The assignment: (4 page paper APA Format)Based on your evaluation of strategies and the situation in the Hurricane Katrina natural disaster, explain which strategies you would use and why. Based on your analysis of the Mississippi crisis plan, explain whi

Application: Crisis Plan—Evaluation and Analysis

Strategies and elements of a crisis plan should be reviewed periodically to ensure they are up-to-date and to add possible solutions learned from recent crisis experiences. Evaluating a crisis plan typically involves examination of “what went right and what went wrong.” Changes that evolve from the evaluation process can include changes in leadership that result from failure to execute strategies and/or legal and ethical issues. Responding procedures may undergo changes because even “what went right” may be improved upon or expanded. Furthermore, resources may be updated because they are usually problematic for implementing any plan, particularly for a disaster of enormous scope. Financial considerations may be evaluated as well, and national, state, and local foundations and government agencies/departments may respond to revisions by providing resources in the form of grants to individuals or organizations. Plans and grants should continually be reviewed and renewed through this cycle of analysis.

To prepare for this assignment:

Thinking about Hurricane Katrina, review pp. 164-175 of the article, “After Katrina: Building Back Better Than Ever,” and think about how the recommendations made might be applied to other natural disaster situations and/or locations.

Review Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 17 in your course text, Crisis Intervention Strategies, paying particular attention to the information on response efforts to Hurricane Katrina.

Review Chapters 9 and 12 in your course text, Crisis Management in the New Strategy Landscape, focusing on how organizational learning can be a useful part of crisis management evaluation and analysis.

Review the article, “Project CREST: A New Model for Mental Health Intervention After a Community Disaster.” Consider how response analysis led to the development, in this example, of a useful new disaster intervention training.

Review the article, “Styles of Suicide Intervention: Professionals’ Responses and Clients’ Preferences,” and reflect on how the authors investigated and analyzed professional responses to client suicide.

Using Hurricane Katrina as your natural disaster case study, think about and evaluate the strategies used in the Mississippi crisis plan.

Research the impact of Hurricane Katrina on either the Alabama or Louisiana coast line.

Then consider which elements or strategies of the Mississippi crisis plan might be applicable and/or relevant to use in Alabama or Louisiana.

Research the demographics for either the Alabama or Louisiana coast line and determine how the Mississippi crisis plan could be used in either of those states.

Consider what you think might need to be added to the Mississippi crisis plan were it to be applied to recovery efforts in either Alabama or Louisiana.

The assignment: (4 page paper APA Format) 

•Based on your evaluation of strategies and the situation in the Hurricane Katrina natural disaster, explain which strategies you would use and why. 

•Based on your analysis of the Mississippi crisis plan, explain which elements of the plan might be relevant/applicable to either Alabama or Louisiana. 

•Identify any element of the plan that might be missing for either Alabama or Louisiana.

Course Text:  James, R. K. & Gilliland, B.E. (2017). Crisis intervention strategies (8th ed.). Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

Chapter 3

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781305888081/pageid/69

Chapter 4

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781305888081/pageid/94

Chapter 5

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781305888081/pageid/117

Chapter 17

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781305888081/pageid/600

Course Text: Crisis Management in the New Strategy Landscape.

Chapter 9

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781483315461/epubcfi/6/32[;vnd.vst.idref=ch09]!/4/2@0:0

Chapter 12

https://bookshelf.vitalsource.com/books/9781483315461/epubcfi/6/38[;vnd.vst.idref=appendix]!/4/2@0:0

KATRINA
FIVE YEARS AFTER

PROGRESS REPORT ON RECOVERY, REBUILDING AND RENEWAL OFFICE OF GOVERNOR HALEY BARBOUR
AUGUST 29, 2010

1FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Message from Governor

Haley Barbour

2

Introduction 4

August 29, 2005 6

Immediate Response and Restoration of Critical Services 7

Federal Assistance 12

Nonprofits and Historic Preservation 17

Housing

2

5

Public Infrastructure 41

Economy 51

Education 58

Health and Human Services 66

Environmental and Marine Restoration 7

0

Disaster Preparedness and Hazard Mitigation 76

Governor’s Commission—Five Years Later 81

Conclusion 87

Appendix 88

KATRINA
FIVE YEARS AFTER

PROGRESS REPORT ON RECOVERY, REBUILDING AND RENEWAL

Cover photograph of the Biloxi Lighthouse by Brian Hilburn, courtesy of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency.

2FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 3FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Friends,

Five years ago, Hurricane Katrina wiped away what
we knew as the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Our southern
counties witnessed unprecedented destruction. Many
homes were erased, leaving only a foundation as a
marker of what used to be. Other homes and businesses
were reduced to rubble by blasts of wind and a merciless
storm surge. Ultimately, more than 60,000 homes were
destroyed and more than 100,000 of our people were
without homes. Hurricane force winds extended more
than 200 miles inland. As I’ve said many times, it looked
like the hand of God came down and just wiped away
everything.

The one thing Katrina didn’t destroy was the indomitable
Mississippi spirit. Moments after the storm passed,
Mississippians responded with unparalleled courage and
compassion, often leaving their own shattered homes
to check on a friend or neighbor. The howl of the storm
gave way to the buzz of chainsaws, as residents cleared
driveways and roads. The resilient, hard-working people
of Mississippi took a tremendous body blow during the

worst natural disaster in our nation’s history, and then we got up, hitched up our britches and
went to work.

Believe me when I tell you that people the world over took notice, and they were impressed. In
the months and years after Katrina, I’ve had business and political leaders across the country
tell me, “Haley, you’ve got to be proud of your people.” There’s no doubt the recovery from
Katrina along Mississippi’s Gulf Coast has cast our state in a new light.

No, we didn’t do it alone. There were waves of volunteers from all over the country who showed
up to help any way they could, whether they were driving nails into homes and businesses or
driving trucks with food and supplies; and we welcomed them with great appreciation. The
federal government allocated an extraordinary amount of money – more than $24 billion – to
our recovery effort, and they gave us unprecedented discretion in how to spend it. We have
spent that money wisely, not just to restore what had been, but to prepare for the future. We
are not simply rebuilding, but we are building back bigger and better than ever.

An unprecedented disaster demands an unprecedented response, and we knew all along that
we would have to break new ground along the way. Where we found problems, we developed
creative solutions, many of which will be indispensable in the future. Our state is now much
more prepared for disasters, and lessons learned during Katrina have been applied in more
recent crises.

Similarly, our congressional delegation and the federal government stepped up to the plate
effectively and generously. Senator Thad Cochran played a vital role, via his leadership on the
Senate Appropriations Committee. Senator Roger Wicker’s assistance in getting support for
our State has been crucial as was that of Senator Trent Lott before him. Our House delegation
put aside party politics and put Mississippians first. Representative Gene Taylor’s expertise
in maritime and naval issues has, and continues to be, an invaluable asset to Mississippi.
Representative Bennie Thompson was essential to our effort to get federal funding for the
survivable interoperable communications system. Both the Bush and Obama administrations
rose to the call for aid in the aftermath of the worst natural disaster in American history. To all
of them, I offer my sincere appreciation on behalf of Mississippi.

We’ve matched monetary aid with hard work, endurance and perseverance. We’ve replaced
rubble with commerce. We’ve torn away the blue tarps and replaced them with new roofs.
From homes and schools to places to play and places to pray, we’re making Mississippi’s Gulf
Coast more than it was; we’re making it what it can be, what it should be.

Mississippi has been the beneficiary of almost unfathomable generosity, and we are truly
thankful.

Marsha and I are extremely proud of the progress and accomplishments the Gulf Coast has
made in coming back from Katrina. We wish God’s grace and blessings on you and your family
as we continue to build upon Mississippi’s spirit and character.

Sincerely,

Haley Barbour

4FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 5FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

INTRODUCTION

Five years ago, Hurricane Katrina unleashed
a fury of destruction on South Mississippi
and the Gulf Coast. The damage caused
was literally unprecedented: Hundreds of
thousands of lives were thrown into disarray;
the coastline was practically wiped away.
Entire landscapes of cities and counties were
changed forever.

Even while piles of rubble covered the
landscape, Governor Haley Barbour made
a promise to all Mississippians: the Coast,
drawing on the resiliency and strength of its
people, would not only be rebuilt, but would
come back bigger and better than ever.

The massive recovery effort coordinated by
the Governor has embodied this Mississippi
spirit. At every turn, Mississippi has rebuilt
and restored that which was lost in a way
that was better than before and rethought
processes and programs to better serve the
affected region.

In many instances, this has meant innovative,
first-of-its-kind programs born from creative
collaborative processes:

• The Governor’s Commission on Recovery,
Rebuilding and Renewal combined
ideas from local residents and leaders
with expert knowledge from around

the country to develop a recovery
framework.

• Mississippi rethought disaster housing
and designed the Mississippi Cottage
as a better alternative to FEMA travel
trailers; indeed, these cottages have
proven their utility by providing
temporary housing during subsequent
disasters in the state.

• An enormous disaster housing grant
program, the Homeowner Assistance
Program, was created and benefited
nearly 30,000 households.

• A regional water and wastewater system
will provide more efficient services to
residents who move inland to be safer
from future hurricanes.

• A statewide interoperable
communications system is in operation
to link emergency responders in times of
crisis. Like the cottages, this system has
already been utilized during the recent
oil spill crisis to enhance communications
between state, local, and federal officials,
as well as crisis responders.

Notable successes achieved in the five years
since Katrina draw on the combined efforts
from all governmental sectors, private
industry, and nonprofit assistance. Examples
include:

• Housing has been restored to meet the
needs of coastal residents. Nowhere

is this more evident than the limited
number of FEMA temporary housing
units; from the tens of thousands of
units that housed more than 100,000
Mississippians, fewer than 100 units
remain on the Coast.

• The state has restored its public
infrastructure using $3 billion obligated
by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), strategically aligning
these dollars with other funding streams
where necessary to meet its vision of
rebuilding bigger and better.

• State employment and job training
efforts have resulted in the Coast’s
having some of Mississippi’s lowest
unemployment rates despite the
economic recession, and has bolstered
the workforce to fuel coastal businesses.

• Every Mississippi school except one re-
opened within six weeks after Katrina,
and students did not let the storm keep
them from achieving high performance
results.

• Medical and social services infrastructure
were restored, allowing impacted
families to quickly get back on their feet.

• Important restoration projects for the
coastal environment, beaches, and forest
lands are underway.

These successes have helped restore what
was lost in Katrina in a manner that was
better than before; however, Mississippi’s

work is not
yet complete.
Several important
initiatives
are currently
underway that will
be the foundation
of the Coast’s
long-term vitality.

Jobs are the
most crucial
piece to the
Coast’s long-term
prosperity, and
the restoration
program at the Port of Gulfport will be the
centerpiece of the Governor’s job creation
efforts. The Port of Gulfport restoration is the
biggest economic development project in
the state’s history, and will be an economic
engine, not just for the Coast, but the entire
state.

The restoration of Mississippi’s barrier
islands will protect the coastline from future
hurricanes, while also nurturing natural
habitats. Unfortunately, Congress has not
yet funded the full coastal restoration plan
created after Katrina. The barrier islands are
an important part of that plan, but other
measures are needed to revitalize coastal
marshlands, forests and beaches.

6FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 7FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Although Mississippians demonstrated great
resiliency in the face of Hurricane Katrina –
the worst natural disaster in American history
– the state’s success would not be possible
without the outpouring of support received
from our sister states, corporations and the
federal government. A great debt is owed to
those nonprofits and volunteers from around
the country and world who have donated
countless hours and monies to restore lives
after Katrina.

After Katrina, the state has emerged with a
better preparedness for the risk of natural
disasters and has implemented every
recovery program with a mindfulness of
the need to rebuild stronger and smarter.
The state has significantly upgraded its
response capabilities through interoperable
communications and an improved Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency.

While challenges and work remain,
Mississippi and the Coast have achieved a
remarkable comeback. From the period of
utter obliteration, this region has seized
upon the Governor’s vision of rebuilding
bigger and better than ever, which is
demonstrated across the post-Katrina
coastline, ongoing recovery efforts, and the
continued resiliency and character of the
citizens of the Gulf Coast.

AUGUST 29, 20

05

Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical
depression over the Bahamas on August
23, 2005. The depression continued to gain
intensity, becoming tropical storm Katrina on
August 24 and officially obtaining hurricane
status on August 25 – a mere two hours
before its center hit Florida’s east coast as
a Category 1 hurricane. Although Katrina
was reduced to a tropical storm as it quickly
moved across southern Florida, it again
became a hurricane when it reached the Gulf
of Mexico.

The storm strengthened to a Category 3
hurricane on August 27 after its inner-wall
deteriorated and a new, stronger outer wall
of the storm formed, raising wind speeds
to approximately 115 miles per hour and
doubling the size of the hurricane’s expanse
to 140 miles from its center. While still in
the Gulf on August 28, Hurricane Katrina
intensified from a Category 3 to a Category
5 hurricane with winds reaching over 170
miles per hour and the area of the hurricane’s
path increasing to a 200-mile radius. The
hurricane’s most destructive winds reached
nearly 30 miles from the storm’s center—
three times the radius of Hurricane Camille’s
maximum winds in 1969.

As a Category 3 hurricane with 120 mph
winds, Katrina arrived at the Louisiana and

Mississippi borders around 9:45 a.m. on
August 29. Katrina’s intensity as it hit the
Mississippi Coast caused the hurricane to
be nearly as strong as it was at its most
powerful and destructive Category 5 stage.
The Mississippi coastline’s low elevation and
shallow waters rendered the area especially
susceptible to destruction from storm surges.
In the case of Katrina, the storm surge topped
30 feet in many places and obliterated 80
miles of the coastline.

Katrina retained its hurricane classification
until well past Meridian, more than 150
miles north of the coast, where it weakened
to a tropical storm around 7:00 p.m. The
storm became a tropical depression on
August 30 near the Tennessee Valley and
dissipated on August 31 over the eastern
Great Lakes.

Because Katrina was literally unprecedented
in strength and retained its power far
inland, nearly all of the state and its citizens
experienced severe effects from its wrath.
Hurricane Katrina took the lives of more
than 230 Mississippians and left
unprecedented devastation in its wake.
Throughout Mississippi, hundreds of
thousands of housing units were damaged
and 80 percent of the state’s citizens
lost electricity.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AND
RESTORATION OF CRITICAL
SERVICES

Mississippi’s hurricane preparedness set the
stage for the state’s post-Katrina recovery,
saving lives and serving the immediate
needs of those affected by the storm.
These measures also laid the foundation
for a faster and more successful long-term
recovery after the hurricane. Actions taken
by the Mississippi Emergency Management
Agency (MEMA) in concert with other state
and federal agencies allowed for the safe
evacuation of coastal residents and enabled
their speedy return after the storm so that
they could participate in the rebuilding of
their communities.

Mississippi began emergency preparations
nearly a week before Katrina came ashore,
including the following:

• August 23, 2005 – MEMA began
publishing daily situation reports,
detailing important information on the
hurricane and response efforts planned
and undertaken.

• August 25 – MEMA conducted an
executive planning meeting in
preparation for Katrina.

• August 26 – Governor Barbour signed
a State of Emergency Order and an
Executive Order authorizing the use of

8FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 9FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

National Guard assets. A briefing was
conducted for all state agencies and
FEMA liaisons. The State Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) was activated
and unified command was established.
MEMA liaisons were deployed to the
six coastal counties and National Guard
liaisons were deployed to the three
coastal counties. To smooth the flow of
evacuations, Mississippi and Louisiana
began contra-flow of Interstates 55 and
59. A MEMA representative was sent to
the Louisiana EOC to help coordinate
evacuations.

• August 28 – The State Emergency
Response Team was deployed to Camp
Shelby, which is approximately 60 miles
from the Gulf Coast, so that it could ride
out the storm safely and respond quickly
after the storm’s passing. More National
Guard troops were sent to Camp Shelby
in preparation for distribution of food,
water and ice to disaster victims.

On August 29, Hurricane Katrina came
ashore as a Category 3 hurricane. Even
before the storm had dissipated, crews from
the Mississippi Department of Transportation
were clearing immense amounts of debris
from the state’s roadways. As a result of
the immediacy of the responders, all roads
that were structurally safe were opened to
emergency crews within six hours of
Katrina’s landfall.

Massive search and response efforts began
without delay. Volunteers at the MEMA EOC
staffed a missing persons hotline that took
more than 11,000 calls from 40 countries
in three days. Teams from state agencies
as well as from Mississippi State University,
the University of Mississippi and Delta State
University converted the missing persons
addresses into coordinates on GIS maps for
use by state and national search and rescue
teams. These teams performed more than
5,000 rescues in Mississippi after the storm.
The Mississippi National Guard began
handing out food, water, and ice at
designated distribution points in every
county. Because the federal pipeline could
not deliver the quantity of supplies needed in
the wake of this unprecedented storm, MEMA
consistently received only 10 to 20 percent
of the daily requested amount. Not until
September 9, 12 days after landfall, did the
supply of these valuable commodities meet
the daily demand.

