Short answer questions for a reading

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Kaarbo, J & James Ray. Global Politics (10th Edition)

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Read chapter 8 and answer following questions:

1) Discuss any examples of cooperation or free-riding not covered in the text. 

2) Considerations of the role of weapons and defense in cooperations. 

3) Is this clash collective action problem of individual vs. group interests the same at the global level as it is at the national level?

4) Any interesting thoughts/comments/questions regarding this week’s topic and readings.

Global Politics
Juliet Kaarbo
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
James Lee Ray
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
Austral ia • Brazi l • Japan • Korea • Mexico • Singapore • Spain • United Kingdom • United States
T E N T H E D I T I O N

Global Politics, Tenth Edition
Juliet Kaarbo
James Lee Ray
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iii
P A R T I
Contents
Maps xi
Preface xiii
Theoretical Perspectives and Historical Background 1
1 Theories of Global Politics 2
Realism 4
Criticisms of Realism 7
Liberalism 7
Idealism 13
Neo-Marxism 15
Constructivism 17
Feminist Perspectives 19
SUMMARY 22 • KEY TERMS 23
POLICY CHOICES: TRADING WITH CHINA 14
2 The Historical Setting 24
Global Politics in Ancient Times 25
The Emergence of the Modern State and the Contemporary International
System 27
Eighteenth-Century European Relations 29
The Impact of the French Revolution 30
Nineteenth-Century European Relations 31
The Age of Imperialism 32
The Twentieth-Century World Wars 34
The Breakdown of the Nineteenth-Century Alliance System 34
The First World War 35
Postwar Settlements and the Interwar Years 38

iv
Challenges to the Status Quo 41
The Second World War 43
The Impact of the Second World War 48
Theoretical Perspectives on the History of Global Politics 48
SUMMARY 51 • KEY TERMS 52
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD BRITAIN HAVE APPEASED HITLER? 44
3 The Modern Era 53
The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War 54
Confl ict over Eastern Europe 54
The British Retreat and the U.S. Policy of Containment 57
The Cold War in Asia 58
Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context 61
Vietnam 63
The Arab-Israeli Confl ict 65
Other Superpower Involvement in the Third World 67
Changes in East-West Competition 68
Two Cuban Crises 68
Détente 69
The Rebirth of the Cold War 70
Changes in the International Economy and the Rise of Interdependence 72
The End of the Cold War 73
The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 79
Ethno-Religious Confl ict and Failed States 79
Security Threats 82
Globalization 87
Theoretical Perspectives on Global Politics in the Modern Era 90
SUMMARY 93 • KEY TERMS 94
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ HAVE
OCCURRED? 83
POLICY CHOICES: IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE WORKABLE AND JUSTIFIED? 88
P A R T I I
Actors in Global Politics: Power and Policy 95
4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational
Actors 96
Nations and States 97
The Power of States 98
The Paradox of Unrealized Power 98

v
Military Capabilities 99
The Impact of Resolve 103
Economic Capabilities 105
The Power of Agenda, Ideas, and Values 105
Matching Capabilities to the Task 108
Measuring Power 109
Indicators of Military Power 109
Indicators of Economic Power 111
A Simple Index of Power 113
Transnational Actors: A Challenge to States’ Power? 116
Multinational Corporations 119
Nongovernmental Organizations 126
International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups 131
Terrorism’s Challenge to the State System 134
SUMMARY 137 • KEY TERMS 139
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF NGOS? 132
5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy 140
Public Opinion 142
Does the Public Know or Care About Foreign Policy? 143
Is Public Opinion Moody or Wise? 144
Does Public Opinion Infl uence Foreign Policy? 145
Should the Public Infl uence Foreign Policy? 149
Differences in Political Systems 150
Are Democracies More Peaceful? 151
How Do Differences in Political Institutions Affect Foreign Policy? 154
Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition 157
Do Interest Groups Infl uence Foreign Policy in Democracies? 157
Does the Military-Industrial Complex Infl uence Defense Policy? 159
What Is the Role of Military and Political Opposition Groups in
Nondemocracies? 162
What Effects Does Political Opposition Have on Foreign Policy? 163
Foreign Policy Bureaucracies 164
SOPs in Action: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Responses to the September 11
Attacks 167
Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making 170
Leaders’ Beliefs 170
Information Processing 173
Leadership Styles 175
Group Decision Making 176
SUMMARY 177 • KEY TERMS 179
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD LEADERS LISTEN TO PUBLIC OPINION? 152

vi
P A R T I I I
Interactions of Actors: Security Relations 181
6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War 182
Explaining Confl ict Between States: Analyzing Wholes and Parts 185
Systemic Explanations of Interstate War 186
Anarchy 187
Distribution of Power 187
Interdependence 193
Systemic Explanations of Three Wars 194
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars 195
Type of Economy 196
Types of Governments and Domestic Opposition 197
Democratic Dyads 198
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Three Wars 203
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars 205
Bureaucratic Politics and Standard Procedures 205
Beliefs and Perceptions 206
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Three Wars 207
Multilevel Explanations of War: Using Caution When Comparing Levels of
Analysis 211
SUMMARY 213 • KEY TERMS 214
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES INTERVENE TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIZATION? 199
7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism 215
Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 216
What Is Ethnicity? 218
The Scope of Ethnic Confl ict in the Contemporary Global System 221
The Role of the International System and Economic Modernization in Ethnic
Confl ict 224
Other Causes of Ethnic Confl ict 226
Resolving Ethnic Confl icts 232
International Terrorism 238
Defi ning Terrorism 238
The History of Terrorism 241
The Origins of Terrorism 247
Dealing with Terrorism 251
SUMMARY 257 • KEY TERMS 258
POLICY CHOICES: DEALING WITH ETHNIC GRIEVANCES 231
POLICY CHOICES: IS THE WAR ON TERROR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY FOR
ADDRESSING TERRORISM? 256

vii
8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms,
and Bargaining 259
Alliances 260
Balancing 261
Bandwagoning 263
The Size of Alliances 263
Other Factors in Alliance Formation and Maintenance 265
Alliances and War 266
Alliances After the Cold War 268
Arms and Arms Control 271
Conventional Weapons 273
Arms Races and International Confl ict 274
Conventional Arms Control 275
Nuclear Weapons: Thinking the Unthinkable 277
The Nuclear Arms Race and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 279
The Threat of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 282
Nuclear Arms Control 286
Beyond Nuclear 290
Efforts to Control Ballistic Missile Technology and Chemical and Biological
Weapons 292
Bargaining and Negotiation 294
Coercive Diplomacy and Bargaining Strategies 294
Diplomats and Their “Games” 296
SUMMARY 299 • KEY TERMS 301
POLICY CHOICES: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 287
9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations,
Law, and Ethics 302
International Organizations and Collective Security 303
Early Attempts to Organize for International Security 303
Collective Security: Principles and Prerequisites 303
The League of Nations 305
The United Nations 307
Peacekeeping as an Alternative to Collective Security 312
Peacemaking in Ethnic Confl icts and Failed States 314
Other Ways the United Nations Attempts to Promote Peace 318
The Future of the United Nations 319
International Law 324
Sources and Principles 324
The Impact of International Law 326
Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 328
The Ethics of War and Nuclear Deterrence 331

viii
P A R T I V
The Ethics of Intervention: Human Rights Versus States’ Rights 338
Women’s Rights 341
An Emerging Legal Right to Democracy 345
International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes 345
Norms Against War 348
Norms Versus Power 349
SUMMARY 350 • KEY TERMS 352
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD TRADITIONAL LAWS OF WAR APPLY TO ENEMY
COMBATANTS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”? 332
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT? 334
Interactions of Actors: Economic Relations 353
10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political
Economy in the North 354
The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic
Order 357
Economic Liberalism Versus Mercantilism 357
The Bretton Woods System 362
The International Monetary Fund 364
The World Bank 366
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 367
How the System Worked 369
Nixon’s Surprise 371
The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 372
The Economic Turmoil of the 1970s 372
The Decline of American Hegemony? And New Players in the Global
Economy 373
Turbulence in World Finance and the Global Economic Crisis 379
International Economic Institutions Today 384
SUMMARY 387 • KEY TERMS 388
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD ECONOMIC LIBERALISM BE ABANDONED
AS THE BASIS FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY? 382
11 The Developing States in the International Political
Economy 389
The Economic Gap Between the North and the South 390
The International Debt Problem 396

ix
P A R T V
Explanations of the North-South Gap 398
The Historical Explanation: Imperialism 398
Dependency and Neo-Imperialism Explanations 400
The Role of MNCs in Economic Dependency 403
The Economic Liberal Explanation of Underdevelopment 409
The “Economic Miracle” of East Asia 409
Development Strategies for the South 412
Strategies Associated with neo-Marxism 412
Liberalization Strategies 417
Addressing Gender Inequality and Disease 421
The Role of the International Organizations in Economic
Development 425
Moral, Economic, and Security Implications of the North-South Gap 426
SUMMARY 428 • KEY TERMS 430
POLICY CHOICES: DEALING WITH MNC INVESTMENTS 407
POLICY CHOICES: AIDING THE SOUTH 415
12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global
Political Economy 431
Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 432
Federalism Versus Functionalism 433
The Institutions of the European Union 436
The Process of Integration 438
The Future of the European Union 441
Economic Integration Among Developing States 446
Obstacles to Integration Among LDCs 447
Economic Integration Across the North-South Divide 451
Regional Integration, Supranationalism, and the International
Political Economy 454
Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Institutions 457
SUMMARY 459 • KEY TERMS 461
POLICY CHOICES: JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION 445
Global Challenges 463
13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants 464
Environmental Challenges 465
Atmospheric Conditions and Climate Change 465

x
Shrinking Natural Resources 468
Overpopulation 471
Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 474
Food Supplies 475
Population Growth 475
Reserves of Natural Resources 477
Pollution and Climate Change 480
Complex Relationships Connecting Environmental Challenges 483
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 484
The Environment as Collective Goods and Common Pools 486
Political Obstacles to Environmental Cooperation 489
Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation 494
SUMMARY 499 • KEY TERMS 500
POLICY CHOICES: SUPPORTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 487
POLICY CHOICES: ADDRESSING POPULATION GROWTH 496
14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics
and the Future of World Politics 501
What Is Globalization? 502
Economic Globalization 503
Political Globalization 507
Cultural Globalization 508
Factors Behind Globalization 511
A Historical Perspective on Globalization: How New Is It? 514
Historical Roots 515
Distinctive Characteristics of Contemporary Globalization 517
Globalization and Its Discontents 518
Unequal Globalization 519
Nationalism as a Countertrend 520
Other Sources of Opposition to Globalization 523
Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 525
“The State Is Dead” 527
“Long Live the State” 528
Understanding the Future of Globalization and the State 530
SUMMARY 534 • KEY TERMS 536
POLICY CHOICES: IS GLOBALIZATION DESIRABLE? 526
References 537
Index 575

xi
Maps
Ancient Greek City-States 26
Choosing Sides in the First World War 36
Squabbling over Eastern Europe After the
Second World War 55
Decolonization, 1945–1980 62
Confl ict in the Middle East 66
Europe (1991) After the Disintegration of the Soviet
Union 76
Modern Islam, 2005 86
Countries GDP around the World 112
Sunni and Shia Distribution 220
Ethnic Groups of Africa 234
The New NATO, 2004 270
Low-Income Countries 392
The Asian Tigers 410
Members of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) 449
Members of the Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Agreement 455

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xiii
Preface
Global Politics has long been praised for providing students with the historical and theoretical background to understand the complexi-
ties of international relations. Indeed, one of the key strengths of the text
continues to be its clear, comprehensive coverage of the historical and
theoretical bases of world affairs. It introduces the major theories and
paradigms important in the study of international relations, integrates
theory into the discussion of many topics, and presents a straightforward
history of the international system from its inception to the present. But
more than a discussion of what has occurred in the past and why, this
Tenth Edition is also a thorough study of the contemporary issues and
events infl uencing modern international relations. These topics include
globalization, one of the most important processes affecting relations be-
tween states and nonstate actors today, as well as coverage of the develop-
ing world, ethnic confl ict, regional integration, international norms, the
politics of environmental problems, and challenges to state power and
sovereignty. In short, Global Politics develops three key themes—the his-
torical, the contemporary and policy-oriented, and the theoretical—and
emphasizes the extent to which they complement one another.
The Framework of the Tenth Edition
Global Politics is arranged in fi ve parts: (1) theory and history, (2) states,
transnational actors, and foreign policy, (3) security relations, (4) econom-
ic relations, and (5) global challenges. This organization highlights the
text’s hallmark coverage of history and theory, and also spotlights today’s
most urgent issues and the latest developments in the study of interna-
tional relations.
Developments in global politics relating to security and economic issues
have been incorporated throughout the Tenth Edition. These include the
on-going occupation of Iraq, the confl ict between Russia and Georgia,
ethnic and religious confl icts (such as in Iraq, Darfur, and Georgia), the
state of World Trade Organization negotiations in the Doha Round, the
Lisbon Treaty in the European Union, nuclear proliferation (including
on-going developments in Iran and North Korea), international terrorism
(including the attacks in London and Madrid, and the 2008 bombing in

xiv
Mumbai), the global economic crisis that began in 2007 and the reactions
to it, and the election of Barak Obama as the 44th President and how this
might affect U.S. global relations. Several new Policy Choices boxes have
been added to the Tenth edition.
The breakdown of content and revisions, chapter-by-chapter, is as follows:
● Chapter 1, “Theories of Global Politics,” covers six major perspectives
on international relations (realism, liberalism, idealism, neo-Marxism,
constructivism, and feminist perspectives) and clearly explains the
premise and signifi cance of each theory.
● Chapter 2, “The Historical Setting,” covers ancient times to World
War II, including the development of nations and states and imperialism,
as well as a new Policy Choices, examining whether Britain should have
appeased Hitler. A discussion of how the major theoretical perspectives
interpret and use history is included in both Chapters 2 and 3.
● Chapter 3, “The Modern Era,” provides a fully updated treatment of global
politics since World War II, including updated sections on ethnic confl ict
in the post–Cold War era (the Arab-Israeli confl ict, Darfur, tensions in
India and Sri Lanka, Sunni-Shia confl ict in Iraq, and the Russia-Georgia
confl ict), nuclear proliferation (Iran and North Korea), the Bush Doctrine
and the on-going war against terror, an expanded discussion of failed states
(Somalia and Haiti), and coverage of the fi nancial crisis of 2008 and its
global economic implications.
● Chapter 4, retitled “The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational
Actors,” now includes information on both state and nonstate actors, such
as the piracy off the coast of Somalia. The chapter features material on
state formation and power, plus sections on multinational corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, international terrorism, and a new Policy
Choices, Should States Support the Activities of NGOs?
● Chapter 5, “Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy,” explores the
foreign policy approach: how what goes on inside states explains why
states may not act as expected in response to international conditions.
The chapter discusses public opinion, political institutions, interest
groups, bureaucratic politics, and the psychology of leadership. Cover-
age includes groupthink in the previous Bush administration and early
indications of how Barak Obama will lead.
● Chapter 6, renamed “International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate
War,” discusses the causes of interstate wars at the system level, state
and dyadic level, and decision-making level of analysis, and applies
these levels to the World War I, World War II, and Cold War cases.
● Chapter 7, “Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism,” focuses fi rst
on ethnic confl ict globally, including the recent confl ict in Georgia
and UN involvement in Rwanda, with discussions of the meaning of

xv
ethnicity, the prevalence of ethnically based wars, and various causes
of and solutions to ethnic confl ict. It then covers the defi nition of ter-
rorism, an expanded analysis of its history and origins, and its impact
on the world today, noting recent events in Mumbai and around the
Middle East. Finally there’s a new Policy Choices box, analyzing the
effectiveness of the War on Terror.
● Chapter 8, “Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargain-
ing” focuses on global relations among states, including states’ use of
alliances, arms, and bargaining to deter and compel other states, with
expanded coverage of newer forms of balancing. It also includes updated
material on efforts to control conventional and mass destruction weap-
ons, such as the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.
● Chapter 9, “Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law,
and Ethics,” continues the discussion with coverage of the internation-
al organizations, ethics, norms, and laws that govern state behavior and
attempt to avoid, or at least regulate, international confl ict. The chap-
ter explores the complex relationship between the United States and
the United Nations, as well as the role of international organizations
in humanitarian intervention.
● Chapter 10, “Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political
Economy in the North,” initiates the discussion of economic relations
among states with coverage of the basic concepts of macroeconomics.
It discusses economic liberalism, mercantilism, and economic systems
throughout the world, focusing on international trade and fi nance, and
also examines the impact of multinational corporations on the global
economy. New to this edition is coverage of the 2008–2009 fi nancial
crisis with its global economic implications, and a new Policy Choices
feature, examining whether economic liberalism should be the basis of
the world economy.
● Chapter 11, “The Developing States in the International Political Eco-
nomy,” describes the problems that developing countries encounter in
the international economic system and provides explanations for the
gap in wealth between the North and the South. The chapter includes
material on the role of multinational corporations in economic
dependency and the role of international organizations in economic
development, as well as coverage of Latin America’s increasingly leftist
orientation and the Doha round of trade negotiations.
● Chapter 12, “Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political
Economy”, shifts the focus away from state boundaries in the inter-
national system and toward the development of regional economies,
and includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Mercosur in
South America, and updated and expanded coverage of the European

xvi
Union (EU). A new section discussing various theoretical perspectives
on regional institutions has also been added.
● Chapter 13, “The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants,” describes
contemporary challenges to the global community. This edition provides
updated statistics and developments on food and natural resource short-
ages, population growth, and global warming, as well as the politics that
complicate solutions to global environmental problems.
● Chapter 14, “Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future
of World Politics,” is a discussion of economic, political, and cultural
globalization. It describes the role of technology in the development
of globalization, explores its historical roots, and, with new expanded
coverage of views that oppose globalization, asks students to consider
the benefi ts and disadvantages of living in an increasingly interdepen-
dent world.
Features of the Tenth Edition
The Tenth Edition includes a number of helpful pedagogical features for
students. The “POLICY CHOICES” boxes, which were so well received in
previous editions, have been retained and expanded. These boxes analyze
crucial contemporary issues in a debate format, with arguments for and
against each position that bring the issue to life and help students think
critically about the presented material. New topics are “Should Britain
have Appeased Hitler?” (Chapter 2); “Should States Support the Activi-
ties of NGOs?” (Chapter 4); “Is the War on Terror an Effective Policy for
Addressing Terrorism?” (Chapter 7); and “Should Economic Liberalism
Be Abandoned as the Basis for the Global Economy?” (Chapter 10). The
Tenth Edition also includes a marginal glossary that defi nes KEY TERMS
on the pages of the text where they are fi rst introduced, as well as a brief
outline on the opening page of each chapter that previews key content.
Each chapter concludes with a bulleted SUMMARY and a list of KEY
TERMS with page references. An extensive list of references by chapter is
located at the end of the text, and there are both name and subject indexes
at the end of the text for ease of reference.
Supplements
Instructor’s Resource CD
A test bank in Microsoft® Word and ExamView® computerized testing
offers a large array of well-crafted multiple-choice and essay questions,
along with their answers and page references.
An Instructor’s Manual includes learning objectives, chapter outlines,
discussion questions, suggestions for stimulating class activities and

xvii
projects, tips on integrating media into your class, simulations, and sug-
gested readings and Web resources.
A variety of blank maps of different areas of the world can be printed out
or used online to test students’ knowledge of important geography.
Companion Website
Students will fi nd open access to learning objectives, tutorial quizzes,
chapter glossaries, fl ashcards, and crossword puzzles, all correlated by
chapter. Instructors also have access to the Instructor’s Manual.
Wadsworth News Video for 2010 DVD
This collection of three- to six-minute video clips on relevant political
issues serves as a great lecture or discussion launcher.
The Rand McNally Atlas of International Politics
This atlas offers maps of the world showing political organization, popu-
lation statistics, and economic development; maps highlighting energy
production and consumption, major world confl icts, migration, and
more; and extensive regional coverage. Students will fi nd it useful for un-
derstanding world events and to supplement their studies with “Global
Politics.”
Acknowledgments
For the Tenth Edition, Juliet Kaarbo acknowledges the support of the
University of Kansas and, while on a research fellowship at Bilkent Uni-
versity in Ankara, support from the Scientifi c and Technical Research
Council of Turkey. Ryan Beasley provided extensive and valuable feedback
and suggestions on many sections of this edition. Jeffrey Lantis, Mariya
Omelicheva, Phil Schrodt, and Brent Steele, lent materials, perspectives,
and support. Adam Brown and Will Delehenty served as the research as-
sistants for this edition, and their work is very much appreciated.
The following people provided extensive, detailed, and helpful com-
ments on this edition:
David V. Edwards, Professor of Government, Univ. of Texas at Austin
Daniel Masters, Department of Public and International Affairs,
University of North Carolina Wilmington
Christopher M. Sprecher, Texas A&M University
John Conybeare, University of Iowa
Juliet Kaarbo
Lawrence, Kansas

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1
Theoretical
Perspectives and
Historical Background
P A R T I

2
C H A P T E R 1
Theories of Global Politics
Realism
Criticisms of Realism
• Liberalism
• Idealism
• Neo-Marxism
• Constructivism
• Feminist Perspectives
Summary
Key Terms

Global politics concerns the relations between different actors in the world, the characteristics of those relations, and their consequences.
It has to do with the nature of those actors, how they have changed over
time, and how their interactions have changed over time. Global poli-
tics, also commonly referred to as international politics, world politics,
or international relations, includes questions of international confl ict
(for example, why do countries and ethnic groups go to war with one
another, and what contributes to peaceful relations?), questions of inter-
national economics (for example, why and how do states enter into trad-
ing agreements with one another, and how is wealth distributed in the
world?), and questions that transcend actors but confront them nonethe-
less (for example, what contributes to global environmental problems,
and how is cultural, political, and economic globalization changing
world politics?).
The major purpose of this book, Global Politics, is to help students
understand world politics in the past, present, and future. The process
begins in this fi rst chapter with a discussion of theoretical perspectives
on the way international relations operate. Theoretical perspectives of
international politics provide answers to these basic questions: Who are
the main actors in international politics? Why do actors do what they
do in international politics? What are the underlying factors that govern
relationships in global politics? How have international relations changed
or stayed the same over the centuries? What accounts for confl ict and
cooperation in international politics?
Each of the theoretical perspectives presented in this chapter provides
different answers to these questions. Each perspective is based on differ-
ent assumptions about humans, governments, and international politics.
Each can provide a different analysis of the same event in international
politics, such as the Vietnam War, the signing of the North American
Free Trade Agreement, the rise of the World Trade Organization, internal
confl ict in Sudan, or the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The purpose of this
chapter is to discuss and compare these alternative takes on international
politics. This chapter presents an overview of these theoretical perspec-
tives. Subsequent chapters will illustrate how these perspectives can be
used to explain more specifi c topics of international politics.
Understanding alternative theoretical perspectives is important for
understanding world politics for two main reasons. First, everybody
already has some theoretical perspective in mind when they consider
international relations. Even students new to the subject bring with
them sets of assumptions about the world and its actors. When you read
about current events or the history of international relations, you are
seeing the “facts” through a particular lens. Knowing what lens you are
using and what alternative lens may be available will help you better
understand how you are interpreting the facts and how facts may be seen
in different ways.
global politics The
relations among different
actors in the world, the
characteristics of those
relations, and their
consequences.
theoretical perspectives
Alternative interpretations
of how international
relations work, why actors
do what they do, and what
underlying factors govern
relationships in global
politics.
Theories of Global Politics 3

4 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
Second, understanding alternative theoretical perspectives allows
students of international relations to analyze global politics in the future,
long after they fi nish reading this book or taking courses on the subject.
When students learn only history and contemporary issues and the par-
ticular explanations of historical and contemporary events, their knowl-
edge of global politics is limited in time, because new issues and events
are always arising. Students who understand more general theoretical
perspectives have the capability of analyzing international relations that
have yet to take place. Thus, the theoretical perspectives provide more
long-lasting analytical tools.
The most prominent theoretical perspectives for understanding
global politics are realism, liberalism, idealism, neo-Marxism, construc-
tivism, and feminist perspectives. Each perspective has a different focus
for understanding international relations. It is not the case that one per-
spective is clearly “right” and the other is clearly “wrong”; all have
something to contribute to our understanding of world politics. One
perspective, however, may be more appropriate than others for certain
parts of international relations or better at explaining certain events.
Indeed, the study of global politics is about discovering what the various
theoretical perspectives do best.
Realism
Realism is the fi rst theoretical perspective for understanding inter-national relations that we consider, because it has historically been
the dominant lens through which world leaders and scholars alike have
understood global politics. Indeed, realism can be traced back to Thucy-
dides’ account of the Peloponnesian Wars between the Greek city-states
Athens and Sparta in 431–404 B.C.E.1 Thucydides, a historian, described
and explained the relations between these actors with realist proposi-
tions. Realism was also the dominant way leaders in Europe in the sev-
enteenth through early twentieth centuries understood international
relations. It was during this period that the modern international system
was created, largely based on realist notions. After World War II, scholars
of international relations embraced realism as the dominant perspective
for explaining global politics. The chief advocate of the realist theory of
international politics was Hans J. Morgenthau, considered the father of
modern realist thought. His classic text, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace, was fi rst published shortly after World
War II and carefully defi ned the realist theoretical perspective that most
scholars would then adopt.2 Because of this dominant position, in many
ways, all of the other theoretical perspectives for understanding global
politics are reactions to and criticisms of realism.
The fi rst proposition of realism, also known as Realpolitik, is that
states are the most important actors in global politics. States are gov-
ernments that exercise supreme, or sovereign, authority over a defi ned
realism A theoretical
perspective for under-
standing international
relations that emphasizes
states as the most
important actor in global
politics, the anarchical
nature of the international
system, and the pursuit
of power to secure states’
interests. Also known as
“Realpolitik” or “power
politics.”
Thucydides Greek
historian who wrote about
the Peloponnesian Wars
between the Greek city-
states Athens and Sparta in
431–404 B.C.E. Thucydides’
accounts described and
explained the relations
between these actors in a
realist approach.
Morgenthau Considered
the father of modern
realist thought with his
work, Politics Among
Nations, fi rst published
shortly after World War II.

Realism 5
territory. Sovereignty means that states are legally the ultimate authority
over their territory and no other actor in the international system has the
legal right to interfere in states’ internal affairs. States are the countries
such as France, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Turkey, Ukraine, and the
United States, on world maps. For realists, it is these states, and not their
leaders, their citizens, business corporations, or international organiza-
tions, that are the key actors and determine what happens in the world.
States can, if they choose, control all other actors, according to realism.
Realism is state-centric because of the central and predominant position
that states play in this perspective.
The second proposition of realism answers the question, why do
states act the way they do in international politics? States, according to
realism, pursue their interests, defi ned as power. State interests, rather
than their values or ideological preferences, are the reason behind every
state act. And it is the maximization of power that is in a state’s interest.
Thus, everything a state does can be explained by its desire to maintain,
safeguard, or increase its power in relation to other states.3
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, for example, was a power
move, according to the realist perspective. It had nothing to do with its
leader, Saddam Hussein or his personality. It had nothing to do with
the authoritarian nature of the Iraqi political system or any anti-Western
beliefs held by some in the Middle East. For realists, it was simply a
chance for Iraq to maximize its power against Kuwait and the other key
states in the region. For realists, the invasion of Kuwait was in Iraq’s
interest, and it would have happened regardless of the leader, political
system, or beliefs in Iraq. Similarly, the reaction of the United States and
its decision to lead a military effort to oust Iraq from Kuwait was also
about interests and the maximization of power. The U.S. interests and
power in the region were threatened by the Iraqi invasion, and so the
reason behind the U.S.-led Desert Storm operation had nothing to do with
the humanitarian interests to save the Kuwaiti people or pure economic
interests to safeguard a supply of cheap oil; it had to do with maintaining
its power in the region. With this focus on power as the primary goal of
states, realist ideas are also known as the power politics perspective.
Why is the maximization of power in a state’s interest? The answer
to this question is based on the defi nition of the primary actor, the state.
Because states exercise sovereign authority over a defi ned territory, and
no other actor in the international system has a higher authority over
states, there is no world government to look after individual states’ inter-
ests. According to realism, the defi ning feature of global politics is that
the international system exists as an anarchy.4 Anarchy does not mean
chaos or confusion, but simply the lack of an overarching political author-
ity or world government. Without a central government, international
politics is akin to the philosopher Thomas Hobbes’ “state of nature” or
“state of war” in which individuals must fend for themselves and life is
“nasty, brutish, and short.”5 For realists, anarchy is what makes inter-
national politics so very different from domestic politics, which occurs
states Governments
that have legal
sovereignty over a
defi ned territory.
sovereignty The legal
notion that states are
the ultimate authority
over their territory and
no other actor in the
international system has
the right to interfere in
states’ internal affairs.
anarchy According to
realism, a defi ning feature
of the international
system wherein there
is no overarching
political authority or
world government;
different from “chaos” or
“disorder.”

6 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
inside countries. Within political systems, individuals can live peacefully
knowing that there is a government to provide them protection in the form
of national defense and internal police and to provide laws that deter or
punish those who seek to harm their individual interests. States in the
international system enjoy no such luxury. Without an international world
authority, they must look out for their own interests. The way they do this,
according to realism, is by securing and maintaining their power. Main-
taining power is a rational response to the anarchic international system.
Because each state must follow a self-help strategy to protect its
own interests, states are naturally competitive with each other, eyeing
one another with necessary suspicion. Confl ict, then, is an inevitable
outcome, and for realists, confl ict and the use of force is the central
concern in international politics. War is a means by which states com-
pete for power, and, relatedly, the key components of power are military
in nature, because ultimately it is the goal of every state to survive
and to protect its territorial integrity (if not its citizens as well) in a
confl ict-ridden world. Typically such “protection” translates into mili-
tary forces. In a dangerous world, states seek greater security by building
up their military forces, by making military alliances, and, if necessary,
by the prudent use of military force.
After military intervention in Iraq in 2003, U.S. troops often came under attack. The
realist perspective sees such confl ict and the use of military force as an inevitable part
of global politics.
(Scott Nelson/Getty Images)

Criticisms of Realism 7
For realism, the pursuit of power and political interests is separate
from economic spheres, moral spheres, and any other sphere of human
activity. Moreover, power considerations must come fi rst. Action taken
in the name of economic wealth must be evaluated according to how it
contributes to or detracts from the national interests. Realists, for exam-
ple, sometimes worry that their state’s economic ties with other states,
in the form of trade agreements and investment deals, unnecessarily con-
strain their state and make them dependent on and at the mercy of others’
interests. Even if an economic agreement will make more money for the
state, realists would caution against it if it detracted from the state’s inde-
pendence or contributed to the power of a potential enemy. Realists also
caution against applying moral principles to state actions. They frown on
human rights policies that do not further the power of a state and may
even threaten its power.
One of the advantages of the realist theory is that it can serve as an
explanation for global politics across the many centuries of state interac-
tion. Indeed, the focus in realism is on continuity. Because all states, no
matter when, no matter where, are all motivated by the same drive to
protect their interests by maximizing their power, realism sees great con-
tinuity in international relations. Despite all the changes in world poli-
tics throughout time, realists say that states are basically doing the same
thing as they did all along: seeking power. And realists point out that
because of this, confl ict remains a dominant feature of the international
landscape today.
Criticisms of Realism
Realism has dominated twentieth-century thinking about global poli-tics so much that most other contemporary theoretical perspectives
can be considered reactions to and criticisms of realism. Not all of these
alternative theories criticize each proposition of realism. Rather, they
focus on particular points of realism and offer divergent ways of thinking
about international relations. The most prominent alternatives to real-
ism today are liberalism, idealism, neo-Marxism, constructivism, and
feminist perspectives. Their reactions to realist propositions are summa-
rized in Table 1.1.
Liberalism
Next to realism, liberalism is the most accepted alternative theoretical
perspective for understanding global politics. In this context, liberalism
and liberal are not to be confused with the terms as they are used to mean
left-of-center in domestic politics in the United States. Rather, liberalism
has a special meaning when applied to an understanding of international
politics. Whereas realism stresses great continuity in international rela-
tions across the centuries, contemporary liberalism sees great changes.
liberalism A theoretical
perspective emphasizing
interdependence between
states and substate actors
as the key characteristic
of the international
system.

8 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
In particular, states and societies became so interdependent by the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century that, according to liberalism, the way
they relate to each other changed in fundamental ways. Interdependence
means that states and their fortunes are connected to each other. What
happens inside one state can have signifi cant effects on what happens
inside another state, and the relations between two states can greatly
affect the relations between other states. While the fortunes of states may
have always been connected, or interdependent, liberalism proposes that a
particular kind of interdependence came to characterize the international
interdependence The
condition in which states
and their fortunes are
connected to each other.
TABLE 1.1
Realism and Its Critics
Main Criticisms*
Main Realist
Propositions Liberalism Idealism Neo-Marxism Constructivism
Feminist
Perspectives
Sovereign
states are
most
important
actors
Transnational
and substate
actors are
increasingly
important
Economic
divisions are
more important
than political/
state divisions
Women are
important
actors left out
by a focus on
male-led states
States pursue
their interests
defi ned as
power
Power is no
longer primarily
military in
nature;
economics is
important
States are
motivated by
morality and
values
Power, like all
other concepts,
is subjectively
constructed
Military power
and individual
state interests
are masculine
ways of thinking
States
maximize
power to
protect
themselves in
an anarchic
world; confl ict
is inevitable
Interdependence
means states’
interests are
intertwined and
cooperation is
likely
States
cooperate to
further values,
such as peace
Economic
confl ict between
social classes and
between the core
and periphery
is inevitable
Cooperation
and confl ict
depend on
states’ social
understandings
Security is
multidimensional
and achieved
through
cooperation
There is great
continuity in
global politics
across time
The post–World
War II world is
very different
Historical
processes
such as the
development
of capitalism
and imperialism
continue to
affect global
politics
* As noted in the text, not all of the alternative theories criticize each proposition of realism. Rather, they focus on particular points of realism,
offering divergent ways of thinking about international relations.

Criticisms of Realism 9
system, beginning after World War II and in place by the 1970s. According
to liberalism, complex interdependence became the dominant feature of
global politics.6 Complex interdependence has three specifi c components:
multiple channels, multiple issues, and the decline in the use of and effec-
tiveness of military force.
First, complex interdependence means that there are multiple chan-
nels among a variety of actors in international politics. Because realism
sees states as the only signifi cant actors, international politics is really
confi ned to state-to-state relations. Although liberalism does not deny
that these interstate connections remain important, it proposes that states
are not the only important actors in global politics. There are a variety
of nonstate actors that liberalism sees as sharing the world stage with
states. Transnational actors operate across state borders and include mul-
tinational corporations (MNCs), which are large companies doing busi-
ness globally. These organizations may have plants or factories in more
than one state, pay taxes in more than one state, or have investments in
more than one state. McDonald’s, Colgate-Palmolive, General Foods, and
General Motors are MNCs. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are
another type of transnational actor. NGOs are private, international orga-
nizations that act across borders and have members in different states,
such as the Catholic Church, Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and Amnesty
International. In addition, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are
actors whose members are states—for example, the United Nations, the
European Union, the Organization of American States, and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization—and can become fairly independent from
the states that govern them. Liberalism views IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs
as important international connections across state boundaries.
In addition, relations between substate actors also make up the
multiple channels in a complex interdependent world. Substate actors
may be businesses that are not multinational, because they essentially
operate within a single border but may buy imported goods from abroad
to make their products. Substate actors also include provincial govern-
ments that establish trade missions in other countries. California, Texas,
and New York are “provinces” in the United States that have extensive
relations and diplomatic representation with other parts of the world.
Substate actors may also include individuals who travel abroad or have
friendships with individuals in other countries. With the growing activ-
ity of substate and transnational actors, liberalism sees a complex web of
connections across the globe. Focusing only on state-to-state relations,
as realism does, misses an important part of world politics, according to
liberalism. Furthermore, states are not the only actors to have interests
that drive their actions. Nonstate actors have their own goals and inter-
ests that sometimes diverge from those of the state.
The second component of complex interdependence is that there are
multiple issues, not just military security, that are of interest to the vari-
ety of global actors. Economic, ideological, religious, and cultural issues
are part of the global agenda. Furthermore, security issues do not dominate
complex interde-
pendence The
dominant feature of
global politics according
to liberalism. Complex
interdependence
has three specifi c
components: multiple
channels, multiple issues,
and the decline in use
of and effectiveness of
military force.
transnational actors
Global actors, such
as nongovernmental
organizations, multi-
national corporations,
intergovernmental
organizations, and private
organizations, that
operate across borders
and share the world stage
with states.
multinational
corporations Large
companies doing business
globally, which may have
plants and factories in
more than one state, pay
taxes in more than one
state, or have investments
in more than one state.
nongovernmental
organizations
Transnational, private
organizations that have
members and activities
across state borders.
intergovernmental
organizations Actors
whose members are
states, such as the
United Nations,
the Organization of
American States, and the
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
substate actors Actors
within a state that
interact with others
outside the state, such
as local businesses
that import goods from
abroad and provincial
governments that
establish trade missions
in other countries.

10 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
the agenda, as realism assumes. Even issues that realism sees as purely
domestic, or internal to the state, can become tangled up in international
politics. Environmental regulations, for example, may be adopted by a
government to safeguard the health of its citizens, but they can also have
an effect on the state’s trading partners, if imports to the country must
meet the regulations as well. In this way, domestic policy can automati-
cally become foreign policy because of the connections between issues,
the multiple channels operating in the world, and the interdependence
among actors. Realism’s division of issues as either foreign or domestic,
argues liberalism, is out-of-date and artifi cial.
Finally, complex interdependence means that military force is not as
effective or frequently used as it was in the past. Many of the issues that
are of concern to states and nonstate actors do not lend themselves to
military solutions. It is diffi cult to solve global environmental problems,
for example, through military interventions or the detonation of a nucle-
ar bomb. These actions simply make the problem worse. It also does not
make sense for a state to conquer a trading partner through military force
to address a trade imbalance, because this would destroy the very eco-
nomic market to which the state and its businesses want to export goods.
Complex interdependence means that states are constrained in their use
of military power, because the use of this power only harms the multiple
interests of states and other actors.
These three components of complex interdependence—multiple
channels, multiple issues, and the ineffectiveness of military force for
some issues—lead liberalism to expect much more cooperation in global
politics than does realism. This is the key point of disagreement between
the two perspectives. While liberals do not deny that confl ict occurs, they
argue that cooperation is the norm and realism exaggerates the impor-
tance of and frequency of confl ict. Liberals point out that states trade
peacefully; they sign nonaggression pacts; they share military responsi-
bilities; some have very small militaries or even no military at all (such as
Costa Rica); and some military rivalries that have endured for centuries
(such as France and Germany) have now transformed into military and
economic partnerships. At best, realism does not account for the consid-
erable cooperation that occurs in international relations; at worst, this
cooperation violates realist expectations.
Why do states cooperate if the world is so dangerous and anarchic?
According to liberalism, states cooperate, because it is in their interests
to do so. Because the world is so interdependent, states realize that hos-
tile actions are likely to harm their interests as much as those of any
potential rival. Also, liberalism points out that the multiple channels
that connect nonstate actors constrain states. Even if leaders of states
recognize security threats and want to employ confl ictual means, they
often face resistance from the public or powerful interest groups, such
as MNCs, that benefi t more from cooperation. Of course, it is easier for
the public and interest groups to constrain leaders in political systems

Criticisms of Realism 11
that are democratic and provide avenues of infl uence. In democracies,
where opposition is legal and allowed, and citizens can hold their leaders
accountable for their actions through competitive elections, the multiple
channels across societies are more likely to constrain leaders from con-
fl ict. Thus, liberalism expects the effects of complex interdependence to
be more signifi cant in a more democratic world.
The spread of democracy is just one factor that liberalism cites to
account for the rise of complex interdependence in the twentieth century.
With the end of World War II, the fascist regimes of Italy, Germany, and
Japan were transformed into democracies. The end of World War II also
brought on the beginnings of decolonization when the European empires
gave up their territorial possessions around the globe. In some cases, such
as India, these newly independent countries became democratic for the
fi rst time. Other factors are also important in the rise of interdependence.
The invention of nuclear weapons meant that force, or at least all-out
war, was less of an option for the major powers. For the fi rst time in his-
tory, using the ultimate weapon in one’s military arsenal meant risking
signifi cant damage to all humanity.
Also after World War II, wealth began to be distributed around the
world to more economies as well, instead of being concentrated in
Europe. The United States became the largest economy in the world and
spread its wealth through aid packages (such as the Marshall Plan to war-
torn Western Europe after World War II) and through a military presence
around the globe during the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.
Multinational corporations also spread out across the globe. In the 1970s,
oil-producing states begin cooperating with each other to make money off
the oil-needy economies of Japan, Western Europe, and the United States.
And by the 1980s, newly rich economies sprang up in Asia: in South
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Indonesia. This new distribution of wealth
meant that more countries and their economies were tied together more
than ever before.
Finally, liberalism points to the technological developments that
allowed for increased global communication and transportation. With
phones, television, jet planes, faxes, the Internet, and satellites, the
world community has become increasingly capable of being in touch and
informed on a global scale. The “shrinking” of the world has meant that
there are more signifi cant connections, which are encouraging cooperation
between states. While these factors—such as democratization, the global-
ization of the world economy, and technological innovation—occurred
over the course of the second half of the twentieth century, there has been
noticeable development in these areas in the past twenty years. With the
end of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union (and the collapse of the Soviet Union), democratization, economic
globalization, and global communications have reached an unprecedented
stage. Liberals say that this makes complex interdependence even more
critical for understanding current and future world politics.

12 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
The last major difference between realism and liberalism concerns
the role of international organizations. Not only are international organi-
zations increasingly present in global politics, serving as a potential chal-
lenge to states as the dominant actor, but liberalism sees states as actively
promoting the rise of international organizations, particularly intergov-
ernmental organizations in which states are members. International insti-
tutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization
facilitate cooperation, which liberals see as in the interests of states. Inter-
national institutions provide an arena for communication and diplomatic
bargaining and an alternative to confl ictual means. International institu-
tions also help states establish agreements and international law that can
provide incentives for cooperation and organized collective responses for
punishing states that do not cooperate. Furthermore, international insti-
tutions can actually change a state’s interests by developing new norms
of international behavior, such as the respect for human rights, and by
developing mechanisms for areas of cooperation, such as in economic
integration.7 Realism, however, sees these institutions as a threat to state
sovereignty and state interests that have little impact on state behavior.8
Contemporary liberalism, as a theoretical perspective for understand-
ing global politics, has its roots in many strands of liberal philosophies.
Writers of eighteenth-century enlightenment and rationalism, such as the
French philosopher Montesquieu and the German philosopher Immanuel
Kant, argued that individuals, and states as well, are not inherently evil
and can learn to live peacefully if good social institutions are created
around them.9 Contemporary liberalism incorporates these ideas in its
focus on international institutions and law as positive and desired ways
to foster cooperation. Nineteenth-century liberalism, also known as clas-
sical liberalism, stressed the importance of the individual and democratic
political systems. Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill argued that indi-
viduals were capable of satisfying their own interests, and the role of the
state should merely be to help provide stability and peace for the realiza-
tion of individual interests.10 Contemporary liberalism incorporates these
ideas in its focus on how individuals in a democracy can articulate alterna-
tive interests to those of the state and on how democratic constraints can
produce cooperation. Finally, contemporary liberalism is consistent with
early-twentieth-century liberal writings, such as those by U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson, who argued that war was partly a product of nondemo-
cratic countries and that war could be prevented through international
organizations. Wilson argued that U.S. participation in World War I was
about “making the world safe for democracy” by destroying authoritarian
governments and empires in Europe. He designed the League of Nations,
an international organization whose goal was to make war extremely
unlikely. Wilson’s ideas are even more closely associated with idealism
and will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
With these philosophical roots, contemporary liberalism offers a fairly
comprehensive alternative perspective on the fundamental features of
classical liberalism
The nineteenth-century
philosophy that stressed
the importance of
the individual and
democratic political
systems.

Criticisms of Realism 13
global politics. Liberalism’s chief disagreements with realism concern the
predominance of states, the expectation for cooperation versus confl ict,
the role of international institutions, and the focus on change versus con-
tinuity in international politics.
Idealism
Idealism is not as comprehensive as liberalism in its criticism of realism.
Rather, idealism focuses on one key point: the absence of morality in
realism. Morals and values, not state interests, should and do shape indi-
vidual and state behavior, according to idealism. Idealism’s focus on what
states “should” do makes it different from other theoretical perspectives.
By prescribing how states should behave, idealism is a more normative,
or prescriptive, theory.
Idealism sees realism’s emphasis on power politics as blind to the
underlying values that states try to promote and worries that the realist
perspective makes the use of military force an acceptable means without
consideration of the ends for which it is used. For most idealists, war
must be a last resort, because it takes away human life, a value idealism
sees as universally held by all.
Idealism shares many features with liberalism and grows out of
some of the same philosophical foundations, including the writings of
Immanuel Kant. According to idealism, humans are basically good, and
it is social institutions that drive them to immoral acts. Perfecting social
institutions is not only possible but is the key to promoting coopera-
tion and peace in the global society. Thus, like liberalism, idealism sees
a role for international organizations in world politics. For liberals, states
participate in intergovernmental organizations and desire cooperation,
because it serves their interests or the interests of nonstate actors that
constrain states. For idealists, cooperation is desirable, because it pro-
motes a value—peace—and avoids something morally questionable—
war. These were the values that motivated idealists such as Woodrow
Wilson to design the League of Nations during the time period between
World War I and World War II. The League was meant to promote the
values of peace and democracy, but it failed to prevent the Second World
War. After World War II, idealist values surfaced in a new international
security organization, the United Nations. The charter signed by mem-
bers of the United Nations obliges states to pursue peaceful means for
resolving confl icts. Efforts by the United States, under President George
W. Bush, to democratize the Middle East were consistent with idealism
in that democracy was a political ideology and value to be promoted.11
Applying values to international politics is not easy, and idealism
does not offer specifi c guidelines for how to do so. Although most ideal-
ists agree that human rights, for example, is an especially important value
to uphold, there is considerable disagreement over which human rights
are the most important and whether they should be considered universal.
idealism A theoretical
perspective, in contrast
to realism, that focuses
on the importance of
morality and values in
international relations.

P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Trading with China
ISSUE: The advanced industrialized economic states are challenged when they
try to balance the economic advantages of trade with China against security and
human rights concerns. Realism, idealism, and liberalism offer alternative policy
prescriptions on this question.
Option #1: The advanced economic states should limit their economic ties
with China.
Arguments: (a) Realists are concerned that trade with China strengthens a
potential threat to other states’ security. Economic exchanges on technology
can be used for military purposes, and China can use its economic gain to fund
its growing military. Furthermore, Chinese threats to Taiwan and its transfer of
nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan should not be rewarded with economic
ties. (b) Idealists argue that China should be punished with economic isolation
because of its violation of individual political and religious rights, its use of child
labor, and its suppression of self-rule in Tibet. The advanced economic states should
hold economic exchanges as a reward to China if it conforms to these values.
Counterarguments: (a) China is not a great threat. Although it has a large military,
it is not sophisticated technologically and does not come close to matching the
capabilities of the United States, the main power with a signifi cant presence in
Asia. Furthermore, internal divisions will keep China more focused at home and
away from hostile adventures. (b) The application of Western values to China is
cultural imperialism and is an intrusion of sovereignty. The advanced economic
states would themselves see such intrusions into their own internal politics as
unacceptable.
Option #2: The advanced economic states should pursue more economic ties
with China.
Arguments: (a) Liberals argue that economic cooperation and interdependence
will restrain China from threatening behavior since it is in China’s interest to pros-
per economically, and military threats would harm those interests. (b) Liberals
also argue that political liberalization will follow economic liberalization and that
more contact with other democracies will eventually undermine the authoritarian
government in China, thus addressing human rights concerns. (c) Liberals argue
that given the importance of economics today and the profi ts that can be made
from the Chinese market, it is not in the interests of the advanced economic states
to sacrifi ce wealth for security or moral values.
Counterarguments: (a) Increased economic cooperation with China in the past
has not diminished its threatening behavior, and democratic structures are not in
place to allow those who oppose confl ictual policy to infl uence Chinese decision
makers. (b) Human rights violations have continued despite increased economic
cooperation with China in the past. (c) Economic trade with China is not that
profi table (the United States, for example, has a trade defi cit with China), and
there are other sources of economic wealth that do not compromise security
and values.
14

Criticisms of Realism 15
These issues lead to a number of questions: Should one society impose
its morals on another, or are values culturally relative? Should societies
that value women’s rights, equal rights between ethnic groups, economic
equality, freedom from torture, freedom from the death penalty, or demo-
cratic political rights apply those values to others who do not? Disagree-
ment also occurs over when to use military force in the name of other
values. Idealism does not mean pacifi sm, and many idealists would argue
that full force should be used in situations that have moral imperatives,
such as the prevention of genocide. Yet because idealists also believe
that one should weigh the moral end with the immoral consequences of
killing, the actual balance of values in a particular situation can spark
considerable debate. Idealists, however, would say that debating which
values are important and how to apply values to international politics
is far better than ignoring values by stressing interests, as realism and
liberalism do. The Policy Choices box demonstrates some of the key dif-
ferences among realism, liberalism, and idealism on the question of trade
with China.
Neo-Marxism
Neo-Marxism disagrees most fundamentally with the realist state-centric
assumption. Whereas realism focuses on the international system of
anarchy and state competition for power, the neo-Marxist perspective
focuses on the international system of capitalism, the competition
among economic classes, and the relationship of politics and society to
capitalist production.12
For this perspective, economics is the primary explanation for world
politics. In this way, it is Marxist in its orientation. But whereas Marx
concentrated on class confl ict within countries, neo-Marxists concen-
trate on global class confl ict.
Many neo-Marxists take a historical view of global politics, tracing
the development of the world economic system. According to this per-
spective, the world economy has always been divided into a core (the
“haves”), in which the most advanced economic activities take place and
wealth is concentrated, and a periphery (the “have nots”), in which the
less advanced economic activities occur and wealth is scarce. Over time,
particular country economies may move from core to periphery or vice
versa, but what is constant across history is that the globe is split into
this core-periphery international division of labor and the economic con-
fl ict that is inherent in this divide. “As a consequence, the core receives
the most favorable proportion of the system’s economic surplus through
its exploitation of the periphery, which, in turn, is compelled to special-
ize in the supply of less well rewarded raw materials and labor.”13 Since
the development of capitalism (a “mode of production . . . dominated
by those who operate on the primacy of endless accumulation”),14 a sig-
nifi cant change in the world system, the core has primarily consisted of
Neo-Marxism A
theoretical perspective
that focuses on the
international system of
capitalism, exploitation,
and the global
competition among
economic classes.
core Countries where
the most advanced
economic activities
take place and wealth is
concentrated.
periphery Countries
where the less advanced
economic activities occur
and wealth is scarce.
capitalism The
dominant mode of
economic production
today, in which the means
of production are privately
owned and goods and
services are distributed in
a free market for profi t.

16 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
the industrialized economies of Europe and eventually North America
and parts of East Asia, and the periphery has consisted of the economies
based on the extraction of raw materials in Africa, Latin America, parts
of Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
This particular division of labor did not develop arbitrarily, but
instead was a product of the historical expansion of the European pow-
ers that in the sixteenth century began colonizing the rest of the world.
Colonization involved changing the conquered territories’ economies to
suit the needs of the European powers. In most parts of Latin America and
Africa, for example, agricultural economies designed to feed the popula-
tion for centuries were destroyed and replaced by luxury crops (largely
goods exported for Europeans) such as bananas and sugar cane or raw
materials such as gold. This imperialism changed the nature of the world
economic system to the advantage of the European powers, and the con-
fl ict between the core and the periphery involved economic and political
domination to ensure continued economic gain on the part of the core.15
Dependency theory, one variation of neo-Marxism, argues that even after
the colonized areas became independent, the core continued to exploit
the periphery through neo-imperialism—not outright occupation of the
areas but indirect domination through military interventions, control of
international organizations, biased trading practices, and collusion with
corrupted elites who governed the periphery.16 Some neo-Marxists focus
on the hegeomony of social and economic classes and the states and inter-
national organizations they control to maintin their positions of power.
Neo-Marxists are highly critical of multinational corporations who they
accuse of using the powers and policies of states to support conditions
that are profi table for them—conditions such as wage controls and little
fi nancial or environmental regulation.
The implications of and debates surrounding neo-Marxism will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. At this point, however, it is
important to recognize the alternative vision of global politics that it
presents compared to other theoretical perspectives. Its focus on econom-
ics contrasts greatly with the realist focus on military power. Compared
to liberalism, which also recognizes the importance of economic rela-
tions, neo-Marxism stresses the historical circumstances that created the
capitalist division of labor. Moreover, whereas liberalism sees interdepen-
dence as fostering cooperation among states and other nonstate actors,
the neo-Marxist perspective sees a particular kind of interdependence—
dependence of the periphery on the core—as fostering confl ict among
global economic classes. Modern neo-Marxists also focus on forms of
exploitation, not just on the basis of class, but also on the basis of race,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation and other social/economic/cultural
constructs. Although neo-Marxism can be used as an explanatory frame-
work—to explain international politics—it also (like idealism) has a nor-
mative side in that it seeks economic equality, justice, legitimacy, and
the emancipation of the global working class.
imperialism The
domination of a
population and territory
by another state. The
European imperial powers
established colonies
throughout the world
from the sixteenth to the
early twentieth century.
dependency theory A
theoretical perspective
arguing that after the
colonized areas became
independent, the core
continued to exploit
the periphery through
neo-imperialism—not
outright occupation of
areas but through indirect
domination.

Criticisms of Realism 17
Constructivism
Constructivism represents yet another challenge to realism. To better
understand constructivism, we need to look at its basic roots, which
(as the name implies) involve “construction.” Although we typically
think of construction as involving physical things, like buildings or cars,
constructivists consider how the social world is built. There are many
different kinds of constructivists, but they all tend to support the idea
that the physical world is much less important than the social world and
that important parts of the physical world are actually built of, or “con-
structed” by, the social world.17
Consider a thief. What exactly is a “thief”? You might readily answer
that a thief is a person who steals things. But then you are left with the
question of what it means to “steal” things. Again, you might answer
that it means taking things that do not belong to you. But, then, what
does “belong to” mean? Surely, a constructivist might argue, we know
that different societies around the world defi ne things like stealing and
possessions differently. Some societies do not even operate on the basis
of private property, and thus, the notion of stealing is largely absent. This
same sort of thinking applies to actions as well. Murder, for example, is
understood very differently depending on how each society defi nes it. The
physical acts may be remarkably similar, but killing a prisoner, a politi-
cal dissident, an unplanned baby, or a trespasser can all be constructed
as very different. We can see, then, that a “thief” or a “murder” are best
thought of not as real things, but rather as ideas that are constructed from
the rules of a society or a particular social context. Two people might
witness a person take something away from another person or end the
life of another person, but the physical act could have entirely different
meanings to each of the observers. We might even say that thieves and
murders do not exist, except insofar as a particular society defi nes them
(constructs them) into existence. The physical world, it would seem, is far
less important than how the social world constructs that physical world.
But how does this apply to international relations, and how does con-
structivism represent a challenge to realism? If realism is purportedly
based on what is “real,” then constructivism confronts realism by ques-
tioning “reality.” Realists (and Liberals) tend to objectify the world by
asserting that there is a single, knowable, true world that is separate from
one’s social context. Constructivists counter that there is no certain, per-
manent, factual reality, and even if there were, physical truths matter less
than social constructions. Thus, constructivism questions some of the
basic claims of realism.
Take the concept of a “state.” Recall that states are the central actors
according to a realist perspective, and it is the pursuit of state power that
drives international relations. Indeed, realists contend that all states are
the same in that they are actors pursuing their objective self-interests.
But what is a “state”? A realist would answer that it is a government that
constructivism
Theoretical perspective
that proposes that the
physical world is much
less important than the
social world and that
important aspects of
global politics are socially
“constructed” through
systems of norms, beliefs,
and discourse.

18 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
exercises sovereign authority over a defi ned territory. But, then, what
is a “government,” and what is “sovereign authority”? Certainly the
notion of government varies from society to society, as do conceptions
of both sovereignty and authority. Moreover, a constructivist might ask
what these “objective interests” are that realists espouse; these things
are not “facts” in the sense that they truly exist somewhere. Rather, they
are constructed from various understandings associated with different
societies and cultures. Thus, it becomes important to understand how a
state or a society conceives of itself and its interests, rather than simply
asserting that all states are the same. Furthermore, constructivists want
to know what the shared understanding of state and sovereignty is in the
international society as this is what provides meaning for state actions.
Constructivists are more interested in understanding shared subjective
meanings than the objective.
Constructivists apply the same logic to the concept of anarchy, which
is central to realism. Realists look at anarchy as the most important char-
acteristic of the international system, because each state must then fend
for itself rather than appeal to some higher authority. But can we really
say that anarchy is a universal truth, viewed and responded to in the
same fashion by all the world across all time? Alexander Wendt, one of
the best-known constructivists, tackles this very issue in an article titled
“Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics.”18 In this article, he suggests that identities and interests of
states are not independent of, and are constructed by, their interactions—
much as thieves and murders are not independent of, and are constructed
by, the social context. Thus, when realists take as a starting point the
self-interested nature of states, and only then consider how they will
interact with one another, they are presupposing something. They are, in
effect, treating interests as given, and then trying to determine how states
will interact. They might say that because states are self-interested, they
will use force to maximize power when they interact in an anarchical
system. But a constructivist would say that interests are not given and
that a state will have different interests depending on its interactions.
Indeed, the notion of anarchy itself is not a universal but rather is con-
structed based on the social context. The social context in this instance is
the actual interactions of states (an international society). Thus, anarchy
(like thieves and murders) will be defi ned differently depending on how
states interact. Anarchy is just what states make of it.
Constructivists argue that states’ constructions of the international
systems infl uence global politics more than do any objective conditions.
One important type of social construction, international norms, can have
powerful effects on how states act and understand international rela-
tions.19 Constructivists point out that what is right, wrong, or appropri-
ate, and even what is in a state’s interest is the product of the collective
social context of global politics. Norms against the slave trade, norms
against the use of war for offensive purposes, and norms condoning the
international
norms Socially
agreed-upon standards
and expectations about
appropriate behaviors
of states and other
international actors.

Criticisms of Realism 19
interference in internal affairs for human rights have, according to con-
structivists, been socially constructed and reinforced by states’ behavior
and now act as serious constraints on what states perceive as acceptable
behavior.
Feminist Perspectives
Much of the feminist perspective in international politics is consistent
with the constructivist perspective. Feminist constructivism examines
the hidden assumptions about gender in the understanding and practice
of global politics. Indeed, feminist constructivism rejects the idea that
there is a universal truth, instead arguing that gender and the way gen-
der is defi ned colors different understandings of world politics. Feminists
argue, for example, that international relations theorizing is largely based
on masculine assumptions and reasoning.20
Specifi cally, the principles of realism and its vocabulary are rather
masculine in perspective. Realism’s preoccupation with confl ict, domi-
nation, and war, for example, refl ects a more masculine way of thinking
about human and state relations. Thus, far from accepting a dog-eat-dog
conception of autonomous states vying for supremacy as if it were a “real”
property of the international system, feminists argue that this is merely a
masculine construction of global politics.
Furthermore, realism’s defi nition of power as control contrasts with
feminine defi nitions of power as the ability to act in concert or action
taken in connection with others. Feminists argue that this conception
of power is practiced by weaker states but that realism, with its focus
on major powers, largely ignores these aspects of international relations.
Feminists also defi ne security, a central concept in realism, differently:
“Many IR [international relations] feminists defi ne security broadly in
multidimensional and multilevel terms—as the diminution of all forms
of violence, including physical, structural, and ecological. . . . Most of
these defi nitions start with the individual or community rather than
the state or the international system.”21 Like idealism, feminism also
criticizes realism for its amoral stance. Moral issues, particularly human
rights issues, are an important part of a broad defi nition of security but
are marginalized in the realist perspective.
Feminism might appear to be more comfortable with liberalism and
its focus on cooperation and idealism with its attention to morality, but
many feminists reject the liberal philosophy of individual interests, as
opposed to community interests, that underlie both of these alternative
perspectives. In sum, many feminists argue that a deconstruction of the
dominant perspectives of international relations will reveal that women
have been “systematically omitted in the quest to represent elite male
experience and images of reality, as reality per se. . . . The result is a Tra-
dition and a discipline, and indeed a whole International Relations com-
munity, that has rendered women invisible.”22 Consequently, feminists
feminist
constructivism
Perspective that rejects
the idea of a universal
truth, instead arguing
that gender and the way
gender is defi ned colors
different understandings
in world politics.

20 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
argue, the study of international relations, especially the dominant real-
ist perspective, is masculine in its perspective and thus is only a partial
description of international politics.
Another part of the feminist perspective concerns the impact that
men and women have on international politics and the impact that inter-
national politics has on men and women. It may not be surprising that
our perspectives on international relations are masculine biased, because
males hold most of the important leadership positions. Politics in gen-
eral, and perhaps especially international politics, has always been male
dominated. According to the World Bank, only about 18 percent of the
world’s parliamentarians are female.23 A perusal of the names of the for-
eign ministers and defense ministers in all the states of the world shows
that only a few are female; also, only a very small minority of ambassa-
dors to the United Nations are female.
What effect does this underrepresentation of women in leadership
positions have on global politics? The answer to this question depends
on how differences between men and women are explained. Essential
feminism argues that women are inherently different from men in ways
that make their contributions to politics differ greatly. According to this
argument, men and women have essential biological differences that lead
them to think and behave differently in ways that might affect interna-
tional relations. In most countries, for example, a gender gap exists in
public opinion: men tend to be more supportive of war and confl ictual
means for addressing their countries’ problems than are women. If more
women were leaders, the argument continues, “a truly matriarchal world,
then, would be less prone to confl ict and more conciliatory and coopera-
tive than the one we inhabit now.”24
Most feminist scholars in international relations do not subscribe to
the view that gender differences are biologically determined.25 Rather,
they see gender roles as socially constructed or created and reinforced
by the social environment. This view recognizes the differences between
men and women and the alternative ways of thinking and behaving that
arise from the feminine standpoint but rejects any biological determin-
ism and inherent superiority of women. Liberal feminism also rejects
biological determinism, but rather than focusing on the unique contribu-
tions that women can make, it stresses the similarities between men and
women and the entitlement for women to the same rights and responsi-
bilities that men enjoy. From this point of view, women can contribute in
the same ways as do men with equal capability (e.g., as women leaders,
soldiers, and suicide bombers) although political, economic, and social
structures, in addition to gender stereotypes, often block their entry into
such positions. Liberal feminists point to the women who have held lead-
ership positions, such as India’s Indira Gandhi, Israel’s Golda Meir, and
Great Britain’s Margaret Thatcher, who were as confl ictual as men in
their foreign policies. More generally, a comparison of female and male
leaders reveals that “both female and male leaders rely on . . . the use
essential feminism
The idea that women are
inherently different from
men in ways that make
their contributions to
politics differ greatly.
liberal feminism
Perspective that stresses
the similarities between
men and women and the
entitlement for women
to the same rights and
responsibilities that men
have.

Criticisms of Realism 21
of force. . . . Furthermore, both female and male leaders’ average use of
violence is equal. According to this evidence, female leaders are not more
peaceful than their male counterparts.”26 Other feminists would counter
that women leaders must conform to socially constructed male roles in
order to get into the positions usually reserved for men.
While women are not well represented in the public sphere of global
politics, feminists point out that their contribution in the private sphere is
no less important, even though it has often been ignored by both politicians
and scholars. Women in their public and private work contribute greatly
to the international economy. Diplomatic wives support their ambassador
husbands through rearing their children and hosting parties. Women make
up a good percentage of regular armed
forces, even though they are often restrict-
ed to noncombat roles. In many revolu-
tionary movements, women participate in
the full range of armed confl ict.27
Women, however, tend not to benefi t
as greatly from their roles in global poli-
tics, and a signifi cant part of the feminist
perspective is demonstrating the impact
that global politics has on women. For
example, “feminists tend to focus on
the consequences of what happens dur-
ing wars rather than on their causes. . . .
They draw on evidence to emphasize the
negative impact of contemporary military
confl icts on civilian populations. . . . As
mothers, family providers, and care-givers,
women are particularly penalized by eco-
nomic sanctions associated with military
confl ict.”28 Discrimination against wom-
en, in part because they make up half the
human race, is arguably the single most
profound human rights issue in the world
today. Worldwide, women typically earn
less than men either because they are
in lower-paying jobs or earn less for the
same job. Most of the work women do
is unpaid, particularly in developing coun-
tries.29 “The differences in the work pat-
terns of men and women, and the ‘invis-
ibility’ of unpaid work not included in
national accounts, lead to lower entitle-
ments to women than to men. This ineq-
uity in turn perpetuates gender gaps in
capabilities.”30
Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s fi rst elected
woman leader, is a rare exception to the male-dominated
world of international diplomacy.
(Shaun Curry/AFP/Getty Images)

22 Chapter 1 Theories of Global Politics
In sum, the feminist perspective serves as another alternative lens
through which to view international relations. In asking “Where are the
women?” it seeks to uncover the gendered nature of global politics and
our understanding of global politics.31
SUMMARY
● Theoretical perspectives provide answers to these basic questions: Who
are the main actors in international politics? Why do actors do what
they do in international politics? What are the underlying factors that
govern relationships in global politics? How have international rela-
tions changed or stayed the same over the centuries? What accounts
for confl ict and cooperation in international politics? These issues are
important to understand because they make explicit underlying assump-
tions, present alternative explanations of the same events or “facts,”
and provide a basis for understanding global politics in the future.
● Realism has been the dominant theoretical perspective. It sees states as
the most important actors in global politics. States pursue their inter-
ests by maximizing their power, primarily military power, because of
the anarchical nature of the international system. As a result, confl ict
is an inherent part of international politics. Realism sees great continu-
ity in international relations across time periods.
● Liberalism argues that changes in the international system have made
nonstate actors—both transnational and substate actors—more impor-
tant in global politics. The multiple connections across states and sub-
state actors, particularly in democracies, serve to constrain states from
engaging in confl icts that might harm their economic interests. Liber-
alism argues that complex interdependence in the international system
means that states engage in and benefi t from cooperation, including
cooperation in international organizations.
● Idealism proposes that states should and do follow their values in global
politics. Foreign policy and international organizations should be con-
structed to address moral issues of peace and human rights.
● The neo-Marxist perspective focuses on the historical development of
the international capitalist economic system, which is divided into a
richer core and a poorer periphery. This division of labor has its roots
in the imperial adventures of the European powers that, beginning in
the sixteenth century, colonized most of the rest of the world. Neo-
Marxists argue that the exploitative economic relationships established
during colonization continue today.
● Constructivism proposes that the physical world is much less important
than the socially constructed world. Constructivists criticize realism
for the assumption that there are universal truths. Key realist concepts,

Key Terms 23
such as the “state” and “anarchy,” are, for constructivists, more subjec-
tive and depend on the context. How such concepts are understood is
much more important than is an objective defi nition of them.
● Feminist perspectives on international politics include arguments that
the other major theoretical perspectives, particularly realism, contain
masculine assumptions and hence offer only partial understanding of
global politics. The feminist perspective also includes assessment of
the gender-biased ways in which women and men participate in and are
affected by global politics.
KEY TERMS global politics 3
theoretical perspectives 3
realism 4
Thucydides 4
Morgenthau 4
states 5
sovereignty 5
anarchy 5
liberalism 7
interdependence 8
complex interdependence 9
transnational actors 9
multinational corporations 9
nongovernmental
organizations 9
intergovernmental
organizations 9
substate actors 9
classical liberalism 12
idealism 13
Neo-Marxism 15
core 15
periphery 15
capitalism 15
imperialism 16
dependency theory 16
constructivism 17
international norms 18
feminist constructivism 19
essential feminism 20
liberal feminism 20

24
C H A P T E R 2
The Historical Setting
Global Politics in Ancient Times
The Emergence of the Modern State and the
Contemporary International System
• Eighteenth-Century European Relations
• The Impact of the French Revolution
• Nineteenth-Century European Relations
The Age of Imperialism
The Twentieth-Century World Wars
• The Breakdown of the Nineteenth-Century Alliance System
• The First World War
• Postwar Settlements and the Interwar Years
• Challenges to the Status Quo
• The Second World War
• The Impact of the Second World War
Theoretical Perspectives on the History of Global Politics
Summary
Key Terms

It is important to understand history in order to understand global poli-tics. Recognizing that things happening today have similarly happened
in the past and will likely happen in the future, gives us insight into why
such things happen. Every generation tends to believe that they are liv-
ing in a special time. And they are right—but they are not so special that
they cannot learn something from the past. It is true that the dramatic
transformation of global politics since the 1990s—including the end of
the Cold War, September 11, 2001, and the global reactions to terrorism—
produced events and trends that were unexpected even for professional
observers. But it is also true that in some ways, history does repeat itself.
Thus, understanding the history of international relations can likely give
us some insights about what to expect in the future.
Global Politics in Ancient Times
Relations between different groups of people did not become “global” until technology allowed for those who lived in one part of the world
to reach those who lived in other parts of the world. It was not until the
early fi fteenth century, when advances in math and engineering made it
possible to design ocean-worthy vessels with the capability to sail across
far distances, that relations become truly international. The history of
these international relations, albeit on a smaller scale, is nevertheless
important, because it gives an idea of how historical relationships differ
from and resemble international politics today.1
In the eastern Mediterranean in the fi rst to sixth centuries B.C.E., politi-
cal life was organized within and between small city-states (see Map 2.1).
The ancient Greek city-states, such as Athens, Corinth, Sparta, and The-
bes, consisted of a group of towns or a small city and were governed by
a variety of types of political systems, including small oligarchies of the
rich, military dictatorships, and limited democracies. The Greek city-state
system of international relations is considered a precursor to the modern
state system, because the city-states related to each other in much the
same fashion that countries relate to each other today. From Thucydides’
account of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens, we know
that the city-states waged war against each other, formed alliances, bar-
gained over peace treaties, and established trading relationships.2 More
important, the city-states were independent of each other, and there was
no overarching authority that governed their relationships. Although the
Greeks did not articulate a legal concept of sovereignty, they operated as
if the city-states were sovereign: They had ultimate authority over their
territory, and no higher authority interfered in their internal affairs.
The Greek system of international politics was unusual. For most
of history, the world has been organized under larger political units or
empires, and the relations between political units did not adhere to the
principle of sovereignty. Some of the great empires include the Persian
empire (circa 600–100 B.C.E), the Roman Empire (circa 44 B.C.E–410 C.E.),
Greek city-states
Formed between the
fi rst and sixth centuries
B.C.E., a group of
towns or a small city
governed by a variety
of types of political
systems including small
oligarchies of the rich,
military dictatorships,
and limited democracy.
Examples include
Athens, Corinth, Sparta,
and Thebes.
empires Large political
units in which the
ultimate power rested in
the hands of the emperor
or the imperial central
power. Examples include
the Roman Empire, the
African kingdoms, the
Arab empire, the Mayans,
the Aztecs, and the Incas.
Global Politics in Ancient Times 25

26 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
the African kingdoms (600–1200 C.E.), the Arab empire (630–1258 C.E.), the
Chinese dynasties (circa 1000–1700 C.E.), and the Latin American empires
such as the Mayans (circa 300–900 C.E.), the Aztecs (circa 1325–1520 C.E.),
and the Incas (circa 1200 C.E.). Within an empire, ultimate power rested
in the hands of the emperor or the imperial central power. Regions
within the empire may have traded with one another or waged war against
each other, but these relationships were sanctioned and governed by the
central authority. The central authority also had the right to interfere in
the internal affairs of the regions. Regions were not independent. There
often was not much activity happening between empires, given the lack
of technology to travel far distances for most of this historical period.
When empires did interact with each other, however, there was also no
Map 2.1 Ancient Greek City-States
(© Cengage Learning)
Medi t e r ranean Sea
Ion ian
Sea
Myrtoum
Sea
A
eg
ea
n
Sea
Saronic
Gulf
Gulf of Corinth
Euboea
C
Cythera
Aegina
Andros
Scyros
Cephalonia
Zacynthos
Corcyra
Paros
Melos
SPARTA
ARGOS
CORINTH
MESSENE
ATHENS
OLYMPIA
THEBES
C y c l a d e s e
Epirus
Aetolia
Achaea
Arcadia
Messenia
Macedonia
Thessaly
Boeotia
Attica
Elis
Laconia
Argolis
0 50 100 Km.
0 50 100 Mi.

The Emergence of the Modern State and the Contemporary International System 27
notion of sovereign rights. Empires interfered in the affairs of others, and
victorious empires absorbed vanquished ones, because there was no con-
ception that empires had any right to continue to exist as an independent
political unit.
This was true in medieval Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire. No
political authority as strong as the former empire came to replace it. Europe
was instead governed by small feudal units, principalities, dukedoms, and
monarchies and was at one time only loosely linked under Charlemagne’s
Holy Roman Empire of the ninth century. Yet the Catholic Church served
as a religious authority that precluded the total independence of the feudal
barons and the monarchs. During this time, the Catholic Church acted as
an imperial central power in the area known as Christendom. Within this
area, people were governed by both their local lords or kings and their local
bishops representing the interests of the Catholic Church in Rome. Chris-
tian doctrine underlay the concepts of rights, justice, and other political
norms, and even kings were theoretically and often in practice subordi-
nate to the pope. When, in the fi fteenth century, Spain and Portugal dis-
agreed over their “discovered” territories in the Western Hemisphere, for
example, it was the pope who settled the matter.3 Questions of war were
also a religious matter. The Crusades against non-Christians, for example,
were organized by the papal authority, and wars within Christendom had
to be justifi ed according to Christian doctrine: “A crusade was an enter-
prise of all Christendom and had to be proclaimed by the pope, preached
and organized by the clergy as well as by lay rulers. It was not a matter for
unilateral decision by a lay ruler for his own advantage.”4
The Emergence of the Modern State and
the Contemporary International System
It was when monarchs begin to centralize their power, taking it away from the local feudal rulers, and when philosophers and commercial
elites alike began questioning the authority of the Catholic Church, that
international relations in Europe began to transform. The fi rst to break
from the governance of the Catholic Church were the city-states of north-
ern Italy. The Italian Renaissance of the fi fteenth and sixteenth centuries
reintroduced to Europe the classic Greek and Roman concepts of justice,
rights, and law, and the Italian city-states of the Renaissance period, such
as Venice, Florence, and Milan, established themselves independent from
papal authority, governing their own internal affairs and conducting their
external affairs without interference from a higher authority. The system
of relations looked very different from medieval times: These city-states
hired mercenaries to wage wars against one another and other foreign pow-
ers; they established a permanent diplomatic corps as a communication
system; and they viewed war as a legitimate means to secure interests
that did not have to be justifi ed according to religious principles. As such,

28 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
the Italian city-state system of Renaissance Italy was in part a return to
the Greek city-state system of independent small states.
In the rest of Europe, the Protestant Reformation that challenged
Catholic authority set the stage for confl ict as the Catholic Hapsburgs
tried to reunify a fracturing Europe. The Hapsburgs were defeated in the
Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), a devastating confl ict that set the stage
for the birth of the modern state and the contemporary international
system. Thus, modern European states arose from the destruction of
the Thirty Years’ War, in which about two-thirds of the total population
had disappeared and fi ve-sixths of the villages in the empire had been
destroyed.5 These horrors made it obvious that the Christian commu-
nity of medieval Europe was fragile indeed and was in need of replace-
ment. The replacement that came out of the Peace of Westphalia was
the sovereign state. The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, is widely
recognized as the dividing line between a medieval Europe dominated by
small, localized political units under the comprehensive authority of the
Holy Roman Empire and/or the pope and a modern Europe where states
became recognized as sovereign. The Holy Roman Empire and the pope
continued to exist, but their political power had been all but destroyed.
The concept of sovereignty, in the post-Westphalian period, extended
beyond the dimensions described by Jean Bodin, the French legal scholar
credited with making the fi rst systematic presentation of the concept in
his Six Books on the State, published in 1586. Bodin’s work was a defense
of the divine right of the French king to rule in an absolute manner, but
Bodin’s concept of sovereignty did not imply a right to rule arbitrarily
or above the law. Nor did it originally imply that a state fell under no
superior obligations in its relations with other states.6 But because of the
urge to avoid catastrophes such as the Thirty Years’ War, the concept of
sovereignty came to imply that the state had an absolute power over its
subjects and an absolute right to be free from interference by other states
in the exercise of that power.7
The Peace of Westphalia did not immediately transform Europe from a
large collection of small, local entities under one universal authority into
a small number of parallel sovereign states. But the idea of states as impen-
etrable units did develop relatively quickly after 1648. Shortly before 1648,
scholars of international law considered it perfectly appropriate for one
state to intervene in the affairs of another in order to protect citizens from
oppression. But some fi fty years later, legal scholars, writing with the ben-
efi t of the experience of the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westpha-
lia, concluded that such interference by one state in the affairs of another
was a violation of sovereignty.8 Thus, by the beginning of the eighteenth
century, sovereign states—a notion only previously seen in isolated, small
areas of the world—became the dominant legal principle governing rela-
tions among the major powers in Europe. This new Westphalian system
was not only a product of religious developments; economic and techno-
logical changes also worked to reinforce the sovereign state.
Peace of Westphalia
Treaty signed in 1648
that is widely recognized
as the dividing line
between medieval
European political
institutions and a modern
Europe where states
became recognized as
sovereign.

The Emergence of the Modern State and the Contemporary International System 29
If the divisions in Christendom in the fourteenth and fi fteenth cen-
turies had not been accompanied by changes in economic forces and in
military technology, the Thirty Years’ War and the Peace of Westphalia
might have established impenetrable sovereign units that were neverthe-
less similar in size to the numerous small units that went into that war.
Economic changes, however, powerfully reinforced the strength of central
political authorities in what were soon to become recognizably modern
states. Feudal authorities tended to restrict trade and commerce, mak-
ing it almost impossible to conduct economic transactions across longer
distances, or indeed anywhere outside the jurisdiction of typically quite
small feudal political units. As merchants and entrepreneurs who wanted
to conduct economic transactions became wealthier and more infl uential,
they increasingly came to value political systems and leaders who could
exert their authority over larger areas and enforce commitments to similar
entities elsewhere.9 Dramatic changes in military technology reinforced
evolutionary developments in economic forces. Around 1200 C.E., stone
castles represented the ultimate in military defense, and they were scat-
tered all over western Europe.
Military technology came to exert a strong force against this state of
affairs. “The sudden maturation in 1450 A.D. of the cannon, after a long
infancy, as the destroyer of castles made a further and large change in the
art of war in favor of the centralized state . . . and in favor of the monarch
over the feudal barons.”10 The appearance of gunpowder on the battlefi elds
accelerated the process of eliminating smaller political units in favor of
larger units, such as states. Between 1400 and 1600, large numbers of the
smaller entities lost their independence; the Thirty Years’ War brought
this process to a climax. After the Peace of Westphalia, fortifi ed cities and
castles increasingly gave way to fortresses lining the borders of states, at
least partly because the cities and castles could no longer defend them-
selves against attackers equipped with the new military technology.
But how did the increasingly powerful monarchs at the head of terri-
torial states acquire the ability to use this new military technology effec-
tively? Changes in warfare favored larger and more expensive armies,
which necessitated more taxation.11 Sovereign states proved themselves
more capable than city-states or city-leagues of providing this increased
taxing power and rational government.12 So the evolution and increas-
ing importance of both economic transactions over large areas and inno-
vations in military technology combined to allow territorial, sovereign
states to prevail, fi rst in Europe and eventually over the entire globe.
Eighteenth-Century European Relations
Following the Peace of Westphalia, the large important European states,
such as Britain, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and the newly emerg-
ing Russia and Prussia, were ruled by centralized monarchies, and wars
between the states were usually confl icts between royal dynasties.

30 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
Typically, one royal family would object to an increase in the power
of another royal family. These confl icts and the resulting wars would
typically be resolved on the balance-of-power principle. This principle
implied that it was dangerous for all states to allow any one state to
become too powerful. Just what was too powerful was in constant dis-
pute, of course, but in practice, the balance-of-power principle usually
served to preserve the existing distribution of power among the great
powers. Any change in the status quo that worked to the detriment of a
given great power made that state (or royal family) feel entitled to some
compensation.13
The eighteenth century saw a series of
balance-of-power wars, with the British and
French being the major protagonists. The wars
between kings were fought by soldiers of vari-
ous nationalities employed for the purpose, and
the diplomats who negotiated the peace settle-
ments were virtually indifferent to nationalis-
tic divisions.14 This cosmopolitanism applied
throughout the diplomatic corps of European
states. Denmark used German diplomats, Rus-
sia employed Englishmen and Frenchmen, and
Spain recruited diplomatic talent from Italy and
Holland. Indeed, cosmopolitanism extended to
heads of states. Britain had a German king, and
the Spanish king was a grandson of Louis XIV
of France.
The Impact of the French Revolution
The new, modern, sovereign state, brought into
existence at the end of the seventeenth centu-
ry, and the balance-of-power system operating
on the European continent would soon face a
challenge that would transform the nature of
the state, as well as the nature of international
relations. This challenge came in the form of
nationalism and expressed itself in the eigh-
teenth century in the French Revolution.
The original aims of the revolution were
liberty, equality, and brotherhood for the French
people. The aims implied the end of aristocratic
rule in France, but more importantly, they
implied that the state belonged to the people.
Kings could no longer say, L’ état, c’est moi
(I am the state). The acts of the government came
to be viewed as acts of the citizenry, and the
balance of power A
principle that implies it
is dangerous for all states
to allow any other state
to become too powerful.
Napoleon, pictured at the height of his power in
1812, revolutionized international politics by his
heavy reliance on conscription to create armies
infused with the spirit of nationalism.
(Jacques-Louis David, Napoleon in His Study, Samuel H.
Kress Collection, © 1994 Board of Trustees, National Gallery of Art,
Washington)

The Emergence of the Modern State and the Contemporary International System 31
revolutionary French constitution of 1793 was ratifi ed by a large popular
majority. As popular will linked itself with the actions of its political
representatives, tremendous support for the government arose. As a con-
sequence, the government came to be regarded as the head of a national
society of French people; not, as in the case of the old monarchy, the ruler
of a mere geographical expression.15 Thus, in the context of the French
Revolution, nationalism, or the identifi cation of a people to a social com-
munity that is often linguistically, ethnically, or religiously based, meant
that the government of France, the state, was legitimate not because of
religious authority, or the family dynasty of a monarch, but because it
represented the nation of the French people.
If the French Revolution had been self-contained, its impact on
international politics might have been less dramatic. But the revolution
became expansionist. The French became convinced that their ideals were
too good and too important to be confi ned in application to one state, and
with Napoleon’s leadership they set out to spread those ideas throughout
Europe. To do this, Napoleon used the levée en masse, or conscription.
Soldiers were no longer mercenaries, but patriots who fought in defense
of or for the glory of the state. Eventually, the other states of Europe found
they could not resist or defeat an army of patriots without copying its
methods and its nationalism. France’s enemies became nationalistic in
self-defense. Even so, it took the combined forces of Napoleon’s enemies
almost two decades to fi nally defeat him at Waterloo in 1815.
Nineteenth-Century European Relations
Following the disruptive Napoleonic wars, the victors sought to reestab-
lish order in Europe. The leaders of the great powers met at the Congress
of Vienna and signed agreements that they hoped would restore stability.
The agreements solidifi ed the notion of state sovereignty. States agreed
to preserve territorial boundaries to prevent future disputes, create buffer
states (such as the Netherlands and Belgium) as small allies, and return
to the balance-of-power principle that had operated in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Fearing a French-like revolution in their own countries, the mon-
archs were also anxious to quell the fl ames of nationalism and democracy,
and thus monarchies were restored and reinforced across Europe, even
in France.16
The goal of restoring stability among the great powers was success-
ful, and the international political system of the nineteenth century
was relatively peaceful, compared to previous centuries. During this
period, known as the Concert of Europe, there was no confl ict in which
all fi ve major powers—Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia—
were involved at the same time. Wars between the states occurred,
such as the Crimean War in 1854 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870,
but one or more of the major powers stayed neutral in each of these
confl icts. One source of continuity during the Concert of Europe was
nationalism The
identifi cation of a people
to a social community
that is often based
on shared language,
ethnicity, and/or religion.
Congress of Vienna A
meeting between the
leaders of the great powers,
following Napoleon’s
defeat in 1815, which
resulted in agreements
designed to restore
stability and solidify the
notion of sovereignty.
Concert of Europe
The nineteenth century
period of relative peace,
with no major confl ict
between the primary
powers.

32 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
the consistently important role played by Great Britain. If Britain was
not always clearly the most powerful state, it was never very far from
being so. Britain’s power and security rested fi rst on its navy, which
dominated the seas the world over and made any attack across the Eng-
lish Channel unlikely to succeed. The second solid basis for Britain’s
nineteenth-century security was its manufacturing ability.17 The Indus-
trial Revolution, the use of energy to drive machinery, began in Britain
with the invention of the steam engine in 1769 and quickly fueled Brit-
ain’s economic growth. Britain rapidly became the economic hegemon,
the most powerful economy.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Britain’s
predominance facilitated a new era of international trade. Indeed, the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century saw the development of a truly inter-
national economy. Previously,
throughout the fi rst half of the nineteenth century, almost all
economic activity was conducted either at the local level or
(in those few countries such as Great Britain and France that
had succeeded in abolishing internal impediments to economic
exchange) on a national wide scale. Where international trade
did exist, it was largely confi ned to distinct commercial regions
defi ned by physical proximity.18
Thanks to the British promise that its currency was as good as gold,
known as the gold standard, currency relations were fairly stable during
this time, allowing countries to engage in considerable amounts of inter-
national trade.19 As a result, the major economies were highly integrated,
depending on trade with one another to a degree that would not be seen
again until late in the twentieth century.
The Age of Imperialism
At roughly the same time that Europe came to be dominated by states, Europe began to dominate the world, setting the stage for the emergence
of sovereign states around the globe. The Europeans fi rst sent explorers to
stake claims. After the explorers, and sometimes with them, came traders
and colonizers, who began exploiting the economic and human resources of
conquered areas. Imperialism refers to the domination of a population and
territory by another state, and the European imperial powers established
colonies throughout the world from the sixteenth to the early twentieth
centuries. The fact that post-Westphalian Europe was divided into inde-
pendent states rather than united in an empire was probably crucial to its
global pursuits. There can be no doubt that China in the early Middle Ages
was a more advanced society than Western Europe economically, tech-
nologically, and scientifi cally.20 But empires, such as those in Asia, were
overcentralized, rigid, and relatively unproductive in economic terms. As
a result, in this view, East Asia came to be dominated by Europe.

The Age of Imperialism 33
The fi rst wave of imperialism occurred in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries when the British, Dutch, French, Portuguese, and Spanish
established colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Most of these colonies
would gain their independence in the last part of the eighteenth centu-
ry and the early part of the nineteenth century. This included the war
of independence by the American colonies, aided by the French, against
the British. The Europeans then turned their attention to the rest of the
world, and in a second wave of imperialism in the late nineteenth and ear-
ly twentieth centuries, the major powers began intensely competing for
colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Indeed, although the Euro-
pean powers did not directly engage in all-out war with each other back on
the continent during the Concert of Europe, they nevertheless competed
with each other in colonization outside Europe, and colonial possessions
became part of their calculations of the balance of power among them.
Britain’s industrial and naval capability allowed it to establish the
largest empire and prompted British imperialists of the time to boast that
“the sun never sets on the British empire.” Eventually, other growing
powers would join in and acquire their own imperial possessions, as Japan
did in East Asia, Russia in Central Asia, the United States in the Pacifi c
and Caribbean, and Germany and Italy in the Middle East and Africa.
(For the pattern of colonization, see Map 3.2 on page 62.) The result was
a carving up of the world, and only a few areas, such as Iran, Siam, and
Ethiopia, remained independent. Even in areas that had gained their inde-
pendence from colonial powers, such as Latin America, the larger states
dominated their affairs. In the early part of the twentieth century, the
United States effectively controlled many countries in the Caribbean and
Central America.21
In the areas that were still colonies, imperial powers mined natural
resources such as gold, grew luxury crops including sugar, and acquired
slaves, incorporating these geographic areas into the modern world system.
As a result, Europe became increasingly advanced in economic terms, and
the peripheral areas lagged far behind, becoming more and more dominated
by Europe economically as well as politically.22 The Europeans saw them-
selves as spreading “civilization” throughout the world. If they benefi ted
more from the emergence of the modern world system, this was, from their
viewpoint, only natural, because they had started down the road to eco-
nomic development earlier than other countries, the very regions they were
now “assisting” in the effort to catch up. This process included instances
of brutal exploitation, including the development of the slave trade. Still,
in the view of some, such as British economist Joan Robinson,23 the misery
of being exploited by capitalists was nothing compared to the misery of
not being exploited at all. Incorporation into the Euro-centered interna-
tional economic system created lots of problems, but people who remained
isolated from that system did not live in a pristine paradise either.
In addition to the human and economic consequences of the impe-
rial age, colonization was the means by which the European model of

34 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
international politics based on sovereign states was exported. Moreover,
when the colonies eventually became independent,
non-European states were admitted as members of the [interna-
tional] society . . . provided that they adopted its rules. . . . The
great powers also insisted that all governments should observe
certain European economic standards and commercial prac-
tices, particularly where they affected foreigners. Non-European
candidates were judged not merely by how they conducted their
external relations, but also by how they governed themselves.
Communities that were culturally non-European had to learn
these laws and practices and adjust to them, often at some cost
to their own societies. The insistence on western values . . .
played an important part in the integrating process which estab-
lished the European-dominated global international society.24
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, European politics was becom-
ing global politics.
The Twentieth-Century World Wars
In retrospect, it is easy to see that the beginning of the twentieth century
brought several developments that would be detrimental to the Concert
of Europe. Probably the most important was the increasing power of
three states. To the west, the United States was already superior to Brit-
ain in economic productivity and would soon surpass Britain in military
strength as well. In the east, Japan was proving to be a major power in
wars against China and Russia, making it very diffi cult for Britain to
maintain its customary domination of the seas in that area. In Europe,
Germany began to challenge Britain’s ability to preserve a balance of
power on the European continent.
In addition, while the monarchs did their best to stave off the forces of
nationalism, their efforts ultimately failed. Although none of the confl icts
was great enough to seriously disrupt the system set up at the end of the
Napoleonic era, wars of national liberation became commonplace. The
Greeks fought for liberation from the Turks. The Poles rose up against the
Russians. The Hungarians and the Italians rebelled against the Austrians.
And so it went until Serbian nationalistic aspirations led to the First World
War and thus helped to destroy the European system established a hun-
dred years earlier by the major powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
The Breakdown of the Nineteenth-Century
Alliance System
For some time, the British were unconcerned about the rise of Germany.
Otto von Bismarck, chancellor of the German Empire from 1871 to 1890,

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 35
had long followed a policy of keeping the German navy small, and as
long as Germany maintained that policy, it did not seem threatening. In
fact, at the beginning of the century, the British, because of colonial rival-
ries, tended to regard the French with more suspicion than they did the
Germans. The suspicion was suffi ciently strong that for a while, the
British were inclined to come to an understanding with Germany and
perhaps even to become aligned in some way with the Triple Alliance of
Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.25 But this inclination was wiped
out by a combination of French conciliation and German belligerence.
The French agreed to give the British a free hand in Sudan and Egypt in
return for the British giving the French a free hand in Morocco. Mean-
while, the Germans made it obvious that they intended to build a navy
to challenge Britain’s control of the seas. The result of these develop-
ments was the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France in 1904 and,
with the addition of Russia, Triple Entente. The entente was faced with
the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. With this
development, the very fl uid alliance system that had operated during the
Concert of Europe, with Britain playing the key role as balancer, came
to an end. In its place, Europe became divided into two rigid camps. (See
Map 2.2 for the alliances.)
After a number of international crises over the next decade, war was
ultimately sparked on June 28, 1914, when a Serbian nationalist, apparently
hoping for the liberation of fellow Slavs under Austrian rule, assassinated
Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary. Austri-
an leaders had long been concerned about separatist movements in their
empire, and they were determined to strike back at Serbia, a nation that,
in the Austrian view, sympathized with and supported these movements.
Austria’s determination was heightened when Germany, on July 5, assured
it of support if confl ict with Serbia brought Austria into confl ict with Rus-
sia. Austria delivered an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, to which Serbia
made a very conciliatory reply. Even so, on July 28, Austria declared war
on Serbia. By August 6, 1914, France, Great Britain, and Russia were at war
with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Allies were later joined by Japan,
Italy, and the United States, while Bulgaria and Turkey fought on the side
of the Germans and the Austrians.
The First World War
Before the outbreak of the war, there was great optimism in Europe. After
all, the nineteenth century had brought enormous benefi ts:
There were dramatic advances in material living standards,
health and education, and also in the sciences and the arts. It
was an age of industrial and technical revolution, and of great
strides in man’s mastery of the environment. The middle class
acquired an increasing say in most of the communities of
Triple Alliance The
alliance between
Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy
established in the early
twentieth century.
Triple Entente The
alliance between Britain,
France, and Russia
established in the early
twentieth century.

36 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
Map 2.2 Choosing Sides in the First World War
During the First World War, the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Bulgaria faced the opposition not only of the Triple Entente (Great Britain, France,
and Russia) but also of their several allies, including the United States.
(© Cengage Learning)
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The Twentieth-Century World Wars 37
Europe, with a new industrial working class crowding on its
heels. The whole world seemed to become Europeanized. It
became diffi cult not to believe in progress.26
World War I shattered much of this optimism. The war would leave more
than 15 million dead, and many of those who survived would long remem-
ber the horrors of trench warfare and mustard gas. This result came about
despite the expectation of leaders in 1914 that either war would not occur
or that it would be a short one.27 Four years later, the Europeans looked
around to see the devastating effects such miscalculations could bring.
One of the most important outcomes of the First World War on inter-
national politics was the weakening of Europe. The European states had
been in unquestioned command of the global political system until 1914.
By 1917, one important European state, Russia, was on the verge of drop-
ping out of the war, and the rest were locked in a seemingly endless stale-
mate. It took a non-European state, the United States, which did not join
the war until 1917, to break the deadlock. By then, the Austro-Hungarian
Empire had been destroyed and Germany, Britain, and France severely
damaged.
The Russian Revolution of 1917, in which the Bolshevik Commu-
nist Party (led by Vladimir Lenin) came to power, was in no small part
another effect of the war. It might have occurred in any case, but the war
revealed ineffi ciencies of the Czarist regime and subjected the Russian
people to such hardships that they became less tolerant of the govern-
ment’s inadequacies.28 Alone among the major combatants, the United
States emerged more powerful than it had been at the beginning of the
war. It was, in fact, already the most powerful state in the world according
to many tangible indicators. The First World War signifi cantly enlarged
the role of the United States in the global political system.
Another important impact of the war was in the realm of political
ideas. The war had been fought, according to U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson, to make the world safe for democracy. It had been won, as no one
could fail to notice, by the more democratic states (the United States,
Great Britain, and France), while the nondemocratic states (Germany,
Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia) had fallen to pieces.
The war served to enshrine the intertwined (but not synonymous) values
of democracy and national self-determination—the right of a community
that identifi es itself as a nation to form a state to govern itself. These
twin ideas delegitimized empires. Applying the principle of national self-
determination, Wilson led the effort to break up the Austro-Hungarian
and Ottoman empires, creating new states such as Poland, Turkey, and
Czechoslovakia. In the Middle East, former colonial possessions were
placed under international control and would gain their independence
after World War II.
Finally, any discussion of the effects of the First World War would be
incomplete without emphasizing how it created conditions conducive to
national self-
determination
The principle that
a community that
identifi es itself as a
nation has the right to
form a state to govern
itself.

38 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
the next world war. In addition to the lasting hatreds it created (or rein-
forced), the First World War had several important effects on the inter-
national economic system that shaped the process leading to the Second
World War. The United States emerged, by a considerable margin, as the
most important economic unit in the world, and Great Britain, France,
and Germany became dependent on it. Furthermore, the war (and perhaps
the provisions of the peace treaty) devastated the German economy in a
manner that paved the way for the appearance, and later the success, of
Adolf Hitler.
Postwar Settlements and the Interwar Years
In the months immediately following World War I, U.S. President
Wilson was anxious to move beyond the days of balance-of-power and
sphere-of-infl uence politics, which he saw as dangerous principles that
had led Europe to near total collapse. The major instrument through
which such principles would be replaced was an international organiza-
tion, to be called the League of Nations. As the president of the strongest
victor in the war, Wilson provided the major impetus behind the creation
of such an organization, but there was widespread agreement on the need
for such a body. Many European leaders were of the opinion that the war
came about largely by default, because the forces of negotiation and peace-
ful settlement marshalled against it suddenly collapsed.29 In short, they
believed that the war had occurred, because the leaders had had no time
or place to talk things over when the crisis began. The League of Nations
would provide the opportunity for a cooling-off period and a forum for
negotiations to avoid the next war.
There were also, however, important areas of disagreement about
the League among the victorious powers. One area was the disposition of
Germany’s colonies. Wilson wanted to make these colonies the common
property of the League and have them administered by small nations.
Britain wanted to annex the colonies outright. A compromise was accom-
plished whereby the British dominions obtained the territories they desired
under a loose mandate from the League. This agreement, in effect, was
based on old sphere-of-infl uence ideas, thus revealing Wilson’s idealism to
still be at odds with European conceptions of international relations.
The French were even less idealistically inclined than the British. In
an important sense, France had been the real loser in the war. It had lost
10 percent of its active male population, the highest proportion of any
of the major participants. Also, the largest and most dreadful battles had
been fought on French soil. The additional deliberate German destruction
meant that fully a third of France was devastated. Almost 300,000 homes
had been destroyed and some 3 million acres of land made unfi t for culti-
vation.30 Finally, France’s war debts were staggering.
French leaders were absolutely desperate to assure their people that
they would never have to battle the Germans again. Their major concern

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 39
was that Germany be kept under control, and they were not willing to
rely on Wilson’s ideals without a solid base of concrete force behind them.
France proposed the establishment of an international peace force to keep
the Germans in check and wanted to take all of Germany’s land west of
the Rhine, an area containing some 5 million people, and create one or
two republics that would be under French control. The United States,
however, rejected both of these proposals.
Another, eventually crucial, disagreement between Wilson and Brit-
ain and France concerned the matter of reparations. Before the peace con-
ference, Wilson had promised Germany that it would suffer no punitive
damages. Germany had signed the armistice on condition that the Allies
would ask for payment only for damages to civilians and their property.
But the British and the French wanted to make Germany pay the whole
cost of the war. This intent was understandable: the British and the French
had suffered much more from the war than the Americans had. Realizing
this, and despite his reservations, Wilson agreed to expand the defi nition
of civilian damages, increasing reparations by about 100 percent.
At the eleventh hour on the eleventh day of the eleventh month of
1918, the armistice that ended the First World War went into effect. Three
days earlier, a new German republic, known as the Weimar Republic, was
proclaimed. It could not have been born at a less propitious time. Within a
matter of seven months, the new government was faced with the respon-
sibility of signing the Treaty of Versailles, the treaty to offi cially end the
First World War. The publication of the treaty in Germany in May 1919
caused an outcry throughout the country. Mass meetings were organized,
the provisional president of the republic called the terms “unrealizable
and unbearable,” and the German delegate to Versailles called the treaty
“intolerable for any nation.”31
The treaty took land away from the German people. Seven million
people were no longer living under German sovereignty, and Germany
was virtually disarmed. Article 231 of the treaty held Germany respon-
sible for the war. But the provision of the treaty that had perhaps the most
lasting impact concerned reparations. The exact amount was not stipu-
lated in the treaty, but the Germans were to make a preliminary payment
of $5 billion between 1919 and 1921. That gave some indication of what
was to come. Then in April 1921, the Allies presented Germany with a
total reparations bill of $33 billion. By that time, the German mark had
begun to fall in value. It was normally valued at 4 to the U.S. dollar, but
by the end of 1921 it had fallen to a value of 75 to the dollar. That was
the beginning of the most spectacular infl ationary spiral in the history
of the industrialized Western world. In 1922, the value of the German
mark fell to 400 to the U.S. dollar, and by the beginning of 1923, it took
7,000 marks to buy a dollar’s worth of goods. When the French occupied
the Ruhr Valley, the value of the mark dropped to 18,000 to the dollar. By
July, it was 160,000 to the dollar; by August, 1 million to the dollar; by
November, 4 billion. From then on, the value of the mark compared to
Treaty of Versailles
Agreement, signed in
1919, that offi cially
ended the First World
War and established the
terms for Germany’s
punishment.

40 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
the dollar had to be calculated in the trillions. It took a wheelbarrow full
of money to buy a loaf of bread, assuming either was to be found.
This was the scene in Germany as Adolf Hitler made his fi rst marked
impression on the body politic, when he staged a ludicrously premature
attempt to begin his ascent to power in Germany. He was arrested, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to fi ve years in prison on April 1, 1924.32 Undis-
couraged, he spent his time in prison dictating a book, Mein Kampf, that
described in some detail his plans for the establishment of a thousand-
year Reich, or empire, in Germany.
In time, Germany recovered from its economic problems, due in
large part to a fl ow of U.S. capital used to pay reparations and renew
Germany’s productive capacities. Unemployment dropped, wages rose,
and neither Hitler nor his Nazi Party was prominent. But the importance
of the U.S. economy to German prosperity
was soon to become forcefully apparent.
In fact, Great Britain and France as well as
Germany had become heavily dependent
on the United States economically. In
the 1920s, U.S. investors and Wall Street
banks poured money into Germany,
which used much of it to pay reparations
to Great Britain and France, which in turn
used that money to pay their First World
War debts to the United States.
Then the stock market crash of 1929
happened, and the supply of money in the
circular fl ow from Wall Street and other
sources in the United States suddenly
stopped. The Germans could no longer
pay their reparations, which meant that
Great Britain and France could not pay
their war debts. The only possible alter-
natives for the Germans, the British, and
the French were to default on their debts
or increase their exports to the United
States in order to accumulate dollars to
pay the debts. President Herbert Hoover
and the Congress moved to eliminate the
second possibility (and to ensure the fi rst)
by putting the Smoot-Hawley Act into
effect in June 1930, raising U.S. tariff rates
to their highest point in history. “Over a
thousand economists had pleaded with
the president not to sign the bill, pointing
out that higher rates would hamper for-
eign exports, block collection of the war
In the early 1920s, infl ation in Germany was so severe that
people, such as this German woman, used their paper
money for fuel in their stoves and fi replaces.
(© Bettmann/Corbis)

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 41
debts, invite foreign retaliation, and embitter foreign relations. The pre-
dictions proved true.”33 At least as important as the domestic impact was
the international effect of the increased tariffs. “The atrocious Smoot-
Hawley tariff of 1930 . . . more than any other act of policy, spread the
Depression to Europe.”34
The effect of the Great Depression on German electoral politics was
immediate and dramatic. In 1928, before the crash, the Nazis had received
810,000 votes and elected twelve of their members to the Reichstag, the
German parliament. In the September 1930 elections, after millions of
people had been thrown out of work and thousands of small businesses
had failed, Hitler’s party won almost 6.5 million votes and 107 seats in
the Reichstag, thus becoming the second-largest party in the legislature.
The Communist Party in Germany also gained as a result of the Depres-
sion. Although its gains were not as spectacular (from 3.2 million votes
in 1928 to 4.6 million in 1930), its rise undoubtedly smoothed the way
for Hitler’s rise to power. By 1932, the Nazi Party was the largest politi-
cal party in the country. In January 1933, Hitler was named chancellor.
On March 27, 1933, the German legislature passed what was called the
Enabling Act, which served as the formal basis for the establishment of
Hitler’s dictatorship. He never received a majority of the votes, but a sin-
gle party rarely does in a multiparty system of the type Germany had at
the time. The Nazis used terror and intimidation; there can be no quarrel
about that, but they also attracted millions of uncoerced voters.
The economic policies of Hitler, based on large-scale borrowing for
public expenditures that were principally civilian in the early years,
worked well and quickly. “The result,” as one well-known economist
has pointed out, “was a far more effective attack on unemployment than
in any other industrial country. By 1935, German unemployment was
minimal.”35 So Hitler came to power in part because many Germans
hoped (correctly, as it turned out) that he could help them with their eco-
nomic problems. He also appealed to Germans of all classes because of
his denunciation of the Versailles treaty, his condemnation of Jews, and
because he was an alternative to the Communists.
Challenges to the Status Quo
Scholars of international politics view the 1930s as notable for the
successful challenges to the international status quo mounted by Japan,
Italy, and Germany. Let us take a look at the assertive policies that each
of these dissatisfi ed major powers adopted.
The fi rst challenge to the status quo was made by Japan when it
invaded Manchuria in 1931. Japan was a rapidly growing power in the
decades before 1931, taking advantage of the First World War to acquire
several German colonial outposts and to extend its economic and politi-
cal privileges in China. Perhaps even more important, Japan dramatically
increased exports to the Asian markets that were cut off from their
Great Depression A
consequence of the 1929
stock market crash. The
U.S. economic depression
spread to other areas of
the world, especially
postwar Europe.

42 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
traditional European suppliers by the war. By the end of the war, Japanese
strength had become so apparent that it was accorded great power status
at the Paris Peace Conference.
Overall, the early 1920s were good years for Japan economically and
politically. But in 1927, Japan began to have domestic economic problems
that were soon exacerbated by the onset of the Depression. The reaction
of all the industrialized states to the Depression was to erect high tariff
walls to protect jobs. Japan, particularly dependent on international trade,
was hit hard. At a time when Japan was feeling the pressure of the high
tariff barriers around the world, China began an effort to counter Russian
and Japanese infl uence in Manchuria, which China considered its terri-
tory. Japanese interests were quite extensive; Manchuria accounted for
some 40 percent of Japan’s foreign trade and investment at the time.36 In
reaction to the increased fl ow of Chinese people into the area, as well as
anti-Japanese propaganda and incidents, the Japanese army took matters
into its own hands. In 1931, manufacturing an incident involving the
dynamiting of a Japanese-controlled railroad track, the army moved to
clear Manchuria of Chinese troops and establish complete control.
The League of Nations urged China and Japan to restore normal rela-
tions, and took great pains to avoid taking sides on the issue. Eventually,
almost a year and a half after the Japanese invasion, the League called for
an autonomous Manchuria under the control of China, as well as safe-
guards for Japanese interests there. When the report was adopted, the
Japanese delegation walked out and announced that Japan was resign-
ing from the League. The incident set an unfortunate precedent for the
League, and the United States did not help the situation. Speeches were
made and warnings given, but it was obvious to the Japanese, especially
because the United States had never joined the League, that American
resistance to Japan’s actions would go no further. Obviously, words alone
did not convince the Japanese to withdraw from Manchuria.
The next challenge to the League of Nations came from Italy. In 1922,
Benito Mussolini came to power. He benefi ted almost immediately from
the general worldwide economic advance, and by 1929, he could claim
that he had put an end to infl ation and reduced unemployment. How-
ever, Italy, like Japan, suffered during the Great Depression. The under-
lying immobility and rigidity of the Italian economy under fascism was
to prove a matter of fi rst-rate importance for the rest of the world. The
international depression deprived fascism of its only real claim to mate-
rial success, and Mussolini’s regime was politically weak.37
In 1935, Mussolini attacked Ethiopia, and the League of Nations
responded initially with surprising forcefulness. Italy was offi cially branded
the aggressor, and the League voted to institute an embargo of arms, ammu-
nition, and implements of war against Italy. But this embargo was never
effectively enforced, partly because the United States refused to cooperate
with the League. Britain and France, the most important states within the
League, were apparently motivated by the fear that strong action against

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 43
Italy might drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler. They still hoped at
this point that Italy might be an ally against Germany if the need arose.
So Britain allowed all the Italian military forces and equipment to pass
unchallenged through the Suez Canal. By June 1936, Mussolini proclaimed
Ethiopia an Italian province. In December 1937, Italy followed Japan in
resigning from the League of Nations, and Mussolini continued his aggres-
sive policies by annexing Albania in the spring of 1939.
If Mussolini killed the League in Ethiopia, Hitler buried it, along with
the Versailles peace treaty. First, he violated the disarmament provisions
of the Versailles treaty. Then, in March 1936, he occupied the Rhineland,
which according to the peace settlement, was supposed to be a demili-
tarized zone. At this early stage, Germany’s military strength was quite
modest, and it is clear that Hitler would have had to back down in the
face of any substantial resistance. But he met virtually no resistance at
all. The German troops simply marched in behind blaring bands; there
was no battle order whatsoever.38
In 1938, Hitler offi cially incorporated Austria into the Third Reich.
Later that year, he began to demand a solution to the problem involving
the people of German ethnic background who lived in a part of Czecho-
slovakia known as the Sudetenland. At a meeting in southern Germany in
September, the British and the French gave in to Hitler’s demands, under
threat of military action. In the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was
forced to cede to Germany 11,000 square miles of territory containing
all the fortifi cations in the Czech defense line. The loss of territory left
the country helpless. By April 1939, Hitler had absorbed the rest of the
Czechoslovakian state into his empire. Yet Hitler was still not satisfi ed.
There was one more territorial change that he considered necessary. On
September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland in an effort to bring about
that change. Britain and France responded this time, having pledged to
protect Poland from the same fate as Czechoslovakia. The Second World
War was under way. The Policy Choices box summarizes the debate over
how to respond to Hitler’s demands in 1938.
The Second World War
The Second World War was the most lethal international confl ict in
the history of the world, and it set the stage for international politics
for the rest of the twentieth century. One of the crucial turning points
in the process that led to the war involved a contest between Germany
and the Western democracies of Britain and France for an alliance with
the Soviet Union.
From the beginning, the Western powers seemed to have a better
chance than the Germans of obtaining the Soviets’ signature on a treaty.
Ideologically, the British and French democracies were hardly compatible
with the Soviet Union, but neither were they as unremittingly hostile
as Nazi Germany. And the Soviet Union had an old score to settle with
Munich Agreement
Negotiated settlement
in 1938 in which Great
Britain and France agreed
to force Czechoslovakia
to cede the ethnically
German Sudetenland to
Hitler’s Germany.

44
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should Britain Have Appeased Hitler?
ISSUE: What would you have done, if you were in British Prime Minister
Chamberlain’s position in 1938, with Hitler making demands about bringing
ethnic Germans together into the greater German state? Germany claimed that
German ethnic minorities were being abused and repressed in the Sudetenland
of Czechoslovakia, thus giving an air of legitimacy to his demands. In hindsight,
it is easy to see that Hitler was actually bent on dominating all of Europe, and
Chamberlain has forever been saddled with the negative term “appeasement.”
Appeasement has come to mean the failed policy of giving in to the demands of
those who will stop at nothing. But at the time, the situation was complex, infor-
mation was often scarce and unreliable, and the prospect of facing another major
confl ict in Europe less than twenty years after “The Great War” (World War I) was
far from appealing. Did Chamberlain show weakness, only to encourage further
demands from Hitler, or were his actions a reasonable choice given the reality of
the time?
Option #1: Britain should have stood fi rm against increasing German demands.
Arguments: (a) Hitler had written Mein Kampf by the mid-1920s, revealing the
magnitude of his racism and the scope of his malevolent ambitions. This should
have revealed his deeper intentions. Against such an actor, stiff resolve rather than
negotiation is required. (b) Regardless of Hitler’s intentions, Britain could clearly
see a rising power emerging in Germany. In order to remain strong, Britain should
have balanced against that power no matter what the specifi c motivations of
Germany or its leaders. (c) Britain was in a position of leadership in the interna-
tional system. Its sacrifi ce of parts of Czechoslovakia to Germany only weakened
the resolve of other powers at the time.
Counterarguments: (a) Governments are extremely complex. One could not pre-
dict that Hitler’s attitudes would determine the overall course of events, anymore
than knowing President G. W. Bush’s attitudes could have predicted the 2003 war
in Iraq. (b) Britain was in no military position to confront Germany; agreeing to
German demands on Czechoslovakia bought time for Britain and France to better
prepare militarily. (c) Great Britain could not have prevented the events of World
War II alone, and the other major powers—such as the U.S. and Russia—could not
or would not have supported a British confrontation of the Nazi regime in 1938.
Option #2: Britain should have tried to secure a peaceful resolution, at virtually
any cost.
Arguments: (a) War is an extremely bloody and horrible thing—killing soldiers
and civilians alike. Statesmen should take extraordinary steps to prevent something
so catastrophic, even if it means giving in on important demands. (b) Hindsight
is 20/20. The magnitude of the eventual outcome should not blind us about the
quality of the decisions that Britain made at the time. People and governments
should not be so easily judged by those who already know the outcomes.
(c) Czechoslovakia was not the fi rst, nor will it likely be the last, country to be
sacrifi ced to satisfy the interests of greater powers. Such sacrifi ces have at times
prevented an even larger war from occurring.
(continued)

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 45
the Germans. The terms of the treaty refl ected Lenin’s desperation to
get out of the war. When the Soviets dropped out of the First World War,
their departure was formalized by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which they
signed with the Germans. Russia gave up 32 percent of its population, or
56 million people. The territory Russia lost contained 73 percent of its
iron ore, 89 percent of its coal, and 33 percent of its railway mileage. In
addition, Russia agreed to pay Germany an indemnity of 6 billion marks.
Thus, in the 1930s, the Soviets felt that some revision of boundaries and
Counterarguments: (a) “Peace at any price” means the strong can do what they
want and the weak will suffer what they must. War is horrible, but peace without
adequate protections of the powerless is not a better option. “Peace” should not
have meant selling out the Czechoslovakian government. (b) The eventual war
should have been predictable, given the information that was available at the time.
Weariness of warfare, lack of military preparedness, and insuffi cient allies drove
Britain’s decision making, simply delaying the inevitable confl ict. (c) Winston
Churchill, who would follow Chamberlain as Prime Minister of Great Britain, clearly
saw the shortcomings of appeasing Hitler, stating that “. . . a disaster of the fi rst mag-
nitude has befallen Great Britain. . . .” Even if Hitler’s intentions were not fully clear,
prominent politicians, such as Churchill, saw the Munich agreement as a sham.
Germany’s Hitler (here represented
by German Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop, far left) and the Soviet
Union’s Stalin (middle) signed a
nonagression pact in 1939. Also
present was the Soviet Commissar
for Foreign Affairs Molotov
(far right).
(AP Photo/AP Images)

46 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
spheres of infl uence was desirable. Hitler did not seem likely to allow
such revisions; perhaps with the help of the Western powers, the Soviets
could bring them about.
Despite the advantages the British and the French had, the Germans
won the contest. In August 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, in which the
Soviet Union and Germany agreed to divide up Poland, was announced.
What brought the two dictatorships together? In retrospect, Hitler’s
motives were quite obvious. Given his actions during the war, one may
surmise that he never gave up his idea of acquiring lebensraum (living
space) in the east. And he knew that his planned attack on Poland might
involve him in a war with Britain and France, especially if the two could
count on a Soviet ally. Once the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, Hitler did
not have to worry that his attack on Poland would lead him into a two-
front war, and he could hope that without a Soviet ally, Britain and France
would refrain from serious opposition to his Polish venture. Even as he
signed the pact with the Soviets, Hitler almost certainly knew that he
would someday violate it.
The motives of Joseph Stalin, who rose to power after Lenin’s death
in 1924, are not quite as easily discerned as Hitler’s. It is clear that Stalin
was reluctant to sign a pact with the Western powers, because he doubted
their willingness to abide by it in the event of a German attack on the
Soviet Union. He suspected that both Britain and France might be happy
to see the Nazis and the Communists engage in prolonged bloodletting.
Furthermore, France and Britain were unable to get Poland to agree to
allow Soviet troops onto Polish soil if Germany attacked Poland. This
heightened Stalin’s suspicions that the pact proposed by the West was
a ruse designed to bring about war between Germany and the Soviet
Union. Finally, Stalin, like Hitler, was worried about a two-front war.
Germany’s ally, Japan, was much on Stalin’s mind as he signed the pact
with Hitler.
If Stalin’s plan was to stay out of world war, it seemed to work for a
while. By agreement, both the Germans and the Soviets moved against
Poland, which ceased to exist as an independent entity. According to their
treaties with Poland, the British and the French declared war on Germany.
Hitler’s initial successes in the ensuing months were spectacular. It took
him a little over two weeks to defeat Poland. Denmark, Norway, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and, most surprising, France fell in quick succession.
After one year of fi ghting, Hitler seemed invincible and well on his way
to adding Great Britain to his list of victims. But Great Britain’s resistance
proved more substantial than Hitler had planned and may have infl uenced
him to make the decision that ultimately led to disaster: He decided to
attack the Soviet Union.
To some extent, the decision was a strategic gamble on Hitler’s part.
His idea was that once he had defeated the Soviet Union, he could turn
the full force of his military might against the British, fi nally accomplish-
ing the victory that so far had eluded him. At bottom, however, Hitler’s
Nazi-Soviet Pact An
August 1939 agreement
between Germany and
the Soviet Union in
which both countries
agreed to remain neutral
toward each other, to
divide up Poland, and to
allow Soviet annexation
of the Baltic states.

The Twentieth-Century World Wars 47
decision to forsake his attack against the British seems to have been an
ideological one. Fifteen years earlier in Mein Kampf he had written:
And so we National Socialists take up where we broke off six
hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement
toward the south and west of Europe and turn our gaze toward
the lands of the East. . . . When we speak of new territory in
Europe today we must think principally of Russia and her border
vassal states. Destiny itself seems to wish to point out the way
to us here. . . . This colossal empire in the East is ripe for disso-
lution, and the end of Jewish domination in Russia will also be
the end of Russia as a state.39
Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, like Napoleon’s on Russia
in 1812, was a disaster. The Soviets managed to hold off the German
onslaught until the harsh Russian winter became an ally of sorts to the
Russian army, disrupting Germany’s lines of supply and subjecting Ger-
man troops to freezing temperatures and weather conditions with which
they were not equipped to deal. That alone might have been enough, in
the long run, to be Hitler’s undoing. But just about the time the German
troops began to have trouble in the Soviet Union, one of Germany’s allies
took the step that ensured the premature dissolution of Hitler’s so-called
1,000-Year Reich.
The Germans did not have previous knowledge of Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbor, nor did they approve of it. Rather, they had hoped that Japan
would be menacing enough to keep the United States out of the Euro-
pean war. They did give assurances to the Japanese government that if it
became involved in a war with the United States, it would have the sup-
port of Germany. But these assurances were apparently calculated only to
encourage the Japanese to assume a menacing posture toward the United
States, not actually to attack it.
Japan’s motives were largely economic. Japan needed a new source of
oil, especially after the United States put an embargo on U.S. oil exports
to Japan in August 1941. The most convenient alternative source for the
Japanese was the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), but to capture these
oil fi elds, the Japanese fl eet would fi rst have to neutralize the Philippines,
at that time a U.S. colony. The Japanese idea was to deliver a punishing
blow to the United States at Pearl Harbor, then resist the U.S. counterat-
tack so vigorously and persistently that the United States would tire of
the struggle and allow the Japanese to keep the gains in China, Southeast
Asia, and Indonesia that they felt were necessary to sustain their econ-
omy. From the Japanese point of view, the United States had expressed
unreasonable opposition for years to their economic and political expan-
sion in East Asia.
The Japanese plan did not work. The productive and military power
of the United States eventually overwhelmed Japan, especially when the
Americans added nuclear weapons to their arsenal. Similarly, the Germans,
Pearl Harbor A 1941
Japanese attack that
surprised and severely
damaged U.S. naval
forces, leading to the U.S.
entry into World War II.

48 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
having already suffered a grievous blow in the Soviet Union, found them-
selves totally unable to withstand the combined weight of the Russians
from the East and the Americans from the West. By the end of 1945, both
Japan and Germany were occupied countries. (Italy had fallen in 1943.)
The Impact of the Second World War
Aside from the total defeat of the three challengers to the international
status quo, probably the most important impact of the Second World
War on the global political system was the subsequent emergence of two
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. When Germany
attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, there was a widespread expectation
that Soviet resistance would be short-lived. When these expectations
were proved wrong, and the Soviets defeated the Germans, their true
strength came to the light.
The emergence of a bipolar world in which two states had the pre-
ponderance of power was especially dramatic in comparison with the
fate of Europe. The fall of Europe had begun in the First World War, but
this fact was at least partially hidden by the withdrawal of the United
States into isolationism and the revolution in the Soviet Union. After the
Second World War, the only European state with credible pretensions to
great power status was Great Britain. But within two or three years of the
war, Great Britain’s pretensions were shown to be unwarranted. It was
no longer able to fulfi ll its previous global ambitions and responsibilities:
By 1947, India had gained its independence, to be followed by Ceylon
(now Sri Lanka) and Burma (now Myanmar), and British withdrawal from
Greece and Palestine. Europe, the center of world political power for at
least 300 years, gave way to a more global competition for power.
Theoretical Perspectives on the History of Global Politics
Each of the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 1—realism, liberalism, idealism, neo-Marxism, constructivism, and feminist
perspectives—looks at the history of international relations through a
different lens and hence focuses on different time periods and the mean-
ing and importance of historical events to our current understanding of
global politics. Moreover, each perspective employs history as evidence
to support its arguments.
Realism, for example, uses the history of relations among the Greek
city-states as portrayed in Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War
to show that the pursuit of power is a constant feature of international
relations. The Peace of Westphalia and the development of sovereign
states is the time period that is most important for realism, as the anarchi-
cal system it established is what leads states to follow their interests by
maximizing their power. Because of the modern state system that devel-
oped at this time, the great powers of the eighteenth century engaged
superpowers After the
Second World War, the
two dominant countries
in the global political
system: the United States
and the Soviet Union.
bipolar When most
power in the international
system is divided between
two states.

Theoretical Perspectives on the History of Global Politics 49
in balance-of-power politics. This balancing continued in the nineteenth
century, and realists point to the relative peace that was maintained dur-
ing the Concert of Europe in their argument that balance-of-power poli-
tics is not only natural but can produce stability. The age of imperialism
is also important for realism, because it extended the European system of
sovereign states to the rest of the globe. In the early twentieth century,
realists point to the failed experiment with the League of Nations in the
interwar years as evidence against idealist notions that value-based insti-
tutions can constrain states from pursing their interests. Finally, realism
sees the rise of the Cold War following World War II and the astounding
shifts in the balance of power as furthering the argument that power and
the balance of power are the critical concepts for understanding interna-
tional relations.
Although liberalism argues that the most important developments in
international history occurred in the second half of the twentieth century
(the subject of the next chapter), there are some parts of earlier times that
are relevant to the liberal perspective. The French and American revolu-
tions, for example, championed the idea of political democracy, which,
for liberalism, is important in that it allows substate actors to constrain
states from engaging in confl ict and push states into entering cooperative
agreements. The growth of world trade under the British gold standard
and the age of imperialism is also important for liberalism as it laid the
seeds for economic interdependence that would mature in the twentieth
century. Finally, liberals often point to the history of the 1930s as evi-
dence that economic confl ict, in the form of tariffs and other trade barri-
ers, can create the conditions, such as the rise of Hitler in Germany, that
lead states to war.
The democratic ideals that spawned the French and American revolu-
tions in the eighteenth century are also important to idealism. The politi-
cal and social rights articulated in the constitutions and other writings
of that period are the historical origins of modern conceptions of human
rights. The heyday of the idealist perspective came later, between the wars
of the early twentieth century. Blaming balance-of-power politics and the
Concert of Europe alliance system for the horrors of World War I, ideal-
ists, including Woodrow Wilson, called on states to pursue values such
as democratization and national self-determination. Even though realists
would blame idealist thinking for World War II, idealists use World War II
as a historical example of the need for values to guide states’ behavior.
Using only interest-based calculations, modern idealists argue, might
lead states to ignore the genocidal acts of leaders like Hitler.
The history of international relations is most important for the neo-
Marxist perspective, which is more consciously historical in its view of
global politics. This perspective argues that it is impossible to understand
the nature of the current world economic system without an account
of the historical development of the global capitalist system, beginning
in the age of imperialism. According to advocates of this approach, this

50 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
integration into the global economic system dominated by Europe was
disastrous for the long-run future of the peripheral areas outside Europe.
They became trapped in a role in the international division of labor that
was fraught with diffi culties. Thus, according to this perspective, the his-
torical events of the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries created the
economic and political dependency that continues today in the former
colonies.
Constructivism and feminism are not as connected as the other theo-
retical perspectives to the history of global politics. They do, however,
offer alternative interpretations of historical events and developments.
Because constructivism is focused on society, important historical turning
points involve dramatic changes in the nature of international society. As
different actors communicate with one another, they begin to develop dif-
ferent ideas and discourses that construct the nature of international rela-
tions. The relative isolation of the Greek city-states, for example, provides
for a very different social context than does the relative interdependence
associated with the modern era. As each international society constructs
both actors and interests, international relations will depend on the exact
nature of that society. Indeed, constructivists might argue that historical
changes in international relations have really been less about the distri-
bution of power than the distribution of ideas. Take, for example, the idea
of a “state.” Clearly, territory, armies, wealth, and resources existed prior
to the Treaty of Westphalia and the formal development of things called
“states.” Yet the creation, modifi cation, and reinforcement of the concept
of states through time by the society of international actors dramatically
changed the course of international relations. States were constructed,
and international relations were transformed.
The feminist perspective analyzes any given historical event and
development by asking two questions: What role did women play that tra-
ditional historians have ignored, and what effect did this have on women?
The rise of the modern state and capitalism, for example, had powerful
effects on how gender was conceived and on gender relations:
In the transition from feudalism to early states, smaller house-
hold/domestic production predominated and . . . “production
and family life” for most people were inseparably entwined. . . .
In this context of social production within patriarchal house-
holds, wives were subordinated but hardly “dependent”; their
work was essential to the survival of the unit and to that extent
respected. Gradually, the industrialization process removed
labor and resources from the household, and the site of “pro-
duction” shifted to the factory. The structural and ideological
separation of “family,” “economy,” and “politics” was clearly
a gender differentiated process with far-reaching consequences
including devaluing “women’s work” and shaping gender con-
ceptions to associate women with “homemaker” and men with
“worker.”40

Summary 51
In this way, the rise of the modern state and modern economic relations
would affect the way women would be allowed to participate in global
politics and how global politics would be understood.
SUMMARY
● In ancient times, international relations operated very differently. For
much of the world’s history, empires dominated relations between vari-
ous actors. Within empires, there was an overarching authority: the im-
perial center. Between empires, there was little notion of independence
and noninterference. A notable exception occurred in ancient Greece,
where city-states related to each other in much the same way that sov-
ereign states relate to each other today.
● The modern state and the modern international system emerged after
the Thirty Years’ War with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. With this
agreement, the overarching authority of the pope in Christendom was
replaced by the notion of sovereign states, and in the eighteenth cen-
tury, European states operated on the balance-of-power principle.
● States came to dominate the international system in a process marked
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by religious divisions and
the evolution of long-distance economic transactions, as well as related
technological developments that provided central governments with
greater power. The French Revolution introduced nationalistically in-
spired armies to international politics.
● Nineteenth-century European relations were relatively stable. The pe-
riod known as the Concert of Europe was absent of total war between
the major states, partly due to Britain’s rise as the most powerful state
and its policy of playing the balancer between other states.
● From the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries, the major Euro-
pean states and eventually other powers colonized and in other ways
dominated much of the rest of the world, making the capitalist eco-
nomic system as well as the system of sovereign states global.
● The foundation for the modern international system was laid in the
First World War, which arose out of a confrontation between Germany
and Austria-Hungary, on the one hand, and Russia, France, and Great
Britain, on the other. The war served to enshrine democracy and na-
tional self-determination as values in international politics. It weak-
ened the major powers of Europe.
● In the interwar period, France was intent on crippling Germany so that
it could never rise again. This effort failed, partly because terrible infl a-
tion at the beginning of the 1920s, coupled with the Great Depression
in the late 1920s and early 1930s, helped create conditions favorable to
Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Italy and Japan joined Hitler’s Germany

52 Chapter 2 The Historical Setting
in an assault on the international status quo in the late 1930s. This
assault was halted only by the Second World War, which weakened
Europe further and led to the emergence of the United States and the
Soviet Union as twin superpowers.
● Each of the major political perspectives uses different parts of the his-
tory of international relations to advance their claims about global poli-
tics. Realism concentrates on the development of the sovereign state
and the anarchical international system. Realism also points to the
balance-of-power principle that seemed to operate among the ancient
Greek city-states and the major powers in eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Europe. Liberalism focuses on the historical origins of democ-
racy and economic interdependence, and idealism on the failure of the
balance-of-power system and the recognized importance of international
institutions designed to further the value of peace. Neo-Marxism
focuses on the development of the international capitalist system and
its division of labor with a core and a periphery; constructivism, on
important historical turning points involving dramatic changes in the
nature of international society; and feminism, on the effects of the
development of the modern political and economic structures for
women and conceptions of gender.
KEY TERMS Greek city-states 25
empires 25
Peace of Westphalia 28
balance of power 30
nationalism 31
Congress of Vienna 31
Concert of Europe 31
Triple Alliance 35
Triple Entente 35
national self-determination 37
Treaty of Versailles 39
Great Depression 41
Munich Agreement 43
Nazi-Soviet Pact 46
Pearl Harbor 47
superpowers 48
bipolar 48

53
C H A P T E R 3
The Modern Era
The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War
• Confl ict over Eastern Europe
• The British Retreat and the U.S. Policy of Containment
• The Cold War in Asia
Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context
• Vietnam
• The Arab-Israeli Confl ict
• Other Superpower Involvement in the Third World
Changes in East-West Competition
• Two Cuban Crises
• Détente
• The Rebirth of the Cold War
Changes in the International Economy and the Rise
of Interdependence
The End of the Cold War
The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty
• Ethno-Religious Confl ict and Failed States
• Security Threats
• Globalization
Theoretical Perspectives on Global Politics in the Modern Era
Summary
Key Terms

54 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
International relations in the second half of the twentieth century serves as the immediate backdrop to contemporary global politics, charac-
terized by ethnic and religious confl icts, nuclear proliferation, terrorist
threats, and globalization. Understanding the Cold War, decolonization,
and changes in the international economy of this period is critical for
understanding today’s and tomorrow’s global landscape. Contemporary
history is also illustrative of alternative theoretical perspectives because
these focus on different aspects of the modern era and offer contrasting
interpretations of its historical development.
The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War
The post-World War II period began with high hopes. Leaders from around the world convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in
1944 to design international economic organizations that they hoped
would rebuild the war-torn economies and avoid another economic
depression like the one experienced in the 1930s. The International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank were two of the organizations that came
out of this initiative. The leaders of fi fty-one states also convened in San
Francisco in 1945 to create the United Nations. The primary purpose of
the United Nations was to help states resolve confl icts of interest peace-
fully and avoid war. With these new initiatives, there seemed to be great
promise that a new global order could be established. In fact, a new order
would emerge over the next few years, but it was one that was largely
unexpected and unwelcomed. Perhaps it was inevitable that at the climax
of a gigantic struggle such as the Second World War, the settlements and
agreements arrived at by the victorious coalition would shape the pri-
mary confl icts in the years to follow. No matter what these settlements
contained, some of the parties would be dissatisfi ed, and their dissatisfac-
tion would form the basis of future confl icts.
Confl ict over Eastern Europe
Perhaps the most heated and important confl ict in the months imme-
diately following the war involved Poland and the rest of the Eastern
European countries. (Map 3.1 shows how the continent was divided after
World War II.) Great Britain, after all, had resorted to war in the fi rst place
to ensure the existence of an independent Poland. After the United States
entered the war, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt was anxious to pro-
tect the interests of the Poles at least partly because of his desire to avoid
alienating an important voting bloc in the United States. So both coun-
tries began to press the Soviets about the future of Poland well before the
Soviets had established their presence in that country. Confl ict centered
fi rst on which government in exile would be recognized as the offi cial rep-
resentative of Poland. The British and the Americans favored one group
in London, and the Soviets set up another more to their liking.

The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War 55
Map 3.1 Squabbling over Eastern Europe After the Second World War
The roots of the Cold War developed as the Soviets moved into the power vacuum left
in Eastern Europe when the Germans retreated at the end of the war.
(© Cengage Learning)
Is
ta
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German territory to Poland
Acquired by Soviet Union,
1939–1945
Soviet satellites
Communist, nonsatellite
nation
“Iron Curtain” after 1950
0 400 Mi.
0 400 Km.200
200
Oslo
Stockholm
Warsaw
Rome
Vienna
Prague
Tirane
Bucharest
Sofia
Athens
Belgrade
Copenhagen
Hamburg
Bonn
Munich
Budapest
Berlin
Gdansk
(Danzig)
Helsinki
Moscow
Leningrad
Ankara
Kiev
ITALY
EAST
GERMANY
AUSTRIA
POLAND
ROMANIA
HUNGARY
CRIMEA
BULGARIA
TURKEY
NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
GREECE
ALBANIA
WHITE
RUSSIA
UKRAINE
S O V I E T U N I O N
DENMARK
NETHERLANDS
SWITZERLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
YUGOSLAVIA
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Dnieper R.
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Po R.
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lbe R.
Vistula R.
Sardinia
Corsica
Sicily

56 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
The Soviets had several reasons to be suspicious of the Poles in
London. In the years following the First World War, when the Soviets
were weak and unable to resist, Poland had taken territory the Soviets
considered their own. Mutual suspicions between the Poles in London
and the Soviets were solidifi ed by a controversy surrounding the discov-
ery in 1943 by German soldiers of a mass grave for Polish army offi cers
in the Katyn Forest in Russia. The Nazis accused the Soviets of these
mass executions, while the Soviets blamed the Nazis. (The Soviets, under
Mikhail Gorbachev’s infl uence admitted that Stalin probably ordered the
massacre.) The Polish government in exile in London believed the Nazi
charges against the Soviets. If there had ever been any chance of compro-
mise between the Poles in London and the Soviets (and it is not clear that
there was), this incident certainly undermined it.
The future of Poland and other Eastern European states was one
of many topics discussed at a 1945 meeting of Roosevelt, Stalin, and
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Yalta Conference in the
Russian Crimea. One result of this discussion was that Stalin was persuad-
ed to endorse the Declaration on Liberated Countries, which promised
free elections and other democratic practices and liberties in Eastern Euro-
pean countries where the Red Army had been victorious over the Nazis.1
Roosevelt’s acceptance of this promise was to provoke controversy in the
years following the war, because Stalin, from the U.S. point of view, did
not keep his promise. Elections were not held in Poland until 1947, and
even then they were not what the Western powers considered the free and
unfettered elections that had been promised in the Yalta declaration. The
outcome in Poland would soon be seen in the rest of Eastern Europe, as
the Soviet Union began to dominate the governments of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and East Germany.
Critics of Roosevelt charged that the U.S. president must have
been incredibly naive to accept Soviet promises with regard to Eastern
Europe after the Second World War and that his acceptance paved the
way for a Communist takeover in these countries. In support of such
critics, it must be said that there is good evidence that Roosevelt was
more optimistic during the war about the prospects for U.S.-Soviet post-
war cooperation than subsequent events proved was warranted. But it
is important not to overlook the basic, if obvious, fact that at the time
Roosevelt accepted Stalin’s pledge concerning free elections in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet Union had troops there, and the United States did
not. A refusal by Roosevelt to accept Stalin’s word on the matter might
have put a serious strain on a coalition that was never entirely solid.
Roosevelt was particularly concerned that the Soviets join the United
States in the upcoming assault on Japan, which, in the days before an
atomic bomb had been successfully exploded, was expected to be very
diffi cult. In retrospect, of course, we know that the United States did
not need help against Japan. But Roosevelt did not have the benefi t of
this hindsight.
Yalta Conference
1945 meeting of
Roosevelt, Stalin, and
Churchill to discuss the
future of Eastern Europe.

The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War 57
In any case, the Soviet satellization of Eastern Europe was an impor-
tant step toward the Cold War with the United States. But the view that
the Cold War was a result of aggressive Soviet actions in Eastern Europe
and elsewhere is hotly disputed. Several U.S. writers, for example, argue
that Soviet policies in Eastern Europe were essentially defensive and that
it was U.S. hostility toward the Soviets that was primarily responsible
for the onset of the Cold War.2 This controversy essentially turns on the
question of which country took the actions that precipitated the Cold
War confl ict. Defenders of the United States point to Bolshevik propa-
ganda against the Western nations from the earliest days of the Russian
Revolution, the Soviet Union’s control of Eastern Europe (including the
Soviet-engineered coup against the democratically elected government
in Czechoslovakia in 1948), its refusal to remove its troops from Iran
in 1946, its pressure on Turkey for access to ports, and its blockade of
the western sectors of Berlin in 1948 as evidence of Soviet hostility.
Defenders of the Soviet Union, in contrast, point to the invasion of the
Soviet Union by several Western states (including the United States)
in an attempt to dismantle the revolutionary government in the years
when it was struggling to survive, the U.S. delay in opening the western
front against German forces, the U.S. preference for a strong, unifi ed
Germany (which the Soviets, as well as the French, saw as a threat),
and the establishment in 1949 of the fi rst postwar military alliance in
Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as evidence of
American hostility.
It is diffi cult to say who started the Cold War (and alternative expla-
nations are discussed in Chapter 6), but it is clear that by 1949, the Allies
of the Second World War had divided Europe along an “iron curtain,”
in British Prime Minister Churchill’s words. The Soviet Union would
develop its own atomic bomb in 1949 and would form its own military
alliance, the Warsaw Pact, in Eastern Europe in 1955 in response to West
German reunifi cation. Germany itself would remain divided until the
end of the Cold War in 1990.
The British Retreat and the U.S. Policy of Containment
The global power of the nineteenth century, Great Britain, was still in
control of much of its possessions around the world, and although the
British were not defeated in the Second World War, it soon became
obvious that they had been severely weakened politically and economi-
cally. As a result, they were forced to pull back from areas of the world
where they had previously exerted infl uence or control. In the British
retreat from global leadership, power vacuums were created, and none
was fi lled without confl ict. In 1947, Britain pulled out of its colony India,
sparking confl ict between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority
that continues today. In 1948 the British pulled out of Palestine. This area
had been the scene of civil strife between Jews and Arabs from the time
North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
(NATO) Military
alliance established in
1949 among the United
States and West European
states.
iron curtain Term
coined by British Prime
Minister Churchill
referring to the Cold War
division of Europe.
Warsaw Pact Military
alliance established in
1955 among the Soviet
Union and East European
states.

58 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
the British had been given a League of Nations mandate to rule the region
after the First World War.
Also about this time, Britain announced to the U.S. government that
it could no longer support the government of Greece, then under attack
by rebels, some of whom were Communists. President Truman decided
to take over British responsibilities there, but the decision concerning
Greece was embedded in and overshadowed by a decision of much wider
application: the decision to institute the policy of containment. Hence-
forth, Truman announced, “It must be the policy of the United States to
support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures.”3 If this did not mark the beginning of
the Cold War, it was at least an offi cial pronouncement of it. From this
time on, there was no doubt as to which country in the West was going to
lead the struggle against the Soviet Union. The United States had decided
not to return to the days of “splendid isolation” when it tried to stay out
of world politics. Instead, it would head the new alliance and seek to con-
tain the Soviet Union.
The U.S. containment policy was designed to thwart any future expan-
sionist moves by the Soviet Union. In the minds of U.S. policymakers,
given Soviet actions in the early years after the Second World War, the
nature of the Communist political system, and the nature of the bipolar
international system, aggression by the Soviets was inevitable. Contain-
ment was about demonstrating U.S. resolve to meet and resist the Soviets.
To do so, containment required a U.S. military presence in Europe as well
as economic aid to strengthen the economies of allies. The Marshall Plan
was an aid package to war-torn Europe designed for this purpose. It aimed
to prevent Communist parties from coming to power in Western Europe
and to bring the economies of Western Europe fi rmly into the capitalist
fold of the world economy dominated by the United States. The Marshall
Plan in particular and containment policy in general were born in Europe
and fi rst applied to the confl ict between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the European region. It did not take too long, however, for the
policy of containment and the Cold War to become global.
The Cold War in Asia
Eastern Europe was certainly not the only sector of the globe where
victory by the Allies in the Second World War would lead to confl ict
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
A broadly similar process took place in China. The Japanese had taken
over large areas of that country during the war, pushing the Nationalist,
conservative government of Chiang Kai-shek farther into the hinterland.
In the meantime, the Communists, under Mao Zedong, took advantage
of the Japanese invasion to strengthen their organization. The Japanese
tended to concentrate on the cities as they took over Chinese territory,
leaving the peasants in the countryside more or less on their own. The
containment U.S.
foreign policy strategy
instituted after World
War II to prevent Soviet
expansion.
Marshall Plan Aid
package to war-torn
Western Europe designed
to strengthen the area’s
economies and prevent
Communist parties from
coming to power.

The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War 59
Communists moved into this breach, organizing the peasants, carrying
out some land reform measures, and generally strengthening this impor-
tant part of their power base.
When the Japanese evacuated the country, the stage was set for the
culmination of the struggle between Mao and Chiang. Despite consider-
able fi nancial aid and free advice from the United States, Chiang was
unable to quash the Communist rebellion, and in 1949, he was forced
to fl ee to the island of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China was pro-
claimed on October 1 of that year. Although Mao fi rst tried to maintain
independence from the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Soviets
would sign an alliance treaty in 1950. The United States would assume
for many years that Mao was a puppet of the Soviet Union and supported
the Taiwan government as the legitimate representative of the Chinese
people. Economic and military support for Taiwan would become part of
the U.S. containment policy in Asia. Politically, the United States backed
Taiwan’s bid to control the Chinese seat on the United Nations Security
Council, against the wishes of the Soviet Union.
Just as in China, the defeat of the Japanese created conditions condu-
cive to confl ict in Korea, which had been formally annexed by Japan in
1910. In the fi nal days of World War II, the Soviet Union and the United
States came to an agreement that the Soviets would accept the surren-
der of the Japanese troops to the north of the thirty-eighth parallel, while
the Americans would accept a similar surrender south of that parallel.
The agreement was carried out by both sides without serious problems.
But problems soon developed. The Americans and the Soviets ruled their
zones separately, and by 1948, North Korea and South Korea had become,
in effect, two separate states. Border tensions between the two halves were
constant; each side threatened to liberate the other, and while the Ameri-
cans armed the South, the North received military aid from the Soviets.
In June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.4 The motives for
this invasion have been the topic of lively speculation. There is wide-
spread agreement that the North Korean government was heavily infl u-
enced by the Soviets and therefore, the Soviets must have known about
and approved the North Korean invasion plan. But why? At the time,
the Americans and West Europeans were fearful that the attack was a
diversionary tactic that Stalin adopted to pin down the United States
in Asia so that he could move against Western Europe. Later, with the
benefi t of hindsight and knowledge of the confl ict between Communist
China and the Soviet Union, some observers surmised that the Korean
War was Stalin’s scheme to get the United States and the Chinese into a
prolonged land war in Asia, thus weakening both. In his memoirs, Nikita
Khrushchev insisted that the invasion was the brainchild of North Korean
premier Kim Il Sung, who managed to convince Stalin that the South
Koreans would greet the northerners as liberators, thus ensuring an easy,
quick victory for the North.5 Stalin also must have been infl uenced by
the announcement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January 12,

60 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
1950, that Korea was outside the defense perimeter of the United States.
Stalin was, fi nally, justifi ably confi dent that the North Koreans would be
able to defeat the South Koreans unless the latter got outside help.
Whatever the motivation, the attack by the North Koreans met with
immediate success. With the U.S. and South Korean defenders rapidly
reaching desperate straits, the United States, seeing the confl ict as the
fi rst test of the new containment policy, urged the United Nations to
resist the invasion. According to the UN Charter, the international com-
munity was supposed to collectively respond to the violation of state bor-
ders with a coordinated military response if necessary, and the Korean
confl ict provided the Security Council, the UN’s highest authority, with
its fi rst test for the newly created United Nations. The UN’s response to
get involved was ensured by the great infl uence of the United States in
the organization and by the absence of the Soviet Union from the Secu-
rity Council. (The Soviets were temporarily boycotting the council to
protest its exclusion of Communist China.) Eventually the United States
and sixteen other nations sent additional troops to Korea and managed to
halt the progress of the North Koreans.
In fact, the success of the UN forces (of which the U.S. contingent was
by far the largest)6 was so substantial and relatively easy that it brought
about a change in U.S. policy in the middle of the war. When the inter-
vention began, Acheson had explained that the UN troops were in Korea
solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior
to the invasion from the North.7 But as the UN forces moved up the pen-
insula, the temptation to bring about a more permanent solution to the
problem posed by the North Korean government proved decisive. Instead
of merely pushing the North Koreans back into their own territory, the
UN troops moved to unify all of Korea by force. The U.S. government and
General Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the UN forces, strongly
believed that the Chinese would not intervene, despite Chinese warnings
to the U.S. government that they would not allow UN troops to eliminate
the North Korean government next to their border.8
But the Chinese did intervene, with immediate and dramatic suc-
cess. Only after many months of hard fi ghting were the Chinese forced to
halt their advance. As the war dragged on, its unpopularity in the United
States grew, and the presidential election of 1952 resulted in the victory
of Dwight Eisenhower, who promised to end the confl ict. The new presi-
dent did manage to bring about an armistice, partly by threatening to
use nuclear weapons, which ended the fi ghting in July 1953 but did little
or nothing to solve the problems that had fueled the confl ict in the fi rst
place. Korea remains divided into two states today.
Another consequence of the Korean confl ict was the further deteriora-
tion of relations between the United States and Communist China. This
was due in part to the assumption by policymakers that the Communist
bloc of the Soviet Union and Mao’s China was monolithic. Although the
two states did have ideology in common, the alliance between the Soviets

Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context 61
and the Chinese had, in retrospect, several powerful forces working
against it. Relations between the Chinese and Russian empires had been
unfriendly since the sixteenth century. And the fact that the Chinese
have for centuries regarded their country as the Middle Kingdom—that
is, at the center of the civilized world and surrounded by “barbarians”—
must have made it diffi cult for them to accept another country’s leader-
ship even under the best of conditions.
By 1956, doctrinal disputes between the Soviets and the Chinese began
to arise. At the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, in the same speech in
which he denounced Stalin, Khrushchev announced that there was no
inevitability of war between the Communist and capitalist worlds. From
Khrushchev’s viewpoint, this modifi cation of Leninist doctrine was a rea-
sonable compromise in the face of possible worldwide nuclear destruc-
tion. To the Chinese, it smacked of inadmissible timidity. In October
1957, Mao Zedong made a speech at an international Communist confer-
ence in Moscow in which he emphasized dogma. He talked of the “east
wind prevailing over the west wind” and insisted that even if the capital-
ist imperialists did plunge the world into nuclear war, only they would be
banished from the face of the earth; the socialists would survive. About a
year later, the Chinese began what appeared to be an attempt to take over
the Taiwanese-controlled offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. From
the Chinese perspective, the Soviets refused to back up these efforts with
suffi cient vigor. Convinced, perhaps, of the recklessness of their allies, in
June 1959, the Soviets renounced an earlier agreement to help the Chi-
nese develop their own atomic weapons.9 Sino-Soviet relations deterio-
rated rapidly from that point, and in 1960, Soviet advisers left China, and
Soviet aid to China stopped. In 1969, the two Communist states engaged
in military confl ict in border clashes on the Ussuri River.
Decolonization and Regional Confl ict
in the Cold War Context
The end of World War II also brought about the end of the age of impe-rialism. Following the war, the process of decolonization, in which
the imperial powers voluntarily gave up or were forced to give up their
colonial possessions, began. Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine, for example,
which had been placed under international mandate after World War I,
became independent. Britain’s retreat from its status as a global power
brought independent states on the Indian subcontinent and in Africa.
Eventually French and other European colonies in Africa and Asia would
gain their independence (see Map 3.2). The result was a dramatic increase
in the number of sovereign states in the international system. The num-
ber of states almost doubled between 1940 and 1970.
Decolonization was often, although not always, a violent process.
Britain’s exit from India led to war between the Muslims and Hindus
decolonization
Process in which colonies
became independent from
imperial powers.

Map 3.2 Decolonization 1945–1980
(© Cengage Learning)
NETHERLANDS
GREAT
BRITAIN
BELGIUM
SPAINPORTUGAL
ITALY
FRANCE
JAPAN
ANGOLA
1975
NAMIBIA 1985
From South Africa
MADAGASCAR
1960
INDIA
1947
PAKISTAN
1947
PHILIPPINES
1946
INDONESIA
1949
MOROCCO
1956
ALGERIA
1962 LIBYA1951
SUDAN
1956
EGYPT
1922
ETHIOPIA
1941
CHAD
1960
NIGER
1960
MALI
1960
MAURITANIA
1960
NIGERIA
1960
YEMEN
DEM. REP.
OF CONGO
1960
SOMALIA
1960
TUNISIA
1957
SENEGAL 1960
GUINEA
1958
GHANA
1957
CAMEROON
1960
KENYA
1963
UGANDA
1962
SRI LANKA
(CEYLON)
1948
REPUBLIC OF CONGO
1960
TANZANIA
1964
ZAMBIA
1964
MOZAMBIQUE
1974
SOUTH AFRICA
(Republic 1961)
P.D.R. OF YEMEN 1967
PAKISTAN 1947,
BANGLADESH 1973
MYANMAR
(BURMA)
1947
LAOS
1949
CAMBODIA
1954
NORTH VIETNAM
1954
SOUTH VIETNAM
1954
Unified 1974
MALAYSIA 1963
GAMBIA 1965
GUINEA-BISSAU
1974
SIERRA LEONE
1961
LIBERIA
1820s
CÔTE
D’IVOIRE
1960
BURKINA FASO
1960
TOGO
1960
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC 1960
DJIBOUTI
1977
JORDAN
1946
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES 1971
QATAR 1971
BAHRAIN 1971
WESTERN SAHARA
(Morocco)
1975
GABON
1960
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
1968
RWANDA
1962
BURUNDI
1962
MALAWI
1964
ZIMBABWE
1980
BOTSWANA
1966
SWAZILAND
1968
LESOTHO
1966
MAURITIUS
1968
From Great Britain
KUWAIT
1961
NORTH KOREA
1948
SOUTH KOREA
1948FromJapan
BRUNEI 1984
From Great Britain
SINGAPORE
1965
BENIN 1960
MALTA 1964
From Great Britain
CYPRUS
1960
LEBANON 1944
SYRIA
1944
IRAQ
1932ISRAEL 1948
A T L A N T I C
O C E A N
I N D I A N O C E A N
PA C I F I C
O C E A N
Great Britain
France
Netherlands
Italy
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
United States
Date is year independence was achieved.
Shading indicates former colonial power.
0 500 1000 1500 Km.
0 500 1000 1500 Mi.
62

Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context 63
and the establishment of two separate states, India and Pakistan. The
French fought a long war in Algeria before that former colony gained its
independence and another long confl ict in Indochina before an indepen-
dent Vietnam was established. Many of these confl icts quickly became
caught up in the competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Indeed, the term Third World originated during the Cold War and
was applied to the states that were not directly part of the United States–
Western Europe–Japan alliance (the First World) or the Soviet Union–
Eastern Europe alliance (the Second World). The two superpowers,
particularly the United States in the early years of the Cold War, would
see in the process of decolonization an opportunity to win allies and con-
trol strategic areas in the struggle between communism and capitalism.
Although many of the new states tried to remain nonaligned, most were
eventually aided by either the Soviet Union or the United States. In many
of the struggles for independence, one or both of the superpowers became
indirectly or directly involved militarily. For the United States, aiding the
side in the civil war that was anti-Communist (although not necessarily
pro-democratic) was part of the global strategy of containment.
Vietnam
One example of the application of the containment policy in a Third
World confl ict was in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam. Before the war,
Vietnam had been a French colony. It remained offi cially so even with
the Japanese occupation during World War II. Vietnamese nationalists
known as the Vietminh had staged uprisings against the French before
the Japanese arrived. The Japanese, after their arrival, cooperated with
the French in an attempt to stamp out the Vietminh, but by September
1945, the Vietminh were in effective control of the country and issued a
declaration of independence. Their reign was short-lived. After the war,
the former French colony was divided at the seventeenth parallel, with
the northern part of the country becoming the Chinese zone and the
southern part the British zone. The Chinese and the British interpreted
their mandates to restore law and order in dramatically different ways.
The Chinese recognized the de facto Vietminh regime. The British, anx-
ious to establish the principle that prewar colonies be returned to their
rightful owners, set about dismantling the Vietminh regime in the South
to transfer control of that area back to the French.
The French experienced problems almost from the moment they reas-
sumed control. For the fi rst few troubled years after the war, the United
States opposed the efforts of the French, viewing them as dedicated to
reimposing an outdated colonial regime and regarding the Vietminh as
fi ghters for national liberation. As late as 1947, President Truman was so
opposed to French policy in Vietnam that he insisted that U.S.-produced
propellers be removed from British aircraft sent to French troops there.10
This attitude was to change quite rapidly without any essential change
Third World Cold
War term for states that
were not directly part of
the U.S.-led or Soviet-led
alliances.

64 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
in the war taking place in Southeast Asia. With the increase in tensions
between the Soviets and the Americans and the victory of the Commu-
nists in China, the Americans by 1950 had come to see the French as
defenders of the non-Communist world and the Vietminh as agents of
a worldwide Communist conspiracy. Accordingly, the U.S. government
began to support the French military in Vietnam economically.
After his election in 1960, President John Kennedy inherited from
the Eisenhower administration a commitment to the government of Ngo
Dinh Diem in South Vietnam that already involved the presence of some
1,000 U.S. advisers to the South Vietnamese military. When Kennedy’s
aides recommended that he send 8,000 military troops to Vietnam, he
instead sent 15,000 more advisers, who were supposed to avoid actual
combat. They did not seem to help the situation substantially, and
Kennedy became increasingly convinced that nothing would unless Diem,
the Catholic leader of a predominantly Buddhist Vietnam, was replaced.
The U.S. government looked the other way when a coup d’état in South
Vietnam resulted not only in Diem’s removal from offi ce but also in his
death. The removal of Diem did not stabilize the government of South
Vietnam. Instead, a series of generals succeeded Diem, and the situation
deteriorated further. When Kennedy was assassinated, Lyndon Johnson
was faced with a problem in South Vietnam that he ultimately found
insoluble.
Johnson delayed any serious increase in U.S. involvement during the
election year of 1964. Then, in 1965, he became convinced that some
forceful response to the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam was
necessary, and he committed large numbers of U.S. combat troops. That
was the beginning of the escalation by the United States and counteres-
calation by North Vietnam that ended in disaster for Johnson. His mili-
tary advisers would request additional troops, and Johnson would grant
only half the number requested, feeling that he was following a wise,
middle-of-the-road course and not willing to risk losing the domestic sup-
port he needed for his programs at home. The air force would submit an
ever-expanding list of targets in the North to be bombed, and Johnson
would trim that list at least partially, again feeling that his strategy was a
moderate, reasonable one. The problem was that no matter how strongly
Johnson resisted the pressures from the military, the escalatory trend con-
tinued. Eventually, the army wanted 1 million soldiers and Johnson could
barely hold the line at 550,000. The reaction from the North Vietnamese
was always the same: no movement toward the bargaining table, which
the Americans were trying to bring about, and counterescalation through
infi ltration of more men and supplies into the South. Finally, in March
1968, following months of domestic unrest in the United States and pre-
cipitously falling ratings in the public opinion polls, President Johnson
announced that he would not seek re-election.
Richard Nixon, who won the presidency in the 1968 election, inher-
ited peace negotiations begun under Johnson and pledged to end U.S.

Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context 65
military involvement in Southeast Asia. Nixon did manage to get a peace
settlement, but only after incursions into Laos and Cambodia, a bombing
campaign against North Vietnam unprecedented in its scope and inten-
sity, and the deaths of thousands more Americans and Asians. Saigon,
the South Vietnamese capital, was taken by Communist forces in 1975, a
little more than a year after the settlement was signed.
The Arab-Israeli Confl ict
After the Second World War, both the Palestinians and the Israelis claimed
the land of Palestine, which had previously been controlled by Turkey
and then Britain, as their national right.11 In the fi rst Arab-Israeli war of
1948, Israel captured all the land that the United Nations had declared
would be divided into two—a Palestinian state and a Jewish state (see
Map 3.3). The confl ict between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East thus
began before the Cold War and would continue after the Cold War ended.
But this regional confl ict, like many others, could not escape the super-
power rivalry, and this already complex dispute would be caught up in
the dynamics of the Cold War almost immediately after Israel declared
its statehood in 1948.
The United States, concerned about containing Soviet infl uence
in the Middle East, saw in the new state a potential strategic ally and
was the fi rst state to recognize Israel in 1948. Egypt, the strongest Arab
state, was the self-proclaimed leader of the Arab world and coordinated
the resistance against Israel. Gamal Abdel Nasser became Egypt’s leader
in 1954 and looked to both the United States and the Soviet Union for
assistance. But when Egypt formed a military alliance with Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Yemen and recognized Communist China in 1956, the United
States responded by withdrawing an offer to fund the building of the
Aswan Dam there. Nasser, in turn, took control of the Suez Canal away
from the British, sparking the Suez crisis. Britain, France, and Israel then
coordinated an invasion of the Egyptian Sinai, confi dent of U.S. support.
In one of the oddest moments of the Cold War, the United States sided
with the Soviet Union and condemned the British, French, and Israeli
invasion. After threats from both superpowers, Britain, France, and Israel
withdrew. The United States went against its allies in the Suez case
because of its anticolonialism policy, its desire to remain on good terms
with the oil-rich Arab states, and, equally important, its fear that going
against Egypt would drive Nasser into the Soviet orbit. Despite U.S. sup-
port of Egypt for this reason, Egypt would turn to the Soviets after the
Suez crisis.
“The fear that a pro-Communist Syria would also threaten the adja-
cent pro-Western regimes of Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, prompted
Washington to step up military assistance to those states, while Ameri-
can arms supplies fl owed into Israel to counter the ominous buildup of
Russian weaponry in Egypt.”12
Suez crisis Cold
War confrontation
between Egypt, which
nationalized the Suez
Canal, and Britain,
France, and Israel.

