by saving us cogni�ve energy and allowing us to process more
informa�on. Therefore, we use categories liberally. That might not be a problem if all we did was categorize people, but it turns out that along with quickly and
easily developing categories, we use them to make later decisions (Tajfel, 1970).
Test Yourself
Click on the ques�on below to reveal the answer.
How are categories helpful to people?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Categories make it possible for people to more efficiently process informa�on.
Ingroup Favori�sm
In 1970 Tajfel published some surprising research results. For his study, he brought boys age 14 and 15 into a psychological research laboratory. The boys were
shown slides that had dots on them and were asked to es�mate the number of dots. The boys were then told that they were either over es�mators of dots or
under es�mators. In reality, the boys were assigned these two labels randomly. Later, the boys were asked to assign money to other par�cipants, they assigned
more money to those who shared their group membership. This tendency to show preferen�al treatment toward members of one’s own group is called ingroup
favori�sm. A group that you are a part of is called your ingroup. Ingroups might include gender, race, or city or state of residence, as well as groups you might
inten�onally join, like Kiwanis or a bowling league. A group that you do not iden�fy with is called your outgroup.
In later work, Tajfel (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) found that even when par�cipants were told that assignment to groups was random, they would s�ll show preferen�al
treatment toward members of their own group. Ingroup favori�sm appears to work even when the reason for group categoriza�on is rela�vely arbitrary (being
an over es�mator or under es�mator of dots) or simply random. Preference for an ingroup is not found among all groups that are targets of prejudice and
stereotyping. People who are overweight show similar nega�ve prejudice toward other overweight people as those who are not overweight (Crandall, 1994;
Robin, Cash, Jacobi, & Bubb-Lewis, 1997). One reason for this might be that those who are overweight may be a�emp�ng to distance themselves from
membership in an a�empt to escape some of the s�gma associated with their weight status (Puhl & Brownell, 2003).
We see evidence of prejudice and preference for rela�ng to those who are similar to oneself in da�ng. For example, people are most likely to form long-term
commitments with those from a similar racial group (Blackwell & Lichter, 2004; Harris & Kalbfleisch, 2000). In the past we might have a�ributed this to lack of
access to poten�al partners of other races because of geographic boundaries, but today the Internet allows people to meet individuals of diverse backgrounds.
Even without the pressures of geography, people tend to prefer da�ng someone of their own race (Sweeney & Borden, 2009). Research suggests that even when
we have equal access to individuals from other racial groups, we tend to s�ll be a�racted to and form in�mate rela�onships with those from our own group.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 43/52
Outgroup Homogeneity Effect
Beyond viewing one’s own group as more deserving than another group, individuals within a group tend to view their own group as more varied than someone
outside the group. Someone describing an outgroup will describe the members in that group as being more homogeneous, or similar, than the members would
describe themselves (Brauer, 2001; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). This effect is called the outgroup homogeneity effect. One explana�on for this effect may be our
tendency to describe an outgroup based on what we know about the primary characteris�cs of that group. However, when we are asked to describe our own
groups, we access informa�on about the individual people within the group (Park & Rothbart, 1982). It is also possible that we simply know more people in our
ingroup. Because we know more people as part of our membership with the group, we know more poten�ally different people; therefore, we judge our ingroup
as being more diverse than the outgroup (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). This effect only happens for naturally occurring groups, not groups that are
temporarily formed, like the groups supposedly formed because of dot es�ma�on (Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Some circumstances can minimize the outgroup
homogeneity effect. In one research study, White par�cipants showed the outgroup homogeneity effect for Black faces with neutral expressions. When the Black
faces were shown with an angry expression, the par�cipants were more accurate in differen�a�ng between them (Ackerman et al., 2006). The outgroup
homogeneity effect was evidenced in neutral circumstances, but largely disappeared when the faces expressed an emo�on that could signal danger to the
individual.
©Ge�y Images/Hemera Technologies/AbleStock.com/Thinkstock
Individuals tend to view outgroup members as being very similar to one another. For example,
someone might describe all homeless people with words like “lazy” and “addicts.” Members of the
wealthy, upper class may be described with words like “greedy” and “self-serving.”
Although categoriza�on saves us cogni�ve energy there are dangers in these tendencies. Categoriza�on denies the unique characteris�cs of individuals. For
example, Germans may typically value �meliness and be prompt, but Hans may defy the stereotype and arrive late. Our judgments about people may be skewed
because of these tendencies. We may perceive and make judgments based on similari�es that do not actually exist or place individuals in categories in which
they do not actually fit (Dotsch, Wigboldus, & van Knippenberg, 2011; Kosic & Phalet, 2006). Although people might automa�cally categorize a 275-pound
woman as overweight, lazy, unmo�vated, and unathle�c, when that woman is Sarah Robles nothing could be farther from the truth. Robles was a 2012 Olympic
weightli�er who placed seventh in the London Olympic games, overcoming a great deal of adversity to do so (Gregory, 2012).
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
For what type of groups do people show ingroup favori�sm?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Ingroup favori�sm is shown even for ingroups formed by random assignment; though, we do not tend to show ingroup favori�sm when
our ingroup is a s�gma�zed group.
People tend to view the people in their outgroup as all __________one another and those in their ingroup as ________ one another.
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Similar to . . . different from