Mississippi volunteer agencies coordinated
much of the initial relief, but an outpouring
of help came from around the country. The
incredible volunteer force that responded to
the needs of the Gulf Coast helped to pave
the way in the recovery effort.

To match incoming donations with existing
needs, the Mississippi Commission for
Volunteer Services (MCVS) operated a

donations hotline that was staffed by
AmeriCorps team members. The Mississippi
Department of Finance and Administration,
MEMA, and MCVS managed a donations
warehouse that processed all donated goods
coming into the state. Almost 10,000 pallets
of goods were distributed.

Through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact and the Statewide
Mutual Aid Compact, more than 25,000
people from 46 states and Puerto Rico
assisted Mississippi during the recovery
process. Several states provided direct
assistance to Mississippi, in some cases
dispatching disaster medical assistance teams
or transporting supplies and commodities
straight to response agencies.

The State’s Volunteer Agencies Active in
a Disaster organization coordinated with
agencies such as the Red Cross and Salvation
Army and worked with the Mississippi
Department of Human Services to ensure
that food was available following the
storm. Faith-based organizations played
a tremendous role in recovery efforts,
particularly in feeding hurricane victims
through shelters, where some evacuees
resided until October 2005.

FEMA began taking disaster assistance
applications immediately after the storm,
setting up mobile application centers in

addition to its normal call center operations.
Nearly 520,000 Mississippi families registered
for federal assistance with more than $1.3
billion given to those residents through the
FEMA Individual Assistance program. Those
funds were used to cover disaster expenses,
such as home repair and replacement,
personal property loss, transportation
expenses, and medical and dental expenses.

Because FEMA had travel trailers in stock and
had pre-existing contracts with companies,
temporary housing was organized in record
time. At the height of this program, more
than 500 travel trailers were being set up
each day. In addition to travel trailers, FEMA
satisfied temporary housing needs by
providing rental assistance for vacant rental
properties, paying for stays in hotels and
motels, and utilizing military facilities and
cruise ships.

THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON
RECOVERY, REBUILDING AND RENEWAL

Seven days after Katrina’s landfall, Governor
Barbour established the Governor’s
Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and
Renewal (the Commission) and tabbed
Mississippian and former Netscape CEO Jim
Barksdale as its chairman.

The Governor’s directive to the Commission
was threefold: solicit the best ideas for

10FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 11FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

recovery, rebuilding and renewal from both
public and private sectors; develop a broad
vision for a better Gulf Coast and southern
Mississippi; and involve local citizens and
elected officials in the process of developing
and endorsing these ideas. Specifically,
the Commission was asked to provide
local leaders with ideas and tools to help
them envision what their region could look
like 5, 10, 20, or 30 years from now and to
recommend strategies and tools for achieving
these goals.

The Commission solicited input not only
from experts and industry-leaders in
housing, planning, and other areas, but most
importantly from the citizens of the affected
counties. Issue committees, comprised of
local stakeholders from both the public
and private sector, were formed to evaluate
challenges and identify opportunities within
specific sectors such as infrastructure, finance,
agriculture, tourism, education, health and
human services, and governmental and
nongovernmental organizations. In addition,
over 50 town hall meetings across 33 counties
were held to receive ideas and opinions on
the long-term recovery and renewal of South
Mississippi. Their input was recorded by
county and regional committees.

The committee meetings and forums
produced many valuable conclusions.
The Commission stressed that while the

process of identifying problems and
recommending solutions is important,
implementation and accountability must also
be addressed, especially in light of the failure
to institute many of the recommendations
after Hurricane Camille. Secondly, the
Commission was also guided by the belief
that local governments and citizens should
control their own destiny in rebuilding their
communities. The Commission believed
communities should have the ability to
explore many different options for rebuilding
their affected area and should accept
responsibility for key decisions.

In October 2005, the Commission, in
partnership with the Congress for New
Urbanism, held a six-day large design
charrette, the “Mississippi Renewal Forum.”
The forum is believed to be one of the
biggest charrettes ever held, as more than
200 professionals from Mississippi and around
the world worked to develop plans for more
sustainable living patterns at all income
levels. Architect and planning teams were
formed and assigned to different cities or
issue areas. They surveyed the damaged cities
and then met with city leaders to collaborate
on rebuilding ideas. Using that input, those
teams then produced strategies to rebuild
communities with pedestrian-friendly streets,
more attractive transit options, and a better
mix of commercial, office, and residential uses.

The designs and plans produced at the
Forum were printed in a pattern book and
summary report, which were then heavily
distributed throughout the Coast. Many
cities have continued working with the
architects and planners from the charrette in
the months and years after the Commission’s
work has concluded.

After thousands of hours of input from
committees and intensive research, the
Commission submitted its final report to
Governor Barbour on December 31, 2005.
The report, “After Katrina—Building Back
Better Than Ever,” offered over 240 specific
recommendations. The recommendations fell
into four broad categories:

• Infrastructure, including land use,
transportation, public services, and
housing;

• Economic development, including
tourism, small businesses, agriculture,
forestry, marine resources, and defense
and government contracting;

• Human services, including education,
health and human services, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);
and

• Other special considerations,
including finance, long-term policy
recommendations, and a roadmap to
greater accountability.

After presenting its final report on December
31, the Commission disbanded. The
work of the Commission was invaluable
for the recovery process, but its impact
went beyond designs, best practices,
and recommendations. Perhaps more
importantly, the Commission jump-started
the process of local engagement: Residents
no longer focused on what had been; instead,
local leaders and citizens focused on what
could be and the best ways to reshape their
cities and neighborhoods in a thoughtful,
comprehensive framework. Although specific
actions taken in relation to the Commission’s
guidance and recommendations will be
described later in this report, it is important
to note that the Governor’s vision in creating
the Commission was achieved largely by the
energy and momentum established in those
initial four months after Katrina.

THE GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY
AND RENEWAL

In early 2006, the Governor established an
office within his administration that reported
directly to him: the Governor’s Office of
Recovery and Renewal (GORR). Since that
time, GORR has maintained staff in Jackson
and on the Coast and has continued its
critical function of coordinating government
assistance at all levels, offering advice and
assistance to local jurisdictions, and creating
policy for recovery programs.

12FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 13FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

FEDERAL ASSISTANCE

Mississippi’s tremendous, ongoing recovery
following Hurricane Katrina would not be
possible without the strong partnership of
the federal government. FEMA and federal
partners joined the state in preparing for the
approaching storm prior to the hurricane’s
landfall, and the partnership between state
and federal response teams during the critical
hours following Hurricane Katrina had a
significant impact on our state’s recovery.
While the federal government response was
not perfect after Katrina, it did far more right
than it did wrong.

While normal disaster frameworks designed
by federal lawmakers would provide much
needed assistance to Mississippi, Governor
Barbour recognized that it would not be
enough. The unprecedented destruction
wrought by Katrina would require an
unprecedented amount of federal aid.

The Governor’s first priority following Katrina
was to develop a comprehensive recovery
plan, which he presented to the Bush
Administration and Congress beginning
November 1, 2005. Working alongside the
state’s congressional delegation – including
Senator Thad Cochran, the chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator
Trent Lott, and our entire Congressional
delegation – Governor Barbour and state

officials worked tirelessly to pass Katrina relief
legislation.

These unified efforts led to Congress passing
a comprehensive package for Katrina relief
in a supplemental appropriations bill in late
December 2005. Since that time, additional
Katrina assistance has been authorized by
Congress in subsequent supplementals
to help Mississippi continue its mission to
recover and rebuild the Gulf Coast.

One of Governor Barbour’s highest priorities
following the storm has been to ensure that
all federal resources are used efficiently while
maximizing efficacy. Toward this end, the
Barbour Administration has been extensively
involved in directing the uses of federal funds
and has helped coordinate efforts between
state and federal entities.

STAFFORD ACT

The general authority for federal disaster
support is outlined in the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(“the Stafford Act”). Generally, after a disaster
strikes, the governor of the affected state
assesses the ability of the state to respond
to the disaster with its own resources, and,
if federal resources are deemed necessary,
officially requests a disaster declaration from
the President. FEMA, in partnership with the
state, will conduct damage assessments and

evaluate whether thresholds for Stafford Act
activation are met. After those preliminary
damage assessments are completed, the
President will make the determination of
what counties may be declared eligible for
disaster assistance and for what specific
programs.

With Katrina no such process was required.
President Bush issued a major disaster
declaration for Mississippi on the day that
Katrina made landfall. The declaration
triggered Stafford Act disaster recovery
programs targeted to both individuals and
local governments affected by the disaster.

FEMA, in partnership with MEMA and other
federal agencies, has coordinated the
following disaster programs after Katrina:

Individuals and Households Program. After
a disaster, disaster victims apply for direct
assistance from FEMA through this program,
which is divided between Housing Assistance
and Other Needs Assistance. The Housing
Assistance program provides grants for repair
or replacement of damaged homes and
also temporary housing for disaster victims,
either directly or through financial means
such as rent payments. Katrina resulted in
the largest temporary housing operation in
FEMA history, as travel trailers and mobile
homes were supplied for more than 48,000
Mississippi families.

The Other Needs Assistance program
is for disaster-related expenses such as
replacement of personal property, fuel,
moving and storage expenses, medical and
dental expenses and funeral and burial costs.

Forty-nine counties were deemed eligible
for the Individuals and Households Program;
this 49 county area has since become
the eligibility standard for many disaster
programs. After the storm, applicants were
eligible for up to $26,200 under the Individual
and Households Program. More than 520,000
Mississippian households registered for
assistance and more than $1.3 billion was
provided in Individual Assistance from FEMA.

Public Assistance. FEMA’s Public Assistance
program includes both emergency work,
such as debris removal and emergency
protective measures, and permanent work,
such as the repair and rebuilding of public
facilities and infrastructure. FEMA will also
cover the losses of the contents within public
facilities. In addition to local governments
and state agencies, certain private non-
profits that serve governmental functions
may qualify for assistance.

Public Assistance Categories A-G and
amounts allocated:

• Emergency Work
• A – Debris Removal: $717 million;

more than 46 million cubic yards

14FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 15FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

of debris removed, including nearly
400,000 cubic yards of marine debris

• B – Emergency Protective Measures:
$422 million

• Permanent Work
• C – Road Systems and Bridges: $91

million
• D – Water Control Facilities: $1 million
• E – Buildings, Contents, and Equipment:

$650 million
• F – Utilities: $893 million
• G – Parks, Recreational, and Other

Facilities: $183 million
• Z – State Management Administration

Costs: $123 million

To date, a total of $3 billion has been obligated
by FEMA. One of the best indications of how
widespread Katrina’s impact was in Mississippi
is that all 82 counties were deemed eligible for
emergency work through the Public Assistance
program. All but eight counties qualified for
permanent work categories.

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. The
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
provides grants to local governments for
measures that reduce the risk of loss of life and
property from natural hazards. The federal share
of HMGP equals 7.5 percent of the total funding
allocated under the Individuals and Households
Program and the Public Assistance program,
which amounts to $433 million for Mississippi.

All counties in the state are eligible under
HMGP. The state has used these funds for a
variety of hazard mitigation measures, such
as generators, relocating buildings outside of
flood prone areas, building storm shelters and
retrofitting buildings to shelter codes.

Small Business Administration Disaster
Assistance Program. Counties declared for
the Individuals and Households Program are
eligible for disaster assistance from the Small
Business Administration (SBA). Low interest
loans totaling $2.6 billion were provided in the
following categories:

• Home Physical Disaster Loans – $2 billion
to 31,000 applicants for homeowners to
repair or replace damaged homes, and
for homeowners and renters to replace
personal property

• Business Physical Disaster Loans – $545
million to 4,350 applicants for businesses
of all sizes and private non-profit
organizations to repair or replace damaged
property and business assets

• Economic Injury Disaster Loans – $19
million to 300 applicants for working
capital for small businesses to cover normal
operating expenses

Disaster Legal Services. This program
provides disaster legal services to low-income
disaster victims to meet their disaster-related
legal needs.

Disaster Unemployment Assistance. This
program provides unemployment benefits
and re-employment services to individuals
unemployed because of a disaster and who
are not eligible for regular unemployment
benefits.

MDES administered 34,600 claims for Disaster
Unemployment Assistance.

Crisis Counseling Assistance. This program
provides crisis counseling to help relieve
grieving, stress, or mental health problems
caused by a disaster. Nearly 300,000
individuals received counseling services.

Non-Federal Match. Nearly all Stafford Act
programs require a cost-share from the state,
local governments or other non-federal
sources. Typically, a state and the entities
within a state must pay for 25 percent of costs,
and that amount may be reduced to
10 percent following a major disaster.

Recognizing the severe impact of Katrina
on the Gulf Coast region and the enormous
cost burden of cost-share for Stafford Act
recovery programs, Congress waived the non-
federal match requirement for all Stafford
Act programs except HMGP in 2007. These
programs will now be 100 percent federally-
funded.

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

While the Stafford Act has met typical post-
disaster recovery needs, the enormous
magnitude of the storm caused tremendous
impacts beyond the Act’s reach. Congress has
been very generous in filling those gaps to
ensure a full revitalization after Katrina.

These gaps were addressed by the Governor’s
comprehensive recovery request to the Bush
Administration and Congress in November
2005. Governor Barbour’s plan detailed
recovery needs beyond FEMA assistance
covered under the Stafford Act.

Mississippi Katrina Federal Funding

Supplemental Funding
Community Development Block Grant (MDA) 5,481,221,059
Federal Highway Administration Emergency Funds (MDOT) 1,033,000,000
Medicaid (MDOM) 643,668,933
K-12 Education (MDE) 323,915,248
Alternative Housing Pilot Program (MEMA) 281,318,612
Social Services Block Grant (DHS) 128,398,427
Higher Education (IHL) 114,745,515
National Emergency Grant (MDES) 95,000,000
Law Enforcement (DPS) 58,250,000
Historic Preservation (MDAH) 27,500,000
Housing Choice Vouchers (PHAs) 16,797,191

8,203,814,985

Stafford Act Funding
Public Assistance (FEMA) 3,071,184,956
National Flood Insurance Program (FEMA) 2,600,000,000
Homeowner and renter loans (SBA) 2,066,425,900
Mission Assignments (FEMA) 1,667,853,393
Individual Assistance (FEMA) 1,284,714,374
Business loans (SBA) 545,480,900
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (FEMA) 293,895,495
Comm Disaster Loans (FEMA) 270,621,714
Interoperable Communications (DHS – HMGP transfer) 140,000,000
Crisis Counseling (MDMH) 24,828,323
Working capital loans (SBA) 19,182,800

11,984,187,855

Federal Funds for Federal Activities 4,406,576,453
(includes funding for military facilities, coastal restoration,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and USDA Rural Development)

TOTAL FEDERAL FUNDING 24,594,579,293

16FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 17FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

The Governor’s recovery plan has been
largely funded by Congress, and the state’s
recovery has remained consistent with
the priorities identified in the original
2005 request. An appropriations package
passed in December 2005, Public Law 109-
148, provided over $10 billion in recovery
funds that have been the bedrock on which
the state has based recovery efforts. The
legislation provided help for housing, medical
centers, schools and colleges, highways and
bridges, employment, law enforcement,
human services, coastal restoration and other
important needs. Subsequent legislation
added more funding and changed program
requirements in tailoring to Katrina needs.
Later sections of this report will detail how
these monies have been utilized.

In the November 2005 plan, Mississippi
requested funding through the agencies
which matched the mission of the projects.
For example, $600 million was requested
for water and wastewater infrastructure
through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Environmental Protection Agency and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); $500
million for the Port of Gulfport restoration
was requested through the Department of
Transportation; $300 million was requested
for economic development through the
Department of Commerce and Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG); and

$150 million was requested for community
facilities repairs through USDA Rural
Development Community Facilities Grants.

Instead of spreading funding over multiple
agencies and creating new programs,
Congress, led by Senator Cochran, chose
to direct funding for many of Mississippi’s
requests through the Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG) program.
This option allowed maximum program
flexibility and reduced existing bureaucratic
structures in each state to manage
CDBG funds.

To ensure maximum flexibility for
states to implement their priorities for
a comprehensive recovery, Congress
included specific language requiring the
HUD Secretary to waive normal CDBG
requirements where necessary, with the

exception of requirements related to
fair housing, labor standards, and
the environment.

Congress allocated $5.4 billion to Mississippi,
which the state has used for housing,
infrastructure, and economic development
needs as identified within the Governor’s
comprehensive recovery plan. The Mississippi
Development Authority (MDA) is the state
agency responsible for administering
these funds. The Barbour Administration
has worked closely with MDA and HUD to
ensure that these funds are used efficiently
to spur housing, infrastructure and economic
development recovery.