66 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
Map 3.3 Confl ict in the Middle East
The control of territory has been at the center of much of the Arab-Israeli confl ict.
Israel’s borders have signifi cantly changed from the original UN partition (see inset),
through the Six-Day War, to today.
(© Cengage Learning)
NEGEV
SINAI PENINSULA
0 50 100 Km.
0 50 100 Mi.
0 50 Km.
0 50 Mi.
LEBANON
S Y R I A
J O R D A N
E G Y P T
SAUDI
ARABIA
ISRAEL
Beirut
Sidon
Haifa
Damascus
Tyre
Acre
Tel Aviv
Ashqelon
Gaza
Tulkarm
Nablus
Jericho
Jerusalem
Hebron
Beersheba
Rabba
Amman
Auja
El Arish
Elat
Aqaba
Nabq
Suez
Ismailia
El Shatt
El Qantara
Port Said
Cairo
Memphis
Abu Zenima
Mt. Sinai
Mt. Hermon
GOLAN
HEIGHTS
WEST
BANK
S I N A I
P E N I N S U L A
N E G E V
Acre
Haifa
Tulkarm
NablusTel Aviv
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Gaza
Beersheba
Hebron
Jericho
LEBANON
EGYPT T
R
A
N
SJ
O
R
D
A
N

SY
R
IA

PALESTINE
Proposed Jewish state
Proposed Arab state
International zone
British Mandate of
Palestine, 1920–1948
U.N. Partition Plan, Nov. 1947
Israel after Arab invasion and War of Independence, 1948
Occupied by Israel in Six-Day War, 1967
Maximum occupation by Israel, 1982
Arab nations
Oil fields
Suez Canal
Israeli occupation
line after Six-Day
War, 1967
Cease-fire line after
Yom Kippur War,
1973
Israeli occupation line
during Suez crisis, 1956
Many areas placed under
Palestinian self-rule in 1994
Line of Israeli withdrawal
from Sinai Peninsula, 1975
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai
Peninsula completed, 1981
Beirut-Damascus
highway
Jewish settlements in
Gaza and West Bank
Withdrawal from Gaza,
2005
R e d S e a
G
ul
f o
f A
qa
ba

G
ulf of Suez
Great Bitter Lake
Dead Sea
Jo
rd
an

Sea of
Galilee
Strait of Tiran
Sharm el Sheikh
N
ile

M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a
Dead
Sea
Jo
rd
an

M e d i t e r r a n e a n
S e a

Decolonization and Regional Confl ict in the Cold War Context 67
From then on, Middle East tensions would become even more dan-
gerous, always risking the possibility of superpower intervention. In
1958, the United States invaded Lebanon to support an anti-Communist
government. In 1967, armed with Soviet weaponry, Nasser threatened
Israel, and Israel preempted the attack. The Six-Day War has had long-
lasting impact as Israel emerged with control over the Egyptian Sinai
and Gaza Strip, the Syrian Golan Heights, and the Jordanian West Bank,
including Jerusalem. Although they had armed opposing sides, the super-
powers communicated to each other in the Six-Day War that they would
not get further involved. This commitment would be tested again in the
1973 Yom Kippur War when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack
against Israel. Again, both superpowers armed their sides, the Soviets
threatened to involve its own forces, and the United States put its forces
on nuclear alert. Eventually, however, the superpowers backed a United
Nations cease-fi re and the introduction of UN peacekeeping troops in
buffer zones. In 1978, with the signing of the U.S.-brokered Camp David
Accords, some of the territorial confl ict was addressed. Egypt and Israel
agreed to a peace treaty in which Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula
to Egypt in exchange for Egyptian recognition of the state of Israel. Most
Arab states opposed the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and the other territo-
rial confl icts between Israel and its neighbors, and the issue of statehood
for Palestinians remained unresolved through the end of the Cold War.
Other Superpower Involvement in the Third World
Vietnam was not the only Third World country in which the United States
was deeply involved. In the early 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency
supported a coup d’état in Guatemala and in Iran. In the 1960s, the United
States aided an attempt to overthrow the Cuban government in the Bay
of Pigs invasion and intervened with over 20,000 armed personnel in the
Dominican Republic. The pattern of intervention in these countries was
largely the same: The United States saw nationalists or Communists as a
threat to allied governments and feared that not doing something to support
their allies would lead to an expansion of the Soviet sphere of infl uence and
a perception of American weakness on the part of the Soviets that would
encourage further Communist expansion. Short of invasion or coups, the
United States would support friendly governments around the globe mili-
tarily and economically in an effort to contain Soviet infl uence. States such
as Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iran, and Nicaragua became America’s
client states, and were supported allies in the Cold War struggle.
Although the Soviet Union did not militarily involve itself in the
Third World to the extent that the United States did (however, it did use
force against its own “allies” in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in
1968), it did become involved in the race for patron states, particularly by
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Soviet support to Egypt, Cuba, Somalia,
and India would ensure that in each region of the world, confl icts that
Six-Day War 1967
confl ict in which Israel
occupied territories
previously controlled by
surrounding Arab states.

68 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
may have begun even before the Cold War became part of the superpower
competition. Even if the roots of most these confl icts lay in the process of
decolonization or regional rivalries and not in the Cold War, the money and
arms that supported the sides certainly intensifi ed and probably prolonged
these confl icts. These proxy wars, in which the United States and the
Soviet Union supported opposing sides, became part of the landscape of the
Cold War. Because one or both of the superpowers were usually involved in
these regional confl icts, the United Nations failed to operate as its archi-
tects had hoped. Collective security could not be achieved because each
superpower had the opportunity to prevent UN action. Instead, the United
Nations turned to peacekeeping operations in which military personnel
were introduced into a region after a cease-fi re had been negotiated.
Changes in East-West Competition
Despite superpower involvement in proxy wars and regional competi-tion, the Cold War remained “cold”—there was never any direct mili-
tary confrontation between the two main belligerents. The Cold War did,
however, undergo some dramatic transformations during its course. In
particular, technological developments rendered the competition for mil-
itary power, so important to more traditional wars, a stalemate. By the
late 1960s, nuclear parity had been achieved. Because the Soviet Union
and the United States had roughly equal capacity to destroy each other,
the consequences of actual confl ict reached doomsday proportions. This,
and the proximity to war that the superpowers approached during the
Cuban missile crisis, sparked reconsideration of the rivalry and a signifi –
cant relaxation of tensions in the 1970s, only to be renewed again in the
1980s and up until the fi nal days of the Cold War.
Two Cuban Crises
The Kennedy administration’s 1,000 days were marked by several dra-
matic events in international affairs. One was the invasion of Cuba at the
Bay of Pigs in 1961. The plan for this invasion originated in the Eisenhow-
er administration shortly after Fidel Castro assumed power. The invasion
was carried out by a small number of Cuban exiles who were fi nanced,
organized, and led into combat by agents of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).13 It was assumed that the invasion would spur massive
numbers of Cubans who were opposed to Castro to active rebellion. It did
not, because there was poor coordination between the invading forces and
the Cuban anti-Castro underground, and almost certainly because there
was less opposition to Castro than the CIA had supposed. The total fail-
ure of the invasion was ensured when President Kennedy decided not to
approve overt and substantial support for the effort by the U.S. Air Force.
The Bay of Pigs fi asco, along with the construction of a wall between
East and West Berlin by the government of East Germany, set the stage
proxy wars Confl icts
in which the United
States and the Soviet
Union supported
opposing opposite sides.
nuclear parity A
balance of nuclear
capabilities.

Changes in East-West Competition 69
for the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. The Soviets had hoped to slip mis-
siles into Cuba secretly in order to prevent another attempt by the United
States to overthrow their Communist ally.14 The United States discovered
the missiles as they were being built and put a naval blockade into effect
to prevent the Soviet Union from delivering more missiles. Kennedy might
well have fi rmly resisted this Soviet move in any case, but his opposition
was stiffened by the fear that having denied air support to the Bay of Pigs
invaders and having failed to take effective action against the construction
of the Berlin Wall, he could not acquiesce in the secret shipment of mis-
siles to Cuba without leading Khrushchev to believe that the United States
would not actively resist other bold moves on the part of the Soviets.
In the end, the Soviets backed down, turning around ships headed for
Cuba with additional missiles and agreeing to remove those already in
Cuba. Although neither the American people at the time nor any others
outside high government circles in the United States and the Soviet Union
were aware of this secret arrangement, “it appears . . . that the withdrawal
of [American] Jupiter missiles from Turkey in the spring of 1963 was indeed
part of a private deal that led to the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from
Cuba in November, 1962.”15 Khrushchev put the best possible light on
the affair, arguing that his primary aim was the defense of Cuba and that
because in return for the removal of the missiles, he had obtained a promise
from the United States not to attack the island, his aim was accomplished.
“The Cuban missile crisis has assumed genuinely mythic signifi cance. . . .
[It] represents the closest point that the world has come to nuclear war.”16
Détente
The Cuban missile crisis produced a desire on the part of the United
States and the Soviet Union to “peacefully coexist” and take steps to
avoid nuclear war. In 1963, the “hot-line agreement” established direct
communications between the White House and the Kremlin. By the end
of the 1960s, both sides had reached the conclusion that serious arms
control negotiations were in their interests.
These negotiations, known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT), produced an agreement to limit the number of intercontinental
ballistic missiles that each side could have and was signed during Presi-
dent Nixon’s trip to the Soviet Union in 1972. This was the high point of
détente, or relaxation of tensions, with the Soviet Union.
At the same time, Nixon was pursuing détente with China.
Nixon journeyed over twenty thousand miles in February 1972
to become the fi rst American president in history to set foot on
Chinese soil. After several days of intensive negotiations, . . .
the two governments issued a joint communiqué in the city of
Shanghai. . . . This declaration candidly recorded the differences
that continued to separate the United States and China. . . . On a
Cuban missile
crisis 1962 superpower
confrontation over Soviet
attempt to place nuclear
weapons in Cuba.
détente Period of
relaxed tensions between
the United States and the
Soviet Union during the
Cold War.

70 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
positive note, both governments agreed to foreswear the pursuit of
“hegemony” in East Asia as well as to oppose any other nation’s
efforts to that end (an unmistakable warning to Moscow).17
The Shanghai communiqué also established economic and cultural ties
between China and the United States.
Rapprochement with China was particularly dramatic and signifi –
cant because formal diplomatic communication between China and the
United States had been almost nonexistent for more than two decades.
What brought about the sudden improvement in relations between
Nixon, known for his rigid, vigorous anticommunism, and the leaders of
China and the Soviet Union? Certainly, the most important factors contrib-
uting to the improvement in relations both between the United States and
the Soviet Union and between the United States and China included the
continuing confl ict between the two Communist states themselves and
their rising military-industrial might. As Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s chief
foreign policy adviser, observed in his memoirs, “China’s cautious over-
tures to us were caused by the rapid and relentless Soviet military buildup
in the Far East. . . . That China and the United States would seek rap-
prochement in the early 1970s was inherent in the world environment.”18
The confl ict between the Soviet Union and China led both countries to
fear isolation from each other and from the United States. This made
both amenable to any move by the United States to improve relations. In
turn, the United States could not view the rising power of these two great
Communist states with equanimity, especially if there were to be contin-
ued antagonism with them.
The Rebirth of the Cold War
Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was short-lived.
The latter half of the 1970s was marked by what some observers referred
to as a rebirth of the Cold War, although relations between Western Europe
and the Soviet Union continued to improve on many fronts. Some archi-
tects of foreign policy in the United States were undoubtedly put into a
belligerent mood by the fall of Saigon to the Communists in 1975. This
mood was not improved when in the same year, Angola achieved inde-
pendence from Portugal in an armed struggle joined by Soviet-supported
Cuban troops.
Still, Jimmy Carter came into the presidency in 1976 vowing to cut
defense expenditures. He left that post in 1980 in the wake of a campaign
based on the promise of signifi cant increases in the defense budget, as well
as condemnations of his Republican predecessors for allowing previous
budgets to shrink to dangerously low levels. Obviously, something had
happened to change Carter’s view of relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union rather drastically. The election of 1980 resulted in a
victory for Ronald Reagan, who was even more enthusiastic than Carter
about strengthening the country’s defenses. Many U.S. voters apparently

Changes in East-West Competition 71
were more concerned about the Soviet threat and less concerned about esca-
lating defense budgets than they had been not too many years before.19
Perhaps the increasing distance in time from the painful experience
of Vietnam made Americans more inclined to fl ex their military muscle.
Events in Iran also had an important impact on American perceptions
about the U.S. role in the world. First, in January 1979 the shah of Iran,
whom the CIA had played a crucial role in restoring to power in 1953, was
deposed, to be replaced by a revolutionary government headed by the Aya-
tollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The shah had been one of the more reliable
allies of the United States in a strategically important area of the world
for almost two decades. His fall contributed to an impression that the
United States was losing its grip on the drift of world affairs. That impres-
sion was reinforced when another long-time ally, Anastasio Somoza, was
overthrown in Nicaragua in July 1979 by a coalition of forces that con-
tained some undeniably anti-American elements. Finally, U.S. feelings
of impotence were heightened dramatically when Iranian students took
ninety people hostage in the U.S. embassy in Tehran in November 1979,
and the U.S. government could not secure their release for 444 days.
One can argue persuasively that none of these problems was created
by military weakness on the part of the United States, and one can claim
even more convincingly that signifi cant increases in nuclear capabilities
were irrelevant to their solution. But when the Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in December 1979, proponents of such arguments were quite
noticeably rare. President Carter announced that the invasion had been
an important educational experience for him with regard to his attitude
about the Soviets. He retaliated by imposing an embargo on grain ship-
ments to the Soviet Union and boycotting the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.
He also declared that the invasion of Afghanistan had created the most
dangerous threat to peace since the Second World War.
In retrospect, that invasion can be seen as the beginning of a period of
tense relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Antagonism
between the Americans and the Soviets was fueled by actions on the part
of both superpowers that may well have been defensive from their respec-
tive points of view but looked aggressive to their counterparts. From the
Soviet vantage point, the operation in Afghanistan was meant to protect
socialism in that country and perhaps stem the tide of Islamic fundamen-
talism so visible in Iran and so threatening to continued control of Islamic
elements in the Soviet Union. In 1983, when the Soviets shot down a
Korean airliner (en route from New York to Seoul) fi lled with civilian
passengers as it fl ew over Soviet territory, the Soviets claimed that they
were protecting themselves from a provocative spy mission. Americans
viewed the act as barbaric. In the atmosphere created by that incident, the
United States began to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Europe
in 1983, and the Soviets broke off arms talks with the Americans.
From the Soviet point of view, President Reagan was unpredictable and
often aggressive in the early years of his administration. He referred to
the Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” He signifi cantly increased the U.S.

72 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
defense budget, even in the face of massive budget defi cits. He ordered an
invasion of the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada in 1983. He waged covert
war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Perhaps of greatest
concern to the Soviets, he insisted on pushing ahead with the development
of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or Star Wars as it came to be called,
designed to prevent nuclear war by providing the technological means to
knock incoming missiles out of the air before they hit their targets.
Changes in the International Economy
and the Rise of Interdependence
The end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and U.S. détente with the Sovi-et Union and China occurred at the same time that changes in the
international economy were becoming evident (see Chapter 10). Until the
1970s, the United States had occupied an obviously dominant position in
the international economic system. By 1971, however, Western Europe
and Japan competed with the United States on much more equal terms
economically. Problems in the U.S. economy, stemming in part from the
Vietnam War, reinforced the trend away from U.S. dominance. When
President Nixon announced in 1971 that the United States would no lon-
ger automatically convert dollars into gold, the whole international eco-
nomic system set up after the Second World War was suddenly deprived
of one of its key supports. By 1973, the U.S. dollar was basically allowed
to “fl oat” against other currencies of the world, and the “fi xed” exchange
rate system that had been established at the Bretton Woods conference
was essentially abandoned. In principle, this meant that each country
could now attempt to exercise control over the value of its currency, and
thereby infl uence its imports, exports, and the likelihood of attracting for-
eign money for investment. In practice, however, this has proved diffi cult,
and countries often fi nd their currencies rising or falling depending on a
wide variety of international factors over which they have little control.
The early 1970s was also an economically volatile period due to activ-
ities undertaken by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). In 1973, OPEC successfully quadrupled the price of oil, causing a
signifi cant economic transformation that shook the foundations of global
economics once again. Suddenly huge sums of money were passing from
the economically wealthy regions of the world to previously economically
poor regions of the world. With this change in the distribution of wealth
came changes in international trade and fi nance. Moreover, because oil is
not just a product but a vitally important element of both economic and
military security, there was a dramatic shift in terms of thinking about
international security. The Cold War had clearly demarcated the United
States and the Soviet Union as the principal actors on the world stage,
each vying for some advantage over the other. But as rising petroleum
prices squeezed the industrial capacities of the superpowers, attention
Organization of
Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)
Organization of
developing countries
whose economies rely on
oil export revenues.

The End of the Cold War 73
was shifted away from bipolarity and toward a greater appreciation of eco-
nomic interdependence. Indeed, both of these shocks to the system—the
abandonment of the fi xed exchange rate system and the rise of OPEC—
highlighted the interdependence of the economies of the richer countries.
It became obvious that political and economic decisions in one industri-
alized society could have dramatic consequences for all the others.
The rise of economic interdependence by the 1970s was in part due
to the increase in international trade to unprecedented levels. The trading
regime that the United States and its allies had established after World
War II worked to bring down political barriers to trade and expand the
exchange of goods across borders. Related to this development were the
multinational corporations, which did business in more than one country
(see Chapter 4). By the 1970s, these corporations were large in number and
size and connecting the economies of many states together in complex
ways. Despite the economic turmoil of the 1970s, the increase in trade and
multinational business seemed to be benefi ting the wealthier states. This
was not true for the developing world, at least those without oil. Although
there had been great hopes after decolonization that these new states would
follow the path of economic development of the United States, Europe,
and Japan, this did not happen for most (see Chapter 11). Indeed, by the
1970s, it was clear that the gap between the wealth in the developed world
and the wealth in the developing world was growing. And in addition to
severe poverty, many states were facing serious internal and external secu-
rity threats, complicated by the superpower competition. At the time, the
developing world, encouraged by the success of OPEC, banded together
in the United Nations to call for fairer economic relations. Indeed, the
developing world was able to use the United Nations to promote economic
and social development issues at the same time the Security Council was
largely ineffective because of the Cold War. By the end of the 1970s, how-
ever, the economic situation in the developing countries had worsened,
and political tensions among them hampered efforts at collective attempts
to renegotiate economic relationships with the wealthier states.
In addition to a recognition that the world was more economically
interdependent, the 1970s brought a recognition of the environmental
interdependence of the world (see Chapter 13). In 1972, the United Nations
held its fi rst conference on the environment in Stockholm, Sweden. This
was an important meeting in that it raised the awareness of environmen-
tal problems, such as air and water pollution, although signifi cant inter-
national efforts at solving environmental challenges did not take place
after the end of the Cold War.
The End of the Cold War
It is instructive to remember how grim international politics looked by the middle of the 1980s and how much change occurred in the ensuing
decade. By the end of 1988, the United States and the Soviet Union had

74 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
agreed for the fi rst time to dismantle a whole category of nuclear weapons,
in an agreement formalized in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. That was widely expected to be a fi rst step toward a strategic
arms reduction treaty (START) that would call for signifi cant reductions
in strategic weapons by both superpowers (see Chapter 8). Toward the end
of his term in offi ce, President Reagan had several cordial summit meet-
ings with his Soviet counterpart. The eight-year war between Iran and Iraq
fi nally ended in 1988. The Soviets pulled their troops out of Afghanistan.
The Cubans pulled their troops out of Angola. The Sandinistas in
Nicaragua lost an election and allowed a peaceful transfer of power to
their opponents.
There is little doubt that the most dramatic political events in the
late 1980s and the fi rst half of 1990s took place in the Communist world.
A decade of reforms in China culminated in massive prodemocracy dem-
onstrations in Beijing in the spring of 1989. Those demonstrations were
fi rmly repressed, and many of the leaders of the prodemocracy movement
were jailed or executed. But as a result of reforms instituted in the late
1970s and early 1980s in the wake of the crackdown at Tiananmen Square,
China’s economic output and exports grew faster than either India’s or
the Soviet Union’s and even more rapidly than those of the well-known
economic superstars in its neighborhood: Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore,
and Hong Kong (see Chapters 10 and 11).
Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty 1988 agreement
between the United
States and the Soviet
Union to dismantle a
whole category of nuclear
weapons.
The young man
standing in front of
Chinese tanks on
Tiananmen Square
became symbolic of
popular resistance to the
Chinese regime during
demonstrations there in
June of 1989.
(© Bettmann/Corbis)

The End of the Cold War 75
The story in the rest of the Communist world (when it was Com-
munist and afterward) was virtually the mirror image of that in China.
In Eastern Europe, and especially in the Soviet Union, dramatic strides
toward political liberalization and democracy coincided with equally dra-
matic economic deterioration. Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985
and put into effect his policies of perestroika and glasnost—the former
referring to market-oriented economic reforms, the latter to political
Gorbachev Soviet
leader who initiated
political, economic, and
foreign policy reforms,
leading to the end of the
Soviet Union and the
Cold War.
perestroika Russian
term referring to
Gorbachev’s restructuring
of the economy.
glasnost Term
referring to Gorbachev’s
political reforms for
greater openness.
A demonstrator pounds away
the Berlin Wall as East Berlin
border guards look on from
above the Brandeburg Gate.
The destruction of the Berlin
Wall symbolized the end of the
Cold War.
(REUTERS/David Brauchli/Landov)

76 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
reforms in the direction of greater openness and democratization. The
political reforms certainly did decrease autocratic controls, but the eco-
nomic reforms never achieved anything like the Chinese successes.
Gorbachev instituted an equally profound revolution in foreign policy,
especially in Soviet relations with its erstwhile satellites in Eastern Europe.
“In 1989,” according to one historian, “while the nations of Western Europe
celebrated the bicentenary of the French Revolution, the nations of Eastern
Europe reenacted it.”20 In that year, a long process of liberalization in Poland
culminated in open parliamentary elections, and other states were soon to
follow Poland’s lead. As the Los Angeles Times observed in the wake of the
1989 revolution in Eastern Europe, “It took 10 years in Poland, 10 months
in Hungary, 10 weeks in East Germany, and 10 days in Czechoslovakia.”21
By the end of the year, the regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu in Romania had
also been overthrown. By 1991, even the long-isolated regime in Albania
was liberalizing in various ways. In October 1990, East and West Germany
were unifi ed in one Federal Republic of Germany, and in 1991, the Warsaw
Pact was offi cially disbanded. The Cold War was over (see Map 3.4).
Map 3.4 Europe (1991) After the Disintegration of the Soviet Union
(© Cengage Learning)
German reunification 1990
Wall opened, Nov. 1989
Elections 1989
Broke into Czech Republic
and Slovakia in 1993
Communist regimes
collapse, 1989
Dissolved into warring states, 1991(Fr.)
(It.)
Corsica
Sardinia
Berlin
Prague
Bratislava
Vilnius
Minsk
Warsaw
Kiev
Kishinev
Bucharest
Budapest
Belgrade
Zagreb
Sarajevo
Ljubljana
Sofia
Skopje
Tiranë
Fo
rm
er
b
ou
nd
ar
y b
et
w
ee
n
Ea
st
a
nd
W
es
t G
er
m
an
y
Vistula
E
lbe
Rh
in
e
Seine
Po
Dnieper
Danube
Black
Sea
Mediterranean Sea
FRANCE
LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
SWITZERLAND
ITALY
POLAND
GERMANY
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
CZECH
REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
CROATIA
ROMANIA
ALBANIA
SLOVENIA
BULGARIA
TURKEY
GREECE
MACEDONIA
UKRAINE
BOSNIA &
HERZEGOVINA
YUGOSLAVIA
(SERBIA)
MOLDOVA
LITHUANIA
BELARUS
RUSSIA
(RUSSIA)
150 300 Km0
150 300 Mi0

The End of the Cold War 77
The consequences of the end of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry became quite
evident when Iraq attacked Kuwait in August 1990. The attack led the
United States to lead a coalition of states against Iraq and eventually evict
it from Kuwait. What made the operation historic was the cooperation
of the United States and the Soviet Union in the framework of the UN
Security Council. Throughout its history, the United Nations had been
largely ineffective at responding to aggression because in almost every
instance, the United States or the Soviet Union supported opposite sides
in the confl ict and thus one of the superpowers would veto UN action
against its ally. After months of negotiations among Security Council
members, the Soviet Union agreed to support the operation against Iraq,
with which it previously had a close relationship. To those who were part
of the coalition, it seemed that the United Nations was fi nally working
the way it was designed, prompting U.S. President George H. W. Bush to
declare that a new world order had emerged.
Political reform in the Soviet Union came to a screeching halt in
August 1991, when a group of high-level conservative Communists in the
party, the army, and the KGB (the Soviet intelligence and security agency)
deposed Gorbachev and began to restore the old system. But Boris Yeltsin,
a reformist leader who had withdrawn from the Communist Party and
established legitimacy by winning a free election for the presidency of the
Russian Republic, took the lead in resisting the coup attempt, which col-
lapsed under the combined pressures of popular resistance and its leaders’
incompetence and indecision. By the end of 1991, not only was the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union deprived of its power; the Soviet Union
itself dissolved, to be replaced by its constituents, fi fteen formerly Soviet
Socialist republics, such as Russia, Ukraine, and Tajikistan.
Political reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe seemed to
have a kind of demonstration effect, encouraging emulation around the
world. Throughout the 1980s, military dictatorships were replaced by
more democratic regimes in Latin America.22 In Asia outside the People’s
Republic of China, a trend toward democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s
was visible in Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Nepal, Mongolia, and
Bangladesh. In 1991, one informed observer in Africa declared that “after
decades of unspeakable repression at the hands of authoritarian regimes,
Africans stand at the threshold of a new epoch. Across the continent, mil-
lions are demanding freely elected legislators, an independent judiciary
and an accountable executive.”23 The Middle East has not been fruitful
ground for democratic reforms, but even there, Turkey and Pakistan moved
in a democratic direction in the 1980s, King Hussein of Jordan instituted
a series of liberalizing reforms, the newly unifi ed Yemen showed some
signs of moving in a pluralist direction, and Algeria’s socialist regime
moved toward multiparty elections (which were, however, postponed
indefi nitely in 1991).
Overall, from the early 1970s to 2006, the number of democratic
states in the world increased from about forty to almost ninety, with
new world order Term
used by U.S. President
George H. W. Bush to
describe the new political
structure of the world at
the end of the Cold War.

78 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
more than fi fty additional states moving in a democratic direction. In
1973, about half of the people in the world lived in states with regimes
that could be classifi ed as “free” or “partly free.” By 2009, that proportion
had increased to a little over three-quarters.24
Figure 3.1 shows the trend toward democratization since 1950. “In
the 1980s and 1990s, the world made dramatic progress in opening up
political systems and expanding political freedoms. Some 81 countries
took signifi cant steps toward democracy. . . .”25 Nevertheless, this trend
toward democratization may be tenuous and reversing. Many states
“that took steps towards democracy after 1980 have since returned to
more authoritarian rule: either military, as in Pakistan since 1999, or
pseudo-democratic, as in Zimbabwe in recent years. Many others have
stalled between democracy and authoritarianism, with limited political
freedoms and closed or dysfunctional politics.”26 Recent anti-democratic
trends can be seen in countries worldwide, including Nigeria, Russia,
Thailand, Venezuela, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Kenya.27 In the
Middle East, non-democratic regimes are well-entrenched and “steps
toward democracy in the Arab world . . . are slowing, blocked by legal
maneuvers and offi cial changes of heart.”28 Many partly democratic
states, including Russia and many other former Soviet republics, are
increasingly seeing Western efforts at promoting democracy as interfer-
ence in their internal affairs.29 Efforts to promote democratization are
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
100
80
60
40
20
0
19501945 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
N
um
be
r
of
C
ou
nt
rie
s
Democracies
Autocracies
Anocracies
Figure 3.1 Global
Regimes by Type,
1950–2006
Anocracies are countries
with governments in the
mixed or transitional zone
between autocracy and
democracy.
Source: Reprinted with permission
from Amy Pate, “Trends in
Democratization: A Focus on
Instability in Anocracies,” in PEACE
& CONFLICT 2008 by J. Joseph
Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and
Ted Robert Gurr, Boulder: Paradigm
Publishers 2008. (p. 27)
Center for Int’l. Dev. & Confl ict
Mgmt

The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 79
The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty
The optimism from the political, economic, and security developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s quickly sobered in the face of eth-
nic confl ict, nuclear and terrorist threats, and the disintegration of states
by the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century. The world economy is also
struggling with the effects of rapid globalization. Many of these issues and
the national and international responses to them have led some to ques-
tion the future of the sovereign state as the distinction between domestic
politics and international politics increasingly blurs. Indeed, some have
suggested that global politics may be entering a “post-Westphalian phase”
in which sovereign states are not the primary way the international sys-
tem is organized. The outcome of this potential reorganization, however,
is quite uncertain.
Ethno-Religious Confl ict and Failed States
The bloody, seemingly endless dissolution of Yugoslavia and the mur-
derous war among the Serbians, the Croats, the Muslims, and Kosovars
did much to diminish post–Cold War euphoria. For years, the interna-
tional community, whether in the form of the United Nations, NATO,
or the European Union, seemed impotent and sometimes incompetent
in the face of interminable warfare between and within the republics in
the former Yugoslavia. Civil war fi rst erupted in 1991, when Croatia and
Slovenia declared their independence. The international community even-
tually recognized them as sovereign states, and the old Yugoslavia was
dead. War then turned to Bosnia, where, during the course of more than
three years, more than 200,000 people would lose their lives, and brutal
violations of human rights occurred. The confl ict eventually erupted in
Kosovo and Macedonia. In the Kosovo confl ict, NATO resorted to force
in the spring and summer of 1999 with a bombing campaign of Serbia.
Although the wars in most of Yugoslavia ended in negotiated agreements,
the future stability of the area remains uncertain, particularly when the
peacekeeping forces leave.
What made the ethnic strife in the former Yugoslavia especially dis-
heartening was that such confl ict was not isolated to the Balkans. Ethnic
and religious groups—groups that perceive themselves to be culturally
distinct—in South Africa, Burundi, India, Egypt, Mexico, and Azerbaijan
also were emersed in brutal confl ict. In Rwanda in 1994, political and
ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi groups resulted in more
than 800,000 deaths. In a three-month period, more than 5,000 people a
day were massacred, leaving one-tenth of the people in the country dead.
Ethnic strife played a key role not only in the dismantling of Yugoslavia
but also in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although ethnic confl icts
did increase in number and intensity after the end of the Cold War, this
is part of a longer-term trend since the 1950s of rising ethnic violence.

80 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
This trend has recently shown signs of changing, as the high number of
ongoing confl icts may have peaked in the 1990s.30
Still, ethnic and religious confl ict inside countries and across their
borders remains a feature of the contemporary global political landscape.
Tensions between Hindus and the Muslim minority in India remain
high, with periodic associated violent events. In Sri Lanka, the twenty-
six year civil war between the Tamil minority fi ghting for autonomy and
the Sri Lankan government escalated in violence as government authori-
ties claimed a military victory over the rebels. In 2008, Russia launched
a full-scale invasion of Georgia in support of ethnic separatists in the
enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In China, tensions between
the Turkic-speaking Muslim Uighurs and Han Chinese (the dominant
ethnic group in China) erupted in violence in 2009. In the Middle East,
the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict continues. The end of the Cold War
helped establish limited Palestinian control over the Gaza territory and
parts of the West Bank, but the fi nal status of key territories remains
unresolved and violence between Palestinians and Israel persists. In
Iraq, fi ghting between Sunni and Shia Muslims added to confl ict already
present between the U.S. military, the insurgents fi ghting against their
presence, and foreign groups joining them. By 2006, Iraq was on the brink
of full-scale civil war, despite the presence of U.S. troops.31
In Darfur, a region in western Sudan, the confl ict between rebel
groups, drawn from some of the region’s non-Arab ethnic groups, and
government-backed militias (known as the “Janjaweed”), composed from
several small Arab nomadic tribes, has brought devastating results. Since
the current confl ict began in 2003, the Janjaweed have attacked the civil-
ian population living in Darfur, and an estimated 300,000 people have
been killed, thousands have been raped, and 2.5 million refugees have
fl ed their homes. The United States has called the killings an act of geno-
cide, and the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants,
charging Sudan’s president and rebel leaders with war crimes. Despite
the signing of a peace agreements, and the presence of an African Union-
United Nations peacekeeping force, the situation remains dire today.32
The Sudanese government had objected to the peacekeeping mission, cit-
ing concerns for state sovereignty.
The ethnic and religious confl ict occurring in the post–Cold War era
is particularly destructive and intractable for many reasons. First, it is
occurring in some of the poorest regions in the world, in states with little
legitimacy, and in states with no stable framework on which to build.
Most disturbing, many of these confl icts are not simply political fi ghts
to win control of the state, but fi ghts where the only acceptable outcome
to all sides is to rid the area of the others’ presence, one way or the other.
Hence, there is not even any pretense of following traditional rules of war,
such as those pertaining to the distinction between civilians and military
personnel. In many of these confl icts, the fi ghting is not carried out by tra-
ditional military forces, but by undisciplined, highly autonomous groups

The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 81
of fi ghters, making negotiations diffi cult, if not impossible. Causes and
potential solutions to ethnic confl ict in global politics will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter 7.
Internal confl ict between ethnic and religious groups is one of the
most important causes of failed states, but it is not the only one.33 States
need a viable political framework to function effectively. There have
been a number of failed states or states on the verge of failing, such as
Somalia and Haiti, where no governing power is clearly in charge. This
type of instability in the post–Cold War period usually occurs in states
experiencing ethno-religious confl ict, in states where the superpowers
have pulled out their support and left a power vacuum, and in states that
are so economically devastated that stability is impossible. In such cases,
food shortages, refugee crises, or signifi cant human rights violations may
ensue. Failed states may also arise after military interventions. In both
Afghanistan and Iraq, following U.S.-led interventions and regime change,
there have been signifi cant challenges to establishing legitimate political
authority and internal security. Failed, or failing, states are problems for
the international community.34 “Although the phenomenon of state fail-
ure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever
before. In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and
kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now,
these states pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbors but
also to peoples around the globe. Preventing states from failing and resus-
citating those that do fail are thus strategic and moral imperatives.”35
There are economic consequences as well. The recent piracy in the Indian
Ocean is directly connected to the failed state of Somalia.
The challenge for the international community, if it gets involved is
separating the internal factions, constructing a legitimate political frame-
work, and carrying out this work in a way that gives some chance to the
newly constructed state. The United Nations, at its creation in 1945, reject-
ed this kind of mission, indicating that internal wars in sovereign states
were out of its jurisdiction. In many instances, that is exactly what the UN
and member states such as the United States have recently attempted to
do. There has developed in the international community more concern for
the internal conditions of states, particularly human rights conditions, and
more action has been taken to address these conditions (see Chapter 9).
Examples include NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, the arrest of political
and military leaders for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Liberia, and U.S. interventions and state-building policies in
Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. There is also a growing consensus
that military operations alone are doomed to fail without accompanying
diplomacy, reconstruction and economic development. According to one
analyst, “we are all nation builders now.”36 Such interventions in the
domestic affairs of states, however, are inconsistent with the Westphalian
conception of state sovereignty and may suggest a dramatic change in
global politics.
failed states Unstable
countries with no clear
functioning government.

82 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
Security Threats
The celebration of several successful arms reduction agreements
between the United States and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) after
the Cold War was accompanied by concerns over new security threats.
Nuclear proliferation, or the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands
of more actors, became an important issue on the global agenda in the
1990s. India and Pakistan, rivals in South Asia, both joined the “nuclear
club” when they conducted nuclear tests in 1998. North Korea became
a nuclear power when it tested a nuclear bomb in 2006, despite years
of diplomacy and sanctions to prevent it. Concerns about Iraq’s poten-
tial to develop and deploy nuclear weapons led to the creation of UN
inspections of Iraq’s military facilities, and Iraq’s resistance to those
inspections led to U.S. attacks in the late 1990s and eventually a U.S.-led
intervention into Iraq in 2003. The Policy Choices box summarizes the
signifi cant international debate over the intervention. Iran has also been
part of the nuclear proliferation debate. Although Iran insists its nuclear
activities are only for peaceful, energy purposes, other countries remain
unconvinced.
In addition to concerns about nuclear weapons, fears of the spread
of biological and chemical weapons have surfaced. Although most states
have signed treaties that ban the use of such weapons, several states have
not signed the treaties and some that have signed nevertheless maintain
stockpiles of them. Chemical and biological weapons are relatively attrac-
tive to poorer, developing countries because they are cheap to produce and
fairly easy to hide, making the proliferation of them very diffi cult to track.
This concern has been heightened recently now that more states have bal-
listic missile capability, allowing them to hit targets with conventional
or unconventional (chemical and biological) bombs. The potential threat
from suspected Iraqi stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons was
another stated reason for the U.S.-led intervention in 2003.
The proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction
(discussed in more detail in Chapter 8) has implications for state sover-
eignty. The fi rst, a more practical question, concerns how states go about
preventing proliferation. As the situations in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea
demonstrate, states resist interference in their sovereignty. The second
question is more fundamental. Given the development of such destructive
capability, is sovereignty more important than the international interest
in preventing the development and possible use of such weapons?
Terrorist threats also highlight the potential change away from state-
centered conceptions of global security. Targeting civilians for political
purposes by non-state actors is not a new phenomenon. Yet, the number of
terrorist attacks has increased in the twenty-fi rst century. Contemporary
terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, are quite transnational, with member-
ship and coordinated attacks in a number of countries. The attacks of
September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the
nuclear proliferation
Spread of nuclear
weapons into the hands
of more actors.

P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should Military Intervention in Iraq Have Occurred?
ISSUE: In late 2002 and early 2003, the international community, particularly the
UN Security Council, was faced with the question of how to deal with Iraq and its
possible weapons of mass destruction programs. The following arguments divided
the international community at the time and continue to surface in the debate
over whether the United States should have initiated military intervention as it did
in March 2003. Since the invasion, additional questions regarding the integrity of
the intelligence on pre-war Iraq and the effectiveness of post-war planning and
occupation have entered the debate over the intervention in Iraq.
Option #1: Regime change should occur through the use of military force.
Arguments: (a) Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, represented a grave security
threat to its neighbors and the rest of the world. Iraq resisted disarming itself of
the capabilities to build weapons of mass destruction, and its past actions demon-
strated its willingness to commit aggressive acts. (b) Iraq was a “rogue” state that
had been or was likely to support terrorist networks like Al Qaeda. Changing the
regime in Iraq would have helped dismantle the support network for such groups
and addressed the post-September 11 global terrorist threat. (c) It was important
for the control of Iraqi oil to be in the hands of a cooperative regime, given the
importance of this economic asset to the world economy.
Counterarguments: (a) Military intervention was not the only solution to the Iraqi
security threat and should have been used only as a last resort. After several years,
UN inspectors had returned to Iraq and were making progress in verifi cation and
disarmament. There was no imminent threat to justify intervention at the time.
(b) There is no known link between Iraq and groups such as Al Qaeda, which his-
torically have been opposed to secular regimes like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. More-
over, military intervention and “occupation” of Iraq would itself likely spark more
terrorism. (c) Using military force to acquire needed resources is imperialistic and
lacks legitimacy.
Option #2: Military force should not be used.
Arguments: (a) Military intervention in Iraq, particularly with the aim of changing
the political leadership and government, represented a violation of the UN Charter
and the principle of state sovereignty, the bedrock of international law. (b) Given
the ethnic and political tensions within Iraq and between Iraq and its neighbors
(Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, and Jordan), military intervention would de-
stabilize an already unstable region, spreading insecurity throughout the region.
(c) The human consequences of war (civilian casualties, refugees, economic strife,
civil wars that might be sparked) outweighed the potential threat in this case.
Counterarguments: (a) State sovereignty should not be used as a cloak to keep a
brutal dictator in power, a leader who himself violated international law and the
UN Charter. (b) The Iraqi regime was a central feature of regional insecurity, hav-
ing attacked Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. (c) Repressive regimes that maintain
power will, if unchecked, create greater suffering and hardship. Declining infra-
structure, squandered resources, and persecution of various sectors of society are
more devastating on a human level over the long term.
83

84 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
United States heightened attention to this transnational issue and helped
to produce a broad coalition of actors dedicated to countering such non-
state actor threats. This effort was termed the “global war on terror” by
U.S. policymakers, and “has already surpassed the amount of time that
the United States fought World War II. And by any measure, it has . . .
had a seismic effect on the United States and the entire world.”37 Coun-
terterrorism is a diffi cult goal, as the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004,
in London in 2005, and in Mumbai in 2008 demonstrate. And despite all
the state power put toward his capture, Osama bin Laden is suspected to
still operate part of the Al Qaeda network somewhere along the border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan.38
How the world copes with contemporary security issues, such as ter-
rorism and proliferation, is affected by the distribution of power in the
international system, the policies pursued by great powers, and the reac-
tion to them. In the twenty-fi rst century, the United States sits at a posi-
tion of economic and military predominance. On almost every dimension
of state power (discussed in Chapter 4), the United States dwarfs other
actors in world politics. Indeed one analyst refers to the post-Cold War era
as the United States’ “unipolar moment” and another labels the United
States an “überpower.”39
This position arguably led the United States to pursue unilateral poli-
cies, particularly under the leadership of George W. Bush. As the fi rst U.S.
president in the new millennium, “Bush had set in motion a revolution
in American foreign policy. It was not a revolution in America’s goals
abroad, but rather in how to achieve them. In his fi rst thirty months in
offi ce, he discarded or redefi ned many of the key principles governing the
way the United States should act overseas. He relied on unilateral exercise
Suicide bombers targeted
London buses and the
subway system, killing over
50 people and injuring more
than 700 in July 2005.
(© Peter Macdiarmid/epa/Corbis)

The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 85
of American power rather than on international law and institutions to
get his way. He championed a proactive doctrine of preemption and de-
emphasized the reactive strategies of deterrence and containment.”40 The
Bush Doctrine encapsulated this change in U.S. foreign policy, proposing
that unilateral and preemptive action may be necessary and that U.S. mil-
itary predominance is critical in the post-September 11 era.41 Members of
the Bush administration also advocated that democratization of the Mid-
dle East was feasible and was the best strategy to secure U.S. interests in
the region and in fi ght against terrorism. These views were used by U.S.
policymakers to justify intervention in Iraq in 2003.
Much of the rest of the world disagreed with the Bush Doctrine and
its application in Iraq. Moreover, many were alienated by what they saw
as arrogance in the United States’ treatment of others. With the Bush
administration’s division of the world into those that were with the
United States and those that were against it and with the criticism and
ostracism of long-time allies when they disagreed with the U.S. approach,
the image of the United States suffered.42 The failure to democratize and
stabilize Iraq and charges of prisoners’ rights abuses in prisons in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay further depleted goodwill toward the
United States. Indeed, very few people in the rest of the world viewed the
United States favorably by 2006. In a survey of people in fi fteen coun-
tries, the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that “America’s global
image has again slipped and support for the war on terrorism has declined
even among close U.S. allies like Japan. The war in Iraq is a continuing
drag on opinions of the United States, not only in predominantly Muslim
countries but in Europe and Asia as well. And despite growing concern
over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the U.S. presence in Iraq is cited at least
as often as Iran—and in many countries much more often—as a danger
to world peace.”43 According to the survey, only in Great Britain did a
majority (56 percent) of people express a favorable opinion of the United
States. In some predominantly Muslim countries, such as Jordan and
Turkey, fewer than 20 percent of the respondents held favorable opinions
of the United States.44 The disenchantment with the United States and
its policies is arguably greater and more intense in the Muslim world (see
Map 3.5). “As is the case with many great powers, the United States has
a problem of being unpopular abroad. But in the Muslim world, the issue
is different and far deeper. The United States is not simply seen as being
mean-spirited or unfair. . . . [I]n the wake of the Iraq War especially, nearly
90 percent of the inhabitants of Muslim countries view America as the
primary security threat to their country.”45
While anti-Americanism in the Muslim world may serve the inter-
ests of certain religiously fundamental groups, it is more than that: “The
ferment within the Muslim world must be viewed . . . through a geopolit-
ical rather than theological perspective. . . . Hostility toward the United
States, while pervasive in some Muslim countries, originates from spe-
cifi c political grievances—such as Iranian nationalist resentment over
Bush Doctrine Set
of policies proposed by
U.S. President George
W. Bush emphasizing
unilateralism,
preemption, and military
strength.

86 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
the U.S. backing of the Shah, Arab animus stimulated by U.S. support
for Israel or Pakistani feelings that the United States has been partial to
India—than from a generalized religious bias.”46
As the situation in Iraq deteriorated from 2003 to 2007, the strate-
gies associated with the Bush Doctrine and the Bush administration—
strategies such as preemption, democratization and regime change,
and unilateralism—came under severe criticism, including in the
United States. Outside the United States, U.S. policies “. . . angered
even America’s closest allies, many of whom came to see their role not
as America’s partner but as a brake on the improvident exercise of its
power. It weakened their support for American actions. And it under-
mined their willingness to cooperate in dealing with those challenges
that were common to all.”47 The Policy Choices box summarizes the
controversy surrounding the Bush Doctrine.
INDIAN OCEAN
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN
XINJIANG
GERMANY
NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
THAILAND
C H I N A
BANGLADESH
BHUTAN
NEPAL
INDIA
ISRAEL
MACEDONIA
JORDAN
SYRIACYPRUS
LEBANON
TURKEY
1. SENEGAL
2. GAMBIA
3. GUINEA-BISSAU
4. GUINEA
5. SIERRA LEONE
6. LIBERIA
7. CÔTE D’IVOIRE
8. GHANA
9. TOGO
10. BENIN
11. MAYOTTE (Fr.)
I N D O N E S I A
PHILIPPINES
CAMBODIA
MYANMAR
LAOS
SINGAPORE
VIETNAM
EAST
TIMOR
BRUNEI
M A L A Y S I A
SWAZILAND
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REP.
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
RWANDA
MALAWI
BURUNDI
UGANDA
MAURITIUS
COMOROS
KENYA
97
4
3
5
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
BOSNIA&
HERZEGOVINA
ALBANIA
AUSTRIA
SERBIA &
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
QATAR
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
OMAN
YEMEN
SAUDI
ARABIA
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
R U S S I A
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAQ IRAN
GEORGIA
KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
EGYPTLIBYAALGERIAWESTERN
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
1
2
6 8
MALI NIGER
BURKINA
FASO
10
11
CAMEROON
NIGERIA
CHAD
SUDAN
MADAGASCAR
ETHIOPIA
SRI
LANKA
SOMALIA
TANZANIA
M
O
ZA
M
BI
Q
UE
DEM. REP.
OF THE
CONGO
0 750 1500 Km.
0 750 1500 Mi.
Over 85%
51% to 85%
26% to 50%
3% to 25%
League of Arab States
Muslims in Total Population
Map 3.5 Modern Islam, 2005
Source: McKay et al., A History of World Societies, 7th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Miffl in, 2007), p. 1046. Data from CIA World Factbook, 2005.
Reprinted by permission of Bedford/St. Martin’s.

The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 87
Although most world opinion welcomed the election of President
Obama, (and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 for his efforts
to strengthen international cooperation) it is too early to tell if this will
have a lasting effect on support for the United States and U.S. policies.
Furthermore, many blame the United States for the recent fi nancial crisis
and economic problems in their own countries.48
Globalization
States are also struggling with issues related to economic globalization.
Although interdependence increased dramatically by the early 1970s, the
integration of economies at the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century is more
geographically widespread (more parts of the world are connected) and is
deeper (more connections across economies have developed). Trade, produc-
tion, and investment are now truly multinational. “Consider the Microsoft
Xbox—a high-technology game console containing cutting-edge technology.
Manufacturing is outsourced to a Taiwanese company. The Intel processors
are sourced from any of 11 production sites, including China, Costa Rica,
Malaysia and the Philippines. Graphics processors are manufactured by a
U.S. company at a plant in . . . China. The hard drive is assembled in China
from components produced in Indonesia. Final assembly has recently been
moved from Mexico to China. The Xbox is a microcosm of what is happen-
ing under globalization.”49 Even this edition of this textbook was revised in
Turkey, copy-edited in India, and published in the United States.
The end result of further globalization is the development of one world
market, uncomplicated by state boundaries. Efforts toward creating single
markets across states have recently been made in various regions of the
world, including South America with Mercosur, North America with the
North American Free Trade Agreement, southern Africa with the Southern
African Development Community, and Asia with the Asian Pacifi c Eco-
nomic Community. In Western Europe, the move toward a single economy
began over fi fty years ago, but only recently did the European Union reach
its highest level of integration with its single currency, the euro.
States are certainly struggling with their responses to increased glo-
balization. While the economic advantages associated with greater inter-
dependence are attractive to many states, the costs are worrisome as well.
Some political leaders in the United States, for example, were concerned
that the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) would establish
an authority that could infringe on state sovereignty if states violated
global free trade principles. Furthermore, free trade often clashes with
other issues, such as security, human rights, labor standards, and environ-
mental regulations, and recent protests at WTO meetings demonstrate
some of the intense backlash against globalization. The poor economies
of the South—containing the less economically developed countries—also
fear that globalization simply means an Americanization of the world
economy, with all profi t returning to the multinational corporations in
the North—consisting of the richer, industrialized economies.
globalization
Economic, political,
and cultural integration
across state borders.
World Trade
Organization
Intergovernmental
organization dealing with
the rules of trade between
states

88
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Was the Bush Doctrine Workable and Justifi ed?
ISSUE: The Bush Doctrine, articulated by the U.S. president in speeches and
developed in offi cial policy documents in 2002, represented a signifi cant break
with both past U.S. foreign policy practices as well as with some general interna-
tional laws and principles. The justifi cation for such a change was largely rooted in
the fi ght against terrorism, itself a response to the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Key aspects that generated the most controversy are the Bush Doctrine’s emphasis
on military preemptive strikes and its focus on unilateral action.
Option #1: Unilateral and preemptive actions are necessary approaches to con-
temporary security threats.
Arguments: (a) Terrorism represents a new kind of threat that limits the effective-
ness of traditional deterrence. Thus, states must be allowed to act preemptively
and unilaterally if necessary to attack and destroy terrorist organizations before
they strike. (b) With the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the hands
of rogue states and terrorist organizations, states no longer have the luxury of
watching tanks and troops amass on their borders to make a determination that a
military threat is imminent. States must act preemptively to prevent future threats.
(c) When capability is distributed, responsibility is distributed. When capability is
concentrated in the hands of one state, such as the United States, that state bears
disproportionate responsibility for ensuring global stability. The United Nations is
not always capable and willing to effectively respond to threats.
Counterarguments: (a) Terrorist threats are better met with cooperative action to
track down and treat individual terrorists as criminals. Multilateral coalitions that
isolate or confront states that harbor terrorist groups are more effective than is
unilateral preemptive action. (b) Though the costs of waiting to fi ght only truly
defensive wars may at times be high, the chaos of allowing all actors in the in-
ternational system to take military action based on speculative or distant threats
would be far worse. If all states followed the logic of the Bush Doctrine, there
would be unrestrained interventions in the pursuit of narrow national interests. (c)
The U.S. capability to act alone does not mean that it should. The United States
does not have the exclusive right and responsibility for determining when action
is required. As signatories of the United Nations charter, states have agreed that
the Security Council shall determine the existence of threats to peace and the
measures to take to restore security.
Option #2: Unilateral and preemptive actions are dangerous to world peace.
Arguments: (a) The Bush Doctrine undermines international law based on the
protection of state sovereignty. Although international law is evolving to allow
for the violation of state sovereignty, it is only doing so in the extreme cases of
genocide and large-scale humanitarian crises, and then only multilateral forces are
seen as legitimate. Weakening international law and norms is not in the interest of
the United States or the international community. (b) Unilateral action generates
animosity, even from traditional allies. Aggressive intentions of others are diffi cult
to judge, and without clear signs of an imminent threat, preemptive action will be
seen as illegitimate. (c) Unilateral military actions are not effective against threats
(continued)

The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty 89
Increased interdependence also means that economic crises, such as
the fi nancial crises that hit Russia and Asia in the 1990s, quickly spread
through the international economy to affect many other states. This
was also true for the economic downturn that more recently started in
the fi nancial sector in United States. This economic crisis, which some
have compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s, left few countries
untouched and may have profound implications for globalization. The
richest economies, all affected by the crisis, responded with state inter-
vention into the economy (with, for example, more regulation and fi nan-
cial assistance to failing banks and companies) and economic liberal
philosophies that underlie globalization came under heavy criticism.50
According to one analyst, this means that “. . . the politics as well as the
fi nance of globalization has now been profoundly altered” and that “even
before the fi nancial meltdown, advocates for globalization . . . had become
deeply worried, as globalization has become a concept with overwhelm-
ingly negative connotations.”51 Globalization is not necessarily doomed
by this crisis, however. Although states are tempted to turn inward and
pursue national economic interests and sacrifi ce global economic coop-
eration, the international community might use this as an opportunity to
further globalization by, for example, cooperating to stabilize the global
monetary system.52 The international community’s responses to the
recent economic crisis are discussed in Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 14.
What is clear from the recent crisis is that globalization has trans-
formed the balance of economic power in the international system
(Chapter 4 details different conceptions and indicators of power). Although
the United States still has the world’s largest economy and the dollar is
sought in times of uncertainty, “. . . Washington today is in no position to
dictate to the rest of the world, as it did after World War II, the contours of
a new global fi nancial architecture.”53 According to many, the twenty-fi rst
century will turn into an “Asian century,” with the emergence of China
and India as important economic and geopolitical powers.54 One analyst
of weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral efforts to track and control the prolif-
eration of weapons of mass destruction are more effective than are military attacks
on “rogue” states.
Counterarguments: (a) International law allows for action taken in self-defense and
should evolve to account for the nature of new threats. International laws designed
to regulate state-to-state interactions are simply inadequate for dealing with such
nonstate actors. States should not be constrained by the UN Charter, which was
written in a very different period of world politics. (b) Although states should work
to infl uence how their actions are judged by others, they should not be constrained
by them. Policies that promote a state’s national interests and protect it from threats
are inherently legitimate. (c) The use of force is an effective way to deal with states
that refuse to comply with international rules and represent a danger to others.

90 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
argues, “This tectonic shift will pose a challenge to the U.S.-dominated
global institutions that have been in place since the 1940s.”55 Global
political institutions, another form of globalization, may have to signifi –
cantly change to refl ect the new power balance if they are to continue.
Political globalization can be seen in the increased importance of
international organizations, such as the United Nations, and nongovern-
mental organizations, such as human rights advocates, that act across
borders and provide services there were in the past reserved for sover-
eign states (see Chapters 4, 9, and 14). Cultural globalization refers to the
notion that people around the world are conforming in their habits (such
as watching the same television shows and eating the same food) and
their attitudes (such as beliefs about democracy and human rights). While
there is considerable debate about the novelty of contemporary globaliza-
tion, there is certainly strong opposition and countertrends occurring in
global politics and there are indications that the global economic down-
turn may be slowing down all forms of globalization. Chapter 14 dis-
cusses economic, cultural, and political globalization and the impact that
current trends may have on the sovereign state system.
Theoretical Perspectives on Global Politics
in the Modern Era
Each of the theoretical perspectives presented in Chapter 1—realism, liberalism, idealism, neo-Marxism, constructivism, and feminist
perspectives—refl ects on the history of global politics in the twentieth
century by focusing on different time periods and events and by using
alternative interpretations of history as evidence to support the perspec-
tive’s arguments.56
For realism, the Cold War was completely understandable, if not pre-
dictable. Given the international condition of anarchy, realists assume
that the two most powerful states will come into confl ict and attempt
to balance each other through military buildup, alliance formation, and
spheres of infl uence. Thus, the behavior of the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War was perfectly natural. The advent of
nuclear weapons, according to realists, transformed what might have been
a traditional confl ict resulting in a conventional war into an indirect or
“cold” war, but the underlying power dynamics and competition remained
the same as they were in ancient Greece and eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century Europe. Détente made sense to realists such as Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger, because the tripolar balance of power between the
United States, the Soviet Union, and China was roughly equal, and stabil-
ity could be maintained among the great powers in the twentieth century
as it had been during the Concert of Europe. Detente did not mean that
competition would cease, however, and thus the superpower interven-
tions in regional confl icts that persisted into the 1970s and 1980s were
inevitable as part of the power struggle. Once the distribution of power

Theoretical Perspectives on Global Politics in the Modern Era 91
in the international system changed, as it did with the end of the Cold
War, realists expected the dynamics of global politics to change as well,
but they did not expect an end to confl ict, as many had hoped. Indeed,
recurring confl icts of interests in the post–Cold War period between, for
example, the United States and China and security threats coming from
regional powers that seek nuclear weapons are inevitable given that states
continue to maximize their power, as realists expect.
Whereas realism sees continuity across the history of international
relations in the twentieth century, liberalism sees great change. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, developments after World War II, such as the spread
of democracy, decolonization, nuclear weapons, the integration of the
world economy, and technological developments that facilitated contact
between actors in global politics, contributed to the rise of complex inter-
dependence. As a result, global politics become the product of more non-
state actors, particularly with the increase in multinational corporations
and nongovernmental organizations interested in economic and other
nonsecurity issues. These actors with multiple interests and the linkages
that developed among them served to constrain states from confl ict and
encourage cooperation. For liberalism, détente and the trade agreements it
included were recognition that the basis for power had shifted to economic
sources and that states were interdependent and had more to gain from
cooperation. Interdependence further eroded the dominance of security
confl icts by facilitating political liberalization in the Soviet Union and
economic liberalization in China. In the post Cold–War world, liberals
point to the powerful forces of globalization and democratization that are
changing international politics and challenging the state-centric system.
In contrast to realism, idealism looks at the Cold War not in terms of
a confl ict of interests but a confl ict of values. On the one side, the con-
fl ict was about capitalist and individualist values; on the other side, it was
about Communist and social values. Idealists argue that it is diffi cult to
understand the vehemence that characterized the confl ict without account-
ing for this clash of ideology and values. Realists would counter that the
ideological rhetoric of the Cold War was simply window dressing— that
at its heart, the confl ict was a power struggle. Idealists also see that val-
ues played a role in the end of the Cold War, starting with agreements
signed during détente. In 1975, thirty-three European and North American
states signed the Final Act of the European Security Conference in Hel-
sinki, Finland. The Helsinki agreement included a provision on human
rights and political freedom. While the Soviet Union and East European
states routinely violated many of the rights they had agreed to protect, the
agreement nevertheless established a norm of behavior, and the discrep-
ancy between the rhetoric of the agreement and the behavior of the gov-
ernments spawned the growth of many dissident groups across the Soviet
bloc in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of these groups, pursuing the values
of human rights that are important to idealism, would play a signifi cant
role in transforming their countries and ending the Cold War. For idealists,
the application of values in global politics is particularly important in the

92 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
types of confl icts in the post–Cold War period. Ethnic confl ict and a vari-
ety of war crimes, idealists argue, provide moral imperatives for the global
community to respond. Values dividing cultures and religions are also key
to current global debates, according to idealists.
For the neo-Marxist perspective, the international economy of the
twentieth century has its roots in earlier times. What is particularly
salient about the modern era, however, is the continued division of labor
into the core, in the North, and periphery, in the South, even after decolo-
nization. Many former colonies remain tied to the economies of the impe-
rialist powers in many respects. The diffi culties that these states have
experienced in economic development are, according to this perspective,
due to the structure of the international economy. In the post–Cold War
era, neo-Marxists point to the different effects that globalization is having
on core and periphery economies.57
Constructivism and feminism provide alternative interpretations of
historical events in the modern era. Constructivists, for example, argue
that a state’s action during the Cold War had less to do with the “real”
situation of a bipolar system and more to do with the state’s understand-
ings of their interactions and their identities in world politics. Along these
lines, constructivists argue that the Cuban missile crisis was a “crisis” only
because of how the “Cuban problem” and the “Soviet threat” were con-
structed by U.S. policymakers. The missiles themselves, after all, were not
more of a threat based in Cuba than they were based in the Soviet Union;
they could hit the United States from either location. Thus, according to
constructivists, the threat from the missiles was not real but constructed.
This, they argue, helps explain why U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba
remains largely hostile and unchanged despite the disappearance of the
“Soviet threat.” U.S. foreign policy has more to do with the construction
of the “Cuban problem,” which continues unchanged.58 In contemporary
global politics, constructivism emphasizes the importance of socially con-
structed norms and institutions that constrain the highly powerful United
States. For constructivists, “the debate in the [UN] Security Council over
war with Iraq highlighted this complex interplay between institutional
norms and processes, the politics of international legitimacy and the power
of the United States. Washington commanded the material resources to
oust Saddam Hussein from power, but without Security Council endorse-
ment it has struggled to shake off an aura of illegitimacy and illegality,
seriously undermining [the U.S.] . . . occupation and reconstruction.”59
For feminism, the military confl ict of the Cold War that dominated
the second half of the twentieth century was masculine in character,
and the preoccupation with power and the superpower rivalry masked or
ignored more feminine issues and agendas. The Cold War did, however,
depend on women, affect women, and affect conceptions of gender:
A lot of women and men in Poland, Chile, South Africa, and
France never served in their governments’ militaries; yet between

Summary 93
1945 and 1989 their lives were also militarized. The militariza-
tion which sustained Cold War relationships between people for
forty years required armed forces with huge appetites for recruits;
it also depended on ideas about manliness and womanliness that
touched people who never went through basic training.60
Feminists are now asking what the end of the Cold War means for women.
As men and women who fought in the proxy wars that have now ended
return to civil society, a renegotiation of gender roles must occur. As the
Soviet systems were dismantled across Eastern Europe, the number of
women representatives in parliament has declined.61 As ethnic confl ict
has spread, local and international women’s groups have fought to get
rape, a form of violence that has occurred in many of the recent eth-
nic confl icts, classifi ed as a violation of human rights.62 As globalization
pressures lead some to embrace economic and political integration, some
women protest that economics is being pursued at the expense of health,
environmental, and safety concerns and that the new global economic
structures, such as the World Trade Organization, are even more patriar-
chal than are state governments.
SUMMARY
● Despite high hopes for peace and stability after the Second World War,
disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States over
the future of Eastern Europe formed an important basis for the begin-
ning of the Cold War. By 1949, the United States had formed a military
alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to protect Western
Europe from Communist encroachment and began developing a global
policy of containment.
● The Cold War quickly spread to Asia as the Communists won the civil
war in China in 1949. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950,
the United States led a UN military mission against North Korea.
● Decolonization following World War II would dramatically increase
the number of sovereign states by 1970. These states, called the Third
World during the Cold War, rarely escaped the superpower rivalry as
internal confl ict within them became proxy wars and as they became
client states in the competition for allies around the globe.
● By the 1960s, the Soviet Union and China became vigorous enemies.
Not coincidentally, relations between the Soviet Union and the Unit-
ed States improved when the Soviet dispute with China became even
more serious at the beginning of the 1970s. The United States pursued
more peaceful relations with both the Soviet Union and China in a
period known as détente. But détente between the United States and
the Soviet Union did not survive the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979, and the Cold War was reborn.

94 Chapter 3 The Modern Era
● The world economic system underwent dramatic changes by the 1970s
as the dominance of the United States declined with the rise of strong
economies in Western Europe and Japan. The 1970s also revealed the
dependence of these economies in the North on the states in the South,
particularly with the development of OPEC.
● The dramatic end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the war
against Iraq in 1991, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union signaled
signifi cant changes in world politics. A period of euphoria following the
end to many confl icts and a wave of democratization was replaced by
concerns over ethnic violence, failed states, nuclear proliferation, and
the challenges of globalization and economic crises. U.S. policies based
on unilateralism, preemption, and regime change, as well as continued
violence in Iraq, generated much criticism and resentment in most of
the rest of the world.
● Each of the major political perspectives uses different parts of the
history of international relations in the second half of the twentieth
century to advance their claims about global politics. Realism concen-
trates on the Cold War rivalry, liberalism on the rise of economic inter-
dependence, and idealism on the value confl icts and growing concern
over human rights. The world economic system perspective focuses
on the continued division of the international capitalist system into
a core and a periphery, constructivism on how the Cold War rivalry
was socially constructed, and feminism on the masculine nature of
the Cold War and the effects that the Cold War and its end have had
on women.
KEY TERMS Yalta Conference 56
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization 57
iron curtain 57
Warsaw Pact 57
containment 58
Marshall Plan 58
decolonization 61
Third World 63
Suez crisis 65
Six-Day War 67
proxy wars 68
nuclear parity 68
Cuban missile crisis 69
détente 69
Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 72
Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty 74
Gorbachev 75
perestroika 75
glasnost 75
new world order 77
failed states 81
nuclear proliferation 82
Bush Doctrine 85
globalization 87
World Trade Organization 87

95
Actors in Global
Politics: Power
and Policy
P A R T I I

96
C H A P T E R 4
The Power of States and the
Rise of Transnational Actors
Nations and States
The Power of States
• The Paradox of Unrealized Power
• Military Capabilities
• The Impact of Resolve
• Economic Capabilities
• The Power of Agenda, Ideas, and Values
• Matching Capabilities to the Task
Measuring Power
• Indicators of Military Power
• Indicators of Economic Power
• A Simple Index of Power
Transnational Actors: A Challenge to States’ Power?
Multinational Corporations
Nongovernmental Organizations
International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups
• Terrorism’s Challenge to the State System
Summary
Key Terms

Nations and States 97
For at least three hundred years, sovereign states have been the most important political organizations in the global system. Their preemi-
nence has not gone unchallenged, and there are good reasons to believe
that these particular organizations may not allow humankind to deal
with problems that have become more serious in the twenty-fi rst century.
Even so, states are still a very important kind of political entity and are
likely to remain signifi cant. An understanding of global politics neces-
sarily involves a grasp of the essential characteristics of states, including
states’ power to infl uence other states. States, however, are not the only
international actors on the global stage. Organizations that transcend
state boundaries include nongovernmental organizations, multinational
business corporations, and terrorist groups. There is indication that the
number and signifi cance of these organizations are rising and that they
represent a challenge to the power of states, if not to the state system
itself.
Nations and States
The terms nation and state are commonly treated as interchangeable in discussions of international relations. The name of the subfi eld itself,
international relations, is an example of this practice. Even though the
term includes “nation,” the subfi eld actually focuses on states most of
the time. Strictly speaking, nation and state are not exactly interchange-
able terms, and the distinction between them shows signs of becoming
particularly important in the future. A nation is “a named human popula-
tion sharing an historical territory, common myths and historical memo-
ries, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights
and duties for all members.”1 It is a psychological concept because it con-
cerns humans’ attachments to the group with which they identify. The
basis of national identity is often shared ethnicity, language, or religion.
A state, in contrast, is a political organization or a government that exer-
cises supreme authority over a defi ned territory.2
One of the major sources of tension in global politics today is that
nation boundaries are not contiguous with state boundaries. There are
several states that contain more than one nation; they are multinational
states. The state of Great Britain, for example, contains the English, Irish,
Scottish, and Welsh nations. Most states in Africa contain many, many
ethnic groups, some of which identify themselves as nations. Further-
more, there are many nations that cross the boundaries of several states;
they are multistate nations. The nation of Korea, for example, crosses the
states of North Korea and South Korea. Some nations that cross many
state boundaries are really not represented in any state; they are stateless
nations. The Kurdish nation, for example, is a minority in Iraq, Iran, and
Turkey. In rare cases, nation boundaries roughly match state boundaries
in true nation-states. Most of those who identify themselves as part of the
nation A community
of people sharing a
common identity, often
based on shared history
and culture.
multinational
states States that
contain more than one
nation.
multistate
nations Nations that
cross the boundaries of
several states.
stateless
nations Nations
that cross many state
boundaries but are not
really represented in any
state.

98 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Japanese nation, for example, live inside the state of Japan, and most of
those living inside the state of Japan share a Japanese national identity.
Chapter 7 will discuss the sources of national identity and the con-
sequences that national identity has for states and global politics. While
nations are a growing force of transformation and change in the inter-
national system, they have not replaced states as the dominant way the
system is organized. States remain the main actor on the global stage.
The Power of States
If states have traditionally been considered the most important kind of
political organization in the global system, the power of states has been
treated as the most important concept in the study of world politics.
Power, as discussed in Chapter 1, is the central concept in the realist the-
oretical perspective. States, according to realism, pursue their interests,
defi ned as power. Everything a state does can be explained by its desire to
maintain, safeguard, or increase its power in relation to other states.
But what is power? Although it is central to the study of world
politics,3 the concept has been defi ned in a confusing variety of ways.
Perhaps the two most important types of defi nitions of power distinguish
between what a state possesses and what a state is able to do. One impor-
tant defi nition is provided by Hans Morgenthau in his classic text, Politics
Among Nations: “When we speak of power, we mean man’s control over
the minds and actions of other men.”4 This has to do with infl uence. But
it is quite clear that many analysts also think of power as being embod-
ied in resources that a state possesses, such as the size of its population,
its geographical size, or the size of its gross national product (GDP; see
discussion that follows).5 Not surprisingly, the theoretical perspectives
introduced in Chapter 1 differ on which components of state power are
most important.
The Paradox of Unrealized Power
Most of the confusion about power arises from the complex relationship
between a state’s control over resources (what it possesses), on the one
hand, and its ability to affect the behavior of others or to control out-
comes in international disputes, confl icts, and wars (what it can do), on
the other. Some confusion might be avoided if we (1) reserved the word
power to refer to the resources or capabilities that give a state the poten-
tial to control outcomes and (2) referred to the actual ability of states to
control outcomes as infl uence. But the confusion surrounding the concept
of power in the analysis of international politics cannot be resolved with
a couple of simple defi nitional distinctions. If State A is more powerful
than State B in the sense that it possesses more resources, then we expect
State A also to prevail in confl icts, at least most of the time. Exceptions
to that rule are surprising, regardless of whether we defi ne power as
power The ability of
an actor to infl uence
others. State power is
largely infl uenced by
state capabilities, but it
is a multidimensional
concept.

The Power of States 99
control over resources and control over outcomes or whether we reserve
the term infl uence for the latter type of control. But exceptions do exist.
For example, the United States, with its vast nuclear arsenal and much
larger military force, took on North Vietnam in a confl ict over the fate
of South Vietnam, and North Vietnam won. The Soviet Union invaded
Afghanistan in 1979 and pulled its troops out in 1989, leaving behind a
chaotic situation that persists to this day. In short, although the Soviets
did not exactly lose the war in Afghanistan, the government the Soviets
were protecting did not last long after their departure. It seems fair to con-
clude that the tremendous advantage in resources that the Soviets had over
Afghanistan did not make it easy for them to prevail. They fought for ten
years and left behind a shaky government that ultimately fell to Islamic
groups that they (the Soviets) had been determined to keep out of power.
A common response to this kind of paradox of unrealized power (in
which far more powerful states lose in confl icts with apparently much
weaker states) is that the ostensibly more powerful states somehow
failed to translate their powerful resources into actual power. The United
States did not win the Vietnam War, according to this type of explanation,
because it did not want to win badly enough, or at least not as much as
the North Vietnamese did. Similarly, the former Soviet Union got bogged
down in Afghanistan for so long and with such uncertain results, because
it did not devote suffi cient effort to the task. “He had the cards but played
them poorly” is the theme of such explanations.6 Explanations of this type
are dangerous, because they are diffi cult to disprove. You might devise
an argument, for example, that in asymmetric confl icts, the actor with
the bigger army will always win. A critic could point out that although
the United States had a much bigger army than North Vietnam, it lost the
war against that country. You could save your argument by saying that
the state with the bigger army will always win unless it does not really
want to, and that is what happened in Vietnam. But you could then try
to save your argument with that tactic in every imaginable case. In doing
so, you would really be admitting that bigger armies are not really that
important, that it is indeed the will to win that is critical.
When we try to predict when power, or capabilities, will translate
into infl uence, it is best to realize that there are various types of power,
including the will to win, that factor into a state’s ability to infl uence
others. In addition to the military power and resolve, power comes from
economic resources, values, control of the agenda, ideas, and cooperative
abilities. Thus, states with great capabilities do not necessarily always
have infl uence.
Military Capabilities
The best strategy for dealing with the paradox of unrealized power
begins with the realization that such upsets in asymmetric confl icts
between states, especially if they escalate to war, are unusual.7 The
paradox of unrealized
power A situation
in which a state that
possesses greater military
capabilities loses in
confl icts to apparently
much weaker actors.

100 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Roman historian Tacitus, as well as Comte de Bussy, Frederick the
Great, Napoleon, and Voltaire (among others), have all been credited with
aphorisms to the effect that “God is always on the side of the larger bat-
talions.” In other words, when two states engage in confl ict, the leaders
and generals of both may pray for success, but usually the state with
the greater military force has a better chance of having its prayers
answered, thus allegedly revealing God’s preferences in such matters. It
is for this reason that realism typically focuses on military capabilities as
the primary ingredient in a state’s power.
If, for example, we look at the thirty wars between two states that
occurred between 1816 and 1965, we fi nd that the state with the larger
armed force won all but nine of those confl icts.8 A review of interstate
wars involving major powers over the past 500 years shows that major
powers usually win wars they fi ght against minor powers and, further,
that in more recent centuries, major powers have become involved more
often in wars with minor power opponents only. Not surprisingly, the
percentage of victories that major powers achieved in those more recent
wars has increased.9 “Most interstate wars [are] won by the stronger
nation or coalition. . . . Examples of confl icts in which militarily infe-
rior nations emerged as victors . . . are exceptional rather than typical
cases.”10
Still, the theory based on God’s bias in favor of large battalions is much
less than perfect, as is demonstrated by the examples of the United States
versus North Vietnam and the Soviet Union versus Afghanistan. And, as
noted previously, nine states with smaller military forces have won wars
between 1816 and 1965. According to one recent study, “Major power
states have failed to attain their primary political objective in 39 percent
of the military interventions they have initiated since World War II.”11
Furthermore, asymmetric confl icts that are fought between states and
guerilla forces or militarized insurgencies, instead of just between states,
are not always won by the most powerful. Unlike conventional warfare
in which massive numbers of forces attempt to overwhelm the other side
with weight and fi repower, guerilla fi ghting (also called asymmetrical
warfare) involves ambush tactics to wear down the other side, rather than
defeat it or capture and hold territory.12 Insurgent groups have had their
successes: “Indeed, they have succeeded against Britain (in Palestine),
France (in Algeria), the United States (in Vietnam) and Israel (in Lebanon)
in spite of clear battlefi eld inferiority.”13
It is possible to modify the explanation that relies on military capabil-
ity only slightly, allowing it to deal with the paradox of unrealized power
in many cases. If the state with the larger battalions does not win, it can
be argued, the state with the smaller battalions must have received help
from powerful friends. Thus, the larger battalions do win, in a sense, even
if they are not all directly engaged in the confl ict. In the case of Vietnam,
for example, both Russia and China gave material as well as moral sup-
port to the regime in North Vietnam. Some in the United States called
asymmetrical warfare
Unconventional fi ghting
between unequal
belligerents that often
involves ambush or
guerilla tactics to destroy
the more powerful side’s
will to fi ght, rather than
to militarily conquer it.

The Power of States 101
for bombing North Vietnam back into the Stone Age or turning it into a
parking lot (somewhat contradictory suggestions), and if the contest had
been clearly confi ned to the United States and North Vietnam, there is
not much doubt that the United States had the capability to do both. U.S.
policymakers rejected those suggestions, and even more moderate ones,
at least partly because the moral support offered to the North Vietnamese
regime by the Soviets and the Chinese (propaganda in radio broadcasts,
speeches in the United Nations, and so on) led them to fear Soviet or
Chinese retaliation if they moved too vigorously against North Vietnam.
Having accepted that limitation, the United States then found that the
material support supplied to North Vietnam by powerful friends (espe-
cially the Soviets) made it very diffi cult to win the war, even if that sup-
port was not great enough for North Vietnam to match the United States
in military capability.
Similarly, in the Afghan case, there is considerable evidence that the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cooperated with Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and China in efforts to funnel military equipment to the Afghan
rebels. In fact, the United States devoted billions of dollars to supporting
the rebels during the decade-long war.14 Accordingly, the idea that God is
always on the side of the larger battalions unless the smaller battalions
get help from powerful friends apparently holds true in the case of the
Soviet Union versus the rebels in Afghanistan.
This idea also receives interesting support from the results of the Per-
sian Gulf War in 1991. Before that war began, some people expressed fears
that the United States might get bogged down in another Vietnam type
of situation in the Middle East. There were good reasons for such fears.
The location of the confl ict—far away from the United States and right
next to (as well as inside) Iraq—created diffi culties for the United States.
But crucial differences between the challenge the United States faced in
Vietnam and that posed by Iraq made it very unlikely that the United
States would get into diffi culties resembling those that developed in its
war against North Vietnam. North Vietnam relied on guerrilla warfare
in its own territory; by simply staying in the fi eld for years, its troops
outlasted the invaders. Iraq attempted to use conventional means to hold
territory where its troops were unwelcome. The most fundamental differ-
ence, certainly from the point of view of the theoretical ideas discussed
here, was that while North Vietnam had powerful allies, Iraq had none.
On the contrary, while China abstained on the key votes regarding the
resolutions committing the United Nations to the removal of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait, every other major power in the world supported those reso-
lutions and the military effort against Iraq. Since Iraq received no support
from powerful friends in 1991, and the United States was not only much
more powerful but also received help from its powerful friends, it was
understandable that Iraq would be defeated, and quite easily. The same
occurred in the 2003 confl ict as the more powerful United States, with
the help of some allies, easily defeated the Iraqi state, which again did not

102 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
receive any outside assistance. As the war in Iraq continued, however,
it became more like the Vietnamese confl ict in the sense that U.S.-led
military forces face armed insurgent groups engaging in nonconventional
guerrilla fi ghting.
Overall, powerful friends may be an important part of winning inter-
national confl ict. Indeed, an analysis of all interstate wars in the years
from 1816 to 1992 shows that the initiators of those wars were more
likely to win if their targets did not get help from third parties, although
this was less true after 1945.15 An explanation based entirely on a com-
parison between the military capabilities of the two main belligerents,
as well as those of their friends, may not completely account for the out-
come of the confl icts in Iraq, what happened in Afghanistan, or the dif-
fi culty the United States experienced in Vietnam. One must somehow
decide whether the help supplied by powerful friends to the smaller bat-
talions is suffi cient, given the difference in power resources available
to the contestants, to account for the outcome of the confl ict. Was the
help that North Vietnam received from the Soviets and the Chinese, for
example, suffi cient to offset entirely the tremendous superiority in power
resources available to the United States over Vietnam? Most believe it
was not. How about the help supplied by powerful friends to the Afghan
rebels? Again, very few would argue that this was the single deciding fac-
tor. Was the superiority of the battalions sent into battle by the United
States and its allies suffi cient to explain the collapse of the Iraqi army
in 1991 and 2003 (which was, after all, rather substantial)? Ultimately,
Guerrilla soldiers load
a missile launcher
in the mountains of
Afghanistan during
their ten-year fight
(1979–1989) against
the Soviet Union.
(Robert Nickelberg/Liason/
Getty Images)

The Power of States 103
if the analysis of power suggested here is to be entirely convincing, the
resources of the larger battalions as well as those of the smaller battalions
and their powerful friends will have to be measured. As we will soon see,
the measurement of military power is not always as straightforward as
it seems.
Even if we take into account help from powerful friends, some inter-
national confl icts have surprising winners. The winning side in some
confl icts appears to have a lot less power on its side, as indicated by mili-
tary resources. This suggests that in addition to help from third parties,
other factors are important in assessing states’ power and predicting the
outcomes of international confl ict.
The Impact of Resolve
What other factors, then, should we consider in cases such as the Soviet
Union’s war in Afghanistan or the U.S. war in Vietnam? One possible
candidate that we have already mentioned several times is the will to
win, or resolve. Indeed, it may not be unusual for a weak state to win
since it might enter into a confl ict with a stronger state only if it has
signifi cant resolve. Although the will to win is often diffi cult to demon-
strate, particularly before a confl ict takes place, it is tempting to pursue
this idea regarding the impact of resolve on confl ict outcomes because it
is so plausible.16 In many asymmetric confl icts in the twentieth century,
for example, desires of nationalism and self-determination fueled many
wars of national liberation that pitted guerrilla insurgents against con-
ventional state militaries.
In the case of the war between the United States and North Vietnam,
many other factors played a role in determining the outcome. Yet it
surely seems logically and intuitively obvious that the Vietnamese did
have a greater will to win and that this is one important reason they did
win. Although the United States did make a determined effort, devot-
ing billions of dollars, tens of thousands of lives, and eight long years to
the cause, it still seems clear that North Vietnam’s resolve was greater.
The stakes of the confl ict were much greater for North Vietnam. The
United States became involved in the war in defense of relatively abstract
principles or distant goals involving the domino theory (the idea that if
one state became Communist, neighboring states would “fall like domi-
noes” and become Communist themselves), the importance of upholding
commitments, and making the world safer for capitalism. (We will avoid
here the controversy regarding which of these factors was most impor-
tant.) From the North Vietnamese viewpoint, the purpose of the war was
immediate, clear, and important: to rid their land of foreign invaders and
to unify the country—in short, to liberate it. The United States did have
a much larger military force than North Vietnam. But it also had a large
number of other foreign policy issues competing for resources, attention,
and effort, such as the confrontation with the Soviet Union, the defense

104 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
of Western Europe, the protection of Israel, and preservation of the stale-
mate in Korea. For North Vietnam, the war against the regime in the
South and its U.S. supporters was close to being its only foreign policy
concern, certainly the only really pressing matter to which it devoted
substantial resources and persistent attention.
In sum, the North Vietnamese will to win was greater than that of the
United States, which had to devote its capabilities to the pursuit of other
goals as well. And one need not rely entirely on logical or intuitive argu-
ments to establish this point. The greater North Vietnamese will to win
was refl ected, for example, in the fact that the maximum number of U.S.
troops in Vietnam at the peak of the war was less than 0.25 percent of the
U.S. population.17 North Vietnam mobilized a much larger proportion of
its smaller population; the number of North Vietnamese soldiers killed
(about 500,000, or 2.5 percent of the population) was probably equal to
the number of Americans deployed. The Vietnamese, then, showed a con-
siderably greater willingness to suffer.18
Similar arguments can be made regarding the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Some estimates indicate that 1 million Afghani soldiers lost their lives
in that war out of a population of some 15 million. Soviet casualties
numbered about 55,000 (up to 1988) out of a much larger population of
280 million people.19 Like the United States, the Soviet Union, while it
was fi ghting its war in Afghanistan, had a whole range of other issues
with which it was concerned. The rebels in Afghanistan, in contrast,
were determinedly single-minded in their goal of ousting the Soviets
from their country. Almost certainly, the rebels had a greater will to win
the confl ict in their own country than did the Soviet army.
Then, too, it seems likely that the Iraqi soldiers who attempted
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War to hold their positions in Kuwait
against the U.S.-led coalition were devoted to their task with nothing
remotely resembling the zeal with which Vietnamese soldiers fought
against the American forces during the Vietnam War. The Vietnamese
soldiers were fi ghting for the liberation and unifi cation of their nation.
The Iraqi soldiers were fi ghting to hold on to territory just recently
annexed by means of an invasion. Perhaps that is one reason, in addition
to the much bigger battalions it faced, that the Iraqi army was expelled
from Kuwait with relative ease. In the current confl ict in Iraq, how-
ever, insurgent groups may have more resolve to expel the U.S. military
than the United States has to pursue the diffi cult goal of stabilizing and
democratizing Iraq.
As we have seen earlier, concrete military resources have an impor-
tant impact on the outcomes of international wars. But even for inter-
state wars, the balance of resolve may be more closely related to the
outcomes than is the balance of power. That is, states with a greater
will to win, or resolve, are more likely to win than states that enjoy an
advantage only in terms of concrete military resources, such as larger
defense budgets.

The Power of States 105
Economic Capabilities
Extensive military capabilities may indeed refl ect a state’s economic
resources. Realists recognize that economic resources are obviously
needed to fund a sizable and good military and to buy a vast number of
technologically sophisticated weapons. That capacity indicates the abil-
ity of a state to produce both an abundance of military hardware should
a long war recur and weapons based on advanced technology, such as
missiles, computers, and (perhaps) laser beams of suffi cient quality and
in suffi cient quantity to deter, or perhaps even fi ght, a nuclear war. Eco-
nomic power may be so important to military power that we should think
about economic sources as the main determinant of a state’s power and
its potential to have infl uence.20 Yet in the cases that demonstrate the
paradox of unrealized power, such as the U.S. confl ict with Vietnam and
the Soviet confl ict with Afghanistan, the victor was both militarily and
economically weaker than its counterpart. And in both of these cases,
one can argue that it was the economic costs on the more powerful state
that forced a reconsideration of policies.
Beyond the ability to fund a war effort, many argue that economic
muscle is even more important than military might in contemporary
global politics. As discussed in Chapter 1, liberalism proposes that mili-
tary force is not a very effective means to infl uence many nonmilitary
issues, such as trade and environmental problems, that have become
increasingly important to states in an era of increased interdependence.
Furthermore, even if the issue is military in nature, using military force
can harm a state’s economic interests. For these reasons, liberals argue
that economic power is the most important form of state power. With
a strong economy, a state can have infl uence by threatening to hurt
others economically through, for example, trade sanctions or withhold-
ing investments, even if it does not have great military capabilities.
Neo-Marxists also place a premium on economic power. The divi-
sion of labor in the global capitalist system creates a core of the haves
and a periphery of the have-nots. For many neo-Marxist interpretations
of world politics, military power is the means to ensure economic power.
In other words, economic wealth is not viewed as the way to purchase
military might, as a realist might see it, but rather, military might is used
to perpetuate economic wealth. Thus, dependency theorists argue that
the control of the world’s largest armies and the control of international
security organizations help the core keep the periphery at an economic
disadvantage.
The Power of Agenda, Ideas, and Values
Many would argue that the focus on military and economic capabilities
as the primary sources of states’ power misses the more subtle ways
people and states infl uence each other. Especially in today’s world where

106 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
capabilities are fairly diffused across a great number of states, using
threats or promises based on military and economic assets, so-called
hard power, can often backfi re. What may be more effective is
a soft or indirect way to exercise power. A country may achieve
its preferred outcomes in world politics because other countries
want to emulate it or have agreed to a system that produces
such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the
agenda and structure situations in world politics as it is to get
others to change in particular situations. This—that is, getting
others to want what you want—might be called co-optive or
soft power behavior. Soft power can rest on such resources as
the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political
agenda in a way that shapes the preferences others express. . . .
[P]olitical leaders and philosophers have long understood the
power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the
framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends
to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture,
ideology, and institutions.21
Joseph S. Nye argues that the United States has soft power in the
form of cultural power—people around the world watch Hollywood
fi lms, listen to U.S. rock music, and want to wear Levi jeans—and in
the form of agenda-setting power—the United States was able to set up
soft power Infl uence
based on the attraction
of one’s ideas or on the
ability to set the political
agenda in a way that
shapes the preferences of
others.
Russian billboards in
St. Petersburg show
the spread of Western
products to the former
Communist country.
Many see the attraction
of Western goods and
values as a form of soft
power in global politics.
(Bonnie Kamin/PhotoEdit, Inc.)

The Power of States 107
international institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and
the United Nations, after the Second World War and continues to domi-
nate these global forums.22 In a sense, this was a recognition “that global
rule through coercion was unsustainable, and that it was preferable to
establish global institutions that could further American interests and
spread American values.”23
Idealists might agree that cultural power is important, but they would
focus on the values, not the materialistic goods, associated with a culture.
Cultural values that others respect give states moral authority. The pow-
er of moral authority, for idealism, also comes from consistently applying
cultural values to global politics. Soft power and the appeal of cultural
values are associated with the “battle for hearts and minds” that many
see as especially important in contemporary struggles. Democratizing and
stabilizing Iraq, for example, may have less to do with the military force
used by the United States to capture insurgents and more with winning
the acceptance and support of the people.24 Constructivists argue that
power, like any other concept, depends on its social construction. Con-
structivism sees power as much more than physical capabilities. In this
view, power is not something possessed by actors, like states, but rather is
a characteristic of ideas and discourse—that is, how actors and their rela-
tionships are defi ned. Constructivists do not ask, “Which state is more
powerful?” but rather, “What are the underlying norms and standards of
legitimacy that allowed this state to be represented as powerful?”25 In a
sense, then, power resides in the ability to determine ideas or the ability
to set the rules and norms by which actors are constructed. As ideas will
undoubtedly exist in advance of any specifi c confl ict of interests between
states, the proper focus for international relations lies not in the physical
capabilities and confl icts of interests of actors but in the representation of
those entities. Power, for constructivists, is about representing and classi-
fying states as “civilized,” “rogue,” “European,” “unstable,” “Western,”
and “democratic,” as these terms generate expectations and structure
relationships between actors.26 The power of actors in the international
system, in other words, is not determined by military resources but is
constructed from the context of existing international practices.
Feminists also question the traditional focus on capabilities as the
roots of power. More fundamentally, as discussed in Chapter 1, realism’s
defi nition of power as control contrasts with feminine defi nitions of
power as the ability to act in concert or action taken in connection with
others:
Power as domination has always been associated with masculin-
ity since the exercise of power has generally been a masculine
activity; rarely have women exercised legitimised power in the
public domain. . . . Hannah Arendt, frequently cited by feminists
writing about power, defi nes power as the human ability to act
in concert, or action which is taken in connection with others
who share similar concerns.27

108 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Matching Capabilities to the Task
Given the number of ways we can conceptualize a state’s powers, we
should consider that resources effective against certain targets for some
specifi c purposes are useless in different situations. In other words, the
explanation of a failure to realize power potential may not be, “the card
player had good cards but played them poorly,” but rather, “the card
player had a great bridge hand but happened to be playing poker.”28
In the case of the United States versus North Vietnam, this perspec-
tive would help us see that the United States had many military resources
that were not relevant to the contest. Its vast nuclear arsenal, for exam-
ple, did not help in the political struggle to win the hearts and minds of
the people in South Vietnam. Its clearly superior ability to wage con-
ventional war was not relevant to the contest with Vietcong guerrillas.
Despite important differences in the two struggles, the Soviets may have
discovered in Afghanistan that their nuclear weapons and conventional
war-fi ghting capabilities were equally irrelevant there.
In short, when analyzing confl icts between states in international
politics, it is sometimes necessary to admit that not all the power
resources available to the side with the larger battalions will be effec-
tive. No resource, then, not even the tremendous destructive potential
of nuclear weapons, gives a state power over everybody with respect to
every political issue. Different kinds of resources lead to power over dif-
ferent groups of people with respect to specifi c types of issues. This point
can be summarized with reference to the scope and domain of different
power resources. The scope refers to the specifi c issues over which certain
resources allow a state (or any holder of those resources) to exert infl u-
ence. The domain refers to the set of people over whom a given resource
allows its possessor to exert infl uence.29 God may usually be on the side
of larger battalions, but sometimes larger battalions lose if the resources
they possess are not relevant to the scope (the issues) or the domain (the
set of people) involved in a particular confl ict.
Still, the traditional focus on power as the ability to exert brute
force is not entirely misleading. Occasions when force is actually used
or explicitly threatened are numerically quite small, but the impor-
tance of brute force in international politics always lurks beneath the
surface of more peaceful transactions. A state may get its way (exert
power) by promising economic aid, but the promise may well be more
effective if the potential recipient knows that it could become the vic-
tim of force if it refuses the aid. Also, force is not used or threatened
very often in international politics, but the occasions when it is used or
threatened are often more important than those much more numerous
occasions when nonmilitary power resources come into play. Indeed, a
state’s very existence can be at stake on those rare occasions when its
ability to exert brute force is actually tested. For that reason, makers of
foreign policy are usually conscious, to some extent, of the possibility

Measuring Power 109
of war and of the relative ability of the larger states in the system to
wage war.
Measuring Power
Although there are various sources of a state’s power, their effectiveness
depends on the task to which they are applied. Military and economic
capabilities stand out as signifi cant factors in a state’s ability to infl uence
others. So, which states are the most powerful, militarily and economi-
cally, in global politics? It depends on how power is measured.
Indicators of Military Power
Many important writers in the history of international politics have
argued that geographical factors can have a crucial impact on a state’s
power.
Important geographical factors include a large land mass, which
is easy to invade but hard to control, and island status and mountain
ranges, which provide natural protection from invaders. All of these are
important indicators of military power. Geopolitics, or the relationship
between geography and political power, is, however, always changing.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. naval offi cer, noted in 1897 the coinci-
dence between the rise of Great Britain to preeminence in the world and
the development of its navy, and he argued that naval capabilities were
the key to national power. Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geographer,
responded that Mahan had let Britain’s temporary predominance lead him
to overemphasize the importance of sea power. Actually, according to
Mackinder, history reveals a constant battle between sea power and land
power, and whereas technological developments favored naval power in
the nineteenth century, the advent of railroads and the internal combus-
tion engine meant that land power would assume the dominant position
in the twentieth century.30
An appreciation of the importance of land power led Mackinder to
analyze the globe as a kind of chessboard on which the game of inter-
national politics is played. Three-fourths of that chessboard, Mackinder
noted, is water. Three contiguous continents—Asia, Europe, and
Africa—constitute two-thirds of the available land. Mackinder referred
to this land mass as the World Island. The other one-third of the land
on the globe is made up of the smaller islands of North America, South
America, and Australia. The key to dominating this chessboard, accord-
ing to Mackinder, was the heartland, roughly the middle of the World
Island occupied by the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Mack-
inder thought the World Island contained such a large proportion of the
world’s resources that whoever controlled it would, in effect, occupy an
impenetrable fortress from which to rule the world. Nicholas Spykman, a
U.S. scholar of international politics writing in the early 1940s, criticized
geopolitics The
relationship between
geography and political
power.

110 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Mackinder’s ideas and modifi ed the major thrust of geopolitical think-
ing. He argued that Mackinder was right to emphasize that the balance
of power in the World Island was crucial to the security of the “offshore”
states. But Spykman also believed that Mackinder had overemphasized
the importance of Eastern Europe and the heartland. The key to control-
ling the World Island, Spykman asserted, is the rimland—the area around
the outside of the heartland (roughly, Western Europe, the Middle East,
and southern and eastern Asia). Spykman summarized his view with the
slogan, “Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia con-
trols the destinies of the world.”31
Geography and geopolitical ideas may well have served as important
bases for assessing the power of nations in the past. But is it not true that
contemporary technological developments have made geopolitical think-
ing obsolete? Surely air power and ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons
have made the distinctions and relationships among the heartland, the
rimland, and the World Island meaningless. Or perhaps not. It is possible
that the new relationship between the United States and the republics of
the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, will reduce the signifi cance
(as well as the size) of their vast nuclear arsenals in world politics. Fur-
thermore, both traditional geopolitical issues and conventional military
means could replace the signifi cance of nuclear technology in the inter-
national politics of the Cold War era. If it is not true that future wars will
be fought with large arsenals of nuclear weapons and will last only a few
minutes, but instead may be more prolonged contests between mostly
conventional military forces, then geopolitical ideas may be of renewed
importance.32
One indicator of military capability that has always been important,
and will continue to be so, is a large population. No state with a very
small population can be extremely powerful militarily. This correlation
does not mean that there is a perfect relationship between military power
and the size of a state’s population. India, for example, is the second most
populous state (next to China) and Indonesia the fourth most populous
state (next to the United States), but neither India nor Indonesia is gener-
ally considered among the world’s greatest military powers.33 Even so,
one of the most obvious criteria for distinguishing powerful from weaker
nations is population size. And India and Indonesia may yet succeed in
the future in taking advantage of their large populations as a source of
infl uence in the international system.
Other crucial determinants of a state’s military power are the size
and quality of its military establishment. The nation with the largest
army, navy, and air force, though, is not necessarily the world’s most
powerful state. China, capitalizing on its large population, has the larg-
est number of military personnel34 and, while certainly a major military
power, is not considered the most threatening. This may be because the
total supply of available people is becoming progressively less impor-
tant as military technology becomes more sophisticated and capable of

Measuring Power 111
greater destructive power. An army equipped with tactical nuclear weap-
ons will probably be more than a match for a much larger force that is
not so equipped. In a sense, war has become more automated, and the
importance of sheer numbers of bodies in the military has diminished
accordingly.
Measuring the technological capacity and quality of states, however,
is diffi cult. We may recognize that the number of nuclear warheads is
important, but by this indicator, Russia is more powerful than the United
States, followed by France. One way to indicate both the size and qual-
ity of a state’s military is to compare military spending (see Chapter 8).
By this indicator, the United States clearly emerges as the most power-
ful, but the next biggest military spenders—China, France, the United
Kingdom, Russia, and Germany—are not necessarily more technologi-
cally advanced (in the case of China and Russia) or are not considered
major military powers for other reasons (in the case of Germany) when
compared to states that spend much less on their military.
Indicators of Economic Power
There are also many indicators of economic power. It is safe to say that
since the death of Napoleon, the most powerful nation on earth has been
the nation with the greatest industrial capacity. Great Britain dominated
the world throughout most of the nineteenth century, not only because it
had the world’s largest navy, but also because it had industrialized earlier
and faster than any other country on earth. The rise of U.S. industrial
might and U.S. status as the most powerful state in the world in the
twentieth century is not coincidental. The two world wars have accentu-
ated the role of industrial capacity in determining a state’s power, and
the introduction of nuclear weapons into modern military arsenals has
continued the trend. Developing and maintaining delivery systems and
a large number of nuclear weapons are technologically and economically
demanding tasks for any state. A large and sophisticated industrial plant
is necessary if a state is to marshal a suffi cient quality and quantity of
technological abilities and generate enough wealth to bear the cost of
nuclear weapons and modern delivery systems.
Economic bases of power also include natural resources. Modern
wars and modern economies require large amounts of oil, coal, iron, and
other raw materials. If a state has these within its boundaries, its power is
enhanced. But this factor alone does not determine a state’s power. Both
Great Britain and Japan are islands lacking in large supplies of most natu-
ral resources, but they both became great military and economic powers.
The fact that the United States has, and the former Soviet Union had,
great supplies of natural resources within their boundaries gave them an
advantage and may be an important reason that both emerged during the
Cold War era as the most powerful states in the international system.
Furthermore, in an age of interdependence, those that are less dependent

112
C
h
ap
ter 4
Th
e Po
w
er o
f States an
d
th
e R
ise o
f Tran
sn
atio
n
al A
cto
rs
Map 4.1 Countries’ GDP around the world
Source: McKay et al., A History of World Societies, 7th ed. (Boston, MA: Houghton Miffl in, 2007), p. 1092. Data from CIA World Factbook, 2005. Reprinted by permission of Bedford/
St. Martin’s.
Over $12,000
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahrain
Belgium
Brunei
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
$5,001–$10,000
$3,001–$5,000
Italy
Japan
Korea, South
Kuwait
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Oman
Portugal
Qatar
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Arab Emirates
Algeria
Belarus
Belize
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Dominican Republic
Gabon
Iran
Kazakhstan
Latvia Albania
Angola
Bangladesh
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Chad
Côte d’Ivoire
Cuba
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Haiti
Honduras
Kenya
Korea, North
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Mauritania
Moldova
Mongolia
Myanmar (Burma)
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
São Tomé and Principe
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Sudan
Tajikistan
Togo
Uganda
Uzbekistan
Afghanistan
Burundi
Congo, Democratic Republic
Congo, Republic
East Timor
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Niger
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Tanzania
Yemen
Zambia
$1,001–$3,000
$0–$1,000
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Georgia
Guatemala
Guyana
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Lebanon
Lesotho
Morocco
Paraguay
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Syria
Libya
Macedonia, F.Y.R.
Malaysia
Mexico
Namibia
Panama
Peru
Poland
Romania
Russia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Swaziland
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Venezuela
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Vietnam
Zimbabwe

Measuring Power 113
on others for natural resources, such as oil, are less constrained in their
attempts to infl uence others. But the history of the past hundred years
indicates that access to large quantities of natural resources is suffi cient
for a state to be powerful; possession is not necessary.
Industrial capacity and natural resources can contribute to a state’s
gross domestic product (GDP), a measure of the value of all goods and
services produced by the people living in a country and often used as
another indicator of economic power.35 According to this measure, the
United States is by far the most powerful, followed by Japan, China, and
Germany. Many would argue that GDP overestimates China’s economic
power, given that China’s large population means that its wealth must
be distributed over many people. GDP per capita takes into account
how strong an economy is relative to its size. By this indicator, the four
most powerful states are Luxembourg, Qatar, Norway, and Switzerland.
The United States drops to seventh place and China to ninety-eighth.36
Others would argue that both of these measures overestimate the economic
power of the United States given that it has a high national debt. Focusing
on only this feature of an economy, countries such as Afghanistan and Iran
are among the most powerful economic powers in the world because they
have the lowest debt.
Human resources, not just natural resources, may also contribute to
a state’s economic success. How skilled and educated a state’s population
is surely matters in its economic production. One measure of education,
the literacy rate, puts Georgia as the most powerful country in the world,
followed by Estonia and Cuba. Others would argue that an economy is
only as healthy as its people are. One measure of the health conditions in
a country is the infant mortality rate. Using this indicator, Iceland, Nor-
way, Sweden, Singapore, Finland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic are
the healthiest countries. Using life expectancy at birth, Japan comes out
on top, followed by Iceland and Switzerland.37
A Simple Index of Power
No index of power can take into account all the factors that allow a state
to exercise infl uence in the international system. But even a simple index
based on a few of the important, tangible elements that make a state
powerful can reveal key characteristics about the structure of that sys-
tem. The point is illustrated here by presenting an index based on three
concrete factors discussed earlier. The index, shown in Table 4.1, mea-
sures a state’s power in terms of demographic, industrial, and military
dimensions. A state’s total population is the indicator that refl ects the
demographic component of power. Three indicators of industrial capac-
ity are included: (1) urban population, (2) steel and iron production, and
(3) energy consumption. Finally, the number of military personnel sup-
ported by a state and the size of its military expenditures are the indica-
tors of the military dimension of power. The index score is derived by
Gross domestic
product The value
of goods and services
produced within a state
in a given year.
GDP per capita The
value of GDP divided
by the population of the
state.

114 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
TABLE 4.1
Distribution of Power Among Major Powers, 1900 –2001
Index Scores by Rank
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6
1900
US
(19)
GB
(18)
GE
(13)
RU
(11)
FR
(7)
AH
(4)
1913
US
(22)
GE
(14)
RU
(12)
GB
(11)
FR
(7)
AH
(4)
1925
US
(25)
SU
(10)
GB
(10)
GE
(8)
FR
(6)
—
1938
US
(17)
SU
(16)
GE
(15)
GB
(8)
JA
(6)
FR
(5)
1950
US
(28)
SU
(18)
CH
(12)
GB
(6)
FR
(3)
—
1965
US
(20)
SU
(16)
CH
(11)
JA
(4)
GE*
(4)
GB
(4)
1980
SU
(17)
US
(13)
CH
(12)
JA
(5)
GE*
(3)
—
1995
US
(14)
CH
(13)
RU
(6)
JA
(5)
GE
(3)
—
2001
US
(15)
CH
(13)
RU
(5)
JA
(5)
GE
(3)
—
Numbers in parentheses are index scores
AH = Austria-Hungary
CH = China
FR = France
GB = Great Britain
GE = Germany (* Indicates score for West Germany)
JA = Japan
RU = Russia
SU = Soviet Union
US = United States
Source: Figures refl ect the Composite Index of National Capability reported in the National Military
Capabilities dataset, version 3.02 compiled by the Correlates of War project at the University of
Michigan. For descriptions of this project, see J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey,
“Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” in Bruce Russett (ed)
Peace, War, and Numbers, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972) 19–48 and J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the
Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985” International Interactions,
14 (1987): 115–32.

Measuring Power 115
taking the sum of all six capability components for a given year, convert-
ing each state’s component to a share of the international system, and
then averaging across the six components.
The index is applied to the major powers in the international system
since 1900 at key time periods. At the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, according to a fairly fi rm consensus among scholars of diplomatic
history, the following states were the key major powers: Austria-Hungary,
France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and the United States. Austria-
Hungary’s status as a great power was permanently destroyed by 1918;
Russia and Germany, having also lost status in the First World War, nev-
ertheless regained it by the 1930s. Japan’s great power status is also appar-
ent prior to World War II. The Second World War eliminated the Axis
powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) from major power status, and signifi –
cantly diminished the relative power of Great Britain and France. China
fi rst appears on the list of major powers in 1950. At what point Germany
and Japan again deserved to be counted as major powers is debatable. In
order to trace their ascent to that status during the contemporary era,
Japan and Germany are included in Table 4.1 starting in 1965. Japan and
Germany replace France and then Great Britain on the list of great powers
by the latter part of the twentieth century.
This index of power has obvious limitations (as do the results of its
application in Table 4.1). It focuses on military power and ignores the
geopolitical factors discussed earlier. It does not take into account who is
trying to infl uence whom to do what, and so may well distort the relative
power of different states in specifi c situations. This limitation is espe-
cially relevant, because the index does not take into account alliance
ties or any intangible elements of power, such as soft power, skill, will,
or purpose—indicators that are much more diffi cult to quantify. More-
over, the index presented here gives equal weight to each indicator for
the whole period under discussion. This is an admittedly arbitrary deci-
sion whose main virtue is simplicity, a virtue not to be taken lightly in
the context of a preliminary discussion of operational measures of power
such as this one. For purposes more ambitious than this discussion, a
more complex or refi ned measure might be justifi ed.
Still, the index quite clearly portrays important changes in the struc-
ture of the international system from 1900 to 2001. Notice, for example,
the increase in the power of Germany before the First World War. Germany
surpassed Great Britain, and by 1913, it had become the most powerful
country in Europe. Germany’s unseating of the longtime greatest power
in Europe (Great Britain) and rapid rise to the top of the power structure
on that continent might well have been one of the unsettling elements
that caused the system to collapse in 1914. Notice, too, the extent to
which the United States benefi ted, in terms of its power advantage over
the other major powers, as a result of the First World War. The substan-
tial increase in the power of Germany before the Second World War is
reminiscent of that before the First World War. U.S. supremacy in the

116 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
international system is refl ected quite clearly in the fi gures for the years
immediately following the Second World War, and the emerging power of
China in later years is also quite apparent. Finally, the data refl ect Japan’s
appearance as a major actor on the world stage by the 1980s.
Did the Soviet Union really become the most powerful state in
the world by 1980, continuing in that position right up to the point of
its disintegration? Did China really become almost as powerful as the
United States by 2001, as the data for Table 4.1 indicate? There are several
good reasons to doubt these implications of the index, because it is biased
against the United States in several respects in addition to those already
mentioned. Total population, military expenditures, and steel produc-
tion may all be given too much weight. The index also probably does not
give suffi cient weight to the productive capacity of the economies of the
major powers.
Although the estimation of contemporary Chinese power does refl ect
the opinion held by many that China is the next likely challenger to the
United States,38 others believe that the components used in this index to
assess Chinese power overestimate the importance of China’s large popu-
lation and ignore many factors that are critical to comparing these two
states. In economic terms, for example,
Upon close examination, China’s record loses some of its luster.
China’s economic performance since 1979, for example, is actu-
ally less impressive than that of its East Asian neighbors, such
as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, during comparable periods
of growth. Its banking system . . . is saddled with nonperform-
ing loans and is probably the most fragile in Asia. . . . The often
breathless conventional wisdom on China’s economic reform
overlooks major fl aws that render many predictions about
China’s trajectory misleading, if not downright hazardous.”39
In terms of military power, Chinese military spending and capacity
have to be assessed in the context of its technological sophistication.
While China will certainly develop many important technologies that
are key to military power in the information age, many analysts see that
technology will favor the United States for many decades.40
In sum, no index of power will capture all the subtle aspects and
dimensions of the concept of power as it is used in the study of interna-
tional politics, although the scores in Table 4.1 are crude indicators that
can serve as an important baseline for many efforts to measure power.
Transnational Actors: A Challenge to States’ Power?
To assess a state’s power in global politics, we should not just consider its capabilities vis-à-vis other states. While states have been the pri-
mary focus of attention in the study of international relations, and in
this book so far, there are actors of a different kind in global politics,

Transnational Actors: A Challenge to States’ Power? 117
with which states vie for infl uence. These include intergovernmental
organizations, such as NATO and the United Nations, that are composed
of states as their members. (Specifi c international organizations are dis-
cussed in several other chapters.) But international actors also include
groups or organizations that are quite separate from states, referred to var-
iously as transnational, nongovernmental, or multinational actors. Their
distinguishing feature is that although they are involved in activities
that include people and objects in different states, they are not formally
associated with the governments of states. Transnational relations spe-
cifi cally refers to “regular interactions across national boundaries when
at least one actor is a nonstate agent or does not operate on behalf of a
national government or an intergovernmental organization.”41 Transna-
tional actors are defi ned by what they are not (they are not states and
states are not their members, as they are in international organizations)
and by what they do (they operate across borders).
Transnational actors include both business and nonprofi t actors that
operate across borders. Both types have increased in number quite rap-
idly in recent decades. There are, for example, more than 78,000 multi-
national corporations (MNCs).42 The existence of many small, poor, and
badly integrated states in the global political system makes many of these
MNCs look relatively strong and effective by comparison. Additionally,
there are many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are largely
issue focused. The organizations that are refl ected in Table 4.2, compiled
transnational
relations Interactions
across state boundaries
when at least one actor
is a nonstate actor or
an intergovernmental
organization.
Somali pirates
hijacking a
Ukrainian cargo
ship in 2008.
(HO/Reuters/Corbis)

118 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
by the Yearbook of International Organizations, must have aims that
are “. . . genuinely international in character, with the intention to cover
operations in at least three countries,” must contain members from at
least three countries, and must have a constitution giving members the
right periodically to elect a governing body and offi cers.43 They include
such diverse organizations as the International League of Antiquarian
Booksellers, the International Basketball Federation, the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Save the Children,
and the Rainforest Alliance. More rapid and inexpensive communica-
tions and transportation have allowed them to organize more effectively
and thus to have a bigger impact on the international system. Recently,
transnational piracy has garnered world attention. Pirates become trans-
national actors when they cross into international waters and target for-
eign ships. In 2008, there were over 100 pirate attacks off the coast of
Somalia alone.44
The growth of transnational linkages is consistent with the liberal
theoretical perspective of international relations (discussed in Chapter 1),
which expects increasing cross-national networks to foster more
peaceful relations.45 But nonstate actors that operate across borders
and challenge states and their authority may instead choose violence
against civilians as their method. “There is no reason to assume that
TABLE 4.2
The Growth of International NGOs, 1909–2007
Year Number
1909 176
1954 997
1962 1,324
1970 1,993
1981 4,263
1992 4,696
2000 5,936
2005 7,306
2007 7,517
Source: Figures for 2007 are taken from Union of International Associations, Yearbook of International
Organizations: Guide to Global and Civil Society Networks, Edition 44 2007/2008, Vol. 2: Geographic
Volume International Organization Participation: Country Directory of Secretariats and Membership
(Munich, Germany: KG Saur, 2007), 1719. Figures for previous years are taken from previous editions
of this same source. Reproduced with permission of the publisher.

Multinational Corporations 119
transnational relations regularly promote good causes. Transnational
terrorism poses a serious threat to internal stability in many coun-
tries, while some scholars have identifi ed Islamic fundamentalism—
another transnational social movement—as a major source of future
inter-state confl icts.”46
Transnational actors began to draw the concerted attention of schol-
ars of international politics in the early 1970s, with the onset of détente
between the United States and the former Soviet Union, which helped to
decrease the pressing importance of national security problems. Détente,
in turn, increased the salience of economic issues and other problems out-
side the area of national security, which nongovernmental actors could
address on a more equal footing with states. The 1970s also witnessed
some dramatic terrorist attacks, increasingly occurring across borders.
By this time, scholars and policymakers alike realized that international
actors without formal, organized military forces would play an increas-
ingly important role in international politics. Although the rebirth of the
Cold War toward the end of the 1970s and early 1980s refocused attention
on national security problems and reduced the attention being given to
nongovernmental transnational organizations, the stage seemed set by
the end of the twentieth century for transnational organizations to play a
correspondingly larger role on the global political stage and for students
of global politics to pay more attention to these types of actors. Indeed,
“the end of the Cold War should not be underestimated in its impact on
international relations theorizing. The failure of traditional internation-
al relations theory to at least recognize some underlying trends, pushed
many scholars away from structuralist theories such as realism . . . to a
renewed appreciation of . . . transnational relations.”47
This chapter now discusses three types of transnational actors:
MNCs, NGOs, and terrorist groups. None of these is necessarily new to
the international scene. Yet they are arguably different from their his-
torical counterparts, undoubtedly more signifi cant to world politics, and
related to other trends in contemporary world politics, such as the spread
of capitalism, the growing importance of international norms, and global-
ization. It can also be argued that MNCs, NGOs, and international terror-
ists challenge, as well as operate independently of and even reinforce, the
sovereign state system.
Multinational Corporations
Probably the most important type of nonstate actor to emerge in the past
two or three decades is the multinational corporation. But corporations
that do business in more than one state are not new. As early as the fi f-
teenth century, the Fugger family engaged in fi nancial and trade activities
on a multinational basis in several parts of Europe.48 Many companies,
among them Singer, Hertz, Unilever, and Nestlé, have been active in sev-
eral countries since the early part of the twentieth century.49 The Krupp

120 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
organization in Germany sold arms to countries in remote areas of the
world before the twentieth century.50
Today’s MNCs differ from those in the past in three basic ways. First,
in the past, companies that did business in several countries were head-
quartered in one state, and all or most of their production was centered
there. This has changed. International commerce is no longer just inter-
national trade, but at least a third of world trade occurs within fi rms.51
Today, if a company wants to sell its products in another country, it may
set up a subsidiary for manufacturing there, and indeed, sales of foreign
affi liates have recently exceeded world total exports. Furthermore, from
1970 to 2006, the total value of foreign direct investment (FDI)—the pur-
chase or subsidy of a corporation in one country by a corporation head-
quartered in another country—rose from $12 billion to $1.2 trillion.52
Second, there are many of these companies, and those involved on an
international scale have dramatically increased the number of their for-
eign subsidiaries. A combination of opportunities presented by improved
and inexpensive communication and transportation, the threat of being
closed out of new markets, and a desire to take advantage of cheap labor
in some developing countries has led to a rapid increase in MNC activ-
ity. There are an estimated 78,000 MNCs, with 780,000 foreign affi liates
worldwide.53 The 100 largest MNCs dominate the world economy, con-
trolling more than half of all global foreign assets and sales.54
The third reason that multinational corporations have become so
visible is that they have been spectacularly successful. One of the more
dramatic ways to demonstrate the degree of their success is to compare
foreign direct
investment (FDI)
The purchase or
subsidy of a corporation
by a corporation
headquartered in another
country.
Multinational
corporations treat
the entire world as
their marketplace.
McDonald’s and Wal-
Mart are pictured here,
in China.
(© vario images GmbH &
Co.KG/Alamy)

Multinational Corporations 121
economic activities (such as salaries and income) for corporations with
the gross domestic products of states. As Table 4.3 shows, many of the
largest economic units in the world are corporations, not states. By these
measures ExxonMobil is economically larger than Pakistan and New
Zealand, and Wal-Mart is larger than Cuba and Uruguay.
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122 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
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Multinational Corporations 123
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124 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
In rising to new importance and visibility, MNCs became controver-
sial partly because most of them were American. In the 1970s, seven of
the ten largest corporations in the world were American. By 1994, though,
out of the ten corporations in the world with the largest annual revenues,
only three were American.55 About half of the largest MNCs in Table 4.3
are primarily American based. Multinational corporations in countries
other than the United States are becoming increasingly important, but it
is also clear that the United States is still by many measures preeminent
in competition among global corporations. The United States is still the
primary source of foreign investment in other countries, but EU foreign
investment has been growing.56 In 2007, the U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment going abroad amounted to approximately $333 billion; the next
most important investors were the United Kingdom with $229 billion
and France with $224 billion.57
Even if MNCs are largely based in the United States, the relationship
between MNCs and the state is a debated question. Are MNCs a tool and
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Multinational Corporations 125
a source of power for states, as the neo-Marxism asserts? (See Chapter 1.)
Or are MNCs a challenge to states’ power because of their transnational
ties? Some see MNCs as no longer having any loyalty to the countries
that serve as their home bases. They are so intent, according to this view,
on serving and taking advantage of the global marketplace that national
boundaries, and the political entities they defi ne, are viewed primarily as
ineffi cient nuisances. This attitude is summed up in an article by Robert
Reich, former U.S. secretary of labor. According to Reich, corporations
have lost their national identity. He points to such corporations as Inter-
national Business Machines (IBM), in which 40 percent of the employees
are non-Americans, and Du Pont, which currently employs 180 Japanese
research and development scientists in Yokohama, Japan. Reich’s conclu-
sion is that “American-owned corporation[s] . . . have no special relation-
ship with Americans.”58 Although this is not exactly tantamount to an
accusation of treason, it certainly does suggest that the lack of national
loyalty in MNCs makes their motives, and their activities, highly suspect
from the point of view of states.
But it is also possible to counter suggestions that MNCs based in
the United States have become so cosmopolitan and so tied to foreign
economies that they are no longer really “American.” Investors from
the United States invest less than 10 percent of the U.S. gross national
product (similar to its GDP) in countries outside the United States, not
much different than what was invested in 1900.59 Even with NAFTA,
which lessened restrictions on MNCs doing business in Canada and
Mexico, fears that U.S. investors would dominate the other states’ econo-
mies were not realized. “Canadians invested at a more rapid pace in the
United States than U.S. fi rms invested in Canada, and although foreign
investment in Mexico soared—from $33 billion in 1993 to $210 billion
in 2005—the percentage coming from the United States declined by ten
percent.”60 Some American MNCs do earn most of their profi ts overseas,
but they are exceptions to a very different rule. In short, it is possible to
mount a plausible argument that “the power of the home country over
the multinational [corporation] has not diminished; if anything, it has
continued to increase. Corporations have not become national, multina-
tional, or transnational; they remain wedded to their home governments
for both political and economic reasons.”61
Indeed, one analysis of MNCs in the United States, Japan, and
Germany found that they remain quite distinct from one another, with “a
tendency for MNCs based in those countries to maintain an overwhelm-
ing share of the R&D [research and development] spending at home.”62
This same study, addressing the concern that MNCs have so loosened
their ties to their home bases that they can no longer be controlled by
national governments, concluded that “power, as distinct from legiti-
mate authority, may indeed be shifting within those societies, but it is
not obviously shifting away from them and into the boardrooms of supra-
national business entities.”63 In short, “durable national institutions

126 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
and distinctive ideological traditions still seem to shape crucial cor-
porate decisions[;] . . . markets in this sense are not replacing political
leadership.”64
The controversy over MNC activities in the world economy and their
impact on development of poorer states will be discussed in Chapters 10
and 11. At this time, it is important to note the potential power that
MNCs have in global politics. For example, “multinational corporations
can use their control over capital to shape the foreign policies of devel-
oping states, as well as global economic policies.”65 As discussed earlier
in this chapter, many theoretical perspectives see economic power as
critical to states’ power. For realism, economics is important to power
politics because wealth can buy military capabilities to further states’
interests. For liberalism, transnational economic power creates inter-
dependence that constrains states. From the perspective of world eco-
nomic system analysis, economic power structures divide states into a
core and a periphery in the international economy. If economic power is
important, as these perspectives argue, then MNC control of wealth, out-
side the infl uence of the state, is an important shift in the global power
structure.
Nongovernmental Organizations
In addition to MNCs, which work on the basis of increasing their profi t,
there are a number of organizations globally that attempt to infl uence
policies, help people, or connect people across borders:
A striking upsurge is underway around the globe in organized
voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofi t or non-
governmental organizations. . . . People are forming associations,
foundations and similar institutions to deliver human services,
promote grass-roots economic development, prevent environ-
mental degradation, protect civil rights and pursue a thousand
other objectives formerly unattended or left to the state. The
scope and scale of this phenomenon are immense . . . [and] may
prove to be as signifi cant . . . as the rise of the nation-state.66
Many of these organizations are transnational in scope and are
increasingly important players in global politics.67 “Although there may
be no universal agreement on what NGOs are exactly, there is widespread
agreement that their numbers, infl uence, and reach are at unprecedented
levels.”68 Early in its history, for example, the United Nations accredited
only about forty-one groups as consultative groups to cooperate formally
with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Today, more than
3,000 such groups have been recognized by the United Nations.69
There is a growing recognition that nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) can have signifi cant effects on state policies and global politics
through the creation of international norms, although their degree of

Nongovernmental Organizations 127
infl uence varies across issues and is greater when they enter the interna-
tional debate at the initial agenda-setting point of the process,70 even in
security issues.71 In 1997, a coalition of more than 350 NGOs, including
the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Human Rights Watch, and
Physicians for Human Rights, and the coalition’s leader, Jody Williams,
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts in bringing about the
Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty (discussed in Chapter 8). The coalition
brought about an amazingly quick and successful negotiation and ratifi –
cation process.
Whether the landmine convention is a harbinger of things to
come is an interesting question. A similar process was used
for the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court. . . . Here again, like-minded countries moved forward
with the support of international and nongovernmental orga-
nizations without the active support of the United States. The
same can be said for the Convention on the Rights of the Child
and the various treaties that emerged from the UN Conference
on the Environment and Development (1992).72
Indeed, NGOs have become particularly active in the area of environ-
mental politics.73 As discussed in Chapter 13, NGOs such as Greenpeace
have become very active, and NGO participation in the Rio Summit and
the Convention on Climate Change was unprecedented.
NGOs have been particularly important in the area of humanitarian
relief and human rights, and their activities in this area have deep histori-
cal roots.74 One of the oldest NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, was
started by a Swiss citizen, Henry Dunant, after witnessing the Battle of
Solferino (1859) in northern Italy and the 9,000 wounded who were left
unattended on the battlefi eld. After returning to Geneva, Dunant wrote a
book about his experience, concluding [it] with a question: “Would it not
be possible, in time of peace and quiet, to form relief societies for the pur-
pose of having care given to the wounded in wartime by zealous, devoted
and thoroughly qualifi ed volunteers?” It was this question that led to the
founding of the Red Cross. He also asked the military authorities of vari-
ous countries whether they could formulate “some international prin-
ciple, sanctioned by a convention and inviolate in character, which, once
agreed upon and ratifi ed, might constitute the basis for societies for the
relief of the wounded in the different European countries?” This second
question was the basis for the Geneva Conventions.75
The International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent contin-
ues to provide humanitarian relief today. Other groups, such as Médecins
Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), established in 1971, coordi-
nate and supply humanitarian relief and health services in times of con-
fl ict and natural disasters. This NGO was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
in 1999 for its global efforts. Groups such as CARE and Save the Children
also try to alleviate human suffering caused by confl ict and poverty.
humanitarian
relief Assistance
to relieve suffering of
individuals experiencing
hardship.
Red Cross/Red
Crescent NGO
established in 1859 that
has as its main objective
providing humanitarian
assistance and protection
to victims of armed
confl ict.

128 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Beyond humanitarian relief organizations, NGOs have been an impor-
tant part of the history and development of norms on human rights (see
Chapter 9).76 In the nineteenth century, transnational antislavery groups
put pressure on governments to ban the slave trade. Human rights groups
were also key in establishing the UN Charter on Human Rights at the
time the United Nations was established. One of the more intriguing
human rights NGOs to appear in the past twenty-fi ve years is Amnesty
International. This organization dedicates itself to the release of political
prisoners all over the world, as well as securing humane treatment for
political prisoners whom it cannot get released. The organization works
for the release of such prisoners “provided that [they have] not used or
advocated violence.”77
Amnesty International’s drive to curb human rights violations began
in 1961. A London lawyer, Peter Benenson, noticed a newspaper story
about Portuguese students who had been imprisoned for taking part in a
peaceful demonstration. Benenson organized some friends and acquain-
tances to agitate for the release of these students. It was presumed to be a
temporary campaign, but by the end of the year, the need for a continuing
organization had become evident. In 1962, the movement adopted the
name Amnesty International, and in 1963, an international secretariat
was set up in London. The group today claims a membership of more
than 2.2 million members in over 150 countries and was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1977.
Amnesty International . . . has been using its Urgent Action
Network on PeaceNet to mobilize its members to pressure
government offi cials to release political prisoners. It may come
as no surprise that dictators and tyrants don’t appreciate their
actions being made public through this democratic tool.78
Supporters of Amnesty International argue that there is little doubt
of the need for this organization. Governments now have many sophis-
ticated methods for apprehending political dissidents and abusing them
while they are in custody. Miniaturized electronic surveillance equip-
ment to gather information and computerized systems to process infor-
mation make it diffi cult for dissidents to escape the clutches of repressive
governments. Injections, tranquilizers, cattle prods, electroshock, sleep
deprivation, noise bombardment, psychosurgery, and sensory deprivation
chambers are among the instruments available to governments bent on
torture and behavior modifi cation.
NGOs also perform a variety of functions in international and state
governance. They often carry out policy research, monitor state commit-
ments to various international agreements, participate in international
negotiations, provide information to international and domestic con-
stituencies about state and business activities and positions, and facili-
tate ratifi cation.79 NGOs also function outside traditional governing
structures:
Amnesty International
NGO dedicated to
improvement of human
rights, particularly for
political prisoners.

Nongovernmental Organizations 129
NGOs are increasingly taking up functions that were once per-
formed by states. Feeding, public health, development, and edu-
cation functions have been largely abdicated to NGOs in many
regions where states are weak or collapsing, such as sub-Saharan
Africa. In Nigeria, public education has generally disappeared
under the military regime. The only education taking place in
the country is provided by faith-based NGOs such as the Jesuit
Mission Bureau.80
In addition, NGOs today deliver more offi cial development assistance
than does the entire UN system (excluding the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund), and states often use them as intermediaries in
foreign aid. Donor governments often see NGOs as more accountable and
more effi cient than developing states.81
NGOs have also had their share of criticism:
One recent study on NGOs and peacebuilding in Bosnia criti-
cized the use of advertising (from signboards to T-shirts) by
NGOs to promote their reconstruction programs to potential
donors. Such advertising, the study noted, had the effect of deni-
grating local rebuilding efforts and raising questions about where
NGOs were actually putting their money. In Sudan and Somalia,
NGOs have subsidized warring factions by making direct and
indirect payments to gain access to areas needing assistance.
In other confl ict settings such as Ethiopia and Rwanda, NGO-
constructed roads and camps for civilian assistance have instead
been used by combatants.82
Another criticism of NGOs concerns their fairly undemocratic
nature.83 Although these organizations often profess to speak for the
powerless and voiceless, they themselves are often unaccountable to any
constituency and can be closed in their internal decision making. It is
also diffi cult for governments, international institutions, and corpora-
tions that want to include NGOs and NGO input to know which NGOs
are reputable and which out of the many they should consult. Includ-
ing all relevant NGOs in policymaking would be a quite cumbersome
process.84
Nevertheless, the argument can be made that the global political sys-
tem needs to have organizations that operate outside or possibly above
the state framework to put pressure on states to, for example, protect
the environment. Similar arguments can be made for analogous organi-
zations, such as Amnesty International, regarding human rights issues.
For these and other reasons, probably a growing number of observers of
the global political system feel that “the relative power of states will
continue to decline. . . . Both in numbers and in impact, nonstate actors
have never before approached their current strength. And a still larger
role likely lies ahead.”85

130 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
The growing number and importance of nongovernmental organiza-
tions is a bit unexpected from the traditional, realist view of global poli-
tics. But although realist accounts of international politics typically do not
consider transnational organizations because of the importance of states
as the central actor in realism (or see them as puppets of states),86 real-
ism’s focus on anarchy as the key characteristic of global politics allows
for such nonstate actors to exist since there is no overarching authority
to control them. When state and nonstate interests collide, realism would
expect power to be the fi nal arbiter, just as it is between states. Thus,
from a power-politics perspective,
when there are confl icts between the state . . . and transnation-
als, outcomes will depend upon power. . . . For transnational
actors, one critical issue is whether or not they must secure
legally recognized territorial access, a . . . prerogative possessed
by all states, even the smallest and least developed. In some
areas, such as raw materials exploitation and civil aviation,
access is essential. In others, such as international broadcast-
ing, it is irrelevant. If territorial access is important for trans-
nationals, then states will have bargaining leverage; if it is not,
the position of central decision-makers, even in very powerful
countries, will be weak.87
Other theoretical perspectives stress different forms of power that
NGOs can use vis-à-vis states. Constructivism suggests that the use of
socially constructed norms has been important for NGO infl uence.88
“Nongovernmental organizations have deployed normative resources
to compel targeted states to alter their policies through a strategy of
shaming.”89 Shaming involves bringing to bear moral pressure to force
states to live up to their international obligations or stated values.90 One
study, for example, found that
States do care about their international reputation and image
as “normal” members of the international community. . . . Very
few norm-violating governments are prepared to live with the
image of a pariah for a long period of time. The Moroccan king,
for example, almost completely changed his rhetoric when
faced with increasing external criticism . . . [regarding human
rights abuses under his leadership]. His self-image as a benign
patriarch who cares about his people was shattered by the
domestic and international networks. In response, he
indicated his desire to belong to the community of civilized . . .
nations.91
This study concludes that the pressures from nongovernmental
organizations were important in improving human rights conditions in
Morocco, as well as in Indonesia, the Philippines, Kenya, South Africa,
Chile, Guatemala, and Communist Eastern Europe.92

International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups 131
NGOs, however, may not be in competition with states or a challenge
to the state system. From a liberal, institutionalist perspective, NGOs are
important, and not necessarily a threat, to states.
States have incorporated NGOs because their participation
enhances the ability, both in technocratic and political terms, of
states to regulate through the treaty process. . . . NGO participa-
tion provides policy advice, helps monitor commitments and
delegations, minimizes ratifi cation risk, and facilitates signaling
between governments and constituents.”93
From an NGO perspective, states are not competitors either. Indeed,
many NGOs rely on states for funding and other means of support.94
Other theoretical perspectives would also recognize, and welcome,
the role of NGOs alongside the state system. Idealism, for example,
would fi nd it natural and valuable that some NGOs are stressing values
such as humanitarian relief and human rights, particularly when states
do not attend to these issues. For feminist perspectives, NGOs have been
particularly important, outside the male-dominated state system as they
are, for advocating issues such as women’s suffrage and women’s rights as
human rights and putting them on the international agenda.95 The debate
over the relationship between states and NGOs is summarized in the
Policy Choices box.
International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups
Terrorist groups are the third type of transnational actor that we consider
in this chapter. Like MNCs and NGOs, today’s international terrorist
groups are related to other trends in international relations, such as glo-
balization, and they represent a potential challenge to states. Also like
MNCs and NGOs, contemporary terrorist groups are not new to global
politics, although they are arguably different from, more numerous than,
and more signifi cant than their historical counterparts. Finally, like these
other actors, terrorist groups can be transnational. Although many terror-
ists operate solely within a single state’s borders (such as Timothy McVeigh
and associates and their bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City in
1995), other terrorists act in a transnational fashion, across state boundar-
ies. Operating in many parts of the world, they include the Basque sepa-
ratist group ETA in Spain and France, the Jaish-e-Mohammed group with
activities in Pakistan and India, and Al Qaeda with members reportedly
worldwide.
Terrorist incidents are transnational when the actions or targets
involve more than one country.96 The kidnapping and killing of Israeli
athletes by members of al-Fatah’s Black September terrorist group at the
Munich Olympics in 1972 was “the fi rst major contemporary terrorist
incident that was truly international in scope.”97 There have since been
many more. In 1982, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction claimed
international terrorist
groups Terrorist groups
with membership,
support, targets,
activities, or aims that
cross state borders.

132 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should States Support the Activities of NGOs?
ISSUE: Nongovernmental actors (NGOs) have rapidly been growing in number
and increasingly play an important role in international relations. NGOs perform
a wide variety of functions, ranging from bringing citizens with common inter-
ests together, to coordinating business activities, to advocating for the rights and
welfare of disadvantaged citizens, to offering critical humanitarian assistance to
disaster victims. But what is their impact on the state-based system? How should
states relate to these nongovernmental actors?
Option #1: States should act to support NGOs, as they perform vital functions
around the globe.
Arguments: (a) NGOs step in when governments fail to do so. Thousands of peo-
ple daily would suffer or die without their assistance. (b) NGOs, as neutral actors,
can gain access to populations that states, with the baggage of their own self inter-
ests and histories, simply cannot. (c) NGOs are a valuable way for people to come
together who have common interests and needs. They break down the artifi cial
barriers of sovereign states and foster greater global interdependence.
Counterarguments: (a) NGOs are not simply value-free “do-gooders.” They have
missions, accept money from donors (often states), and have agendas that may be
at odds with various people or governments. (b) NGOs, when they step in where
governments have failed to, are actually discouraging governments from owning
their responsibilities to their citizens. In the long run, this may allow states to fail
and still remain in power. (c) NGOs lack coordination with each other, and this
can often make problems worse rather than better. One hundred NGOs trying to
help disaster victims might be worse than allowing the state where the disaster
happened take charge.
Option #2: States should seek to limit the infl uence and activities of NGOs.
Arguments: (a) NGOs lack accountability. Their actions, though often admirable,
are not always in line with the interests of the people they are assisting. (b) NGOs
can save lives, but they can also seek religious converts, push their values, and
otherwise leave lasting footprints on people’s lives. (c) If states do not limit non-
state actors’ power, the long-standing, effective, and stable international system
based on sovereignty is threatened.
Counterarguments: (a) NGOs represent the power of the people instead of the
power of governments. States that seek and support democracy and democratic
principles should certainly support NGOs and the activities of citizens working
together to address problems and communicate about important issues. (b) NGOs
save lives. They may not be perfect actors in all cases, but the good they do far
outweighs the possible drawbacks. (c) States continue to hold the lion’s share of
power in the world, with their national militaries and ability to regulate economies.
NGOs are in no way a threat to states.

International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups 133
responsibility for shooting U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Robert Ray
in Paris. In 1981, twenty people were injured when a bomb exploded at
a U.S. Air Force base in West Germany; the German Red Army Faction
claimed responsibility. In 1985, Palestinian gunmen hijacked the Achille
Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, off the coast of Egypt, killing one American
on board. Also in 1985, Abu Nidal’s Revolutionary Army Fatah claimed
responsibility for attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports. In 1988, a
Japanese group, the Organization of Jihad Brigades, claimed responsibility
for a car bomb explosion outside a USO club in Italy.98 “Given the per-
petrators’ citizenship and the multiple nationalities of the victims, the
four simultaneous hijackings on September 11, 2001, were transnational
terrorist acts” as well.99 More recently,
the 3/11 [train bombings in Madrid, Spain] are transnational
because they involved Moroccan terrorists on Spanish soil and
killed or maimed victims from a number of countries. The
kidnappings of foreign workers in Iraq in 2004 are transnational
terrorist events intended to pressure foreign governments to pull
out their troops, workers, and diplomats. These acts are also
meant to keep other governments from assisting the U.S.-backed
fl edgling Iraqi government. Clearly, terrorist incidents whose
ramifi cations transcend the venue country are transnational.100
Terrorist groups are transnational actors in other ways. “An act can
be transnational owing to the foreign ties of its perpetrators, the nature
of its institutional or human victims, the target of its demands, or the
execution of its logistics.”101 Even groups that operate primarily within a
country may receive money from international sources. The Irish Repub-
lican Army, for example, was partly funded by Irish Northern Aid, an
assistance group established in the United States. Terrorist organizations
also share information, weapons, and training facilities, and they create
networks and alliances across borders. In 1986, the Red Army Faction of
West Germany and Action Direct of France issued a communiqué declar-
ing their intention to attack the North American Treaty Organization
(NATO) jointly. This was followed by several attacks—the killing of a
French arms sales offi cial and a West German defense businessman and
the killing of two Americans in a bombing of a U.S. air base in Frankfurt—
for which the groups claimed joint responsibility.102 An international
conference of terrorist groups, all aligned against U.S. forces in Europe,
took place in Germany in 1986, with reports of 500 people attending.103
Terrorist groups can also be multinational corporations, with busi-
nesses in various countries to support their operations. The PLO, or Pal-
estine Liberation Organization (itself a political organization with several
terrorist groups historically associated with it) owned farms and shops in
Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Guinea, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe
and invested profi ts in stocks and bonds in Europe and the United
States.104 Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda group is reportedly involved in

134 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
banking, agricultural, transportation, and investment companies.105
Indeed, “it is striking how closely transnational terror groups like Al
Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers [of Sri Lanka] have come to resemble large
multinational corporations.”106
The international community has only recently put international ter-
rorism on the global agenda:
The evolution of terrorism as a major international policy
issue . . . occurred only in the last quarter century. Before that,
it was generally viewed as ancillary to some other problem. For
example, Middle East terrorism was generally viewed as a subset
of the Arab-Israeli problem. . . . The perception of a terrorist
threat distinct from an insurgent threat emerged in the late
1960s from the worldwide student antiwar protest movement in
reaction to the Vietnam War. It spawned such terrorist organiza-
tions as the Baader-Meinhof Group in Germany, the Italian Red
Brigades, and the Japanese Red Army.”107
While various efforts to combat terrorism took place in the 1970s,
1980s, and 1990s, the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
placed international terrorism front and center on the global agenda.
Terrorism’s Challenge to the State System
The history, origins, and defi nitions of terrorism will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 7. At this time, it is important to note that along with
multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations, terrorist
groups represent another signifi cant actor outside the authority of states.
If contemporary terrorism represents a challenge to the state sovereignty
system:
The use of terrorism implies an attempt to de-legitimise the
concept of sovereignty, and even the structure of the state
system itself. . . . The gradual transition at the end of the twen-
tieth century away from direct state sponsorship of terrorism,
and towards more amorphous groups . . . is a potentially serious
development. Obviously, states are far from helpless, but in an
increasingly globalised international environment, the tradi-
tional state-centric means of responding to such a threat will not
work and may even be counterproductive.108
Terrorism in the contemporary global context challenges many theo-
retical perspectives for understanding international politics. Realism,
with its focus on states as the primary actors, has particular diffi culty
accounting for the power of terrorist groups and the policies designed to
deal with them:
For realists . . . transnational terrorism creates a formidable
dilemma. If a state is the victim of private actors such as

International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups 135
terrorists, it will try to eliminate these groups by depriving
them of sanctuaries and punishing the states that harbor them.
The national interest of the attacked state will therefore require
either armed interventions against governments supporting
terrorists or a course of prudence and discreet pressure on other
governments to bring these terrorists to justice. Either option
requires a questioning of sovereignty—the holy concept of real-
ist theories.109
When states do face terrorist actors, their overwhelming military
power, also a key concept of realism, may not translate into victory,
because the terrorists may engage in asymmetrical warfare (as discussed
earlier in this chapter), which is often a challenge for states to resist.
Osama bin Laden, for example, has spoken about “the asymmetric
virtues of guerilla warfare. Indeed, the al Qaeda leader has often cited
the victory he claims was achieved with this tactic against American
forces in Mogadishu, Somalia, during October 1993—when eighteen
U.S. Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos were killed in fi ghting
with Somali militiamen and, according to bin Laden, al Qaeda fi ghters
too. . . . For bin Laden, the withdrawal of American military forces that
followed is proof that terrorism and guerilla warfare defeat more powerful
opponents.”110 Nonstate actors also rely on other forms of power. In the
“battle for hearts and minds,” for example, groups like al Qaeda, Hezbol-
lah, and Hamas win support and recruit members by providing public
services.
Indeed, in most Islamic countries, radical groups of fundamen-
talists have developed a social and cultural infrastructure to
build an Islamic civil society and fi ll a vacuum that their coun-
tries’ governments have neglected. For example during the 1990s
in Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, radical movements provided health care, education,
and welfare for those nations’ poor.111
Terrorism may indeed be a reaction to weaknesses in the sovereign
state system, brought on by other global processes and transnational
actors:
Rather than religious nationalists, transnational activists like
bin Laden are guerrilla anti-globalists. Bin Laden and his vicious
acts have a credibility in some quarters of the world because of
the uncertainties of this moment of global history. Both violence
and religion historically have appeared when authority is in
question, since they are both ways of challenging and replacing
authority.112
Globalization is undoubtedly connected with contemporary terror-
ism.113 Technology, as one engine of globalization, has been a tool that
terrorist groups have used to their advantage. And the backlash against

136 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
globalization has advantaged terrorists, as it is “fueled by a resistance to
unjust’ economic globalization and to a Western culture deemed threat-
ening to local religions and culture.”114 Globalization and its backlash
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 14.
For some, then, terrorism represents a new age of global politics, a
more transnational, globalized age. Others disagree:
Even the most prominent international terrorist threat of today,
from radical Islamist political organizations, are in reality
strongly rooted in the politics of individual sovereign political
states. Islamist groups involved in terrorism in Egypt, Israel/
Palestine, and Algeria, for example, are far more interested in
creating revolutionary Islamic regimes in their own countries
than in some utopian desire to submerge them into a larger
Islamic political entity.115
Yet even if the state system is largely intact, the current wave of ter-
rorism has certainly changed some relationships in that system:
While we have obviously not seen the last of inter-state war,
war between organised states will no longer be the main
driving force that it has been in the last 400 years or so. . . .
We have already seen evidence of a remarkable shift: States are
entering coalitions not to fi ght a traditional “war” or to deter
such a war fought by other states or coalitions. They are aligning
in surprising ways to fi ght the major non-state threat that has
successfully targeted the leading state power: the United States.
There is a new relationship evolving between formal rivals like
Russia and the United States, and China and the United States,
and the guiding principle around which they align is not mili-
tary power but the stability and integrity of the state system
itself.116
One observer sums up these points nicely, proposing that “the clas-
sical realist universe of Hans Morgenthau . . . may therefore still be very
much alive in a world of states, but it has increasingly hazy contours and
offers only diffi cult choices when it faces the threat of terrorism.”117
Transnational actors have proliferated in number and grown in sig-
nifi cance because of the changing nature of power and the changes in
world politics discussed in previous and subsequent chapters. The end of
the Cold War (see Chapter 3), the increase in the number of democratic
political systems and their possible implications for state-to-state rela-
tions (see Chapters 3 and 6), the changing nature and signifi cance of inter-
national law and international norms of democracy and human rights
(see Chapter 9), and the rise of global environmental issues on the inter-
national agenda (see Chapter 13) all contribute to, and also stem from,
contemporary transnational politics.118 Globalization (see Chapter 14) is
also inextricably linked to these trends.

Summary 137
It seems increasingly reasonable to argue that states need to give
way to some extent to these nongovernmental political entities. Even
the larger and more important states, which dominate an anarchic and
politically decentralized global political system, seem ill equipped today
to deal with a growing variety of problems such as global environmental
issues. Indeed,
the activities of these organizations are increasingly imping-
ing upon functions which previously were jealously guarded by
states. Not only have health, education, welfare, and develop-
ment functions been carried out by nonstate actors, but MNCs
and NGOs are now also active in law enforcement and police
training, economic and environmental policy making, land use,
and even arms control. 119
This development represents a potential challenge to the historical
and legal sovereign system of states. According to one analyst of these non-
state entities, “National governments are sharing powers . . . with busi-
nesses, with international organizations, and with . . . nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). The steady concentration of power in the hands of
states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for
a while.”120 Thus, transnational actors lead many to question the future
of the state as the dominant actor in world politics. Others see a change
in the international system that accommodates both state- centered and
nonstate-centered political relations.121 Some, for example, argue that a
world civil society is growing alongside the state that not only seeks to
infl uence state behavior but involves actors who have political signifi –
cance in their own right relating to each other outside of state-to-state
relations.122 Others have suggested that the world has bifurcated into a
state-centric world, in which states interact much as they have historically,
and a multicentric world, in which transnational actors and international
organizations dominate, and that these two worlds operate simultaneously,
sometimes independently and sometimes infl uencing one another.123
SUMMARY
● Nation is a psychological concept, referring to a group of people who
identify with each other based on a common language, ethnicity, or re-
ligion. State is a political concept, referring to a government that exer-
cises authority over a territory. State boundaries are rarely contiguous
with national boundaries.
● Power is a confusing concept, because it often refers to capabilities
(what states possess), as well as infl uence (what states can do). Because
occasionally states that seem powerful in terms of capabilities fail to
have infl uence, it is important to separate these issues and deal with
the paradox of unrealized power.

138 Chapter 4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
● There are a variety of sources of a state’s power. Military capabilities,
primarily the size of armed forces, are a fairly good predictor of infl u-
ence in international confl ict, especially if the capabilities of allies are
considered. However, less tangible factors, such as the will to win, seem
to be important in many cases of confl ict, including confl icts between
states and nonstate actors engaging in asymmetrical warfare.
● Economic power, especially given changes in the international system,
is another source of state power. Alternative conceptions of power in-
clude soft power, based on what others want to emulate and the control
of the agenda, and moral authority. Others argue that power should be
thought of in terms of ideas that make infl uence possible and in terms
of the ability to cooperate. It is important to think of power according
to the type of task for which capabilities are employed.
● Both economic and military capabilities can be measured in a variety
of ways. Different measures often point to different power rankings. An
index of power seeks to include multiple measures and can show the
relative change in states’ power over time.
● Transnational relations that involve multinational corporations, non-
governmental organizations, and terrorist groups may represent the
wave of the future. Certainly these types of transnational actors are
having a signifi cant impact on global politics. The global political sys-
tem today faces numerous problems that a state-dominated system
may fi nd impossible to resolve. Transnational organizations have be-
come increasingly visible in recent decades and may pose a challenge
to states’ power.
● MNCs have proliferated in the past twenty or thirty years and have
been very successful. MNCs are controversial, because they have been
dominated by American fi rms, and they are seen as potential challenges
to states because of their size and their transnational interests.
● NGOs have proliferated over the past few decades and now perform a
variety of functions in international and state governance. Their im-
pact in human rights, development assistance, humanitarian relief, se-
curity issues, and environmental politics is signifi cant. In many ways,
the rise of NGO activity represents a challenge to the state system
and the perspectives that place states as the central actors in inter-
national politics. In other ways, though, NGOs appear complemen-
tary to states and offer avenues for addressing issues that cross state
boundaries.
● Many terrorist groups operate transnationally and have international
targets. International terrorism is not new but has recently been placed
at the top of the international agenda. As nonstate actors, terrorist
groups are another challenge to the power of states, the concept of state
sovereignty, and the ways we think about global politics.

Key Terms 139
KEY TERMS nation 97
multinational states 97
multistate nations 97
stateless nations 97
power 98
paradox of unrealized power 99
asymmetrical warfare 100
soft power 106
geopolitics 109
gross domestic product 113
GDP per capita 113
transnational relations 117
foreign direct investment
(FDI) 120
humanitarian relief 127
Red Cross/Red Crescent 127
Amnesty International 128
international terrorist
groups 131

140
C H A P T E R 5
Inside States: The Making
of Foreign Policy
Public Opinion
• Does the Public Know or Care about Foreign Policy?
• Is Public Opinion Moody or Wise?
• Does Public Opinion Infl uence Foreign Policy?
• Should the Public Infl uence Foreign Policy?
Differences in Political Systems
• Are Democracies More Peaceful?
• How Do Differences in Political Institutions Affect Foreign Policy?
Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition
• Do Interest Groups Infl uence Foreign Policy in Democracies?
• Does the Military-Industrial Complex Infl uence Defense Policy?
• What Is the Role of Military and Political Opposition Groups in
Nondemocracies?
• What Effects Does Political Opposition Have on Foreign Policy?
Foreign Policy Bureaucracies
• SOPs in Action: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Responses to the
September 11 Attacks
Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making
• Leaders’ Beliefs
• Information Processing
• Leadership Styles
• Group Decision Making
Summary
Key Terms

Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy 141
In most discussions of global politics (including the previous chapters in this book), people speak of states as the actors in international poli-
tics. News agencies, for example, report that “Brazil agreed to trade terms
today,” or “Indonesia refused to attend a meeting” or “Moscow decided
to send troops.” In such reports, states or their capitals, are treated as if
they are unitary actors—monolithic, speaking with one voice, and with
no divisions or differences of opinions within the government or the
larger society.
This assumption that states are unitary actors is consistent with
most theoretical perspectives for understanding global politics. In par-
ticular, realism sees sovereign states as having control over the people in
its territory and therefore able to quell any divisions. In addition, realism
believes that because security is the primary issue facing states, reason-
able people will put aside any differences they may have and act with
one voice for the sake of national interests. While other theoretical per-
spectives, such as liberalism and neo-Marxism, do not assume states are
unitary (liberalism sees multiple channels existing across states, and neo-
Marxism sees economic classes existing across states), they generally do
not examine what goes on inside states and how this affects states’ for-
eign policies. Only liberalism’s claim that democratic governments are
more constrained than nondemocratic governments takes seriously how
the politics within states affects the politics between states.
Many who study international relations, however, believe that in
order to understand what goes on between states, it is necessary to under-
stand what goes on within them. This is the foreign policy approach.
“Foreign policy consists of those discrete offi cial actions of the authori-
tative decisionmaker of a nation’s government, or their agents, which
are intended by the decisionmakers to infl uence the behavior of interna-
tional actors external to their own policy.”1 The foreign policy approach
to understanding global politics argues that attention to what goes on
inside states can give us a better explanation for why states might not be
acting as expected in response to international conditions. France dur-
ing the Cold War, for example, attempted to defy the constraints of the
bipolar Cold War, even opting out of the military structure of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi
does not take the limited power of his small state as a given but instead
attempts to “exploit the seams” of the international system by crafting a
maverick foreign policy.3 Britain today faces many of the same economic
constraints as other European Union (EU) members, but instead has cho-
sen not to join the single currency.4 Attention to domestic actors and
politics, many argue, can help explain why some states challenge inter-
national constraints. Part of the explanation may be that they are not in
fact unitary. The disagreements that occur within states and how those
are resolved are considered domestic sources of foreign policy. Domes-
tic sources of foreign policy include what the public is like, the type of
political system, and how decisions get made—particularly the effects of
unitary actors
Assumption that states
are monolithic, with
no divisions or opinion
differences within
government or the larger
society.
foreign policy
approach The approach
to understanding
international politics that
focuses on how domestic
actors seek to infl uence
states’ actions and the
ways in which foreign
policy is made.

142 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
bureaucracies and the characteristics of leaders on the process of making
foreign policy.
The theoretical perspectives of realism and liberalism also often
assume that states, or their leaders who represent states, are rational
actors.
The rational model, as usually conceived, maintains that an
individual decisionmaker reaches a decision via a clearly defi ned
intellectual process: He or she clarifi es and ranks values and
goals; then weighs all (or at least the leading) alternative courses
of action (policies); the likely consequences (costs/benefi ts) of
each; and ultimately chooses the optimal course(s) of action
with regard to the ends pursued.5
Because most of the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapter 1
focus on the constraints of the international system (realism focuses
on the anarchical nature of the system and the distribution of power in
the system, liberalism on the degree of interdependence, and neo-marxism
on the structure of wealth in the international capitalist system), states
are assumed to respond rationally to these constraints. While domestic
actors may rationally respond to internal constraints, they may also mis-
perceive or ignore both internal and external constraints. The psycho-
logical approach to foreign policy focuses on leaders’ beliefs and images
of other countries, their personalities and policymaking styles, and how
individuals and groups process information and make choices that may
be less than perfect.
Public Opinion
One domestic source of foreign policy is the people themselves. What a state does in international politics may be driven by what the people,
rather than just the leaders, think the state should do. Public opinion con-
cerns the attitudes people of a state have on a particular foreign policy.
The public may be divided over what the state should do, or there may be
a consensus. In either event, the public may push state leaders to act in
ways that are not necessarily in the optimal interests of the state. When
there is a division in public opinion or when leaders’ preferences are at
odds with public opinion, the state is clearly not unitary. How these dif-
ferences are negotiated, then, becomes important for understanding state
behavior in global politics. For the public to be considered a source of a
state’s foreign policy, three conditions must be satisfi ed: (1) The public
must have knowledge of foreign policy; (2) public opinion must be stable
enough for leaders to judge what the people want; and (3) the public’s
views must be taken into account by policymakers. According to demo-
cratic theory, these conditions must be met for foreign policy to represent
“the will of the people.” Indeed, we would expect foreign policy to be more
affected by public opinion in democracies, compared to authoritarian
rational actors The
idea that individuals
make decisions through
a process that includes
clarifi cation of goals,
weighing of alternatives
and consequences, and
selection of optimal
course of action.
psychological
approach Focuses
on leaders’ beliefs,
personalities, and styles,
and how individuals
and groups process
information and make
decisions.
public opinion The
attitudes that people have
regarding their state’s
goals and policies.

Public Opinion 143
systems, because democracies have institutionalized means for citizens
to infl uence policy. Even in authoritarian systems, however, the question
of the impact of public opinion on foreign policy is not irrelevant.
Does the Public Know or Care about Foreign Policy?
Most people do not know or care very much about international politics.
This is true even in democracies such as the United States, where people
have access to information on foreign policy issues.6 Examples abound.
“It has been easy to portray the American public as one knowing little
about major political issues and not eager to learn more.”7 Surveys show
that in 1979, only about 34 percent of Americans knew which two coun-
tries were participants in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).8
The war in Vietnam was one of the most intensely debated foreign policy
issues in U.S. history; 58,000 American soldiers lost their lives, and the
war generated more domestic unrest than the United States had seen
since the Civil War. And yet in 1985, less than two-thirds of the Ameri-
can public knew that the United States had supported South Vietnam
against North Vietnam in that war.9 A study by the National Geographic
Society in 1988 reported that many Americans could not fi nd the United
States, much less England, Greece, Hungary, or Poland, on a world map
and that fully half did not know that France, China, and India have nuclear
weapons.10 Even on economic issues that presumably more directly touch
people’s lives, Americans are largely ignorant. During the debates of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), for example, only 50
percent of Americans had ever heard of the agreement.11 Ignorance of
foreign affairs is not limited to the American public. In France, Germany,
and Japan as well as in the United States, only about “20–30 percent of
the public indicate serious concern about foreign affairs.”12 In short, it
is widely agreed that “the vast majority of citizens hold pictures of the
world that are at best sketchy, blurred, and without detail, or at worst so
impoverished as to beggar description.”13
In any society, individuals are most likely to be concerned about
problems that affect them directly and over which they feel they have
some control. Problems on the scale of international politics often seem
to fail on both counts. Wars, economic crises, and coups in one part of
the world can have a dramatic impact on the lives of individuals in other
parts of the world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, for example,
can lead to reductions in the defense budget and the closing of military
bases all over the country. But the connection between events in certain
countries and their impact on individuals in other countries is seldom
so clear. And even if the effect of international events is great, individu-
als in the countries affected may not have enough knowledge to be able
to see the link between such events and their local impact. Add to this
the fact that even when the link is clear, most individuals feel they have
no control over the event or its consequences, and it is not hard to see

144 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
why most people, even in countries whose citizens are on average rela-
tively wealthy and highly educated, do not know or care very much about
international politics. The relatively small number of people who do pay
attention to and are relatively knowledgeable about foreign policy issues
and international politics is sometimes referred to as the attentive public
and typically consists of no more than 10 percent of the population.14
There are reasons to hope that public opinion in most countries of the
world is becoming better informed in relation to foreign policies.
The expansion of analytic skills is . . . worldwide in scope. Not
only for citizens in democratic and industrialized societies, but
also for Afghan tribesmen and Argentine gauchos, for peasants
in India and protesters in Chile, for guerrillas in Peru and stu-
dents in the Philippines, for blacks in South Africa and Palestin-
ians in Israel, the interdependence of global life and the conse-
quences of collective actions are daily experiences.15
One reason for this change is that higher educational levels are
increasing almost everywhere. “Enrollments in higher education have
been increasing since 1970 in every part of the world. . . . The same has
been true since 1960 in primary and secondary education as well, and for
both males and females.”16 Another reason has to do with the worldwide
spread of television and the Internet. Even in such desperately poor coun-
tries as India, over half of the population now has access to television.
“Access to television has become suffi ciently global in scope that it must
be regarded as a change of [fundamental] proportions.”17
Is Public Opinion Moody or Wise?
Even if the public is interested and informed about foreign policy, they
would have great diffi culty infl uencing leaders if public opinion was so
unstable that leaders could not confi dently discern and predict what the
public prefers. The conventional wisdom has been that public opinion
on foreign policy is subject to wildly fl uctuating moods and cannot be
counted on for consistent support of foreign policy commitments.18 But
the available evidence does not consistently support such a negative view
of public opinion regarding foreign policy. There certainly are fl uctuations
in public opinion about foreign policy issues, but they are not unpredict-
able or irrational shifts.
Opinion shifts in the American public from 1935 to 1985 regarding
issues such as isolationism, the Cold War, the Korean War, the United
Nations, Vietnam, and détente, for example, were arguably “understand-
able in terms of changing circumstances and changing information. More-
over, . . . most of them [were] reasonable, or sensible, in that they refl ect
in a logical fashion the impact of new information.”19 A recent study
of Italian public opinion reached a similar conclusion: “The commonly
held idea that Italian public opinion is unpredictable and capricious in
attentive public The
people who attend to and
are knowledgeable about
foreign policy issues and
international politics.

Public Opinion 145
foreign policy is not supported by the available evidence. Public opinion
in Italy does not change more abruptly or more frequently than in the
United States, Germany, and France.”20 In a similar vein, the public in
the United States seems capable of differentiating between uses of force
by the United States for different kinds of purposes in a discriminating
way. In general, public opinion responds more favorably to force when
it is used to resist aggression than when it is applied to impose internal
political change on another state. Improvements in the public approval
ratings of presidents “following military action to impose foreign policy
restraint [that is, to resist aggression] are nearly 4 percent greater . . . than
when internal political change is the principal objective.”21
In order to respond to foreign policy events and make a judgment, the
public may rely on underlying core values, which are
underlying beliefs—such as isolationism, anticommunism, non-
appeasement, neutrality, and anti-imperialism—that the public
holds and uses to judge foreign policy. In Germany and Japan,
for example, the public has come to value multilateralism and
antimilitarism. In post Cold War Russia and in contemporary
India, core values support the maintenance of a “great power”
identity.22
Core values provide a structure to the public’s attitudes on foreign
policy and help make sense of information concerning events in global
politics.23
Does Public Opinion Infl uence Foreign Policy?
Because only a rather small proportion of the public knows or cares very
much about most foreign policy issues, it would be logical to conclude
that most people rarely do very much to let their opinions be known or
attempt to persuade others to accept their point of view. That logical
conclusion is supported by concrete evidence. In the United States, for
example, the Vietnam War provoked an unusual amount of interest for a
foreign policy issue. Yet a survey of a representative sample of Americans
in 1967 found that although most people expressed a concern about the
war, most had done nothing to refl ect their concern. Only 13 percent
reported that they had made any attempt at all to persuade others
to change their views on the war. Only 3 percent had bothered to write
letters to newspapers or political offi cials, and only 1 percent had taken
part in marches or demonstrations.24
Recent issues, however, may have sparked a renewed activism in
global politics. Protesters have gathered in large numbers to voice their
concerns about globalization at international economic summits. In 2003,
world opinion across the globe was against a military intervention in Iraq,
and millions of protesters gathered on February 15, particularly in Europe
and the United States, to denounce U.S. policy toward Iraq. Despite the
core values The
underlying beliefs that
the public holds and uses
to judge foreign policy.