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 44/52
Stock Foundry/Design Pics/Valueline/Thinkstock
We pick up prejudice and stereotypes from the norms in our
social groups.
Norms can lead to nega�ve a�tudes and behavior.
Norms and Da�ng Violence
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
How do norms influence violent behavior?
What are some of the norms that influence your
behavior?
Expand Your Knowledge:
United Na�ons Declara�on on Race
and Racial Prejudice
To learn more about the interna�onal response to prejudice, read
the United Na�ons Declara�on on Race and Racial Prejudice,
6.3 Societal Origins
Our prejudice and stereotypes come not only from the way we take in and process informa�on but also from the world around us. Societal origins of prejudice
involve the norms in the world around us, the compe��on that exists between groups, and the social inequali�es that exist in the world. Because categorizing
happens naturally and is a helpful tool in many ways, all human cultures are likely to have stereotypes. Ingroup favori�sm leads to unequal treatment of those
we have been categorized as part of the outgroup, and outgroup homogeneity bias blinds us to the uniqueness among individuals within the outgroup. Our
beliefs about the characteris�cs of those outgroups are largely determined by the culture in which we reside.
Norms
Prejudice and stereotypes have origins in the norms of our social groups. Norms are our beliefs
about what a group is thinking or doing. People learn nega�ve a�tudes toward groups by learning
the norms of their social context (Sherif, 1936). We learn from our peers which stereotypes are
appropriate. When par�cipants in one study were led to believe that their stereotypes were different
from their peers, those stereotypes were changed to be more in line with peer stereotypes (Stangor,
Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). For example, par�cipants who learned that their peers had more posi�ve
a�tudes toward people who are obese, increased the posi�ve stereotypes about this group and
decreased their nega�ve stereotypes. Informa�on about the a�tudes of others is par�cularly
powerful when it comes from people in the ingroup (Puhl, Schwartz, & Brownell, 2005). When
making judgments about others we tend to go along with the judgments of those in our ingroup,
without cri�cally evalua�ng the content of those judgments (Binning & Sherman, 2011). Employees
might pick up a stereotype about the salespeople from their own department but would discount or
carefully evaluate that same informa�on if it came from another department. Overall, we seem to
believe as others do, par�cularly those we iden�fy with; we change our stereotypes and prejudice to
fit with that shown or expressed by our friends.
If social norms are accurate indicators of
prejudice, then there should be a
correla�on between exis�ng prejudices,
and what social norms would dictate.
Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002)
found an almost perfect correla�on
between the norms about groups and
people’s ra�ngs of prejudice toward
those groups. Social norms dictate that
we dislike child abusers, terrorists, and
members of the Ku Klux Klan, so these
groups are ones toward which people feel the strongest prejudices. On the other hand, norms dictate that farmers, family men, and those with physical
challenges are people toward whom one should not have nega�ve prejudice; therefore, people report less nega�ve prejudice toward these groups. The level of
expressed prejudice toward different racial groups in the United States has been parallel to the perceived acceptability of prejudice over the years (Dowden &
Robinson, 1993). As society views prejudice as less acceptable, individuals are less likely to express prejudice. For example, as society has become more open and
accep�ng of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, individuals have been less likely to express prejudice.
Compe��on for Resources
When groups exist together in a society they may be at odds with one another in compe��on for resources, which can create prejudice (Butz & Yogeeswaran,
2011; Jackson, 1993; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Compe��on is at the heart of realis�c group conflict theory. Realis�c group
conflict theory proposes that struggles between groups over scarce resources or conflic�ng objec�ves can create hos�lity and prejudice. Compe��on may center
on economic interests, poli�cal or military advantage, or even threats to the safety or status of the group. A strong factor in crea�ng prejudice is anger. When in
compe��on we may feel angry that a rival group is taking away resources or pres�ge from our group. Individuals who feel angry are more likely to feel prejudice
than those who feel sadness or more neutral emo�ons (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartle�, & Cajdric, 2004). For example,
when people feel like their jobs may be threatened, they show more prejudice toward immigrants than if they feel no threat (Zárate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan,
2003). Compe��on can certainly enhance prejudice, but is not necessary for prejudice to occur. People tend to show the social cogni�ve factors for prejudice,
such as ingroup favori�sm and outgroup homogeneity effect, even when compe��on is not in play (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1991).
This compe��on between groups can lead to problems for groups like immigrants.
When immigrants do well in their new country, their success may be seen as
coming at the expense of those already in the country. This compe��on for
resources, real or perceived, may create tension, prejudice, and hos�lity. For the
immigrant, lack of success could be just as problema�c. An immigrant who
requires social services or is not fully contribu�ng to society may also be a target
of prejudice and hos�lity (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). Immigrants