NONPROFITS AND HISTORIC
PRESERVATION

While federal, state, and local governmental
entities are tasked with official disaster
recovery efforts, nonprofit networks,
including faith-based organizations, play
a key role in helping affected areas to
usher in complete recovery. Response
efforts following Hurricane Katrina were
no exception, as nonprofit and faith-based
organizations lent a helping hand not only
to our citizens, but to our federal and state
responders. Often times, the “no strings
attached” funding provided by these groups
enables them to reach the lowest income

households before government programs
can assist and provide an invaluable lifeline
to those families.

Uniquely, after Katrina nonprofit
organizations were helping to rebuild lives
while simultaneously rebuilding their own
offices and operations; in other words,
these organizations embodied the spirit of
Mississippians which, as Governor Barbour
has often noted, “helped others before

helping themselves.” Even though the storm
did not spare nonprofit and faith-based
facilities and infrastructure, these response
groups were amazingly resilient and did not
allow destruction to impede their efforts to
respond. The story of nonprofit rebuilding
is marked not only by repairing damaged
communities, but also by repairing the
destruction wrought upon the nonprofit
communities as well.

Community Development Block Grant

PROGRAM ALLOCATION
Homeowner Assistance 2,087,864,059
Regional Water and Wastewater 641,075,000
Ratepayer/Windpool Mitigation 440,000,000
Long Term Workforce Housing 350,000,000
Small Rental Assistance 232,500,000
Public Housing 110,000,000
Elevation Grants 70,500,000
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Assistance Fund 30,000,000
Building/Code Inspectors 9,500,000

HOUSING TOTAL 3,971,439,059

Port of Gulfport Restoration 570,000,000
Community Revitalization 295,000,000
Economic Development 247,182,000
Hancock County Long Term Recovery/Ground Zero 200,000,000
Economic Development Employee Training Facilities 20,000,000
Planning 10,000,000
Tourism 5,000,000
Fraud Investigation/Contractor Fraud 5,000,000
State Administration 157,600,000

TOTAL 5,481,221,059

18FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 19FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Historic preservation touches on many of the
important parts of what makes communities
– sense of place, culture, tourism, and
affordable housing. Mississippi was able
to secure funding for historic preservation
efforts, and the Mississippi Department of
Archives and History (MDAH) has made great
strides in restoring the historic and cultural
identity of the Gulf Coast.

THE MISSISSIPPI COMMISSION FOR
VOLUNTEER SERVICE

National service and volunteer sectors
continually have provided tremendous
housing and other services to those
struggling from the storm. To date, more
than 950,000 volunteers have been a part
of rebuilding Mississippi by contributing
over 9.5 million hours of work the past five
years totaling over $143 million in service to
Mississippi communities and residents. Many
volunteers spent weeks, months, and even
years to rebuild our state – some came as
volunteers and now call Mississippi home.

The Mississippi Commission for Volunteer
Service (MCVS) continues to partner with
nonprofit and faith-based organizations
and local and state governments to connect
unaffiliated volunteers with needs and
rebuilding projects across Mississippi.

Nonprofit and faith-based disaster response
organizations and AmeriCorps members
provided:

• 954,000 volunteers
• 10 million volunteer hours served
• $143 million value in labor
• Over $381 million in immediate

emergency financial assistance
• $850,000 in relief, medical supplies,

personal hygiene products, and
household goods

• Leveraged over $17 million in recovery
assistance for low income residents

• 4,650 homes built
• 18,800 homes rehabilitated
• Provided over 376,000 individuals with

pastoral, mental health and emotional
support services

• Completed 52,000 damage assessments
• Supported 2,412 community projects

valued at $5.5 million
• Over 15 million meals, sandwiches

and snacks served to volunteers and
displaced residents

• 208 shelters provided housing to over
284,000 people affected by Hurricane
Katrin

a

• Over 178,800 cleaning kits distributed
• Over 235,000 food boxes distributed
• Over 106,000 families received assistance

from Distribution Centers

MCVS’s Nonprofit and Faith-Based
Organization Partners:

• American Red Cross
• AmeriCorps National Service Members
• Assemblies of God Disaster Response

Mississippi
• Catholic Charities
• City Team Ministry
• God’s Pit Crew
• Gulf Coast Community Foundation
• Habitat for Humanity
• Hancock Resource Center
• Hands On Mississippi
• International Relief and Development
• Lutheran Episcopal Services in

Mississippi
• Mississippi Baptist Disaster Relief
• Mississippi Coast IDTF
• Mississippi United Methodist Disaster

Relief
• Recover Rebuild Restore Southeast

Mississippi
• The Salvation Army
• United Way

MISSISSIPPI CASE MANAGEMENT
CONSORTIUM

The Mississippi Case Management
Consortium (MCMC), a project of MCVS,
began in June 2008 to provide case
management services to households
residing in FEMA Temporary Housing Units.
The MCMC was extended in October 2009
to provide case management services to
households receiving Disaster Housing

Assistance Program assistance through
HUD. Through a consortium structure
administered by MCVS and led by the
Lutheran Episcopal Services of Mississippi,
a total of 14 nonprofit agencies worked
together to move remaining families from
temporary housing situations into long term
permanent housing solutions by focusing
on the case management processes of
assessment, planning, advocacy, linking and
monitoring.

Since becoming operational just two years
ago, the MCMC has reached out to 7,000
households throughout the state and
provided disaster case management services
that included outreach, intake, holistic
needs assessments, and the development
of short and long-term recovery plans that
focus on the unresolved needs, barriers, and
solutions to obtaining permanent housing
solutions. For many clients, the process
included assistance in navigating state and
national application and eligibility processes
that become difficult for clients to handle
independently.

The disaster case management process has
resulted in the closure of 97 percent of the
original caseload. By the fifth anniversary of
Hurricane Katrina, MCMC’s goal is to have
each of these families in a program that will
have the resources available to meet their
housing needs.

20FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 21FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Mississippi Case Management Consortium’s
Partners include:

• Lutheran Episcopal Services in Mississippi
• Hope CDA
• Waveland Citizens Fund/Katrina Relief
• Recover, Rebuild, Restore South

Mississippi
• Recovery Assistance International
• International Relief and Development
• Boat People SOS
• University of Southern Mississippi’s

Institute for Disability Studies
• Rebuilding Pearl River County Together/

Manna Ministries
• Public housing authorities (HUD)
• Long-Term Recovery Committees
• Mississippi VOAD
• Mississippi Emergency Management

Agency

• Federal Emergency Management Agency
• AmeriCorps NCCC
• Mississippi Commission for Volunteer

Service

NATIONAL SERVICE IN MISSISSIPPI

AmeriCorps NCCC (National Civilian
Community Corps) is a full-time, team-based
residential program for men and women ages
18-24. NCCC members are assigned to one
of five campuses and organized into teams
of 10-12 members. NCCC serves every state,
responding to pressing local needs that are
identified by organizations in the community.
One of the nation’s five campuses is located in
Vicksburg, MS, which had its grand opening
in September 2009.

Through an inter-agency agreement with
FEMA and arrangements with the American
Red Cross, NCCC members have responded to
every national disaster since the program was
established. Since September 2005, NCCC
members from all campuses have served
more than 2.7 million hours in the Gulf Coast
on over 1,040 relief and recovery projects.

AmeriCorps NCCC highlights and
accomplishments include a service value
estimated at $54 million. NCCC members
assisted approximately 3 million people
and leveraged over 262,000 volunteers to
refurbish over 10,500 homes and construct
over 2,000 new homes; completed nearly
55,800 damage assessments; supported
approximately 870 emergency response
centers; distributed over 6,000 tons of food;
and served 1.6 million meals. NCCC members

refurbished 450 school rooms, and over 750
NCCC Alumni have engaged in service in
the Gulf Coast.

MISSISSIPPI CENTER FOR NONPROFITS

At least 75 percent of the community and
faith based organizations doing mission
work on the Gulf Coast lost buildings,
equipment, computers, furnishings and files
for operations.

Mississippi Center for Nonprofits is the state’s
only management service center whose
purpose is to strengthen the capacity of
nonprofits. In the wake of Katrina, its mission
was even more relevant and vital. The Center
participated in the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO) Committee of the
Governor’s Commission. The Center’s role
continues to expand well beyond the
Commission’s recommendations.

South Mississippi Alliance of Service
Organizations. After several NGO Committee
meetings, the Mississippi Center for
Nonprofits continued to engage the nonprofit
sector in supporting the momentum of the
Governor’s Commission. As a result, an alliance
began emerging to address infrastructure,
partnerships, reduction of service duplication
and advocacy strategies. The South Mississippi
Alliance of Service Organizations (SMASO) is
the conduit through which all programs and

services reach Gulf Coast faith and community
based organizations. Additionally, the Alliance
identifies the most pressing issues for such
services and helps the Center conduct
planning to best serve their needs.

Operation: RISE (Rebuilding Infrastructure
in Service Organizations). The Governor’s
Commission NGO Committee identified the
need for an information infrastructure and
clearinghouse for nonprofits on the Gulf
Coast. The Center contracted with a firm to
develop a technology-driven initiative to
address this issue. Replicable throughout
the entire state, this project is a web-based
searchable database clearinghouse of Gulf
Coast nonprofits. A very user-friendly website,
www.operationrise.org, allows a resource
provider to identify organizations in a specific
county or in a specific area of focus, such as
arts and humanities or youth development.
Having such a database on the Internet allows
funders to identify groups to support based
on the needs that the organizations, have in
their profile.

Workshops and Training. The Center
provides workshops and training
opportunities throughout the state and was
able to bring its experience and knowledge
resources to focus on the Gulf Coast. Standard
workshops such as grant writing, governance
and others have been a focus for the training
programs.

22FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 23FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

The most successful projects in this arena
were grant writing blitzes, which were
quick training by a professional consultant
accompanied by grant drafting exercises. The
Center organized three blitzes that raised
more than $500,000. The Center was able
to build on this structure to provide weekly
grant writing training opportunities using a
“circuit rider” approach to reach a broader
audience. Working with the WIN Job Centers,
several hundred nonprofits and groups have
received help with their grant writing skills
and grant seeking research.

MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES
AND HISTORY

Hurricane Katrina not only inflicted the
greatest natural disaster America had ever
witnessed, but it also produced the greatest
cultural disaster in American history. Her
powerful winds and tidal surge dealt an
almost instant lethal blow to more than 300

of Mississippi’s buildings listed in the National
Register of Historic Places, forever changing
the cultural landscape of the Mississippi
Gulf Coast.

Among the
Mississippi Gulf
Coast’s well-
known historic
landmarks that
were completely
destroyed
were the circa
1800 French
and Spanish
Creole mansions known as Elmwood Manor
and the Old Spanish Custom House; the
mid-nineteenth-century Greek Revival
mansions Grass Lawn and Tullis-Toledano
Manor; the late-Victorian cottages known
as the Brielmaier House and the Fisherman’s
Cottage; much of the early twentieth-century
artist compound Shearwater Pottery, atelier
of the renowned Anderson family; and much
of the Scenic Drive Historic District in Pass
Christian, often referred to as the “Newport
of the South” for its once magnificent
collection of vacation “cottages” of wealthy
Southern families. These great houses that
lined Mississippi’s Gulf Coast were works of
architectural art. Seldom have structures
more harmoniously or successfully blended
architectural aesthetics with practical climatic
needs as was illustrated in these buildings.

Museums and libraries were also hard hit.
Only the chimney remained of the once
charming Pleasant Reed House Museum, the
restored 1880s cottage of Biloxi carpenter
and African-American leader Pleasant Reed.
Only the roof and a few scant sections of walls
survived from the Mission-Style former Coast
Guard cadet barracks that for many years
housed Biloxi’s popular Maritime and Seafood
Industry Museum. Scarcely a trace remained
of Pass Christian’s old public library, a virtual
time capsule from the turn of the 20th century,
which was under restoration when Katrina hit.

Although many of the best-known historic
buildings were destroyed, many more
survived, even if damaged. Beauvoir, the
retirement estate of former Confederate
President Jefferson Davis, is a National Historic
Landmark and the single most significant
historic structure severely damaged by
Katrina. Beauvoir’s distinctive design and
sturdy construction permitted it to withstand
a tidal surge of more than twenty feet that
swept through the site. Although the house
sustained extensive damage from the impact
of such an enormous storm surge, its “raised
cottage” construction technique allowed
the main body of the building to survive in
relatively sound condition, with portraits
still on the walls of the interior where the
Davis family had hung them more than a
century ago.

It was not only the Gulf Coast that was hit
hard by Katrina. The hurricane was still at
Category 1 status when it roared through
central Mississippi. Historic downtowns
and residential neighborhoods in cities like
Hattiesburg, Columbia, Picayune, Laurel,
Meridian, and Jackson suffered extensive
damage. The damage was so extensive to
Mississippi’s Old Capitol building, a National
Historic Landmark and home of the state’s
historical museum, that the museum was
closed until early 2009 while efforts were
underway to restore the structure and
conserve damaged artifact collections.

Within days of Katrina, the MDAH fielded
teams to document the extent of damage
to historic buildings and to help local
governments, libraries, and museums salvage
their documents and collections. Within a
month, the Historic Preservation Division had
documented more than 1,200 damaged, but
surviving, historic properties scattered across
80 miles of coastline.

At the same time, MDAH partnered with
the Mississippi Heritage Trust, the National
Trust for Historic Preservation, the Heritage
Emergency National Task Force, the
Association for Preservation Technology,
the National Conference of State Historic
Preservation Officers, and the World
Monuments Fund to recruit volunteer
architects, engineers and preservation

24FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 25FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

specialists to assess damaged historic
properties to see if rehabilitation were feasible.
By May 2006, volunteer teams, working out of
a rented 1920 Bungalow in downtown Biloxi,
had completed detailed reports on hundreds
of damaged historic structures. The reports
provided property owners with accurate
evaluations of the condition of their historic
buildings and guidance on how or whether to
proceed with rehabilitation. The reports saved
many historic structures from demolition, since
many property owners had previously thought
their damaged buildings were not salvageable.

The most significant boost
to preservation came in
June 2006, when Congress
appropriated $40 million for
rehabilitation of hurricane-
damaged historic properties in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi and an additional
$3 million to assist the states with the added
administrative workload in processing Section

106, National Historic Preservation Act reviews
necessitated by the various Katrina recovery
programs.

MDAH was allocated $24.7 million and
established the Mississippi Hurricane Relief
Grant for Historic Preservation to assist citizens
and communities committed to preserving
and rehabilitating hurricane damaged historic
buildings and sites significant in defining
the unique character and heritage of those
communities. MDAH has expended most of
the grant funds to rehabilitate owner-occupied
houses listed on or eligible for the National
Register of Historic Places, and the program
has generated hundreds of affordable housing
units.

The program has also been used to preserve
and restore public and institutional landmarks
that are icons of a community’s history.

Program funds have been
leveraged with FEMA,
CDBG, and other private
and public sources to
rehabilitate and rebuild
historic places, including:
• Beauvoir
• Waveland Civic Center,

formerly the Old Waveland School
• Bay St. Louis Little Theatre, which relocated

to a historic building
• Historic Carnegie Library in

Gulfport

• Randolph School in

Pass Christian

• Old Hattiesburg High School
• Gulfport City Hall
• Hancock County Courthouse
• 100 Man Association Building in Bay St.

Louis
• Magnolia State Supply Co. in Bay St.

Louis
• The Old Capitol Building in Jackson

MDAH’s Hurricane Relief Grant Program
for Historic Preservation has helped south
Mississippi communities preserve their local
landmarks and special sense of place that
gives the region its unique cultural identity.

The distinctive sense of place manifested in
Mississippi’s towns is a very important aspect
of the state’s heritage tourism industry.
Studies show that Mississippi’s history
and unique culture is the state’s primary
attraction for out-of-state visitors. Much of
what is identifiable as coastal Mississippi’s
historic environment was damaged by
Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing clean up
efforts. The restoration of that sense of place,
for residents and visitors alike, is a primary
benefit of the MDAH Program.

Mississippi faced a staggering task in
attempting to rehabilitate the historic
buildings that survived Hurricane Katrina
and in recapturing the sense of place that
existed in its historic communities prior
to August 29, 2005. Our state has produced

a remarkably rich and varied culture, the
story of which is visually told through
our preserved historic buildings and
archaeological sites. These historic resources
are not only important in helping our
citizens understand their history; they are
also significant “economic magnets”
that attract many visitors and investors to
our state.

HOUSING

What began as the biggest challenge
following Hurricane Katrina became
the lynchpin of Governor Barbour’s
comprehensive recovery efforts: the
restoration of housing in South Mississippi
and the Gulf Coast. The massive amount
of Katrina damage inflicted on homes left
hundreds of thousands of Mississippians
without a place to live. Collaborating with
state, federal, nonprofit and private partners,
the Governor developed a comprehensive
recovery plan to solve the housing crisis that
was put into place almost immediately after
the storm.