146 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
numbers, the protesters constituted a very small proportion of the public,
and the intervention against Iraq proceeded even with the participation of
some European countries in which a large majority opposed the war.25
The next logical conclusion would be that public opinion does not
have much impact on foreign policy. Logic and some evidence seem
to support each other in this regard, but the diffi culty in assessing the
impact of public opinion should be stressed. Elites that deal with foreign
policy issues usually do not feel very constrained by public opinion. Some
analysts go so far as to claim that “no major foreign policy decision in
the United States has ever been made in response to spontaneous public
demand.”26 In many countries, even democratic ones, there are numer-
ous cases in which crucial foreign policy decisions have been taken in the
absence of mass public consensus. West Germany’s decision to rearm and
join NATO in the early 1950s and French decisions to build an indepen-
dent nuclear force in the 1950s and leave NATO’s military institutions in
the mid-1960s were made by a small circle of elites without input by the
public.27
This claim might seem to contradict the experience of many readers
who have noticed how closely politicians watch public opinion polls. Even
U.S. presidents seem to have reacted to public opinion concerning foreign
policy issues rather dramatically in recent times. President Johnson was
apparently persuaded not to seek reelection in 1968 by public opposition
to his Vietnam War policy. President Carter, faced with rapidly declining
popularity as the 1980 election drew near, approved an attempt to rescue
the U.S. hostages in Iran, which failed miserably. In 1993, in an appar-
ent response to public concern about increasing immigration, President
Clinton continued steps to prevent Haitian refugees from escaping from
their homeland into the United States, even though he had condemned
his predecessor, George H. W. Bush, for adopting such a policy.28
But one can get an exaggerated impression of the impact of public
opinion on foreign policy by concentrating on such events. For exam-
ple, President Franklin Roosevelt, in the years before World War II, was
faced with overwhelmingly isolationist attitudes among the general pub-
lic. Even so, he worked quietly behind the scenes to prepare the United
States for war and never swayed from his conviction that the United
States would have to resist actively the aggressive policies of Germany
and Japan at some point. President Johnson made a concession to public
opinion by campaigning as a dove in favor of peace in the election of
1964, but we now know that he planned to escalate the Vietnam War as
soon as the election was over. Johnson might have decided not to run for
reelection in 1968 because of public opinion against his war policy, but it
is less clear that public opinion changed that policy: U.S. involvement in
the war continued for fi ve more years. President Carter knew that public
opinion polls showed that turning over the Panama Canal to Panama was
a tremendously unpopular idea. He negotiated the treaty anyway, appar-
ently fi guring that an educational campaign would persuade most of the

Public Opinion 147
public (and the U.S. Senate) to support its ratifi cation. He was right. In
France, “mass public opinion affects policy only if it reaches top deci-
sionmakers, notably the president. It is often he who decides whether to
respond to the public’s demands.”29
Even if the government’s policy is in line with public opinion, it is dif-
fi cult to know who infl uences whom. Diplomats and other foreign policy
offi cials are fond of saying that “public opinion demanded” a concession
or a hardline stand with respect to a foreign policy issue. But does the
public infl uence decisions, or do government offi cials manipulate public
opinion to support their point of view and then announce decisions they
had settled on in advance? Probably a majority of scholars believe that
elites (people in leadership positions within political, economic, or mili-
tary organizations) infl uence the public more than the public infl uences
elites, especially with regard to foreign policy issues. This impression that
decision makers tend to treat public opinion as a problem to be dealt with
rather than as a guide to policy has been confi rmed in recent research
based on interviews with offi cials in the National Security Council and
the U.S. State Department. The results of the interviews showed quite
clearly that “when public opposition does emerge, the reaction of most
offi cials is . . . not to change the policy in question, but to try to educate’
the public, thereby bringing public opinion in line with the policy.”30
Most scholars agree that the George W. Bush administration undertook
such an effort to infl uence the public to support the war in Iraq. As
the president and his advisers turned their attention toward Iraq after
September 11 and the Afghanistan intervention,
the administration sought to lead the public using a combi-
nation of persuasion and priming—especially in relation to
WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. . . . So successful were its
efforts that before the war the majority of the public believed
Iraq possessed WMD; after the war, roughly a third incorrectly
believed that the USA had actually discovered WMD . . . [T]he
administration chose a public relations strategy that appears to
be a prime example of policy ‘oversell’ . . . : the exaggeration of
threats in order to generate public support and overcome domes-
tic opposition.31
The public seems to be particularly vulnerable to follow elites
on military issues, at least initially. One of the best-known relation-
ships between public opinion and foreign policy in the United States
involves the rally-round-the-fl ag effect, which increases the popular-
ity of leaders whenever they elect to use force with respect to some
foreign policy issue.32 The rally-round-the-fl ag effect is, however, “far
from automatic. . . . One can easily identify international crises . . .
in which no signifi cant positive rally took place.”33 One analysis of
102 cases in the United States when the public might have been expected
to rally around the president reveals that in fact, the average change in
rally-round-the-fl ag
effect An increase
in a leader’s popularity
following the use of force.

148 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
the president’s approval rating after those cases was 0 percent.34 Indeed,
President George H. W. Bush could not translate the public’s approval
of the war against Iraq in 1991 into a victory for him in the presidential
election of 1992. And in the United Kingdom, in which only a minority
supported their country’s participation in the Iraq war, a “rally effect”
quickly turned that support into a majority at the onset of the war, but
just as quickly melted away, only two months into the confl ict.35
Indeed, the support for leaders in times of confl ict may be short-lived,
particularly when there are high troop casualties. According to the “body-
bag syndrome,”
the public, at least in Western democratic countries, has lost the
willingness and endurance to fi ght and carry the consequences. . . .
Especially in the case of humanitarian crises, the public would
fi rst of all put pressure on their governments to do something’ . . .
but when the risks of military actions in the form of casualties
become evident it would recoil at the prospect.36
The body-bag syndrome did seem to be operating in the U.S. public’s
support for missions in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq. Indeed,
American public opinion became a key factor in all three wars,
and in each one there has been a simple association: as casual-
ties mount, support decreases . . . The only thing remarkable
about the current war in Iraq is how precipitously American
public support has dropped off. Casualty for casualty, support
body-bag
syndrome The
negative relationship
between high levels of
troop casualties and
public support for a war.
Tens of thousands of
people marched across
U.S. Cities in January
2007 to protest the
continuing war in Iraq.
(AP Photo/Reed Saxon)

Public Opinion 149
has declined far more quickly than it did during either the Korea
or the Vietnam War.37
Despite these particular cases, systematic evidence of the body-bag
syndrome has not been found.38 Furthermore, a decline in public support
that comes with an increase in casualties does not necessarily mean the
casualties caused the decline. Instead, some argue the causality fl ows in
the reverse direction: that as public support of the military mission in
general declines, tolerance for casualties decline. If the public continues
to see the value of the mission, this argument goes, public approval can
sustain a large number of casualties.39 Political scientist John Mueller has
argued that the precipitous decline in support for the war in Iraq came
when one of the main justifi cations for the war—the threat from weapons
of mass destruction—was largely discredited.40
The most important way that public opinion does infl uence foreign
policy may be through the core values or underlying beliefs that the pub-
lic holds and uses to judge foreign policy. While these general beliefs do
not necessarily guide leaders to choose particular policies, they do set
parameters beyond which leaders cannot stray or risk retaliation.41 Core
values may be less vulnerable to elite manipulation as well. In Germany,
for example, core values such as multilateralism and antimilitarism and
other “collective attitudes and perceptions of average citizens may shape
the elite discourse by ruling certain initiatives ‘in’ or ‘out’ of political
bounds.”42 And core values in Britain that stress an “English identity”
that is quite separate and stands above a “European identity” are arguably
an important factor behind Britain’s reluctance to participate fully in the
EU and particularly the common Euro currency.43
Manipulation of public opinion by leaders may not be successful in
all cases. In the war with Iraq, for example, despite the U.S. government’s
success at infl uencing public beliefs regarding the threat of weapons of
mass destruction and Iraqi-terrorist connections, public support for the
war stayed at a fairly stable 60 percent level. If the administration led the
public into war, it was partly “because after September 11, the public was
inclined to support a war. This would appear to be consistent with previ-
ous research that suggests that the effect of elite leadership on foreign
policy is more limited than commonly supposed.”44
Should the Public Infl uence Foreign Policy?
“Open covenants openly arrived at with input from the populace” was
one of President Woodrow Wilson’s principles, adopted in the belief that
secret deals between professional diplomats and makers of foreign policy
were a part of traditional international politics that led to disasters such
as World War I. The developers of democratic theory, such as Thomas
Jefferson, certainly believed that foreign policy was not a special area to
be controlled by an elite group. Wary of a monarchical style of govern-
ment that dominated the power politics in Europe, the writers of the U.S.

150 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Constitution divided foreign policy powers between the legislative and
executive branches, partly in hopes that this would make policy more
representative of the people’s preferences.
The trouble with that idea, according to anti-Wilsonians and elite
theorists, is that an ignorant public opinion creates more problems. The
famous diplomat George F. Kennan wrote,
I sometimes wonder whether . . . a democracy is . . . similar to
one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this
room and the brain the size of a pin: he lies there in his comfort-
able primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment:
he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his
tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed;
but once he grasps this . . . he not only destroys his adversary
but largely wrecks his native habitat.45
The international debate over intervention in Iraq in the winter of
2003 once again focused attention on the role of public opinion—both
world opinion and domestic opinion—in foreign policy choices. The over-
whelming antiwar opinion around the globe, seen in numerous and siz-
able protests, led one writer in The New York Times to argue that “there
may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world
public opinion. In his campaign to disarm Iraq, by war if necessary, Presi-
dent Bush appears to be eyeball to eyeball with a tenacious new adver-
sary: millions of people who fl ooded the streets of New York and dozens
of other world cities to say they are against war based on the evidence at
hand.”46 British Prime Minister Tony Blair faced even stronger public crit-
icism at home for his choice to support U.S. plans for going to war against
Iraq without a United Nations mandate. Despite the public’s opposition,
both Blair and Bush proceeded to execute the invasion in March 2003,
and both were subsequently reelected. In response to the protests, Bush
replied that basing foreign policy on the size of demonstrations would be
similar to basing policy on a focus group and that “the role of a leader is
to decide policy based upon the security, in this case, the security of the
people.”47 The Policy Choices box summarizes some of the general argu-
ments for and against public infl uence on foreign policy.
Differences in Political Systems
It is probably safe to say that in general, public opinion has a greater impact in democratic states than in autocracies. It would be a mistake,
however, to conclude that public opinion can be ignored entirely in auto-
cratic, or nondemocratic, states. Public opinion on the war in Afghani-
stan, for example, apparently affected Soviet foreign policy with respect
to that war (and may ultimately have played a role in bringing down the
whole regime). Nevertheless, many propositions about the effects of pub-
lic opinion on foreign policy concern differences in political systems and

Differences in Political Systems 151
what these differences imply for how foreign policy is made. In particular,
the proposition that democracies are more peaceful than authoritarian
political systems has been the focus of much thought and study.
Are Democracies More Peaceful?
The proposition that democracies should be less war prone than nondem-
ocracies is part of the liberal perspective. According to liberal thought, in
democracies, where opposition is legal and allowed and citizens can hold
their leaders accountable for their actions through competitive elections,
the multiple channels across societies are more likely to constrain lead-
ers from confl ict. Furthermore, based on the values of political tolerance,
democracies supposedly reinforce preferences for nonviolent resolution
of confl ict. The idea that democratic republics are peace loving has, in
fact, a very long history, going back at least to the philosopher Immanuel
Kant in 1795. The proposition that democracies are more peaceful has sig-
nifi cant implications for global politics. Democratic states were among
the most important and powerful nations in the world in the twentieth
century, and the number of democratic states in the world has grown sig-
nifi cantly in recent years.
The consensus from scholarly research on the question of whether
democratic states are less likely than autocratic states to become
involved in international wars is that this is not the case: Democracies
are not more peaceful than nondemocracies.48 “Democratic constraints,
for example, did not prevent British involvement in the Falklands War,
French military interventions in Africa, India’s confl icts with China and
Pakistan, and Israel’s participation in numerous Middle East confl icts.”49
The United States, one of the world’s long-standing democracies, was
involved in many military confl icts during the Cold War. This may
be due to the lack of infl uence by the public, as discussed previously.
Table 5.1 shows the signifi cance of democracies’ involvement in major
wars from 1946 to 2000. Recent participation by democratic states in the
confl icts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon further questions the notion
that democracies are inherently peaceful.
Moreover, it may be that there is something about democracies that
pushes them toward confl ict. U.S. presidents, for example, are more likely
to be assertive or forceful in their foreign policies in the wake of a loss of
support from their own political party.50 And there is evidence that states
that are in the process of democratization may be more confl ict prone
than either democracies or authoritarian governments.51 Yet democracies
are not as likely to enter wars just prior to an election, compared to ear-
lier in their election cycle, which may mean that leaders are constrained
at times by the electoral process from going to war.52 Most scholars now
agree that democracies are in general just as war prone, or confl ict prone,
as other states, although they tend not to go to war against each other (as
will be discussed in Chapter 6).53

152
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should Leaders Listen to Public Opinion?
ISSUE: Leaders often face political opposition, at home or abroad, among the
public when making foreign policy. They have a choice as to whether they listen
to that opposition, and even change directions in foreign policy, or remain true
to their own preferences and perhaps the advice they are receiving from other
government offi cials.
Option #1: Foreign policy should refl ect public opinion.
Arguments: (a) Leaders should be held accountable for their actions. Because for-
eign policy is taken in the name of the state and directly affects the lives and
well-being of the people who live in it, it should refl ect the interests and the will
of the people, not just the leaders. (b) Successful military operations and political
objectives depend on public support; without it, the morale of the military is com-
promised, and the public will not sustain a long and costly policy. Thus, leaders
who ignore public opposition are dooming a policy to failure. (c) Global politics
today is about soft power and winning hearts and minds. Maintaining favorable
world opinion is in a leader’s long-term interests. If a state is viewed by the world
as acting unilaterally or aggressively, others are less likely to cooperate with it, and
there may be more resistance in the form of political opposition or even terrorism
against it and its objectives.
Counterarguments: (a) People elect offi cials for their skills, leadership, and values
and should trust their offi cials to carry out their mandates in specifi c cases without
interference. (b) The public is fi ckle and does not have the “stomach” for poli-
cies that may be costly and lengthy, although useful and in the national interest.
(c) Global politics remains anarchic, and states must look out for their own inter-
ests, even if that means “going it alone” and in opposition to world opinion.
Option #2: Foreign policy should be made by leaders.
Arguments: (a) Most citizens seem to know little about particular foreign policy
issues. Listening to the “ignorant masses” would lead leaders into poor choices.
(b) Public opinion only complicates international negotiations. Diplomats are
unable to exercise their talents for compromise if the public is a participant in the
negotiating process. When the public looks on, diplomats are subject to political
pressures that require them to take extreme positions from which it becomes virtu-
ally impossible to retreat as negotiations continue. If the uninformed and moody
public is kept out of the process, the wisdom and talents of professional diplomats
can be given full play, and the result will be a better foreign policy and decreased
probability of violent confl ict. (c) Open processes that allow public input compro-
mise the secrecy that is often necessary for the successful execution of policies.
Letting the public in on what is happening means letting potential adversaries
know as well, which can compromise strategy and credibility.
Counterarguments: (a) While citizens may know little about the specifi cs of a pol-
icy, they do hold fairly strong and stable core values, such as protection of human
rights and a commitment to multilateralism, that should serve as a guide to leaders
in making foreign policy choices. (b) Experts who have had a largely free hand in
(continued )

Differences in Political Systems 153
making foreign policy as long as the modern state system has been in existence
have made their share of mistakes. Public input holds negotiations and agree-
ments to refl ect the national interest, not just the narrow interests of the leader
or those groups that are closest to the leadership. (c) Secrecy often pits policy
effectiveness against democratic principles. A democracy can be effective only if
individuals have knowledge regarding their government’s actions. Moreover, of-
ten such secrecy arguments have later turned out to have been camoufl age for
politicians as much as for the protection of the good of the people.
TABLE 5.1
Democratic Participation in Interstate Wars,* 1946–2000
Confl ict Democratic Belligerent(s)
Palestine (1948–49) Israel
Kashmir (1948–49) India
Korea (1950–53) Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,
Netherlands, U.K., U.S.
Sinai (1956) France, Israel, U.K.
Sino-Indian Border (1962) India
Kashmir (1965) India
Vietnam (1965–73) Australia, U.S.
Six-Day War (1967) Israel
Israel-Egypt Confl ict (1969–70) Israel
Bangladesh (1971) India
Yom Kippur (1973) Israel
Falklands (1982) U.K.
Israel-Syrian Confl ict (1982) Israel
Gulf War (1991) Canada, France, Italy, U.K., U.S.
Kargil (1999) India
Kosovo (1999) France, Italy, U.S., U.K.
*Note: Interstate wars are defi ned as those having at least 1,000 combat deaths. This excludes other “minor”
interventions by democracies such as U.S. actions in Grenada and Panama in the 1980s.
Source: Adapted from David Leblang and Steve Chan, “Explaining Wars Fought by Established Democra-
cies: Do Institutional Constraints Matter?” Political Research Quarterly 56(4) (December 2003): 385–400,
p. 392. Copyright © 2003 by Sage Publications. Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications; four Indian
confl icts added by authors.

154 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
How Do Differences in Political Institutions
Affect Foreign Policy?
Although democratic institutions do not necessarily constrain states
from going to war, differences in political systems and their institutions
do affect foreign policy. Some of the starkest differences can be seen
within the family of democracies. The United States, France, Japan, and
Germany, for example, differ in terms of the degree to which political
institutions are centralized and the degree to which the state dominates
public opinion.54 The United States appears to have the least centralized
political institutions; the impact of public opinion there is correspond-
ingly more important. In France, the highly centralized domestic political
structure seems to have the greatest dampening impact on the infl uence
of public opinion on foreign policies. In Germany and Japan, the infl u-
ence of public opinion on foreign policies falls somewhere in between
the extremes of the United States and France and is more mediated by
political parties.55
Part of the differences in these institutions stem from how leaders
are elected. In the United States, a presidential system of democracy,
both the president and members of Congress are elected by the people
and are thus, in theory at least, accountable to the public. Within the
executive branch, however, presidents are constitutionally supreme (as
President Truman said, “The buck stops here”), and because presidents
enjoy a separate electoral mandate from the people, they do not necessar-
ily have to listen to others in their political party or in the legislature. In
parliamentary systems, the people do not vote for the leader, the prime
minister; rather, they vote for a party or party representatives to the legis-
lature. The leader of the party with the most seats in parliament usually
then becomes the prime minister and in many countries holds no special
constitutional authority above other cabinet members. Thus, leaders of
parliamentary democracies are not directly accountable to the public, but
they do share power with the rest of the cabinet and are accountable to
their party, which can replace them even without a national election.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, for example, was not voted
out of offi ce by the British public in 1990, but she was replaced (by John
Major) when she did not get enough votes from her own political party,
partly because of her party’s disapproval of her policy toward the European
Community. Most of the time, however, prime ministers whose party
controls a majority of seats in the legislature do not worry about opposi-
tion from parliament, because party members tend to vote strictly along
party lines and thus all legislation is almost guaranteed approval.
Contrast this to the U.S. presidential system, in which legislators
often vote against presidents even if they are from the same party. The
division of powers between the legislative and executive branches means
that Congress can be quite an infl uential player in foreign policy. With
the requirement that the U.S. Senate must ratify all foreign treaties by

Differences in Political Systems 155
a two-thirds majority, Congress has the potential to severely constrain
U.S. participation in international agreements. Indeed, the failure of the
U.S. Senate to ratify U.S. membership in the League of Nations is seen
as a key development on the road to World War II. More recently, the
U.S. Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (to be
discussed in Chapter 8) over the president’s objections. Congress does
not always exercise its power, however. In security policy particularly,
Congress often defers to presidential wishes. Congress is more likely to
exert infl uence over trade, aid, and other budget-related issues, which are
often seen as more relevant to congressional district interests. Indeed,
“when it comes to trade policy, no other legislative body has as much
infl uence and authority relative to the executive branch as does the U.S.
Congress.”56 But even in trade policy, Congress has acceded power to the
executive branch. For example, by giving the president fast-track authority
on key trade legislation,
Congress gives itself sixty days, from the time a trade agree-
ment is presented to it, to vote the measure cleanly up or down;
no amendments are permitted under fast track. . . . Fast track’s
achievement was to make clear Congress’s determination to
overcome the morass of confl icting parochial interests and vote
directly and expeditiously on major trade matters.57
Without fast-track authority in 1993, NAFTA would not have been
ratifi ed in anything like the form that it was negotiated by U.S. Presi-
dents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.
While most other countries do not face ratifi cation constraints as
signifi cant as those in the U.S. political system, some other democratic
systems must go directly to the public to ratify foreign treaties. In these
direct referenda, the public votes to accept or reject a proposed foreign
policy. In 1992, for example, the French public and the Danish public
voted on the controversial Maastricht Treaty (to be discussed in Chapter 12),
which included plans for a common currency for the EU. The French
public followed the lead of their president and passed the treaty, but the
Danish rejected it. Similarly, in 1994, the people of Sweden, Austria,
Finland, and Norway voted on whether to join the EU. The Swedes and
the Austrians voted yes, and the Norwegians voted no (as they had previ-
ously in 1972), and Norway remains one of the only Western European
countries outside the EU. Thus, in political systems with institutions
that require or allow for a referendum on a foreign policy, leaders must
face the public directly for approval of their foreign policy initiatives.
Parliamentary systems also differ according to how majoritarian or
proportional they are. In majoritarian systems, two parties dominate the
political system, and one party usually can gain a majority on its own
in the parliament, thus controlling the entire cabinet. In Great Britain,
for example, either the Conservative Party or the Labour Party domi-
nates the parliament and the cabinet, depending on the election results.
fast-track
authority An
important power that
can be used by the U.S.
president to speed up
the process and decrease
Congressional infl uence
on key trade legislation.
ratifi cation The fi nal
step necessary for a state
to approve international
agreements.

156 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
In contrast, in systems with electoral laws that favor more proportional
representation, many parties are represented in parliament, and no single
party controls a majority of the seats. The result is the formation of a
coalition cabinet in which the various ministries (such as prime minister,
defense minister, and foreign minister) are divided among two or more
parties. Cabinets in Germany, Israel, and the Netherlands, for example,
have more than one party, and if the parties disagree over a foreign policy
decision, they must negotiate their differences. At times, multiparty cab-
inets fail to overcome their internal differences and are unable to respond
to international decisions. At other times, small “junior” parties can have
a signifi cant infl uence on the direction of a country’s foreign policy.58
The main effect of political institutions on foreign policy, then, con-
cerns what type of potential constraint a leader faces. In presidential
systems, the constraint primarily comes from the public or an opposing
legislature. In majoritarian parliamentary systems, constraints are most
likely to be felt within the leaders’ own party. In proportional parliamen-
tary systems, the prime ministers face potential opposition within their
own party and within the cabinet from other political parties. To be sure,
leaders can sometimes ignore these various pressures. Sometimes they
are held accountable for this and sometimes they are not, but the effect of
political institutions is to fi lter pressure from the public and other orga-
nized groups that may oppose the leader’s policies.
This difference in the locus of constraint also occurs in nondemocra-
cies. In these states,
there are often decisionmaking and political constraints, and
these are as pervasive as those found in the more established
political systems of the advanced industrial [democratic] states.
Not only must the . . . leader pay close attention to domestic
political opposition . . ., but in many regions there may be a con-
siderable diffusion of power across intensely competitive actors
in a highly fragmented setting. Indeed . . . political constraints
occur as frequently . . . as they do in modern polities. And if
there is anything distinctive about Third World politics, it is the
intensity and fl uidity of those pressures compared to those of
more established political systems.59
Indeed, because these states often have authoritarian systems, the
leaders lack the legitimacy to rule and often need to take into account
opinions of the military (as discussed in the next section), other soci-
etal groups, and rival leaders within their own party. The leadership may
even be a collective group, such as the Communist Party Politburo was
at times during the former Soviet Union, with no single individual who
dominates foreign policymaking.
Finally, it is often assumed that because they are not elected, leaders in
nondemocracies are not constrained by public opinion. Yet authoritarian

Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition 157
leaders, particularly ones with a weak hold on their power, must also take
into account societal opinion or risk retribution.
Although citizens in authoritarian systems cannot vote their
leaders out of offi ce, they do have other means of holding leaders
accountable, including forming or pledging allegiance to nongov-
ernmental groups who oppose the authoritarian leader, backing
a coup and change of government, assassinating a leader, and
starting a revolution. Indeed, simply being voted out of offi ce
may pale in comparison.60
Thus, as in democracies, institutional differences in authoritarian
systems—how centralized they are, how much support and legitimacy is
behind them, and appointment and accountability patterns—will affect
the way that public opinion and domestic opposition in general impact
foreign policy.
Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition
Perhaps more important than the infl uence of public opinion in general is that wielded everywhere by interest groups, in particular as they
exert a concentrated effort to have an impact on foreign policy. Interest
groups, also known as pressure groups and lobbies, are organized parts
of a society that articulate a particular sector’s interests and mobilize to
pressure and persuade the government. Are their efforts successful? What
are generally the most powerful interest groups in a society? How can
one tell?
Do Interest Groups Infl uence Foreign Policy
in Democracies?
Certainly there are interest groups in every society that attempt to
infl uence foreign policy, and many of their efforts are visible. Interest
groups pay for advertisements in the media, support their lobbying per-
sonnel, and contribute to the campaigns of friendly politicians. Other
activities of interest groups are less visible. In U.S. politics, lobbyists
talk to members of Congress at private lunches, secretly threaten to
withdraw fi nancial support from uncooperative senators, offer fi nancial
support for subversive CIA activities against unfriendly foreign govern-
ments, and so on. The impact they have is diffi cult to determine.61 But
it is almost as diffi cult to determine the effectiveness of the more open
and visible activities of interest groups. If infl uence means the ability
to affect behavior, how does one tell if an interest group is infl uential?
The fact that a group favors a policy that is later adopted is insuffi –
cient evidence of the impact of its efforts. The policy might have been
adopted anyway. Or the political decision makers may have persuaded
the lobbying groups to favor the adopted policy, not vice versa. Finally,

158 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
some powerful third group, like the media, may have infl uenced both
the lobbying group in question and the political decision makers to favor
a given policy. Infl uence is diffi cult to trace.
Nevertheless, a variety of interest groups seek to infl uence foreign
policy in a democracy, such as the United States. These groups include
religious organizations, which often seek to infl uence U.S. policy regard-
ing other states’ human rights; foreign lobbies, such as the Japan lobby,
that represent another country’s views and seek to affect foreign relations
with that country; and single-issue groups such as nuclear freeze groups
or proenvironmental groups that seek to infl uence policy on a particular
issue. There are also many ethnic-based interests groups in the United
States, such as the Greek lobby, Transafrica, the Cuban lobby, and the
American Israel Political Action Committee (arguably the most success-
ful ethnic interest group). These groups represent U.S. citizens who have
ethnic ties with other countries or parts of the world and seek to infl u-
ence policy toward those countries or regions. It is clear that all types of
interest groups are very active and spend many resources trying to infl u-
ence foreign policy. But it is diffi cult to detect when they are successful.
If, for example, U.S. policy toward Israel is consistent with the Ameri-
can Israel Political Action Committee’s position, we do not always know
if this is because of the interest group’s pressure on the government or
because U.S. leaders see the policy in the interest of U.S. security or other
interests in the region.
Another type of interest group is economic in nature, such as busi-
nesses, labor unions, and agricultural groups. These interest groups can
have great infl uence on foreign policy “because they help to generate
wealth, and economic welfare has become one of the primary functions of
the modern state. Economic groups often have an interest in foreign rela-
tions as they seek to promote their foreign business adventures abroad
or to protect markets from competitors at home.”62 While these inter-
est groups are certainly infl uential at times, it is perhaps surprising how
often they lose. In the United States, such losses can be attributed partly
to the fact that “Congress [gave] up the authority to set individual tariff
rates in 1934 when it delegated to the executive the authority to negoti-
ate reciprocal tariff reduction.”63 And historically, the U.S. president is
the prime advocate of free trade in the U.S. political process. The group
with the greatest interest in opposing increased trade protection consists
of all consumers.64 So in effect, the president represents that group and
discourages Congress from engaging in rampant logrolling, in which each
member of Congress would trade his or her vote in support of a tariff pro-
tecting industries in other congressional districts in return for votes from
other members of Congress in favor of interests in his or her district.
Refl ecting the growing complexity of global politics, many debates
over foreign policies involve several types of interest groups, sometimes
working at cross-purposes and sometimes forming coalitions. In the
debate within the United States over NAFTA, for example, many

Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition 159
powerful interest groups lobbied hard . . . to make ratifi cation
of NAFTA extremely unlikely. The AFL-CIO argued that free
trade with Mexico would come at the price of lost American
jobs; environmental groups such as Friends of the Earth argued
that Mexico’s lax pollution standards would generate pressure
to relax U.S. air quality standards in order to keep manufactur-
ers from relocating to Mexico. Both groups made defeat of . . .
[NAFTA] a top lobbying priority for 1991.65
On the other side of the issue,
business supporters formed an umbrella organization called
the Coalition for Trade Expansion that included more than
500 corporations and lobbyists. Five key business trade associa-
tions were represented in this coalition: the Business Round-
table, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Emergency Committee for
American Trade, National Association of Manufacturers, and
National Foreign Trade Council.66
In the end, the economic agreement, negotiated and supported by two
successive presidential administrations, was ratifi ed by Congress (under
the fast-track procedure discussed previously).
Even in a comparatively open political system like that of the Unit-
ed States, economic and other interest groups often have a diffi cult
time infl uencing foreign policy if the leaders are opposed to the inter-
est group’s position. In other democracies, such as Great Britain and
Germany, interest groups have similar diffi culties since most foreign
policy is made in the cabinet, which is much less accessible than is the
parliament.
Does the Military-Industrial Complex Infl uence
Defense Policy?
One pressure group in a position to exert a signifi cant infl uence on for-
eign policy in many countries is the group involved in producing and
using a nation’s military hardware. The term military-industrial complex
was introduced into the U.S. political lexicon by President Eisenhower,
but the idea that munitions makers successfully plot to bring about large
wars so that they can make a profi t selling arms goes back much further
in the United States and elsewhere. In 1934, some sixteen years after the
First World War ended, there was a fl urry of interest in the United States
in the substantial profi ts made by weapons manufacturers and banks
through sales to the Allies in that war. For months, a Senate committee,
headed by Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, held widely publicized hear-
ings marked by revelations of spectacular profi ts, and many Americans
were convinced by the revelations that they had been maneuvered into
the war for the sake of corporate profi ts.
military-industrial
complex Network of
defense contractors, the
military, and government
agencies that may work
together to promote
military spending and
other policies from which
they benefi t.

160 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Accusations made against the U.S. military-industrial complex dur-
ing the Vietnam War were not restricted to assertions that it had plot-
ted to bring about the war. Rather, the organization and structure of the
U.S. military and its relationship to industries that supply weapons were
probed for inherent biases in favor of larger defense budgets. Purchases by
the military, for example, are often arranged by generals and retired gener-
als working for weapons manufacturers. Such arrangements are especially
cozy from the viewpoint of the military-industrial complex, because the
cost of any deals that are made, as well as cost overruns that may occur if
the weapons turn out to be more expensive than originally estimated, are
passed on to U.S. taxpayers. Taxpayers are unlikely to complain, though,
because many of them benefi t from a large defense budget, as when large
defense contracts are awarded to industries in their districts or when mil-
itary bases are established near their places of business. Members of Con-
gress in districts blessed with such defense budget largesse are naturally
reluctant to trim the budget. In addition, universities that receive large
research contracts out of the budget are another part of the complex that
pushes for increasingly large defense budgets.67
But to say that military-industrial interests play an important role in
foreign policy formation is different from saying that they dominate the
process.68 By 1979, the defense budget in the United States was ten times
larger than it had been in 1949; but welfare spending in 1979 was twenty-
fi ve times that for the year 1949.69 A signifi cantly larger portion of the
budget was spent on social programs even after the Reagan administra-
tion made a determined effort to increase the proportion assigned to the
Defense Department. And although Reagan’s efforts to increase defense
budgets were successful, on average the Pentagon’s share of the budget
was lower as a percentage of the GNP during his years in offi ce than
it was during the Kennedy and Johnson years or during the Nixon and
Ford years.70
The end of the Cold War provided an interesting challenge to the
military-industrial complex in the United States, as well as an intrigu-
ing opportunity to evaluate its strength and infl uence. The demise of
the Soviet Union denied the U.S. military-industrial complex its primary
rationale for large defense budgets. The strongest version of the theo-
ry stressing the impact of the military-industrial complex would sug-
gest that the Soviet Union’s disappearance should make no substantial
difference in the ability of those interests to generate continuing large
increases in defense budgets. But the data on defense budgets shown in
Figure 5.1 provide a mixed picture. Initially at least, the end of the Cold
War (roughly around 1989) appears to have had a defi nite impact on mili-
tary expenditures in the United States (this is true whether we focus on
American defense budgets in terms of constant dollars as in Figure 5.1
or as a proportion of the federal budget). This decline in defense spend-
ing produced a temporary peace dividend—a freeing up of money to be
spent on other government programs or returned to taxpayers—and is
peace dividend A
freeing up of government
revenue to be spent
on other programs or
returned to taxpayers
rather than spending it on
the military.

Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition 161
consistent with a systematic analysis of military spending in the United
States during the Cold War, which reported that “the greatest infl u-
ence on change in U.S. military spending was change in Soviet military
spending.”71 Yet after almost a decade of declining defense budgets, U.S.
defense spending increased, even before the attacks of September 11,
2001. Whether this was in response to new threats, such as nuclear pro-
liferation and failing states, that warrant defense comparable to defense
required for facing the Soviet Union, or whether this is a sign that the
military-industrial complex was able to infl uence military spending for
its own advantage is unclear. It is certainly true that even quite liberal
members of the U.S. Congress, who were traditionally more skeptical of
defense expenditures during the Cold War, objected to the shutting down
of military bases in their districts. In addition, debates over military base
closings have revealed that many in Congress are interested in preserving
defense expenditures to preserve jobs, even if the expenditures are not
necessary for national security.72
The record high levels of U.S. defense spending since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, are certainly related to the “global war on terror”
and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these security threats seem
to be the primary rationale behind defense budgets, the purchase of some
high-cost items have been linked to the infl uence of defense contractors.73
Particularly controversial has been the awarding of defense contracts by
the military in Iraq to certain fi rms.
Halliburton, a construction and oil company once led by former
Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, received roughly
six billion dollars in new contracts, most of which were
Figure 5.1 U.S. Defense
Budget, 1985–2010
Figures for 2009 and 2010
are estimates. Figures do
not include supplementary
defense appropriations
which, for expenses
related to the confi cts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, have
been substantial, totaling
more than $800 billion
from 2002 to 2008.
Source: Offi ce of Management and
Budget. 2009. Historical Tables
Budget of the U.S. Government
Fiscal Year 2010, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/
fy2010/assets/hist (Accessed
28 May 2009.)
Year
U
S
N
at
io
na
l D
ef
en
se
B
ud
ge
t (
in
m
ill
io
ns
$
U
S
)
200
300
400
500
600
700
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Estimate only

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/hist

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/hist

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/hist

162 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
provided on a noncompetitive basis. . . . [In addition] Halliburton
admitted numerous overcharges in connection with its recon-
struction work in Iraq. This has prompted criticism about the
dysfunctional relationships between the DoD [Department of
Defense] and contractors.74
What Is the Role of Military and Political Opposition
Groups in Nondemocracies?
Authoritarian systems, particularly those in larger countries that play the
role of regional powers, also have military-industrial establishments that
exert infl uence on the foreign policies of their respective countries. The
military in Russia has been humiliated by many developments in recent
years. There is some danger that elements in the military, and their sup-
porters, will produce a leader in the coming years bent on restoring the glo-
ry of Russia’s Cold War years (not to mention some of the budget it shared
with the industrial establishment). The military in China also seems
intent on increasing its strength and, consequently, Chinese infl uence in
the world. In developing countries, the military-industrial complex loses
most of its industrial fl avor because these nations are less industrialized
and because their armies, navies, and air forces are not supplied by domes-
tic fi rms. Rather, they get most of their weapons and equipment from one
or more of the major powers (Brazil, though, and recently South Africa are
two of the world’s more important exporters of military weaponry). This
dependency on imports weakens the symbiotic ties between the military
and industrial elements in most developing countries.
It obviously does not, however, weaken the infl uence of the mili-
tary on the foreign policies of less developed or newly industrializing
countries. States that fi t into these categories differ greatly, and making
generalizations about them is dangerous. But the prevalence of military
infl uence and military governments in much of the developing world,
at least until the recent global wave of democratization, has been clear.
Even in the newly democratic governments in some developing coun-
tries, the military has often seemed to be in charge, exerting a controlling
infl uence behind the government (in Guatemala and the Philippines, for
example). And the military actively has resisted or subverted democratiz-
ing impulses in places such as Peru and Nigeria. The military establish-
ments of a great number of developing countries have a crucial impact
not only on foreign policy but on all policy.
Developing countries are often vulnerable to military and political
opposition groups because of the weak domestic structures that are char-
acteristic of many of these states, as discussed earlier. The divisions that
typically exist, such as economic class divisions and ethnic divisions,
are the bases for political opposition to the government and, often, its
foreign policy.

Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition 163
What Effects Does Political Opposition Have
on Foreign Policy?
Authoritarian governments are often able to resist the infl uence attempts
by political opposition groups, just as democratic governments are often
able to resist interest groups. Even if these groups do not infl uence a par-
ticular policy, however, political opposition can still potentially affect
foreign policy.
For example, one hypothesis that has a long history among theorists
of international relations points to a possible relationship between the
amount of internal unrest in a country and the amount of foreign confl ict
in which it becomes involved. The idea is that societies with a lot of
internal opposition, such as riots, strikes, and coups, are those in which
the tenure of the ruling elite is likely to be insecure. Leaders in democratic
systems facing falling approval ratings are in a similar situation. This
insecurity may tempt the elite to distract the attention of restless and
dissatisfi ed citizens by initiating quarrels, perhaps even wars, with other
countries. The elite hopes this ploy will take the people’s minds off their
domestic grievances and focus their antagonism against foreign enemies.
It is also a way to build internal cohesion and national legitimacy for the
leader. This is often referred to as the diversionary theory of war, because
leaders attempt to divert the attention away from internal confl ict by
initiating foreign confl ict. It is also called the “scapegoat hypothesis,”
because leaders may be seeking to fi nd an external actor to blame for their
problems at home. Recently, this idea has been termed the “wag-the-dog
effect,” after the title of a Hollywood fi lm in which the U.S. president
created a fi ctitious war to divert attention away from a sex scandal.
A real-world example comes from the Persian Gulf War and Saddam
Hussein’s reasons for invading Kuwait in 1990. There are indications that
this decision was a product of economic desperation. Iraq’s long war with
Iran had left it $70 billion in debt,75 with a half-million Iraqi soldiers dead
in a war that had lasted from 1980 to 1988.76 In retrospect, some analysts
are convinced that “the invasion [was] a desperate attempt to shore up
[Hussein’s] regime in the face of the dire economic straits created by the
Iran-Iraq war.”77
Researchers who have looked for a general relationship between
domestic problems and the use of force have failed to provide convincing
evidence for the diversionary theory.78 It seems that the use of force as a
diversionary tactic depends on the type of political system, the strength
of the potential target, the nature of the domestic unrest, and the popular-
ity of the regime among core supporters.79
Additional evidence suggests that democracies too might try to divert
public attention away from internal weakness. Researchers have found
that democracies are likely to use force abroad during election years,
especially those that occur at times of economic stagnation.80 Other evi-
dence indicates that U.S. presidents are aware of the rally-round-the-fl ag
diversionary
theory The idea that
political leaders attempt
to divert attention away
from internal confl ict by
initiating foreign confl ict.
Also referred to as the
scapegoat hypothesis and
the wag-the-dog effect.

164 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
effect (the increase in the president’s popularity whenever he elects to use
force) and initiate forceful policies in order to reap domestic political ben-
efi ts. U.S. presidents may be particularly likely to use force in response to
foreign policy crises if, for example, the economy or their own popularity
is declining.81
In general, political opposition—in the form of public opinion or
organized interests—means that foreign policy may be shaped by fac-
tors internal to states as well as external constraints. Indeed, leaders who
negotiate international agreements must often simultaneously bargain
with opposition back home and with other leaders from other countries or
international organizations. This dual pressure on leaders, known as two-
level games, can mean that foreign policy is forged only when it meets the
concerns of both the domestic and the international audiences.82 In the
negotiations over NAFTA, for example, Presidents George H. W. Bush and
William Clinton had to consider demands from their international coun-
terparts from Canada and Mexico, as well as demands from the myriad
domestic interests that supported and opposed the treaty.
Would the North American Free Trade Agreement have been
possible without the successful manipulation of the two-level
bargaining game by Bush and Clinton? Probably not. Had the
Level I [international] negotiators failed to look over their
shoulders and consider how commitments made in the trade
talks would be received at Level II, it is unlikely they could
have fashioned an agreement with enough domestic support for
ratifi cation. . . . It is not an overstatement to say, therefore, that
when states engage in negotiations, the hardest bargaining is not
between states, but within them.83
Foreign Policy Bureaucracies
Another important domestic source of foreign policy is how the foreign affairs bureaucracy makes decisions. Almost every modern state has a
large bureaucracy in charge of providing intelligence (gathering and inter-
preting information), developing proposals, offering advice, implement-
ing policy, and, at times, making foreign policy. Individual leaders cannot
possibly consider every alternative solution to a problem. There is an infi –
nite number of such alternative solutions, and searching for information
about them is costly. Also, estimating the probability of success and the
costs of implementing each alternative solution of which the executive
and the organization are already aware is an impossible task. Because of
the complexities in dealing with the many issues of international poli-
tics, governments organize themselves bureaucratically. This means that
separate agencies or departments are typically assigned different areas
or jurisdictions of policy for which they are responsible. Separate agen-
cies, for example, are responsible for diplomatic relations with different
two-level games Dual
pressure on leaders
whereby international
agreements can be
forged only when they
meet the concerns of
both domestic and
international audiences.

Foreign Policy Bureaucracies 165
countries, for trade ties, and for different parts of the military. Within
these agencies, there is a hierarchical division of labor, with superiors at
the top, close to the leaders; at the bottom are the lower-level bureau-
crats, who typically gather information and oversee the day-to-day opera-
tions of implementing policy.
Although such jurisdictional and hierarchical organization is a nec-
essary part of dealing with a complex world, it can create problems for
foreign policy.84 The different departments, for example, may come into
confl ict over interpretations of intelligence and what foreign policy should
be adopted. Departments tend to develop their own sense of identity, or
organizational mission. This stems from their organizational role—their
job, after all, is to safeguard certain parts of the state’s foreign policy—and
from the different types of information and experiences that bureaucrats
in separate agencies may have.
An example of how organizational roles affect the policy-making
process comes from the Soviet bureaucracy’s response to events in
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Czechoslovakia, under the leadership of Alexan-
der Dubcek, began reforming the Communist Party in 1968. Within the
Soviet Union, there was considerable disagreement over what should be
done, and the various departments’ positions were consistent with their
organization roles. For example, those responsible for domestic affairs
worried about the effects on the power of reformists within the Soviet
Union. Those in charge of ideological supervision feared the contami-
nation of reform into the intellectual and scientifi c communities. The
Soviet internal police and the Warsaw Pact military command saw reforms
in Czechoslovakia as a threat to internal order. Agencies responsible for
foreign affairs had a different reading. Those interested in improving rela-
tions with the West, especially those pursuing dtente with the United
States, or with other socialist states, worried about the negative effects of
intervention. In the end, the agencies that saw a threat were able to build
support for intervention, and the Soviet Union crushed the reform effort
with an invasion in August 1968. But for a considerable amount of time,
the disagreement within the Soviet Union (clearly not a unitary actor at
this point) stemmed from bureaucratic jurisdictional roles.85
The confl ict in viewpoints may create inconsistent foreign policy if
departments are acting on their own and are not coordinating policy. Lack
of coordination across agencies was an important part of the failure of
the U.S. government to anticipate the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.
It has been well documented that there was a lack of coopera-
tion when it came to sharing intelligence prior to 9/11. The Joint
Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission reports demonstrate that the
CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation], and NSA [National Security Agency] hoarded intelli-
gence and failed to share information or work collaboratively.86
organizational
role The mission of
each bureaucratic agency,
which may infl uence
how it views the world
and the foreign policies it
prefers.

166 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Another example of decentralized, bureaucratic policymaking comes
from U.S. anti-proliferation policy in the early 1990s. Concerned that the
disintegration of the Soviet Union could mean the spread of nuclear tech-
nology and nuclear material, the U.S. Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act in 1991, which provided $400 million
to be used to ensure the safety and security of former Soviet weapons, to
dismantle those weapons, and to prevent proliferation.
In a classic example of Washington bureaucratic politics, no
senior offi cial in the [George H. W.] Bush administration actively
supported Nunn-Lugar, but every agency wanted to be in charge
of it. While the bill specifi ed that the Department of Defense
[DOD] was to be the executive agent for the program, in a move
that spelled disaster for rapid action, DOD ceded control to an
inter-agency arms control policy working group with partici-
pants from the State Department, the Department of Energy,
the National Security Council Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the intelligence
community. Within the State Department, at least three differ-
ent offi ces vied for leadership responsibility for the program.87
With so many agencies involved, each having somewhat different
views, the anti-proliferation efforts were incoherent at best.
Bureaucratic confl ict may also result in compromises that are not
necessarily in the best interests of a state’s foreign policy. In other words,
bureaucratic agencies that meet to resolve their differences may engage in
give and take, and in the end, the compromise is in the middle, refl ecting
the wishes of no one. Such a compromise is termed a resultant. In the pro-
liferation example, “the bureaucracy developed a laundry list” of issues
to discuss with Moscow, with each agency simply adding on its concerns,
without any overarching sense of purpose or coordination.88 In the lead-
up to the Iraq war, policy offi cials were divided over how large a force was
needed. In the end, “a compromise was worked out. The invasion would
be heavier than [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld wanted but not as
heavy as [Secretary of State Colin] Powell thought was necessary.”89
The hierarchical organization within agencies can create problems as
well. Faced with severe limitations in information, time, and resources,
bureaucracies display a tendency to rely on standard operating procedures
(SOPs) developed in the past or on a repertoire of prearranged responses or
standard routines. SOPs simplify the crucial problem of coordinating the
different parts of the bureaucracy. If it becomes obvious that the SOPs are
not appropriate to solving the problem at hand, bureaucracies do not usu-
ally search for all possible alternatives. If a situation is novel, lower-level
bureaucrats may stick to inappropriate SOPs if new procedures have not
been developed by their superiors. If bureaucrats do generate new policies
to address new problems, they tend to give the most serious consider-
ation to alternatives involving only incremental changes in SOPs.90
resultant
Compromises caused by
bureaucratic confl ict that
are not necessarily in the
best interests of a state’s
foreign policy.
standard operating
procedures
Prearranged responses or
routines used frequently
by bureaucracies.

Foreign Policy Bureaucracies 167
SOPs in Action: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Responses
to the September 11 Attacks
SOPs played an important role in the development of the Cuban missile
crisis in 1962. The Soviets sent the missiles to Cuba in utmost secrecy,
using various deception devices to mislead any observer. Yet when
the missiles arrived in Cuba, no attempt was made to camoufl age the
sites; even more incredible, the surface-to-air missile (SAM), medium-
range ballistic missile (MRBM), and intermediate-range ballistic missile
(IRBM) sites constructed in Cuba were built to look exactly like the SAM,
MRBM, and IRBM sites in the Soviet Union.91 Also, the Soviet military
personnel arrived in Cuba wearing slacks and sport shirts to hide their
identity, but they left the Cuban docks formed in ranks of four and piled
into truck convoys. Furthermore, they decorated their barracks with
standard military insignia. All of these indications, but especially the
construction of the missile sites in Soviet style, made it rather easy for
the United States, by way of overhead spy fl ights, to fi gure out what was
happening.
What accounts for this seemingly irrational behavior? Why the great
secrecy and deception, on the one hand and the blatant lack of secrecy, on
the other? The most plausible answer involves the bureaucratic tendency
to adhere to SOPs. The delivery of the missiles to Cuba and their move-
ment from the docks to the sites were the responsibilities of the GRU
(Soviet military intelligence) and the KGB (the Communist Party intel-
ligence organization). Security is their SOP, so the missiles were hidden
successfully until they reached their sites. After that,
It appears that the reason the Soviets failed to camoufl age the
missiles is that the Soviet standard operating procedures for con-
structing nuclear missile sites did not include the use of camou-
fl age. All previous installations had been on Soviet territory; the
installation crews in Cuba simply overlooked the importance of
disguising their activities on foreign soil under the watchful eyes
of the Americans.92
As for the shirt-and-slack-clad soldiers arriving at the Cuban docks, it
is reasonable to guess that delivering them there was also the responsibil-
ity of organizations devoted to secrecy. But once they had arrived at their
Cuban barracks, they adhered to procedures as if they were still in the
Soviet Union.
The U.S. bureaucracies involved in the crisis were not immune to the
tendency to adhere to SOPs. The list of options considered by President
Kennedy and his advisers was affected greatly by the repertoire of prear-
ranged responses that the military had developed in the event of a crisis
calling for an attack on Cuba. For example, one option that the U.S. deci-
sion makers considered was a surgical air strike that would eliminate the
Soviet missiles already in place. The U.S. Air Force insisted that this kind

168 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
of strike would result in extensive collateral damage and probably fairly
large numbers of Soviet casualties and would not necessarily knock out
all the Soviet missiles, but this argument was based on previous plans.
The air force was not caught off guard by this opportunity to attack Cuba.
Action against Castro by the United States had been anticipated, and a
prearranged response had been carefully worked out. The trouble was
that given the context of the missile crisis and the desire for a surgi-
cal air strike, the response called for a strike of intolerable dimensions.
“The ‘air strike’ option served up by the Air Force called for extensive
bombardment of all storage depots, airports, and the artillery batteries
opposite the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, as well as all missile sites.”93
In short, when asked about the feasibility of a surgical air strike, the air
force had modifi ed its prearranged response, but only incrementally. It
added the missile sites to the list of targets to be bombed and subtracted
nothing. To do so, the U.S. joint chiefs of staff insisted, would pose an
unacceptable risk.
SOPs also affected the imposition of a quarantine by the United
States designed to prevent missile-bearing Soviet ships from getting to
Cuba. President Kennedy and his advisers decided on the quarantine,
and the U.S. Navy set its SOPs into motion. The complexity of the task
Shown here is one of
the sites where Soviets
placed nuclear missiles
in Cuba in 1962.
Because the missile
sites were constructed
according to the same
standard operating
procedures used to
erect sites within the
Soviet Union, the U.S.
government soon
realized that Soviet
missiles had been
delivered to Cuba.
(Courtesy John F. Kennedy,
Presidential Library and
Museum, Boston)

Foreign Policy Bureaucracies 169
should not be underestimated. The quarantine was designed to moni-
tor almost 1 million square miles of ocean. The navy assigned 180 ships
to the task. Then, virtually at the last moment, the British ambassador
suggested to Kennedy that precious time might be gained if the quaran-
tine were modifi ed. Originally, it was designed to intercept Soviet ships
800 miles from Cuba. If the quarantine procedures could be changed so
that the Soviet ships would not be intercepted until they got to within,
say, 500 miles of Cuba, this delay would give the Soviets a substantial
amount of extra time in which, it was hoped, they could change their
minds. Kennedy agreed that this was a good idea and immediately
ordered the navy to move the line of interception closer to Cuba. Despite
Kennedy’s orders, the navy complained loudly: Procedures could not be
modifi ed at the last minute in such a major way without some colos-
sal foul-up, which, under the circumstances of the missile crisis, would
have repercussions of horrifying dimensions. But Kennedy and his secre-
tary of defense, Robert McNamara, were insistent, and the navy fi nally
gave in.
Or did it? The navy did assure Kennedy that the line of intercep-
tion had been pulled back, but an examination of the evidence on how
the sighting and boarding of the ships was timed “confi rms other suspi-
cions. . . . Existing accounts to the contrary, the blockade was not moved
as the President had ordered.”94 In short, even when confronted with the
possibility that much of the world might be devastated by a nuclear holo-
caust, the navy, according to some evidence, refused to modify its SOPs
substantially.
Obviously it is not necessary to go as far back in history as the Cuban
missile crisis to fi nd examples of the importance of SOPs, especially dur-
ing times of crisis. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States cited many bureaucratic routines in its report on how
the United States was less than prepared for the events of September 11,
2001. The report stressed that the problem was not that the government
agencies followed SOPs, but that there were no SOPs developed for such
an occasion. “Existing protocols on 9/11 were unsuited in every respect
for an attack in which hijacked planes were used as weapons. What
ensued was a hurried attempt to improvise a defense by civilians who
had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear, and by
a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into
weapons of mass destruction.”95 The report also cited failure of imagina-
tion: some agencies simply never considered the possibility that multiple
airplanes could be simultaneously hijacked and that airplanes could be
used in suicide attacks; other agencies assumed that any such attacks
would come from planes originating outside the United States, which
would give them more time to respond. These failures to question pre-
vailing bureaucratic assumptions prevented what the Commission called
an “institutionalization of imagination” in the form of new procedures
that could deal with this type of threat.96

170 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology
of Decision Making
At the top of the bureaucracy sits the leader or leaders who are in charge of making decisions. Ultimately, what states do in global politics rests
in the hands of these decision makers. They may be particularly con-
strained by the distribution of power and economics in the international
system, as realism and liberalism argue, and thus have very little choice.
What the leadership is like, under severe constraints, may not then have
much impact on global politics. Many argue, however, that few decisions
in international relations are obvious. Constraints can be misinterpreted
by the leaders, leaders are not prisoners of constraints, and indeed some-
times leaders attempt to manipulate constraints to their advantage. In
particular, when the situation is ambiguous, uncertain, and complex, the
characteristics of leaders can have profound implications for the deci-
sions they make.97 In international relations, leaders often face such situ-
ations. Under these conditions, what leaders believe, how they process
information, and their leadership style become important factors. When
the authority to make government decisions rests with a group of leaders,
the nature of group relations is also important.
Leaders’ Beliefs
What leaders believe often serves as the basis on which they make their
decisions. Leaders form beliefs about themselves, the world, and the
nature of politics in a variety of ways. The psychoanalytic approach to
beliefs, for example, traces individuals’ beliefs back to early childhood
experiences. Freud, for example, argued that U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson’s beliefs in the inherent morality of the League of Nations, which
led him to resist compromise and the League of Nations to fail ratifi ca-
tion by the U.S. Senate, was rooted in Wilson’s troubled relations with
his religious father.98 Others focus on how beliefs develop from the time
period individuals experience. Different generations, for example, live
through different defi ning historical moments. It has been argued that
the reforms of the Khrushchev period in the 1950s had a lasting effect on
Mikhail Gorbachev and his generation, thus paving the way for more dra-
matic reform efforts in the 1980s. For a whole generation, world leaders
were affected by the experiences of World War II. Their anti-fascist, anti-
isolationist, and anti-appeasement beliefs refl ected their shared under-
standing of this experience. In the United States, leaders of the Vietnam
generation have a very different understanding of world politics based on
this shared, formative experience.
More important than the origins of leaders’ beliefs is the content
of those beliefs. Leaders may differ in their beliefs about, for example,
nationalism, confl ict, or the role that their country should play in world
psychoanalytic
approach An approach
to leaders that traces
individuals’ beliefs
back to early childhood
experiences.

Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making 171
politics. In particular, leaders’ operational code serves as a set of over-
arching beliefs that may guide leaders’ understanding of world politics.
A leader’s operational code concerns his or her beliefs about the nature
of the political universe (Is it confl ictual or harmonious? Predictable or
random?) and the means for dealing with others in politics (How should
risks be managed? Are confl ictual or cooperative methods more effec-
tive?). Operational codes are a general way of describing leaders’ ideolo-
gies and orientations to politics.99
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s beliefs, for example, illustrate the
importance of operational codes. Blair had a choice as to whether Britain
would participate in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Blair was not pressured
by the United States, nor was it clear that it was in British interests to
participate.100 Rather, “the dominant reason for Blair’s commitment to
U.S. policy was his intense and rather moral perspective on international
politics.”101 Compared to other leaders, Blair believed that the interna-
tional environment is susceptible to infl uence (a belief he shared with
George W. Bush at the time) and that Great Britain is a very infl uential
actor in the international system.102
Blair also saw the world in terms of absolutes, categorizes people and
states into “good” versus “bad,” and had a strong desire to control out-
comes.103 Consistent with these core principles,
Blair’s foreign policy, both during the Iraq case and in general,
has indeed been based on activist, interventionist principles . . .
Blair suggested that the principle of noninterference in the
operational code The
beliefs of political leaders
about the nature of the
political universe and the
means for dealing with
others in politics.
U.S. President Barack Obama
meeting with advisors in the
Oval Offi ce.
(Pete Souze/Mai/Landov)

172 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
internal affairs of states should not be regarded as an
insurmountable constraint . . . [and] argued that dictatorial
regimes forfeit their sovereign right of noninterference both on
moral grounds of harming their people and practical grounds of
threatening others.104
Another important type of belief that a leader may hold is an image
of another country. Images are the set of beliefs or perceptions that lead-
ers have about another country regarding its capabilities, motivations,
political system, and culture.105 A particularly powerful image in global
politics is the enemy image. If a leader holds an enemy image of another
country, he or she sees that country as expansionist, militarily threaten-
ing and having an immoral culture and an individualistic political sys-
tem. Ole Holsti described the enemy image that John Foster Dulles, U.S.
secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, held:
[Dulles] cited Stalin’s Problems of Leninism, which he equated
with Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a master plan of goals, strategy, and
tactics, as the best contemporary guide to Soviet foreign policy.
From a careful reading of that book, he concluded, one could
understand both the character of Soviet leaders and the blueprint
of Soviet policy. Characteristically, he placed special emphasis
on the materialistic and atheistic aspects of the Communist
creed, attributes he felt ensured the absolute ruthlessness of
Soviet leaders in their quest for world domination.106
When leaders of two countries hold enemy images of each other, we
call this “mirror images.” Just as Dulles held an enemy image of Stalin,
no doubt Stalin held similar beliefs about the United States.
A third type of belief that has proved to be important in the study of
international politics is analogies. Analogies are beliefs that a current sit-
uation, event, or leader is very similar to a situation, event, or leader from
the past. When leaders use analogies to guide their decisions, they use
history, or at least their beliefs about what lessons we should learn from
history. The Munich analogy became a popular analogy in international
politics after World War II. When Hitler continued his aggressive policies
after receiving concessions in the Munich agreement in 1938, many drew
the lesson that any concession will only encourage any leaders who have
committed previous hostile actions.
U.S. President George H. W. Bush, for example, relied heavily on
this historical analogy in order to make his decision about what to do
after Iraq had occupied Kuwait in 1990. He based his decision on les-
sons from the 1938 Munich debacle and on the assumption that Hussein
and the attack he had launched on Kuwait were reminiscent of Hitler
and his surprise attacks in the 1930s.107 President Bush and his advisers
also relied on analogies involving the Vietnam War in this strategic plan-
ning. President Bush demanded of the military that they avoid at all costs
image Set of beliefs or
perceptions that leaders
have about another
country regarding its
capabilities, motivations,
political system, and
culture.
enemy image Belief
that another country is
inherently threatening
and immoral.
analogies Beliefs that a
current situation, event,
or leader is very similar
to something or someone
from the past.

Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making 173
another Vietnam.108 Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, as it turned out,
also used analogies and his beliefs about Vietnam. Infl uenced by both
American reactions to casualties in Vietnam and the U.S. retreat from
Lebanon after the loss of fewer than three hundred Marines to a terrorist
attack in 1983, Saddam told the U.S. ambassador to Iraq in April 1990 (less
than four months before the attack on Kuwait), “Yours is a society which
cannot accept 10,000 battle dead.”109 Hussein’s confi dence that he would
be able to infl ict 10,000 casualties on American forces was apparently
based on analogical thinking relating the Iran-Iraq War to his upcoming
battle with the United States. After all, his troops had infl icted 750,000
deaths on Iranian soldiers during the 1980s.110
The effects of analogies and other beliefs can be dramatic if they
are misinformed. Beliefs necessarily simplify a complex world. There is
no escaping such simplifying mechanisms; the world is so complicated
and so full of information that everyone must be selective, choosing to
concentrate on certain bits of information and ignoring others in their
beliefs. Whether Saddam Hussein had expansionist motives comparable
to Hitler’s may never be known with certainty, but applying the Munich
analogy to all leaders who commit an act of aggression will certainly
mean that opportunities to avoid war through concessions will be missed
at times. Analogies that exaggerate the similarities between the current
situation and the past will likely produce poor decisions. “Saddam’s fail-
ure to distinguish between the coalition forces confronting him and the
poorly equipped and ill-trained Iranian army led him to the mistaken
belief that Iraq’s defensive posture would suffi ce to infl ict unacceptable
pain on the enemy when and if the coalition forces attacked his troops
occupying Kuwait.”111 The Iraqi army found itself unable to mount effec-
tive resistance to the devastating attack by coalition forces.
Information Processing
Beliefs that lead to misjudgment are partly caused by the inability of
humans to process all available information. We selectively perceive
information, ignoring what can be critical pieces. Franklin Roosevelt had
at his disposal information that could have led him to anticipate the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Stalin was warned repeatedly before
June 1941 that the Germans were about to attack the Soviet Union.
Truman had lots of information from which he might have concluded that
the Chinese would intervene in the Korean War if General MacArthur led
his troops into North Korea. Blair had every indication that the United
Nations would not adopt a resolution endorsing the Iraq war, but was
apparently “mystifi ed” and “baffl ed” when a resolution did not materi-
alize.112 But all these leaders were the victims of perceptual screens that
led them to discount or ignore the evidence concerning possible attack
from an enemy.

174 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
There are particular patterns to human information processing that
help us predict what information leaders will selectively perceive and
what information they will ignore or distort. In general, humans seek out
and attend to information that is consistent with the beliefs that they
already hold, especially beliefs that are very important to them. Various
cognitive consistency theories in psychology offer explanations for why
this happens when humans process information. When information is
inconsistent with existing beliefs, for example, humans might feel cogni-
tive dissonance and are uncomfortable until the dissonance is reduced.
They are then motivated to resolve the inconsistency by denying or dis-
crediting the source of the inconsistent information, searching for other
information that supports the preexisting belief, or reinterpreting the
inconsistent information so that it is consistent. Only rarely will indi-
viduals actually change their preexisting beliefs to fi t the new informa-
tion. Part of John Foster Dulles’s enemy image of the Soviet Union in the
1950s was his belief that the Soviet economy was inherently weak, on
the verge of collapse. Despite numerous indicators to the contrary, Dull-
es maintained his consistent belief system. Hitler, too, believing in the
inherent inferiority of the American military, eventually refused to hear
any reports that included statistics on American industrial and military
production.
The way we explain cause and effect also has a way of maintaining
our beliefs. Attribution theory suggests that humans tend to explain
negative outcomes (such as failing a test) through situational attribu-
tions (the light was poor) when they occur to ourselves or people we like.
When bad things (such as failing a test) happen to people we do not like,
humans tend to offer explanations using dispositional attributions (they
are not very smart). Alternatively, when good things (getting an A on a
test) happen to “good people” (ourselves or people we like), we use dispo-
sitional attributions (I am smart), and when good things (getting an A on
a test) happen to “bad” people (people we do not like), we use situational
attributions (they must have gotten lucky). These attributions reinforce
our beliefs about who is good and who is bad. In international politics,
where it is rare to know exactly what caused an event, leaders use attri-
butions to reinforce these group images. The end of the Cold War (a good
thing) was attributed by Western leaders to something about them, their
political systems, and their values (“we stood fi rm,” “democracy won”),
and little credit was given to the other side. In international economics,
failing economies in the developing states are often explained in terms
of “corrupt leaders” (a dispositional attribution) rather than the interna-
tional system (a situational attribution).
Processing information in the world of international politics is diffi –
cult enough in routine situations. Under crisis conditions, when there is
little time to respond and high stakes, leaders—because they are human
with limited information-processing abilities that become more strained
under stress—are likely to make errors in judgment and decisions.113
cognitive consistency
theories Psychology
theories that suggest
humans seek out and
attend to information
that is consistent with
the beliefs that they
already hold.

Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making 175
Leadership Styles
In addition to what leaders believe and how this affects information
processing, how leaders approach policymaking can have an effect on a
state’s foreign policy. Leadership style—the leaders’ work habits, how
they relate to those around them, how they like to receive informa-
tion, and how they make up their minds—varies across leaders in par-
ticular patterns.114 Some leaders like to be very much involved in the
decision-making process; others delegate authority. Some leaders
choose a side of an issue and advocate for that side; others act as con-
sensus builders. Some leaders solicit advice from many information
sources; others rely on trusted advisers or themselves. Some leaders
focus on the policy under consideration; others are more attuned to the
politics around them.
Perhaps the most important distinction for assessing a leader’s deci-
sion-making style is how open or closed the leader is. Leaders with more
open styles want to tailor their behavior to fi t the demands of the situation,
to ascertain where others stand with regard to a problem and consider how
other governments are likely to act before making a decision. To become
acceptable to the leader, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, and motives must receive
external validation from others. Because situational cues are so important
to deciphering appropriate behavior, these more responsive leaders seek to
create and maintain extensive information-gathering networks to keep on
top of what is happening. They want people around them who represent
their various constituencies so that they can keep abreast of the needs and
interests of those on whom their support depends.115
Leaders who have been classifi ed as having open decision-making
styles include former U.S. presidents Carter, George H. W. Bush, and
Clinton; former Syrian President Havez al-Assad; former Iranian Presi-
dent Hashemi Rafsanjani; former British Prime Minister John Major; for-
mer Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato; and former German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl. An early assessment of U.S. President Obama also placed
him in the category of leaders with open decision-making styles.116
Leaders with more closed styles are crusaders for a cause. They are
confi dent of their own positions and policy preferences and have little
use for others’ advice. What determines their decisions is how they view
the situation through their preexisting belief system, regardless of any
opposition or warning from others.
In effect, the leader selectively uses incoming information to
support his predispositions. Such leaders tend to choose advisers
who defi ne problems as they do and are generally enthusiastic
about the leader’s ideas. Libya’s Qaddafi and Cuba’s Castro are
examples of predominant leaders whose orientations appear to
predispose them to be relatively insensitive to the variety of
information in their external environments.117
leadership
style Leaders’ work
habits, how they relate
to those around them,
how they like to receive
information, and how
they make up their
minds.

176 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Other leaders who have been classifi ed as having closed decision-
making styles are former U.S. Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush,
former German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, and former British Prime
Minister Thatcher. British Prime Minister Blair also dominated the
decision-making process. “Indeed, accounts of Blair’s policy-making
style invariably stress his focus upon fundamental principles over
detail, his limited information search, and his lack of receptivity to
information which does not accord with his existing beliefs.”118 In the
lead-up to the Iraq war, Blair preferred to meet with small groups of
advisers who agreed with him and stifl ed full debate on the issue of
British support for the U.S.-led war.119
The effect that leaders with closed styles have on foreign policy is
direct: What the leader perceives, values, and believes is most likely
going to be the decision that is made, despite any domestic or interna-
tional constraints. The effect that leaders with open styles have on foreign
policy is indirect. Because these leaders test the waters and often forge
compromises between alternative constituencies, just knowing what the
leader is like does not tell us what decision will emerge. Knowing that
this water testing and compromise forging is going on, however, tells us
to look at the positions of those with whom the leader is consulting.
Group Decision Making
Rarely do individuals make decisions on their own. Usually they are part
of a group of other people. Even powerful presidents and dictators who
have the authority to make foreign policy usually rely on a small group of
advisers. Thus, the interactions of humans at the top levels of government
are also important to understand. Research on group decision making sug-
gests that groups are often more than the sum of their parts. In other words,
when you put people in a social environment, they act differently and the
choices they make as a group are not simply the “average” of what each
group member might have chosen individually. Groups, for example, may
discourage objections to policies for the sake of group cohesion. Groups are
also highly susceptible to a forceful leader who steers the others to accept
their position. In this way, groups may be particularly prone to engage in
risky behavior or foreign policy that ends in failure.120
In particular, small, highly cohesive groups may have a tendency to
engage in groupthink, defi ned by psychologist Irving Janis as excessive
concurrence seeking. Janis examined the history of several key U.S. for-
eign policy decisions, including cases of “success” such as the Marshall
Plan and the Cuban missile crisis, and cases that ended in “fi asco” such
as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the escalation of U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam during the Johnson administration:
In each of the cases, key decisions were made by a cohesive
small group composed of a leader . . . and his closest advisers.
groupthink Excessive
concurrence seeking that
can occur in small, highly
cohesive groups.

Summary 177
And in each case [that ended in a fi asco], . . . group members
were keen to preserve the mood of optimism and presumed
agreement that prevailed. This desire to minimize controversy
compromised the quality of the discussion; crucial informa-
tion was ignored or misinterpreted, alternatives to the group’s
preferred course of action were not considered or not taken seri-
ously, and the groups tended to persist in their original policies
even when confronted with feedback that the policies were not
working out well or that they were fraught with risk.121
More recently, the cohesive group of advisers around George W. Bush
has been accused of engaging in groupthink. According to Washington
Post writer Bob Woodward, during the administration’s discussions fol-
lowing the September 11 attacks, Bush’s style did not foster discussion, as
he “directed his energy at forging on, rarely looking back, scoffi ng at—even
ridiculing—doubt and anything less than 100 percent commitment.”122
And a report by the U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence concluded
that groupthink led senior policymakers not to question their assumption
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.123 According to one scholar,
It became more diffi cult for people in the State Department’s
Intelligence branch to argue caution about intelligence analyses.
This took the critical edge off the debate, creating an atmo-
sphere in which Bush and his advisers began to bolster their
arguments about what Saddam Hussein allegedly possessed and
what he was building. It may also have created a mild climate
of groupthink in which critical thinking is suppressed for fear of
upsetting the predominant view.124
Current research suggests that Janis’s conception of groupthink was
in some ways limited.125 Still, the idea that the social and political rela-
tionships and infl uence attempts that exist in small groups is another fac-
tor to be added in an understanding of policymaking has become widely
accepted, especially given the number of foreign policy decisions made in
a small group setting.
SUMMARY
● The foreign policy approach to understanding global politics challenges
the unitary actor and rational actor assumptions. Disagreements within
states and how those disagreements are managed can help explain why
states at times do not act optimally, given international constraints. The
domestic sources of foreign policy include what the public is like, what
the political system is like, and how decisions are made—particularly
the effects of bureaucracies and the characteristics of leaders on the
foreign policymaking process.

178 Chapter 5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
● The general public probably has a limited impact on the foreign policies
of most states, because individuals do not typically know or care very
much about international politics, and because they are vulnerable to
manipulation by leaders. Yet there is some indication that citizens are
becoming more informed, that changes in public opinion are often in
reaction to changing circumstances, and that core values serve as a ba-
sis from which citizens derive opinions.
● Despite good arguments for why democracies might be more peaceful
than nondemocracies, this simply is not the case. Political institutions,
however, do have important effects on foreign policymaking. Leaders
in presidential systems, for example, face different types of constraints
than do leaders in parliamentary and nondemocratic systems.
● Interest groups seek infl uence on particular policies but are often inef-
fective or their infl uence is diffi cult to detect as the main source of
the policy. The military-industrial complex in the United States has
obviously been successful in attempts to capture large portions of the
federal budget in the United States. Although the end of the Cold War
deprived the military-industrial complex of its primary rationale for
ever-larger defense budgets, recent defense budgets have increased to
Cold War levels.
● Militaries and other political opposition groups can be infl uential in
nondemocracies, especially when the government is not legitimate or
is otherwise weak. This internal opposition may push leaders to engage
in risky behavior externally, in the hopes of diverting attention away
from troubles at home. This diversionary tactic may also occur in de-
mocracies when the leader’s approval ratings are in danger.
● Foreign policies are often the product to some extent of political in-
fi ghting among different parts of the bureaucratic apparatus. Bureau-
cratic organizations tend to disagree based on their organizational roles,
pursue inconsistent and incoherent policies due to lack of organization,
and adhere to SOPs that do not fi t the situation.
● What leaders believe, the images they hold, and the analogies they use
can have a profound effect on the decisions they take in the name of the
state. Psychological perceptions are especially important because they
tend to resist change. Leaders, as humans, often selectively perceive
information and make particular attributions to keep their beliefs cog-
nitively consistent.
● A leader’s decision-making style may be open or closed and determine
whether alternative viewpoints are considered. Alternative viewpoints
may be ignored in group settings as well as due to the desire to preserve
good relations among group members.

KEY TERMS unitary actors 141
foreign policy approach 141
rational actors 142
psychological approach 142
public opinion 142
attentive public 144
core values 145
rally-round-the-fl ag effect 147
body-bag syndrome 148
fast-track authority 155
ratifi cation 155
military-industrial complex 159
peace dividend 160
diversionary theory 163
two-level games 164
organizational role 165
resultant 166
standard operating
procedures 166
psychoanalytic approach 170
operational code 171
image 172
enemy image 172
analogies 172
cognitive consistency
theories 174
leadership style 175
groupthink 176
Key Terms 179

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181
Interactions of Actors:
Security Relations
P A R T I I I

182
C H A P T E R 6
International Confl ict:
Explaining Interstate War
Explaining Confl ict between States: Analyzing Wholes and Parts
Systemic Explanations of Interstate War
• Anarchy
• Distribution of Power
• Interdependence
• Systemic Explanations of Three Wars
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars
• Type of Economy
• Types of Governments and Domestic Opposition
• Democratic Dyads
• State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Three Wars
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars
• Bureaucratic Politics and Standard Procedures
• Beliefs and Perceptions
• Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Three Wars
Multilevel Explanations of War: Using Caution When Comparing
Levels of Analysis
Summary
Key Terms

International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War 183
War is a pervasive part of global politics and has been the central topic of study for scholars of international relations. It has been
suggested that since 3600 B.C.E., there have been only 292 years without
war, and each decade since 1816 has averaged twenty-two wars.1 It is
estimated that more than 150 million people have died from war-related
deaths since 3000 B.C.E.2 As Figure 6.1 graphically indicates, the destruc-
tion of war has worsened across time. “Each of the centuries prior to the
sixteenth accounted for less than 1 percent of all war deaths. In fact all
of them added together accounted for little more than 4 percent of these
deaths, while almost 96 percent of war deaths were estimated to occur in
the modern period of history, 1500–2000.”3 “Seventy-three percent of all
war-related deaths since 3000 B.C.E. have occurred in the twentieth cen-
tury A.D.”4 Civilian deaths have been a large part of the increase in war
deaths. According to the United Nations, “In recent decades, the propor-
tion of civilian casualties in armed confl icts has increased dramatically
and is now estimated at more than 90 percent. About half the victims are
children.” Indeed, the UN estimates that more than 2 million children
have died from armed confl ict in the last decade.5
Most of the wars throughout history have occurred in the past two
centuries. “Since the end of World War II, 236 confl icts have been active
in 150 locations, including 124 confl icts in 80 locations after 1988.”6
Indeed, “the 1990s will likely win the dubious distinction of being one
of the two most war-prone decades [along with the 1970s] since the Con-
gress of Vienna.”7
Text not available due to copyright restrictions

184 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
About the only positive trends in warfare to report are that wars have
generally become shorter since 1945, the frequency of wars between great
powers has declined, and “the overall trend since the early 1990s has
been that of a marked, steep decline. However, this decline has not been
constant: The number of confl icts increased marginally in 1996, 1999,
and again in 2004.”8 The year 2007 saw the fewest number of wars since
1957.9 Still, one of the most recent wars, between Russia and Georgia in
2008, killed hundreds, created many refugees, and created fi ction between
Russia and the United States, even if it only lasted a few days.10
International confl ict can generally be divided into two categories:
interstate wars (wars between states) and internal wars (civil wars within
states). In this chapter, we take a look at the causes of interstate wars. In
the next chapter, we will consider ethnic confl icts as one type of internal
war, as well as transnational terrorism, another source of international
violence. We will use three wars—World War I, World War II, and the
Cold War—as applications of the various causes of interstate war. We
organize our discussion of the complexities of war by classifying causes
at different levels of analysis.
interstate wars
International wars or
confl icts between states.
internal wars Internal
confl ict, or civil wars
within states.
Georgian soldiers march past an apartment building after the area was bombed by
Russian jets in August 2008. The confl ict between Georgia and Russia involved a full-scale
invasion of Georgia in support of ethnic separatists in the enclaves of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.
(Cliff Volpe/Getty Images)

Explaining Confl ict between States: Analyzing Wholes and Parts 185
Explaining Confl ict between States:
Analyzing Wholes and Parts
Some of the most vigorous and mystifying debates over how best to ana-lyze politics focus on the relationship between entire social systems
and their components. Some analysts believe passionately that all valid
explanations of political behavior must ultimately deal with individuals.
These individualists “insist that no social laws operate independently
of human understanding; all explanations can be reduced to the level
of the individual and couched in terms of the nature and intentions of
these actors.”11 The alternative viewpoint is that explanations of human
behavior, and of problems such as war, must focus not on individuals or
human nature but on the social structures, or social systems, that emerge
as people interact with each other.
The various causes of wars that have been proposed over the centu-
ries have been cast in this debate over the relationship between structures
and their components and can be categorized into levels of analysis. Level
of analysis concerns whether one focuses “upon the parts or upon the
whole, upon the components, or upon the system.”12 That is, the level of
an analysis is determined by the type of social entity (individual states,
for example, or the whole international system) whose behavior or opera-
tion the analyst seeks to explain. In other words, levels of analysis have
to do with what kinds of questions are posed. One can ask, for example,
why some states are more war prone than other states or why individual
states are more war prone at some times than at other times. These ques-
tions pertain to the national level of analysis. Or one can ask why the
international system was less war prone in the nineteenth century than
in the twentieth century. Are bipolar international systems more or less
war prone than multipolar systems? These questions pertain to the inter-
national system level of analysis.
Levels of analysis have to do not only with the types of questions
that are asked but also with the answers that are given—in other words,
with the type of factors relied on to explain foreign policy decisions
or political events. Can war be attributed, for example, to the type of
state, certain relationships between states, or the characteristics of the
international system? In this way, the level of analysis deals not only
with which units one asks questions about but also with which units
or social entities should be observed to fi nd out why actors behave as
they do.
For example, one school of thought suggests, following the individ-
ualist logic, that understanding international war is not diffi cult: Wars
occur because human beings are evil. Our miseries are ineluctably the
product of our natures. The root of all evil lies with humans, and thus we
are ourselves the root of the specifi c evil of war.13 Yet human evil is not
a very satisfactory answer for a number of reasons. If people were more
levels of analysis
Concerned with where
the focus lies in an
explanation: whether it
is on components (such
as individuals or states)
or on systems (such as
international structures).

186 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
consistently self-centered and lacking in altruism, international wars
might occur considerably less often than they actually do. In a more evil
world, nobody could be found to engage in that brave, self-sacrifi cing
behavior that soldiers characteristically exhibit on the battlefi eld, usually
for very little in terms of personal gain and often at the cost of their lives.
War might be at least as much a function of humankind’s virtues as of its
vices. Even more important from a theoretical viewpoint, humankind’s
propensity for evil does not vary, at least not much, and only then over
eons. Logically, this means that the evil nature of human beings cannot
account for variations in international war over time and across space.
For example, the international system was relatively peaceful in 1910
but engulfed in war in 1914. What accounts for this difference in the war
proneness of the system in those two different years? Surely humankind
was not signifi cantly more or less evil in 1910 than in 1914, so the pas-
sage of time could not account for the onset of the First World War (or any
other war).
Those who have attempted to explain international confl ict focus on
other explanations. Rather than explaining war in terms of all humans,
some theories of war causation point to particular humans: leaders who
are charged with making the decision of whether their state goes to war.
Others focus on types of states: states with capitalist economies or states
with little internal legitimacy, for example. One of the most persistent
versions of this idea asserts that dictatorships are bad states. Still others
focus on the war proneness of pairs of states. They ask questions such as,
Are pairs of democracies less war prone than pairs of nondemocracies?
Are certain pairs of states destined to be military rivals? These questions
that focus on the characteristics of dyads of states reside at the dyadic
level of analysis. According to structuralists, the blame for war should be
placed not on the internal structure of some states (be they dictatorships
or capitalistic) or on relationships between certain types of states, but on
the structure of the international system in which all states and dyads
must operate. We now turn to the various causes of war between states
proposed at the structural, state, dyadic, and decision-making levels of
analysis.
Systemic Explanations of Interstate War
The system, or structural, level of analysis points to characteristics of the
international system as the root of war between states. Systemic explana-
tions of war posit that international structures can create consequences
that are not intended by any of their constituent actors. In other words,
states may go to war because of the nature of the international system,
not because they themselves are warlike. International structures as an
explanation of war are particularly important in realism and liberalism
(see Chapter 1 for the general descriptions of these theories and defi ni-
tions of their key concepts).
dyadic level of analysis
Explanation focusing
on characteristics of
relationships between
two states.

Systemic Explanations of Interstate War 187
Anarchy
For realism, the primary characteristic of the international system
is anarchy. Because the system is anarchic—there is no overarching
government—each state must look out for itself or risk losing out in
the war of “all against all.” In such a system, “it is not only that a
state, becoming too fond of peace, may thereby perish; but also that the
seeming somnolence of one state may invite a war of aggression that
a more aggressive pose by the peace-loving state might have avoided
altogether.”14 Because, given the nature of the international system,
even peace-loving states need to strike aggressive poses for their own
protection, all states are aggressive (or strive to appear so). What results
is the security dilemma. When one state takes an aggressive action
purely for defensive reasons to increase its security, this automatically
decreases the security of other states, which then must also undertake
aggressive actions for defensive reasons. In such a situation, no state is
acting with intentional hostility, but because of the anarchic structure
of the international system, one must assume the worst intentions and
react accordingly. Under these conditions, wars are bound to break out
periodically, and it is the anarchic structure of the international system
that is the root cause of those wars. Anarchy, of course, cannot explain
why one war occurs while another is averted, since all states face the
same anarchic condition, but it does, according to realists, explain the
pervasiveness of war generally.15
Distribution of Power
In addition to anarchy, realists point to the distribution of power in the
international system as another structure-level factor that affects the like-
lihood of war between states. The distribution of power in the international
system can be described in terms of polarity—the number of independent
power centers, or poles, in the world. If there are several powers that are
roughly equal in power, the system is said to be multipolar. If most of the
power in the international system is divided between two states, the sys-
tem is bipolar. If one state holds a preponderance of power, the internation-
al system is unipolar, or hegemonic. As discussed in Chapter 4, a state’s
power can be derived from a variety of types of sources and measured in a
variety of ways. For realists, however, the determination of power in the
international system is largely based on military capabilities.
Although realists agree that the distribution of power is an impor-
tant factor in the likelihood of war in the international system, they
do not agree on which type of system is likely to be most confl ictual.
For some, multipolar systems, like the one that operated in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century Europe, are the most stable and least likely to
produce major power wars. This particular multipolar system is known
as the classical balance-of-power system. The most basic rule that was
security dilemma
The idea that when
one state enhances its
power for security, this
leads other states to
do the same, thereby
undermining security
for all.
polarity Number
of independent power
centers, or poles, in the
international system,
which can be unipolar,
bipolar, or multipolar.
hegemonic Term for
unipolar system with one
predominantly powerful
state.
classical balance of
power Multipolar
system in eighteenth-
and nineteenth-century
Europe in which states
balanced power with
fl uid alliances.

188 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
consciously adhered to by culturally homogeneous European elites dedi-
cated to the preservation of the system was that power ought to be dis-
tributed throughout the community of states in such a way that no single
state would ever become strong enough to dominate all the rest.16
Preserving such a distribution of power meant fi rst that the states
supporting the classical balance of power needed to be watching and eval-
uating one another constantly. Thus, exchanging ambassadors became
standard practice. The key type of information on which ambassadors
(and spies) concentrated had to do with the power of the other states in
the system. Obviously, if the independence of states was to be ensured
by preventing any single state in the system from becoming powerful
enough to dominate it, each state needed to monitor continually the power
of others that threatened to become dominating, as well as the power
of those states seeking to counterbalance that threat. States could help
themselves by increasing their own power through internal means by,
for example, increasing military budgets or the size of their armies, or
by augmenting industrial capacity and encouraging population growth.
But the most rapid and fl exible means of manipulating power within the
system of the classical balance of power was the formation of alliances.
To maintain the balance of power required fl exibility of alliances. Every
member of the international system had to be prepared to cooperate
with any other member, as circumstances demanded. Ultimately, if one
state, or coalition of states, threatened the entire system, a grand alliance
involving all the rest could be formed, preserving the equilibrium and the
independence of each member state.17
Classical balance-of-power theorists also commonly assumed that it
was important for one state, the so-called “holder of the balance,” to keep
a watchful eye on the rest of the system and to step in at the appropriate
moment to ally with a weaker coalition about to be crushed by a too-
powerful state or coalition. In Europe, Great Britain usually played the
role of holder of the balance. Finally, players in this game of classical
balance of power typically felt it was important to be moderate in vic-
tory; losers of wars, at least on most occasions, would not be humiliated
or eliminated. In Europe, “wars . . . were ended by treaties which more
often than not, represented a compromise, and in their forms studiously
respected the dignity of the defeated party.”18
Some realists point to this era of classical balance of power in Europe
as a notable success and an example of a stable multipolar system. In
the period from 1648 to 1792, there were generally no great territorial
changes in continental Europe.19 For a system whose basic purpose was
the preservation of the states within it, this period of 144 years with vir-
tually no important changes in boundaries should not pass unnoticed.
Perhaps even more important was the absence of system-shattering wars
throughout the nineteenth century (after 1815). From the viewpoint of
the twentieth century, with its two world wars, the nineteenth century
looks almost idyllic, even though there were several rather extensive con-
fl icts, especially in the latter half.20

Systemic Explanations of Interstate War 189
Many argue that the relative peace during the Concert of Europe was
due to the balance of power in a multipolar system. Confl ict is much
more likely in a bipolar system, the argument goes, in which there are
only two really important actors. If those two disagree on every impor-
tant issue, and virtually every other state in the system lines up with one
of the two poles, confl ict within the international system is bound to be
exacerbated. But if there are several important actors in the system, no
single issue will be likely to divide the system into two groups of states
unremittingly hostile to each other, because some states on one side of
one issue will agree with a number of states on the opposing side when
another issue arises. Advocates of multipolarity also argue that states
must devote considerable attention to one another before they become
hostile enough to start a war. In a bipolar system, this is likely to happen.
In a multipolar system, no state can devote full energy to concentrating
on the dastardly deeds of any other single state, because every state must
also worry about several other potential enemies.21
Others disagree, arguing that a bipolar international system is more
stable and a multipolar system more warlike—for example:
In a world of three or more powers the possibility of making
and breaking alliances exists. . . . Flexibility of alignment then
makes for rigidity of national strategies: a state’s strategy must
satisfy its partner lest that partner defect from the alliance. . . .
The alliance diplomacy of Europe in the years before the First
World War is rich in examples of this. Because the defection or
defeat of a major state would have shaken the balance of power,
each state was constrained to adjust its strategy, and the deploy-
ment of its forces to the aims and fears of its partners.22
In short, the multipolar system of the early 1900s may have contrib-
uted to the First World War because the major powers were infl exible in
defense of their allies. The bipolar system of the Cold War, in contrast,
was relatively stable following the Second World War because the super-
powers could afford to lose allies (they both “lost” China, for example)
without feeling that a war was necessary to prevent such a loss.
The alert reader might have noticed that this point about the supe-
rior stability of bipolarity is made with the benefi t of a type of levels-
of-analysis switch. It is true that if we focus on the relationship among
states, the international system before the First World War was multi-
polar. But if we focus instead on the relationship between coalitions of
states, then it was bipolar, with two major alliances confronting each
other. Thus, the First World War can be attributed to bipolarity or mul-
tipolarity, depending on which kind of social entity or actor one chooses
to concentrate on.
Consider Table 6.1, which shows two imaginary international sys-
tems, with the states assigned power scores similar to those discussed in
Chapter 4. In System 1, power is very unevenly distributed. State A pos-
sesses 80 percent of the military-industrial capabilities. The occurrence

190 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
of war in such a system would seem to indicate that power disparity is
likely to lead to war. But what if the war breaks out between States B and
D, which are evenly matched in power, in spite of the unequal distribu-
tion of power in the entire system?
In that situation, we can see that the co-occurrence of high power
concentration and war in the system presents a misleading picture of the
relationship between the distribution of power within the system and
the war proneness of states. In System 2, in a similar fashion, the co-
occurrence of low power concentration and war in the system creates the
misleading impression that equality between states leads to war, when
in fact the opponents in the war were two very unequally matched coali-
tions of states.
At issue here is whether balance contributes to peace. If states are
unlikely to go to war unless they have a good chance of winning, a bal-
ance of power can be dangerous. Others counter that, on the contrary, as
long as a balance is maintained, no state will feel confi dent that it can win
a war, and so all states will be reluctant to start one.23 Both arguments are
reasonable, and researchers have attempted to fi nd evidence to support
them. One study collected information on the power of all the major pow-
ers in the international system from 1820 to 1965 and assessed the extent
to which power or military-industrial capability was unequally distributed
at fi ve-year intervals.24 The measure of concentration was used to pre-
dict the amount of war experienced by the major powers in the fi ve-year
TABLE 6.1
Relationship Between (1) Equality and Disparity in Power and (2) the
Incidence of War in Imaginary International Systems
System 1: Power Concentration Is High
State Power Score
A 80
B 5
C War opponents 5
D 5
E 5
System 2: Power Concentration Is Low
State Power Score
A 30
B Coalition 1 30
C War opponents 20
D Coalition 2 15
E 5
}
}

Systemic Explanations of Interstate War 191
periods following each observation.25 This study found that, generally,
the impact of the distribution of power in the international system on the
war proneness of the system is minimal, although this was not true across
different time periods. In the nineteenth century but not in the twentieth,
greater amounts of war were more likely when power concentration was
high; that is, when the distribution of power was unequal.26
It is possible that balance worked at preventing major wars in the
nineteenth century but not in the twentieth. The leaders of the pre–First
World War, European-dominated system shared not only a conscious
commitment to the balance of power but also a certain amount of cul-
tural homogeneity. “Europe was an in-group of states which excluded
non-European countries. . . . [This] homogeneity was a necessary condi-
tion of the balance-of-power system.”27
But after the First World War, and particularly after the Second World
War, the globe came to be dominated by the United States and the Soviet
Union, joined eventually by such important non-European states as China
and Japan. The elites in these states had distinct worldviews, reinforced
(especially in the cases of the United States and the Soviet Union) by oppos-
ing ideological principles to which they zealously adhered. Also, in the nine-
teenth century, there was a relative lack of democratic pressure on foreign
policy elites, which (along with the cultural homogeneity) allowed them to
pursue fl exible balance-of-power policies unencumbered by the necessity
to explain them to the people. That democratic pressure, combined with
the ideological fervor of the Cold War, robbed (in theory, anyway) the elites
in the major powers of the contemporary international system of the abil-
ity to arrange and rearrange alliances as necessary to maintain the balance-
of-power system. So, in light of all these differences between the twentieth-
century system and that of Europe before the First World War, it is not
surprising that when the authors of this study analyzed the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries separately, they found different relationships.
One recent study, however, found support for the notion that power
imbalance is related to confl ict across time: “Out of all the arguments
we look at, the most powerful predictors of war are primarily associated
with the concentration of power in the international system.”28 This is
a particularly relevant fi nding for global politics today. By most mea-
sures, power in the international system is highly concentrated, with the
United States in a preeminent position. Indeed, according to one analyst,
the post–Cold War world became America’s “unipolar moment.”29 What
should we expect in a unipolar system in which a hegemonic state has a
preponderance of power?30 In this situation, too, realists agree that such
a distribution of power is an important systemic factor and argue that
a high imbalance of power produces stability. States are unlikely to go
to war unless they have a good chance of winning, and this opportu-
nity is unlikely to arise unless there is relative equality, that is, a bal-
ance of power between the prospective opponents. Unipolar systems
lack such a balance and therefore are more stable. This idea is known as

192 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
hegemonic stability theory.31 A very powerful hegemon in a sense coun-
ters the anarchy in the international system in that it can play the role
of an overarching authority: It can enforce rules.
Is this the role the United States is playing today? Some argue that
despite the relative preponderance of power that the United States holds,
the system is not completely unipolar. According to Samuel Huntington,
There is now only one superpower. But that does not mean that
the world is unipolar. A unipolar system would have one super-
power, no signifi cant major powers, and many minor powers . . .
Contemporary international politics . . . is instead a strange
hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several
major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires
action by the single superpower but always with some combina-
tion of other major states; the single superpower can, however,
veto action on key issues by combinations of other states.32
While the major powers in today’s international system cannot seriously
challenge the United States, Huntington argues, they would prefer a mul-
tilateral system and resent the unconstrained unilateralism of the United
States. Josef Joffe agrees on the point that recent U.S. foreign policies have
alienated much of the rest of the world.33 And although many states see
the benefi ts that come with the United States’ preeminent position in the
world, there is more tension between the United States and the rest of the
world than some variants of hegemonic stability theory would expect.
Even if the United States is in a unipolar position, realists warn that
unipolar systems are eventually inherently unstable and dangerous. Hege-
mons do not last. Either they spread their resources too thin to maintain
their hegemonic power, or the capabilities that contribute to power trans-
form, allowing new states to catch up to the hegemon’s level. According
to power transition theory,34 confl icts are more likely when power transi-
tions are underway. At the core of such shifts are simultaneous increases
in productivity linked to industrialization, increased manpower due to
demographic growth, and an increase in the capacity of political elites to
mobilize natural resources. Sudden changes in national capabilities upset
the previous distribution of power. Specifi cally, major wars are asserted
to be most likely when the challenger catches up to the dominant state,
impelling a kind of “rear-end” collision.35
Closing in on the hegemon, the challenging state may attack in a bid
for power. Seeing a rising challenger, the hegemon may initiate a preemp-
tive war. Thus, while unipolar systems can be quite stable for a long time,
they have a built-in dynamic for major war.36 These ideas certainly hold
implications for confl ict and cooperation today and in the near future.
Power transition theorists point to rising Chinese power and U.S.-Sino
relations.
Should China surpass the United States as the world’s most
powerful state while having no substantial demands for change
hegemonic stability
theory Idea that
preeminent power of a
hegemon allows it to
enforce rules and deters
others from initiating
confl ict.
power transition
theory Idea that
confl ict is likely when
rising states challenge
weakening hegemons.

Systemic Explanations of Interstate War 193
to the international system’s organizing principles, power
transition theory postulates that catastrophic war likely will be
averted. In this case, China will emerge as a “satisfi ed” preemi-
nent power, much as did the United States when the mantle
of international leadership passed from the British. In contrast,
should China challenge the United States in the mid twenty-
fi rst century, holding deep-seated grievances against the West,
its culture, and its imposed international rules and norms, then
the probability of war rises dramatically.37
Interdependence
While realism focuses on anarchy and the distribution of power as the
most important characteristics of the international system, liberalism
focuses on how interdependent the system is. How would the degree of
complex interdependence affect the likelihood of war? Liberalism argues
that multiple channels across states facilitated by international organi-
zations, transnational links among nonstate actors, and the varied non-
military issues in which states and other actors have interests means that
war becomes more costly and states are constrained from using war as a
policy tool.38 In relationships that are characterized by a high degree of
interdependence, the effects of an anarchical system that realists would
expect are simply not seen.
Particularly among industrialized, pluralist countries, the per-
ceived margin of safety has widened: Fears of attack in general
have declined, and fears of attacks by one another are virtually
nonexistent. . . . Canada’s last war plans for fi ghting the United
States were abandoned half a century ago. Britain and Germany
no longer feel threatened by each other. Intense relationships
of mutual infl uence exist between these countries, but in most
of them force is irrelevant or unimportant as an instrument of
policy.39
Even in relationships in which force might be contemplated, it is not as
effective as it once was, according to liberalism, because of changes in the
international system:
The limited usefulness of conventional force to control socially
mobilized populations has been shown by the United States
failure in Vietnam as well as by the rapid decline of colonialism
in Africa. Furthermore, employing force on one issue against
an independent state with which one has a variety of relation-
ships is likely to rupture mutually profi table relations on other
issues. In other words, the use of force often has costly effects on
nonsecurity goals. And fi nally, in Western democracies, popular
opposition to prolonged military confl icts is very high.40

194 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
Thus, interdependence, especially when combined with democratic gov-
ernments, is a system-level factor affecting war, according to liberalism.41
Systemic Explanations of Three Wars
Various systemic-level explanations have been advanced to explain the
three major confl icts of the twentieth century: World War I, World War II,
and the Cold War (for a review of the historical background and major
events of these confl icts, refer to Chapters 2 and 3).
The systemic-level explanations of World War I have already been
alluded to. Realists point to the distribution of power as a major cause
of the war, although they disagree on the nature of that distribution.
Those who see the system as multipolar point to the dangers of alliances
like those operating in the classic balance-of-power system. The system
worked well as long as Britain was dominant, but when Germany’s power
increased and threatened the multipolar balance, Britain had to abandon
its role as balancer and form an alliance with France and then Russia (the
Triple Entente) against Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy (the Triple
Alliance). This rigidity in alliances and “the keen competition between
the two camps meant that although any country could commit its asso-
ciates, no one country on either side could exercise control. If Austria-
Hungary marched, Germany had to follow; it could not be left alone in
Central Europe. If France marched, Russia had to follow; a defeat by Ger-
many would be a defeat for Russia.”42 Thus, the argument goes, the con-
fl ict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was transformed into a major
confl agration by the complex interlocking system of alliances built up by
the major powers in this multipolar distribution of power. Others contend
that World War I points to the dangers of bipolarity. When the two coali-
tions formed, they argue, the system ceased to be multipolar. Whether the
system was bipolar or multipolar, realists agree that the anarchic nature
of the international system and the rise of German power that upset the
distribution of power were key system-level factors that contributed to
World War I.
The system-level explanation of World War II also features the dis-
tribution of power. After World War I, no meaningful balance of power
emerged. In particular, World War I had failed to resolve the problem
of Germany as a rising power. The postwar settlements had weakened
Germany, and without a strong, central power on the continent, a bal-
ance could not be maintained. Furthermore, when Germany began to
regain its power, there was no check against it. Britain had weakened
and could no longer play the balancer role to keep the peace, and the two
emerging world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with-
drew from European international politics for domestic political reasons.
Liberals also offer a system-level explanation for World War II, focusing
on interdependence. Although the economies of the major powers were
fairly integrated by the 1920s, the economic depression that began in

State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars 195
the United States with the 1929 stock market crash led many countries
to cut their economic ties to each other. Indeed, a series of protectionist
policies made the world less interdependent by the mid-1930s. Isolated
economies arguably exacerbated the effects of the worldwide depres-
sion. Not only did the poor economic conditions in Germany play a key
role in Hitler’s rise to power, but the lack of connections between coun-
tries made war a less costly decision for all. Thus, many countries pur-
sued more interdependence between countries, especially Germany and
France, after World War II as a way to bind the fates of countries together,
thus changing the nature of the international system in an effort to
avoid war.
The Cold War is used in system-level explanations to point out the
inevitability of competition in a bipolar world and the stability that a
bipolar distribution of power can create. At the end of World War II, the
only remaining state with any considerable power was the United States.
The British, French, and Germans were exhausted by the two world wars
and were clearly not going to be the world powers they once were. The
Soviet Union was also devastated by its participation in World War II,
but compared to the other European states, it had the size and resources
necessary to make a bid for superpower status. By 1949, with the Soviet
Union’s test of its fi rst atomic weapon, the world had transformed into a
bipolar system. The systemic explanation for the onset of the Cold War
argues that a high level of hostility was inevitable in such a system. Like
two big bullies on the same block, the two superpowers were destined to
compete against each other in world politics. The competition for terri-
tory, alliances, and allegiances had all the trappings of a war, although the
two main belligerents never directly fought each other. This remarkable
outcome, often referred to as “the long peace,”43 has also been attrib-
uted to the bipolar nature of the Cold War. The overwhelming power
that divided the world into two blocs, the argument goes, combined with
the specter of nuclear war, made direct confl ict too costly, perhaps even
unthinkable. Thus, bipolarity, it is said, explains both the rise of the Cold
War and the sustenance of “the long peace.”
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars
Just as some people may be more accident prone than others, some types
of states may be more war prone than others. In other words, certain
characteristics of states may make them more likely to become involved
in wars. In particular, the nature of a state’s economy, the domestic polit-
ical opposition that a state faces, and the nature of its political system
are all featured in prominent state-level explanations of war. When we
consider the interaction of the characteristics of two states, we move to
the dyadic level for explaining war. Democratic dyads, or pairs of states
with democratic governments, seem to be exceptionally capable at avoid-
ing wars.

196 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
Type of Economy
The traditional Marxist theory of war argues that states with capitalist
economies will be inherently war prone.44 First, the argument goes, capi-
talist states often seek to address economic problems that occur at home
within their own economy—problems such as overproduction, surplus cap-
ital, and unequal distribution of wealth—by engaging in imperialism. Con-
quering other lands secures new markets, cheap labor, and access to raw
materials. Second, while imperialism itself involves military intervention,
Marxists expect additional military confl ict between capitalist states.
In a world of many capitalist countries imperialism means
economic competition between rival states. Each state strives to
gain exclusive control over markets, raw materials, sources of
cheap labor, naval bases, and investment opportunities. At some
point, these can be gained only at the expense of other capitalist
states. Economic confl ict eventually leads to military confl ict.45
Lenin himself argued in his book Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capi-
talism, written in 1916,46 that imperialism and eventual military confl ict
among capitalist states was the inevitable destiny of capitalist states.
There have been many criticisms of this Marxist-Leninist theory of
war. One group of arguments focuses on the Marxist assumptions for
why capitalist states must engage in imperialism, pointing out, for exam-
ple, that not all capitalist states were experiencing economic problems
at home when they engaged in imperialism and that they often did not
secure the benefi ts of imperialism. Another group of criticisms focuses
on the historical record, pointing out that not all capitalist states have
engaged in imperialism, that not all confl icts between capitalist states
ended in war, that war has been around longer than capitalist economic
systems, that wars between capitalist states were not necessarily fought
for economic reasons, and that states with socialist or centrally planned
economies have often been engaged in confl ict, even with each other. To
be even-handed, we should entertain the idea that states with centrally
planned economies may be more warlike since they are often isolated
economically and thus war will not hurt their economy as much as war
can dampen profi ts for capitalist states. Yet this general proposition also
fails on historical grounds. States with both types of economies have been
involved in major military confl icts.
Even if we accept the criticisms of these theories that capitalist or
centrally planned states are inherently more war prone than the other,
we are not obliged to reject the idea that economic conditions or forces
may indeed provide an explanation for some wars. Conquering others’
resources in order to address economic problems may indeed be a major
motivation for some states to initiate wars. There is more evidence,
however, that good economic conditions may be related to war because
that is when states can afford military adventures. War also benefi ts the

State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars 197
economic interests of some groups in a society. Weapons makers, for
example, have been accused of advocating high levels of defense spending
and even war to turn a profi t. Furthermore, the proposition of a military-
industrial complex (discussed in Chapter 5) focuses on the relationship
among the military, the bureaucracy, and the defense industry as a coali-
tion of economic and political interests that benefi t from international
confl ict. Such coalitions of economic and bureaucratic groups can often
logroll their narrow interests to promote over-expansion and empire
building, even to the detriment of the country.47
Types of Governments and Domestic Opposition
In addition to the systemic-level characteristic of interdependence, liberal
explanations of international confl ict include the type of political system
that states have. Specifi cally, liberalism expects states with democratic
systems to be less war prone than nondemocratic states because of the
constraints that are built in to democratic structures and the cultural
values of peaceful resolution of confl icts that are related to democratic
processes.48 As discussed in Chapter 5, there is substantial criticism of
these reasons behind the liberal expectation of peace-loving democracies,
and the evidence supporting this position has been more controversial.
At the heart of the notion that political systems play a role in state
choices for war is the presence of domestic opposition. Democracies, lib-
erals argue, are supposedly constrained from choosing war because of an
opposition that sees war as violating democratic cultural values or jeopar-
dizing economic benefi ts that come from peaceful trading relations. Leaders
of democratic states can be held accountable through elections if their war
policies create signifi cant domestic opposition. Leaders in nondemocratic
states can also face opposition to aggressive policies and can sometimes be
held accountable by means other than elections, as discussed in Chapter 5
(see the section “What Is the Role of Military and Political Opposition
Groups in Nondemocracies?”). Furthermore, states with serious domes-
tic opposition may not be able to mobilize enough of the population and
resources to wage war. All of these ideas point to the extent and nature of
domestic political opposition as a state-level factor and to the way opposi-
tion at home can constrain states from military adventures abroad.49
Internal opposition may also push states into going to war. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 5 (see the section “What Effects Does Political Opposi-
tion Have on Foreign Policy?”), leaders of democracies and nondemocra-
cies may use external confl ict to placate domestic opponents or divert
attention away from internal confl ict. Known as the diversionary, or
scapegoat, theory of war,
it is believed that when states are beset with deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions, ethnic divisions, increasing political opposi-
tion, or civil strife and rebellion, their leaders will seek to end

198 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
these internal woes by initiating confl ict with an external foe.
Presumably, war is undertaken in the belief that it will rally
the masses around the globe in the face of a “foreign threat,”
and that a healthy dose of patriotism is the best medicine for
the internal problems facing the government. The external foe,
then, becomes a scapegoat. Internal problems are either blamed
(unjustly) on the external opponent and victory over the scape-
goat is touted as essential to reverse the wretched internal situ-
ation, or the war is simply used by the government to divert the
attention of citizens from the internal situation.50
While there is some evidence that questions a general relationship
between the level of internal confl ict and the level of external confl ict
for all states, the diversionary and scapegoat propositions persist and are
quite convincing for particular confl icts, including the three great con-
fl icts in the early part of the twentieth century.51
Democratic Dyads
Although democratic states are just as likely to go to war as nondemo-
cratic states, research suggests that democratic states are less likely to
become involved in wars against each other. The evidence for the demo-
cratic peace proposition—that democratic states will not war against each
other—is, on the surface at least, convincing and simple. “Even though
liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal
states, constitutionally secure states have yet to engage in war with each
other.”52 In other words, these democratic dyads are confl ict free. One
evaluation of the proposition that democratic states do not fi ght interna-
tional wars against each other concludes that “the evidence is conclusive
that . . . there is one aspect of the military behavior of democratic states . . .
that is clearly distinguished from that of nondemocratic states: . . .
democratic states do not fi ght each other.”53 Perhaps the most profound
implication of the democratic peace proposition is that a world full of
democratic states would be substantially less prone to war. “The increas-
ing number of liberal states announces the possibility of global peace this
side of the grave or world conquest.”54 Other implications of the demo-
cratic peace proposition are debated in the Policy Choices box on whether
states should intervene in other states to promote democratization.
It is true, of course, that the validity of this proposition is heavily depen-
dent on the defi nitions of democracy and war that one adopts. It is easy to
discredit the idea by adopting very broad defi nitions; it would be equally
easy to make the proposition invulnerable to contrary evidence, but also
empirically meaningless, by adopting a defi nition of democracy that is so
strict as to eliminate virtually every state that has ever existed. Yet,
if democracy is defi ned as a type of political system in which
the identities of the leaders of the executive branch and the
democratic peace
Proposition that
democratic states will
not war against each
other.

P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should States Intervene to Promote Democratization?
ISSUE: Given the fi ndings from research that democratic dyads are not likely to
fi ght each other, many scholars and policymakers have advocated that the pro-
motion of democracy should be a major foreign policy goal of states and is in the
interests of the international community at large. At times, advocates argue that
intervention in states’ affairs, including military intervention, is necessary to bring
about democratization and encourage long-term peaceful relations with other
democracies. This was, for example, one of the justifi cations offered for military
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.
Option #1: States should actively intervene and support democratization in other
states.
Arguments: (a) Scientifi c evidence and historical experiences suggest that democ-
racies rarely fi ght each other. A more democratic world would be a more secure,
peaceful world. (b) Democratization is a moral imperative as it enhances basic fun-
damental human rights and political freedom. (c) Military intervention is necessary
when autocratic leaders prevent reform and democratic changes.
Counterarguments: (a) It is not yet clear what causes peace between democra-
cies and whether this fi nding will continue to hold true in the future, with many
more democratic states in the world. Furthermore, democratic states are still as
confl ictual as nondemocratic states. (b) Undemocratic regimes are only one source
of human rights violations. Addressing root causes such as poverty will do more
to improve people’s lives than will regime change. (c) Military intervention itself is
a threat to security and often produces long-lasting, destabilizing consequences.
Other means, such as economic and political sanctions, can be effective and allow
for internal, rather than imposed democratization.
Option #2: Democratization should not be a primary foreign policy goal of states.
Arguments: (a) Countries in transition may be particularly susceptible to internal
and external confl ict. (b) Imposed democracies usually fail, sometimes leading to
more repressive regimes. Indigenous democracy is lasting democracy. (c) Militant
democracies bent on enforcing their will around the world may actually risk be-
coming less free and democratic. Wartime environments often stifl e dissent and
the exercise of basic political freedoms.
Counterarguments: (a) Transitions, even if diffi cult and bloody, are ultimately
more desirable than organized confl ict between well-armed belligerent states, as
occurs between nondemocratic dyads. (b) Post-World War II Germany and Japan
are examples of how the imposition of democracy can be quite successful, with
enough political will and international pressure. (c) Stifl ing political freedoms is
neither necessary nor permanent. Any infringement of liberties caused by military
actions abroad will ultimately be corrected.
members of the national legislature are selected in elections
involving at least two independent political parties, in which at
least half the adult population is eligible to vote, and in which
the possibility that the governing party will lose has been
199

200 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
established by historical precedent, then . . . none of those [con-
troversial] cases is appropriately categorized as an international
war between democratic states.55
The absence of wars between democratic states is interesting, but
it is not conclusive enough to prove that democratic states are unusu-
ally peaceful in their relationships with one another because they are
democratic. It may be that something else (that is, not the nature of the
democratic political system) is contributing to peace. Some critics argue
that although democracy may correlate with peace, this is largely because
peaceful conditions produce democratic states rather than the other way
around.56 Other critics focus on the number of opportunities that all states
have had to fi ght wars against each other. In recent years, there have been
about 190 states in the global political system. This means that there are
roughly 17,955 pairs of states in the system (190 times 189 divided by 2).
In earlier years, when the number of states was lower (about 50), the
number of pairs of states was of course also lower, but it was still quite
large. And the number of democratic states has (until quite recently, at
least) been relatively small, so that the proportion of pairs made up of
democratic states has always been quite small. In short, this means that
the fact that democratic states have not fought each other in war may
not be as remarkable as it seems at fi rst, because the mathematical prob-
ability that they would do so is not very large. The lack of wars between
democratic states may in fact be no more remarkable than the absence of
wars over the same period between two states whose names both begin
with the letter Z. This has been one of the more prominent criticisms of
the democratic peace proposition.57 Given the recent expansion of demo-
cratic states, however, for at least the last couple of decades, the statisti-
cal chances for two democratic states to get involved in wars with each
other have not been trivial.
Others argue that the reason that war between democracies has not
occurred may be that modern democratic states are relatively wealthy,
that they trade a lot with each other, that they have been unifi ed by com-
mon interests created by the threat of a common enemy (the Communist
states),58 or that all democratic states have been under the infl uence of
U.S. hegemony. But European states, for example, have been among the
wealthiest and most trade oriented in the world for most of this century,
and that did not, before they turned uniformly democratic, prevent them
from continually fi ghting wars against one another. In general, a review
of wars in the past century and a half reveals that “of the ten bloodiest
interstate wars, every one of them grew out of confl icts between coun-
tries that either directly adjoined one another, or were involved actively
in trade with one another.”59 In terms of those criteria, Europe should
still be a war-prone continent, but for some reason it clearly is not. In
addition, some recent research indicates that under certain conditions,
international trade can exacerbate, rather than reduce, confl ict.60

State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars 201
If having a common enemy is a key to peace, why did the opposition
of capitalist states, with their many anti-Communist alliances, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), not prevent wars (and
other lower-level military confl icts) among socialist states, such as those
between the Soviet Union and Hungary; Czechoslovakia, China, and
Afghanistan; China and Vietnam; and Vietnam and Cambodia? Mean-
while, relationships among states on the U.S. side of the Cold War were
not always entirely tranquil either. El Salvador fought a war against Hon-
duras in 1969, Turkey and Greece became involved in a war over Cyprus
in 1974, and Great Britain fought with Argentina over the Falkland (or
Malvinas) Islands in 1982. It is no accident, from the point of view of
democratic peace theorists, that all of these wars on the non-Communist
side of the Cold War involved at least one undemocratic state, and that
clearly common viewpoints on the Cold War were no guarantee of peace-
ful relationships.61
In recent years, there has been an impressive accumulation of evi-
dence supporting the idea that democratic states avoid wars with each
other because they are democratic, not because of these other factors.62
Statistical analyses of data on regime types and the incidence of wars
between states, from 1816 to the modern era, suggest that this situa-
tion is unlikely to have occurred by chance or to be spurious, that is,
brought about by some third factor.63 In addition, sweeping historical
studies of republics, for example, in ancient Greece, among Italian city-
states, and among the cantons of historical Switzerland;64 ethnographic
and anthropological studies of territorially based societies;65 and experi-
ments in social-psychological laboratories66 all support the democratic
peace proposition.
What remains a puzzle is why democracies do not fi ght each other,
especially if they are as war prone as nondemocratic states. To address this
puzzle, analysts have primarily focused on two possible theoretical expla-
nations.67 One is a cultural explanation emphasizing that decision mak-
ers in democracies have cultural expectations about how confl icts can be
resolved in a peaceful manner, based on compromise instead of violence,
which will carry over from their domestic political experiences into inter-
national politics, particularly when they are involved in confl icts with
other democratic states.68 A second type of explanation focuses on struc-
tural constraints that make it diffi cult or unlikely for decision makers
in democracies to fi ght wars against each other.69 This explanation pro-
poses that when democratic governments bargain with each other, they
both observe the democratic institutions in their counterparts and infer
that opposition to government policies will exist. The constraints that
this opposition puts on both governments when two democratic states
become involved in a confl ict with each other make them much more
likely to settle disputes by negotiation rather than through warfare.70
These explanations, however, are not without criticism.71 The
cultural explanation, for example, posits that citizens and leaders in

202 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
democracies are generally more peace loving and deviate from that cul-
tural tendency only when they encounter nondemocracies. Yet it is not
clear why they deviate at all from norms and values that are presumably
so engrained in their culture. Furthermore,
while it may be safe to assume that leaders and constituents
who share democratic norms will be more tolerant of others who
do so also, less certain is whether democratic leaders [and citi-
zens] indeed perceive another country as a democracy or whether
they believe that they know how specifi c leaders of other demo-
cratic countries will act, and therefore, whether they can count
on these leaders to resolved disputes peacefully. It is an empiri-
cal question whether or not leaders of democracies embrace the
same values and perceive each other to be ideologically com-
mitted to the liberal prohibition against the use of force to settle
disputes and on these bases decide not to go to war.72
The structural constraint explanation has received the most critical
attention. Critics argue that it is based on the assumption that the public
does infl uence foreign policy in democratic systems. As the discussion
in Chapter 5 on public opinion demonstrated, it is not at all clear that
this is the case, given citizens’ lack of knowledge of foreign affairs, the
manipulation of public opinion by elites, and the numerous examples of
leaders who made foreign policy decisions, including decisions to engage
in confl ict, without input or against the wishes of the public and who
were apparently not held accountable. The structural explanation also
assumes that all democracies have structures that give citizens the oppor-
tunity to infl uence foreign policy and that this infl uence occurs across
all democracies, at least in comparison to nondemocracies.73 Yet, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, there are important differences, even among demo-
cratic states, in the ability of public opinion to have an impact on foreign
policy, and public support and opinion can be critical in nondemocracies
that suffer from a defi cit of legitimacy.
Critical to the notion of the democratic peace, and any other dyadic-
level explanation of war, is the interaction of two states. State A must act
differently because of the characteristics of state B and vice versa. In the
cultural explanation, the pair must see each other as sharing democratic
values, as being part of an in-group, so that it can trust it to resolve con-
fl icts in a peaceful manner.74 In the institutional explanation, because
leaders of a democracy have to satisfy the broader public in order to get
reelected, they will be more careful about going to war, will put more
effort into winning a war, and will more carefully anticipate what effort
the other side will put forward.
Fearing public policy failure, democrats try to avoid contests
they do not think they can win. Since two democrats in a dis-
pute both try hard, both can anticipate that, if they go to war,

State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars 203
each will spend lots of resources in a risky situation in which
neither is disproportionately advantaged by greater effort. There-
fore, democrats are generally inclined to negotiate with one
another rather than fi ght.”75
This anticipation of what the other side will do is important not only
for calculations of war, but also for state decisions regarding alliances, arms
buildups, and bargaining strategies, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Three Wars
State-level explanations of World War I have been popular. One such
explanation was provided by Lenin himself in 1917. Lenin viewed World
War I as the inevitable outcome of capitalist development. As the capital-
ist states had succeeded by 1914 in carving up much of the world into ter-
ritories to satisfy their economic needs, they were destined to come into
confl ict with each other in their competition for more resources, labor,
and markets. According to this view, the spat between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia served as an excuse to engage in a battle that the major capital-
ist powers were intent on for more important reasons having to do with
the nature of their economic systems. Economic interests of the United
States, and key groups within the country, fi gure prominently in another
explanation of World War I. Many charged munitions makers and banks,
labeled “merchants of death,” with maneuvering the United States into
war for profi t. World War I is also used as an example of the diversionary
and scapegoat propositions. Many of the states involved in the war were
experiencing opposition at home: The Austro-Hungarian empire was fac-
ing the demands of nationalist groups such as the Serbs; Russia’s internal
turmoil may have prompted the leaders to go to war rather than admit
weakness that might further stimulate opposition to the government;
and the controlling groups in Germany may have been looking for ways
to put off calls for social reforms. War, then, may have looked like an
attractive strategy to weak states facing considerable opposition at home.
At the dyadic level, World War I is only one example of democracies (such
as the United States and Great Britain) fi ghting nondemocracies (such as
Austria-Hungary and Germany), but not each other.
State-level explanations have also been applied to World War II. Given
the worldwide depression and the burdens of war reparations imposed
on it in the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was economically devastated.
Hitler’s scapegoating economic troubles on to internal groups and exter-
nal enemies helped him secure power and pursue aggressive policies.
Another state-level factor points to the nature of the political systems of
the actors involved. The two aggressors in the war, Germany and Japan,
were fascist dictatorships with little domestic constraint on their deci-
sions. The domestic constraints on the democracies, moreover, may have
made them slow to respond. Isolationist opinion in the United States, for

204 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
example, meant that it was impossible for President Roosevelt to mobi-
lize the country for war until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
In democratic Britain, the Depression had driven a Labour govern-
ment out of power in 1931, and it was replaced by a national coalition
consisting of the three major parties in Britain: the Labour Party, the Con-
servative Party, and the Liberal Party. The coalition fell apart when the
Labour Party, torn by internal dissension, left the government. The Con-
servatives effectively ruled the country in the remaining prewar years,
and the leaders of the Conservative Party adopted an unwavering policy
of appeasement. Neville Chamberlain is most clearly associated with the
policy, but it should be remembered that he had great popular support
in Britain and it is unlikely that any prime minister who had adopted a
much different policy would have lasted very long. Chamberlain became
prime minister in 1937. In 1938, Germany’s military expenditures were
roughly fi ve times larger than Britain’s. Chamberlain’s deal with Hitler
at Munich won for him a tumultuous hero’s welcome when he returned
to Great Britain. As late as April 1939, both the Labour and the Liberal
parties voted against the introduction of conscription, thus refl ecting the
determination of many Britons to avoid war at any cost.
While World War II looks, in general, like another case of democra-
cies waging war against nondemocracies, it is also an example of some of
the debate that scholars have about how to assess the democratic peace
proposition. The debate in this case centers on Finland’s role in the war.
Contrary to the idea that democratic dyads do not go to war against each
other, Finland was basically on the side of the Germans; Finnish troops
served under German command; German troops served under Finnish
command; Finnish citizens were directly recruited into German armed
forces; Britain launched an air attack on Finnish territory in 1941; Britain
and the United States broke off economic and diplomatic relations with
Finland, and Britain, Canada, Australia; and New Zealand declared war
on Finland.76 Nevertheless, consistent with the democratic peace idea,
Finland was not a formal ally of Germany; Finland refused to participate
in key German offensives in the Soviet Union; the United States never
declared war on Finland and never actually fought Finland; and no combat
casualties were recorded between Finland and any other democracy.77 After
a careful analysis of the decision-making process on all sides, Elman con-
cludes that “Finland’s involvement in World War II is partially consistent
with the democratic peace theory” and that the Finnish case suggests
that the democratic peace proposition may be less applicable to small
states facing severe external threats and to democracies that have highly
centralized institutions.78
Political systems are also factors in explanations of the rise of the Cold
War. Those who point to the Soviet Union’s behaviors in Eastern Europe
as the origins of Cold War hostilities focus on the nature of a Commu-
nist dictatorship: Stalin had little, if any, domestic opposition constrain-
ing him, and the isolation of the Soviet economy meant that aggressive

Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars 205
policies cost it little in trade. Others who point to behaviors of the United
States in Western Europe as the source of Cold War tensions focus on the
nature of the U.S. capitalist economy: U.S. economic interests needed to
create and dominate a market in Western Europe in which to make profi ts.
Furthermore, in order to address domestic opposition to a U.S. military
presence in Europe, U.S. leaders had to exaggerate the Soviet threat and
put the struggle in moral terms of good versus evil, which would resonate
with the U.S. public. The lineup of mostly (but not all) democratic states
in the NATO alliance against the nondemocratic states in the Warsaw
Pact is also consistent with the democratic peace proposition.
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars
The cause of international confl ict may also be located within states at
the decision-making level of analysis. This level focuses on policymak-
ing processes and how characteristics of those processes lead countries
down paths that they may not have intended, or at least did not clearly
think through according to traditional standards of rational actors and
rationality. Recall from Chapter 5 that the foreign policy approach to
international politics rejects many of the assumptions of system-level
theories, such as realism and liberalism. Specifi cally, foreign policy ana-
lysts believe that treating the state as a unitary actor ignores the divisions
that occur within states. These domestic sources of foreign policy may
at times propel states to war. Furthermore, the psychological approach
believes that how leaders defi ne the situation is key to an understanding
of the choices they make. What leaders believe about their domestic and
international constraints and what images they hold of other countries
can provide clues about their choices for confl ict.
Bureaucratic Politics and Standard Procedures
At the decision-making level of analysis, many point to the way in which
bureaucracies are organized. As discussed in Chapter 5, governments
are divided up into several bureaucratic agencies responsible for gather-
ing information, providing advice, and implementing policies in their
jurisdictions. One consequence of this bureaucratic organization is that
the numerous agencies tend to see decisions, including decisions about
war, differently based on their organizational roles. Bureaucratic units,
such as those representing military interests, may search for information
and advocate policies that are more aggressive given that their job is to
emphasize and protect the country from threats and such threats justify
their existence, and budgets. In the decision to begin aerial bombing in
Vietnam, the air force was the prime supporter:
The air force, like no other advocate, was fi ghting for the credi-
bility of a part of its organizational identity and the preservation

206 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
of primary missions by arguing that bombing would “work” in
Viet-Nam before it was begun, maintaining that it was effective
after it was started, and protesting that it could not produce vic-
tory unless it was conducted with more vigor after it appeared
to fail.79
Another consequence of bureaucratic decision making is that bureaucra-
cies tend to rely on prearranged standard operating procedures. Standard
operating procedures are typically functional but may be misapplied in
a particular situation and tend to be infl exible once they are put into
action:
The key intervening variable between military plans and the
outbreak of war is the infl exible implementation of an existing
plan (under conditions where it is no longer optimal). This can
increase the likelihood of war by requiring an early mobiliza-
tion, which generates a momentum of its own and triggers a
nearly irreversible action-reaction cycle.80
Thus, bureaucracies may identify a particular situation as a threat and
initiate a predetermined procedure to deal with threat without stepping
back to assess the nature of the threat and whether the previous plans
actually are appropriate for the particular situation.
Beliefs and Perceptions
What leaders believe and how they process information is another factor
at the decision-making level that can explain why wars occur. Particularly
dangerous are beliefs or images that another country is aggressive and
evil. Seeing the other as evil or immoral often prevents any compromises
that might avert war and may prolong a war until an unconditional sur-
render is achieved. Furthermore, these enemy images (see Chapter 5) can
become a self-fulfi lling prophecy when leaders begin treating the other
country as an enemy—by responding to its leaders in hostile language,
developing a military defense against it, or breaking off diplomatic rela-
tions. Upon seeing such actions, the country begins perceiving the other
as the enemy, responds in kind, and in the end becomes the enemy they
were believed to be.
Also, because strongly held beliefs are very resistant to change, any
information that a leader receives that is inconsistent with the enemy
image is often ignored, denied, or distorted. The way that information is
processed to fi t existing beliefs and images means that cooperative ges-
tures may be missed, leading the states further down the path to war.
Because the process of organizing and simplifying can result in
errors in judging information and political events, images can
lead to either harmful or benefi cial decisions which in confron-
tational situations can serve to increase or decrease the level of

Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars 207
confl ict intensity. Psychologically, once confl ict begins to inten-
sify, it is much more likely for an actor to move with the fl ow of
escalation than to stop and back down. As confl ict intensifi es,
it becomes even harder to achieve the accurate communication
and shared understandings necessary for deescalation.81
(For more on how information is processed to be consistent with preexist-
ing beliefs, in general and in the case of Tony Blair’s decision making on
the Iraq war, see Chapter 5.)
In this way, enemy images can create misperceptions regarding the
likelihood of war.82 Leaders who have enemy images are likely to exag-
gerate the likelihood of confl ict, because they see the other as inherently
aggressive. For example,
Anthony Eden’s estimation of the threat posed by Egypt’s
nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 illustrates the impact
of cognitive predispositions on the overestimation of threat. The
prime minister’s formative experience was Britain’s appease-
ment of Mussolini and Hitler in the 1930s, appeasement that
resulted in war. . . . Fifteen years later, when confronted with
the Egyptian nationalization of the canal, Eden could only see
President Nasir as yet another dictator. He did not consider the
critical differences between Nasir in Egypt in 1956, and Musso-
lini in 1935 and Hitler in Germany in 1938. Rather, he saw what
he expected and what he expected to see was a threat of massive
proportions.83
Leaders may also underestimate the likelihood of war if they have a belief
that the other country lacks a will to fi ght or is too constrained domesti-
cally. During the Korean War, U.S. policymakers ignored China’s warn-
ings that if UN troops moved north, China would intervene in the war.
U.S. President “Truman and [U.S. General] MacArthur were convinced
that China neither would nor could intervene in Korea and believed that
their frequent pronouncements of America’s nonaggressive intentions
would reassure the Chinese leader. . . . They simply did not see the inter-
vention coming.”84 Perceptions about the likelihood of winning a war
may also infl uence a leader’s decision to pursue war. “Military optimism
is especially dangerous when coupled with political and diplomatic pes-
simism. A country is especially likely to strike if it feels that, although it
can win a war immediately, the chances of a favorable diplomatic settle-
ment are slight and the military situation is likely to deteriorate.”85
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Three Wars
Explanations of the beginning of World War I have featured the decision-
making-level of analysis in addition to the other levels. One explanation
emphasizes the importance of bureaucracies and the military technology

208 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
that was expressed in certain standard operating procedures.86 Generals
of the time were convinced that rapid mobilization of forces would be
crucial in determining who would win the next war. Accordingly, in Ger-
many and Russia particularly, but also in Austria-Hungary and France, the
armies made elaborate plans to ensure rapid mobilization. After Austria-
Hungary attacked Serbia, Russia mobilized. Germany did not respond
immediately; Kaiser Wilhelm sent a telegram to his cousin Nicholas, the
Russian czar, requesting that he show some sign of good faith that would
allow the kaiser to avoid issuing his own mobilization orders. The czar
canceled a general mobilization order and substituted an order for partial
mobilization. But the Russian military bureaucracy would not respond
to a change in its operating procedures for full, rapid mobilization. The
generals feared the consequences of trying to convert to partial mobiliza-
tion once general mobilization had been initiated. Czar Nicholas then
became convinced that such a sudden change of plans might throw his
military organization into chaos, and he reinstated the original general
mobilization order.
When Kaiser Wilhelm realized that Russia was not going to pull
back from its general mobilization, he and his advisers decided that they
must proceed quickly with their own. But because the German army
was aware that France and Russia were allied, and because the German
generals assumed that the Russian army would take longer than the
French army to mobilize effectively, the German plan called for mobili-
zation and attack against the French fi rst. The French would be quickly
defeated, and the Russians could be dealt with in turn. So although the
Russians were responding to the threat from Germany’s ally, Austria-
Hungary, the German war plans called for an attack against France. At
the last moment, Kaiser Wilhelm was led to believe (with help from the
British) that France might be kept out of the war even if Germany became
involved against the Russians. Therefore, Wilhelm decided that to give
France a chance to stay out, Germany ought to turn its troops around
and attack Russia instead. But the German generals were as reluctant as
the Russian generals to change their plans at the last moment. Helmuth
von Moltke, the German chief of staff, reportedly broke down in tears at
the suggestion that such a thing might be attempted. Historian Barbara
Tuchman describes the process that the kaiser wanted to modify in the
hour of crisis:
Once the button was pushed, the whole vast machinery for
calling up, equipping, and transporting two million men began
turning automatically. Reservists went to their designated
depots, were issued uniforms, equipment, and arms, formed
into companies and companies into battalions, were joined by
cavalry, cyclists, artillery, medical units, cook wagons, black-
smith wagons, even postal wagons, moved according to prepared
railway timetables to concentration points near the frontier

Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars 209
where they would be formed into divisions, divisions into corps,
and corps into armies ready to advance and fi ght. . . . From the
moment the order was given, everything was to move at fi xed
times according to a schedule precise down to the number of train
axles that would pass over a given bridge within a given time.87
The fact that Austria-Hungary and France also had rapid mobilization
schedules, an important element in the pressure on Russia and Germany,
adds strength to the argument that the state of military technology and
the bureaucratic organizations administering it were important causes of
the war. With all sides so intent on rapid mobilization, had the assassina-
tion of Archduke Franz Ferdinand not taken place, some crisis was bound
to lead to war sooner or later.
The reluctance by the Russians and the Germans to alter their prear-
ranged responses in this moment of crisis also corresponds with theories
of the making of foreign policy emphasizing factors other than standard
operating procedures and prearranged responses. Undoubtedly, under the
pressure of the moment, there was a tendency to simplify matters, result-
ing in a number of misperceptions:
Before World War I, all of the participants thought that the war
would be short. They also seem to have been optimistic about
its outcome. . . . Some of the judgments of July 1914 were prov-
en incorrect—for example, the German expectation that Britain
would remain neutral and Germany’s grander hopes of keeping
France and even Russia out of the war. Furthermore the broader
assumptions underlying the diplomacy of the period may also
have been in error. Most important on the German side was
not an image of a particular country as the enemy, but its basic
belief that the ensuing events would lead to either “world power
or decline.”88
The tendency to simplify, misperceive, and focus on information con-
sistent with prior beliefs is not unique to policymakers in World War I:
The list of misperceptions preceding World War II is also impres-
sive. . . . Few people expected the blitzkrieg to bring France
down; the power of strategic bombardment was greatly overesti-
mated; the British exaggerated the vulnerability of the German
economy, partly because they thought it was stretched taut at
the start of the war. Judgments of intentions were even less
accurate. The appeasers completely misread Hitler; the anti-
appeasers failed to see that he could not be stopped without a
war. For his part, Hitler underestimated his adversaries’ deter-
mination. During the summer of 1939, he doubted whether
Britain would fi ght and, in the spring of 1940, expected her to
make peace.”89

210 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
Entrenched beliefs also play an important part in many explanations
of how the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union
began and how hostile relations continued for decades. Specifi cally,
one can point to the perceptions that the superpowers formed about
each other in the fi rst few years following World War II. Despite the
high hopes for friendly postwar relations that leaders in both countries
seemed to have, each began to perceive the other as committing hos-
tile, threatening acts. The United States was appalled at Soviet actions
in Eastern Europe and viewed Soviet control over governments in
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, for example, as contrary to the
promises for elections in those countries that Stalin had made at Yalta.
Furthermore, Soviet support for a divided and weak Germany, pressure
on Turkey for access to its ports, and threats against Iran for oil con-
cessions were increasingly viewed by American policymakers as evi-
dence of hostile, expansionist intentions and of the need to contain the
Soviet Union.
The Soviets for their part viewed the aid package to Western Europe,
the aid to Greece fi ghting a Communist insurgency, support for a strong
Germany, and Churchill’s speech in the United States in 1946 calling for
English-speaking peoples to unite and use the atomic bomb that “God
has willed” to the United States against the Soviet Union as evidence of
Western hostility.90 Even when “the United States offered to extend aid
to the Soviet Union to assist in the reconstruction of its economy after
the war, Soviet leaders suspected that the United States was seeking a
market to absorb the expected surplus of peacetime production.”91 By the
late 1940s, and certainly by the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, both
sides had strong enemy images of each other that directed their atten-
tion toward information that confi rmed their perceptions and away from
information that disconfi rmed their perceptions. For example, when the
Soviet Union ceased its pressure and threats against Iran in 1946, even
though the Soviets did not receive the oil concessions they were after,
U.S. policymakers did not use this piece of information to alter their
emerging view of the Soviets.
The mirror enemy images that Soviet and American leaders held per-
sisted throughout much of the Cold War and led policymakers in both
countries to interpret the others’ behaviors as consistent with their
assumptions. Most U.S. leaders, for example, believed for a long time
that all Communist states and movements were part of a monolithic bloc
directed from Moscow. Thus, despite the differences between Commu-
nist China and the Soviet Union and despite Communist and socialist
movements that originated independently, any group or leader with some
connection to communism was assumed to be part of the Soviet threat,
and numerous U.S. military interventions and supported coups (such
as in Iran, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Grenada, and
Vietnam) took place because of suspected, and usually exaggerated, links
to Moscow.

Multilevel Explanations of War: Using Caution When Comparing Levels of Analysis 211
Multilevel Explanations of War: Using Caution When
Comparing Levels of Analysis
Convincing explanations of war come from the various levels of analysis:
the system, the state, dyads, and the decision-making process. Even the
same war can be explained by factors at all levels, as with World War I,
World War II, and the Cold War. The implication of this point is not that
one kind of analysis is better than another but that analyses on differ-
ent levels can lead to distinctly different conclusions regarding the rela-
tionship between the explanatory factors and behaviors or events being
analyzed. Those conclusions, though apparently contradictory, may be
equally valid. The contradictions are only apparent, and they are a func-
tion of the relative independence of the different levels of analysis.
Imagine, for simplicity, that there are only three pairs of states (dyads
A, B, and C) in a hypothetical international system we want to investi-
gate. Imagine further that we are interested in the relationship between
the extent to which these pairs of states are democratic and the amount
of war involving those same pairs of states. Looking fi rst at Pair A and
considering three successive time periods (t0, t1, and t2), we fi nd that
when Pair A’s democracy scores go up, it experiences more war, and when
they go down, it becomes involved in less war. In other words, in this
imaginary system (and its imaginary nature should be emphasized), we
fi nd, contrary to the democratic peace proposition, that war is positively
related to democracy: As the pair of states becomes more democratic, it
gets involved in more military confl ict.
Inferring a causal connection from this covariation would be risky.
First, only three time periods have been considered; the degree of democ-
racy within this pair of states and instances of war between them might
have gone up and down together that many times just by chance. Also,
perhaps some third factor, such as the amount of unrest in the state, has
an impact on both democracy and war that causes them to covary. (In
principle, it could also be true that war has a positive impact on democracy
rather than democracy having a positive impact on war.) But suppose,
for the sake of this example, that investigations of all those possibili-
ties reveal that none of them applies. For Pair A, the positive correlation
between democracy and war indicates that the former causes the latter.
Suppose further that analyses of Pairs B and C in the same hypotheti-
cal system reveal the same pattern between democracy and war. In other
words, we fi nd that for each pair of states in the system, the greater its
degree of democracy, the more war it experiences. It might then seem
logical to conclude that the higher the average level of democracy in the
system, the greater the amount of war that will occur. But such a conclu-
sion would constitute a level-of-analysis error. Consider Table 6.2, show-
ing the relationship between the level of democracy and war experience
of dyads of states A, B, and C. Notice that as the democracy scores for the
three time periods for each pair of states go up, the numbers representing

212 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
the amount of war experienced go up too. Similarly, as the democracy
scores go down (for example, for Pair A from t1 to t2), so too does the
amount of war it experiences. For every pair of states, there is a positive
relationship between democracy and war.
Now consider the data pertaining to the entire system, obtained by
adding up the numbers on democracy and war for the separate pairs of
states. In the international system as a whole, there is a negative relation-
ship between the level of democracy and the amount of war. On the sys-
tem level of analysis, as the level of democracy in the system increases,
the amount of war decreases. And conversely, when democracy at the
system level goes down, the amount of war increases.
This system-level negative correlation may or may not refl ect a causal
connection between democracy and war. The point is that one cannot
safely infer that a pattern existing on a lower level of analysis necessarily
also exists on a higher level, or vice versa. That is, it would be a logi-
cal mistake (a level-of-analysis error) to infer the system-level relation-
ship from the patterns revealed on the lower, dyadic level of analysis. It
would also be a mistake to focus on the negative system-level relation-
ship between democracy and war depicted in Table 6.2 and to conclude
that the democratic pairs of states (or individual democratic states) are
likely to experience less war.
Similarly, if one fi nds a positive relationship between the number of
alliances in the international system and the amount of war that occurs,
it would be a mistake to conclude that states with many alliances are
TABLE 6.2
An Imaginary System-Wide Profi le Showing Pairwise- and System-Level
Relationships
t0 t1 t2
Pair A
Democracy 10 40 20
War 5 10 5
Pair B
Democracy 15 10 20
War 20 15 40
Pair C
Democracy 30 15 20
War 40 10 30
Total System
Democracy 55 65 60
War 65 35 75

Summary 213
more likely to become involved in wars. The system-level correlation
might occur because smart states form protective alliances, whereas
dumb states avoid alliances and fi ght the wars. Even though, in such a
case, there would be a positive correlation between the number of alli-
ances and the amount of war in the international system, the relation-
ship between alliances and war on the national level of analysis might be
negative in every case.
Thus, caution must be exercised when comparing levels of analysis.
Levels of analysis primarily provide students of global politics a way to
categorize various factors that are involved in the very real problem of
war between states. These factors, such as lack of an overarching author-
ity, economic and political relationships, and psychological beliefs about
“the enemy,” can also be found within the levels of analysis that explain
ethnic confl ict, to be explored in Chapter 7.
SUMMARY
● War is a pervasive part of global politics. Statistics indicate that the fre-
quency and destruction of war, both interstate and internal war, have
increased throughout history. Studies of international politics can fo-
cus on a variety of social entities, such as individual leaders, states,
groups of states, or the entire international system. Such levels of anal-
ysis have to do with what kinds of questions are asked (such as why
some states are war prone versus why some systems are war prone) and
the answers that are given (such as wars are caused by certain types of
states versus wars are caused by individual leaders).
● The system level of analysis points to characteristics of the internation-
al structure as the root of war between states. Realism focuses on the
anarchy in the international system and the security dilemma it cre-
ates and on the distribution of power in the international system. Some
argue that multipolar systems such as the classic balance-of-power sys-
tem in nineteenth-century Europe are the most stable. Others point to
the relative stability of the Cold War bipolar system. Hegemonic stabil-
ity theorists believe that unipolar systems are the most stable, although
during times of power transition, major war can erupt. Liberalism looks
to the degree of interdependence at the system level, arguing that eco-
nomic connections between states make war less likely.
● At the state level of analysis, arguments have been made that the type
of economic system and economic factors operating in the state can
contribute to war. Opposition in political systems may also serve to
constrain or push states into war. Although opposition in democracies
does not necessarily mean that these types of states are more peaceful,
dyads of democracies are typically less likely to experience war. Po-
tential explanations for the dyadic democratic peace have been the fo-
cus of much recent research. Some argue that democracies apply their

214 Chapter 6 International Confl ict: Explaining Interstate War
cultural values of peaceful resolution of confl icts to other democracies
and others that the structural features of democracies constrain states
when they both are democracies.
● Decision-making processes, such as bureaucratic procedures, can factor
into decisions for war. Decision making by leaders is also susceptible to
biases in beliefs and perceptions, biases that favor war.
● Convincing explanations of war come from all levels of analysis: the
system, the state, dyadic, and the decision-making process. Even the
same war can be explained by factors at all levels, as with World War I,
World War II, and the Cold War.
KEY TERMS interstate wars 184
internal wars 184
levels of analysis 185
dyadic level of analysis 186
security dilemma 187
polarity 187
hegemonic 187
classical balance of power 187
hegemonic stability theory 192
power transition theory 192
democratic peace 198

215
C H A P T E R 7
Ethnic Confl ict and
International Terrorism
Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics
• What Is Ethnicity?
• The Scope of Ethnic Confl ict in the Contemporary
Global System
• The Role of the International System and Economic
Modernization in Ethnic Confl ict
• Other Causes of Ethnic Confl ict
• Resolving Ethnic Confl icts
International Terrorism
• Defi ning Terrorism
• The History of Terrorism
• The Origins of Terrorism
• Dealing with Terrorism
Summary
Key Terms

216 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
Although scholars of global politics have generally focused on under-standing wars between states (see Chapter 6), there is renewed
interest in internal wars. This is partly because of their pervasiveness:
“In every year since the end of World War II, the number of ongoing inter-
nal armed confl icts has exceeded the number of interstate confl icts. . . .
The number of interstate confl icts has remained fairly stable.”1
Scholars of global politics are also interested in civil wars, because
they are rarely isolated: A foreign actor actively aids one side or the other
or directly intervenes in the war, or the internal war has internation-
al consequences. From 1989 to 2005, one or more sides in twenty-four
civil wars received military support from outside governments.2 Most
recently, internal confl ict in Georgia led to foreign intervention by
Russia. Generally,
most intrastate confl icts do not remain confi ned within the bor-
ders of a single country. Nominally internal confl icts typically
exhibit transnational (i.e., cross-border) characteristics, such as
the outfl ow of refugees, the illicit international trade in natural
resources and weapons, and the transit across international bor-
ders of rebel and government forces.3
The most recent internal confl icts are of global concern, particularly
since the events of September 11, 2001.4 Internal confl icts can generate
terrorism, another source of violence in global politics. Terrorism can
certainly remain inside borders during a civil war, but can also become
transnational, as discussed in Chapter 4. Internal confl icts can also
weaken states so that their territory becomes a refuge for international
terrorist activities.
In this chapter, we take a look at two types of confl ict important
in contemporary world politics: ethnic confl ict and terrorism. To assess
these sources of violence, we examine defi nitions of ethnicity and ter-
rorism, their history, the role of religion, the origins of these types of
violence, and the diffi culties the international community has in dealing
with ethnic confl icts and international terrorist groups.
Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics
As with interstate war, a variety of factors contribute to ethnic con-fl icts, a type of international and civil war that has become particu-
larly pervasive, severe, and consequential since the end of the Cold War.
Ethnic strife threatens the integrity and even the existence of a set of
countries that spans the globe. Ethnic confl icts certainly appeared to be
involved in the process that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
French separatists in Quebec, some fear, could set off a chain reaction
that might lead to the dissolution of Canada. The largest democratic state
in the world, India, is besieged by confl ict focusing on ethnic grievances

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 217
and China experienced its worse incidence of ethnic violence in decades
when ethnic Han clashed with ethnic Uighurs in the western part of the
country in the summer of 2009.
Probably the ethnic confl ict grabbing the biggest, ugliest headlines in
the post–Cold War era occurred in the former Yugoslavia (see Chapter 3),
but the confl ict in Rwanda involved genocide of unimaginable proportions.
In his book, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed
with Our Families, Philip Gourevitch wrote:
The Rwandan confl ict was between the Hutus and the Tutsis:
Unfortunately, internal confl ict in Africa did not stop with Rwanda.
As the twenty-fi rst century began, ethnic confl icts in Liberia and Congo,
for example, continued to take lives, create refugee crises, destroy
economies, and spread weapons. In Sudan, after a twenty-year war between
the Muslim-dominated government in the North and the Christian
population in the South in which more than a million people were killed,
confl ict erupted in the western region of Darfur. The Sudanese govern-
ment responded to insurgent militia groups by backing other militias.
According to one observer,
Because the insurgents were mostly blacks, the government
tapped the Darfuri Arab tribes for militiamen, telling them
that the abid (slaves) were about to take over. The strategy
worked wonderfully. Soon the Darfuri Arab militias, known
as the janjaweed (which can be loosely translated as “the evil
horsemen”) were looting, burning, raping, and killing entire
black villages.7
Text not available due to copyright restrictions
Text not available due to copyright restrictions

218 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
The violence in Darfur has been astonishing. More than 30,000 are esti-
mated to have been killed and 2.5 million have been displaced (either
within Sudan or across the border into Chad).
Although the study of interstate war is often separate from the study of
ethnic confl ict, there are a number of similarities in the factors that are rele-
vant to both types of confl ict. The causes of both interstate and ethnic wars,
for example, can be traced to political and economic relationships, lack of an
overarching authority, legitimacy needs of leaders, a history of rivalry, and
psychological images and identities. Moreover, in the case of both interstate
and ethnic confl ict, it seems that more than one of these various factors are
operating in a particular war and the multiple factors that are involved often
relate to each other in a complex, and reinforcing, fashion.
What Is Ethnicity?
An obvious prerequisite to a useful discussion of ethnicity and ethnic
confl ict in international politics is a clear defi nition of the term ethnic
group. With ethnic confl ict so prominent in the news on a daily basis,
it might seem that everyone must have a clear idea what ethnic means.
Appearances are deceiving. For example, in the early 1990s, the former
Yugoslavia was the site of probably the most publicized “ethnic” confl ict
in the world. And yet it can be argued that ethnicity had nothing to do
with it. “Yugoslavia’s ethnic war is waged among three communities
ethnic group People
who perceive themselves
as distinct in terms
of language, origins,
physical appearance, or
region of residence.
Sudanese refugees in West Darfur in 2004.
(Nic Bothma/Corbis)

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 219
[the Muslims, the Croatians, and the Serbians] possessing no distinct
physical characteristics or separate anthropological or racial origins. . . .
The notion of an exclusive, and exclusionary ethnic existence for each of
the Yugoslav peoples is an invention.”8
Similarly, historically in Rwanda,
Hutus and Tutsis spoke the same language, followed the same
religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territo-
rial distinctions, on the same hills, sharing the same social and
political culture in small chiefdoms. The chiefs were called
Mwamis, and some of them were Hutus, some Tutsis; Hutus
and Tutsis fought together in the Mwamis’ armies; through
marriage and clientage, Hutus could become hereditary Tutsis,
and Tutsis could become hereditary Hutus. Because of all this
mixing, ethnographers and historians have lately come to agree
that Hutus and Tutsis cannot properly be called distinct ethnic
groups. Still, the names Hutu and Tutsi stuck . . . and . . . the
source of the distinction is undisputed: Hutus were cultivators
and Tutsis were herdsmen. This was the original inequality:
cattle are a more valuable asset than produce, and although some
Hutus owned cows while some Tutsis tilled the soil, the word
Tutsi became synonymous with a political and economic elite.9
When Belgium ruled the Rwandan territory as a colony, the Belgians
decided that the Tutsi were a superior “race” and issued ethnic identity
cards to separate the groups.
Whatever Hutu and Tutsi identity may have stood for in the
pre-colonial state no longer mattered; the Belgians had made
ethnicity the defi ning feature of Rwandan existence. . . . With
every schoolchild reared in the doctrine of racial superiority and
inferiority, the idea of a collective national identity was steadily
laid to waste.10
Although it is often assumed that for an ethnic group to qualify as
such, it must have some distinguishing physical or “racial” characteris-
tic, this is clearly not the case. Consistent with the constructivist perspec-
tive, ethnic groups can be considered socially constructed or “imagined
communities.”11 This recognition, however, can lead to a defi nitional
strategy suggesting that if any group subjectively defi nes itself as an ethnic
group, it qualifi es as one. While the subjective nature of ethnic identity
is important, one can identify many subjectively defi ned ethnic
groups on objective criteria. A recent comprehensive review of ethnic
minorities, for example, defi nes communal groups (that is, ethnic groups)
as “people who share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based
on a belief of common descent and on shared experiences and cultural
traits.”12 This project uses fi ve relatively specifi c cultural traits to iden-
tify ethnic groups: (1) language or dialect, (2) social customs, (3) religious

220 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
beliefs, (4) physical appearance, and (5) region of residence.13 For the
purpose of this discussion, we will defi ne an ethnic group as one that
perceives itself to be culturally distinct in terms of its language, customs,
religious beliefs, physical appearance, or region of residence.
These bases of distinction tend to go together. Indeed, only about
10 percent of minorities in the developing world are distinct in terms
of only one of these cultural characteristics.14 Most ethnic groups that
perceive themselves as such not only have different languages but also
have at least one other distinctive cultural trait having to do with their
customs, religious beliefs, physical appearance, or the place where they
live. As we have seen, it can be argued that the civil war in the former
Yugoslavia did not constitute ethnic confl ict, because the Croats, the
Muslims in Bosnia, and the Serbs are not “racially” distinct. But because
these groups are distinct in terms of their religious beliefs and their region
of residence, they are distinct ethnic groups by our defi nition, and they
can be said to have engaged in ethnic confl ict.
Similarly, the confl ict between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the Mid-
dle East qualifi es as ethnic confl ict, according to our defi nition. The dif-
ference between Sunnis and Shias lies in a historical disagreement over
the succession to the Prophet Muhammad for the spiritual leadership of
INDIAN OCEAN
XINJIANG
GERMANY
NETHERLANDS
FRANCE
THAILAND
C H I N A
BANGLADESH
BHUTAN
NEPAL
INDIA
ISRAEL
MACEDONIA
JORDAN
SYRIACYPRUS
LEBANON
TURKEY
1. SENEGAL
2. GAMBIA
3. GUINEA-BISSAU
4. GUINEA
5. SIERRA LEONE
6. LIBERIA
7. CÔTE D’IVOIRE
8. GHANA
9. TOGO
10. BENIN
11. MAYOTTE (Fr.)
I N D O N E S I A
PHILIPPINES
CAMBODIA
MYANMAR
LAOS
SINGAPORE
VIETNAM
EAST
TIMOR
BRUNEI
M A L A Y S I A
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REP.
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
RWANDA
MALAWI
BURUNDI
UGANDA
COMOROS
KENYA
97
4
3
5
MOROCCO
TUNISIA
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN
BOSNIA&
HERZEGOVINA
ALBANIA
AUSTRIA
SERBIA &
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA
QATAR
UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES
OMAN
YEMEN
SAUDI
ARABIA
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KYRGYZSTAN
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAQ IRAN
GEORGIA
KUWAIT
BAHRAIN
EGYPTLIBYAALGERIAWESTERN
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
1
2
6 8
MALI NIGER
BURKINA
FASO
10
11
CAMEROON
NIGERIA
CHAD
SUDAN
ETHIOPIA
SRI
LANKA
SOMALIA
TANZANIA
DEM. REP.
OF THE
CONGO
Sunni
Shia
Map 7.1 Sunni and Shia Distribution
Source: Courtesy of the University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 221
Muslims. Thus, although both groups are similar in many ways—both
groups have members who are Arabs and speak Arabic (although both
groups contain non-Arabs as well, particularly Farsi-speaking Iranians
who make up the majority of Shias), and all are Muslim—their sectarian
(intra- religious) differences separate them into distinctive and enduring
communal groups. Although Sunnis and Shias live throughout the
Middle East, they also tend to reside in separate regions that have either
a Sunni or Shia majority (see Map 7.1).
The Scope of Ethnic Confl ict in the Contemporary
Global System
Because defi ning an ethnic group is diffi cult, there are widely disparate
estimates of how many such groups there are in the world. One source
asserts there are 862 ethnic groups globally.15 A geographer has identifi ed
5,000 nations, or distinct communities, in the contemporary world that
could claim to be national peoples.16 Using the defi nition and criteria
discussed in the previous section and focusing on disadvantaged groups
and groups that have organized to promote their collective interests,
one group of researchers, led by Ted Robert Gurr has identifi ed 275 such
groups.17
Not only are there many ethnic groups in the world; it is safe to con-
clude that the politics, domestic and international, of virtually every state
in the world is affected in important ways by the activities of these ethnic
groups. Gurr declares that about three-fourths of the 161 largest countries
in the world have at least one politicized minority.18 There are very few
states in the world that are ethnically homogeneous (see the discussion
of nations versus states in Chapter 4). Moreover, “Wherever one looks in
the world there seems to be an unresolved ethnic confl ict underway.”19
Indeed, “since the end of the Cold War, a wave of ethnic confl ict has
swept across parts of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and
Africa. Localities, states, and sometimes whole regions have been engulfed
in convulsive fi ts of ethnic insecurity, violence, and genocide.”20 The
human and political costs of ethnic confl ict have already reached sub-
stantial proportions and threaten to get worse. There were some eighty
guerrilla and civil wars fought by rebelling ethnic groups from 1945 to
1980, such as the Karen and Kachin in Burma, the Nagas and the Tripuras
in India, the Eritreans in Ethiopia, the Palestinians in Israel, the Kurds
in Iraq, and the Basques in Spain.21 Because of this ethnic confl ict, there
have been “rights denied, immiseration, exodus of refugees, mass murder,
democracy subverted, development deferred . . . and regional wars.”22 The
list of ethnic problems in the world seems nearly endless:
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has received the most attention
in the West because of the intense coverage it has received from
the Western media, but equally if not more horrifi c confl icts are
sectarian Pertaining to
intra-religious divisions.

222 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
underway in Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Burma,
Georgia, India, Indonesia, Liberia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajiki-
stan. Other trouble spots abound—Bangladesh, Belgium, Bhutan,
Burundi, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Iraq, Latvia, Lebanon,
Mali, Moldova, Niger, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Romania, Rwanda, South Africa, Spain, and Turkey, for
example.23
Some of the ethnic confl ict is confi ned within the borders of a single
state, but most are not and thus they become international in scope.24
This is in part because quite often, ethnic groups are spread over the
boundaries of states. More than two-thirds of ethnic groups in the devel-
oping world have ethnic compatriots in two or more adjacent countries.25
Such situations can create pressures to extend the political power of the
homeland to include the ethnic compatriots currently outside the bound-
aries of the country in which they live. Annexation of another state, or
part of it, based on ethnic ties, is known as irredentism.
Irredentist movements usually lay claim to the territory of an
entity—almost invariably an independent state— in which
their in-group is concentrated, perhaps even forming some local
majorities. The original term terra irredenta means territory
to be redeemed. . . . The territory to be regained sometimes is
regarded as a part of a cultural setting (or historic state) or an
integral part of one homeland.26
Even without irredentist pressures, ethnic confl ict can become inter-
national when ethnicity combines with nationalism and ethnic groups
seek self-determination and work toward creating a new state in the inter-
national system. (See Chapter 2 for a historical discussion and defi nitions
of nationalism and national self-determination.) According to one defi ni-
tion of nationalism, it is present when “individual members give their
primary loyalty to their own ethnic or national community” and “these
ethnic or national communities desire their own independent state.”27
Ethnic confl icts also become internationalized because other members
of the international community have economic, security, or political
interests affected by the confl ict or become involved for humanitarian
purposes. That ethnic minorities are often subjected to discrimination
and that current state boundaries seldom coincide with the physical dis-
tribution of ethnic groups has made ethnic confl ict a virtual epidemic.
Ethnic confl ict is not new, as a moment’s refl ection on the legend-
ary battle between David and Goliath or the Roman custom of throwing
Christians to the lions will reveal. In more recent times, Turkish groups
in the Ottoman Empire are suspected of murdering about 1.5 million
Armenians, mostly during the First World War.28 The Nazis in Germany
killed 6 million Jews and perhaps as many as 14 million people of oth-
er ethnic groups, such as Slavs, Serbs, Czechs, Poles, and Ukrainians.29
irredentism Annexation
of an area that includes
ethnic compatriots residing
in another state.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 223
There were mass murders of members of ethnic groups in East Bengal in
1971, in Kampuchea in 1977, and in Uganda in 1978.
It is true that violence focused on or fostered by ethnic confl ict did
increase in the early 1990s, but “the eruption of ethnic warfare that
seized observers’ attention in the early 1990s was actually a culmination
of a long-term general trend of increasing communal-based protest and
rebellion that began in the 1950s and peaked immediately after the end of
the Cold War. The breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia provided oppor-
tunities for new ethnonational claims and the eruption of a dozen new
ethnic wars between 1988 and 1992. In the global south, more than two
dozen ethnic wars began or restarted in roughly the same period, between
1988 and 1994.”30 The good news is that ethnic confl ict may have peaked
in the mid-1990s. Figure 7.1 shows that the number of ongoing confl icts
reached a height in the early 1990s and declined thereafter. There is also
evidence that more ethnonational wars have been settled or
contained through international engagement and negotiations
since the early 1990s than in any decade of the Cold War.
Examples include the settlement and deescalation of ethnona-
tional rebellions by the Miskitos and other coastal peoples in
Nicaragua (1990), the Gagauz in Moldova (1995), the Moros in
the Philippines (. . . 1996), and the Chakmas in Bangladesh (. . .
1997).”31
50
40
30
N
um
be
r
of
O
ng
oi
ng
W
ar
s
(c
ur
ve
)
C
ha
ng
es
to
th
e
N
um
be
r
of
W
ar
s
(b
ar
s)
20
10
0
pre–
1956
1956–
1960
1961–
1965
1966–
1970
1971–
1975
1976–
1980
1981–
1985
1986–
1990
1991–
1995
1996–
2000
2001–
2006
20
25
15
10
5
0
Ongoing at End of Period
New Armed Conflicts
Conflicts Contained
Conflicts Settled or Won
Figure 7.1 Trends in Armed Confl icts for Self-Determination, 1956–2006
Source: Reprinted with permission from David Quinn, “Self-Determination Movements and their Outcomes,” in Peace
and Confl ict 2008 by J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers,
2008, p. 35.