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 45/52
approved in 1978.
The statement can be found here (h�p://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13161&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html) .
can also be scapegoats within a society. In European Union countries with
struggling economies (low gross domes�c product) and a high percentage of
minori�es, an�-immigrant sen�ment is high (Quillian, 1995). When things are not
going well, having a group that can be blamed for the problems may make people
feel be�er about themselves or their ingroup.
Social Inequali�es
Social inequali�es are maintained, to some extent, by legi�mizing myths, beliefs, and a�tudes that keep low-status groups in their place. Prejudice is created
through a specific set of beliefs to support that prejudice. For example, the place of those of higher status may emphasize some aspect of the lower-status group
that, according to the stereotype, indicates a flaw or weakness. People might argue that the low socioeconomic status of a person from a par�cular racial group
is the result of nega�ve quali�es found in that group (for example, lack of intelligence or ini�a�ve). Such views jus�fy stereotypes and prejudice (Fiske, 2001);
individuals feel jus�fied in their privileged posi�on and the status quo in the social system is maintained (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Individuals who have more
nega�ve stereotypes tend to view social and economic status differences between people as more jus�fied than those with fewer nega�ve stereotypes (De
Oliveira & Dambrun, 2007).
Social inequali�es are supported by the beliefs of people but also by the way they use language. At �mes, people in groups with higher social standing will tell
jokes that support the nega�ve views they have of those of lower social standing. These jokes allow the dominant group to maintain and legi�mize their posi�on
of power while supposedly simply being humorous (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010). To stop such talk is difficult because of the guise of humor and can result
in ostracism of the challenger. Guerin (2003) argues that changing this type of language must come from within the ingroup by, for example, interrup�ng the
speaker with a different joke or story that is nonprejudiced, is natural, and holds a�en�on.
Individuals who prefer more hierarchical power structures, what researchers call social dominance orienta�on, also tend to have prejudiced and racist views
(Pra�o, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Hierarchical power structures support differences between people, with those at the bo�om having less power and
pres�ge than those at the top. Such power structures provide a reason, or perhaps more accurately an excuse, for discrepancies in what society expects of
people and the freedoms they are allowed. Social dominance orienta�on is related to prejudice and racism across cultures (Pra�o et al., 2000). For example,
Serge Guimond and colleagues (2013) found that greater social dominance orienta�on in both Canada and Germany was related to greater prejudice toward
those of lower social status. However, Canada’s greater na�onal commitment to mul�culturalism decreased the overall endorsement of social dominance
orienta�on than in Germany. Social dominance orienta�on interacts with realis�c group conflict theory; when an economic downturn occurs, crea�ng a threat
and therefore more perceived conflicts between groups, those who are high in social dominance orienta�on are less suppor�ve of policies that would benefit an
outgroup (King, Knight, & Hebl, 2010).
Social Psychology in Depth: Blue-Eyed and Brown-Eyed
How can a teacher teach about prejudice in a classroom with li�le diversity? Jane Ellio�, a third-grade teacher in a small Iowa town in the late
1960s was faced with this predicament. Shortly a�er the assassina�on of Dr. Mar�n Luther King, Jr., Ellio� decided to teach her students about
the dangers of prejudice and discrimina�on by having them experience it. Elliot said
We’ve all been told those things. We know them, at least in the sense that we mouth them at appropriate �mes. Yet we con�nue
to discriminate, or to tolerate it in others, or to do nothing to stop it. What I had racked my brain to think of the night before was
a way of le�ng my children find out for themselves, personally, deeply, what discrimina�on was really like, how it felt, what it
could do to you. Now the �me had come to try it. (Peters, 1987)
Elliot divided the class by the color of their eyes; blue-eyed versus brown-eyed students. On the first day the blue-eyed students were told they
were smarter and be�er. Discriminatory policies were ins�tuted for the brown-eyed children. Children with brown eyes got less recess �me, were
forbidden to use the drinking fountain, and could not play with the blue-eyed children. The next day roles were switched. The children quickly
and easily joined in the game, and it swi�ly became reality for them. A normally friendly, coopera�ve group of children were mean to one
another and fought. The lower-status children became sad, withdrawn, and angry. By the end of the second day the children had a taste of
prejudice and a sense of what discrimina�on feels like.
Since her lesson, Ellio� has traveled around the world giving lectures and doing the same exercise with adults. The adults’ reac�ons are similar
to the children’s reac�on. Both the children in Ellio�’s class and the adults in her seminars reported a profound long-term change in their
understanding of prejudice and discrimina�on. Ellio� received mul�ple awards for her work and has been the subject of a number of
documentaries.
Ellio�’s website contains addi�onal informa�on and materials: h�p://www.janeellio�.com/index.htm (h�p://www.janeellio�.com/index.htm) .
Prejudice influences daily interac�ons between people. For example, research has shown that people desire less social contact with people who are overweight.
Research par�cipants have reported less of a desire to get to know or to become friends with, to work with, or do a favor for a person who is overweight
(Brochu & Morrison, 2007). This effect varies depending on the type of prejudice. Explicit prejudice, such as reported prejudice toward those who are
overweight, individuals from different racial groups, or toward those of different sexual orienta�ons, tends to affect consciously controlled behavior, such as the