MDAH Hurricane Recovery Grants for Historic Preservation

Projects Projects
Awarded Awarded Completed

Hancock County 5,589,200 82 72

Harrison County 10,828,584 121 94

Jackson County 6,072,531 43 32

Other Counties 2,234,686 17

11

Total 24,725,000 263 209

26FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 27FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Five years later, the Governor’s housing vision
has achieved remarkable results. Housing
data show the Coast’s housing stock will be
fully replenished once the few remaining
state housing projects are complete in mid-
2011. However, since 2009 the number of
online housing units has corresponded to
the population of the coastal region. In
other words, the supply of housing has been
sufficient to meet the demand.

A clear indicator of the state’s housing
progress is evidenced by the low occupancy
of FEMA temporary housing, which became
one of the most recognizable symbols of
the disaster as more than 100,000
Mississippians called these units home
following the hurricane.

In mid-2010, the number of occupied FEMA
temporary housing units has dwindled to less
than 180 statewide, with fewer than 100 on
the Coast. Those that remain represent very
difficult circumstances, but a recovery plan
has been formed for each and the state has
combined several resources to get them
out soon.

Achieving such a successful housing recovery
has not been easy. The state has used
innovative approaches that were, in many
cases, marked by first-of-its-kind housing
programs. As a result, the state had to create
many processes from the ground up, reacting

to unforeseen problems and adjusting
accordingly. Adding to the complexity was
the sheer scale of the programs: never before
has any state had to restore housing stock at
this level.

The Homeowner Assistance Program
is an example of the state’s innovative
approach, which was predicated on the
Governor’s initial request to Congress: the
unprecedented aspect of Katrina and the
reason supplemental funding was necessary
was the damage wrought by the tremendous
storm surge. The Governor argued that some
flooded residents had relied on the federal
government’s determination that their
homes did not require flood insurance, and
the federal government should compensate
these homeowners for the mistake.

Congress allocated the funding on the
condition that the grant program only
compensate for flood damage and that those
homes be mitigated so that federal assistance
was never again required.

The Homeowner Assistance Program has
since become the cornerstone of the state’s
housing recovery plan, providing grants
to more than 28,000 homeowners. The
Governor has kept his promise as well – every
home rebuilt under the program must utilize
the highest building codes and elevation
requirements available. Furthermore, flood

insurance covenants are tied to all properties,
ensuring that those property owners will
never again experience an uncompensated
loss due to hurricane damage.

Mitigation has been a major theme
throughout all state housing programs. The
state has ensured that all new housing is built
to withstand future storms, going beyond
locally-adopted building codes and elevation
requirements in many instances.

The Mississippi Alternative Housing Program
is another first-of-its-kind approach for
disaster housing. The Governor took the
Katrina Cottage design from the Governor’s
Commission charrettes, and has formulated
a program that not only removed thousands
from cramped conditions in travel trailers,
but is also providing an affordable permanent
housing solution for low income households.
For many of these families, the Mississippi
Cottage is among the highest quality living
units in which they have ever resided.

These two initiatives, in combination with
many other housing programs, have not
just resulted in a comprehensive housing
recovery that has not only addressed supply
and affordability, but also replaced housing
in a manner that was better than before.

With housing stocks back to normal, the
Coast’s main housing problem is now

wind insurance. Before Katrina, the state-
sponsored Wind Pool had 16,000 policies;
it now has 45,000 policies in effect. This has
created a situation that is not sustainable for
both the state and policyholders.

The Governor’s Office and Mississippi
Insurance Department have worked to infuse
state monies into the Wind Pool to keep rates
as low as possible in the near term. The state
will remain committed to addressing the
problem in the long-term, with help from the
federal government and the private sector.

HOUSING DAMAGE

Katrina’s storm surge and strong winds
destroyed tens of thousands of homes in
Mississippi, and left more than 200,000
with some degree of damage. Hundreds of
thousands of Mississippians were displaced
from their homes.

HUD estimates released in early 2006
provide the most reliable approximation of
housing damage. According to HUD, 61,386
housing units (defined to include both
owner-occupied and rental dwellings) were

HUD Housing Damage Estimates

Minor Major/Destroyed Total

Hancock County 3,406 11,786 15,192

Harrison County 24,187 24,430 48,617

Jackson County 14,203 16,296 30,499

Three County Total 41,796 52,512 94,3

08

Mississippi 158,998 61,386 220,384

28FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 29FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

severely damaged or destroyed in Mississippi,
including 52,512 in the three coastal counties.
The report estimated 220,384 housing units
received some level of damage throughout
the state.

TEMPORARY HOUSING

The massive destruction of housing
left more than 100,000 Mississippians
homeless. Temporary options such as
hotels, apartments, and condominiums
were obliterated by the storm, leaving
displaced residents with few options for
accommodations while FEMA began
organizing temporary housing operations.
Many migrated northward in Mississippi and
other areas to stay in shelters and hotels or
with friends and family. Others stayed in tents
near their homes.

The ensuing FEMA temporary housing
mission became the largest and fastest
deployment of travel trailers and mobile
homes in FEMA history. To expedite
operations, FEMA utilized in-stock travel
trailers as well as built on pre-existing
contracts with companies to provide
temporary housing units. The massive
amount of debris and complicated nature
of procuring and transporting units,
identifying and inspecting suitable sites, and
coordinating with victims in need caused
initial deployment to move slowly. Once

operations began running at maximum
efficiency, more than 500 travel trailers were
placed each day.

By January 1, 2006, there were 34,000 units
in operation. That number increased to
38,000 in May 2006 before beginning a
steady decline as housing stock began to be
replenished. Collectively, more than 45,000
temporary housing units were occupied in
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina.

Five years later, the number of FEMA travel
trailers and mobile homes occupied is fewer
than 180, with less than 100 in the lower
three coastal counties. The Mississippi Case
Management Consortium, in partnership
with the Governor’s Office, MDA, and MEMA,
continues ongoing case management with
individuals remaining in travel trailers and
mobile homes and has developed a housing
recovery plan for each. The Gulf Coast
Community Foundation has committed more
than $1 million to help some families repair

their homes and move out of temporary
housing, and others are being guided
through the Mississippi Cottage and housing
choice voucher processes.

MISSISSIPPI ALTERNATIVE HOUSING
PROGRAM

Given the severe destruction of housing,
Governor Barbour recognized that a lengthy
period of time would be needed to restore
the housing stock and that travel trailers
would not provide suitable accommodations
in the long-term. While the units can be
transported and installed quickly, they offer
inadequate living conditions because
they are meant to be lived in for months,
not years.

Immediately after Hurricane Katrina,
Mississippi led the movement to find a more
suitable replacement for travel trailers. The
first alternative housing designs were created
at the Mississippi Renewal Forum convened
by the Governor’s Commission on Recovery,
Rebuilding and Renewal. Architects gathered
at the Forum designed the first “Katrina
Cottage.” The Katrina Cottage concept would
generate substantial interest and media
attention from around the country.

The state actively pursued the issue of
replacing travel trailers with cottages. In June
2006, U.S. Senator Thad Cochran successfully

secured $400 million for Katrina-ravaged
states to support alternative temporary
housing solutions. The legislation created
the FEMA Alternative Housing Pilot Program,
with the goal to design a superior disaster
housing unit that could be delivered quickly
and inexpensively.

Mississippi was awarded $281 million
after its proposals were ranked the
highest in a competition between the five
states (Louisiana, Alabama, Florida and
Texas). Governor Barbour gave MEMA the
responsibility of managing the program.

In creating its alternative housing designs,
the Governor’s Office collaborated with an
expert team of architects and organizations,
including the Oak Ridge National Laboratory;
the College of Architecture, Art and Design
at Mississippi State University; the Federation
of American Scientists; and the architectural
firm Looney Ricks Kiss.

The units came in three models – the one-
bedroom Park Model and the two- and three-
bedroom Mississippi Cottages. Designed to
be safer, more durable, more comfortable,
and more aesthetically pleasing than FEMA
temporary housing, all units offered a front
porch and larger bathroom and living areas,
and were designed to reflect traditional
Gulf Coast architecture. Built to the highest
standards of the International Residential

Au
g–

05

Fe
b–

06

Au
g–
06
Fe
b–

07

Au
g–
07
Fe
b–
08
Au
g–
08
Fe
b–

09

40000

3

5000

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000

5000

FEMA Temporary Housing (occupied)

30FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 31FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Code and HUD Code, these units have a
dual certification that allow them to be set
anywhere in the country and moved from place
to place.

The first Park Model was occupied in June
2007. FEMA temporary housing occupants
in Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, and Pearl
River counties were eligible to move into the
cottages. At the height of the program more
than 2,800 units were occupied.

By 2009, MEMA was working with occupants
to transition the units from temporary to
permanent housing. The state also began
donating cottages to private nonprofit groups
to create Mississippi Cottage developments
to fill a need for those still in need of affordable
housing.

As of July 2010, 500 units had been sold to
their occupants as permanent housing; only
950 units remain occupied with many of those
occupants working towards purchasing their
cottage. Qualified residents were offered a
purchase price based upon their income.
Cottages were also made available to the
general public through an auction held in June.
Nearly 350 one-bedroom cottages were sold in
the one day event. All proceeds received from
the sale of units are distributed back into the
program to help fund additional permanent
installations and program management costs.
On April 24, 2010 an EF4 tornado tracked

through the central part of the state, killing
five people and leaving hundreds homeless.
Governor Barbour integrated Mississippi
Cottages in replacing tornado-ravaged homes
as permanent housing. Less than three weeks
after the storm hit, the first resident moved
into a Mississippi Cottage in Yazoo City. More
than 40 households will receive a Mississippi
Cottage as their permanent home following
this devastating storm system.

MISSISSIPPI HOUSING DATA PROJECT

In 2008, Governor Barbour requested a
detailed housing recovery assessment to help
guide housing policy. The Compass Group,
LLC and Southern Mississippi Planning and
Development District were chosen through a
procurement process to provide an ongoing
comprehensive analysis of current and future
housing recovery. This study has informed
program funding decisions and directed
Administration housing recovery efforts.

Southern Mississippi Planning and
Development District (SMPDD), which is
primarily responsible for data collection
and mapping, is a nonprofit organization
that works with local governments in the 15
southern Mississippi counties in the areas
of planning, geographic information and
mapping, workforce development, services for
the elderly and disabled, and child care. The
Compass Group, LLC (Compass), which focuses

on data coordination and analysis, is a small
business that advises state and federal clients
on affordable housing policy, finance and
operational issues.

The data project team began by collecting
data, including: FEMA assessment of damage,
SBA assessment of damage, various studies
of local housing conditions, MDA and
Mississippi Home Corporation program
funding awards, local building permit and
land roll (i.e., real estate tax) data, Census and
related data, U.S. Postal Service data on active
mailing addresses, Public School enrollment
data, and data on insurance costs.

In October 2008, Compass and SMPDD
produced an integrated database containing
key data on all aspects of the housing
recovery in the three coastal counties, mostly
at a home-by-home level. Housing Stock
Estimates were produced using this database.

The data project team has focused efforts
on the recovery status and housing needs
of the elderly and disabled populations,
the recovery status and housing needs of
households occupying FEMA temporary
housing and Mississippi Cottages, and on
the needs among low and moderate income
households in general.

The National Association of Development
Organizations honored the work of SMPDD

and Compass with a 2009 Innovation Award,
which recognizes regional development
organizations and partnering organizations
for improving the economic and community
competitiveness of our nation’s regions and
local communities.

HOUSING RECOVERY

The housing study helped the state
determine the relationship between its
own housing recovery programs and
rebuilding occurring through private efforts.
That interrelation was key in housing
program policy decisions concerning
housing production and targeting unmet
housing needs.

The housing study revealed that state
housing programs, in combination with
private and nonprofit rebuilding, would
return the Coast to pre-Katrina housing levels
by 2011. When compared to population
estimates, it became even clearer that
housing supply would be more than
adequate to meet demand.

Housing Stock and Population Estimates Lower Three Counties

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%
Sept 2005 Mid 2008 Mid 2009 Mid 2010 Mid 2011

Pre Katrina

Pre Katrina

32FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 33FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

According to the housing stock estimates
produced through the study, population
recovery outstripped permanent housing
recovery through mid-2009, necessitating
the prolonged use of temporary housing. In
mid-2010, the supply of permanent housing
caught up to the population, and with many
housing units now under construction, the
mid-2011 housing supply is estimated to be
100 percent of pre-Katrina totals compared to
96.2 percent of pre-Katrina population.

Mississippi has designed housing production
programs to fill gaps not met by traditional
disaster housing recovery resources – such as
insurance, FEMA grants, and SBA loans.

HOMEOWNER PROGRAMS

Homeowner Assistance Program – Phase
I (CDBG). In his initial funding request
presented to Congress, Governor Barbour
identified the largest gap not served by
disaster resources – flood-damaged homes
located outside the federally-delineated
flood boundaries. The Governor explained
to Congress that the truly unprecedented
aspect about Katrina was not its wind speeds,
which were Category 3 strength at landfall,

but the gigantic storm surge that measured
nearly 30 feet in some areas and pushed its
way miles across the shoreline.

Most homeowners whose homes flooded did
not have flood insurance because they were
located far enough away from the coastline
and inland waterways that flood insurance
was not recommended by the federal
government. Approximately 17,000 did; in
Mississippi, the National Flood Insurance
Program paid out $2.4 billion in flood claims.
However, more than 20,000 homeowners
who maintained wind insurance, but were
told they did not require flood insurance,
were left uncompensated after the storm.

When Mississippi was allocated $5.4 billion in
CDBG, the Homeowner Assistance Program,
which was designed to compensate these
homeowners, became the cornerstone of
Mississippi’s housing recovery plan. This
program was created to assist homeowners
who made responsible insurance decisions,
yet still suffered uncompensated losses.
These homeowners relied to their detriment
on the federal government’s determination
that their homes did not need NFIP coverage.

This compensation program targeted
homeowners outside the established flood
zones who suffered flood damage to their
primary residence from Hurricane Katrina.
Its purpose was to provide one-time grant

payments up to a maximum of $150,000.
To be eligible, homeowners located outside
the 100-year flood plain in the counties of
Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, or Pearl River
must have owned and occupied their primary
residence on August 29, 2005, maintained
homeowners insurance on the property, and
received flood surge damage.

To mitigate future risk, each homeowner
agreed to place covenants on the property
to ensure that any necessary rebuilding or
repairs would be made in accordance with
new building codes and local ordinances;
that during rebuilding, the home would
be elevated in accordance with FEMA
advisory flood elevations; and that the
homeowner and successors in title would
obtain and maintain flood insurance. The
latter requirement, that flood insurance be
tied to the property in perpetuity, will ensure
that those homes will never again need
governmental assistance.

Homeowner Assistance Program – Phase
II (CDBG). Immediately after releasing the

Homeowner Assistance Program, MDA, with
HUD’s assistance, began designing a second
phase of the program that would assist
homeowners not eligible under the first
phase. Phase II of the Homeowner Assistance
Program differs from the first phase in three
major respects: applicants were not required
to have carried homeowners insurance,
applicants’ homes could have been located
inside or outside the floodplain, and eligibility
was limited to those with incomes of 120
percent Area Median Income or below.

Phase II targeted low-to-moderate
homeowners, either in or out of the flood
zone, who suffered flood damage from the
hurricane, and who had uncompensated
losses due to insufficient insurance. Its
purpose was to provide grants up to a
maximum of $100,000, or if combined
with Phase I proceeds, up to a maximum
of $150,000. As in Phase I, to be eligible,
homeowners must have owned and occupied
their primary residence located in the
counties of Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, or
Pearl River on August 29, 2005, and received
flood surge damage.

The Homeowner Assistance Program was
implemented with an unprecedented level
of accountability and transparency. The HUD
Office of Inspector General has performed
audits on the program, and has praised the
implementation of sound controls by MDA.

Traditional Disaster Recovery Resources

Insurance Payments $ 12,000,000,000

FEMA Individual Assistance $ 1,300,000,000

SBA Homeowner Disaster Loans $ 2,000,000,000

HUD Damage Estimates Homeowner Major and Severe Damage

30,000

2

5,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
Hancock Harrison Jackson Three Counties

Flood Damage
Wind Damage

34FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 35FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Elevation Grant Program (CDBG).
The Elevation Grant Program provides
supplemental funding to Homeowner
Assistance Program grants. This program
targets those homeowners who have
already received funds for a Homeowners
Assistance Program Phase I or Phase II
grant, and is used for the specific purpose
of defraying the added cost of elevating the
applicant’s primary residence in accordance
with higher flood elevations. Eligible
applicants must be located in a flood plain,
and are required to elevate to a level at or
above the current levels required by FEMA.
The maximum grant amount is $30,000,
payable upon issuance of the building permit
and following successful completion of a
multi-step environmental review.