224 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
Gurr, however, warns that “the ebb in new ethnopolitical confl icts
since the early 1990s and the expanding repertoire of strategies for man-
aging them do not mean that communal violence is about to disappear as
a challenge to global or regional order. Ethnic rioting in Indonesia, com-
munal and civil war in Eastern Congo, and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
illustrate the ever-present possibility that ethnic confl icts can recur and
morph in unexpected and deadly ways.”32
Keeping in mind that ethnic confl ict has occurred for centuries and
that it may be on a decline, it is still appropriate to ask why there was
an apparent explosion of ethnic passions and ethnic confl ict and violence
in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War. It might be
admitted fi rst that the academic fi eld of international politics (as well
as, perhaps, the contemporary global political system) is ill equipped
to deal with, or to explain persuasively, this outburst of ethnic passion,
because it has a history of ignoring ethnic groups and their relationship to
international politics. As one specialist in ethnic confl ict observes, “The
post-war world has been dominated by the ideological battle between
Western liberalism and Soviet style Marxism,” and “neither of these sys-
tems of belief have shown much concern for ethnicity.”33 “Liberals” in
the classic Western tradition have tended to see the emphasis on collective
rights by emotional ethnic groups as a dangerous threat to the individual
human rights that they hold dear. Marxist scholars have tended to view
ethnic groups and their ethnically based political passions as annoying
diversions on the road to communism. Religious differences, an increas-
ingly important part of many ethnic confl icts, have also been ignored
by scholars of international relations.34 “Paradigms like realism [and]
liberalism . . . placed their emphasis on military and economic factors as
well as rational calculations, all of which left little room for religion.”35
In short, as the prominent analyst of ethnicity Walker Connor argued
several decades ago, international politics as an academic fi eld has had a
regrettable tendency to treat ethnicity as an “ephemeral nuisance.”36
The Role of the International System and Economic
Modernization in Ethnic Confl ict
There are many competing expectations on the role of the international
system and economic forces in ethnic confl ict. During the Cold War, for
example, it was commonly hypothesized that the structure of the inter-
national environment, a bipolar system, fueled ethnic confl ict. Although
bipolarity presumably prohibited confl ict between the major powers, it
encouraged it among its clients.37 In other words, during the Cold War,
it often appeared that antagonism between the superpowers made eth-
nic confl icts worse. In Angola, for example, the United States and other
Western powers tended to support the Ovimbundu people in the southern
part of the country against the Soviet-supported Mbundu-led coalition
that controlled the government. The result was a civil war that dragged

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 225
on for years. Because of situations like this, during the Cold War the com-
petition between the superpowers.
to complete a network of international alliances in such a way
as to maximize the number and wealth of allies and trading
partners, tremendously enriched and infl ated ethnic move-
ments, particularly in the Third World. The injection of external
resources into domestic ethnic confl icts resulted in larger, better
organized, and more violent ethnic movements. The conse-
quences . . . were a lengthening and escalating of confl ict, often
resulting in civil wars, and a decreased likelihood of negotiated
settlements.38
But the end of the Cold War has hardly seemed to be a cure-all for
the world’s epidemic of ethnic strife. On the contrary, it and the end of
communism obviously brought to the surface a host of violent confl icts
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. And the end of global
competition between the superpowers has not brought to an end many
confl icts that previously seemed to be primarily a function of that com-
petition. We can now see that even without superpower encouragement,
ethnic confl ict in Angola, Sudan, Afghanistan, Burundi, Burma, Iraq, Tur-
key, and other places continues.
In many ways, current ethnic confl icts are simply the latest expres-
sions of the principle of national self-determination that was legitimized
as a political value and international norm by Woodrow Wilson after
World War I when empires began to be dismantled, and colonies became
independent. The application of the self-determination principle con-
tinued with post–World War II decolonization. Current confl icts are the
logical next step.
The same principles which fashioned out of European colonial-
ism many Third World independent states, became the platform
upon which challenges to those state boundaries were mounted.
Nationalism against colonialism became sub-nationalism
against the new states. This confrontation between nationalism
and ethnic subnationalism was a predictable outcome clearly
implied in anti-colonialist argumentation.39
The debate over whether the Cold War encouraged or dampened
ethnic passions and confl ict is reminiscent of an even more fundamen-
tal issue regarding the relationship between economic modernization
and ethnicity. Traditional Western scholarship has viewed ethnicity as a
phenomenon destined to be overcome by broader, stronger modernizing
forces. “ Twentieth century approaches to the study of ethnicity in poli-
tics can be traced to the writings of Marx and Durkheim, both of whom
evaluated ethnic identities as part of a larger set of phenomena subject to
transformation by the forces of economic modernization.”40 For Marx, as
we have noted, attachment to ethnic groups was an annoying obstacle that

226 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
would surely and ultimately give way to more powerful forces, moving the
nations of the world to socialism. For the sociologist Emile Durkheim, and
then a whole generation of scholars associated with modernization theory,
nation-building efforts were destined to erode old-fashioned loyalties to
smaller, outdated, even quaint ethnic groups. Similar to the liberal expecta-
tion that increased interdependence would ameliorate interstate confl ict,
a major assumption of western social science in the post-war
decades was that ethnic confl ict would disappear as nations
modernize and minority groups were assimilated. Industrializa-
tion would lead to increased contact and community between
different groups. Urbanization would take place. Gradually this
would result in . . . acculturation, which would result in a trans-
fer of loyalty from the ethnic group to the nation-state.41
Modernization theorists also assumed that religion, as a basis of ethnic
identity, would be replaced with secularism.42 In other words, states were
to become melting pots in which anachronistic divisions between ethnic
and religious groups would dissolve and everyone would adopt the more
modern attitude of loyalty to one’s country.
History has not been kind to this theory and there has emerged
something of a consensus that rather than ameliorating ethnic confl ict,
economic modernizing forces actually increase its likelihood. “Although
many scholars endorsed . . . [the] melting pot modernization approach,
the weight of . . . evidence eventually overwhelmed these theoretical
arguments.”43 Now it is more commonly argued that modernizing and
centralizing governments provoke a backlash from ethnic groups that
fear losing their identity in the move toward a more integrated state or
that economic modernization increases contact between ethnic groups
that increasingly perceive themselves in competition with each other.
Walker Connor, for example, argues that “economic modernization does
not undermine ethnic divisions but invigorates them by bringing together
previously isolated ethnic groups that suddenly fi nd themselves compet-
ing for the same economic niches.”44 Modern life also represents a threat
to religious traditions, leading many groups to fi ght to preserve them.45
Others believe that economic processes in the most recent decades, with
their emphasis on computers, decentralization, and fl exibility, also encour-
age ethnic passions. In the computer information age, economic produc-
ers are able to offer ever more specialized, personalized products for ever
more narrowly defi ned consumer groups in grocery stores, hobby shops,
automobile dealer showrooms, and bookstores. These processes may be
driving people apart rather than assimilating them in a “melting pot.”46
Other Causes of Ethnic Confl ict
It is tempting to see ethnic confl ict as inevitable, as an expression of deep
animosities between groups that are destined to fi ght. Indeed,
modernization
theory The idea that
economic modernization
assimilates peoples
and that identity to
the country replaces
ethnic and religious
attachments.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 227
one of the fi rst theories about the proliferation of violent ethnic
confl ict was the ancient hatred explanation, which was mainly
the creation of journalists covering the various wars in Europe,
Africa, and Asia. The core idea was that the ethnic groups
locked in murderous combat had a long history of confl ictual
intergroup relations. Historically, the periods of relative peace in
intergroup relations arose when strong central authority man-
aged to keep tenuous intergroup harmony through the use of
rewards and sanctions. Whenever central authority weakened,
though, interethnic relations became marked by hostility and
violence. From this it follows that under communist rule in
countries like Yugoslavia, ethnic relations were kept in check by
strong authoritarian elites like Tito; however, when the center
itself became weak and crumbled in the early 1990s, the relations
between the constituent ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Kosovars, Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins—
naturally regressed back to violence.47
One problem with this explanation is that it does not account for why
some ethnic groups live peacefully with each other, while others do not.
It also ignores the fact that in many situations, such as in the former
Yugoslavia, relations between groups were not simply held in check by
powerful authorities but at times were quite harmonious and positive.
In Yugoslavia, “the rivalries in question had been dormant for decades.
In the early 1980s, intermarriage rates among Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian
Muslims were high in ethnically mixed areas . . . [and] ethnic hostility
was low. Confl ict among these groups was kept alive primarily in ethnic
stereotypes falling far short of hatred.”48 In Darfur, Sudan, intermarriage
between “Blacks” and “Arabs” was also quite common until violence
erupted in 2003. The ancient hatreds perspective also leaves out the polit-
ical, economic, and social conditions and goals of many ethnic groups in
confl ict. In Darfur,
when the janjaweed were organized into coordinated military
units and assigned to camps they shared with the regular army,
it is not possible to characterize what was happening as sponta-
neous violence. Ethnic tensions in Darfur were and still are real,
and recurring droughts have made them worse. But they them-
selves were not suffi cient to unleash the violence we have seen.
They were the raw material, not the cause.49
Ethnic groups may engage in confl ict in situations of a collapsed state or a
power vacuum not because of enduring hatreds, but because of uncertain-
ty and a fear of discrimination if they do not control the state. In this way,
ethnic groups fi ght for the same reason that realists argue states fi ght.
In situations of anarchy, in which there is no overarching government,
groups face a security dilemma and must protect themselves. Because

228 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
groups in anarchical situations are not likely to possess strong military
capabilities,
their military strength becomes largely a function of their
‘groupness’ or ‘cohesion.’ But because all sides . . . stress their
groupness and cohesion, each appears threatening to the other.
Under these conditions, the only way to assess the intentions of
other groups is to use history. But prevailing political conditions
may lead to nationalist interpretations of history. The result . . .
is a ‘worst case analysis’ whereby every group thinks the other is
the enemy.50
Even without complete anarchy, weak and unstable states often give rise
to insurgencies and civil wars.51 The political vacuum and struggle for
power that arose after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq may have sparked
such conditions, leading to high levels of sectarian confl ict unprecedent-
ed in modern Iraqi history.52 One criticism of this anarchy explanation
is that ethnic confl icts are not isolated to failed states, but mostly occur
where governments continue to have some control, where the condi-
tion of anarchy is not present. Furthermore, this perspective “stresses
material factors and parsimony, at the expense of a vast array of other
motivations—religious, ideological, and emotional—that fuel domestic
confl ict.”53
Material factors are nevertheless important. Of the 275 communal
groups identifi ed by Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project, about 65 percent
are the victims of economic discrimination, and about 73 percent were
the targets of political discrimination in 1994–1995.54 The theory of rela-
tive deprivation expects groups that perceive themselves as relatively
worse off to mobilize:
The theory of relative deprivation is useful for explaining the
rise of ethnic political mobilization not only among economi-
cally backward groups but also among relatively prosperous eth-
nic groups, such as the Sikhs in India, the Tamils in Sri Lanka,
and the Tutsis in Central Africa. When such groups perceive a
threat to their privileged position, or if they become victims of
state discrimination, they too may take to political action. After
all, as the theory suggests, it is the realization by a group that
it is receiving less than it deserves and that others are receiving
more that motivates the group to take political action. Applying
this concept to ethnic confl ict . . . , it is easy to understand why
perceived disadvantage or discrimination (real or imaginary) by
a group regarding its status (sociocultural, economic, political) is
an underlying cause for political action.55
Theories such as relative deprivation that focus on the economic and
political grievances of groups do not directly explain why it is that ethnic-
ity is such an important base for group identity and comparisons to other
theory of relative
deprivation The idea
that groups that perceive
themselves as relatively
worse off than others will
mobilize and take action.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 229
groups. Many argue that “socioeconomic factors may form the basis of
discontent but that only discontent based on ethnocultural identity can
lead to ethnonationalism and secessionist sentiments.”56 Some see ethnic
identities as the basic, or primordial, identity that is salient for people.
Psychologically, ethnicity can be an easy category for people to sim-
plify the world. Social psychologists argue that categorization is a natu-
ral way that people function in an information-rich, complex world, and
social identity theory suggests that categorizing people into groups helps
promote an individual’s self-esteem. Categorization includes a division of
peoples into “us” (in-groups) and “them” (out-groups). Once such catego-
rization occurs, people tend to process information that reinforces group
boundaries and develop an in-group bias, or ethnocentrism, seeing their
own group in a favorable light and the out-group in an unfavorable light.
Research suggests that “the mere perception of belonging to two distinct
groups . . . is suffi cient to trigger intergroup discrimination favoring the
in-group. In other words, the mere awareness of the presence of an out-
group is suffi cient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory
responses on the part of the in-group.”57 People, for example, tend to
see the in-group as more heterogeneous than it often is and the out-group
as more homogeneous (“they are all alike”) than it often is. Furthermore,
people will remember more about the in-group, discount information that
is inconsistent with their stereotype of the out-group, explain away any
success achieved by the out-group, and make decisions that reward the
in-group and penalize the out-group, often without recognizing that they
are doing so.58 In extreme situations, the need for social identity and the
way stereotypes are maintained through errors and biases in information
processing may produce a dehumanized view of out-group members. Once
dehumanization occurs, killing members of the out-group is not that
uncomfortable, because they are seen as less than human. Dehumanizing
other ethnic groups is similar to leaders seeing other countries with an
enemy image, with similar effects of increasing the likelihood of confl ict.
Political leaders often recognize the power that group identity can
play in mobilizing the masses to commit violent behavior. The instru-
mentalist approach to ethnicity and ethnic confl ict focuses on the role
that elites play in highlighting, or even creating, ethnic identities for
political ends:
From this perspective, ethnic identity, one among several alter-
native bases of identity, gains social and political signifi cance
when ethnic entrepreneurs, either for offensive or defense pur-
poses or in response to threats or opportunities for themselves
and/or their groups, invoke and manipulate selected ethnic
symbols to create political movements in which collective ends
are sought. At such moments, ethnicity can be a device as much
as a focus for group mobilization by its leadership through the
select use of ethnic symbols.59
social identity
theory Theory
suggesting that group
membership promotes
self-esteem and creates
favorable in-group biases.
ethnocentrism Belief
that one’s ethnic group is
superior to others.
instrumentalist
approach Explanation
of ethnic confl ict
focusing on leaders’ use
or creation of ethnic
divisions for political
ends.

230 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
Leaders within states may use ethnic identities for the same reasons
that leaders of states may go to war: to divert attention and enhance their
legitimacy. In Sudan, for example, “Darfur represents the latest example
in which Khartoum [the government] has used its policy of Arabization
in an effort to bolster or restore its hegemony.”60
Leaders are successful at manipulating ethnic identity for instrumen-
tal ends when there is a history of group antagonism, and there are severe
economic problems.61
In the Balkans, there is no doubt that leaders of the former
Yugoslavia, particularly Serbian head, Slobodan Milosevic, helped
cause the fi ghting by infl aming ethnic nationalism. . . . Milosevic
(and others) stirred up ethnic confl ict in order to realize their
personal interest of remaining in power. . . . Recognizing that
he could not hold on to power in a multiethnic Yugoslavia . . . ,
Milosevic deliberately fostered a racist nationalism that resulted
in the replacement of most of Yugoslavia with a state that had a
clear Serbian majority.62
The Belgians, as the colonial power in Rwanda, also used ethnicity for
political means. By cultivating separate Hutu and Tutsi identities, they
Soldiers in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in March 1999, during the confl ict
between Kosovars and Serbs in Yugoslavia.
(David Brauchli/AP Photo/AP Images)

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 231
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Dealing with Ethnic Grievances
ISSUE: There are many ethnic groups in the world who wish to have states of
their own, but this would involve the dismemberment of currently existing states.
Whether the international community should, or effectively can, address the inten-
sity and scope of ethnic confl icts raises many issues and concerns.
Option #1: The international community should treat all of these problems as
matters of domestic concern only.
Arguments: (a) International institutions, such as the United Nations, and global
powers, such as the United States, should conserve their resources to deal with
the truly international problems. (b) The international community will avoid
having to choose which internal disputes to deal with and which to disregard.
(c) The international community will avoid the risks of making situations worse by
intervening.
Counterarguments: (a) Ethnic problems may invite unilateral interventions from
single states in the various regions, creating international problems that might
have been easier to deal with at an earlier stage. (b) Because most ethnic con-
fl icts are increasingly domestic rather than international, international institutions
such as the United Nations risk becoming irrelevant to the globe’s most serious
confl icts. (c) Hundreds of thousands of people may suffer oppression at the hands
of governments that are insensitive to the needs or aspirations of minority ethnic
groups.
Option #2: The international community should energetically defend the prin-
ciple of national self-determination, which suggests that all peoples deserve to
have their own states if they so desire.
Arguments: (a) An active policy of self-determination would allow the United
Nations to become a major player in attempts to resolve the most serious violent
confl icts in the global system today. (b) Hundreds of thousands of people could
be rescued from insensitive, perhaps even racist, oppression. (c) Interventions on
behalf of oppressed peoples might undermine autocratic governments, leading to
their replacement by democratic governments.
Counterarguments: (a) Operations on behalf of oppressed minorities could be-
come too expensive, perhaps bankrupting the United Nations. (b) Activism of
this sort by the international community might encourage additional minorities
to aspire to establish their own states, increasing instability on a global scale.
(c) Schisms and disagreements about which minorities are truly oppressed and
deserving of external support may weaken the ability of the United Nations to deal
with truly international problems.

232 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
focused any potential confl ict between these groups, diverting attention
away from the fact that they were ruling over both.
As with the causes of interstate war, the causes of ethnic confl ict
seem individually insuffi cient to explain all ethnic violence.
People do feel strongly about their ethnicity, but very few
convinced nationalists actually go as far as to exterminate their
neighbors. Maniacal leaders clearly play an important role in
civil wars, but simply saying so does not explain why some end
up as powerful demagogues while others simply rant in obscu-
rity. Economic grievances and security dilemmas can also push
groups toward violence, but such explanations predict far more
confl ict than actually occurs in the world.63
Thus, as in wars between states, all levels of analysis—the structural
condition of the state, the strategies of leaders, and the beliefs of the
masses—all contribute to an understanding of why ethnic confl ict
occurs. Some even argue that conditions at all levels must be present to
spark ethnic war:
It is the interaction between these factors—all of them neces-
sary conditions for ethnic war—which causes ethnic violence
to begin and escalate. There can be no violence without hos-
tile feelings, and hostile feelings are unlikely to be widespread
unless groups have a history of confl ict, confl icting symbolic
interests, and negative stereotypes of each other. . . . Even in
these conditions, violence can only be sustained if the war effort
is organized by extremist leaders who gain or hold power by
outfl anking more moderate rivals. Unless all of these factors
operate to a suffi cient degree, any ethnic violence which occurs
is likely to be brief and on a relatively small scale.64
Resolving Ethnic Confl icts
Given the long-term trend of increasing violence and the global implica-
tions of these confl icts, the international community is wrestling with
ways to address this problem (see the Policy Choices box on ethnic griev-
ances). An attempt to anticipate the future of ethnic confl icts through-
out the world needs to take into account, unfortunately, the extent to
which ethnic confl icts in Europe have been “resolved” in roughly the
Yugoslavian fashion: with “ethnic cleansing,” forced migrations, and dis-
placed peoples. “Europe’s nationality problem was solved by wars and
population transfers over the span of centuries.”65 Peace settlements after
the First World War redrew boundaries in such a way as to decrease the
percentage of ethnic peoples without a state or self-government from
about 26 percent in 1910 to about 7 percent in 1930. As a result of the
Second World War, 20 million people settled in new homelands. Often
they were relocated with little attention to their own interests or wishes.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 233
For example, “3 million Germans [were] forced to abandon lands their
families had occupied for centuries, banished with nothing but tattered
clothes and bandaged feet into a harsh winter. The expulsion of Sudeten
Germans from their villages in Czechoslovakia still resonates . . . as one
of World War II’s most contentious incidents.”66 As a result of such epi-
sodes of brutality and relocation, the share of Europe’s total population
belonging to ethnic minorities without autonomy or self-government
was reduced to about 3 percent.67
The implications of this history of relationships among ethnic groups
in Europe for much of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa are sobering,
if not downright depressing. Nationalism as an ideological movement
emerged in Europe as a result of the French Revolution in the late
eighteenth century. It took nearly two centuries of massive relocations
and wars for the peoples of Europe to sort themselves out and redraw
boundaries in such a way that the distributions of ethnic groups and
national boundaries were made largely congruent. And even so, the United
Kingdom has yet to resolve the situation in Northern Ireland; Spain faces
continuing confl ict with the Basques and Catalans; and France still has
problems with the Bretons and the Corsicans. Must Africa, Asia, and the
Middle East go through these relocations and wars to establish a match
between the physical distribution of peoples and legitimate national
boundaries? Or to put this partially rhetorical question in more specifi c
but equally gloomy terms, are “Arab-Israeli Wars,” complete with refu-
gees and relocations, destined to be duplicated throughout the rest of the
Middle East, in Africa, and in Asia?
Anyone who wishes for a more peaceful and stable global political
system in the twenty-fi rst century must hope that this is not the case.
Even centuries of wars and relocations in Europe have not resolved all the
ethnic problems there, and Stalin’s forced relocations of millions in the
Soviet Union certainly did not resolve all of those ethnic confl icts. It is,
in fact, nearly futile to hope that peaceful relationships among the ethnic
groups of the world can be established by relocating people and redraw-
ing national boundaries. Africa, for example, is faced with probably the
greatest number of ethnic confl icts of all the continents. These problems
are often traced to Africa’s colonial heritage. “Africa . . . is a continent of a
thousand ethnic and linguistic groups squeezed into some 50-odd states,
many of them with borders determined by colonial powers in the last
century with little regard to traditional ethnic boundaries.”68
Consider Map 7.2 showing the geographical distribution of ethnic
groups in Africa. The colonial powers did undoubtedly draw national
boundaries in Africa that arbitrarily cut across or combined disparate
ethnic groups. However, the number and distribution of ethnic groups
in Africa is such that even had they attempted to be more sensitive in
that regard, they would have found it nearly impossible to satisfy all the
national aspirations of the various ethnic groups. There are too many of
them, and they are not organized in neat, state-size geographical pack ages.

234 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
Obviously there are many areas in Africa where ethnic groups are inter-
mingled in the same territory. Ethnic peace will never come to Africa
(or anywhere else in the world) if it depends on every ethnic group’s sat-
isfying its aspirations to national autonomy and self-determination. In
short, no amount of national boundary redrawing is going to resolve all,
or even most, of the ethnic confl icts in the world.69 Such redrawing of
boundaries historically creates as many problems as it resolves. The for-
mer Soviet Republic of Georgia, for example, broke away from Russia, to
be confronted itself by a rebellion by ethnic enclaves in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia.70
The Eritreans successfully established independence from Ethiopia,
but “the Eritrean nationalists themselves are an amalgam of Muslims and
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
INDIAN
OCEAN
0 500 1000 Km.
0 500 1000 Mi.
Map 7.2 Ethnic Groups of Africa
Source: Systematic Political Geography, 4th ed., Martin Ira Glassner and Harm J. de Blij. Copyright © 1989
by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Reproduced with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 235
Christians who, if they gain autonomy, are likely to fracture along . . .
ethnic lines.”71 In the former Yugoslavia, the Macedonians became inde-
pendent from Serbia, only to face irredentist pressures from the 20 percent
of its population that is Albanian, not to mention its even smaller Serbian
population. There may be no end in sight to this kind of process. As
Kosovo, formerly part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, declared its independence
in 2008 and was recognized as sovereign by the United States and much of
Europe, “some of the world’s most powerful countries are fearful the move
will encourage separatist movements elsewhere to intensify their often
bloody struggles and give hope to nascent independence groups that have
not yet begun to fi ght.”72
It is incumbent on those of us who live in the major industrialized
countries, secure in our national identities within states with a long history
of democracy and stability, not to be condescending toward ethnic groups
with frustrated desires for national autonomy and self- determination.
It is too easy for us to say (or feel), “Why can’t those people (in Rwanda,
Lebanon, Georgia, Burundi, India, or Northern Ireland) just give up their
delusions of national grandeur and learn to live together?” Even so, the
conclusion of Ted Gurr, the author of one of the more comprehensive
surveys of ethnic confl icts in the world, seems reasonable. He observes
that a strategy of reconstructing the state system so that state boundar-
ies correspond more closely to the social and cultural boundaries among
ethnic communities would “create as many problems as it resolved.”
According to Gurr,
A more constructive and open-ended answer is to pursue the . . .
coexistence of ethnic groups and plural states. . . . [Ethnic]
groups should have the protected rights to individual and col-
lective existence and to cultural self-expression without fear of
political repression. The counterpart of such rights is the obli-
gation not to impose their own cultural standards or political
agenda on other peoples.”73
Indeed, Gurr attributes the decline in ethnic confl ict in the second
half of the 1990s to a “regime of managed ethnic heterogeneity.” This
regime includes a recognition of the rights of minority peoples and the
right of ethnic groups to have some degree of autonomy within states,
democratization that institutionalizes these rights, and an increasingly
accepted “principle that [maintains] disputes between communal groups
and states are best settled by negotiation and mutual accommodation.”74
Democratic governance is one logical solution to the ethnic confl ict.
“Minorities in the . . . democracies . . . have two distinctive traits. Their
grievances usually are expressed in protest, rarely in rebellion, and the
most common response by government . . . is to accommodate their
interests rather than forcibly subordinate or incorporate them.”75 In
states where governmental power is exercised autocratically, struggles
for control of the government are likely to be more desperate and violent.

236 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
In general, democratic “societies bleed off confl ict in divergent direc-
tions, preventing that fatal congruence of cleavages and oppositions that
leads to intense struggles over societal powers and consequent extreme
violence.”76
But it is diffi cult to impossible to initiate democratic reforms in a
country already torn by ethnic confl ict. In fact, many analysts are con-
vinced that transitions to democracy are likely to increase ethnic strife
and other sources of internal confl ict, even if relatively entrenched,
stable democracy may ultimately prove to be an important solution to
it. Carment and James provide systematic evidence that “high political
constraint [by which they mean democratic controls on the use of politi-
cal power] reduces threat perception and belligerent behavior” by states
involved in confl ict over ethnic issues.77 But they believe that this fi nding
must be taken with a grain of salt, arguing that politicians in democratic
countries might use ethnic grievances and strife for their own purposes in
ways that could increase confl ict.
The challenges of democratization in a country with ethnic and reli-
gious divisions were evident after the 2003 military intervention of Iraq.
Although Arabs constitute a majority (80 percent) of the population,
there is a large Kurdish minority that has long fought for national self-
determination. Iraq is also divided along sectarian lines—with roughly
60 percent Shia and 35 percent Sunni Muslims. Larry Diamond, an expert
on democratization and senior adviser to the Coalitional Provisional
Authority in Baghdad in 2004, spelled out the tasks facing the United
States and a new post-Saddam Iraqi government:
The political challenges in Iraq from around 9 April 2003—when
Saddam’s regime fell in Baghdad and a U.S.-led postwar admin-
istration began to assert itself—resembled many of the other
recent post–confl ict-reconstruction or nation-building efforts.
Once the Ba’athists [Saddam Hussein’s ruling political party]
were ousted from power, the vacuum of political authority had
somehow to be fi lled, and order on the streets had to be rees-
tablished. The state as an institution had to be restructured and
revived. Basic services had to be restored, infrastructure repaired,
and jobs created. Fighting between disparate ethnic, regional,
and religious groups—many of them with well-armed militias—
had to be prevented or preempted. The political culture of fear,
distrust, brutal dominance, and blind submission had to be
transformed. Political parties and civil society organizations
working to represent citizen interests, rebuild communities, and
educate for democracy had to be assisted, trained, and protected.
A plan needed to be developed to produce a broadly representative
and legitimate new government, and to write a new constitution
for the future political order. And sooner or later, democratic
elections would need to be held.78

Ethnic Confl ict in Global Politics 237
These tasks proved to be quite diffi cult. Although sovereignty was
offi cially transferred from U.S. authorities to an appointed interim gov-
ernment, voters approved a new constitution, and elections were held,
criminal and sectarian violence escalated. Shias and Sunnis attacked each
others’ mosques and religious gatherings and each group targeted spiritual
leaders from the other. And Sunnis have been suspicious of the political
process, which they see as dominated by the majority Shias. By mid-2006,
most observers agreed that Iraq had descended into civil war.79
As the Iraqi experience illustrates, state-building and democrati-
zation involves many diffi cult issues, including the timing of the fi rst
elections.
Ill-timed and ill-prepared elections do not produce democracy,
or even political stability, after confl ict. Instead they may only
enhance the power of actors who mobilize coercion, fear, and
prejudice, thereby reviving autocracy and even precipitating
large-scale violent strife. In Angola in 1992, in Bosnia in 1996,
and in Liberia in 1997, rushed elections set back the prospects
for democracy and, in Angola and Liberia, paved the way for
renewed civil war.80
The United States is not the only international actor to engage in
state-building and face the challenges of democratization in countries
divided by ethnic confl ict. The United Nations, as will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 9, recently involved itself in efforts to deal with
ethnic confl icts in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Kashmir, India,
and Rwanda. Efforts by the international community to deal with ethnic
strife in Rwanda were particularly controversial, with some analysts argu-
ing that those efforts actually provided a base of operations for those who
committed genocide, thus prolonging the confl ict for years.81 According
to one observer, “The pre-cold war, cold war, and post–cold war record on
intervening militarily to promote the more ambitious goals of political
and economic development yields a cautionary lesson—don’t.”82
Despite the diffi culties of democratization and resolution to ethnic
confl ict, the international community remains interested in these tasks
(see the Policy Choices box in Chapter 6 for more on the pros and cons of
democratization). Ethnic confl icts can present moral imperatives—such
as the prevention of genocide—and can affect the political, security, and
economic interests of other states. As already mentioned, ethnic confl icts
frequently become internationalized and can easily spark interstate con-
fl icts. Ethnic confl ict can also produce terrorist groups and these groups
can become signifi cant transnational actors. The terrorist attacks in
Mumbai India in 2008, rooted in the confl ict between Pakistan and India
over Kashmir, are an example of the interrelationship between group
confl ict, terrorism, and interstate confl ict. International terrorism, along
with ethnic confl ict, is another signifi cant source of violence in contem-
porary global politics.

238 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
International Terrorism
As discussed in Chapter 4, international terrorist groups are signifi -cant nonstate actors in contemporary international politics and in
some ways represent a challenge to the sovereign state system. Although
international terrorism is not new, its contemporary features include a
strong connection to religion, a worldwide presence that uses globaliza-
tion in a sophisticated way, and an increase in the number of deaths of
targeted civilians. After the attacks in the United States on September 11,
2001, transnational terrorism and states’ attempts to fi ght terrorism have
become a central aspect of global politics.
Defi ning Terrorism
Any useful discussion of terrorist groups or terrorism must fi rst deal with
the question, “What is terrorism?” As is the case with most questions
on this subject, the answers are both numerous and controversial.83 The
standard summary of this controversy asserts that “one person’s terrorist
is another person’s freedom fi ghter,” because terrorism is a highly charged
political term used by most people to refer to political violence (or any
other political tactic) of which they disapprove:
In their confl ict with the Palestinians, for example, the Israelis
claim the moral high ground by pointing to the means their oppo-
nents employ, notably suicide bombings. . . . The Palestinians, in
contrast, focus on ends. Israel, they argue, is intent on continuing
its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Opposing this
occupation is legitimate, in their eyes, and the huge disparities in
strength leave them no alternative to terrorism.84
The term terrorism often comes with a moral judgment. One defi ni-
tion is that “terrorism is the deliberate, systematic murder, maiming, and
menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to gain political ends. . . .
Terrorism . . . is intrinsically evil, necessarily evil, and wholly evil.”85 The
problem is then defi ning what are “evil” political ends and what ends jus-
tify certain means. Because there is usually considerable disagreement
on what is moral, defi ning terrorism in moral terms becomes problematic.
The French Resistance and the Polish Underground were labeled terrorists
by Germany in World War II, but others would certainly disagree, believ-
ing that resisting Nazi occupation was a moral cause. This is not to say
that terrorist acts should not be held to moral and legal standards, but
that it becomes problematic if morality is part of the very defi nition of
terrorism.
Because of the moral judgment connected to the label terrorism,
defi ning groups as terrorists has become a tool that political actors use to
undermine the legitimacy of their enemies:
terrorism Acts of
intimidation against
civilians committed
by nonstate actors for
political motives.

International Terrorism 239
The political nature of determining under what circumstances
a violent international political act should be considered terror-
ism is illustrated by [the] U.S. State Department’s offi cial list
of states supporting terrorism. . . . With no objective criteria for
deciding when countries should be placed on or removed from
the list, inclusion is a purely political decision.86
For example, Syria remained on the list for years even though the State
Department testifi ed it had no evidence of Syrian support for terrorism.87
Since September 11, the tool to defi ne enemies as terrorists has become
even more powerful. China, for example, “has launched its own ‘war on
terror.’ Beijing now labels as terrorists those fi ghting for an independent
state in the northwestern province of Xinjiang.”88 China uses, as do many
other states, the term terrorist partly in an attempt to avoid condemna-
tion from the international community of its activities against internal
groups. The term terrorism, then, is unfortunately related to the judgment
of the morality of the actor’s objective and the political consequences of
being labeled a terrorist.
Less judgmentally, Thomas Schelling points out that the diction-
ary defi nes the term as “the use of terror, violence, and intimidation to
achieve an end.”89 A CIA-sponsored study has defi ned international terror
as “the threat or use of violence for political purposes when (1) such action
is intended to infl uence the attitude and behavior of a target group wider
than its immediate victim;, and (2) its ramifi cations transcend national
boundaries.”90 The main problem with these defi nitions is that they are far
too broad. They would include under the same rubric an incredibly diverse
array of phenomena. According to these defi nitions, terrorism includes
more than the hijacking of airplanes or the random machine-gunning of
people in airports. The bombing of civilian populations in cities by both
sides in the Second World War, the invasion of Germany by Allied troops,
the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the arrest and torture
of political prisoners, and the execution of criminals (or imprisonment
of criminals, for that matter) would all qualify as terrorism according to
these defi nitions. A more useful defi nition might stipulate that terrorism
is “the use of violence for political purposes by nongovernmental actors.”
This defi nition, however, is still broad, because it would include attacks
on states by revolutionaries or guerrillas, such as the French Resistance
or the Polish Underground in the Second World War, and many feel that
guerrilla fi ghters who restrict their targets to the military forces of the
government they are trying to overthrow should not be labeled terrorists.
Indeed, “a condemnation of terrorism is not a denunciation of revolu-
tionaries or guerillas. It is only a reiteration of the limits of violence that
a civilized society is willing to permit. It does not in any sense preclude
the right to revolution, which is a recognized and protected right under
international law.”91

240 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
A more tenable distinction, perhaps, is offered by those who argue
that “in terrorism, the perpetrators deliberately choose noncombatant
targets and relatively indiscriminate means.”92 It is probably easier to
discriminate between combatants and noncombatants than between
those who are innocent and those who are not. Even that distinction,
though, is not free of ambiguities. President Reagan denounced as ter-
rorism the 1983 attack that killed 241 U.S. Marines in Beirut. He had
argued previously that “freedom fi ghters” act against military targets,
while “terrorists” attack innocent civilians. Can soldiers be classifi ed as
noncombatants? Reagan’s answer to that question with respect to the
bombing of the marines’ barracks in Lebanon was that the Marines were
noncombatants. He argued that those troops were on a peacekeeping mis-
sion and that they were asleep when they were attacked. Furthermore, if
terrorism is restricted only to noncombatants, would the September 11,
2001, bombing of the U.S. Pentagon, the headquarters of the U.S. mili-
tary, qualify as a terrorist act? As is obvious in these cases, the question
of whether soldiers can be classifi ed as noncombatants is likely to spark
considerable debate even among those determined to conduct a relatively
dispassionate analysis of terrorism.93
Another problem with defi ning terrorism as violence against
noncombatants is how to classify political assassinations. Politically
motivated murders of leaders of states are frequently considered acts
of terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s list of “Signifi cant Terrorist
Incidents, 1961–2003,” for example, includes the assassination of Indian
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and the attempted assassination of
former U.S. President George Bush in 1993. Most of the popular histori-
cal examples of terrorists are assassins as well. Yet, just as with military
personnel, it is diffi cult to view state offi cials as innocent civilians in
political confl icts.
Title 22 of the U.S. Legal Code (Section 2656[d]) defi nes terrorism
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. . . . The
term international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the
territory of more than one country.”94 This defi nition is reasonably spe-
cifi c and avoids many or even most of the problems posed by the defi –
nitions discussed previously. The only possibly questionable phrase is
“clandestine agents,” which opens the door to the idea that states can
commit terrorism through such agents.
States and their agents, clandestine or not, certainly commit violence
for political purposes against noncombatant targets and this violence
inspires “terror.” Furthermore, the violence perpetrated by governments
is a problem incomparably greater in scope and intensity than terrorism.95
But most who offer analytical defi nitions of terrorism believe that if any
defi nition is going to be suffi ciently precise to be useful, such violence is
not terrorism. An act of unjustifi able violence by a government should
certainly be called an atrocity but not terrorism. Of course, it is true that
noncombatant
targets Targets, such
as civilians and certain
military personnel
that are not engaged in
military combat.

International Terrorism 241
states can sponsor terrorism and terrorist agents and that this is a signifi –
cant problem, as will be discussed shortly. Still, there can be a distinction
made between states sponsoring terrorism and states themselves engag-
ing in political violence against noncombatants.
Another aspect missing in these defi nitions is the drama associated
with terrorism and the fear it is meant to inspire. The murdering of a man
in his wheelchair during the Achille Lauro cruise ship hostage crisis was
certainly designed to instill terror. The visual image of airplanes crashing
into the twin towers of the World Trade Center seemed to be crafted to
shock an audience accustomed to Hollywood fi lms. “Terrorist strategy
is basically psychological in nature. The fi rst step is to create mass ter-
ror, not mass destruction. . . . The second step is to manipulate political
disaffection created by this psychological reaction either to intimidate
governing authorities into acceding to specifi ed political demands, or else
to get rid of the government entirely.”96 Indeed, “terrorists choose their
targets to appear to be random, so everyone feels at risk—when getting
on a plane, entering a federal building, or strolling a market square. Busi-
nesspeople, military personnel, tourists, and everyday citizens . . . are
generally the targets of terrorist attacks.”97
As we can see, there are numerous ways to defi ne terrorism. Yet
there seems to be a consensus in the academic community on key
ingredients to classifying acts as terroristic: “the underlying political
motive [as opposed to a purely criminal or personal motive], the general
atmosphere of intimidation, and the targeting of those outside of the
decision-making process.”98 Terrorist groups are nonstate actors that
commit such acts.
The History of Terrorism
It is easy to get the impression that terrorism is a quite recent phenom-
enon, almost entirely dependent on, and so to a great extent a result of,
modern communications media, especially television. One analysis of
three groups of religious terrorists that existed centuries ago—the Thugs
(Hindu), the Assassins (Islamic), and the Zealots (Jewish)—makes it clear
that terrorist activity on a signifi cant scale has occurred at least since the
days of the Roman Empire. Clearly, terrorism is not a phenomenon pro-
duced solely by excessive attention from modern media. The Assassins,
for example, “did not need mass media to reach interested audiences,
because their prominent victims were murdered in venerated sites and
royal courts, usually on holy days when many witnesses were present.”
In general, the idea that “terrorist operations require modern technology
to be signifi cant” is a “misconception.”99
Other historical examples of international terrorist groups include
Narodnaya Volya (“The People’s Will”), operating in Russia in the late
1800s and early 1900s, and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Orga-
nization (IMRO), formed in the 1890s. “For several years, the IMRO

242 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
waged guerilla warfare, sometimes employing terrorist tactics, against the
Turkish rulers of their region. . . . Other nations both assisted and inter-
fered in the struggle. Bombings and kidnappings, as well as the murder of
civilians and offi cials were frequent.”100
In the modern age of terrorism, one analyst has identifi ed four
waves.101 The fi rst wave, beginning at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, was characterized by anarchism as a motive and assassination as
a method, including the assassination of the Austrian archduke in Sara-
jevo in 1914 that sparked World War I. The second wave was primarily a
reaction to decolonization after World Wars I and II and involved groups
fi ghting for national self-determination. The third wave came in response
to criticism of the United States in Vietnam and Israel in the Middle East.
This wave was more transnational in character, and airline hijacking was
the most popular method used. Presumably the fourth wave, beginning
with the Iranian revolution in 1979 and growing signifi cantly in the post–
Cold War era, involves religion more directly as a motive, or at least as a
rhetorical and recruitment tool.102
International terrorism in the 1980s was largely connected to Israel’s
invasion of Lebanon and U.S. support for Israel and its involvement in
the Lebanese civil war. “The most militant of [the Lebanese] Shiite orga-
nizations was Hezbollah, whose guerrilla arms inaugurated the tactic of
massive truck or vehicle bombs. . . . The American embassy in Lebanon
was bombed twice . . . [and] the American embassy in Kuwait was also
bombed.”103 A Hezbollah suicide bomber was responsible for the attack
on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983.
Furthermore, the 1980s saw an increased involvement of states
supporting or “sponsoring” terrorism.104 There were reports, for example,
that Libya maintained camps within its borders capable of training
5,000 men at a time.105 Several terrorist training camps were located
in Syria in the 1980s.106 And Iran was suspected of sponsoring several
Islamic groups, including the Lebanese Hezbollah.107 State sponsorship of
terrorism in the 1980s was also connected to the Cold War rivalry between
the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1984, one report claimed that
“an ever-increasing fl ow of arms and ammunition, manufactured in
the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, have been shipped
to the PLO via East Germany and Hungary.”108 In addition, the United
States has funneled millions of dollars in support of such “nongovern-
mental perpetrators of violence for political purposes” as the rebels in
Afghanistan and the contras in Central America.
One disturbing result of state-supported terrorism is that terrorists
acquire access to increasingly sophisticated military technology. Even
in the 1970s, terrorists were arrested in Rome, Paris, and Kenya with
anti-aircraft missiles and portable rocket launchers.109 When the Israelis
attacked the PLO camps in Lebanon in 1982, they found that the Soviets
had supplied that organization with rocket launchers and radar-guided
anti-aircraft cannon.110 The ultimate fear along these lines is that some
Hezbollah Political
and military Shia Islamic
group in southern
Lebanon.

International Terrorism 243
state at some time would supply weapons of mass destruction to a ter-
rorist group. The Aum Shinrikyo group in Japan used poisonous sarin gas
in an attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995, and the bomb-
ing of New York’s World Trade Center in 1993 was intended to involve
cyanide gas.111 Most worrisome is evidence that al Qaeda has a long his-
tory of trying to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear capabilities.112
Most analysts agree, however, that most terrorist groups do not yet have
the fi nancial or technical capabilities to acquire, assemble, and deliver
these weapons of mass destruction.113
The decline of state sponsorship of terrorism in the 1990s was associ-
ated with a decline in terrorist attacks. In 1992, according to a U.S. State
Department report (using its own defi nition of terrorism), “the number of
international terrorist incidents dropped sharply [36 percent] . . . falling to
its lowest level in 17 years.” State Department offi cials claimed that this
decline was attributable to “the disappearance of the Communist govern-
ments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that provided support and
safe haven for terrorist groups.”114 Certainly, the decline in leftist terror-
ists in the post–Cold War period is partly attributed to the decline of the
Soviet empire. Domestic antiterrorism policies by some countries (such
as Spain, France, and Germany) and some collective efforts by the Euro-
pean Union and NATO involving coordination and information sharing
are also part of the explanation.115
Figure 7.2 shows the number of international terrorist attacks occur-
ring each year since 1968, as compiled in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism
Knowledge Database. According to this source, the lowest annual total
in the last thirty years was 106 incidents in 2000, down from a high of
434 incidents in 1985. The number of incidents generally declined from
1988 to 2003. Since the beginning of this century, the number of terrorist
incidents has increased. The number of fatalities, shown in Figure 7.3,
associated with these terrorist events also varies across the years. Before
2001, the deadliest year in this record was 1988, with 702 casualties. Even
when the number of incidents was on the decline, the number of deaths
generally increased, suggesting that terrorist tactics have become more
lethal.116 The embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, for example,
killed 247 and injured 5,500, and the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center in the United States killed six and injured about 1,000. “The
attacks of September 11 fi t a pattern but also marked a dramatic escala-
tion of violence,” killing more than 3,000 people.117 In addition, the per-
centage of international attacks against U.S. targets increased from about
25 percent in the mid-1980s to about 47 percent in 2000.118
The higher number of deaths seems to have been caused by more
attacks on large numbers of civilians, which may be related to the new
types of terrorist groups that have emerged (to be discussed later in this
chapter). “Although it is tempting to attribute the increased casualties . . .
to better technology available to terrorists, incidents have not really relied
on new technologies. Old fashioned bombs were used at the World Trade

244 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
Center, . . . Nairobi, and elsewhere. The difference today is that these
bombs are often planned to explode where and when maximum carnage
would result.”119 The use of cutter knives and “old-fashioned” hijacking
of commercial airlines on September 11, 2001, clearly demonstrates that
attacks can be quite lethal without sophisticated technology.
The most lethal attacks have been associated with Osama bin Laden
and relate to U.S. policy in the Middle East and the al Qaeda network:
Many sources of the terrorism of the 1990s can be traced to
specifi c events associated with the Persian Gulf war and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The post-
war sanctions against Iraq and the military enforcement of the
no-fl y zones in Iraq . . . perpetuated that confl ict and mobilized
anti-American sentiment. . . . Islamic militants from around the
world gained experience fi ghting the Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan. . . . After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989,
al Qaeda An
international network of
terrorist cells, created by
Osama bin Laden.
0
100
200
300
400
500
In
ci
de
nt
s
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Figure 7.2 Number of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968–2005
Source: Data from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Data Base. http://www.tkb.org, accessed October 13, 2006. Data include only international
incidents “in which terrorists go abroad to strike the targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international
incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel, or equipment.”

http://www.tkb.org

International Terrorism 245
the establishment of training camps in Afghanistan by Saudi-
born terrorist Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization
provided an ongoing arena for the socialization of Islamic radi-
cals from across the world.120
Osama bin Laden, son of a wealthy man who owned a construction
company and had ties to the royal ruling family in Saudi Arabia, was
part of the resistance against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Indeed,
al Qaeda means “the base” and refers to the tracking station that bin
Laden established in Pakistan to document the Arabs who went through
his guesthouse and training camps on the way to fi ght in the Afghan resis-
tance. The Muslim opposition to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was
directly encouraged and funded by the United States. The war against the
“atheist power” proved attractive; between 1982 and 1992, over 35,000
people from forty Islamic countries joined in the fi ght.121 After the Soviet
Union withdrew from Afghanistan, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia
0
500
1000
1500
2500
2000
3500
3000
F
at
al
iti
es
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Figure 7.3 Number of International Terrorist Fatalities, 1968–2005
Source: Data from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Data Base. http://www.tkb.org, accessed October 13, 2006. Data include only international
incidents “in which terrorists go abroad to strike the targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international
incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel, or equipment.”

http://www.tkb.org

246 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
but was restricted in his movements for his criticism of the Saudi govern-
ment, particularly for allowing the Americans to come into Saudi Arabia
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When he fl ed Saudi Arabia and was
not allowed to return, Sudan accepted him, and there he set up train-
ing camps and established ties with groups in Libya, Palestine, Somalia,
Bosnia, and the Philippines.122
Under pressure from the United States, Sudan expelled him in 1996,
at which time bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, soon to be ruled by the
Taliban, an Islamic government led by teachers and students from semi-
naries for the training of the Islamic clergy. The Taliban were backed by
neighboring Pakistan and, initially, by Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden set up a
number of terrorist camps in Afghanistan and signifi cantly infl uenced the
Taliban leadership.123 During this time period, he has been linked to the
attacks on the Khobar towers in 1996 in Saudi Arabia, the embassy bomb-
ings in Africa in 1998, and foiled attacks in Jordan and the United States
at turn-of-the-century celebrations in 1999. In 1998, he joined forces with
groups in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh to issue a “Declaration of the
World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders.” Among
other things, the declaration criticized the U.S. “occupation” of Saudi Ara-
bia and issued a fatwa, or ruling, stating, “To kill Americans and their
allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim . . .
until their armies, shattered and broken-winged, depart from all the lands
of Islam, incapable of threatening any Muslim.”124 Despite the intent of
the signatories that the fatwa should apply to all of the Islamic faith, the
statement to most Muslims was a “grotesque travesty of the nature of
Islam and even of its doctrine of jihad [“holy war”]. . . . At no point do the
basic texts of Islam enjoin terrorism and murder. At no point do they even
consider the random slaughter of uninvolved bystanders.”125
The attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed, however, to be gruesomely
prophesied by the declaration and previous activities of al Qaeda and took
the history of terrorism, some say world politics, into a new era. Since
then, additional attacks, assumed to be connected with al Qaeda in some
form, have occurred in a tourist area of Bali, Indonesia (in 2002), in Casa-
blanca, Morocco (in 2003), and in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (also in 2003).126
More recently, in March of 2004, terrorists, assumed to be Spanish-based
Moroccans connected to al Qaeda, attacked a Madrid commuter train,
killing 191 and injuring more than 1,400 people. In July 2005, fi fty-two
people died in an attack on buses and subway trains in London. The Lon-
don bombings were carried out by British-born Muslims, and it is unclear
how much al Qaeda played a role in the training of the attackers and the
planning of the attacks.127 al Qaeda is also suspected of involvement in
a plot to blow up as many as ten transatlantic planes in August 2006,
and groups related to al Qaeda are accused of recent attacks in Lebanon,
Algeria, Pakistan, Yemen, and Iran. To many, the attacks in London and
Madrid served as further proof that global politics had entered a new
phase of terror. Europe, for example, seems to be a new locus of Islamic
Taliban Fundamentalist
Islamic group that
supported al Qaeda and
ruled most of Afghanistan
from 1996 to 2001.

International Terrorism 247
extremist activity, with both long-time residents and new immigrants join-
ing the now-global, decentralized network associated with al Qaeda.128
Still, in the light of the actual amount of suffering and death from
international terrorism, it might be argued that it is an over-publicized
phenomenon: “[I]t is worth remembering that the total number of peo-
ple killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda like operatives outside of
Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown
in bathtubs in the United States in a single year.”129 The total number
of deaths caused by international terrorist incidents from 1968 to 2005,
according to the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, is 9,858.130
That is a tragically large number, although not in comparison with the
numbers killed by international wars, civil wars, government-sponsored
policies of oppression, and so on.
In the end, perhaps, what is most worrisome about international
terrorism in the contemporary era is its potential for wreaking massive
havoc and suffering with nuclear weapons, biological and chemical
weapons, or information warfare techniques that could result in massive
dislocations in banking records, airline traffi c, and communication net-
works. “Chances are that of 100 attempts at terrorist superviolence, 99
would fail. But the single successful one could claim many more victims,
do more material damage, and unleash far greater panic than anything the
world has yet experienced.”131
The Origins of Terrorism
It is a mistake to believe that terrorism is mindless violence, without
purpose other than a release for pent-up frustration:
The ultimate goals of all international terrorism are political.
This distinguishes it from nonpolitical violence by criminal ele-
ments or the emotionally disturbed. Most terrorist goals involve
a sense of grievance, real or imagined, which the perpetrators
seek to overcome either by forcing political authorities to accede
to their demands or by forcing them from power entirely.132
Furthermore, terrorist strategies often obtain their goals. According to
one study, “ . . . terrorism has been so successful that between 1980
and 2003, half of all suicide terrorist campaigns were closely followed
by substantial concessions by the target governments. Hijacking planes,
blowing up buses, and kidnapping individuals may seem irrational and
incoherent to outside observers, but these tactics can be surprisingly
effective in achieving a terrorist group’s political aims.”133
Terrorism can have several tactical aims for resistance groups. For
some of the Palestinian groups, these aims include publicizing the groups’
cause, “provoking Israel to adopt repressive measures against innocent,
uncommitted Arabs in the hope that such measures will lead the latter
to join or support the resistance, . . . provoking Israel to retaliate severely

248 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
against Arab states and thereby undermine diplomatic efforts to achieve
peace, . . . [and] dissuading moderate Arab regimes from making conces-
sions to Israel.”134 Like the Palestinians, several groups are ethnic minor-
ities seeking national self-determination:
Faced with the overwhelming odds in favor of the well-established
and well-armed state, many of the peoples seeking to exercise
their right to self-determination have been increasingly will-
ing to use less conventional methods and means of waging war.
Lacking large popular support from the indigenous population,
facing a state whose trained army and weaponry make conven-
tional resistance a mockery, such groups are increasingly willing
to use . . . terrorism . . . to achieve their right.135
From the late 1960s until the late 1980s, transnational terrorism
was primarily motivated by nationalism, separatism, Marxist ideology,
racism, nihilism, and economic equality.136 Some argue that the current
wave of modern terrorist activity is distinct because of its religious char-
acter. “Older groups like the PLO or the IRA are generally constrained by
nationalists or irredentist goals—a Palestinian state, a united Ireland—
that are negotiable. . . . What motivates their violence is the desire to
obtain a particular political result. Old terrorists are looking to bar-
gain, new terrorists want only to express their wrath and cripple their
enemy.”137 Indeed, over the last two and a half decades, groups for which
religion provides the dominant objective and who engage in terrorist acts
have become more prevalent.138 Possibly due to a worldwide growth of
religious fundamentalism, some analysts view these more religious-based
groups as more dangerous “than earlier terrorist groups that wanted to win
over the people and, in so doing, did not want to leave massive casualties.
During . . . earlier decades, precision attacks were directed at well-defi ned
targets of the establishment.”139 And suicide attacks, possibly motivated
by religious notions of martyrdom, have become more prevalent.
The year 2000 witnessed 37 attacks—a record number. It also sig-
naled the beginning of an upward trend in the number of suicide
missions that would span most of the fi rst decade of this
century. Thus, between 2000 and 2007, the number of attacks
rose steadily each year, from 54 in 2001 to 71 in 2002, 81 in 2003,
104 in 2004, 348 in 2005, 353 in 2006, and 535 in 2007 . . .140
Others disagree, arguing that the current type of violence is not particu-
larly new141 and not particularly related to religion. Islam, for example,
strictly prohibits the targeting of innocent civilians, and Islamic “the-
ology cannot explain suicide as a method of terrorism. Here again, the
perpetrators and their supporters may twist religion to suit their ends,
and to brush aside the basic Islamic doctrine prohibiting suicide.”142
Furthermore, suicide bombing is not a new terrorist tactic. Historically,
other groups, such as some Palestinian Islamic and Lebanese Christian

International Terrorism 249
groups in the 1950s and 1960s and the Japanese in World War II, used
tactics that involved the necessary death of the attacker.143 And one non-
religious group, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, is “the world leader in
suicide terrorism.”144
Furthermore, “while there is some truth to the notion that Isla-
mism is the leading doctrinal ideology among terrorists today, . . . the
political dynamics of the Islamist terrorist groups are overwhelmingly
nationalist and ethnic in scope.”145 The origins of al Qaeda terrorism, for
example, are decidedly political. Members of al Qaeda, particularly those
with roots in Egypt, were fi rst fi ghting quite authoritarian and repressive
regimes, backed by the United States:
For most of the militants now engaged in al Qaeda, opposition
to authority at home, whether peaceful or violent, was ineffec-
tive. Local regimes countered dissent with severe repression. As
a result, radical frustrations apparently were transferred to the
United States as a symbol of both oppression and arrogance. . . .
One cannot understand Al Qaeda without understanding the
domestic politics of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or now much of the
Muslim world.146
Specifi cally, U.S. support of successive Egyptian governments (after
1979, Egypt became the second largest recipient, following Israel, of
U.S. foreign aid) angered groups that had been fi ghting repression for
decades. One of these groups, the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, had been
active since the 1970s in attempting to overthrow the government, and it
began working outside Egypt in the 1990s. Its spiritual leader, the cleric
Umar Abd al-Rahman, along with other members of the group, were
convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Another group, the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad, joined forces with Osama bin Laden in 1998, and
this alliance “can be interpreted as an outcome of the group’s inability to
continue its terrorist activities within Egypt.”147
In contrast to Egypt, in which Islamic dissidents were responding to
a secular state, dissidents like bin Laden in Saudi Arabia emerged in a
country with a government that supports a strict, fundamentalist ver-
sion of religious doctrine. Yet Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United
States—its alliance with the United States in the Gulf War against Iraq
and its continued logistical support of the U.S. presence in the Middle
East—angered many Saudis, including groups such as the Saudi Hezbollah.
Attacks on U.S. military personnel in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1995, and
on the Khobar towers in 1996 refl ected this anger.
Al Qaeda’s political motives behind the September 11 attack are
presumably related to these objections to U.S. policy:
The reasoning behind the September 11 attacks was expressed
primarily in a statement from bin Laden broadcast in Qatar on
October 7. . . . The statement referred specifi cally to 80 years

250 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
of humiliation of Islam. It thus apparently dated the period of
humiliation to 1921, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire,
and the establishment of Britain’s Palestine Mandate that pro-
vided for a Jewish homeland. Specifi c references to Palestine and
Iraq were made, as well as more vague allegations that countries
that believe in Islam had been turned against bin Laden by the
United States. Bin Laden cited United States retaliation against
Afghanistan in 1998 as another grievance.148
Today, al Qaeda continues to criticize U.S. policies around the world,
including the intervention and occupation of Iraq. “Thousands of Arab
volunteers, many of them inspired by bin Laden’s words, went to Iraq in
the run-up to the U.S. invasion. Some joined the fl edgling network creat-
ed by the longtime bin Laden associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who had
fl ed Afghanistan and come to Iraq sometime in 2002 to begin preparations
against the invasion.”149 al Qaeda in Iraq’s strategy to force the United
States to leave involved sparking sectarian violence between Sunnis and
Shi’ites. How new the mix of religion and politics is in the motivations
behind current terrorism is unclear. It is certainly the case that:
Osama bin Laden is no more representative of Islam than Timo-
thy McVeigh is of Christianity, or Japan’s Shoko Asahara is of
Buddhism. Still, one cannot deny that the ideals and ideas of
these vicious activists are permeated with religion. The authority
of religion has given bin Laden’s cadres what they believe is the
moral standing to employ violence in their assault on the very
symbol of global economic power. It has also provided the meta-
phor of cosmic war, an image of spiritual struggle that every
religion has within its repository of symbols: the fi ght between
good and bad, truth and evil.150
What does seem to be new about contemporary terrorist acts is that
they are supported by well-organized and global networks.151 The coor-
dinated attacks against two U.S. embassies, in Kenya and Tanzania, in
1998 were one of the fi rst signs that a new, transnational, well-organized
network of groups was operating. Subsequently, in the trials of suspects
in these attacks, the degree of organization, sophistication, and scope of
al Qaeda was revealed:
United States government offi cials estimate that bin Laden’s
organization . . . has thousands of operatives who are active, or
suspected to be active, in dozens of countries. . . . Many groups,
such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Algerian Armed
Islamic Group, are closely affi liated with al Qaeda. . . . The al
Qaeda organization, and others like it, have branches that han-
dle fi nance, documents, public relations, and intelligence. They
run businesses. They conduct surveillance of enemy targets.
They cultivate journalists to ensure favorable coverage in the

International Terrorism 251
press. They have sophisticated web sites for both fund raising
and recruiting.152
After September 11, 2001, al Qaeda has become even more transna-
tional, and more decentralized. With the invasion of Afghanistan and the
destruction of the Taliban government, al Qaeda relied more on “associated
groups to advance their territorial aims, as well as support al-Qaeda’s univer-
sal jihad. To this end, its organizers, trainers, fi nanciers and human couriers
have dispersed and are moving around the world to provide support to these
groups.”153 “The result is that today there are many al Qaedas rather than
the single al Qaeda of the past.”154 What is unclear is the degree to which Al
Qaeda leaders such as bin Laden direct these other groups and their activities
and provide them with training and resources, or simply inspire them. What
is certain, however, is that the transnational character of today’s internation-
al terrorist networks is undoubtedly aided by globalization155 (see Chapter
14) and makes the design of policies to prevent terrorism more diffi cult.
Dealing with Terrorism
Most analysts of terrorism agree that it is impossible to completely pre-
vent terrorist attacks. Yet intelligence does work at times. A series of
“millennium plots,” including a plan to bomb the Los Angeles airport,
Photographers run past a burning hotel which was one of the targets in a coordinated
terrorist attack in Mumbai, India in November 2008. More than 175 people were killed
and over 300 wounded in these attacks.
(Arko Datta/Reuters/Corbis)

252 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
were foiled in December 1999 and British authorities averted an attempt
to blow up transatlantic fl ights in August 2006.156 Overall, however,
prevention is extremely diffi cult, and some antiterrorism measures can
in fact be counterproductive. Using data on terrorist acts from 1968 to
1988, one study evaluated the impact of various antiterrorist policies.
The study concluded that:
the most effective policies were the installation of metal detec-
tors in January 1973 and the fortifi cation of U.S. embassies
in 1976 and thereafter. Although metal detectors decreased
skyjackings, they had the unintended effect of increasing
other types of hostage missions and assassinations. . . . No
long-run decrease in terrorism could be attributed to the raid
[by the United States on Libya in 1986]. Finally, the Reagan
antiterrorism laws did not inhibit terrorism directed against
U.S. interests.157
The U.S. raid on Libya in retaliation against terrorist activities
believed to be sponsored by Libya is one approach to terrorism: relying
on conventional military attacks launched against the states that sup-
port it. This attack caused a transatlantic maelstrom of controversy. Most
Americans approved the action, whereas most Europeans did not. Only
the British government cooperated with the attack. The controversy
regarding the U.S. attack focused fi rst on its effectiveness and second on
its morality. Even offi cials in the Reagan administration acknowledged
initially that the raid on Libya might cause an increase in terrorism in the
short run. They also argued, however, that it would decrease terrorism in
the long run. Ethical military operations, according to just war principles
(see Chapter 9), require discrimination, that is, immunity for noncomba-
tants. Unfortunately, U.S. bombs in Libya killed civilians. The just war
doctrine also stipulates that military action must be proportional, doing
more good than harm. One critic addressed the idea of using conventional
military attacks as a response to terrorist activities even before President
Reagan’s retaliation against Muammar Qaddafi ’s Libya. He said that such
attacks would “substitute the greater evil of full-scale war, with all its
attendant death and devastation and dangers of escalation, for the lesser
evil of terrorism.”158
As mentioned, one study indicates that there was no long-term
effect and “the American bombing of Tripoli apparently led Libya to
seek revenge by organizing the midair bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988.”159 Yet the suspects for
this bombing were eventually indicted, with one convicted, and Libyan
sponsorship of terrorist groups does seem to have decreased. How much
Libya’s change in policies can be attributed to fear of another military
attack, however, is debatable, as many analysts believe that these chang-
es were motivated more by Libya’s desire to end sanctions and improve
its economy.160

International Terrorism 253
The raid against Libya is not the only example of military attacks
against states accused of sponsoring terrorists. More recently, the United
States attacked a pharmaceutical company in 1998 in Sudan, believing
there was a connection between the company and Osama bin Laden, who
was suspected in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
At the same time, the United States launched attacks in Afghanistan
against suspected al Qaeda training camps. The decision to attack Sudan
and Afghanistan was controversial. “In particular, critics disputed the link
between the pharmaceuticals plant, chemical precursors, and bin Laden.
The retaliatory attacks may have been a signal of American resolve, but
they infl icted no serious damage on Al Qaeda’s capabilities.”161
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States, backed by
a large coalition of states, again pursued military options as one way
of dealing with terrorism. Within weeks, the war against the Taliban
government in Afghanistan was launched and eventually succeeded in
dismantling the state that had given sanctuary to al Qaeda leaders. But
even after the fall of the Taliban, it was unclear if the military campaign
caused any signifi cant, long-term damage to the al Qaeda network.162
In addition to the military strikes, the United States and other countries
froze economic assets believed to be linked to al Qaeda, arrested numer-
ous suspected al Qaeda associates, attempted to heighten security, and
increased monitoring of suspected individuals. Of course, one justifi cation
offered for the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 was the Iraqi regime’s
suspected links with al Qaeda, although this justifi cation is criticized for
being based on faulty and exaggerated intelligence (for a summary of the
debate prior to intervention, see the Policy Choices box in Chapter 3).
Many fear that military attacks, such as those on Afghanistan in 1998
and 2001, against terrorist groups can be counterproductive:
If the terrorists are militarily destroyed, the legitimacy of their
cause may still exist and even become stronger, depending on
how the operation is perceived. Dramatic cruise missile attacks,
for example, play into the mindsets of developing countries (and
even of some U.S. allies) affi rming the belief that the U.S. is too
powerful, takes too many unilateral actions and has too much
sway in the world. The ironic result is an overall increase in
political sympathy for the terrorists or their cause.163
Along this line of thinking, many argue that it is U.S. foreign policy
in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Taliban and in Iraq after the war
against Saddam Hussein’s regime that is most critical to its antiterrorist
goals.164 If Afghanistan, for example, falls from the international agen-
da and reverts back into economic despair and civil war, it once again
may provide sanctuary for terrorists, and it will serve as an example to
those who oppose U.S. policies. Similarly, with regard to Iraq, many argue
that the civilian casualties, the rise in sectarian and criminal violence,
and the abuse of both prisoners and civilians by the U.S. military are

254 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
counter productive if the campaign against terrorist groups involves a
“battle for hearts and minds.”165 The treatment of terrorist suspects at
the U.S. base in Guantánamo Bay (discussed in Chapter 9) may have also
failed in this regard.
Relatedly, another approach to dealing with terrorism is to address
the grievances of the terrorists. Many of the most spectacular terrorist
incidents, especially those involving Americans and Israelis, have been
carried out by Palestinians or groups sympathetic to Palestinians. Provid-
ing Palestinians with more support might deprive at least some terrorist
organizations of an important source of volunteers for their plans and
projects. This was presumably one motive behind the signing of the Oslo
Peace Agreement in 1993, but the process of implementing this agree-
ment was accompanied by, and perhaps even provoked, several terrorist
incidents in the decade that followed. Beyond addressing specifi c griev-
ances in the Middle East, a broader strategy may be appropriate. Accord-
ing to one observer,
much more needs to be done to create a peaceful and stable
world order; the major powers must not only cooperate in the
fi ght against terrorism but also deal with its root causes. . . .
We are locked in a struggle for ideas and beliefs that demands
greater attention be paid to such issues as poverty. . . . A robust
global economy is a condition sine qua non in the battle against
Members of Jaysh al-Ummah take part in a training at their base in the Gaza Strip.
Jaysh al-Ummah, or the Army of the Nation, is a Palestinian Islamist group modelled
on the ideology of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda.
(Mohammed Salem/Reuters/Landov)

International Terrorism 255
terrorism. By destroying a root cause of frustration—namely
grinding poverty—a healthy economy denies terrorists a fresh
source of recruits.166
Although the idea that terrorism is rooted in poverty is plausible and
possible, research fails to fi nd a strong relationship between poor eco-
nomic conditions and terrorist activity.167
What seems to be more important is the nature of the state. Weak
states that are divided by ethnic and religious confl ict, for example, may
see more violence by terrorism.168 Indeed, addressing the problem of
failed and weak states in the international system may also be key to
addressing international terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 3 and earlier
in this chapter, states’ lack of suffi cient control over their territory stems
from a number of causes, including ethnic confl ict. When states fail and
political vacuums arise, violence can escalate and create insecurity, pov-
erty, and refugees. Not only are these conditions ripe for terrorist groups
to form and recruit members; these countries are attractive to existing
terrorist groups. Terrorist groups that can operate outside the structure of
state authority can engage in various organizational activities free from
interference. Thus, many weak states in the international system, such
as Somalia, Sudan, and Afghanistan, might not necessarily actively spon-
sor terrorism, but become hosts to various terrorist groups. The diffi culty
of establishing political authority in Iraq after the U.S.-led military inter-
vention has also encouraged international terrorists, including al Qaeda,
to establish bases in Iraq and participate in the sectarian violence and
attacks against the U.S. military.169
Border areas or “brown areas,” which are often diffi cult for states to
control, also become attractive locations for terrorist groups. According
to one terrorist analyst, “the triborder region of South America [at the
intersection of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay] has become the world’s
new Libya, a place where terrorists with widely disparate ideologies—
Marxist Colombian rebels, American white supremacists, Hamas, Hez-
bollah, and others—meet to swap tradecraft.”170 The Lebanese border
with Israel has also sparked terrorist activities and confl ict. While Israel
and others accuse Syria and Iran of directly sponsoring the Lebanese Hez-
bollah, Israel accuses Lebanon of being too weak to control its southern
territory, allowing Hezbollah to operate there. Israel’s military attack on
Lebanon in July 2006 was its response to this situation, but some charged
that this action would prove counterproductive.
Many argue that if terrorism has become an international problem,
states cannot deal with terrorist threats unilaterally. The coalition,
however shaky, formed against al Qaeda and Afghanistan after Septem-
ber 11 is an example of international cooperation, a fairly new way of
dealing with terrorism. Historically, terrorism was seen as an internal
issue and elicited little international, coordinated response. “Those
attitudes began to change in the 1980s when a number of spectacular

256
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Is the War on Terror an Effective Policy for Addressing
Terrorism?
ISSUE: Although “terrorism” has been around for many centuries, the modern
era–with its mass communications technology, increasingly available weapons,
and particular political challenges–represents a new global challenge. After the
attacks of September 11, U.S. President George W. Bush announced a “War on
Terror,” which involved extensive resources, covert and overt military operations,
and new alliances. Many countries have been reluctant to fully embrace this policy
due to doubts about its costs and effectiveness. Since 9/11, however, there have
been no terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, and many attribute this to the success of
the “War on Terrorism.” However, terrorism continues in other parts of the world,
and huge expenditures of national wealth are being devoted to efforts to prevent
and eliminate terrorism. Is the War on Terrorism an important policy for protect-
ing innocent civilians from those willing to use extreme violence to advance their
cause, or is it a misguided use of resources that will ultimately fail to achieve any
signifi cant results?
Option #1: The war on terrorism is important for the safety and security of citi-
zens around the world, and thus should be continued.
Arguments: (a) Allowing terrorism to go unchecked would send the message that
violating the law and killing innocent people is legitimate, provided you feel strong-
ly enough about your particular cause. Terrorists might feel oppressed but that does
not mean we should abandon the rule of law. (b) Sustaining a “war on terror” is not
just a catch phrase, but the natural consequence of the erosion of state power. As
nonstate actors have more access to technology and increasingly infl uence world
events, controlling or preventing terrorism will become even more crucial. (c) Ci-
vilians have a special status in international law, and for good reason. Protecting
innocent people is one of the most important responsibilities states assume.
Counterarguments: (a) The best predictors of terrorism are when people feel they
have serious grievances and yet have no legitimate political means to address them.
Preventing terrorism requires political efforts to shift countries toward more demo-
cratic systems, something rarely accomplished through warlike actions. Military ap-
proaches to terrorism generate sympathy and recruit more terrorists. (b) Terrorists
are forced to use radical and violent tactics, because they lack the massive resources
of states; they frequently pursue causes that focus on oppressed people. (c) A terror-
ist could argue that there are no “innocent people.” Citizens who pay taxes and do
not resist corrupt and oppressive governments are essentially supporting the system.
Defi ning some people as noncombatants and “off limits” for violence is the same as
supporting the status quo and letting the powerful decide right from wrong.
Option #2: The war on terrorism should not be continued, as it lacks a clear
policy defi nition and costs billions of dollars.
Arguments: (a) Terrorism is a tactic used by people who feel oppressed. It is not
a thing, like “drugs,” that can be controlled or eliminated. (b) The daily physical
threat from terrorism is vanishingly small compared to other daily threats, like
starvation, disease, and grinding poverty. The money spent fi ghting terrorism
could more effectively be spent addressing these real and pressing problems
facing millions. (c) States get to decide who is and is not a terrorist, but states
(continued)

Summary 257
attacks captured the world’s attention, and it became apparent that with-
out political cooperation, all countries would be at risk. By mid-1995,
there were eleven major treaties and conventions against various kinds of
terrorist acts.”171
The United Nations is a forum for international cooperation against ter-
rorism. Following the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland, the Security Council passed a resolution demanding, among other
things, an end to Libyan sponsorship of terrorism and Libyan acceptance of
responsibility for the Pan Am attack. Later, in 1992, the Security Council
imposed an arms and civil aviation embargo on Libya and followed up in 1993
by freezing some Libyan assets and placing an embargo on oil technology on
Libya.172 The Taliban government’s refusal to surrender bin Laden after the
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 led to UN sanctions as well.
Despite instances of international cooperation, these efforts may not
work, and coalitions can be quite fragile:
Terrorism’s history shows that organizations can be decimated,
and . . . can be made less signifi cant but terrorists also can invent
new ways to carry out their activities. Previous international
efforts were diffi cult to sustain and similar problems are emerg-
ing now. Members do not agree on how to apply the term, and the
decision not to use it for groups in Kashmir, Lebanon, and Israel
demonstrates that the interests of states simply do not suffi cient-
ly coincide, and that some will encourage groups others abhor.173
The Policy Choices box summarizes the debate over recent anti- terrorism
efforts.
SUMMARY
● Ethnic confl ict, attracting major headlines and contributing to the death
toll from war in the post–Cold War era, can occur between groups of
have perpetrated much more horrifi c acts than any nonstate terrorist organization.
Many anti-terrorist policies are simply another way for states to legitimize their
own power and justify their periodic abuses.
Counterarguments: (a) Many crimes cannot be eliminated, but that does not mean we
should abandon efforts to try to control or limit their effects. Terrorism, like many do-
mestic crimes, must be deterred and perpetrators must be punished to prevent others
from engaging in the same behavior. (b) Terrorism represents not only a physical threat,
but a moral one. We must focus the international community on preventing the kind
of violence that treats innocent people as legitimate targets. (c) Claiming that states are
worse abusers of power than terrorists does not offer a clear alternative to a war on ter-
ror. Many states have abused their power, but that does not justify terrorism.

258 Chapter 7 Ethnic Confl ict and International Terrorism
KEY TERMS ethnic group 218
Sectarian 221
Irredentism 222
modernization theory 226
theory of relative
deprivation 228
Ethnocentrism 229
instrumentalist approach 229
social identity theory 229
Terrorism 238
noncombatant targets 240
Hezbollah 242
al Qaeda 244
Taliban 246
people who share a collective identity based on a belief of common de-
scent and shared experiences and cultural traits. There are many ethnic
groups in the world in confl ict over group rights and self-determination.
These confl icts typically affect relations between states.
● Ethnic confl ict is not a new phenomenon but did increase from the early
1950s to the early 1990s. During the Cold War, ethnic confl icts often
became part of the East-West rivalry, but the end of the Cold War did not
bring about an end to ethnic confl ict. The end of the Cold War contrib-
uted to ethnic confl icts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
● Many factors contribute to ethnic confl ict, including competition
over economic resources and economic modernization, historical
animosities, anarchical situations in collapsed states, ethnocentric
beliefs, and leaders’ manipulations of identities for political gain.
● The resolution of ethnic confl ict may be as complex as the causes.
Democratization can help, but democratization in places with a history of
ethnic confl ict is diffi cult to achieve. Redrawing boundaries and recognizing
the right of self-determination for all ethnic groups is not feasible in most
situations and would not necessarily prevent the continuation of confl ict.
● Terrorism might most usefully be defi ned as the use of violence by
nonstate actors for political purposes, typically against noncombatants.
Terrorist groups are not new, but they do have new potential to wreak
havoc in the international system with weapons of mass destruction.
The rise of state-sponsored terrorism in the 1980s and the activity of
groups associated with al Qaeda in the late 1990s and early twenty-
fi rst century represent the most recent waves of terrorism, which are
causing a higher number of deaths. The attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001, brought about a new phase of terrorism and state
responses to global networks of terrorists.
● Terrorist groups have a variety of political motives, including national
self-determination. Recently, religious-related objectives have become
more central to terrorist groups.
● Prevention of terrorism is diffi cult. Anti-terrorism techniques include
retaliatory and preemptive military interventions. Many see military
solutions as counterproductive and instead urge the international com-
munity to address the grievances and root causes of terrorist groups.

259
C H A P T E R 8
Efforts to Avoid Confl ict:
Alliances, Arms,
and Bargaining
Alliances
• Balancing
• Bandwagoning
• The Size of Alliances
• Other Factors in Alliance Formation and Maintenance
• Alliances and War
• Alliances after the Cold War
Arms and Arms Control
• Conventional Weapons
• Arms Races and International Confl ict
• Conventional Arms Control
• Nuclear Weapons: Thinking the Unthinkable
• The Nuclear Arms Race and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
• The Threat of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Nuclear Arms Control
• Beyond Nuclear
• Efforts to Control Ballistic Missile Technology and Chemical and
Biological Weapons
Bargaining and Negotiation
• Coercive Diplomacy and Bargaining Strategies
• Diplomats and Their “Games”
Summary
Key Terms

260 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Given the pervasiveness of interstate confl ict, states devote sig-nifi cant attention to preparing for war, trying to prevent attacks
from others, and negotiating their differences. This chapter discusses
alliances—why they form, their size, who joins with whom, and how
they relate to the likelihood of war. The chapter also discusses the acqui-
sition of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, their
dangers, and how states try to control military buildup and arms races
through arms control agreements. States join alliances and arm them-
selves for both security and other motivations. The post-Cold War era has
seen signifi cant efforts to address the nature of old alliances such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and threats from conven-
tional, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
As we will see in this chapter, states often form alliances and acquire
arms in order to prevent others from doing something that they would
otherwise do (deterrence) or to force others to do something that they
would not otherwise do (compellence). Alliances often try to achieve
extended deterrence by signaling to others that a stronger state’s military
arsenal will be used to protect their junior alliance partners. In the Cold
War, the United States hoped its nuclear arsenal would deter a Soviet
attack against its allies around the world. Alliances and arms races may
also involve a compellence strategy. In the 1991 Gulf War, for example,
the United Nations created a coalition to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait.
Deterrence and compellence involve communicating goals and com-
mitment to other actors through bargaining and negotiation. How states
bargain and negotiate alliances and arms agreements is also a topic in this
chapter. The strategies that diplomats adopt stem from their efforts to
deter or compel, but they also come from the relationship between cur-
rent and future confl icts and from pressures from domestic constituents.
These strategies can have signifi cant effects on the resolution of interna-
tional confl ict in global politics.
Alliances
Alliances, or international coalitions, seem to be an inevitable result of interaction among sovereign political units. Alliances are “formal
associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specifi ed
circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”1 “ Wherev er
in recorded history a system of multiple sovereignty has existed, some of
the sovereign units involved in confl icts with others have entered into
alliances.”2 Alliances were part of interstate relations in ancient India
and China, in Greece during the era of city-states, and in Renaissance
Italy. They have been a constant feature of the political landscape since
the rise of the modern state in the mid-seventeenth century.
Why are these coalitions such a prominent part of international rela-
tions? The most common answer given by policymakers is that they are a
necessary defense against aggression. Often, or perhaps most of the time,
weapons of mass
destruction
(WMD) Nuclear,
chemical, and biological
weapons.
deterrence Preventing
another actor from doing
something they would
otherwise do.
compellence Forcing
another actor to do
something they would
not otherwise do.
alliances Formal
associations in which
states pledge to militarily
protect each other in
specifi ed circumstances.

Alliances 261
defense is the actual motive for the formation of alliances. But some alli-
ances are formed for more aggressive purposes. The pact between Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, which resulted in the immediate
dismemberment of Poland, is probably the most prominent twentieth-
century example of an alliance that was formed precisely for the purpose
of carrying out aggression as opposed to deterring it.
Whether for defensive or offensive purposes, alliances are usually
formed to give members an advantage in interstate confl icts. But under
what conditions states are most likely to form alliances, who will ally
with whom, what kinds of alliances are most effective and cohesive, and
what effects alliances have on the stability of the international system
are issues about which there is still substantial disagreement.
Balancing
The most traditional set of answers is supplied by the balance-of-power
ideas of realism discussed in Chapter 6. According to this theory, coun-
tries form alliances when any state in their midst becomes so powerful
that it threatens to establish hegemony, or domination of the system.
Through the mechanism of fl uid alliances, the balance is preserved, and
if war is not avoided, at least the powerful, aggressive state is denied
victory. Most balance-of-power theorists would argue that alliances
so used are benefi cial, indeed necessary, for the stability of the interna-
tional system.
States engaging in balancing behaviors “join alliances to protect
themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose
a threat. States choose to balance for two main reasons. First, they place
their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it
becomes too strong. . . . Second, joining the weaker side increases the
new member’s infl uence within the alliance, because the weaker side has
greater need for assistance.”3 What do states actually balance against?
Stephen Walt argues that while traditionally realists have focused on
capabilities or power, it is more accurate to say that states balance against
threats. “Although power is an important part of the equation, it is not the
only one. It is more accurate to say that states tend to ally with or against
the foreign power that poses the greatest threat. For example, states may
balance by allying with other strong states if a weaker power is more dan-
gerous for other reasons. Thus, the coalitions that defeated Germany in
World War I and World War II were vastly superior in total resources, but
they came together when it became clear that the aggressive aims of the
Wilhelmines [German leaders prior to World War I] and Nazis posed the
greater danger.”4 Walt believes that balancing against threat, not power,
is what drove many states into the U.S. alliance system during the Cold
War.5 Although the power of another state is certainly important (states
rarely ally against a state with little capabilities), a state’s geographical
proximity, perceived aggressive intentions, and the offensive nature of
balancing Joining an
alliance against states or
coalitions whose superior
resources could pose a
threat.

262 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
a state’s power are other factors that states consider when they assess
threats.6
Because of balancing, one common pattern of alliance formation
can be summarized in the statement, “The enemy of my enemy is my
friend.” Republican France, for example, allied with Czarist Russia in
1894, because they had a common enemy, Germany. Republican France
allied with the Communist Soviet Union in 1935 for the same reason.
Two of the clearest examples of the principle “the enemy of my ene-
my is my friend” in post–Second World War international politics arose
from the confl ict between Pakistan and India. The two newly indepen-
dent nations fought over Kashmir in 1947. In the ensuing decade, they
developed sharply contrasting political systems. India was democratic,
while Pakistan was ruled by a military dictatorship. The dictatorship,
though, was staunchly anti-Communist and aligned itself with the West-
ern world in not one but two alliances: the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Despite
membership in these two strongly anti-Communist alliances, Pakistan
soon found itself with a strong Communist ally. Pakistan’s enemy, India,
became involved in a border dispute with China, which erupted into a
war in 1962. China thus emerged as the enemy of Pakistan’s enemy, and
by the mid-1960s, Pakistan had membership in two Western military
alliances and simultaneously maintained friendship with the People’s
Republic of China.
This confl ict produced more coalitions of strange bedfellows. While
Pakistan developed into a military dictatorship strongly allied with the
forces of Western democracy, democratic India remained resolutely neu-
tral in the Cold War confl ict. But in 1971, as the civil war between West
and East Pakistan became more serious and India decided it must inter-
vene, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (still a democratic leader at
the time) abandoned India’s long-standing policy of nonalignment and
signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. Why? Because by that
time, the Soviet Union was an enemy of India’s enemy, China.
Balancing in the more contemporary system may take on new forms.
‘These new forms of balancing employ nonmilitary instruments of power.
For example, “soft balancing” involves the use of diplomacy, internation-
al institutions, and international law to constrain and delegitimize the
actions of a hegemonic United States. “Economic prebalancing” occupies
a middle ground between soft balancing and hard balancing. States that
pursue economic prebalancing are trying to avoid the risks of engaging in
a premature arms buildup aimed at the United States by concentrating
fi rst on closing the economic and technological gap between them and
the United States.”7 Another new form of balancing is termed “leash-
slipping.” “States engaging in leash-slipping do not fear being attacked by
the hegemon. Rather, they build up their military capabilities to maxi-
mize their ability to conduct an independent foreign policy.” Europe’s
attempts to create a common security policy and an integrated military
are one current example of “leash-slipping.”8

Alliances 263
Bandwagoning
States may join alliances for reasons other than balancing. Bandwagon-
ing is a strategy that involves joining an alliance with the stronger pow-
er, rather than joining an alliance to balance against the stronger power
(or threat). States engage in bandwagoning to share in the benefi ts of an
alliance. “Simply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses;
bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain. The presence of a signifi cant
threat, while required for effective balancing, is unnecessary for states to
bandwagon.”9 Bandwagoning can take several forms. “Jackal bandwagon-
ing” involves several states joining forces to overcome a predominant
power, like jackals attacking a lion, in order to share in the spoils of the
attack. “Wave of the future bandwagoning” occurs when states perceive
that one state will likely prevail in the future. “During the Cold War era,
for example, many less-developed countries viewed communism in this
way. Consequently, they did not have to be coerced or bribed to join the
Sino-Soviet bloc; they did so voluntarily.”10 “Piling-on bandwagoning”
comes at the end of a confl ict when states on the losing side opportunisti-
cally switch their allegiance in order to be on the winning side. At the end
of World War II, for example, several states switched from the Axis to the
Allied side, because the Allied side was winning. In addition, the Allied
powers had announced that states that did not declare war against the
Axis coalition by March 1, 1945, would be excluded from membership
in the to-be-formed United Nations. “More recently, the overwhelming
superior coalition arrayed against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War exemplifi es
piling-on bandwagoning behavior.”11 Certain states may be more likely
to bandwagon than others. Weaker states, for example, might be more
likely to bandwagon than balance.12
The Size of Alliances
While bandwagoning reasons for joining alliances would lead us to expect
quite large coalitions, others would argue that alliances among large
numbers of states, particularly large numbers of major powers, are not in
the interests of states and are diffi cult to maintain. In particular, coali-
tion theory expects that in certain situations, including international
relations, “participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will
ensure winning and no larger.”13 This is known as the size principle; in
effect, it predicts that the pattern of alliances in the international system
will result from two contradictory intentions held by states: (1) to join
a winning coalition and (2) to win as much as possible for themselves.
Obviously, the fi rst aim will lead each state to prefer larger alliances,
because they can ensure victory. The second leads each state to prefer
smaller alliances because they can provide the biggest share of whatever
there is to win. The result of such contradictory aims will be alliances
that are just as large as they must be to win but no larger, so that alliances
will be minimum winning coalitions.
bandwagoning Joining
an alliance with the
superior power to share
in the benefi ts of the
alliance.
minimum winning
coalitions Alliances
only as large as they must
be to win.

264 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Historically, minimum winning coalitions have been quite rare.
There are several reasons that coalitions in world politics are often much
larger than minimum winning ones. For example, states are unlikely to
want to take the risks involved in forming minimum winning coalitions;
once the coalition is formed, it may well have to defeat an opposing coali-
tion in a war. Also, any attempt to form a minimum winning coalition
may be foiled by the diffi culty of measuring power (see Chapter 4). What
was thought to be just enough to win may turn out to be insuffi cient.
Even if that problem does not occur, a minimum winning coalition may
have to fi ght long and hard to win the war, whereas a much larger coali-
tion might win easily. Furthermore, despite some complications in recent
alliances, a systematic review of the historical record shows that larger
international alliances do not show any tendency to break up faster than
small alliances do.14
It is true, though, that once large alliances are formed, there is dif-
fi culty in maintaining them because of the competing interests of states,
particularly the interests of the major powers involved. The most spec-
tacular dissolution of a grand coalition took place after the Second World
War. During the war, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great
Britain (with some help from France) constituted what was fairly close
to a minimum winning coalition. But after the war, with Italy defeat-
ed and Japan and Germany nearly prostrate, the Big Three became a
grand coalition. Controversy continues among U.S. historians about the
origins of the Cold War (see Chapter 3). According to coalition theo-
rists, the Cold War occurred as a more or less inevitable result of the
breakup of the grand coalition. The fact that the only state in the world
strong enough to threaten the United States was the Soviet Union, and
vice versa, also played a role. “Having defeated the Axis, the winners
had nothing to win from unless they split up and tried to win from
each other.”15
Actual cases of post–Cold War coalitions also demonstrate the dif-
fi culty of maintaining large alliances. On the one hand, the multistate
coalition against Iraq, formed after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
largely held together for quite a long time after the war. More than a
decade later, UN economic sanctions were basically still in place, and the
United States still maintained no-fl y zones over northern and southern
Iraq. Without some support from the coalition, this would have been dif-
fi cult. On the other hand, the grand Gulf coalition certainly showed the
cracks that the size principle would predict, even before the 2003 inter-
vention in Iraq. Substantial opposition to the sanctions increased in the
Middle East and from Russia and France. When the United States tried to
reconstitute this “grand alliance” in 2002 and 2003, it met considerable
resistance from other major powers, including Russia and France. The
United States proceeded with some other states, dubbed the “coalition
of the willing,” but this was a much smaller alliance compared to that in
the 1991 Gulf War.

Alliances 265
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the coali-
tion against al Qaeda and Afghanistan was quite large, thus violating
the minimum winning principle. Yet it too demonstrates the diffi culty
of maintaining a large alliance. Concerns from Pakistan about the eth-
nic makeup of the post-Taliban Afghani government, for example, had
to be balanced against the preferences of the internal Afghani opposition
groups involved in the military campaign against al Qaeda. The debate
over the intervention in Iraq in 2003 also brought into question the long-
term viability of a large alliance against terrorist groups.
Other Factors in Alliance Formation and Maintenance
Beyond power, threats, gains, and size calculations, states may choose
alliance partners for other reasons, and these factors challenge the more
traditional, balance-of-power assumptions in the realist theoretical per-
spective. In particular, “views of international relations that are based
exclusively on considerations of security and issues of war and peace may
miss a major motivation that states may have in joining alliances and
in their foreign policy more generally. If multiple goals can be shown
to underlie the formation of alliances, we must question a fundamen-
tal premise of realism.”16 States may choose partners, for example, that
share a common ideology, common economic and political systems, or
similar cultural characteristics. Once alliances are formed, these affi ni-
ties, institutional arrangements, and norms of alliance behavior may
constrain alliance members.17 States may also join alliances to counter
domestic, rather than external, threats, such as poor economic condi-
tions.18 These factors, various forms of liberalism argue, are important in
alliance behavior as well as traditional security concerns.19
Recent evidence on the tendency for states to ally with other simi-
lar states is mixed,20 but even if states do ally out of ideological solidar-
ity, it does not necessarily mean the alliance will be long-lasting. Indeed,
Walt argues that “certain types of ideology cause confl ict and dissension
rather than solidarity and alignment. In particular, when the ideology
calls for the members to form a centralized movement obeying a single
authoritative leadership, the likelihood of confl ict among the members is
increased.”21 In the Soviet-led alliance during the Cold War, for example,
ideological differences between the Soviet Union and some of its alliance
partners, particularly Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and China at various
times, contributed to alliance problems and even intra-alliance military
confl ict.
Regardless of ideology, maintaining a cohesive alliance can be com-
plicated by disputes over burden sharing, or the costs of the alliance.
The burden-sharing debate has been particularly important in the NATO
alliance. “Meeting the Soviet threat through coordinated action was the
raison d’être of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, . . . but the dis-
tribution of the costs of achieving that objective was a persistent source
burden sharing How
costs of alliance are
distributed among
member states.

266 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
of contention. The allies consistently failed to meet the goal, emphasized
by the United States, of bearing the same defense burden.”22 The burden-
sharing debate may have arisen from the very nature of the alliance.
Providing a collective deterrent to the Soviet threat was in the interests of
all; it was a collective good. But as economist Mancur Olson has pointed
out, collective goods often lead to uneven contributions by those who
benefi t from them. In alliances like NATO, he argued, there is a “ tendency
for the larger’ members—those that place a higher absolute value on the
public good—to bear a disproportionate share of the burden.”23 Thus, for
many years, the United States incurred most of the costs for maintain-
ing the alliance. (The characteristics of collective goods will be discussed
further in Chapter 10 in the context of international trade and monetary
relations and in Chapter 13 in the context of environmental challenges.)
Alliances and War
At least equal in interest to the question of which nations will ally are
questions concerning the effects of alliances on incidences of interna-
tional war. Alliances have usually been intended to help a state avoid
war or to help it win a war already in progress. Whether alliances serve
the fi rst purpose well is a matter of some dispute in research on interna-
tional relations.24 It may be true that a state threatened with aggression
can deter the potential aggressor by acquiring one or more formal allies.
But these alliances also may convince the potential aggressor that it is
the victim of a strategy of encirclement, which can lead to several unde-
sirable reactions. For example, the aggressor target of the alliances may
seek its own alliance partners. Before the initial alliance was formed, the
potential aggressor may have had trouble fi nding such partners, because
the important states in the area were not aware of the lines of cleavage
in the system. But an alliance or two could conceivably polarize the situ-
ation to the point where the potential aggressor will fi nd it easy to form
a counteralliance. Also, alliances can clarify the situation in such a way
as to allow a potential aggressor to calculate just how much help will be
needed to launch a successful war.25 At worst, the polarized situation can
result in the very thing that the original alliance was designed to avoid: an
enemy attack. The attack might be carried out either because the original
alliance made the enemy afraid or because the enemy’s confi dence was
bolstered by the alliance it created in response to the original coalition.
This analysis is all highly speculative, of course, and it seems fairly
clear that in the past, such speculation was infl uenced heavily by the role
that alliances played in the previous big war.
After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, in which France lost badly part-
ly due to its lack of allies, “statesmen grew more fearful of isolation, and
they made greater efforts than in the pre-1870 era to establish and maintain
alliances in peacetime.”26 As a result, the rate at which the European great
powers formed alliances in the period from 1875 to 1910 was signifi cantly

Alliances 267
higher than the rate from 1814 to 1874.27 By 1914, the European state sys-
tem was virtually honeycombed with formal alliances. These alliances in
retrospect seem to have been an important part of the problem that led to a
major confl agration because of an intrinsically unimportant spat between
Austria and Serbia. Alliance ties drew Germany into the confl ict. After
Russia became involved, alliances then entangled France and Britain. Thus,
alliances came out of the First World War with a rather tarnished reputa-
tion. “In the late 1930s . . . policymakers and strategists who had lived
through the trench warfare stalemates of 1914–18 believed that conquest
was diffi cult and slow. Consequently they thought that they could safely
stand aside at the outset of a confl ict, waiting to intervene only if and when
the initial belligerents showed signs of having exhausted themselves.”28 So
policymakers deliberately avoided commitments to enter into wars imme-
diately in the form of alliance treaties. Again, in retrospect, the avoidance
of alliance bonds seemed disastrous. If effective alliances with the targets
he attacked before his move against Poland had been formed against Hitler,
he might not have begun the Second World War.
Right or wrong, alliances came out of the Second World War with their
reputation for deterring aggression restored, at least in the eyes of U.S. poli-
cymakers. The United States, in the years following the war, formed the
most extensive set of formal alliances in the history of the world: the Rio
Pact in Latin America; CENTO in the Middle East; SEATO in Asia; and a
treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS)
in the South Pacifi c to implement the U.S. policy of containment. Several
bilateral pacts were also concluded, such as the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty,
fi rst signed in 1951, which pledged the United States to defend Japan in
exchange for the use of Japan’s military bases. The keystone of the U.S. sys-
tem of alliances was NATO, centered on Western Europe. Having already
signed an alliance with Communist China, the Soviets soon organized the
Warsaw Pact to counterbalance NATO (and in response to the rearming of
West Germany in 1955), thus solidifying the bipolarity of the international
system (see Chapter 3 for further discussion and defi nitions of NATO and
Warsaw Pact). This proliferation of alliances after the Second World War
was inspired, like the rapid rate of alliance formation after the quick Prus-
sian victory over France in 1870, by perceptions regarding the scope and
pace of warfare. “Just as the Prussian [victory] over . . . France encouraged
statesmen to scramble to line up allies in advance of the next war, the
tremendous destructiveness of the Second World War encouraged states
that had formerly sought safety in neutrality . . . to lobby for admission to
NATO in an attempt to avoid becoming a battlefi eld in a future war.”29
The structure of the alliance network that emerged after the Second
World War changed considerably over the next few decades and was trans-
formed quite dramatically in 1991. The Sino-Soviet alliance ceased to
exist in 1961. For several complicated reasons involving Middle Eastern
politics at the time, the United States never did join CENTO, and that
organization died. SEATO was disbanded in 1975 after the Communist

268 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
victories in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were
by far the most important alliances for each of the superpowers.
Alliances after the Cold War
When the Warsaw Pact was disbanded in 1991, its demise naturally called
into question the continuing necessity and purpose of its major rival,
NATO, because there was no apparent power or threat to balance against.
Defenders of NATO today insist that it deserves credit for preserving
peace in Europe since 1945 and that it would be a mistake to disband
it even though the Warsaw Pact is dead. And in fact, fairly soon after
the end of the Cold War, NATO’s most enthusiastic supporters argued
that it was crucial to expand its membership to take in several Central
and Eastern European states—not so much as a defense against a possible
Russian attack but rather to solidify these new democracies. According to
one proponent of NATO’s inclusion of new states in East-Central Europe,
“An expansion of NATO today . . . must have as its primary purpose the
internal transformations of new member states.”30 Thus, domestic fac-
tors were an important argument for extending the alliance.
The hope that bringing East-Central European countries into NATO
might help solidify their newly democratic regimes seems based in part on
the experience of Germany. Making West Germany a member of NATO
in the 1950s does seem in retrospect to have solidifi ed its transition from
Nazism to democracy. Although there is some evidence that membership
in such an alliance will consolidate a nation’s democracy,31 it seems clear
that alignment with the United States, for example, is certainly no guar-
antee of stable democracy. During the 1960s, even though most countries
in the region were members of the Rio Pact, “sixteen military coups took
place in the Latin American countries.”32
Some worry about the credibility of an expanded NATO. Will the
United States and the rest of NATO respond as promised to attacks on
their new allies in East-Central Europe? Even more to the point, will
potential attackers believe that NATO would defend its newest mem-
bers? There is certainly room for doubt. “After seeing how reluctant
George [H. W.] Bush and Bill Clinton were to send American troops to
Bosnia, . . . it is easy not to visualize a future American president sending
American soldiers to central Europe to sort things out there.”33 Although
a recent study suggests that alliance commitments are fulfi lled in most
cases, they are still violated 25 percent of the time.34
In 1999, three Central European states—the Czech Republic, Hungary,
and Poland—formally joined the NATO alliance, increasing the number
of member countries to nineteen. Very soon after they assumed formal
membership in NATO, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland faced
their fi rst opportunity to be active participants when NATO began its
attacks on Yugoslavia due to its treatment of ethnic Albanians in its
province of Kosovo.

Alliances 269
Instead of being a security liability, the new members were
an asset to the Alliance despite the inadequacy of their armed
forces. Expansion improved NATO’s ability to conduct a bombing
campaign . . . and to deploy peacekeeping troops in the Balkans
because, absent expansion, the Czech Republic and Hungary
would likely have lent far less support. . . . Hungary’s provision of
military bases, transportation routes, and other forms of logistical
support was strategically signifi cant.35
In 2004, seven more countries joined the alliance (Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and in 2009, Albania
and Croatia became members, bringing the total number of states in the
alliance to twenty-eight (see Map 8.1). Other East European countries,
including Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovnia, are considered applicant
states. NATO has stated that Georgia and Ukraine will eventually be
in NATO, but there is division within the alliance over this particular
expansion and opposition from Russia.
NATO expansion has occurred over Russian objections. Indeed, one
observer of the alliance notes: Whatever the merits of NATO enlargement—
and they are many—the eastward expansion of the alliance has unquestion-
ably come at the expense of its relationship with Russia.”36 In 2002, the
NATO-Russia Council was established to provide Russia an input in NATO
discussions about a variety of issues, including crisis management, missile
defense, and counterterrorism, but Russia has no say over NATO expansion
and the prospect of Georgia’s membership is complicated by the Russian
support for independence for Georgia’s breakaway regions.37 Russia objects
to any further expansion of NATO at its borders and according to one analyst,
“One need not be an apologist for the regime in Moscow or its behavior, or
sympathetic to Russia’s national interests, to empathize with its resentment
of this revolutionary overturning of the balance of power [in the region].”38
In addition to NATO’s new members, the post–Cold War world has
brought new roles to the alliance. During the wars in the former Yugoslavia,
NATO modifi ed its constitution to engage in “out-of-area” operations.
NATO’s mission in the Balkans was clearly beyond the defense of an ally
from an outside threat. To many observers, “the NATO intervention in
Kosovo in the spring of 1999 exemplifi ed the challenges of an old alli-
ance that has to adjust to a new world, where enemies and threats are
no longer quite as clearly defi ned. . . . The Alliance was able to maintain
an impressive degree of cohesion in a situation in which such cohesion
was in no way guaranteed at the outset.”39 NATO has also responded
to threat from a nonstate actor. After the September 11 terrorist attacks
on the United States, NATO, for the fi rst time in the alliance’s history,
activated a clause in its charter by which members regard an attack on
one member as an attack on all.40 Many NATO members took part in the
U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, and NATO, operating under United
Nations mandate, offi cially took over command of the military mission
to provide security to the post-Taliban regime, in 2003.41

FRANCE
SPAINPORTUGAL
ITALY
GERMANY CZECH
REPUBLIC
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
POLAND
HUNGARY
LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
DENMARK
UNITED
KINGDOM
TURKEY
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
CROATIA
ROMANIA
GREECE
ICELAND
CANADA
UNITED STATES
NO
RW
A
Y
NATO member prior to 2004
NATO member since 2004
NATO member since 2009
Source: From www.nato.int/
Map 8.1 The New NATO
270

www.nato.int/

Arms and Arms Control 271
Indeed, with little fanfare—and even less notice—the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization has gone global, . . . seeking to bring
stability to other parts of the world. In the process, it is extending
both its geographic reach and the range of its operations. In recent
years, it has played peacekeeper in Afghanistan, trained security
forces in Iraq, and given logistical support to the African Union’s
mission in Darfur. It assisted the tsunami relief effort in Indonesia
and ferried supplies to victims of Hurricane Katrina in the United
States and to those of a massive earthquake in Pakistan.42
While some see this role expansion as growth in the alliance, others
worry that NATO has an “identity crisis” and is overstretching itself.43
Moreover, the division within NATO over the U.S.-led intervention in
Iraq, may have long-lasting negative effects on the alliance. “While no
one in Europe is predicting the death of NATO . . ., the damage is evident
in the renewed willingness of Germany and France to consider a military
policy separate from . . . [the Atlantic alliance]. But the larger obstacle
may be the widespread perception across the Continent that a political
Rubicon has been crossed, and that divisions will not be bridged easily,
or soon.”44 Indeed, on the sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of
NATO in 2009, the alliance was riddled with disagreements over con-
tributions to the Afghanistan mission, potential membership of Georgia
and Ukraine, and relations with Russia.45
Arms and Arms Control
In addition to joining alliances, states deal with the potential threat of war by building a military, by acquiring weapons.46 This may be for offensive
purposes in preparation for war, but the acquisition of arms may also be for
defensive purposes—to protect territory and citizens and to deter others from
attack. States may also acquire weapons for domestic political reasons.47 As
discussed in Chapter 5, military-industrial complexes have long been accused
of infl uencing armament decisions for their own profi t. Indeed,
arms expenditures would seem to be perfect candidates for
government decisions arrived at through bureaucratic and
incremental processes. They are long-term, noncrisis, budget-
ary decisions that ordinarily involve a large number of inter-
ested domestic actors . . . legislators, political offi cials in the
executive branch, civilian defense offi cials, military offi cers
in various rival services, manufacturers of weapons and their
subcontractors, citizen groups, and so on.48
For all of these reasons involving external security and internal poli-
tics, the world spends massive amounts of money on arms. Although
world military expenditures declined at the end of and following the Cold
War, from 1987 to 1998, they have been on the rise since 1999. In 2008,
over $14 billion went toward military spending, equal to 2.4 percent of

272 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
the world’s GDP or $216 per person. The current level of military expen-
ditures is higher than the peak of military spending during the Cold War,
in 1987–1988. The recent rise is primarily due to the high levels of U.S.
military spending, for the “war on terror” generally and for operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq specifi cally, although almost all regions of the world
have seen an increase in military spending since 1999.49
The United States is by far the biggest spender, accounting for more
than 40 percent of the world’s total military expenditures. Table 8.1 lists
the fi fteen top spending states in 2008.
TABLE 8.1
The Ten Top Military Spenders, 2008
Rank Country Spending (billions)
1 United States $607
2 China 84.9*
3 France 65.7
4 United Kingdom 65.3
5 Russia 58.6*
6 Germany 46.8
7 Japan 46.3
8 Italy 40.6
9 Saudi Arabia 38.2
10 India 30.0
11 South Korea 22.6
12 Brazil 15.3
13 Canada 15.2
14 Australia 15.1
15 Spain 14.6
Note: “The Spending fi gures are in current US dollars.” (Perlo-Freeman et al, 2009: 11).
*Estimated spending fi gures. Data for South Korea, Brazil, Canada, Australia, and Spain are 2007 spending
fi gures.
Sources: 2008 fi gures are from Sam Perlo-Freeman, Catalina Perdomo, Petter Stålenheim, and Elisabeth
Sköns, “Military Expenditure,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2009 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security
Summary. 2009: pp. 10, 11. http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/fi les/SIPRIYB09summary Accessed
9 June 2009. 2007 Figures are from Petter Stålenheim, Catalina Perdomo, and Elisabeth Sköns, “Military
Expenditure,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2008 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Summary. 2008:
pp. 10–11. http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/fi les/SIPRIYB08summary Accessed 21 May 2009.

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary

http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary

Often states simultaneously engage in arms buildup and arms control
efforts. They agree to arms control treaties in order to control the damage
of war should it occur or to lessen the likelihood of war. Arms control
may simply be arms limitations agreements; putting, for example, a ceil-
ing on the number of a certain type of weapons that states can have. Arms
control agreements may also involve disarmament agreements, requir-
ing states to give up a certain class or type of weapons. The buildup and
control of arms are important ways that states respond to and deal with
international confl ict.
Conventional Weapons
Most of the money that states spend on arms goes for conventional weap-
ons. Conventional weapons are also traded on the world market or given
as part of a military assistance program by one state to another. Arms
transfers of major conventional weapons (measured in value) declined in
the early post–Cold War years, held steady in the late 1990s, and declined
again in 2001. The United States is the largest weapons supplier, account-
ing for almost one-third of global arms transfers over the last fi ve years.
Together with the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom supplied the world with 78 percent of the arms transfers from
2004 to 2008.50 As Table 8.2 indicates, many arms transfers of major con-
ventional weapons go to the developing world—Asia in particular. The
top fi ve recipients of major conventional weapons transfers from 2004 to
2008 were China, India, Greece, Turkey, and South Korea.51
A growing area of concern regarding conventional weapons is the pro-
liferation of light weapons, or small arms, such as pistols, rifl es, machine
arms control Efforts to
limit or ban weapons in
states’ military arsenals.
arms transfers Sales or
gifts of military weapons.
small arms Typically
inexpensive light
weapons that an
individual can carry.
TABLE 8.2
Transfers of Major Conventions Weapons to the Leading Recipients by
Region, 2004–2008
Recipients by regions Share of world arms transfers
Asia 37%
Europe 24%
Middle East 18%
Americas 11%
Africa 7%
Source: Bromley, Mark, Paul Holtom, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Arms Transfers Data, 2008,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2009, Figure 1. The trend
in transfers of major conventional weapons, 1999-2008. Reproduced with permission.
Arms and Arms Control 273

274 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
guns, and shoulder-fi red antitank and antiaircraft missiles. Relatively
cheap to obtain and easy to transport and hide, light weapons have
become extremely signifi cant in many post–Cold War civil confl icts:
The centrality of light weapons in contemporary warfare is espe-
cially evident in the confl icts in Liberia and Somalia. In Liberia,
rival bands of guerillas—armed, for the most part, with AK-47
assault rifl es—have been fi ghting among themselves for control
of the country, bringing commerce to a standstill and driving
an estimated 2.3 million people from their homes and villages.
In Somalia, lightly armed militias have been similarly engaged,
ravaging the major cities, paralyzing rural agriculture, and at one
point pushing millions to the brink of starvation. In both coun-
tries, UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions have proved unable
to stop the fi ghting or disarm the major factions.52
Small arms in Iraq, particularly “improvised explosive devices” (IEDs)
have been a signifi cant cause of injury and death to foreign troops, Iraqi
military, and Iraqi civilians. IEDs are small versions of antipersonnel land
mines, another type of conventional weapon drawing international atten-
tion. Land mines, which cost as little as $3 to $15, “. . . continue to claim
human victims, both during and after confl ict, many of them civilians. The
Landmine Monitor, the monitoring arm of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL), a worldwide network of more than 1,400 NGOs,
reported deaths and injuries from landmines and ERW (explosive remnants
of war) in 58 countries and seven other territories in 2005–2006. . . .”53
What role do arms transfers play in international confl ict? The impact
of arms transfers to areas of confl ict is complex. “While suppliers have dif-
ferent reasons for supplying weapons, the arms suppliers cannot control
whether arms deliveries will stabilize or destabilize a particular relation-
ship. Sometimes the weapons help to end a war; in other situations the
acquisition of new weapons increases insecurity and could thereby reduce
the likelihood of a peaceful solution.”54 Most research on this question sup-
ports the view that arms transfers generally increase the likelihood of con-
fl ict, although other factors are important as well.55 For example, one study
found that arms transfers from major powers make states more likely to ini-
tiate military disputes and to be targets as well.56 Arms transfers are most
worrisome when they are received by parties to ongoing confl icts, such as
the Indian-Pakistani confl ict, and when they contribute to arms races.
Arms Races and International Confl ict
When rival states engage in signifi cant military buildups, arms races
become a concern. An arms race is “a progressive, competitive peacetime
increase in armaments by two states or coalitions of states resulting from
confl icting purposes and mutual fears.”57 Arms races are an example of the
security dilemma (discussed in Chapter 6), as one state’s decision to arm
arms race Competitive
increase in armaments by
two states or coalitions
of states.

may simply be for defensive reasons but may be interpreted by another
state as an offensive threat. When each state responds to increase its secu-
rity, the overall result is a less secure situation for all. Many believe that
arms races will spiral out of control and contribute to war, and there is
evidence to support this claim One study, for example, reports that states
involved in serious disputes and an arms race at the same time are sub-
stantially more likely to end up in a war against each other than are states
involved in disputes when no arms race is underway.58
This evidence does not necessarily justify the conclusion that arms
races are dangerous. Perhaps states conducting arms races are less likely
to get involved in serious disputes in the fi rst place. If that were the case,
if one compared states in arms races with states not in arms races (rather
than comparing states in serious disputes and simultaneously in arms
races with other states in serious disputes but not in arms races), the rap-
idly arming states would be seen as less likely to become involved in war.
Admittedly, it is certainly possible that arms races increase tensions and
thus cause wars that otherwise would not have occurred. But it is perhaps
equally plausible that states become involved in arms races, because they
accurately perceive their disputes with other states as being suffi ciently
serious to lead to war and that the subsequent wars are more the result of
those existing disputes than the result of the arms accumulations them-
selves. In short, it is clear that “arms races have been a preliminary to
war. . . . The major wars of our century—World Wars I and II—have each
been preceded by arms races. But just as clearly, many wars have not been
preceded by such mutual arms buildups, and many arms races never end
in war.”59 While there is comparatively less research on the role of arms
races in internal confl icts, recent evidence suggests a similar pattern: The
acquisition of arms by warring sides in an internal confl ict is associated
with, but is not necessary for, an escalation of violence.60
Conventional Arms Control
Nevertheless, states have often entered into arms control agreements to
limit damage from conventional weapons or lessen the chances of war
from arms races. Indeed, in the early 1920s, at the Washington Naval
Conferences, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy agreed to limit
the weight of their naval fl eets. More recently, the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty (known as the CFE treaty) was a direct response
to the end of the Cold War in Europe.
Signed in 1990 and fully implemented by 1995, the CFE treaty
created a military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact
by reducing to equal levels each group’s military holdings in
fi ve categories of conventional weapons: tanks, armored combat
vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and aircraft. . . . Another measure
of the success of the CFE treaty is the fact that it was used as
Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe
Treaty agreement
creating military balance
of conventional weapons
between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact at the end of
the Cold War.
Arms and Arms Control 275

276 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
a model by the Dayton accords for the regional arms control
settlement in the former Yugoslavia.61
For the most part, however, the control of conventional arms and the
limitation of arms buildup through arms transfer have not been a high
priority:
Despite the correlation between high levels of arms imports and
chronic instability, control of the conventional arms traffi c has
been a relatively minor international concern until fairly recently.
For most of the Cold War period, arms sales were considered
an essential glue to alliance systems and a useful tool in gain-
ing infl uence in the Third World. Following the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait, however, the world community became much more
concerned about conventional arms traffi cking. The fact that
Saddam Hussein had been able to accumulate a massive mili-
tary arsenal . . . from external sources led many world leaders to
regret their earlier failure to control the arms trade.62
One recent effort to monitor the arms trade is the establishment of a
voluntary “register” of arms imports and exports so the international
community can monitor buildups. This information may be important in
directing attention to certain regions, but it does not prevent the buildups.
Furthermore, while arms sales have declined in recent years, transfers to
some particularly unstable regions remain at very high levels. States do
cooperate to impose international arms embargoes on some high-confl ict
regions. In 2008, seven countries and fi ve rebel groups were under man-
datory UN Security Council embargoes.63 Countries under recent UN
mandatory embargoes include Iraq, Somalia, and North Korea.
Given the types of post–Cold War confl icts and the proliferation and
destructive capabilities of small arms, there have been efforts to monitor
and control arms traffi cking of this type. Controlling light weapons—
what has been called “microdisarmament”—has only recently come on
the agenda of the international community and will be diffi cult given the
lack of information on the small arms trade and the black market nature
of much of this trade.64 In the late 1990s, the United Nations established
the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms to investigate the
problem and potential solutions, and in 2001, the United Nations held
its fi rst large conference on the subject, the UN Conference on the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. State and
nonstate actors attending the conference agreed, among other measures,
to coordinate efforts to track trade in small arms and light weapons, crack
down on illicit trade in these weapons, and engage in effective disarma-
ment where possible.
Those interested in controlling small arms have tried to build on the
success of the Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty, drafted in 1997. Also
known as the Ottawa Treaty, this agreement bans production and export
international arms
embargoes Agreements
to cease arms transfers to
threatening or unstable
states.
Anti-Personnel
Landmines
Treaty Agreement
to ban production and
export of land mines
designed to harm or kill
people.

of land mines designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or con-
tact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more
persons.
Since the signing of the Ottawa treaty, a remarkably large
number of states have moved to add their signatures and ratifi ca-
tions. Within a year, 130 countries had signed it, and the num-
ber swelled to 156 by early 2009. But perhaps more signifi cant
is that countries quickly expedited the ratifi cation process to
approve the treaty. . . . The landmine ban is widely considered
the most quickly negotiated and ratifi ed international conven-
tion ever.65
Still, in 2009, many countries, including China, Israel, Pakistan,
Russia, and the United States, had not signed the treaty.
Nuclear Weapons: Thinking the Unthinkable
The nuclear era introduced new concerns about the acquisition of arms.
During most of the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union
possessed about 95 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads. As a result,
each superpower had enough fi repower to obliterate the other’s citizens
several times over. Were there any good reasons for the Americans and the
Soviets to keep stockpiling fantastically destructive weapons for decades,
or did the process continue for as long as it did because both sides suc-
cumbed to madness, the greed of their respective military-industrial com-
plexes, or incredibly foolish pride?
Because millions of people would have died in almost any nuclear
war, it might seem logical to conclude that such a confl ict was always
unthinkable and virtually certain not to occur. But the nuclear con-
frontation between the United States and the Soviet Union would have
been much less serious and intractable than it was for decades if the
probability of nuclear war were virtually zero. In fact, under certain
conditions, it might have been rational for one or both sides to initi-
ate a nuclear war, even if we optimistically assume that nuclear weap-
ons have a sobering effect on both sides, leading them to think more
conservatively about using them. To the extent that one side believes
the other is actually preparing to launch an attack, it may be rational
to strike fi rst. Confronted with such a situation, leaders on both sides
might reason as follows: Our side, of course, would not dream of com-
mitting such a horrifying and repugnant act as launching a fi rst strike.
We are too honorable and humanitarian to do such a thing. But I am not
so sure about the Soviets [Americans]. Being Communists [capitalists],
they are inherently imperialistic. And they know that if they strike
fi rst, they will win. Worse, they know that we know that they will win
if they strike fi rst. Because they know that we know that they will win
Arms and Arms Control 277

278 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
if they strike fi rst, they might well conclude that we will strike fi rst,
if only to avoid catastrophe. Considering this, they are sure to attack.
Thus, we must launch a nuclear attack.
Fortunately, the nuclear confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union changed so that this logic, based on the ability of a
fi rst strike to eliminate all of the enemy’s weapons and thereby allow the
initiator to escape retaliation, was no longer valid. In fact, a fi rst strike
that deprived the other side of any signifi cant ability to retaliate became
highly unlikely, at least by the late 1960s. In other words, the leaders of
the former Soviet Union and the United States were usually quite con-
fi dent that if they were the victim of a fi rst strike, their second-strike
capability would enable them to deliver a devastating counterattack.
Second-strike capability was the basis of the nuclear doctrine Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) that came to dominate superpower strategic
thinking by the 1970s. The MAD doctrine argued that stability could be
maintained between the nuclear powers because they were both vulner-
able to each other’s second-strike capability. Neither side would attack,
because they knew that the other could absorb an initial attack and still
render unacceptable damage in a second strike.
But the Cold War nuclear confrontation was often quite tense,
because technological developments always posed a danger that a nuclear
war might become winnable. As early as 1960, Henry Kissinger pointed
out that “every country lives with the nightmare that even if it puts
forth its best efforts its survival may be jeopardized by a technological
breakthrough on the part of its opponent.”66 And such nightmares were
magnifi ed during the Cold War by the fact that each side was making
determined efforts to achieve such breakthroughs, whether by developing
more accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), or submarine-
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or ballistic missile defense systems
like President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a
research program to build a space-based system to defend the nation
against strategic ballistic missiles.
Innovations of that type were inspired in part because successful
deterrence required more than simply second-strike capability. A deter-
rence strategy was effective only if the leaders of the other side could
not even imagine that a fi rst strike might be successful. To be more pre-
cise, during the Cold War, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet
Union had to contend continuously with the possibility that deterrence
might break down and a nuclear war might break out if the decision mak-
ers on either side became convinced that the other side imagined that its
enemies believed that a fi rst strike might be successful. As long as these
reciprocal fears of surprise attack67 existed, there was always the possibil-
ity that a nuclear war might occur—not only because of an accident or
insanity but also because one side or the other (or most dangerously, both
sides) would fi nd itself in a position where nuclear war seemed, by some
calculations, a logical option.
second-strike
capability The ability
of a state to deliver a
devastating counterattack
after being attacked by
nuclear weapons.
Mutual Assured
Destruction
(MAD) Strategic
doctrine based on the
idea that war between the
superpowers was deterred
when they both were
vulnerable to each other’s
second-strike capability.
Strategic Defense
Initiative
(SDI) Program to use a
space-based technology
to strike down incoming
missiles.

The Nuclear Arms Race and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The nuclear arms race during the Cold War can also be seen as a rational
response to uncertainty. From 1945 until 1993, the United States deployed
about 70,000 nuclear warheads, and the Soviet Union made about 55,000.
Both states continued to add to their arsenals, partly because of a situa-
tion that is known in game theory as the prisoner’s dilemma.
Game theory is an approach to the study of global politics that focuses
on situations that two or more actors fi nd themselves in and the choices
that these situations lead actors to make. Game theory is based on math-
ematics and is also referred to as formal models.68 Formal models depict
actors, such as states, in various situations (games), and assume that they
make rational choices, given their individual preferences and the incen-
tives (the rules of the game) (see Chapter 5 for a discussion of rational
actors). Game theory predicts the likely outcomes, the solutions to the
game, that result from actors’ interacting in various scenarios, such as the
prisoner’s dilemma.
The prisoner’s dilemma game gets its name from a story designed to
illustrate the underlying dilemma. The structure of such a game is pre-
sented in Figure 8.1. In the prisoner’s dilemma story, two bank robbery
suspects are detained by the prosecutor and placed in separate rooms. The
prosecutor tells each of them individually that she has enough evidence
to convict them on a minor weapon possession charge, which carries a
penalty of fi ve years in jail. She also tells each of them that if he will
confess to his and his partner’s crime, then the prosecutor will reduce
the charges leveled against him (by taking off fi ve years of jail time). The
only way the prosecutor can convict either of the suspects for the serious
prisoner’s dilemma
Scenario in which actors
following individually
rational strategies
produce the least-desired
outcome.
game theory
Mathematical approach
for predicting outcomes
of actors’ interactions in
various scenarios.
Figure 8.1 The
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The game theory
matrix shows the
payoff to each
prisoner for confessing
or not confessing
a crime to the
prosecutor.
Arms and Arms Control 279

280 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
bank robbery charge (which carries a fi fteen-year jail sentence), however,
is for one of them to confess to their involvement in the robbery. In this
scenario, each suspect must decide whether to keep quiet or confess. The
cells in Figure 8.1 represent the results (termed “payoffs” in game theory)
for each prisoner based on each prisoner’s choice of whether to confess or
keep quiet. Which is the rational strategy from their individual points of
view? Social scientists have debated the defi nition of rationality at some
length, but in the context of games like this, game theorists point out a
couple of important ways in which self-interested calculations lead both
of the suspects to confess.
Prisoner 1 wonders to himself what would be best for him to do if
his partner keeps quiet. If prisoner 1 also keeps quiet (illustrated in the
top left box of Figure 8.1), then he will get fi ve years in jail from the
weapon possession charge. If he chooses to confess while his partner
keeps quiet (illustrated in the bottom left box of Figure 8.1), then he will
be charged only with weapon possession (a fi ve-year jail term) but will
also be rewarded for supplying evidence for prosecution (with a fi ve-year
sentence reduction), resulting in no jail time at all. Clearly, the choice
favors confessing (and going free) over keeping quiet (and getting fi ve
years of jail time).
But what if prisoner 1’s partner decides to confess to his crime instead
of keeping quiet? In that case, prisoner 1 will certainly be charged with the
serious bank robbery (fi fteen years of jail time). He can either keep quiet
himself and receive no reduction in his sentence (top right of Figure 8.1),
or he can also choose to confess and at least get fi ve years knocked off his
sentence (resulting in ten years of jail time; bottom right of Figure 8.1).
Again, clearly the choice favors confessing (ten years of jail time) over
keeping quiet (fi fteen years of jail time). So no matter whether prisoner
1’s partner chooses to keep quiet or to confess, prisoner 1 will do less
jail time by confessing. To be sure of receiving the shorter jail sentence,
prisoner 1 should confess. Of course, the same logic holds for the sec-
ond prisoner. Following the same reasoning, prisoner 2 will conclude that
regardless of his partner’s choice, he will do less jail time by confessing
than by keeping quiet.
Because each prisoner is rational (in this case, each wants to spend the
least amount of time in jail as possible), each will come to the conclusion
that he should confess to the crime. Game theorists call this the “domi-
nant strategy” because regardless of the behavior of the other prisoner, it
is the rational thing for each of them to do individually. What is particu-
larly compelling about this dominant strategy is that it results in both
prisoners spending ten years in jail (the bottom right box of Figure 8.1),
whereas had they both kept quiet, each would receive only a fi ve-year jail
sentence (the top left box of Figure 8.1). Although they both would prefer
fi ve years in jail instead of ten years, they receive the longer sentence,
because they followed their individually rational strategy. Individually
rational behavior resulted in an outcome that neither individual would

prefer. This is why the prisoners have a dilemma: Being rational by trying
to get the least amount of jail time as possible actually results in more jail
time. By thinking of this scenario in terms of the underlying structure of
choices and payoffs, which demonstrates how each individual actor’s out-
come is dependent on the moves made by the other player, game theory
provides some insight into why irrational consequences can result from
rational behavior.
The logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma helps to make sense of the nucle-
ar arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Unit-
ed States had to consider the various outcomes that depended on Soviet
actions. From the U.S. perspective, the prospect of nuclear superiority
(if the Soviets did not engage in the buildup) was tempting, like confess-
ing when your partner in crime remains silent (see again Figure 8.1). And
the prospect of nuclear vulnerability (if the Soviets built up their nuclear
arsenal but the United States did not) was to be avoided at all costs, like
keeping quiet while your partner in crime confessed. Given these options,
the United States and Soviet Union chose to build up their nuclear arse-
nals rather than restraining their buildup (and perhaps spending their
money on other things).
Under those conditions, it is not so surprising that the United States
and the Soviet Union had very large defense budgets and accumulated
weapons at a very rapid rate for four decades after the Second World
War. From the point of view of the decision makers on both sides, they
were only protecting their countries. But from the point of view of many
outside observers, the arms race between the United States and the
Soviet Union was dangerous. It would ultimately, many felt, lead to the
nuclear holocaust that both sides were ostensibly trying to avoid. Even as
recently as 1979, Hans Morgenthau, father of the modern realist perspec-
tive, declared that “the world is moving ineluctably toward a third world
war a—strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done
to prevent it.”69
The arms race between the Soviet Union and the United States was
clearly dangerous, not to mention incredibly wasteful in purely economic
terms. But it did come to an end without nuclear disaster. This is not a
historically unprecedented outcome for arms races, as we have seen. It
was, however, the potentially most dangerous arms race in the history of
the world. Although their stockpiles of such weapons are much reduced
today, the United States and Russia still deploy around 2000 strategic
warheads each.70 Fortunately, “Russia has signed reciprocal agreements
with the United States, the United Kingdom and China stating that they
will not target their missiles at each other while they are on normal alert
status.”71
Although it is certainly fortunate that the two vast arsenals of the
Cold War superpowers are no longer deployed in a tightly organized fash-
ion, ready to initiate what would surely have been the most lethal war
in history, the disintegration of the Soviet Union created new dangers.
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282 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
“The collapse of the Soviet Union left Soviet strategic forces scattered
across the newly independent states. Missile and bomber bases were
distributed across Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.”72 The
good news is that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine handed over to
Russia all of their nuclear warheads.73 The bad news is that continued
reform in Russia toward democracy is not assured. It is not at all incon-
ceivable that ultranationalist, Communist, or fascist leaders could take
over in Russia and return control of massive nuclear power to intensely
antagonistic hands. It is also frighteningly possible that the painful and
bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia might be duplicated in the former
Soviet Union.
The Threat of Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction
Even if Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union develop
into peace-loving states, the world will not be safe from the threat of
nuclear weapons. Nations other than the United States and Russia pos-
sess these weapons of mass destruction, although the United States is the
only state that has ever used an atomic bomb (as it did twice in Japan in
1945). Great Britain, France, and China have each had nuclear weapons
for decades now. The nuclear arsenals of these states are small compared
to the United States and Russia. Great Britain has about 160 strategic
nuclear warheads, France has 300, and China has approximately 186.74
India fi rst exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and in 1998, both India
and Pakistan “declared” themselves nuclear powers with a series of
underground tests. It is estimated that India has about seventy nuclear
weapons and Pakistan has sixty.75 In 2006, North Korea tested its fi rst
nuclear weapon. Outsiders believe that North Korea has enough nuclear
material to make at least eight nuclear bombs. Israel has not declared
itself a nuclear power, but it is assumed that it has about eighty nuclear
weapons.76 South Africa once had nuclear weapons but has subsequently
destroyed them, and Libya claimed that it had come close to building a
nuclear bomb before it abandoned its unconventional weapons program
and agreed to international weapons inspectors in 2003.77
The international community was also concerned about Iraq’s
nuclear ambitions after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. “[E]ven though
Iraq signed the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] it managed to
mount a massive covert program to acquire nuclear and other weapons of
mass destruction. . . . The Iraqi program involved more than 10,000 quali-
fi ed technical people who remain[ed] in place as a competent cadre.”78
Suspicions that Iraq had continued to develop its nuclear programs led
to the return of UN inspection teams in 2002 and were one justifi cation for
the U.S-led intervention in Iraq in 2003, although no evidence of nuclear
weapons was found post-invasion. Many states possess the technology

and material to build nuclear weapons, including Australia, Canada,
Germany, Japan, and Ukraine.
The nuclearization of South Asia is of particular concern. In May
1998, India conducted underground testing of several nuclear devices.
Within three weeks, Pakistan responded with its own underground
nuclear tests, despite intense international pressures. “Given the history
of confl ict between the two states, most members of the international
community viewed the introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asia
with alarm. Fueled by religious animosity and disagreements over their
border, India and Pakistan had fought three major wars since the British
partitioned colonial India into India, East Pakistan, and West Pakistan
in 1947. Outbreaks of violence and crises between India and Pakistan
had become more frequent in the 1990s”79 and have continued in recent
years. Some analysts attribute this to the increased suspicions over each
others’ nuclear aims and others argue that India and Pakistan are par-
ticularly likely to use their nuclear weapons against each other.80 Indeed,
“soon after the 1998 tests, Pakistani military planners developed more
belligerent strategies against India. Dusting off an old plan, in the winter
of 1999, Pakistani infantry units . . . snuck into Indian-held Kashmir.
The incursion sparked the 1999 Kargil War, in which over 1,000 soldiers
were killed on both sides before Pakistani forces reluctantly withdrew.
According to U.S. and Indian intelligence, before the fi ghting ended, the
Pakistani military had started to ready its nuclear capable missiles for
potential use.”81 Yet, despite ongoing tensions over Kashmir, India and
Pakistan, as nuclear powers, have not directly engaged in large-scale
conventional war or nuclear confl ict.82 And in 2005, the United States
signed a historic nuclear cooperation agreement with India. In the agree-
ment, the United States pledges to assist India’s civilian energy program
and cooperate with India on energy and satellite testing. In exchange,
India agreed to international inspections of its civilian nuclear program,
strengthen the security of its nuclear arsenal, and continue to not test
nuclear weapons.83
North Korean proliferation has been an area of concern for quite some
time. When North Korean leaders threatened to build nuclear weapons
in the early 1990s, the United States, fearing an arms race in East Asia,
responded with its own threats of economic sanctions and considered an
attack on North Korean facilities. North Korea responded by deploying
many more troops on the border with South Korea, and for several weeks
in 1994, a replay of the 1950s Korean War was considered a real possibility.
After negotiations, North Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle
its nuclear program in exchange for U.S. funds to construct nuclear pow-
er generators that would not yield plutonium. North Korea revealed in
2002 that it did not dismantle its nuclear materials production program.
Multiparty talks failed to defi nitively address the threat of North Korean
nuclear proliferation, and North Korea became a nuclear power when it
Arms and Arms Control 283

284 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
tested a nuclear bomb in 2006. Attention then shifted to dismantling or
preventing further development of North Korea’s nuclear program. Again,
in 2007, North Korea agreed to eventually cease its program but this agree-
ment faltered on North Korean rejection of the terms for verifi cation.
In 2009, North Korea test-fi red another ballistic missile, declared that it
was restarting its atomic weapons program and would begin enriching
uranium (in addition to its plutonium program) and conducted a second
nuclear test. The United Nations responded with tougher sanctions on
North Korea, and the United States announced it would intercept North
Korean ships suspected of carrying nuclear material.84
Why would North Korea develop nuclear weapons? “The North
Koreans have presented a rationale for developing . . . such a weapon. . . .
They point out that the United States, which has more nuclear weapons
than any other country, has labeled North Korea a member of the “axis
of evil,” thereby making the country a possible target of pre-emptive
attack.”85 Others, however, see North Korea’s actions stemming more
from the regime’s strategy of keeping North Korea isolated in order to
remain in control of its people and from the economic rewards that it
believes it can get from the international community in exchange for
promises to give up its nuclear program.86
Iran is another state receiving attention on the topic of nuclear pro-
liferation. “The issue of Iran’s nuclear ambition is complicated. On [the]
one hand, Tehran is a signatory to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty] and since the mid-1970s has called for making the entire Middle
East a nuclear-free zone. On the other hand, Western powers . . . have
suspected that Iran has been secretly developing nuclear capability since
the mid-1980s . . . Iranian leaders categorically deny these accusations
and assert that their nuclear program is only for peaceful purpose,” which
is allowable under the NPT.87 Weapons inspectors from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have made accusations that Iran’s nuclear
energy programs violate some aspects of the Nonproliferation Treaty and
that Iran had secretly worked on the potential development of a nuclear
bomb, but this agency has not found solid evidence that Iran is devel-
oping nuclear weapons.88 In 2007, a U.S. intelligence report concluded
that Iran did not have a weapons program at that time, but that Iranian
intentions were unclear. Other reports claim that Iran now has enough
enriched uranium to build an atomic bomb.89 The United Nations Secu-
rity Council has threatened Iran with sanctions if it does not discontinue
enriching uranium, but Iran has not complied.
The Iranian issue is further complicated by decades of poor relations
between Iran and the United States, U.S. accusations that Iran sponsors
terrorist groups in Iraq and Lebanon, and Iranian suspicions that the
United States is determined to militarily dismantle the Iranian regime no
matter what Iran does.
Beyond the Iranian and North Korean cases, it is clear that more states
might acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps the threat that these new
Nuclear
Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT)
agreement in effect
since the 1970s to
prevent further nuclear
proliferation and promote
nuclear disarmament.

owners of nuclear weapons will actually use them may be greater than
that which existed during the Cold War. International attention to nuclear
proliferation has rapidly increased since the end of the Cold War. Today,
not only are states’ desires for nuclear weapons a concern, but many
worry about nuclear capabilities acquired by nonstate actors, such as
terrorist groups. According to Graham Allison, founding dean of Harvard’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government and former assistant secretary
of defense for policy and plans, “Given the number of actors with seri-
ous intent, the accessibility of weapons or nuclear materials from which
elementary weapons could be constructed, and the almost limitless ways
in which terrorists could smuggle a weapon through American borders, . . .
a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely
than not.”90 Most recently, the international community became con-
cerned that, given the internal confl ict in Pakistan, that country’s nuclear
arsenal is inadequately secured.91
Could the spread of nuclear weapons be good news? Could nuclear
deterrence provide stability as some argue it did during the “long peace”
between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War?
It has been argued for some time now that nuclear proliferation in the
Middle East has the potential to bring stability to that volatile region.92
And one analyst argues that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is working,
despite the tensions between India and Pakistan.93 Others have asserted
in more general terms that “proliferation may serve the global desire for
peace”94 and that “the spread of nuclear weapons is something that we
have worried too much about and tried too hard to stop . . . the measured
spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.”95 The
end of the Cold War evoked an argument to the effect that stability in
Europe would be enhanced if Germany acquired nuclear weapons and
if Ukraine developed nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Russia.96
Another proliferation “optimist” argues that “the leaders of medium
and small powers alike tend to be extremely cautious with regard to the
nuclear weapons they possess . . . the proof being that, to date, in every
region where these weapons have been introduced, large-scale interstate
warfare has disappeared.”97
One main objection to optimism about the impact of nuclear pro-
liferation in the developing countries involves the vulnerable nature of
nascent nuclear forces. One of the possible virtues of the large nuclear
forces in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States was that
they made both states relatively safe from the destabilizing impact of
technological breakthroughs.98 Even without such breakthroughs, emerg-
ing nuclear forces in the developing world are vulnerable to preemptive
strikes, and so they will tempt such strikes. “Even if both sides prefer not
to preempt, each may fear that the other side will; consequently, both
may decide to launch at the fi rst (perhaps fake) indication of an attack.”99
In addition, in the case of South Asia, “The decade since the . . . nuclear
tests suggests that a principal risk of nuclear proliferation is not that the
Arms and Arms Control 285

286 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
leaders of new nuclear states will be irrational or suicidal, or even that
organizational and other pathologies will result in suboptimal policy for-
mulation. The danger, rather, is that leaders may weigh their strategic
options and reasonably conclude that risky behavior best serves their
interests. Nuclear weapons do enable Pakistan, as a conventionally weak,
dissatisfi ed power, to challenge the territorial status quo with less fear of
an all-out Indian military response.”100
In the end, perhaps it is most important to point out that the costs of
guessing wrong on this issue are not equal in both directions. If nuclear
proliferation is discouraged when actually it is benefi cial, the cost is the
loss of a boost to stability and a somewhat larger probability of conven-
tional wars. If proliferation is encouraged when it is actually dangerous
(even if it makes war a less rational option), then tolerating or encourag-
ing proliferation would be experimentation in the absence of any solid
evidence on which to base estimates of the results. The Policy Choices
box on nuclear proliferation presents some of the issues surrounding pro-
liferation and preventive efforts.
Nuclear Arms Control
Most states recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Even during
the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States cooperated in an
effort to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the
1960s, they helped draft the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The
hope that this agreement would restrict the nuclear club to a membership
of fi ve (China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United
States) was crushed in May 1974 when India exploded its fi rst nuclear
device.
In 1995, the NPT was extended, and by 2003, 189 states had signed
the treaty, making it “the most widely-adhered-to arms control treaty in
history” according to the U.S. Department of State.101 Although North
Korea agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its nuclear weapon
program under the October 1994 U.S.–North Korean Framework Agree-
ment, it announced in 2002 that it had been continuing to develop its
nuclear materials program and withdrew from the NPT. Talks to get
North Korea to reenter the treaty were stalled for many years before it
tested its fi rst nuclear weapons in 2006.102 India, Israel, and Pakistan
have all refused to sign the treaty. In addition to the extension of the
NPT, there have been several more specifi c, signifi cant successes in the
antinuclear proliferation effort in recent years. In the early 1990s, South
Africa dismantled its arsenal of six nuclear weapons and signed the NPT
in 1991. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have not only transferred to
Russia all the strategic and nuclear warheads they inherited as a result
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have also joined the NPT and
opened their nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Algeria agreed to join the NPT in 1995, and Libya

287
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Nuclear Proliferation
ISSUE: The number of states with nuclear weapons capabilities has increased in
the last decade, and more states may be on the verge of testing and stockpiling
nuclear weapons. Intuitively this seems to be problematic and almost certainly a
recipe for disaster. However, there is another side to this deceptively complicated
problem that emphasizes the stability that such weapons can bring and the dif-
fi culties of preventing nuclear proliferation.
Option #1: Nuclear proliferation can provide many benefi ts to the international
system and generally should be embraced.
Arguments: (a) Nuclear weapons create stability between actors, because they
make the potential cost of going to war too great for states to seriously contem-
plate. Nuclear rivalry was a main reason the United States and the Soviet Union did
not directly fi ght during the tense Cold War. (b) States acquire nuclear weapons for
security and prestige. States that are secure and enjoy status are less likely to initiate
confl ict and are more likely to cooperate on many international issues. (c) There are
no effective strategies to prevent nuclear proliferation—incentives do not stop states
from acquiring them and punishments often push them faster toward proliferation.
Counterarguments: (a) States are not necessarily rational actors who calculate
costs and then choose courses of action. Decisions are made by fallible humans,
religious zealots, and impassioned policymakers, thereby reducing the supposed
“rational” effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Today’s international system is very
different from the Cold War period—multiple nuclear rivals, protracted confl icts,
and unstable states make it less likely that nuclear deterrence would work. (b) Nu-
clear security may embolden states to engage in more risky, aggressive behaviors.
(c) There have been many nonproliferation successes. Extending the deterrence
of existing nuclear states, imposing economic sanctions, establishing international
monitoring agencies, and incentive-based negotiations have all worked to con-
vince states to forgo nuclear ambitions.
Option #2: Nuclear proliferation constitutes one of the most serious problems fac-
ing humanity, and efforts to prevent it should be foremost on the minds of leaders.
Arguments: (a) More actors in possession of nuclear weapons means a greater
likelihood of having such weapons get into the hands of rogue states or unstable
leaders. (b) Unstable nuclear regimes increase the chance of accidental nuclear
war or the transfer of nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorist groups. (c) Al-
though nuclear weapons have killed far fewer people than conventional weapons,
the potential destruction is much greater. A nuclear attack in a large city, enacted
by a single decision maker, could kill hundreds of thousands in one stroke.
Counterarguments: (a) Claims that certain countries cannot be trusted with
nuclear weapons are rooted in prejudice and misunderstanding. The only country
ever to have used a nuclear device in hostility is the United States. (b) The inter-
national community can implement safeguards to protect nuclear facilities. It is
not in the interests of states to share nuclear technology with nonstate actors.
(c) The real weapons of mass killing in humanity’s arsenal are small arms and light
weapons, which are profi table to sell and readily distributed to unstable countries
without hesitation. Arguments by arms exporters for limiting nuclear proliferation
are thus hypocritical.

288 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
announced in 2003 that it would comply with the treaty. Argentina and
Brazil have brought into force a nuclear-free zone in that part of the
world through the Treaty of Tlatelolco and have also accepted IAEA
inspections. Treaties have also created nuclear-weapon-free zones in
Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. International agreements have
been reached that designate Antarctica, outer space, the moon, and the
seabed as denuclearized areas.103
In addition to the NPT, decades of multilateral negotiations produced
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), banning all testing of
nuclear weapons. Today, 148 countries have ratifi ed the treaty. Although
the United States originally signed the treaty, the U.S. Senate rejected it
in 1999.104
The Senate vote marked at least a temporary setback for inter-
national efforts to bring the CTBT into force, since the USA is
one of the 44 states which must ratify the treaty in order for it
to enter into force. The treaty’s prospects were given a boost,
however, when the Russian Duma voted overwhelmingly to
ratify it on April 21, 2000. . . . In addition, in September [2000]
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee pledged that his
government would not conduct further nuclear testing while
it attempted to build a consensus on signing the CTBT.105
By 2009, however, the treaty had not entered into force as fi ve of
the forty-four necessary states (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, US)
had not yet ratifi ed the treaty. Newly-elected President Obama prom-
ised to push for U.S. ratifi cation, but strong opposition in Congress
persists.106
The United States and Russia have also engaged in signifi cant bilat-
eral arms reduction efforts, building on the SALT talks during the détente
era of the 1970s (see Chapter 3). In 1991, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START I) was signed, reducing the number of nuclear warheads
and delivery systems in each country. In 1993, START II banned all land-
based multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and
committed both parties to make phased reductions in their strategic
nuclear forces. The levels of nuclear warheads agreed to in START II were
quickly outdated, however, as the United States and Russia announced
plans for unilateral cuts that would take their strategic nuclear forces
well below START II levels. In 2002, the countries codifi ed these pledges
in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), better known as the
Moscow Treaty. According to this agreement, each side will reduce its
number of warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012. Both
states were already close to reaching that target by 2009 and agreed to
further reductions in the next 7 years to between 1500 and 1700 warheads
for each side. The general reduction of the number of nuclear weapons
in the post–Cold War era, as depicted in Figure 8.2, is quite a remarkable
arms control achievement.
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) Proposed
agreement to ban nuclear
weapons testing.
Moscow Treaty U.S.–
Russian agreement to
reduce their stockpiles of
nuclear warheads by the
year 2012.

Talks over nuclear arms reductions between the United States and
Russia have been complicated by the U.S. decision (announced in 2001)
to withdraw from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty. Withdrawing
from the treaty allows the United States to conduct tests, without any
conditions, for a missile defense system. Opposition to the building of
a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system came from within the United
States and from the international community (expressed, for example,
by China, Russia, and a number of states in Europe and Asia). “The con-
troversy obstructed efforts to further reduce strategic nuclear arms and
gave rise to international concern that the entire framework of nuclear
arms control was in danger of breaking down.”107 Opposition to BMDs
is based on the concern that they will undermine stability by compro-
mising second-strike capability, the foundation of nuclear deterrence and
the ABM treaty. Opponents argue that BMDs do not address the types of
threats, such as from terrorists with crude weapons, that states are more
likely to face. Supporters counter that BMDs address the real threat from
rogue states who are acquiring ballistic missile technology and they can
decrease the probability of such an attack by making the probability of
success less likely.108
ballistic missile
defense (BMD)
system Defense system
designed to intercept and
destroy ballistic missiles.
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
N
uc
le
ar
W
ar
he
ad
s
6,000
4,000
2,000
U.S.
1990
USSR U.S.
1996 2000 2009
Russia U.S. Russia U.S. Russia
0
Figure 8.2 Reductions
in U.S. and Soviet/
Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces
Source: Data compiled from
the Stockholm Peace Research
Institute’s SIPRI Yearbook
1996, the SIPRI Yearbook
2002, and from the U.S.
Department of State Shannon
N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, and
Hans M. Kristensen, “World
Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI
Yearbook 2009 Armaments,
Disarmament and International
Security Summary. p. 16,
HYPERLINK “http://www.
sipri.org/yearbook/2009/
fi les/SIPRIYB09summary.
pdf” http://www.sipri.
org/yearbook/2009/fi les/
SIPRIYB09summary .
Accessed 9 June 2009.
Arms and Arms Control 289

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary.pd

http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary.pd

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290 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Beyond Nuclear
Even if nuclear weapons can be kept under control, the post–Cold War
world promises to be a dangerous place because of the rapid spread of bal-
listic missiles, which can deliver conventional or nuclear weapons over
fairly long distances, and the potential diffusion of chemical and biologi-
cal weapons. Some twenty-fi ve countries, most in the developing world,
have acquired or attempted to acquire ballistic missiles. Nine of them are
in the Middle East, but India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, Brazil
and Argentina, Taiwan, and South Africa either have or have tried to get
ballistic missiles.109 Ballistic missiles are diffi cult to defend against and
can be very accurate with missile-guided technology.
Ballistic missile technology also allows the delivery of chemical and
biological weapons. While the horrors of nuclear weapons are relatively
well publicized, chemical weapons are less familiar. Modern use of
chemical weapons dates back to
April 22, 1915, when German troops entrenched at Ypres,
Belgium, opened 6,000 chlorine cylinders, releasing a cloud of
deadly gas into the wind blowing toward their French adversar-
ies. Thousands perished in this fi rst large-scale use of chemical
warfare. Two years later, Germany introduced another deadly
chemical to the battlefi eld as well: mustard gas. By the war’s
end, chemical weapons had infl icted 1.3 million casualties,
including almost 100,000 deaths.110
Chemical weapons were again used in World War II by Italy against
Ethiopia and Japan against China.111 Concern over the proliferation of
chemical weapons came to the foreground in the 1980s when Iraq used
them against Iran and against Kurds living in Iraq. “The number of
countries believed to have chemical weapons programs has grown from
about a dozen in 1980 to about 20” near the end of the 1990s.112 Chemi-
cal weapons such as phosgene (a choking agent) or nerve agents (which
induce nausea, coma, convulsion, and death) are estimated to be capable,
if attached to ballistic missiles, of killing forty to 700 times as many
people as missiles equipped with conventional weapons.113
Biological weapons are even more lethal. Ballistic missiles might be
equipped with “bombs,” for example, that could spread anthrax, plague
bacteria, or the Ebola virus. Germany used anthrax in World War I
against its opponents’ horses and mules. During World War II, the Soviet
Union reportedly used typhus and typhoid fever as a weapon of war, and
Japan used plague germs in bombs dropped on China. Many of these dis-
eases can kill within days, vaccines often must be administered before
infection to be effective, and antibiotic treatments are of uncertain effec-
tiveness. In short, biological weapons like anthrax delivered by ballistic
missiles could be as lethal as at least small nuclear weapons.114 It is
estimated that at least seventeen states possess biological weapons.115
chemical weapons
Weapons that contain
chemical elements,
such as chlorine gas and
mustard gas.
biological weapons
Weapons that contain
biological agents such
as anthrax or plague
bacteria.

Countries such as Iraq, Japan, the former Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States have developed anthrax as an agent of bio-
logical warfare.116
Why would nations want to acquire chemical or biological weap-
ons? They are much more lethal than conventional weapons; they have
nearly the military effectiveness of small nuclear weapons, and they are
cheaper and easier to acquire than nuclear weapons—they are “a poor
man’s nuclear weapon.” Furthermore, ballistic technology is not neces-
sary for the use of chemical and biological weapons; “a crude dispersal
system may be enough to kill thousands and cripple a major metropoli-
tan area.”117 In 1993, a U.S. federal agency estimated that “a crop duster
carrying a mere 100 kilograms of anthrax spores could deliver a fatal
dose to up to 3 million residents of the Washington D.C. metropolitan
area.”118
The bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1993
could have been much worse had the chemical weapon been delivered not
in a common truck but in some technologically sophisticated ballistic
missile. “The bombing of [the] World Trade Center . . . was meant to top-
ple the city’s tallest tower onto its twin, amid a cloud of cyanide gas. Had
the attack gone as planned [the cyanide container malfunctioned], tens of
thousands of Americans would have died.”119 In 1995, Aum Shinrikyo,
a Japanese Buddhist sect, attempted to murder tens of thousands of
people by placing eleven bags fi lled with the nerve gas sarin wrapped in
newspapers on fi ve subway trains. Twelve people were killed and more
than 5,000 hospitalized. In 1990, in the fi rst known chemical weapons
attack by a nonstate actor, the Tamil Tigers used chlorine gas against the
Sri Lankan military.120
These incidents, in the United States, Tokyo, and Sri Lanka sug-
gest “a trend toward nonstate actors becoming proliferation threats.”121
In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, there is a heightened fear
that groups such as al Qaeda have chemical and biological weapons
capabilities.
Indeed, suspicions regarding al Qaeda’s aims to use chemical weap-
ons against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia prompted the U.S. to attack a
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan in 1998, following the bombings of U.S.
embassies in Africa (see Chapter 7). “[S]ince that time incontrovertible
information has repeatedly come to light that clearly illuminates al
Qaeda’s long-standing and concerted efforts to develop a diverse array of
chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons capabilities.”122 Terrorist
groups have not, however, yet taken up chemical and biological agents as
their weapons of choice. Indeed, fewer than sixty terrorist incidents out
of the 8,000 recorded in the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database
involved “any indication of terrorists plotting such attacks, attempting to
use chemical or biological agents, or intending to steal or fabricate their
own nuclear devices.”123
Arms and Arms Control 291

292 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Although the threat from nonstate actors is worrisome, the more
orthodox international threat posed by states armed with chemical or
biological weapons is not to be dismissed lightly. The U.S. government
has alleged that several states—including China, India, Iran, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, and Syria—are either seeking chemi-
cal and biological weapons or have the capacity to develop them. The
United States and the United Nations had been particularly concerned
about Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons potential in the 1990s.
“The UN Security Council . . . placed Iraq under an international sanc-
tions regime in order to compel it to comply with the conditions of
Resolution 687, which includes the destruction of its CBW and the
termination of the CBW-related programmes under international
supervision.”124 The UN inspectors returned to Iraq to verify compli-
ance in 2002, but doubts by the United States and other countries about
Iraq’s claims that it had completely dismantled all such programs was
one of the justifi cations used for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However,
no clear evidence of chemical or biological weapons programs has been
discovered in postwar Iraq.
Efforts to Control Ballistic Missile Technology
and Chemical and Biological Weapons
Given the threat, there have been a number of attempts to deal with these
weapons of massive destruction and their delivery systems. In 1987, the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established, seeking to
control the export and production of missile technology capable of carry-
ing weapons of mass destruction. The MTCR is a voluntary agreement,
with no enforcement. From 1987 until 2003, the countries that joined
the MCTR grew from seven to thirty-three.125 In 2003, the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) was launched to seize components of ballistic
missile technology and other technology for the production or delivery of
weapons of mass destruction. The more than ninety countries that par-
ticipate share intelligence and interdict ships suspected of carrying such
technology. According to one analyst,
It is diffi cult to gauge the ultimate effectiveness of the PSI, but
it has been successfully employed about a dozen times already.
The initiative’s most prominent accomplishment to date
occurred in October 2003, when U.S. intelligence established
that equipment for enriching uranium (produced in Malaysia
using designs provided by the network led by the Pakistani
scientist A. Q. Khan) was on its way to Libya via Dubai. The
ship involved was the German-fl agged BBC China, and following
a request by the United States, the owner of the ship diverted
it to an Italian port. The Italian government, a PSI participant,
Missile Technology
Control Regime
(MTCR) Voluntary
agreement that seeks
to control export and
production of missile
technology capable of
carrying weapons of mass
destruction.

searched the vessel and seized parts for a gas centrifuge. The
action was an important step in exposing Khan’s illicit nuclear
network and in halting Libya’s clandestine nuclear program.126
In January 1993, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which
aims for the destruction of all chemical weapons, was opened for sign-
ing, and by 2009, 188 states were parties to the convention. For some
time, the United States was not among those countries. However,
shortly before the deadline in April 1997, at which time the conven-
tion would have gone into effect whether or not the United States
had agreed to it, the U.S. Senate agreed to ratifi cation. The four states
that have declared their chemical weapons programs—India, South
Korea, Russia, and the United States—are in the process of destroying
those weapons.
The effect of the CWC has probably been to reduce the number
of parties with chemical weapons and to reduce the likelihood
they will be used. . . . Nevertheless, it is not clear which coun-
tries still have CW [chemical weapons] programs because the
Convention has not been aggressively implemented and there
have been no challenge inspections. Several countries that rati-
fi ed the CWC have probably terminated their CW programs, but
it is suspected that some signatories (such as Iran and China)
and several countries that have not ratifi ed the Convention
(Egypt, Israel, North Korea, and Syria) may still be developing or
producing CW.127
The CWC builds on a 1925 Geneva Protocol, an agreement that banned
the use, but not production, of chemical weapons in warfare in reaction to
the horrors caused by chlorine and mustard gas in World War I.
There is also a Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC),
dating from 1972, that bans the production, stockpiling, and use of
biological agents, but ensuring compliance with it is diffi cult. Although,
as of 2009, 175 states had become parties to the convention, the BTWC
“has two basic weaknesses. First, because of the dual-use nature of micro-
bial pathogens . . . the line between treaty-permitted and prohibited activ-
ities is largely a question of intent. . . . Second, the . . . [convention’s]
lack of formal verifi cation measure has made it toothless and unable to
address a series of alleged violations.”128
It is clear that although the end of the Cold War may have eliminated
the threat of a truly massive nuclear war, at least for the time being, it
has not delivered the world from the menace posed by nuclear weapons,
ballistic missiles, and chemical or biological weapons. For the foresee-
able future, a growing list of state and nonstate actors will continue to
threaten their enemies with a deadly combination of nuclear, chemical,
and biological weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons
Convention
(CWC) Agreement
whereby signature states
pledge to destroy their
chemical weapons.
Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention
(BTWC) Agreement
banning production,
stockpiling, and use of
biological agents.
Arms and Arms Control 293

294 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Bargaining and Negotiation
When states enter into alliances and arms agreements, they do so through bargaining and negotiation—informal and formal com-
munication between actors. Bargaining and negotiation are another way
that states try to resolve or avoid confl ict and form the bulk of state-
to-state relations. Indeed, bargaining takes place on an ongoing basis
between most states as they seek to cooperate and enter into mutually
benefi cial arrangements. States bargain over the NPT, the World Trade
Organization, and environmental treaties such as the Kyoto protocol.
“Within the realm of international relations, diplomatic negotiation is
central to the functioning of the system of nation-states that has evolved
over time.”129
Nonstate actors are part of international bargaining as well. “Increas-
ingly, negotiation situations feature actors that are neither sovereign states
nor reliant on those states for membership and direction.”130 At times,
substate actors negotiate directly with other states. In 2006, for exam-
ple, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger negotiated with British
Prime Minister Tony Blair an agreement to collaborate on research to
address problems of global warming, thereby bypassing the U.S. national
government.131 Nongovernmental organizations, such as Greenpeace,
also bargain with states and other nonstate actors on a variety of topics
(see Chapter 13 on the role of NGOs in environmental issues). States also
bargain with terrorists, despite many states’ offi cial policies not to nego-
tiate with such groups.132
Coercive Diplomacy and Bargaining Strategies
International actors sometimes attempt to bargain by engaging in coer-
cive diplomacy and initiate or imply threats to deter or compel other
actors.133 As we have seen in this chapter, deterrence and compellence
are critical strategies in global politics and are the foundation of many
decisions to pursue alliances and build up arms. Both deterrence and com-
pellence involve demonstrating capabilities, signaling the credibility of a
threat, and communicating to other actors the will and terms of the use
of this threat. Alliances and arms involve boosting a state or coalition’s
capabilities—increasing their power in relation to that of their potential
adversaries. Credibility and communication are achieved through suc-
cessful bargaining and negotiation.
Bargaining strategies in deterrence, for example, are designed to con-
vince the other side that the costs of doing something they want to do (such
as attacking) outweigh the benefi ts that they will achieve from this action
(such as control of a territory). To do this, negotiators must convince the
other side that they will impose these high costs (attacking back) and that
this threat is credible (they really will carry it out) and not a bluff. Many
argued that the 1950s U.S. nuclear strategy known as massive retaliation,
bargaining and
negotiation Formal
and informal
communication between
actors.

in which the United States threatened to use its nuclear weapons against
the Soviet Union for any unwanted behavior, was not credible. The United
States certainly had the capability to do this, but would it really launch an
all-out nuclear war over, for example, South Korea or West Berlin, risking
Soviet retaliation directly against Washington, DC?
This credibility must be successfully communicated to the other
side. Successful communication, unfortunately, requires that the other
side receive the threat as it is intended. If, for example, the target of the
threat does not see the costs as great as the actor that is initiating the
threat or sees the benefi t of actions differently, the message is not suc-
cessfully communicated. Under the MAD nuclear strategy, the United
States estimated that if it could maintain a second-strike capability that
ensured, after absorbing an initial strike from the Soviet Union, that it
could destroy 20 percent of the Soviet population and infrastructure, this
was a credible deterrent threat. The danger is that the Soviet Union may
not have seen this as a great cost. In the Second World War, the Soviets
were willing to lose 20 million people, a considerable cost, for the benefi t
of defeating the German threat. Estimating what the other sides’ costs
and benefi ts are and how they weigh those is a very diffi cult part of coer-
cive diplomacy.
Communicating capability often involves taking a hard bargaining
line, but this can sometimes lead to unfortunate outcomes. The United
States refused for years to back down in its battle with North Vietnam
over the fate of South Vietnam and yet failed to achieve its objective
despite that prolonged effort. The logic or theory behind a coercive strat-
egy is that “effective . . . bargaining [is] dependent on exploiting the
other side’s fear of war through the use of credible threats and punish-
ments, that is, on demonstrating a willingness to accept the risk of war to
achieve state objectives.”134 This outlook on international politics leads
to what might be called a “bullying” strategy of bargaining, because it
relies heavily on force and threats of force, as opposed to compromises
and “carrots,” or rewards, for desired behavior. A bullying strategy relies
almost exclusively on severe threats and punishments until and unless
the bargainer’s demands are accepted.
But diplomatic bargaining is not a simple game in which one suc-
ceeds by adopting extreme positions or acting tough all of the time.
Data on forty international crises that occurred between 1816 and 1980
indicate that a bullying strategy was used only about 35 percent of the
time. Almost as often, the participants in those crises instead used a
more fl exible and conciliatory “reciprocating” strategy, in which one
side imitates or duplicates the kind of diplomatic moves made by the
other party regarding a dispute or crisis. Bargainers who engage in a
reciprocating strategy respond to coercive or bullying moves involv-
ing force or the threat of force with threatening or violent moves of
their own. But unlike “bullies,” who rely on threats or force regard-
less of what the other side does, reciprocating strategists respond in a
“bullying”
strategy Bargaining
strategy relying heavily
on force and threats of
force.
“reciprocating”
strategy Flexible
bargaining strategy in
which one side imitates
or duplicates the kind of
diplomatic moves made
by the other actor.
Bargaining and Negotiation 295

296 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
cooperative or conciliatory way to compromising moves and signals
from the other side.135
Realists would expect that bullying strategies work better than recip-
rocating strategies, while others who analyze bargaining believe that this
is unduly pessimistic. Such strategies are insuffi ciently sensitive, in this
view, to the danger that hardline bargaining can lead to an escalation of
coercive moves that will precipitate wars that neither side wants. In the
analysis of forty crises mentioned earlier, bullying strategies led to war in
almost two-thirds of the crises in which they were used, while reciprocat-
ing strategies achieved either a diplomatic victory or a compromise nearly
two-thirds of the time. Does this mean that reciprocating strategies are
always preferable? That depends partly on the priority that decision makers
involved in international negotiations and crisis situations give to avoiding
international war. Clearly, avoiding war is not always the highest priority
for policymakers. Sometimes, for example, they may consider it even more
important in confrontational situations to achieve victory or avoid defeat.
And some evidence suggests that states are more likely to gain a victory by
adopting a bullying strategy.136 In any event, “it is clear that many interna-
tional actors continue to view military force as a primary way of achieving
their goals in contemporary international affairs.”137
In short, although diplomats may take extreme positions that can
backfi re, sometimes such positions are effective bargaining tools and
the decentralized character of the global political system, where every
actor must ultimately protect its own interests, often tempts decision
makers to adopt coercive bargaining strategies. But just as often, actors
will bargain in a more conciliatory or reciprocating fashion, meeting
coercive moves with coercive responses and cooperative signals with
cooperation. Coercive strategies may help gain diplomatic victories (and
avoid humiliating defeats), especially if the actors employing them seek
a change in the status quo, but history also suggests that they carry a
higher risk of war than do reciprocating strategies. Those more concilia-
tory strategies have produced substantially more peaceful outcomes in
international disputes.
Diplomats and Their “Games”
The job of negotiating across state boundaries is performed by diplomats,
that is, those people offi cially engaged in negotiations or bargaining.
Diplomats are often misunderstood and unappreciated. In the popular
conception, the essence of the diplomatic profession is deceit (“An ambas-
sador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth,” Sir
Henry Wotton observed in 1604), and professional diplomats are almost
universally suspected of having lost touch with their home countries and
the values of their citizens. They typically spend so much time out of
the country that they only naturally become more sympathetic to the
concerns of the “foreigners” with whom they live than does the average
diplomats Government
offi cials engaged in
negotiations and
bargaining.

citizen who rarely leaves the country; that sympathy can easily be mis-
taken for diminished loyalty. Also, to the average person, diplomats seem
to play a lot of silly games when they negotiate. At the truce negotiations
during the Korean War, for example, diplomats spent considerable time
and energy discussing the relative height of fl ags placed on the negoti-
ating table. At the Paris peace talks aimed at ending the Vietnam War,
diplomats wrangled for weeks (while soldiers and civilians died) over the
shape of the bargaining table. Why do diplomats engage in such seem-
ingly senseless behavior?
An important part of the answer involves a fundamental attitude that
diplomats, as well as national leaders, seem to have concerning bargaining
and negotiating with their counterparts. Although this concern is not
made explicit in every case, diplomats involved in international bargain-
ing are almost always less concerned about the issue immediately at hand
than about the impact of the settlement on resolving future issues. Let
us consider fi rst the implicit bargaining that goes on between states (and
their leaders) over crucial issues of peace and war.
It is highly probable, for example, that in 1939, Britain and France
chose to take a hard line against Germany when it invaded Poland not
because the leaders in those countries were primarily concerned about
Poland but rather because they were worried about how the settlement
between Poland and Germany would affect the resolution of future
European territorial issues. Because they had already backed down in the
Diplomats from South Korea and North Korea engage in negotiations over the
dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
(Segye Lee-Won, Lorea Poll/AP Photo/AP Images)
Bargaining and Negotiation 297

298 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
face of several of Hitler’s aggressive actions (for example, against Austria
and Czechoslovakia), the British and the French felt that they could not
allow Hitler to resolve his confl ict with Poland with such ease that he
would conclude that any future confl ict could be settled just as easily
and victoriously. Similarly, although Kennedy and his advisers were quite
concerned about the missiles the Soviets had placed in Cuba in 1962,
the missiles themselves were not their greatest concern. Rather, their
main worry was that if they allowed the Soviets to get away with sneak-
ing missiles into Cuba, it would be impossible to predict the Soviets’
next scheme, and the ability of the United States to deter such schemes
would be called into serious question.138 At the time of the Vietnam War,
Vietnam was not that valuable to the United States either economically
or strategically. But U.S. policymakers at the time made clear, with their
talk of Munich and the domino theory, that they were very concerned
about how an unsatisfactory outcome of the Vietnam War might affect
future confl icts. Subversives all over the world, it was believed, might
be so encouraged by a North Vietnamese victory that similar wars of
national liberation would break out in several other parts of the world.
Nations and their diplomatic representatives are especially concerned
about the impact that settling current problems will have on future issues
because precedents and the status quo have an almost sacred place in
international relations. Diplomats engaged in bargaining are often con-
cerned that a concession on the current issue will imply that concessions
on similar or related issues in the future will be expected and will be very
diffi cult to refuse. In short, because the status quo is so important, and
because the settlement of an issue can establish a precedent for the settle-
ment of future issues (that is, alter the status quo), diplomats are anxious
to avoid giving the impression that they make concessions easily. The
shape of the bargaining table may not itself be important, but concessions
quickly granted on that issue may create expectations of quick conces-
sions on other issues that will be diffi cult to overcome.
Some bargaining strategies may also seem puzzling. If, for example, a
diplomat creates the impression that he or she is a little crazy for being so
stubborn about the shape of the bargaining table, that may not be all bad.
As one well-known scholar of bargaining in international politics points
out, “If a man knocks at a door and says that he will stab himself on the
porch unless given $10, he is more likely to get the $10 if his eyes are
bloodshot.”139 In other words, the man is more likely to get the money
if he somehow conveys the impression that he is actually crazy enough
(because his eyes are bloodshot) to stab himself if refused. Similarly, if a
diplomat can convey the impression that he or she is really a tough nut to
crack even on such a seemingly minor issue as the shape of the bargaining
table, that reputation may stand him or her in good stead during negotia-
tions over the more important issues.
The silly games that diplomats seem to play are also a function of
the symbolic value that the process holds and what it refl ects about the

underlying issues and defi nition of the confl ict. The shape of the table, in
other words, can say something about the shape of the confl ict. If the table
is round, all participants are seen as equal players with equal interests.
If it is in the shape of a rectangle, the participants who get to sit at the
“head” of the table are in some way already privileged and may see their
interests prevail because of the way that the procedures are arranged.
Bargaining and negotiation is also often affected by who is not at the
table: each side’s constituents back home. Diplomats must return to their
domestic political constituents (discussed more extensively in Chapter 5)
at the end of negotiations and persuade them that the international agree-
ment for which they bargained is legitimate. Because of this, negotiators
are often looking over their shoulders to see how various positions and
agreements are being received at home. In fact, they are often simultane-
ously bargaining with the other actors across from them at the negotiating
table and with their domestic constituents to fi nd an agreement that is
acceptable to both. This dynamic has been termed two-level games (also
discussed and defi ned in Chapter 5) and has been described as follows:
Each national political leader appears at both game boards.
Across the international table sit his foreign counterparts, and
at his elbows sit diplomats and other international advisors.
Around the domestic table behind him sit party and parliamen-
tary fi gures, spokesmen for domestic agencies, representatives
of key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisors.
The unusual complexity of this two-level game is that moves
that are rational for a player at one board (such as raising energy
prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto imports) may be
impolitic for that same player on the other board. . . . Any key
player at the international table who is dissatisfi ed with the
outcome may upset the game board; and conversely, any leader
who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks
being evicted from his seat.140
The constant balancing act that two-level games require in interna-
tional negotiations means that agreements may be diffi cult to reach and
the process may appear a bit convoluted. At times, however, negotiators
successfully overcome these challenges and diplomats resolve interna-
tional disputes.
SUMMARY
● In order to deal with the threat of confl ict, states enter into alliances,
build up their military arsenals, enter into arms control agreements,
and otherwise bargain and negotiate differences with other actors in
global politics.
● Coalitions of states emerge with regularity whenever and wherever in-
dependent sets of political entities interact. Alliances have often played
Summary 299

300 Chapter 8 Efforts to Avoid Confl ict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
a vital role in international politics. States may join alliances for a
variety of reasons, including balancing against another power or per-
ceived threat or bandwagoning together with a stronger power in order
to share in the benefi ts of an alliance. Alliances may also form based
on common ideological, economic, or political affi nities. While history
suggests that grand coalitions occur more often than one might expect,
large coalitions can experience signifi cant diffi culty in maintaining the
alliance relationships.
● Whether alliances serve the purpose of deterring aggression and creat-
ing peace is a question on which analysts seem to differ. History shows
that when alliances seem to contribute to war, they will be avoided in
the postwar era; when leaders think that a recent war could have been
averted by an alliance, allies will be pursued in the postwar period.
● NATO is an alliance born in the Cold War but living on today and
expanding with new members in central and eastern Europe. Consider-
able debate has arisen over the continuation, membership, and role of
the alliance, with particular concern about Russian reaction.
● States build up their arsenals for offensive and defensive purposes, as
well as for domestic political reasons. World military expenditures are
currently on the increase, with the United States as the top spender.
States produce and transfer a variety of conventional weapons. Arms
transfers are currently declining but remain at high levels in some re-
gions. The proliferation of small arms and land mines has been of high
concern in many of the current confl icts. A variety of agreements to
control conventional arms have been concluded, including the Moscow
Treaty and the Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty.
● The Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet
Union was the most dangerous and pervasive but still peaceful inter-
national rivalry in world history. Throughout the Cold War, both sides
continued to stockpile nuclear weapons well beyond the point at which
each had enough fi repower to kill the other’s citizens several times
over. These stockpiles of weapons may have protected both sides from
the threat of a disarming fi rst strike, which might have deprived them
of their ability to retaliate. This incredibly dangerous and expensive
arms race ended without the global catastrophe that many argued it
would ultimately bring. That is not an unprecedented outcome. Most
arms races have not ended in international war.
● The end of the Cold War has not liberated the world entirely from the
dangers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Some argue that nuclear proliferation can stabilize tense relationships,
just as they did in the Cold War. Nuclear proliferation may have made
intentional wars less likely, but may also increase the probability of
accidents and unintentional escalation to nuclear confl ict. The Nuclear

Key Terms 301
Nonproliferation Treaty is an important agreement in the effort to con-
trol nuclear proliferation. Many countries are acquiring ballistic mis-
siles and attempting to stockpile biological and chemical weapons.
Some progress in dealing with these weapons has been made through
the CWC and the BTWC.
● Diplomats are often tempted to engage in coercive bargaining and
negotiation strategies in order to deter or compel their adversaries.
However, coercive diplomacy requires successful communication of
capability, commitment, and credibility, which may be diffi cult to
achieve. Coercive bargaining strategies quite clearly carry a greater risk
of international war, which can sometimes be avoided with more con-
ciliatory reciprocating bargaining strategies. Diplomats’ strategies can
also be affected by domestic politics that constrain the moves they can
make at the negotiating table.
KEY TERMS weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) 260
deterrence 260
compellence 260
alliances 260
balancing 261
bandwagoning 263
minimum winning
coalitions 263
burden sharing 265
arms control 273
arms transfers 273
small arms 273
arms race 274
Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe Treaty 275
international arms
embargoes 276
Anti-Personnel Landmines
Treaty 276
second-strike capability 278
Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD) 278
Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI) 278
prisoner’s dilemma 279
game theory 279
Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) 284
Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) 288
Moscow Treaty 288
ballistic missile
defense (BMD) system 289
chemical weapons 290
biological weapons 290
Missile Technology
Control Regime
(MTCR) 292
Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) 293
Biological and Toxic
Weapons Convention
(BTWC) 293
bargaining and
negotiation 294
“bullying” strategy 295
“reciprocating”
strategy 295
diplomats 296

302
C H A P T E R 9
Global Security Efforts:
International Organizations,
Law, and Ethics
International Organizations and Collective Security
• Early Attempts to Organize for International Security
• Collective Security: Principles and Prerequisites
• The League of Nations
• The United Nations
• Peacekeeping as an Alternative to Collective Security
• Peacemaking in Ethnic Confl icts and Failed States
• Other Ways the United Nations Attempts to Promote Peace
• The Future of the United Nations
International Law
• Sources and Principles
• The Impact of International Law
Ethics, Morality, and International Politics
• The Ethics of War and Nuclear Deterrence
• The Ethics of Intervention: Human Rights versus States’ Rights
• Women’s Rights
• An Emerging Legal Right to Democracy
International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes
• Norms against War
• Norms versus Power
Summary
Key Terms

In addition to efforts by states to negotiate, build alliances, and engage in arms control, there are more global or collective attempts to address
international confl ict and security issues. International organizations
such as the United Nations have been formed to coordinate efforts to
maintain peace, and international law attempts to establish the rights of
state and nonstate actors in global politics. Ideas about what is right and
wrong (international ethics) and what is expected (international norms)
also serve to govern state behavior and to avoid, or at least regulate,
international confl ict.
International Organizations and Collective Security
International organizations, with permanent structures, membership, and procedures, are one way states have tried to institutionalize diplomacy and
collective efforts for peace. The theory of liberalism (see Chapter 1) stresses
the importance of international institutions in global politics as arenas for
communication, diplomatic bargaining, and an alternative to confl ict.1
Early Attempts to Organize for International Security
The fi rst serious attempt to establish continuing international institutions
to deal with threats to peace was made in the aftermath of the Napoleonic
Wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Congress of Vienna
(1815), a meeting attended only by the major powers, dealt with several
unsettled political problems; states agreed to periodic consultations that
became known as the Concert of Europe. This agreement led to a series
of international meetings in the next decade that were unprecedented,
because they occurred during times of peace. But the grand coalition that
served as the basis for the concert was prone to disunity. Although the
concert did successfully establish the precedent of peacetime consulta-
tions, after the fi rst decade of its existence it met only in the aftermath of
wars to arrange settlements.
International peace conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 were
meant to deal more directly with the threat of war by decreasing arma-
ment levels. They failed. Still, they began an important trend toward a
democracy of sorts in international diplomacy, because for the fi rst time
at such conferences, small states were invited and thus given a voice.
Only twenty-six states attended the 1899 conference, but forty-four sent
delegations to the 1907 meeting. The latter meeting might be considered
the precedent for the establishment of institutions such as the General
Assemblies of the League of Nations and the United Nations.
Collective Security: Principles and Prerequisites
The next Hague conference was scheduled for 1915. It was not held,
for obvious reasons, but the process leading to the outbreak of the First
International Organizations and Collective Security 303

304 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
World War convinced many leaders that a permanent international orga-
nization was needed. In retrospect, many political leaders and scholars
concluded that the First World War had occurred because the decision
makers involved had lost control of a situation that none of them wanted
to see culminate in a war. If, according to this reasoning, there had been a
chance to talk things out, a cooling-off period, none of the confl icts that
created the crisis would have proved insoluble. When designing the fi rst
major collective attempt at governance through an international insti-
tution, the League of Nations, they drew on the concept of collective
security, which can be defi ned briefl y as the idea that “aggressive and
unlawful use of force by any nation against any nation will be met by the
combined force of all other nations.”2 Collective security arrangements
attempt to safeguard the collective interest of all states against the nar-
row self-interest of one state that might profi t from aggression by inhibit-
ing war through the threat of collective action.
There are several logical and theoretical requirements for a success-
ful collective security system.3 For example, if any state that uses force
aggressively is to be opposed by the combined force of all other nations,
there must be some universally agreed defi nition of aggression. Otherwise,
it will be impossible for the world community to agree when the time has
come to impose sanctions. There must also be an international institution
that can make authoritative decisions about disputes and designate aggres-
sors. As well, there must be an institution or authoritative process for allo-
cating the costs of resisting aggression. The states of the world must be so
committed to peace and so loyal to the world community that they will be
willing to forsake their own short-range interests by imposing sanctions
against states that are involved in disputes of no immediate concern to
them. Also, if the collective security ideal is to be upheld, the members
of a collective security organization must be willing to give up the right
to fi ght to change the status quo and to fi ght against any state not willing
to give up that right. Alliances are, strictly speaking, logically incompat-
ible with the collective security ideal. That ideal implies a willingness by
all states to oppose any state committing aggression, whereas alliances
involve precommitments to avoid military action against certain states.
Finally, if collective security is to preserve peace, there should be a diffu-
sion of power in the international system so that one or two very powerful
states cannot withstand the threat of force by the world community.
Just listing some of the logical requirements for a successful collec-
tive security system reveals why the League of Nations and the United
Nations experienced diffi culty maintaining such a system. There is no
universally accepted defi nition of aggression. International lawyers have
been trying to devise one for more than fi fty years. Although the UN
General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1969 and 1974 including such
a defi nition,4 agreement on this defi nition or, one suspects, on any other
is virtually impossible to maintain when the time comes to apply it to
concrete cases. In short, “it is sometimes diffi cult in a crisis to determine
who is the troublemaker and who is the victim.”5
collective
security Idea that
aggressive use of force
by any state will be met
by combined force of all
other states.