http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13161&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

http://www.janeelliott.com/index.htm

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 46/52
words people say and the degree of comfort people report feeling in the interac�on. Implicit prejudice, as would be measured through the Implicit Associa�ons
Test, is related to behaviors that are less consciously controlled, such as nonverbal behavior. In one study, the explicit a�tudes of White par�cipants indicated
what they said and their self-reported friendliness toward an African American interac�on partner. Implicit prejudice, however, was revealed by their nonverbal
behavior, the ra�ngs of observers, and the interac�on partner (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Implicit prejudice seemed to be displayed in the nonverbal,
less-consciously controlled behaviors, like how close people sat or the naturalness of their movements and gestures. Because controlling our responses requires
energy, interac�ons with a person from a minority group that is o�en the target of prejudice can leave a member of the majority group with lower self-
regulatory capacity. If people are concerned about appearing prejudiced, they will use self-regula�on and experience ego deple�on, leaving fewer resources for
subsequent tasks (Richeson & Shelton, 2007).
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
What term describes the source of prejudice as coming from clash between groups over resources or power?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Realis�c group conflict theory
What is social dominance orienta�on and how is it related to prejudice?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Social dominance orienta�on is a preference for hierarchical power structures. Individuals high in social dominance orienta�on tend to also
show more prejudice than those low in social dominance orienta�on.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 47/52
Don Mason/Photolibrary
Stereotype threat suggests that the fear of confirming or flou�ng
a given stereotype can cause performance anxiety, like a student
driver failing a test.
Expand Your Knowledge:
Stereotype Threat
The website ReducingStereotypeThreat.org
(h�p://www.reducingstereotypethreat.org/) was developed by two social
psychologists to describe and provide resources on the topic of
stereotype threat. The site provides a very good introduc�on to
stereotype threat and describes situa�ons where stereotype threat
occurs, the individuals who are vulnerable, the consequences of
stereotype threat, and the mechanisms contribu�ng to stereotype
threat. Some sugges�ons for reducing stereotype threat and some
unresolved issues on the topic of stereotype threat are also
provided.
6.4 Influences on Those Stereotyped
Do stereotypes influence our performance? Imagine you had to take a test to assess your
performance that, based on the stereotype about your group, suggests you may not perform well.
For example, there is a stereotype that women are not as good at math as men. If you are a woman
and were thinking about the stereotype while you took a math test, would that affect your
performance? Research suggests it would.
In a classic study by
Steele and Aronson
(1995), the
researchers varied
how much
par�cipants were
thinking about a racial
stereotype. The
researchers told one
group of African
American and White
par�cipants that the
test they would take
would be diagnos�c
of intellectual ability,
tapping into the
stereotype for African Americans that they are not as intelligent as those from other racial groups.
For a second group of par�cipants, the researchers emphasized that this test was not diagnos�c of
ability. The researchers found that African American par�cipants in the first group did worse than
their White counterparts, but in the second group, African Americans and Whites did equally well
(see Figure 6.1). Obviously, the African American par�cipants were capable of doing just as well on
the test as the White par�cipants, so why the difference? Steele and Aronson explain that the
possibility that one is going to be evaluated on an ability about which others show a stereotype
creates anxiety. This anxiety distracts people from doing as well as they might truly be capable of doing. The researchers named this phenomenon stereotype
threat. Stereotype threat refers to the threat people feel when they think they may be at risk of confirming a nega�ve stereotype about their group. The
stereotype predicts poor performance, so the person has to deal with the possibility of confirming that stereotype. Awareness that one is being evaluated based
on membership in a stereotyped group can, therefore, interfere with performance.
Figure 6.1: Effects of stereotype threat
African Americans primed with the stereotype threat—that the
test was a measure of intellectual ability—scored lower on the
test than African Americans who were not primed with the
stereotype threat.
From Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual
test performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social

