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Discussion: Social Influence

This Discussion focuses on social influence and group processes. As you likely know from your own experience, the presence of others impacts an individual’s behavior, an individual’s behavior often impacts another’s, and individuals’ behaviors often impact that of an entire group.

Conformity is the tendency to change one’s beliefs or behaviors to match those of others. There are many theoretical reasons suggested by social psychologists for why people conform. Obedience is believing that a legitimate authority has the right to make a request and then adhering to this request. Social psychology studies the concept of obedience to help analyze the reasons that people disobey legitimate authority, as well as why people obey perceived authority, even when the requests go against their personal beliefs. In addition, various group processes affect whether people conform or obey in a given situation.

To prepare:

· Review Chapters 8 and Chapter 9 of your course text, Social Psychology, focusing on the factors that are associated with social influence on behavior.

· Think about examples in the news in which people did or did not demonstrate conformity or obedience.

Note: One way to find examples of news events for these concepts is to go to a major search engine (Google, Yahoo, Bing, etc.), click on the “news” tab, and type in appropriate search terms.

By Day 3

Post a brief description of a contemporary example from the news in which people did or did not demonstrate conformity or obedience. Use a theory discussed in Chapter 8 to explain how or why the behavior illustrates conformity or obedience. Use information from Chapter 9 to explain how being in a group might influence behaviors in your example. That is, in your example, how might group processes, characteristics, or functions explain behavior?

Notes:

· Please do NOT select the Holocaust or Milgram’s studies as your example.

· Support the responses within your Discussion post, and in your colleague reply, with evidence from the assigned Learning Resources.

· You are required to complete your initial post before you will be able to view and respond to your colleague’s postings. After clicking on the “Post to Discussion Question” link, select “Create Thread” to create your initial post.

Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Sommers, S. (2016). Social psychology (9th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.

· Chapter 8, “Conformity: Influencing Behavior”

· Chapter 9, “Group Processes: Influence in Social Groups”

Discussion: Social Psychological Approach to Insights on Human Behavior

Before you begin to explore aggression and apply concepts from social psychology to it, it is important to examine one of the most fundamental social psychological concepts: construals. A construal is defined as the way in which people perceive, comprehend, and interpret the social world. The concept of construal has its roots in Gestalt psychology—a school of psychology that stresses the importance of studying the subjective way in which an object appears in people’s minds, rather than the objective, physical attributes of the object.

Social psychologists have found that two motives are of primary importance in determining human thoughts and behavior: the need to feel good about ourselves and the need to be accurate. Self-esteem is people’s evaluation of their own self-worth, or the extent to which people see themselves as good, competent, and decent. Most people have a strong need to maintain a high self-esteem. This need can clash with the need for accuracy, referred to as the social cognition motive, leading people to distort their perceptions of reality (e.g., by explaining their personal deficiencies in more positive ways) so as to preserve self-esteem. Such distortions are more “spins” on the facts rather than complete delusions.

Consider, for instance, a man who proposed marriage and had his proposal rejected in front of his girlfriend’s entire family. This person faces a conflict between the need to maintain self-esteem and the need to be accurate. What should he think about being rejected by his girlfriend? He could protect his self-esteem and assume it was not his fault at all that she said no, or he could try to get an accurate assessment of what happened (e.g., perhaps proposing in front of her family was a bad idea; perhaps his relationship was not as solid as he thought) so it will not happen again. Social psychologists study people’s subjective construals of situations and how these construals are influenced by their self-esteem and social cognition motives.

An important application of this study is to better understand aggressive behavior, a social psychology topic that has far-reaching implications for individuals, groups, and society as a whole. One of the most important reasons for studying aggression is the goal of reducing violence. For example, individuals can be counseled to change the parameters of their situation, trained in communication and problem-solving skills, or provided with ongoing interventions such as anti-bullying programs. Social psychologists seek answers to questions such as: In aggressive situations, do people learn to be aggressive or is their behavior a function of their environment? Do some people have aggressive attributes and tendencies or do they become aggressive because of their unique situations? Are individuals from some cultures more aggressive than those from others?

A fundamental difference between social psychologists and lay people is the application of this construal approach in understanding how aggressive situations and other types of behavior arise. Social psychologists recognize and examine the power of the situation in influencing people. Lay people often cite the situation to explain their own behaviors, but they overlook the situation and instead cite personality to explain others’ behaviors. This is termed the fundamental attribution error.

For this Discussion, you consider why some individuals are aggressive toward others and how aggression escalates or can be reduced. You will compare how social psychologists and lay people might each explain various types of aggressive behavior, and in doing so, apply many of the concepts you explored in the Learning Resources this week, including construals, the fundamental attribution error, and the sometimes competing motives of self-esteem and social cognition.

To prepare:

· Review Chapter 1 of the course text, Social Psychology, focusing on how social psychologists would view or attempt to explain a specific situation. Note the example about Edward Snowden on page 16.

· Review Chapter 12 of the course text, Social Psychology, focusing on aggression.