International Organizations and Collective Security 305
In addition, while political leaders are quite willing to make verbal
commitments to the cause of world peace, their actions sometimes
reveal that peace is lower on their list of priorities. Leaders are more
fi rmly committed to national security, justice, democracy, national self-
determination, or their own credibility. Commitment to the status quo is
much less than universal, and several states are unwilling to give up the
right to fi ght to change it. In fact, it might even be argued that aggression
is not always a bad thing. “There are good reasons,” one analyst argues,
“to applaud the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, since it drove
the murderous Pol Pot from power.”6 Alliances, and the precommit-
ments they involve, are widespread in the existing international system.
Furthermore, even long-standing international friendships not formalized
by alliances could cause problems for a collective security system.7
The League of Nations
The League of Nations was the fi rst real experiment in collective secu-
rity and experienced diffi culties in applying collective security principles.
During the First World War, private societies advocating the establish-
ment of the League sprang up in Britain, France, Italy, and the United
States. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson included the creation of such an
organization as one of his famous “Fourteen Points” for postwar peace
outlined in an address to the U.S. Congress. The South African leader Jan
Smuts published a pamphlet calling for the creation of the League, and it
proved to be infl uential, perhaps because of good timing (It was published
A cartoon from the
time of the League of
Nations recognized the
signifi cance, and the
irony, of the absence of
the United States from
the organization.
(Punch Magazine,
10 December 1919)

306 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
in the month between Wilson’s arrival in Europe and the beginning of the
peace conference).
The structure of the League was much like that outlined in Smuts’
publication. Its three major organs were an assembly, a council, and a
secretariat. The assembly consisted of delegations from all the member
states, and its main duties involved the election of new members to the
organization, debate and discussion of political and economic questions
of international interest, and preparation of the annual budget. The coun-
cil was dominated by the great powers, but it also contained nonperma-
nent members whose identity and number varied throughout the history
of the League. Its most important duty was the resolution of interna-
tional disputes, and to that end it had the power to advise the member
states to institute sanctions against any state committing aggression. The
secretariat was an international civil service that handled administrative
details for the League and compiled information relevant to the various
problems and issues with which the League was confronted.
Under Article 10 of the League’s covenant, members pledged “to
respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity
and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”8
Despite this pledge, member states did not internalize the ideal of collec-
tive security:
Members reestablished alliance systems and refused to take the
necessary institutional actions to check aggression. The League
was unable to reverse Japan’s takeover of Manchuria; the Ital-
ian invasion of Abyssinia; the German remilitarization of the
Rhineland and subsequent takeover of the Sudetenland; or the
intervention by Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union in the
Spanish civil war. The gradual buildup of war machines pro-
ceeded apace, and the collapse of the fl edgling collective-security
system was complete with the German invasion of Poland in
1939. The League broke down and the international community
headed down the road to World War II, although the formal dis-
solution of the League did not occur until 1946.9
Although the covenant provided for potentially effective economic and
military sanctions against aggressors, it allowed each member to decide
whether aggression had been committed and, if so, if sanctions would
be applied. These loopholes were not in the covenant as a result of over-
sight. The founders of the League insisted on them, and it seems unlikely
that the absence of loopholes would have made any real difference to the
behavior of the League’s members. Even if the covenant’s articles had
mandated sanctions, it is unlikely that many states would have been
inclined to apply them.
Much the same kind of argument can be made about the most notori-
ous fl aw in the structure of the League: the absence of the United States.
This absence was brought about by President Wilson’s unwillingness to

International Organizations and Collective Security 307
consult and compromise with the U.S. Senate when the covenant was
being drafted, by a bitter personal feud between Wilson and Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, and by widespread isolationist sentiment among a signifi –
cant number of Americans. After the demise of the League and the ensu-
ing world war, a powerful belief developed that the refusal of the United
States to join the League was a crucial cause of its failure. If the United
States had not shunned its duty, according to this argument, the League
might have been powerful enough to withstand the aggressive policies of
Japan, Italy, and Germany.
This thesis can be questioned. The desire of the United States in 1931
to avoid provoking Japan after it invaded Manchuria differed very little
from Britain’s desire to avoid undue provocation of Italy after it invaded
Ethiopia in 1935. It is by no means certain whether membership in the
League really would have induced the United States to adopt policies other
than those it actually pursued in the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises.10
In other words, it does not seem likely that mere formal membership in
the League would have changed U.S. foreign policy very much. Given
that the major threats to the League occurred when the United States
was in the throes of the Great Depression, it seems more likely that if
the United States had been a member, it might have withdrawn from
the League rather than energetically pursuing its obligations under the
covenant. Nevertheless, the absence of the United States may have done
much to generally damage the legitimacy and credibility of the League.
With the United States present in the League, aggressive states might not
have taken the action they did, and other states, such as Britain, might
have reacted differently to provocations.
The League will always be most famous for its failures, but it was
not completely ineffective. It set precedents, in the establishment of the
secretariat and in the way the entire organization was structured, that
provided valuable lessons for those who later established the United
Nations. The League is well remembered for the disputes it did not settle,
but it did play a role in resolving some confl icts, such as the one between
Greece and Bulgaria in 1925.
The United Nations
True or not, the idea that the failure of the United States to enter the League
was a terrible mistake that played a signifi cant role in bringing about the
Second World War became widely accepted in the United States. The best
evidence is the energetic manner in which the U.S. government strove for
the creation of the League’s successor, the United Nations. By October 1943,
the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and China had declared their fi rm intention to create an international
security organization after the war. The intention was reaffi rmed at
several wartime meetings of the Allied coalition, and the fi nal charter
was hammered out at a meeting in San Francisco in the spring of 1945.

308 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
The UN Charter was completed in June, and by July, the U.S. Senate had
approved it by a vote of eighty-nine to two. The contrast with the U.S.
reaction to the League some twenty-fi ve years earlier could hardly have
been starker. The distinction was made even sharper by the choice of
New York City as the home of the new United Nations.
The structure of the United Nations shares many features with that
of the League (see Figure 9.1). The Security Council, according to the
charter, has the primary responsibility for international peace and secu-
rity. The fi ve permanent members—China, France, Great Britain, Russia,
and the United States—have the power of veto in the Security Council.
Ten nonpermanent members also serve on the Security Council and vote
on resolutions, but they cannot veto. The General Assembly is composed
of delegations from all the member states, which by 2006, numbered 192
(see Figure 9.2), and has three principal duties. It determines the bud-
get of the organization and (along with the Security Council) selects the
secretary-general, who is the administrative leader of the United Nations,
the members of the International Court of Justice, and new members of
the United Nations. The General Assembly also debates any topic within
the scope of the charter. Finally, the Secretariat, headed by the secretary-
general (currently Ban Ki-moon), serves as an international civil service
charged with administering the organization. The secretary-general
makes an annual report to the General Assembly and has the right to
speak to it at any time, as well as to propose resolutions to the commit-
tees of the General Assembly. The secretary-general also has the author-
ity to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in
his or her opinion threatens the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The International Court of Justice (World Court), composed of fi fteen
judges elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, has
the two-fold function of serving as a tribunal for the fi nal settlement of
disputes submitted to it by the parties and acting in an advisory capacity
to the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other organs on ques-
tions of a legal nature that might be referred to it.11 Decisions made by the
court are binding, but no state can be brought before the court without its
consent. “Some states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in advance under the Optional Clause of the Statute (Article 36),
but because of a myriad of reservations and amendments, the general
rule is that only those states that are willing to have their controversies
adjudicated by the Court will be parties to cases before it.”12
The United Nations was designed to protect, not challenge, states and
state sovereignty. In fact, the United Nations legitimizes sovereignty in
that states (not people, nations, regions, or other international actors) are
members. In addition, the UN Charter was set up to protect state boundar-
ies. Part of Article 2 of the UN Charter reads, “All members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Chapter VII of
UN
Charter Document
that delineates purpose,
rules, and institutions of
the United Nations.
Security Council
UN institution
responsible for
international peace and
security. It is composed of
fi ve permanent members
with veto power and ten
nonpermanent members.
General
Assembly Institution
in which all member
states are equally
represented.
Secretariat
UN administrative-
bureaucratic institution,
headed by the secretary-
general.
International Court of
Justice (World Court)
UN-associated tribunal
for settlement of disputes
between states.

International Organizations and Collective Security 309
Text not available due to copyright restrictions

310 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
the charter spells out the principle of collective security by stating that the
Security Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air,
sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” Also in Chapter
VII, Article 43 of the UN Charter specifi es how the member nations are
to go about creating a military force for the organization: “All Members of
the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security Coun-
cil, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, neces-
sary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”
This arrangement, though, is not as airtight as it might appear. First,
the military forces, which according to the charter are to be provided
to the Security Council, have never materialized. Second, because every
permanent member of the Security Council has the right to veto propos-
als before the council, it is virtually impossible to implement sanctions
against one of the major powers. Indeed, the United Nations is a modifi ed
form of collective security, because the veto power of the fi ve perma-
nent Security Council members means that collective action could never
occur against one of these states. In effect, not all UN members stand
equal risk of punishment for violating another state’s borders.
The veto power, combined with the Cold War rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union, has meant that the United Nations
has not worked to ensure collective security for most of its history.
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1993 2006
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Year
N
um
be
r
of
M
em
be
rs
Figure 9.2 Membership
in the United Nations,
1945–2006
Source: Based on Robert E.
Riggs and Jack C. Plano, The
United Nations International
Organization and World Politics,
2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1994), p. 46. Data
for 1993 and 2006 supplied by
the authors.

International Organizations and Collective Security 311
During the Cold War, intervention of one state by another divided the
two superpowers, and one or the other would veto Security Council
action against its ally. During the fi rst two decades of the existence of
the United Nations, the United States never used its veto in the Security
Council, whereas the Soviet Union vetoed proposals brought to that body
103 times. From 1966 to 1975, the United States used its veto power
twelve times, and the Soviet Union vetoed eleven propositions. Between
1976 and 1985, the United States vetoed proposals brought before the
Security Council thirty-seven times, while the Soviets vetoed only seven
measures. And from 1986 to 1990, the United States exercised its veto
power twenty-three times, while the Soviet Union never vetoed a single
measure. For most of the post–World War II period, the United States and
the former Soviet Union were so powerful that they could not be intimi-
dated by any implicit or explicit threats made by the United Nations in
the name of collective security. When the Soviets invaded Hungary in
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979, and when the
United States invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983,
and Panama in 1989, the United Nations could do little to deter the inva-
sions, even if it had been able to come to some kind of nearly universal
agreement on the culpability of either superpower.
In fact, Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been invoked only twice.
The fi rst time was in 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.
Although the Soviet Union surely wanted to veto any action against
North Korea, it was boycotting Security Council meetings (in protest of
the seating of the Republic of China, or Taiwan, as the permanent rep-
resentative of China instead of the People’s Republic of China). The UN
coordinated collective action proceeded against the North. The Soviet
Union learned its lesson and never missed a Security Council meeting
again, exercising its veto (as did the United States) to protect its friends.
It was not until the end of the Cold War that the fi ve permanent members
could agree on a Chapter VII resolution, this time condemning and coor-
dinating action against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
In one important way, the structure of the United Nations is better
suited to the maintenance of collective security than was the League’s.
The UN Charter
incorporates more elaborate and ambitious provisions for sanc-
tions. Instead of requiring states to impose economic penalties
if and when they unilaterally recognize the existence of aggres-
sion, and permitting them the exercise of voluntary participa-
tion in military sanctions, the Charter brings all enforcement
activity under the aegis of the Security Council, conferring on
that body the authority to identify the aggressor, to order mem-
bers to engage in nonmilitary coercion, and itself to put into
action the military forces presumably to be placed at its perma-
nent disposal by members of the organization.13

312 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
Yet attempts by the United Nations to identify aggressors or targets of
collective action have proved diffi cult. The International Court of Justice
can hear only those cases willingly brought to it by both sides of the
dispute. The Security Council, as noted, has been hamstrung by the veto
any permanent member can impose. The General Assembly is large and
unwieldy and, unlike the Security Council, does not have the authority
to oblige states to carry out sanctions.
Peacekeeping as an Alternative to Collective Security
Exclusive concentration on UN diffi culties in establishing a collective
security system as envisioned by the writers of its charter might lead to
an overly pessimistic conclusion regarding the organization’s contribu-
tion to peace. The United Nations has at least partially fi lled the void
created by the failure of its efforts to institute collective security with a
technique known as peacekeeping. Although the UN Charter says noth-
ing about peacekeeping, the technique was used repeatedly to deal with
confl icts during the Cold War era that might otherwise have led to dan-
gerous confrontations between the superpowers.
The origins of peacekeeping can be traced to the earliest days of the
United Nations from 1946 to 1949, when it sent small numbers of mili-
tary personnel to monitor cease-fi res and engage in fact-fi nding missions in
the Balkans, Palestine, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.14 But the fi rst major
example of a peacekeeping force was created in response to a crisis in the
Middle East. When Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the
Suez Canal in 1956, Great Britain, France, and Israel (each for its own rea-
sons) joined in an attack on Egypt. Much to the surprise of those three
states, the United States and the Soviet Union demanded that the attack
be terminated immediately. Collective action against the attackers was
impossible, because France and Great Britain would veto any Chapter VII
resolution in the Security Council. The two superpowers also cooperated in
getting the General Assembly to pass resolutions calling for an end to the
hostilities. To implement the resolutions (and to avoid the introduction of
military forces from one or both of the superpowers), the General Assem-
bly created the UN Emergency Force (UNEF). Made up of military forces
from ten to twenty-four states at different times in its existence, none of
which came from the fi ve permanent members of the Security Council, it
was stationed on the Egyptian-Israeli border until 1967. The importance
of its contribution to peace in the area may be suggested by the fact that
shortly after it was removed, war between Israel and Egypt ensued.15
Since 1956, the United Nations has used peacekeeping forces in a
number of hot spots around the world. The primary goal of a peacekeep-
ing operation (also called “blue helmets,” for the color of the helmets
and berets that peacekeeping soldiers wear) is to halt armed confl ict or
prevent its recurrence. It achieves this goal by acting as a physical barrier,
a “thin blue line,” between hostile parties and monitoring their military
movements. Peacekeeping forces have been
peacekeeping Troop
deployment intended to
halt armed confl ict or
prevent its recurrence in
confl ict areas.

International Organizations and Collective Security 313
normally composed of troops from small or nonaligned states. . . .
Lightly armed, these neutral troops were symbolically deployed
between belligerents who had agreed to stop fi ghting; they rarely
used force and then only in self-defense and as a last resort.
Rather than being based on any military prowess, the infl uence
of UN peacekeepers in this period resulted from the cooperation
of belligerents mixed with the moral weight of the international
community.16
A secondary purpose of peacekeeping is to create a stable environment
for negotiations.17 The United Nations sent a force to Lebanon in 1958,
making it easier for the United States to withdraw the Marines it had
sent into that country to support the pro-Western Lebanese regime of
the time.
In 1960, the United Nations became rather deeply involved in the civ-
il war that broke out in the Congo after Belgian colonial rule had ended.
In this case, UN troops became directly involved in the fi ghting (as they
had not in the confl ict between Egypt and Israel), and the undertaking
became so controversial that the Soviet Union and France refused to pay
their share of the expenses for this particular peacekeeping effort. Despite
that setback and the fi nancial and political crisis it created for the United
Nations, peacekeeping missions have been organized quite often since
the UN involvement in the Congo. UN troops were sent to Yemen in
1963, to Cyprus in 1964, and again to the Middle East in the wake of the
Yom Kippur War in 1973 and after the invasion
of Lebanon by Israel in 1978.18
After the creation of the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a decade
passed before the United Nations mounted
another peacekeeping mission.19 By 1987, there
were only fi ve UN peacekeeping missions in
the world, staffed by fewer than 10,000 troops
at a cost of $250 million a year. Even as late as
1992, there were only 11,500 UN peacekeepers
in the world. Then an explosion of UN activity
began. By 1994, some 80,000 UN troops were
involved in eighteen peacekeeping missions
around the world at a cost of more than $3.3
billion.20 Overall, since the UN’s inception,
“Well over 750,000 military and civilian police
personnel and thousands of other civilians from
111 countries have served in UN peacekeeping
operations.”21
Although peacekeeping missions are not an
attempt to resolve confl icts (and some missions
have been in place for almost sixty years), most
UN efforts in this area have been successful at
UN peacekeeping forces, shown here in 2001, have
been in Lebanon since 1958.
(Courtney Kealy/Getty Images)

314 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
creating buffers and maintaining cease-fi res. Indeed, one systematic study
of more than 350 cases of post–World War II peacekeeping concluded that
“peacekeeping works, particularly after the Cold War when most of the
attempts to keep peace after civil wars have been made. The presence of
international personnel is not a silver bullet, of course, it does not guaran-
tee lasting peace in every case, but it does tend to make peace more likely
to last, and to last longer.”22 Peacekeeping is a rather tentative and piece-
meal approach compared to the grander sweep of collective security. But
it may be an especially important function for the United Nations to carry
out in the contemporary era, when most confl icts are internal wars.
And, until recently, the United Nations has not been equipped to
implement collective security. Its reaction to the Iraqi annexation of
Kuwait in August 1990 suggested that it may be possible for the organi-
zation to move beyond peacekeeping and institute a working collective
security system. That is essentially what President George H. W. Bush
meant when he responded to that crisis by asserting that out of these
troubled times, a “new world order can emerge.”23 A working collective
security system might come into being, because it now may be possible
for the major powers to cooperate in the establishment of such a system,
in which an aggressive move, such as Iraq’s against Kuwait, will be met
by the determined resistance of the world community, working through
the institutions of the United Nations.
It is also possible that Iraq’s attack on Kuwait created an ideal situa-
tion for the concept of collective security that is not likely to be repeated.
“The term ‘war’ still conjures up an image of massed armies clashing on
the battlefi eld. But this kind of war is now largely a thing of the past. The
vast majority of violent disputes today (and quite likely of tomorrow)
are . . . civil wars.”24 The situation in Iraq in 2003 was not a case for col-
lective security; the debate in the United Nations was over intervention
to force compliance with UN resolutions, not about collectively defend-
ing the sovereignty of an invaded country. If it is true that international
war is now largely a thing of the past, that is a milestone in human events
that should not go unnoticed. But if more “old- fashioned” wars of the
kind precipitated by Iraq’s attack on Kuwait should arise, it is fair to won-
der how effective the reaction of the United Nations will be. Collective
security is likely to be ineffective so long as the aggressor is a permanent
member of the Security Council, a client state of a permanent member,
or a country able to amass eight votes from the Security Council’s fi fteen
members.
Peacemaking in Ethnic Confl icts and Failed States
When the United Nations intervenes in civil wars, such as those in the
former Yugoslavia and Somalia, it often engages in peacemaking rather
than peacekeeping, because in these places there is no peace to be kept,
and in the case of failed states, no stable political authority to confront
peacemaking Attempt
to force or negotiate
settlement between
warring factions, often in
an internal confl ict.

International Organizations and Collective Security 315
or defend. The founders of the United Nations certainly did not intend
for the organization to be used in internal confl icts, just as they did not
envision peacekeeping between states. In Article 2 of Chapter I, the char-
ter reads, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit
to such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” In spite of this,
UN peacemaking operations in the 1990s “were qualitatively and quan-
titatively different from UN operations that were backed by states during
the Cold War. They indicated that the consent of the parties cannot be
assumed; the military effectiveness required from and the dangers faced
by UN military forces go far beyond the parameters of traditional lightly
armed peacekeepers.”25 The question of how well the United Nations is
suited to the task of peacemaking as opposed to peacekeeping has been
asked numerous times during the increase in UN activity in the post–
Cold War era.26
After the UN presence in the confl ict in Somalia in the early 1990s,
for example, a British journalist noted that U.S. and UN intervention in
Somalia had fl ooded the market with arms and put the war on hold, but
that when the Americans pulled out, “the politics of Somalia reverted to
the status quo ante, except that the rich and powerful had become richer
and better armed.”27 He also predicted that succumbing to the tempta-
tion to send international help to the refugees from the slaughter-fi lled
civil war between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda would have simi-
larly baneful effects. “Free supplies do not stay free for long. . . . There are
already reports of Hutu militias regrouping. They will establish new pat-
terns of leadership, fear, and loyalty. Relief camps motivated by political
exile inevitably are umbrellas for revanchism.”28
This turned out to be an accurate prediction. Some two years later,
The New York Times published the following account:
From the start, the Rwandan camps in Zaire have been con-
trolled by the same forces that carried out the genocide in
Rwanda and that swear to continue it. . . . The camps, under the
fl ag of the United Nations, became bases for a vicious guerrilla
war against Rwanda and local populations in Zaire. . . . Yet for
more than two years, the international community has turned a
blind eye and poured $1 million a day into supporting them.29
Additional reports suggested that the problem of the camps was solved
only when the aid workers had fl ed and Tutsi fi ghters were able to
preempt the arrival of more peacekeepers. “The Tutsis were afraid that
once Westerners arrived, they would impose a cease-fi re and freeze the
situation with the Hutu militia in control once again of the seething
camps. They were afraid of a repeat of 1994: Save the children, save the
murderers, save the embers of civil war, prolong forever the exile and
suffering of the refugees.”30

316 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
In short, at least according to this interpretation, the role of the Unit-
ed Nations in the tragedy that unfolded in Rwanda from 1994 to 1996
and the efforts of the international community were insuffi cient to pre-
vent a terrible holocaust. The efforts to respond to the refugees created
by the civil war ultimately succeeded mostly in substantially prolonging
a painful, brutal status quo based on camps that could not have survived
(probably) without the intervention of UN and other international agen-
cies; the problem was not resolved until the UN and other relief workers
were removed from the situation, after which a rather quick solution was
achieved.
The United Nations was also severely criticized when it found itself
attempting to protect “safe havens” while war waged on in the former
Yugoslavia in the early to mid-1990s. Despite the presence of almost
50,000 peacekeepers, the UN mission was unable to protect the safe
havens or prevent ethnic cleansing. “The idea of ‘safe areas’ brought
derision because the least safe places in the Balkans were under UN
control. The ultimate ignominy arrived in summer 1995 when two of
these enclaves in eastern Bosnia were overrun by Bosnian Serbs whose
tactics included mass executions of Muslims. Shortly before this, Serbs
had chained UN blue helmets to strategic targets and thereby prevented
NATO air raids.”31
These challenges to UN peacekeeping missions in the 1990s creat-
ed a temporary mood of caution in the United Nations and the Security
Council as the end of the twentieth century neared.32 The number of UN
peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers in the world was reduced and
the annual peacekeeping budget of the United Nations fell as well. In
addition, unpaid bills for peacekeeping operations piled up. Finally, there
was a growing feeling that internal problems within countries might be
better dealt with by multinational forces from the region within which
a given country falls.33 Thus, in response to chaos in Albania in early
1997, Italian troops led a peacekeeping force of sorts into that country.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has performed UN-like
peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. And in Africa, Nigerian
troops led a peacekeeping force sent to Liberia in 1990 by the Economic
Community of West African States.34
This scaling back of UN peacekeeping operations, however, was tem-
porary. It seems clear that the United Nations feels that it cannot over-
look continuing threats to international security, however challenging
they may be. Table 9.1 lists the peacekeeping missions in operation in
2009. New missions established in recent years in Darfur Sudan, Haiti,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo suggest that the United Nations
continues to be involved in diffi cult internal confl icts. In Kosovo, the
UN mission that was established in 1999 after NATO military interven-
tion served to coordinate efforts by the European Union, the Organiza-
tion on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and several UN agencies
to establish civil administration for basic services and political stability.

International Organizations and Collective Security 317
Similarly, after the violence that marked East Timor’s independence from
Indonesia, the UN mission
was exceedingly ambitious and wide-ranging. It was empowered to
exercise all legislative and executive powers and judicial authority;
establish an effective civil administration; assist in the develop-
ment of civil and social services; provide security and maintain law
and order; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian
assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance; promote
sustainable development; and build the foundation for a stable lib-
eral democracy. To carry out this mandate, authorization was given
for a military component of up to 8,950 troops and 200 observers
and a civilian police component of up to 1,640 personnel.35
Text not available due to copyright restrictions

318 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
These new missions suggest another way UN peacekeeping is chang-
ing. Not only is peace to be kept, and sometimes made, but the United
Nations is engaged in state-building by trying to provide the conditions,
training, and mandate for the creation of a stable, democratic political
authority. Whether the organization can have long-term success in these
efforts remains to be seen.
Other Ways the United Nations Attempts to Promote Peace
Besides responding to aggression, issuing blue helmets to keep ceasefi res,
and rebuilding war-torn societies, the United Nations engages in a num-
ber of activities designed to promote peace through prevention. An impor-
tant, original goal of the United Nations was to create norms against vio-
lence. By signing the charter, states agree to settle disputes by peaceful
means. The charter codifi es a belief, fairly new to the international com-
munity in the twentieth century when the League of Nations and the
United Nations were created, that the use of force except in the case of
self-defense is unacceptable. Obviously, this norm is not powerful enough
to prevent war entirely, but it does seem to affect how states justify war
and may work to inhibit war in some circumstances (the role of norms in
global politics will be discussed more generally later in this chapter).
The United Nations also seeks to provide a forum for debate as an
alternative to fi ghting. In the United Nations, states can publicly air
their points of view and privately negotiate their differences. The United
Nations also intervenes diplomatically to avert the outbreak of war by
sending inquiries (fact-fi nding missions) and by mediation (making sug-
gestions about possible solutions and acting as an intermediary between
sides) and arbitration (rendering a judgment that all sides agree in advance
to accept) of disputes between states. It also attempts to pressure states
by instituting diplomatic and economic sanctions. For example,
UN-imposed sanctions against South Africa refl ected the judg-
ment that racial discrimination (apartheid) was considered a
threat to peace. Limited economic sanctions, an embargo on
arms sales to South Africa, embargoes against South African
athletic teams, and selective divestment were all part of a visible
campaign to isolate South Africa. These acts exerted pressure
whose impact is diffi cult to quantify, although observers usually
assert that they have played an important role [in the disman-
tling of the apartheid government].36
In addition, the United Nations seeks to create positive peace, which
means not just the absence of war, but the resolution of the underlying
conditions from which confl ict emerges. In this way, it promotes eco-
nomic and social development and humanitarian affairs. According to the
United Nations,
state-building Efforts
to create stable,
legitimate political
authority and institutions
in post-confl ict
situations.
positive peace
Resolution of underlying
causes of confl ict.

International Organizations and Collective Security 319
although most people associate the United Nations with the
issues of peace and security, the vast majority of its resources
are devoted to economic development, social development and
sustainable development. . . . Guiding the United Nations work
is the conviction that lasting international peace and security
are possible only if the economic and social well-being of people
everywhere is assured.37
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) handles the economic and
social programs of the United Nations, serving as a clearinghouse and
central administrative body for its associated functional organizations,
such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Health Organization (WHO). The
United Nations also regularly holds conferences on the environment,
population, women, economic development, refugees, and children in an
effort to address some of the underlying causes of international confl ict,
instability, and insecurity. Attention to these issues that are not tradi-
tionally considered security matters is important according to both lib-
eral and feminist theories, as discussed in Chapter 1.
The Future of the United Nations
In addition to the criticisms of UN activities in Somalia, Yugoslavia,
and Rwanda in the mid-1990s, questions about the future of the United
Nations continue to be raised. A critical concern is the funding for the
United Nations. As Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar noted at
the end of the Cold War, “It is a great irony that the UN is on the brink
of insolvency at the very time the world community has entrusted the
organization with new and unprecedented responsibilities.”38 By 1992,
80 percent of the UN members had not paid their dues. The United
States has been one of the largest UN debtors. Beginning in the 1980s, the
United States has at times withheld payment from various UN programs
to protest some of the organization’s activities. Specifi cally, under pres-
sure from domestic interest groups, successive administrations barred
the use of U.S. funds to international organizations involved in family
planning and population control, charging that abortion was being pro-
moted through these activities. In addition, members of the U.S. Con-
gress perceive a disparity between what the United States contributes to
the UN budget and the infl uence of those states within the organization
that contribute so much less. Because dues are based on the size of a
nation’s economy, the United States has annually paid about 25 percent
of the UN budget. By the early 1990s, it was paying over 30 percent
of the organization’s peacekeeping bills. Even more irksome, perhaps,
from the point of view of U.S. lawmakers, the eight largest contributors
to the United Nations provide 73 percent of the budget but have only 4
percent of the votes in the General Assembly. And the remaining 177
Economic and
Social Council
(ECOSOC) UN
institutions for
economic and social
programs on such
issues as development,
employment, health, and
education.

320 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
countries in the assembly, which can dominate the proceedings with
their votes, contribute only 27 percent of the budget (see Figure 9.3). Yet
those countries that contribute only a small portion determine the bud-
get’s size and allocation. In the words of Senator Jesse Helms, chairman
of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was highly criti-
cal of the United Nations, its annual budget is “voted on by the General
Assembly, where the United States has no veto, and where every nation
whether democratic or dictatorial, no matter how much or how little it
contributes to the United Nations has an equal vote.”39
In response to this situation, “Under an act of Congress in 1996, the
United States stopped paying its 31 percent assessment for peacekeeping
operations, unilaterally lowering it to 25 percent and falling steadily deeper
into debt. The Clinton administration also made a deal with Congress to
cut regular budget payments from 25 percent to 22.”40 Japan, the second-
largest contributor, has also threatened to cut its UN payments.41 The Unit-
ed Nations remains in fi nancial crisis today. Although the United States
paid much of its past dues to the United Nations in 2001, it still owed $394
million in 2008.42 The UN’s fi nancial crisis demonstrates how vulnerable
international organizations like the United Nations are to states and their
domestic politics. The United Nations depends on states to voluntarily
contribute funds and other resources, such as peacekeeping troops.
UN supporters point out that as profl igate as the United Nations may
be in its fi nancial dealings, analyzed in context, it is arguably a bargain.
The budget for the Secretariat, for example, is only for a fraction of bud-
gets for major cities, such as New York. Peacekeeping is expensive, but
miniscule compared to the U.S. defense budget. According to the United
Nations, “A study by the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce esti-
mated that it would cost the United States approximately twice as much
as the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar to the UN Stabi-
lization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). . . .”43 The peacekeeping budget
in 2000 amounted to 30 cents per person in the world.
Percentages
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Proportion of Votes,
Smaller Contributors
Proportion of Budget
Proportion of Votes,
Larger Contributors
Proportion of Budget
Figure 9.3 Typical
Budget Obligations
Versus Votes, UN General
Assembly

International Organizations and Collective Security 321
Another criticism of the United Nations that may shape its future
concerns its structure and representation. It can, for example, plau-
sibly be argued that the United Nations is too dominated by rich and
powerful countries like the United States and that this undermines its
legitimacy.44 Observed from the point of view of poorer countries, the
United Nations is under the control primarily of the rich, industrialized
countries of the West. Many feel that the representation in the Security
Council is anachronistic. The fi ve states that have a veto were selected
on the basis of the results of the Second World War. Not only does this
leave out major regional powers in the developing world (such as Brazil,
India, Nigeria, and Egypt), but it also leaves out states that are clearly
economic heavyweights (such as Japan and Germany) and states that
contribute heavily to UN peacekeeping operations (such as Canada).45 In
response to this concern, an Independent Working Group convened at the
request of the UN secretary-general concluded that “the Security Coun-
cil [should] be expanded from its present membership of 15 to a total
of approximately 23 Members, of whom not more than fi ve would be
new Permanent Members.”46 These fi ve new permanent members would
probably include Japan, Germany, and representatives from geographic
regions such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, but
in spite of unequivocal rhetorical support from Washington and
the fact that many other governments have declared themselves
in favor of changing the composition of the Security Council,
each major structural reform opens another Pandora’s box:
Which developing countries should be added? Why should they
be the most powerful or populous? After a civil war, should a
splintered state retain its seat? . . . Should there be three perma-
nent European members? What about the European Union (EU)?
Which countries should wield vetoes?47
It has also been recommended that the scope of the veto be restricted,
if such an expansion takes place, so that it would be applicable only to
peacekeeping and enforcement measures.
The United Nations has also recently faced the challenge of seem-
ing irrelevant to the world’s largest military power, the United States.
Although most Security Council members favored continued inspections
for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the UN was unable to prevent
or limit the U.S. intervention in that country in 2003, demonstrating the
organization’s weakness. According to one view,
President Bush’s doctrine of unilateral preemption, if main-
tained, challenged the 1945 commitment to collective security
in the UN Charter. By acting without the UN authorization, or
early UN ratifi cation after the fact, when no imminent threat
to U.S. national security seemed to exist, the Bush administra-
tion circumvented the bedrock principles on which the United

322 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
Nations was founded. Other major powers on the Security
Council noted the grave precedent set by U.S. action and sought
ways to constrain Washington’s unilateral foreign policy.48
Despite the fallout between the United Nations and the United States
over Iraq, the organization and the Bush administration continued to
work together on issues of global importance, including nuclear programs
in Iran and North Korea and the confl ict between Hezbollah and Israel in
Lebanon in 2006. Even in Iraq, the United Nations has played some role,
such as assisting in the fi rst elections, although the insecure situation
severely restricted UN activities, particularly after the attack on the UN
building in Iraq in August 2003.
Despite its problems and its current budgetary crisis, it is likely
that the United Nations will continue to be a signifi cant global actor.
It is a vast organization that performs a number of roles in interna-
tional politics, beyond issues of security and peace. UN agencies such
as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour
Organization (ILO) are quite active in AIDS policy and workers’ rights,
respectively. And the majority of its members from less developed coun-
tries (LDCs) fi nd it convenient for a variety of reasons. Many of them
cannot afford to establish embassies throughout the world. The United
Nations provides a place where they can meet and talk with offi cial
representatives of states to which they cannot afford to send ambas-
sadors. This kind of contact is valued, especially at a time when lead-
ers of developing countries generally believe, despite the wide variety
of political and economic structures their countries exhibit, that they
have many important concerns in common. Also, the United Nations
provides a forum and a platform that is probably irreplaceable for most
developing nations. If an offi cial from Zaire makes a speech in Zaire,
for example, it is likely to go unnoticed in most of the rest of the world.
But if Zaire’s delegate to the United Nations or a visiting dignitary
from Zaire delivers a speech in the General Assembly, there is at least
a reasonable chance that it will be picked up in The New York Times
or Le Monde. Finally, the structure of the United Nations allows such
nations not only to maintain contacts with one another but also to use
those contacts to build a coalition that can exert some political clout
in the General Assembly as well as in other UN agencies. And if that
coalition creates an imbalance between majority votes in the United
Nations and actual political power in the international system, this
inequality may not be so bad. In virtually every other forum and arena
of interaction in the global system, LDCs suffer a disadvantage in terms
of their political and economic power in relationship to the industrial-
ized world. Perhaps the United Nations can serve the useful purpose of
partially redressing that imbalance. For all these reasons, it seems fairly
certain that the United Nations will continue to be supported by most
of its members.

International Organizations and Collective Security 323
The continued existence of the United Nations is in the interest not
only of LDCs and the United States but also of the entire global political
system. It is possible that debates in the General Assembly and the Secu-
rity Council serve to exacerbate rather than mollify confl ict. It is also pos-
sible that in the long run, the United Nations will not be able to enforce
fully the ideals of collective security, despite the success of the world
community, using UN institutions to a limited extent, in terminating the
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. But at least a couple of lessons gleaned from
the historical record of the last century indicate that deemphasizing the
United Nations might be a serious mistake. The crisis that culminated in
the First World War might conceivably have been resolved if some insti-
tutionalized forum for negotiations among the great powers, such as that
provided by the Council of the League of Nations or the Security Council
of the United Nations, had existed. And certainly one cause of the Second
World War was the failure of the major powers to support the League of
Nations. Both of these assertions are, to be sure, debatable. Even the most
vigorous dissenter must agree, though, that they are not entirely implau-
sible. If there is a reasonable chance that an organization such as the
United Nations may help the world avoid catastrophes of the magnitude
of the world wars, is it not prudent to preserve the organization? Many
in the world seem to think so. The United Nations enjoys support and
legitimacy across the globe.49 In the international debate over interven-
tion in Iraq in 2003, for example, much of the public in many countries
expressed their preference that intervention should occur only under a
mandate of the United Nations. This is consistent with U.S. public opin-
ion on the United Nations, which generally supports multilateral initia-
tives over unilateral ones.50
At a time when both positive forces such as improved communica-
tions and transportation and worldwide problems such as famine, ter-
rorism, nuclear proliferation, and pollution are making it increasingly
necessary for the world community to function as a whole, it would
surely be a mistake to destroy virtually the only existing symbolic and
institutional basis for the community, as fl awed as it admittedly is. On
a more practical level, intergovernmental organizations such as the IMF
and WHO are expanding the scope of their activities and infl uence. The
same can be said for international nongovernmental organizations such
as multinational corporations and professional societies. What other
organization is better suited to the progressively more important task
of monitoring and coordinating the activities of these international and
transnational organizations? The United Nations is not likely to evolve
into a world government. It might, though, facilitate the coordination
of the world community’s efforts to deal with problems that cannot be
dealt with effectively by states going their separate ways, especially if
the major powers agree that the organization ought to be used for such
purposes, as they increasingly seemed inclined to do in the post–Cold
War era.

324 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
International Law
In addition to international organizations, states create international law as a way to infl uence behavior, avoid confl ict, and maintain peace and
cooperation. As described by Hersch Lauterpacht, perhaps one of greatest
international law scholars, “The mission of international law is to lead
to enhancing the stability of international peace, to the protection of the
rights of man, and to reducing the evils and abuses of national power.”51
According to liberalism, international law can provide incentives to coop-
erate and organize predictable consequences to punish states that do not
cooperate. But according to realism, international law is often irrelevant
to global politics. After all, the international community is anarchic; that
is, there is no central authority or government. The business of govern-
ment is making, applying, and enforcing laws; because the international
political system has no government, it is only natural to conclude that
international law either does not really exist or is not really law.
That is a common opinion for several reasons, one of which is that
states (or their representatives) so often behave in violent and unethical
ways. Also, there is no established way to enforce legal rules in the inter-
national system. A law in domestic systems is virtually by defi nition a
rule that is enforced or has force behind it. If there is no enforcement in
the global political system, there is no law. Add to this lack of enforce-
ment mechanisms the lack of an authoritative legislative body to formu-
late laws, and the basis for law in the international system does in fact
seem extremely fl imsy.
Sources and Principles
Although there is no enforcer and no legislative organ for the global
community, there is a centralized judicial body, the International Court
of Justice, or World Court. It is the successor to the Permanent Court of
International Justice, which was established in 1920. As described in the
UN Charter, the World Court has fi fteen members elected to nine-year
terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice contains a widely accept-
ed statement of the sources of international law. (Since there is no inter-
national legislature, international laws have to come from somewhere
else.) The statute asserts that international law is based on (1) interna-
tional treaties; (2) international custom; (3) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; (4) previous judicial decisions; and (5)
the writings of recognized legal scholars or qualifi ed publicists. The two
most important sources of contemporary international law are treaties
and customs. Treaties (also called agreements, protocols, conventions,
charters, and pacts, among other terms) are between international actors
and are binding only to those actors that sign and ratify them. The United
Nations Treaty Collection, a depository of treaties, contains more than
international
law Rules governing
relations between states,
primarily based on
treaties, custom, and
general legal principles.

International Law 325
500 major multilateral treaties, in addition to many bilateral treaties.
While treaties are written products, customs are based on behavior. Inter-
national customary law is based on the general practices of states or states
acting as if there is an accepted law governing their behavior. “The main
evidence of customary law is to be found in the actual practice of states,
and a rough idea of a state’s practice can be gathered from published
material—from newspaper reports of actions taken by states, and from
statements made by government spokesmen . . . and also from a state’s
laws and judicial decisions.”52 State behaviors pertaining to freedom
of the high seas, the immunities of diplomats, behaviors in wartime, and
territorial jurisdiction have been interpreted as evidence of international
customary law. Once a custom is recognized as international law, all
states are bound to it, even if they have not consented or if it is not a
universally accepted custom. Treaties are becoming the more important
source of international law, as states have increasingly preferred to codify
existing customary practices.53
There is little doubt, then, that international law exists, on paper
at least. But there is still room for much doubt about its effectiveness.
Despite hundreds of treaties, treatises, and rulings by courts, the interna-
tional legal structure is so fi lled with loopholes and ambiguities that the
ability of international law to constrain state behavior is questionable.
Perhaps the most fundamental loophole lies at the heart of international
law in the form of the concept of sovereignty.
As developed originally by Jean Bodin in De Republica (1576), sov-
ereignty refers to the supreme lawmaking and law-enforcing authority
within a given territory. A state is sovereign in the sense that it is a source
of, but not subject to, laws. This notion of sovereignty, which is clear
enough within a certain territorial area, becomes problematic when its
implications for relations between territorial units are considered: “What
in law and logic could be the appropriate relationship between two sov-
ereign states, each incorporating an authority that alleged itself to be
supreme, and which recognized no superior?”54 The answer is that all
states must be considered absolutely equal in legal terms.
On this absolute legal equality is based the principle of noninterven-
tion. No state has the right to interfere in the affairs of any other, since
that would imply that the interfering state is somehow superior. Another
implication of sovereignty and sovereign equality is that the only rules
that are binding on states are ones to which they consent.55 Even when
states give their consent to certain rules, they are often “so vague and
ambiguous and so qualifi ed by conditions and reservations as to allow the
individual nation a very great degree of freedom of action whenever they
are called upon to comply with a rule of international law.”56 Typically,
states can be taken into a court of international law (such as the World
Court) only if they are willing.57 And even if they have created law, in
effect, by signing a treaty, states are not necessarily bound by that law.
One long-standing principle of international law inserts a kind of implicit

326 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
escape clause into every treaty signed by sovereign states. Referred to
as clausula rebus sic stantibus, this principle stipulates that treaties are
binding only “so long as things stand as they are.”58 In other words, if
the circumstances as they stood at the time of the signing of the treaty
change in some vital way, as determined by one of the signatories to that
agreement, the treaty is no longer considered binding. This principle is
“capable of being used, and . . . often has been used, merely to excuse the
breach of a treaty obligation that a state fi nds inconvenient to fulfi ll.”59
The Impact of International Law
International law, devoid of any centralized enforcement authority
and formulated by states in such a way as to preserve their freedom of
action, is often cleverly avoided, openly fl outed, or simply ignored. When
Iranians seized American hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979,
the United States took its case to the International Court of Justice.
The World Court ruled against the Iranian government but had no
effective means to enforce its judgment. The hostages remained trapped
in the embassy for 444 days. The Nicaraguan government repeatedly
charged the Reagan administration with violations of international law.
The World Court ruled in June 1986 that those complaints were valid.
But the United States simply rejected that ruling (and other similar ones),
and the court had no apparent effect on the Reagan administration’s
campaign to depose the Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan government.
Perhaps the most famous, or infamous, example of the impotence of
international law is the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, offi cially the Trea-
ty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National
Policy, or the Pact of Paris. This treaty was an attempt to outlaw interna-
tional war. In retrospect, with the Second World War and many other wars
having been fought since then, the attempt looks idealistic to a foolish
extreme. Indeed, “the shape of the international system during the Cold
War reinforced this realist perspective. International institutions and
judicial bodies such as the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice . . . were hobbled by both the bipolar split in world politics and its
aggravation of tensions between the developed and developing worlds.”60
Despite the obvious validity of a claim that the international legal
system has serious fl aws, the case against international law is usually
overstated. International laws are often broken, but so are domestic laws,
as the homicide rate in most major U.S. cities demonstrates. The fact that
murders occur in every society does not commonly lead to the conclusion
that laws against murder have no effect or are not really laws. Granted,
domestic laws have force behind them. Some murderers are arrested and
punished. But the idea that “law works because it is a command backed
up by force [is] essentially false.”61 The U.S. government routinely obeys
rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court, even though the Court commands no
troops or other means to enforce those rulings.
Kellogg-Briand
Pact Treaty that
attempted to outlaw war.

International Law 327
In short, laws, including international ones, are sometimes obeyed
even if the fear of punishment is absent. President Truman obeyed the
Supreme Court out of respect for the system and with a sense that the
system was worth preserving even if it meant losing on the issue at
hand. Most people, most of the time, perhaps obey laws not merely
because they fear punishment but, because they believe the laws are
just or benefi cial in principle. Similarly, in global politics, “nations have
a common interest in keeping the society running and keeping inter-
national relations orderly. They observe laws they do not care about to
maintain others which they value, and to keep the system’ intact.”62
Furthermore, upholding international law has become a test of sorts of
a state’s credibility. “Every nation’s foreign policy depends substantially
on its ‘credit’—on maintaining the expectation that it will live up to
international mores and obligations. Considerations of ‘honor,’ ‘pres-
tige,’ ‘leadership,’ ‘infl uence,’ ‘reputation,’ which fi gure prominently in
governmental decisions, often weigh in favor of observing law.”63 Lead-
ers may also uphold international law to get “credit” from their domes-
tic constituents who often have internalized and support principles of
international law.64
Furthermore, most people obey the majority of laws much of the
time, because cooperation pays. That is, the benefi ts from cooperative,
law-abiding behavior outweigh the costs, at least in the long run. Take
the simple example of the law in most countries requiring motorists to
stop at red traffi c lights. Even if all the police in a city were to go on
strike, reducing to zero the probability that violators would be arrested,
chances are that most people would continue to obey this law. To do
otherwise would risk injury or death in a traffi c accident. That law, to an
important extent, is self-enforcing.
Roughly analogous situations obtain in the realm of international
law. For example, there are laws against the mistreatment of personnel
representing foreign countries. In fact, diplomatic personnel are in
some respects above the law, being granted diplomatic immunity.
Any government that mistreats diplomats from other countries could
expect its own diplomats to be targets of retaliation. That is clearly one
reason the laws regarding the treatment of diplomats have rarely been
violated. When the Iranian government held U.S. diplomatic personnel
as hostages in 1979 and 1980, its behavior was virtually without
precedent.
There are also many consistently observed laws having to do with
routine international interactions in the areas of trade, communications,
and immigration. These areas are sometimes referred to as private inter-
national law to distinguish them from public international law, which
governs relations between governments and other international actors
such as international organizations and nongovernmental organizations.
Disputes in these areas are almost always successfully dealt with through
legal channels.
diplomatic
immunity Freedom
from arrest or
prosecution granted to
foreign representatives.

328 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
International law is not entirely lacking in enforcement either:
The traditional toolbox to secure compliance with the law of
nations consists of negotiations, mediation, countermeasures
(reciprocal action against the violator) or, in rare cases, recourse
to supranational judicial bodies such as the International Court
of Justice. . . . For many years, these tools have been supple-
mented by the work of international institutions, whose reports
and resolutions often help “mobilize shame” against its viola-
tors. But today, states, NGOs, and private entities, aided by their
lawyers, have striven for sanctions with more teeth. They have
galvanized the UN Security Council to issue economic sanc-
tions against Iraq, Haiti, Libya, Serbia, Sudan, and other nations
refusing to comply with UN resolutions.65
In sum, “international law provides the framework for establishing rules
and norms, outlines the parameters of interaction, and provides the pro-
cedures for resolving disputes among those taking part in these interac-
tions. . . . [International law also acts] . . . as a normative system [and] pro-
vides direction for international relations by identifying the substantive
values and goals to be pursued.”66 While violations of international law
may appear blatant, “the reality as demonstrated through their behavior
is that states do accept international law and, even more signifi cant, in
the vast majority of instances they obey it.”67
International law in the twenty-fi rst century is addressing more global
concerns, such as the environment and economic cooperation. It is also
addressing ethics, particularly human rights. While contemporary inter-
national law is still organized around the principles of sovereignty and
nonintervention, there have been signifi cant challenges to these notions
in the post–Cold War era. “We have seen some erosion of the concept of
state sovereignty and of some of its earlier implications, such as state sov-
ereign immunity. The international system has accepted a fundamental
permutation of state societies as a result of the International Human
Rights Movement: . . . How a state treats its own inhabitants is now of
international concern and a staple of international politics and law.”68
Ethics, Morality, and International Politics
The current developments in international law concerning human rights are attempts to codify certain values and ethics and apply them
to global politics. What is ethical and what is legal can be dealt with
separately even in discussions of domestic politics. Not all legal behav-
ior is ethical, and illegal behavior (civil disobedience of unjust laws, for
example) is not necessarily unethical for individuals within the context of
domestic political systems. But legality and morality are even more tenu-
ously related for states in the global community than they are for individ-
uals in domestic politics. Most domestic political systems have regular,
ethics Standards for
evaluating right and
wrong.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 329
accepted procedures for translating ethical values into legal, enforceable
rules. Murder is considered unethical in virtually every society, and it is
also illegal, meaning that rules against it are enforced, with violators pun-
ished according to established procedures. Like other communities, the
international one is based in part on shared ethical standards intended to
induce more orderly and predictable behavior among states as they inter-
act. Yet in the international community, there is typically more diversity
of opinion about what is ethical or moral.
According to a commonly held view, moral principles have nothing to
do with international politics, even though they are discussed regularly.
If defenders of national policies are to be believed, the policies of every
state in the world conform rigorously to the highest ethical standards
and are motivated primarily by the purest altruistic motives.69 But in the
standard skeptical view, morality in the context of international politics
is like the weather: Everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything
about it.
Opinions such as these are not often totally without foundation, and
skepticism about the role of moral principles in international politics is
supported by considerable evidence and logic. First, historically as well
as in modern times, many important actors in international politics have
behaved in blatantly immoral ways, apparently free from the infl uence
of ethical considerations. Also, the peoples of the world have very dis-
parate ideas about what constitutes moral behavior. Then, too, because
the international political system is anarchic, there is no central author-
ity, no government, nobody responsible for enforcing laws designed to
enforce morality. “The moral requirements of a state which has some-
how to survive in a context of states each of which is potentially a violent
criminal and above which there is no political superior with a monopoly
of authority to enforce law and order, must be different from that of an
individual in an orderly civil society.”70
This fairly typical statement that the moral requirements of states
are different from those of individuals seems suspiciously like a euphe-
mistic way of saying that they do not have any moral requirements at all,
except to do whatever they must to protect themselves. And this idea,
this skepticism about the role of morality in politics, attracts support
from widely divergent points on the ideological and theoretical spectrum.
Realism rejects ethics as a guide for foreign policy, arguing that states are
driven instead by interests and power.71 Similarly, Marxist writers believe
that ethical justifi cations for political actions are “superstructure” and
tools in class warfare.72 Leon Trotsky spoke for many of his Marxist peers
when he argued that “the appeal to abstract norms is not a disinterested
philosophical mistake but a necessary element in the mechanism of class
deception.”73
Still, a case can be made for the proposition that moral principles
should and do play an important role in international politics. Ideal-
ism makes this case, arguing that morals and values, not state interests,

330 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
should and do shape individual and state behavior. Although violence is
common in the international system, and there is no centralized author-
ity to enforce moral standards, states do not continuously behave in a
disorderly and immoral fashion. In other words, even though there is
a constant threat that world politics will degenerate into a war of “all
against all,” actual warfare is not typical. “The international community
possesses a variety of devices for promoting compliance with established
norms. These range from such mild sanctions as community disapproval
and censure by international organizations to coordinated national poli-
cies of economic embargoes of offending states.”74 Most publicity about
these sanctions and embargoes focuses on the limitations of their effec-
tiveness. But ethical principles, like laws, are also violated repeatedly by
individuals within domestic political systems, and unless disorder reach-
es extraordinarily high levels, these numerous violations do not often
provoke or justify the conclusion that ethical considerations have no
effect on the behavior of individuals within those societies.
Even well-known moral skeptics concede that ethical principles do
have an impact on international politics. According to one realist, for
example, even “the most cynical realist cannot afford even in the inter-
est of realism to ignore political ideals. . . . For man is at heart a moral
being.”75 Similar sentiments can be found in Marxist writing. Trotsky
noted that Lenin’s “‘amoralism’ . . . his rejection of supra-class morals,
did not hinder him from remaining faithful to one and the same idea
throughout his whole life; from devoting his whole being to the cause of
the oppressed.”76
Moral skepticism, then, in the analysis of domestic as well as inter-
national politics, can be and often is taken too far. Nations do pursue val-
ues, such as economic justice, protection of human rights, and the spread
of democratic political arrangements. Some of the rhetoric by national
political leaders who strive for those goals is, to be sure, hypocritical. But
“it is only a prejudice that these [goals] are mere masks for self-interest;
neither citizens nor governments see such goals that way.”77
Even if we grant that international political actors are genuinely
infl uenced by moral standards, it may still be a waste of time to discuss
seriously those standards and their application to moral problems. Indi-
viduals adhering to moral relativism insist that “moral judgments are just
mere opinion, concerning which there is no point in arguing, as there is
no point in arguing about any matters of taste or personal predilection.”78
Others reject extreme moral relativism partly out of reluctance to accept
the conclusion implied by such relativism that all foreign policies and
international political acts must logically be categorized as amoral, or
equally immoral; that, for example, it is impossible to distinguish, mor-
ally speaking, between Hitler’s attack on Belgium in 1940 and the deci-
sion by Belgium’s leaders to resist that attack. Many feminists agree with
idealism’s criticism of realism and embrace moral issues as important in
global politics. Some feminists, however, believe that morality is relative
moral
skepticism Denial
that morality does or
should infl uence actors’
behaviors.
moral
relativism Belief that
moral judgments have no
objective basis.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 331
and dependent on, or constructed by, cultural contexts. In other words,
they recognize the importance of morality but emphasize its variabili-
ty across cultures. Other feminists see some morals and values, such as
women’s rights, as universal. Still others reject the idea that the debate
over human rights should revolve around the extremes of cultural relativ-
ism and universalism, arguing that
universalism and relativism are not mutually exclusive catego-
ries but rather different ends of a continuum. . . . In defi ning and
promoting international human rights, the challenge is to assert
and defend the universality of basic rights while recognizing that
the formulation and application of rights claims will depend in
part on the social and cultural context in which rights claims are
asserted.79
The Ethics of War and Nuclear Deterrence
War may seem like the breakdown of international law and moral stan-
dards in global politics, but there are legal standards applied to the purpose
and conduct of war, and many times these standards are obeyed. Indeed,
the laws of war are the oldest and most developed. Under the Geneva
Conventions (1949), for example, soldiers have the right to surrender and
become prisoners of war (POWs). As POWs, they are expected to be treat-
ed humanely, and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent has the right
to provide food and medical supplies and to keep track of POWs and refu-
gees during wartime. The conventions also establish rules for the protec-
tion of civilians in areas covered by war and in occupied territories. As of
2009, more than 190 states have ratifi ed the conventions. Today, there is
considerable debate over how these agreements relate to suspects of ter-
rorism. The Policy Choices box summarizes some of the issues involved
in U.S. treatment of detainees in anti-terrorist operations.80
Additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions have declared
that the right of actors in international and noninternational confl icts
to choose methods of warfare is not limited. The protocols prohibit the
use of weapons that cause superfl uous injury or unnecessary suffering.
Indeed, some acts of war are not acceptable, according to the interna-
tional community. In 1948, the United Nations adopted the Genocide
Convention, which declares that any acts intended to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such are crimes
punishable under international law. Most states have signed the Genocide
Convention.
After World War II, the victorious allies tried German and Japanese
leaders and military offi cers for war crimes through international tribu-
nals. More recently, Yugoslavian, Rwandan, and Liberian leaders and offi –
cials have been indicted by UN war crime tribunals. The former leader of
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, was imprisoned in 2001 and put to trial
for crimes against humanity:
Geneva Conventions
International
humanitarian laws
dealing with treatment
of wounded or captured
soldiers and civilians
under enemy control.
Genocide
Convention Treaty
declaring illegal any acts
intended to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial, or
religious group.
war crimes Violations
of international law
governing conduct of
warfare and treatment
of soldiers and civilians
during confl ict.

332 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should Traditional Laws of War Apply to Enemy
Combatants in the “War on Terror”?
(continued)
ISSUE: The treatment of prisoners in the U.S.-led “war on terror” has been subject to
intense debate, both internationally and within the United States. Article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions prohibits humiliating and degrading treatment of prisoners and
grants them all judicial guarantees seen as indispensable by civilized societies. The
administration of George W. Bush asserted that the Geneva Convention does not
pertain to detainees suspected of terrorism and of having connections to Al Qaeda
and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The terrorist suspects, held for indefi nite periods and
without standard legal safeguards, were confi ned at U.S. military bases in Guantána-
mo Bay, Cuba (GITMO), in Afghanistan, and in CIA detention centers in undisclosed
locations. The United States also extended GITMO procedures to U.S.-controlled
prisons in Iraq and rendered (handed over) suspects to be held in prisons in other
countries, some known for human rights violations. These practices generated wide-
spread condemnation, especially by European and Middle Eastern countries and hu-
man rights NGOs. In the United States, the Supreme Court and Congress challenged
Bush administration policies on treatment of terror suspects. Upon assuming offi ce,
President Obama ordered the closing of the Guantánamo Bay detention center and
other secret prisons and released memos detailing the interrogation techniques that
were used by the Central Intelligence Agency on terrorist suspects.
Option #1: Traditional laws of war are inadequate to effectively deal with terror-
ism and the treatment of suspected terrorists.
Arguments: (a) International law was constructed for conventional warfare and
does not apply to this new, stateless enemy. It is vague on what defi nes torture
and “humiliating and degrading treatment,” as expressed in the Geneva Conven-
tion. What is humiliating or degrading to one culture or individual may not be to
another. (b) Aggressive interrogation may reveal critical information about pend-
ing attacks, such as those of 9/11. (c) The threat of harsh treatment may deter
individuals from joining terrorist causes, or prevent some terrorists from engaging
in more aggressive and dangerous acts.
Counterarguments: (a) International law protects all agents in wars; even illegal
and irregular combatants have minimal rights under widely agreed-upon conven-
tions. International law is clear on what constitutes humans rights violations, and
U.S. efforts to defi ne torture as only involving “organ failure” are unacceptable.
(b) Information derived from torture is notoriously untrustworthy, because people
will say anything to end their suffering. U.S. military manuals have long viewed
prisoner abuse as ineffective for gathering quality intelligence. (c) Engaging in tor-
ture simply reinforces the negative attitude many hold of the United States, thus
resulting in more recruiting and intensifi ed resolve of potential enemies.
Option #2: The United States must embrace international law and respect the
fundamental rights of detainees.
Arguments: (a) International laws, such as those against torture, are the pinnacle
of humanitarianism, and abiding by them shows the United States to be a leader

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 333
The creation of the UN war crimes tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 stemmed from the
worldwide revulsion over the documented evidence of wide-
spread killings of civilians and other human rights violations
in those two confl icts. The tribunals were the fi rst courts ever
created by the United Nations to try individuals for war crimes:
the victorious Allies had conducted the trials of German and
Japanese offi cials after World War II.81
In 1998, 120 states took the prosecution of war crimes a step fur-
ther when they voted to create an International Criminal Court (ICC), a
permanent tribunal with powers to try acts of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. The court is composed of eighteen judges
from different countries and a prosecutor with the power to initiate cases
and is located in The Hague, the Netherlands, also home to many UN
war crimes tribunals and the UN’s International Court of Justice. The
International Court of Justice handles disputes only between states; the
ICC hears cases against individuals. The ICC is not part of the UN orga-
nizational structure. It receives its funding through contributions from
states, international and nongovernmental organizations, corporations,
and individuals. The court has jurisdiction only over crimes committed
after July 1, 2002, when it came into force. National courts have priority
to try their citizens of crimes, but the court has jurisdiction when states
International
Criminal Court
(ICC) Permanent
tribunal that tries
individuals accused of
genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war
crimes.
of international morality and ethics. U.S. commitments to democracy based on
civil and political rights are undermined and seen as hypocritical when repres-
sive techniques are employed. (b) Undermining the Geneva Conventions is not
in the U.S. interests, because it puts its own military personnel at risk of torture if
captured in future confl icts. Abiding by international law continues the norm of
reciprocity; ignoring it weakens centuries-old customs that regulate the conduct
of war. (c) Violating international law tarnishes the U.S. image in the world and
generates condemnation from important allies. The United States loses the battle
for hearts and minds when human rights violations are associated with U.S. prac-
tice, such as with the photos of abuse in the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison.
Counterarguments: (a) International law loses the moral high ground when it
protects immoral actors and tactics, such as those associated with terrorism. Fur-
thermore, state rhetoric never matches reality, particularly in times of crisis; other
states have pursued similar policies in asymmetrical confl icts in which enemy com-
batants do not follow conventional tactics of warfare. (b) Harsh interrogations of
members of terrorist groups does not put our troops in jeopardy, because these
enemies typically do not take prisoners and, in any event, are unlikely to abide by
international law themselves. (c) National interests should drive U.S. policies, not
international norms that infringe on state sovereignty and hinder efforts to protect
a state from threats to its people.

334 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should States Support the International Criminal Court?
(continued)
ISSUE: At the Rome conference where the ICC was created, seven states voted
against it: China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar, Yemen, and the United States. The Unit-
ed States would eventually sign the treaty on December 31, 2000, the last possible
date for signature, but later it formally withdrew its support (in May 2002). The
new Obama administration signaled that it is supportive of the ICC, but Russia
and China remain opposed to the court. By late 2009, 108 states were parties to
the ICC.
Option #1: States should sign, ratify, and support the International Criminal
Court.
Arguments: (a) The ICC will have a positive infl uence on international society,
because it will uphold the commitment to the protection of human rights and
provide a means of accountability to international norms. (b) The ICC will act as
a potential deterrent to future transgressors—from heads of state and command-
ing offi cers to militia recruits—and, through deterrence, lower the need for costly
interventions. (c) The ICC is needed, because states are often unwilling or unable
to prosecute their own citizens or leaders who commit heinous crimes.
Counterarguments: (a) The ICC is unlikely to fare any better than the World Court
and UN Human Rights Commission in the extension of international law, especial-
ly because it lacks connection to established international organizations. (b) There
is no evidence that the ICC will exert a deterrent effect. Individuals most likely to
commit fl agrant human rights violations are probably the least likely to feel the ef-
fect of international norms or moral convictions. (c) States, with established policy
and judicial systems, are the best place to pursue credible justice and should not
abdicate that responsibility to an international body.
Option #2: States should not support the ICC and instead should support the
prosecution of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity through exist-
ing, alternative mechanisms.
Arguments: (a) States will be the target of politically minded prosecutions of their
leaders and military personnel; ICC safeguards against abuse of the prosecutorial
system are inadequate and vague. (b) When domestic will is lacking, the interna-
tional community can respond to international crimes through the UN Security
Council, consistent with the UN Charter, or through ad hoc international mecha-
nisms such as the international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. (c)
Any such permanent body is likely to be more ineffi cient than tribunals specifi c to
the violations. The ICC is infl exible and unable to incorporate novel solutions.
Counterarguments: (a) The court has an extremely narrow jurisdiction, and judg-
es and prosecutors must abide by strict guidelines, thereby making prosecutions
based on political agendas highly unlikely; not signing means no input into the
management of the ICC. (b) Ad hoc tribunals can serve only “selective justice.”
Why were tribunals established for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda but not for
Cambodia, for example? A permanent court administers justice more consistently.
(c) Ad hoc efforts at international justice do not facilitate enduring cooperation.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 335
are unwilling or unable to do so. The ICC came into existence in 2002,
when the necessary sixty states ratifi ed it. While some hail the creation
of the ICC as “the biggest legal milestone since Hitler’s henchmen were
tried at Nuremberg,”82 there has been strong opposition to the court,
particularly from some of the major states (see the Policy Choices box).
There is considerable doubt about its effectiveness and legitimacy given
this opposition.83 In 2009, the ICC, for the fi rst time, issued a warrant
for the arrest of a sitting head of state, President al-Bashir of Sudan. The
court charged the leader with crimes against humanity and war crimes
in Darfur, but the Sudanese government vowed to resist the court and
immediately expelled Western aid groups in retaliation.84
Most of the laws concerning war are consistent with the just war tra-
dition, based on writings of Saint Augustine of Hippo in the fi fth century
and Saint Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century:
Just War is the name for a diverse literature on the morality of
war and warfare that offers criteria for judging whether a war is
just and whether it is fought by just means. This tradition, thus,
debates our moral obligations in relation to violence and the use
of lethal force. The thrust of the tradition is not to argue against
war as such, but to surround both the resort to war and its con-
duct with moral constraints and conditions.85
Hugo Grotius, a scholar in the seventeenth century and often consid-
ered the “founder of international law,” helped codify just war ideas into
modern international convention. Just war principles are divided into the
categories of jus ad bellum (laws on the use of force) and jus in bello (laws
in war). The most important principles are listed in Table 9.2.
Just war principles are certainly violated by states, but they do serve
as the foundation for moral judgments and are often applied to contempo-
rary confl ict. For example, in the case of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq
in 2003, former President Jimmy Carter, in an editorial in The New York
Times in March 2003, cited just war principles He argued that the war
was not just for the following reasons: all nonviolent options were not
exhausted; aerial bombardment inevitably cannot discriminate between
combatants and noncombatants; there was no evidence that tied the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks to Iraq, which might justify violence propor-
tional to that injury; there was no legitimate authority sanctioning the
effort to change the regime; and the outcome of the war would not likely
just war Set of
principles for judging
conditions for when
states can resort to war
(jus ad bellum) and for
the conduct of war (jus in
bello).
By not signing, states send a clear message to the international community that
narrow self-interest is more important than global values and cooperation. Estab-
lishing a pattern of international commitment will undoubtedly promote better
solutions to problems that transcend state boundaries.

336 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
be a clear improvement over what existed. Others disagreed, although
the main disagreement was whether the war met these principles, not
over whether just war principles should be applied to the confl ict.86
Just war principles have been applied more broadly to the “war on
terror.” According to one scholar, in order to use the Just War tradition to
evaluate counter-terror operations, “First of all we need to ask whether
all terrorism is unjust and to understand why. Then we need to evaluate
the legitimacy of the war on terror itself.”87 While some have concluded
that many aspects of the anti-terror strategies of the United States have
been unjust because they are disproportionate, others believe that the end
goal of combating terrorism justifi es certain means.88
The weighing of costs and benefi ts in the Just War tradition may
seem a natural way of resolving moral dilemmas, but there is an impor-
TABLE 9.2
Just War Principles
Principle Defi nition
Jus ad Bellum
Right authority Only a legitimate authority has the right to declare
war.
Just cause We are not only permitted but may be required to
use lethal force if we have a just cause.
Right intention In war, not only the cause and goals must be just,
but also our motive for responding to the cause and
taking up the goals.
Last resort We may resort to war only if it is the last viable
alternative.
Proportionality We must be confi dent that resorting to war will do
more good than harm.
Reasonable hope We must have reasonable grounds for believing the
cause can be achieved.
Relative justice No state can act as if it possesses absolute justice.
Open declaration An explicit formal statement is required before
resorting to force.
Jus in Bello
Discrimination Noncombatants must be given immunity and
protection.
Proportionality Military actions must do more good than harm.
Source: Adapted from Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon
International Studies Review 42 (1998): p. 286.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 337
tant philosophical tradition that rejects such an approach. Deontological
theories insist that the morality of an act may be independent of the
consequences of that act—that certain acts (or actions based on rules)
are inherently good or bad, regardless of their consequences. In this view,
actions either conform to valid moral rules—for example, “We ought
always to tell the truth,” in which case they are moral—or they do not,
and so are immoral. These rules are valid independent of whether they
promote the good.89
In other words, according to the deontological point of view, an act is
moral if it is based on valid moral principles; it is the rule on which the
act is based, rather than the consequences of the act, to which one must
look in order to evaluate its morality.
This stance might seem on the surface a stereotypical “head in the
clouds” position that only a philosopher could love. But philosophy is
full of surprises. Imagine that a police station is surrounded by a mob
of people who are convinced, wrongly, that a man inside the station is
responsible for the rape and murder of their friend’s wife. They send a
message into the station stating that if the man is not turned over to
them, so that he may be dealt with in some traditionally agonizing man-
ner appropriate to the occasion, they will set fi re to the station, kill-
ing everyone inside. What is the moral decision for the commander of
the station? If the man in question is surrendered, one innocent person
will die. If the request to turn him over is denied, many innocent people
inside the station seem destined for certain death. Would it be morally
right to sacrifi ce the life of an innocent man to save the lives of many
equally innocent people?
Perhaps not. So maybe it is not so self-evident that, as utilitarians
argue, “our actions . . . are to be decided upon by determining which of
them produces or may be expected to produce the greatest general bal-
ance of good over evil.”90 In the case of nuclear deterrence, deontologists
argue that the waters are even muddier than in the example because the
consequences of deterrence are so diffi cult to discern.
There is little doubt that nuclear weapons and the doctrine of nucle-
ar deterrence create what is probably the most profound moral dilemma
that has ever faced the human species; they also bring into focus with
special clarity the more general ethical issues surrounding the use of
military force. No matter what the goal to be achieved or the principle
defended, the use of nuclear weapons in pursuit of that goal or in defense
of that principle entails the possibility that the world will be destroyed.
“If it can be shown that a nuclear war is likely to destroy the end(s) for
which it is waged, it can have neither political nor moral justifi cation.”91
If no cause can justify the risk of ending life on the planet, then it is
important to ask whether it is possible to defend, on moral grounds, a
policy of nuclear deterrence that is by defi nition based on the threat to
launch a nuclear attack, which in turn could lead to the demise of the
human race.

338 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
The Ethics of Intervention: Human Rights
versus States’ Rights
One moral issue that has come to the forefront of global politics and inter-
national law is human rights. All members of the United Nations have
signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, fi rst adopted by the
General Assembly in 1948. “Underlying the evolution of human rights
principles was a clear link between good governance and the maintenance
of international peace and security. It was believed that the aggressive for-
eign policies of the Axis powers [in World War II] were caused by the mili-
taristic nature of their political systems” which abused human rights.92
The UN Universal Declaration commits states to promote respect for
human rights and freedoms, including the right to life, liberty, freedom
from torture and arbitrary detention, equality before the law without any
discrimination, freedom of movement across countries, individual prop-
erty rights, freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to work,
education, and an adequate standard of living. Yet when the declaration
was adopted,
virtually all governments said the standards were not legally
binding upon them. At that time, no specifi c human rights
violations, apart from slavery, genocide, and gross abuses of the
rights of aliens, were effectively proscribed. Virtually all states
shielded themselves happily behind Article 2(7) of the UN Char-
ter arguing that human rights was strictly an internal affair for
the state concerned. While a UN Commission on Human Rights
was set up, governments entirely dominated its work. . . . When
the drafting of the two International Human Rights Covenants
was fi nally completed, in 1966, it took another decade before
a mere thirty-fi ve states ratifi ed them and brought them into
operation. Thus, the UN’s initial foray into the human rights
area was far from promising.”93
Numerous governments violate the human rights of their citizens. Some
governments stay in power without elections, against the apparent wish-
es of the majority of people in the country. Other governments simply
follow unwise policies, economic or otherwise, that perpetuate needless
suffering among their citizens. In a just world, governments that do such
things should be subject to the corrective and benefi cial infl uence of peo-
ple outside the borders of the country being victimized. In principle, a
lot of problems and abuses of human rights in many countries could be
solved by outside intervention.
But interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states is, for moral
purposes or otherwise, against one of the most important principles of
international law. The principle of nonintervention “is the most important
embodiment of the modern idea that states should be treated as autono-
mous entities; it is also the main structural principle of a conception
Universal Declaration
of Human Rights UN
agreement that commits
states to promote respect
for human rights and
freedoms.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 339
of the world, dominant since the mid-seventeenth century.”94 According
to most interpretations of international law, states should be left alone.
Interference in their internal affairs is not permissible, even for their own
good. Outsiders are permitted to intervene only to protect a government
against outside interference.
Some philosophically oriented analysts of international politics
fi nd this right of states to be free of outside interference an intolerable
limitation on the range of moral concern. One argument asserts, for
example, that only “legitimate states should be free of interference from
outsiders.”95 Another posits, in a similar way, that “unjust institutions
do not enjoy the same prima facie protection against external interfer-
ence as do just institutions.”96 And on the surface, there seems no good
reason that government leaders should be able to perpetrate all manner of
crimes against people under their rule and hide behind the international
legal principle of nonintervention.
The idea that states can use sovereignty as justifi cation for human
rights violations has lost much of its credibility. Indeed, “the view that
human rights violations are essentially domestic matters, while still
put forward in an almost ritual manner from time to time, receives very
little credence from the international community.”97 In the contempo-
rary era, several analysts have noted that one reason interventions have
become more acceptable (especially after the Cold War) “is the increas-
ing acceptance of the protection of individual rights as an international
norm.”98 Many of the UN peacekeeping missions, discussed earlier in
this chapter,
have had explicit human rights responsibilities. UN operations
in Haiti and Rwanda even had primarily human rights man-
dates. Operations in Somalia and northern Iraq also included a
human rights dimension. The tasks of these peacekeeping forces
have included monitoring the activities of the police and secu-
rity forces, verifying the discharge of human rights undertakings
in agreements ending civil wars, supervising elections, encourag-
ing authorities to adopt international human rights instruments
and comply with their international human rights obligations,
and providing human rights education.99
Indeed, after the Cold War, there have been numerous humanitarian
interventions, within and outside of the UN framework. Humanitarian
interventions involve “the threat or use of force across state borders by
a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and
grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other
than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose
territory force is applied.”100 But despite the changing views that inter-
vention for the protection of human rights may be appropriate, there exist
many dilemmas over the use of humanitarian interventions. Legally and
politically, the right of states to violate sovereignty remains controversial,
humanitarian
interventions Threats
of use of force against
a state accused of
perpetrating or allowing
human rights violations.

340 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
even if state sovereignty is no longer seen as absolute.101 Despite the UN
Security Council’s call for action to end the humanitarian crisis in Dar-
fur, for example, the Sudanese government has successfully resisted UN
peacekeeping forces for a long time with the argument that this would
violate its sovereignty. Ethically, some utilitarians question whether the
consequences of any military intervention are worth human rights abus-
es short of genocide.102
The diffi culties of resolving internal confl icts through outside inter-
vention and state-building efforts (discussed earlier in this chapter and
in Chapter 7) raise questions about the effectiveness of humanitar-
ian interventions. Even if the international community has the resolve
and resources to deploy forces quickly enough to prevent an escalation
of humanitarian abuses and to stay long enough to resolve underlying
confl icts, humanitarian interventions may not be that useful and may
have unintended consequences.103 One analyst of the Rwandan genocide
argues, for example, that the prospect of outside intervention may create
perverse incentives for weaker parties in such confl icts to
escalate the fi ghting and thereby exacerbate the suffering of
their own people, because they expect or hope to attract foreign
intervention. Thus a policy of intervening to relieve humanitar-
ian emergencies that stem from internal confl icts may uninten-
tionally increase the number and extent of such emergencies—a
classic instance of moral hazard.104
Part of a limited
humanitarian
intervention, a soldier
from the African
Union Force stands
in front of Sudanese
children in Darfur.
(Beatrice Mategwa/©
Reuters/Corbis)

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 341
This analyst concludes that prevention of severe human rights crises
is a much more effective strategy than is humanitarian intervention.
Part of the change in how the international community views human
rights has been due to the attention to this issue brought by transnational
networks of nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4).105
The United Nations has also become more focused on human rights.
Although its Human Rights Commission was created in 1946, “the United
Nations continued to build its human rights machinery through the
1990s—in particular, with the creation of the high commissioner post in
1993. In addition, the UN broadened the human rights agenda by creating
two special war crimes tribunals and moving to incorporate human rights
initiatives in peacekeeping operations.”106
Women’s Rights
Almost certainly the most pervasive human rights abuses in the world
involve women, who constitute half of the world’s population and are
subjected to discriminatory policies and violent acts in virtually all coun-
tries. Women are “beaten in their homes by intimate partners; raped and
otherwise sexually assaulted by law enforcement personnel while in their
custody; raped in refugee camps by other refugees, local police or the mil-
itary; and targeted for sexual violence based on their low social status.”107
According to the World Health Organization, women between the ages of
15 and 44 are more likely to die or be disabled as a result of violence than
from cancer, malaria, or traffi c accidents.
Another human rights issue involves discrimination against women,
even before birth. In China, the government’s population policy limits
families to one or two children. “That makes parents fearful of wast-
ing’ their quota on a girl.”108 Ultrasound scanners make it possible to
detect the gender of a child before birth. It is estimated that some 1.7
million unborn girls are identifi ed in this way each year in China and
subsequently aborted. In other words, as a result of government policy,
approximately 12 percent of female fetuses are aborted or otherwise unac-
counted for in China every year. Similar patterns can be found in other
Asian countries, such as South Korea and India.109 Economist Amartya
Sen estimates that 100 million women are “missing” in female defi cit
countries, that is, countries whose female populations are smaller than
they would be under “normal” circumstances; 44 million and 37 mil-
lion of these missing women are in China and India, respectively. “The
phenomenon of missing women refl ects a history of higher mortality for
females and a staunch anti-female bias in health care and nutrition in
these countries.”110
In the post–Cold War era, the international community has witnessed
rape as a tool of war in the Balkans and in Africa, traffi cking of girls and
women in Asia, and the establishment of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
female
defi cit Situation in
countries with female
populations smaller than
they would normally be.

342 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
Under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the most extreme case of female sub-
jugation under Islamic law,
women must don a ‘burqa,’ a dark robe with only a small, heavy
mesh opening to see through, before venturing out of the house. . . .
The many Afghan women whose fathers, husbands or brothers
have died in the country’s ongoing civil war live under virtual
house arrest. They are even denied a view of the outdoors, as
the windows of houses where women must live must be painted
over to prevent them from being seen from the street.111
The Taliban defended these policies as consistent with their culture and
religion. The debate over respect for differences in culture versus the
universality of women’s rights has been an important one on the global
agenda, as well as within the feminist perspective.
Consider, for example, the millions of African girls, and some girls in
Asia and the Middle East, who are subjected to female circumcision, as it
is called by its proponents, or female genital mutilation, as it is called by
its opponents:
Genital mutilation has been infl icted on 80 to 100 million girls
and young women. In countries where it is practiced, mostly
African, about two million youngsters a year can expect the
knife or the razor or a glass shard, to cut their clitoris or remove
it altogether, to have part or all of the labia minora cut off, and
part of the labia majora, and the sides of the vulva sewn together
with catgut or thorns.112
From one point of view, this might be considered a private matter,
a culturally based custom of no legitimate interest to outsiders. Alter-
natively, one might argue that it may not be accepted even in cultures
where it is practiced, since “a small number of African and foreign women
devote their lives to fi ghting genital mutilation. But unless they get major
help and attention, their struggle may take more generations.”113
What should be done about widespread mistreatment and abuse
of half the world’s population? The United Nations is moving toward
action in this realm of human rights abuses. The World Health Organiza-
tion, a functional organization of the United Nations, has announced its
intention to put an end to female circumcision. The United Nations also
adopted in 1979 a Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW), which had been ratifi ed by 185
countries by early 2009. The United States is one prominent state that
has refused to ratify the convention, although newly elected President
Obama has indicated that he supports CEDAW. Often described as an
international bill of rights for women, the convention defi nes discrimina-
tion as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on
Convention on
the Elimination
of All Forms of
Discrimination
Against Women
(CEDAW) Agreement
by which states commit
to the principle of legal
gender equality and to
end various forms of
discrimination against
women.

Ethics, Morality, and International Politics 343
a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
fi eld.” States that accept the convention agree to a number of policies to
eliminate discrimination against women in a variety of forms.
The post–Cold War years have seen a number of important interna-
tional forums and agreements on women’s human rights:
At the World Conference on Human Rights [in Vienna in 1993],
the international community recognized that women’s rights
are human rights, affi rming that the human rights of women are
universal, inalienable, and indivisible. Further, for the fi rst time
in UN history, the Vienna Programme of Action stated clearly
that violence against women, whether in public or private,
constitutes a violation of human rights. A year later, at the
International Conference on Population and Development
(Cairo, 1994) the protection of women’s human rights was
extended to include women’s rights to reproductive and sexual
decision making. The World Summit for Social Development
(Copenhagen, 1995) affi rmed that equality between women
and men is critical to achieving social development, and that
this cannot happen in the absence of human rights—including
women’s human rights. The culmination of these efforts came
with the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995),
the largest world conference in the history of the UN, where a
strong commitment to women’s rights as human rights formed
the very foundation of the Beijing Platform for Action.114
In addition, in 1998 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda des-
ignated rape as a war crime for the fi rst time in history.
Ellen Goodman, an American syndicated columnist, argues that
these collective efforts suggest that “global mistreatment of women is no
longer a cultural issue.”115 That conclusion is probably premature. Two
African women employed in the United States as a lawyer and a college
professor, respectively, “take great exception to the recent Western focus
on female genital mutilation in Africa.” They go on to note that the U.S.
State Department has required African governments to report on the inci-
dence of genital mutilation and that infl uential lawmakers have called
for discontinuation of fi nancial aid to governments that do “not address
this issue in the manner dictated by the West.” “We do not believe,”
these African women conclude, “that force changes traditional habits and
practices. Superior Western attitudes do not enhance dialogue or equal
exchange of ideas.”116 The headline for their The New York Times article
is, “The West Just Doesn’t Get It.” In a similar vein, the director of the East
Asian and Pacifi c Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore
has argued that “the diversity of cultural traditions, political struc-
tures, and levels of development will make it diffi cult, if not impossible,
to defi ne a single distinctive and coherent human rights regime that can

344 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
encompass the vast region from Japan to Burma, with its Confucianist,
Buddhist, Islamic, and Hindu traditions.” “Asians,” he continues, “do
not wish to be considered good Westerners,” and he concludes that “the
self-congratulatory, simplistic, and sanctimonious tone of much Western
commentary at the end of the Cold War and the current triumphalism of
Western values grate on East and Southeast Asians.”117
It can certainly be argued with some legitimacy that the main con-
cern of this spokesperson from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singa-
pore is to “delegitimize international efforts to address the abuses that
particularly characterize his own government and its regional allies:
detention without trial and denial of press freedoms.”118 But Americans
too are capable of arguing that international standards of morality are
inapplicable to special problems they face. “The U.S., no less than [other]
countries . . . claims the right to pick and choose which rights to defend
and international laws to uphold.”119 President Clinton, for example,
when faced with refugees from Haiti trying to reach Florida, claimed that
international law governing treatment of political refugees does not apply
to the United States. The U.S. policy of forcing Haitians to return to Haiti
without a hearing to determine their eligibility for political asylum vio-
lates an international legal requirement that they be given such a hear-
ing. Furthermore, “although most nations have banned the death penalty,
[Americans] refuse to acknowledge international law on this issue claim-
ing, in effect, our culture gives us the right to go our own way.”120
So persistent claims in favor of the right of states to be free of inter-
ference from outsiders, buttressed by cultural differences regarding what
is moral or ethical, make it diffi cult to enforce the rights of women in
countries where they are obviously and harshly discriminated against.
Canada adopted an interesting approach to dealing with this problem. It
accepted as a political refugee a woman from Saudi Arabia who argued
that her opposition to discrimination against women in her homeland put
her at risk.121 One advantage of that approach is that it does not involve
direct intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state, certainly not
with military force. And it is conceivable that if additional countries
adopted Canada’s policy, thus increasing the right of exit for women from
countries whose female citizens want to leave, this could increase their
bargaining power in domestic political processes focusing on women’s
rights. In distinct contrast, when Fauziya Kasinga left her native Togo in
1994 and immigrated (illegally) to the United States rather than submit
to genital mutilation, she awaited hearings for more than a year during
which “she endured body searches, shackles, and poor sanitation at a
federal detention center.”122
Women’s rights can also be enhanced if those rights, and violence
against women, continue to be treated as development issues (discussed
in Chapter 11). And the status of women can be further improved if
they are specifi cally given increased support by the policies of govern-
ments and international agencies such as the International Monetary

International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes 345
Fund and the World Bank. Finally, international campaigns in the Unit-
ed Nations and affi liated organizations, complemented by the efforts
of transnational organizations such as Amnesty International, to make
women’s rights a high-priority human rights issue may in the long run
improve the political, legal, and economic conditions for the world’s
female population.
An Emerging Legal Right to Democracy
It is clear that human rights is a controversial concept on which to
base decisions about which governments are legitimate targets of out-
side intervention. Would democracy perhaps better serve that purpose?
Governments elected by their own peoples in fair, competitive elections
could be assumed to be legitimate and entitled to run their internal affairs
as they see fi t. Undemocratic governments could justifi ably be subjected
to outside intervention. “From the point of view of persons nonvolun-
tarily subject to a regime, and unable effectively to express or withhold
their consent to it, [there is] little moral difference whether the regime
is imposed by other members of their own community or by foreign
governments.”123
There does in fact seem to be an emerging international legal right
to democratic governance. “Democracy,” according to an analysis in the
American Journal of International Law, “is on the way to becoming a
global entitlement, one that increasingly will be promoted and protected
by collective international processes.” According to this argument, objec-
tions to antidemocratic coups in Russia and Haiti in 1991 by leaders from
other governments offi cially registered in such international organiza-
tions as the United Nations and the Organization of American States
refl ect a “new global climate” that has resulted in a “transformation
of the democratic entitlement from moral prescription to international
legal obligation.”124 This new legal norm has the obvious potential to be
abused by more powerful countries for their own selfi sh purposes against
weaker countries. Indeed, there has been signifi cant unease regarding the
United States’ promotion of democracy and its recent association with
regime change and military intervention.125 Thus, while there does seem
to be a clear trend in the international system toward equating demo-
cratic government with legitimate government, “there is no well-settled
body of norms about acceptable forms of involvement in democratization
across borders.126 (See the Policy Choices box “Should States Intervene to
Promote Democratization?” in Chapter 6.)
International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes
International cooperation in global politics can revolve around ideas that develop about what is right and acceptable, such as the emerging right
to democracy, the growing belief that internal conditions are a legitimate

346 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
arena for international concern, and the idea that the use of force is not
legitimate unless for self-defense or to punish an aggressor. These ideas
become reinforced through the behavior of states. States may obey laws
and adhere to less explicit ethical principles despite the possibility that
disobedience would bring immediate and obvious advantages. As the
highly nationalistic German historian Heinrich von Trietschke, a fervent
advocate of power politics, argued, “Honest and legal policies are also,
ordinarily, the most effective and profi table. They inspire the confi dence
of other states.”127
In other words, under some circumstances, cooperation is benefi cial,
partly because states will reward cooperation with further cooperation.
In situations structured like the prisoner’s dilemma game discussed in
Chapter 8, cooperation pays for both players unless one player defects.
Such defections can best be avoided if participants pursue a tit-for-tat
strategy. That is, players can most reliably evoke cooperation if they
cooperate on the fi rst move and then do whatever the other player does
on subsequent moves. In time, apparently, both players may realize
that every defection is met by defection and every cooperative move is
reciprocated.128
Such consistent cooperation can be the result of merely strategic cal-
culations, but cooperative tendencies among players can be strengthened
if they are based on norms, rules, or principles. If such norms, rules, and
principles become clearly established and recognized by a suffi ciently large
number of important states in the international system, then a regime
may emerge. “Regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms,
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations.”129 Regimes “may or
may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements.”130 In
short, regimes, capable of evoking actors’ expectations that foster orderly
behavior, can be based on ethical principles, international law, or interna-
tional organizations.
So, for example, there is a regime in the international system regard-
ing the issue of nuclear nonproliferation that is based in part on an explicit
treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (discussed in Chapter 8). This
treaty in effect makes proliferation illegal for its signatories, who also
cooperate in the effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in ways
specifi cally stated within the treaty. The nonproliferation regime also has
an organizational basis in the form of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, which implements procedures designed to detect the diversion
of nuclear materials produced by nuclear power plants for the production
of nuclear weapons.
But the norms or principles on which regimes are based are often less
explicit, their content rather emerging and becoming clear as a result of
states’ actual practices and behavior. There is, arguably, a regime in the
current international system regarding intervention for human rights and
protection of democracy.
tit-for-tat strategy
To evoke cooperation by
matching another actor’s
gestures.

regime Set of
principles, norms, rules,
and procedures in a given
area of international
relations.

International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes 347
Realists see regimes as simply a refl ection of state preferences, with
little or no infl uence independent of states:
The realist argument that national actions are governed entirely
by calculation of interests . . . is essentially a denial of the
operation of normative obligation [that is, obligation inspired by
norms rather than enforced by coercion] in international affairs.
This position has held the fi eld for some time in mainstream
international relations. But it is increasingly being challenged by
a growing body of empirical study and academic analysis.131
Many point out that norms can be a powerful source of political behav-
ior.132 Even if individuals usually behave in essentially egocentric, self-
interested ways, there are intriguing, anomalous exceptions. For example,
why people bother to vote represents a long-standing puzzle for analysts of
voting behavior, because a single individual’s vote usually will not make
a difference in a national election. It is also diffi cult to understand why
Americans, for example, make contributions to the United Way Fund or
public radio and television stations, why they risk their lives in time of
war, and why they “do not always cheat when no one is looking.”133 One
of the best-known advocates of social analysis based on the assumption
that human beings are rational acknowledges, “I have come to believe
that social norms provide an important kind of motivation for action that
is irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of optimizing
mechanism.”134
If individuals are capable of sacrifi cing even their lives for ethical rea-
sons, it does not seem so far-fetched to imagine that individual leaders
may at least on occasion promote ethical considerations ahead of, though
not necessarily against, the state’s national interest when making govern-
ment decisions.135 Essentially, international norms “entail a collective
evaluation of behavior by members of the state system in terms of what
ought to be, as well as a collective expectation as to what behavior will
be.”136 Constructivists (as discussed in Chapter 1) point out that what
is right, wrong, appropriate, and even what is in a state’s interest is the
product of the collective social context of global politics. Because norms
are not objective, they change over time as state behavior and collective
evaluation change.137
The norm against slavery is a good example. “Probably the purest’—
most moral, least self-interested—foreign policy action ever taken on
behalf of human rights’ was the British navy’s suppression of the slave
trade in the nineteenth century.”138 Slavery was for thousands of years
considered an immutable aspect of human nature. But because of the
opposition of the British, ultimately joined by many others, norms against
slavery became so strong that it virtually disappeared altogether. The
traditional, quite prevalent counterargument is that slavery disappeared
only when and because it became unprofi table.139 In this view, slavery’s
disappearance had nothing to do with moral progress and is therefore no

348 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
indication that ethical principles infl uence the behavior of governments
as well as individuals. Morality, according to one modern student of phi-
losophy, requires “people to act in ways that do not promote their indi-
vidual self-interest. . . . Living wholly by the principle of enlightened
self-love just is not a kind of morality.“140 If regimes are based on an
entirely self-interested adherence to norms, their existence (disputable as
even that turns out to be) does not constitute very good evidence of the
potential impact of ethical principles.
But if slavery’s (and the slave trade’s) disappearance was a result of
truly ethical behavior, then it is at least one important example of altru-
istic government behavior analogous to that found among individuals,
such as voting, contributing to charities, and risking death for the sake of
their country. And if moral progress or cultural change is capable of elimi-
nating a social practice of such long standing as slavery, perhaps such
progress also can eliminate another seemingly indestructible custom in
the global political system: international war.
Norms against War
Norms against war as an acceptable tool for states may also be evolving.
“The major powers have not fought each other since 1945. Such a lengthy
period of peace among the most powerful states is unprecedented.”141
As discussed in Chapter 6, democratic states have been unlikely to fi ght
international wars against each other. The use of military force to col-
lect international debts or establish colonies, so prevalent in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, has virtually disappeared, arguably
because such uses of military force are no longer ethically acceptable.142
Even in “a total war, states struggling for survival altered or transcended
the expected use of particular forms of military power [such as chemical
warfare, during the Second World War], in part because of intentionally
constructed international prohibitions on those types of warfare.”143 One
recent study of war concludes that after 5,000 years, cultural and material
changes may be combining to inhibit international war. “War,” accord-
ing to one prominent military historian, “seems to me, after a lifetime of
reading about the subject, mingling with men of war, visiting the sites of
war and observing its effects, may well be ceasing to commend itself to
human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of
reconciling their discontents.”144
Perhaps, in short, the world wars of the twentieth century, combined
with the historical tendency of states to ignore international law, ethical
principles, and norms, have led theorists of international politics to dis-
count too heavily the impact of norms and ethics on foreign policies and
international politics. In 1989, while Soviet troops were still in Afghani-
stan, President Mikhail Gorbachev declared that the Soviet intervention
in that country was a “sin.”145 This may have been the fi rst time a major
political leader has ever so categorized a military operation of his or her

International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes 349
own government, especially while it was still in progress. It may be a straw
in the wind along with more important indications, such as the recent
absence of war between major powers or between democratic states, and
the end of formal colonialism showing that we are entering an era in
which the importance of ethical and legal prohibitions against the use of
military force for settling disputes and resolving confl icts among nations
will become increasingly apparent. “Despite confusion and uncertainty,
it seems just possible to glimpse the emerging outline of a world without
war.”146
Norms versus Power
How many states does it take to accept a norm for us to say that an inter-
national norm, or regime, has truly emerged? That is a diffi cult question
with no clear answer, and one that undergirds many international debates
in contemporary global politics. What if just one state, or a small group of
states, is in violation of an international norm or refuses to sign a treaty
that almost everyone else has signed and ratifi ed? Generally, we would
agree that norms do not have to be universally accepted to be signifi cant
in international relations, but what if that state is (or the group of states
includes) one of the most powerful in the world? What if that state is the
United States in the twenty-fi rst century?
The United States has refused to sign or ratify important international
treaties (see Table 9.3). “Even as the United States seeks to strengthen the
enforcement of international law for its own ends, it has often recoiled at
the prospect that these norms might be enforced against it.”147 In doing so,
it is asserting its sovereign right but may be undermining the legitimacy
of these specifi c efforts at multilateral cooperation, international law gen-
erally, and the international institutions that support these efforts. Just
as the U.S. refusal to join the League of Nations after World War I may
not have been the sole reason leading to the failure of collective security
and the onset of World War II, U.S. isolation in these particular areas may
not be the only obstacle to solving the problems they attempt to address.
But it is clear that the pattern of violation of these international norms
exhibited by the United States, given its hegemonic position in global
politics, is of great concern to the rest of the world. In the international
debate over the intervention in Iraq in 2003, many states saw the U.S.
conviction to pursue the invasion unilaterally in the context of its previ-
ous policies to “go it alone.” Part of the opposition to U.S. foreign policy
toward Iraq, then, may have been a breakdown in the tit-for-tat reciprocal
cooperation that underlies the development and maintenance of interna-
tional norms. This may not be in any state’s long-term interests. “As the
world’s sole superpower, the United States can defy international stan-
dards with little fear of immediate sanction; but other states will begin to
question its motives in trying to strengthen important legal regimes such
as those covering nuclear and chemical nonproliferation.”148 Although

350 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
the Obama administration signaled that it supports some of the treaties
in Table 9.3 and the norms they embody, there has been no formal adop-
tion of these conventions (at the time of this writing).
SUMMARY
● Modern international organizations trace their origins to the nine-
teenth century, when the Concert of Europe was established by the
Congress of Vienna and several international functional organizations
were launched. After the First World War, the League of Nations was
established in the hope that it would prevent such wars from recurring.
The League failed to prevent the Second World War, but its temporary
existence taught U.S. policymakers that the war happened because of
failure to support the League, not necessarily because organizations
like the League, or the United Nations, are inherently ineffective.
● A major purpose of the United Nations is to establish a system of col-
lective security guaranteeing that any victim of aggression in the inter-
national system will receive support from the collective weight of the
entire international community. There are several logical or theoreti-
cal grounds for expecting it to be diffi cult to create an effective collec-
tive security system. “Aggression” is not easy to defi ne, and even if
a defi nition can be agreed on, its application to concrete cases can be
controversial. Precommitments by some nations to other nations in
the form of alliances are, strictly speaking, inconsistent with a system
of collective security, since the world community must be ready to
resist aggression by any state in the world. In addition, all states have
a powerful incentive to let other states carry the burden of resisting ag-
gression in any given case. The Cold War also hamstrung the efforts of
the United Nations at collective security since both sides possessed the
power to veto the enforcement of Chapter VII by the Security Council.
TABLE 9.3
Major Multilateral Treaties That the United States Has Not Signed or
Ratifi ed
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(1979)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (1996)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction (1997)
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997)
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)
Note: Major multilateral treaties are those with more than 120 state parties.

Summary 351
● For all these reasons, over the years the United Nations has invested a
lot of time and energy in peacekeeping, as opposed to collective securi-
ty. Peacekeeping involves intervening militarily in trouble spots of the
world to separate antagonistic factions for long enough to allow stable
relationships to be restored. Peacekeeping and peacemaking ventures
have proliferated in the post–Cold War world, sometimes, with con-
troversial effects, as in Rwanda and Somalia. Peacekeeping activities
reached a peak in 1993 and 1994. After these experiences, the United
Nations seemed set on scaling back peacekeeping operations, but recent
missions, such as in East Timor, are quite ambitious.
● The United Nations attempts to promote peace in other ways beyond
peacekeeping and collective security. These include mediating between
disputes and addressing the underlying social and economic factors that
contribute to confl ict. The future of the United Nations will include
debates about its budget and its structure.
● Continual violations of international law commonly lead to the con-
clusion that it is so weak and ineffectual that it does not really exist.
But high crime rates within states do not lead to the conclusion that
domestic law does not exist. In fact, most states obey most interna-
tional laws most of the time. In part, this occurs because cooperation
pays; that is, states can benefi t from a reputation for being trustworthy
and law abiding.
● It is commonly asserted that ethics and moral principles are irrelevant
to international politics. But even realists and other moral skeptics
do not adhere to such a categorical position. Even when cooperation
breaks down and war ensues, international law and moral standards are
applied, largely based on ideas from the just war tradition.
● Nuclear weapons create profound moral dilemmas because their use in
defense of ethical principles or other values could destroy the world, or
at least kill millions of people instantly. Deontological analysis of such
dilemmas insists that ethical choices must be based on sound moral prin-
ciples rather than on calculations regarding the empirical impact of those
choices. In defense of this position, it must be admitted that it is, at best,
very diffi cult to estimate the impact of, for example, nuclear deterrence
policies or a decision to resist the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.
● According to basic principles of international law, states should be
free of interference in their internal affairs. However, the corrupt and
oppressive policies of some governments against their own citizens
create continuing temptations for the international community to
ignore or circumvent legal prohibitions against intervening in the
domestic affairs of other sovereign states. Indeed, the post–Cold War
system has seen a shift away from states’ rights and toward human
rights, including those that are codifi ed in the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, signed by most states.

352 Chapter 9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
● The most pervasive human rights issue in the world at present involves
discrimination against the female population. Recent years have seen
a number of developments in which women’s equality is seen as a part
of human rights. Some argue that an emerging norm countenances in-
ternational intervention on behalf of democracy when dictatorships
threaten to emerge, or when existing dictatorships suppress democratic
aspirations.
● Cooperative tendencies on the part of states can be enhanced if co-
operation is based on established norms and recognized principles. If
those norms and principles become suffi ciently well established, they
provide the basis for regimes. The impact of regimes is at least poten-
tially substantial. An antislavery regime in the nineteenth century, for
example, eliminated a practice long thought to be indestructible. There
are some signs, such as the absence of war among democratic states,
the absence of war between major powers since the Second World War,
and the demise of formal colonialism, that norms against the use of
violence in international politics are becoming more effective.
KEY TERMS collective security 304
UN Charter 308
Security Council 308
General Assembly 308
Secretariat 308
International Court
of Justice (World Court) 308
peacekeeping 312
peacemaking 314
state-building 318
positive peace 318
Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) 319
international law 324
Kellogg-Briand Pact 326
diplomatic immunity 327
ethics 328
moral skepticism 330
moral relativism 330
Geneva Conventions 331
Genocide Convention 331
war crimes 331
International Criminal
Court (ICC) 333
just war 335
Universal Declaration
of Human Rights 338
humanitarian
interventions 339
female defi cit 341
Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) 342
tit-for-tat strategy 346
regime 346

353
Interactions of Actors:
Economic Relations
P A R T I V

354
C H A P T E R 10
Interdependence Among Rich
States: International Political
Economy in the North
The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal
International Economic Order
• Economic Liberalism versus Mercantilism
• The Bretton Woods System
• The International Monetary Fund
• The World Bank
• The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
• How the System Worked
• Nixon’s Surprise
The International Political Economy after Bretton Woods
• The Economic Turmoil of the 1970s
• The Decline of American Hegemony? and New Players in the Global
Economy
• Turbulence in World Finance and the Global Economic Crisis
• International Economic Institutions Today
Summary
Key Terms

Interdependence among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North 355
Having examined the security relationships between states, we now begin to look at economic interactions in global politics. The study
of the international political economy concerns the relationships between
political units and political relationships, on the one hand, and econom-
ics and economic relationships, on the other. This relationship between
politics and economics is important for understanding global politics.
Economics, simply put, deals with the exchange of goods and ser-
vices. An economic market is composed of producers and consumers of
these goods and services. Economists tell us that a market functions on
the supply of goods and services produced by the sellers and the demand
for goods and services consumed by the buyers. Without any restrictions
on this exchange, the price of a good or service on an economic mar-
ket will be determined by the relative supply and demand. But there are
restrictions on the exchange of goods and services in the international
economic system (just as there are in all domestic economic systems).
In other words, there is no such thing as a “free” economic market. The
restrictions come from politics—from values and goals of states. States
may impose restrictions on economic exchange for the sake of security
or for moral considerations, for example. This tension between economic
forces of production and consumption and other political forces is the cen-
ter of the international political economy. Economics cannot be divorced
from politics (even the choice to pursue a “freer” market is a political
choice), but the exact nature of what the relationship between economics
and politics should be is a source of disagreement among major economic
philosophies, as we will see in the discussion of economic liberalism,
mercantilism, and neo-Marxism in this and the next two chapters.
Just as economics cannot be divorced from politics, politics is funda-
mentally shaped by economics. Politicians around the world are continu-
ally concerned about the economic impact that their policy decisions will
have on their own citizens. Failing to manage such politically and social-
ly volatile issues as unemployment and infl ation, for example, can leave
a political system weak and vulnerable and may result in the removal
of leaders from offi ce. Indeed, a large part of what government offi cials
do is attempt to provide economic resources—such as jobs, tax cuts, and
government subsidies—to their constituents or supporters. This is true in
democracies and nondemocracies alike: All types of governments rely to
some extent on the support of key groups within society, such as workers
and businesses. Moreover, economic interdependence has increasingly
connected the fortunes of citizens around the world, and a decision by
one state to alter its trading practices, devalue its currency, or increase
its minimum wage, for example, can have dramatic consequences on the
economies of other states. Today, trade accounts for high percentages of
the gross domestic product (GDP) of industrialized states (see Table 10.1),
and fi nancial fl ows between countries exceed trade fl ows by thirty to
one.1 Because of this interdependence, as we have seen time and again,
an economic downturn in one part of the world results in hard political
international political
economy Area of
study focusing on
the relationships
between international
political and economic
relationships.

356 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
choices elsewhere as jobs are lost, investment dollars dry up, and the
economic landscape becomes fi lled with uncertainty. The recent global
economic downturn demonstrates how interdependent fi nancial sectors
are and how governments are forced to respond. Just as there can be no
markets free of politics, politics cannot free itself from economics.
This chapter analyzes relationships among the wealthier, more indus-
trialized, or developed countries, sometimes referred to as the North,
because most are located in the Northern Hemisphere (although coun-
tries such as Australia are included in this category). Chapter 11 focuses
on the economic relationships between the industrialized states and the
poorer, developing countries, mostly in the Southern Hemisphere and
therefore often referred to as the South (although again, states such as
Vietnam are an exception). Chapter 12 looks at efforts at regional free
trade and economic integration, particularly the European Union.
Until the 1970s, most people considered the topics discussed in this
chapter to be too technical and apolitical to be of much interest to stu-
dents of international political relations. The rules by which the rich
industrialized states conducted international commerce with each other
were devised in the four or fi ve years after the Second World War, and
several factors worked to make those rules uncontroversial, as well as
apparently uninteresting. One of these factors was a steady, positive rate
of economic growth in almost all the industrialized countries. Another
important factor was the unquestioned U.S. domination of the world’s
economic transactions. As long as these factors persisted and the United
States supported the structure of the economic system in the noncommu-
nist world, economic relationships among rich countries seemed rather
divorced from politics, which centered on meeting the Communist threat.
But when the system ran into serious problems and American economic
preeminence began to fade, those technical problems suddenly seemed
very political. They had always been political, of course; what had been
TABLE 10.1
An Indicator of Interdependence: Trade as a Percentage of Gross Domestic
Product, 2007
Germany 72%
China 68%
France 45%
United Kingdom 38%
United States 38%
Japan 30%
Average for high-income states 49%
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, June 2009. © 2009 World Bank. Repro-
duced by permission.
developing
countries Poorer, less
industrialized countries.
developed
countries Wealthier,
more industrialized
countries.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 357
missing was overt political confl ict over economic arrangements in the
noncommunist world. This chapter examines the structure of economic
relationships among the rich industrialized countries of the world and
the process by which those relationships have become an increasingly
prominent political issue.
The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal
International Economic Order
The contemporary international economic system has its roots in the economic problems of the 1930s (see Chapter 2) and how the lead-
ing states after World War II attempted to build institutions and inter-
national norms to prevent a recurrence of a global economic depression.
The architects of the post–World War II economic system were not solely
interested in making economics work better and thus making more profi t
from economic exchanges. They also believed that economic prosperity
and certain types of relationships between states and other economic
actors were the keys to security. Many blamed the economic troubles of
the 1920s and 1930s for the war. Recall from Chapter 6 that one expla-
nation for World War II points to the poor economic conditions in Ger-
many, which played a key role in Hitler’s rise to power. This explanation
also blames the protectionist policies that states adopted to try to isolate
themselves from the effects of the worldwide depression. These policies
did not always achieve prosperity for states, and they served to discon-
nect states from each other, making the choice for war a less costly one.
This, of course, is liberalism’s explanation of World War II, and thus the
plans for the new international economic system rested on the liberal
philosophy about the relationship between economics and politics. The
architects of the new system attempted to build a Liberal International
Economic Order.
Economic Liberalism versus Mercantilism
As we saw in Chapter 1, liberalism is a perspective on global politics that
focuses on interdependence, nonstate actors, and incentives for coopera-
tion among states. It includes, but is not limited to, a recognition that
economic actors such as multinational corporations have become more
important in world politics and that economic interests of states and
nonstate actors can constrain states, pushing them away from war and
toward cooperation.
Liberalism is a general perspective and is related to a narrower phi-
losophy of economic liberalism. Economic liberalism is narrower in the
sense that it focuses on only economics and the relationships among
individuals, fi rms, markets, and governments in the economic sphere.
The two terms, however, share the word liberalism and thus share a
focus on individuals, self-interests, and rights. Liberalism recognizes that
Liberal International
Economic Order Post–
World War II attempt to
construct international
economic relations based
on economic liberalism.
economic
liberalism Economic
philosophy advocating
free trade to increase
effi ciency and wealth.

358 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
individuals following their interests will diverge from the interests of the
state and thus constrain states. In an open economic system and in an
open, democratic political system, individuals have the most freedom
to pursue their interests and constrain the state. This is why liberalism
expects democracies to be more peaceful than nondemocracies. Liberal-
ism is founded on ideas of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century liberal phi-
losophers such as Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and
Jeremy Bentham.
Economic liberalism, the narrower philosophy, also borrows ideas of
individual self-interest from liberal philosophers, applying them to the
realm of economics. The writings of Adam Smith are particularly impor-
tant. Smith, considered to be the father of modern economics, wrote in
his book, The Wealth of Nations, in 1776 about the importance of free
markets and individual economic interests.2 He argued that the way to
greater wealth for all was through complex divisions of labor, determined
by individual interests, and that production and effi ciency were best
achieved through market mechanisms, allowing what Smith referred to
as the “hidden hand” of the market, rather than the government, to direct
economic relations. According to Smith, individuals and business fi rms
pursue their individual interests, and these are coordinated by the market
system to produce what is in the society’s interest: greater wealth for all.
Smith wrote that “every individual is continually exerting himself to fi nd
out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can com-
mand. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he
has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather neces-
sarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous
to society.”3 In this quotation lie two very important assumptions behind
economic liberalism: that individuals do in fact act in their self-interests
and that this produces a social good.
For economic liberals, it is the free market system that best coordi-
nates economic activity, making it more effi cient and producing greater
wealth for all. Although Smith was primarily applying these ideas to a
domestic economy, others have applied economic liberalism to the inter-
national economy. The economic liberal view on international economic
relationships also stresses the free market, particularly in the form of free
trade, or exchange across borders unrestricted by penalties, such as tariffs
that place a tax on incoming goods, imposed by governments. A free trade
system is Smith’s ideas of individual interests coordinated by a market
system, on a grander scale. Economic liberals such as David Ricardo, an
early nineteenth-century economist and politician in England, argued
that each country should pursue its self-interests by allowing fi rms to
specialize in what they most effi ciently produce and trade freely with
one another to distribute goods to consumers, free of government inter-
vention.4 For Ricardo and other economic liberals, it did not make sense
for governments to protect their country’s jobs or profi ts at the expense
of other countries, because the market mechanism would distribute
free trade International
commerce unrestricted
by state-imposed
penalties such as tariffs.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 359
the jobs and profi ts in the most effi cient way, regardless of nationality,
and in a way that would provide more wealth for all in the long run.
Instead, countries should allow fi rms to specialize in the production of
goods that are in their comparative advantage—goods that they are rela-
tively more effi cient at producing than other countries—and selling those
goods abroad. For goods that are not a country’s comparative advantage,
countries should import these goods from abroad, not wasting capital and
labor on their production. In a free trade system, a division of labor along
countries’ comparative advantage will enhance global effi ciency and cre-
ate greater wealth for all, according to economic liberalism.
Most economic liberals believe that governments should play some
role in domestic and international economies. “The role of the state is
to perform the limited number of tasks that individuals cannot perform
by themselves, such as establishing a basic legal system, assure national
defense, and coin money.”5 Basically, the role of government in econom-
ics is to provide for collective goods—goods such as security, law, and
education—to all. Collective goods are indivisible, so that once they are
supplied to one member of a group, all members benefi t, and recipients
cannot be singled out and excluded from receiving the collective good.
A government’s role in providing for collective goods, according to eco-
nomic liberals, makes sense, because it would be ineffi cient for fi rms
to provide for them themselves. Imagine if McDonald’s or IBM had to
educate its own work force, build and maintain its own roadway, and
provide for its own defense from external threats! It is more effi cient for
businesses to pay taxes and allow the government to coordinate efforts to
provide for collective goods. Overall, however, economic liberalism sees a
relatively narrow role for governments. Most important, economic liber-
als put economics fi rst, above politics, and see the two as separate spheres
of activity.
David Ricardo and other economic liberals of the nineteenth century
were reacting to another prominent philosophy of economic exchange
and the relationship between economics and politics. Mercantilism is the
philosophy that economics and politics are related, that politics should
come fi rst, and that economic activity should serve the interests of the
state. Mercantilism has its roots in the fi fteenth through eighteenth cen-
turies, when states were established and the great powers began engaging
in international economic relations. The rulers of the time viewed eco-
nomic relations with other states as a way of amassing wealth for their
own states in order to maximize power. Wealth was a tool of infl uence
rather than an end in itself; it was used to purchase guns, territories, and
mercenaries. What is important about economics, according to mercan-
tilism, is that it serves the interest of the state in the competition for
more power and infl uence. As long as international economic transac-
tions benefi t the state, such as when the state is selling more to others
than it is buying, then all is well. When economic relations threaten the
power and autonomy of a state, such as when a state is buying more than
comparative
advantage Goods
that a certain country is
relatively more effi cient
at producing.
collective
goods Goods that, once
provided, are available
to all group members,
regardless of their
individual contributions.
mercantilism
Economic philosophy
that asserts the primacy
of the state and
protection of the state’s
economic power.

360 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
it is selling or when it becomes dependent on others for something it
needs, then all is not well.
Thus, for mercantilists, economic relations with other states need to
maximize profi t as a means toward more power relative to other states
and minimize economic loss and dependence. It is the role of the state
to structure its foreign economic relations to this end. States should,
for example, grant subsidies to their own industries so that they better
compete with the industries of others. States should also protect their
own industries with restrictions on imports such as tariffs, which are
taxes on imports that make them more expensive and thus less attrac-
tive to consumers, so that profi ts stay at home and the country does not
grow too dependent on foreign sources. There are a variety of methods of
protectionist policies in addition to subsidies and tariffs. States can, for
example, impose import quotas on goods (limiting the number of goods
that can be imported into a country), place health and safety regulations
on imported goods (making it diffi cult for imported goods to meet these
standards), and engage in dumping (selling goods abroad for less than they
are sold at home).
The bottom line for mercantilism is a positive balance of trade: more
exports to other countries and fewer imports from other countries. This is
important not for reasons of simple profi t but for what profi t buys: politi-
cal power. The focus on power and state autonomy links mercantilism, an
economic philosophy, with realism, a more general perspective on global
politics (as described in Chapter 1). Economic liberals disagree with the
protectionist policies of mercantilism and argue that politics should not
drive or limit economics. The fundamental difference between mercan-
tilism and economic liberalism is that the former sees competition with
other states as the raison d’être of states, while the latter sees cooperation
with other states as the key to economic prosperity for all. For economic
liberals, it does not matter that one state may be benefi ting more eco-
nomically, with, for example, a positive balance of trade, than another
state. What is important is that they are both benefi ting more from a divi-
sion of labor and free market system than if restrictions are imposed on
economic activity. Put another way, mercantilism focuses on the relative
gains of states (how states are faring in relation to each other) in a zero-
sum competition, and economic liberalism focuses on the absolute gains
of states (how states are faring generally, regardless of the gains for other
states) in non-zero-sum relationships.
Mercantilists and economic liberals also disagree about the value of
multinational corporations (MNCs). As discussed in Chapter 4, the num-
ber and importance of MNCs in the global economy accelerated in the
second half of the twentieth century. Economic liberals see foreign direct
investment (FDI) by MNCs as positive in that it facilitates free trade
based on comparative advantage; MNCs can be the architects of a world-
wide division of labor that is effi cient, without political interference by
states. Mercantilists, on the other hand, are suspicious of MNCs, because
they fear that they put profi ts over state interests, and because they take
subsidies Financial
aid from governments to
domestic industries.
tariffs Import tax on
foreign products.
protectionist
policies Policies
directed to protect
domestic economy from
foreign competition.
import quotas Limits
on the number of goods
that can be imported into
the country.
dumping Selling
products abroad at below-
cost prices.
balance of trade Value
of a state’s exports minus
its imports.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 361
away from the national economy by relocating jobs to other countries.
Similarly, American labor unions are particularly concerned about the
contribution of MNCs to U.S. unemployment. As many critics of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (discussed in Chap-
ter 12) point out, MNCs repeatedly shut down factories in the United
States and set up new ones in export platforms, where labor is cheaper—
for example, in Mexico. According to labor union leaders in many indus-
trialized countries, domestic jobs are lost directly to the laborers in the
export platforms, and even more jobs are then lost indirectly, because
the foreign subsidiaries monopolize export markets that otherwise could
be served by national factories with domestic workers. In this view, by
exporting jobs, investing money overseas, and having subsidiaries over-
seas that make it impossible for products made in the home country to
be exported, MNCs exacerbate balance-of-trade and balance-of-payments
problems for industrialized countries. In addition, goods made by domes-
tic companies are made by overseas subsidiaries, and these products must
be imported into the home country, adding further to its balance-of-trade
and balance-of-payments defi cits.
It can also be argued that MNCs are exacerbating the unequal dis-
tribution of wealth in industrialized societies such as the United States
by moving a variety of productive jobs out of the country, leaving noth-
ing but highly specialized occupations for which only their wealthy and
highly educated citizens can qualify. A study of nine industries in the
United States reveals that “multinationals create . . . jobs but that many
of the jobs created [are] in the white-collar and managerial areas whereas
the jobs lost [come] from the blue-collar ranks.”6
MNCs and their defenders, including economic liberals, do not take
these criticisms lightly, and in some cases, their counterarguments are
convincing. The contribution of foreign investment activity by MNCs to
unemployment is direct and visible, but foreign investment also makes
substantial, less direct, and less visible contributions to the number of
jobs in industrialized countries. The wages MNCs pay to workers over-
seas, for example, create increased demands for domestic-made products
in the countries where they operate. And these subsidiaries need parts
and capital equipment from the home country, adding again to the num-
ber of jobs in the domestic economy. The fact that DVD players can be
made more cheaply in China than in the United States saves American
consumers thousands (or millions) of dollars a year, and because those
machines are available to them at the lower prices, they can spend the
money they save on additional American products. It is also important
not to overlook the fact that imports create jobs. When the United States
imports automobiles from Japan, for example, people must transport
them to dealerships, advertise them, sell them, and service them, and
most of these people are Americans.
Defenders of MNCs argue that if they were somehow prohibited from
setting up subsidiaries in export platforms, it would not mean more jobs
for workers at home. MNCs from other countries would simply use such
export
platforms Countries
that use incentives
to attract foreign
direct investment and
production by MNCs.

362 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
platforms to full advantage instead. Production facilities in the home
states would not be economically viable, because they could not com-
pete with those foreign MNC subsidiaries in places with lower costs.
Of course, the governments could forbid home-based corporations from
investing overseas (or tax such activity so heavily that it would not be
feasible) and prevent the import of products made by foreign MNCs tak-
ing advantage of conditions elsewhere. But this, economic liberals argue,
would be the beginning of an escalatory process involving tariffs and
countertariffs, quotas and counterquotas, that would be disastrous for the
entire world.
The extent to which MNCs are inclined to export jobs to states
with lower wages may also be somewhat exaggerated in the minds of
their critics. Low wages are obviously only one consideration these
corporations take into account when they decide where to set up a
subsidiary, and the available evidence suggests that it is far from the
most important consideration. Developing countries have attracted an
increasing share of FDI today, but it is still true that most FDI comes
from and is received by developed countries. Indeed, the United States
and the United Kingdom are typically the largest recipients of FDI in
the world.7 Most of this investment comes from Great Britain, Japan,
the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland; that is, like most
FDI, it originates in a rich industrialized country and is transferred to
another rich industrialized country. For economic liberals, this transfer
of wealth across borders is important for an effi cient and prosperous
global economy.
The Bretton Woods System
After World War II, most of the leaders of the major states, as well as
their economic advisers, embraced the philosophy of economic liber-
alism as the basis for a postwar international economic system—the
Liberal International Economic Order. Mercantilist policies that states
adopted in the 1920s and 1930s were blamed for the economic devasta-
tion and for World War I. In particular, the protectionist trade policies
adopted by states that limited imports (such as the Smoot-Hawley Act,
which raised U.S. tariff rates) were blamed for spreading and deepen-
ing the economic depression around the world. States’ monetary poli-
cies were a concern as well. Monetary policies have to do with states’
decisions on printing and circulating their currency and other fi nancial
decisions that affect the fl ow and value of money. One tool that states
have to increase the cost of imports to their country and decrease the
costs of exports from their country is devaluing their currency—making
their currencies worth less in relation to other currencies. If Britain,
for example, whose base unit of currency is the British pound sterling,
devalues its currency by printing more pound notes, then British goods
are cheaper in other countries and foreign goods are more expensive in
monetary
policies State decisions
on printing, circulating,
and otherwise affecting
the value of their
currency.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 363
Britain. The effect is that foreigners will buy more British goods, and
Britons will buy fewer foreign goods, thus infl uencing the balance of
trade in a positive direction, which is exactly what mercantilists want.
The problem, according to economic liberals, is that the value of the
currency and goods then becomes artifi cial and does not refl ect market
mechanisms. The other problem is that when the values of currencies
change so rapidly, as they did in the 1930s, business is ineffi cient. Busi-
nesses simply cannot plan if they cannot predict how much goods will
cost them and how much profi t they will make when exchange rates
(the values of currencies in relation to each other) are unstable. Thus,
the architects of the Liberal International Economic Order were primar-
ily focused on establishing a system of free trade and providing a stable
monetary system.
One dilemma that economic liberalism has when applied to the inter-
national system concerns the anarchical nature of global politics. As dis-
cussed, while economic liberals prefer a minimal role for the government
in economics, the government does provide a very useful function of
coordinating and supplying collective goods, such as a legal system, and
ensuring a sound banking system in a domestic economy. In the inter-
national system, there is no overarching government that can provide
for collective goods that enhance the effi ciency and safety of economic
exchanges.
Economic liberalism, however, does suggest solutions to this dilem-
ma. First, collective goods, like the rules for a free trade system, can be
provided by an overwhelmingly powerful state, or hegemon, that can act
like an overarching government, absorbing the costs of providing a col-
lective good and enforcing the rules of the system. (The stable effects
of a hegemon were discussed in the security realm in Chapter 6.) In the
economic realm, “the liberal theory of hegemonic stability asserts that
when a hegemon arises, the world economy tends to grow and prosper, as
the benefi ts of free trade, peace and security, sound money, and so forth,
stimulate markets everywhere. When the hegemon fails . . . these public
goods disappear and the world economy stagnates or declines.”8 Even if a
hegemon’s power declines, however, a collective good can be maintained
if it has been institutionalized in international organizations. These insti-
tutions serve to coordinate states and their individual contributions to
collective goods. They can also serve as arbitrators and enforcers of the
rules of the economic system. Recall from Chapter 9 that international
norms about what is desirable behavior, such as the practice of free trade,
can themselves shape state choices, particularly if they are supported by
international organizations that reinforce norms. Fortunately, for the
adherents to the economic liberal philosophy after World War II, there
was a single state with a preponderance of economic muscle, the United
States, that was in a position to serve as the hegemon and put its strength
behind the construction of international institutions in the Liberal Inter-
national Economic Order.9
exchange rates Values
of currencies in relation
to each other.

364 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
In the fi ve years after the Second World War, the United States led the way
in an international effort to create what became known as the Bretton
Woods system. The name comes from a meeting that was held at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944 and attended by forty-four countries,
all of them anxious to devise some economic rules and regulations that
would help the world avoid the kinds of international economic catastro-
phes of the 1930s that had seemed to play such a key role in the process
culminating in the Second World War. At that meeting in Bretton Woods
and at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, three years later, the rules of
the international economic game in the noncommunist world were ham-
mered out. Those rules, and the system, rested on three main pillars, as
shown in Figure 10.1.
The International Monetary Fund
The fi rst of the three pillars of the Bretton Woods system concerned
international monetary management, and the organization created to
help states cope with problems in this area was the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). By 1947, the United States and the IMF had set up an
exchange rate system based on the U.S. dollar, backed by gold in order
to provide a stable monetary environment for economic relations. The
United States thus played a hegemonic role in international monetary
relations, having a strong currency and economic wealth to back it up.10
The price of gold was set at U.S. $35 per ounce, and that was the standard
by which other currencies were to be measured. In other words, the offi –
cial value of the Japanese yen, for example, would be stated in terms of
its relationship to a dollar or 1 ounce of gold. The countries that joined
the IMF system agreed to keep their exchange rates (the value of their cur-
rencies) in relation to dollars and gold fi xed within a narrow range. The
IMF monitored those exchange rates and stood ready to help any coun-
try whose currency threatened to fall lower in real value than its offi cial
exchange rate indicated.
Such a threat might originate, for example, from a consistently uneven
balance of trade. Let us imagine that Italy went through a period of years
Bretton Woods
system Set of post–
World War II agreements
and organizations
for managing the
international economy.
International
Monetary Fund
(IMF) Organization for
promoting international
monetary stability and
cooperation.
The Post–Second World War International Economic System
IMF
(exchange rate
stability)
World Bank
(reconstruction/
aid)
GATT/WTO
(“free trade”)
Figure 10.1 The Bretton
Woods System
Founded in 1944, the
Bretton Woods system
strove to manage the
international money
system, rebuild wartorn
countries, and regulate
international trade.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 365
when it imported much more from the United States than it exported to
the United States. At the end of every year, Italy, in effect, had to settle
accounts with the United States to make up the difference in the value
of what it imported and exported. According to the rules of the system
set up by the IMF and the United States after the Second World War, Italy
had to pay up in either U.S. dollars or gold, the two being interchangeable
(until 1971), because the United States had promised to support its dollars
with gold. If, in order to do this, the Italian government almost entirely
depleted its supply of dollars or gold (its so-called reserve currencies),
international confi dence in the Italian lira (Italy’s currency) would have
deteriorated. The offi cial value of a lira (plural lire) would not have been
the same as its real value. The real value (determined by what people
would give up in exchange for lire) would have been lower than the offi –
cial value, and everyone involved in economic transactions based on lire
would have started to demand more of them in exchange for U.S. dollars
(or anything else of value) than the offi cial exchange rate stipulated. It is
crises such as these that the IMF was designed to meet.
In this scenario, to prevent the real value of the lira from falling signif-
icantly lower than the offi cial value, the Italian government would have
had to support it. That means the government would have had to buy lire
at the offi cial price. As long as the Italian government was willing and
able to buy lire at the offi cial price, the real value and the offi cial value
would have stayed reasonably close. Everyone involved in transactions
based on the lira would have realized that the real value and the offi cial
value were essentially identical, because the Italian government, at least,
would pay the offi cial price for its own currency. Therefore, everyone
would have paid the offi cial price for lire, secure in the knowledge that
they could sell those lire to the Italian government at that price. In time,
having built up confi dence in the value of the lira, the government would
not have to buy such great quantities. The crisis would have been over.
Until the crisis passed, the Italian government would have had to obtain
dollars or gold with which it could buy lire. As a member of the IMF, Italy
can borrow dollars or gold from the fund to support its currency, thus
keeping the offi cial value and the real value in line and adhering to a fi xed
exchange rate.
From 1947 to 1971, this type of arrangement helped the rich indus-
trialized countries to avoid most serious monetary crises, like those of
the 1930s, and to keep the different national currencies at fi xed exchange
rates. From the viewpoint of economic liberalism, this stability was
signifi cant for confi dence in the monetary system and international
business. When the values of currencies were threatened, the member
states would borrow from the IMF to support them, and the fi xed offi –
cial exchange rates would be maintained. People engaged in international
commerce could be confi dent of the relative value of different currencies,
and international trade and commerce were thus simplifi ed and encour-
aged. The confi dence engendered by fi xed exchange rates was one factor
fi xed exchange
rates Values of
currencies “pegged”
to either another
currency or to certain
commodities, such as
gold.

366 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
that contributed to the growth in trade and in the economies of the indus-
trialized countries after the Second World War.
The World Bank
The second pillar of the post–Second World War economic system was
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),
or the World Bank. This organization was originally designed (as the
“Reconstruction” in its name suggests) to provide capital for rebuilding
countries devastated by the war. It was also supposed to aid economic
development for poorer countries in the South, and at Bretton Woods,
these states tried to ensure that developmental aid for them would have
at least as high a priority as economic assistance to those countries dev-
astated by the war. Those efforts were unsuccessful. The United States
felt that postwar reconstruction deserved a higher priority and that eco-
nomic development should be spurred primarily by domestic efforts.
Outside assistance might be necessary, but the capital should come from
private rather than government sources. In theory, the documents on
which the World Bank was founded gave equal weight to reconstruc-
tion and development. But those documents also urged a special regard
for the problems of those countries devastated by World War II; “the
developed countries that dominated the World Bank unanimously agreed
that European postwar reconstruction would be the fi rst priority for the
Bank.”11
The emphasis in World Bank activities began to change as early as
the 1950s. By that time, the countries devastated by the Second World
War had been reconstructed. Then an increasing number of former colo-
nies achieved independence, entered the United Nations, and began to
lobby effectively for economic aid from the developed countries. Also,
although under Stalin the Soviets had tended to ignore the poor countries
of the world, by 1956 under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, the
Soviets began to support development efforts and wars of national libera-
tion in the developing world, thus making the South one of the primary
theaters of the Cold War. The attitude of the United States and other
developed countries about public aid to developing countries changed
in response to these developments, and those changes were refl ected in
the activities of the World Bank. In 1956, the World Bank created the
International Finance Corporation (IFC) to encourage private investment
in underdeveloped countries. And in 1960, the United States took the
lead in creating the International Development Association (IDA) “as a
separate institution closely integrated with the World Bank.”12 The IDA
makes loans at low interest rates to developing countries, to be used for
development projects. In short, although the World Bank originally was
concerned with relationships among the more industrialized countries of
the world, over the years it has become primarily an aid-giving institu-
tion focusing on developing countries. It has come to serve as a forum for
World Bank
International
organization for
economic assistance, fi rst
for countries recovering
from World War II, then
for developing countries.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 367
discussion among the richer countries about treatment of less developed
countries rather than an organization that is directly involved in relation-
ships among the developed countries.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The third pillar of the Bretton Woods system was the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with twenty-three original countries
as signatories by the time it came into force in 1948. The original plan
after the war called for the creation of an institution to be known as the
International Trade Organization (ITO), but opposition in the U.S. Con-
gress killed that idea. In the beginning, the GATT was merely a trading
agreement among twenty-three nations, meant to be in force only until
the ITO came into being. “When the ITO failed to materialize, the GATT
was transformed from a temporary agreement into a[n] . . . institutional
framework in which governments pursued multilateral regulations and
discussed trade policy.”13
The primary function of the GATT was to encourage an increase
in international trade and reduce barriers to that trade, whether in the
form of tariffs, quotas, or other impediments such as regulations regard-
ing labor standards or environmental protection (see Figure 10.2). One
important means of fulfi lling its main function was to encourage nations
to abide by the most-favored-nation principle. This principle involves a
commitment not to discriminate. If State A decides to give a break to
State B (say, to lower its tariffs on shoes coming from State B), it must,
General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Post–World
War II multilateral
regime for promoting free
trade.
most-favored-nation
principle Granting
the same low-tariff trade
status as enjoyed by
a state’s most-favored
trading partner.
Figure 10.2 Changes
in Tariff Rates in the Era
of GATT (World Trade
Organization)
Source: Data from the Centre for
International Economics, offi ce of
the U.S. Trade Representative.

368 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
according to the GATT, give the same break to all the other GATT mem-
ber states from which it imports shoes. In other words, State A is obliged
to offer the same favorable terms on shoes to all states that it offers to
the most favored nation among its trading partners.14 The GATT encour-
aged countries to abide by the most-favored-nation principle in order
to remove barriers to trade (especially tariffs). The principles on which
the GATT was based come directly from economic liberalism. States
should not interfere with the free trade of goods and services determined
by states’ comparative advantage; they should not favor one state over
another for political reasons by granting them preferential trading rela-
tions. These are the principles to which states pledged when they joined
the GATT.
In fact, the GATT allowed many exceptions to the most-favored-
nation principle and has not come close to creating a system where free
trade reigns supreme. Still, it almost certainly helped reduce barriers to
international trade and thus encouraged its growth. One recent analysis
found that trade among GATT members was considerably higher than
we would expect without the agreement.15 GATT negotiations occur in
what are referred to as “rounds.” The Kennedy Round of negotiations,
for example, began in 1962 and was concluded in 1967 with agreements
to reduce tariffs and expand world trade. The Tokyo Round (1973–1978)
focused on lowering nontariff barriers, such as government subsidies
and regulations. The Uruguay Round (1986–1993) tackled more diffi cult
and more recently developed issues hindering free trade, such as agri-
cultural subsidies, protection of service industries, and intellectual prop-
erty rights. The most recent negotiations, the Doha Round, focused on
economic development and will be discussed in Chapter 11. With this
history of trade negotiations, “there can be little doubt that the GATT
has had an important role in the evolution of postwar international trade
relations.”16
Another result of the Uruguay Round of international negotiations
was the creation of a permanent organization, similar to the originally
proposed International Trade Organization. On January 1, 1995, the
GATT, whose membership had reached 122 states at the time, evolved
into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Chapter 3 for defi nition).
WTO is more powerful than GATT, incorporating trade in goods,
services, and ideas and has more binding authority. . . . Replac-
ing the GATT, which was never more than a provisional set of
rules with a small secretariat in Geneva, the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) will be the umbrella organization covering the
old GATT and all the new agreements reached in the Uruguay
Round.17
The WTO and its role in the current global economy will be discussed in
more detail at the end of this chapter.

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 369
How the System Worked
In economic terms, this system based on the IMF (supporting a dollar
standard), the World Bank, and the GATT (fostering free trade) certainly
worked well for the noncommunist industrialized countries. Although
economic liberalis was the underlying philosophy of the Bretton Woods
system, the United States acted as a hegemon, and international institu-
tions were established to coordinate collective goods in the absence of an
overarching government, purely economically liberal policies were rarely
realized in practice. One way in which the system was not completely eco-
nomically liberal was the fi xed exchange rate system. In an ideal world,
according to economic liberals, the market should determine the value of
currencies, and state intervention that fi xed these values was a political
intrusion into economics. Another way the system deviated from eco-
nomic liberalism was that free trade was not always the offi cial policy.
The United States allowed certain distortions in the system to operate
against its own best short-run economic interests and in favor of Western
Europe and Japan. For example, one exception to the most-favored-nation
principle in the GATT rules allowed nations forming a customs union to
discriminate against the outside world. The most important of these was
the European Community, or Common Market, now known as the Euro-
pean Union (EU) (see Chapter 12), which was encouraged by the United
States even though it adopted tariff barriers against U.S. products and did
some harm to U.S. trading interests. Japan was allowed to use a variety of
protectionist measures in the 1950s and 1960s, even though it became a
member of the GATT in 1955. “Free trade was accepted where the United
States did not have a comparative advantage and discrimination was tol-
erated where U.S. products did have an advantage.”18 Also, the United
States purposely incurred balance-of-payments defi cits in relation to
Western Europe and Japan in the 1950s and early 1960s to provide a fl ow
of dollars for the other industrialized countries.
Why was the United States so generous to the Western Europeans and
Japanese in the 1950s and 1960s? It is safe to say that more than altru-
ism was involved. Perhaps the most important reason concerned secu-
rity. The United States felt threatened by the Soviet Union in the fi rst
couple of decades after World War II and also believed that economically
prostrate (and politically valuable) countries in Western Europe and Japan
were vulnerable to Communist subversion. The United States did what it
could to foster its allies’ rapid economic growth and thereby substantially
decrease their vulnerability to such subversion, as well as increase their
value as allies against the Soviet threat.
There were long-run economic advantages, too, in the types of poli-
cies adopted by the United States in the years immediately following the
war. An impoverished Western Europe and Japan would not provide lucra-
tive markets for U.S. exports. But U.S. generosity would create economic
leverage for the United States in Western Europe and Japan, which would

370 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
be advantageous to the United States once the other industrialized coun-
tries were back on their economic feet. Economic liberalism claims that
the pie will grow larger for all in the long run, but those who have the
largest slice (as the United States did with its overwhelmingly larger
economy) will benefi t the most. Leading the establishment of a Liberal
International Economic Order also enhanced the agenda-setting power
(discussed in Chapter 4) of the United States. Agenda-setting power, or
structural power, was “the power to shape and determine the structures
of the global political economy . . . the power to decide how things will
be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to
each other.”19 To sum up, after the Second World War, the United States
was by far the most important entity within the non-Communist world’s
economic system, and it had the most urgent need to see that the system
worked well. Because it could not work well unless Western Europe and
Japan recovered economically from the ravages of war, the United States
provided important support for that recovery.
During the Bretton Woods system, trade policies deviated from pure
economic liberalism in other ways. The United States, for example, pro-
tected some of its older industries such as shoes and textiles, and it sub-
sidized agricultural products. These policies primarily stemmed from
domestic political pressures rather than mercantilist principles. Simply
put, “domestic groups seek protection or liberalization because such
policies increase their incomes.”20 Not all domestic groups or economic
sectors resist protection. Some, in fact, benefi t from trade liberalization—
such as shipping industries and other businesses that are dependent on
imports and exports—and with increasing interdependence, more eco-
nomic domestic groups organized to promote liberal trading policies.21
With some groups pushing for liberalization and some groups advocat-
ing protectionist policies, political institutions are important factors in
trade policy, because they affect which groups will have greater access to
infl uence leaders. Furthermore, some institutions insulate leaders from
societal pressures, and then it is the leaders’ beliefs—liberal or mercantil-
ist—that become critical factors in promoting or inhibiting free trade.22
Politics affects trade policies in other ways as well. Trade sanctions and
other restrictions against the Soviet Union, Cuba, and South Africa are
examples of economics being used for political ends, which economic
liberalism says states should avoid.
Overall, the Bretton Woods system was quite successful. World
trade grew at a rapid rate, and by the 1960s, Western Europe and Japan
staged remarkable recoveries from the devastation of the Second World
War. By this time, the preponderant position of the United States in the
noncommunist industrialized world was modifi ed in important ways.
By 1960, the United States had already allowed so many dollars to leave
the country that for the fi rst time, the value of dollars overseas became
greater than the value of U.S. gold reserves. The fl ow of dollars out of
the country continued throughout the 1960s and accelerated during the

The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order 371
Vietnam War. In 1952, the United States held 68 percent of all interna-
tional monetary reserves; by 1977, that share had fallen to 6 percent. A
similar deterioration occurred in the U.S. position in international trade.
In 1947, the United States accounted for 32 percent of world exports. In
1974, it accounted for only 11 percent of world exports. In the meantime,
the European Community had become the largest trading entity in the
world. By 1971, the fl ow of cash out of the United States was so great,
and imports into the United States so far exceeded U.S. exports in value,
that a balance-of-payments crisis and a balance-of-trade crisis occurred
simultaneously.
Nixon’s Surprise
Under the rules of the Bretton Woods system in operation at that time,
the United States could not devalue its currency, because the U.S. dol-
lar, tied to the price of gold, constituted the standard by which all the
other currencies were measured and on which their values were based.
Because the dollar served as the anchor of the system, it could not be
tampered with. In August 1971, President Nixon decided to change the
rules of the system dramatically. He announced that the U.S. dollar
would no longer be convertible to gold. Ever since the creation of the
Bretton Woods system in the 1940s, the United States had promised to
exchange dollars for gold at the rate of $35 an ounce whenever holders
of dollars wished to make such an exchange. But by 1968, U.S. holdings
of gold were so low that the United States was quite reluctant to give
up gold for dollars; thus, it did its best to discourage such transactions.
In 1971, President Nixon abandoned even the offi cial promise to back
up dollars with gold. He also imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports
into the United States, distancing the United States further from its offi –
cial policy of economic liberalism. To maintain the gold standard and
the collective good of fi xed exchange rates, extreme fi nancial responsi-
bility by the United States was necessary, but the economic effects of
responsibility would probably have not been acceptable politically at
home.23
Two fundamental aspects of the Bretton Woods system were thus
substantially altered in 1971. First, when the United States pulled the
props out from underneath the international monetary standard, all
the currencies of the world were deprived of a fi xed standard by which
their value could be ascertained. Fixed (and therefore stable) exchange
rates soon came to an end because the standard according to which they
were fi xed was abolished. After the early 1970s, fl oating exchange rates
replaced fi xed exchange rates (see Figure 10.3). This shift means that the
relative value of the different currencies is established by market forces,
and the value of one currency in exchange for another is determined by
what people (and central banks) are willing to pay on any given day.
fl oating exchange
rates Relative values of
currencies as determined
by supply and demand of
market forces.
371

372 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
The other aspect of the Bretton Woods system that was affected by
President Nixon’s announcement in August 1971 was the U.S. commit-
ment to support the system itself. Until 1971, the United States had been
willing to base its monetary and trade policies at least in part on consider-
ations of what was good for the world economy as a whole. (Again, as not-
ed earlier in this chapter, this does not mean that U.S. policymakers were
astoundingly altruistic.) By 1971, the economic problems of the United
States, both domestic and international, had become so serious that the
U.S. government “demanded the right to manage its own currency in the
pursuit of national objectives, just like any other country.”24
The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods
The Economic Turmoil of the 1970s
The impact of Nixon’s announcement in 1971 would have been profound
under any circumstances. But the world economy was just beginning to
recover and accommodate itself to that shock when it was hit in 1973 with
a 400 percent increase in the price of oil. The members of the Organization
Figure 10.3 Fluctuations in Exchange Rates After Bretton Woods, Six Industrialized
Countries, 1970–1990
The values of national currencies in relationship to the U.S. dollar fl uctuated substantially
after fi xed exchange rates were eliminated in 1971.
Source: Data compiled by the author from tables in the New York Times, circa July 1, in the selected years from 1970 to
1990.

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 373
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (see Chapter 3 for defi nition) set
the price of oil in terms of U.S. dollars and are generally paid in dollars. With
the price of oil dramatically increased, a torrent of dollars left the industrial-
ized countries, including the United States, and went to Saudi Arabia and
other leading oil producers. It can be said of any kind of money that the
more of it that is around and available, the less valuable it is. When the
price of oil increased, the number of dollars in circulation also increased.
That is one reason that throughout most of the 1970s, the value of the dollar
fell relative to gold and other foreign currencies. This fall was also probably
an important factor contributing to the double-digit infl ation that hit the
United States and several other industrialized countries in that decade.
It was during the 1970s, too, that analysts of relationships among
industrialized countries began to focus on their interdependence (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 1).25 What were once seen as purely domestic prob-
lems in the industrialized countries came to be seen as problems with an
important impact on other industrialized countries. This gave rise to pro-
tectionist pressures (that is, pressure to erect high tariff barriers or quotas
to keep foreign imports out) and temptations to adopt other policies that
might bring short-run benefi ts to individual countries. “Throughout this
period international trade continued to grow, but not at the rate at which
it had earlier. Under increasing pressure to stimulate economic growth,
many nations reduced their tariff barriers. At the same time however, they
devised new and more sophisticated ways of protecting their exports and
otherwise limiting imports.”26 Indeed, in the 1970s, states began using
more nontariff barriers such as government subsidies to export producers
and government-imposed product standards.27 As a result of protectionist
policies, “trade among the industrialized nations quadrupled from 1963 to
1973, but increased only two and one-half times in the next decade.”28
In the midst of the economic crises of the 1970s, the industrialized
states could not develop a replacement to the Bretton Woods exchange
rate system. As a substitute, they began meeting annually to try to coor-
dinate monetary policy in the absence of a fi xed system.29 The European
states also tried to build a fi xed exchange rate system on a smaller scale
in 1979 with the European Monetary System, a predecessor to the euro
(discussed in Chapter 12). Overall, however, there was great concern that
with the changes in the international economy, the stability that had been
achieved under the old Bretton Woods institutions could not be dupli-
cated. This concern was partly based on the belief that the United States,
which had served as a hegemon in the system, was in serious trouble.
The Decline of American Hegemony? and New Players
in the Global Economy
In the early 1980s, economic growth in most industrialized countries was
slow, infl ation and unemployment were high, and the price and supply

374 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
of oil (and other energy resources) were uncertain. Some analysts traced
those problems to the relative decline of the United States as an eco-
nomic power. “Part of the world’s economic problems today,” explained
one well-known economist,30 “is that the United States has resigned (or
has been discharged) as leader of the world economy, and there is no can-
didate willing and acceptable to take its place.”
A widely accepted explanation for the economic problems of the
United States stressed the decline in productivity (output of economic
goods and services per hour of effort) in various important sectors of the
American economy. And in the mid-1980s, U.S. productivity was lagging
not only relative to its own past record but also in comparison with its
chief competitors: Germany, Japan, France, and Britain. Persuasive his-
torical evidence indicates that a productivity decline in a country such
as the United States can have profound implications for that nation’s role
in the global political system. In fact, one prominent analyst of the his-
tory of the world’s economic and political system argues that a relative
decline in productivity is one of the fi rst signs that a predominant state
in the world system is losing its grip.31
Others agreed that the United States was losing its hegemonic posi-
tion and were quite pessimistic about the stability of the economy in a
“posthegemonic” system. The most publicized example of this specula-
tion was historian Paul Kennedy’s book, The Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers, published in 1987.32 Kennedy suggested that the United States
was on the verge or in the process of suffering a fate similar to that of
many other great powers since 1500. According to Kennedy, Spain in the
1600s, Britain in the 1900s, and Hitler’s Germany in the 1940s all had a
similar problem: They became overcommitted militarily. Keeping their
commitments required military expenditures so great that the economies
of their states, and so their political power bases, became fatally under-
mined. In Kennedy’s view, “The United States runs the risk, so familiar
to historians of the rise and fall of previous Great Powers, of what might
roughly be called imperial overstretch’: that is to say, decision-makers
in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum
total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far
larger than the country’s power to defend them simultaneously.”
Kennedy’s arguments reinforced skepticism about the capitalist world
system and its leader, the United States. Several writers then proclaimed
the end of U.S. hegemony and explained the economic problems of the
industrialized world as a result of that decline.33 The reasoning, consis-
tent with hegemonic stability theory, was based on an analogy with the
Great Depression, during which national economies allegedly continued
to contract because no leading nation had the economic strength and
willingness to direct and enforce global economic cooperation.34
Yet the U.S. economy proved to be more resilient at the end of
the twentieth century than many expected. By 1995, the value of U.S.
exports as a proportion of the nation’s gross national product (GNP) was
imperial overstretch
The idea that hegemonic
powers overcommit
resources, thus
undermining their power.

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 375
higher than Japan’s.35 In addition, foreign investment in the United States
and U.S. investment both increased by over 30 percent in the 1990s.36
On many measures, the U.S. economy has done very well over the last
decade compared to both Europe and Japan. Thus, the rapid decline of the
economic hegemon that many had predicted in the 1970s and 1980s did
not materialize.
Today, the U.S. economy remains the largest economy in the world
and the major player in world economic processes, but it certainly does
not dominate the world economy as it did just after World War II.37
Now, the U.S. share of the international economy is declining relative to
“emerging markets”—economies that have had rapid economic growth
over the past twenty years. Leading the emerging markets is the group
of countries referred to as the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—
which met formally for the fi rst time in mid-2009. These countries, along
with countries in Europe, have experienced a growth in their proportion
of the world economy, while that of the United States and Japan has
declined in recent years (see Figure 10.4). The U.S. share of world eco-
nomic growth has also fallen. From 2002 to 2005, the U.S. share of world
economic growth was 35 to 40 percent, but by 2006, the BRIC’s share was
greater than the U.S. share for the fi rst time.38 The dollar has also seen its
share of the world economy fall. “. . . [B]y 2005 the euro had emerged as
a clear regional and plausible global alternative to the dollar. . . . By some
estimates, the euro share will rise to 30–40 percent of the global total by
2010.”39
The rise of new players in the international economy is refl ected in
the development of the Group of 20 (G-20)—a forum for international
Group of 20 (G20) A
forum for economic
cooperation of the major
economies: Argentina,
Australia, Brazil,
Britain, Canada, China,
France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa,
South Korea, Turkey, the
United States and the
European Union.
0
%
o
f W
or
ld
G
D
P
U.S.A
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2000
2007
Euro Area Brazil China Russia Japan
Country / Region
Figure 10.4 “Key
States’ Share of World
Economy”
Source: The World Bank
Group, Key Development Data
and Statistics, 2009. © 2009
World Bank. Reproduced by
permission.