http://www.reducingstereotypethreat.org/

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 48/52
Expand Your Knowledge:
Test Yourself for Hidden Bias
The Southern Poverty Law Center provides a solid explana�on of
prejudice, focusing most thoroughly on implicit prejudice, or what
they term hidden bias. One of their resources for professional
development is an ar�cle called “Test Yourself for Hidden Bias”. This
ar�cle describes the connec�on between hidden bias and behavior,
as well as how prejudice and stereotypes affect people. It also
provides some sugges�ons of what one can do about hidden
biases. Learn more at h�p://www.tolerance.org/
(h�p://www.tolerance.org/) .
Psychology, 69, 797–811. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.5.797. Copyright ©1995 by
the American Psychological Associa�on. Reprinted with permission.
Stereotype threat is not just present for African Americans on intelligence tests.
Women college students perform worse on tests of mathema�cs when in the
presence of men (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003). Huguet and Regner (2007) found
similar results in sixth- and seventh-grade girls (girls 11 to 13 years old).
Stereotype threat is also realized in athle�c performance (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling,
& Darley, 1999). When the stereotype was presented that White men do not have
the same athle�c ability as African Americans, the White men did much worse
when they thought their natural athle�c ability was being tested. Similarly, La�nos
showed poorer intellectual performance under situa�ons of stereotype threat
(Gonzales, Blanton, & Williams, 2002). Also, individuals who are overweight show
a stress reac�on when asked to do something that is related to weight s�gma
(Major, Eliezer, & Rieck, 2012). For example, women who are overweight may
avoid exercise because of stereotype threat (Seacat & Mickelson, 2009). As part of
various social groups, we all have the poten�al for our performance to be
disturbed by stereotype threat.
Stereotype threat seems par�cularly strong when people have a vested interested in the area being tested. For example, women who describe math as being
important will feel more stereotype threat than women who report math is not important (Aronson et al., 1999; Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003). Dealing with
stereotype threat leaves people with less self-control, causing the effects of the stereotype to spill over into other aspects of life. Individuals who experience
stereotype threat may engage in risky behaviors such as risky decision making, overea�ng or even aggression. Over the long term, these behaviors can be
detrimental to physical and mental health (Inzlicht & Kang, 2010; Inzlicht, Tulle�, & Gutsell, 2012).
Test Yourself
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
How does stereotype threat affect behavior?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Stereotype threat results in poor performance on a stereotype related behavior.
How does the effect of explicit prejudice differ from the effect of implicit prejudice on behavior?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
Explicit prejudice tends to affect consciously controlled behavior like what a person says, while implicit prejudice tends to affect nonverbal
behavior or other behavior that one does not consciously control.