As of mid-August 2010, 2,285 applications
have been approved totaling $68.5 million,
and 932 grants have been paid totaling
$23.9 million.

Long Term Workforce Housing Program
(CDBG). The Long Term Workforce (LTW)
Housing Program is designed to incentivize
rental and homeowner housing construction
for the workforce, defined as households

at or below 120 percent Area Median Income.
The program has a diverse set of project
types, ranging from homeowner and rental
construction to mortgage assistance to
homeowner repair. Those projects target
varying incomes as well, serving those
in the middle class to those with severely
low incomes.

In soliciting affordable housing proposals,
MDA encouraged developers to leverage
requested CDBG dollars with other sources
of private and public housing financing. As a
result, the total investment in LTW housing
projects is more than double the amount
of CDBG committed by the state. The 32
projects awarded represent more than 5,000
proposed units.

The LTW homeowner recovery strategy
dealt not only with rehabilitation of existing
housing and new construction, but also on
making existing market rate homes more
affordable for purchase. The cost of new
construction and higher insurance rates
resulted in prices that were not affordable to
many homeowners.

To bridge this gap for homeowners and make
homebuying affordable to renters, the state
provided $76 million for five homebuyer
assistance programs through LTW, most
notably the Renaissance Corporation My
Home, My Coast and REACH programs. These

programs provided low cost mortgages and
downpayment assistance for homebuyers
to purchase more than 1,000 houses on the
open market.

Mortgage Revenue Bond Program (GO
Zone). The Mississippi Home Corporation
offered the Mortgage Revenue Bond Program
before Katrina to provide low-interest
mortgages to first-time homebuyers and
assistance with closing costs equal to three
percent of the mortgage amount. The Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act widened eligibility for
those in hurricane-affected areas by waiving
the first-time buyer requirement and placing
higher limits on buyer’s income and the
purchase price of the home.

The program has allowed many residents
who would not be eligible for a conventional
loan to become homeowners. Under this
increased flexibility, 2,213 homebuyers,
representing $267 million in loan volume,
have qualified for the low-interest mortgages.
In the lower three counties, 1,331 loans
were issued.

Mississippi Alternative Housing Program.
As described earlier, MEMA has transitioned
Mississippi Cottages from temporary
accommodations to permanent housing.
As of July 2010, 500 units had been placed
permanently; an estimated 1,400 units will
be placed as permanent housing. Mississippi

Cottages have provided an attractive,
affordable homeowner solution for low
income residents.

USDA Rural Development. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA) has several
rural housing programs that address single-
family housing in towns with a population
of 25,000 or less. Congress increased USDA
rural development funding capacity in
Katrina-affected areas, allowing its grant
and direct and guarantee loan programs to
help displaced families repair their homes or
purchase replacement housing. USDA Rural
Development has directly loaned more than
$8 million and has guaranteed loans of more
than $100 million for nearly 1,000 families, in
addition to providing funds to repair more
than 100 homes.

Social Services Block Grants. The Mississippi
Department of Human Services allocated $8
million to its Division of Community Services
for rebuilding homes. Services rendered
included not only housing repair, but also
septic and water line repairs, replacement
of furniture, appliances, and personal items,
debris removal, and short-term rent. More
than 1,100 homes were repaired or rebuilt
through this program.
Modular Housing Tax Reduction. Governor
Barbour called a Special Session of the
Mississippi Legislature in October 2006 to ask
lawmakers to reduce the cost of new modular

Homeowner Assistance Program

Eligible Applications Amount Awarded

HAP Phase I 21,379 $1,534,728,683.06

HAP Phase II 6,369 $468,707,770.

43

Total 27,748 $2,003,436,453.49

36FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 37FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

home construction on the Coast. As a result of
the session, the state’s tax on modular homes
was reduced from seven percent to three
percent. The measure saved homeowners
$4,000 to $6,000 per modular home purchase.

RENTAL PROGRAMS

Public Housing Program (CDBG). Rebuilding
public housing has been a crucial element in
the state’s housing plan because of its role in
serving the lowest income residents. Coastal
Public Housing Authorities (PHAs) sustained
major damage to their housing stocks – more
than 1,600 of 1,981 public housing units were
damaged or destroyed.

The Public Housing Program provided
$106 million to the four coastal PHAs (Bay/
Waveland, Long Beach, Biloxi, and Mississippi
Regional Housing Authority No. VIII) to rebuild
their housing stocks.

PHAs have leveraged CDBG, Low Income
Housing Tax Credits, and other funding to
grow their housing inventories, and when
final projects are complete, PHAs will have
1,000 more housing units under their control.
Before Katrina, PHAs managed 1,981 units;
after construction is complete on remaining
projects, 3,114 units will be online. CDBG
Public Housing program funds alone will
account for construction of more than 2,000
units, of which 1,300 are currently in service.

Small Rental Program (CDBG). The Small
Rental Assistance Program (SRAP), allocated
$232.5 million, is a forgivable loan program
that assists owners of small rental properties
in Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, and Pearl River
counties. Project applicants, which include
individuals, non-profit groups, corporations,
and partnerships, receive forgivable loans for
restoration or construction of rental properties
consisting of less than four units. Once the few
remaining projects are complete, SRAP will
account for 4,000 new rental units. More than
3,800 units are now in service.

In return for forgivable loans up to $30,000,
small rental landlords are required to rent
to low and moderate income households at
affordable rents: fifty-one percent of units to
households with incomes below 80 percent
of Area Median Income, and the remainder to
households at or below 120 percent of Area
Median Income. Applicants are required to
meet program terms for a period of five years.

This initiative has been very important in
rebuilding affordable housing for low and very
low income residents. Program reports reveal
that SRAP tenants are typically low income;
more than half have incomes less than
$20,000, and approximately 75 percent have
incomes below $30,000.

A third round of the program, the
Neighborhood Rental Restoration Program

(NRRP), was launched in 2009. NRRP varied
from the regular program by limiting eligible
activities to repair and rehabilitation of
blighted properties, restricting eligible
tenants to very low income households
at or below 50 percent of Area Median
Income, and requiring a ten-year affordability
compliance period. In this way the program
served two goals, bringing debilitated
housing back into operation
and offering deep affordability to very low
income renters.

Through NRRP, an estimated 700 deeply
affordable rental homes will be rehabilitated
or rebuilt in existing neighborhoods south
of Interstate 10 in Hancock, Harrison and
Jackson Counties.  Applicants received
forgivable loans ranging from $50,000 for
one bedroom homes to $70,000 for three
bedroom and more homes. Rental rates range
from $337 to $557 per month depending
upon the number of bedrooms and the
location of the home.

Long Term Workforce Housing Program
(CDBG). As mentioned previously, LTW
funds both homeowner and rental housing
projects. In addition to providing a leveraged
funding source for 750 new rental units, two
senior housing projects will provide more
than 300 rental units designed for elderly
living.

Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program
(GO Zone). The Low Income Housing Tax
Credit program (LIHTC) incentivizes the
development of high-quality apartments
by providing investors with federal income
tax credits. In return, units must remain
affordable to households at or below 60
percent of Area Median Income. The Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act (GO Zone) authorized
the Mississippi Home Corporation (MHC) to
allocate approximately $35 million LIHTC
annually in 2006, 2007, and 2008. At Governor
Barbour’s request, MHC awarded most of
the credits to the lower six counties and
encouraged mixed income developments.

MHC allocated $106 million in credits to 99
developments throughout the GO Zone
representing more than 9,200 housing units.
In the three lower counties, LIHTC awards
account for 5,000 low income apartment
units.

Tax Credit Assistance Fund (CDBG). As
a result of the economic depression and
tightening credit markets, the pricing of tax
credits changed, causing some Low Income
Housing Tax Credit projects to become
under-funded. Recognizing this effect on
affordable housing, the state budgeted $30
million in CDBG funds to cover project gaps,
enabling troubled projects to move forward.
Ten projects were approved for funding
representing 922 units.

38FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 39FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Vouchers (HUD). After Katrina, the scarcity
of rental housing caused rental rates to
rise. Even as rental stock returned, market
rents remained higher due to the costs of
new construction and the realities of higher
insurance costs.

To help very low income renters afford the
higher costs of living, Governor Barbour
asked Congress for 5,000 housing vouchers
for the Coast. Vouchers are available to
households with very limited incomes to pay
the cost difference between market rents and
what the renter can afford.

The Governor made the request in late 2009,
and Senator Thad Cochran and Mississippi’s
Congressional delegation were successful in
adding $30 million to an existing $50 million
appropriation for Section 8 Housing Choice
Vouchers.

As a result of that appropriation, HUD
allocated 2,930 new vouchers to Mississippi
PHAs. Households in FEMA temporary
housing units and Mississippi Cottages
were given first preference for eligibility.
MCMC and MEMA subsequently informed
the residents of those units of the availability
of vouchers and helped them apply if they
chose to do so. Other low income households
were eligible to apply for the remaining
vouchers.

INSURANCE

From the time Hurricane Katrina made
landfall, the Mississippi Insurance
Department (MID) actively responded
to serve the consumers of the state.
Immediately following the storm and for
months thereafter, the fire services arms
of the Mississippi Insurance Department
diligently responded to assist victims of
the storm.

In the first month following Hurricane
Katrina, MID staff worked extended hours,
taking over 11,000 calls and 1,500 complaints.
A year after the storm the department was
still averaging approximately 1,000 calls a
week. MID staffed Disaster Recovery Centers
on the Coast to answer insurance questions
and distributed nearly 15,000 flyers with
additional insurance company contact
information.

To assist consumers in facilitating claims and
claims payments the Department issued over
a dozen bulletins to insurance companies
to help expedite hurricane response efforts
relating to the insurance claims process.

The effects of Hurricane Katrina rippled
through the insurance industry and
highlighted the need for reform of many of
the state’s insurance regulations. Changes

sought by the Department of Insurance
resulted in regulatory insurance reform
as well as legislative changes. Legislative
changes include more stringent building
code requirements for coastal counties;
authorizing an alternative dispute resolution
for personal lines insurance claims; temporary
state support for the coastal insurer of last
resort, the Wind Pool; and other legislative
initiatives.

The Insurance Department’s Hurricane
Katrina Mediation program, which began
in mediation conferences in 2006, has
maintained a consistent average settlement
success rate of over 80 percent among the
thousands who requested mediation through
the program. The success of this program
resulted in MID being asked to design a pilot
program for hurricane insurance cases to help
alleviate court docket backlogs and lengthy
delays, which was ultimately implemented in
the federal courthouse in Gulfport. The pilot
program resulted in 17 of the 21 selected
cases being mediated and seven settling for a
41 percent success rate. The Hurricane Katrina
Mediation program has handled nearly 5,500
cases and maintained an over 80 percent
settlement rate. The federally-ordered
program has handled over 450 cases with a
settlement rate over 50 percent.

By October 2006, insurance companies
reported that approximately 98 percent of

their Hurricane Katrina claims were settled,
closed or paid. Final reporting figures showed
that statewide there were 486,913 total
claims filed (included those from insurance
companies, Mississippi Residential Property
Insurance Underwriting Association,
Mississippi Windstorm Underwriting
Association, and the National Flood Insurance
Program). Statewide claim payments totaled
$11,947,234,377. Of those claims reported,
263,744 were filed in the six coastal counties
of George, Pearl River, Stone, Hancock,
Harrison and Jackson with total payments of
$8,748,438,501.

In addition to those reported claims figures,
an early 2007 agreement was reached
between the MID and State Farm wherein
the insurance company agreed to reopen
and re-examine approximately 35,000
Hurricane Katrina claims on the Mississippi
Gulf Coast. A similar agreement was reached
with Nationwide Insurance in the spring of
2007. These efforts resulted in Mississippi
policyholders receiving more than $110
million in additional claims payments.

In 2008, newly-elected Insurance
Commissioner Mike Chaney created
an Insurance Department office on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast to assist coastal
residents with insurance issues. In the spring
of 2008, MID hosted a Coastal Insurance
Forum to discuss insurance issues that

40FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 41FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

continued to plague the Gulf Region and
explore possible solutions. The Department
has recognized that coastal insurance issues
were not confined within Mississippi’s
borders and that solutions would be found
by working with similar states facing the
same problems. Toward this end, MID later
sponsored a larger conference in the summer
of 2009 which brought together, among
others, the Insurance Commissioners of four
coastal states.

To help offset the large rate increases
requested by the Mississippi Windstorm
Underwriting Association (Wind Pool), MID
and Governor Barbour collaborated on a
plan to use federal grant funds to subsidize
the Wind Pool. In 2006, this subsidy plan was
approved and the infusion of $30 million
in CDBG allowed the Wind Pool to reduce a
proposed 397 percent rate increase to only
90 percent for homeowners.

An additional $30 million grant was approved
by Governor Barbour and HUD in 2007
to offset high commercial wind pool rate
increases. This resulted in commercial wind
rates being reduced from an over 200 percent
increase to 142 percent.

This was just the first in a series of funds
given to the Wind Pool to offset rising re-
insurance costs. Since 2006 through the
beginning of fiscal year 2011 on July 1, 2010,

the Wind Pool has received a combined total
of nearly $180 million. The breakdown:

• 2006 – $30 million from CDBG (the total
$50 million approved was divided into
a $30 million payment in 2006 and $20
million in 2007)

• 2007 – $30 million from CDBG for
commercial

• 2007 – Additional $20 million from
CDBG

• 2007 – Mississippi Legislature passed
HB 1500 which gave the Wind Pool a
total of $80 million ($20 million a year
for 4 years, final installment of funds was
available effective July 1, 2010)

• 2009– Mississippi Legislature passed HB
32 which gave the Wind Pool $18 million
from the state’s Hurricane Disaster Relief
Fund following requested budget cuts

MID has guided the Wind Pool Board in a
number of preemptive actions that have
allowed the Wind Pool to keep premium rates
on the Coast constant during the
past three years. Wind Pool rates were
reduced an average of 11 percent in 2008
and have remained constant since that
time. Reserve funds available through the
Hurricane Disaster Relief Fund has enabled
the Wind Pool to maintain stable rates
throughout the remainder of 2010; in fact,
no projected Wind Pool rate increases are
anticipated for 2010.

Working in conjunction with the Governor’s
Office, MID is a staunch advocate of stronger
building codes and mitigation as methods
to help lower premium rates and make
insurance available and affordable to Coast
residents – the foundation for MID recovery
programs. To that end, MID applied for and
received a $1 million federal grant for a wind
mitigation study. The purpose of the study
was to help lay the groundwork for the MID’s
launch of the Comprehensive Hurricane
Damage Mitigation Program by estimating
the costs and benefits associated with various
residential and commercial construction
features which can reduce hurricane wind
losses.  The study was completed in late
2009, and $20 million in mitigation grant
funds is expected to be awarded through the
program in mid-2010.

Following Katrina, MID observed several
significant changes in the insurance market
which were directly related to the impact
the storm had on our state’s citizens. These
include:

• Mississippi ranked in the top five in terms
of flood insurance policy growth in the
country one year after Katrina. The
growth rate for Mississippi in the past 12
months has been 51 percent according
to the National Flood Insurance Program.
This was the result of a special multi-
agency Flood Insurance Campaign

created and run by MID. The framework
of the program was recognized by Flood
Smart and the National Flood Insurance
Program, who began using the campaign
as an example when advocating flood
insurance in other states.

• Since August of 2005, 140 new Property
and Casualty companies have started
writing business in Mississippi.

MID continues to aid coastal Mississippians
in finding available, affordable insurance
while keeping companies accountable for
the service they provide. The key to helping
Mississippians avoid the insurance problems
that arose following Katrina is to help them
become better prepared through outreach,
the advocacy of stronger building codes
and through such programs as the wind
mitigation grant programs to assist them
in making their homes more capable of
withstanding such disasters as Katrina.

PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

Massive damage was inflicted on roads,
bridges, electricity, water and sewer systems,
and an equally massive response was
required to restore critical infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the Governor remained
committed to rebuilding bigger and better
through all avenues: better aesthetics, more

42FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 43FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

efficiency, more modern capacity, more
resilient design, and regionalized approaches.

The FEMA Public Assistance Program has
been the cornerstone of restoring public
infrastructure. More than $3 billion has
been obligated to remove debris, provide
emergency services, and rebuild community
buildings, utilities, roads, parks, and other
public facilities. Less than 30 percent of
funding remains to be spent, and most of
that is obligated to two substantial long-term
utility projects.

To achieve his
recovery vision, the
Governor has used
the CDBG program
to supplement
FEMA funds. In the
case of rebuilding

public buildings, that has meant creating the
Community Revitalization and Ground Zero
programs to build buildings and landscapes
that are more aesthetically pleasing and
offer more efficiency and convenience for
government operations, and to otherwise fill
needs not met through FEMA programs.

For utilities, CDBG has been used to
expand and regionalize the delivery of
services to underserved areas and to
promote growth through the Regional Water
and Wastewater Program.