· Consider the following five social situations in which aggressive behavior is demonstrated and how social psychologists versus laypeople might treat each situation:

· A high school or college campus shooting

· An act of domestic violence or child abuse within a family

· Looting of shops and homes after a natural disaster

· Domestic or global terrorism

· White collar financial embezzlement

· Select one of the five aggressive behaviors listed above for your Discussion post.

By Day 3

Post a discussion of the following:

· How would you explain the aggressor’s behavior if you had made the fundamental attribution error? In other words, provide a dispositional explanation for the aggressive behavior.

· Next, provide a situational explanation for the aggressor’s behavior. What might be the aggressor’s construal, or interpretation, of the situation? Examples of several social situations are described in Chapter 12.

· How is the aggressor’s construal influenced by the self-esteem motive (the need to feel good about ourselves by justifying our behavior) orthe social cognition motive (the need to be accurate by acting on available information)?

· How could the aggressive act be explained by one of the following: the evolutionary view, or the influence of culture, or the influence of gender, orlearning?

· Based on your reading of Chapter 12, what would you suggest to prevent or reduce instances of this specific type of aggression, either at the individual level or at the societal level?

Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Sommers, S. (2016). Social psychology (9th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.

· Chapter 1, “Introducing Social Psychology”

· Chapter 12, “Aggression: Why Do We Hurt Other People? Can We Prevent It?”

Assignment: Social Psychology Research and Prosocial Behavior

As a student of psychology, it is important to fully understand how research is conducted, as well as the numerous issues associated with sound research. Two important research topics are validity and ethics. When a research study lacks internal or external validity, the results may be misleading. When practitioners then apply the results of the study to a real world situation, the impact may be ineffective, may achieve different results than expected, or may even be harmful. Addressing validity in research is essential.

Another important consideration in psychological research is ethics. Any research must be ethical in how it is conducted and how the results are used. A high level of ethics is especially critical when it comes to research involving human subjects, which is the case with most psychological research. Ethics in research involves honesty, objectivity, integrity, carefulness and competence, openness, respect for intellectual property, respect for privacy, confidentiality, responsible publication of findings, social responsibility, non-discrimination, legality, care of animals for those studies involving animals, and protection of the rights of human subjects.

This Assignment asks you to analyze a social psychology research article for validity and ethics. The skills practiced can be applied to a critique of any scientific research study. Then, you will use theory to explain how prosocial behavior is relevant to the topic of your selected research article.

To prepare:

· Review Chapter 2 in your course text, focusing on journal article analysis.

· While reading Chapter 11, reflect on how prosocial behavior can be used to address problems.

· Read the online article, “What Is Ethics in Research and Why Is It Important?” Focus on the expectations of ethics for the scientific community, how results are used in the real world, and related ethical issues.

· Choose one of the journal articles from this week’s Learning Resources to analyze (not Resnik’s online article about ethics).

The Assignment (2–4 pages):

Analyze the article you selected by responding to the following questions:

· Briefly, what were the research method, the purpose of the study, and the main finding(s)? As this is a brief statement of the main finding(s), do not provide details such as means or other statistics.

· What potential threats are there, if any, to the study’s external validity or generalizability? What about the study, if anything, enhances its external validity or generalizability?

· Do you have any concerns regarding whether the study was conducted ethically? Explain in terms of the information you learned in the assigned readings (e.g., informed consent).

· Recall this week’s Discussion Spark about various prosocial behaviors. What prosocial behavior or act could increase understanding of, or provide support to someone dealing with the issues presented in your selected journal article? The prosocial behavior could be something described in the journal article, explored in the Discussion Spark, or a prosocial behavior that has not previously been mentioned in the course.

· What theory or concept described in Chapter 11 explains the motive for this prosocial behavior?

· What personal quality of an individual or situational determinant would increase the likelihood of this prosocial behavior occurring?

Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Sommers, S. (2016). Social psychology (9th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.

· Chapter 2, “Methodology: How Social Psychologists Do Research”

· Chapter 11, “Prosocial Behavior: Why Do People Help?”

· “Making a Difference With Social Psychology: Attaining a Sustainable Future” (pp. 456–461)

Assignment: Social Cognition and Perception

Social cognition is the study of the ways people think about themselves and the social world, including how they select, interpret, remember, and use social information. Two types of social cognition are controlled thinking and automatic thinking. Controlled thinking is thinking that is conscious, intentional, voluntary, and effortful, such as when you are weighing the pros and cons of an issue to make an important decision or are learning a skill for the first time. Automatic thinking is just as it sounds—thinking that happens without conscious thought—and it is this type of thinking that you will concentrate on this week.

Schemas, one example of automatic thinking, are mental structures that organize our knowledge about the social world and influence what we notice, think about, and remember. Schemas are important for making sense of the world. They help us to create continuity to relate new experiences to old ones and are especially helpful when information is ambiguous. We also engage in a second type of automatic thinking when we use mental strategies and shortcuts, or heuristics, that make judgments and decisions easier, allowing us to proceed with our lives and not turn every decision into a major hurdle. Examples of heuristics include availability, representativeness, and counterfactual thinking. Schemas and heuristics significantly influence our impressions of a social situation and facilitate our social cognition processes. Schemas are highly determined by the cultures in which we grow up, and they strongly influence what we notice and remember about the world.