http://www.tolerance.org/

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 49/52
Big Cheese Photo/Thinkstock
Jigsaw classrooms encourage children to collaborate in diverse groups and rely on
each other to carry out a project, aiming to reduce prejudice.
6.5 Reducing Prejudice
How do we reduce prejudice and discrimina�on? During the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government ins�tuted
policies of desegrega�on in schools and in the military. One hope of such a policy was that pu�ng people of different groups together would reduce prejudice,
an idea called the contact hypothesis. While contact might increase prejudice in some situa�ons (Allport, 1954), under certain condi�ons contact is more likely to
reduce prejudice (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005). Here are some of the condi�ons found by researchers to reduce prejudice:
People or groups are at equal status
Common goals
Intergroup coopera�on
Support by the larger social context (e.g., authori�es)
When these condi�ons are met, contact with different people is most effec�ve in reducing prejudice. Yet even when the condi�ons are not met, contact can s�ll
reduce prejudice (Pe�grew & Tropp, 2006). One of the big determining factors in the success of prejudice reduc�on is the level of anxiety individuals feel when
interac�ng. When we feel anxious and uncertain about how we should act, it is difficult for an interac�on to go well (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Stephan et al.,
2002).
One interes�ng extension of the work on contact has been studying the effects of indirect intergroup contact. Even if people have no real contact with people
from another group, their own prejudice can be reduced if they have a friend who does have contact with people from that group (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-
Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). It seems that even imagined contact is sufficient to reduce prejudice (Turner & Crisp, 2010). Research par�cipants who were asked to
imagine interac�ng with an older adult for two minutes showed less prejudice toward older adults than those who did not imagine such an interac�on. Although
imagined interac�ons do not have as strong an impact on reducing prejudice, the effect was s�ll a posi�ve one for such a low investment.
Common goals have long been viewed as important for the reduc�on of prejudice and conflict between groups. In the 1950s, Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues
studied the effec�veness of shared goals—what he called superordinate goals—on the reduc�on of intergroup conflict (Sherif, 1958; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood,
& Sherif, 1961). Superordinate goals are goals held by both groups in a conflict that transcend the conflict, providing a common aim. Sherif’s study brought two
groups of boys to a summer camp se�ng. For a week each group did not know the other group existed. As you might imagine from the previous discussions of
categoriza�on and ingroup favori�sm, each group of boys quickly and easily bonded as a group. When the groups discovered that another group was at the
camp, conflict between the groups quickly escalated. The researchers then provided both groups of boys with problems they could solve only if all of them
worked together. In one such instance, researchers caused the camp’s water supply to be cut off. The two groups of boys had to work together to fix the
problem and restore water to the camp. A�er several such events, conflict between the groups reduced significantly and the boys became friends without