Transportation recovery is highlighted by the
Mississippi Department of Transportation’s
ability to quickly rebuild Highway 90 as well
as the two bridges that connect the Coast.
The state has also addressed problems
faced by local governments due to revenue
shortfalls and the need for better land
use planning.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The FEMA Public Assistance (PA) Program is
the primary source of funding and support
for the repair and restoration of public
buildings and infrastructure. More than
$3 billion has been obligated through this
program and more than $2.1 billion has
been paid out to communities and eligible
private non-profits (PNP) to restore what was
damaged or destroyed by Katrina.

The PA Program is a partnership between
FEMA and the state that is in effect until
recovery is completed. Shortly after a
disaster, FEMA, the state, and eligible
applicants meet in a kick-off meeting to
assess the applicant’s needs, discuss disaster
damages, and establish priorities. Initially, the
primary emphasis is on debris removal and
formulation of projects, which may include
both basic and complex items such as
repairs to a damaged facility or consolidation
or modification of facilities to handle
current and future needs. All projects are

documented on Project Worksheets, which
describe the scope of work and itemized
cost estimate.

FEMA reviews and approves the projects.
During its review, FEMA also considers
special issues such as insurance, floodplain
management, hazard mitigation, and
historical preservation, which can affect the
scope of work and funding of a project.
Once approved, FEMA obligates the funding
to the state for disbursement to the sub-
grantee. For smaller projects, the state
provides the funding to the applicants right
away. For large projects, the state provides
incremental payments to the sub-grantee as
work is completed on the project. If needed,
FEMA provides or funds temporary facilities
for the applicant to use while their damaged
facilities are being rebuilt.

Once the applicant completes the project,
FEMA and the State review all of the
cost documentation and conduct a final
inspection of the project. Once all of an
applicant’s projects are complete and
eligible costs have been reimbursed, FEMA
concludes the closeout process.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FUNDS OVERVIEW
(AS OF JULY 2010)

Five years after Katrina, 70 percent of the
PA program’s $3 billion has been spent. The

largest portion of unfinished projects is for
public buildings and utilities, which together
represent 85 percent of the unspent balance.
Utility projects account for 54 percent, or
$500 million, of remaining PA funds.

Utility projects are generally considered
longer-term projects on a construction
timeline. When a community chooses to
modify its infrastructure or utility systems
to provide for future conditions, the success
of those projects requires careful planning,
public consultation, and coordination.

While federal funds may be approved and
obligated for the projects prior to these
deliberative planning processes, actual
construction and payment to the applicant is
much further down the road. In Mississippi,
two massive, complex utility replacements
in Gulfport and Biloxi are underway which

Remaining PA Balance By Category of Work (as of August 2010)

F-Utilities
54.42%

G-Parks,
Recreational,

and Other
8.04%

Z-State Management Costs
0.31%

A-Debris Removal
0.42%

B-Emergency
Protective Measures

1.56%
C-Roads and Bridges

4.46%

D-Water Control
Facilities

0.08%

E-Buildings and
Equipment

30.71%

44FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 45FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

account for more than $480 million in
PA funds. The time required for citizen
participation and deliberate design to
meet future conditions is time well spent
to ensure the job is done right.

CUTTING THROUGH THE RED TAPE

During the PA process, applicants have the
opportunity to appeal decisions regarding
PA assistance. As an alternative to appeals,
Congress established an arbitration process
for hurricanes Katrina and Rita PA applicants.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 provided for the establishment
of an arbitration panel having sufficient
authority regarding the award or denial
of disputed PA applications. The process
was designed to expedite resolution of

outstanding FEMA PA projects stemming
from hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Mississippi’s Bay Waveland School District
became the first applicant in the nation to
take advantage of the new process when it
filed its arbitration request on September
30, 2009. Bay-Waveland School District
requested nearly $7 million to aid in the
restoration of multiple buildings across three
schools. In a February 2010 decision, the
arbitration panel fully granted the school’s
request.

To date, with eight Mississippi applicants
having utilized the process, this new
alternative has proven to be very beneficial
to applicants, FEMA, and the state in
resolving difficult issues. With this new
process in the recovery toolbox, Mississippi
applicants can more easily work together to
move our recovery efforts forward.

REBUILDING BIGGER AND BETTER

After Katrina, Governor Barbour urged cities
and counties not to simply rebuild what
was lost, but also to use the disaster as an
opportunity to rebuild bigger and better.
Across Mississippi, communities
embraced this opportunity, repairing
and rebuilding their damaged facilities to
better accommodate future needs. This
revitalization has come in many forms:

• Greater aesthetics to enhance
community development

• Adding modern state-of-the-art
capacities to government buildings

• Consolidating services for more efficient
operations

• Rebuilding stronger and more resistant
to natural hazards, and, in some cases,
relocating essential emergency services
to safer areas

The FEMA PA program has provided the
flexibility to meet some of these future
challenges and conditions through use of its

improved and alternate
project options. In many
instances however,

Mississippi has combined other funding
sources to allow public facilities to be rebuilt
bigger and better.

To capitalize on the opportunity to build
back better and stronger, Mississippi has
coupled FEMA Public Assistance funds with
HUD Community Development Block Grant

(CDBG) and FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program (HMGP) funding. Since FEMA PA
funds will repair or replace facilities only as
they existed before the disaster, these other
programs were needed to rebuild facilities
better than they were before Katrina.
CDBG infrastructure programs, including
Community Revitalization, Ground Zero,
and Regional Water and Wastewater, have
been used to enhance buildings and
infrastructure beyond eligible costs covered
by FEMA PA. The CDBG Ground Zero and
Community Revitalization programs have
funded enhancements to public buildings
and facilities, including expansions, as well
as new community centers, town greens,
and harbors. The CDBG Regional Water and
Wastewater program provided funds to build
new utility infrastructure in underserved
areas to accommodate current and future
growth and population shifts. FEMA Hazard
Mitigation funds were used to strengthen
facilities to better withstand future storms,
minimizing potential losses of life and
property.

In some cases, communities chose to
combine multiple funds into one facility.
Gulfport’s Municipal Courthouse, scheduled
for completion in 2010, combined PA, CDBG,
and HMGP funds to create a state-of-the-art
facility that can also serve as a shelter for its
first responders in future storms. In other
instances, communities used PA funds to

Public Assistance Funds Overview
PA Obligations by Category of Works (as of August, 2010)

G-Parks,
Recreational,

and Other
5.95% Z-State Management Costs

4.01%

D-Water Control Facilities
0.04%

C-Roads and Bridges
2.97%

B-Emergency
Protective Measures

13.72%

A-Debris Removal
23.29%

E-Buildings and
Equipment

21.06%

F-Utilities
28.95%

46FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 47FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

repair the existing systems and used CDBG
funds to build out utilities in new areas of the
community to support population shifts and
encourage relocation in less vulnerable areas.

The state facilitated this integrated
partnership between federal partners
and programs so that communities could
leverage all available funds to build back
better and stronger.

PUBLIC FACILITIES

Public Assistance. FEMA has obligated $650
million to rebuild public facilities. A partial
breakdown of PA projects includes:

• 330 schools
• 134 recreational facilities
• 90 municipal buildings
• 20 fire stations
• 10 medical facilities
• 4 police stations
• 3 court buildings

Beyond the construction funds, local
governments, schools, hospitals, and first
responders have used PA funds to replace
the equipment, vehicles, uniforms, textbooks,
and other materials that were lost in Katrina.
While these repairs and construction projects
were underway, mobile and temporary
facilities were used to carry out essential
government services as well as serve as
classrooms and police and fire stations.

Community Revitalization. This CDBG
program includes 82 projects representing
$241 million for the lower six counties and
39 projects representing $42 million for the
other GO Zone counties. Of these projects, 25
are completed and all projects except one are
under construction. In many cases, program
funds leveraged FEMA PA funding to rebuild
bigger and better.

Local governments developed projects for a
broad range of uses including reconstruction
and rehabilitation of city halls, fire stations,
civic centers, libraries, parks, and streetscape
improvements. GO Zone projects included
the same broad range of uses and included
drainage improvements, restoration of
public buildings, and repairs to water and
wastewater treatment facilities.

Ground Zero. Hancock County bore the
brunt of Hurricane Katrina, as the eye crossed
its western side, and the storm’s most
destructive winds and storm surge pounded
the county. To meet the extraordinary needs
in this area, Governor Barbour created the
Ground Zero Program (also known as the
Hancock County Unmet Needs Program).

Funded through CDBG, this program has
directed $200 million for public infrastructure,
community revitalization and economic
development in Hancock County, “ground
zero” for the destructive force of Katrina.
A total of 42 projects have been awarded
through the program, including water and
sewer facilities, fire protection facilities,
public buildings and flood and drainage
improvements.

TRANSPORTATION

Transportation infrastructure was severely
damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Mississippi

was allocated $1 billion in Federal Highway
Administration Emergency Funds to repair
federal highways and bridges, and cities and
counties were obligated $91 million in FEMA
PA for local road and bridge repair.

MDOT worked quickly to make roads and
bridges operational after the storm:

• Restoration to the damaged I-10 bridge
was completed within 20 days

• Repairs on the northbound lanes of I-110
were completed within one month of
the storm

• U.S. 90 was opened to two-lane traffic in
phases, with some sections in Biloxi and
Gulfport open as soon as mid-October.
U.S. 90 between the Bay of St. Louis
Bridge and Biloxi Back Bay Bridge was
reopened within 90 days. All of U.S. 90
was restored to four-lane traffic in early
January 2006

Bridges. MDOT’s greatest recovery
achievement was the quick construction
of the Bay St. Louis Bridge and the Biloxi
Bay Bridge. Both of these vital bridges were
destroyed by Katrina.

• Bay St. Louis Bridge – Links Bay St. Louis
and Pass Christian, and Hancock and
Harrison counties. The first two lanes
were opened in May 2007 and four lanes
were opened in January 2008. While this

48FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 49FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

bridge was under construction, MDOT
used FHWA funds to provide free vehicular
ferry service for commuters. The service,
which ran from November 2006, through
May 2007, ran every half hour from 6:00
a.m. to 6:30 p.m., reducing the cost of
gasoline and commute time for motorists.

• Biloxi Bay Bridge – Links Biloxi and Ocean
Springs, and Harrison and Jackson
counties. The first two lanes were opened
in November 2007; four lanes were
opened in April 2008.

PUBLIC UTILITIES

In addition to all of the schools, city halls,
public safety facilities, parks, and other
recovery projects visible across Mississippi,
an unprecedented amount of infrastructure
improvements have happened below ground.
The repair or replacement of utility systems,
including water, sewer, and gas, accounts
for the largest portion of FEMA PA funding,
representing $893 million.

More than 45 utility projects have been
completed or are underway, allowing
communities to not only provide utility
services to its citizens, but also use the
opportunity to improve aging infrastructure
and achieve efficiencies in their systems.
More than half of the remaining PA funds are
associated with ongoing utility projects, due to
the complexity and scale of those efforts.

Gulf Region Water and Wastewater Plan.
As part of the Gulf Regional Infrastructure
program the Governor directed the Mississippi
Department of Environmental Quality
(MDEQ) to develop the Gulf Region Water
and Wastewater Plan to determine the needs
for water, wastewater, and storm water
infrastructure in the six coastal counties. The
Plan’s objective was to prioritize the water,
wastewater, and storm water infrastructure
needs in the region for CDBG funding.

A draft of the plan was developed in October
2006 after significant local stakeholder
involvement. After public comment, the plan
was modified and a final draft was developed
in December 2006. HUD approved $665
million in CDBG for the Regional Water and
Wastewater Program in April 2007.

By August 2007, MDEQ had made grant
awards for all 67 projects to the five County
Utility Authorities (CUAs) located in Pearl River,
Hancock, Harrison, Jackson and Stone counties
and the cities of Gautier, Ocean Springs,
Pascagoula, and Moss Point. The County
Utility Authorities, which were created by the
Mississippi Gulf Coast Region Utility Act in
April 2006, have adopted rules and regulations
as required by the Act and are responsible for
the implementation of these projects with
the exception of those grants made to the
referenced cities.

These are not minor projects; these projects
represent major backbone infrastructure
that will benefit growth patterns, economic
development, improve quality of life, and
should ensure functioning water/sewer
services during future natural disasters in the
Gulf Coast Region for decades to come.

As of mid-2010: all projects are under
construction or complete; 11 projects have
completed construction and approximately
40 projects are expected to be complete by
December 2010. By June 2011, it is estimated
that 59 projects will be complete, and the
remainder of projects should be complete by
early 2013.

When the infrastructure program is complete,
the Gulf Coast Region will have a significant
amount of new water and wastewater
facilities, including:

• more than 500 miles of new water and
sewer lines

• 32 new water tanks
• 31 new water wells
• 48 new wastewater pumping stations
• 17 new wastewater treatment facilities

The State strives to be a good steward of
these funds and continues to ensure that
the infrastructure program is implemented
consistent with federal regulations and
requirements. The State has received
excellent reports from HUD on its most recent
overview of the CDBG infrastructure program.

Ratepayer Mitigation. After Katrina, state
residents faced large increases in utility rates
due to the hundreds of millions of dollars
spent by companies to repair and replace
downed power lines and other electric utility
infrastructure. To prevent large increases in
electric bills, the state allocated $360 million
for a ratepayer mitigation plan.

PUBLIC SERVICES

After Hurricane
Katrina, city and
county governments
in the most heavily
impacted areas
suffered financially
during a time of
increased need
for public services.
The widespread destruction of homes
and businesses decimated the property
tax revenues that help fund government
operations. Although many cities benefited
from increased sales tax collections due to
disaster-related spending, those communities
closest to the point of Katrina’s landfall
experienced significant financial shortfalls.

A number of measures were used to keep
government operations afloat and to provide
enhanced services to deal with increased
needs.

50FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 51FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Community Disaster Loan Program. The
Community Disaster Loan (CDL) program
provides loans to offset revenue losses after a
disaster so that disaster-stricken jurisdictions
can maintain government services. Forty
loans, totaling over $182 million, were
provided to state applicants.

In 2007, Congress reformed law to allow
these loans to be cancelled based on an
assessment of the community’s financial
condition after Katrina. Mississippi
communities are now in the final phases
of assembling financial documentation to
support the full or partial forgiveness of their
loans. Given the financial burden caused
by the disaster coupled with the economic
downturn, the state is optimistic that these
loans will be forgiven and anxiously awaits
further information from FEMA and the
Obama Administration about the disposition
of these loans.

Public Safety Grants. Public safety entities
across Mississippi suffered unique problems
as a result of the storm. On the Coast, law
enforcement agencies had much of their
equipment and facilities damaged or
completely destroyed. North of the coastal
counties, law enforcement agencies had
to deal with problems associated with
increased populations due to the influx of
hurricane evacuees.

In the December 2005 supplemental bill,
Congress appropriated $58.25 million to aid
local and state law enforcement entities with
reestablishing their agencies to a pre-Katrina
level of public safety.

Police and sheriff departments across south
Mississippi received grants to supplement
their staff funding. Approximately $6 million
of these funds were used to fund a highway
patrol training school. Another $1.5 million
was used to provide urgent updates to the
Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(AFIS).

Grants to Financially Distressed
Governments. At an August 2006
special session of the state legislature,
Governor Barbour proposed a bill to make
approximately $20 million available to
struggling communities. This bill allowed
up to $3 million in grants for city and county
governments which lost more than 25
percent of their revenues.

PLANNING

The Governor’s Commission on Recovery,
Rebuilding and Renewal emphasized the
importance of zoning and planning and
gave communities tools to evaluate their
land use plans. MDA allocated $10 million for
local governments to create comprehensive
land use and zoning plans. These funds

allowed coastal jurisdictions to continue the
planning process started by the Governor’s
Commission, and incorporate their
revitalization visions into rebuilding
their cities.

ECONOMY

While major problems were caused by the
temporary housing crisis and the major loss
of public infrastructure, the most important
component to the long-term recovery of the
Coast will be the return of businesses and
jobs. This is true not merely for the Coast, but
also the entire state, as the coastal economy
represents a major portion of the state’s
economic vitality. Coupled with the onset of
the economic downturn in 2008, job creation
initiatives are even more significant.

Disaster relief programs administered
through the Mississippi Development
Authority and the Mississippi Department
of Employment Security have provided the
resources to restore business and bring jobs
back to the Coast.

Beyond initial recovery from the disaster,
Governor Barbour has focused economic
recovery efforts to build a solid foundation to
create and sustain jobs for years to come.

The biggest piece of this foundation will be

the restoration of the Port of Gulfport, the
largest economic development project in
Mississippi’s history. A restoration plan is
being implemented to maximize the use
and efficiency of the Port. Once that plan is
completed, the Port will serve as an economic
engine for the entire state.