Think back to this week’s Introduction. When you meet someone new, you no doubt use many different kinds of information available to you and process that information in a way that allows you to make sense of their behavior. You may see if a person fits into some group with which you are familiar and then try to make sense of the person’s behavior in light of others in that group. In addition, you probably have your own goals for relating to the person, which also influence your impression. If your goal is to form a long-term relationship with the person, you will process the information differently than you would the information from a store clerk with whom you don’t plan to have any kind of relationship.

The information you focus on, the strategies you use in processing the information, and the resulting impressions and preconceived ideas you form about a person make up what is called person perception. Since social psychology is all about relating to others, be it an individual or a group of people, person perception is an important topic.

In addition to understanding how people form impressions of others, it is helpful to dig deeper into why people might behave as they do. In doing so, you can more easily predict how people will behave and then control the environment accordingly. By having a better understanding of why people behave as they do, you also can understand your own emotions and feelings toward the situation, which impact your own future behavior. The simple question of “What causes what?” is essential in understanding those around you and your social environment. And, since it would be cumbersome to constantly ask the question “What causes what?”—people tend to ask and answer it automatically. The social psychology term for this concept is causal attribution. There are many related social psychological theories that you can use to understand why people behave as they do. This understanding in turn, helps you to better understand how people relate to one another and to the environment, predict behavior, and partly control social situations—all major goals of social psychology.

To prepare:

· Review Chapters 3 and 4 of the course text, Social Psychology.

· Review the article, “Person Perception” found in this week’s Learning Resources.

· Watch the video on selective attention.

The Assignment (2–4 pages):

· Select one person’s behavior for each of the following two categories:

· A person you do not know and who you probably will not see again (clerk at the grocery store, etc.)

· A person you have known for some time and for whom you can remember your first impressions (acquaintance, friend, spouse, etc.)

· Briefly describe each person including his or her specific behavior at your first meeting, the context of your interaction with each person, and your first impression of each person.

· Explain whether you made external (situational) and/or internal (dispositional) causes for each person’s behavior during that first meeting.

· Did you engage in automatic thinking or controlled thinking in forming your first impression of each person? Explain. What, if any, schemas or heuristics did you use?

· According to the information in this week’s readings, how does your culture influence your impressions of others? For example, culture can influence the content of a particular schema (Aronson, Wilson, & Sommers, 2016, p. 70); culturally-specific display rules can influence your impressions (Aronson, Wilson, & Sommers, 2016, pp. 90-91); and culture can predict holistic or analytic thinking (Aronson, Wilson, & Sommers, 2016, p. 110).

Aronson, E., Wilson, T. D., & Sommers, S. (2016). Social psychology (9th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.

· Chapter 3, “Social Cognition: How We Think About the Social World”

· Chapter 4, “Social Perception: How We Come to Understand Other People”

· “Social Psychology in Action 3: Psychology and the Law” (pp. 496–506 on Eyewitness Testimony)

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 721–725

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

Reports

Buffering against weight gain following dieting setbacks: An implicit
theory intervention☆

Jeni L. Burnette a,⁎, Eli J. Finkel b

a University of Richmond, USA
b Northwestern University, USA

☆ We thank the Anthony Marchionne Foundation fo
Erickson-Kulas, Nellie Jenkins and Eric VanEpps for the
Paul Eastwick, Gráinne Fitzsimons, Don Forsyth, and
feedback.
⁎ Corresponding author at: 28 Westhampton Way, Ps

University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, USA. Fax: +1 8
E-mail address: jburnet2@richmond.edu (J.L. Burnet

0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.020

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:
Received 31 October 2011
Revised 20 December 2011
Available online 8 January 2012

Keywords:
Implicit theory
Incremental belief
Dieting setback
Intervention

Research on implicit theories suggests that incremental beliefs—that attributes are malleable—can help buffer
people against the adverse effects of setbacks on goal achievement. We conducted a longitudinal experiment
to examine whether an incremental beliefs intervention could help dieters manage their body weight in the
face of severe dieting setbacks. To explore the efficacy of our incremental beliefs intervention, we randomly
assigned individuals to a control, a knowledge, or an incremental beliefs condition. In addition to examining
the main effect of intervention condition on weight-loss across a 12-week period, we also tested the hypoth-
esis that although participants assigned to the control or knowledge intervention condition would gain more
weight as dieting setbacks became more severe, participants assigned to the incremental beliefs condition
would not. Results supported this hypothesis: Incremental beliefs protected against setback-related
weight-gain. Implications for integrating implicit beliefs interventions with obesity relapse prevention pro-
grams are discussed.

© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All

rights reserved.