respect to the original grouping. The superordinate goals of solving problems helped reduce the ini�al prejudice the boys felt toward one another.
Coopera�ve learning experiences in the classroom have also been shown to reduce
prejudice. Learning can provide a superordinate goal that the group can only reach if
it works together. One technique that incorporates coopera�ve learning is the jigsaw
classroom. A jigsaw classroom is a classroom in which different students have access
to different pieces of the material to be learned. For example, if an elementary school
class were learning about cells, one group of students might learn about the nucleus,
another about mitochondria, another about ribosomes, and another about golgi body.
Groups need to work together to gain exper�se in each aspect of the material. The
expert groups disperse and share their exper�se with a new group, each student
presen�ng his or her own area of exper�se (Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp,
1978). In a study of Australian school children who used the jigsaw method while
learning about nutri�on, researchers found that children in classrooms using the
jigsaw method showed greater liking for their outgroup and less stereotyped views of
children from other ethnic groups (Walker & Crogan, 1998).
On the individual level, reducing prejudice is, in part, dependent on commi�ng to
thinking about and approaching the world in a way that honors individuality and
diversity. The more interac�on we have with a variety of people, the be�er off we are
likely to be. People are mo�vated to learn about others when it is important to living successfully in the world (Fiske, 2004). Placing ourselves in situa�ons where
interac�ons with others are inevitable and necessary may help us to learn about those in our outgroup, and reduce the prejudices we might have about them.
The more the norms of a social group also focus on inclusivity, the more individuals will do the same (Fiske, 2004). It also helps to realize that all people are part
of a variety of social groups. For example, someone might be a woman, a Korean American, an ar�st, and a runner. By thinking about this person not just based
on gender, with the stereotypes and prejudice that may come with that, but also her race, occupa�on, and hobby, one may be inclined to show less prejudice
and be more tolerant (Brewer, 2000).
Test Yourself

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 50/52
Click on each ques�on below to reveal the answer.
What are the factors of contact that need to be present for the contact to reduce prejudice?
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
The contact should be between people or groups of equal status, with common goals, that includes ingroup coopera�on, and is supported
by the social context.
What is a superordinate goal? (h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover#)
A goal that can only be achieved when people work together to fulfill it.
Conclusion
We all live with prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina�on every day. Although we naturally form the categories that lead us to form stereotypes; show
discriminatory behavior toward those outside of our groups; and are part of socie�es that, inten�onally or not, support prejudice and discrimina�on, we can s�ll
work hard to reduce prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimina�on through our interac�ons with others.

https://content.ashford.edu/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sections/cover#