BUSINESS DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Small Business Administration. As
designated by the Stafford Act, the Small
Business Administration (SBA) provides low-
interest, long-term loans to businesses of all
sizes and private, non-profit organizations
after a disaster. SBA offers Physical Disaster
Business Loans to cover the costs of repairing
or rebuilding damaged business structures
and to replace machinery, equipment,
inventory and other business assets damaged
by a disaster. SBA Economic Injury Disaster
Loans provide working capital for small
businesses, small farms, and certain private
non-profits, while they recover to normal
business operations after a disaster.

In Mississippi, SBA loaned more than
$545 billion in physical disaster loans and
$19 million in economic injury loans after
the storm.

Small Business Administration
Applications Approved Amount Approved

Business Loans 4,375 $ 545,480,900

Economic Injury Loans 333 $ 19,182,800

52FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 53FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Mississippi Development Authority. In
the months after Katrina, the Mississippi
Development Authority (MDA) operated
Small Business Assistance Centers in each
of the most damaged counties to provide a
one-stop recovery resource for businesses.
These centers connected business persons
with counselors from SBA, Planning and
Development Districts, chambers of
commerce and volunteers from Service
Corps of Retired Executives. MDA also
provided free computer usage and
Internet access to help businesses regain
communications with customers and
suppliers. In less affected areas, MDA held
Disaster Recovery Workshops to help
business people
navigate the array of disaster recovery
resources available to them.

Less than a month after Katrina struck,
the Mississippi Legislature authorized a
no-interest bridge loan program for small
businesses. These bridge loans provided
quick, cheap financing to get businesses back
in operation. Working with local banks, the
state loaned $13.25 million to 537 businesses,
an average loan of $24,674.

Gulf Opportunity Zone. The Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 was passed
by Congress and signed into law by
President Bush in December 2005. The
49 federally disaster-declared counties were

designated as the “GO Zone,” and economic
development activities within those
jurisdictions were eligible for the incentives
created by the legislation. Among the
incentives for qualifying businesses were:

• 50 percent bonus-depreciation of eligible
personal assets and real estate during
the first year of service for property
placed in service before December 31,
20

10

• $4.9 billion in tax-exempt private activity
bonds

• $106 million in Low Income Housing Tax
Credits

Through GO Zone tax-exempt private activity
bonds, business owners and corporations can
borrow capital at interest rates lower than
would otherwise be available. For the GO
Zone, the $4.9 billion allocated by Congress
for the five-year period from 2006 to 2010
was a sizeable increase from the normal
statewide allocation, which would have been
approximately $1.3 billion for the same time
period. Prohibitions against financing hotels
and retail facilities were
also lifted.

Some of the largest employers on the Coast,
including Chevron, Northrop Grumman
and PSL-North America, received recovery
assistance through the increased bond
allocation.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Port of Gulfport. To restore the Port
facilities, as well as address the damage in
the surrounding community resulting from
surge-displaced Port of Gulfport container
cargo, $570 million in CDBG was allocated
to the Mississippi State Port Authority
at Gulfport. The funds are to facilitate
restoration of public infrastructure and
publicly owned facilities that were damaged
or destroyed during Katrina and to better
protect the surrounding community during
future storms.

Currently in the design and engineering
phase of the restoration program, the Port is
continuing its planning and environmental
review processes. Twelve contracts for
engineering, design and environmental
services have been awarded to companies
through several rounds of competitive
procurement.

In addition to these contracts, the Port’s 60-
acre West Pier fill project is almost 75 percent
complete and over one million cubic yards
of fill have been deposited. This project will
elevate the West Pier facilities to 25 feet
above sea level – more than twice the current
elevation and about three feet above Katrina
surge levels. Raising the Port’s elevation
will help provide the Port, its tenants and
the community with enhanced protection
against future storm surges.

The restoration program is important to
recapturing a major portion of the region’s
job base and to filling a national need for
more port capacity. With the expected
completion of the Panama Canal expansion
in 2014, ports in the Gulf and Southeast
must increase their operations to handle the
nation’s imports and exports. Restoration will
help ensure the Port can service increased
traffic resulting from improvements to the
Panama Canal; a viable port is crucial for
handling these cargoes.

The Port is a major driver of both jobs and
business activity and is vital part of the
comprehensive recovery of the Gulf Coast.
The state is not only rebuilding this facility
in a way that better protects the Port and
Gulfport area, but also working to build a
“Port of the Future” with an eye toward future
shipping and growth trends. Thousands of
jobs are directly or indirectly related to State

54FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 55FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Port activity, and the Port is expected to not
only boost the Coast economy but also to
have a job-producing ripple effect statewide.

Economic Development Program. The
$267 million Economic Development
Program is creating new jobs by funding
public infrastructure improvements or
eligible training activities to benefit private,
for-profit businesses. All counties in the GO
Zone are eligible for this CDBG program.
Grants and loans flow through the local units
of government or non-profit entities, and
projects are funded on an as-needed basis.

Approximately $240 million has been
committed, and grant contracts have
been issued for 47 projects to create 5,584
proposed jobs. To date, 33 projects are
complete or under construction accounting
for the creation of 3,529 jobs:

• 17 projects have completed construction
and have created 1,862 jobs

• 16 projects are under construction and
will create 1,667 jobs

More than 75 percent of funding has been
committed to the most affected counties
– Hancock, Harrison, Jackson and Pearl
River. The Promenade at D’Iberville, PSL-
North America in Hancock County, the Gulf
Coast Coliseum and Convention Center, the
Gulfport-Regional Airport, the Pass Christian
Harbor, Signal International, and Northrop

Grumman are just a few of the beneficiaries
of Economic Development Program funding.

EMPLOYMENT

The major damage to businesses left many
Gulf Coast residents without a job, at least
temporarily; unemployment levels spiked to
nearly 25 percent in September 2005.
As provided in the Stafford Act, Disaster
Unemployment Assistance was made
available to disaster victims who lost or had
their jobs interrupted as a result of Katrina
and who would not otherwise be eligible for
unemployment insurance benefits.

The Mississippi Department of Employment
Security (MDES) handled 34,600 claims
for Disaster Unemployment Assistance.
MDES also received $85 million from the
Department of Labor for unemployment
benefits. These funds were placed in the
Mississippi Unemployment Trust Fund,
enabling the Fund to maintain a healthy
balance despite the filing of an additional
55,264 Katrina-related unemployment
insurance claims. MDES also assisted more
than 50,000 job placements in the three
months after Katrina.
In June 2006, 17,000 Mississippians in the
Gulfport-Biloxi Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) were without work. Yet at the peak of
the Gulfport-Biloxi area’s economic comeback
in June 2008, employment levels reached 96

percent of the employment from June 2005,
two months prior to the storm.

Despite the nation’s current economic crisis,
April 2010 data shows that 90 percent of
the June 2005 workforce is employed in the
Gulfport-Biloxi area. Although the mining,
logging, construction, and government
workforce reports growth, the leisure
and hospitality industry is still rebuilding,
reaching only 72 percent of its employment
level from June 2005.

The Pascagoula MSA employment numbers
for April 2010 show that the area has 600
more jobs than before the hurricane in June
2005. Mining, logging, construction, and
manufacturing labor force classifications all
have more jobs that in 2005.

The combined April 2010 employment for
both the Gulfport-Biloxi and Pascagoula
MSAs is 94 percent of the June 2005
employment for both of these areas.

Unemployment rates steadily receded
and had reached pre-Katrina levels by fall
2006. Since returning to normal levels,
coastal county unemployment rates have
consistently ranked among the lowest in
Mississippi.

The state’s efforts have focused beyond
those initial temporary unemployment

benefits, and toward meeting the long-term
employment needs of the Coast. MDES has
concentrated heavily on job placement
and training, utilizing National Emergency
Grant funds, tax credits, and the state’s WIN
Job Centers. These programs have matched
residents with jobs and developed a more
highly-skilled workforce.

National Emergency Grant. MDES, under
Governor Barbour’s leadership, administered
a $95 million National Emergency Grant
(NEG) to aid in the recovery efforts on
reemployment and job training. NEG
programs focused on temporary job
placement and support and long-term goals
of job training, filling workforce needs in
the manufacturing, shipbuilding, health
care, supportive services, construction,
information technology, and hospitality
services sectors.

MDES administered the following NEG
programs:

30

25

20

15

10
5
0

Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties Unemployment Rates

Hancock
Harrison
Jackson

Ja
n

-0
5

Ju
ly

-0
5
Ja
n

-0
6

Ju
ly
-0
6
Ja
n

-0
7

Ju
ly
-0
7
Ja
n

-0
8

Ju
ly
-0
8
Ja
n

-0
9

Ju
ly
-0
9
Ja
n

-1
0

Ju
ly
-1
0

56FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 57FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

• Temporary Recovery Jobs – Provided
temporary employment through public
sector and non-profit employers to
more than 2,500 individuals. Participants
were eligible to be employed for up to
eighteen months or paid up to $36,000.
Many of these temporary jobs led to
permanent employment.

• Training – Provided funds for on-the-
job training while earning wages
on a permanent job, classroom
training through public and private
training providers that led directly to
employment, and job search services.
More than 6,500 residents were served.

• Supportive Services – Provided support
payments to individuals enrolled in
training to enable them to attend and
succeed in training. Payments covered
costs such as transportation and child
care. More than 1,300 participants
were served.

• Working Your Way Back Home Program
– Helped Mississippians who evacuated
151 miles or more from home get the
assistance they needed to find a job.
Eligible costs included reimbursement
for travel and relocation expenses. More
than 1,500 residents participated.

• Pathways to Construction Training

– Provided training through area
community and junior colleges to meet
construction industry needs, which
grew significantly as South Mississippi
rebuilt after Katrina. More than 6,000
construction workers received training.

• The Arts Recovery Project – A unique
partnership between MDES, the Twin
Districts local workforce area, and the
Mississippi Arts Commission to address
the needs of the many coastal artists
and craftsmen severely affected by
Hurricane Katrina. As individual artisans
who created and sold original works of
art, they constituted small businesses.
Collectively, they represented a
significant industry that served as a
cornerstone to other economic sectors
such as tourism.

In addition to the NEG funds, MDES received
$8 million in workforce development funds
from the Department of Labor. These funds
have been used by the state’s community
and junior colleges to provide training and
employment in high-growth and high-
demand fields. Specifically, $5 million has
been focused on construction related job
training, with the remaining targeted for
other high demand jobs.

Shipbuilding Academy. The last component
of the Economic Development program is

the Employee Training Facilities program.
This program will provide unskilled, under-
employed and unemployed low-income
individuals with additional training and
ultimately the opportunity to compete for
the top wage jobs that are available as a
result of the recovery of the ship building and
metal-related industries. The facility will be
approximately 80,000 square feet in size. 
A ground breaking for this $20 million project
was held in June 2010.

Mississippi WIN Job Centers. The Workforce
Investment Network (WIN) in Mississippi
is an innovative strategy designed to
provide convenient, one-stop employment
and training services to job seekers and
businesses. MDES partners with four
local Workforce Areas, which includes 53
WIN Job Centers throughout the state
and several part-time offices. Within two
weeks of Hurricane Katrina, all WIN Job
Centers were open with extended hours to
provide employment services and process
applications for unemployment benefits.

Four WIN Job Centers on the Gulf Coast
(Biloxi, Gulfport, Pascagoula, and Picayune)
were significantly damaged and the office
in Bay St. Louis was completely destroyed.
By September 12, 2005, Mobile WIN Job
Centers were transported in to handle
unemployment claims. A Claims Call Center
was created and operated 7:00 a.m. to 6:30

p.m. seven days a week, and the other non-
Coast WIN Job Centers throughout the state
were open 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. for at least
a month.

The WIN Centers were committed to
providing people
services tailored
to their individual
needs. MDES ran
television, radio,
and newspaper
announcements
throughout
the state, encouraging people to visit their
local WIN Job Center to look for jobs and
reminding employers to list their jobs with
MDES in order to take full advantage of the
resources available to them.

TOURISM

Tourism is the lifeblood of the Coast economy
and provides a boost to the state’s economy
as well. The area’s beaches, fishing, golf,
casino reports and seafood cuisine, combined
with the relaxed atmosphere and unique
coastal culture has attracted visitors from all
over the country.

The tourism industry has made a strong
comeback, but in recent years that recovery
has been hampered by circumstances
unrelated to Hurricane Katrina. The economic

58FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 59FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

downturn slowed the pace of tourists to the
Coast, and the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill had a serious negative impact on
tourism, despite the spill’s limited contact
with Mississippi.

Casino revenues on the Mississippi Gulf Coast
in 2004 totaled nearly $1.23 billion, reaching
higher levels than ever before. Yet after the
devastation of Hurricane Katrina, the casinos
received no income for September, October,
and November of 2005, causing their profits
to significantly decrease to $886 million for
the year. A similar trend occurred during
the rebuilding 2006 year with revenues
amounting to only $910 million.

However, 2007 and 2008 saw considerable
increases in Gulf Coast casino revenues,
coming in at a record $1.3 billion and $1.26
billion, respectively.

Although the nation’s current economic crisis
has caused the Gulf Coast’s gaming profits
to decrease since 2009, early 2010 data show
improvement from late 2009 revenues.

The state has used CDBG grants to help
attract tourists back. MDA created the $5
million Tourism Industry Restoration Grant
Program to fund extensive advertising and
events marketing campaigns to attract
travelers and to bolster the area’s economy.
Grants have been given to 27 tourism

entities in the six southernmost counties
plus Forrest County.

EDUCATION

While Hurricane Katrina caused
unprecedented destruction of educational
facilities accompanied by disruption of
the educational process, Mississippi’s
aggressive response by state leaders and
education officials to ensure a swift return
to normalcy got results; notably, Mississippi
had re-opened all of its disaster impacted
K-12 public schools before the City of New
Orleans re-opened any one of its schools.
This achievement highlighted the efficiency
of the state’s coordinated response shared
among state and educational leaders at
all levels: K-12, community colleges, and
universities. Mississippi’s success in meeting
the educational needs of disaster impacted
citizens was aided in large part by unique
federal funding opportunities, which
provided monies not only for construction
rehabilitation and repair, but also to
encourage teacher retention and innovation
in a post-Katrina educational environment.

Enrollment continues to increase at all
educational levels, with some K-12 facilities
experiencing increased attendance rates
compared to pre-Katrina levels. Performance
at the secondary level demonstrates the

resiliency of our children to overcome the
most adverse of situations as assessment
scores were positive following Hurricane
Katrina and even now, five years later.

Higher education, including both the
community college and university systems,
continues to experience a resurgence of
enrollees at Mississippi institutions, with
the southernmost campuses offered by
the University of Southern Mississippi and
Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College
benefiting from the completion of post-
Katrina construction projects. While some
work remains, one thing is clear: Mississippi’s
educational system has become even stronger
in the years since Hurricane Katrina decimated
South Mississippi and the Gulf Coast region.

K-12
Hurricane Katrina wrought destruction to
schools throughout Mississippi. The state’s
schools had begun a new academic year just
days before the hurricane made landfall in
Mississippi on August 29, 2005. Students
were forced to evacuate just as they were
settling in their new schools. The damage was
widespread across the state:

• 263 schools in 79 school districts received
damage

• 16 schools were destroyed and 24 severely
damaged

• Only 14 of the state’s 152 school districts
did not miss any days due to the storm

• Nearly 80,000 children were out of school
in Mississippi immediately after Katrina

Mississippi’s public school leaders were
resilient, working tirelessly to quickly reopen
schools because they understood the critical
role that schools would play in rebuilding
their area. Schools had to be operating for
families to return to their homes, for academic
progress to continue for students, and for
children to feel a sense of normalcy again in
their lives.

Fortunately, Mississippi’s strong response
efforts resulted in children not staying out of
school very long. Local school districts and
FEMA made repairs to minimally damaged
schools and set up portable classrooms
where schools were more heavily damaged.
Two weeks after the storm, most Mississippi
schools were open again while, a mere six
weeks after the storm, all but one Gulf Coast
school, Bay St. Louis-Waveland, was back open.
Because of a shortage of portable classrooms
and the inability to adequately repair the
infrastructure on the school grounds to put
these classrooms in place, Bay-Waveland had
to wait until November 7 to open again. By
contrast, Mississippi had re-opened all of its
public schools after Hurricane Katrina before
New Orleans had re-opened any of its schools.

Facilities Status. Most of the Gulf Coast’s
school districts have completed major

60FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 61FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

renovations on severely damaged schools as
well as new construction to school facilities.

Hancock County:
• The Bay-Waveland School District is on

schedule to complete the Lower and
Upper Elementary schools in the late
summer of 2010.

•

Hancock County School District
completed construction on West
Elementary and South Elementary in
September 2008, which replaced three
district elementary schools destroyed by
the storm.

Harrison County:
• Harrison County School District completed

construction on new facilities D’Iberville
High School and West Harrison High
School in June 2009. When future storms
approach the area, both high schools will
also serve as storm shelters, can hold up
to 2,500 people, and can withstand 200
mph winds.