376 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
economic cooperation among the nineteen strongest economies plus
the European Union. The G-20 represents 90 percent of the global GDP
and two-thirds of the world population. The G-20 was established in
response to the Asian fi nancial crisis of the 1990s and is recognition of
the growing power of states outside the Western industrialized econo-
mies. Before the G-20, the G-7 began meeting annually in the 1970s to
coordinate economic policies. The group was expanded in the late 1990s
to include Russia and was known as the G-8. In 2008, it was the G-20
that met to deal with the global economic crisis (discussed following).
To many, this was “. . . recognition that global leadership can no longer
resemble an exclusive private club. . . . The problem is not merely that
US indebtedness and Western fi nance triggered the present crisis. It is
also that, although the United States still ranks as the world’s largest
economy, the rise of China and other developing markets has undercut
US supremacy.”40
At the forefront of the emerging markets and the challenge to American
economic hegemony is China. China’s GDP is likely to exceed the Unit-
ed States’ in the next thirty years.41 China’s economic growth has been
phenomenal:
According to offi cial statistics, China’s annual real GDP growth
averaged 9.7 percent between 1989 and 2000. In aggregate terms,
real urban incomes more than doubled over the same period. For
many Chinese families, the increased prosperity of the 1990s
can be measured by the new range of goods that they can now
afford. The prizes of the 1980s included basic items such as
refrigerators and television sets. Today, many Chinese families
fi nd computers, designer clothes, mobile phones, and home-
entertainment centers within their reach as well. The growing
prosperity is the result of the Chinese government’s commit-
ment to structural economic reforms. . . . Today, more than 40
percent of industrial output comes from private companies,
and more than 30 percent of nonagricultural employees work
for private or mixed-ownership fi rms. (In contrast, virtually no
privately owned industrial fi rms existed in 1979 when . . . eco-
nomic reform began.)42
Although Chinese economic growth has slowed in the recent global
economic downturn, it is in comparatively better shape, as it is relatively
more insulated from the international fi nancial sector and it has massive
foreign exchange reserves.43 Indeed, it was China, along with Middle East
countries, that helped delay the onset of the fi nancial crisis in 2007 when
it used its sovereign wealth funds to support already-failing American
and European institutions.44
China’s rise as a major economic player has not been without costs.
Even though the Chinese transformation from a planned economy to
a market-based economy has been fairly smooth, “as economic reform

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 377
continues, millions of Chinese workers are being laid off each year with
little hope of reemployment or adequate social welfare support. In some
cities, unemployed workers are now joining together in large-scale pro-
tests, involving as many as 20,000 people at a time.”45 In the “special
economic zones”—the cities that have gone the furthest toward liber-
alization—there is growing inequality and income disparity as well.46
Some estimates put the inequality in China between urban and rural resi-
dents at near the highest in the world, and rural unrest has signifi cantly
increased over the last decade.47
In many ways, the Russian transition from classical socialism to more
free market capitalism was much more tumultuous than the Chinese
experience. There are many possible reasons for this, including the fact
that Russia was a socialist system for a much longer time than China and
that Russia simultaneously experienced the breakup of its empire, the
Soviet Union.48 The diffi culties that Russia faced can also be explained
by Russia’s attempt to change its political system, making it more demo-
cratic, at the same time it liberalized its economy. Although this was
initially met with high hopes and applauded by the Western countries
that had opposed the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it has turned out
to be extremely diffi cult and created a great deal of human suffering. Rus-
sian GDP declined almost 50 percent between 1989 and 1999; its unem-
ployment rate (as percentage of economically active population) climbed
from .08 to 1.6 percent from 1991 to 2001; the percentage of people living
in poverty went from 1.5 to between 39 and 49 from 1988 to 1993; Rus-
sian life expectancy for males declined from 64.9 to 58.7 years from 1987
to 2003; and annual alcohol consumption increased from 5.3 to almost
9 liters of pure ethanol per person from 1989 to 2003.49 Despite major aid
packages from the IMF, the Russian economy remained in dire straits,
and in 1998, the government was forced to devalue the Russian currency,
the ruble, and default on $40 billion in domestic debt. Some argue that
liberalization during the transition was not the cause of the decline in
standards of living and economic growth; rather, the diffi culty is Russia’s
unwillingness to engage seriously in liberalization.50
The Russian economy did, however, rebound quite well after the ruble
devaluation. Since 1999, the poverty rate fell and Russia had economic
growth rates of 10 percent in 2000 and 8 percent in 2007. Russia became
an economically stable, emerging market and foreign investment fl owed
into the economy. Russia also became the third largest holder of foreign
currency reserves, after China and Japan. Russia’s turnaround came from
many sources, including sound monetary policies and liberalization poli-
cies that were previously put in place. But Russian economic growth can
also be attributed to the state’s intervention in the economy, its control
over the oil and gas sector, and high energy prices. This growth in Russia’s
economy is not even, however, as the gap between the very rich and the
poor has widened.51 And with the decline in energy demand and the fall
of oil and gas prices, Russia’s economy, like most in the world, fell ill by

378 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
2008, with rises in unemployment, infl ation, and the poverty rate, a bud-
get defi cit, and a tightening of credit markets.52
The transitions from socialist, centrally planned economies in China,
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Vietnam in the last two decades certainly
altered the global economic system. Before these transformations, the
Communist countries were outside the liberal international economic
system established by the Bretton Woods conference. This means that
these countries did not engage in any signifi cant international trade with
Bretton Woods countries, did not have currencies that were readily con-
vertible into U.S. dollars (and thus did not receive assistance from the
IMF), and did not receive loans for development and reconstruction from
the World Bank. In effect, the Communist countries’ economies devel-
oped quite independently from the economies of the rest of the world.
The economies developed independently,
because they were fundamentally incompati-
ble with the Bretton Woods system, which was
premised on economic liberalism. In classical
socialist economies, there is very little room
for the hidden hand of the free market. Indeed,
individual self-interest is seen to be detrimen-
tal to the collective interests of society, and
thus a free market where individuals pursue
their own interests is fundamentally at odds
with the good of society as a whole. Accord-
ing to Karl Marx, the founder of Communist
ideology, when individuals (private citizens)
own factories and other means of production,
wealth tends to accumulate in the hands of
those individuals instead of in the hands of
society at large. Moreover, such practices will
result in the emergence of different social
classes (the owners and the workers), and this
will create further tensions in society. Because
a free market will tend to create winners and
losers, Communist ideological commitment to
social equality and a classless society requires
the virtual elimination of a market system.
Thus, in most Communist countries, private
property (that is, private ownership of eco-
nomically valuable resources) was offi cially
forbidden or extremely limited (although citi-
zens could own their own household items and
personal effects, and an underground economy,
or black market, existed in almost every Com-
munist economy). Without an offi cial free mar-
ket, where producers produce what they think
centrally planned
economies Economic
systems in which
the state determines
production, consumption,
and pricing of
commodities.
Rapid economic growth often comes with growing
income inequality and poverty side by side with
wealth, as in Hong Kong (pictured here).
(© Brian Brake/Photo Researchers, Inc.)

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 379
they can sell and buyers buy what they want and can afford, something
else must regulate production, consumption, and prices. For Commu-
nist countries, that is the state. Indeed, in Communist countries such as
the former Soviet Union, the state determined what was produced, how
much was produced, what the price of goods would be, and how much
money (wages) workers earned.
Thus, the fact that China, Russia, and other countries that until fairly
recent were centrally planned economies are major players in the global
capitalist system—even if they still criticize many economically liberal
policies—is quite a transformation. After years of negotiation, China
joined the WTO in 2001; Russia has observer status. Many of the Com-
munist countries in central and eastern Europe are now members of the
European Union, itself based on economic liberalism and free trade (see
chapter 12). Within a relatively short time, the Bretton Woods system and
its economic liberal principles became global, at the same time economic
power was shifting and new economic realities challenged efforts at eco-
nomic cooperation.
Turbulence in World Finance and the
Global Economic Crisis
After the Bretton Woods system, and particularly after the end of fi xed
exchange rates, there have been a number of fi nancial crises in the inter-
national economy. In 1997, for example, “Thailand’s currency depreciation
triggered a sudden collapse in other Asian exchange rates, causing a rash
of bankruptcies among corporations and fi nancial institutions. . . . In turn,
the devaluations contributed to a slide in world commodity prices, leading
currencies of other commodity producers such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Chile, and Mexico to plummet as well.”53 Since the end of fi xed
exchange rates, countries have been struggling with ways to keep curren-
cies stable. To encourage investment, Thailand had fi xed its exchange rate
to keep the baht at a set price per U.S. dollar, but this value could not be
sustained, particularly when Japan, a major trading partner of Thailand, saw
a decline in the yen.54 Argentina followed a similar path, pegging its cur-
rency to the dollar and eventually spiraling into economic crisis in 2001.55
The frequency and severity of recent fi nancial problems are of great
concern to the international community.
Financial crises once made most people’s eyes glaze over; they
were the subjects of intense interest to only a limited clientele,
many of whom wore green eyeshades. Not any longer. The topic
has unfortunately acquired a mass audience in the second half of
the 1990s. Stunning currency collapses in Mexico (1995), south-
east Asia (1997), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1999) have pushed the
subject to the front page. Financial confl agrations have become
too frequent, too devastating, and too contagious to be ignored.56

380 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
Although these fi nancial crises had far-reaching implications, they
were more contained than the world-wide economic downturn that began
in 2007. A report to the U.S. Congress described the primary causes and
spread of this crisis:
The plunge downward into the global fi nancial crisis did not
take long. It was triggered by the bursting of the housing bubble
and the ensuing subprime mortgage crisis in the United States,
but other conditions have contributed to the severity of the
situation. Banks, investment houses, and consumers carried
large amounts of leveraged debt. Certain countries incurred
large defi cits in international trade and current accounts (par-
ticularly the United States), while other countries accumulated
large reserves of foreign exchange by running surpluses in those
accounts. Investors deployed “hot money” in world markets
seeking higher rates of return. . . . [G]lobalization . . . allowed for
rapid communication, instant transfers of funds, and informa-
tion networks that fed a herd instinct.57
Stock market values across the world lost nearly half of their values
in 2008.58 The crisis threatened the banking sector in some of the wealth-
iest countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
At the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in Germany, a graph shows the massive downswing in
international fi nancial markets in September 2008.
(Boris Roessler/Corbis)

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 381
and Switzerland.59 Global fi nancial institutions suffered heavy losses and
credit dried up. According to one analyst, “This credit freeze has brought
the global fi nancial system to the brink of collapse.”60
Many are concerned that states will respond by protecting their
national economies, just as they did in response to the stock market crash
of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s. If this occurs, “trade liber-
alization efforts would languish; protectionism and mercantilism would
swell.”61 Protectionist measures have already been taken in Europe, the
United States, Latin America, China, and elsewhere in East Asia.62 “There
is already a push by several countries in different regions to raise tariffs to
the maximum levels permitted under the Uruguay Round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.”63
Perhaps even more troubling than protectionist policies, at least to
economic liberals, is the impact the crisis is having on the support for
economic liberalism itself. Indeed, the fi nancial crisis “discredited the
U.S. brand of free market capitalism. The lords of Wall Street atrociously
gamed the system while supervisors slept.”64 The Policy Choices box
summarizes some of the current debate about the future of liberalism
and capitalism. The undermining of the credibility of economic liber-
alism may be a major turning point in international politics: “. . . for
decades much of the United States’ infl uence and soft power refl ected
the intellectual strength of the Anglo-Saxon brand of market-based capi-
talism. But now, the model that helped push back socialism and pro-
moted deregulation over regulation . . . is under a cloud.”65 French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy has reportedly claimed laissez-faire, c’est fi ni and
called for “the return of politics” to economics. The German fi nance
minister cited Marx’s analysis of the crisis-prone nature of capitalism.
And, referring to the United States and other promoters of economic
liberalism, the Chinese vice premier claimed: “The teachers now have
some problems. ”66
Economic liberal policies of little government intervention have been
challenged even in countries where free-market philosophies held almost
a sacred place. “Now, searching for stability, the U.S. government and
some European governments have nationalized their fi nancial sectors to
a degree that contradicts the tenets of modern capitalism. Much of the
world is turning a historic corner and heading into a period in which
the role of the state will be larger and that of the private sector will be
smaller.”67 This trend is indeed worldwide and may be long lasting. A
recent report by the U.S. government predicted that, by 2025, many of
the major economies of the world will be in the form of state capitalism,
“a system in which the state functions as the leading economic actor and
uses markets primarily for political gain.”68
Forms of state capitalism can already be seen in authoritarian coun-
tries such as China and particularly Russia.69 And in oil-producing
countries, it is the state, not private corporations, that own the large oil
companies of the world, such as Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, Brazil’s
state capitalism
Economic system in
which the government
is the leading economic
actor and uses markets
for political purposes.

382 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Should Economic Liberalism Be Abandoned as the Basis
for the Global Economy?
ISSUE: The liberal international economic order depends on coordination and
cooperation from states, which often takes the form of regulations and through
international organizations such as the WTO. What can be agreed to in such or-
ganizations, however, might not be suffi cient to protect the global economic sys-
tem from certain perils. When the recent economic crisis hit, it was truly a global
event. Although we might be tempted to view such economic crises as cyclical, a
necessary evil, or simply part of the risks associated with development and growth,
some observers disagree. They point to the inequalities that continue to plague
the global economy, the injustices in how economic hardships are distributed,
and the inability of individual citizens to exert control over their own destinies.
Indeed, they question the philosophy of economic liberalism as the basis for the
global economy.
Option #1: The global liberal economic system, albeit imperfect, should be sup-
ported by states as the best means to global growth.
Arguments: (a) Liberalism is not about greed. It simply recognizes that interna-
tional trade and fi nance can be mutually benefi cial to states, and thus represents
an effective means to growth. (b) When international fi nancial collapse occurs,
it reminds states that they are fundamentally connected to each other. Far from
blaming liberal economics for the challenges facing states today, we should in-
stead celebrate the fact that states are increasingly likely to recognize their inter-
dependence and spend their summits discussing trade instead of war. (c) We have
only experienced a few decades exploring the positive impact of global free trade
and global fi nancial interaction. Had the abysmal failures of early rocketry been the
guiding standard of judgment, we would never have landed on the moon. Trying
times do not always implicate the times themselves.
Counterarguments: (a) When I offer to you my goods and services in exchange for
your money, we are doing well by each other. When a global economy can nearly
be brought to a halt because of collapsing housing market bubbles, mega-bank in-
vestment policies, and the greed of a handful of merchants on Wall Street, we are
not doing well be each other. (b) Liberals are fond of noting how “a rising tide lifts
all boats,” but they are considerably more hesitant to admit that economic inter-
dependence can lead to contagion and mutual economic peril. As U.S. President
F. D. Roosevelt once chided, “I think we consider too much the good luck of the
early bird and not enough the bad luck of the early worm.” (c) Although we often
tend to believe that economic progress must inevitably entail setbacks, sometimes
the system is so fundamentally fl awed that the pain of an “economic adjustment”
can be confused with the need for a fundamental revolution.
Option #2: States should seek ways of curbing the infl uence of global capitalism
and begin enforcing regulations that focus on people over profi ts.
(continued )

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 383
Petrobras, and Russia’s Gazprom. In addition, ‘Sovereign wealth funds,’
a recently coined term for state-owned investment portfolios, account for
one-eighth of global investment, and that fi gure is rising. These trends are
reshaping international politics and the global economy by transferring
increasingly large levers of economic power and infl uence to the central
authority of the state. They are fueling the large and complex phenom-
enon of state capitalism.”70
Protectionism and the promotion of nationalist interests, however,
have not been the only response to the economic crisis. States have also
engaged in multilateral cooperation to collectively address economic
problems. It is in states’ interests to cooperate on fi nancial regulation.
If there is no coordination, fi nancial institutions might fl ee to countries
with the least stringent regulations.71 And despite the discrediting of eco-
nomic liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism, states are reluctant to aban-
don the free trade regime that has brought economic growth and a rise in
living standards to so many countries in the past.
In November 2008, the G-20 held an emergency meeting in
Washington, DC to coordinate changes in policy, regulations, oversight,
Arguments: (a) Even the former chairmen of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Alan
Greenspan, admitted that unregulated, self-interested rational behavior produced
the economic crisis, not a greater good.1 This calls into question the guiding prin-
ciples of free market capitalism. (b) There is no reason to believe that free market
capitalism is the ultimate solution. States such as China and Russia have realized
that growth comes from a heavy hand in the economy, not the invisible hand of
the market. (c) For roughly the past three and a half centuries, the state has been
the most important force in global relations. However, the greater the economic
interdependence of the world, the less the state matters, and the less the state
matters, the less chance people’s interests are represented. The great democrat-
ic experiment where the people rule has come to this question: Are the people
citizens, or employees?
Counterarguments: (a) There is nothing wrong with the basic ideas of liberalism,
but they clearly do not include a “free license” for investors, which has caused so
much recent economic turmoil. A free market is not one free of regulation, but
rather one in which those who rise and fall on its successes and failures get to
determine its rules. (b) Knocks against the expansion of trade and commerce are
nothing new. At each step, advances have been highlighted by setbacks. The key is
to not throw the baby out with the bathwater and instead take setbacks as simply
a part of the growth process. (c) The state, however important in the development
of economic systems, is far less effi cient than the private marketplace. Regulating
global markets squeezes out the rational economic interests of the buyers and sell-
ers, replacing it with the cumbersome political interests of governments.
1 Edmond L. Andrews, “Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation,” The New York Times,
October 24, 2008.

384 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
and enforcement in their fi nancial sectors.72 The G-20 met again in Lon-
don in early 2009. At this meeting,
The Group of 20 did agree on new global rules to govern the pay
and bonuses of bankers. The leaders also agreed to “name and
shame” countries that erected trade barriers, intended to resist
growing protectionist sentiment. But a European push for sweep-
ing global regulation of the fi nancial markets was blunted, to a
large degree, by the United States. While the leaders agreed to
create a new Financial Stability Board to monitor the fi nancial
system for signs of risks, they stopped well short of giving regu-
lators cross-border authority. . . .73
A similar meeting took place in London, in 1933. Then, countries
that tried to cooperate to avert or at least lessen the effects of the Great
Depression failed. According to historian Walter Mead,
Economic cooperation didn’t collapse in 1929. In fact, from
1929 through most of the fi rst four years of the Depression,
there were a lot of efforts which ended up not being successful.
There were strong efforts to try to put together some kind of a
united front on economic issues. Unfortunately, in some ways,
protectionism on trade undermined everything else. And when
Franklin Roosevelt came in [in 1933], he torpedoed the London
Economic Conference, which was portrayed as the last grand
effort to get some kind of currency agreement, because he want-
ed the freedom to try to raise U.S. prices without regard for other
countries. So, what happened really was that economic coopera-
tion was the fi rst thing that people looked to as the Depression
began to break out, because it was obviously an international
crisis in many respects. But the long, grinding pressure of the
downturn drove countries more and more inward.74
Some have used the term “Bretton Woods II” to describe the attempts
to address this most recent economic crisis. The idea is to use the crisis
as an opportunity to rewrite and update the rules of cooperation that were
set up after World War II. As one analyst writes: “A worldwide web of
economic interdependence spreads risks as well as rewards, and global
governance needs to evolve along with the interactions. International
fi nancial institutions, for example, are still largely structured for an era
of American-dominated globalization, when businesses expanded mainly
from developed to emerging economies.”75
International Economic Institutions Today
Although the fi xed exchange rate came to an end in the 1970s, the institu-
tions created with the Bretton Woods system still function today. They are
not, however, without criticism. The IMF, for example, is often criticized

The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods 385
for the conditions it attaches to its loans. Often called “austerity pack-
ages,” these typically require governments to privatize their holdings, cut
government spending, and increase interest rates. The IMF attaches these
strings to its loans in order to ensure that the money is spent in these
ways and so that future loans will be unnecessary. Many, however, argue
that IMF conditions are too liberal and force more privatization on econo-
mies than exists in most of the leading economies. Furthermore, critics
charge, the IMF focuses blindly on the economic bottom line, ignoring the
political causes of the economic situation in countries and the political
consequences of its austerity packages. Finally, critics say that the IMF
often gives bad economic advice and makes the economic situation even
worse. In the IMF’s handling of the Asian fi nancial crisis, for example,
leading economists “suggested that the austerity measures required by
the IMF—including the imposition of high interest rates—helped spread
the Asian crisis even to well-managed economies.”76 The IMF was a play-
er in the Russian fi nancial problems, too. With the Russian economic
crisis looming, the IMF offered a $22 billion package in July 1998 to help
save it from devaluation. This ounce of prevention, however, failed and
the IMF was criticized by some for not doing enough and for not doing
something earlier. Others say that Russia itself is to blame because it has
not passed essential policies for reform.77
More generally,
the seemingly relentless spread of the fi nancial crisis from
Asia to Russia and possibly to Latin America . . . has left many
observers wondering whether the IMF is still able to do its
job. Computerized trading has made it increasingly easy for
international investors to buy and sell stocks, bonds and other
securities 24 hours a day, and liberalized markets have greatly
expanded their access to countries around the world. While all
this facilitates the free fl ow of capital by making it easier for
investors to quickly move their money from one country to
another, it makes it harder for the IMF to keep an eye on things
and avert crises before it’s too late.78
Others defend the institution as the only hope for global efforts to
stabilize trouble spots.
The IMF, mistakes notwithstanding, was and remains crucial to
economic stabilization and recovery. Despite all the controversy
surrounding the IMF’s policies and the withering criticism of
several highly respected economists, the overwhelming weight
of opinion on Wall Street and in Washington favors strengthen-
ing the fund. Not everyone agrees on the exact nature of its role,
but all believe that some global institution needs to be in the
center of the storm and that it is wiser to use the IMF as the
starting point than to craft something altogether new.79

386 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
Some see the recent global downturn as a prompt for IMF reform.
“The fi nancial crisis has created an opportunity for the IMF to reinvigo-
rate itself and possibly play a constructive role in resolving, or at the least
mitigating, the effects of the global downturn.”80 Potential reforms of the
IMF also include making it more fl exible, increasing its lending capacity,
and changing its management to refl ect the weight of the new economic
powers, such as China and India.81
The World Bank has also come under criticism recently, for trying to
do too much. Through the years, the World Bank “has added new tasks to
its mandate. In recent years, it has been called on for emergency lending
in the wake of the Asian fi nancial crisis, for economic management as
part of Middle East peacekeeping efforts, for postwar Balkan reconstruc-
tion, and for loans to combat the AIDS tragedy in Africa. By now, its mis-
sion has become so complex that it strains credulity to portray the bank
as a manageable organization. The bank takes on challenges that lie far
beyond any institution’s capabilities.”82
Of all the components of the Bretton Woods Liberal International Eco-
nomic Order, it is the GATT arrangement that has undergone the most
transformation, particularly recently. With the establishment of the WTO
in 1995, the framework of agreements that made up GATT became an inter-
national institution that provides regular monitoring of the trade policies
of member countries. The WTO is more powerful than GATT and covers
broader areas of international trade (such as services, intellectual properties,
and trade-related investment measures). By creating an overarching body to
monitor trade practices, the member countries hoped to avoid protection-
ist policies that tended to surface between GATT negotiations and various
loopholes to free trade exploited by governments. Proponents of the WTO
cited the economic benefi ts to a permanent institution, but many felt that
the WTO might threaten national sovereignty. In the United States, such
fears put the ratifi cation of the WTO Treaty in doubt for some time.
Concerns about threats to sovereignty are primarily associated with
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, which has the authority to
impose sanctions on member states that violate free trade agreements.
Other countries can bring complaints before the WTO if they believe a
state is in violation. By 2009, more than 390 cases had been brought to
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. These included rulings against the
United States on disputes brought by Venezuela and Brazil on U.S. gaso-
line standards and by many Latin American countries on U.S. prohibition
of imports of tuna that did not use dolphin-safe fi shing techniques. The
United States obtained a WTO ruling against the European Union for its
preferences for importing bananas from its former colonies.
According to the WTO itself, it is a myth that the Dispute Settlement
Mechanism gives it power to tell other countries what to do:
The only occasion when a WTO body can have a direct impact
on a government’s policies is when a dispute is brought to the
Dispute Settlement
Mechanism
WTO Procedures
to deal with disputes
between member-
states over free trade
agreements.

Summary 387
WTO and if that leads to a ruling by the Dispute Settlement
Body (which consists of all members). Normally the Dispute Set-
tlement Body makes a ruling by adopting the fi ndings of a panel
of experts or an appeal report. Even then, the scope of the ruling
is narrow: it is simply a judgment or interpretation of whether
a government has broken one of the WTO’s agreements—
agreements that the infringing government had itself accepted.
If a government has broken a commitment it has to conform. In
all other respects, the WTO does not dictate to governments to
adopt or drop certain policies.83
Yet it is clear that the WTO procedures are changing states’ behaviors,
even if they are not forced to do so. “So far, it seems that nations have been
willing to abide by the dispute panel decisions rather than withdraw from
the WTO when such decisions go against them. Because so much appears
to be at stake for each nation by way of expected economic gain that would
result from further liberalizing trade, states have felt compelled to partici-
pate in the rule-making exercise rather than being left out of it.”84
What the WTO does do is highlight the tensions between politics and
economics. The political decisions by the United States to save dolphins
and decrease pollution from gasoline have come in confl ict with the
economic philosophy of free trade. For now, the economic side seems to
have triumphed in most cases, leading several groups to protest at WTO
meetings (these protests will be discussed in Chapter 14), but the tension
between politics and economics continues to be at the heart of the inter-
national political economy.
SUMMARY
● The study of the international political economy concerns the relation-
ships and tension between political units and values and economics
and market relations. Alternative economic philosophies, such as eco-
nomic liberalism and mercantilism, offer different perspectives on the
nature of these relationships.
● The international economic system set up in the noncommunist in-
dustrialized world after the Second World War was based on the eco-
nomic liberal perspective, which stresses the free market system as a
coordinator of greater wealth for all and free trade. The role of govern-
ments, according to this perspective, is best limited to provider of col-
lective goods. Economic liberals disagree with mercantilists, who put
the national interests of the state before economic wealth and favor
protectionist politics when national interests are at stake and to main-
tain a positive balance of trade.
● The international economic system after World War II was centered on
three principal organizations: the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT.

388 Chapter 10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
That system, based to an important extent on fi xed exchange rates and
free trade, worked well for the industrialized countries until the 1970s.
In 1971, the United States put an end to the system in which gold and
dollars were perfectly convertible at the rate of U.S. $35 per ounce of
gold. The fi rst OPEC increase in the price of oil in 1973 was another
shock to the international system and helped produce a combination
of high infl ation and slow growth throughout the rest of the 1970s.
When OPEC increased the price of oil again in 1979, the second oil
shock helped throw the industrialized world into a recession. In 1982,
it brought the United States the deepest recession it had experienced
since World War II, and many predicted the decline of the United States
as an economic hegemon. Economic growth in the 1990s, coupled with
economic crises in countries like Japan, means that the United States
remained the leading economy by many measures.
● The end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-fi rst centuries
witnessed a rapidly changing and largely unstable international econo-
my. New players, most notably China, emerged as important econom-
ic powers and international fi nancial crises created turbulence in the
increasingly global economy. The problems that began in the U.S. fi –
nancial sector in 2007 quickly spread with potentially signifi cant long-
term consequences, including the weakening of support for economic
liberalism. The Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank, the IMF,
and now the WTO—remain the primary global efforts to coordinate
economics across state borders, although their structure and effective-
ness are often debated.
KEY TERMS international political
economy 355
developed countries 356
developing countries 356
Liberal International Economic
Order 357
economic liberalism 357
free trade 358
comparative advantage 359
collective goods 359
mercantilism 359
subsidies 360
Tariffs 360
protectionist policies 360
import quotas 360
dumping 360
balance of trade 360
export platforms 361
monetary policies 362
exchange rates 363
Bretton Woods system 364
International Monetary Fund
(IMF) 364
fi xed exchange rates 365
World Bank 366
General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 367
most-favored-nation
principle 367
fl oating exchange rates 371
imperial overstretch 374
Group of 20 (G-20) 375
centrally planned economies 378
state capitalism 381
Dispute Settlement
Mechanism 386

389
C H A P T E R 11
The Economic Gap between the North and the South
• The International Debt Problem
Explanations of the North-South Gap
• The Historical Explanation: Imperialism
• Dependency and Neo-Imperialism Explanations
• The Role of MNCs in Economic Dependency
• The Economic Liberal Explanation of Underdevelopment
• The “Economic Miracle” of East Asia
Development Strategies for the South
• Strategies Associated with neo-Marxism
• Liberalization Strategies
• Addressing Gender Inequality and Disease
The Role of the International Organizations in Economic
Development
Moral, Economic, and Security Implications of the North-South
Gap
Summary
Key Terms
The Developing States
in the International
Political Economy

390 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
This chapter discusses the economic state of countries in the South and the economic and political relations between the wealthier
industrialized, or developed, states of the North and the poorer states of
the South—the less developed countries (LDCs). On many measures, the
gap between the economic prosperity in the North and the poverty in the
South is growing, although there are positive trends on some dimensions
and in some countries.
Various explanations have been offered as to why this gap exists and
why it has been growing, at least on some criteria and in some coun-
tries. Neo-Marxist approaches (introduced in Chapter 1) posit that those
relationships tend to have a deleterious impact on the poor states. These
perspectives have proved to be popular for explaining problems that
developing countries have faced in their quests for economic well-being
and political independence. However, in recent years, the prescriptions or
solutions offered by at least some versions of neo-Marxism have become
less infl uential, even if some of their descriptions of the problems that
poor countries face retain much of their credibility. Explanations based
on economic liberalism focus on the internal policies of states as the
cause of underdevelopment, and prescriptions for liberalizing the econo-
mies of developing states were accepted and followed by many in the
immediate post–Cold War years. Liberalization policies, however, have
experienced a backlash as many developed states, even those thought to
be most successful, are facing continued economic problems, especially
given the recent global economic downturn.
After reviewing the alternative explanations of the North-South
gap and the various development strategies associated with them, this
chapter concludes with a consideration of the apparently emerging con-
sensus about the important role of women in the process of economic
and political development in the poorer countries of the world and of
the role of diseases such as HIV/AIDS in underdevelopment. Whatever
strategies for development are chosen, the implications for addressing
the North-South gap are broad because the economic relations between
the rich and the poor in the world have ethical, security, and economic
consequences.
The Economic Gap between the North and the South
Poverty, starvation, and glaring inequality in the distribution of the world’s wealth constitute a serious problem in many respects. Millions
suffer grievously from poverty, and they probably will continue to do so
for a long time to come. According to a recent UN report on human devel-
opment, “In the midst of an increasingly prosperous global economy, 10.7
million children every year do not live to see their fi fth birthday, and
more than 1 billion people survive in abject poverty on less than $1 a
day.”1 Seventeen percent of the population in the developing world in
recent years has not had enough to eat.2
less developed
countries The
poorer states of
the South.

The Economic Gap between the North and the South 391
According to economist Jeffrey Sachs, “the greatest tragedy of our
time is that one sixth of humanity is . . . caught in a poverty trap. . . .
They are trapped by disease, physical isolation, climate stress, envi-
ronmental degradation and by extreme poverty itself.”3 Such statistics
would be marginally more tolerable, though still distressing, if the situ-
ation were improving rapidly. But what makes poverty in the developing
world, and the gap between rich and poor countries, politically explosive
and ethically even more pressing are the indications that the inequalities
are growing.
In 1960, the average per capita gross national product (GNP) of coun-
tries in the developed world (that is, the United States, Canada, most
of Europe, Oceania, Israel, and Japan) was $6,520 (U.S. dollars); in the
developing world, the fi gure was $361, or $6,159 less. By 1988, the aver-
age per capita GNP had increased to $13,995 in the world’s rich coun-
tries and $717 in the poor countries, resulting in a gap of $13,278, an
increase of $7,119 over that twenty-eight-year period (as measured in
constant 1987 U.S. dollars).4 Another source reveals that “the gap in
per capita income between the industrial and developing worlds tripled,
from $5,700 in 1960 to $15,400 in 1993.”5 In addition, “Thirty years ago,
the income of the richest fi fth of the world’s population combined was
30 times greater than that of the poorest fi fth. Today, the income gap is
more than 60 times greater.”6 In 1993, the poorest 10 percent of people
globally retained 0.8 percent of global income. The richest top 10 percent
retained 50 percent of global income. In 2000, the trends changed only
slightly, with the poorest 10 percent of people globally retaining 0.7 percent
of global income whereas the richest top 10 percent retained 50.9 percent
of global income.7
Some economists object to economic comparisons that simply con-
vert income fi gures from various countries into dollar equivalents. Until
recently, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) used cur-
rency exchange rates to do this. Now its economists base their calcula-
tions on purchasing power parities that take into account what money
actually buys in the various countries around the world. Using this mea-
sure, the picture of the North-South gap does not look much better. In
2005, the gap between the developing countries (with $2,531 per capita)
and the developed countries (with $33,082) was more than $30,000.8
There is little prospect that this disparity will decrease in the fore-
seeable future. Assume that per capita GNP grows at 2 percent per year
in the developed world and at 5 percent per year in the developing world
over a ten-year period. This assumption is rather optimistic, implying
that growth rates in the developing world will be two and a half times
greater than those in industrialized countries. Even if that rather uto-
pian dream were to come true, the gap between per capita GNPs would
still increase by $2,613. Furthermore, “to halve the share of people living
on $1 a day, optimistic estimates suggest that 3.7% annual growth in
per capita incomes is needed in developing countries. But over the past
purchasing power
parity A measure of
the relative purchasing
power of currencies to
buy the same goods in
different countries.

392 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
10 years only 24 countries have grown this fast. . . . Indeed, many have
suffered negative growth in recent years, and the share of their people in
poverty has almost certainly increased.”9
The recent downturn in the global economy certainly will not help
the situation. “According to the IMF, The International Monetary Fund
estimates that the crisis will cost developing countries $1 trillion in lost
growth. The World Bank warned that it would add more than 50 million
people to those living on less than $2 a day across the globe” (“The Crisis
at Home and Abroad,” The New York Times editorial, March 5, 2009). Per
capita income data, however, capture only one aspect of reality, and these
data can be misleading.10
They are averages that do not take into account the distribution of
wealth being produced. The economy of a developing country may grow
very rapidly in terms of per capita GNP as a result of wealth increas-
ingly concentrated in the hands of a select few, while most people remain
worse off. In contrast, decreases in the GNP can mask improvement in
living conditions for many people in poor countries. Young people make
up the majority of the population of most developing countries. Before
recent improvements in health care, many of them died of disease or mal-
nutrition. “An increase in the survival rate of the poorest groups usually
INDIAN OCEAN
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN
PACIFIC
OCEAN
Low-income countries by World
Bank classification (income
below $765 per capita)
Map 11.1 Low-Income Countries
Source: “Maps,” copyright © 2005 by Jeffrey D. Sachs. Data from World Bank (2004), from The End of Poverty by Jeffrey D. Sachs. Used by
permission of The Penguin Press, a division of Penguin Group (USA) Inc.

The Economic Gap between the North and the South 393
promotes . . . a fall in per capita income. . . . The average income in the
country can fall even if everybody is materially better off.”11 In short, the
survival of the young, who typically have no income at all, can depress a
country’s per capita income, but the decrease does not necessarily indi-
cate a worsening of living conditions as a whole.
Even in terms of income or GNP data, though, the economic picture
in the developing world is not uniformly bleak. From 1970 to 1981, if
“we look at annual average growth rates of per capita GNP . . . the top
fi fteen countries in the world were all developing [countries], far outpac-
ing the fi gures for industrial countries.”12 From 1990 to 2005, the econo-
mies of the rich countries grew at about 1.8 percent a year, while those
of the developing countries grew at an average rate of about 2.9 percent a
year.13
Furthermore, a calculation of the distribution of wealth between rich
and poor countries using purchasing power parities reveals that by the
early 1990s, “the share of the world output produced by the rich indus-
trial economies [dropped] to 54% from 73%.”14 Overall, much of human-
ity is experiencing signifi cant economic progress.15 Figure 11.1 shows the
trends in GNI per capita in major regions and economic categories of
the world.
0
G
N
I p
er
C
ap
ita
(in
th
ou
sa
nd
s
of
c
ur
re
nt
U
.S
. d
ol
la
rs
)
Latin America
& Caribbean
Europe &
Central Asia
High-Income
OECD*
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1990
2007
2000
World East Asia &
the Pacific
South Asia Sub-Saharan
Africa
Middle East
& North Africa
*High-Income OECD includes most EU countries, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the
United States.
Source: World Bank, “Key Development Data and Statistics,” Millennium Development Goals, 2009. © 2009 World Bank. Reproduced by
permission.
Figure 11.1 Global Disparities in Income: Are Regions Closing the Gap?

394 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
And if we analyze quality-of-life indicators, such as life expectancy
(arguably the most comprehensive statistic available), it is no longer so
clear that the developing world is falling farther behind the industrialized
countries with each passing year. Data on life expectancy are particularly
important in this context, “since life expectancy statistics are calculated
by looking at how long all the people in a given country live. . . . Although
a small number of rich people can have enough money to raise the aver-
age income in a country far above what the average person has, nobody
can live long enough to raise the average length of life very much.”16 In
1950, “citizens of low-income countries had a life expectancy of only 35.2
years,”17 at a time when the average life expectancy in rich countries was
about 65. By the early 1970s, life expectancy in the developing world was
about 55, while it had reached 71 in rich countries.18 Currently, the gap
between life expectancy in poor countries and rich countries has dimin-
ished to about thirteen years.19
The improvements in life expectancy data indicate at a minimum
that more people are receiving better medical care. The United Nations
Development Programme has created the Human Development Index,
which “is a composite index of achievements in basic human capabilities,
a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Three
variables have been chosen to represent those three dimensions: life
expectancy, educational attainment and income.”20 Figure 11.2 compares
the performance of the industrialized world with that of the developing
Human Development
Index Composite index
of achievements in basic
human capabilities,
including life expectancy,
education, and income.
1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
H
um
an
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t I
nd
ex
S
co
re
s
Year
A 52-Point Gap
A 36-Point Gap
Poor Countries
Rich Countries
Figure 11.2 The
Human Development
Gap, Rich Versus
Poor Countries,
1970–2005
Source: Based on United
Nations Development
Programme, Human
Development Report (New
York: Oxford University Press,
1996 and 2005) United
Nations, Human Development
Report (New York: Palgrave,
Macmillan, 2007/2008) p.
232.

The Economic Gap between the North and the South 395
world in terms of this index over the past several decades. It shows a
defi nite trend toward closing the gap between rich countries and poor
countries on the composite, reasonably comprehensive indicator of the
quality of life. In short, although it is possible that people in general, and
those in poor countries in particular, are more miserable than their coun-
terparts two, three, and four decades ago, despite being healthier, better
fed, better educated, and better off, it is not likely. Why are some quality-
of-life indicators showing a decline in the gap, while economic indicators
are showing an increase in the gap between the North and South? There
are several possible explanations, but probably the most important is that
many measures in the human development index have a ceiling value.
People in the North can become only so literate; there is no improving
on 100 percent literacy. Thus, any advance in literacy in the poorer states
will close the gap. Economic measures, on the other hand, such as GNP
and GNP per capita, have no upper level. Improvements on these mea-
sures in the South can occur at the same time improvement occurs in
the North, allowing for the gap to increase. Also important is the role
of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations that
have focused on increasingly available health care and education over the
past several decades. These groups have made progress in reducing infant
mortality and increasing literacy rates in the South. In contrast, there
have not been comparable global efforts to increase economic well-being,
partly because of the debates over effective ways to do this.
Comparisons between the standards of living in rich countries and
poor countries over time, provide an important basis for evaluating pes-
simistic assertions about catastrophic trends in the world’s distribution
of wealth. But most of the data showing recent improvement in living
standards in poor countries focus on averages, which can mask large dis-
crepancies between countries in various regions. Much of the improve-
ment in life expectancy in developing countries, for example, is the result
of rather dramatic increases in the index of living standards in China and
other Asian countries.21 “The general picture of the developing world in
the latter half of the twentieth century . . . is one of tremendous progress
in improving health and raising incomes; child mortality has been cut in
half and incomes have more than doubled. . . . These statistics, however,
have been skewed by the tremendous health gains and economic growth
of China”22 and other newly industrialized states in Asia (Chinese eco-
nomic growth is discussed in Chapter 10; other, newly industrialized
Asian states are discussed later in this chapter).
While the dramatic improvements in China in particular and many
other Asian countries in general should not be overlooked (those coun-
tries do contain a signifi cant proportion of the developing world’s
population), it is also true that some countries have seen their human
development scores decline in recent years.23 Many of these countries
are in sub-Saharan Africa. GDP per capita increased at an average annu-
al rate of 5.8 percent in China from 1965 to 1990, but it decreased over

396 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
the same period in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Zaire, Uganda,
Madagascar, Niger, Ghana, Togo, and Zambia. Furthermore, African
states make up the vast majority of the states that rank at the bottom
of the UN Human Development Index ranking.24
Available calorie supplies increased by more than 700 calories a day
in China from 1965 to 1989, but in Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad, Malawi,
Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Kenya, and Togo, calo-
rie supplies were lower in 1989 than they were in 1965.25 Food produc-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa was 20 percent lower in the 1990s than it was
in 1970, when the population was half its current size. The average life
expectancy for males in sub-Saharan Africa is fi fty years, six years lower
than the average for the developing world and only slightly better than
people living in England in the 1840s.26
The gap between life expectancy for sub-Saharan Africa and the rest
of the world has widened in recent years and “HIV/AIDS is at the heart of
the reversal. In 2004, an estimated 3 million people died from the virus,
and another 5 million became infected. Almost all of these deaths were
in the developing world, with 70% of them in Africa.”27
In general, living standards have probably improved in developing
countries since the Second World War, perhaps even more rapidly in some
respects than they have in rich countries. But there are tragic exceptions
involving millions of desperate people.
The International Debt Problem
One of the reasons that the gap between the North and the South has
been growing (at least according to many economic indicators) concerns
the large amounts of debt many of these countries owe. Any economic
progress that is made by a country with large debts is quickly eaten up
by debt payments. Many countries spend huge amounts servicing their
debt—paying only interest—without diminishing the principal of the
original loans. Debt in the developing world takes away resources that
could be spent on economic restructuring, research and development, and
addressing poverty.
One root of the international debt problem involved the action of
the Organization of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) in 1973 of
quadrupling the price of oil. The importance of oil to each domestic econ-
omy in the world and to international economic intercourse is diffi cult
to overstate. The dramatic change in oil prices set in motion fl ows of
capital and economic changes whose ramifi cations (almost all negative,
including those felt by most of the oil exporters that initiated the price
increase) are still felt today. First, naturally enough, the price increase
brought billions of dollars to OPEC countries and other oil exporters.
They deposited much of that money in large banks in the United States
and Europe. Despite the entirely understandable joy created in much of
the Third World by OPEC’s success, the change in the price of oil put

The Economic Gap between the North and the South 397
many of those countries in dire economic straits. That problem was dealt
with in large measure by transforming a large portion of OPEC profi ts into
Third World debt. “London and New York bankers voluntarily [and for a
profi t] became risk-bearing intermediaries for transferring the oil money
from one group of developing countries—the oil exporters—to another—
the non oil-producing, capital starved, less developed countries . . .
of the Third World.”28
In order to understand the tragic nature of what was to follow, it is
important to realize fi rst how wise all this seemed in the 1970s. The
OPEC price increase had brought the member countries billions of dol-
lars, which they deposited in several of the largest banking institutions
in the world. That increase created a crisis for developing countries that
needed to pay for their oil imports. What could have been more logical
for those countries than to obtain loans from the banks that had recent-
ly received huge deposits from the oil exporters? “This recycling of oil
wealth was welcomed wholeheartedly by the LDCs that wanted credit
for their . . . import needs. It also served the needs of other interested
parties. Industrial governments and aid donors also welcomed an easy
way to fi nance poorer countries’ import bills. Moreover, the recycling
process compensated Western economies for the defl ating effect of high-
er oil payments.”29 In other words, the fact that banks in industrialized
countries could use the deposits from oil-exporting countries to provide
loans for which they could charge interest to some extent offset the pain
infl icted on Western economies by the higher oil prices.
The recycling process worked rather well in the 1970s. The prices
of exports from developing countries rose at an average annual rate of
14.7 percent from 1973 to 1980, and the volume of their exports rose
4 percent a year during that time.30 Real per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) in developing countries grew at an annual rate of 3.2 percent from
1973 to 1980. This rate was not terrifi c, but considering that the growth
rate in industrialized countries was only 2.1 percent in those years, it did
not indicate a terrible crisis.31
That terrible crisis was soon to come, though, triggered by the second
OPEC price increase in 1979. “With the second oil price increase, the
[industrialized countries] by and large adopted anti-infl ationary macro-
economic policy stances. The result was a severe worldwide recession,
sharply falling commodity prices, and the highest real interest rates in
the postwar era.”32 In other words, when the price of oil increased dra-
matically for the second time in a decade, the governments of industrial-
ized countries took several painful steps to protect themselves, mostly to
avoid uncontrollable infl ation. They raised interest rates; their economic
growth slowed. By 1982, the U.S. economy had gone into the deepest
recession since the Second World War. Recessions in most other devel-
oped countries followed.
The economic slowdown in the rich countries soon led to depression-
type conditions in many LDCs. First, world trade slowed to a crawl, and

398 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
developing countries found it impossible to export their commodities to
the industrialized countries. The year 1981 “had the dubious distinction
of being the fi rst . . . since 1958 to experience an actual decrease in world
trade in current dollar terms, a shrinkage of 1 percent.”33 The value of
world trade continued to fall for the next two years. Along with the vol-
ume of exports from LDCs, the value of those exports fell as well. Food
commodity prices dropped 15 percent from 1981 to 1985. The prices of
minerals and metals fell 6 percent during that time. The terms of trade
for developing countries, that is, the relationship between the prices of
the goods they export and the goods they import, turned against them
violently in 1986. They had to export 30 percent more that year to receive
the same volume of imports as the previous year; the result was a loss of
$94 billion to the developing world. Somewhat ironically, one of the com-
modities whose prices dropped most precipitously was oil. This meant
that developing countries such as Mexico and Nigeria, which had benefi t-
ed spectacularly from oil price increases in the 1970s, found themselves
in the 1980s suffering in a way that was virtually indistinguishable from
their oil-starved peers.
Many of the states in the developing world have yet to escape the debt
problem of the 1980s. Developing countries had debt service payments,
on average, of 4.6 percent of their GDP in 2005, up from 3.5 percent in
1990.34 In 1999, debt service ate up over 20 percent of the value of rev-
enue in countries such as Senegal, Zambia, and Bolivia.35 The develop-
ing world faced severe economic problems in the late 1990s, and many
of these problems continue today, particularly after the global economic
downturn in 2008. “Overall, borrowing needs for developing countries
are expected to exceed net capital infl ows by between $350 billion and
$635 billion.”36
Explanations of the North-South Gap
Why does the economic gap between the North and the South exist and, at least on some measures, continue to grow? So far, theories
purporting to answer these questions have been much more numerous
than examples of success in attaining these goals. The experience of
LDCs in the decades since the Second World War discredited one plan
after another concerning the most effective ways to speed development.
The Historical Explanation: Imperialism
Most would agree that the roots of the North-South gap lay in the his-
torical relationship between the colonial powers and the areas that they
conquered from the sixteenth to early twentieth centuries. As discussed
in Chapter 1, neo-Marxist perspectives take a historical view of global
politics and how the development of capitalism and imperialism divided
the world economy into a core of “haves,” in which the most advanced

Explanations of the North-South Gap 399
economic activities and wealth were located, and a periphery of “have-
nots,” in which less advanced economic activities occurred and wealth
was scarce. Colonialism was in many ways economically detrimental to
the colonies. Minerals were exported, with profi t going to the colonial
powers, economic expertise was often limited to the colonists, and econo-
mies were developed in narrow ways to serve the interests of the colonial
power. Luxury crops such as coffee were planted to serve the needs of the
home populations of the colonial powers. The economic gap between the
North and the South was thus established during this historical period.
The North industrialized, with the help of the resources it extracted from
the South, established modern infrastructure, and accumulated capital to
continue its economic growth. The South, on the other hand, was forced
to remain agrarian, its economic and political structures were dominated
and molded to serve the interests of the colonial states, and it lagged more
and more behind the development in the North. While most agree that
the colonial relationship primarily benefi ted the North at the expense
of the South, some argue that this is not the complete picture. The gap
between the areas was in some ways already in place before imperialism
began, and it is not clear that the growth in the North was directly due to
the imperial relationship. According to one analyst,
commerce between core and periphery for three centuries after
1350 proceeded on a small scale, was not a uniquely profi table
fi eld of enterprise, and . . . could in no way be classifi ed as deci-
sive for economic growth in Western Europe. . . . The commerce
between Western Europe and regions at the periphery of the
international economy forms an insignifi cant part of the expla-
nation for the accelerated rate of economic growth experienced
by the core after 1750. . . . For economic growth of the core, the
periphery was peripheral.37
Furthermore, it is not clear that the North became rich at the expense
of the poor since all regions grew economically during and immediately
after the colonial period. “The key fact of modern times is not the trans-
fer of income from one region to another, by force or otherwise, but rather
the overall increase in world income, but at a different rate in different
regions.”38
Also, in this view, far from harming most countries in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia, contact with colonial imperialists actually brought
some degree of economic progress to those areas. Those few places that
were not taken over by Europeans do not seem, on average, to have
benefi ted greatly by that “good luck.” For example, “the African states
not subject to Western imperialism—Liberia and Ethiopia—are today
more backward than those neighbors which [were] colonized.”39 Japan
is often cited as a shining example of the good things that might have
happened to areas had they not been colonized, because Japan was never
formally subjected to colonial status. It is certainly an economic success

400 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
story. But “Britain and other Western powers imposed treaties upon the
Japanese that required something approaching free trade with the rest
of the world. In particular, a treaty of 1866 restricted the Japanese to a
revenue tariff of not more than 5 percent, which lasted until 1899. . . .
Trade immediately expanded, and economic growth apparently picked
up speed, particularly in the 1880s and 1890s.”40 It would seem diffi cult
to trace Japan’s economic success to lack of contact with the Western
industrialized world.
Despite these criticisms of the historical explanation, many after
World War II believed that overall, imperialism had been economically
devastating to the South. It was widely believed that when the colonial
relationship was severed, the states in the South would catch up eco-
nomically to the North. According to modernization theory, the South
was simply in an earlier economic stage than the North.41 From this
perspective, Britain, the United States, and the other Western industrial-
ized countries would serve as a historical model that the new countries
would try to emulate in their efforts to develop politically and economi-
cally. This meant that the new countries should adopt free enterprise sys-
tems based on individual initiative and democratic political systems. In
general, modernization and development theories, popular in the 1950s,
stressed that internal changes in the new states were crucial to their eco-
nomic development. The people would have to be educated and social-
ized to give up their “old-fashioned ideas.” Urbanization was considered
desirable for its impact on the education and socialization processes, and
industrialization, with its attendant concentration of people in cities and
capital-intensive activities, was presumed to be the primary goal of devel-
oping countries. All of these processes would be accelerated by a maxi-
mum amount of contact between rich countries and poor countries in the
form of international trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid.
Based on these assumptions in modernization theory, there was great
optimism that the South would quickly escape poverty conditions. After
all, many of these states possessed vast natural resources that were now
under their control, free from colonial oppression. These optimistic hopes
were largely dashed. Overall, the South did not catch up to the North,
and, as we have seen, the gap between the rich and the poor in the world
accelerated, particularly after the 1960s.
Dependency and Neo-Imperialism Explanations
Many leaders in the South, as well as many analysts in the North, have
proposed one explanation to the continued and growing gap between the
North and the South: The exploitative structure of the colonial period
was extended with neocolonial structures, even after states gained their
independence, and this neo-imperial relationship continued to disad-
vantage the South in the international political economy. According to
neo-Marxist approaches, particularly dependency theory (introduced in
modernization
theory Perspective
that emphasizes stages of
development and expects
poor countries to develop
as they move from
traditional to modern
societies and economies.

Explanations of the North-South Gap 401
Chapter 1), the states in the South will not catch up with the states in the
North until the international structure of the global economy changes.42
Neo-Marxists argue that after gaining independence, developing states
were subjected to international power structures when they began the
development process. LDCs had to compete in a system dominated eco-
nomically, politically, and militarily by states that were already relative-
ly rich and powerful. This situation, according to neo-Marxists, calls for
strategies quite different from those used in earlier days by states such as
Great Britain and the United States. Neo-Marxists believe that adopting
a strategy similar to that relied on by the currently rich countries would
perpetuate a process that many economists and historians in the North
tend to overlook when they analyze the historical experience of wealthy
industrialized states. That process transfers wealth from poorer regions
and countries to wealthier countries. Such a redistribution of wealth, in
the view of most neo-Marxists, is a more or less natural consequence
of capitalism. While economists and historians in the developed states
acknowledge that colonialism and imperialism existed, neo-Marxists
believe they understate the extent to which economic progress in the rich
northern countries was based on exploitation of the currently underde-
veloped regions. In short, rich countries got rich, to an important extent,
by making poor countries poor. And here again, of course, is a factor
pointing in the direction of development strategies quite different from
those used in earlier epochs. Current LDCs have no relatively defense-
less, untouched areas available for exploitation—the key to success for
capitalist states.
Neo-Marxists view the structure of the international system as the
reason that they cannot escape the poverty originating in the colonial peri-
od. In particular, the structure of international trade, aid, and investment
by multinational corporations works against the interests of the South.
These economic structures are backed by powerful military and political
structures, primarily through the foreign policies of the United States, to
maintain the neo-imperialist economic domination over the South.
Why, according to the neo-Marxist perspective, does international
trade tend to have a deleterious impact on poor countries? The main argu-
ment is that many poor countries depend heavily on the export of one or
two raw materials or commodities; that is, they suffer from commodity
concentration. They developed this reliance in the historical process of
becoming integrated into the capitalist world system. As long as they
depend on international trade (as most LDCs do for a very large proportion
of their GNP), and especially if they are also heavily dependent on one key
trading partner (often their former colonial power), they will never break
out of this role to which they have been relegated in the world’s division
of labor. The problem is exacerbated by the rich countries’ refusal to abide
by the free trade doctrine when it does not suit their purposes. They erect
high tariff barriers or adopt quotas to protect their own domestic econom-
ic interests against competition from cheap labor or cheap commodities

402 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
in the poor countries. Indeed, the GATT trading regime seems to have
worked against the South as the North has negotiated free trade for what
it exports (manufactured goods) and kept protectionist barriers for goods
for which the South has a comparative advantage (primary products).
Neo-Marxists also argue that the terms of trade involving the pri-
mary products on which developing countries depend have deteriorated
steadily. That is, the amount of a given raw material they must export
to get a manufactured product in return keeps growing. For example, the
amount of rice that Myanmar must export to obtain a refrigerator from
some industrialized country keeps getting larger as the years go by. Also,
the prices of raw materials and commodities fl uctuate in a notorious fash-
ion. Occasionally, the prices of exports from developing countries, such
as copper, coffee, or sugar, have been very high, and the producers have
experienced temporary windfalls. But in the next year, the prices of those
same products have dropped precipitously, and the developing countries
that export them have suffered grievous balance-of-trade defi cits and oth-
er painful dislocations in their highly vulnerable economies.43
Thus, because the South primarily earns its living by exporting pri-
mary products and because the prices of primary products are unstable,
these countries are disadvantaged compared to the North and its exports
of manufactured goods with stable prices.
From the neo-Marxists’ viewpoint, foreign aid (or overseas develop-
ment assistance) also serves the interests of the North, because aid often
supports elites in dependent countries whose interests are tied more closely
to the elites of the richer capitalist countries than to their own countries.
The elites often use that aid to suppress people who would like to achieve
a degree of national autonomy. Furthermore, aid builds up debts that poor
countries have a great deal of diffi culty repaying. They must structure
their economies in such a way as to earn foreign exchange rather than to
feed the people in their own country. Foreign aid, neo-Marxists also point
out, is usually “tied.” That is, it can be spent only on products or services
provided by the donor country. In this way, it serves primarily as a crudely
disguised subsidy to the corporations and fi rms that provide these prod-
ucts and services to the countries receiving foreign aid.
In recent years, when foreign aid levels have dropped, private banks
have to some extent stepped in where governments have backed out. Now
many developing countries (Mexico and Brazil, for example) have crushing
debts to private banks, and those debts have the same deleterious effects
as debts to governments for foreign aid. Also, particularly now that poor
countries have built up international debts, to qualify for more aid or loans
they must follow recommendations for restructuring their economies laid
down by international organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD). The reform efforts advocated by the IMF in particular (and based
on economic liberalism) call for the governments of developing countries
to abolish import controls, devalue their exchange rates, curb government
terms of trade Prices
of exported goods relative
to imported goods.
overseas development
assistance Foreign
aid, aimed at economic
development.

Explanations of the North-South Gap 403
expenditures (often on social services or food subsidies for the poor), con-
trol wage increases, and welcome foreign investment:44
The IMF and IBRD impose stringent conditions on their bor-
rowers; conditions . . . [according to neo-Marxists] that open
the door for their penetration by the trade and investment of
rich states. . . . Less developed countries not willing to conform
to IMF and IBRD suggestions fi nd themselves denied not only
loans from these institutions but also credit through private
channels or bilateral aid programs.45
Thus, from the point of view of neo-Marxists, foreign aid is a form of
neocolonial political control only slightly more subtle than old-fashioned
colonialism. Foreign aid is, in short, a form of imperialism.46
Furthermore, neo-Marxists point out that the international power
structure supports the dominance of the North over the South in the
international economic structures. Specifi cally, foreign policies of the
United States are argued to work to the advantage of U.S. business inter-
ests. Especially during the Cold War, the United States consistently and
energetically supported the status quo in many developing countries.
In Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, to name only a few of the better-known
cases, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) helped subvert govern-
ments that were not deemed suffi ciently friendly to the U.S. government
or American economic interests. Elsewhere, reactionary governments
have been sustained by foreign aid, military aid, and private sources of
fi nancial support. According to some neo-Marxist critics of U.S. foreign
policy, the pattern of support for the status quo throughout the develop-
ing world is motivated primarily by a desire to make the world safe for
capitalism.
The Role of MNCs in Economic Dependency
Neo-Marxists also argue that economic powers in the world work to sup-
port MNC activities in the developing world, to the detriment of develop-
ing economies. MNCs attract criticism, in part, because they are so large.
In fact, many of them, by some measures, are larger economic units than
are developing countries themselves (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4).
According to neo-Marxism, foreign investment in developing coun-
tries by MNCs does much more economic harm than good. For example,
MNCs take more money out of countries in the form of repatriated profi ts
than they put into them. During the 1960s, for example, when approxi-
mately $1 billion of capital was transferred to U.S.-controlled subsidiaries
in developing countries, about $2.5 billion was being withdrawn annually
from those same subsidiaries.47 In addition, critics of MNCs point out
that these companies do not bring much money into developing coun-
tries. “Over the 1966 to 1976 period, 49 percent of all net new investment
funds of U.S. transnational corporations in the less developed countries
repatriated
profi ts Money from
investment that leaves a
country and is returned
to the investor’s home
country.

404 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
were reinvested earnings, 50 percent were funds acquired locally, and
only 1 percent were funds newly transferred from the United States.”48
In short, “the fi nancing of foreign investment is done largely with host-
country, not foreign, capital.”49
And when MNCs engage in outsourcing—producing goods overseas
primarily for export back home—there may be little investment in the
local economy:
The U.S.-Mexican border, with its two thousand or so maquila-
doras [“assembly plants”], is perhaps the best-known example of
such a zone. This zone provides U.S. MNCs with comparatively
cheap, nonunion labor, in sites close to the large U.S. market.
Taxes and tariffs are virtually eliminated, and environmental
and labor laws are weakly enforced. U.S. MNCs in the garment,
electronic, and auto industries have fl ocked to the zone, import-
ing parts from the United States for assembly in Mexico and
then shipping the fi nished products back to the United States. . . .
The problem for some host countries [such as Mexico] is that
such MNCs sink few deep roots into the economy, transferring
little research and development and developing few linkages
with local fi rms.50
Multinational corporations are now present in almost every developing country
around the globe. These workers are some of Nike’s 50,000 employees in Vietnam.
Nike is one of Vietnam’s largest private employers.
(© Steve Raymer/Corbis)

Explanations of the North-South Gap 405
If MNCs have such bad economic effects, one might reasonably wonder
why so many developing countries welcome them with open arms. In
fact, there are few, if any, countries in the world today that do not actively
seek foreign investment. The answer, according to neo-Marxism, is that
MNCs co-opt the leadership and elites of poor countries, bribing them,
in effect, to accept foreign investment that benefi ts those leaders and a
small elite but is detrimental to the country as a whole.
Others contend that MNCs are not as bad as critics claim. Some
defenders of MNCs argue that they do supply much-needed capital to
developing economies and that in addition to the investment money they
bring in, they also serve to improve the balance of payments of those
poor countries by adding to their exports and by manufacturing products
locally that would otherwise have to be imported.
Defenders of MNCs claim that most of the criticisms of MNCs are
based on misunderstandings or misinformation, or both. Consider the
comparison of infl ow of investments by MNCs and outfl ows of repatri-
ated profi ts for a given period of time. It is true, MNC defenders concede,
that these comparisons typically show that the global companies take
more money out of a country than they put into it. But such comparisons
are irrelevant or misleading. The fact that corporations took more mon-
ey out of a country in a given year—for example, 2005 than they put into
that country in the same year does not prove that the country is being
decapitalized, or otherwise impoverished, by the activities of the MNCs,
because what comes out of a country in the form of repatriated profi ts
in a particular year is not a function of the direct investments that went
into that country during that time. Rather, the profi ts of 2005 were the
result of corporate investments over several previous years. Such com-
parisons also ignore the fact that once capital is invested in a country, it
forms the basis of a capital stock that can grow and produce more with
each passing year.
In addition, the comparison of infl ows and outfl ows of capital ignores
the multiplier effect of the original investments. Each dollar invested
expands the economy by some factor greater than one. A dollar paid in
wages is used by the worker who earns it to buy groceries; the grocery
store owner buys a pair of shoes; the shoe-store owner invests the dollar
in some new furniture; and so on.
Corporate spokespersons argue that their companies transfer technol-
ogy and management techniques necessary for economic development to
developing countries. Critics respond that, on the contrary, the technolo-
gy introduced by MNCs is capital intensive and thus inappropriate for the
economies of developing countries for two basic reasons. First, although
these states have an abundance of labor, the technologically sophisticated
equipment MNCs use limits the need for a large labor force.51 Second,
“in countries where the overall key legal institution governing economic
relations is the private ownership of productive resources . . . it follows
that the larger the proportion of total output due to capital-technology

406 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
resources, the greater the amount of income going to the owners of those
resources.”52 Thus, in addition to creating unemployment, this capital-
intensive technology can exacerbate the already unequal distribution of
wealth in developing countries.
Many researchers have tried to determine the overall economic
impact of MNCs on developing economies by statistically analyzing the
relationship between foreign investment and economic performance, but
with no clear conclusions.53 Some have found that foreign investment
in less developed countries (LDCs) retards economic growth and human
development; additional recent analyses reveal that foreign investment is
not associated with increased inequality in the distribution of wealth.54
An increasingly common opinion about the impact of MNC investment
in developing countries is that the nature of the impact depends on how
the government of a given country deals with it (and how it is dealt
with is not inevitably determined by the presence of the investment).
In other words, MNC investments can have negative effects, but if they
are handled properly, they can bring substantial benefi ts. As one noted
scholar of international political economy concludes, MNCs are “nei-
ther as positive nor as negative in their impact on development as liber-
als or their critics suggest. Foreign direct investment can help or hinder,
but the major determinants of economic development lie within LDCs
themselves.”55 More recently, analysts have concluded that “FDI fl ows
have a more strongly positive effect on economic growth in countries
that have made signifi cant investments in education and worker training
than in countries that have not done this.”56
Beyond the economic impact of MNCs on the developing world, crit-
ics of MNCs also argue that they have adverse affects on state sovereignty
and other political values. According to neo-Marxists, for example, any
developing country that attempts meaningful political reforms may fi nd
such efforts stifl ed by the formidable opposition of MNCs. The spectacu-
lar example supporting this argument involves the activities of Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) in Chile when Salvador Allende
was in power in the early 1970s. It has been established that ITT offered
the CIA funds to carry out subversive activities in Chile and that the CIA
later did engage in such activities (although it has never been defi nitively
established that the CIA accepted ITT fi nancial support for those ven-
tures). Allende’s overthrow by the Chilean military on September 1, 1973,
is just an extreme example, MNC opponents contend, of the preference of
MNCs for right-wing regimes that can ensure “stability” through politi-
cal oppression and their willingness to take active measures to install or
maintain such regimes in power.
Others charge MNCs with violation of labor rights and unethical
treatment of workers. Nike, for example, has been accused of a wide
variety of abuses, especially in such countries as China, Vietnam, and
Indonesia, including “wretchedly low wages, enforced overtime, harsh
and sometimes brutal discipline, and corporal punishment.”57 Another

P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Dealing with MNC Investments
ISSUE: MNC investments in developing countries can provide potential benefi ts
but at the cost of depending on corporations whose home bases are elsewhere and
whose long-term interests are more congruent with those of rich, industrialized
countries.
Option #1: Discourage foreign direct investment and provide political and eco-
nomic protection for corporations owned and operated by local interests.
Arguments: (a) Local talent may take a while to develop a viable corporation,
but in the long run, local fi rms will serve the economy of the country better than
subsidiaries of foreign corporations will. (b) Foreign subsidiaries are more diffi cult
to control than are local fi rms, because they can always threaten to shut down the
local subsidiary and move production to countries with more pliant governments.
(c) Reliance on foreign investment makes a poor country more vulnerable to the
negative impact of economic setbacks in rich countries.
Counterarguments: (a) Local fi rms will produce more expensive goods for local
consumers, who will have to pay higher prices for many years until the domestic
fi rms become as effi cient as giant MNCs. (b) Local fi rms face severe disadvantages
in their attempts to export their products. MNCs already have vast international
networks of contacts and familiarity with numerous markets in different regions of
the world. (c) Few countries have achieved economic success using the politics of
autonomy or self-reliance. Many countries that have tried such policies so far, such
as North Korea, have instead brought on economic disaster.
Option #2: Foreign direct investment can be actively encouraged; for example,
by providing tax breaks to MNCs that establish subsidiaries.
Arguments: (a) Competition between foreign and domestic fi rms, as well as the
typical higher levels of effi ciency achieved by MNCs, will result in lower prices for
consumer goods in countries that encourage foreign investment. (b) Subsidiaries
of foreign fi rms will achieve greater success than local fi rms would by exploiting
export markets around the world. (c) Foreign fi rms will bring with them techno-
logical and administrative know-how that will yield benefi ts in the countries where
they establish subsidiaries.
Counterarguments: (a) Reliance on foreign subsidiaries will make the country vul-
nerable to decisions made by corporations with foreign headquarters. (b) Increased
integration with recent globalizing forces in the worldwide economy often seems
to exacerbate economic inequality. (c) Foreign subsidiaries may engage in practices
harmful to the environment of the country in which they are established; any at-
tempt to curb those practices will be met with threats to close down that subsidiary.
similar report points out that “a worker making Nike running shoes in
Jakarta, Indonesia, for example, makes $2.28 a day. . . . The wage paid in
Indonesia is not suffi cient to live on. The Indonesian government admits
that an individual needs no less than $4 a day to pay for basic human
needs in an urban area such as Jakarta.”58 At fi rst, the company responded
by denying knowledge of poor working conditions, but later, in response

408 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
to boycotts and protests, it announced several changes in policies, includ-
ing raising its minimum working age in its factories. 59 Other MNCs have
been accused of a range of human rights abuses. One U.S.-based oil com-
pany settled a case that alleged its use of slave labor to build a pipeline
in Burma. Oil giants Shell and Chevron have been accused of complicity
with the Nigerian government in the deaths of activists protesting envi-
ronmental abuses of the companies.60
These are, of course, only a few examples. It has been reported that
“in the world of Asian laborers, which makes goods that line the shelves
of American, European, and Japanese stores, workers get fi red for leav-
ing their machines to go to the bathroom. Bosses punish tardy workers
by making them stand in the sun for hours.”61 The use of child labor by
MNCs in Asia and elsewhere has been widely documented.62 Because of
consumer awareness and pressure by nongovernmental advocacy groups,
however, there is a growing acceptance by MNCs that they must abide by
a certain corporate social responsibility in their business practices.63
Fairly recently, for example, Oxfam International has led a push for
the jewelry industry to limit itself to selling responsibly mined gold.
“These changes are partly coming about . . . because gold mining’s
environmental and social impacts have become impossible to ignore,
especially in developing countries where [violent confl icts], political
protests, corruption, and displacement of indigenous peoples have often
accompanied mining.”64
MNCs may adopt internal policies designed to show that they are
treating their workers and the environment according to international
norms. They also may agree to sectorwide standards, such as the Apparel
Industry Partnership, designed to improve working conditions in garment
factories. Finally, they may abide by the UN Global Compact, which
draws on nine principles from UN human rights, labor, and environmen-
tal treaties.65 All of these mechanisms for corporate responsibility are
voluntary and
there are vigorous debates over which codes, standards, and
reporting techniques are more effective in raising corporate
behavior and improving labor, human rights, and environmental
practices. Many are too new to be able to fully assess; MNCs
are still in the adoption and implementation phase. . . . [But] the
explosion of CSR [Corporate Social Responsibility] codes and
implementation techniques shows a rising acknowledgement of
the power of private governance and the power of corporations
to implement social and economic change.66
Despite the continued controversies over the economic, political, social,
and environmental consequences of MNCs to developing countries, it is
quite clear that “most governments seem reconciled to the prospect that,
even if the costs seem high, they cannot cut themselves off from their
access to global technologies and global markets, and from institutions
corporate social
responsibility Idea
that corporations are
accountable for the
social, economic, and
environmental impact
of their decisions and
operations.

Explanations of the North-South Gap 409
such as multinational enterprises that contribute to that access.”67 Some
of the issues involved in the debate about MNCs are outlined in the Policy
Choices box.
The Economic Liberal Explanation of Underdevelopment
Proponents of economic liberalism (see Chapter 10) disagree with the neo-
Marxist perspective. They argue that the international economic struc-
ture, if based on economic liberal ideas, will benefi t all, both rich and
poor. International trade based on the principle of comparative advantage
and investment by multinational corporations is the key to all economic
growth. Economic interdependence is good for the South: It allows these
countries to acquire markets, capital, and technology for development.68
The fundamental source of disagreement between economic liberals,
on the one hand, and neo-Marxists, on the other hand, is the starkly dif-
ferent estimates of the relative impact of external and internal factors on
the process of development. Economic liberals believe that the changes
necessary to bring economic progress to LDCs are largely internal to those
countries. In short, internal domestic political and economic changes that
involve liberalizing the country to remove political and social obstacles
to the function of the free market are the key to economic progress. Neo-
Marxists do not deny that internal changes are necessary (indeed they
see the elites within poor countries as a critical problem), but from their
point of view, economic liberals seriously underestimate the extent to
which the problems of LDCs are caused by factors external to those coun-
tries, such as the structure of the international economic and political
environment. Some neo-Marxists also point out the historical structure
of the relationship between imperial powers and the colonized areas as
the primary cause for the North-South gap. For these reasons, some neo-
Marxists theories are structural, whereas economic liberalism is not.
The liberal criticism of the structural theories often points to the suc-
cessful economic development story of several countries in East Asia.
The argument is that these states prove that poor states can experience
economic growth despite, or because of, the current international eco-
nomic structure.
The “Economic Miracle” of East Asia
Even before China’s miraculous economic growth, there were develop-
ment success stories in East Asia. Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, referred to as the “Asian Tigers,” were seen as remarkable
achievements in economic development (see Map 11.2). And these states,
part of a group known as the newly industrialized countries (NICs), have
not just achieved a rapid rate of growth in the aggregate size of their respec-
tive economies. Even large increases in the GNP can leave much of the
population no better off, or even relatively worse off than before, compared
newly industrialized
countries Countries
that have experienced
fairly recent economic
development, such as
the “Asian Tigers”:
Singapore, South Korea,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

410 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
with only a few benefi ciaries of such increases. But the Asian Tigers “have
apparently been able to overcome strong cross-national patterns suggest-
ing that good things do not tend to happen together.’ . . . The East Asians’
record of growth with equity’ sharply distinguishes them from other devel-
oping countries that have also undergone rapid growth.”69
This economic success was troublesome for neo-Marxist approaches,
because the Asian Tigers followed development policies that were quite dif-
ferent from those advocated by structural theories. All four became closely
integrated into the world’s economic system and achieved success by stress-
ing a high volume of exports to the industrialized states.
Neo-Marxists approaches “. . . had not predicted and could
not explain this record of economic growth and industrial
diversifi cation.”70 For these reasons, “by the end of the 1970s
the World Bank had singled out the four Asian NICs as models
to be studied by the second rung of developing countries.”71
The Asian Tigers took the lead in transforming the rela-
tionship between LDCs and the industrialized countries in
the area of international trade, something that neo-Marxism
suggests LDCs cannot do, because they are trapped in a role
in the international trading system in which they export
mostly primary products and commodities. But in fact,
“while manufactures amounted to merely 5 percent of all
Southern exports to the North in 1955 and only 15.2 percent
in 1980, they had jumped to 53.5 percent by 1989.”72 And
this trend was not wholly due to the Asian Tigers. In fact,
nations accounting for about two-thirds of the population of
the developing world have successfully severed dependence
on their single largest traditional primary export. Diversi-
fi cation of exports for developing countries has progressed
to the point at which “manufactures are rapidly claiming
an ever larger share of exports in most developing coun-
tries, and already have a share in exports almost equal to
primary products in countries representing the majority of population in
the developing world.”73 Manufactured goods now account for 71 percent
of the value of exports from developing countries. and one-fourth of all
manufactured exports in the world.74 In short, the four Asian Tigers have
demonstrated convincingly that it is not true that the international eco-
nomic and political structures permanently relegate developing countries
to the role of exporting only primary products. Their success in escaping
that kind of role has been duplicated elsewhere well enough to argue that
it is quite relevant to the rest of the developing world.
In fact, several additional East and Southeast Asian nations went a
long way toward duplicating the success of the original Tigers in the 1980s.
Most East Asian countries following an outward-looking, export-oriented
development strategy during the 1980s enjoyed “per capita income
growth of more than 7% . . . a record exceeding anything experienced.”75
East
China
Sea
Sea of
Japan
South
China
Sea
PACIFIC
OCEAN
C H I N A
N. KOREA
JAPAN
I N D O N E S I A
THAILAND VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
TAIWAN
HONG KONG
(Returned to
China, 1997)
S. KOREA
Map 11.2 The Asian Tigers
(© Cengage Learning)

Explanations of the North-South Gap 411
The economies of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, for example, experi-
enced poverty reduction, high employment, and increased life expectancy
from their growth in exports of manufactured goods.76
As discussed in Chapter 10, China became very export oriented and
open to foreign investment. By 1991, it was the second-largest recipient
of foreign investment in the world.77 During this era of increased open-
ness and export orientation, “some 150–200 million people, equivalent to
half the population of Western Europe, have worked their way out of pov-
erty . . . a revolution in wealth-creation on a scale unparalleled in mod-
ern history.”78 More recently, “during the 1990s, India liberalized foreign
trade and investment with good results. . . . It too has pursued a broad
agenda of reform and has moved away from a highly regulated, planned
system.”79
Generally speaking, if you divide developing countries into two
categories—those who have opened up their economies and those who
have not—the former group has experienced more economic growth.
Moreover, inequality within those countries has not necessarily fol-
lowed.80 Yet many states have not been able to duplicate this type of
export-led success. While developing states as a whole now account for
a signifi cant portion of manufactured goods, “much of the developing
world has little more than a toehold in manufacturing export markets”
and “after more than two decades of rapid trade growth, high-income
countries representing 15% of the world’s population still account for
two-thirds of world exports.”81
Although the early success of the Asian Tigers and some other devel-
oping states is used by economic liberals to support their arguments about
the causes and solutions for development, several dimensions of the expe-
riences of many rapidly developing Asian states support neo-Marxists and
other critics of economic liberalism. Taiwan has demonstrated, for exam-
ple, the importance of “the eradication of colonial institutions, effective
land reform, government-directed structural transformation, national
management, and regulation of foreign multinationals.”82 Furthermore,
“the socio-economic structure and the patterns of income distribution in
South Korea and Taiwan were relatively egalitarian even before the tran-
sition to export-led growth, in large part because of the extensive busi-
ness/commercial restructuring and comprehensive agrarian reforms that
had been undertaken in these countries in the 1940s and 1950s.”83 Some
neo-Marxist approaches advocate protective tariffs as a means of isolat-
ing developing countries from some of the harmful effects of the interna-
tional economic environment and “all of the East Asian [countries], with
the exception of Hong Kong, used protection to develop infant industries,
even after the shift to an export-oriented strategy.”84
And quite contrary to the principles of economic liberalism, “the
authoritarian regime of South Korea . . . achieved spectacular growth rates
by practicing command economics. . . . Government incentives, subsi-
dies, and coercion fueled the drive for heavy industry in such areas as

412 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
iron and steel that market forces would have rendered uncompetitive in
the early stages.”85 In general, scholars analyzing the success of the East
Asian states have often “emphasized the pattern of extensive state inter-
vention in the market,”86 consistent with more with state capitalism (see
Chapter 10) then liberal capitalist economies. One prominent analyst of
the success of East Asian economies concludes that “most Anglo-American
development economists have a mistaken understanding of Korea and
Taiwan as ‘low-intervention’ countries, especially with reference to
trade, and they rely on this mistaken understanding to validate a low-
intervention prescription elsewhere.”87 The rapidly developing states of
East Asia (and the United States and Western Europe, for that matter),
then, have neither adhered zealously to principles of free trade and the
free market nor entirely avoided some of the policies that neo-Marxists
might suggest. And the use of the rapid progress of East Asia as a model
for economic development elsewhere became even more questionable
since the economic crises hit these countries in the late 1990s, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 10. But the economic growth that they did experience
does call into question fundamental tenets of structural theories regard-
ing self-reliance and breaking away from the world capitalist system.
Development Strategies for the South
Various strategies have been offered as ways for the poorer states to develop and close the North-South gap. Development strategies are
related to the explanations of underdevelopment just reviewed. In other
words, neo-Marxists who believe that the cause of economic underdevel-
opment is the international structure will support very different develop-
ment strategies than will economic liberals, who believe that the cause
of economic underdevelopment lies in internal political and economic
conditions. Although various theories have been more or less popular at
different times, there has yet to be a complete consensus on which strat-
egy represents the best chance for economic development.
Strategies Associated with Neo-Marxism
If, as many neo-Marxists believe, the international political and eco-
nomic structures continue to work to the advantage of the North and
simply exploit the South in a neo-imperialist fashion, then the solution
to this condition of dependence is more independence. This is the goal
of a developmental policy known as the import substitution strategy,
which was particularly popular in the 1960s in Latin America and was
advocated by some of the original neo-Marxist dependency theorists, who
were from that region. “The import substitution path taken by countries
like Brazil and Mexico can best be described as a series of stages during
which these countries moved from being exporters of primary commodi-
ties to developing an indigenous industrial base.”88 States following this
import substitution
strategy Policy to
develop and protect
industries to produce
goods that a country has
been importing.

Development Strategies for the South 413
strategy protected infant industries with tariff and nontariff barriers, cur-
tailed imports, and tried to create a niche in manufacturing goods that
could benefi t from better terms of trade. Thus, rather than being depen-
dent on the North for these higher-priced goods, they would become
more self-suffi cient. For some countries, like Brazil and Mexico, this
worked for a while. “Through this strategy . . . Brazil, Mexico, and oth-
ers were able to generate sustained economic growth. Brazil had a 9 per-
cent annual average growth in GDP between 1965 and 1980. Mexico and
Venezuela lagged behind but still averaged a growth rate of 6.5 and 3.7
respectively.”89 These growth rates did not compare to the Asian Tigers,
did not distribute growth equally within the countries, and did not last
into the 1980s. The debt crisis that affl icted Latin American countries
in the 1980s and the slowdown in growth rates severely discredited the
import substitution strategy.
In addition to advocating import substitution strategy as economic
development policy for individual countries, there have been collective
efforts on the part of the South to address the global gap between rich
and poor. Regardless of policies that LDCs might adopt, many economic
and political analysts are convinced that the gap cannot be closed unless
the globe’s entire economic system is transformed. In the 1970s, this
basic idea culminated in the call for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO). Neo-Marxism was infl uential in developing ideas that served as
the basis for the NIEO and inspiring unity among the disparate group of
countries referred to as the Third World. The origins of this quest can be
traced to the early 1960s, when LDCs united behind the idea of a world-
wide conference on this problem, resulting in the fi rst UN Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1962. At about the same time,
a coalition of developing southern states became known as the Group
of 77, a name it retains even though it is now much larger. “The G-77
sought to make UNCTAD a mechanism for dialogue and negotiation
between the LDCs and the developed countries on trade, fi nance, and
other issues.”90
With its call for a NIEO, the Group of 77 wanted more foreign aid,
especially multilateral aid through both the World Bank and the IMF,
rather than bilateral country-to-country aid. This aid, they argued, should
not be given on the condition that they use it to buy goods from par-
ticular countries or support particular countries’ policies. Foreign aid,
or overseas development assistance, is a controversial tool for econom-
ic development. As mentioned, some neo-Marxists have blamed aid for
underdevelopment, arguing that it often serves as a bribe to elites to gain
support for further dependence on the North. Furthermore, neo-Marxists
argue, aid is rarely given without conditions attached and is usually in
the form of loans with which states fall further into debt. Yet the NIEO
included calls for more foreign aid, without strings attached, as a kind of
reparation for the imperialist policies of the North and as the only hope
that many countries have for investment in future development.
New International
Economic Order
(NIEO) Name used to
describe the developing
states’ goal of a
reformed, more equitable
international economy.
Group of 77 A
coalition of developing
states, now numbering
over 100, that seeks to
address the economic gap
between the North and
the South.

414 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
The criticisms of foreign aid are many (see the Policy Choices box).
For economic liberals, aid is a political intrusion into the market. Many,
including developing countries that are recipients of aid, recognize that
other than aid for the relief of disasters, development assistance programs
rarely meet their goals. There are a few success stories, but in general, the
impact of foreign aid in poor countries has been disappointing. Poverty
remains in these countries partly, because wealth is not easily transferable
on an aggregate basis. If John Doe, an individual, inherits $10 million from
his rich uncle, chances are that unless John is incredibly foolish, he will
be set for life in economic terms. But wealth
for millions of people in a poor country must
be based at least in part on economic growth
and productivity, not gifts. In short, because
foreign aid cannot be sustained in suffi ciently
large amounts to improve the lives of people
in poor countries, it can produce lasting ben-
efi ts only if it is used to create self-sustaining
economic growth and to increase the produc-
tivity of poor people in developing countries.
The effects of foreign aid, however, are
not always and everywhere bad. Although
billions of dollars of aid have been dispensed
in recent decades and poverty still prevails
in the developing world, some data show
that “aid contributes powerfully to both eco-
nomic growth and human development.”91
According to economist Jeffrey Sachs, aid is
a necessary tool to alleviate extreme poverty
and the costs are within reason: “The truth
is that the cost now is likely to be small
compared to any relevant measure—income,
taxes, the costs of further delay, and the ben-
efi ts from acting. . . . All of the incessant
debate about development assistance, and
whether the rich are doing enough to help
the poor, actually concerns less than 1 per-
cent of rich-world income.”92 Sachs argues
that this aid should be based on country-
specifi c assessments of needs and carefully
implemented and monitored for successful
results.93 Others argue that there is no his-
torical basis for assuming that foreign aid will do anything to improve
economic conditions.
With the NIEO, the South also argued for a new international cur-
rency to replace the U.S. dollar, freer access to markets in rich countries,
and commodity agreements to stabilize the prices of raw materials and
A Dutch doctor, working for Médecins Sans Frontières
(Doctors Without Borders), attends to a baby boy with
measles in West Timor. Many children in developing
countries lack basic immunization programs for
potentially deadly diseases such as measles.
(AFP/Getty Images)

P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Aiding the South
ISSUE: The question of whether states in the North should provide more foreign
assistance to the South is a controversial one in debates on economic develop-
ment. Most states in the North do provide some foreign assistance to the South. In
absolute terms, the United States is the number one supplier of foreign aid to the
South (giving over $27 million in 2005), followed by Japan (with over $13 million
in 2005). The amount of aid relative to a country’s gross national income (GNI),
referred to as its aid burden, varies across countries in the North, with the United
States coming in at or near the bottom of rich countries (giving 0.22 percent of
its GNI) and Scandinavian countries coming in at the top (Norway’s aid burden,
for example, was 0.94 percent in 2005). Overall, government foreign aid to the
South fi rst diminished immediately after the end of the Cold War but has recently
increased, and in 2005, a group of wealthy states agreed to double their foreign
aid to Africa and provide $40 billion in debt relief, but not all have delivered on
this promise. Governments are not the only suppliers of development assistance
to the South. International organizations, such as the United Nations, and non-
governmental humanitarian agencies, such as Save the Children and Oxfam, also
provide some aid and assistance to the developing world.
Option #1: The developed countries should offer more foreign aid to the poorer
countries.
Arguments: (a) The economies are in such dire shape that only aid will jump-start
any growth, as did the Marshall Plan for Western Europe following World War II. (b)
The North, like all other actors with excess resources, is morally obligated to help
the starving. Aid is the most direct form of humanitarian assistance that states can
provide. (c) Because the North’s imperialism is partly responsible for the economic
conditions of the South, the North has a special obligation to make amends, much
as was demanded of Germany after World War I for its imperialist ambitions.
Counterarguments: (a) Aid prolongs dependencies and ineffi ciencies and retards
rather than stimulates growth. (b) States’ fi rst obligation is to provide for their own
citizens. Poverty in the South is due to corrupt leaders, and further aid would sim-
ply stay in their pockets and not alleviate any suffering. (c) The South suffers from
far more than a simple history of being dominated, and demanding reparations in
the form of foreign aid diverts attention from more fundamental and immediate
development problems.
Option #2: The developed countries should limit or curtail foreign aid to the South.
Arguments: (a) The countries of the developing world should focus on exporting
their way out of their economic situation instead of requesting aid. (b) It is the
problem of the developing world and is not for the North to solve. (c) Aid is simply
a way to impose cultural values by demanding certain actions from the recipient.
Counterarguments: (a) Because of historical inequities as well as the structure
of trade between the North and the South and biases against goods from their
countries, developing economies cannot compete and simply export their way to
growth. (b) Addressing the North-South gap is in the long-term economic and
political interests of the North. (c) The mission of foreign aid became distorted
by the Cold War competition for client states and could instead be refocused on
alleviating human suffering without expectations from donors.
aid burden Percentage
of a country’s GNI
that goes to foreign
assistance.

416 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
primary products on which they depend. A change in the decision- making
process of key international economic organizations, such as the IMF and
the World Bank, was also proposed to give more control to the South
(something the IMF did only recently, in 2006, when it gave more voting
power to states such as China and Mexico).94 Finally, the South pushed
for international controls over foreign investment and international man-
agement of projects to develop the wealth on the world’s seabeds.
Nevertheless, “by the close of the 1970s the South’s strategy based on
unity, commodity power, and the NIEO had reached a dead end.”95 The
North, experiencing severe economic crises of its own, was not inclined
to address the demands of the South. The South could not maintain a
unifi ed voice, and the oil crisis served to create a new gap within the
South between the oil-producing rich states and the oil-importing poor
ones. Finally, the success of some developing countries, such as the Asian
Tigers, within the old system and the new willingness of the most popu-
lous Communist country in the world, the People’s Republic of China, to
open up and become more closely integrated with the world’s economic
system as currently constituted all combined to take some of the steam
out of the campaign on behalf of the NIEO.
Part of the optimism that the South could succeed in a collective
effort like the NIEO came from the success of OPEC in redistributing
wealth from the North to at least some of the countries in the South.
Throughout the 1970s, OPEC countries cooperated to control the price of
oil by agreeing on production limits and succeeded in changing the struc-
ture of the international economy that had previously served the North’s
interests. Before OPEC,
Western oil companies dominated the petroleum industry from
exploration to marketing and had historically provided cheap
and abundant access to the energy needs of the industrialized
world. The cartel’s pricing actions helped dampen economic
growth and spurred an infl ationary trend in the developed coun-
tries. From the standpoint of relations between the developed
and less developed nations, the latter were to gain considerable
leverage for the time being. The developed countries—being
highly dependent on oil-exporting countries for their energy—
could no longer ignore the considerable impact oil-producing
countries from the South had on the economic well-being of the
industrialized world.96
Thus, an economic cartel that seeks to control production over an impor-
tant commodity such as oil was seen as another potential strategy for
economic development.
Efforts to duplicate OPEC’s strategy have largely been unsuccessful.
And just as OPEC’s success in the 1970s helped garner the NIEO a lot of
attention, OPEC’s disarray in the 1980s contributed to the virtual disap-
pearance of the NIEO from that decade’s agenda. By the 1980s, attempts
economic cartel
Association of states
aiming to control
production and pricing of
a commodity.

Development Strategies for the South 417
by producers of other raw materials to duplicate OPEC’s success were
thoroughly frustrated, as recession depressed prices for most commodi-
ties. Today, OPEC members still cooperate to cut or raise oil production
to affect the price of oil and their profi ts, but the organization is much
less militant and more pragmatic. OPEC, as an organization, no longer
attempts to use oil for political purposes, as it did in the 1970s, although
some of its member states, such as Venezuela, have attempted to trans-
late their recent rise in their profi ts from oil into international political
clout.97
Liberalization Strategies
Economic liberalism proposes that the key to greater wealth for all, both
developed and developing countries alike, is liberalization or little politi-
cal interference in economic markets. This means that economic liber-
als advocate free trade practices so that states avoid protecting domestic
industries. Liberals also urge privatization of internal economic practices
so that states allow the hidden hand of the market to determine which
sectors of the economy will be competitive and serve as the country’s
comparative advantage in trade with others.
The policy known as export-oriented strategy is associated with the
liberal economic philosophy. Made popular by the success of the Asian
Tigers, this strategy involves fi nding a niche in the international econo-
my and exporting goods to fi ll, and profi t from, that niche.
A second major component of this export-led growth
strategy—one that is also seen by advocates of the liberal model
as a crucial ingredient for development—involved promoting a
high level of savings and investment (including intense efforts
in research and development). The liberal perspective suggests
that without the necessary capital, basic investments in infra-
structure, resource development, and equipment growth would
be quite impossible. Hence, capital formation is central to
development.98
The practice of the export-led strategy by the Asian Tigers did not
completely match the economic liberal model. Instead of the market’s
determining comparative advantage and the economic niche, for exam-
ple, the governments were heavily involved in creating economic sectors
that would be good for export. Economic liberals believe that a better
strategy would include less interference by the government. In general,
then, the development strategies associated with economic liberalism
differ from those associated with dependency by focusing on how much
poor countries could benefi t from engaging, rather than abandoning or
changing, the international economic structures. The obstacles to eco-
nomic growth, according to economic liberals, are to be found in corrupt
and ineffi cient governments.
export-oriented
strategy Economically
liberal strategy involving
exports that fi ll and
profi t from a niche in the
international political
economy.

418 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
Although the import-substitution policies were popular in the 1960s,
the liberalization policies became the favored path to development in the
1990s. The New York Times reported in 1993 that
almost 40 years after the emergence of the so-called Dependency
School in Latin America, the theorists who argued that develop-
ing countries need to protect their resources from being ravaged
by multinational corporations, the argument has been turned
around. . . . Now . . . hopes are being pinned on the prospect
of interdependence with the United States and other advanced
industrial nations, through diversifi ed and effi cient economies
that can compete in free trade.99
Indeed, the conditions attached to IMF and World Bank loans, known
as structural adjustment programs, were requirements that countries lib-
eralize and privatize based on the principles of economic liberalism in
order to receive aid from the organizations. In short, by the mid-1990s,
market-oriented and export-oriented strategies seemed to have evoked
something of a consensus among academics and policymakers in the
richer industrialized countries as well as politicians in power in the poor-
er countries of the world. “The so-called Washington Consensus was the
prescription for . . . ills in the developing countries. . . . The consensus in
the political Washington’ of Congress and the executive branch and the
technocratic Washington’ of the international fi nancial institutions, the
Federal Reserve Board, and think-tanks”100 was for developing states to
allow market-determined interest and exchange rates, liberalize trade and
foreign direct investment, and privatize state-owned businesses, among
other measures.
But the consensus was far from perfect, and many criticized the IMF
for its strategies and the consequences of its programs. “The IMF pre-
scription has been budgetary belt tightening for . . . [countries] much too
poor to own belts. IMF-led austerity has frequently led to riots, coups,
and the collapse of public services. In the past, when an IMF program
has collapsed in the midst of social chaos and economic distress, the
IMF has simply chalked it up to the weak fortitude and ineptitude of the
government.”101
In Latin America in particular, there was growing impatience with
the market-oriented reforms that swept through the region in the 1990s
“Latin America is swerving left, and distinct backlashes are under way
against the predominant [free-market] trends of the last 15 years. . . .
[T]he economic, social, and political reforms implemented in Latin Amer-
ica starting in the mid-1980s had not delivered on their promises. With
the exception of Chile . . . the region has had singularly unimpressive
economic growth rates.”102
The disillusionment with liberal economic policies resulted in a
recent political makeover of Latin America, with leftist and populist lead-
ers coming to power in, for example, Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina,
structural adjustment
programs Conditions
attached to IMF and
World Bank loans
requiring countries to
liberalize and privatize
based on the principles of
economic liberalism.
Washington
Consensus The
idea, as advocated by
the United States and
largely accepted in the
developing world in the
1990s, that economically
liberal strategies
were the best path for
development.

Development Strategies for the South 419
and Uruguay. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez transformed the hos-
tility over Washington-supported economic programs in the developing
world to a more general anti-U.S. orientation, making alliances with Iran,
Cuba, and others opposed to U.S. policies.103
The backlash against economic liberalism in Latin America can be
seen more widely around the world after the global economic downturn
of 2008. As discussed in Chapter 10, many blamed unregulated capital-
ism for the problems in the fi nancial sector in the United States and other
Western economies and the spread of recession. In the developing world
too, political leaders are rejecting economic liberal strategies and embrac-
ing state capitalism. State intervention, and outright ownership, of key
economic sectors seem to have worked economically for emerging mar-
kets, such China and Russia, and state-run oil companies brought high
profi ts to oil exporting countries in recent years.104
In addition to the largely unfulfi lled promises of economic liberaliza-
tion policies, critics of market and export-oriented strategies can point
to such places as Kerala, a state in India with 30 million people (making
it about as populous as Canada), for potentially valuable lessons about
the development process. In 1957, voters in Kerala elected the fi rst Com-
munist majority to the state legislature. Since then, Kerala’s voters have
elected solidly leftist governments, which have included the Communist
Party of India-Marxist and the Communist Party of India.105 Kerala is one
of India’s poorest states, and yet its population has achieved the highest
life expectancy and literacy rate in India, as well as the lowest infant mor-
tality rate and birthrate.106
It might also be relevant to point out in this context that life expectancy
in the People’s Republic of China is 70 years. In some respects, health care
in China is better than in the United States. For example, life expectancy at
birth in Shanghai, China’s largest city, reached 75.5 years, just as life expec-
tancy in New York City, the largest city in the United States, was 73 years
for whites and 70 years for nonwhites. And while China has adopted many
market-oriented policies in recent years, its health care system is a
government-based system established in the Maoist era.107 Cuba is
another example of a Communist state that has achieved relatively high
human development indicators, including life expectancy (77 years),
despite a fairly weak and noncapitalist economy.
In short, problems in many states that adopted economically liberal
policies, as well as some successes in places such as Kerala in India, Cuba,
and the People’s Republic of China, seem to point to the conclusion that
socialist policies might have been prematurely buried under a kind of pub-
lic relations onslaught by the forces in favor of market-oriented capital-
ism and export-led development in the late 1980s and on into the 1990s.
But the point of this discussion is that the terms socialism and capital-
ism are not free of ambiguities. In their purest forms, those terms denote
extreme ends of a continuum, and most countries fall somewhere in the
middle of that continuum. It is important to recognize that “the concept

420 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
of market’ is . . . broader than that of ‘capitalism.’”108 The essence of a
market is the central role of prices arrived at in bargaining between buy-
ers and sellers, while the essence of capitalism is the private ownership of
the means of production and the existence of free labor. Theoretically, at
least, socialist states could establish market systems. The most populous
country in the world, China, seems to be trying to put this theory into
practice.
Because virtually all the countries of the world have mixed econo-
mies, with the government playing an active role in the economy even
if market forces also play an important role, some students of political
economy have concluded that “capitalism is too ambiguous a label to be
used as an analytical category.”109 But while it is important to acknowl-
edge that it is diffi cult to establish precisely the point at which capital-
ism ends and socialism begins (or vice versa), the distinction between
capitalism and socialism is not necessarily meaningless. The problems
leading to the demise of the former Soviet Union may well suggest with
some force that it is a mistake for governments to expropriate virtu-
ally all the means of production; that is, it is possible to go too far in
the socialist direction. And as we have seen, the experiences of the past
economic successes of countries in East Asia do not indicate that gov-
ernments in developing countries should give private entrepreneurs or
market forces an entirely free rein. Rather, they seem to demonstrate
that governments might be well advised to take an active role in the
economy, but in a manner that is compatible with and supportive of at
least some market forces.
Today, most developing countries neither shun participation in the
international political economy, as some neo-Marxists suggest, nor do
they accept economic liberal prescriptions without question. Rather,
developing countries seek to change economic relationships to further
development. In international trade, for example, developing countries
continue to stress the disadvantages to them in current trading prac-
tices. “The world’s highest trade barriers are erected against some of
its poorest countries: on average the trade barriers faced by developing
countries exporting to rich countries are three to four times higher than
those faced by rich countries when they trade with each other.”110 In the
WTO’s Doha Round of trade negotiations (begun in 2001), the develop-
ing countries have tried to lower tariffs on goods and services originating
in the South and to address the agricultural subsidies that developing
states provide. These subsidies, including U.S. subsidies to cotton pro-
ducers and the European Union’s subsidies for sugar, make it diffi cult
for developing states to compete. But the Doha talks have yet to make
progress on these issues and talks collapsed in the summer of 2008. “The
nominal cause of the collapse was a technical issue relating to agricul-
tural trade. But that was a proxy for deep and longstanding differences
between developed and developing countries over the role of trade in
development and how to defi ne a fair deal.”111 Some have criticized the
Doha Round WTO
negotiations, begun in
2001, involving a number
of issues related to free
trade, many of which are
signifi cant to economic
development in the
South.

Development Strategies for the South 421
Doha Round for being too narrow and have called on the WTO to negoti-
ate broader changes to address the shift in global economic power toward
emerging markets.112
Addressing Gender Inequality and Disease
Analyses of the challenges confronting developing countries highlight
the role that women can play in economic development and the role that
diseases play in underdevelopment.
It appears that economic conditions in most developing countries can
benefi t from efforts to address gender inequalities and improve economic
conditions for women. Recall from Chapter 1 that part of the feminist
perspective on global politics stresses the need to consider the impact of
international relations on women and the role that women play in the
world. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, women are subjected to
various forms of economic and political discrimination by the men who
dominate the economic and political systems of virtually every coun-
try of the world. In the poorer countries, gender bias is arguably a more
serious problem. In other words, “gender bias is a worldwide phenom-
enon, but it is especially pernicious in the Third World, where most of
women’s activity takes place in the non-wage economy for the purpose
of household consumption.”113 Citing these patterns of work, some femi-
nists criticize liberal development policies if they involve cutbacks in
government spending on health care, child care, or education, which “can
dramatically increase the burden on the unpaid female-dominated sector
of the economy. Because neoliberal economic analysis measures only the
paid sector of the economy, it does not recognize this impact and thus
suffers from a key gender bias.”114 Because women make up about half
the population of every country in the world, this problem has come to be
seen by many specialists in economic development as a major obstacle to
economic progress in poor countries. “Gender bias is . . . a primary cause
of poverty, because in its various forms it prevents hundreds of millions
of women from obtaining the education, training, health services, child
care, and legal status needed to escape from poverty.”115
One dramatic example of the importance of bringing women into the
economic mainstream of a country pertains to one of the poorest countries
of the world, Bangladesh.116 In 1983, the Grameen Bank (“village” bank)
was founded by Muhammad Yunus, a professor of economics. Yunus’
original idea was to provide very small loans (microfi nancing) to people
in general, but his ideas were not originally received with enthusiasm by
economists or bankers. “‘Where is the collateral?’” the bankers asked.
“‘These people can’t even read.’”117 Yunus ultimately had to take out
the fi rst loans himself. Those loans were put to good use and repaid, but
still local bankers would not provide the capital to fund more such loans
on a continuing basis. Yunus had to get the support of the government
to enable poor people to obtain these loans so that they could become,
Grameen Bank
Founded by Muhammad
Yunus to provide very
small loans to poor
individuals, particularly
women.
microfi nancing
Financial services, such as
small loans, that are often
provided to individuals
or groups with low
economic status.

422 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
in effect, entrepreneurs. Today, the Grameen Bank grants loans to more
than 7 million people and has branches in more than 84,000 Bangladeshi
villages. More than 97 percent of its loans are repaid.118
Originally, loans from the Grameen Bank were divided about equally
between men and women. But Yunus soon discovered that “in the fami-
lies in which the women received the loans, the children were better
cared for, the houses were better maintained.” He also found that while
women spent the money on their families, men often squandered it on
luxuries or drugs. Women also repaid the loans more dependably.119 The
result is that today, nearly all the borrowers are women. “When a bank
focuses on women, according to Yunus, the impact on society is greater.
Men are more likely to use additional income to make their own lives
more comfortable. . . . Poor women who have a little extra income use
it to bring back their children who have been living with and working
with other families. When the children come back, their mothers see
that they receive an education.”120 One study found that women who
receive Grameen loans have better-nourished and better-educated chil-
dren, particularly their daughters. These women are also more likely to
Women receive small loans to start businesses from the Grameen Bank. Muhammad
Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, was awarded the Noble Peace
Prize in 2006 for his efforts to address poverty, seen by the Nobel Committee as key to
achieving lasting peace.
(© Philippe Lissac/Godong/Corbis)

Development Strategies for the South 423
use contraception more consistently, as are other women in their village,
even if they did not receive any loans themselves.121 And approximately
65 percent of those who get loans averaging about $100 have achieved
signifi cant economic improvements in their lives. About half have risen
above the poverty line.122
What is most important about the Grameen Bank is the generally
applicable nature of its lessons and successes. Indeed, the Grameen
model has been replicated in more than forty countries, with signifi cant
results.123 In 2006, Muhammad Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize,
recognizing him as a pioneer in microfi nancing for the advancement of
development and human rights.124 The importance of focusing develop-
ment efforts on women, as done in the Grameen Bank, has also become
commonly accepted wisdom. “Several studies suggest that income is
more likely to be spent on human development when women control the
cash.”125
In particular, these studies fi nd that increases in women’s income
improve the nutritional status of families seven times as much as do
equivalent increases in the incomes of men. “In Cote d’Ivoire, it has been
calculated that if women had as much control over cash income as men,
the share of food in the household would go up by 9%, while that of ciga-
rettes would fall by 55% and that of alcohol by 99%.”126 Reducing gen-
der equality can greatly infl uence the lives of children in terms of child
mortality and malnutrition.127 In short, evidence is rapidly accumulating
in support of the proposition that political efforts to allow women to ben-
efi t from market forces are key to alleviating poverty in the developing
world.
A second aspect of life in the developing world concerns the eco-
nomic impact of diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Malaria, a dis-
ease transmitted by a specifi c type of mosquito, is treatable, yet still kills
approximately 1 million people annually, mostly children in sub-Saharan
Africa.128
As mentioned previously, Africa is also suffering from the majority
of AIDS-related deaths, although the problem is not isolated there, as
India, Ukraine, and Russia are experiencing signifi cant infection rates as
well.129 The number of AIDS deaths has accumulated to over 35 million
(see Figure 11.3).
The relationship between economic conditions and disease is not
one-way. Poverty creates conditions for disease, and disease, in turn, con-
tributes to poverty. In the case of malaria, for example, the poor cannot
afford insecticides, screens for windows and doors, and bed nets, which
are highly effective for reducing transmission of the disease. Once a region
is infected, malaria impedes economic growth. “It is worth remembering
how malaria and yellow fever delayed the construction of the Panama
Canal for more than thirty years. . . . Only after the United States invested
heavily in a mosquito-control effort . . . was the canal constructed. Malar-
ia to this day can stop a good investment project in its tracks, whether

424 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
a new mine, farm region, or tourist site.”130 At the household level, the
AIDS disease can be economically debilitating, because individuals are
too sick to work, and medicine and treatment can use more than one-
third of household income.
Beyond the household, HIV/AIDS is eroding the social and
economic infrastructure. Health systems are suffering from a
lethal interaction of two effects: attrition among workers and
rising demand. . . . HIV/AIDS is eroding human capacity on a
broad front. Zambia now loses two-thirds of its trained teachers
to HIV/AIDS, and in 2000 two in three agricultural extension
workers in the country reported having lost a co-worker in the
past year.131
The World Health Organization Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health, determined that the main causes for the gap in life expectancy
between Africa and the rest of the world included AIDS, malaria, tuber-
culosis, vaccine-preventable disease, acute respiratory infection, and
nutritional defi ciencies.132
Most believe that the international community’s response to these
diseases has been too little and too late. The World Bank sponsored one
project on AIDS before 1993 and only spent $15 million a year on AIDS in
Africa from 1988 to 1999.133
In 2004 the world spent an estimated $6 billion combating
the [HIV/AIDS] virus through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria. Had resources been on this scale
0
1995 2000 2005
5
10
15
20
M
ill
io
n
25
30
35
40
1980 1985 1990
Source: From Vital Signs
2006/2007: The Trends That
Are Shaping Our Future from
Worldwatch Institute, p. 77.
© 2006 Worldwatch Institute.
www.worldwatch.org.
Figure 11.3 Estimates
of Cumulative AIDS
Deaths Worldwide,
1980–2005

www.worldwatch.org

20 years ago, the epidemic could have been reversed. Today, that
amount is insuffi cient to contain the crisis. . . . The interna-
tional community’s response to a global public health threat has
been plainly inadequate.134
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was announced
at a UN summit on AIDS in 2001. This fund and the $15 billion pledged
in 2003 by the United States are indicators that these diseases have fi nal-
ly arrived on the agenda of the international community. However, like
other forms of foreign assistance, fi nancial packages for the HIV/AIDS
problem have their critics. According to economist William Easterly, “If
money spent on treatment went instead to effective prevention, between
three and seventy-fi ve new HIV infections could be averted for every extra
year of life given to an AIDS patient. Spending AIDS money on treatment
rather than on prevention makes the AIDS crisis worse, not better.”135
The Role of the International Organizations
in Economic Development
Although the United Nations began primarily as an international orga-nization concerned with security issues (as discussed in Chapter 9), it
is a major player in economic development as well. Indeed, more than 80
percent of UN personnel work on topics of human welfare.136
The United Nations has devoted much effort to the elaboration
of operation programs for economic development. Loans apart,
the UN system mounts more than 10,000 development projects
per year . . . To this emphasis more recently was added the con-
trol and treatment of AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Together,
they involve commitments of money, people’s work, and hope
on a scale never before reached by international agencies. 137
The United Nations plays a role in economic development through its
agencies, such as the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Chil-
dren’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the
UN Population Fund (UNFPA). These agencies collect information,
administer development assistance, make recommendations regarding
development issues to member-states, and organize conferences to publi-
cize economic-related problems.
Recently, the United Nations has attempted to coordinate devel-
opment efforts by focusing on specifi c development goals for this mil-
lennium, spelled out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration,
which was signed by all UN member states in 2002. The Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), listed in Table 11.1, attempt to cut pov-
erty in half by 2015. Supporters argue that these goals are “bold but
achievable, even if dozens of countries are not yet on track to achieve
them.”138 According to critics, however,
Millennium
Development Goals
(MDGs) UN targets
for achieving signifi cant
progress on issues such
as poverty, education,
gender equality, health,
and the environment in
developing countries.
The Role of the International Organizations in Economic Development 425

426 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
The MDGs are already losing traction because governments
have limited power to directly affect these outcomes. Most
of the world is closer to meeting the MDGs now than it was
a decade ago, but that is largely because human welfare has
generally been improving. . . . The MDGs . . . do not constitute
a strategy that informs the actions of governments, companies,
and NGOs. Most of what the MDGs envision is beyond the
power of any enterprise to deliver.139
According to the UN MDG report in 2008, there has been some progress,
and some goals are on track for 2015. For example, enrollment in primary
education is up in most parts of the world, and the number of deaths
from measles and AIDs is down. But carbon dioxide emissions continue
to increase, and malnourishment, poverty levels, and deaths in childbirth
remain at high levels.140
Moral, Economic, and Security Implications
of the North-South Gap
The ethical implications of trends in poverty and economic inequality in the world are clear enough, even though they are not often spelled
out explicitly. If poverty is being alleviated as fast as can reasonably be
expected, then there is not such a pressing need logically, politically, or
morally for greater sacrifi ces on the part of the people and countries in the
industrialized world. Yet if millions are suffering (a fact not much in dis-
pute) and the situation is rapidly getting worse in at least some regions,
drastic steps, including even painful sacrifi ces by the rich, might seem
clearly called for on pressing moral grounds. Although, as indicated by
the statistics quoted at the beginning of the chapter, there is some good
news about the prospects for growth in the developing world, it is wrong
to conclude that the lot of people in developing countries is improv-
ing so fast that no actions or sacrifi ces by people in richer countries are
necessary.
TABLE 11.1
UN Millennium Development Goals for 2015
Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.
Achieve universal primary education.
Promote gender equality and empower women.
Reduce child mortality.
Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.
Ensure environmental sustainability.
Develop a global partnership for development.

Moral, Economic, and Security Implications of the North-South Gap 427
If the current desperate economic conditions in many developing
countries were caused by the policies and actions of industrialized coun-
tries in the past, then the case for drastic action is that much stronger.
Although it is diffi cult to conclude with confi dence that current econom-
ic problems in developing countries are primarily the fault of imperialism
and colonialism in previous centuries, there arguably remains a strong
moral obligation on the part of people in rich countries to assist those
starving in poor countries, even if the poverty creating that suffering is
not entirely their fault. One can argue that mere coexistence on the same
planet creates a moral obligation among human beings to aid each other
in times of stress and that coexistence obliges rich countries to help poor
countries regardless of the origins of their economic problems. Accord-
ing to one international ethicist, “. . . the global poor have a compelling
moral claim to some of our affl uence and that we, by denying them what
they are morally entitled to and urgently need, are actively contributing
to their deprivations.”141
Beyond morality, there are economic consequences for the rest of the
world if the South remains poor. From a purely economic standpoint,
poverty is not good for business. The North cannot make money from an
impoverished state that cannot buy its exports. Furthermore, interdepen-
dence in the global economy means that poverty may be localized, but
it cannot be isolated. When instability and economic crises occur in the
South, the result is fi nancial losses for northern businesses. In general,
poverty and lack of adequate resources present tremendous obstacles for
individual economic productivity, not to mention creative expression,
such as in the arts and sciences.
In the view of many, the North-South gap is not simply a problem of
the lack of wealth in the South but of the excess of wealth in the North.
Indeed, from this vantage point, the luxurious lifestyles of the wealthy
result in unnecessary waste and environmental destruction (as will be
discussed in Chapter 13). Making the distribution of wealth around the
world more equitable might reduce the excesses of the North as much as
alleviate the suffering of the South.
There are also consequences for world security. Recall from Chapter 6
that poor economic conditions can prompt leaders to blame (justly or unjustly)
these conditions on external foes and even initiate war in an attempt to
divert the public’s attention to an outside enemy. Poor economic condi-
tions can also breed ethnic confl ict as groups compete for scarce resources.
Economically devastating conditions can foster terrorist groups to form and
facilitate their continued recruitment from populations that fi nd their situ-
ation hopeless. From the North’s perspective, economic development may
help prevent confl icts to which the North will often have to respond in
order to prevent the spread of war and other forms of violence.
Economic development may also be important for democratic val-
ues. The relationship between economics and democracy is controversial.
Which must come fi rst: democratization or economic development? The

428 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
fact that the countries with the highest per capita GNPs and life expectan-
cies are democratic convinces a lot of people that democracy is a necessary
condition for economic success.142 And there is an impressive theoretical
as well as empirical case to be made for the argument that political democ-
racy provides a promising basis for economic development. Some argue,
for example, that “the conditions that are needed to have individual rights
needed for maximum economic development are the same conditions
that are needed to have a lasting democracy.”143 That is why only stable
democracies have reached the highest levels of economic development
and have maintained those levels across generations. In contrast, “though
experience shows that relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily
rapidly when they have a strong dictator who happens to have unusually
good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one
or two dictators.”144
One recent analysis of the relationship between democracy and eco-
nomic growth, as well as broader indexes of the physical quality of life
in developing countries in the 1980s, concludes that democracy and
economic performance mutually reinforce each other. “Improvements
in economic well-being will facilitate the transition to democracy and
full provision of political rights will enable nations to promote economic
prosperity.”145 Other analysts report that the correlation between democ-
racy and economic growth is more a result of the impact of growth on
democracy than of democracy on growth.146 Still another research report
argues that “the level of economic development does not affect the prob-
ability of transitions to democracy but . . . affl uence does make demo-
cratic regimes more stable.”147 In addition, it is clear that “the growing
number of affl uent authoritarian states suggests that greater wealth alone
does not automatically lead to greater political freedom. Authoritarian
regimes around the world are showing that they can reap the benefi ts of
economic development while evading any pressure to relax their politi-
cal control.”148 The connections between economic development and
democratization and the implications of the North-South gap in general
illustrate the complex relationships between politics and economics that
are at the heart of the global economy.
SUMMARY
● On many economic measures, there exists a considerable chasm between
the rich countries in the developed world and the poor developing coun-
tries. The gap in the average GNP per capita between the North and the
South is increasing. In terms of such indicators as life expectancy and
the UN Human Development Index, the difference is almost certainly
decreasing, at least for most parts of the developing world. Still, millions
of people in poor countries are suffering, and in many countries their
plight worsens each year. The economic conditions in some developing
countries are more diffi cult to address because of debt obligations.

Summary 429
● Poverty in developing countries and the North-South gap have been
explained by a variety of theoretical perspectives. Most agree that the
roots of the gap can be traced back to the colonization of the South
by the North and the economic consequences of imperialism for the
colonized areas. Many, however, expected the countries in the South
to develop just as those in the North did once they were independent.
When they did not, neo-Marxists pointed to the domination of the
global economic system by rich, powerful capitalist states, which, it
claims, makes it necessary for LDCs to adhere to policies of econom-
ic development radically different from those based on democracy
and capitalism historically followed by most of the currently rich
countries. The terms of trade, aid, and investment by multinational
corporations, according to neo-Marxist approaches, put the South at
a structural disadvantage.
● Economic liberals point to the benefi ts of economic interdependence
that the South can receive if it reforms internally. Liberals note the
early success of East Asian states, which adopted strategies emphasiz-
ing exports and market forces, but critics point to the heavy hand that
governments played in these economies.
● In Latin America in the 1960s, neo-Marxists approaches were popu-
lar and associated with the strategy of protecting industries to produce
substitutes for imported goods. Although this worked for a while for
some states, such as Mexico and Brazil, it is largely discredited as a de-
velopment strategy today. In the 1970s, states in the South attempted
to band together in the NIEO, which called for reform of many of the
international economic structures and practices and more uncondi-
tional aid. With economic crises in many countries in the North and
with the diminished effectiveness of OPEC as a cartel, the NIEO lost
its signifi cance as a rallying cry from the developing world.
● Liberalization strategies, such as export-oriented growth, became more
accepted by developing states in the 1990s, and liberal reform pack-
ages are usually the requirements for IMF aid. However, worsening
conditions in many states that followed liberal policies and examples
of successful human development programs in some nonliberal states
have prompted many recent criticisms of this approach to economic
development.
● Government policies to modify market forces in favor of women show
signs of producing important economic benefi ts. Development strate-
gies, including microfi nancing, focused specifi cally on giving women
more control of economic resources have produced quite a bit of evi-
dence to support their effectiveness. Recently, the role of diseases such
as malaria and HIV/AIDs in underdevelopment has received more at-
tention, because poverty contributes to high infection rates and dis-
eased populations can further impede economic development.

430 Chapter 11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
● The question of economic development is of concern for both the North
and the South, as well as for the international community as a whole.
For the North, the moral implications of the poverty in parts of the
developing world compared to the excessive wealth in the developed
states are important to consider, regardless of the cause of the North-
South gap. Economically and politically, one can argue that economic
development in the South is in the interests of the North.
KEY TERMS less developed countries
(LDCs) 390
purchasing power parity 391
Human Development Index 394
modernization theory 400
terms of trade 402
overseas development
assistance 402
repatriated profi ts 403
corporate social
responsibility 403
newly industrialized countries
(NICs) 409
import substitution strategy 412
New International Economic
Order (NIEO) 413
Group of 77 413
aid burden 415
economic cartel 416
export-oriented strategy 417
structural adjustment
programs 418
Washington Consensus 418
Doha Round 420
Grameen Bank 421
microfi nancing 421
Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) 425

431
C H A P T E R 12
Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe
• Federalism versus Functionalism
• The Institutions of the European Union
• The Process of Integration
• The Future of the European Union
Economic Integration among Developing States
• Obstacles to Integration among LDCs
Economic Integration across the North-South Divide
Regional Integration, Supranationalism, and the International
Political Economy
Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Institutions
Summary
Key Terms
Regional Economic
Integration in the Global
Political Economy

432 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
With an increasingly interdependent global economy, the purpose and future of state boundaries in the international system come
into question. Indeed, economic liberalism, one of the dominant eco-
nomic philosophies (as discussed in the previous two chapters), would
see the withering away of the political interference that “artifi cial” state
boundaries can have on effi cient economic exchanges as a positive trend.
Many contemporary states recognize the potential economic benefi ts of
economic integration—the replacement of national economies with larg-
er (in most cases, regional) ones. “One of the most striking facts about
the modern global political economy is that it is organized strongly on
a regional basis. For all the talk of globalization, many indicators of glo-
balization (for example, trade, foreign direct investment, international
institutions) are directed toward regional partners.”1 Today, more than
400 regional trading arrangements have been reported to the World Trade
Organization. Attempts at regional economic integration have increased
in recent times, partly because the end of the Cold War means that states
have more freedom to cooperate economically and partly because the end
of the Bretton Woods system and American economic hegemony (as dis-
cussed in Chapter 10) have led states to search for alternative paths to
economic stability.
Yet, as with most other economic choices, efforts at integrating econ-
omies often confl ict with other political values, such as state sovereignty.
This tension has been apparent throughout the history of the most suc-
cessful effort at regional economic integration: the European Union (EU)
in Western Europe. This chapter introduces the EU and examines the
debates about how to integrate its political institutions, the history of
integration, and some of the most pressing issues refl ecting the relation-
ship between politics and economics in the EU’s future. The chapter then
examines other, less ambitious efforts at regional economic cooperation
in the developing world and across the North-South divide.
Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe
Shortly after the Second World War, the threat of Soviet domination led Winston Churchill to call for a United States of Europe. In the suc-
ceeding years, there were several attempts to bring European countries
closer together. The impetus toward international organization in Europe
received two important boosts in 1948. First, the Soviets backed a suc-
cessful coup in Czechoslovakia. Second, they blockaded West Berlin, cut-
ting it off from all supplies from the West. The United States responded
by supplying the city from the air. One immediate response to the per-
ceived Soviet threat was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization (NATO). Another was more serious consideration of politically
and economically integrating Western Europe.
It is important to recognize that the motivations behind the current
EU, the most successful effort at integration by sovereign states, were both
economic integration
The replacement of
national economies with
larger—in most cases
regional—ones.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 433
political and economic in nature. Politically, leaders of the time, including
the leadership in the new superpower, the United States, were convinced
of the general liberal perspective on the causes of World War II. Recall
that the liberal explanation of the war focused on how states attempted
to compete economically through mercantilist policies rather than coop-
erate. According to this perspective, states that are more interdependent
with one another will be less likely to fi ght one another because war
brings too many economic costs. The explanation also blamed the auto-
cratic nature of regimes, such as Germany’s under Hitler’s dictatorship,
which did not allow for the public to constrain its leaders from going to
war. Furthermore, the poor economic conditions in the 1930s made states
vulnerable to leaders like Hitler who promised prosperity in exchange for
power. So one motivation behind post–World War II efforts at European
integration was to build a community of states that were economically
connected (with special importance of connecting Germany to the rest
of Western Europe), had open political and economic systems, and were
prosperous for the purpose of addressing internal and external threats to
security in the newly emerging Cold War. The postwar aid package pro-
vided by the United States, the Marshall Plan, required that recipient
states coordinate their economic recovery efforts and was thus an impor-
tant effort to encourage integration for political goals.
Economically, the states wanted to integrate their economies to
achieve greater growth. European countries after World War II were eco-
nomically devastated. Economic liberalism proposes that the best road
to wealth is to eliminate political barriers to economic exchange. So the
states, as well as American and European businesses, wanted to elimi-
nate tariffs and other trade barriers and eventually create a single market
to make business easier and more profi table. Given these motivations
behind European integration, the question remained as to how the states
should go about it. Integration theory offers two distinct alternatives:
federalism and functionalism. Both alternatives were considered by west
European leaders, although a hybrid of the two, neofunctionalism, best
describes the actual process of integration.
Federalism versus Functionalism
The heart of federalism, as a theory of integration, is summarized neatly
in the slogan, “The worst way to cross a chasm is in little steps.” In other
words, any attempt to unify several states into a federal union must be
comprehensive, not incremental. There must be at the start a central gov-
ernment, even though the lower-level political units would retain some
powers, and the incipient federal government must be given substantial
political power from the beginning. An overarching political system,
like the federal government in the United States, is needed to impose
integration, according to this perspective. Along these lines, Ren Pleven,
French premier in 1950, suggested the creation of an all-European army.
federalism Approach
to integration involving
central political
institutions to impose
political and economic
union.

434 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
The United States originally opposed this plan but was persuaded to sup-
port it by the summer of 1951.2 This was a federalist idea par excellence,
going to the heart of the sovereignty of the separate European states—the
control of their armies. Leaders in the United States hoped that this plan
would allow the Europeans to thwart any aggressive designs the Soviets
might have and to rearm the Germans without giving them control of
weapons or troops. Five out of the six states involved in the plan to cre-
ate the integrated European army (the European Defense Community)
approved it. But, in 1954, the French parliament voted to postpone fur-
ther discussion of the idea, and it faded away, as did many of the grander
federalist plans.
Functionalism provides an alternative way of integrating and was
more attractive to the leaders of many states who were worried about
giving up their sovereignty to a supranational (authority above the state
level) federal institution. Whereas federalism is a top-down approach,
starting with overarching political institutions, functionalism is a bottom-
up approach, starting with cooperation among private and some public
actors in uncontroversial technical areas, such as uniform standards
for road signs across countries and projects to build roads that cross
borders. So-called functional organizations had made signifi cant advances
in the nineteenth century. Various river commissions were created for the
purpose of regulating international commerce and transport, and orga-
nizations such as the International Telecommunications Organization
(1875), the Universal Postal Union (1874), and the International Offi ce of
Weights and Measures (1875) were established.
These institutions are not directly related to preventing confl ict, but
according to a form of functionalist theory, they may ultimately serve
that end. If the tasks that these organizations undertake proliferate, they
may eventually control such a signifi cant portion of international inter-
course that they could serve as a basis for some type of world govern-
ment. A world of states that had become so closely intertwined in a mesh
of functional activities and appreciative of the benefi ts brought by func-
tional organizations would be unlikely, according to this functionalist
theory, to degenerate into international warfare.3 Functionalism assumes
that integration will occur gradually as states create small-scale admin-
istrative institutions to coordinate these activities and as they fi nd it to
their advantage to allow these institutions to take over, fulfi lling some
functions of the state. Eventually, these connections will become denser
between states, and states will fi nd it useful to cooperate in less techni-
cal, more controversial areas until, like the peeling away of layers of an
onion, sovereignty will be transferred to a supranational entity that per-
forms all the functions of the original states.
Although wary of the all-at-once approach of federalism, most west
European leaders were not comfortable with allowing integration to pro-
ceed as gradually as in functionalism and felt that more direction was
needed for the integration process. This compromise position is known as
functionalism
Bottom-up approach to
integration involving
cooperation among
states and private actors,
beginning in technical
areas.
supranational
Authority of an
organization above the
state level.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 435
neofunctionalism. Neofunctionalists, led by Jean Monnet of France, often
referred to as the founder of the modern European integration, stressed
the development of some central political institutions, with the power to
oversee and direct integration, whereas functionalists were satisfi ed with
more loosely knit organizations, and federalists wanted supranational
organizations. Neofunctionalists also stressed that states should seek out
activities that are specifi cally defi ned but also politically important. In
other words, economic cooperation should not be limited to just techni-
cal areas at fi rst, as functionalists argue. According to neofunctionalists,
the strength of an integration organization that selects its initial activi-
ties wisely will grow with time. Monnet, for example, used the goal of
integrating the coal and steel markets as a rationale for promoting the
integration of social security and transportation policies. He argued that
this was the only way to counteract distortions in coal and steel prices.4
As the member states saw the economic benefi ts resulting from the activ-
ities of the central organization, neofunctionalists believed, they would
be willing to give that organization broader authority. One technical task
would create spillover effects in other tasks until the integrating forces
were virtually overwhelming. The neofunctionalist organization would
end up running everything; at this stage, the process of giving it political
power would be little more than a formality, to which the formerly inde-
pendent member states would have no objections.5
These ideas were put into practice by way of the Schuman Plan (named
for Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister), proposed in 1950.
Devised by Jean Monnet, the plan called for the creation of a common
market in Europe for the coal and steel industries. In 1951, the six states
of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem-
bourg signed the Treaty of Paris, launching the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). These six states agreed to reduce trade barriers to
coal and steel and to coordinate policies (such as taxes and production) in
this economic area. Cooperation in coal and steel was an important fi rst
step. Coal and steel were key to Europe’s industrial growth and recovery
from the war. This agreement also tightly linked together Europe’s eter-
nal rivals, France and Germany. France and Germany had long fought
over territories important for coal and steel, such as Alsace-Lorraine (now
part of France in the northeast corner, bordering Germany). Free trade
of coal and steel made it irrelevant, at least economically, who actually
owned this land.
By almost any standard, the ECSC was an immediate success. The
benefi ts its members derived were suffi ciently obvious that by 1955, nego-
tiations were under way for a more comprehensive approach to European
integration. These negotiations culminated in the Treaty of Rome, signed
by the same six states in 1957, which created two new organizations,
the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom). These two organizations, together with
the ECSC, formed the nucleus of what became known starting in 1967
neofunctionalism
Approach to integration
involving development
of some central political
institutions and
cooperation to create
spillover effects for
further integration.
spillover effects
Integration generated by
cooperation in technical
areas that leads to
cooperation in other
areas.
European Coal and
Steel Community
(ECSC) 1951 agreement
among six European
states to integrate their
coal and steel economic
sectors.
Treaty of Rome 1957
agreement by France,
West Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg to
economically integrate
and establish the
institutions that now
constitute the European
Union.

436 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
as the European Community (EC). When the Treaty of Maastricht (dis-
cussed later in the chapter) came into effect in late 1993, the organization
offi cially adopted its current name, the European Union.
The Institutions of the European Union
The Treaty of Rome outlined the structure of institutions for the EEC
(and now the EU), much like the constitution of a country, and by signing
the Treaty of Rome, states agreed to eventually integrate economically
and politically. The EU has, in effect, executive, legislative, and judicial
institutions.
The European Court of Justice, for example, fulfi lls a role that is
somewhat like that of the U.S. Supreme Court. The court consists of
one judge from each member state. The primary function of the court
is to settle disputes concerning the provisions of the treaties that estab-
lished the organization, as well as laws passed with respect to the treaties.
Although the court is one of the more obscure institutions in the EU, it
has acquired supranational powers of some signifi cance.6 Historically, in
courts of international law, only states can be heard. Individuals are not
allowed to take legal complaints to such courts, and states traditionally
have insisted that this custom be adhered to rigorously. But individuals in
the EU can be heard before the European Court of Justice, and there have
been cases in which the supreme court of a member state has deferred to
the judgment of this court. The European Court of Justice also can hear
cases brought by member states, other institutions of the EU, and corpo-
rations affected by treaty provisions. The court hears a number of such
cases every year and appears to be developing the potential to become a
supranational judicial institution. “Its rulings are binding for all Courts
of the Member States, which have to set aside national law if it does con-
fl ict with European law.”7 If states do not comply with the court’s ruling,
it can impose fi nes on them.
The executive functions of the EU are shared by the European Com-
mission and the Council of the European Union (formerly the Council of
Ministers).8 The Commission is the supranational part of this executive
“branch” within the institutional structure. It is made up of commission-
ers appointed by each of the national governments, but they are to act
in the interests of the EU as a whole, independent of their home states.
There is currently one commissioner from each member state. The com-
missioners prepare the fi rst draft of the council’s budget every year and
propose policies to the Council. The Commission also guides legislation
through the European Parliament. The European Commission is head-
ed by a president, who is chosen by the member states and endorsed by
the European Parliament. Some Commission presidents, such as Jacques
Delors (president from 1985 to 1994), have been very important in guid-
ing the entire institutional framework.
European Court
of Justice Judicial
EU institution that
primarily settles disputes
concerning the provisions
of EU treaties and law.
European Commission
Represents EU interests
as a whole and proposes
and implements policies.
Council of the
European Union
Composed of
representatives of each
member state, this is the
primary policymaking
body of the EU.
European Parliament
EU legislative body,
whose representatives
have been directly elected
since 1979.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 437
The Council of the European Union reviews and approves decisions
made by the European Commission, and each minister is accountable to
the state he or she represents.
The Council consists of ministers from the national govern-
ments of all the EU countries. Meetings are attended by which-
ever ministers are responsible for the items to be discussed:
foreign ministers, ministers of the economy and fi nance, minis-
ters for agriculture and so on, as appropriate. Each country has
a number of votes in the Council broadly refl ecting the size of
their population, but weighted in favour of smaller countries.
Most decisions are taken by majority vote, although sensitive
issues in areas like taxation, asylum and immigration, or foreign
and security policy, require unanimity.9
Over the years, major decisions have been passed on to the heads of all
state governments. The heads of the separate governments, like the other
ministers in the Council, represent the individual interests of the member
states, and it is clear that the members’ leaders must approve measures of
substantial importance. If the EU ever becomes truly supranational, one
of the most obvious institutional changes that
will be required would involve giving the Com-
mission greater independence from the Council
and heads of the state governments.
The European Parliament is in formal
terms the legislative body of the EU, although
at this stage in the development of the EU, most
of the legislative functions are still carried out
by the executive bodies of the Commission and
the Council of Ministers. The European Parlia-
ment is probably the least powerful of the major
institutions making up the EU, but it is also
one of the most intriguing. It took an important
step forward in 1979, when its members began
to be directly elected to the body. (Previously,
they had been selected by the parliaments of the
member nations.) Parliamentary elections are
held every fi ve years. The European Parliament
currently has 732 members, and they organize
themselves along ideological rather than nation-
al lines. Normally, for example, the Christian
Democratic delegates from the various member
states sit, caucus, and vote together, as do the
delegates from various Green parties, rather than
acting in concert with the other delegates from
their respective countries.
Representatives to the European Parliament voted
in 2004 to open EU membership talks with Turkey.
(Vincent Kessler/Corbis)

438 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
Until 1987, the Parliament’s role was restricted to minor budget
issues.10 Since then, the European Parliament has gained control over about
one-third of the budget—the part that does not involve the Common Agri-
cultural Policy (a very large part of the budget, as we shall see) or foreign
aid. Also since 1987, “the Parliament has had the right to amend or reject
legislation approved by the Council, which can overrule the Parliament
only by a unanimous vote.”11 And the Maastricht Treaty gives the Parlia-
ment the right to veto decisions made by the Council.12 That treaty also
makes it possible for the Parliament to approve the president of the Com-
mission as well as the Commission as a whole, and to make the Commis-
sion as a whole resign if a two-thirds majority so votes. As the only directly
elected body within the EU, the Parliament perhaps can be expected to play
an increasingly important role in the organization’s future.
The Process of Integration
How well have the institutions of the EU worked? Answering that ques-
tion involves fi rst discussing the question, “What exactly are they trying
to accomplish?” The ultimate goals of the community are both political
and economic, but the intermediate steps are almost completely econom-
ic in nature. The beginning of the economic integration process is the
creation of a free trade area in which tariffs among the member states are
eliminated. The member states achieved free trade in many areas by the
late 1950s. A free trade area is supposed to increase trade among member
states, but free trade areas can be easily infi ltrated. A state outside the
organization could simply export goods into the member state with
the lowest tariffs. Once that was done, the goods could be exported from
the infi ltrated member state to the other members of the organization and
escape the tariffs of the other states as if they had come from within the
free trade area. An obvious solution to this problem involves the adoption
of a common tariff by the states in the organization, to be applied to all
imports coming from the outside. If this is accomplished, the organiza-
tion reaches the status of a customs union, as the European Commu-
nity did by 1969. With this step, the organization began to bargain as a
single unit in trade talks, such as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiations, with outside states.
The next step up the ladder of economic integration is to establish a
common market. In addition to abolishing intraorganization tariffs and
creating a common external tariff, a common market allows the com-
ponents of production—that is, capital and labor—to move freely across
national boundaries. Entrepreneurs from one member state can invest
without restriction in any other member state, and workers can freely
migrate to any state in the organization to fi nd work. If the member
states cooperate to the extent that they jointly plan monetary, fi scal, and
social policies, they form an economic union. If they turn the planning of
these policies over to a unifi ed, supranational body such as the European
Commission, total economic integration is accomplished. According to
free trade area
Geographical area where
tariffs and other trade
restrictions among
member states are
eliminated.
customs union
Agreement by a group of
states to apply common
tariffs on imports from all
other states.
common market Area
that allows member
states to freely move
components of production
such as capital and labor
across borders.
economic union
Cooperation of member
states to jointly plan
monetary, fi scal, and
social policies.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 439
neofunctionalist ideas, once economic integration reaches this advanced
stage, the central integrating organization will be running virtually every-
thing anyway, so there will be no strong objection to advances toward
political integration and the emergence of a new state-like entity.13
The process of integration, however, has not been so smooth. While
much progress was made in the fi rst decade of the community, further
integration came to a virtual standstill in the 1970s. This was partly
due to the economic turmoil of the 1970s (as discussed in Chapter 10).
European states, heavily dependent on foreign energy supplies, suffered
greatly with the oil shocks of that decade. Furthermore, aging popula-
tions made expansive welfare programs much more expensive and with-
out a strong revenue base to pay for them. Facing these economic crises,
many European states were reluctant to undergo short-term costs (like
further lowering tariffs) for the long-term benefi ts of economic integra-
tion. Indeed, the 1970s and early 1980s were the height of “Europessi-
mism,” with dire predictions about the future of the community. Instead
of deeper political or economic integration, the organization turned to
broader integration, doubling its membership in the 1970s and early
1980s. Table 12.1 shows the expansion of the European Union.
TABLE 12.1
The Expansion of the European Union
Original members: 1957 Fourth enlargement: 1995
Belgium Austria
Germany (plus East Germany in 1991) Finland
France Sweden
Italy
Luxembourg Fifth enlargement: 2004
Netherlands Cyprus
Czech Republic
First enlargement: 1973 Estonia
Denmark Hungary
Ireland Latvia
United Kingdom Lithuania
Malta
Second enlargement: 1981 Poland
Greece Slovakia
Slovenia
Third enlargement: 1986 Sixth enlargement: 2007
Portugal Bulgaria
Spain Romania

440 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
Efforts at deeper integration fi nally surfaced again in 1985 when the
European Commission drafted a white paper titled “Implementing the
Internal Market.” It called for 300 measures to remove physical, techni-
cal, and fi scal barriers to true economic integration. By December 1985,
the heads of the member governments had approved the Single European
Act (based on the white paper), calling for the establishment of a single
European market by 1992. “The year 1992 promised the creation of a
larger, more dynamic market, with the wealth and political power that
would fl ow therefrom. To achieve this big goal, however, required each
nation to sacrifi ce its interests on hundreds of smaller issues, many of
which had important domestic political impacts.”14 On January 1, 1993,
the European Single Market went into effect, thus offi cially creating the
economic union toward which the organization had been striving since
1957. The Single European Act also called for important changes in vot-
ing procedures in the European Council. By 1987, European Communi-
ty decision-making procedures provided for majority voting rather than
unanimous voting on certain issues. Previously, every state had, in effect,
veto power over any proposal, because a unanimous vote was required
to pass it. The Single European Act also strengthened the power of the
European Parliament, as discussed earlier.
Optimistic about the Single European Act and the end of the Cold War,
the European foreign ministers in 1991 signed the Maastricht Treaty, an
ambitious document that, among other things, changed the name of the
organization to the European Union. Maastricht established three pillars:
a common currency, a common foreign and security policy, and a common
justice and internal policy. If all three of these goals are accomplished, the
EU will become something much closer to a state-like entity.
Only one of these goals, a common currency, has been achieved by
most EU members. In January 1999, banks began trading in the new cur-
rency, the euro (€), and in January 2002, citizens in twelve European states
began purchasing goods in euros. Within a few months, the national cur-
rencies, such as the Italian lira, the German mark, and the French franc,
became illegal currency, and the European Monetary Union (EMU) was
in place across the twelve participating countries. The European Cen-
tral Bank is an institution roughly analogous to the U.S. Federal Reserve,
with authority over the new European currency.15
Establishing a common currency certainly simplifi es commercial
transactions within the EU, and perhaps in the long run it will be an eco-
nomic boon to most member countries:
Monetary union offers a number of potential benefi ts to mem-
ber countries. Adoption of a single currency is designed to help
stabilize prices, the main object of the EMU and the European
Central Bank’s foremost obligation under its charter. A single
currency will eliminate trading against swings in currency
values, reducing a major cost of trade both within Europe and
with non-European importers and exporters. A single currency
Single European Act
1985 agreement calling
for the establishment of a
single European market.
Maastricht Treaty
1991 EU agreement to
work toward common
currency, common
foreign and security
policy, and common
justice and internal
policy.
euro Common
currency of the European
Monetary Union, fi rst
used by citizens in 2002.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 441
also will make it harder for companies to charge more for their
products in one country than another, thus making it easier for
consumers to pay fair prices.16
In short, the euro is what economic liberalism wants: economic exchange
without political barriers that create artifi cial obstacles like national
currencies.
The establishment of the EMU was not an easy political or economic
decision for the EU, and at several points after the adoption of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, there were signifi cant doubts that the euro would ever hap-
pen. It was partly over objection to the EMU that a majority of Danish
voters refused to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in 1992.
Later, Denmark passed a weaker version of the treaty, opting out of many
controversial provisions, as did Great Britain. When the euro came into
existence, three key states—Britain, Denmark, and Sweden—chose not
to participate. As of this writing, they are still not members of the “euro-
zone.” Most of the newest states in central, eastern, and southern Europe,
who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, cannot use the euro until they meet
certain economic standards. Since 2007, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, and
Slovakia have adopted the euro, bringing the total of eurozone countries
to sixteen.
Part of the pessimism surrounding the euro had to do with the
extremely diffi cult process of coordinating national economies before they
could integrate monetarily. Stringent criteria, such as low interest rates,
low infl ation rates, and low national debt, were required to be eligible to
participate in the EMU. For many west European states, their economies
already in trouble (in 1998, for example, Spain’s unemployment rate was
18.8 percent, and Greece’s infl ation rate was 4.5 percent),17 meeting these
criteria by cutting government spending meant facing serious political
opposition. A common currency also means a loss of sovereignty. Devalu-
ing one’s own national currency is a popular way to deal with economic
problems. With the establishment of the euro, the members gave up this
option, and their economic fate largely rests in the hands of the overarch-
ing institutional framework of the EU.
The Future of the European Union
The euro has fared well since its introduction, emerging as a strong alter-
native to the U.S. dollar, despite early predictions that it would fail. Yet
how EU member states manage their differences over economics associat-
ed with the euro is still an open question. Although the Central European
Bank is in charge of the value of the euro, the EU still exists as separate
national political and economic systems in many ways. States in the euro-
zone must coordinate their economies (levels of defi cits, infl ation rates,
and so forth) for the euro to work. Soon after the euro was established,
Germany risked exceeding the defi cit limit that states have to maintain.
This crisis threatened “the credibility of the fi nancial architecture that

442 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
underpins the . . . euro.”18 Part of the problem is that states are still in con-
trol of revenue generation (taxes) and spending, and they may have very
different priorities and philosophies from each other and from the Central
European Bank. Currently, there are no set procedures for coordinating
these other aspects of economic policy with monetary policy. The strain
that this creates is most evident during economic crises. In the economic
downturn that was in place in Europe by 2008, states were constrained in
their response. Because they must follow the lead of the European Cen-
tral Bank, they cannot unilaterally stimulate their economies. And non-
euro countries have seen their currency values fall in relation to the euro,
thereby increasing their debt to European banks. By 2009, a rift between
older and newer EU members developed over stimulus packages and “bail-
outs” to the economies in the worse shape. According to the foreign editor
of a major German newspaper:
The European Union will now have to prove whether it is just
a fair-weather union or has a real joint political destiny. We
always said you can’t really have a currency union without a
political union, and we don’t have one. There is no joint fi scal
policy, no joint tax policy, no joint policy on which industries
to subsidize or not. And none of the leaders is strong enough to
pull the others out of the mud.”19
Beyond the euro, the two fundamental political goals established in the
Maastricht Treaty remain on the EU’s agenda. “The Maastricht Treaty . . .
created . . . a specifi c intergovernmental pillar for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). It created concepts of action joint and common
which member states would undertake. It provided for a CFSP budget. . . .
The CFSP was born in optimism.”20 This optimism was quickly shattered
in the early 1990s when the EU could not fi nd a common voice or strat-
egy in its approach to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars
in the Balkans. The division over intervention in Iraq in 2003 reinforced
skepticism over a unifi ed foreign policy. In foreign and security policy,
Europe still seemed to be in the shadow of the United States and NATO.
Indeed, the goal of creating a common foreign policy for the EU highlights
the organization’s relationship to NATO. If the EU is to have a common
foreign and security policy, it will need some authority over the deploy-
ment of its members’ military forces. One of the many complications fac-
ing the coordination of activities between NATO and the EU is that the
memberships do not overlap entirely. The United States is not in the EU,
of course, but neither are NATO members Canada, Iceland, Norway, and
Turkey. And with the recent enlargements of the EU, some of the newest
EU members—Austria, Cyprus, Finland, and Sweden—are not a part of
NATO.
Perhaps the most dramatic implication of the third pillar of
Maastricht—the common justice and internal policy—would involve
doing away entirely with border controls among the member states.

Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe 443
Already most of the members have introduced common border controls
and allow freedom of movement for all individuals who are nationals of
the other states. The Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent Amsterdam
Treaty (1997) also introduced the idea of “European citizenship,” whereby
Europeans could work, own property, vote, and even run for some offi ces
in any EU country in which they were residing. In many ways, these
notions challenge state sovereignty the most, and because of the back-
lash, with many states opting out of the most controversial provisions of
Maastricht, these questions of deeper integration have taken a backseat
to questions of broader integration.
On the immediate agenda of the EU is the question of implications
of enlargement. The largest enlargement took place in 2004, adding ten
new countries—Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria
joined in January 2007. Many other countries in Europe see the economic
and political benefi ts of EU membership and are knocking at the EU’s
doors to get in. Turkey, Croatia, and Macedonia are candidate countries,
in membership negotiations with the EU. In order to join the EU, states
need to fulfi ll certain economic and political conditions. They must “be
a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law, and the pro-
tection of minorities; have a functioning market economy; [and] adopt
The Maastricht Treaty was passed over strong objections by citizens in several
member states in the European Union, such as the French farmers pictured here.
Farmers worried that the Treaty’s further economic integration would jeopardize
agricultural subsidies they received from the French government.
(Jack Dabaghian/Corbis)

444 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU
law.”21 When the membership expanded in 2007 to twenty-seven coun-
tries, the EU became much larger in population size and geographical
scope and looked much different than it had previously. If all of the states
that want to join are admitted and if Norway and Switzerland change
their minds, the EU would grow to thirty-one states. The Policy Choices
box summarizes some of the debate over joining the EU.
There are economic as well as political challenges that accompany
expansion of the EU. As diverse as the previous fi fteen member states
were, they all had fairly prosperous economies compared to the states that
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Many in the EU worry that admission of
these new states will require costly investments in the infrastructures,
technology, and education systems of the poorer countries. Furthermore,
most of the recent members from east-central Europe have a substan-
tial agricultural sector. Agricultural subsidies, allocated through the EU’s
Common Agricultural Policy, were already a signifi cant part of the EU
budget and increased drastically with the addition of the new east-central
European countries. If subsidies to farmers are cut, then cheaper products
from eastern Europe will overwhelm the western European agricultural
sector, something that many politically powerful farmer interest groups
oppose.
Turkey’s potential membership in the EU is complicated by many
factors. The EU “. . . sees liabilities in Turkey’s size, its uneven econom-
ic development, its less advanced democratic development, its borders
with dangerous countries, and its Islamic proclivities. There is conse-
quently strong resistance to a political, economic, and cultural marriage
with Turkey.”22 Many in Turkey have lost confi dence that the EU is
negotiating membership in good faith and believe Europeans are highly
prejudiced against Muslims.23 Even if these problems can be overcome,
any enlargement of the EU will make it even more diffi cult to govern, not
to mention hammer out something like a common foreign policy for the
entire organization.
Indeed, there is concern that the entire organizational structure of
the EU would be overwhelmed with more ministers in the Council,
more commissioners in the Commission, and more representatives in
the Parliament, not to mention more languages for EU business. Most
important, more national interests that would have to be coordinat-
ed in the EU might mean that serious steps toward integration would
be diffi cult at best. For this reason, many are considering a two-tier
system in the EU, with one tier composed of a subset of states that
are economically capable and politically willing to commit to further
economic and political integration and another tier composed of states
with lower levels of integration among them. The EU recently launched
a major review of its structure and a “constitutional convention” to
consider ways to make the organization more accountable, democratic,
and streamlined.
Common Agricultural
Policy Designed to
provide food at affordable
prices, this policy gives
substantial subsidies to
European farmers

The discussion about the future of the community took the EU back
to the early years with federalism and functionalism as two proposed
pathways toward the future.
The most fundamental divide . . . is whether the union will
move toward a more federalist model. Among those pushing
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Joining the European Union
ISSUE: Although the economic benefi ts to regional integration in the European
Union are attractive, the decision to join and fully participate in deeper integra-
tion can be a controversial one for many states. Two governments, Norway and
Switzerland, have failed in national votes to get a majority of their citizens to ap-
prove membership. Other states that are members of the EU, such as Great Britain,
Sweden, and Denmark, have opted out of key agreements, refusing, at least at
fi rst, to join the common currency. While many other states in central, eastern, and
southern Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, recently joined the EU with great
enthusiasm, there was some political opposition to this within these countries.
Given the economic prospects, why would anyone object to joining the EU?
Option #1: States should wholeheartedly join the EU’s integrative efforts.
Arguments: (a) The EU will promote economic effi ciency for member states by
reducing tariffs and facilitating international trade. (b) The EU will promote politi-
cal stability and reduce the chances of war between states by more closely con-
necting states’ interests. (c) The EU will generate a greater ability to act together,
thus avoiding situations in which single states can become obstacles to collective
actions that can solve problems.
Counterarguments: (a) Economic benefi ts will not be evenly distributed to all
states. (b) Forcing unwilling actors to work together can often result in greater
friction and animosity rather than greater harmony. (c) As the EU grows in size,
decision making will become more and more diffi cult, resulting in collective inac-
tion as opposed to collective action.
Option #2: States should stay out of the European Union or opt out of key agree-
ments like the common currency.
Arguments: (a) Giving up sovereignty jeopardizes states’ ability to provide for their
own citizens and make decisions that will benefi t those who elected their leaders.
(b) Greater economic integration, such as with a common currency, means that
effi cient economies will be adversely affected by economic downturns in places
outside their control. (c) The EU will attempt to impose western European culture
and values on central, eastern, and southern European states should they decide
to join.
Counterarguments: (a) Citizens will retain the right to elect their own leaders and
determine important issues in their own communities. (b) A common currency will
reduce economic fl uctuations, thus minimizing the severity of all states’ economic
diffi culties. (c) The democratic nature of the EU will ensure that each state has a
voice in determining policies, thereby preventing “cultural imperialism.”

446 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
for that is Germany, which would probably increase its power
under a more democratic system. In the complex voting sys-
tem now in place, it is underrepresented, given the size of its
population. But former President Jacques Chirac of France and
former Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain argued vehemently
that the union must remain an organization of states united,
‘not a united states.’ Early drafts of the declaration calling for
the convention were rejected for sounding too much in favor of
a federalist system.24
By 2005, however, the leaders of the EU agreed on a Constitutional Treaty,
which reiterated many earlier agreements, increased further the power
of the European Parliament, proposed a new way to weight the votes of
member states, and attempted to strengthen EU external relations.25 The
Constitutional Treaty required unanimous approval to be ratifi ed. It was
defeated when a majority of voters in France and the Netherlands rejected
it in referenda, signaling deep opposition to further integration. “The con-
stitution’s rejection by founding members of the EU does not in itself
spell the end of the union, but it both refl ects and deepens a profound
crisis in the process of European unifi cation—one that has no obvious
solution.”26 Most analysts believe that the “no” votes were not rejec-
tions of the treaty’s specifi c provisions, but instead refl ected concerns
over economic problems, opposition to ruling parties, immigration fears,
and skepticism about recent and future enlargement.27 In the summer of
2007, the EU reached a new constitutional agreement, the Lisbon Treaty,
which attempts to streamline and democratize its institutions and to
enhance the power of the EU President and a foreign policy chief. All EU
members ratifi ed the Lisbon Treaty, except Ireland. In a referendum in
2008, Irish voters rejected the treaty, concerned that it would infringe on
Irish sovereignty in areas such as taxation, military neutrality, and abor-
tion. In 2009, the EU formally guaranteed Ireland that the treaty would
not affect these areas in an attempt to get Ireland to hold a second ref-
erendum.28 Although Ireland did support the Lisbon Treaty in a second
vote, there remain serious doubts about whether the EU can satisfy all
members in its attempts to reform itself and achieve any of the extremely
ambitious goals it has set for itself.29 But the organization does have a
rather impressive track record of disproving the predictions of skeptics
and pessimists.
Economic Integration among Developing States
The thrust toward international integration has a different emphasis among less developed countries (LDCs). In Western Europe, the pri-
mary motive, at least in the beginning, was probably the avoidance of
war. In the developing world, the primary motive for integration is quite
clearly economic. The hope is that by integrating the markets of several
Lisbon Treaty 2007
EU agreement that
streamlines decision
making and strengthens
the positions of the EU
president and foreign
policy chief

Economic Integration among Developing States 447
countries, their collective economic systems will benefi t from economies
of scale. In many cases, each developing country cannot by itself provide
a market big enough to justify setting up expensive factories that pro-
duce heavy machinery. But if the markets of several small countries are
combined, a fi rm with access to the enlarged market may be able to sur-
vive and help the members develop economically. Furthermore, political
leaders in LDCs also hope that economic integration will allow them to
deal better with what they see as unfair competition from industrialized
countries.
Many of the regional cooperation efforts in the developing world are
only functional in nature, in that they typically involve “collective state
action within defi ned confi nes controlled by participating governments.
Collective state action in this respect is not meant to usurp national
authority or to displace sovereignty. Functional cooperation by member
states entails minimal regional bureaucracy at best, and national govern-
ments are the gatekeepers between the national and regional levels, and,
thus, can slow down or completely halt the construction of a regional
political order.”30 Other efforts have varying degrees of regional integra-
tion, which involves “a process of creating a larger political entity, whose
institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national
ones. Regional integration can be intentional by governmental agents to
forge ‘the rules of the game,’ thus implying the eradication of, usually,
economic barriers.”31
Obstacles to Integration among LDCs
In theory, the argument for economic integration sounds convincing. In
practice, the results of integration efforts among LDCs have been mixed
at best, with no organization in the developing world even approaching
the level of institutional development of the EU. One reason may be that
neofunctionalism does not work as well in less industrialized countries.
The economies are less complex, making spillover from one technical
economic task to another less likely to occur. Even when spillover does
occur, the typical integrating organization in the developing world lacks
the necessary administrative and bureaucratic infrastructures to take
advantage of the situation. In contrast, bureaucrats have been in abun-
dant supply to take advantage of any opportunity to expand the role of
the EU.
These factors are important impediments to the integration of LDCs,
but there is little doubt that the most serious obstacle arises from the cre-
ation of problems inside the integrating organization similar to those in the
outside world that the LDCs in such organizations are trying to escape. One
important motive for integration in the developing world is the hope that
free trade areas or customs unions will give industries in these countries a
chance to survive in competition with corporations in developed countries.
But when developing countries get together in an integrating organization,

448 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
they create the same kind of market pressures and advantages for relatively
developed states inside these organizations that exist in the outside world.
For example, industries attracted by the commercial opportunities inside
a new customs union tend to gravitate toward the most economically
advanced state in the organization, because that state will probably have a
larger supply of workers used to the rigors of industrial labor. In addition,
the infrastructure (roads, ports, and so on) will be better equipped to handle
the demands of modern business, and the consumers in that country will
have more money to buy goods produced by the new fi rm. This does not
necessarily mean that inside a free trade area, where free trade and a free
market prevail, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. But it probably
does mean that the rich will experience a disproportionate share of some
benefi ts brought about by the integration process.32 In turn, even if every
state in the regional organization is better off than it was before integra-
tion, the gap between the richer and poorer states may grow. And the grow-
ing gap has produced tensions inside economic communities that threaten
almost constantly to tear them apart.
Moreover, regional economic cooperation in the developing world is
often affected by the North-South dependent relationship and individual
states’ efforts to address that relationship. In Africa, for example,
all African states are in one North-South dialogue or another
with the EU. . . . Whereas these North-South arrangements are
meant to provide concessions to and facilitate the development
of African countries, there is always the possibility that these
accords could be competing with Africa’s regional groupings
for loyalty. Indeed, there is evidence that North-South arrange-
ments . . . or extra-African aid linkages have hindered South-
South trade and cooperation and also undermined the goals and
cohesion of Africa’s regional groups.33
In addition, civil wars and regional military rivalries, much more com-
mon in the developing world than in contemporary Western Europe, hin-
der regional cooperation in these areas. In general, neofunctionalist theory
argues that integration is most likely to occur when the region’s members
have democratic institutions with strong societal interest groups, have
few class and ethnic confl icts, and are advanced capitalist economies.
“Such countries would have much to gain from an expansion of capital-
ism to the regional level.”34 These conditions are rarely met in regions of
the developing world.
There have been differences in the histories of the different orga-
nizations in the developed world, of course. But organizations such as
the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania); the Latin
American Free Trade Area (consisting of most South American states plus
Mexico, disbanded in 1980); the Andean Common Market (Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela); the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS); and the Association of Southeast Asian

Economic Integration among Developing States 449
Nations (ASEAN) have all experienced diffi culties and tensions created
by a perceived unequal distribution of the benefi ts of integration.35
Consider, for example, one of the most ambitious efforts at regional
integration in the developing world: the East African Community (EAC) of
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. “For a decade after the EAC’s inception in
1967, the three countries shared common currency and banking systems,
common postal services, shared railways and airline, and a common uni-
versity system.”36 In many ways, the EAC’s chances for integration were
strong: The member nations shared a common colonial (British) heritage
that left them with common, overlapping administrative structures and a
common language at the time of independence. Yet differences over eco-
nomic strategies (Kenya was more capitalist oriented and Tanzania more
socialist oriented), differences over political regimes (Tanzania was quite
critical of the dictatorship of Idi Amin in Uganda), and the strong growth
of the Kenyan economy relative to its neighbors led to the collapse of the
EAC after a decade.37 The EAC was revived in the 1990s, reestablished a
customs union in 2004, and expanded to include Burundi and Rwanda.
No other regional cooperative effort in Africa, or anywhere else in the
developing world, has come close to the earlier EAC, or to the EU, although
there are over 200 regional economic arrangements in Africa alone.38 The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has attempted
to learn from the lessons of past failed attempts at regional integration
(see Map 12.1). “To assure an equitable distribution of the benefi ts that
accrue from the undertaking, the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation,
and Development was set up.”39 The purpose
of this fund is to distribute money from the
wealthiest economies within the region (such
as Nigeria) to the poorest. This effort is simi-
lar to the EU’s Structural Funds and the Cohe-
sion Fund, by which the wealthier states such
as Germany helped develop poorer regions,
such as southern Italy and northern England
and the whole of Ireland. The difference, how-
ever, between this type of fund in the EU and in
ECOWAS is that the wealthiest state in a region
in the developing world is still relatively poor
and cannot, or will not, adequately subsidize
the development of other states. Yet, ECOWAS
“has proven its resiliency, despite coming close
to disintegration several times. Moreover, the
community recently called for the creation of a
single currency. Admittedly, the group may not
be close to adopting a single currency any time
soon, but the mere fact that its members agreed
to do so at this time, calculated posturing or
not, must not be easily dismissed.”40
East African
Community
Economic organization
that included Kenya,
Uganda, and Tanzania
and was highly integrated
during the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
Economic Community
of West African States
(ECOWAS) Regional
group founded in 1975
with the objective of
integrating economies
of several West African
countries.
CAPE
VERDE
NIGER
MALI
NIGERIA
TOGO
BENIN
GHANA
CÔTE
D’IVOIRE
LIBERIA
SIERRA LEONE
GUINEA
BURKINA
FASO
GAMBIA
SENEGAL
GUINEA-
BISSAU
Map 12.1 Members of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS)
(© Cengage Learning)

450 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
In terms of scale, perhaps the most ambitious effort at regional
cooperation in Africa is the pan-African Economic Community (AEC),
established in 1991. The AEC is realistic in the sense that it calls for
integration to occur over a forty-year process (similar to the EU). In other
ways too, the AEC is patterned after the EU. “The pan-African integra-
tion process was intended to be implemented in six phases, culminating
in the functioning of, among other entities, a pan-African economic and
monetary union, an African central bank, a single African currency, and
a pan-African parliament.”41 If ever achieved, the continent-wide com-
munity would be impressive, but efforts are likely to be complicated for
all the reasons discussed previously.
Economic integration is a hot topic in Central and South America as
well. There have been many regional agreements since 1990 to liberal-
ize trade within Latin America and the Caribbean. Six Central American
presidents signed an accord in 1993 aimed at creating a trade bloc
involving Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Panama. In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed the
Common Market of the South, known as Mercosur. From 1991 to 1994,
Mercosur’s members cut their tariffs sharply, to the point that most goods
traded among its members are now tariff free. The clearest single measure
of Mercosur’s progress is the growth in trade that it has prompted. From
$4 billion in 1990, trade among its four members tripled to $14.5 billion
by 1995.42 In 2006, Venezuela became the fi fth member of Mercosur (pend-
ing ratifi cation by the other members), expanding the regional agreement
to include 250 million people and over a trillion dollars of gross domes-
tic product.43 Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru are associ-
ate members. “The MERCOSUR aims at completing a customs union
. . . , and its ultimate goal is a common market.”44 Although Mercosur
has provisions for third-party binding arbitration of disputes between
its members, there is no enforcement, and confl icts have thus far been
settled through state-to-state negotiations.45 Mercosur, like the African
Economic Community, has expressed intentions to evolve into an EU.
Already with common external tariffs, it aims for a common market and
political institutions similar to the European Commission and the Euro-
pean Parliament. “Considering the insuffi ciency of conditions favorable
to political institutionalization (for example, economic interdependence,
dedicated regional leadership, and stable security arrangement), however,
it is unlikely that MERCOSUR will establish a workable supranational
governance system in the near future.”46
Other regional economic efforts in the developing world have been
less willing to discuss neofunctionalist structures, such as third-party
arbitration. For example, the ten-member ASEAN organization, which
was created in the 1960s to maintain regional order in Southeast Asia, has
been “extremely reluctant to create a supranational body with a binding
authority.”47 The importance of ASEAN, however, has grown with Chinese
economic growth and with China’s decision to help ASEAN states out
Mercosur A South
American free trade
zone created in 1991
by Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay,
joined by Venezuela in
2006.