Introduction

Maintaining a healthy body weight is difficult, as illustrated by the 34%
of Americans who are obese (BMI>30) and the additional 34% who are
overweight (BMI>25) (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Curtin, 2010). Millions
of people diet (Hill, 2002), but most of them ultimately gain weight
(Mann et al., 2007). Our “obesogenic environment” yields nearly inevita-
ble setbacks in the pursuit of nutrition and exercise goals (e.g., Brownell &
Rodin, 1994; Lowe, 2003; Stroebe, 2008), which, in turn, frequently cause
weight gain (Cochran & Tesser, 1996; Polivy & Herman, 1985).

This article reports the results of a longitudinal intervention designed
to buffer dieters against setback-related weight gain by altering their
implicit theories of body weight (Dweck, 2000; Molden & Dweck,
2006). This intervention was designed to foster the belief that body
weight is changeable (Burnette, 2010). Parallel incremental beliefs—
that attributes are malleable and, consequently, that one is not destined
to long-term failure following poor performance—in the academic do-
mains buffer against the adverse effects of academic setbacks on aca-
demic performance (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). In the
present article we (a) develop a novel implicit theory of body weight

r funding, Emma Berry, Ryan
ir help in data collection and
Jeff Green for their insightful

ychology Department,
04 287 1905.
te).

rights reserved.

intervention to help individuals reach their weight-loss goals; (b) com-
pare this incremental beliefs intervention to a comprehensive
information-based weight-loss intervention; (c) test whether changes
in incremental beliefs mediate any links between the incremental beliefs
intervention and changes in body weight, and (d) discuss applications of
our findings for obesity relapse prevention programs.

The sole emphasis of the incremental beliefs intervention was pre-
senting evidence that body weight is malleable. This minimalist inter-
vention offered no information about exercise or nutrition, no training
on weight-loss strategies, and no lifestyle change recommendations
for reaching weight-loss goals. In line with implicit theory research
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988), our major prediction was that the incremental
beliefs intervention would be especially relevant in times of threats to
one’s ability. As such, we focused on weight change after setbacks to
one’s dieting goals.

When confronting dieting-related setbacks (e.g., overeating at a
party), knowledge related to lifestyle, nutrition and exercise may
not be very useful. Motivation to behave in accord with such knowl-
edge wanes as dieters become frustrated with unavoidable tempta-
tions (Herman & Polivy, 2011). Indeed, dieters often exhibit the
“what-the-hell” effect, disengaging entirely from their goal following
setbacks in favor of unrestrained indulgence (Polivy & Herman,
1985). The what-the-hell effect emerges when dieters drink a milk-
shake in a taste perception task (Herman & Mack, 1975); when they
observe a model overeating (Polivy, Herman, Younger, & Erskine,
1979); and even when they merely think they consumed a few
extra calories, regardless of whether they have actually done so
(Polivy, 1976). In the current article, we suggest that an incremental

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.020

mailto:jburnet2@richmond.edu

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2011.12.020

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00221031

1 Our 74% retention rate is comparable to the rates for other weight-relevant inter-
ventions of comparable duration (e.g., Honas, Early, Frederickson, & O’Brien, 2003). Ex-
perimental condition was unrelated to dropout rate, p=.409.

2 The 18 participants who did not experience a setback and therefore had missing
severity data were comparably distributed across experimental conditions, p=.285.

722 J.L. Burnette, E.J. Finkel / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 721–725

message can help buffer dieters against succumbing to the what-the-
hell effect after severe dieting setbacks.

We suggest that the incremental intervention is likely to do so for two
reasons. First, incremental messages inculcate a mindset that encourages
dieters to remain motivated instead of disengaging from their goal after
dieting setbacks. To avoid falling prey to the what-the-hell effect, dieters
must believe that they have the ability to change their outcomes, which is
precisely what an incremental message can achieve. For example, partic-
ipants in a recent one-shot laboratory experiment who read a brief article
suggesting that body weight is malleable (an incremental message)
responded to hypothetical dieting setbacks with greater confidence in
their opportunity for future success and less goal disengagement, relative
to participants who read a brief article suggesting that body weight is
fixed (an entity message; Burnette, 2010). Second, across achievement
contexts, incremental messages help to foster effective self-regulatory
strategies when facing setbacks (Burnette et al., 2011; Dweck, 2000).

These motivational and self-regulatory benefits of incremental be-
liefs can ultimately promote better goal achievement in the face of set-
backs. For example, in academic interventions, encouraging students to
hold an incremental theory helps to buffer against the typical decline in
grade point average following the transition from elementary school to
the more challenging context of middle school (Blackwell et al., 2007).
In short, incremental messages can buffer against setbacks by providing
a mindset that helps individuals remain motivated to achieve their
goals. Such interventions do not inculcate the skills necessary to eat
more healthfully (or to study more effectively), but rather we suggest
that the motivational and self-regulatory consequences of holding in-
cremental beliefs buffer people against setback-related weight gain.