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 51/52
Chapter Summary
Prejudice, Stereotypes, and Discrimina�on
Prejudice includes the a�tudes we have about individuals of a par�cular group based on their group membership. Bias leads us to form judgments about people
based on their membership in a group. Stereotypes are the beliefs we hold about individuals based on their group membership. Discrimina�on involves ac�ons
toward individuals or groups based on group membership.
Social/Cogni�ve Origins
Our cogni�ve systems naturally categorize others. This categoriza�on saves us cogni�ve energy. When we categorize others as members of our ingroup, we show
ingroup favori�sm. We see members of the outgroup as all similar, while we acknowledge that members of our ingroup are quite different from one another.
Societal Origins
Socie�es support stereotypes and prejudice, and therefore discrimina�on, through norms. All members of a group generally learn those norms. Groups develop
nega�ve views of one another when they are in conflict over resources. Groups in power maintain the social inequali�es through legi�mizing beliefs that jus�fy
their superior posi�on.
Influences on Those Stereotyped
Stereotypes can interfere with performance. When people perform a behavior knowing their group is stereotypically not very good at that behavior, their
performance may be less than their best. This phenomenon is called stereotype threat. Stereotypes and prejudice also interfere with posi�ve interac�ons
between people.
Reducing Prejudice
The contact hypothesis proposes that contact between members of groups that hold prejudice against one another may reduce prejudice. Contact can reduce
prejudice when a number of condi�ons are sa�sfied. Common goals, called superordinate goals, are par�cularly helpful in bringing groups in conflict together.
Cri�cal Thinking Ques�ons
1. Humans naturally categorize; it is good for memory and saves cogni�ve energy. But categoriza�on also leads to stereotyping. If we could somehow reverse
our tendency to categorize, should we? What are the tradeoffs?
2. Have you seen ingroup favori�sm or the outgroup homogeneity effect in your own experiences?
3. What effect would changing societal norms have on stereotypes and prejudice?
4. In your environment, in what ways do you see a jus�fica�on of a social system to maintain status for the privileged and keep those with lower status in
their place?
5. Everyone is part of a social group that has certain stereotypes that go along with it. What stereotypes exist for your social groups? How might that affect
your performance?
Key Terms
Click on each key term to reveal the defini�on.
bias
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to form judgments about people based simply on a characteris�c such as weight, skin color, or personal characteris�cs.
contact hypothesis
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The idea that contact between groups will lessen conflict.
discrimina�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Nega�ve behavior toward individuals or groups based on beliefs and feelings about those groups.
ingroup
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo

1/23/2018 Imprimir
https://content.ashford.edu/print/AUPSY301.14.1?sections=ch04,sec4.1,sec4.2,sec4.3,sec4.4,sec4.5,ch04summary,ch05,sec5.1,sec5.2,sec5.3,sec… 52/52
The group to which one belongs.
ingroup favori�sm
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The tendency to show preferen�al treatment toward members of one’s own group.
jigsaw classroom
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A coopera�ve learning technique in which different students have access to different pieces of the material to be learned. Groups work together to gain exper�se
in their piece of the material and then work with another group to share their exper�se and learn about the other pieces from their group mates.
norm
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Belief about what the group is thinking or doing.
outgroup
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The group to which one does not belong.
outgroup homogeneity effect
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Members of outgroups, groups an individual is not a part of, are viewed as more similar, or homogeneous. Individuals tend to view members of their own group
as more varied.
prejudice
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Nega�ve a�tudes toward individuals based on their membership in a par�cular group.
realis�c group conflict theory
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A theory that proposes that conflict and compe��on between groups over resources or power creates prejudice.
social dominance orienta�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
An individual difference between people in their preference for hierarchical power structures.
stereotype threat
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The threat people feel when they think they may be at risk of confirming a nega�ve stereotype about their group. The stereotype predicts poor performance, so
people have to deal with the possibility of confirming that stereotype. Awareness that one is being evaluated based on membership in a stereotyped group can,
therefore, interfere with performance.
stereotypes
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Beliefs about the characteris�cs of par�cular groups or members of those groups.
s�gma
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
A sign of disgrace or shame that taints the en�re person.
s�gma by associa�on
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
The transfer of s�gma from a s�gma�zed person to someone related to them in some way.
superordinate goals
(h�p://content.thuzelearning.com/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/books/AUPSY301.14.1/sec�ons/cover/boo
Goals held by both groups in conflict that transcend the conflict and provide a common aim.

Turn in your highest-quality paper
Get a qualified writer to help you with

“ Judgment ”

Get high-quality paper

Guarantee! All work is written by expert writers!

Still stressed from student homework?

Get quality assistance from academic writers!

Order now