Economic Integration across the North-South Divide 451
of their fi nancial crises in the 1990s. China also recently concluded a
free trade agreement with ASEAN which will be one of the largest free
trade zones in terms of its combined economic wealth and the number of
people within it.48
Economic integration as part of a development strategy is an idea that
clearly persists in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Yet as was the case
with integration in Western Europe in the 1970s, economic hard times
can put the brakes on integrative efforts. The economic crises in Asia and
Latin America and the global economic downturn have made many states
in these regions wary of the short-term costs of integration, even if they
recognize the potential for long-term gains.
Economic Integration across the North-South Divide
Recently, regional integration efforts have seen more diverse member-ships. “The early integration initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s were
either among the advanced countries (North-North integration) or among
the developing countries of the South (South-South integration). In the
mid-1980s, a new breed of integration emerged among countries with dif-
ferent levels of economic development (North-South integration).”49 Like
the economic cooperation attempts within the South, these efforts have
not achieved anything close to the levels of integration in the EU.
The 1994 launching of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States constituted an
especially interesting experiment from the point of view of international
integration theories, because the disparity in average income between
Mexico and the United States was greater than that between any other
pair of bordering states in the world. In 1991, the gross domestic product
per capita in Mexico was about $7,010, whereas in the United States,
it was about $24,680.50 According to both critics and supporters of free
trade and economic integration, this disparity should make the impact
of both free trade and economic integration particularly pronounced and
benefi cial (or disastrous) depending on one’s point of view.
The major point of NAFTA was to eliminate within ten years all
restrictions on trade in manufactured products and cross-national invest-
ment and to remove all tariffs and quotas on agricultural goods within
fi fteen years:
The NAFTA is a preferential trade arrangement, and thus its
scope of activity remains largely limited to trade and invest-
ment, although it has been used as a forum for discussing and
implementing standards for labor and the environment. NAFTA
has an institutional basis for dispute settlement . . . in which the
third party’s ruling is non-binding and without proper enforce-
ment authority. In addition, . . . [the agreement] establishes a
separate dispute settlement mechanism regarding anti-dumping
North American Free
Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) Free trade
zone created in 1994
by the United States,
Mexico, and Canada.

452 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
and countervailing duties. Panel decisions are binding and have
“direct effect” in domestic laws, creating a binding obligation
under national law.51
According to its supporters, the agreement would bring benefi ts to all
three economies involved. Consistent with economic liberalism, Mexico,
the United States, and Canada would allocate their productive energies
to those activities at which they are most effi cient. More would be pro-
duced, and better-paying jobs would ultimately be created in all three
countries. But according to its critics, especially in the United States,
hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs would be lost as industries relocated to
Mexico to take advantage of the low wages there. Mexican critics, on the
other hand, worried about having Americans dominate their economy.
Others worried that increased integration with Canada and the United
States would worsen economic inequalities in Mexico and that increased
economic clout in the hands of the Mexican rich would slow or eliminate
political reform in Mexico.52
On the very day that NAFTA offi cially went into effect (January 1,
1994), the Mexican government was faced with an armed rebellion in the
southern state of Chiapas. And the rebels in the Zapatista National Lib-
eration Army in Chiapas were motivated at least in part by opposition to
NAFTA. One of their leaders denounced NAFTA as a “death sentence” for
Mexico’s Indians.53 What was defended in some important U.S. circles as a
step crucial to the survival of a friendly government in Mexico had appar-
ently provoked a rebellion, creating serious doubts about its stability.
After more than fi fteen years of NAFTA, there is still no consensus
on its effects. Some point to the fact that, “on aggregate, the NAFTA has
been a tremendous boost to Mexican trade and investment. . . . In dollars,
Mexico’s exports to the United States have more than doubled since the
entry into force of the NAFTA, while exports to Canada have more than
tripled.”54 In 1999, Mexico replaced Japan as the United States’ second-
largest trading partner, after Canada. Canadian and U.S. foreign direct
investment in Mexico has also surged since NAFTA went into effect.55
Supporters of NAFTA point out that the Mexican economy seems to be
benefi ting. Since the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century, infl ation and
the value of the peso have been relatively stable. Overall, NAFTA sup-
porters argue that Mexico
successfully has decoupled its economy from the old boom-and-
bust, high-infl ation, debt-ridden model that characterized it and
much of Latin America until the 1980s. When Mexico’s old pro-
tectionist model crashed and burned in the debt crisis of 1982,
it took seven years to regain its international credit rating and
for U.S. exports to Mexico to regain their pre-crisis level. After
the peso crisis of 1994–95, it took Mexico only seven months to
regain its credit rating and 17 months for U.S. exports to Mexico
to recover.56

Economic Integration across the North-South Divide 453
Others argue that more Mexicans are now under-employed in low-paying
jobs and overall income inequality in Mexico has increased:
NAFTA has not delivered the promised benefi ts to workers in
Mexico, and few if any of the agreement’s stated goals has been
attained. . . . In many ways (such as the stagnation of the manu-
facturing share of employment), the entire process of develop-
ment has been halted, and in some cases it even may have been
reversed. . . . The question that remains is whether Mexico can,
under NAFTA, restart its stalled development and fi nd a way to
redistribute the benefi ts of the resulting growth.57
Mexico’s growth rates for the past several years have only been around
3 percent, not enough to provide a solid base of employment. There
is also a downside to the surge in exports from NAFTA. The Mexican
economy is now much more vulnerable to economic downturns in the
United States. As a result, the economy suffered in 2001 and 2008 when
U.S. demand declined.58 As for the effects on the United States, one report
concluded that NAFTA has had minimal effects, positive or negative, on
the U.S. economy.59
Just how infl uential NAFTA turns out to be in the Western Hemi-
sphere, and possibly the rest of the developing world, will depend largely
on how well the Mexican government deals with the impact of NAFTA
on Mexico’s economy. Despite some of the potential drawbacks, NAFTA
is quite attractive to other Latin American developing states. Chile has
already expressed its desire to join NAFTA, and Chile and the United
States signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 2003. There are also plans
for a larger, Western Hemisphere regional trade area. At the Summit of the
Americas, held in 1994, thirty-four states in North, Central, and South
America agreed to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
which would eliminate barriers to trade and investment.
When the United States proposed the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) in the 1990s, the idea was to integrate all
Western Hemisphere countries (save for Cuba) . . . into a single
institution that followed the practices set forth in what is now
the World Trade Organization. Most hemispheric countries were
initially in favor of the proposal—and many still are. Venezuela
was not among them, but this was expected. Brazil’s opposition
was more serious, in that the FTAA without Brazil’s participation
would exclude the dominant country in South America and,
with it, the other three countries of the Common Market of the
South (Mercosur)—Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The
US response was to conclude instead a number of free trade
agreements—with Chile and the fi ve countries of the Central
American common market, plus the Dominican Republic.
Free trade agreements were also negotiated with Panama and

454 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
Colombia, but the US Congress has yet to approve them. The
status quo, as a result, is neither a unifi ed trade grouping in the . . .
region (which the FTAA would have created) nor trade integration
between the separate clusters in South America. Instead the region
has separate political groupings . . . and economic arrangements
that partially overlap with the political divisions.”60
Negotiations were meant to complete the FTAA by 2005, but remain
stalled.
Another attempt at regional economic cooperation across the North-
South divide is the Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) agree-
ment. Established in 1989, it comprises twenty-one economies, from
Australia to Southeast Asia, China, Japan, and Russia, to across the Pacif-
ic from Canada, the United States, and Mexico (see Map 12.2). APEC,
however, is at a very low level of economic cooperation. Member states
have pledged to decrease trade barriers, but there is no formal institution
or enforcement mechanism.
Japan’s nationalistic disposition, along with the importance
attached to national sovereignty among the newly independent
East Asian countries, has proven to be a strong impediment to
institutional integration. The absence of working regional secu-
rity arrangements, hot wars waged in Korea and Vietnam . . . , the
fears of domination by Japan and China, and the existence of terri-
torial disputes must have aggravated the concerns about national
sovereignty and relative gains from cooperation.61
Regional Integration, Supranationalism, and
the International Political Economy
The debate between functionalism and neofunctionalism still under-girds many efforts at regional cooperation. As we have seen, there is
quite a difference in the institutionalization of these areas of economic
cooperation among the major regions despite the fact that there is a fairly
high level of intraregional trade and one or two leading economic pow-
ers within each region. Table 12.2 compares these institutions, as well as
some of the other regional areas. As Choi and Caporaso note with respect
to the EU, NAFTA, and APEC, “Working with just these three cases, it is
diffi cult to evaluate testable hypotheses. Perhaps the variable institution-
al patterns have to do with the taming of sovereignty in Western Europe,
as well as the waning of nationalism.”62 In particular, Germany, after
World War II, decided that it would embrace multilateralism and Europe-
anism over German nationalism. The United States and Japan, for their
part, have resisted supranational notions in NAFTA and APEC. Moreover,
many of the smaller states in Western Europe concluded that institution-
alization was the way to prevent a resurgence of German nationalism,
Asian Pacifi c
Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Regional
economic agreement
among twenty-one
economies including
Australia, China, Japan,
Russia, and the United
States.

R
eg
io
n
al In
teg
ratio
n
, Sup
ran
atio
n
alism
, an
d
th
e In
tern
atio
n
al Po
litical Eco
n
o
m
y
455
P A C I F I C O C E A N
I N D I A N
O C E A N
PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
CHINESE TAIPEI
SOUTH
KOREA
Hong Kong (CHINA)
PHILIPPINES
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
AUSTRALIA
NEW ZEALAND
THAILAND
SINGAPORE
MALAYSIA
I N D O N E S I A
VIETNAM
JAPAN
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
C A N A D A
U N I T E D
S TAT E S
Alaska (U.S.)
MEXICO
PERU
CHILE
Map 12.2 Members of the Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC) Agreement
(© Cengage Learning)

456 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
while smaller states in North America and Asia still worry that regional
institutions will be dominated by the United States or Japan.
It is important to note that despite the lack of institutionalization,
signifi cant regional cooperation has been achieved, as is evident in
Table 12.2. Intraregional trade among countries in the Free Trade Area of
the Americas was already at 60 percent of all exports of the countries in
the regions in 2001, despite lacking even a free trade agreement.63 Indeed
many, including functionalists, would argue that informal institutions
and practices can be just as effective at facilitating cooperation as formal
institutions. Some East Asian states, particularly Japan, seem to prefer
informal business networks that “can reduce the demand for formal/legal
protection by internalizing” economic cooperation.64 Yet,
the rejection of formal, supranational institutions or the utility
of informal institutions . . . is not likely to persist. . . . The ben-
efi ts of formal institutions are likely to increase with growing
economic interdependence or integration. . . . In fact, East Asian
countries have become more receptive to legalist resolution of
trade disputes under the WTO dispute settlement procedures,
and ASEAN has developed a more sophisticated institutional
structure in recent years.65
TABLE 12.2
Comparing the Institutionalization of Some Regional Economic Agreements
Region Institution
Level of
Regional
Trade*
Scope of
Activity
Level of Institutional
Authority in Dispute
Settlement†
Europe European Union
(economic union)
55.2% Comprehensive High
Americas NAFTA (free trade area) 51.7% Trade and
investment
Medium
Mercosur (projected
customs union)
25.1% Trade and
investment
Medium
Asia and the
Pacifi c
AFTA (free trade area) 20.4% Trade and
investment
Low
APEC (projected free
trade area)
69.7% Consultation on
numerous issues
None
* Intraregional exports as a percentage of all exports, 1998.
† High = third-party review, binding ruling, direct effect in domestic law. Medium = third-party review, binding
in some areas, direct effect in domestic law in some areas. Low = third-party review, nonbinding.
Source: From Handbook of International Relations ed. By Walter Carlsnaes, pp. 480, 481, 483, 484, 485, 493, 494.
Reproduced by permission of SAGE Publications, London, Los Angeles, New Delhi and Singapore.

Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Institutions 457
What will be the effect of regional integration on the world economy?
From the point of view of the developing world, efforts to link their econ-
omies to the richer economies in the North and break down the structur-
al barriers that they see inhibiting growth are one hoped-for effect. From
an economic liberal point of view, regional integration is good, because
it enhances free trade among the participating economies; but it can be
bad, because it tends to erect protectionist obstacles between the regional
group and the rest of the world. According to one economic analyst,
the spectre of global fragmentation is haunting the global trad-
ing system and with it international fi nancial markets. The
fear is that progress toward global integration over the past
four decades will be reversed as the world economy splits up
into three regional trading blocs, each centered on a major cur-
rency, each closed to outsiders. . . . But . . . the major regional
initiatives currently under way are more likely to represent the
building blocks of an integrated world economy than stumbling
blocks which prevent its emergence. . . . The forces initiating
these developments are the very opposite of protectionism. They
represent positive, integrative responses to the pressures exerted
by globalization. If accompanied by parallel progress at the
GATT, regionalization could be a potent mechanism for freeing
world trade and investment and harmonizing national institu-
tional practices.66
In this way, the globalization of the economy (discussed in more detail
in Chapter 14), which is represented by the WTO, and the regionalization
of the economy, which is represented by the EU and NAFTA, may work
in tandem.
Both of these processes also call into question the functioning of the
state. Whether it is state-directed cooperation, the transfer of some politi-
cal authority to a larger political entity with some supranational powers,
or somewhere in between, states involved in these economic cooperative
efforts are potentially ceding some sovereignty, as they will have less con-
trol over their national economies.67 If economic decisions in the future
rest more and more in the hands of regional organizations, global organiza-
tions, or multinational corporations that can travel freely across political
boundaries, states will lose a signifi cant degree of their sovereignty. The
forces at work against the state and the ability of states to cope with global
challenges and globalization are the subjects of the next part of this book.
Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Institutions
While federalism and functionalism help describe how states go about regional cooperation, other theoretical perspectives (intro-
duced in Chapter 1) offer insights on why states build regional institu-
tions, how these institutions are designed, and what effects they have

458 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
on their members.68 Realism, for example, assumes that institutions
come from powerful states that use them to further state interests, and
they do not to see international organizations as autonomous means of
resolving confl icts. “In a world where confl ict is the norm, institutions
are neither necessary nor suffi cient for cooperation.”69 Institutions
are simply forums for powerful states to exercise their infl uence and
disproportionately reap any benefi ts. Institutions have no autonomy
and independence from their member states; because participation
in international institutions is voluntary, states are free to abandon
their membership when the particular institution no longer serves
their interests. Indeed, regional institutions refl ect power and power
relations in the broader international environment.70 Hegemons, for
example, may use regional arrangements to dominate states within the
region and to balance against another great power outside the region.
Smaller states may “bandwagon” (see Chapter 8) with a stronger state
to share in the benefi ts of the arrangement or they may join together in
a regional institution to balance against an outside threat. Along these
lines, realists would stress the importance of the Soviet threat to the
creation of the European Community and the role of regional instabil-
ity in the creation of ASEAN.
Liberalism, as a broad theoretical perspective stressing the importance
of interdependence, sees a greater role for regional institutions.71 States
create these institutions in order to facilitate and manage interdependent
relations and to provide collective goods, such as free trade (see Chapter 10).
Liberalism argues that institutions decrease uncertainty about coopera-
tion and lower the costs of transactions in an anarchical system, making
relations more effi cient. While important, however, regional organi-
zations are simply arenas for cooperation and states remain important
actors, although institutional arrangements can change state preferences
over time. Analyses of regional organizations, such as NAFTA, that focus
on the economic benefi ts of economic cooperation and the way these
organizations are benefi cial to the interests of all states is consistent with
the liberal perspective.
Regional institutions also make sense from a constructivist per-
spective.72 For constructivism, institutions and their design refl ect
converging norms of international behavior and identities, including
regionally-based identities (such as what is “European” and what is
not). Institutions act to socialize their members to common ideas and
can change states’ interests, by transforming their beliefs and identities.
More experience with shared rules facilitates further institutionaliza-
tion. Contrary to both realism and liberalism, constructivism expects
institutions to act more autonomously from their member states, as
they adopt their own culture and identity. Constructivists would point
to the importance of an “Asian” identity to regional organizations like
ASEAN and to the autonomy and separate culture that has developed in
the bureaucracy of the EU.

Summary 459
Finally, domestic political explanations (see Chapter 5) also have
something to say about regional institutions.73 “[D]omestic-politics argu-
ments focus on how domestic constituencies advance their interests by
creating institutions” and how, in turn, regional institutions affect the
distribution of power and interests within a country.74 From a domes-
tic political perspective, for example, we would expect internationally-
oriented domestic actors, such as business groups, to advocate for higher
levels of institutionalization and legalization to ensure compliance of
benefi cial arrangements among states. The creation of APEC, for exam-
ple, has been traced to the interests of domestic political groups who
benefi t from globalization converging across borders.75 Other domestic
actors, however, such as the military, would resist institutionalization
on the grounds that it would diminish sovereign control. The particular
nature of the domestic political system would affect how these compet-
ing domestic interests are able to infl uence the design and working of the
regional institution.
SUMMARY
● The most successful attempt at economic regional integration is the
European Union, which has made signifi cant strides toward the cre-
ation of a more unifi ed, federal type of political entity since its found-
ing in 1957. The drive behind a more united Europe after World War II
had both political and economic motivations.
● The path of integration that west European states have followed is
primarily neofunctional, involving the creation of some institutions
to guide integration while avoiding an all-at-once federal unifi cation.
These institutions include the European Commission, the Council of
the European Union, and the directly elected European Parliament.
● Some of the most signifi cant steps toward deeper political and eco-
nomic integration have occurred fairly recently: The Single European
Act went into effect in 1987, and the Maastricht Treaty was imple-
mented in 1993. The Single European Act offi cially removed many of
the remaining economic barriers to integration, and the Maastricht
Treaty called for all members of the EU to use a common currency
and to move toward coordination of defense and foreign policies, as
well as legal processes within their countries. The common curren-
cy, the euro, was established among twelve countries and circulated
among their citizens beginning in 2002. Sixteen countries now use
the euro.
● Movement toward a common defense and foreign policy has been slow,
complicated partly by the desire to add new members from central and
eastern Europe. Many are concerned that the expansion of the EU will
overburden the EU’s institutions, making effective choices and policy

460 Chapter 12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
more diffi cult. Recently, the Lisbon Treaty was negotiated in an at-
tempt to streamline and democratize EU institutions.
● Economic integration efforts involving developing countries have
persisted since the 1960s. Those efforts have fl oundered repeatedly,
partly because the poorer nations involved in those organizations
perceive that they receive a smaller share of the benefi ts of integra-
tion than the richer states. Despite the obstacles, there have been a
number of new regional economic integration efforts in the develop-
ing world.
● NAFTA is an example of regional economic integration that aims to in-
tegrate relatively wealthy nations (the United States and Canada) with
a developing state (Mexico). Trade among NAFTA’s members has in-
creased, but the indicators of the effects on the Mexican economy have
been mixed.
● Regional integration efforts such as NAFTA and APEC vary greatly
in the level of institutionalization and scope of economic coopera-
tion. Even without institutionalization, however, functional eco-
nomic cooperation in the form of high levels of intraregional trade
can challenge the autonomy of sovereign states and can contribute to
economic globalization.
● Theoretical perspectives offer alternative explanations for why re-
gional institutions are created, how they are designed, and what ef-
fects they have on member states. Realism focuses on the impor-
tance of power relations, both inside and outside the region, and
expects institutions to have no independence or real effect. Liberal-
ism stresses the greater effi ciency that institutions provide by co-
ordinating the similar interests of various states. Constructivism
points out how institutions refl ect shared identities and develop
their own autonomous identities. Finally, domestic political expla-
nations trace the origin and operation of regional institutions to do-
mestic actors’ interests.

Key Terms 461
KEY TERMS economic integration 432
federalism 433
functionalism 434
supranational 434
neofunctionalism 435
spillover effects 435
European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) 435
Treaty of Rome 435
European Court of Justice 436
European Commission 436
Council of the European
Union 436
European Parliament 436
free trade area 438
customs union 438
common market 438
economic union 438
Single European Act 440
Maastricht Treaty 440
euro 440
Common Agricultural
Policy 444
Lisbon Treaty 446
East African Community 449
Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) 449
Mercosur 450
North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) 451
Asian Pacifi c Economic
Cooperation (APEC) 454

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463
Global Challenges
P A R T V

464
C H A P T E R 13
The Global Environment
and Its Inhabitants
Environmental Challenges
• Atmospheric Conditions and Climate Change
• Shrinking Natural Resources
• Overpopulation
Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists
• Food Supplies
• Population Growth
• Reserves of Natural Resources
• Pollution and Climate Change
• Complex Relationships Connecting Environmental Challenges
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation
• The Environment as Collective Goods and Common Pools
• Political Obstacles to Environmental Cooperation
Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation
Summary
Key Terms

Environmental Challenges 465
It is possible to analyze global politics from a viewpoint that emphasizes the extent to which a global community, as opposed to a set of inter-
dependent but still separate states, exists. Such a viewpoint has become
increasingly relevant, partly because a set of interrelated problems high-
lights the extent to which people everywhere are connected by the global
environmental system. Food and natural resource shortages, high levels
of population growth, deterioration of the ozone layer, and signifi cant cli-
mate change all seem to be problems that cannot be solved by individual
states. They all make the common fate of people in the global commu-
nity dramatically visible.
This chapter focuses on these global environmental challenges. It
describes some of the most important problems facing the world commu-
nity and analyzes the debates over how serious the problems will become
in the next few decades. The debates often pit optimists against pessi-
mists over the severity of the problems and involve further disagreements
over workable solutions. Even when most agree on the challenge and it
seems in the interest of all to cooperate to address the problem, political
and economic interests complicate global efforts. This chapter discusses
these interests as obstacles to cooperation on collective goods, such as
clean air and biodiversity, as well as how different theoretical perspec-
tives view global environmental politics.
Environmental Challenges
The international environment has always been an interdependent sys-tem. The rain that falls in one part of the globe, for example, evaporat-
ed from lakes in another part of the globe. But it was not until the 1960s
that the connections among states through the international environment
were seriously recognized. “While individual environmental treaties date
back more than a century, the environment is a relatively new fi eld of
international law,”1 and a fairly new issue in international politics.
Atmospheric Conditions and Climate Change
Air pollution was one of the fi rst environmental challenges to reach the
international agenda. “As countries industrialized in the fi rst half of the
century, environmental pollution issues became more prevalent. . . . Per-
haps the most famous international environmental dispute . . . began in
the 1930s when the United States complained that sulfur dioxide emis-
sions from a smelter located across the border in Canada damaged U.S.
crops.”2 As the effects of industrialization accumulated in the second
half of the twentieth century, concern for pollution within countries
prompted a number of the industrialized states to pass national environ-
mental protection laws. These countries soon realized, however, that the
air around them could not be protected through national efforts alone.

466 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
“Particularly in Europe where many environmental issues such as air and
water pollution inherently present transboundary issues, the emerging
environmentalism moved to the international level.”3
In 1968, Sweden, facing transboundary pollution problems in the form
of acid rain, organized an international conference on the global environ-
ment.4 Sweden also hosted the fi rst UN conference on the environment,
known as the Stockholm Conference, in 1972. This conference,
. . . marked the culmination of efforts to place the protection
of the biosphere on the offi cial agenda of internal policy and
law. Specifi c aspects of the environment had been the objects of
international negotiations and arrangements, but the concept
of the collective responsibility of nations for the quality and
protection of the earth as a whole did not gain political recog-
nition until the years immediately preceding the Stockholm
Conference.5
Today, air pollution remains an important part of the international
environmental challenge. Perhaps the most notorious pollution results
from the world’s reliance on fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) to gen-
erate most of its industrial energy. Carbon dioxide is released into the
atmosphere when these fuels are burned. In 2007, 8.2 billion tons of car-
bon were added to the atmosphere through fossil fuel combustion, up
2.8 percent from 2006 and 22 percent from 2000.6 Annual emissions of
carbon dioxide have increased more than 80 percent since 1970.7 These
emissions have a rather dramatic effect on the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere.
Part of the rise in concentration of carbon dioxide is due to deforesta-
tion in the world. When trees die, carbon dioxide is added to the atmo-
sphere in two ways. As the dead trees rot, they release carbon dioxide
into the air. Also, trees consume carbon dioxide in the process of photo-
synthesis. When they die, less photosynthesis occurs; thus, less carbon
dioxide is absorbed. “Already, more than half of the forested belt around
the tropics—once about 5.5 million square miles—has been lost. Pristine
tropical forests in West Africa, Madagascar, the Philippines, and Brazil
have been reduced to less than 10 percent of their natural areas. India
has virtually no original forests remaining. Moreover, scientists estimate
that at least 34 million acres of tropical forests are still being cleared
yearly due to the insatiable global demand for land, timber, crops and
such valuable commodities as gold and oil; millions more acres are par-
tially logged.”8 According to satellite data, deforestation in Brazil was
so extreme by 1987 that the Amazon rain forest was reduced in size by
8 million hectares, an area about the size of Austria;9 by 1989 the defor-
ested area was larger than the size of Japan,10 and the pace of deforestation
in the Amazon increased by 34 percent in the early 1990s.11 In addition
Stockholm
Conference First
UN Conference on the
environment, in 1972.

Environmental Challenges 467
to the link to rising levels of carbon dioxide in the air, deforestation also
creates problems with fl ooding, food supplies, and biodiversity (discussed
later in the chapter).
Constant emissions of large amounts of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere through fossil fuel combustion and deforestation combine
with the pollution of the atmosphere by volatile chemicals known as
chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs) to produce the greenhouse effect and a global
warming trend. CFCs prevent infrared radiation from escaping the earth’s
atmosphere, thus making their own contribution to the global warming
effect. In addition to their possible role in the process leading to global
warming, CFCs may have helped to destroy the ozone layer in the upper
atmosphere over the polar regions and, recently, over the entire world.
The ozone layer screens out a portion of the ultraviolet radiation from the
sun. Because that layer decreased by about 2 percent worldwide between
1969 and 1986, allowing 4 percent more radiation to reach the earth, an
increase in skin cancer is expected.12
The rise in carbon emissions, CFCs, and the concentration of car-
bon dioxide in the atmosphere is worrisome because it could dramati-
cally change climate throughout the world. “Unprecedented increases
in global temperatures have occurred in tandem with record levels of
greenhouse gas concentrations and emissions. . . .”13 Global warming
in recent times, over the fi fty-year period from 1956 to 2005, was twice
the rate of warming in the 100-year period from 1906 to 2005 and eleven
of the last twelve years have had the warmest global surface tempera-
tures on record (since 1850, when recordkeeping began). The hottest
year in recorded history was 2005. (see Figure 13.1).14 Global average
Figure 13.1 Global
Average Land-
Ocean Temperature
at Earth’s Surface,
1880–2007
Source: Worldwatch Institute,
Vital Signs 2009: The Trends
that Are Shaping Our Future,
p. 56. © 2009 Worldwatch
Institute. www.worldwatch
.org.
14.8
14.4
14.0
13.6
13.2
1880 1906 1932
Year
D
eg
re
es
C
el
si
us
1958 1984 2010

www.worldwatch.org

www.worldwatch.org

468 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
temperature is due to increase signifi cantly by 2100. “More important
than the average warming is the effect it may have on climates. Things
will not just get warmer, climatologists predict, some places will, but
others will get cooler, wetter, drier, or cloudier. The average warming is
merely the engine that will drive the changes. The term ‘global warm-
ing’ is mischievous in suggesting that hot summers are what it is all
about.”15
If current trends continue, global warming could have catastrophic
effects all over the world, mostly because of rising global sea levels due
to melting polar ice caps, as well as permanently lower levels of rainfall
in once-fertile croplands.16 Around the world, many coastal cities could
be completely lost to a rising global sea level. In Bangladesh, a rising sea
level might put 18 percent of the country’s habitable land under water,
making 17 million people environmental refugees.17 Climate models
also suggest that global warming may permanently reduce rainfall in the
U.S. Midwest, reducing crop yields in an area that produces 50 percent of
the world’s corn and 60 percent of its soybeans.18 Chronic water short-
ages already plague many countries and over 40 percent of the world’s
population.19
Other effects on public health are created as well:
Warm weather speeds up insect metabolism: in warm years,
insects often grow quicker, breed more frequently, and migrate
sooner. . . . Many of the world’s most dangerous insects for agri-
culture, forestry, and public health are tropical or subtropical in
origin; almost by defi nition they are poised to follow the retreat
of temperature barriers.20
There is still some debate about this trend (discussed in more detail
following), but there does seem to be a growing consensus in the world’s
scientifi c community that a warming trend is in place on a global scale
and that human activities are in part responsible. In a recent report, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change concluded “Some planned
adaptation (of human activities) is occurring now; more extensive adapta-
tion is required to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Unmitigated
climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity
of natural, managed and human systems to adapt.”21
Shrinking Natural Resources
In the 1970s, the view that the world would soon run out of several
important natural resources gained widespread acceptance.22 The energy
crises of that decade were the major force making that idea so popular. By
the middle of the 1980s, the world had recovered from the shock of the
global warming Long-
term rise in world’s
surface temperatures
and lower atmospheric
temperatures caused by
certain “greenhouse”
gases such as carbon
dioxide.

Environmental Challenges 469
second major increase in the price of oil in 1979, and the glut of oil on
the world market had driven prices down and threatened the unity of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Thus, the notion
that supplies of natural resources were running dangerously low for the
entire world fell from favor.
Nevertheless, many analysts feel that the oil glut brought about a
false sense of security. Indications are that the demand for energy will
increase dramatically in the coming decades, spurred in part by eco-
nomic growth in China and India. World consumption of traditional
fuel supplies and electricity consumption per capita climbed between
1980 and 1998 (see Figure 13.2 on world oil consumption), and fossil
fuel consumption is projected to increase by 57 percent between 1997
and 2020.23 “Energy is the master resource’ [because] the extraction
of all other resources depends on availability and prices of energy.”24
In other words, if increasing demand does deplete supplies of energy
resources, all the other natural resources will become more diffi cult
to obtain.
As previously mentioned, deforestation is another issue on the inter-
national environmental agenda. Not only do fewer trees relate to climate
change, but deforestation also means fewer energy supplies and food sup-
plies for many people living around forest areas. The shrinking of the
rain forests also represents a threat to the earth’s biodiversity. “Since
rainforests are thought to harbor about half the world’s species of plants
and animals, researchers worry that destruction of the globe’s genetic
library will hamstring efforts to create new medicines and more produc-
tive crops.”25
In addition, fresh water is a scarce commodity in many parts of the
world. “More precious than oil, yet routinely wasted, water is arguably
the world’s most pressing resource issue. . . . Global water consumption
Figure 13.2 World
Oil Consumption,
1965–2007
Source: Worldwatch Institute,
Vital Signs 2009: The Trends
that Are Shaping Our Future,
p. 29. © 2009 Worldwatch
Institute. www.worldwatch.org.
1965
0
20
40
60
80
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
M
ill
io
ns
B
ar
re
ls
P
er
D
ay
Year

www.worldwatch.org

470 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
rose sixfold between 1900 and 1995—more than double the rate of popu-
lation growth—and continues to grow rapidly as agricultural, industrial,
and domestic demand increases.”26 Much of the world’s population expe-
riences frequent water shortages and more than one billion people do not
have access to safe drinking water.27 According to an environmental vice
president of the World Bank, “The wars of the [twenty-fi rst century] will
be over water instead of oil or politics.”28 Ocean water is at risk as well,
harming another source of food supply.
Chemicals, solids, and nutrients from agricultural runoff, oil
and gas development, logging, dredging, fi lling, and mining are
routinely dumped directly into the ocean or otherwise end up
in rivers and streams and make their way to the world’s oceans.
Some of the effects of ocean pollution include destruction of the
world’s fi sheries, climate and sea level change brought on by
changes in ocean temperature, and the destruction of salt marsh-
es, mangrove swamps, coral reefs, and beaches which means the
loss of habitat and biological diversity.29
This comes at the same time that land resources, or the availability
of cropland, are diminishing as well.30
Threats to the environmental well-being of the world’s waters and
cropland have serious implications for human health. Certainly one of
the most dismal facts about the world today is that so many people are
starving. One recent estimate suggests that more than 1 billion people in
the world are chronically malnourished and that the number of hungry
people in the world has been rising over the past few years.31 Children
bear the brunt of this problem. Children are seriously affected by mal-
nourishment as it affects them daily and can impair their development.
“About one quarter of all children in developing countries are considered
to be underweight and are at risk of having a future blighted by the long-
term effects of undernourishment.”32
The United Nations estimates that if current trends continue, it
would take more than 130 years to eradicate world hunger.33 Equally dis-
tressing are some signs that the problem is likely to get worse. From 1950
to 1975, world food production outpaced world population growth. But
growth in food production slowed in the decades after 1975 as demand
increased with a growing world population, raising doubts about how long
adequate food supplies can be maintained.34 In addition to contributing to
world hunger, the shrinking of natural resources relative to demand has
the potential to contribute to international confl ict. Confl ict over fi shing
rights and water is common in many parts of the globe:
The risk of violence over the allocation of shared water sup-
plies is especially acute where fresh water is scarce, particularly
where major river systems constitute the main source of water

Environmental Challenges 471
for two or more countries. The Nile, for example, is the main
source of water for Egypt and Sudan, and a signifi cant source
for several other states; the Jordan River is vital to Israel and
Jordan, while the Tigris-Euphrates system is a major source for
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Because these states have failed to agree
on the manner in which the fl ow of these rivers is to be divided
among them, discord can arise whenever one country in a
system appropriates more water than what others consider its
fair share. That these countries often disagree on other matters
only adds to the danger that disputes over water supplies will
lead to confl ict.35
In general, the developing world is already witnessing violent con-
fl icts related to environmental scarcities.36 Oil is particularly associated
with confl ict. “Among developing countries, an oil-producing country is
twice as likely to suffer internal rebellion as a non-oil-producing one.
The confl icts range in magnitude from low-level secessionist struggles,
such as those occurring in the Niger Delta and southern Thailand, to
full-blown civil wars, such as in Algeria, Colombia, Sudan, and, of course,
Iraq.”37 Confl ict over scarce resources led one analyst to a very dire pre-
diction: “Within the lifetimes of our children and grandchildren, these
environmental scarcities may cause widespread social disorder and vio-
lence, including war, revolution, ethnic violence, riots and coups that
topple established governments.”38
Overpopulation
The potential for food shortages and starvation (as well as many other
global problems) stems in important part from the rapid growth of the
earth’s population (see Figure 13.3). It took from the beginning of the
human species until 1804 for the world’s population to reach 1 billion.
The second billion was added in a little over 120 years (in 1927), and the
third billion took only a little over thirty years (1960). By 1974, the world’s
population reached 4 billion, the fi fth billion was added in only thirteen
more years (by 1987), and the sixth billion was added in just thirteen more
(by 2000). The annual growth rate of the globe’s total population was an
average of 1.6 percent from 1975 to 1999. This declined to an average of
1.18 percent annual growth today and is expected to decline to 0.34 per
cent by 2050. Even with a decline in growth, the United Nations current-
ly projects world population to reach 9.1 billion by 2050.39 It is diffi cult
to reverse population growth trends easily due to population momentum.
Many years of high growth mean that more people will be entering their
reproductive years in the future, giving more potential for growth.
What makes the situation particularly problematic is that popula-
tion grows fastest in areas of the world where poverty is stark. The six
population
momentum Tendency
for population to
continue to grow
due to high numbers
of individuals at
childbearing age.

472 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
countries that accounted for half of the population growth in 2000 were
India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Between now
and 2050, population growth will be highest in many poor countries,
including Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the United
Republic of Tanzania.40 Population increased by 69 percent in low-income
countries between 1975 and 1999, compared to a 17 percent increase in
high-income countries in the same period. Population experts agree that
the population explosion has been brought about by two major factors,
both related to economic development. One is the success of medical sci-
ence. Population growth is a function of fewer people dying, rather than
more people being born.41 In 1650, the average life expectancy was only
about thirty years. In 1968, it was about fi fty-three years, and by 1999, it
had increased to seventy.42
Nevertheless, great numbers of children still die at an early age, and
this too adds pressure to the upward trend in population. Large families
serve as a form of social security in many developing countries. Par-
ents want to have several children to support them in their old age. And
because the infant mortality rate is so high in many developing coun-
tries, they are likely to want to play it safe, adding more children to the
family in anticipation of the early loss of several of them. Also, in some
rural settings especially, children can be economic assets as agricultural
laborers even before the parents reach old age, providing an added incen-
tive for large families.43 Thus, the fertility rate (the average number of
children born to women) differs across levels of economic development.
In developing countries, the fertility rate is 2.46, while in high-income
fertility rate Average
number of children born
to women.
Figure 13.3 World
Population, 1750–2200
Source: From The Skeptical
Environmentalist: Measuring the
Real State of the World, p. 46 by
Bjorn Lomborg, © 2001. Reprinted
with the permission of Cambridge
University Press.

Environmental Challenges 473
countries, the fertility rate is 1.64.44 Note that the fertility rate in the
wealthier countries is lower than the replacement level (two children to
replace their father and mother after they die). Below-replacement-level
fertility rates mean that population levels will decline (some are already
declining) in the high-income countries.
The demographic transition theory describes the relationship
between economic development and population growth. In very poor,
underdeveloped countries, death rates are high for lack of medical treat-
ment, and birthrates are high because of high infant mortality and the
need for many children to help provide for the family welfare. High
death rates and birthrates make for little or no population growth. This
is the situation the whole world was in before medical advances in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When states develop enough so
that medicine that prolongs life expectancy is widely affordable, death
rates fall, but birthrates remain high and population grows rapidly. This
is the part of the transition that most of the developing countries are
currently in. Once countries become more economically advanced,
medicine that increases life expectancy and decreases infant mortal-
ity is available, and children are seen as economic drains rather than
assets. Because modern welfare states provide old age insurance, people
do not need to have many children to take care of them as they age.
In this fi nal part of the demographic transition, which is where most
developed countries are now, death rates and birthrates are low, making
population growth minimal or even negative. Figure 13.4 graphically
shows the demographic transition for Sweden and Sri Lanka, showing
how, in both countries, death rates declined before birthrates, leading to
population growth. Once birthrates decline, population growth slows,
and even becomes negative when the death rate rises as the population
ages. According to one economist, this transition is “one of the most
fundamental of all social changes during the era of modern economic
growth.”45
The demographic transition theory does not completely capture pop-
ulation dynamics. Many countries have experienced a decline in birth-
rates prior to high economic development, and others continue to have
steady birthrates despite economic development. The theory leaves out
many factors beyond economics that play a role in fertility decisions,
such as culture, access to and attitudes toward birth control, and govern-
ment population policies.46 What seems particularly critical to lowering
birthrates is the status of women. “Education, particularly of girls, has
been shown to be the factor most closely related to fertility decline, by
delaying marriage and fi rst births. Increasing equality between the sexes
in legal, economic, and social affairs raises the cost of children by making
roles other than childbearing more feasible and attractive to women.”47
Recognizing the importance of women’s status, the World Population
Conference held in Cairo in 1994 emphasized raising women’s status as
the key to reducing birthrates.
replacement
level Fertility rate at
which the number of
children replace their
mother and father.
demographic
transition
theory Proposition
that population
growth is signifi cantly
infl uenced by economic
development effects
on death rates and
birthrates.

474 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
Controlling population has become a critical issue for high-growth
states. Large populations place more pressure on environmental systems
and make economic development more diffi cult. Population growth also
contributes to social and political confl ict within and between states.
The population density of Bangladesh, for example, is more than 1,000
people per square kilometer. The state of Assam in India, just across the
border, has approximately 340 people per square kilometer, resulting in
a massive migration of Bengalis to Assam. Recurring attacks in India
against Bengalis are in part related to this demographic pressure.48
Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists
Part of the debate on how to respond to environmental challenges such as population growth and shrinking natural resources has revolved
around questions about the severity of the problems. The disparity of
opinions in the various analyses of the future of the globe is disconcert-
ing. The opinions exist on a full range of pessimism to optimism. “It
appears,” one informed analyst of such work concludes, “that highly
intelligent individuals, who presumably read each other’s work and who
appear to respond to one another, are not convincing one another, and per-
haps are not even communicating.”49 Predicting the future of the world
over the next twenty, fi fty, or one hundred years is obviously tricky. But
the debate between pessimists and optimists for the world’s future is not
for lack of studies on the problems. With that in mind, let us turn to an
evaluation of the arguments made by the optimists and the pessimists.
Figure 13.4
Demographic Transition:
Birth and Death Rates in
Sweden (1750–2050) and
Sri Lanka (1910–2050)
Source: From The Skeptical
Environmentalist: Measuring the
Real State of the World, p. 124 by
Bjorn Lomborg, © 2001. Reprinted
with the permission of Cambridge
University Press.

Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 475
Food Supplies
It would be easy, considering the headlines in the recurring famine crises
in Africa, to conclude that pessimistic predictions about food supplies are
were accurate. Some observers, for example, predicted that land for agri-
cultural use would be intolerably scarce by the middle of the twenty-fi rst
century. These predictions, made in the late 1970s and early 1980s, were
based in part on rising grain prices, but these prices fell unexpectedly
and dramatically in the 1980s.50 Such predictions have by now a rather
lengthy history among those who are pessimistic about the future with
respect to these problems. Paul Ehrlich made an international reputa-
tion for himself with the 1968 publication of The Population Bomb, in
which he predicted that “the battle to feed humanity is already lost, in
the sense that we will not be able to prevent large-scale famines in the
next decade.”51 He claimed that general famine was certain to strike even
the United States by the 1980s, and that millions or more would have
starved to death in developing countries by that time.
Optimists, on the other hand, suggest that greater effi ciency in food
production techniques can provide more than enough food supplies for a
growing global population.52 The well-known environmental optimist,
Julian Simon, has argued that even at our current levels of agricultural
effi ciency, “the entire present population of the world can be supplied
from a square area about 140 miles. . . .”53 He also pointed out, less spec-
ulatively, that “the record of food production entirely contradicts the
scary forecasts. The world trend in recent decades shows unmistakably
an increase in food production per person.”54 Furthermore, “what the
United Nations defi nes as chronic malnutrition’ has declined 16 percent”
since the 1960s.55 In addition, the United Nations reports that the goal of
reducing global poverty by half by 2015 is within reach.56
This does not mean, however, that chronic food shortages and fam-
ine are not a problem for many states and for the global community. As
economist Amartya Sen points out, “Starvation is the characteristic of
some people not having enough food to eat. It is not the characteristic of
there being not enough food to eat. While the latter can be a cause of the
former, it is but one of many possible causes.”57 If there is enough food
in the environment, starvation and famine become problems of economic
entitlement, ownership and access, distribution networks, and domestic
and international politics.58
Population Growth
The history of demographic predictions is replete with errors and marked
by continuing modifi cations. The predictions of Thomas Malthus in the
nineteenth century, for example, proved to be very misleading. One recent
analysis of population forecasts notes that
The Population Bomb appeared twenty-fi ve years ago. . . . Writ-
ten by the biologist Paul Ehrlich . . . it was a gloomy book for

476 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
a gloomy time. A new Dark Age would [according to Ehrlich]
cloud the world, and “men [would] have to kill and eat one
another.” A well-regarded book, Famine 1975! predicted that
hunger would wipe out the Third World that year. . . . In 1972 a
group of researchers at MIT . . . [issued] The Limits to Growth,
which used advanced computer models to project that the world
would run out of gold in 1981, oil in 1992, and arable land in
2000. Civilization itself would collapse by 2070.59
Despite these gloomy warnings, which relied in part on rapid popu-
lation growth, the UN Population Division in 1975, for the fi rst time in
its history, revised its estimate of future population growth downward
and population growth peaked in the 1960s.60 In fact, from 1965–1970
to 1980–1985, fertility in poor countries decreased by 30 percent. “If the
decrease continues, it will surely be the most astonishing demographic
shift in history.”61 Figure 13.3 demonstrates the “S-curve” shape of pre-
dicted population levels, with growth leveling off around the middle of
the twenty-fi rst century.
Population estimates have often been wrong in the past, and the
latest predictions may be wrong, too. But even if the population of the
world grows much faster than expected, disaster, in terms of food sup-
plies or other aspects of the quality of life, will not necessarily result.62
It is quite commonly pointed out that “the parts of the world that have
done most poorly economically are also those where projected popula-
tion growth rates are the highest.”63 But it is quite possible that poverty
leads to population growth, not the opposite. Indeed, some studies “have
found no association between the population growth rate and per capita
income growth rate” and “the empirical evidence thus indicates no nega-
tive correlation between the rate of population growth and the standard
of living.”64 Julian Simon insists that population “density has a positive
effect on the rate of economic growth” and that, more fundamentally,
the standard of living has risen along with the size of the world’s
population since the beginning of recorded time. And with
increases in . . . population have come less severe shortages,
lower costs, and an increased availability of resources, including
a cleaner environment, and greater access to natural recreational
areas. And there is no convincing reason why these trends
toward a better life . . . should not continue indefi nitely.65
This does not imply that some population control program cannot con-
tribute to economic growth. In many developing countries, such as Mexico,
Egypt, and India, rapid population growth continues, and bringing it under
control is almost certainly a desirable goal. At the same time, however, it is
clear that the predictions made during the 1960s and 1970s about impend-
ing planet-wide disasters resulting from population growth outstripping
the world’s food production capabilities seem unduly alarmist.

Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 477
Reserves of Natural Resources
Similarly, the dire warnings about energy resources in the 1970s con-
fronted overwhelmingly contrary evidence in the 1980s. Consider fi rst
the most publicized warnings of the 1970s—those regarding oil. After
OPEC successfully quadrupled the price of oil in the winter of 1973, those
that advocated a halt to economic growth as a way of preserving natural
resources used the price increase as proof that the world’s supply of ener-
gy resources was running low. But in fact, the increase proved no such
thing. The members of OPEC were not running out of oil; they were just
charging more for it. World oil production actually increased in 1973.66
OPEC raised the price of oil again in 1979, and shortages again developed.
But in the mid-1980s, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, as well as
non-OPEC countries, fl ooded the world with cheap oil in attempts to gain
larger shares of the market. In addition, changes in the manufacturing
processes and shifts in the large economies away from manufacturing to
service industries created less of a demand. As a result, the price of a bar-
rel of oil fell through most of the 1990s. Since 1999, the world has seen a
steady increase in the price of oil, particularly since 2003 (see Figure 13.5).
In 2008, oil prices were quite high, reaching more than $145 per barrel.
The rise in prices from 1999 to 2008 is attributed to increased demand
(particularly in China), decreased spare oil production capacity, and the
political events, crises, and natural disasters that have disrupted produc-
tion or threaten to disrupt future production. With the global economic
downturn, demand for energy shrunk and oil prices plummeted in the
second half of 2008. World wide consumption of oil fell in 2008, for the
fi rst time since 1983.
Table 13.1 shows an interesting series of predictions about the deple-
tion of oil reserves in the United States. Although the table covers only
Figure 13.5 World Oil
Prices 1965–2007
Source: Worldwatch Institute,
Vital Signs 2009: The Trends that
Are Shaping Our Future, p. 30.
© 2009 Worldwatch Institute.
www.worldwatch.org.
1965
0
20
40
60
80
100
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
D
ol
la
rs
Year
Real Price
(2007 dollars)
Nominal
Price

www.worldwatch.org

478 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
TABLE 13.1
A Short History of Predictions about U.S. Oil Supplies, 1866–1949
Date Prediction What Actually Happened
1866 Synthetics available if oil
production should end (U.S.
Revenue Commission)
In next 82 years, the United States
produced 37 billion barrels with no
need for synthetics
1885 Little or no chance of oil in
California (U.S. Geological
Survey)
8 billion barrels produced in
California since that date, with
important new fi ndings in 1948
1891 Little or no chance of oil in
Kansas or Texas (U.S. Geological
Survey)
14 billion barrels produced in these
two states since 1891
1908 Maximum future supply of 22.5
billion barrels (offi cials of U.S.
Geological Survey)
35 billion barrels produced since
1908, with 26.8-billion-barrel
reserve proven and available on
January 1, 1949
1914 Total future production only 5.7
billion barrels (offi cial of U.S.
Bureau of Mines)
34 billion barrels produced since
1914, or six times this prediction
1920 U.S. needs foreign oil and
synthetics: peak domestic
production almost reached
(director of U.S. Geological
Survey)
1948 U.S. production in excess of
U.S. consumption and more than
four times 1920 output
1931 Must import as much foreign
oil as possible to save domestic
supply (secretary of the interior)
During the next 8 years, imports
were discouraged, and 14 billion
barrels were found in the United
States
1939 U.S. oil supplies will last only
13 years (radio broadcasts by
Department of the Interior)
New oil found since 1939 exceeds
the 13-year supply known at that
time
1947 Suffi cient oil cannot be found
in United States (chief of
Petroleum Division, State
Department)
4.3 billion barrels found in 1948,
the largest volume in history and
twice our consumption
1949 End of oil supply almost in sight
(secretary of the interior)
Petroleum industry demonstrated
ability to increase U.S. production
by more than 1 million barrels daily
in the next 5 years
Source: Presidential Energy Program, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives. First sessions on the impli-
cation of the President’s proposals on the Energy Independence Act of 1975. Serial no. 94-20, p. 643.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, February 17, 18, 20, 21, 1975.

Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 479
the period from 1866 to 1949, it could easily be extended. For example,
“in 1979 the United States Central Intelligence Agency concluded that
global oil output must fall within a decade ahead’ and that the world
does not have years in which to make a smooth transition to alternative
energy sources.’ In essence, the CIA experts were arguing that the world’s
primary energy supply needed to be converted to a different source with-
in months, an utter impossibility. A generation later, oil output is more
than 10 percent higher than it was in 1979.”67
One reason that pessimistic predictions of long-term shortages are
often inaccurate is that they were based on estimates of known reserves.
But these estimates provide a misleading basis for such predictions.68
For example, we now know that for resource after resource, estimates
of known reserves made in the 1950s proved by 1970 to be drastically
low.69 This degree of underestimation happens with regularity, in part
because of the economic incentives operating on those who gather data
on known reserves. Usually the original sources of such data are compa-
nies interested in the commercial exploitation of a given resource. Once
a company has located reserves that are projected to last, say, thirty years,
it is unlikely even to attempt to fi nd additional reserves for at least two
important reasons. First, because the company will not be able to sell
those reserves for thirty years, there is little incentive to spend time and
energy locating them. Second, if known reserves become too abundant,
they exert a strong downward pressure on the price of that resource.
Today’s known reserves are at the highest level (see Figure 13.6).70 In light
Figure 13.6 World’s
Known Oil Reserves
and World Oil
Production, 1920–2000
Source: From The Skeptical
Environmentalist: Measuring the
Real State of the World, p. 124
by Bjorn Lomborg, © 2001.
Reprinted with the permission
of Cambridge University Press.

480 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
of these data, even most pessimists no longer argue that the world is in
imminent danger of running short of oil. Paradoxically (but, as we have,
seen, actually quite predictably), both fossil fuel consumption and proven
reserves have steadily increased through the past fi fty years or so.
In general, optimists seem on fairly fi rm ground when they assert that
“the potential supplies of all the important minerals are suffi cient for
many lifetimes.”71 Still, pessimists have a valid point when they empha-
size that more than 50 percent of the global oil reserves are estimated to
be in the Middle East, a region currently vulnerable to political instabil-
ity and confl ict. It is possible that market forces will ultimately solve
this problem, that the concentration of current known reserves will spark
the discovery of huge reserves outside the Persian Gulf,72 and that the
world’s supply of inexpensive, readily accessible oil will continue well
into the twenty-fi rst century. But it might be prudent to develop alterna-
tive sources of energy, even if the world is not about to run out of oil,
given the role of fossil fuel in other environmental challenges.73
Pollution and Climate Change
Pessimistic predictions about the impact of various forms of pollution on
the global atmosphere are diffi cult to ignore, even though they are based
on scanty evidence. That evidence is often weak, because pollution is a
relatively recent concern, and data on relevant problems rarely go back
more than twenty to thirty years.
There has been considerable debate over predictions of the green-
house effect. For one thing, it is not entirely clear that industrialization
on a worldwide scale will have a warming effect on the global climate.
Climatologists do not have a particularly impressive record of prognosti-
cation. In the 1930s, they were predominantly of the opinion that there
was a global warming trend. Spencer Weart, a specialist in the history
of physics, asserts that the greenhouse effect rhetoric of the 1930s was
virtually identical to that of the 1980s and 1990s—“of irreversible dam-
age, of humankind overstepping its bounds in horrifying fashion.”74 Con-
trary to the forecasts made in the 1930s, the global temperature declined
from the 1940s to the 1970s. This had an apparent impact on forecasts
about the future of the globe’s climate: One article in 1975 suggested
that “the threat of a new ice age must now stand alongside nuclear war
as a likely source of wholesale death and misery for mankind.”75 In fact,
“many of the same persons who [warned] about global cooling are the
same climatologists who are now warning of global warming.”76
This is not the context in which to attempt to sort out or evaluate
comprehensively the opposing arguments about global warming. Let us
instead examine a couple of reasons why the issue is so diffi cult to resolve.
First, global climate processes are so complex and affected by so many
countervailing factors that making predictions about their future course
is risky.77 Tropical deforestation, for example, continues at an alarming

rate and may make an important contribution to global warming. Less
noted is the fact that in North America and Eurasia, forests are growing
larger and absorbing more carbon dioxide.78
Debate has also centered on the relative impact of human versus
natural processes in climate change. Approximately 200 billion tons of
carbon are emitted into the atmosphere by natural processes such as vol-
canic eruptions, plant decay, and forest fi res. Almost exactly that same
amount is removed from the atmosphere every year, also by natural pro-
cesses “breathed in” by trees or taken from the air by ocean plankton,
for example. Human activities contribute a very small percentage of
the amount produced by these natural processes. Skeptics charge that
this relatively insignifi cant amount cannot have a substantial impact on
global climate. Skeptics also question the dire predictions that global
warming will produce.79
An additional aspect of the global warming debate concerns the rela-
tionship between pollution and economic growth. Economic growth is
perceived to be part of the problem by many, but it may be that growth
is an important part of the solution. In the early stages of industrializa-
tion, economies are not wealthy enough to pay the costs of environmen-
tal protection.80 As a result, although it is diffi cult to prove that things
were worse in the previous times, because there are virtually no precise
measures of pollution from the nineteenth century, pollution was a seri-
ous problem even then. Novelist Charles Dickens described one nine-
teenth century English town in this manner: “It was a town of machinery
and tall chimneys, out of which interminable serpents of smoke trailed
A protester from the
environmental group
Friends of the Earth
wears a mask during
a demonstration in
Hong Kong’s business
district, urging drivers
to shut off idling
engines. Residents
of cities such as
Hong Kong, Beijing,
Bangkok, and Mexico
City often wear masks
to protect their health
from signifi cant air
pollution.
(© Bobby Yip/Corbis)
Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 481

482 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
themselves for ever and ever, and never got uncoiled. It had a black canal
in it, and a river that ran purple with ill-smelling dye, and vast piles of
buildings full of windows, where there was a rattling and a trembling all
day long.”81
Nineteenth-century industrial centers in the United States, such as
New York City and Chicago, also experienced signifi cant pollution prob-
lems. The Chicago River was reportedly polluted with grease so thick on
its surface that it looked like a liquid rainbow.82
A comparison of contemporary developing societies with industrial-
ized countries provides additional support for the assertion that economic
growth and environmental deterioration do not necessarily go hand in
hand. For example, developing states typically have water pollution prob-
lems, brought about by poor sanitation systems, that are more serious
than those of industrialized societies. The crowding in the slums of major
cities in many poor countries creates additional serious pollution prob-
lems. Economic growth may exacerbate some pollution problems for poor
countries in the short run, but ultimately such growth is likely to be a
necessary condition for the alleviation of pollution. One study of the rela-
tionship between economic growth and pollution revealed that “some
problems decline as income increases.”83 As per capita income increases,
“some problems initially worsen but then improve as incomes rise.”84
Economic growth, while certainly capable of damaging the environment,
also can lead to environmental improvements. And even rather stringent
steps to protect the environment need not stifl e economic growth. In
fact, energy conservation, which can, for example, decrease the amount
of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere, can also increase the effi –
ciency of an economy and even speed up growth. In 1974, in the wake of
the fi rst OPEC-induced energy crisis, one study predicted that if current
trends continued, energy use in the United States would double between
1970 and 1987. It also predicted that even if the United States adopted
a “zero-growth policy option,” energy use would still increase about 20
percent. Instead, energy consumption decreased from 1970 to 1987, while
the economy grew.
Still, the debate over global warming and the role of economic devel-
opment may subside in future years as more and better evidence becomes
available. In 1995, “in an important shift of scientifi c judgment, experts
advising the world’s governments on climate change are saying for the
fi rst time that human activity is a likely cause of the warming of the
global atmosphere.”85 The story refers to a report published by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), consisting of more than
2,000 scientists assembled by the United Nations to advise the world’s
governments on climate policy. According to an analyst from the World-
watch Institute, “Sophisticated computer modeling and actual measure-
ments of the atmosphere are now converging with uncanny accuracy . . .
increasingly the computer answers are corroborated by direct observa-
tion. By 1995, the fi t looked too close to be pure coincidence; the . . . IPCC

Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists 483
. . . concluded that human activity is warming the earth.”86 In the IPCC’s
most recent assessment, they conclude the increase in carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases is due to human activities and the net effect has
been one of warming in the global climate system.87
Complex Relationships Connecting
Environmental Challenges
One of the most pessimistic perspectives on the environmental challenges
facing the globe points out the diffi culty of solving one problem without
causing another to worsen. In the 1970s, the results of an analysis of all
these problems based on a computer simulation of the world were pub-
lished in a report titled The Limits to Growth, which provoked a torrent of
both praise and criticism that continues to this day; it has sold more than
30 million copies in thirty languages since it was published in 1972.88
Computer simulations of social systems allow social scientists a
form of experimentation that would not otherwise be possible.89 Once
a simulation is operational, it can be used to obtain answers to a mul-
titude of questions such as what would happen if the world were this
way. The answers are quite often surprising, because social systems can
behave counter-intuitively. Actions designed to solve problems may have
no effect or may make the problems worse.90
The world system, according to the designers of The Limits to Growth
simulation, operates in just such a fashion. Measures that seem designed
to alleviate problems actually make them worse or have an impact on
other parts of the system that creates even worse problems. Given the
rampant poverty and starvation in the global system, for example, a seem-
ingly logical solution would involve substantially increased food produc-
tion and economic development. But The Limits to Growth simulation
shows that increased economic growth would help alleviate poverty and
starvation in the short run, but in the long run it would exacerbate all
the other problems. Because more food would be available, the popula-
tion would grow faster. In time, increases in income would help bring
the population under control, but the same economic growth would
accelerate depletion of natural resources and dramatically increase levels
of pollution.
Part of the problem with the economic growth solution is that it
depletes the earth’s natural resources. What if, through intensifi ed explo-
ration, the amount of available natural resources doubled? According to
The Limits to Growth, a rise in available resources would allow industri-
alization to accelerate until pollution reached dangerous levels. And even
if the amount of natural resources doubled, growth would be so rapid
that these reserves would be used up in a few years. Even with the more
optimistic assumptions that nuclear energy will permanently satisfy the
world’s energy needs and that recycling programs will conserve supplies

484 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
of natural resources effectively, the world’s population is still doomed
to a sad end. Pollution again will lead the system to collapse within a
hundred years. Even population control policies that achieved zero popu-
lation grown would be disastrous, according to The Limits to Growth.
Industrial growth would accelerate as capital accumulation was facilitat-
ed by the decreased pressure of the population explosion, but the eventual
depletion of nonrenewable resources would bring a sudden collapse of the
economic system.91
There is just one problem left unattacked. Surely it would seem that
pollution control can have only good results. In the simulation, pollution
controls would allow industrialization levels to reach heights unattain-
able in a world that would otherwise have choked to death. But because
people would no longer die of emphysema, cancer, lead poisoning, birth
defects, and other pollution-related diseases, population growth would
continue. Ultimately, arable land would be depleted, and food production
would not be able to keep up with the population growth.
Is there no escape? There is, according to the authors of The Lim-
its to Growth, but the path entails a drastically new and comprehensive
approach to the world’s problems. If the world is to avoid disaster, conser-
vation and pollution control must be combined with a halt in economic
growth. There are limits to growth, and the world is on the verge of reach-
ing those limits. The Limits to Growth simulation and its proposal to
limit economic growth has attracted imitators and critics since its pub-
lication. Its dire predictions were based on evidence that was questioned
on a number of grounds, such as those discussed earlier in the chapter. Its
value, however, was to point out the diffi cult balancing act that the global
community must undertake if it believes that these global challenges are
severe enough to warrant solutions.
The scientifi c debate over the severity of environmental problems
and the consequences of possible solutions has affected efforts by the
international community to deal with these global issues:
Science has received particular attention as a force promoting
environmental cooperation. . . . Scientists certainly do infl uence
international negotiations, not least because scientists’ methods
and rules of . . . legitimacy are an alternative to strictly interest-
based bargaining. That said, those methods and rules do not
prevent bias and partiality in the arguments and facts scientists
offer and even less prevent policy-makers from selectively using
or ignoring science to support interest-based positions.92
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation
Despite the uncertainty of the problems, the international community has been concerned enough to put many environmental issues on the
global agenda. The fi rst major international environmental meeting, the

The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 485
UN Stockholm Conference in 1972, has been followed by a number of
additional efforts at environmental cooperation:
Spurred on by the success of Stockholm, the remainder of the
1970s saw a proliferation of international environmental treaties
addressing mostly conventional or “fi rst generation” environ-
mental issues such as air or water pollution. . . . Wildlife conser-
vation and habitat protection also took a front seat in the 1970s.
. . . As the 1980s approached, the conventional issues of air pol-
lution gave way to . . . a “second generation” of environmental
issues involving more complex and global processes inextricably
connected with development issues. Many of the conventions of
the 1980s and 1990s required more global consensus. Examples
include the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, and the related Montreal Protocol. . . . Also critical during
the 1980s was negotiation of the UN Convention on the Law
of the Sea, which set out a broad constitution for the oceans
including critical provisions on protecting the ocean environ-
ment. . . . The Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
are all further examples of the complicated and global approach
now occupying much of international environmental
treaty-making.93
The biodiversity and climate change agreements were concluded at
the same time as the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (often referred to as the Rio
Summit or the Earth Summit). This was the most signifi cant global meet-
ing on the environment to date, with more than 100 heads of state in
attendance and more than 1,000 representatives of nongovernmental
organizations. The conference resulted in a nonbinding agreement based
on very broad and complex negotiations. The agreement covered every
environmental issue, as well as development, and included many domes-
tic social and economic policy changes. The Rio Summit also created
norms and expectations about environmental cooperation.94
Following the summit in Rio, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change led to intense negotiations that ultimately resulted in the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which calls for industrialized countries to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 percent by 2012. Some countries
are targeted to reduce their emissions by as much as 8 percent. One of
the controversial aspects of the protocol concerns the allowance of emis-
sion credits. Some states such as Russia and the developing world were
not obliged to reduce emissions and could sell their credits to countries
that were obliged to reduce emissions. The fact that developing states,
which will contribute to greenhouse emissions in the near future as they
industrialize, were not required to curb emissions led the United States
(one of the largest greenhouse gas producers) to announce in 2001 that it
Montreal Protocol
1987 treaty requiring
reductions in use of
CFCs and, later, almost
all ozone-depleting
substances.
UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea Treaty
adopted in 1982 with
broad rules on protecting
the ocean environment.
Framework Convention
on Climate Change
1992 agreement among
industrialized states to
work toward reduction of
greenhouse emissions.
Convention on
Biological Diversity
Treaty requiring
national strategies for
conservation of a variety
of species and plants,
genetic variations, and
ecosystems.
Kyoto Protocol 1997
treaty that calls for
industrialized countries
to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.

486 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
would refuse to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol went into effect
in February 2005 when the states that account for 55 percent of the car-
bon emissions for the top-emitting group of states ratifi ed the treaty.
The future of the climate change regime still hangs in the bal-
ance. Nevertheless, what was once criticized by many to be void
of any potential for success has shown the world that progress
indeed remains possible. . . . Although major issues remain, the
continued injection of science into the policymaking process,
along with necessary fi nancial and technical assistance to the
developing countries, may help the various veto coalitions to
make the necessary compromises for a strong climate change
regime in the future.95
The United States is the only industrialized country not participating in
the agreement. Although President Obama is supportive of some emis-
sion controls and a new climate control international treaty, he faces sig-
nifi cant domestic opposition.96 The Policy Choices box outlines some of
the arguments for and against the Kyoto Protocol and other international
efforts to address climate change.
The Environment as Collective Goods
and Common Pools
These efforts at environmental cooperation have not been easy, and many
believe that most have largely failed to address some of the most chal-
lenging global environmental issues. Why this is so is best illustrated
by a metaphor known as the tragedy of the commons. Garrett Hardin, a
human ecologist, fi rst used the phrase tragedy of the commons in 1968
to describe overgrazing in nineteenth-century English villages. As Hardin
explains, the tragedy of the commons develops when there is a pasture
in a community open to all, and each herder must decide whether to add
one more animal to his or her herd of cattle. All the gain from a decision
to do so will go to that herder, but the cost of that decision, overgrazing
on the pasture, is shared by all the herders. Because of this, each herder
is tempted to add to his or her herd. If each herder makes that decision,
which is rational on the individual level, collectively they will ruin the
pasture for everybody by overgrazing.97
Similarly, all states would be better off if, for example, pollution-
creating activities were curbed. But each state individually can manufac-
ture a product in a manner unrestricted by expensive pollution controls
and thus put the product on the international market at a low price. All
the profi ts from the sales of that product will go to the polluting state, but
the cost—the increasingly polluted atmosphere—is shared by all. Because
each country can see a clear profi t for itself from manufacturing a product
without pollution controls, all states are tempted, rationally, to take steps
that collectively will ruin the atmosphere for the entire globe. Although
tragedy of the
commons Metaphor
used to describe the
diffi culty of achieving
cooperation on natural
resources that would
have long-term benefi ts
for all, given the
short-term benefi ts of
resource exploitation to
individuals.

The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 487
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Supporting the Kyoto Protocol
ISSUE: Signed in December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change called for a worldwide reduction of emissions of carbon-
based gases by an average 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by 2012, although
different countries adopted different targets. Although many countries have rati-
fi ed the protocol, there has been much internal debate about ratifi cation in many
countries, and some countries, including countries responsible for large emissions,
have not ratifi ed the Kyoto Protocol and efforts to create a new climate change
treaty face many obstacles. The debate illustrates the diffi culties in environmental
cooperation.
Option #1: All countries should support and ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Arguments: (a) Emissions of carbon-based gases are contributing to global warm-
ing, with disastrous consequences for the future. (b) It is necessary for all major
industrialized states to support the protocol, especially large states like the United
States, because they are responsible for the majority of emissions. (c) Not support-
ing the agreement means becoming isolated on the environmental issue, which
might jeopardize efforts to achieve cooperation on other issues.
Counterarguments: (a) The evidence linking carbon-based emissions to global
warming and climate change has been mixed. (b) The industrialized states can still
continue to produce large emissions under Kyoto, because the protocol allows for
large-emissions-producing states to trade credits with low-emissions-producing
states. (c) States must look out for their own interests and cooperate on an issue-
by-issue basis.
Option #2: States should not support and ratify the Kyoto Protocol if it is not in
their interests.
Arguments: (a) The developed world is not required to curb emissions, but some
developing states, such as China and India, are currently contributing signifi cantly
to global emissions. (b) Meeting the Kyoto targets and paying the penalties if they
are not met are too costly to business and the economy. (c) There are alternative
ways, such as voluntary programs, that states can encourage to help solve the
global warming problem.
Counterarguments: (a) It would be too costly for the developing states to join
Kyoto now. It is assumed that the developing world will one day join the protocol;
in the meantime, the European Union has pledged a fund to help them clean
their emissions. (b) Investing now in emission-reducing technologies will make for
more effi cient, and profi table, economies in the future. (c) Voluntary programs do
not work. Although enforcement is not possible, there must be agreed-on rules,
incentives, and penalties to facilitate cooperation on an issue that is in the interest
of all.

488 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
the parallels between Hardin’s example of the nineteenth-century Eng-
lish commons and contemporary international environmental problems
are clear, many caution against the conclusion that states are necessarily
caught in a “tragedy”:
It is popularly believed that the actors involved in . . . [such]
problems, whether individuals or governments, are trapped in an
inexorable “tragedy of the commons” from which they cannot
extract themselves. . . . Empirical and theoretical work on. . . .
[these] situations, however, has shown that the “inexorable”
nature of the problem results more from the assumptions used
by theorists than from constraints that are universally present in
all . . . situations.98
Yet the tragedy of the commons metaphor is useful in understanding some
of the obstacles to environmental problems because it points out the dif-
fi culties of preserving something that is in the long-term collective inter-
est of all, despite the short-term interest to undermine preservation.
Environmental conditions such as clean air, clean water, healthy
supplies of natural resources, and a commons grazing area are similar
to collective goods. Recall from Chapter 10 that all people benefi t from
collective goods regardless of their participation in maintaining the good.
National defense, for example, is a collective good that everyone benefi ts
from regardless of how much tax they pay to support the national defense
system. Indeed, even citizens who cheat and do not pay taxes benefi t from
this collective good. International environmental problems are similar to
collective goods, but are technically known as common pool resources
(CPRs), because, unlike true collective goods, they can be spoiled by one
actor. Common pool resources “are affl icted by an additional problem
that is not encountered in situations of public goods: use of the resource
by one individual may have adverse consequences for others.”99 Both col-
lective goods and common resources, however, face the problem of who
is to provide for the good or resource.
In both types of situations, a key problem is how to induce
contributions to provide benefi ts from as many benefi ciaries
as possible. The classic problem of public goods, which also
affl icts CPRs, is under provision. When there are many benefi –
ciaries, each of whose contribution is small relative to the cost
of provision, the good will not be supplied in optimal quantity,
unless institutional arrangements exist that induce incentives to
provide it.100
In the international system, the problems of under-provision and adverse
consequences by individual actors are compounded by the lack of an over-
arching authority to coordinate the maintenance and provision of collec-
tive goods. To solve some of the most important environmental problems
requires the coordination of several states. But the temptation to follow
common pool
resources
(CPRs) Goods that can
be spoiled by one actor.

The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 489
short-term national interests over collective interests or even long-term
national interests is often too high.
Because of the nature of these problems, the world’s states are hav-
ing a diffi cult time cooperating in a way that might effectively deal with
the dangers of global warming, shrinking natural resources, and popu-
lation growth. It is in individual states’ interests to pollute, cut down
forests, and exploit cheap resources. In some circumstances, it is in the
individual world citizen’s self-interest to have more children. Yet the
collective result of these individual decisions can mean that everyone’s
welfare, including that of future generations, is compromised if today’s
environmental problems accumulate to threaten the carrying capacity of
the earth, just as over-herding turned common pastures into desert in
nineteenth-century villages.
Political Obstacles to Environmental Cooperation
In addition to the general problems of getting independent actors to con-
tribute to collective goods, international environmental cooperation is
affected by a number of existing political divisions. Perhaps the most
important division complicating recent efforts is the North-South debate
on environmental challenges.
Inequitable economic relations between North and South have
proven to be a crucial element of the political context of global
environmental politics, as on other issues. The developing
states’ perceptions of the global economic structure as funda-
mentally inequitable often shape their policy responses to global
environmental issues and their strategies for negotiating on
issues as different as elephants and climate.101
The poorer developing countries point out that the blame for the envi-
ronmental problems we are facing today lies with the past and current
actions of the richer developed states. It was, after all, during the time of
the North’s industrialization that pollution and resource scarcity devel-
oped. Developed countries “. . . account for about 7 out of every 10 tonnes
of CO2 that have been emitted since the start of the industrial era.”102
Today, developed countries consume more than nine times as much
electricity per capita as developing countries and emit over six times as
much carbon dioxide per capita.103 The United States alone consumes
35 percent of the world’s resources but constitutes only 6 percent of the
global population. The United Kingdom produces more carbon dioxide
than Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Vietnam combined; Texas emits more
than the total region of sub-Saharan Africa; and an air-conditioner in
Florida produces more CO2 emissions in one year than a person living in
Afghanistan or Cambodia does in a lifetime.104 “Moreover, the poorest
people in the poorest countries—which consist of several hundred million
adults and children, and include subsistence farmers, landless rural

490 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
workers, and destitute and homeless people in expanding mega cities—
still do not consume any commercial fuels or electricity directly.”105 The
demand for paper and wood products from the rain forests of the world
is primarily located within the North as well. Demand for coffee in the
North has also resulted in coffee plantations’ replacing rain forest land.
“In Latin America, so many trees have been felled to create coffee planta-
tions that migratory songbirds are losing vital winter habitat. As consum-
ers of fully one-third of the world’s coffee, Americans contribute to such
environmental degradation.”106
Thus, the South argues that much of the environmental damage is
due to current and past abuses by the North so the North should bear the
greatest burden, particularly the fi nancial burden of solving environmen-
tal challenges. The North, for its part, points out that it is the developing
world that accounts for the large and growing emissions of greenhouse
gases.107 China, for example, is highly dependent on coal-fi red power
plants for its electricity. With its growing economy, it is the fastest-
growing source of carbon dioxide emissions in the world and has passed
the United States as the country that emits the most carbon dioxide.108
Because of the role that the industrializing South will play in future envi-
ronmental degradation, the North argues that the South is the key to
preventing future problems. The South, however, fears that environmen-
tal cooperation comes at the expense of development. For the South, the
priority is to meet the short-term economic needs of the current genera-
tion. While developing countries may share concern about the future of
the global commons, many are facing severe poverty, a deadly killer on a
massive scale, right now. “Poverty is already a worse killer than any fore-
seeable environmental distress, according to the chief economist of the
World Bank. Nobody should kid themselves that they are doing Bangla-
desh a favor when they worry about global warming.”109 For the South,
then, sacrifi cing economic development, which the North already enjoys,
is unacceptable.
Recognizing this dilemma, there has emerged a consensus in the inter-
national community that cooperation on environmental issues must take
seriously the question of the South’s economic development. The term
sustainable development captures this idea. The consensus on sustain-
able development can be traced back to 1983 when the United Nations
created a commission to study global environmental problems and pos-
sible solutions. Chaired by the prime minister of Norway, Gro Harlem
Brundtland, the commission produced a report (known as the Brundtland
report) in 1987 titled Our Common Future, which
took an integrated approach to environment and development
issues. Indeed economic development was as central to the
report as were environmental issues. The Brundtland Commis-
sion did not invent the term sustainable development, but it
did popularize the term and place it squarely in the center of
sustainable
development
Development that meets
current economic needs
without compromising
future economic growth
and environmental
health.

The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 491
international policymaking. The Commission’s defi nition of
sustainable development remains the most famous defi nition
of the term: “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.”110
While most of the international environmental community agrees
that environmental cooperation must be pursued with economic devel-
opment in mind, there is no consensus on how to do this and whether the
emphasis should be placed on sustaining the environment or developing
economies.111
The disagreements between the North and the South were certainly
evident at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992:
The issue of inequitable consumption patterns as a cause of
global environmental degradation was elevated to a new status
in international politics at the insistence of the developing coun-
tries. The issue was woven through several chapters of Agenda
21 as well as the Rio Declaration and the Statement of Forest
Principles, making it a major theme of the entire conference.
Industrialized countries were asked to accept responsibility to
change their “unsustainable lifestyles.”112
The developing countries failed, however, to get the wealthier coun-
tries to agree to policies aimed at changing consumption patterns or to
certain debt-reduction programs that the South argued were important for
economic development. The developed countries failed to get the poorer
countries to agree on particular forest management policies.
Disagreements between the North and the South over responsibil-
ity issues also surfaced during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. In this
meeting,
Brazil presented an analysis that compared the relative respon-
sibility of Annex I (industrialized) countries and of non–Annex
I (developing) countries for climate change, not just in terms
of carbon dioxide emissions in a given year, but in terms of
carbon dioxide concentrations because of historical emissions.
It showed that the responsibility of non–Annex I countries for
accumulated emissions would not equal that of Annex I coun-
tries until the middle of the 22nd century.113
Efforts at environmental cooperation have continued to be affected by
the differences between the developing and developed states. For the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development, the developing states succeed-
ed in preventing the word “environment” from even appearing in the name
of the conference.114 “At the climate change talks in Copenhagen in 2009,
a group of developing states walked out of the meetings at one point, argu-
ing that the developed countries were not doing enough to control carbon

492 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
emissions.” These differences, however, were not always obstacles to coop-
eration. The developing states, for example, signed the 1987 Montreal Pro-
tocol after a fund was established to help them switch to the more costly
substitutes for CFC that would not contribute to ozone depletion.115
The North-South debate is not the only political division in the world
complicating cooperation on environmental challenges. States that are
in similar positions economically do not always agree on environmental
issues. The European Union states, for example, were prepared to adopt
specifi c targets and deadlines for conversion to renewable sources of
energy at the 2002 World Summit, but the United States disagreed and
successfully blocked their efforts to include targets and dates in the fi nal
program. And at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, on many issues,
countries were not united along development lines. Develop-
ing countries themselves were split over such issues as climate
change (oil producing nations vs. small island states), fi sher-
ies (distant water fi shing countries vs. coastal countries), and
population growth (Catholic and Muslim countries vs. more
secular countries). Industrialized countries disagreed on a num-
ber of issues, including ODA [overseas development assistance]
levels (Nordic countries vs. the United States), fi sheries (dis-
tant water fi shing countries vs. coastal countries), hazardous
and radioactive waste disposal, and the need to reduce exces-
sive production.116
In general, most efforts at environmental cooperation produce divi-
sions between those that are more affected by the problem and those that
are not. On the issue of transboundary air pollution, for example,
those states that had been the victims of . . . acid rain—notably
Sweden, Finland, and Norway—took the initiative to negoti-
ate for stringent and binding regulations on emissions of sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide. But the industrialized states that
were net exporters of acid rain formed a veto coalition, in large
part because of their reliance on coal-fi red power stations, which
accounted for two-thirds of all sulfur dioxide emissions.117
Just like other issues in international relations, the fact that states
are not unitary actors and face domestic pressures at home can compli-
cate efforts at environmental cooperation.118 Business and environmental
groups have been key domestic players in global environmental debates.
Some states are quite susceptible to business interests opposed to environ-
mental agreements. After ten years of negotiations on the Law of the Sea
Treaty, for example, the United States rejected the treaty in 1982, citing
its concern that the treaty rules for governing mineral resources in the
deep seas were contrary to private enterprise principles. Business inter-
ests may represent themselves at international environmental meetings.
At the Kyoto Summit on global warming, “the most powerful MNCs

The Politics of Environmental Cooperation 493
[multinational corporations] representing oil and car manufacturers worked
to defeat stringent new environmental standards that might decrease car-
bon emissions (and thereby cut into the sales of existing fuels or cars).”119
The environment and business interests can also clash in free trade
negotiations.120
When the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], . . .
was negotiated just after World War II, there was not mention of
the word environment. At that time no one saw much connec-
tion between trade liberalization and environmental protection.
In fact, for the next 40 years, trade and environmental policy-
makers pursued their respective agendas on parallel tracks that
rarely, if ever, intersected. The wake-up call for environmental-
ists was the U.S. ban on tuna from Mexico and Venezuela on the
ground that their fl eets did not meet U.S. standards for minimiz-
ing dolphin kills in tuna fi shing [as required by the 1972 Marine
Mammal Protection Act]. In 1991 the GATT declared that the
U.S. ban was illegal under the rules of international trade. U.S.
environmentalists were alarmed that a national environmental
law could be overturned by the GATT and began to take seri-
ously the environmental implications of trade.121
Environmental values clashed with free trade principles again in the
negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1992.
Environmentalists worried that less strict environmental laws in Mexico
combined with free trade would mean that U.S. companies would relo-
cate to Mexico, where they could pollute without penalty, creating more
environmental damage. A coalition of consumers, labor groups, and envi-
ronmentalists worked to make NAFTA the fi rst trade agreement to have
supplemental agreements on environmental issues.122 While some areas of
the North American environment have seemed to improve due to NAFTA-
related agreements, other areas seem to be deteriorating, and the debate
between environmentalists and free traders continues as NAFTA may
expand into a larger Free Trade Area of the Americas (see Chapter 12).123
Since its creation in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
heard a number of cases of environmentalists versus free traders. These
cases included issues such as U.S. laws requiring fuel imports to meet
“clean” gasoline standards and imported shrimp to be caught by ves-
sels that do not endanger sea turtles. The United States and the Euro-
pean Union (EU) have also been involved in a WTO dispute over U.S.
use of genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs) in agriculture. The EU,
which views GMOs in food as unsafe, placed a moratorium on GMO
imports from 1999 to 2004, but the WTO recently ruled that this ban
violated WTO free trade laws. Although those who advocate more liberal
trade now have to contend with environmental challenges, it is unclear
which value has the advantage. It is true that the WTO treaty recognized
the importance of securing “the optimal use of the world’s resources in
Marine Mammal
Protection Act U.S.
law that prohibits the
sale of tuna if it is not
caught with “dolphin-
safe” fi shing methods.

494 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
accordance with the objective of sustainable development.”124 On the
other hand, the Framework Convention on Climate Change specifi es that
cooperative efforts on global warming should abide by GATT/WTO trade
principles.125
Value differences have also affected global cooperation on environ-
mental issues. Population growth is one example. Although the United
States took the lead in the 1960s in funding family planning programs
in the developing world, funding for international population programs
has been controversial. As discussed in Chapter 9, some domestic groups
succeeded in getting Congress to cut off funding for any organization
involved in abortion activities. The Clinton administration reinstated
the funding, amid considerable controversy, the subsequent Bush admin-
istration returned to the policy of withholding money from the United
Nations Population Fund, and the Obama administration reinstated the
funding once again.126 There has also been a value clash over particular
countries’ population control programs. “China’s one-child policy—the
toughest population-control policy in the world—has been especially
criticized for allegedly forcing pregnant women who already have a child
to have abortions, even late in pregnancy.”127
The relationship between population growth and the status of wom-
en has also generated value confl icts in global efforts to curb population
growth. At the 1994 World Population Conference in Egypt, women’s
rights groups pushed for the funding of programs to educate girls and
women generally and to promote women’s equality, arguing that more
economic and political freedom is the key to decreasing birthrates in the
developing countries. Other groups, including the Catholic Church and
some Islamic countries, allied to block some of these population propos-
als. The Policy Choices box outlines some of the issues in the debate on
population policy.
Despite the numerous obstacles, cooperation on environmental chal-
lenges is possible. Because of the Montreal Protocol, for example, the
total consumption of CFCs has dropped dramatically. “The Montreal
Protocol is the best example so far of a regime that has been continually
strengthened in response to new scientifi c evidence and technological
innovations.”128
Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation
The major theoretical perspectives (see Chapter 1) for understanding global politics can shed light on international environmental coopera-
tion, even though it is a fairly new area in world politics. In looking at the
prospects for environmental cooperation, realism, would expect coopera-
tion to be very diffi cult, given states’ self-interested motivations to guard
their power and autonomy.129 Furthermore, environmental issues consti-
tute “low politics” and do not demand the attention of states compared
to “high politics,” such as national defense.130 When cooperation does

Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation 495
occur, realism would expect international agreements to refl ect the inter-
ests of the most powerful states strongly. On the issue of climate change,
for example, realists would point out the infl uence of the United States.
In the negotiations on the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
“the United States opposed the others (particularly a number of European
countries) that wanted a timetable for greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions. Largely because of the U.S. position, the members of the interna-
tional community could only agree to the provision that industrialized
countries would try to ensure that their greenhouse gas emissions in the
year 2000 were no higher than they were in 1990.”131
While not denying that state interests are important, liberalism, as a
theoretical perspective, would also highlight the importance of nonstate
and substate actors in global environmental politics. These actors include
the World Wildlife Fund, which was established in 1961 with the aim of
protecting endangered species and habitats. “It is the largest private NGO
devoted to conservation with a $40 million annual budget and over 5 mil-
lion members in 28 different countries. The WWF has over 800 projects
underway and works with 7,000 NGOs in developing countries to help
preserve wildlife and educate people.”132 Perhaps the most famous non-
state environmental group is Greenpeace. “Greenpeace’s goal is to infl u-
ence national and international environmental legislation the world over
even if it means practicing civil disobedience on the high seas.”133 In May
Greenpeace NGO
that seeks to
infl uence national
and international
environmental policy.
A Greenpeace ship
blocks the entrance to
a British military supply
port in January 2003,
to protest against
the approaching war
with Iraq. Greenpeace
actively works against
the negative effects to
the environment that
can result from, for
example, dumping on
the high seas, nuclear
testing, and military
interventions.
(AFP/Getty Images)

496 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Addressing Population Growth
ISSUE: Given the seemingly obvious connection between more and more people
on the planet and a wide variety of environmental problems—such as rain forest
depletion, global warming, and hunger—it may be surprising to note that not
everyone agrees that curbing population growth is a good policy. Still, despite
compelling objections, most of the world’s most populous countries are engaged
in one or another form of population control.
Option #1: Global efforts to reduce population growth should be redoubled, and
effective family planning programs should be supported.
Arguments: (a) Overpopulation is at the root of many serious environmental prob-
lems, as more and more people create greater and greater demands on the planet.
(b) Economic success depends on creating sustainable growth within countries.
Poor countries will remain poor as long as their populations continue to grow
excessively. (c) Without education about family planning, people will naturally
continue to procreate, thereby adding to the population problem.
Counterarguments: (a) Environmental destruction is related to excessive con-
sumption associated with global capitalism, not excessive population. If wealthy
countries would scale back their luxurious lifestyles, global population could safely
exceed current projections. (b) Historically, population growth has frequently oc-
curred alongside or in advance of economic progress. People should be viewed as
a resource, not a burden. (c) Individuals’ right to procreate should not be threat-
ened for political convenience. People are not cattle, and implementing popula-
tion control policies fundamentally degrades people who naturally pursue a most
basic human desire.
Option #2: The international community should turn its attention to other seri-
ous global problems, rather than continuing to support policies aimed at reducing
population growth.
Arguments: (a) Raising overpopulation fears opens the door for prejudicial reac-
tions toward the poor and likely lessens political will to address catastrophic ill-
nesses such as AIDS. (b) People respond to economic factors in their decisions to
have children. Countries should focus on raising standards of living, and popula-
tion growth will then take care of itself. (c) Population pressures are correctly con-
sidered local problems and should be dealt with only by individual states rather
than the international community.
Counterarguments: (a) Programs aimed at limiting population growth often have
other benefi ts, such as promoting the use of condoms and educating and empow-
ering women. (b) Without government intervention, people will continue to make
the decision to have more children based on cultural factors and religious beliefs.
(c) Excessive populations within states all too often spill over to other states in the
form of immigrants, refugees, and regional instability, thus turning a local problem
into a global one.

Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation 497
2002, for example, a Greenpeace boat rammed into France’s America’s
Cup yacht to protest the team’s sponsor, a nuclear power company owned
by the French government. This was just one incident in Greenpeace’s
history with France.134 In 1985, the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior
was sunk in an assault by French special forces, apparently in order to
prevent it from protesting French nuclear testing.
The large number of NGOs at the 1992 Rio Summit is further evi-
dence that the actors emphasized in the liberal theoretical perspective
are shaping environmental cooperation. On the global warming issue
specifi cally,
. . . [W]hile the FCCC [Framework Convention on Climate
Change] is a creature of states, and the international climate
regime is dominated by governments, as a formal matter,
nonstate actors are encouraged and enabled to participate in its
operation and evolution. In practice, NGOs are now a pervasive
presence.135
Liberalism would also focus on the importance of international orga-
nizations as actors that facilitate and provide incentives for cooperation.
On the topic of climate change, for example, international organiza-
tions have certainly been instrumental as regular multilateral meetings,
requirements to publish reports, and ongoing monitoring and assessment
have facilitated implementation of the FCCC.136 Generally, international
institutions can affect environmental cooperation in three key ways:
(1) They can contribute to more appropriate agendas, refl ecting the
convergence of political and technical consensus about the nature
of environmental threats;
(2) They can contribute to more comprehensive and specifi c interna-
tional policies, agreed upon through a political process whose core
is intergovernmental bargaining; and
(3) They can contribute to national policy responses which directly
control sources of environmental degradation.137
Beyond specifi c organizations, liberals point to the emergence of
international regimes as focal points for environmental cooperation.
As discussed in Chapter 9, international regimes are implicit or explicit
rules and norms that govern actors’ behaviors. Not all international
regimes all equally effective. The regime to govern Antarctica, for
example, has been effective at keeping the region open for scientifi c
research and other agreed-on activities. This can be contrasted with
many of the attempted international fi sheries regimes, which have gen-
erally not achieved their goal of preventing overfi shing.138 It appears
that regimes that, among other things, address domestic opposition
forces within states are more likely to be effective at securing environ-
mental cooperation.139

498 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
The neo-Marxist perspective on global environmental politics would
stress the structure of economic capital, particularly energy capital, in
the world and its effects on cooperation attempts.140 On the greenhouse
issue, for example, neo-Marxists would point to the structure of oil capi-
tal and the oil companies’ power to thwart cooperation that would harm
their interests.
The reaction of many of the companies involved in fossil fuel
production use (particularly coal and oil) has been as would
be expected by a historical materialism [neo-Marxist] analy-
sis. Consider, for example, the Global Climate Coalition—a
grouping of (primarily) U.S. industry interests that has been
working hard to discredit the international scientifi c consen-
sus on climate change and to highlight the economic costs of
reductions.141
Neo-Marxist perspectives, particularly dependency theory, would
also highlight the many disagreements between the North and the South
over environmental issues:
Although many offi cials of developing countries . . . recognize
the seriousness of local and global environmental degradation
for their own economic future, many of them regard environ-
mental regimes for ozone and climate, for example, as a means
by which industrialized countries will maintain their control
over resources and technology or even gain control over resourc-
es now located in the South. One developing-country delegate
to the second meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol
in 1990 declared that for “some countries,” the protocol was a
“pretext” to place new obstacles in the way of efforts by devel-
oping countries to develop their economies.142
From this perspective, the North’s positions on environmental issues
are simply instances of “ecoimperialism.”143
Constructivist perspectives on international politics would empha-
size the importance of norms and discourse that have been constructed
on environmental cooperation.144 They would also point out the differ-
ences in the understandings of environment:
This insight helps explain much about global environmental
politics. One of the consistent mishaps in international environ-
mental affairs is the assumption that all parties concerned with
climate change, biological diversity, and so forth share the same
understanding of the problem. To take the most obvious exam-
ple: many northern states and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) work on behalf of wilderness preservation and biological
diversity in the developing world. Yet, many in the developing
world argue that one person’s wilderness is another person’s
home, and that what is a valued endangered species to some is
ecoimperialism
Perspective that sees
the North’s position on
environmental issues
as indirect control the
South.

Summary 499
dinner, a threat, or potential income to another. . . . “Nature,” as
such, is not a single realm with a universalized meaning, but an
ideational canvas on which one project’s one’s sensibilities, cul-
tural attributes, economic conditions, and social necessities.145
Feminist perspectives would also point out the gendered meanings
of nature and the environment. Some feminists argue that women and
women’s views have a special connection to environmental issues. Both
women and the natural environment, for example, fall prey to domina-
tion on a global level through the production and consumption patterns
created and maintained by the international market. The ramifi cations
of the international economic system for the natural environment are
most readily apparent in underdeveloped regions and, by extension, in
the lives of the rural people who depend on the natural world for their
survival. Because the daily tasks of providing for basic needs usually fall
to women in these communities, women are the most acutely aware of
the results of environmental destruction. The actions these women have
taken to reclaim the natural environment as their home have grown into
an international ecofeminist movement.146 Feminist activists have been
an important part of environmental politics, particularly on issues of
population and the importance of women’s status in changing population
dynamics.
SUMMARY
● The global community can be analyzed as an integrated entity rather
than simply a group of interrelated but separate states. Global environ-
mental problems lend themselves to such analyses because the hole in
the ozone layer, for example, does not respect international boundaries.
Since the 1970s, states have increasingly recognized the importance of
environmental issues and have placed global environmental coopera-
tion on the international political agenda.
● Important environmental challenges include pollution, damage to the
ozone layer, deforestation, global warming, availability of natural re-
sources and food supplies, and overpopulation. An integrated analysis
of such global problems as the population explosion, famine, depletion
of natural resources, global warming, and threats to the ozone layer in
the upper atmosphere reveals that ostensible solutions to any one of
those problems might unexpectedly make related problems even more
serious. The role of economic development and industrialization in
contributing to environmental problems has been part of the debate on
the global environment.
● Analysts of environmental issues tend either to be very pessimistic
about the future of the global community or optimistic that admittedly
serious problems can be dealt with. Pessimistic predictions from the
1960s and the 1970s about the population explosion, food shortages,
ecofeminist
movement Group with
perspective that links
oppression of women
with environmental
abuse.

500 Chapter 13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
and depletion of energy resources, for example, have proved premature
at best. And economic growth, which tends to be distrusted by many
pessimistic analysts, can create resources to devote to the solution of
global environmental problems.
● Although states, nongovernmental groups, and international organiza-
tions have become concerned about many environmental issues, coop-
eration on solutions to these issues has proved diffi cult, partly because
collective action requires states to take action that is not necessarily in
their short-term individual interests. Cooperation is also complicated
by divisions between states in the North and states in the South over
what economic development is sustainable, as well as by confl icts be-
tween environmental issues and free trade, business interests, and val-
ues related to reproduction.
● Despite these hurdles, there have been numerous efforts in recent years
to deal with environmental problems. These include the Montreal Pro-
tocol on chlorofl uorocarbons, the Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Kyoto Protocol, and the Convention on Biological
Diversity.
● Theoretical perspectives stress different factors for understanding global
environmental cooperation. Realism focuses on the importance of large
states that, seeking to protect their sovereignty and other interests, can
effectively block global initiatives on the environment, while liberal-
ism stresses the signifi cance of international and nongovernmental or-
ganizations in environmental negotiations. Neo-Marxists point to the
structure of energy capital in the world and how it affects attempts at
cooperation. Constructivist and feminist perspectives look at the hid-
den meaning in discourse and understandings about the environment.
KEY TERMS Stockholm Conference 466
global warming 468
population momentum 471
fertility rate 472
replacement level 473
demographic transition
theory 473
Montreal Protocol 485
UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea 485
Framework Convention on
Climate Change 485
Convention on Biological
Diversity 485
Kyoto Protocol 485
tragedy of the commons 486
common pool resources
(CPRs) 488
sustainable development 490
Marine Mammal Protection
Act 493
Greenpeace 495
ecoimperialism 498
ecofeminist movement 499

501
Globalization:
Contemporary Dynamics
and the Future of World
Politics
C H A P T E R 14
What Is Globalization?
• Economic Globalization
• Political Globalization
• Cultural Globalization
• Factors behind Globalization
A Historical Perspective on Globalization: How New Is It?
• Historical Roots
• Distinctive Characteristics of Contemporary Globalization
Globalization and Its Discontents
• Unequal Globalization
• Nationalism as a Countertrend
• Other Sources of Opposition to Globalization
Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics
• “The State Is Dead”
• “Long Live the State”
• Understanding the Future of Globalization and the State
Summary
Key Terms

502 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
This fi nal chapter discusses a dynamic that is perhaps the central characteristic of global politics in contemporary times. Globaliza-
tion arguably is the most important process affecting relations between
states, as well as nonstate actors, today. Many of the previous chapters
have already raised some of the topics that are critical to a discussion
of globalization. The growing number and signifi cance of multinational,
nongovernmental, and terrorist organizations and the implications for
the power and autonomy of states (Chapter 4); the changing role of con-
fl ict in the international system (Chapter 7); the growing signifi cance of
international organizations, law, and norms in the post–Cold War system
(Chapter 9); the rise and consequences of interdependence and liberaliza-
tion in the international political economy (Chapter 10); the spread of
capitalism and regional integration (Chapters 11 and 12); and the global
nature of and global solutions to environmental problems (Chapter 13)
are all linked to the globalization process. Any discussion of globalization
raises the question of how new this process really is, and if it is occurring
at all. This question pushes us to assess globalization in historical and
theoretical perspective (Chapters 1, 2, and 3).
This chapter brings together these themes related to globalization by
fi rst defi ning it, examining the evidence for economic, political, and cul-
tural globalization, and reviewing the factors, such as technology, behind
it. The chapter then assesses the novelty and scope of globalization and
its political opponents and contrary trends. We end with a look at the
effects of globalization on states and the consequences for future ways in
which global politics might operate and be understood.
What Is Globalization?
G lobalization is one of the most used, and perhaps overused, terms to describe world politics today:
Indeed, globalization is in danger of becoming, if it has not
already become, the cliché of our times. . . . Clichés, neverthe-
less, often capture elements of the lived experience of an epoch.
In this respect, globalization refl ects a widespread perception
that the world is rapidly being molded into a shared social space
by economic and technological forces and that developments in
one region of the world can have profound consequences for . . .
individuals or communities on the other side of the globe.1
Globalization is similar to interdependence, and the two terms are
often used interchangeably. Recall from Chapter 1 that according to the
theoretical perspective of liberalism, interdependence means that what
happens inside one state can have signifi cant effects on what happens
inside another state and that there has been a rise in the signifi cance of non-
state and substate actors, which connect states in a network of relations.

What Is Globalization? 503
While the fortunes of states may have always been connected, or inter-
dependent, liberalism proposes that the interdependence between states
and other actors reached an unprecedented level by the 1970s. This is one
reason, as we will discuss following, that some say the current globaliza-
tion is not really new, that it is merely a continuation of the trends appar-
ent in the 1970s.
Although the concepts of globalization and interdependence are
similar, globalization places more emphasis on the growing similarity
of people, places, and things in a “borderless world.”2 Economies, for
example, are not simply more connected; the distinctions between them
are becoming less meaningful. Defi nitions of globalization typically stress
the “increase in interconnections, or interdependence, a rise in trans-
national fl ows [like the preceding defi nition of interdependence], and
an intensifi cation of processes such that the world is in some respects,
becoming a single place.”3 Globalization is then the process of reach-
ing that single place, a global village. There is evidence for this global
homogenization process, which makes people, places, and things around
the world more similar in many interrelated areas. The most important
arenas for globalization are economic, political, and cultural.
Economic Globalization
It is in the economic sphere that we most think of and refer to globaliza-
tion. In a globalized economy, borders and distance do not hinder eco-
nomic transactions.4 In many ways, a global marketplace has developed.
If economic globalization trends continue, the world will presumably
approach a single economy.
With respect to world trade, for example, “today all countries trade
internationally and, with the odd exception like North Korea, they
trade signifi cant proportions of their national income.”5 Indeed, the
percentage of the world’s GDP that is traded increased from 42 percent
in 1980 to 62 percent by 2007.6 One component of the rise in world
trade is trade in services, as compared to trade in goods. “Today, a global
marketplace is developing for retail sales as well as manufacturing.
Law, advertising, business consulting, and fi nancial and other services
are also marketed internationally.”7 As a result, it is diffi cult to fi nd
anything—goods or services—to buy that did not originate somewhere
else. Starbucks coffee shops are everywhere, as are McDonald’s res-
taurants. Indeed, Western products, including Kinko’s, Gerber, Coca-
Cola, Starbucks, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Haagen-Dazs, and Dunkin’
Donuts, are readily available in China. McDonald’s has more than
900 restaurants, with 60,000 employees in China, and in a recent sur-
vey, almost half of Chinese children believed that McDonald’s was a
Chinese company.8
economic
globalization
Economic integration
approaching a single
world economy.

504 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
Another major aspect of economic globalization concerns international
financial flows:
Globalization often implies abandoning national ties and
embracing supranational alliances. In international fi nance, this
is more than a buzzword; it is a reality. . . . Nationality simply
means less than it did even a year ago. Global fi nancial products
are accessible in national markets and national investors can
operate in global markets. Investment banks used to split up
their analyst teams by country to cover a national market; now
they tend to do it by industrial sector across all major countries.9
The international banking market rose to 48 percent of world output
in 2006, as compared to 10 percent in 1980.10 As noted in Chapter 4, for-
eign direct investment has reached unprecedented levels. World foreign
exchange levels have skyrocketed as well.11 Indeed,
there are few more pervasive images of globalization than men and
women at their trading desks in the City of London or Wall Street
frantically buying and selling currencies and assets from around
the globe at the push of a button. Although heavily concentrated
in the three main centres of London, Tokyo, and New York, world
foreign exchange trading averages a staggering $1,490 billion every
working day. In addition billions of dollars of fi nancial assets are
traded daily across the globe. . . . The development of new fi nan-
cial instruments, the deregulation of national fi nancial markets
As seen here in
India, mixture of
traditional dress and
high technology is a
common sight in today’s
globalized world.
(Jami Tarris/Getty Images)

What Is Globalization? 505
and the growth of international banks and other fi nancial institu-
tions have created a functioning global fi nancial system.12
The recent world fi nancial crises (as discussed in Chapter 10) showed
the consequences of fi nancial globalization. Economies are more vulnera-
ble than ever before as foreign exchanges of currencies, which can now be
executed on a twenty-four-hour basis, cause the value of many currencies
to plummet overnight and the internationalization of banking and fi nan-
cial assets mean that problems in one economy undermine confi dence in
the entire system.
The primary actors facilitating economic globalization are multina-
tional corporations (MNCs), increasingly referred to as global corporations.
McDonald’s, for example, has restaurants in more than 119 countries.13
As discussed in Chapter 4, these businesses are more global, more numer-
ous, and bigger than ever before. Accounting for most of world trade, par-
ticularly in technology and private research and development,
the operations of MNCs are central to processes of economic
globalization. They play a signifi cant role in the globalization of
trade, fi nance, technology and (through output and media owner-
ship) culture, as well as in the diffusion of military technology.
But MNCs are implicated most centrally in the internationaliza-
tion of production and services activity; they can be conceived as
stretching business across regions and continents.14
Alongside the legitimate global marketplace, an illegal global mar-
ket has been growing as well, contributing to economic globalization.15
“The forces shaping the legitimate global economy are also nourishing
globally integrated crime. . . . Huge increases in the volume of goods and
people crossing borders and competitive pressures to speed the fl ow of
trade by easing inspections and reducing paperwork make it easier to
hide contraband.”16 Although estimates of international crime are not
completely reliable, many believe that international crime is a $1 trillion
a year business, an amount equal to about 4 percent of the total interna-
tional economy. Half of this is thought to be in narcotics trade.17
Economic interdependence, in terms of trade and fi nance, has cer-
tainly been present among the wealthy countries of the North, integrated
together after World War II in the Bretton Woods system (as discussed in
Chapter 10). What makes current economic dynamics global is the spread
of these practices to most of the rest of the world. The fall of the Commu-
nist bloc and the change in leadership and economic policies in China led
to linkages between these countries and the West and their incorporation
into the global trading and fi nancial systems.
Linkages between the North and South are growing as well. One econ-
omist argues that “the most notable features of the new world economy
are the increasing links between the high- and low-income countries. . . .
The great novelty of the current era is the extent to which the poorer

506 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
nations of the world have been incorporated in the global system of trade,
fi nance, and production as partners and market participants rather than
colonial dependencies.”18 In terms of trade, most countries by 1990 had
a trading relationship with most of the other countries in the world.19
While trade between the developed and developing states still dominants
the developing states’ economies, trade between developing economies
has risen over the last several decades.20
International fi nancial fl ows are more global today as well, incor-
porating the transition economies of the former Communist bloc and
the developing countries. By the 1990s, international investors were
increasingly interested in emerging markets (see Chapter 10). As a result,
investment companies’ portfolio allocations became increasingly global
in coverage.21 Net private capital fl ows to developing countries jumped
from $208 billion in 2003 to $961 billion in 2007.22
Multinational corporations are also found in new locations:
All regions of the globe, to a greater or lesser extent, are both the
home of and host to MNCs or their foreign affi liates. But what is
striking is the scale of MNC activity within, and from the devel-
oping countries. . . . In the late 1980s developing countries were
home to some 3,800 indigenous MNCs; by the mid-1990s . . .
this had more than doubled. This is an indication of the expand-
ing reach of global production and distribution systems.23
Incorporation of the developing and transition economies into the
world economic system occurred with these countries’ liberalization
(diminishing government restrictions) of their own economies (see
Chapters 10 and 11). Since the end of the Cold War, most countries
liberalized their foreign investment regulations and actively encouraged
inward investment. Indeed, from 1992 to 2001, 95 percent of adjust-
ments that states made to their trade policies were in the direction of
liberalization.24 In this way, the world has witnessed a homogenization
of economies. Rather than the mix of market economies, planned econ-
omies, and hybrid economies that characterized the Cold War period,
most economies moved in the direction of liberal market economies,
more similar to the economies of the wealthy North. This homogeniza-
tion in terms of liberalization was institutionalized on a global scale.
The institutions of the Bretton Woods system, such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), now incorporate more
countries around the world. Most important, the formalization of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principles into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the expansion of WTO (discussed
in Chapter 10) to include most of the countries of the world (153 of
the approximately 193 countries by mid-2009) have institutionalized a
global trading regime. And as discussed in Chapter 12, even the increas-
ing regionalization of the world economy may work in tandem with the
globalization of economic relations.

What Is Globalization? 507
Political Globalization
International institutions such as the WTO and the IMF are contributing
to another form of globalization: political globalization—“the stretching
of political relations across space and time; the extension of political power
and political activity across the boundaries of the modern nationstate.”25
It is characterized by the rise in number and signifi cance of international
and regional organizations and nonstate transnational actors.26 The trans-
national networks of international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations that play political roles arguably compose a new system of
global governance.27
As discussed in Chapter 9, the United Nations has become more
active since the end of the Cold War and has taken on more roles, such
as peacemaking and humanitarian intervention, without the consent
of sovereign states. Although far from a world government, the United
Nations is clearly acting as a global governing system: providing a forum
for debate, codifying developing norms, and at times enforcing norms
through its executive body, the Security Council. More recently, the
United Nations helped to create the International Criminal Court (ICC)
to deal with cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
(see Chapter 9). The ICC began functioning on a permanent basis in July
2002 and represents the trend toward political globalization. The number
of recent multilateral international agreements, often negotiated in the
UN framework, to deal with global challenges such as environmental
threats (see Chapter 13) is also contributing to the globalization of issues
as states recognize that certain problems are transnational and require
cooperation across state boundaries. Yet global governance is
not only the formal institutions and organizations through
which the rules and norms governing world order are (or are not)
made and sustained—the institutions of state, intergovernmen-
tal cooperation and so on—but also all those organizations and
pressure groups—from MNCs, transnational social movements
to the plethora of non-governmental organizations—which pur-
sue goals and objectives which have a bearing on transnational
rule and authority systems. . . . Clearly, the United Nations
system, the World Trade Organization, and the array of activi-
ties of national governments are among the central compo-
nents of global governance, but they are by no means the only
components.28
As seen in Chapter 4, the growth of NGOs and their capacity to infl u-
ence world politics are striking characteristics of today’s global system.
Not only do they serve as pressure groups, but they also are performing
a variety of political functions that states have failed to provide or have
handed over to NGOs. As such, they are increasingly important partici-
pants in global governance.
political globalization
Extension of political
power and activity across
state boundaries.
global governance
Multiple, interconnecting
spheres of political
authority beyond
sovereign states.

508 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
Along with the United Nations, NGOs infl uence the norms and
regimes that are becoming increasingly global. As discussed in Chapter 9,
norms regarding women’s rights and human rights, for example, can have
powerful effects on states’ behavior, and a number of norms have reached
almost global acceptance and are becoming codifi ed in international law.
Indeed,
changes in international law have placed individuals, govern-
ments and non-governmental organizations under new sys-
tems of legal regulation. . . . One signifi cant area in this regard
is human rights law and human rights regimes. “The defence
of human dignity knows no boundaries,” observes Emilio
Mignone, an Argentinean human rights campaigner. . . . This
statement captures important elements of the international
human rights regime as a global political and legal framework
for promoting rights.29
Another emerging global norm is democracy. As we saw in Chapter 9,
there is greater acceptance today that democratic governance is a legal
right. The growing democratization of the world is an additional form of
political globalization. Countries are becoming more similar as democ-
racy as a form of government has spread to more parts of the globe (see
Chapter 3). This homogenization of politics has meant that by the 1990s,
most of the people in the world lived in systems that could be character-
ized as “free” or “partly free.”30 This development has been referred to as
the “globalization of democracy.”31
Cultural Globalization
The spread of democracy as a political system is associated with the
spread of democratic values that is part of cultural globalization. Culture
involves values, norms, traditions, and practices, and many see a homog-
enization of what people do, think, and value around the world. People
are buying the same products, listening to the same music, playing the
same video games, eating the same food, and watching the same televi-
sion programs.
Few expressions of globalization are so visible, widespread and
pervasive as the worldwide proliferation of internationally
traded consumer brands [such as Coca-Cola], the global ascen-
dancy of popular cultural icons [such as Madonna] and artifacts
[such as Harry Potter books], and the simultaneous communica-
tion of events by satellite broadcasts [for example, by CNN] to
hundreds of millions of people at a time on all continents.32
Cultural globalization means that norms, practices, symbols, and val-
ues from one culture have spread globally. Cees Hamelink, in his book,
cultural
globalization
Worldwide spread of
similar norms, values,
and practices.

What Is Globalization? 509
Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications, records these “experi-
ences of the international scene”:
In a Mexican village the traditional ritual dance precedes a soccer
match, but the performance features a gigantic Coca-Cola bottle.
In Singapore, a band dressed in traditional Malay costume offers
a heart-breaking imitation of Fats Domino.
In Saudi Arabia, the television station performs only one cultural
function—the call for the Moslem prayer. Five times a day, North
American cops and robbers yield to the traditional muezzin.
In its gigantic advertising campaign, IBM assures Navajo Indians
that their cultural identity can be effectively protected if they
use IBM typewriters equipped with the Navajo alphabet.33
The spread of Western culture to Asia, particularly China, has been
rapid. “Until the late 1970s and early 1980s,” for example, “most peo-
ple paid little attention to their calendar birth date if they remembered
it at all. McDonald’s and its rivals now promote the birthday party—
complete with cake, candles, and silly hats—in television advertising
aimed directly at kids,” and by all indications, it is working.34 Similarly,
most Chinese people never drank coffee until Starbucks opened in
China. Now there are approximately 700 Starbucks stores in China.
Popular culture is perhaps the most pervasive aspect of cultural glo-
balization. “The globalization of the music industry,” for example,
has . . . taken a number of forms. First it has involved the cre-
ation of transnational corporations producing and marketing
records. Second, it has involved the import and export of musi-
cal products and the penetration of national markets by foreign
artists and music. Third, it has in part been based on a broader
transfer of styles and images that are largely rooted in American
youth culture and black cultures.35
The fi lm industry has experienced globalization as well, with U.S.,
Indian, French, Italian, and British fi lms attracting audiences all over
the world. The share of box offi ce receipts that come from import-
ed fi lms (usually from the United States) was high by 1990 in many
countries—over 60 percent in France and Japan, 80 percent in Italy, and
over 90 percent in the United Kingdom and Sweden.36 The story for tele-
vision is similar. Sesame Street is broadcast in more than 100 countries,
and 84 million people worldwide watch CSI: Miami each week. CNN
is another example of the homogenization of television programming.
CNN is broadcast in more than 200 countries and has become an impor-
tant news source for a signifi cant number of people, including leaders.
Cultural globalization also has its linguistic form.

510 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
We can apply the idea of globalization to language in a number
of ways. The fi rst and most obvious is the diffusion of any one
individual language across the globe. The second sense in which
languages or language capacities have been globalized is through
the diffusion of bilingualism or multilingualism, easing the
transmission of cultural products and ideas. Although there are
over 5,000 languages in the contemporary world and many more
dialects and regional variations, . . . ten to twelve languages
[such as Japanese, German, Arabic, Russian, French, and Chi-
nese] now account for the fi rst language of over 60 percent of the
world’s population. . . . But it is English that stands at the very
centre of the global language system. It has become the lingua
franca par excellence. . . . It has become the central language of
international communication in business, politics, administra-
tion, science and academia as well as being the dominate lan-
guage of globalized advertising and popular culture.37
English is the language used for international computing and interna-
tional safety procedures as well.
Cultural globalization is occurring at the personal level too, as more
and more people have moved to other countries. Migration patterns have
become global, with almost every state in the world exporting emigrants
or importing immigrants. Immigration from the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe, sealed off during the Cold War, became part of the global
migratory fl ow once again by the 1990s.38 In addition to migration, cul-
tures come into contact with one another when refugees cross borders.
A refugee is a person who is outside his or her country of nationality
and cannot return owing to a well-founded fear of persecution because of
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular
social group.39
People fl eeing war conditions are also considered refugees. There
were more than 11 million refugees in 2009, a population bigger than
some states, and up from 8.4 million in 1980.40
As a result, many states have a large “foreign” population as a result
of heavy levels of migration and refugee fl ows, and once-distinct cultures
are arguably giving way to a more shared global experience. Worldwide
tourism, “which generates jobs, offers foreign exchange, and shapes men-
tal images of peoples and places,”41 is also affecting cultural globalization
and is on the rise. In the past two decades, for example, the number of
people who traveled internationally more than doubled, from 287 million
a year to 595 million a year.42
One aspect of globalization is the extent to which it is dominated by
the United States. How much, in other words, is globalization a process
of mutual homogenization, and how much is it simply Americanization?
The Americanization of the world can be seen in economic globalization,
because U.S.-based MNCs and products dominate the global marketplace,
and in political globalization, because the United States is a major player
migration
Movement of people
across countries.
refugees
Persons who have left
their home countries to
fl ee political persecution
or confl ict conditions.

What Is Globalization? 511
in international institutions and the development of global norms. But
it is in the cultural globalization area that charges of Americanization,
and even cultural imperialism, are most debated. Clearly, the United
States dominates cultural globalization in all aspects, from the global
music industry (Madonna and Michael Jackson) to food (McDonald’s and
Kentucky Fried Chicken) to fi lms (Disney) and television (CNN) and
the global predominance of the English language. Yet are Americans and
American culture untouched by cultural globalization? Arguably they are
not. “Foreign” food—sushi, Thai, Ethiopian—is more popular than ever
before in the United States, and not just in major cities. And “according
to the Italian culinary magazine Gambero Rosso, there are about twice as
many reasonably authentic Italian restaurants outside of Italy as there are
McDonald’s restaurants in all of the world, including the United States.”43
WorldBeat music is quite popular in the United States, and two recent
crazes in American youth culture were also imports: Harry Potter from
Great Britain and Pokémon from Japan. Moreover, recent trends in televi-
sion watching around the globe show a decline in the popularity of U.S.
shows in favor of local ones. “A recent survey by Nielsen Media Research
found that 71% of the top 10 programs in 60 countries were locally
produced.”44 In sports, Michael Veseth points out that although basket-
ball is arguably an “American” game that is going global, many players
in the U.S. National Basketball Association are from other countries. He
also notes that the United States does not dominate—in fact, hardly even
participates in—soccer, which is more of a global sport, followed by fans
in most parts of the world.”45 According to Joseph Nye, “The idea that
globalization equals Americanization is common but simplistic.”46
Factors behind Globalization
One of the primary factors behind contemporary globalization—economic,
political, and cultural—is the revolution in technology, particularly as it
pertains to communication and the information revolution.47 Distance-
shrinking technologies allow different parts of the world to be connected.
People can talk with one another more easily and cheaply than ever
before, they can travel to various parts of the globe more quickly, and
they can share information across borders instantaneously.
For example, the number of main telephone lines in the world almost
doubled between 1991 and 2001, and the number of mobile cellular phone
owners increased from 16 million in 1991 to over 4 billion in 2008. In the same
time frame, the number of international telephone traffi c minutes more than
tripled. The changes in computer technology have made a tremendous
impact on communication and information processing. In 1980, there were
probably fewer than 2 million computers in the entire world, and most
of them were mainframes, or very large computers. By 1991, there were
about 130 million computers, and most of those were personal, or desktop,
computers (PCs). From 1991 to 2005, the number of PCs grew by more
than 600 percent, to over 800 million. During that same time, the Internet
cultural
imperialism
Dominance of one
country’s culture over
others.
distance-shrinking
technologies
Communication and
information tools that
allow different parts of
the world to be easily
connected.

512 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
became usable for most people with PCs, and the number of Internet users
skyrocketed from 4.4 million in 1991 to over 1 billion by 2006.48
New information technology, particularly computers and the Inter-
net, has the ability to transform the way the people around the world
communicate and interact. These technologies are an important part
of economic, political, and cultural globalization. In terms of econom-
ics, new technologies have decreased transport costs and contributed to
the growth of trade to unprecedented levels.49 Furthermore, advances
in communications have drastically increased the velocity of interna-
tional fi nancial transactions by allowing trading to occur on a twenty-
four-hour basis around the world.50 Technological advances have con-
tributed to the illegal global market as well. “The largely unregulated
multi-trillion-dollar pool of money in supranational cyberspace, acces-
sible by computer 24 hours a day, eases the drug trade’s toughest prob-
lem: transforming huge sums of hot cash into investments in legitimate
business.”51
Technology is no doubt having an impact on politics and political glo-
balization. “The most powerful engine of change in the relative decline
of states and the rise of nonstate actors is the computer and telecom-
munications revolutions.”52 In authoritarian Yugoslavia, for example, the
Serbian opposition at Radio B92 used the Internet to get their message
out when President Milosevic had shut the radio station down. After the
cyber-broadcast, international pressure led to the reopening of the sta-
tion.53 Human rights groups have also used the Internet to get interna-
tional attention:54
Within hours of the fi rst gunshots of the Chiapas rebellion in
southern Mexico in January 1994 . . . the Internet swarmed with
messages from human rights activists. The worldwide media
attention they and their groups focused on Chiapas, along with
the infl ux of rights activists to the area, sharply limited the
Mexican government’s response. What in other times would
have been a bloody insurgency turned out to be a largely non-
violent confl ict. “The shots lasted ten days,” José Angel Gurria,
Mexico’s foreign minister, later remarked, “and ever since, the
war has been . . . a war on the Internet.55
Technology is changing the political relationships between states as
well. Capturing territory, for example, is not what it used to be. After the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq discovered that the Kuwaiti government
and banks had already electronically transferred all of the money from
the accounts and could use this money to help fund the ouster of the Iraqi
army from Kuwait.56 Technological developments, particularly the Inter-
net, may be changing the very nature of security threats:
Increasingly, security is defi ned not by the numbers of weap-
ons in place or the number of troops that can be deployed at a

What Is Globalization? 513
moment’s notice but by the ability to gain or deny access to crit-
ical information. . . . Just as the concept of security is changing,
so is the defi nition of threats. Because the Network puts extraor-
dinary power in the hands of individuals and small groups, its
existence inevitably heightens concerns about terrorism. . . . As
more and more business activity takes place on the Web, the
specter of economic terrorism will also rise. For example, the
existence of the Network makes it possible for malicious hack-
ers to crash the New York Stock Exchange, to siphon billions of
dollars of “digital cash” from banks, or to seize control of com-
puters that manage electric powergrids.57
Communication revolutions are also a factor in cultural globaliza-
tion. New, less costly, more effi cient, and better-quality ways of stor-
ing and transmitting music, for example, mean that music can be shared
more easily around the globe. Similarly, music, programs, and news can
be better shared on television with the development and spread of satel-
lites and cable television. “Both of these technologies allow television
corporations to circumvent the regulatory capacity of nation-states to
some degree, and to break from the national limits of terrestrial broad-
casting structures.”58 Social networking applications, such as Facebook,
also operate globally.
In general, the information revolution technologies facilitate cul-
tural globalization. “By drastically reducing the importance of proxim-
ity, the new technologies change people’s perceptions of community. Fax
machines, satellite hookups, and the Internet connect people across bor-
ders with exponentially growing ease while separating them from natu-
ral and historical associations within nations.”59 And although language
differences are an obstacle to globalization, programs on the Internet can
translate webpages or search the Internet across languages. Some argue
that this “will further loosen culture from its geographic moorings, there-
by contributing to the creation of a free-fl oating cosmopolitan class that
is not restricted by national identity.”60
Despite the undeniable importance of technological developments in
contemporary globalization, the technological factor cannot be divorced
from politics. “If historical experience demonstrates anything, it is that
integration is not technologically determined. If it were, integration
would have gone smoothly forward over the past two centuries. On the
contrary, despite continued falls in the costs of transport and commu-
nications in the fi rst half of the twentieth century, integration actually
reversed course.”61 Certain states, groups, and interests stand to gain
from globalization and have actively pushed for globalizing technologies
and policies:
While technological openings may in some sense have “driven”
the process of opening markets and societies, technological
advances do not occur in an economic or political vacuum.

514 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
Sustained political and investment decisions drive technologi-
cal advances. Scientists did not happen upon the discovery of
powerful supercomputers, tiny microchips, and fi beroptic tele-
communications links by accident. These advances came about
through sustained investment, political, and social policy that
harnessed resources in pursuit of technological progress, and
pursued technological innovation as a tool to advance economic
and political goals.62
Certain states benefi t more from globalization than others and have
pursued decidedly pro-globalization policies. In other words, “globaliza-
tion is not destined, it is chosen.”63 The economically liberal policies
and capitalist practices of the United States (see Chapter 10), for exam-
ple, mean that globalization, at least in its economic form, “is largely
an American creation, rooted in the period after World War II and based
on U.S. economic might.”64 Historical and political factors associated
with the end of the Cold War—the spread of capitalism and a largely
unchallenged unipolar international system—have also facilitated glo-
balization. Globalization, however, was probably not inevitable and is
likely not irreversible. States have made other choices and still can serve
as anti-globalization forces (to be discussed following). Even though,
for example, the United States has done much to further economic and
cultural globalization, it does not always support newly emerging inter-
national norms and agreements, as discussed in Chapter 9.
A Historical Perspective on Globalization:
How New Is It?
This summary of the evidence for economic, political, and cultural globalization and the technological developments related to it may
impart the sense that we have indeed entered a completely new era of
global politics. This is one school of thought on globalization, which
David Held and his colleagues refer to as the hyperglobalist thesis. “For
the hyperglobalizers . . . contemporary globalization defi nes a new era
in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the disciplines
of the global marketplace. . . . Economic globalization is constructing
new forms of social organization that are supplanting, or will eventually
supplant, traditional nation-states as the primary economic and politi-
cal units of world society.”65 The globalization skeptics, for their part,
point to long historical trends in arguing that globalization is not new
at all.66 Indeed, some say that globalization is as old as history itself.
If globalization is the increase in contact of people across geographi-
cal space, then “when groups of people fi rst came into contact with
one another through conquest, trade, and migration, the globe began to
shrink.”67
hyperglobalizers
Individuals who
believe contemporary
globalization has
produced a new and
unique era.
globalization
skeptics
Individuals who believe
globalization has long,
historical roots.

A Historical Perspective on Globalization: How New Is It? 515
Historical Roots
Many skeptics point out that recent technological developments con-
nected to globalization are simply part of long-term trends, dating back
centuries from sail power to steam power, from the telegraph to the
telephone, and from commercial air travel to e-mail.68 And although
trade and fi nancial relations across political borders can be traced back
to antiquity, early international economic relations were fairly limit-
ed.69 Some skeptics would suggest that the sixteenth century, with
the development of capitalist modes of production, is the real starting
point of economic globalization.70 Others use indicators from early in
the twentieth century to show that connections between economies are
not that different from those of today. For example, a comparison of the
leading economies’ dependence on world trade (exports and imports as
a percentage of GDP) in 1910 and near the end of the twentieth century
shows that the proportion of world production in global markets is not
incredibly higher for most countries, contrary to what one might expect
(see Table 14.1). The United States is the only leading economy to see a
doubling of its ratio of trade to gross domestic product (GDP) during the
century.
From 1870 to 1914, world trade expanded greatly, and for some com-
modities, such as rice and wheat, truly global markets were formalized.71
During this time, Great Britain provided fi nancial stability by supplying a
gold standard to give confi dence in its currency. “Indeed, for the skeptics,
the classical Gold Standard era prior to the First World War is taken as
a benchmark for fi nancial globalization, in so far as they argue that the
scale of net fl ows was greater than at any time since and that adherence
to the rules of the Gold Standard meant that countries had to subordinate
their domestic economic policy to a rigid set of international rules.”72
Of course, it was in the period after World War II that world trade levels
grew at a remarkable rate, with the establishment of the Bretton Woods
fi xed exchange rate system and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
TABLE 14.1
Leading Economies’ Dependence on World Trade (Exports and Imports as
Percentage of GDP)
1910 1995
United Kingdom 44% 57%
Germany 38 46
France 35 43
United States 11 24
Source: Martin Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” Foreign Affairs, pp. 178–191.
Reprinted by permission of Foreign Affairs, January/February 2001. © 2001 by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc. www.ForeignAffairs.com.

www.ForeignAffairs.com

516 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
Trade (as discussed in Chapter 10). Thus, many date the beginning of
economic globalization to the immediate postwar period and view
today’s global economy as nothing more than the continuation of these
historical trends.
In the realm of political globalization, there is also historical prece-
dent. After all, in the age of empires—from Roman to British—large areas
came under the control of imperial states (see Chapter 2), making these
areas more integrated in some ways than the sovereign state system of
approximately 193 countries today:
Undoubtedly, the rapidly developing empires of Britain and of
other European states were the most powerful agents of glo-
balization in the late nineteenth century. . . . At issue was not
simply an intensifi cation of European expansion along a con-
tinuum that ran back through earlier centuries, but a new order
of relations of domination and subordination among the major
regions of the world, aided by new communications and trans-
port infrastructures which facilitated new mechanisms of politi-
cal control.73
The development of global governance is also not new. Even the
beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the growth of organizations
and regulatory regimes, such as the International Telegraph Union estab-
lished in 1865, so that “by 1914 . . . signifi cant aspects of global affairs
were already subject to international regulation by world organizations . . .
[which] gradually extended beyond the boundaries of Europe to embrace
a global jurisdiction.”74 Others would argue that political globalization
really began in the 1970s with the rise of nonstate actors including the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Amnesty Inter-
national, and Greenpeace, although these too had historical precedents,
the International Red Cross among them.
Current cultural globalization is a long-established trend and noth-
ing new, say some skeptics. Empires, in addition to providing political
uniformity, also homogenized cultures in various ways. Latin and Greek
served as offi cial languages, and Rome-built theaters and amphitheaters
spread drama and poetry across the Roman Empire. The British Empire
globalized culture as well:
At its height the British Empire was the most global of any for-
mal empire . . . [and] there was a strong cultural . . . dimension
to both the execution of British dominance and the mainte-
nance of complex links between centre and periphery. . . . This
took a multiplicity of forms, but two of the most important
were the conduct of imperial educational policy and the estab-
lishment of an imperial communications infrastructure, both of
which offer clear examples of the globalization of culture and
communications.75

A Historical Perspective on Globalization: How New Is It? 517
In education, for example, the English language and English ideas and
cultural practice were the basis of the curriculum in the English model of
education established for elites throughout the British colonies.76
Historically, religion, such as Islam and Christianity, has also served
as a powerful force of cultural integration. World religions “are systems of
belief and ritual that have had the capacity at crucial historical moments
to reach out from their place of origin and embrace, convert and conquer
other cultures and other religions. . . . World religions unquestionably
constitute one of the most powerful and signifi cant forms of the global-
ization of culture in the pre-modern era, indeed of all time.”77 In the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, diverse cultures were shaped by secu-
lar globalizing ideological forces and belief systems such as socialism,
liberalism, and the scientifi c mode of thinking that infl uenced peoples
throughout the world.78
If immigration, in addition to technology, is a conduit of cultural glo-
balization, then there is another reason to doubt the novelty of today’s
global village, because high immigration is also not without precedent.
Mass migration peaked in 1815 when approximately 60 million Europe-
ans emigrated. In the 1890s, immigration to the United States soared,
increasing the population by 9 percent during that single decade. In the
1990s, the United States had one of the highest immigration rates in
the world, but the increase in the population was only 4 percent over the
decade.79 “The current era of globalization has not even approached the
cosmopolitanism and openness to migration that characterized the pre-
1914 phase.”80
Distinctive Characteristics of Contemporary
Globalization
While it is clear that current economic, political, and cultural dynam-
ics have historical roots and are not completely novel, most agree that
there are quantitative and qualitative differences between the past and
the present.81
In between the hyperglobalists and the skeptics on the debate on glo-
balization are the transformationalists:
Transformationalists make no claims about the future trajec-
tory of globalization; nor do they seek to evaluate the present
in relation to some single, fi xed ideal-type “globalized world,”
whether a global market or a global civilization. Rather, trans-
formationalist accounts emphasize globalization as a long-term
historical process. . . . Such caution about the exact future of
globalization is matched, nonetheless, by the conviction that
contemporary patterns of global economic, military, techno-
logical, ecological, migratory, political and cultural fl ows are
historically unprecedented.82
transformationalists
Individuals who view
globalization as both
historically rooted and
unprecedented.

518 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
The distinctiveness of contemporary global politics concerns the
scope and velocity of recent technological developments and economic,
political, and cultural globalization. In terms of scope of globalization,
more parts of the world are connected through technology than ever
before. Although television, for example, has been around for a long time,
it is only with recent developments in satellites and cable that more
people have access to television and to programs and news from differ-
ent countries. Moreover, while economic integration and liberalization
increased throughout the twentieth century, it was primarily limited
to the advanced economies. Overall, “today the world trading system is
defi ned both by an intensive network of trading relations embracing vir-
tually all economies and by evolving global markets for many goods and
some services.”83
The velocity of globalization is also distinct. “Many communications
improvements have been taking place over the last century, but the con-
temporary speed of change, the enlargement of capacity for information
(and capital) transmission and the proliferation of communications media
have not been experienced before.”84 And although the degree of fi nancial
interdependence may not be drastically different from some past eras, the
speed at which the transmission of fi nancial exchange can take place is
remarkably faster.85 Effi ciency has increased along with velocity, so that
there is no denying quantum changes. . . . Along with major
technological breakthroughs in production systems, commu-
nications, and transportation . . . the reduction of barriers has
markedly accelerated the movement of goods, services, capital,
labor, and knowledge. Not only is there a major rise in the veloc-
ity of transactions, but the cost of various types of transport,
telephone calls, and computers has plummeted. For example,
owing to satellite technology, the price of a three-minute call
from New York to London dropped from $244.65 in 1930 to
$31.58 in 1970, and to $3.32 in 1990.86
The degree of institutionalization of integration and coordination in politi-
cal globalization may also be unique. “The nineteenth century was a world
of unilateral and discretionary policy. The late twentieth century, by com-
parison, was a world of multilateral and institutionalized policy.”87
Thus, transformationalists argue that while it is important to keep
in mind the historical roots of today’s global politics, it is also wise to
recognize the changes that are taking place.
Globalization and Its Discontents
While some argue that globalization is not new, others insist that it is not really happening at all.88 The “globalization” processes out-
lined previously, some say, are not truly global, but rather limited to spe-
cifi c parts of the world. Furthermore, the unevenness of globalization is

Globalization and Its Discontents 519
causing devastation among those who are becoming more marginalized
from the “globalizers” of the world. National and subnational cultures
are under pressure, and because of this, some see a resurgence in local
cultures rather than movement toward a global culture. Finally, global-
ization faces considerable political opposition from those who see it as a
threat to their values and interests.89
Unequal Globalization
As discussed in Chapter 11, the economic gap between the North and the
South, as measured by many indicators, is worsening despite any trends
in economic globalization and, some argue, because of globalization.90
This is due in part, according to the skeptics’ argument on economic glo-
balization, to the fact that the world economy is not globalized but is in
fact concentrated in Europe, Japan, and North America:
For most skeptics, if the current evidence demonstrates any-
thing it is that economic activity is undergoing a signifi cant
“regionalization” as the world economy evolves in the direction
of three major fi nancial and trading blocs, that is Europe, Asia-
Pacifi c and North America. . . . In comparison with the classical
Gold Standard era, the world economy is therefore signifi cantly
less integrated than it once was.91
Furthermore, skeptics point to the marginalization of the developing
world: “the creation of a global market has resulted in a growing divide
between rich and poor, with new pockets of affl uence arising in areas of
widespread poverty and stagnation. Rapidly changing class dynamics are
often a source of friction and become especially explosive when new class
disparities correspond to long-standing ethnic and religious divisions.
Thus, while globalization has improved living conditions in some coun-
tries, it has also increased the risk of confl ict in others”92 and between
the North and the South.
Part of the inequality stems from the vast differences that the North
and the South have in terms of their access to the revolutions in tech-
nology.93 North America, Europe, and Japan, for example, account for
75 percent of all international telephone calls. On average, individuals
in the richest countries currently use 36.6 minutes of international tele-
phone traffi c per person per year, while individuals in sub-Saharan Africa
average 1 minute per person per year.94 Similarly, in 1992, there were
498 TV sets per 1,000 people in the developed countries, compared to
61 sets per 1,000 people in the developing world.95 Access to mobile
phones, computers the Internet is also very uneven across the globe (see
Table 14.2). Within regions, there are signifi cant differences as well. In
Asia, 10 percent of individuals in Bhutan have used the Internet, compared
to 68 percent in Japan. In the Americas, 68 percent of individuals in the
United States have used the Internet, compared to 7 percent in Ecuador.96

520 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
This inequality in access to technological developments contributes
to the growing economic inequalities between the North and the South.
It also means that much of the world is simply not part of the “global”
culture that is supposedly developing.
Political globalization is arguably not truly global either. Indeed,
“international civil society remains embryonic. Many nongovernmen-
tal organizations refl ect only a tiny segment of the populations of their
members’ states. They largely represent only modernized countries.”97
Furthermore (as discussed in Chapters 9 and 11), international organiza-
tions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund
are often criticized by the South for being dominated by the North and
their interests rather than truly global governing organizations.
Nationalism as a Countertrend
Another argument against the development of a globalized world, par-
ticularly a global culture, concerns the presence and persistence of local
and national loyalties and identities:
Globalization has not profoundly challenged the enduring
national nature of citizenship. Economic life takes place on a
global scale, but human identity remains national—hence the
strong resistance to cultural homogenization. Over the centu-
ries, increasingly centralized states have expanded their func-
tions and tried to forge a sense of common identity for their sub-
jects. But no central power in the world can do the same thing
today, even in the European Union. There, a single currency and
advanced economic coordination have not yet . . . resulted in
a sense of postnational citizenship. . . . A world very partially
Text not available due to copyright restrictions

Globalization and Its Discontents 521
unifi ed by technology still has not collective consciousness or
collective solidarity.98
Perhaps ironically, revolutions in global communication, such as the
Internet, may drive people apart rather than bring them together: “The
ability the Net gives us to endlessly fi lter and personalize information
means that, more than ever before, we can also build virtual gated com-
munities where we never have to interact with people who are different
from ourselves.”99
Even in countries where access to global technologies and information
is the highest, such as in the United States, global culture is not necessar-
ily taking root. “Compared with their counterparts in other nations, citi-
zens born in the United States know fewer foreign languages, understand
less about foreign cultures, and live abroad reluctantly, if at all.”100
Access to international news has not resulted in a more globally
informed population. Indeed, most newspapers and news broadcasts
around the globe are dominated by local stories.101 This domination of
news sources by local stories has probably always existed, but curiously it
seems to have become more pervasive following the end of the Cold War.
At the same time that new communication technologies have made it far
easier to link events and people separated by large geographic distances,
people in many countries seem to have become less interested in that
available information.
Not only are subglobal identities persisting despite trends in global-
ization, they may be stronger. Indigenous peoples, such as those in Chia-
pas, Mexico, are uniting to fi ght against what they see as a threat to their
local culture. As discussed in Chapter 12, the timing of the Zapatista-
led revolution in Chiapas, to coincide with the day the North American
Free Trade Association (NAFTA) went into effect, was a shot across the
globalization divide. Others oppose the Americanization or Westerniza-
tion of globalization. The French and the Canadians, for example, have
passed recent laws to provide for minimum quotas for domestic fi lms
shown in cinemas and domestic musicians broadcast over radio airwaves.
Many adherents to fundamental versions of religions oppose the domi-
nance of Western values; some are opposing this with terrorist acts (see
Chapter 7).102 And (also discussed in Chapter 7) ethnic confl icts became
particularly pervasive, severe, and consequential immediately following
the Cold War. Ethnic strife continues to threaten the integrity and even
the existence of a set of countries that girdles the globe.
Many globalization skeptics believe that advances in fundamental-
ism and nationalism mean that “rather than the emergence of a global
civilization, . . . the world is fragmenting into civilizational blocs and
cultural and ethnic enclaves.”103 Samuel Huntington, in his infl uential
1996 article, “The Clash of Civilizations?“ argued that in the future,
global confl ict will revolve around differences in “civilizations,” such
as Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, and
“The Clash of
Civilizations?”
Title of article by Samuel
Huntington asserting that
future global confl ict will
revolve around cultural
differences.

522 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
Latin American. According to Huntington, “The interactions between
peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interac-
tions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences
between civilizations and commonalities within civilization.”104
In another infl uential work, Jihad vs. McWorld, Benjamin Barber
characterized the fragmentation of the world along confl icting identities.
He wrote that there is a
grim prospect of a retribalization of large swaths of humankind
by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of nation-
states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against
people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred
narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of interdepen-
dence, every kind of artifi cial social cooperation and mutuality:
against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated
markets.105
Yet he also acknowledged the forces of globalization, stating that
there was also prospect for a “future in shimmering pastels, a busy por-
trait of onrushing economic, technological, and ecological forces that
demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize peoples every-
where with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—MTV, Macintosh,
and McDonald’s—pressing nations into one homogeneous global theme
park, one McWorld tied together by communications, information, enter-
tainment, and commerce.”106 Barber’s primary thesis was that what is
unique about current global politics is that these forces of disintegration
and integration were occurring simultaneously and at very high levels:
“caught between Babel and Disneyland, the planet is falling precipitously
apart and coming together at the very same moment.”107
Even if globalization is not actively opposed by nationalist, local, or
civilization identities, these alternatives provide a check on homogeniza-
tion.108 As one group of globalization analysts argue,
we agree that some things become more similar around the
world as globalization proceeds. . . . But we do not think this
leads to a homogeneous world, for three reasons. First, general
rules and models must be interpreted in light of local circum-
stances. Thus regions respond to similar economic constraints
in different ways; . . . the same television program means differ-
ent things to different audiences; McDonald’s adapts its menu
and marketing to local tastes. Second, growing similarity pro-
vokes reactions. Advocates from many cultures seek to protect
their heritage or assert their identity—witness the efforts of
fundamentalists to reinstate what they consider orthodoxy, the
actions of indigenous peoples to claim their right to cultural sur-
vival, and the attempt of Asian leaders to put forth a distinctive

Globalization and Its Discontents 523
Asian model of human rights. Third, cultural and political dif-
ferences have themselves become globally valid. The notion that
people and countries are entitled to their particularity or distinc-
tiveness is itself part of global culture.109
Other Sources of Opposition to Globalization
The developing world and national and ethnic identities are not the only
factors working in opposition to globalization. As discussed in Chapter 10,
labor groups are often critical of multinational corporations, the fl ag-
bearers of economic globalization, charging that in the process of globaliz-
ing production, MNCs create high unemployment in areas they leave and
exploit workers in areas where they relocate. Local producers also criti-
cize MNCs and economic globalization, warning that local “mom-and-
pop” grocery stores, cafés, and cinemas are being crowded out by chain
stores with a global reach. Other criticisms come from environmental-
ists. While political globalization includes new and more extensive inter-
national agreements to protect the environment, economic globalization
is often seen as the cause of environmental problems:
Although contemporary environmental abuses have their ante-
cedents in earlier periods of history, globalization coincides with
new environmental problems such as global warming, depletion
of the ozone layer, acute loss of biodiversity, and forms of trans-
border pollution (e.g., acid rain). . . . Moreover, some ecological
problems are clearly the result of global cross-border fl ows, as
with certain kinds of groundwater contamination, leaching, and
long-term threats traceable to importing hazardous wastes.110
Environmentalists also contend that economic globalization involves
“the spread of a global consumer culture that . . . embodies a world view
unconcerned with the ecological consequences of human economic
activity.”111
On many issues, the labor and environmental movements have not
agreed. But along with other groups that oppose globalization, they have
found common ground. The fi rst sign of this new coalition against global-
ization came in 1999 in Seattle at a meeting of the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Known as the Battle for Seattle, the protests involved an estimated
10,000 representatives from labor unions, environmentalists, farmers,
consumer activists, religious people, women’s activists, student groups,
and anarchists. The protests blocked WTO representatives from attend-
ing negotiation meetings and, in the end, the WTO was forced to close
the meeting without even a fi nal formal declaration, partly due to the
protests. “It was a surprise ending to a week of stunning developments,
in which the opponents of WTO-facilitated corporate globalization

524 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
exerted more infl uence over the negotiating process than any could have
expected.”112 Anti-globalization protests have continued at key economic
international meetings, such as the G-20 meeting in London in 2009 in
which thousands participated in a protest titled “March for Jobs, Justice,
and Climate.” One activist, Tony Juniper of Friends of the Earth UK,
explains the evolution of the “antiglobalization” coalition from the envi-
ronmentalists’ perspective:
For the past 10 years we’ve been locating ourselves more in the
bigger economic debate and less in the “save the whales” type
of debate. Talking about rainforests led us into talking about
Third World debt. Talking about climate change led us to talk
about transnational corporations. The more you talk about these
things, the more you realize the sub-
ject isn’t the environment any more,
it’s the economy and the pressures on
countries to do things that undercut
any efforts they make to deal with
environmental issues. By the time we
got to Seattle, we were all campaign-
ing on the same basic trend that was
undermining everybody’s efforts to
achieve any progressive goals. That
trend is the free market and privileges
for big corporations and rich people at
the expense of everything else.113
Opposition to globalization became more
intense as many blame globalization and
economic liberalism for the global eco-
nomic downturn that began in the United
States in 2007 (see Chapter 10). Accord-
ing to the magazine, the Economist: “The
integration of the world economy is in
retreat on almost every front. The eco-
nomic meltdown has popularised a new
term: deglobalisation.”114 Foreign direct
investment is declining, as is world trade,
and European and U.S. public opinion
is increasingly suspicious of globaliza-
tion and trading relationships.115 In addi-
tion, “The institutional foundations of
globalization—such as the rules that
oblige governments to keep their markets
open and the domestic and international
politics that allow policymakers to liber-
alize their economies—have weakened
Anti-globalization protest prior to the G-20 summit in
London in 2009.
(Andy Rain/Corbis)

Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 525
considerably in the past few years. Politicians and their constituents in
the United States, Europe, and China have grown increasingly nervous
about letting capital, goods, and people move freely across their borders.
And energy—the most globalized of products—has once more become the
object of intense resource nationalism, as governments in resource-rich
countries assert greater control and ownership over those assets.”116 The
backlash following the recent economic crisis may be more on focused
on economic globalization and economic liberalism in particular. Glo-
balization, as we have discussed, occurs in many forms. One analyst,
for example, argues that globalization is not limited to trade and invest-
ment; globalization means much more:
Jihadists in Indonesia, after all, can still share their operational
plans with like-minded extremists in the Middle East, while
Vietnamese artists can now more easily sell their wares in Euro-
pean markets, and Spanish magistrates can team up with their
peers in Latin America to bring torturers to justice. . . . Around
the world, all kinds of groups are still connecting, and the eco-
nomic crisis will not slow their international activities. In some
cases, it might even bolster them.117
Yet any opposition to globalization is important, because it will likely
shape the future of globalization. It is not necessarily the case that global-
ization proceeds in a linear fashion and cannot be reversed: “Over the past
decades, many have recited a reassuring mantra that globalization . . . is
irreversible. This view is historical unsustainable.”118 Indeed, despite the
presence of more and more globalizing technologies throughout much of
the twentieth century, parts of the world at times become more economi-
cally isolated (as in the 1930s) or more politically isolated (as during the
Cold War). This is because groups favoring integration engaged with groups
against integration in political battles, and the anti-integration interests
often won. Similarly, the debate over contemporary globalization will be
characterized by advances by both pro- and anti-globalization forces. The
Policy Choices box summarizes some of the arguments in this debate.
Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics
Another potential source of opposition to globalization is sovereign states. After all, if globalization continues on the path that many pre-
dict, state borders will become meaningless, states will lose their power
to nonstate actors, and sovereignty will no longer be the dominant prin-
ciple of world politics, as it has been since the Treaty of Westphalia was
signed in 1648. Many say this has already occurred (recall the discussions
on multinational corporations and other nonstate actors in Chapter 4).
Others argue that the state is still strong, able to resist and even benefi t
from globalization.

526 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
P O L I C Y C H O I C E S
Is Globalization Desirable?
ISSUE: States face choices with respect to how much their policies promote or
limit globalization. Many face substantial opposition to globalization-promoting
policies from environmentalists, human rights groups, and labor unions, for ex-
ample. Many states are also concerned about the effects of globalization on their
own sovereign authority.
Option #1: States should pursue policies that promote globalization.
Arguments: (a) Globalization is good business. State economies will profi t if politi-
cal restrictions on trade and fi nancial fl ows are reduced, and consumers will have
more choice at less cost for products from around the world. (b) If states embrace
globalization, the capacity of state leaders to needlessly and heartlessly coerce
their citizens will be diminished. Citizens will become central, respecting human
rights will become the norm, and individual liberty will fl ourish at the expense of
dictators and despots. (c) Globalization allows solutions to the growing list of hu-
mankind’s interconnected problems. International organizations, and NGOs are in
a better position than states to help solve global challenges such as environmental
degradation.
Counterarguments: (a) Removing barriers to legitimate economic activities has
unacceptable costs. Terrorism, drug traffi cking, international crime, and the nearly
free fl ow of nuclear materials will increasingly fl ourish as globalization expands.
(b) Globalization affords new opportunities for those attempting to suppress indi-
vidual liberties. Technology is ultimately under the control of the state, which can
use it to suppress human rights. (c) Nonstate actors such as the United Nations
and various NGOs do not have a good track record for solving problems and are
not accountable to any constituency.
Option #2: States should limit or reverse policies that contribute to globalization.
Arguments: (a) Limiting or reducing the global perspective in state policies would
refocus attention where political decisions rightly belong: on the domestic front,
where states have the most insight and ability to improve the lives of their citizens.
(b) States exist on the basis of sovereignty and are almost by defi nition dedicated
to its preservation. Although individual citizens may wish to transcend their state
boundaries, states themselves would be well served to limit losses to their sover-
eignty due to globalization, lest they fi nd themselves unable to carry out neces-
sary functions of good government. (c) Increasing globalization is simply another
means by which rich and powerful states can further advance their already envi-
able positions. States that now fi nd themselves at a disadvantage in the system
should struggle relentlessly to prevent further disparities, not to encourage them.
Counterarguments: (a) Globalization should not be seen as a competitor to do-
mestic politics, but rather as a resource by which citizens can improve their lives
and their futures. (b) The fact of globalization has already reduced the sphere of
effective policymaking for states, favoring markets, nonstate organizations, and
individuals. States thus have less and less control over a global phenomenon such
(continued )

Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 527
“The State Is Dead”
According to the “hyperglobalists,” globalization dynamics, particularly
those associated with economic globalization, signal the eventual end to
the sovereign state.119
Hyperglobalizers argue that economic globalization is bringing
about a “denationalization” of economies through the estab-
lishment of transnational networks of production, trade and
fi nance. In this “borderless” economy, national governments are
relegated to little more than transmission belts for global capi-
tal, or ultimately, simple intermediate institutions sandwiched
between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mecha-
nisms of governance.120
There are numerous ways in which the state is challenged by eco-
nomic globalization. First, the rapid exchange of goods, services, and capi-
tal on the global market might undermine the abilities of governments to
control infl ation and unemployment through national policy. Second, the
mobility of labor, production, and capital might undermine states’ effec-
tiveness at establishing employment, safety, and environmental stan-
dards. Third, greater interdependence means that national economies, on
whose fate governments rest, are more vulnerable to shocks and crises
from abroad, with greater consequences at home.121 Finally, the rise of
global governance in the international political economy challenges state
authority. “The global regulation of trade, by bodies such as the WTO,
implies a signifi cant renegotiation of the Westphalian notion of state
sovereignty.”122
The growing illegal marketplace and the associated growth of glo-
balized organized crime is also a challenge to state authority. Early in
1990, Italy’s parliamentary Anti-Mafi a Commission sent a message to the
UN General Assembly to the effect that organized crime was “taking on
the characteristics of an extremely dangerous world calamity”:123
Modern criminal power has surpassed the ability of govern-
ments to contain it. International organized crime is too big;
nobody knows how to deal with it. Perhaps it cannot be dealt
with as long as the world is divided into nearly two hun-
dred sovereign states. While the big crime syndicates simply
as globalization. Any state that individually seeks to limit globalization is not likely
to have an appreciable impact. (c) Globalization is in large part a consequence of
an increasingly competitive global market. If states limit or reverse globalization
policies, especially economic ones, they will fi nd themselves at a disadvantage,
and their citizens will suffer the economic consequences.

528 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
go where the money is, sovereign states cannot do anything
simply. . . .124
In addition to international economic organizations such as the WTO
that represent a challenge to states, there are other forms of global gover-
nance that arguably threaten state sovereignty:
Until recently, international organizations were institutions of,
by, and for nation-states. Now they are building constituencies
of their own and, through NGOs, establishing direct connections
to the peoples of the world. The shift is infusing them with new
life and infl uence, but it is also creating tensions. States feel
they need more capable international organizations to deal with
a lengthening list of transnational challenges, but at the same
time fear competitors. Thus they vote for new forms of interna-
tional intervention while reasserting sovereignty’s fi rst principle:
no interference in the domestic affairs of states. . . . At the same
time, governments . . . have driven some gaping holes in the wall
that has separated the two. . . . International accords . . . drew
explicit links between democracy, human rights, and interna-
tional security, establishing new legal bases for international
interventions. In 1991 the U.N. General Assembly declared itself
in favor of humanitarian intervention without the request or
consent of the state involved. A year later the Security Council
took the unprecedented step of authorizing the use of force “on
behalf of civilian populations” in Somalia. Suddenly an interest
in citizens began to compete with, and occasionally override, the
formerly unquestioned primacy of state interests.125
Contemporary migration is another challenge to states. If they are
unable to stop it, illegal immigration demonstrates the inability of states
to maintain their own borders, the territorial expression of sovereignty.126
States are being challenged by cultural globalization as well. Govern-
ments that want to control the political culture of their citizens by, for
example, limiting their access to liberal values and Western media, are
having more diffi culty doing so with new technological developments.
It is not, however, cultural globalization that threatens states as much
as the backlash to a global culture. As national and local identities resist
homogenization of culture, “regions as far-fl ung as Catalonia, Northern
Italy, Quebec, and Scotland, . . . provinces in China, and [regional] states
in India, have taken globalization as their cue to pursue greater autonomy
within the nation-state.”127
“Long Live the State”
The globalization skeptics caution against exaggerating the impact of
current economic, political, and cultural trends on the sovereign state.
“Far from considering national governments as becoming immobilized

Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 529
by international imperatives, they point to their growing centrality in
the regulation and active promotion of cross-border economic activity.
Governments are not the passive victims of internationalization but, on
the contrary, its primary architects.”128
The state, for example, continues to control economic policy areas.
In . . . various ways globalization’ does inhibit governments’
freedom of maneuver in economic policy but it does not elimi-
nate it. Governments can do much to make their economies
more or less attractive to investors: by supporting infrastructure
development, education and training; increasing the effi ciency
and lowering the cost of services through competition or regula-
tory change; and improving the workings of labour markets.129
Furthermore, states often have a choice, and their choice is not neces-
sarily determined by globalization forces. “There is a tendency to exag-
gerate the impact of globalization. Many of the constraints on national
freedom of action are self-imposed.”130 Joining the single currency or peg-
ging one’s currency to the dollar is a choice some governments make, and
some do not (see Chapter 12).
It is the states themselves that have been the architects of interna-
tional agreements that constrain them. “Global governance will come
not at the expense of the state but rather as an expression of the interests
that the state embodies. As the source of order and basis of governance,
the state will remain in the future as effective, and will be as essential, as
it has ever been.”131 And as discussed in Chapter 4, state interests and the
interests of MNCs and NGOs are not necessarily in confl ict, but when
there is a confl ict of interests, states can still prevail.
The technological revolutions associated with globalization are not
inherently a challenge to state authority. “Ironically, the technology that
is supposed to make globalization inevitable also makes increased sur-
veillance by the state, particularly over people, easier than it would have
been a century ago.”132 States can use technology to enhance their power.
A recent study found that at least twenty-six states fi lter a wide range of
Internet material, include information on politics, human rights, sexual-
ity, and religion.133
Many governments, including China, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey,
and Tunisia have recently blocked access to popular sites such as You-
Tube. Beginning in 2009, China required all new computers to include
software that censors “unhealthy information.”134 Government fi lters
are not always effective, but some states impose strict penalties for indi-
viduals using the Internet and fax machines for “subversive” purposes.
States also have the power to undermine technologies that NGOs use:
Encryption, for example—the technology that allows commu-
nications to be scrambled and kept private—is a vital tool of
human rights work; it allows fi eldworkers to collect, transmit,

530 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
and store communications in a way that does not compromise
the safety of victims and witnesses. If governments outlaw
or restrict strong encryption, human rights workers and their
clients will be deprived of an important digital asset that would
help them to take on corrupt powers.135
Overall, despite historical technological change and integration,
states have not become weaker political units. “On the contrary, in the
countries with the most advanced and internationally integrated econo-
mies, governments’ ability to tax and redistribute incomes, regulate the
economy, and monitor the activity of their citizens has increased beyond
all recognition. This has been especially true over the past century.”136
Sate capitalism (as discussed in Chapter 10), may be the primary eco-
nomic model in the future and involves a strong role for governments in
their economies.
Understanding the Future of Globalization
and the State
The transformationalist viewpoint lies in between the predictions that
the state will wither away and the contentions that the state is strong, or
even stronger today than ever before:
At the core of the transformationalist case is a belief that
contemporary globalization is reconstituting . . . the power,
functions and authority of national governments. . . . Rather
than globalization bringing about the “end of the state,” it has
encouraged a spectrum of adjustment strategies and, in certain
respects, a more activist state. Accordingly, the power of nation-
al governments is not necessarily diminished by globalization
but on the contrary is being reconstituted and restructured in
response to the growing complexity of processes of governance
in a more interconnected world.137
So what kind of world will this restructuring produce? Admittedly,
“after three and a half centuries, it requires a mental leap to think of
world politics in any terms other than occasionally cooperating but gen-
erally competing states, each defi ned by its territory and representing all
the people therein. Nor is it easy to imagine political entities that could
compete with the emotional attachment of a shared landscape, national
history, language, fl ag, and currency.”138 To take this mental leap, we
return to the theoretical perspectives introduced in Chapter 1. Globaliza-
tion is in many ways a challenge to these perspectives, because most of
them were conceived before the shape of current global politics could be
seen. Accordingly, most of these perspectives do not have a clear answer
on what the future of the world will be. What these perspectives can do
for us, however, is provide a list of factors that will likely be important

Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 531
in the restructuring of world politics and the debate over globalization.
In Chapters 2 and 3, we used these perspectives to look at the history of
international relations through different lenses. Each perspective focused
on different time periods and the meaning and importance of historical
events. Similarly, in this chapter, each of the theoretical perspectives can
comment on the future of globalization. Each perspective stresses dif-
ferent dynamics that are signifi cant to the future of the world political
system. Table 14.3 summarizes the aspects of globalization that each per-
spective emphasizes.
Realism would agree with the skeptical argument on the state, as
outlined previously. For realists, the state will, and should, jealously
guard its sovereign power and seek to increase it when it can. States
are expected to oppose any efforts or processes that are a threat to their
autonomy. Recent U.S. opposition to the International Criminal Court
is consistent with the realist perspective. Realists would also argue that
there is more historical continuity than change in global politics. “The
‘realist’ orthodoxy insists that nothing has changed international rela-
tions since Thucydides and Machiavelli: a state’s military and economic
power determines its fate; interdependence and international institu-
tions are secondary and fragile phenomena.”139 While realists would not
deny the growing number of MNCs and NGOs on the world scene, they
would maintain that the primary actors remain states and the dominant
factor that underlies international politics remains the competition for
power among states. When the interests of nonstate and state actors
collide, realists would argue that states maintain the capability and
TABLE 14.3
Theoretical Perspectives on Globalization
Theory Emphasized Aspects of Globalization
Realism States can and will protect sovereignty; power remains
the currency of global politics
Liberalism Global politics continues to be transformed by
interdependence; individuals will challenge traditional
authority structures
Idealism Human rights and other liberal values will spread;
debates over values underlie globalization
Neo-Marxism Globalization rooted in historical spread of capitalism;
unevenness of globalization fuels class divisions
Constructivism Construction of international norms underlies
globalization; some values and ideas are privileged over
others in defi ning globalization
Feminist perspectives Globalization has gendered economic consequences;
globalization spreads ideas of gender equality

532 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
the will to prevail. Thus, the dominant theme of the future for realists
is the continual reassertion of sovereignty as the defi ning characteristic
of states.
Liberalism, as a theoretical perspective, is better equipped to
deal with current and future globalization processes. Whereas real-
ism stresses continuity, contemporary liberalism sees great change
and emphasizes the transformation of global politics that has arisen
from the development of complex interdependence in the second half
of the twentieth century. Liberalism would expect that as the degree
and scope of interdependence continue to increase; states will have to
coordinate their activities further;140 nonstate and substate actors will
become increasingly important; traditional matters of security will
become less important on the international agenda (replaced by trans-
national issues such as environmental problems); military force will
become even less frequent and less effective; and institutions of global
governance will take on more functions once reserved by states. Glo-
balization is, however, more than interdependence, as discussed at the
beginning of this chapter. What, then, does the liberal theoretical per-
spective contribute to our understanding of globalization, beyond the
observations it made about interdependence in the 1970s? To answer
this question, liberals return to their roots of classical liberal philos-
ophy and stress the importance of individual interests and rights.141
Liberalism would expect that values of freedom, for example, will con-
tinue to spread and elevate the status of the individual in world poli-
tics through democratization, freedom of movement, and human rights
above state rights.
The long-standing pattern whereby compliance with authority
tends to be unquestioning and automatic is conceived to have
been replaced by a more elaborate set of norms that make the
successful exercise of authority much more problematic. . . . By
virtue of their newly acquired skills, people are more able and
ready to question authority, and in turn the new authority rela-
tionships have facilitated the development of new, more decen-
tralized global structure.142
In this regard, the dominant theme of the future for liberalism is the
transformation of the political system through new authority relationships.
Sharing some of liberalism’s philosophical roots, idealism would
also expect more emphasis on human rights and values of freedom. Ide-
alism, with its focus on values over interests, would expect the debate
over globalization and the future path that globalization takes, to be
heavily determined by values. Debates over cultural imperialism, the
ethics of humanitarian intervention, and the value of local cultures and
indigenous peoples will drive the political struggles over economic,
political, and cultural globalization in the future, according to the ideal-
ist perspective.

Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics 533
The neo-Marxist perspective has something to say about globaliza-
tion as well. Indeed, globalization has renewed interest in neo-Marxist
theory.143 According to some neo-Marxists, globalization is not necessar-
ily new but is instead rooted in the development of capitalism in the six-
teenth century. From that time, states have not been the most important
actors in global politics. Instead, class divisions between the core in the
North and the periphery in the South were the dominant feature of the
world economic and political system. Contemporary globalization then
is simply the intensifi cation of this historical pattern—further spreading
the capitalist mode of production—and the global class confl ict between
the developed and developing world will be the dominant theme of the
future. The unevenness of globalization will continue and will be the
source of this confl ict. Furthermore, neo-Marxists view globalization as a
tool to
. . . deny developing countries the possibility of building their
national economies. Thus, the internationalization and global-
ization of macro-economic policies transforms poor countries
into open economies and ‘‘reserves’’ of cheap labor and natural
resources. . . . In addition, multinational corporations, as carri-
ers of technology, capital, and skilled labor between states, have
reinforced the negative effects of foreign capital penetration by
creating enclave economies within the host countries, which
are characterized by small pockets of economically developed
regions, in contrast to the larger peripheral areas that exhibit
extreme poverty and little progress, thus enlarging the gap
between the rich and the poor. . . . In this sense, globalization is
producing a new kind of hegemony that fuses power and wealth
in a kind of ‘‘corporcracy’’ of fi nancial markets and corporations
that rule the world. . . .144
From the constructivist perspective, globalization is what states, and
nonstate actors, make of it. In other words, it is not the actual reality
of economic, political, and cultural globalization that is important; it is
how these processes are being socially constructed, or understood, in the
world society. Thus, the important thing to know about globalization
and its future is how it is being interpreted and shaped by actors and
the social context. Constructivists would want to know: Who is defi n-
ing what globalization means? How are some cultural values and norms,
such as those promoted by Disney and McDonald’s, becoming privileged
to be part of the global culture while others are not? How are new interna-
tional norms such as human rights becoming internalized by states and
defi ning their interests and identities? The future of globalization and the
future of the state are not determined by actors’ interests but rather by
how global politics is constructed along the way.
Feminist perspectives are also interested in how the features and con-
cepts of globalization are constructed and have hidden assumptions about

534 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
gender and gender relations. Some feminists worry, for example, that eco-
nomic globalization, because it involves the spread of economic liberal
ideas of individual interests rather than community interests, is a process
that refl ects masculine understanding more than feminine understanding
and relations. Other feminists concentrate on the consequences of global-
ization for women. Because women make up a disproportionate number
of the poor, particularly in the developing world, feminists often oppose
globalization that contributes to widening the gap between the North
and the South.145 On the other hand, if globalization means diminished
power for states, which are largely controlled by men, and the diffusion
of norms that promote gender equality, feminists would see positive signs
for women in globalization. In a systematic analysis of the effects of glo-
balization on women, one study concluded that “global norms and insti-
tutions make a difference for the quality of life and status of women. . . .
[W]hen domestic cultures are more open to international infl uences, out-
comes for women improve, as measured by health, literacy, and participa-
tion in the economy and government.146 Overall, the feminist perspective
would stress the relations between men and women and the gendered
understandings of those relations as an important part of the evolution of
the future of global politics.
SUMMARY
● Globalization is arguably the most important process affecting relations
between states and nonstate actors today. It refers to the high degree of
interdependence between people and other actors and the homogeniza-
tion of economic, political, and cultural life across the globe.
● Economic globalization involves moving toward a global marketplace.
Evidence for economic globalization includes unprecedented levels of
trade, including trade in services, high levels of international fi nancial
fl ows, including worldwide foreign exchange, the growing importance
and presence of multinational corporations, and a growth in globally
integrated crime. Economic relations are more global today than before
the end of the Cold War, as developing countries, former Communist
countries, and current Communist countries (like China) are partici-
pating in trade and fi nancial fl ows to a greater extent.
● Political globalization involves new political actors and transnational
political activities in a new system of global governance. The United
Nations and other international organizations are part of this system
and are engaging in policies that increasingly challenge state sover-
eignty. NGOs are also more infl uential and provide representation and
services across borders. International and nongovernmental organiza-
tions are helping to create, and at times enforce, global norms, such as
human and democratic rights.

Summary 535
● Cultural practices are becoming globalized as people are listening to
the same music and watching the same television programs and fi lms.
The English language is facilitating the spread of cultural values and
practices, as are high levels of migration, refugees, and worldwide
tourism. While the majority of instances of cultural globalization are
of American products, values, and practices becoming part of non-
American cultures, Americans too are being exposed to other cultures.
● Technological developments, particularly revolutions in communica-
tion such as satellites, computers, and the Internet, are an important
engine behind globalization, because they make it easier for econom-
ics, politics, and cultures to cross borders.
● While hyperglobalists argue that globalization is without precedent,
skeptics point to the historical roots in economic, political, and cul-
tural relations. International fi nance and trade at the turn of the cen-
tury, for example, in some ways integrated states to a greater degree
than they do today, and empires, particularly the British empire, glo-
balized politics and culture in previous times. Transformationalists
recognize these historical roots but argue that there is something
quantitatively and qualitatively distinct about current globalizing dy-
namics that are transforming world political relations. Many point to
the scope and velocity of these current dynamics as distinct features
of globalization today.
● Skeptics point out that the scope of globalization is not really that
global, given the vast differences in economics, politics, culture, and
access to technology between the North and the South. Many ar-
gue that globalization is in fact further marginalizing the developing
world, and many opponents to globalization can be found in the South.
Others oppose globalization because they see it as a threat to local
and national loyalties, and the persistence and growth of nationalism
in recent years is an important countertrend to cultural globalization.
Other sources of opposition to globalization are labor and environmen-
tal groups.
● The debate over globalization involves the relationship between global
forces and the sovereign state. Some see current trends culminating in
the eventual end to the state in a borderless world. Others argue that
states are able to counter some losses to their power and are even the
engines behind globalization. The various theoretical perspectives on
world politics point to different aspects of the state-global relationship
in the future. Realists, for example, bet on the state to survive, and
control, globalization. Liberals focus more on nonstate actors, particu-
larly individuals and their new ability to challenge the authority of
states.

536 Chapter 14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
KEY TERMS economic globalization 503
political globalization 507
global governance 507
cultural globalization 508
migration 510
refugees 510
cultural imperialism 511
distance-shrinking
technologies 511
hyperglobalizers 514
globalization skeptics 514
transformationalists 517
“The Clash of
Civilizations?” 521

537
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Realisms,” International Organization 51(3) (Summer 1997):
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(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Michael W.
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Michigan Press, 1965). More recently, Immanuel Wallerstein,
World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2004).
16. See, for example, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) and Robert A.
Packenham, The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and
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Chapter 2 (pages 24–52)
1. Much of this section is drawn from Adam Watson,
The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative
Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992).
2. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex
Warner, ed. M. K. Finley (London: Penguin, 1972).
3. Samuel Edward Dawson, The Lines of Demarcation of
Pope Alexander VI and the Treaty of Tordesillas (Ottawa: J.
Hope & Sons, 1899).
4. Watson, Evolution of International Society, pp. 146–147.
5. Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Political and Social History of
Modern Europe (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 231.
6. James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 2nd ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 11.
7. Edward Morse, Modernization in the Transformation of
International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp.
330–334.
8. John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 50–51.
9. Hendrik Spruyt, “Institutional Selection in International
Relations: State Anarchy as Order,” International
Organization 48 (Autumn 1994): pp. 527–536.
10. Richard Bean, “War and the Birth of States,” Journal of
Economic History 33 (March 1973): p. 208.
11. Spruyt, “Institutional Selection,” p. 550.
12. Karen Rasler and William Thompson, “War Making and
State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenue,
and Global War,” American Political Science Review 79
(June 1985): pp. 491–507.
13. Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: An
Introduction to the Western State System, 6th ed. (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 70–71.
14. Richard Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World
Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 20.
15. Ibid., p. 34.
16. Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the
Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in
International Relations,” International Organization 48
(Winter 1994): pp. 107–130.
17. “So long as Great Britain as an industrial nation had
no equal, it was the most powerful nation on earth, the
only one that deserved to be called a world power.” Hans
J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, Politics Among
Nations, 6th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1958), p. 138.
18. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 34.
19. Benjamin J. Cohen, “A Brief History of International
Monetary Relations,” and Charles P. Kindleberger, “The Rise
of Free Trade in Europe,” in Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A.
Lake (eds.), International Political Economy: Perspectives
on Global Power and Wealth (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995).
20. Erich Weede, Economic Development, Social Order, and
World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1996), p. 51.
21. Keylor, Twentieth Century World, p. 206.
22. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New
York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).
23. Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Chicago: Aldine,
1962), p. 45.

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References 539
7. “Review of UN and U.S. Action to Restore Peace,”
Department of State Bulletin, 1950, p. 46.
8. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York:
Macmillan, 1960), pp. 108–109.
9. Geoffrey Stern, “Soviet Foreign Policy in Theory
and Practice,” in F. S. Northedge (ed.), The Foreign Policies of
the Powers (New York: Free Press, 1974),
p. 134.
10. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 6th ed.
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), p. 81.
11. This section is drawn from accounts in Stephen E.
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since
1938 (New York: Penguin Books, 1988); William R. Keylor,
The Twentieth Century World: An International History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); and Wayne C.
McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945:
A History of International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner, 1993).
12. Keylor, Twentieth Century World, p. 359.
13. Lloyd S. Etheredge, Can Governments Learn? (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1985), p. 20.
14. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch,
“Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” International Security 14 (Winter 1989–
1990): p. 139.
15. Ibid., p. 165. These missiles were obsolete and had
already been slated for removal before the missile crisis
began.
16. James G. Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch,
“The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited,” Foreign Affairs 66
(Fall 1987): p. 176.
17. Ibid., pp. 397–398.
18. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1979), pp. 693–746.
19. Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein, “Changes in Public
Support for U.S. Military Spending,” Journal of Confl ict
Resolution 24 (March 1980): pp. 79–111.
20. Michael Howard, “The Springtime of Nations,” Foreign
Affairs 69 (1989–1990): p. 17.
21. Los Angeles Times, December 17, 1989, p. 1.
22. “Since 1979, the politics of Latin America have
been transformed by the longest and deepest wave of
democratization in the region’s history.” Karen Remmer,
“Democracy and Economic Crisis: The Latin American
Experience,” World Politics 42 (April 1990): p. 315.
23. Makau wa Mutua, “African Renaissance,” New York
Times, May 11, 1991, 1:13.
24. Freedom House, Freedom in the World, edition, 2008,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/Chart116File163
(accessed May 20, 2009).
25. United Nations, Human Development Report 2002 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1.
26. Ibid. See also United Nations, Human Development
Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.
20–21.
27. Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The
Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs 87(2)
(March/April 2008): pp. 36–48; see also Arthur A. Goldsmith,
“Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning
the Premises of Democracy Promotion,” International
Security, Vol. 33, no.2 (Fall 2008): pp. 120–147.
28. Hassan M. Fattah, “Democracy in the Arab World, a U.S.
Goal, Falters,” New York Times (April 10, 2006). See also
Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Bush Doctrine and Democracy
24. Watson, Evolution of International Society, pp. 273–274.
25. Anthony Haigh, Congress of Vienna to Common Market
(London: Harrap, 1973), p. 67.
26. Watson, Evolution of International Society, p. 249.
27. See Kier Lieber for the argument that the Germans
expected a protracted war. Keir A. Lieber, “The New History
of World War I and What It Means for International Relations
Theory,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007),
pp. 155–191.
28. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York:
Vintage Books, 1990).
29. Arthur Sweetser, The League of Nations at Work (New
York: Macmillan,1920), p. 5, as cited in Inis L. Claude,
Swords into Plowshares, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House,
1964), p. 40.
30. William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), p. 114.
31. Ibid., pp. 57–58.
32. He became eligible for parole in six months and was
released after only nine months in prison.
33. Alexander de Conde, A History of American Foreign
Policy (New York: Scribner’s, 1963), pp. 559–560.
34. Paul Johnson, Modern Times (New York: Harper & Row,
1983), p. 246. This is a predominant opinion, but for an
alternative interpretation, see Susan Strange, “Protectionism
and World Politics,” International Organization 39 (Spring
1985): pp. 239–240.
35. John Kenneth Galbraith, Money: Whence It Came, Where
It Went (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), p. 274.
36. De Conde, History of American Foreign Policy, p. 526.
37. James Dugan and Laurence Lafore, Days of Emperor and
Clown (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 80.
38. William L. Shirer, The Nightmare Years: 1930–1940
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), p. 242.
39. Cited in William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third
Reich (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), p. 796.
40. V. Spike Peterson, “Security and Sovereign States: What
Is at Stake in Taking Feminism Seriously?” in V. Spike
Peterson (ed.), Gendered States: Feminist (Re)Visions of
International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 43.
Chapter 3 (pages 53–94)
1. Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945, 6th ed.
(New York: Longman, 1991), p. 231.
2. Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power (New
York: Harper & Row, 1972); David Horowitz, The Free World
Colossus (New York: Wang & Hill, 1965); Gar Alperowitz,
Atomic Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1965).
3. Louis W. Koenig (ed.), The Truman Administration: Its
Principles and Practice (New York: New York University
Press, 1956), pp. 296–301.
4. This version of the event is accepted by most Western
sources, although the North Koreans claimed that they
were responding to an attack by the South, and one well-
known Western journalist argues that the United States
was at least partially responsible for the onset of the
Korean War. I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean
War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952).
5. Richard J. Barnet, The Roots of War (Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1971), p. 274.
6. The majority of troops opposing North Korea, though,
were South Korean.

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540 References
America http://www.whitehouse.gov/
nsc/nss.html (accessed December 21, 2006).
42. Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush
Revolution in Foreign Policy.
43. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “America’s Image Slips,
But Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Pew
Research Center, report released June 13, 2006, available
at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252
(accessed December 26, 2006).
44. Ibid. For more on the Latin American reaction to the
United States, see Michael Shifter, “The U.S. and Latin
America Through the Lens of Empire,” Current History
(February 2004): pp. 61–67.
45. Peter Warren Singer, “America, Islam, and the 9–11 War,”
Current History (December 2006): pp. 415–422. See also
Byman, D. 2007. “Al Qaeda,” Foreign Policy 159 (March/
April): 42-3.
46. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Hegemonic Quicksand,” The
National Interest (Winter 2003/2004): pp. 5–16. See
also Dalia Mogahed, 2006. “Muslims and Americans: The
Way Forward.” http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/
File/109480/Muslims_and_Americans (May 19, 2009).
47. Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush
Revolution in Foreign Policy, p. 195.
48. Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Some Positive Signs for
U.S. Image: Global Economic Gloom–China and India Notable
Exceptions.” Pew Research Center, report released June 12,
2008, available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/260 ;
Pew Global Attitudes Project, “Global Public Opinion in
the Bush Years (2001–2008) America’s Image; Muslims and
Westerners; Global Economy; Rise of China” Pew Research
Center, report released December 18, 2008, available at http://
pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=263; Ethan
Bronner, “The Promise: For Many Abroad, an Ideal Renewed,”
The New York Times (November 5, 2008).
49. United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report 2005 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), p. 116. Reprinted by permission of Oxford
University Press.
50. Alan Sorensen, “A Panic Made in America,” Current
History (January 2009), 3–9, p. 6; Roger C. Altman, “The
Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West,”
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88(1) (Jan/Feb2009); Ian Bremmer, “State
Capitalism Comes of Age,” Foreign Affairs, May/Jun2009,
Vol. 88(3).
51. Harold James, “The Late, Great Globalization,” Current
History (January 2009), 20–25, pp. 20–21.
52. Alan Sorensen, “A Panic Made in America,” Current
History (January 2009), 3–9, p. 6; Moisés Naím, “Think
Again: Globalization.” Foreign Policy 171 (March/April
2009): pp. 28–34.
53. Alan Sorensen, “A Panic Made in America,” Current
History (January 2009), 3–9, p. 7.
54. See, for example, Harold James, “The Late, Great
Globalization,” Current History (January 2009):
pp. 20–25; Christopher Layne, “China’s Challenge
to US Hegemony,” Current History (January 2008):
pp. 13–18; Kishore Mahbubani, “America’s Place in
the Asian Century,” Current History (May 2008):
pp. 195–200; Roger C. Altman, “The Great Crash, 2008: A
Geopolitical Setback for the West,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/
Feb2009), Vol. 88(1).
55. Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Order,”
Foreign Affairs 86(2):34–46, p. 34.
56. For a good discussion of theoretical perspectives on the
end of the Cold War and the post-September 11 era, see
Promotion in the Middle East” in David P. Forsythe, Patrice
C. McMahon, and Andrew Wedeman, American Foreign
Policy in a Globalized World (New York: Routledge,
2006), pp. 313–334. See also Tamara Cofman Wittes,
Freedoms Unsteady March: Americas Role in Building Arab
Democracy (Brookings Institution Press, 2008) and Marina
Ottaway and Julia Choucair-Vizoso (Eds.) Beyond the Façade:
Political Reform in the Arab World (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2008.)
29. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy
Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85(2) (March/April, 2006).
30. Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities at
Risk in the New Century (Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press, 2000) and Monty G. Marshall and
Ted Robert Gurr, Peace and Confl ict 2005: A Global Survey
of Armed Confl icts, Self-Determination Movements, and
Democracy (College Park, Md.: Center for International
Development and Confl ict Management, 2005).
31. See Ahmed S. Hashim, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Current
History (January 2007), pp. 3–10. See also Judith S. Yaphe,
“Iraq: Are We There Yet?” Current History (December
2008): 403-409.
32. See Gérard Prunier, “The Politics of Death in Darfur,”
Current History (May 2006): pp. 195–202. John Predergrast
and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Sudan: A State on the Brink?
Current History 108(718).
33. Robert I. Rothberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and
Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2004).
34. On Iraq, see Judith S. Yaphe, “Iraq: Are We There
Yet?” Current History (December 2008): pp. 403–409;
on Afghanistan, see Thomas Barfi eld, “The Roots of Failure
in Afghanistan,” Current History (December 2008): pp.
410–417.
35. Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,”
Foreign Affairs 81 (4) (July/August 2002): pp. 127–40. Also
see Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security:
Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas,” International
Studies Review, 2007 Vol. 9(4): 644-62. On Afghanistan, see
Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashind, “From Great Game to
Grand Bargain,” Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2008, Vol. 87 Issue
6, pp. 30–44.
36. Lucien Crowder, “We Are All Nation Builders Now,”
Current History (January 2009): pp. 9–13.
37. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), p. 294.
38. Bruce Ridel, “Pakistan: The Critical Battlefi eld,” Current
History (November 2008): pp. 355–361.
39. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,”
Foreign Affairs 70 (Winter 1990/91): pp. 23–33 and Josef Joffe,
Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 2006). Also see Joseph S. Nye,
Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002). Also see Stewart Patrick, “’Failed’ States and
Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas,”
International Studies Review, 2007 Vol. 9(4): pp. 644–662. On
Afghanistan, see Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashind, “From
Great Game to Grand Bargain,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87(6) (Nov/
Dec 2008): pp. 30–44.
40. Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound:
The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
41. The Bush Doctrine is best described in the report issued
by President Bush to the U.S. Congress in September 2002.
See The National Security Strategy of the United States of

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http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/File/109480/Muslims_and_Americans

http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/260

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http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=263

References 541
Geopolitics, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007),
Chapter 9.
13. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
14. Peter Schweizer, in Victory: The Reagan Administration’s
Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet
Union (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 1996).
15. Karen Rasler and Kenneth W. Thompson, “Predatory
Initiators and Changing Landscapes for Warfare,” Journal of
Confl ict Resolution 43 (August 1999): 411–433.
16. For a discussion of the motivation explanation, including
the Vietnam example, see Merom, How Democracies Lose
Small Wars, pp. 11–14.
17. Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The
Politics of Asymmetric Confl ict,” World Politics 27(January
1975): p. 197.
18. Steven Rosen, “War Power and the Willingness to
Suffer,” in Bruce M. Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers
(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972).
19. J. David Singer, “Peace in the Global System:
Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation,” in Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace (New York:
HarperCollins, 1991), p. 73.
20. For those reasons, A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The
War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp.
33–34, for example, use the gross national product (GNP),
discussed below, as their basic measure of power.
21. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Confl icts
(New York: Longman, 2000), p. 57. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
The Paradox of American Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002). Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to
Success in World Politics. 2005 New York: Public Affairs.
22. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature
of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), and Nye,
The Paradox of American Power.
23. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in
International Politics,” International Organization 59
(Winter 2005): pp. 39–75
24. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Win in Iraq,” Foreign
Affairs 84(5) (September/October 2005): pp. 87–104. See also
Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power,” in Alexander T.
J. Lennon (ed.), The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft
Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 2003), pp. 3–28.
25. Stevano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: A
Constructivist Analysis,” Millenium: Journal of
International Studies 33(3) (2005): pp. 495–521. Martha
Finnemore, “Legitimacy, Hypocrisy, and the Social Structure
of Unipolarity: Why Being a Unipole Isn’t All It’s Cracked
up to Be,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 58–85.
26. Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International
Politics,” p. 56.
27. J. Ann Tickner, “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of
Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation,” Millennium
17 (1988): p. 434.
28. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics,” p. 166.
29. David Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A
Conceptual Analysis,” International Organization 34
(Autumn 1980): p. 497.
30. James F. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,
Contending Theories of International Relations, 3rd. ed.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1990), pp. 61–64.
31. Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of Peace (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944), p. 43.
Barry Buzan, “Implications for the Study of International
Relations,” in Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn (eds.), Global
Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond
(London: Routledge, 2003): pp. 296–309.
57. For a summary of this perspective on globalization, see
Arie M. Kacowicz, “Globalization, Poverty, and the North-
South Divide,” International Studies Review (2007), Vol. 9:
pp. 565–580.
58. Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco, “Making State
Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive
Construction of ‘The Cuban Problem,’ 1960–1994,”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25 (1996): p.
363.
59. Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Scott
Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly,
Matthew Patterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True,
Theories of International Relations, 3rd ed. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): pp. 188–212.
60. Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at
the End of the Cold War (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993), p. 5.
61. Ibid., p. 23.
62. Ibid., p. 243.
Chapter 4 (pages 95–139)
1. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of
Nevada Press, 1991), p. 14.
2. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, Concepts
of International Politics in Global Perspective, 3rd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1979), p. 120.
3. In fact, it can be argued that “the concept of power is
perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political
science.” Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power
and Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1950), p. 75.
4. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed.
(New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 26.
5. “Power is the means by which international actors deal
with one another. It implies possession.” Walter S. Jones and
Steven J. Rosen, The Logic of International Relations, 4th ed.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), p. 229.
6. David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics,”
World Politics 31 (January 1979): pp. 161–194.
7. The following discussion is based in large part on James
Lee Ray and Ayse Vural, “Power Disparities and Paradoxical
Confl ict Outcomes,” International Interactions 12 (1986):
pp. 315–342.
8. Cynthia A. Cannizzo, “The Costs of Combat: Death,
Duration, and Defeat,” in J. David Singer (ed.), The
Correlates of War II: Testing Some Realpolitik Models (New
York: Free Press, 1980).
9. Kevin Wang and James Lee Ray, “Beginners and Winners:
The Fate of Initiators of Interstate Wars Involving Great
Powers Since 1495,” International Studies Quarterly 38
(March 1994): pp. 139–154.
10. Zeev Maoz, “Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes
of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976,” Journal of Confl ict
Resolution 27 (June 1983): p. 220.
11. Patricia L. Sullivan, “War Aims and War Outcomes: Why
Powerful States Lose Limited Wars,” Journal of Confl ict
Resolution 2007; 51; 498.
12. For an overview of asymmetric warfare and its
importance in current U.S. security policy, see Donald M.
Snow, National Security for a New Era: Globalization and

542 References
46. Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back
In,” p. 4.
47. Risse, “Transnational Actors and World Politics,” p. 258;
Josselin and Wallace, “Nonstate Actors in World Politics.”
48. W. Clausen, “The Internationalized Corporation: An
Executive’s View,” Annals 403 (September 1972): p. 21.
49. Robert S. Walters and David H. Blake, The Politics of
Global Economic Relations, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1992), p. 104.
50. William Manchester, The Arms of Krupp (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1968).
51. David Turner and Pete Richardson “The Global
Business.” The OECD Observer no. 234 (October 2002): 27-8,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/850/
The_global_business_.html
52. Joan Edelman Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of
International Economic Relations, 7th ed. 2010 Belmont,
CA: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 135-136.
53. Ibid, p. 129.
54. United Nations Conference on Trade & Development.
2008. World Investment Report 2008: Transnational
Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge. New York:
United Nations Publications.
55. “Fortune’s Global 500: The World’s Largest
Corporations,” Fortune, August 7, 1995, p. F-1.
56. United Nations Conference on Trade &
Development. 2008. World Investment Report 2008:
Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure
Challenge. New York: United Nations Publications, http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008p1_en , p.7.
57. OECD Investment Committee. 2008. “OECD FDI Outfl ows
and Infl ows Reach Record Highs in 2007 but Look Set to Fall in
2008.” OECD Investment News, Iss. 7 (June): 1-3, http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/18/28/40887916 (May 21, 2009).
58. Robert B. Reich, “Who Is Us?” Harvard Business Review
90 (January–February 1990): p. 59; see also
Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for
21st Century Capitalism (New York: Knopf, 1991).
59. Gross national product is closely related to GDP. Whereas
GDP includes only the goods and services produced within
a country by all people residing there, both citizens and
noncitizens, GNP includes the total product of a country’s
nationals, whether or not they reside in that country. These
differences tend to be offsetting and the fi gures are quite
similar for most countries.
60. Robert A. Pastor, “The Future of North America:
Replacing a Bad Neighbor Policy.” Foreign Affairs 87 (July/
August 2008): 84-98, p.90.
61. Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Myth of the Multinational,”
National Interest 26 (Winter 1991–1992): p. 56.
62. Louis W. Pauly and Simon Reich, “National Structures
and Multinational Corporate Behavior: Enduring Differences
in the Age of Globalization,” International Organization 51
(Winter 1997): p. 22.
63. Not all analysts of the relationship between states and
MNCs agree, of course. One analysis, for example, asserts
that “nowadays governments have only the appearance
of free choice when they set out to make rules.” Jessica
T. Mathews, “Power Shift,” Foreign Affairs 76 (January–
February 1997): p. 57. Reprinted by permission of Foreign
Affairs. Copyright © 1997 by the Council on Foreign
Relations, Inc. www.ForeignAffairs.com
64. Pauly and Reich, “National Structures and Multinational
Corporate Behavior,” p. 25, Abstract. See also Paul N.
32. For a recent geopolitical analysis on the importance of
the Indian Ocean, see Robert D. Kaplan, “Center Stage for
the Twenty-First Century, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009,
Vol. 88 Issue 2, p16-32.
33. The 1999 fi gures are from the World Development
Indicators database, World Bank, August 2, 2000 (http://
www.worldbank.org/data/).
34. John Allen, Student Atlas of World Politics (New York:
Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), pp. 108–110.
35. A related measure is gross domestic product (GDP).
Whereas GDP includes only the goods and services produced
within a country by all people residing there, both citizens
and noncitizens, GNP includes the total product of a
country’s nationals (citizens), whether or not they reside in
that country. These differences tend to be offsetting to some
extent for most countries; therefore, the fi gures are quite
similar for most countries.
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544 References
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80. Charles W. Ostrom and Brian L. Job, “The President and
the Use of Force,” American Political Science Review 80
(1986): pp. 554–566; see also B. Fordham, “The Politics of
Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy
Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949–1994,” International
Studies Quarterly 42 (1998): pp. 567–590.
81. David J. Brulé, “Congress, Presidential Approval,
and U.S. Dispute Initiation.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4
(October 2008): 349–370.
82. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:
The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization
42 (1988): pp. 427–460. The “selectorate theory” also makes
some of these points and emphasizes differences across
some measures, at least, democratic states are in fact less
confl ict or war prone than states. For the most recent
analyses, see Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating
Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International
Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001); Kenneth
Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Paul K. Huth and Todd
L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Confl ict in
the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002); and David L. Rousseau, Democracy and War
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005).
54. Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and
Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” p. 511.
55. Ibid. See also Richard Eichenberg, Public Opinion and
National Security in Western Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1989).
56. Stephen D. Cohen, Joel R. Paul, and Robert A. Blecker,
Fundamentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy: Economics,
Politics, Laws, and Issues (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
1996), p. 106.
57. Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, United States
Foreign Policy: Politics Beyond the Water’s Edge (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), p. 184.
58. Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Infl uence in Foreign Policy
Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in
German and Israeli Foreign Policy” International Studies
Quarterly 40 (December 1996): pp. 501–530; Joe D. Hagan,
Philip P. Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, and John D. Stempel,
“Foreign Policy by Coalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and
Anarchy,” International Studies Review 3 (Summer 2001):
pp. 169–216.
59. Joe Hagan, Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in
Comparative Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1993), p. 47.
60. Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign
Policy in Comparative Perspective,” p. 17.
61. David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York:
Knopf, 1951); G. David Garson, “On the Origins of Interest-
Group Theory: A Critique of a Process,” American Political
Science Review 68 (December 1974): p. 1505.
62. Kaarbo, Lantis, and Beasley, “The Analysis of Foreign
Policy in Comparative Perspective,” p. 15; see also Stephen
D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials
Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1978); Jack Snyder, Myths of
Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Helen Milner,
“Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the
Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States
During the 1970s,” International Organization 41 (1987): pp.
639–666.
63. Stefanie Ann Lenway, The Politics of U.S. International
Trade (Boston: Pitman, 1985), p. 34.
64. Ibid., p. 26.
65. Snow and Brown, United States Foreign Policy, p. 185.
66. William P. Avery, “Domestic Interests in NAFTA
Bargaining,” Political Science Quarterly 11 (Summer 1998):
p. 284.
67. This powerful coalition of the armed forces, Congress,
and infl uential groups in the private sector, particularly
private industry, is often referred to as the “iron triangle.”
See Gordon Adams, “The Iron Triangle: Inside the Defense
Policy Process,” in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene
Wittkopf (eds.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign
Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York: St. Martin’s Press,

References 547
Relations,” Mershon International Studies Review 42,
supplement 2 (1998): pp. 63–96.
100. Steven Philip Kramer, “Blair’s Britain After Iraq,”
Foreign Affairs 82(4) (July/August 2003): pp. 90–104 and
Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy:
Tony Blair’s Iraq Decisions,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2(3)
(July 2006): p. 298.
101. Kramer, “Blair’s Britain After Iraq.”
102. For an analysis of George W. Bush’s operational code,
see Jonathan Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief
Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush,” Journal
of Confl ict Resolution (December 2008) 52(6): 820–849.
103. Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s
Iraq Decisions”; see also Mark Schafer and Stephen G.
Walker, “Political Leadership and the Democratic Peace:
The Operational Code of Prime Minister Tony Blair,” in
Ofer Feldman and Linda O. Valenty (eds.), Profi ling Political
Leaders: Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality and Behavior
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001): pp. 21–35 and Mark
Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, “Democratic Leaders and
the Democratic Peace: The Operational Codes of Tony Blair
and Bill Clinton,” International Studies Quarterly 50(3)
(September 2006): pp. 561–583.
104. Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s
Iraq Decisions,” p. 298.
105. Richard K. Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller,
“Beyond the Enemy Image Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic
Research After the Cold War,” International Organization
49 “How Kuwait Was Won,” p. 16.
106. Ole Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the
Enemy,” Journal of International Affairs 21 (1967): p. 25.
107. Alex Roberto Hybel, Power over Rationality (Albany,
N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 8–9.
108. Freedman and Karsh, bridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005).
109. Ibid., p. 15.
110. Singer, “Peace in the Global System,” p. 63.
111. Freedman and Karsh, “How Kuwait Was Won,” p. 36.
112. Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s
Iraq Decisions,” p. 298.
113. Arjen Boin, Paul ’t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius,
The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under
Pressure (Cam (1995): pp. 415–450.
114. Juliet Kaarbo, “Prime Minister Leadership Styles
in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Framework for
Research,” Political Psychology 18 (1997): pp. 553–581.
115. Margaret Hermann, “Leaders and Foreign Policy
Decision-making,” in D. Caldwell and T. McKeown (eds.),
Diplomacy, Force, and Leadership: Essays in Honor of
Alexander George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), p.
82.
116. Fred I. Greenstein, “The Leadership Styoe of Brack
Obama: An Early Assessment,” The Forum: 7 Iss. 1, Article
6, (11 pages) http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol7/iss1/art6
Accessed 31 May 2009.
117. Margaret G. Hermann, Charles F. Hermann, and Joe
D. Hagan, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy
Behavior,” in C. F. Hermann, C. W. Kegley, Jr., and J. N.
Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign
Policy (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 314; see also
Margaret G. Hermann, Thomas Preston, Baghat Korany,
and Timothy M. Shaw, “Who Leads Matters: The Effects
of Powerful Individuals,” International Studies Review 3
(2001): pp. 83–131.
political institutions. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James
D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith,
“An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,”
American Political Science Review 93 (1999): pp. 791–807
and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph
M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, The Logic of Political
Survival (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003).
83. Avery, “Domestic Interests in NAFTA
Bargaining,” p. 305.
84. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, “Why Bureaucrats Play
Games,” Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971): pp. 70–90; John D.
Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory
of Decision (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1974).
85. Jiri Valenta, “The Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm and
the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia,” Political Science
Quarterly 94 (1979): pp. 55–76.
86. Charles F. Parker and Eric K. Stern, “Bolt from the
Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and
the Origins of Strategic Surprise,” Foreign Policy Analysis
1(3) (November 2005): pp. 301–331. See The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Report (New York: St. Martin’s, 2004).
87. Heather Wilson, “Missed Opportunities: Washington
Politics and Nuclear Proliferation,” National Interest
(Winter 1993–1994), p. 29.
88. Ibid., p. 29.
89. George Friedman, America’s Secret War (New York:
Doubleday, 2004), p. 262.
90. Charles Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’”
Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959): p. 81.
91. This discussion of the missile crisis relies heavily on
Graham Allison’s work. See Allison, Essence of Decision;
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision 2nd
ed. (New York, NY: Longman, 1999).
92. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch,
“Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” International Security 14 (Winter 1989–
1990): p. 153.
93. Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 110
94. Ibid., p. 130. The account of this episode involving
the quarantine procedures can be found on pp. 127–132
in Allison, Essence of Decision. However, the validity of
Allison’s account has been challenged by, among others,
Dan Caldwell, “A Research Note on the Quarantine of
Cuba, October 1962,” International Studies Quarterly 22
(December 1978): p. 628.
95. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States, The 9/11 Report, p. LXXXIX.
96. Ibid. See also Parker and Stern, “Bolt from the Blue or
Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins
of Strategic Surprise,” especially pp. 316–317.
97. Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics: Problems
of Evidence, Inference and Conceptualization (Chicago:
Markham, 1969); Margaret G. Hermann, “When Leader
Personality Will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions,”
in James N. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns (New
York: Free Press, 1976).
98. S. Freud and W. C. Buillitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A
Psychological Study (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1967).
99. Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Is There Method in
Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International

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548 References
9. Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen,
“Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Confl ict, 1946–2007,”
Journal of Peace Research 45(5) (2008): 697–710, pp. 698.
10. Charles King, “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow
After the Georgia Crisis,” Foreign Affairs (November/
December 2008) 87(6).
11. Richard Little, “Structuralism and Neo-Realism,”
in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), International
Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Pinter,
1985), p. 74.
12. J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in
International Relations,” in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba
(eds.), The International System (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1961), p. 77.
13. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 3. Waltz is merely
describing this kind of theory here, not advocating or
defending it.
14. Ibid., p. 221.
15. Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist
Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988):
615–628.
16. Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power and International
Order,” in Alan James (ed.), The Bases of International Order
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 100.
17. Ibid., pp. 104–105, 108.
18. Edward V. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance
of Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1955), p. 76.
19. Ibid., p. 39.
20. Seyom Brown, New Faces, Old Forces, and the Future of
World Politics (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1980), p. 24.
21. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar
Power Systems and International Stability,” in James N.
Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy,
2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 317–318.
22. Kenneth Waltz, “International Structure, National Force,
and the Balance of World Power,” in Rosenau, International
Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 306.
23. Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of
International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p.
50.
24. J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey,
“Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power
War, 1820–1965,” in Bruce M. Russett (ed.), Peace, War,
and Numbers (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1972).
25. To count as a war for the purposes of this study, a
confl ict had to have resulted in at least one thousand battle
deaths. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms:
International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Thousand Oaks,
Calif.: Sage, 1982).
26. A related analysis of the major powers that focused
on the distribution of power among blocs, or coalitions of
states, found that the concentration of power among those
blocs correlated with war in the period from 1830 to 1914
but not in the period from 1919 to 1965. See Richard J.
Stoll, “Bloc Concentration and Dispute Escalation Among
the Major Powers, 1830–1965,” Social Science Quarterly
65 (March 1984): pp. 48–59.
27. Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, pp. 19–20.
28. D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, The Behavioral
Origins of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2004), p. 147.
118. Dyson, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair’s
Iraq Decisions,” p. 299.
119. Ibid., especially pp. 299–303.
120. Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton
Miffl in, 1972); Yaacov Vertzberger, “Collective Risk Taking:
The Decision-Making Group,” in Paul ‘t Hart, Eric K. Stern,
and Bengt Sundelius (eds.), Beyond Groupthink (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1997).
121. Paul ’t Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius “Foreign
Policy-making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics,” in ’t Hart,
Stern, and Sundelius, Beyond Groupthink, p. 10.
122. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2002), p. 256.
123. William Branigin and Dana Priest, “Senate Report
Blasts Intelligence Agencies’ Flaws,” washingtonpost.com,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38459–
2004Jul9.html.
124. Alexander Moens, The Foreign Policy of George W.
Bush: Values, Strategy, and Loyalty (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,
2004), p. 200.
125. See ’t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius, Beyond Groupthink.
Chapter 6 (pages 181–214)
1. See Francis A. Beer, Peace Against War (San Francisco:
Freeman, 1981), pp. 20–34, for a discussion and confi rmation
of this widely cited estimate on the number of years
without war. For the average number of wars per decade,
see Meredith Reid Sarkees, Frank Whelon Wayman, and J.
David Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars:
A Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time,
1816–1997,” International Studies Quarterly 47 (2003): pp.
49–70.
2. William Eckhardt, Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A
Quantitative History of War (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland &
Company, 1992), p. 174.
3. Ibid., p. 174.
4. Ibid., p. 175. For a recent discussion of why the twentieth
century was so violent, see Niall Ferguson, “The Next War
of the World,” Foreign Affairs 85(5) (September/October
2006): pp. 61–74.
5. UNICEF, Child Protection From Violence, Exploitation
and Abuse, http://www.unicef.org/protection/
index_armedconfl ict.html, July 31, 2006. Diffi culties in
determining what constitutes a war-related casualty and a
general lack of accurately recorded information regarding
civilian casualty levels make estimation of these fi gures
prone to inaccuracy, but, according to Klaus Jurgen Gantzel
and Torsten Schwinghammer, Warfare Since the Second
World War (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers,
2000), p. 138, “most likely the percentage of civilians
(noncombatants) killed in relation to military personnel
(combatants) has risen steadily since the industrialization of
war, beginning with the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865).”
6. Lotta Harbom, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen,
“Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Confl ict, 1946–2007,” Journal
of Peace Research 45(5) (2008): 697-710, pp. 697–8.
7. Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer, “Inter-State, Intra-State, and
Extra-State Wars,” pp. 60–61.
8. Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen, “Armed Confl ict and
Peace Agreements,” pp. 617–619. For a discussion of trends in
major power warfare, see Jack S. Levy, Thomas C. Walker, and
Martin S. Edwards, “Continuity and Change in the Evolution
of War,” in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gat (eds.), War in a Changing
World (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 15–48.

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http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_armedconflict.html

http://www.unicef.org/protection/index_armedconflict.html

References 549
Confl ict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
42. Waltz, “Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” p. 621.
43. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of
Stability in the Postwar International System,” International
Security 10 (Spring 1986): pp. 99–142.
44. See J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1965).
45. Greg Cashman, What Causes War? (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass, 1993), p. 130.
46. V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism
(New York: International Publishers, 1939).
47. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1991).
48. See John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces
Democratic Peace,” International Security, vol.19, no.2 (Fall
1994): 87–125.
49. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph
M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Testing Novel
Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” World
Politics 56 (April 2004): pp. 363–88.
50. Cashman, What Causes War? p. 146.
51. See Chapter 5 for application to the Iraqi decision for war
in 1990.
52. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign
Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983):
p. 213.
53. Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of
Interdisciplinary History (Spring 1988): p. 661.
54. Michael W. Doyle, “Liberal Institutions and International
Ethics,” in Kenneth Kipnis and Diana T. Meyers (eds.),
Political Realism and International Morality (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1987), p. 191.
55. James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Confl ict
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp.
124–125.
56. William R. Thompson, “Democracy and Peace: Putting
the Cart Before the Horse?” International Organization 50
(Winter 1996): pp. 141–174.
57. David E. Spiro, “The Insignifi cance of Liberal Peace,”
International Security 19 (Fall 1994): pp. 50–86.
58. See Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Polities
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59. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace,” p. 112.
60. Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path
to Peace or a Source of Interstate Confl ict?” Journal of Peace
Research 33 (February 1996): pp. 29–50.
61. James Lee Ray, “The Democratic Path to Peace,” Journal
of Democracy 8 (April 1997): pp. 49–64.
62. Dina A. Zinnes, “Constructing Political Logic: The
Democratic Peace Puzzle,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution
48(3) (June 2004): pp. 430–454. Michael D. Ward, Randolph
M. Siverson, and Xun Cao, “Disputes, Democracies, and
Dependencies: A Reexamination of the Kantian Peace,”
American Journal of Political Science 51(3) (2007): pp.
583–601; Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, “The Kantian
Liberal Peace (Revisited),” American Journal of Political
Science 51(2) (2007): pp. 397–414; David Lektzian and Mark
Souva, “A Comparative Theory Test of Democratic Peace
Arguments, 1946—2000,” Journal of Peace Research 46(1)
(2009): pp. 17–37.
29. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign
Affairs, 70 (Winter 1990/91): pp. 23–33.
30. For a recent discussion of contemporary unipolarity and
its consequences, see the special issue of World Politics,
“Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,”
edited by G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and
William C. Wohlforth, January 2009.
31. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
32. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,”
Foreign Affairs 78(2) (March-April 1999): pp. 35–49.
33. Josef Joffe, Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of
America (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2006).
Also see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American
Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It
Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) and Ivo H.
Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush
Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003).
34. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf,
1968). For recent research on power transition theory, see
Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke (Eds.) Parity and War
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996) and Ronald
Tammen, Jacek Kubler, Douglas Lemke, Allan Stam, Carole
Alsharabati, Mark Abdollahian, Brian Efi rd, and A. F. K.
Organski, Power Transitions (New York: Chatham House,
2000).
35. Greg Cashman, What Causes War? An Introduction
to Theories of International Confl ict (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1993), p. 248.
36. William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition,
and Great Power War,” World Politics 61(1) (2008): pp. 28–57;
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisisted: The
Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,”
International Security (Fall 2006) 31(2):7–41.
37. Douglas Lemke and Ronald L. Tammen, “Power Transition
Theory and the Rise of China,” International Interactions 29
(2003): pp. 269–271. See also G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of
China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System
Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87(1) (January/February 2008):23–37;
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is
Confl ict Inevitable?” International Security 30(2) (2005): pp.
7–45; Thomas Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a
Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia”
International Security 31(1) (2006): pp. 81–126; and William C.
Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power
War,” World Politics 61(1) (2008): pp. 28–57.
38. See, for example, John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett, and
Michael L. Berbaum, “Causes of Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations,”
International Studies Quarterly 47(3) (2003).
39. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and
Interdependence (New York: HarperCollins, 1989), p. 27. See
also Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York:
Norton, 1997).
40. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 29.
41. According to Kim and Rousseau, recent empirical
evidence on pacifying effects of interdependence has been
mixed (Hyung Min Kim and David L. Rousseau, “The
Classical Liberals Were Half Right (or Half Wrong): New
Tests of the ‘Liberal Peace’, 1960–88,” Journal of Peace
Research 42(5): pp. 523–543. See also Bennett and Stam,
The Behavioral Origins of War, p. 141. For recent reviews
of this literature, see Edward D. Mansfi eld and Brian M.
Pollins, (eds.) Economic Interdependence and International

550 References
Miriam Fendius Elman (ed.), Paths to Peace: Is Democracy
the Answer? (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 192–
193; see also David E. Spiro, “The Insignifi cance of the Liberal
Peace,” International Security 19 (Fall 1994): pp. 50–86, and
Michael W. Doyle, “Correspondence on the Democratic
Peace,” International Security 19 (Spring 1995): pp. 164–184.
77. Elman, “Finland in World War II,” pp. 192–193; see
also James Lee Ray, “War Between Democracies: Rare, or
Nonexistent?” International Interactions 18 (1993):
pp. 251–276.
78. Elman, “Finland in World War II,” pp. 229–232.
79. Robert Gallucci, Neither Peace nor Honor (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 48.
80. Jack S. Levy, “Organizational Routines and the Causes of
War,” International Studies Quarterly 30 (1986): p. 218.
81. Shannon Lindsey Blanton, “Images in Confl ict: The Case
of Ronald Reagan and El Salvador,” International Studies
Quarterly 40 (1996): p. 24.
82. Jack S. Levy, “Misperception and the Causes of War:
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Politics 36 (October 1983): pp. 76–99.
83. Janice Gross Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology:
The Misperception of Threat,” in N. Kressel (ed.), Political
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Paragon House, 1993), pp. 370–371.
84. John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (Boston:
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85. Robert Jervis “War and Misperception,” Journal of
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86. Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the
Origins of the First World War (in The Great War and the
Nuclear Age),” International Security 9 (Summer 1984):
pp. 958–107. See Kier Lieber for recent criticism of this
explanation of World War I. Keir A. Lieber, “The New
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Relations Theory,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2
(Fall 2007), pp. 155–191.
87. Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York:
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88. Jervis, “War and Misperception,” pp. 681–682.
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90. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to
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91. Stein, “Building Politics into Psychology,” p. 372.
Chapter 7 (pages 215–258)
1. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Confl ict
and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004,” Journal of
Peace Research 42 (2005): pp. 623–635.
2. Lotta Harbom, Stina Högbladh, and Peter Wallensteen,
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3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI
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74. Ibid.
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76. Miriam Fendius Elman, “Finland in World War II:
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84. Grenville Byford, “The Wrong War,” Foreign Affairs 81
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87. Ibid, p. 98.
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91. Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century
(Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2000), p. 36.
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edition, 2006, pp. 232, 236.
53. Steven R. David, “Internal War: Causes and Cures,”
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54. Gurr, People Versus States, p. 106.
55. Taras and Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Confl ict, 2002,
pp. 15–16.
56. Ibid., p. 16.
57. Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, “The Social Identity
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William G. Austin (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations
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58. David L. Hamilton and Tina K. Trolier, “Stereotypes and
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59. Taras and Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Confl ict, 2002,
p. 5.
60. Nelson Kasfi r, “Sudan’s Darfur: Is It Genocide?” Current
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61. David, “Internal War,” p. 565, and Brown, Ethnic Confl ict
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62. David, “Internal War,” p. 565.
63. Charles King, “The Myth of Ethnic Warfare:
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64. Kaufman, “An ‘International’ Theory of Inter-Ethnic
War,” p. 157.
65. Rita Jalali and Seymour Martin Lipset, “Racial and
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66. William Drozdiak, “50 Years On, Expulsion Rankles for
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67. Jalali and Lipset, “Racial and Ethnic Confl ict,” p. 60,
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68. Joseph Nye, “Confl icts After the Cold War,” Washington
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69. Richard Rosecrance, “Separatism’s Final Country,”
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70. Charles King, “The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow
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71. Gurr, Minorities at Risk, p. 38.
72. Nicholas Wood, “For Albanians in Kosovo, Hope for
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Islamists: Managing Communal Confl ict in the Twenty-
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127. Alan Cowell, “London is Solemn on Anniversary of
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128. Olivier Roy, “Europe’s Response to Radical Islam,”
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130. MIPT Terrorism Data Base, http:www.tkb.org, accessed
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131. Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” p. 36.
132. Long, “Countering Terrorism Beyond Sovereignty,” p.
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133. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies
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135. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, pp. 37–38.
136. Enders and Sandler, “Is Transnational Terrorism
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137. Jonathan Stevenson, “Pragmatic Counterterrorism,”
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138. Enders and Sandler, “Is Transnational Terrorism
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Al-Qaida, Sala Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,”
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141. One analysis suggests that the proportion of religious to
non-religious ethnic minorities remained stable from 1945
to 2000, although religious-separatist confl icts became more
violent than other separatist groups after 1980. See Jonathan
Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Confl ict:
Ethnic Confl ict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945–2001.”
142. Shibley Telhami, “It’s Not About Faith: A Battle for the
Soul of the Middle East,” Current History (December 2001):
p. 417. See also Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today.
2nd ed. 2008, New York: Routledge.
143. Ibid.
144. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” p. 343.
145. Long, “Countering Terrorism Beyond Sovereignty,” p.
102.
146. Crenshaw, “Why America?” p. 429.
147. Ibid.
148. Ibid., p. 432.
149. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs,
(May/June 2007) 86(3):24-40.
150. Mark Juergensmeyer, “Terror in the Name of God,”
Current History (November 2001): p. 357.
151. On Al Qaeda, see Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New
York: Free Press, 2001).
152. Jessica Stern, “Preparing for a War on Terrorism,”
Current History (November 2001): p. 355.
92. Sederberg, Terrorist Myths, p. 33.
93. Ibid.
94. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Patterns of Global Terrorism
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1997).
95. R. J. Rummel, Death by Government, www.hawaii
.edu/powerkills, July 21, 2006.
96. Long, “Countering Terrorism Beyond Sovereignty,” p. 99.
97. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Patterns of Transnational
Terrorism, 1970–1999: Alternative Time-Series Estimates,”
International Studies Quarterly 46 (2002): p. 146.
98. Ibid, p. 146.
99. David C. Rapoport, “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in
Three Religious Traditions,” American Political Science
Review 78 (September 1984): pp. 659, 672, 673, 675.
100. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, p. 22.
101. David C. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave: September 11 in
the History of Terrorism,” Current History (December 2001):
pp. 419–424.
102. For a concise history of terrorism in the second half
of the twentieth century, see Martha Crenshaw, “Why
America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History
(December 2001).
103. Ibid., p. 427.
104. Ibid., pp. 426–427.
105. Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists:
Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics (New York: Facts on
File, 1979), p. 71.
106. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, p. 79.
107. Ibid., pp. 80–81.
108. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet
Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984), p. 49.
109. Dobson and Payne, The Terrorists, p. 115.
110. Cline and Alexander, Terrorism, p. 51.
111. Laurie Mylroie, “The World Trade Center Bomb,”
National Interest 42 (Winter 1995–1996): pp. 3–15.
112. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, pp. 272–275.
113. Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” p. 29; Hoffman,
Inside Terrorism, p. 276.
114. Steven A. Holmes, “U.S. Says Terrorist Attacks Dropped
Sharply in 1992,” New York Times, May 1, 1993, p. 4.
115. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Is Transnational
Terrorism Becoming More Threatening?” Journal of Confl ict
Resolution 44 (June 2000): p. 310.
116. Ibid., p. 308.
117. Crenshaw, “Why America?” p. 432.
118. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty:
American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism,” Survival 44
(2002): p. 124.
119. Enders and Sandler, “Is Transnational Terrorism
Becoming More Threatening?” p. 311.
120. Crenshaw, “Why America?” pp. 428–429.
121. Ahmed Rashid, “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism,”
Foreign Affairs 78 (November–December 1999): p. 31.
122. Ann M. Lesch, “Osama bin Laden’s ‘Business’ in
Sudan,” Current History (May 2002): pp. 203–209.
123. Rashid, “The Taliban.”
124. Bernard Lewis, “License to Kill,” Foreign Affairs 77
(November–December 1998): p. 15.
125. Ibid., p. 20.
126. Elaine Sciolino, “Offi cials Suspect Global Terror Tie in
Moroccan Blasts,” New York Times, May 18, 2003; Douglas

www.hawaii.edu/powerkills

www.hawaii.edu/powerkills

http://www.tkb.org

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169. Taras and Ganguly, Understanding Ethnic Confl ict,
2006, p. 236.
170. Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” p. 32.
171. Long, “Countering Terrorism Beyond Sovereignty,” p.
105.
172. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, p. 82.
173. Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave,” p. 424.
Chapter 8 (pages 259–301)
1. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1997), p. 4.
2. Arnold Wolfers, “Alliances,” in David Sills (ed.),
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New
York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), p. 269.
3. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 18–19.
4. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
5. Ibid., p. 5.
6. Ibid., pp. 21–22.
7. Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited:
The Coming End of the United States’ Unipolar Moment,”
International Security (Fall 2006) 31(2):7–41.
8. Ibid.
9. Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profi t: Bringing
the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security 19
(Summer 1994): 74.
10. Ibid., p. 96.
11. Ibid.
12. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, p. 29.
13. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalition (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32–33.
14. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer, “Alliances,
Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis,” in
Cornelius Cotter (ed.) Political Science Annual, Vol. 4
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 266.
15. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalition, p. 7.
16. Glenn Palmer and J. Sky David, “Multiple Goals
or Deterrence: A Test of Two Models in Nuclear and
Nonnuclear Alliances,” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 43
(December 1999): p. 750.
17. On institutional and normative constraints of alliances,
see, for example, John Duffi eld, “International Regimes and
Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO
Force Levels,” International Organization 46 (1992): pp.
819–855.
18. Jack Levy and Michael Barnett, “Alliance Formation,
Domestic Political Economy, and Third World Security,”
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14 (December
1992): pp. 19–40.
19. Zeev Maoz, “Paradoxical Functions of International
Alliances: Security and Other Dilemmas,” in John Vasquez
and Colin Elman (eds.) Realism and the Balancing of Power:
A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
2003).
20. See Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, “Democracy, political
similarity, and international alliances, 1816–1992,” Journal
of Confl ict Resolution 44(2000): pp. 203–227 and Douglas
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154. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, p. 282.
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156. Crenshaw, “Why America?” p. 431.
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159. Crenshaw, “Why America?” p. 428. See also Bruce W.
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160. Nacos, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, p. 189; “How
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161. Crenshaw, “Why America?” p. 428.
162. Bruce Riedel, “Al Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs,
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163. Cronin, “Rethinking Sovereignty,” p. 127.
164. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 2003. Bruce Riedel, “Al
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167. Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, “Overview:
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168. James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty?:
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50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
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23. Mancur Olson, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,”
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83. For more details, and pros and cons of the agreement,
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86. Ibid., pp. 273, 276.
87. Gawdat Bahgat, “Nuclear Proliferation: The Islamic
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125; Nils Duquet, “Arms Acquisition Patterns and the
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56. Krause, “Hazardous Weapons.”
57. Samuel Huntington, as quoted in Cashman, What Causes
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58. Susan Sample, “Arms Races and Dispute Escalation:
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59. Cashman, What Causes War? p. 182. See also James
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60. John Sislin and Frederic Pearson, Arms and Ethnic
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62. Michael T. Klare and Lora Lumpe, “Fanning the Flames
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63. SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and
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67. “Fear that the other may be about to strike in the
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Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Confl ict (Cambridge,
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68. Some classic and recent sources on the game theory
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8. Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate,
The United Nations and Changing World Politics (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 2001), p. 24.
9. Ibid., pp. 24–25.
10. Gerhart Niemeyer, “The Balance-Sheet of the League
Experiment,” in David A. Kay (ed.), The United Nations
Political System (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 49.
11. Leland M. Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 18–19.
12. Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, The United Nations:
International Organization and World Politics, 2nd ed.
(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994), p. 35.
13. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, p. 224.
14. Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence (New
York: Knopf, 1979), p. 194.
15. Brian E. Urquhart, “United Nations Peace-Keeping
in the Middle East,” World Today 36 (March 1980):
pp. 88–89.
16. Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, The United Nations and
Changing World Politics, p. 55.
17. Paul F. Diehl, “The Conditions for Success in
Peacekeeping Operations,” in Paul F. Diehl (ed.), The Politics
of International Organizations (Chicago: Dorsey Press,
1989), pp. 173–174.
18. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations, 2nd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 157.
19. Riggs and Plano, The United Nations, p. 121.
20. Paul Lewis, “How the U.N. Keeps Pace As Fewer Keep
Peace,” New York Times, May 4, 1997, p. 1:7.
21. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, “50 Years
of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” June 9, 2003,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/50web/1.htm.
22. Virginia Page Fortna, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?
International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After
Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48(2) (June
2004): pp. 269–292.
23. President George H. W. Bush used this phrase in
numerous speeches in 1990 and 1991.
24. Renner, 1993, p. 8.
25. Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, The United Nations and
Changing World Politics, p. 81.
26. “In the last fi ve years, more than 90 cases of armed
confl ict have broken out, practically all of them within
states. . . . The UN since 1989 has been directly or indirectly
involved in more than half of these cases.” Ruben P. Mendez,
“Paying for Peace and Development,” Foreign Policy, no. 100
(Fall 1995): p. 22.
27. Simon Jenkins, “Leave Rwanda Alone,” London Times,
July 10, 1994, p. 1:13.
28. Ibid.
29. Philip Gourevitch, “Zaire’s Killer Camps,” New York
Times, October 28, 1996, p. A:13.
30. Charles Krauthammer, “Saved by a Failure of
Humanitarianism,” Tampa Tribune, November 25, 1996, p. 13.
31. Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, The United Nations and
Changing World Politics, p. 89.
32. Lewis, “How the UN Keeps Pace As Fewer Keep Peace,” p. 4.
33. Ibid.
34. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World: An
International History (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), p. 511.
131. Associated Press, “California and Britain Announce
Agreement on Global Warming,” published in the New York
Times, August 1, 2006.
132. See Steven Poe, “Nations’ Responses to Transnational
Hostage Events: An Empirical Evaluation,” International
Interactions 14 (1988): pp. 27–40; Edward Mickolus, Todd
Sandler, Jean Murdock, and Peter Fleming, International
Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (Dunn Loring:
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133. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons (eds.), The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
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134. Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980:
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135. Ibid., p. 200.
136. Ibid.
137. Starkey, Boyer, and Wilkenfeld, Negotiating a Complex
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138. James Blight, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and David A. Welch,
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140. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42
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Chapter 9 (pages 302–352)
1. For studies on the relationship between international
organizations and confl ict, see Charles Boehmer, Erik
Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “ Do Intergovernmental
Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57 2004 (1):
1–38; Michael W. Doyle, and Nicholas Sambanis, Making
war and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations,
2006 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Jon
Pevehouse, and Bruce Russett, “ Democratic International
Governmental Organizations Promote Peace,” International
Organization 60 2006 (4): 969-1000 and the special issue of
Journal of Confl ict Resolution 52(2) (April 2008).
2. Inis L. Claude, Swords into Plowshares, 3rd ed. (New York:
Random House, 1964).
3. These logical and theoretical requirements are taken from
discussions by Claude and by John J. Mearsheimer, “The
False Promise of International Institutions,” International
Security 19 (Winter 1994–1995): p. 32. Mearsheimer is
particularly skeptical about the possibility of developing an
effective system of collective security, and Claude, although
more sympathetic, does ultimately emphasize the diffi culties
and barriers to implementing such a system.
4. Worldmark Press, The United Nations (New York: Wiley,
1977), p. 123.
5. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International
Institutions,” p. 31.
6. Ibid.
7. It is diffi cult to imagine the United States, for example,
using military force against Israel, even if it were branded an
aggressor by the international community.

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59. Ibid.
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63. Ibid., p. 52.
64. Ibid., pp. 60–68.
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36. Ibid., p. 62.
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100. J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention
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101. Ibid., pp. 36–49 and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving
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102. Holzgrefe, pp. 18–36.
103. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the
West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So
Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), pp. 311–336.
104. Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian
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Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 117–118. For the
exploration of this argument in the Balkan confl icts, see
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105. See, for example, Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of
Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human
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106. Jost, “Human Rights,” p. 217.
107. Human Rights Watch, “World Report 1999,” 2003, pp.
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108. Nicholas D. Kristoff, “Peasants of China Discover New
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A:4.
109. Ibid.
110. Amartya Sen, “The Economics of Life and Death,”
Scientifi c American 268 (May 1993): p. 46. See also Valerie
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111. Mary H. Cooper, “Women and Human Rights,” CQ
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Press, 2001), p. 228.
112. M. Rosenthal, “Fighting Female Mutilation,” New York
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113. A. M. Rosenthal, “A Challenge to the Clintons and the
Doles,” New York Times, May 30, 1996.
114. Charlotte Bunch and Roxanna Carrillo, “Global
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115. Ellen Goodman, “Global Mistreatment of Women
No Longer a Cultural Issue,” Boston Globe; appeared in
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116. Seble Dawit and Salem Mekuria, “The West Just
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117. Bilahari Kausikan, “Asia’s Different Standard,” Foreign
Policy, no. 92 (Fall 1993): p. 34.
118. Aryeh Neier, “Asia’s Unacceptable Standard,” Foreign
Policy, no. 92 (Fall 1993): p. 51.
119. Beth Stephens, “Hypocrisy on Rights,” New York Times,
June 24, 1993, p. A:13.
80. For a scholarly analysis of U.S. compliance with the laws
of war in Iraq, see Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfi re or the
Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in
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81. Kenneth Jost, “Human Rights,” CQ Researcher,
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82. Reuters, “Judges for War Crimes Court Sworn In,” New
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83. Helena Cobban, “International Courts,” Foreign Policy
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84. Marlise Simons and Neil MacFarquhar, “Court Issues
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85. Mona Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian
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86. Jimmy Carter, “Just War or a Just War?” New York
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87. Alex J. Bellamy, “Is the War on Terror Just?”
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88. See, for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against
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89. William Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 17. Frankena (Ethics, p. 15) also
explains that “a deontologist contends that it is possible
[for] an action or rule of action to be the morally right or
obligatory one even if it does not promote the greatest
possible balance of good over evil for self, society, or
universe.” For an application of deontological pacifi sm to the
“war on terror,” see Alex J. Bellamy, “Is the War on Terror
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90. Frankena, Ethics, p. 34.
91. Robert W. Tucker, The Nuclear Debate (New York:
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92. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Introduction:
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93. Philip Alston, “The UN’s Human Rights Record,” in Ku
and Diehl (eds.), International Law, pp. 355–356.
94. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 71.
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96. Beitz, Political Theory and International
Relations, p. 121.
97. Alston, “The UN’s Human Rights Record,” p. 356. See
also Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink
(eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms
and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization
Era (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
98. Michael Mandelbaum, “The Reluctance to Intervene,” in
Robert C. Art and Robert Jervis (eds.), International Politics:
Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues (New York:
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Intervention,” in Peter J. Kazenstein (ed.), The Culture of
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York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
138. Irving Kristol, “Human Rights: The Hidden Agenda,”
National Interest 6 (Winter 1986–1987):
p. 10. For historical arguments supporting this view, see
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(New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); Seymour
Drescher, Econocide: British Slavery in the Era of Abolition
(Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977);
and David Eltis, Economic Growth and the Ending of the
Transatlantic Slave Trade (New York: Oxford University
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139. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill:
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140. Beitz, Political Theory and International
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141. Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear
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142. Evan Luard, War in International Society (London:
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144. John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf,
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145. “After the Withdrawal,” World Press Review, April 29,
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146. Keegan, A History of Warfare, p. 58.
147. Ratner, “International Law.”
148. Ibid.
Chapter 10 (pages 353–388)
1. Joan Edelman Spero, and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of
International Economic Relations, 7th ed. (2010) Belmont,
CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
2. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations (London: George Routledge and Sons,
1892), fi rst published in 1776.
3. Ibid., p. 343.
4. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation (London: Dent, 1973), fi rst published in 1817.
5. David N. Balaam and Michael Veseth, Introduction to
International Political Economy (Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 2001), p. 49.
6. Robert S. Walters and David H. Blake, The Politics of
Global Economic Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 1992), p. 128.
7. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
World Investment Report 2006, United Nations, New York,
2006.
8. Ibid., pp. 57–58; see also Robert Gilpen, US Power and the
Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975);
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord
in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1984); and Charles P. Kindleberger, The World
in Depression, 1928–1939 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1973).
9. Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker and Privilege Taker:
U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” World
Politics (January 2009) 61(1):121–54, p.150.
120. Ibid.
121. “Canada Will Offer Refuge to Women,” Tampa Tribune,
March 3, 1993, Nation/World: p. 3.
122. Rosenthal, “A Challenge to the Clintons and the
Doles,” p. 13.
123. Beitz, Political Theory and International
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124. Thomas M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance,” American Journal of International Law 86
(January 1992): pp. 46–47.
125. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy
Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85(2) (March/April, 2006).
126. Ibid.
127. As quoted in Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New
York: Praeger, 1966).
128. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New
York: Basic Books, 1984).
129. Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime
Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,”
International Organization 36 (Spring 1982): p. 186.
130. Oran Young, “International Regimes: Problems of
Concept Formation,” World Politics 32 (April 1980):
pp. 332–333.
131. Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance,” pp. 185–186.
132. The following argument is largely based on James Lee
Ray, “The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International
War,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989): pp.
405–440. For a recent review of the infl uence of human
rights norms on state behavior, see Sonia Cardenas, “Norm
Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human
Rights Pressure on State Behavior,” International Studies
Quarterly 6 (June 2004): pp. 213–231.
133. Howard Margolis, Selfi shness, Altruism, and
Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
pp. ix, 4.
134. Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
p. 15, cited in Chayes and Chayes, “On Compliance,”
p. 186. For similar arguments, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil,
Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), and Frederick Schauer, Playing
by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991).
135. Janice E. Thomson, “State Practices, International
Norms, and the Decline of Mercenarism,” International
Studies Quarterly 34 (March 1990): pp. 23–47, argues that
certain norms that have developed have led to the virtual
disappearance of the once common practice of recruiting
foreigners to serve in national armies. Ethan A. Nadelmann,
“Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms
in International Society,” International Organization 44
(Autumn 1990): pp. 479–526, traces the impact of moral and
emotional factors on piracy, counterfeiting, drug traffi cking,
aircraft hijacking, and the killing of endangered species.
136. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Gregory A. Raymond, When
Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics
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40. Ibid., p. 220.
41. Ibid., p. 222.
42. Ibid., p. 5.
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http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/KeyTelecom99.html

574 References
120. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 3. See also Sachs,
“International Economics.”
121. Cable, Globalization and Global Governance, p. 33, and
Held et al., Global Transformations, pp. 228–234.
122. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 188.
123. Claire Sterling, Thieves’ World: The Threat of the New
Global Network of Organized Crime (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1994), p. 244.
124. Ibid. See also Mathews, “Power Shift.”
125. Mathews, pp. 58–59.
126. Held et al., Global Transformations, pp. 321–322.
127. Sachs, “International Economics,” p. 109. See also Nye,
The Paradox of American Power, p. 98.
128. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 6.
129. Cable, Globalization and Global Governance, p. 35.
130. Ibid., pp. 33–34.
131. Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?”
p. 190.
132. Ibid., p. 184.
133. Doreen Carvajal, “Governments Using Filters to Censor
Internet, Survey Finds,” The New York Times, May 18,
2007.]
134. Andrew Jacobs, “China Requires Software on New
PCs,” The New York Times, June 9, 2009.
135. Ibid., p. 24.
136. Wolf, “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?”
p. 179.
137. Held et al., Global Transformations, pp. 8–9.
138. Mathews, “Power Shift,” p. 61.
139. Hoffmann, “Clash of Globalizations,” p. 105.
140. On this thesis, see Nye, The Paradox of American
Power.
141. Raffaele Marchetti, “Mapping Alternative Models
of Global Politics,” International Studies Review (2009)
11:133–156.
142. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A
Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1990), p. 11.
143. Ronaldo Munck, “Globalization as the New
Imperialism,” Review of Radical Political Economics (2009)
44:380–388.
144. Arie M. Kacowiz, “Globalization, Poverty, and the
North-South Divide,” International Studies Review (2007)
9:565–580.
145. See Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases:
Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989); Valentine Moghadam,
“Gender and Globalization: Female Labor and Women’s
Mobilization,” Journal of World Systems Research 5(2)
(1999): pp. 367–388; Saskia Sassen, Globalization and Its
Discontents (New York: Free Press, 1998); and Eric Helleiner,
“Economic Liberalism and its Critics: The Past as Prologue?”
Review of International Political Economy 10(4) (November
2003): pp. 685–696.
146. Mark M. Gray, Miki Caul Kittilson, and Wayne
Sandholtz, “Women and Globalization: A Study of
180 Countries, 1975–2000,” International Organization 60
(Spring 2006): p. 326.
92. Michael T. Klare, “Waging Postindustrial Warfare on the
Global Battlefi eld,” Current History (December 2001): p. 436.
93. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, p. 81.
94. Held et al., Global Transformations p. 344, citing data
from International Telecommunications Union, Direction
of Traffi c: International Telephone Traffi c 1994 (Geneva,
Switzerland: International Telecommunications Union,
1994).
95. Ibid., p. 358, citing data from UNESCO, Statistical
Yearbook, 1994.
96. HYPERLINK “../../Second Half/United”United Nations,
The Global Information Society: A Statistical View, New
York, 2008.]
97. Hoffmann, “Clash of Globalizations,” p. 109.
98. Ibid., p. 111.
99. Shapiro, “The Internet,” p. 25. See also Nye, The Paradox
of American Power, p. 98.
100. Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” p. 60.
101. See William C. Adams (ed.), Television Coverage of
International Affairs (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex, 1982), and Doris
Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington,
D.C.: CQ Press, 2001).
102. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, p. 100.
103. Held et al., Global Transformations, p. 6.
104. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”
Foreign Affairs 72 (1993): p. 25.
105. Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld (New York: Times
Books, 1995), p. 4.
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Nye, The Paradox of American Power, pp. 95–99.
109. Frank J. Lechner and John Boli, “General Introduction,”
in Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (eds.), The Globalization
Reader (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), pp.
2–3. See also Veseth, Globaloney: Unraveling the Myths of
Globalization.
110. Mittelman, The Globalization Syndrome, p. 179.
111. Eric Helleiner, “Economic Liberalism and its Critics:
The Past as Prologue?” Review of International Political
Economy 10(4) (November 2003): pp. 685–696.
112. Robert Weissmann, “Democracy Is in the Streets,”
Multinational Monitor 20 (December 1999): p. 24.
113. Quoted in Mike Bygrave, “Where Did All the Protesters
Go?” Observer, July 14, 2002.
114 The Economist, “Globalisation: Turning their Backs on
the World,” Feb 19, 2009.
115 Ibid and Moisés Naím, “Think Again: Globalization,”
Foreign Policy 171 (March/April 2009): 28–34.
116 Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, “Has Globalization
Passed Its Peak?” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2007)
86(1):103–111.
117 Moisés Naím, “Think Again: Globalization,” Foreign
Policy 171 (March/April 2009): 28-34; See also Joseph S. Nye,
“Which Globalization Will Survive?” The Korea Times,
April 13, 2009.
118. But see Nye, The Paradox of American Power,
pp. 84–85, for reasons that contemporary globalization is
likely to be more long lasting than previous eras of high
interdependence.
119. Ibid., especially pp. 47–50, 53–62.

575
Index
A
Abu Nidal, 133
Acheson, Dean, 59–60
Achille Lauro, 133, 241
Action Direct of France, 133
Actors: primary, 5; substate, 9; transnational, 9; unitary, 141
Adenauer, Konrad, 176
Advertisements: global, 509; soft power example, 106 (Illus.)
AEC. See African Economic Community (AEC)
Afghanistan: al Qaeda in, 245; antiterrorist policy, 253–254;
border areas, 255; confl ict with Soviet Union, 102 (Illus.);
female subjugation in, 342; following Taliban defeat,
253; military capabilities, 100, 101; NATO mandate, 269;
resolve to win, 104; Soviet Union invasion, 71; Taliban
rule, 246
Afghanistan war: economic factors, 105; Soviet defeat, 99, 108
AFL-CIO, 159
Africa: colonialism’s effects, 399; deforestation, 466;
economic integration efforts, 448–451; ethnic confl icts,
221, 227, 233–234; ethnic groups, 234 (Illus.); female
genital mutilation in, 342; HIV/AIDS in, 396, 423; internal
confl icts, 217; kingdoms, 26
African Economic Community (AEC), 450
Aggression, 304, 350
Agriculture: cropland loss, 470; global warming and, 468;
GMOs, 493; subsidies (EU), 444
Aid burden, 415
AIDS. See HIV/AIDS
Air pollution, 465–466, 480–482
al-Assad, Havez, 175
al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, 249
Al Qaeda: activities, 133–134; border area control by, 255;
defi ned, 244; history of, 243–244; Hussein link to, 83;
investments, 133–134; Iraq links to, 253; origins of
terrorism, 249; political motives for September 11 attack,
249–250; support for, 135; terrorist attacks, 244–247;
training camps, 253; transnational operatives, 251;
weapons development, 243
Algeria: decolonization of, 63; democratization of, 77
Allende, Salvador, 406
Alliances, 260–261. See also North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO); after the Cold War, 268–271;
balance of power and, 194; balancing, 261–262;
bandwagoning, 263; burden sharing, 265; collective
security and, 304; defi ned, 260; formation and
maintenance, 265–266; Islamic Jihad/Al Qaeda, 249;
nineteenth-century alliance system, 34–35; post-
September 11, 265; Rainforest Alliance, 118; size of,
263–265; Triple Alliance, 35; war and, 266–268
al-Rahman, Umar Abd, 249
America. See United States
Amin, Idi, 449
Amnesty International, 128
Analogies, 172
Anarchy: concept of, 18; defi ned, 5; ethnic confl ict, 227–228;
systemic explanation of interstate wars, 187
Ancient hatred explanation of ethnic confl ict, 227
Andean Common Market, 448
Angola: Cubans in, 74; ethnic confl ict, 224–225;
independence, 70
Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 289
Anti-Mafi a Commission, 527
Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty, 127, 276–277
ANZUS, 267
APEC. See Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC)
Apparel Industry Partnership, 408
Arab empire, 26
Arab-Israeli confl ict, 65–67, 66 (Illus.)
Arendt, Hannah, 107
Argentina, 288, 397, 450
Armed Revolutionary Faction (Lebanese), 131–132
Arms. See also Weapons: ballistic missiles, 278, 290–292;
conventional, 273–274; embargoes, 276; expenditures,
271–272; improvised explosive devices, 274; small,
273–274
Arms control: ballistic missiles, 292–293; chemical and
biological weapons, 292–293; conventional, 275–277;
defi ned, 273; nuclear, 286–289; nuclear reductions, 289
(Illus.)
Arms race, 274–275, 279–282
Arms transfers, 273
ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)
Asia: alliances in, 267; Cold War, 58–61; colonialism’s
effects, 399; containment policy in, 59; democratization
of, 77; economic integration, 451; female genital
mutilation in, 342; fi nancial crisis in, 385; nuclear
proliferation in, 82; Western culture in, 509
Asian Pacifi c Economic Cooperation (APEC): defi ned, 454;
map of members, 455 (Illus.)
Asian Tigers, 409–412, 410 (Illus.), 417
Assassins (Islamic terrorists), 241
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 448–451
Aswan Dam, 65
Asymmetrical warfare, 100
Attentive public, 144
Attribution theory, 174
Aum Shinrikyo, 243, 291
Austria: alliances, 35, 267; German incorporation of, 43;
mobilization plans, 208
Bold page numbers indicate locations of key terms.

576 Index
Burden sharing, 265–266
Bureaucracies: decentralization, 166;foreign policy, 164–169;
organizational role, 165; standard procedures, 205–206;
wars and, 205–206
Burma, 408
Bush, George H. W.: analogies, 172–173; assassination
attempt on, 240; Bosnia and, 268; foreign policy, 164;
historical analogy use, 172; NAFTA, 155, 164; new
world order, 77, 314; Nunn-Lugar support by, 166; public
opinion, 148
Bush, George W.: Bush Doctrine, 85–86; group decision
making, 177; Iraq War, 147; public opinion and foreign
policy, 147, 150; security threats, 84
Bush Doctrine: criticisms, 86; defi ned, 85; workability of,
88–89
C
Calorie supply, 396
Camp David Accords, 67
Canada: NAFTA effects, 452; refugee policy, 344
Capitalism: ambiguities of, 419–420; defi ned, 15;
globalization and, 514; liberalization strategies, 419–420;
theory of war, 196–197
Carbon dioxide, 466
Carter, Jimmy: defense cuts, 70; just war, 335; leadership
style, 175; Olympic boycott by, 71; public opinion,
146–147; Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan, 71
Castro, Fidel, 68; Cuban missile crisis, 168; leadership style,
175
Catholic Church, 27–28
Ceausescu, Nicolae, 76
CEDAW. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Afghan intervention of,
101; Bay of Pigs role, 68; energy policy recommendations,
479; intelligence hoarding by, 165; MNCs and, 406; north-
south gap role, 403; Third World interventions, 67
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 262, 267
Centrally planned economies, 378
CFCs. See Chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs)
CFE Treaty, 275–276
CFSP. See Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Chamberlain, Neville, 204
Charlemagne, 27
Chavez, Hugo, 419
Chemical weapons, 82, 290–293
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 293
Cheney, Dick, 161–162
Chiang Kai-shek, 58–59
Chiapas rebellion: human rights groups support of, 512;
motivation for, 452; timing of, 521
Child labor, 408
Chile: market-oriented reforms, 418; NAFTA and, 453
China. See also Peoples’ Republic of China: détente, 69–70;
dynasties, 26; economic growth, 376–377; population
limits, 341; Tiananmen Square, 74, 74 (Illus.); trading
with, 14; war on terror, 239
Chirac, Jacques, 446
Chlorofl uorocarbons (CFCs), 467
Christendom: defi ned, 27; divisions in, 29
Churchill, Winston: iron curtain speech, 57; Yalta
Conference, 56
CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Circumcision: female, 342
Authoritarian systems, 157, 162
Authoritarianism: military and political opposition groups,
162; political opposition, effect on foreign policy, 163–164
Aztecs, 26
B
Balance of power, 30
Balance of trade, 360
Balancing, 261–262
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, 289
Ballistic missiles, 278, 290–292
Bandwagoning, 263
Bangladesh: demographic pressures, 474; Grameen Bank,
421–422
Barber, Benjamin, 522
Bargaining and negotiation, 294; coercive diplomacy, 294–
296; defi ned, 294; diplomatic games, 296–299; strategies,
294–296
Basque separatists, 131
Battle for Seattle, 523
Bay of Pigs, 68
Beliefs of leaders, 170–173; analogies, 172–173; enemy
image, 172; explanations of wars, 206–207; image, 172;
operational code, 171–172; psychoanalytic approach, 170
Benenson, Peter, 128
Bentham, Jeremy, 358
Berlin Wall, 68, 75 (Illus.)
Bias: gender, 421; in-group, 229
bin Laden, Osama: Al Qaeda activities, 133–134; background,
245–246; guerilla warfare, 135; terrorist attacks, 244–245
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), 293
Biological weapons, 82, 290–293
Bipolar, 48, 189
Black September, 131
Blair, Tony: anti-global warming efforts, 294; EU voting
system, 446; information processing by, 173; Iraq war
support by, 207; leadership style, 176; operational code,
171–172; public opinion view of, 150
Blue helmets, 312
BMD. See Ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
Bodin, Jean, 28, 325
Body-bag syndrome, 148–149
Bolshevik Communist Party, 37
Border areas for terrorists, 255
Bosnia-Herzegovina: inattention to, 221–222; U. S.
involvement, 268; UN peacekeeping efforts, 316
Boundaries: confl icts over, 97; redrawing, 234
Brazil: development strategies for, 412, 413; liberal policy
disillusionment, 418; nuclear-free zone, 288
Bretton Woods II, 384
Bretton Woods System: abandonment of, 72; background,
362–364; defi ned, 364; fundamental changes to (1971),
371; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 367–368;
International Monetary Fund, 364–366; Nixon’s surprise,
371–372; purpose of, 364 (Illus.); system workings,
369–371; World Bank, 366–367
BRICS, 375
Britain. See Great Britain
Brown areas for terrorists, 255
Brundtland, Gro Harlem, 490
Brundtland report, 490–491
BTWC. See Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention
(BTWC)
Budgets: defense (post-Cold War), 160, 161; UN, 319–320
“Bullying” strategy, 295

Index 577
Concert of Europe: alliance system and, 35; defi ned, 31;
relative peace during, 189; results of, 303
Confl icts: arms race and, 274–275; arms transfers and,
274; boundary, 97; class confl ict, 15; ethnic (See Ethnic
confl icts); post-Cold War, 79–81; realpolitik view, 4
Congo, 313
Congress of Vienna, 31, 303
Connor, Walker, 226
Constitutional Treaty, 446
Constructivism: Cold War perspective, 92–93; defi ned, 17;
environmental cooperation, 498–499; feminist, 19–22;
globalization, 533; history of global politics, 50; NGO
perspectives, 130; power of agenda, ideas, and values, 107;
realism vs., 17–19
Containment, 58
Contemporary liberalism, 12
Convention on Biological Diversity, 485
Convention on Climate Change, 127
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 342
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 127
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, 275–276
Conventional weapons, 273–274
Cooperation: environmental, 484–494; norms and, 345–350;
principles, 346; regimes and, 345–348
Core, defi ned, 15
Core values, 145
Corporate social responsibility, 408
Council of the European Union, 436
Counterterrorism, diffi culty of, 84
CPRs. See Common pool resources (CPRs)
Crimean War, 31
Croatia: ethnic confl ict, 219; EU membership request, 443;
independence, 79
Crusades, 27
CTBT. See Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Cuba, Bay of Pigs invasion, 68
Cuban missile crisis: background, 68–69; defi ned, 69; missile
site, 168 (Illus.); standard operating procedures, 167–169
Cultural Autonomy in Global Communications
(Hamelink), 509
Cultural globalization, 90, 508–511
Cultural imperialism, 511
Currency exchange rates, 363, 365, 379
Customary law, 325
Customs, 325
Customs union, 438
CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Cyprus, 313
Czechoslovakia, 43, 165
D
Darfur: ethnic confl ict, 227, 230; ethno-religious confl ict,
80–81, 217–218; humanitarian intervention, 340 (Illus.);
Sudanese refugees, 218 (Illus.)
de Cuellar, Javier Perez, 319
De Republica (Bodin), 325
Debt of developing countries, 396–398
Decimation, 217
Decision-making-level explanations of wars, 205–210;
beliefs and perceptions, 206–207; bureaucratic politics and
standard procedures, 205–206; Cold War, 210; World War I,
207–210; World War II, 210
Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews
and the Crusaders, 246
City-states: Greek, 25, 50; Italian, 27
Civil wars, 216
Clash of Civilizations, The (Huntington), 521
Classical balance of power system: assumptions, 188;
defi ned, 187; maintaining, 188; multipolar system versus,
188–189; stability and, 191–192; World War I and, 194
Classical liberalism, 12
Clausula rebus sic stantibus, 326
Climate change, 465–468
Clinton, Bill: Bosnia and, 268; leadership style, 175; NAFTA,
155, 164; public opinion and, 146; refugee policy, 344
Clinton, William, 146, 164
Closed leadership style, 175–176
CNN, 508, 509
Coalition for Trade Expansion, 159
Coercive diplomacy, 294–296
Cognitive consistency theories, 174
Cold War: alliances after, 268–271; Arab-Israeli confl ict,
65–67; in Asia, 58–61; bandwagoning during, 263; British
retreat, 57–58; China relations and, 58–61; confl icts/
instability following, 79–81; constructivists view of, 92;
Cuban crises, 68–69; decision-making-level explanations,
210; decolonization, 61–63; détente, 69–70; Eastern Europe
confl ict, 54–57; Eastern Europe map, 55 (Illus.); end of,
73–78; ethnic confl ict after, 224–225; ethno-religious
confl ict, 79–81; failed states, 81; feminist view of, 92–93;
globalization, 87, 89–90; idealist view of, 91; ideological
factors, 265; interdependence, 72–73; international
economy, 72–73; liberal view of, 11, 91; military-industrial
complex in, 160; nuclear confrontation, 277–278; peace
dividend, 160–161; political system explanation, 204;
post-Cold War world, 79–90; realist view, 90, 91; rebirth
of, 70–72; Security Council veto power, 310–311; security
threats, 82, 84–87; state- and dyadic-level explanations,
204–205; superpower involvement in the Third World,
67–68; systemic explanations, 195; theoretical
perspectives, 90–93; Third World status quo and, 403;
U.S. containment policy, 57–58; UN’s impact on, 73;
Vietnam confl ict, 63–65
Collective goods, 359, 488
Collective security. See also Alliances; Peacekeeping:
defi ned, 304; early attempts, 303; League of Nations,
305–307; principles and prerequisites, 303–305; United
Nations, 307–323
Colonies: fi rst wave, 33; independence, 34; natural resources,
33; north-south economic gap and, 398–400
Colonization: during the Age of Imperialism, 33–34; Cold
War decolonization, 61–63
Common Agricultural Policy, 444
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 442
Common market, 438
Common pool resources (CPRs), 488
Communicating capability, 295
Communist countries. See also Peoples’ Republic of China
(PRC); Soviet Union: Chinese, 58–59; economic system,
356; German, 41; Russian, 37; U.S. fear of, 369
Communist economy, 378–379
Communist parties: Chinese, 58–59; German, 41;
Russian, 37
Comparative advantage, 359
Compellence, 260
Complex interdependence, 9
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 155, 288
Computer technology, 520 (Illus.)
Comte de Bussy, 100

578 Index
Ecofeminist movement, 499
Ecoimperialism, 498
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 126, 319
Economic cartel, 416
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 449
Economic globalization, 503–506: fi nancial fl ow and, 504;
institutions, 506; social organization and, 514; trade
and, 503
Economic integration: among developing states, 446–451;
defi ned, 432; federalism vs. functionalism, 433–436;
institutions of the EU, 436–438; North-South divide,
451–454; process of, 438–441
Economic liberalism: abandonment as basis for global
economy, 382–383; Bretton Woods System, 362–364,
369–371; defi ned, 357; General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 367–368; International Monetary Fund, 364–366;
vs. mercantilism, 357–362; Nixon’s surprise, 371–372;
North-South economic gap, 417–421; World Bank,
366–367
Economic power: capacity, 105; indicators, 111, 113; interest
groups, 158
Economic union, 438
Economics. See also International political economy: after
the Cold War, 72–73; during the Age of Imperialism, 33;
balance of economic power, 89–90; downturn beginning
in 2007, 380–381; economic liberalism vs. mercantilism,
357–362; economic miracle of East Asia, 409–412; global
economic crisis, 379–384; globalization impact, 89;
interdependence, 72–73; interest groups, 158; international
political economy, 355–356; natural resources, 111, 113;
North-South economic gap, 427; power indicators, 111–
113; role in ethnic confl ict, 224–226, 228–229; state- and
dyadic-level explanations, 196–197; state capabilities, 105
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
ECOWAS. See Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
Eden, Anthony, 207
EEC. See European Economic Community (EEC)
Egypt: Islamic rebellion in, 249; leadership role, 65; Yom
Kippur War, 67
Ehrlich, Paul, 475
Eisenhower, Dwight, 60: Bay of Pigs role, 68; military-
industrial complex, 159; Vietnam policy, 64
Elites: bribing of, 413; foreign policy, 146; military issues,
147; public opinion, 150
Empires, 25
EMU. See European Monetary Union (EMU)
Enabling Act, 41
Encryption technology, 529–530
Enemy image, 172
England. See Great Britain
English language, 510, 517
Entente Cordiale, 35
Environment: atmospheric conditions and climate change,
465–468; collective goods and common pools, 486,
488–489; complex relationships, 483–484; deforestation,
466; food supplies, 475; Friends of the Earth, 481 (Illus.);
global average land-ocean temperature, 467 (Illus.);
natural resource shrinkage, 468–471; NGOs and, 495,
497; overpopulation, 471–474; policy choices, 487, 496;
political obstacles to cooperation, 489–494; politics of
cooperation, 484–494; pollution, 480–483; theoretical
perspectives, 494–499
Essential feminism, 20
Declaration on Liberated Countries, 56
Decolonization, 61–63, 62 (Illus.)
Defense. See Military; Security
Defense policy, military-industrial complex infl uence,
159–162
Deforestation, 466–467, 469
Delors, Jacques, 436
Democracy: ethnic and religious division challenges, 236–
237; explanations of war, 198–203; foreign policy impact,
154; history of global politics, 49; increase after the
Cold War, 77–78; institutional differences, 157; interest
group infl uence on foreign policy, 157–159; legal right to,
345; North-South economic gap, 427–428; participation
in interstate wars, 151, 153 (Illus.); peacefulness of,
151; political opposition, 163–164; spread of, 11; state
promotion of democratization, 199; values of, 37
Democratic peace, 198
Democratic theory: interest groups and, 157–159; public
opinion, 142, 149
Demographic transition theory, 473
Deontological theories, 337
Dependency theory: defi ned, 16; development strategies, 412;
environmental cooperation, 498; North-South economic
gap, 400–409; role of multinational corporations, 403–409
Desert Storm, 5
Détente, 69–70
Deterrence, 260
Developed countries, 356
Diamond, Larry, 236
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 64
Diplomacy: coercive, 294–296
Diplomatic immunity, 327
Diplomats: coercive diplomacy, 294–296; defi ned, 296;
negotiations, 297 (Illus.)
Disease. See also HIV/AIDS: economic impact of, 423–425;
measles, 414 (Illus.)
Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 386–387
Distance-shrinking technologies, 511
Diversionary theory, 163, 197–198
Division of labor, 15–16
Doctors Without Borders, 127
Doha Round, 420–421
Dollar (U. S.), 39, 364–366
Domains, 108
Domestic opposition, 197–198
Domino theory, 103
Dubcek, Alexander, 165
Dulles, John Foster, 172, 174
Dumping, 360
Dunant, Henry, 127
Durkheim, Emile, 226
Dyadic-level explanations of wars, 195–205; Cold War, 204–
205; democratic dyads, 198–203; type of economy, 196–197;
types of governments and domestic opposition, 197–198;
World War I, 203; World War II, 203–204
Dyadic level of analysis, 186
E
EAC. See East African Community (EAC)
East African Community (EAC), 449
East Timor, 317
Eastern Europe: confl ict, 54–57; ethnic confl icts, 221; ethno-
religious confl icts, 79; EU membership, 443; inclusion in
NATO, 268–269; political liberalization of, 75; satellization
of, 57; Soviet domination, 210; Warsaw Pact, 57

Index 579
Feminist constructivism, 19–22; perspectives of, 19–22
Ferdinand, Archduke Franz, 35, 209
Fertility rate, 472
Film industry, 509
Final Act (European Security Conference), 91
Fixed exchange rates, 365
Floating exchange rates: defi ned, 371; fl uctuations after
Bretton Woods, 72, 372 (Illlus.)
Food: GMOs, 493; supplies, 475
Food supply, 396, 470, 475
Force, complex interdependence, 10
Foreign aid, 413–415
Foreign direct investment (FDI): defi ned, 120; liberal view
of, 360
Foreign lobbyists, 157
Foreign policy: approach, 141, 177; body-bag syndrome,
148–149; bureaucracies, 164–169; capitalist system and,
403; domestic sources, 141–142; elites, 146; EU, 442;
institutional affects, 154–157; interest group infl uence,
157–159; leader’s beliefs and, 170–173; military-industrial
complex infl uence on defense policy, 159–162; political
institution impact, 154–157; political opposition, effect
of, 163–164; psychoanalytic approach, 170; psychological
approach, 142; public knowledge and concern, 143–144;
public opinion, 142–143; public opinion infl uence, 145–150;
public opinion moody or wise, 144–145; rally-round-the-fl ag
effect, 147–148, 163–164; two-level games, 164; Vietnam
War debate, 143
Fourteen Points, 305
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 485: GATT/
WTO policies and, 494; Kyoto Protocol and, 485;
liberalism and, 497
France, 38–39, 63–64: balancing (pre-WWI), 262; decision-
making process (WWI), 208; Greenpeace and, 497; NATO
withdrawal, 141; Nazi-Soviet Pact and, 46; public opinion
impact in, 154; resistance movement (WWII), 238; war
debts (WWI), 40
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, 31, 266–267
Frederick the Great, 100
Free markets: Russian, 377; systems, 358
Free trade, 358–359: area, 438
Free trade area, 438
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 453–454
French Revolution, 30–31
Freud, 170
Friends of the Earth, 481 (Illus.)
FTAA. See Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
Functionalism: defi ned, 434; federalism vs., 433–436
Fund for Cooperation, Compensation, and
Development, 449
G
G-7, 376
G-8, 376
G-20. See Group of 20 (G-20)
Game theory, 279
Gandhi, Indira, 20
GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
GDP. See Gross domestic product (GDP)
GDP per capita, 113
Gender bias, 421
Gender inequality, 421–423
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT):
background, 367–368; defi ned, 367; environmental
cooperation, 493; EU trade talks, 438; function of, 367;
Ethics. See also Morality: defi ned, 328; human rights vs.
states’ rights, 338–345; in international politics, 328–329;
North-South economic gap, 426–427; nuclear deterrence,
331–337; of war, 331–337
Ethiopia, 43
Ethnic confl icts: ancient hatred explanation, 227;
categorization, 229; dealing with, 231; economic
modernization roles, 224–226; economics, 228–229;
effects of, 216–217; ethnocentrism, 229; instrumentalist
approach, 229; international system roles, 224–226;
irredentism, 222; mass murders, 222–223; peacemaking,
314–316; political benefi ts, 230, 232; relative deprivation,
228–229; resolving, 232–237; scope of, 221–224, 257–258
Ethnic group: of Africa, 234 (Illus.); cultural traits, 219–220;
defi ned, 218; interest group infl uence on foreign policy, 158
Ethnicity, 218–221
Ethnocentrism, 229
Ethno-religious confl ict, 79–81
EU. See European Union (EU)
EURATOM, 435–436
Euro, 440
Europe: after Soviet Union disintegration (map), 76 (Illus.);
alliances system, 34–35; concert of, 31, 35; economic
advances, 33; eighteenth-century relations, 29–30; fall of,
48; feudal units, 27; imperialism, 32–34; map (post-WWII),
55 (Illus.); Marshall Plan, 58; nineteenth-century relations,
31–32; Peace of Westphalia and, 28; terrorist attacks in,
246–247; World War I, 35
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 435–436
European Central Bank, 440
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 435
European Commission, 436
European Court of Justice, 436
European Economic Community (EEC), 435–436
European Monetary Union (EMU), 440–441: exchange rate, 373
European parliament, 436
European relations: eighteenth-century, 29–30; nineteenth-
century, 31–32
European Union (EU): border controls, 442–443; currency,
440; environmental cooperation, 492; expansion of,
439 (Illus.); federalist approach, 433–434, 445–446;
functionalist approach, 434–436, 445–446; fund
distributions, 449; future of, 441–446; GMO policy, 493;
institutions of, 436–438; integration process, 438–441;
joining, 445; motivations behind, 432–433; nationalism
in, 520; policy choices, 445; single currency, 141; Turkey
membership, 437 (Illus.); voting system, 446
Exchange rates, 363
Export-oriented strategy, 417
Export platforms, 361
Exports: diversifi cation, 410; Mexican, 452
ExxonMobil, 121
F
Failed states: defi ned, 81; peacemaking, 316–318
Fast-track authority, 155
Fatah, 131, 133
FDI. See Foreign direct investment (FDI)
Federalism: defi ned, 433; functionalism vs., 433–436
Female circumcision, 342
Female defi cit, 341
Feminism: Cold War perspective, 92–93; environmental
cooperation, 499; essential, 20; globalization, 533–
534; history of global politics, 50; liberal, 20; NGO
perspectives, 131; power, view of, 107

580 Index
Greece, 58
Greek city-states: ancient, 25–26; defi ned, 25; interaction
between, 26–27; map, 26 (Illus.)
Greenhouse effect, 480
Greenpeace, 127, 495, 495 (Illus.)
Grenada invasions, 72
Gross domestic product (GDP): defi ned, 113; in developing
countries, 397; GDP per capita, 113; indicator of
interdependence, 355–356, 356 (Illus.); map, 112 (Illus.)
Gross national product (GNP): in developing countries,
392–393; per capita statistics, 391
Grotius, Hugo, 335
Group decision making, 176–177
Group of 20 (G-20): background, 375–376; defi ned, 375;
fi nancial regulations, 383–384
Group of 77, 413
Groupthink, 176
Guatemala: CIA coup, 67
Guerilla fi ghting. See Asymmetrical warfare
Guntánamo Bay (GITMO) military base, 332
Gurr, Ted Robert, 221, 224, 235
Gurria, José Angel, 512
Gurr’s Minorities at Risk project, 228
H
Hague peace conferences, 303–304
Haiti: antidemocratic coup in, 345
Halliburton, 161–162
Hamas: support for, 135
Hamelink, Cees, 508–509
Hapsburgs, 28
Hardin, Garrett, 486, 488
Harry Potter books, 508
Hegemonic, 187
Hegemonic stability theory, 191–192
Helms, Jesse, 320
Helsinki agreement, 91
Hezbollah, 242
Hindu-Muslim confl ict, 80
History of global politics: ancient times, 25–27;
contemporary international system, 27–32; eighteenth-
century European relations, 29–30; French Revolution,
30–31; Imperialism, 32–34; interwar years, 38–41; modern
state, 27–32; nineteenth-century alliance system, 34–35;
nineteenth-century European relations, 31–32; postwar
settlements, 38–41; status quo challenges, 41–43;
theoretical perspectives, 48–51; World War I, 35–38; World
War II, 43–48
Hitler, Adolf: attack on Soviet Union, 46–47; British policy
choices, 44–45; Mein Kampf, 40, 47; Munich agreement,
204; prosperity promise, 433; rise to power, 40, 41;
takeover of Austria and Czechoslovakia, 43
HIV/AIDS: cumulative deaths worldwide, 424 (Illus.);
economic impact of, 423–425; WHO and ILO
activities, 322
Hobbes, Thomas, 5
Holsti, Ole, 172
Holy Roman Empire, 28
Hong Kong, 378 (Illus.)
Hoover, Herbert, 40
Hot-line agreement, 69
Human development gap, 394 (Illus.)
Human Development Index, 394
Human resources as economic power indicator, 113
Human Rights Watch, 127
gold standard and, 515–516; negotiation rounds, 368;
recent transformation, 386; tariff rate changes, 367 (Illus.)
General Assembly, 308
Genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs), 493
Geneva Conventions, 331
Genocide Convention, 331
Genocide in Rwanda, 217
Geography and military power, 109–110
Geopolitics, 109
Georgia, 184 (Illus.)
German Red Army Faction, 133
Germany: alliances (pre-WWI), 267; balance of power
(pre-WWII), 194; Berlin Wall, 68; Communist Party, 41;
currency devaluation, 39–40; decision-making process
(WWI), 208; Finland support (WWII), 204; Frankfurt Stock
Exchange, 380 (Illus.); Hitler’s economic policies, 41;
infl ation, 40 (Illus.); Nazi Party in, 40; power index rating,
115; public opinion impact in, 154; reparations and, 39;
rise of, 34–35; social reforms (pre-WWI), 203; World War
I, 38–39
GITMO. See Guntánamo Bay (GITMO) military base
Glasnost, 75
Global economy, key states’ share, 375, 375 (Illus.)
Global governance, 507
Global politics, 3
Global warming: defi ned, 468; deforestation and, 480–481;
development and, 482; Kyoto Protocol, 485–487, 491,
492–493; pollution and, 480–483; process leading to, 467;
trends, 468, 480
Globalization: anti-globalization protest, 524 (Illus.); balance
of economic power, 89–90; characteristics of, 517–518;
contemporary characteristics, 517–518; cultural, 90,
508–511; defi ned, 87, 502–503; desirability of, 526–527;
discontents, 518–525; economic, 503–506; environment
and, 523; factors, 511–514; future of, 530–534; historical
roots, 515–517; interdependence, 87, 89; MNCs and, 523;
nationalism as countertrend, 520–523; NGOs and, 90;
opposition to, 523–525; policy choices, 526; political, 90,
507–508; skeptics, 514, 521; the state and, 525, 527–534;
state is dead, 527–528; state sovereignty versus, 528;
terrorism and, 135–136, 138; theoretical perspectives, 531
(Illus.); traditional dress and high technology, 504 (Illus.);
unequal, 519–520; world market, 87
GMOs. See Genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs)
GNP. See Gross national product (GNP)
Gold standard, 32
Goodman, Ellen, 343
Gorbachev, Mikhail: defi ned, 75; intervention in
Afghanistan, 348–349; reforms, 75–76; removal from
offi ce, 77
Gourevitch, Philip, 217
Governance, global, 507, 516
Grameen Bank, 421–423
Great Britain: balance of power (pre-WWII), 194;
decolonization and, 61–62; economy (pre-WWII), 204;
Finland attacks (WWII), 204; industrial power, 111;
Industrial Revolution and, 32; international retreat (post-
WWII), 57–58; natural boundaries, 97; natural resources,
111; Nazi-Soviet Pact and, 46; nineteenth-century power
and security, 31–32; Parliamentary system, 154, 155–156;
power index rating, 115–116; retreat from possessions,
57–58; security of, 32; war debts (WWI), 40; World War I
settlements, 38–40
Great Depression: defi ned, 41; impact of, 41
Great power status, 115

Index 581
Interdependence. See also Complex interdependence:
after the Cold War, 72–73; complex, 9–11; defi ned, 8;
globalization, 87, 89, 502–503; systemic explanation of
interstate wars, 193–194
Interest groups: function, 157–158; lobbyists in, 157; types of,
158; visibility of, 157
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 9
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
482–483
Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), 167
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 74
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO),
241–242
Internal wars, 184
International arms embargoes, 276
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 284
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), 366–367, 402–403
International Basketball Federation, 118
International Business Machines (IBM): educational
programs, 359; global advertising, 509; non-American
employees, 125
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), 274
International coalitions, 260. See also Alliances
International cooperation: ideas that are right and acceptable,
345–346; norms, 345–348; norms against war, 348–349;
norms vs. power, 349–350; regimes, 346–347; against
terrorism, 255, 257; tit-for-tat strategy, 346
International Court of Justice (World Court), 308
International Criminal Court (ICC): creation of, 335; defi ned,
333; state support of, 334–335; structure of, 333
International Development Association (IDA), 366
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, 118. See also Red Cross/Red Crescent
International Finance Corporation (IFC), 366
International Labour Organization (ILO), 322
International law: common opinion of, 324; customs and,
325; defi ned, 324; democracy rights, 345; enforcement,
328; ethics in, 328; European Union courts, 436; impact
of, 326–328; Kellogg-Briand Pact, 326; nonintervention,
325–326; norms and, 345–350; sources and principles,
324–326
International League of Antiquarian Booksellers, 118
International Monetary Fund (IMF): background, 364–366;
criticisms, 384–386; decision making changes at, 416;
debt restructuring, 402–403; defi ned, 364; economic
comparisons, 391; establishment of, 54; exchange rate
system, 364–366; fi nancial crisis associated with, 385;
Group of 77 and, 413; income disparity of developing
countries, 392; reform efforts, 402–403; soft power
form, 106–107; structural adjustment programs, 418;
Washington Consensus, 418
International norms, 18
International political economy: American hegemony
decline, 373–379; current institutions, 384–387; defi ned,
355; democratic implications, 427–428; dependency,
400–409; disease issues, 423–425; East Asia economic
miracle, 409–412; economic implications, 427; economic
liberalism, 409; economic turmoil of the 1970s,
372–373; gender inequality, 421–423; global economic
crisis, 379–384; imperialism, 398–400; international
debt, 396–398; liberalization strategies, 417–421; moral
implications, 426–427; neo-imperialism, 400–403; neo-
Marxism, 412–417; North-South economic gap, 390–412;
organizational roles, 425–426; regional integration,
Humanitarian interventions: Darfur, 340 (Illus.); defi ned,
339; human rights vs. states’ rights, 338–345; legal right to
democracy, 345; women’s rights, 341–345
Humanitarian relief, 127
Hungary: alliances, 265; mobilization plans, 208
Huntington, Samuel, 521–522
Hussein, King (Jordan), 77
Hussein, Saddam, 92, 172–173, 236: Kuwait invasion, 5, 163;
security threat of, 83
Hutus, 217, 219, 230, 232, 315–316
Hyperglobalizers, 514, 527
I
IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IBM. See International Business Machines (IBM)
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD)
ICBL. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
ICBMs. See Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
ICC. See International Criminal Court (ICC)
IDA. See International Development Association (IDA)
Idealism: China trade policy, 14; Cold War perspective,
91–92; defi ned, 13; NGO perspectives, 131; power
of agenda, ideas, and values, 107; realism vs., 13–15;
values, 13, 15
IEDs. See Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
IFC. See International Finance Corporation (IFC)
IGOs. See Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)
ILO. See International Labour Organization (ILO)
Image, 172
IMF. See International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Immunizations, 414 (Illus.)
Impact of resolve, 103
Imperial overstretch, 374
Imperialism: Age of Imperialism, 32–34; Catholic Church
and, 27; cultural, 511; defi ned, 16, 32; ecoimperialism,
498; neo-imperialism, 400–403; North-South economic
gap, 398–400
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Lenin), 196
Import quotas, 360
Import substitution strategy, 412
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 274
IMRO. See Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
(IMRO)
Incas, 26
Income: global disparities, 393 (Illus.); low-income countries,
392 (Illus.)
Index of power, 113–116
India: British retreat from, 57; Communist state in, 419;
deforestation, 466; demographic pressures, 474; ethnic
confl icts, 228; female defi cit in, 341; Kashmir confl ict,
262; military power, 110; NPT refusal by, 286; nuclear
capability, 282, 286
Indonesia: military power, 110; World War II and, 47
Industrial capacity and economic power, 111, 113
Industrial Revolution: Britain and, 32
INF. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
Infant mortality, 472, 473
Infl uence: power of, 98–99
Information processing by leaders, 173–174
Information technology, global use of, 520 (Illus.)
In-group bias, 229
Instrumentalist approach, 229
Inter group infl uence on foreign policy, 157–159
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 278

582 Index
Joffe, Josef, 192
Johnson, Lyndon, 64, 146
Johnson-Sirleaf, Ellen, 21 (Illus.)
Jordan, 77
Juniper, Tony, 524
Jus ad bellum, 335, 336
Jus in Bello, 335, 336
Just war: costs and benefi ts, 336–337; defi ned, 335;
principles, 336 (Illus.); proportional military action, 252;
violations, 335–336; War on Terror, 336
K
Kant, Immanuel, 12, 13, 151
Kargil War, 283
Kashmir: confl ict, 262; Pakistani incursion, 283
Kasinga, Fauziya, 344
Kazakhstan, 286
Kellogg-Briand Pact, 326
Kennan, George F., 150
Kennedy, John, 64, 167–169
Kennedy, Paul, 374
Kenya: U. S. embassies’ bombings, 250
Kerala, India, 419
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 71
Khrushchev, Nikita, 61, 69
Kim Il Sung, 59
Kissinger, Henry, 70
KLA. See Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
Kohl, Helmut, 175
Korea, 59–61. See also North Korea; South Korea: states
crossing, 97
Korean War: body-bag syndrome, 148; decision-making
process, 207, 210; diplomatic efforts, 297; origins, 59;
Soviet role, 59; UN Chapter VII and, 311
Kosovo, 79, 235
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 230 (Illus.)
Kurds, 97
Kuwait, Iraq’s attack on, 77, 163, 314
Kyoto Protocol, 485, 486, 487
L
Land power, 109
Landmines, 274, 276–277
Latin America: colonialism’s effects, 399; development
strategies for, 412; environmental degradation in, 490;
fi nancial crisis, 385; free trade zone, 450; liberal policy
disillusionment, 418–419
Latin American empires, 26
Latin American Free Trade Area, 448
Lauterpacht, Hersch, 324
Law. See International law
Law of the Sea Treaty, 492
LDCs. See Less developed countries (LDCs)
Leaders: beliefs, 170–173, 206–207; group decision making,
176–177; information processing, 173–174; leadership
styles, 175–176
Leadership style, 175–176
League of Nations: Article 10, 306; Chinese-Japanese
relations, 42; for collective security, 305–307; Gap in
the Bridge cartoon, 305 (Illus.); goals, 12; idealism of,
13, 49; Italian challenge, 42; Japanese expansion and, 42;
membership, 306; postwar settlements, 38; structure of,
306; United States absence, 306–307; Wilson’s psychology
and, 170
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, 131, 133
454–457; security implications, 427; world fi nance
turbulence, 379–384
International politics, 3, 338–339
International relations, 3, 49–50
International system, 28, 224–226
International Telegraph Union, 516
International Telephone and Telegraphy (ITT), 406
International terrorism, 239
International terrorist groups, 131
International Trade Organization (ITO), 367
Interstate wars: analysis of, 185–186; anarchy, 187; beliefs
and perceptions, 206–207; bureaucratic politics and
standard procedures, 205–206; Cold War, 195, 204–205,
210; decision-making-level explanations, 205–210;
defi ned, 184; democratic dyads, 198–203; distribution of
power, 187–193; interdependence, 193–194; multilevel
explanations of war, 211–213; state- and dyadic-level
explanations, 195–205; systemic explanations, 186–195;
type of economy, 196–197; types of governments and
domestic opposition, 197–198; World War I, 194, 203,
207–210; World War II, 194–195, 203–204, 210
Intervention ethics: human rights, 338–341; women’s rights,
341–345
Investments: Al Qaeda’s, 134; direct foreign, 120; MNC
development and, 403; multiplier effect, 405
IPCC. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)
Iran: CIA coup, 67; Islamic revolution, 71; nuclear capability,
284; nuclear proliferation and, 82; Soviet pressure on, 57;
terrorist support by, 242; U.S. embassy hostages, 71, 326;
war with Iraq, 173
Iraq: Al Qaeda links, 253; antiterrorist policy, 253–254;
attack on Kuwait, 77, 163, 314; coalition against, 264;
democratization, 236; realist perspective, 6 (Illus.); United
States war in Iraq, 85; U.S. intervention and the U.N.,
321–322; war protestors, 147, 148 (Illus.)
Iraq War: body-bag syndrome, 148; policy divisions, 166;
small arms use, 274; WMD and, 147
Irish Republican Army, 133
Iron curtain, 57
Irredentism, 222
Islam. See also Muslims: map, 86 (Illus.); terrorism, 248
Israel: Arab-Israeli confl ict, 65–67, 66 (Illus.); Lebanese border
issues, 255; Middle East terrorism and, 242; NPT refusal
by, 286; Six-Day War, 67; terrorism, 242; Yom Kippur
War, 67
Italian Renaissance, 27–28
Italy, 27, 42–43
ITO. See International Trade Organization (ITO)
ITT. See International Telephone and Telegraphy (ITT)
J
Jackal bandwagoning, 263
Jackson, Michael, 511
Jaish-e-Mohammed, 131
Janis, Irving, 176
Janjaweed, 80
Japan: invasion of Asia, 58–59; invasion of Manchuria, 41–42;
Pearl Harbor attack, 47; Tokyo subway terrorist attack,
243; World War I impact, 41–42
Jaysh al-Ummah, 254 (Illus.)
Jefferson, Thomas, 149
Jews, 41
Jihad vs. McWorld (Barber), 522
Jihad, 246, 522

Index 583
Marx, Karl, 196, 225–226, 378. See also Neo-Marxism
Matsu, 61
Mayans, 26
McDonald’s, 120 (Illus.): cultural imperialism and, 511;
economic globalization and, 503; employee education by,
359; nationalist versus, 522
McNamara, Robert, 169
McVeigh, Timothy, 131, 250
MDGs. See Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
Mead, Walter, 384
Measles, 414 (Illus.)
Médecins Sans Frontières, 127
Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), 167
Mein Kampf (Hitler), 40, 47, 172
Meir, Golda, 20
Mercantilism: defi ned, 359; economic liberalism vs., 357–362
Mercosur, 450
Mexico: Chiapas rebellion, 452, 512, 521; development
strategies for, 412; exports, 452–453; liberal policy
disillusionment, 418–419; maquiladoras, 404; NAFTA,
451–453; U.S. investment in, 125
Microfi nancing, 421
Microsoft Xbox, 87
Middle East. See also specifi c countries: Arab-Israeli
confl ict, 65–67; female genital mutilation in, 342–343;
Oslo Peace Agreement, 254; terrorism in, 242; terrorist
attacks in, 249
Migration patterns, 510: contemporary, 528; globalization of,
510; United States and, 517
Military: budget allocations (1970s), 70; budget allocations
(post-Cold War), 160–161; cannon, 29; Cuban missile
crisis, 167; as freedom fi ghters, 240; gunpowder, 29; liberal
view of, 105; major vs. minor powers, 100–101; military-
industrial complex infl uence on defense policy, 159–162;
opposition groups in authoritarian systems, 162; power
and, 115–116; power indicators, 109–111; public opinion,
147; role in nondemocracies, 162; state capabilities,
99–103; technology, 29; ten top spenders, 272 (Illus.); U. S.
assistance, 65
Military-industrial complex: budgets and, 160; challenges to,
160; infl uence, 159; wars and, 196–197
Mill, John Stuart, 12, 358
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): criticisms,
425–426; defi ned, 425; goals for 2015, 426 (Illus.)
Milosevic, Slobodan: ethnic identity manipulation by, 229;
media and, 512; prosecution of, 331, 333
Minimum winning coalitions, 263–264
Minorities at Risk Project, 228
Mirror images, 172, 210
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 292
MNCs. See Multinational corporations (MNCs)
Modern states: emergence of, 27–29; French Revolution and,
30–31
Modernization theory: defi ned, 226, 400; ethnic confl ict, 226
Mogadishu, Somalia, 135
Molotov, 45 (Illus.)
Monetary policies, 362
Monnet, Jean, 435
Montesquieu, Baron de (Charles de Secondat), 12, 358
Montreal Protocol, 485; CFC regulation, 494; funding, 492
Moral relativism, 330
Moral skepticism, 330
Morality. See also Ethics: impact of, 330; international
politics, 328–331; just war, 337; North-South economic
gap, 426–427; principles, 328–329; slavery, 347–348
Lebanese terrorism, 242
Lebensraum, 46
Lenin, Vladimir, 37, 196
Less developed countries (LDCs): debt problems, 396–398;
defi ned, 390; development strategies, 412–425; disease in,
423; economic dependency, 406; economic integration,
446–451; international debt, 397–398; international trade,
410; liberal’s view, 409; North-South economic gap, 401;
UN and, 322
Levee en masse, 31
Levels of analysis: defi ned, 185; dyadic, 186; explaining
confl ict between states, 185–186
Liberal feminism, 20
Liberal International Economic Order, 357, 362–363:
Bretton Woods system, 362; free market system in, 359;
mercantilism versus, 359–360; perspective, 357
Liberalism: China trade policy, 14; classical, 12; Cold War
perspective, 91; communication and transportation
increases, 11; complex interdependence, 9–11;
contemporary, 12–13; defi ned, 7; democracy spread, 11,
357–358; development strategies, 417–421; economic,
357–362; environmental cooperation, 495, 497; ethnic
confl icts, 224; explanations of war, 197–198; feminist, 19;
foreign policy, 142; globalization, 532; hegemonic stability
theory, 363; history of global politics, 49; interdependence,
8–11, 193–194; international organizations, 12; interstate
war explanation, 193; MNCs, 126; NGOs, 131; nonstate
actors, 9; North-South economic gap, 417–421; peaceful
states, 151; power, 105; state cooperation, 10–11; states as
rational actors, 142; states as unitary actors, 141; substate
actors, 9; technological development, 11; transnational
linkages, 118–119; underdeveloped countries, 409; wealth
distribution, 11; World War II explanation, 194–195
Liberia: peacekeeping efforts, 316
Libyan terrorism, 252–253
Life expectancy, 394–395, 396, 424
Limits to Growth, The, 483, 484
Lisbon Treaty, 446
Lobbyists: function of, 157
Lockerbie, Scotland, Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, 252, 257
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 307
London suicide bombers, 84 (Illus.)
London terrorist bombings, 246
M
Maastricht Treaty: defi ned, 440; European Parliament and,
438; implementation of, 442–443; objections to, 443
(Illus.); ratifi cation, 155; referendum, 441
MacArthur, Douglas, 60, 173, 207
Macedonia, 79
Mackinder, Halford, 109–110
MAD. See Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
Madonna, 508, 511
Madrid train bombing, 131
Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 109
Major, John, 154, 175
Malaria, 423–425
Malaysia, 411
Mao Zedong, 58–59, 61
Maquiladoras, 404
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 493
Mark (Germany), 39–40
Mark, Karl, 378
Markets. See Free markets
Marshall Plan, 58, 433

584 Index
Neo-Marxism: Cold War perspective, 92; defi ned, 15;
economic power, 105; environmental cooperation, 498;
globalization, 533; North-South economic gap, 400–403,
412–417; realism vs., 15–16; states as unitary actors, 141
Nerve gas, 291
New International Economic Order (NIEO), 413, 414, 416
New world order, 77
Newly industrialized countries (NICs): defi ned, 409;
dependency theory and, 409–411
Ngo Dinh Diem, 64
NGOs. See Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
Nicaragua: peaceful transfer of power, 74; Sandinista
government, 72; Somoza’s overthrow, 71
NICs. See Newly industrialized countries (NICs)
Nidal, Abu, 133
NIEO. See New International Economic Order (NIEO)
Nike, 404 (Illus.), 406–408
Nixon, Richard: détente, 69–70; gold exchange rates, 72,
371–372; Vietnam, 64–65; Bretton Woods changes by,
371–372; realist views of, 90
Nobel prizes, 127, 128
Noncombatant targets, 240
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): actors, 9; agenda-
setting role, 126–127; criticisms, 129; defi ned, 9; economic
development role, 425–427; environmental, 495–497;
functions, 128–129; governance functions, 128–129;
growth of international NGOs, 118 (Illus.); Human
Development Index improvements, 394; human rights
efforts, 127–128; humanitarian efforts, 127; ICBL, 274;
negotiation role, 294; Nobel prizes for, 126, 127; political
infl uence, 507–508; state power and, 117; state sovereignty
and, 530, 531; state support of, 132; theoretical
perspectives, 130–131; as transnational actor, 117–118,
126–131, 132, 138; UN accredited, 126–127
Nonintervention, 325–326, 338–339
Norms: against war, 348–349; antislavery, 347; free trade,
363–364; international, 18; international cooperation,
345–348; maintenance of, 349; norms vs. power, 349–350;
political power of, 347; against war, 348–349 regimes
based on, 346
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 87: burden
sharing and, 265–266; criticism of, 361; defi ned, 451;
environmental issues, 493; interest group infl uence on
foreign policy, 158–159; Latin America’s interest in, 452–453;
launch, 451; major point of, 451–452; Mexican impact,
452–453; multinational corporation impact, 361; nationalism
and, 521; negotiation strategy, 164; public knowledge of, 143;
purpose of, 451–452; ratifi cation, 151–152
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 205, 432:
Afghanistan mandate, 271; after the Cold War, 268–271;
burden sharing, 265–266; defi ned, 57; Eastern Europe’s’
inclusion in, 268–269; establishment of, 57; European
Union and, 442; growth after World War II, 267;
humanitarian efforts, 271; interests groups and, 158;
Kosovo intervention, 81; the new NATO map, 269,
270 (Illus.); peacekeeping efforts, 316; public opinion
and, 146; terrorist threat to, 133; war prevention by,
201–202
North Korea: framework agreement, 286; nuclear capability,
282–284; nuclear proliferation and, 82
North Korean confl ict, 59–61
North-South economic gap: background, 390–398; child
mortality rates and, 390–391; democratic implications,
427–428; dependency, 400–409; disease issues, 423–425;
East Asia economic miracle, 409–412; economic
Morgenthau, Hans J., 4: nuclear war, 281; on power, 98; state
systems, 136
Moscow Treaty, 288
Most-favored-nation principle, 367; exceptions, 368, 367
MTCR. See Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Mueller, John, 149
Muhammad, 220
Multilevel explanations of war, 211–213
Multinational corporations (MNCs): actors, 9; controversy
over, 126; Chinese McDonald’s and Wal-Mart, 120 (Illus.);
defi ned, 9; economic dependency, 403–409; economic
globalization, 505–506; economic interdependence and, 73;
economic liberalism vs. mercantilism, 360–362; human
rights, 407–408; importance of, 119–120; largest economic
units, 121–124 (Illus.); liberal economic perspective,
360–362; markets, 119–120; mercantilist perspective,
348–349; Nike, 404 (Illus.), 406–408; outsourcing, 404;
policy choices, 407; R&D, 125; state sovereignty and, 531;
states relationship to, 124–126, success of, 120; technology
introduced by, 405–406; as terrorist groups, 133; terrorist
organizations as, 133; theoretical perspectives, 126; as
transnational actor, 117, 119–126, 138
Multinational states, 97
Multiplier effect, 405
Multipolarity, 189
Multistate nations, 97
Mumbai, India, terrorist attach, 251 (Illus.)
Munich Agreement, 43
Munich analogy, 172–173
Munich Olympics, 131
Music industry, 511
Muslims. See also Islam: anti-Americanism, 85–86;
democracy and, 236; Hindu confl ict, 80; sectarian
confl icts, 228; Shia, 220–221, 220 (Illus.), 236–237; Sunni,
220–221, 220 (Illus.), 236–237
Mussolini, Benito, 42–43
Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 278
N
NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)
Napoleon, 30 (Illus.), 31; military capabilities, 99, 111
Napoleonic Wars, 303
Narodnaya Volya, 241
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 65, 312
Nation: defi ned, 97, 137; state vs., 97; stateless, 97–98
National Basketball Association, 511
National identity, 97
National Security Agency (NSA), 165
National Security Council, 147
National self-determination, 37
Nationalism: countertrend to globalization, 520–523;
defi ned, 31; ethnic confl ict resolution, 233; history of, 233;
rise of, 31
Nations. See also States: boundaries, 97; defi ned, 97;
multistate, 97; stateless, 97; states crossing, 97
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Natural resources: as power indicator, 111, 113; reserves,
477–480; shrinking supplies, 468–471; warfare and, 111
Nazi Party: charges against Soviets, 56; origins of, 40–41; rise
of, 41
Nazi-Soviet Pact, 46
Negotiation. See Bargaining and negotiation
Neofunctionalism, 435
Neo-imperialism, 400–403

Index 585
P
Pairwise-level relationships, 211–212, 212 (Illus.)
Pakistan: democratization of, 77; Kashmir confl ict, 262;
Kashmir incursion, 283; NPT refusal by, 286; nuclear
capability, 282–283
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 133: self-
determination efforts, 248; terrorism and, 243
Palestine: British retreat from, 57–58
Palestinian terrorism, 247–248
Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, 252, 257
Panama Canal, 146
Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, 276
Paradox of unrealized power, 98–99
Parliamentary systems, 154, 155–156: characterization,
154; European Union, 436–437; majoritarian, 155; party
leadership, 154; proportional, 155
Partnership for Peace, 269
Peace: conferences, 303–304; democratic, 198; positive, 318;
UN promotion of, 318–319
Peace dividend, 160–161
Peace of Westphalia, 28–29
Peacekeeping: as alternative to collective security, 312–314;
defi ned, 312; East Timor, 317; ethnic confl icts, 314–318;
failed states and, 314–318; goals, 312–313; human rights and,
339; in Lebanon, 313 (Illus.); NATO efforts, 316; operations
in 2006, 317 (Illus.); origins of, 312; purpose of, 313
Peacemaking: defi ned, 314; ethnic confl icts, 314–316; failed
states, 316–318
PeaceNet, 128
Pearl Harbor, 47
Peloponnesian War, 25
Pentagon. See September 11, 2001 terrorist attack
Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC): border disputes, 262;
countries recognizing, 65; female defi cit in, 341; GNP
ranking, 113; Internet restrictions, 529–530; Korean
confl ict and, 60–61; life expectancy in, 419; military
power, 110, 162; NIEOs and, 416; Nixon’s visit to, 69–70;
opposition groups, 162; power index rating, 113–115; pro-
democracy movement, 70–74; Soviet relations with, 61;
special economic zones in, 377; Truman administration
view of, 207; U. S. rapprochement, 70; unemployment in,
377; Vietnam War and, 63–64; Western culture in, 509;
Western products in, 503; WTO membership, 379
Perestroika, 75
Periphery, 15
Persian empire, 25
Persian Gulf War: alliances, 264; collective security issue in,
314; diversionary theory and, 163; impact of resolve on,
103; just war principles and, 335; realist perspective of, 5;
UN Chapter VII and, 311; UN’s role, 101
Personal computers, 511
Philippines, 47
Physicians for Human Rights, 127
Piling-on bandwagoning, 263
Pirates, 118
Pleven, René, 433
PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Poland, 43, 46, 56: German invasion of, 43, 297;
parliamentary elections, 76; Soviet presence, 54, 56;
underground (WWII), 238, 239
Polarity: bipolar, 48, 189; defi ned, 187; multipolarity, 189;
uni-multipolar, 192; unipolar, 192
Policy choices: aiding the South, 415; Bush Doctrine,
88–89; economic liberalism, 382–383; ethnic grievances,
231; European Union, 445; globalization, 526–527;
implications, 427; economic integration, 451–454;
environmental cooperation and, 489–494; gender
inequality, 421–423; globalization and, 518–521, 534;
GNP differences, 391–393; Human Development Index,
394–396; imperialism, 398–400; integration across,
451–454; international debt, 396–398; LDC economic
integration and, 446; liberalism, 409; liberalism strategies,
417–421; life expectancy, 394; MNCs role, 403–409; moral
implications, 426–427; neo-imperialism, 400–403; neo-
Marxism strategies, 412–417; NGOs mitigation efforts,
425–427; organizational roles, 425–426; per capita income
data, 392–393; security implications, 427; strategies to
close, 412–421; theoretical explanations, 390
NPT. See Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
NSA. See National Security Agency (NSA)
Nuclear arms race, 279–282
Nuclear deterrence, ethics of, 331–337
Nuclear-free zones, 288
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 284
Nuclear parity, 68
Nuclear proliferation, 82, 287: advantages if, 285; history,
282–283; policy choice, 287; rapid increase of, 285–286;
regimes against, 346–347; terrorism and, 84
Nuclear weapons, 82, 277, 278: arms reduction treaties, 74;
controlling, 286–287; dismantling, 74; fi rst- and second-
strike capabilities, 278; parity, 68; prisoner’s dilemma and,
279–282; stockpiling, 277–278
Nunn-Lugar Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 166
Nye, Gerald P., 159
Nye, Joseph S., 106–107
O
Obama, Barack, 171 (Illus.)
Oil: as cause of confl ict, 471; international debt crisis and,
396–398; international security and, 72; oil glut, 468–469;
OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC); prediction of U.S. supplies, 478 (Illus.); price of,
372, 477; production history, 478; reserves, 477–480; world
oil consumption, 469 (Illus.); world oil prices, 477 (Illus.);
world’s known reserves and production, 479 (Illus.)
Oklahoma City bombing, 131
Olson, Mancur, 266
Olympic boycott, 71
Olympic terrorism, 131
OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC)
Open leadership style, 175
Operational code, 171
Organization of Jihad Brigades, 133
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC): boycott, 73; defi ned, 72; economic impact,
72–73; industrialized countries interest, 373, 416–417;
international debt crisis and, 396–398; North-South
economic gap, 416–417; oil costs and, 477; price increase
in 1973, 372–373, 396–397, 477; price increase in 1979,
397; world oil supplies, 469
Organizational role, 165
Oslo Peace Agreement, 254
Ottawa Treaty, 276–277
Our Common Future (Brundtland), 490
Outsourcing, 404
Over fi shing, 470–471
Overseas development assistance, 402
Ovimbundu people, 224
Oxfam International, 408

586 Index
Public opinion: body-bag syndrome, 148–149; core values,
145, 149; defi ned, 142; democratic theory, 142; impact on
events, 143; infl uence on foreign policy, 145–150, 152–153;
knowledge and concern for foreign policy, 143–144;
leaders’ adoption of, 152; moody or wise, 144–145;
political system and, 150–157; rally-round-the-fl ag effect,
147–148, 163–164; shifts in, 144–145; state foreign policy,
142–143; underlying beliefs, 149
Purchasing power parity, 391
Q
Qaddafi , Muammar, 141, 252
Quality-of-life indicators, 394–395
Quemoy, 61
R
Rainbow Warrior, 497
Rainforest Alliance, 118
Rally-round-the-fl ag effect, 147–148, 163–164
Rape, 341, 343
Ratifi cation, 155
Rational actors, 142
Ray, Charles Robert, 133
Reagan, Ronald: Cold War, 71–72; terrorism, 240; U.S.
defense, 70–71, 160
Realism: bargaining strategies, 296; China trade policy, 14;
classical balance of power, 188; Cold War perspective,
90–91; constructivism vs., 17–19; criticisms, 7–13, 8 (Illus.);
defi ned, 4; dominance of, 7; environmental cooperation,
494–495; feminist perspectives, 19–22; foreign policy, 142;
globalization, 531–532; history of, 4, 48–49; idealism vs.,
13–15; interstate war explanations, 186; liberalism, 7–13;
main criticisms of, 8; MNCs, 126; Neo-Marxism vs.,
15–16; NGO perspectives, 130; pursuit of power, 7, 107;
Realpolitik, 4–5; states, 5–6; states as rational actors,
142; states as unitary actors, 141; terrorism perspectives,
134–135
Realpolitik, 4–5
“Reciprocating” strategy, 295–296
Red Army Faction, 133
Red Cross/Red Crescent, 118, 127
Refugees: defi ned, 510; Rwandan, 217; U. S. policy, 344
Regime: defi ned, 346; international cooperation, 346–347;
types, 78 (Illus.)
Regional institutions, 457–459
Regional integration, 454–457, 456 (Illus.)
Reich, Robert, 125
Relative deprivation, 228–229
Religion: as cause for terrorism, 248; ethno-religious confl ict,
79–81; religious interest groups, 158
Repatriated profi ts, 403
Replacement level, 473
Republic of China. See Taiwan
Resolve to win, 103–104
Resultant, 166
Revolutionary Army Fatah, 133
Ricardo, David, 358–359
Rio Earth Summit, 127, 485, 491–492, 497
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, The (Kennedy), 374
Robinson, Joan, 33
Roman Empire, 25
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Eastern Europe confl ict, 54, 56;
leaders’ beliefs, 173; public opinion, 146
Rumsfeld, Donald, 166
International Criminal Court, 334–335; Kyoto Protocol,
487; military intervention in Iraq, 83; MNC investments,
407; NGO activities, 132; nuclear proliferation, 287;
population growth, 496; public opinion, 152–153; should
Britain have appeased Hitler?, 44–45; state intervention
to promote democratization, 199; trading with China, 14;
War on Terror, 256–257, 332–333
Political economy. See International political economy
Political globalization, 90, 507–508: historical precedent,
516; institutions, 507; technology and, 520
Political opposition, 163–164
Political systems: opposition in, 162–163; public opinion
and, 150–157
Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau), 4, 98
Pollution: air, 465–466; climate change and, 480–483;
economic growth and, 482; transboundary, 466
Popular culture, 509
Population: control of growth, 475–476; fertility rate, 472;
growth, addressing of, 496; military power and, 110;
overpopulation, 471–474; world population growth,
472 (Illus.)
Population Bomb, The (Ehrlich), 475
Population growth: addressing, 496; economic growth and,
483–484; food shortages and, 471, 475; global, 471–472,
475–476; infant mortality and, 472–473; military
capabilities and, 110; policy choices, 496; UN programs,
493–494; world conference on, 494
Population momentum, 471
Positive peace, 318
Powell, Colin, 166
Power: balance of power, 30; classical balance of power,
187–188; constructivists view of, 107; cultural, 107;
defi ned, 98, 137; distribution among major powers, 114
(Illus.); distribution of power, 187–193; domain, 108;
economic capabilities, 105; economic power indicators,
111–113; failures, 108; feminist view of, 107; geographical
factors, 109; idealist view of, 107; impact of resolve
and, 103–104; index of power, 113–116; indicators of,
109–111; liberal view of, 105; military power indicators,
109–111; norms vs., 349–350; power and incidence of
war, 190 (Illus.); soft power, 106–107; of states, 105–107,
138; terrorist groups, 134–136; transnational actors role,
116–119; unrealized, 98–99
Power politics perspective, 5
Power transition theory, 192
POWs. See Prisoners of war (POWs)
PRC. See Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC)
Presidential system, 154–155
Primary actors, 5
Prisoner’s dilemma: defi ned, 279; game structure, 279–281;
game theory matrix, 279 (Illus.); logic of, 281–282
Prisoners of war (POWs), 331
Private international law, 327
Productivity, 374
Profi ts: repatriated, 403
Proliferation: anti-proliferation policy, 166; nuclear, 287;
power distribution and, 84
Protectionist policies, 360, 373, 381
Protestant Reformation, 28
Proxy wars, 68
Psychoanalytic approach, 170
Psychological approach, 142
Public health: global warming and, 468; overpopulation
and, 473

Index 587
Small arms, 273–274
Smith, Adam, 358
Smoot-Hawley Act, 40–41, 362
Smuts, Jan, 305–306
Social identity theory, 229
Social responsibility: corporate, 408
Soft power, 106–107
Somali pirates, 117 (Illus.)
Somalia, 315
Somoza, Anastasio, 71
SOPs. See Standard operating procedures (SOPs)
SORT. See Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
South Africa: NPT signing by, 286; nuclear capability, 284
South Korea: confl ict, 59–61; economic development,
411–412
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 262, 267–268
Sovereignty, 5, 28, 325: common currency and, 441;
globalization and, 527–528; human rights versus, 338–341;
importance of, 97; Iraq war and, 83; lawmaking and, 325;
post-Saddam Iraq, 236; UN protection of, 308–309; WTO
and, 527–528
Soviet Union. See also Superpowers: Afghanistan invasion
by, 71, 99; balance of power (pre-WWII), 194–195; Chinese
relations with, 61; Cold War beliefs, 210; Czechoslovakia
invasion (1968), 165; democratization of, 77; détente,
69–70; disintegration impact, 143; disintegration of, 76
(Illus.), 420; Eastern Europe and, 54, 56–57; economic
system, 377–378; ethnic confl icts, 222–223; Gorbachev’s
reforms, 75–76; Hitler’s attack, 46–47; invasion of
Afghanistan, 71; Korean confl ict and, 59–60; Nazi
invasion, 56; Nazi nonaggression pact, 43–46, 261; Nazi
Party’s charge against, 56; nuclear deterrence, 277–278;
political reform, 77; power index rating, 116; presence in
Poland, 56; superpower status, 48; support of terrorist by,
243; Western goods as soft power, 106 (Illus.); World War
II, 43–48; Russian Revolution, 37
Spillover effects, 435
Spykman, Nicholas, 109–110
Sri Lanka: demographic transition, 474 (Illus.); Tamil Tigers,
80, 134, 249
Stalin, Joseph: China and, 61; Cold War and, 204; enemy
image, 172; ethnic relocation policies, 233–234;
information processing by, 173; Korean confl ict, 59–60;
leaders’ beliefs, 173; motives, 46; photo, 45 (Illus.); rise of,
46; Yalta Conference, 56, 210
Standard operating procedures (SOPs): Cuban missile crisis,
167–169; defi ned, 166; September 11, 2001 terrorist attack,
169; use by bureaucracies, 166, 205–206
Star Wars, 72
Starbucks, 503, 509
START. See Strategic arms reduction treaty (START)
START I, 288
START II, 288
State-building, 318
State capitalism, 381
Stateless nations, 97
State-level explanations of wars, 195–205; Cold War,
204–205; democratic dyads, 198–203; type of economy,
196–197; types of governments and domestic opposition,
197–198; World War I, 203; World War II, 203–204
States: constructivism, 17–18; city, 25, coalitions of, 189;
confl icts between, 185–186; defi ned, 4–5, 137; economic
capabilities, 105; economic policy and, 529; economic
power indicators, 111–113; failed states, 81, 316–318;
Russia. See Soviet Union
Rwanda: ethnic confl ict, 79, 217, 219, 230, 232; genocide,
217; peacemaking, 315–316
S
Sachs, Jeffrey, 391, 414
SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
Sarin, 243, 291
Sato, Eisaku, 175
Saudi Arabia: Islamic fundamentalism and, 249; Western
culture in, 509
Saudi Arabian terrorism, 249
Save the Children, 118
Scapegoat hypothesis, 163, 197–198
Schelling, Thomas, 239
Schuman, Robert, 435
Schuman Plan, 435
Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 294
Scope, 108
SDI. See Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
Second-strike capability, 278
Secretariat, 308
Sectarian, 221
Security. See also Collective security: Cold War, 82, 84–87;
dilemma, 187; feminist constructivists’ view, 19; Internet
and, 529; Iraq threat, 83; liberals’ view, 9–10; nuclear
proliferation and, 82, 94; post-cold war threats to, 81–87;
North-South economic gap as threat, 427; terrorism as
threat, 82, 84
Security Council, 308; membership, 321; veto power, 310
Security dilemma, 187
Security threats, 82–87
Self-determination: ethnic confl ict and, 225–226; national
self-determination, 37, 248; Palestinian, 248, trends, 223
(Illus.)
Sen, Amartya, 341
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack: al Qaeda motives,
246, 249–250, 251; alliances following, 265–266; Bush’s
leadership style and, 175–176; coalition against al Qaeda
and Afghanistan, 265; defense spending increase, 161;
foreign policy and, 165; impact of, 84; international
terrorism, 133; Iraq war justifi cation and, 335;military
actions after, 253; security threats, 82, 84; standard
operating procedures, 169; technology of terrorist attacks,
244; World Trade Center, terrorist strategy, 241
Serbia: alliances (pre-WWI), 194, 200; ethnic confl ict, 219;
Franco-Prussian War, 266
Sesame Street, 509
Shah of Iran, 71
Shanghai Communiqué, 69–70
Shia Muslims: democratization of Iraq, 236–237; distribution,
220 (Illus.); ethnic confl ict, 220–221
Sikhs, 228
Simon, Julian, 476
Singapore, 509
Single European Act, 440
Sino-Soviet alliance, 267
Six Books on the State (Bodin), 28
Six-Day War, 67
Size principle, 263
Slavery: antislavery groups, 128; international cooperation,
347–348
Slovenia, 79

588 Index
Television, 508–509, 518
Terms of trade, 402
Terrorism: See also War on Terror: Al Qaeda inspired,
244–247, 249–251; challenge to states, 134–137; civil wars
and, 216; dealing with, 251–257; defi ned, 238–241; deaths-
related to, 243; defi ning, 238–241; global war on, 84–87;
globalization and, 135–136, 138; history of, 241–247;
incidents of, 131; international fatalities, 243–244, 245
(Illus.), 247; international incidents, 243, 244 (Illus.);
international terrorism, 239; international terrorist
groups, 131; moral judgment, 238–239; noncombatant
targets, 240; Oklahoma City bombing, 131; origins of,
247–251; security threats, 82, 84; state-sponsored, 242;
statistics on, 242, 247; September 11, 2001. See September
11, 2001 terrorist attack; suicide bombings, 248; terrorists
as assassins, 240; theoretical perspectives, 134–135;
transnational, 248; waves of, 242
Terrorist groups: in border areas, 255; defi ned, 131; ethnic
confl ict and, 237; proliferation of, 136; religious, 241; as
transnational actors, 131, 133–137
Thailand: currency crisis, 379; economic development, 411
Thatcher, Margaret, 154: defeat of, 154; leadership style, 176;
male attributes, 20–21
Theoretical perspectives: See also specifi c theories:
alternatives, 3–4; constructivism, 17–19; defi ned, 3;
dependency, 16; environmental cooperation, 494–499;
globalization, 531 (Illus.); history of global politics,
48–51; idealism, 13–15; just war, 337; liberalism, 7–13;
modern era global politics, 90–93; realism, 4–7; regional
institutions, 457–459
Theory of relative deprivation, 228–229
Third World: defi ned, 63; superpower involvement, 67–68
Thirty Years’ War, 28–29
Thomas Aquinas, 335
Thucydides, 4, 25
Thugs (Hindu terrorists), 241
Tiananmen Square, 74, 74 (Illus.)
Tit-for-tat strategy, 346
Title 22 of the U.S. Legal Code, 240
Tito, 227
Torture: U. S. policy on, 332–333
Trade. See Free trade; World trade Center
Tragedy of the commons, 486
Transboundary pollution, 466
Transformationalists, 517, 530
Transnational actors: challenge to states’ power, 116–119;
defi ned, 9; multinational corporations, 119–126;
nongovernmental organizations, 126–131, 132; role of,
116–117; terrorist groups, 131, 133–137; types of, 117–118
Transnational linkages, 118–119
Transnational relations, 117
Treaties. See also Maastricht Treaty; North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO): Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 289;
Anti-Personnel Landmines Treaty, 127, 276–277; arms
reduction, 74; CENTO, 262, 267; CFE Treaty, 275–276;
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 155, 288; Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, 275–276; INF Treaty,
74; international law and, 324–325; Lisbon Treaty, 446;
Moscow Treaty, 288; NGOs’ infl uence, 127; Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, 284; Ottawa Treaty, 276–277;
SEATO, 262, 267–268; SORT, 288; START, 74, 288; United
Nations Treaty Collection, 324–325; United States has not
signed or ratifi ed, 350 (Illus.); U.S. refusal to sign, 349–350
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 45
Treaty of Paris, 435
future of, 530–534; globalization, 527–534; human rights
vs. states’ rights, 338–345; index of power, 113–116;
interactions between, 202; international law enforcement,
326–328; long live the state, 528–530; matching capabilities
to the task, 108–109; military capabilities, 99–103; military
power indicators, 109–111; MNCs relationship to, 120,
124–126; modern, 27–29; multinational, 97; nation vs., 97;
paradox of unrealized power, 98–99; power of, 98; power of
agenda, ideas, and values, 105–107; principle actors, 4–5;
redrawing boundaries, 234–235; resolve to win, 103–104;
self-interest of, 5–7; state is dead, 527–528; terrorism’s
challenge to state system, 134–137; transnational actors,
116–119; as unitary actors, 141
Status quo, challenges to, 41–43
Stock market, downturn in 2008, 380–381
Stockholm Conference, 466
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 69, 143
Strategic arms reduction treaty (START), 74
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), 288
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 72, 278
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 288
Structural adjustment programs, 418
Structural constraint explanation of war, 201–202
Subsidies, 360
Substate actors, 9
Sudan, 217, 230
Sudetenland, 43
Suez crisis, 65
Suicide bombing, 248–249
Sulfur dioxide, 465
Sunni Muslims: democratization of Iraq, 236–237;
distribution, 220 (Illus.); ethnic confl ict, 220–221
Superpowers, 48: alliances, 267–268; Arab-Israeli confl ict
role, 65–67; Cuban crises, 68–69; détente, 69–70; hot-line
agreement, 69; nuclear parity, 68; petroleum price and,
72–73; proxy wars, 68; rapprochement between, 76–77;
realist views of, 91; rise of, 48; SALT agreement, 69
Supranational, 434
Supranationalism, 457
Surface-to-air missile (SAM), 167
Sustainable development, 490
Sweden, 466, 474 (Illus.)
Syria, 67
Systemic explanations of interstate war, 186–195; anarchy,
187; Cold War, 195; distribution of power, 187–193;
interdependence, 193–194; World War I, 194; World War II,
194–195
System-level relationships, 211–212, 212 (Illus.)
T
Tacitus, 99
Taiwan: economic development, 410–411; Nationalist retreat
to, 59; Quemoy and Matsu, 61
Taliban: defi ned, 246; female subjugation, 341–342; war
against, 253–255
Tamil Tigers, 134, 249, 291
Tanzania, 250–251
Tariffs: common external, 450; defi ned, 360; increase after
World War I, 40–41, 42; post WWI, 41; tariff barriers, 373
Technology: access inequality, 519; communication and
transportation increases, 11; development, 11; distance-
shrinking, 511; encryption, 529; globalization factors,
511–514; information technology, global use of, 520
(Illus.); military power and, 111; MNCs introduction of,
405–406; political impact, 512

Index 589
United States contribution, 319–320; veto power,
310–311, 321
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 313
United States. See also Superpowers: anti-terrorism policies,
85–87; American hegemony decline, 373–379; arms
reduction efforts, 286–288; balance of power (pre-WWII),
194–195; China overtures, 70; coercive diplomacy, 294;
Cold War beliefs, 210; containment policy, 58; cultural
dominance of, 510–511; currency, 39–40, 364–366;
defense budget, 161 (Illus.); détente, 69–70; economic
strength in the 1990s, 374–375; economy (post-WWI),
40–41; embassies’ bombings, 250–251; environmental
cooperation, 489, 491–495; European aid (post-WWII),
433; Finland policy (WWII), 204; GNP, 125; gold standard
abandonment by, 72; Gulf War, 5; hegemony, decline
in, 373–379; ICC opposition, 531; immigration to, 517;
industrial power, 111, 113; Iraq invasion by, 83; Korean
confl ict, 59–60; League Nations and, 306–307; Libyan raid,
253; Middle East policy, 248–250; military assistance, 65;
military capabilities, 111; military-industrial complex,
159–160; MNCs based in, 124–125; NAFTA effects,
451–453; natural resources, 111, 113; nuclear deterrence,
277–278; pollution in, 482; power index rating, 115–116;
presidential system, 154–155; productivity decline,
374; public opinion impact in, 154; refugee policy, 344;
satellization of Eastern Europe, 57; soft power of, 106;
superpower status, 48; treaties, refusals to sign, 349–350;
treaty ratifi cation process, 155; UN contributions,
319–320; UN funding by, 319–320; unfavorable image of,
85–86; unipolar moment, 191–192; Vietnam policy (See
Vietnam War); war debts (WWI), 40; World War II entry,
47–48
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 338
Urbanization, 400
V
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 288
Values: core, 145, 149; democratic states, 37; idealism, 13,
15; public opinion and, 149
Venezuela, 418–419
Vietnam: Cold War confl ict, 63–65; decolonization of,
61, 63; matching capabilities to the task, 108; military
capabilities, 100–101; resolve, impact of, 103–104;
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 127
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 127
Vietnam War: body-bag syndrome, 148; debate over, 143;
diplomatic efforts, 296–299; escalation of, 64–65; fall of
Saigon, 70; groupthink and, 176; impact of resolve on,
103–104; military-industrial complex, 160; public opinion
and, 145, 146; symmetrical warfare in, 100–102; U. S.
defeat, 99, 108
Voltaire, François-Marie, 100
Volya, Narodnaya, 241
von Bismarck, Otto, 34–35
von Moltke, Helmuth, 208
von Ribbentrop, 45 (Illus.)
W
Wag-the-dog effect, 163
Wal-Mart, 120 (Illus.)
Walt, Stephen, 261
War. See also Cold War; Interstate wars; Just war; War on
Terror; World War I; World War II: alliances and, 266–268;
asymmetrical, 100; belief systems and, 206–207; Cold War
and, 201; Crimean War, 31; deaths by century, 183 (Illus.);
Treaty of Rome, 435, 436
Treaty of Tlatelolco, 288
Treaty of Versailles, 39, 43
Triple Alliance, 35, 194
Triple Entente, 35, 194
Trotsky, Leon, 329
Truman, Harry S., 58, 154
Tuberculosis, 424, 425
Tuchman, Barbara, 208–209
Turkey: democratization of, 77; EU membership request,
443; Soviet pressure on, 57; U. S. missile removal, 69
Tutsis, 217, 219, 230, 232, 315–316
Twentieth Party Congress, 61
Two-level games, 164, 299
U
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 267
U.S.-North Korea framework agreement, 286
Ukraine, 286
UN Charter on Human Rights, 128
UN Charter, 308, 310–311: Article 2, 315; Chapter VII, 311;
state sovereignty, 308–310; World Court, 324
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 425
UN Conference on the Environment and Development, 127
UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects, 276
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 413
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 485
UN Development Program (UNDP), 425
UN Emergency Force (UNEF), 312
UN Global Compact, 408
UN Human Rights Commission, 341
UN Population Fund (UNFPA), 425
UN Treaty Collection, 324
UNCTAD. See UN Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD)
UNDP. See UN Development Program (UNDP)
UNEF. See UN Emergency Force (UNEF)
UNFPA. See UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
UNICEF. See UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
UNIFIL. See United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL)
Uni-multipolar system, 192
Unipolar, 192
Unitary actors, 141
United Nations (UN): aggression defi nition, 304–305; anti-
Americanism, 85–86; anti-terrorism efforts, 257; arms
control efforts, 276; budget obligations, 320 (Illus.); for
collective security, 307–323; consulting groups, 126;
criticisms of, 321; economic development efforts, 73,
425–426; ECOSOC, 126, 319; environmental initiatives,
466; ethnic confl icts resolution efforts, 237; expanding
scope of, 323; fi nancial crisis, 319–320; forum for debate,
318; future of, 319–323; globalization role, 507–508; Gulf
War role, 101; human rights commitment, 338; internal
confl ict intervention by, 81; Iraq weapons question,
83; Korean War and, 59, 60; less developed country
participation, 322; membership, 310 (Illus.); norms against
violence, 318; organization, 309 (Illus.); peacekeeping role
promotion, 312–319; permanent members, 321; positive
peace, 318–319; purpose of, 54, 350; representation, 321;
signifi cance of, 322–323; social development issues, 73;
soft power form, 106; state-building, 318; state sovereignty
and, 308–310; structure of, 308–311; UN Charter, 308,
310–311; United Nations Treaty Collection, 324–325;

590 Index
roles, 19–20; modern state and, 50; mission of, 366–367;
rape, 341, 343; women’s rights, 341–345
World Bank, 506: Bretton Woods and, 54; criticisms, 386;
decision making changes at, 416; defi ned, 366; Group of 77
and, 413; income disparity of developing countries, 392;
overview, 366–367; structural adjust ment programs, 418;
Washington Consensus, 418
World Court, 308
World Health Organization (WHO), 322, 425
World hunger, 470
World Island, 109, 110
World politics, 3
World Population Conference, 473, 494
World Summit on Sustainable Development, 491
World Trade Center. See also September 11, 2001 terrorist
attack: bombing in 1993, 249, 291; terrorist strategy, 241
World trade of leading economies, 515 (Illus.)
World Trade Organization (WTO): background, 368; backlash
against, 87; defi ned, 87; Dispute Settlement Mechanism,
386–387; Doha round, 420; environmental issues, 493;
GATT agreements, 386; state sovereignty, 527–528
World War I: alliances, 266–267; cause of, 35; alliance
system, 34–35; central powers, 36 (Illus.); decision-
making-level explanations, 207–210; ethnic confl ict
resolution, 232; impact of, 37–38; map, 36 (Illus.); major
powers in, 115–116; postwar settlements, 38–41; pre-war
optimism, 35, 37; process leading to, 303–304; reparations,
39–40; state- and dyadic-level explanations, 203; systemic
explanations, 194
World War II: alliances, 267; background, 43, 45; decision-
making-level explanations, 210; diplomatic failures, 297;
ethnic confl ict resolution, 232–233; Europe following,
55 (Illus.); impact of, 48; Nazi-Soviet Pact, 46; origins
of, 42–43; state- and dyadic-level explanations, 203–204;
Soviet role in, 43–47; systemic explanations, 194–195;
terrorist acts during, 238–239; United States entry, 47–48;
wealth distribution following, 11
World Wildlife Fund, 495
Wotton, Sir Henry, 296
WTO. See World Trade Organization (WTO)
Y
Yalta Conference, 56
Yeltsin, Boris, 77
Yemen: blue helmets in, 313; democratization of, 77
Yom Kippur War, 67
Yugoslavia: ancient hatred in, 227; civil war, 79; ethnic war,
217, 218–219; nationalism in, 230; redrawing boundaries,
235; UN peacekeeping efforts, 316
Yunus, Muhammad, 421–422, 422 (Illus.)
Z
Zapatista National Liberation Army, 452
Zealots (Jewish terrorists), 241
decision-making level explanations, 205–210; democratic
dyads, 198–203; diversionary theory of, 163, 197–198;
domestic factors, 197–198; dyadic-level explanations, 195–
205; ethics of, 331–337; Franco-Prussian War of 1870, 31,
266–267; frequency of, 183; internal, 184; interwar years,
38–41; levels of analysis, 185; multilevel explanations,
211–213; Napoleonic Wars, 303; natural resources and,
111; norms against, 348–349; Peloponnesian War, 25;
perceptions and, 206–207; Persian Gulf War, 101–102;
postwar settlements, 38–41; prisoners of, 332–333; proxy
wars, 68; Six-Day War, 67; state-level explanations,
195–205; Thirty Years’ War, 28–29
War crimes, 331: just war principles and, 335–337;
prosecutions, 333
War on Terror. See also Prisoners of war (POWs): in
China, 239; ethics of, 331; global war on terror, 84,
161; international law and, 331; as just war, 336; policy
choices, 256–257, 332–333; policy effectiveness, 256–257;
POWs, 331
Warfare, asymmetrical, 100
Warsaw Pact, 57
Washington Consensus, 418
Water resources, 469–471
We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed
with Our Families (Gourevitch), 217
Wealth: distribution of, 392; function of, 359
Wealth of Nations, The (Smith), 358
Weapons. See also Arms: biological, 82, 290–293; chemical,
82, 290–293; conventional, 273–274; IEDs, 274; nuclear,
82, 277–278; transfers of major conventions weapons,
273, 273 (Illus.); WMD. See Weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Al Qaeda’s interest in,
246, 291; biological, 290; chemical, 290–293; defi ned, 260;
security threats, 82; threat of, 282–286
Weimar Republic, 39
Wendt, Alexander, 18
Westphalia, peace of, 28–29, 48
WHO. See World Health Organization (WHO)
Wilhelm, Kaiser, 208–209
Williams, Jody, 127
Wilson, Woodrow: beliefs, 170; Fourteen Points, 305;
idealism of, 13, 49; League of Nations, 306–307; Lodge
feud with, 307; postwar settlements, 38–39; psychology,
170; public infl uence on foreign policy, 149–150; self-
determination principle, 225; on war’s origins, 12; World
War I impact, 37
WMD. See Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Women: bias against, 421; birthrate and, 473; CEDAW, 342;
Cold War conceptions of, 92–93; development role, 390;
discrimination against, 341; female circumcision, 342;
female defi cit, 341; feminist constructivism, 19–22; gender
inequality, 421–423; globalization and, 508; Grameen Bank
loans, 421–423; in international politics, 20–22; leadership

Front Cover
Title Page
Copyright
ISBN-13: 978-0-495-80264-8
Contents���������������
Maps�����������
Preface��������������
PART I: Theoretical Perspectives and Historical Background
1 Theories of Global Politics
Realism��������������
Criticisms of Realism����������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: TRADING WITH CHINA
2 The Historical Setting
Global Politics in Ancient Times���������������������������������������
The Emergence of the Modern State and the Contemporary International System����������������������������������������������������������������������������������
The Age of Imperialism�����������������������������
The Twentieth-Century World Wars���������������������������������������
Theoretical Perspectives on the History of Global Politics�����������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD BRITAIN HAVE APPEASED HITLER?
3 The Modern Era
The Origins and Early Years of the Cold War��������������������������������������������������
Decolonization and Regional Conflict in the Cold War Context
Changes in East-West Competition���������������������������������������
Changes in the International Economy and the Rise of Interdependence���������������������������������������������������������������������������
The End of the Cold War������������������������������
The Post–Cold War World: Challenges to Sovereignty���������������������������������������������������������
Theoretical Perspectives on Global Politics in the Modern Era��������������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ HAVE OCCURRED?
POLICY CHOICES: IS THE BUSH DOCTRINE WORKABLE AND JUSTIFIED?

PART II: Actors in Global Politics: Power and Policy
4 The Power of States and the Rise of Transnational Actors
Nations and States�������������������������
The Power of States��������������������������
Measuring Power����������������������
Transnational Actors: A Challenge to States’ Power?����������������������������������������������������������
Multinational Corporations���������������������������������
Nongovernmental Organizations������������������������������������
International Terrorism and Terrorist Groups���������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF NGOS?
5 Inside States: The Making of Foreign Policy
Public Opinion���������������������
Differences in Political Systems���������������������������������������
Interest Groups and Domestic Opposition����������������������������������������������
Foreign Policy Bureaucracies�����������������������������������
Characteristics of Leaders and the Psychology of Decision Making�����������������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD LEADERS LISTEN TO PUBLIC OPINION?

PART III: Interactions of Actors: Security Relations
6 International Conflict: Explaining Interstate War
Explaining Conflict between States: Analyzing Wholes and Parts
Systemic Explanations of Interstate War����������������������������������������������
State- and Dyadic-Level Explanations of Wars���������������������������������������������������
Decision-Making-Level Explanations of Wars�������������������������������������������������
Multilevel Explanations of War: Using Caution When Comparing Levels of Analysis��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES INTERVENE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIZATION?
7 Ethnic Conflict and International Terrorism
Ethnic Conflict in Global Politics
International Terrorism������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: DEALING WITH ETHNIC GRIEVANCES
POLICY CHOICES: IS THE WAR ON TERROR AN EFFECTIVE POLICY FOR ADDRESSING TERRORISM?
8 Efforts to Avoid Conflict: Alliances, Arms, and Bargaining
Alliances����������������
Arms and Arms Control����������������������������
Bargaining and Negotiation���������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
9 Global Security Efforts: International Organizations, Law, and Ethics
International Organizations and Collective Security����������������������������������������������������������
International Law
Ethics, Morality, and International Politics���������������������������������������������������
The Ethics of Intervention: Human Rights Versus States’ Rights
International Cooperation: Norms and Regimes���������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD TRADITIONAL LAWS OF WAR APPLY TO ENEMY COMBATANTS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR”?
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD STATES SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?

PART IV: Interactions of Actors: Economic Relations
10 Interdependence Among Rich States: International Political Economy in the North
The Era of U.S. Economic Predominance and the Liberal International Economic Order�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
The International Political Economy After Bretton Woods��������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SHOULD ECONOMIC LIBERALISM BE ABANDONED AS THE BASIS FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY?
11 The Developing States in the International Political Economy
The Economic Gap between the North and the South
Explanations of the North-South Gap������������������������������������������
Development Strategies for the South�������������������������������������������
The Role of the International Organizations in Economic Development��������������������������������������������������������������������������
Moral, Economic, and Security Implications of the North-South Gap������������������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: DEALING WITH MNC INVESTMENTS
POLICY CHOICES: AIDING THE SOUTH
12 Regional Economic Integration in the Global Political Economy
Economic and Political Integration in Western Europe�����������������������������������������������������������
Economic Integration among Developing States
Economic Integration across the North-South Divide
Regional Integration, Supranationalism, and the International Political Economy��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Theoretical Perspectives on Regional Institutions��������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: JOINING THE EUROPEAN UNION

PART V: Global Challenges
13 The Global Environment and Its Inhabitants
Environmental Challenges�������������������������������
Assessments of the Challenges: Optimists and Pessimists��������������������������������������������������������������
The Politics of Environmental Cooperation������������������������������������������������
Theoretical Perspectives on Environmental Cooperation������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: SUPPORTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
POLICY CHOICES: ADDRESSING POPULATION GROWTH
14 Globalization: Contemporary Dynamics and the Future of World Politics
What Is Globalization?�����������������������������
A Historical Perspective on Globalization: How New Is It?����������������������������������������������������������������
Globalization and Its Discontents����������������������������������������
Globalization and the State: The Future of World Politics����������������������������������������������������������������
SUMMARY
KEY TERMS
POLICY CHOICES: IS GLOBALIZATION DESIRABLE?

References�����������������
Index������������