Given that setbacks to one’s eating and exercise goals predict weight
gain (e.g., Ulen, Huizinga, Beech, & Elasy, 2008), and that incremental
beliefs work to buffer people against the deleterious effects of setbacks
on goal achievement, we predicted that participants facing severe set-
backs would be able to avoid weight-gain over the present 12-week
study if they were in the incremental beliefs condition rather than the
no-intervention control condition. However, given that incremental be-
liefs rarely directly influence motivation and subsequent achievement
(e.g., in the absence of adversity; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Cury, Da
Fonseca, Zahn, & Elliot, 2008; Plaks & Stecher, 2007), we expected that
participants in the incremental beliefs intervention would not differ
from those in the control condition when facing mild setbacks to their
eating and exercise goals.

We also included a third condition to provide a broader context for
interpreting changes in body weight in the incremental beliefs and the
control conditions. In this third condition, the knowledge intervention,
we employed the strongest comparison condition we could generate in
light of our Web-based intervention procedures, providing participants
with a broad range of scientifically validated information for promoting
weight-loss. We focused on the main pillars of the LEARN program for
successful weight-loss (Brownell, 1997), one of the most comprehensive
and efficacious approaches to weight management. We incorporated in-
formation related to lifestyle (e.g., reduce pace of eating), exercise (e.g.,
information on understanding mechanisms linking exercise to weight-
control) and nutrition (e.g., maximize fiber). We also provided healthy
recipes and strategies for reaching weight-loss goals. Given that we pro-
vided participants with information that has been shown to be useful in
controlling weight, we expected that participants in this condition would
lose more weight over this 12-week study than would participants in the
control condition. This knowledge condition was especially relevant to
the present research as a comparison for the incremental beliefs inter-
vention for participants confronting setbacks. Specifically, we hypothe-
sized that any potential advantage of the LEARN-inspired knowledge
condition over the incremental beliefs condition should be significantly
smaller (perhaps even nonexistent) as individuals confronted setbacks
of greater severity.

In sum, we advanced three hypotheses. First, the intervention hypoth-
esis was that participants in the incremental beliefs intervention would

lose more weight at Time 2 than would participants in the control condi-
tion, although we suspected that participants in the knowledge condition
might lose even more weight than participants in the incremental beliefs
condition because the knowledge condition was a much more extensive
intervention. Second, the mechanism hypothesis was that changes in in-
cremental beliefs are the driving mechanism behind changes in weight
from Time 1 to Time 2. Third, and most importantly, the incremental buff-
ering hypothesis was that participants assigned to the knowledge or con-
trol condition would gain more weight as setbacks became more severe,
whereas participants assigned to the incremental beliefs condition would
not. Another way of conceptualizing this third hypothesis is that the
knowledge intervention, with its proven weight-control information,
would be most effective at promoting weight-loss when setbacks are
mild, but that its advantages over the incremental beliefs intervention
would be smaller (perhaps even nonexistent) when setbacks are severe.

Method

To test our three hypotheses, we recruited 169 participants (80%
female) who were currently trying to lose weight, with the majority
(61%) having dieted at least twice in the previous year. We focused
on such a population because restrained eaters are especially suscep-
tible both to the “what-the-hell” effect and to weight gain after diet-
ing setbacks (e.g., Polivy & Herman, 1985). According to the weight
measurement we took at Time 1 (T1), 81% had BMI scores in the over-
weight or obese range, with the mean weight exceeding the thresh-
old for obesity (M=30.56, SD=6.71). Participants were 42 years
old, on average (SD=16) and the majority were White (79% White,
16% Black, 3% Asian, 2% Hispanic).

At T1, we also assessed naturally occurring implicit theory of weight
[e.g., “Your weight is something about you that you can’t change” (re-
verse-scored item); 1=strongly disagree, 6=agree strongly; α=.89;
Burnette, 2010]. In addition, for use in control analyses, we assessed
dieting self-efficacy (e.g., “I usually feel confident in my ability to man-
age my weight”; 1=strongly disagree, 7=agree strongly; α=.82;
Burnette, 2010), nutrition coping self-efficacy (e.g., “I can manage to
stick to healthy foods even if I have to try several times until it
works”; 1=very uncertain, 4=very certain; α=.86) and exercise cop-
ing self-efficacy (e.g., “I can manage to carry out my exercise intentions
even if I am tired”; 1=very uncertain, 4=very certain; 1=strongly dis-
agree, 7=agree strongly; α=.90; Schwarzer & Renner, 2000).

In all three conditions, we sent participants five biweekly emails,
adapting procedures from successful implicit theory interventions in ac-
ademic contexts (Blackwell et al., 2007; Good, Aronson, & Inzlicht,
2003) and incorporating tactics to induce lasting attitude change
(Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002). In the two intervention conditions,
these emails contained links to a Website we designed to present the
intervention-relevant information (see Table 1); in the control condi-
tion, these emails provided no information regarding body weight.

Twelve weeks after Time 1, 125 participants1 (102 females; incre-
mental condition=33 females; knowledge condition=33 females; con-
trol condition=36 females) attended the Time 2 (T2) laboratory session
and provided a second weight assessment. We assessed setback severity
by asking participants to characterize the severity of any setback they ex-
perienced over the preceding 12 weeks (1=not all, 5=extremely;
M=2.76, SD=1.19). We gave participants freedom to select the relevant
setback (rather than asking them to report on, say, their most serious set-
back) because we sought to access their natural, unaltered cognitive eval-
uations—the information that was accessible to them as they reflected
upon a specific setback over the previous 12 weeks.2 Self-reported set-
back severity did not differ across condition, p=.753. Additionally, two

Table 1
Summary of the biweekly intervention protocols.

Session Module Knowledge condition Incremental condition

1–2 Readings Lifestyle (e.g., eat more slowly), exercise (e.g., exercise more often and for
shorter periods of time), and nutrition (e.g., importance of fiber) strategies
adapted from pillars of weight-loss success in LEARN (Brownell, 1997)

Weight is changeable message: Genes may provide an initial map and
framework, but, through hard work and effort, one can change one’s body-
weight

3 Video Exercise is crucial for weight-loss (e.g., explanations of how muscle mass
can promote weight-loss)

With effort, people can reach and maintain their desired body weight,
regardless of their family history (e.g., it is not the hand one is dealt that
matters, it’s how we play that hand)

4 Examples Healthy recipes and nutritional tips (e.g., how to balance among important
food groups)

Examples of people who have successfully lost weight

5 Summary Summary of key strategies for achieving weight loss goals and a
maintaining a sustainable healthy eating regimen

Summary of the incremental message and evidence supporting the validity
of incremental beliefs of weight

723J.L. Burnette, E.J. Finkel / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 721–725

independent raters blind to condition coded setbacks for severity (e.g.,
“The setback was severe”; “The setback seems likely to lead to weight
gain”; 1=strongly disagree, 9=strongly agree; α=.97; inter-rater
r=.87), and these objective ratings also did not differ by condition,
p=.496. At T2, as a manipulation check, participants completed the
same measure assessing incremental beliefs regarding body weight as
at T1 (α=.84; Burnette, 2010). In addition, for use in control analyses,
participants completed a 1-item measure of perceived weight-loss goal
performance (1=complete failure, 7=complete success).

Results

Manipulation check

Before conducting hypothesis tests, we tested whether partici-
pants in the incremental condition exhibited stronger incremental
beliefs regarding body weight at T2 than participants in the other
two conditions (neither of which included any information about
the malleability of body weight). As expected, an independent sam-
ples t-test revealed that, at T2, participants in the incremental inter-
vention (M=5.17, SD=0.70) believed more strongly in the
malleability of body weight than did participants in the other two
conditions (M=4.84, SD=0.91), t(124)=2.10, p=.038. We also ex-
amined if participants in the incremental condition exhibited greater
changes towards incremental beliefs regarding body weight from T1
to T2 than participants in the other two conditions. A 2 (Time 1 vs.
Time 2)×2 (incremental beliefs vs. experimental conditions) mixed
model ANOVA yielded similar conclusions: Participants in the incre-
mental condition became more incremental in their beliefs from T1
to T2 (T1: M=4.96, SD=0.85; T2: M=5.17, SD=0.80), whereas par-
ticipants in the other two conditions trended the opposite direction
(T1: M=4.99, SD=0.69; T2: M=4.83, SD=0.92), F(1, 120)=3.52,
p=.063.

3 We also ran a 2 (T1 vs. T2)×3 (incremental beliefs vs. knowledge vs. control con-
dition) mixed-model ANOVA to examine weight change in each condition. The time×-
condition interaction was significant, F(2, 122)=6.76, p=.002. Simple effects
demonstrated that, across the 12-week study, participants gained a significant amount
of weight (M=3.11 lb, p=.002) in the control condition, lost a marginally significant
amount of weight (M=−1.83 lb, p=.066) in the knowledge condition, and neither
gained nor lost any significant amount of weight in the incremental beliefs condition
(M=0.09 lb, p=.924).

H1: Intervention hypothesis

Our first hypothesis was that participants in the incremental
beliefs intervention would lose more weight at T2 than would
participants in the control condition. We regressed T2 weight onto
two dummy variables, which we created—using the control condition
as the reference group—to represent our three-level experimental
factor, controlling for T1 weight. Both the knowledge, b=−4.96,
t(121)=−3.60, pb .001, and the incremental beliefs, b=−3.00,
t(121)=−2.31, p=.023, dummy variables were significant. Although
participants failed to lose weight, participants in both intervention
conditions had gained less weight by T2 than did participants in
the control condition. In a separate analysis to examine whether the
participants in the knowledge condition weighed less at T2 than
those in the incremental condition, we re-ran analyses using the
incremental intervention as the comparison condition. Although
the means trended in the expected direction, the two intervention

conditions did not differ significantly from each other, p=.16 (see
Table 2).3

H2: Mechanism hypothesis

Our second hypothesis was that differences between the incre-
mental and control conditions in T2 weight, controlling for T1 weight,
were driven by changes in incremental beliefs. Upon first blush, it
might seem that the optimal way to examine this hypothesis is by
performing a standard mediation analysis (condition→change in
beliefs→T2 weight) to examine whether the effect of condition on
T2 weight becomes significantly smaller after adding change in be-
liefs to the model. However, such an analysis is not theoretically sen-
sible because our hypothesis was that condition would influence T2
weight and change in incremental beliefs in different ways. Specifical-
ly, regarding the dependent measure, we hypothesized that partici-
pants in the incremental condition would gain less weight than
participants in the control condition, and, if anything, that partici-
pants in the knowledge condition would weigh least of all (knowl-
edgebincremental beliefsbcontrol). In contrast, regarding the
mediator, we hypothesized that participants in the incremental con-
dition would become more incremental in their beliefs from T1 to
T2, whereas participants in the other two conditions would not (in-
cremental beliefs>knowledge=control). That is, we hypothesized
that the incremental beliefs condition would differ from only the con-
trol condition (i.e., it would be similar to knowledge condition) when
predicting T2 weight, whereas it would differ from both of the other
two conditions when predicting change in incremental beliefs. As
reported previously, results generally supported these hypotheses
(although, in a finding of tangential importance to our main goals,
the knowledge intervention did not yield significantly better weight
outcomes than the incremental beliefs intervention).

Given that standard mediation was not a sensible approach, we
followed the recommendations of Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005),
who argue that, in situations like ours, the best way to establish
whether the putative mediator (theory change) is in fact a driving
mechanism is to consider “the within-cell correlations between the
mediator and the dependent variable in each cell of the design” (p.
850). First, we calculated changes in implicit theories (mediator) by
subtracting the Time 1 scores from Time 2 scores; positive scores
represented increases and negative scores represented decreases
over time (e.g., higher numbers represent relatively increasing incre-
mental beliefs). Next, we examined the association of changes in im-
plicit theories with weight at T2, controlling for weight at T1,

Lifestyle
Exercise
Nutrition
Recipes

Incremental
beliefs

Fig. 2. Comparison of materials in two experimental conditions.

Table 2
Time 1 and Time 2 weight by experimental condition.

Incremental
condition

Knowledge
condition

Control
condition

Time 1 weight 190.39 lb
(SD=40.93)

179.11 lb
(SD=51.76)

185.13 lb
(SD=40.44)

Time 2 weight 190.48 lb
(SD=41.40)

177.28 lb
(SD=51.37)

188.24 lb
(SD=41.19)

Difference (T2−T1) +0.09 lb −1.83 lb +3.11 lb

724 J.L. Burnette, E.J. Finkel / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 721–725

separately across the three experimental conditions. As predicted,
this association was significant (and negative, as hypothesized) only
in the incremental beliefs condition, b=−1.78, t(44)=−2.21,
p=.033; it did not approach significance in either of the other two
conditions (knowledge: b=−0.37, t(35)=−0.43, p=.671; control,
b=−0.31, t(43)=−0.36, p=.723). For participants in the incre-
mental beliefs condition, and only for those participants, greater in-
creases in incremental beliefs predicted greater decreases in weight.
This effect, which corresponds to a moderately strong association
(r=−.322), suggests that an important reason why the incremental
beliefs intervention helped participants avoid the weight-gain exhib-
ited by participants in the control condition is that it increased their
beliefs that body weight is malleable.

The combination of the significant association of changes in implicit
theories and T2 weight (b=−1.78) and the lack of weight change from
T1 to T2 (M=0.08 lb; see Footnote 3 and Table 2) for participants in the
incremental beliefs condition is intriguing. What does the significant re-
lation between theory change and weight-loss mean in light of the non-
significant weight change over time for individuals in the incremental
condition? We hypothesized that participants for whom the interven-
tion successfully inculcated an increase in incremental beliefs would ex-
hibit weight-loss over time, whereas participants for whom the
intervention did not inculcate such an increase would, like participants
in the control condition, exhibit weight-gain over time.

To test this hypothesis, we conducted a set of analyses on the 45
participants in the incremental beliefs condition to test whether
their weight change over time varied as a function of changes in
their incremental beliefs. We conducted a multilevel modeling analy-
sis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) predicting weight from change in in-
cremental beliefs; the two weight assessments (T1 and T2) were
nested within person. This analysis revealed a significant time×-
change in beliefs interaction effect, b=−2.18, t(42)=−2.56,
p=.014. As predicted, participants for whom the intervention suc-
cessfully inculcated an increase in incremental beliefs (+1 SD) lost
weight over time, b=−2.32, t(42)=−1.92, p=.061, whereas par-
ticipants for whom the intervention did not inculcate such an in-
crease (−1 SD) gained weight over time, b=2.03, t(42)=1.69,
p=.098. That these marginally significant simple effects (underneath

Fig. 1. Predicting Time 2 weight from setback severity, intervention condition, and
their interaction, controlling for Time 1 weight.

the significant interaction effect) trended in the opposite direction
explains the overall lack of weight change in the incremental beliefs
condition. When participants internalized the intervention, changing
their beliefs accordingly, they lost weight. When they did not, they
gained weight, as would be expected in light of the weight-gain
among participants in the control condition.

H3: Incremental buffering hypothesis

Our third hypothesis was that incremental theories buffer against
weight gain associated with severe dieting setbacks. We regressed T2
weight onto two dummy variables representing our three experimental
conditions (as before, the control condition was the reference group),
setback severity, and the interaction of setback severity with each of
the dummy variables, controlling for T1 weight. Setback severity pre-
dicted (marginally) greater T2 weight, b=1.60, t(100)=1.78, p=.078.
Most importantly, however, this association was moderated by the in-
cremental intervention dummy variable, b=−2.65, t(100)=−2.10,
p=.038, but not by the knowledge intervention dummy variable,
p=.955 (see Fig. 1). Controlling for T1 weight, participants in the knowl-
edge and the control conditions exhibited a positive association of set-
back severity with T2 weight, b=1.78, t(64)=2.46, p=.017. In
contrast, participants in the incremental condition exhibited a nonsignif-
icant (and negative-trending) association of setback severity with T2
weight, b=−1.10, t(37)=−1.14, p=.262, suggesting that the incre-
mental intervention completely buffered participants against
setback-related weight-gain. Indeed, as depicted on the right side of
Fig. 1, the incremental beliefs intervention was every bit as effective as
(even nonsignificantly more effective than) the knowledge intervention
for participants who confronted severe setbacks.4 For each standard de-
viation increase in setback severity, participants in the knowledge and
the control conditions weighed 1.78 lb more (beyond general tendencies
toward weight gain), whereas participants in the incremental condition
weighed 1.10 lb less. In addition, we replicated our moderational analy-
sis after controlling for the potential direct effects of dieting self-efficacy,
nutrition self-efficacy, exercise self-efficacy, and perceived goal perfor-
mance. All hypothesis tests reported in this paragraph yielded identical
conclusions in this rigorous confound analysis.5

4 Participant sex exhibited no main or interactive effects in auxiliary analyses pre-
dicting T2 weight and controlling for T1 weight.

5 A separate analysis, including the eight interaction terms involving the four poten-
tial confounds and each of the two dummy variables, demonstrated that (a) none of
these interaction terms was even marginally significant and (b) our key analyses
remained significant or marginally significant.

image of Fig.�2

725J.L. Burnette, E.J. Finkel / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 721–725

Discussion

Modernity has brought ever-increasing access to fattening food,
which renders dieting setbacks virtually inevitable in wealthy countries
(Brownell & Horgan, 2004; Kessler, 2009; Stroebe, 2008; Wansink,
2006). Our longitudinal intervention demonstrated that both the incre-
mental and the knowledge interventions buffer against the natural
trend toward weight-gain. Additionally, for participants for whom the
intervention successfully inculcated an increase in incremental beliefs,
it even reversed this trend; individuals in the incremental condition
who adopted more incremental beliefs actually lost weight from T1 to
T2. Furthermore, incremental beliefs buffered against setback-related
weight-gain: Although setback severity predicted weight-gain for par-
ticipants in the control and the knowledge intervention conditions,
this link was nonsignificant (and negative-trending) for participants in
the incremental beliefs condition. The knowledge intervention was
more effective than the incremental beliefs intervention when setbacks
were mild, but this effect disappeared (and nonsignificantly reversed)
when setbacks were severe (see Fig. 1).

We were somewhat surprised that the minimalist incremental be-
liefs intervention appeared to be just as effective as the knowledge inter-
vention overall (the conditions did not differ significantly). After all, the
incremental beliefs intervention only stressed the changeable nature of
body weight, offering no other information or strategies regarding
weight-loss-promoting lifestyles, nutrition, exercise, or recipes. In con-
trast, the knowledge condition included all of these features, which are
critical components of past weight-loss interventions. Fig. 2 visually de-
picts the comparison between these two interventions, emphasizing
that neither was clearly superior to the other in terms of weight at T2.

The present results suggest that incorporating incremental beliefs
training into broader dieting regimens holds promise for helping people
avoid weight gain (and perhaps lose weight), especially when confront-
ing severe dieting setbacks. Based on findings from the current study, an
incremental beliefs intervention could be incorporated into larger scale
relapse prevention programs that focus on helping individuals to cope
successfully with setbacks (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). The minimal con-
tact procedures and short duration make our incremental beliefs inter-
vention easy and inexpensive to administer. Furthermore, these
findings highlight that small changes in beliefs may be all that is needed
to buffer against setback-related weight gain. Future research could
fruitfully merge our incremental beliefs intervention with attitude inoc-
ulation procedures and other weight control programs. Such integration
holds promise for promoting successful weight-management—includ-
ing maintenance of weight-loss in the face of dieting setbacks, the
holy grail of obesity prevention.

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• Buffering against weight gain following dieting setbacks: An implicit theory intervention

Introduction
Method
Results
Manipulation check
H1: Intervention hypothesis
H2: Mechanism hypothesis
H3: Incremental buffering hypothesis
Discussion
References