• Pass Christian School District finished
constructing Pass Christian Elementary
and Middle School in August 2009. The
district is rebuilding its DeLisle Elementary
School, and it should be completed in the
summer of 2011.

• Long Beach School District completed the
new Harper McCaughan Elementary in
November 2009. The district also finished
repairs to W.J. Quarles Elementary in
August 2008.

• Gulfport School District completed
construction on East Ward Technology
Center in July 2009.

• Biloxi School District had two schools
under water during the tidal surge, Nichols
Elementary and Gorenflo Elementary.
Prior to the hurricane, both schools were
new, having opened in August 2004. After
renovations and repairs, both schools
reopened in December 2006.

Jackson County:
• Jackson County School District will move

into its new high school at St. Martin in
2010, with all other projects 99 percent
complete.

• Pascagoula School District has completed
all repairs to their facilities. During the
2007-08 school year, the Pascagoula
School District reopened two elementary
schools that were severely damaged
from the storm. Beach Elementary in
Pascagoula again welcomed students to

the first day of school on August 6, 2007,
after being housed at nearby Central
Elementary.

• Gautier Elementary opened its doors
again for students and faculty in
November 2007. After the hurricane
and previous to the school’s reopening,
Gautier Elementary students and
teachers worked in College Park
Elementary in Gautier. Currently, all 19
schools in the Pascagoula School District
are in full operation. Minor repairs are
ongoing.

• Moss Point School Board is deliberating
whether to repair or build a new facility
for Magnolia Junior High School.

Hurricane Education Recovery Act. While
the FEMA Public Assistance Program financed
the reconstruction of school facilities, the
Stafford Act could not account for the
enormous difficulties Mississippi school
districts would face. In late 2005, Congress
passed the Hurricane Education Recovery
Act to help K-12 schools deal with immediate
post-Katrina challenges. The Mississippi
Department of Education has administered
the $323 million distributed to Mississippi
from that legislation:

• $222 million: RESTART (Immediate Aid
to Restart School Operations). This
program was designed to compensate
for the loss of property tax revenue,

covering expenses such as salaries,
classroom materials, supplies, and
furniture.

• $93 million: Emergency Impact Aid
for Displaced Students. Funds were
designated for school districts across
Mississippi, which were educating an
estimated 20,000 Katrina-displaced
students.

• $687,000: Homeless Education. Many
Coast school children met the federal
homeless student definition, and these
funds were appropriated by Congress to
help educate these children.

• $7 million: Hurricane Educator Assistance
Program (HEAP). This program was
designed to attract and keep quality
educators at Coast schools. Funds
were provided to recruit, retain, and
compensate new and current teachers
and administrators who commit to work
for at least three years in school-based
positions in public elementary and
secondary schools. Incentives include
salary supplements, housing subsidies,
signing bonuses, relocation costs and
loan forgiveness. Most school districts
are using these funds to retain teachers.

Educational Performance. The expediency
of Mississippi reopening its schools is merely
the beginning of the educational success
story. Because of the uncertain conditions
in which the students, teachers, and

62FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 63FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

administrators lived, it would not have been
surprising to see test scores impacted by
these circumstances. However, the students’
post-Katrina test scores show that they
excelled despite the personal struggles
they faced.

Even the turbulent 2005-2006 academic
school year on the Mississippi Gulf Coast
proved that academic achievement would
remain a top priority, as demonstrated
by the results on state assessments. The
former accountability model ranked schools
academic performance from Levels 1 to 5
with Level 5 being superior. In the years
immediately following Katrina, all coastal
districts ranked Level 3 or higher.
In 2008, the Mississippi Board of Education

voted to increase the rigor of the curriculum
and assessments so that students will be
better prepared to transition into a college or
university and, more importantly, to compete
in a global economy. A new assessment
model was developed to measure student
achievement.
The new model ranks schools from highest
to lowest: Star, High Performing, Successful,
Academic Watch, Low Performing, At-Risk of
Failing and Failing. Of the 16 school districts
in the six southern counties that were
rated under the new Mississippi Statewide
Accountability Model in 2009:

• One district is rated a Star District
• Four districts are rated High Performing
• Eight districts are rated Successful
• Two districts are rated Academic Watch

• One district is rated At Risk of Failing
• No districts are rated Failing

Enrollment. The number of students
attending South Mississippi schools is slightly
lower than before Katrina. In total, school
districts in the lower three counties had 95.7
percent of pre-Katrina attendance in the 2009-
2010 school year, and when considering the
lower six counties, enrollment was at 97.5
percent.

Enrollment varies by school district. Schools
on the western end of the Coast, which bore
the brunt of Katrina, have experienced lower
enrollment percentages than those on the
eastern end. School districts located in the
northern parts of the coastal counties, such

as the Hancock
County, Harrison
County, and
Jackson County
school districts,
have actually
experienced
attendance

growth. Likewise, districts in the three
counties located just above the coastal
counties have grown as well.

HIGHER EDUCATION

Hurricane Katrina’s effects on colleges and
universities in Mississippi were substantial.

Not only were South Mississippi campuses left
with extensive damage, but also Mississippi
schools accepted thousands of transfers from
New Orleans colleges and universities, which
were at that time closed indefinitely.

Coastal students in colleges around the state
faced financial uncertainty as their families
struggled at home. To meet this need,
Congress appropriated $95 million in financial
aid for coastal residents enrolled in Mississippi
colleges and universities. These funds were
expended in the 2005-2006 and 2006-
2007 school years. Mississippi universities
also received $20 million, including $4.3
million from the Hurricane Katrina Foreign
Contributions fund, to defray the effects of lost
revenues and cover disaster-related expenses.

Repairs and reconstruction to coastal college
campuses, as described below, were funded
through the FEMA Public Assistance Program.

USM Gulf Park Campus. The University of
Southern Mississippi’s Gulf Park campus in
Long Beach – which received damage to
every building – embodies the university
system’s biggest success story. In fall 2010,
the campus surpassed enrollment records
at 3,066 students. The 2010 spring semester
enrollment increased by 12 percent over
enrollment records from spring of the
previous year.

K-12 Enrollment

May Aug/Sept May Aug/Sept Aug/Sept Aug/Sept Aug/Sept
2004-2005 2005-2006 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010
District
Hancock County 4,238 98.6% 94.9% 100.6% 101.5% 102.7% 104.4%
Bay St. Louis 2,303 62.6% 63.8% 70.5% 72.9% 71.7% 73.4%
Harrison County 12,940 94.4% 93.7% 98.5% 101.1% 102.1% 103.3%
Biloxi 6,051 86.7% 74.6% 77.9% 80.6% 78.0% 80.4%
Gulfport 6,047 71.5% 84.6% 90.6% 92.3% 91.8% 94.1%
Long Beach 3,304 83.0% 85.3% 85.3% 83.1% 83.8% 84.1%
Pass Christian 1,971 68.1% 70.4% 75.5% 74.6% 76.7% 82.6%
Jackson County 8,387 99.3% 99.1% 103.8% 106.4% 107.2% 109.4%
Moss Point 3,770 86.4% 89.7% 85.3% 82.9% 81.1% 77.5%
Ocean Springs 5,290 89.5% 92.5% 95.7% 98.7% 102.4% 102.5%
Pascagoula 7,288 92.6% 91.7% 95.6% 97.8% 97.7% 96.3%
Lower Three Counties 61,589 88.6% 88.8% 92.7% 94.4% 94.8% 95.7%

Pearl River County 2,818 105.9% 106.0% 112.7% 111.3% 112.0% 111.4%
Picayune 3,783 99.3% 100.8% 100.7% 99.7% 96.6% 96.3%
Poplarville 2,069 100.7% 100.7% 106.0% 106.7% 106.0% 104.0%
Stone County 2,602 105.6% 103.7% 107.7% 111.1% 107.8% 111.1%
George County 4,119 101.6% 100.2% 103.5% 104.3% 102.2% 102.9%

Lower Six Counties 76,980 91.3% 91.5% 95.3% 96.7% 96.6% 97.5%

64FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 65FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Since Hurricane Katrina, USM’s Gulf Park
campus has repaired 139,000 square
feet of classroom and office space of the
original 270,000 square feet lost. The Gulf
Coast Research Laboratory, which is now
instrumental in research related to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill event, has
replaced 44,440 square feet of the original
59,000 square feet lost during the storm.
Currently, there are an additional 31,800
square feet of research and laboratory
buildings under construction at the Cedar
Point site.

The Holloway Complex and the Fleming
Education Center reopened in 2007. The
Fleming Education Center (previously named
the Advanced Education Center) contains
a 500-seat auditorium, 19 classrooms, two
interactive video classrooms and three
computer laboratories.

Also back in operation is the Gulf Coast
iTech office, which manages all technology
activities for the Gulf Coast, from Stennis
Space Center in Hancock County to the Gulf
Coast Research Laboratory Teaching and
Research Site in Ocean Springs.

The Gulf Coast Library and Media Center,
which was flooded with 18 inches of storm
surge, reopened in January 2008. The Library
includes The Katrina Research Center,
which serves as an inter-disciplinary center

and a public clearinghouse to facilitate
the gathering of historical and current
information related to the natural, physical,
social, political, economic and spiritual
aspects of recovery from Hurricane Katrina
and other disasters. The library also
contains a coffee house, writing center,
and speaking center.

The Toy Library and Technology
Learning Center (TLC) is a community-
based, university-directed, non-profit
organization dedicated to enhancing
education, independence and quality
of life for persons with disabilities. TLC
serves children and adults with disabilities,
their families, teachers, and other special
education professionals through specialized
training and loan of assistive technology
and recreation. The Toy Library and TLC
completed a $1.6 million building project in
October 2009.

The TLC Tennis Center, which occupies the
Barber Building, completed construction in
May 2009. The facility houses the existing
wheelchair tennis program.

TLC’s Adaptive Playground allows children
with special needs an opportunity to
interact in a “user friendly” playground. The
playground was completed April 2009.
Bear Creek Fitness Trail is open to the public
and designed to accommodate people with

or without disabilities in an effort to facilitate
physical fitness in an outdoor setting.

USM Cross Creek Campus. In June 2006,
the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of
Higher Learning reaffirmed its commitment to
the Mississippi Gulf Coast by announcing that
an additional Southern Mississippi campus
would be created on the Coast to meet the
growing needs of Mississippi’s educational
landscape.

The Board sought land for the establishment
of an additional campus that would be
capable of meeting the educational needs
of a growing population. After considering
multiple sites, the Board selected Cross Creek.
The Cross Creek site contains approximately
200 acres located just north of I-10, five miles
from the Gulf Park Campus and two miles from
Highway 49.

The master planning process for the Cross
Creek Campus began in summer 2008 and
progressed until summer April 2009, when the
developers asked USM to shift selected 200
acres to the northeast. Planning will resume
once an agreement is reached.

USM Hattiesburg Campus. Repairs resulting
from damages at the Hattiesburg campus are
largely complete. In 2010, USM successfully
appealed negative FEMA determinations on
Lloyd Hall and the Administration Building,

allowing those projects to move forward as
envisioned by the school.

Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College.
With campuses in Harrison, Jackson, Stone
and George counties, Mississippi Gulf Coast
Community College (MGCCC) was the
largest community college in Mississippi
before Katrina. However, in the fall 2005
semester following the hurricane, MGCCC’s
enrollment dropped to nearly 75% of its pre-
Katrina numbers. Nevertheless, the college
has continually grown after Katrina. Five years
later in the fall 2010 semester,
MGCCC’s enrollment reached 95% of its pre-
Katrina levels. During the summer 2010
academic terms, MGCCC surpassed its
pre-Katrina enrollment for the first time
since the hurricane.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the college
was working on a $34 million district bond
project. To date, only one building project
remains to be finished. MGCCC worked
with FEMA and has already restored all
buildings lost on the Perkinston Campus
from the storm.

Katrina Research and Assistance. The
Mississippi Institutions of Higher Learning
(IHL) and several of Mississippi’s public
four-year universities continue to assist in
recovery through meaningful research and
volunteerism activities.

66FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 67FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Alcorn State University continues to provide
assistance to small farmers and limited-
resource cooperatives. National centers of
research associated with The University of
Southern Mississippi recently published
scientific studies related to Hurricane Katrina’s
effects on the Gulf Coast.

The Gulf Coast Community Design Studio
(GCCDS), located in Biloxi, is a professional
research and service program of the College of
Architecture, Art + Design. Its most innovative
aspect is the degree of collaboration and
integration with the community. The design
studio is embedded in a local community
organization, the East Biloxi Coordination and
Relief Center. The 15 architects, landscape
architects, planners and interns in the design
studio work directly with the people that need
housing and with the various organizations
that are building housing. Since 2006 the
GCCDS has completed over 120 new houses
and dozens of house rehabilitations. The
estimated economic benefit of the house
projects is over $18 million.

The GCCDS’ community redevelopment
planning work will transform from a focus on
hurricane recovery to long-term economic
development. House projects occur along the
entire Gulf Coast; the GCCDS’ planning work
is focused on three low-income communities:
East Biloxi, Gulfport’s Soria City neighborhood,
and the city of Moss Point.

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

Governor Barbour often said Hurricane
Katrina was a storm that “didn’t discriminate”;
indeed, Katrina did not spare anyone from
its wrath, including some of our neediest
citizens who depend on state health and social
services facilities. The crisis in this sector was
compounded by the fact that the storm had
created an increased need for those services,
particularly in the mental health and economic
counseling fields.

The immediate aftermath was an especially
stressful and troubling time for individuals and
families, many of whom were facing the reality
that all they owned had been destroyed. In
addition, many persons could not go back
to work for months and needed help paying
normal expenses.

The Mississippi Department of Human
Services (MDHS) was instrumental in restoring
basic human services and helping to rebuild
lives across Mississippi’s Gulf Coast. It is often
said the greatest resource of state government
is its employees, and the aftermath of Katrina
was a shining example.
MDHS quickly established programs for
essential items and services. More than one
million individuals received food stamps
and assistance for everyday expenses. Those
programs were the foundation for providing
immediate relief to those with the most needs

to get them through the difficult first
few months.

To help alleviate stress and depression, the
MDHS used disaster funds to provide counseling
services for nearly 300,000 individuals.

For long-term recovery of health and human
services sectors, MDHS has utilized $128 million
in Social Services Block Grants. A myriad of
health, mental health, and human services
programs were funded to restore facilities and
services in this vital area.

All told, the immediate response and long-term
recovery programs have helped Mississippi
families move on with their lives and have
restored critical health and human services
infrastructure.

INDIVIDUAL AND FAMILY ASSISTANCE

After Katrina, MDHS received $128 million
in Social Services Block Grants (SSBG). This
program has been instrumental in restoring
operations and facilities in the areas of health,
mental health, and human services.
Disaster Assistance. MDHS provided
immediate and long-term support to
persons and families in the aftermath of Katrina.
Through its various divisions, MDHS assisted
families in covering necessary expenses, such as
food and utility bills, at a time when households
were temporarily out of work.

The MDHS Division of Economic Assistance
managed several programs focusing on
immediate relief to families. The Disaster Food
Stamp Program, which ran from September 13
to October 9, 2005, assisted 521,679 individuals
representing 186,765 households, with benefits
of more than $110 million. Additionally, the
Supplemental/Replacement Program for
ongoing food stamp recipients provided over
$24 million to 572,408 individuals representing
224,165 households.

The Expanded Evacuee Food Stamp Policy
allowed for a month’s allotment of food stamp
benefits to be issued without regard to income
and resources if the household was an evacuee
from the federally-declared disaster areas. This
program issued over $6 million in benefits to
18,700 individuals from Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Alabama.

The MDHS Division of Community Services was
allocated $11.75 million in Social
Services Block Grants (SSBG) to help families pay
for utility deposits and bills, emergency repairs,
emergency shelters, meter boxes, and appliance
replacements. This program has assisted over
31,000 households. MDHS has assisted more
than 29,000 households with nearly $12 million
of supplemental Low-Income Home Energy
Assistance funds to help pay energy bills.

Senior Services. The MDHS Division of
Aging and Adult Services assessed the needs of

68FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 69FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

senior citizens after Katrina. The Division has
partnered with local Area Agencies on Aging
to restore, rebuild or repair senior center
services to the Gulf Coast using $13 million in
SSBG funds. Out of these funds, Southwest
AAA provided $230,000 to seniors for repairs
or modifications to approximately 50 homes.

Child Support. The MDHS Division of Child
Support Enforcement used $4 million in
SSBG funds to hire additional child support
enforcement officers to work through the
backlog of cases representing lost files on the
Gulf Coast and replace computer equipment
in Katrina-affected areas.

Child Care. The MDHS Office for Children
and Youth (OCY) played a major role in
the restoration of the age-appropriate
playground infrastructures at licensed
and unlicensed child care facilities in 18
of Mississippi’s hardest hit counties. OCY
installed more than 200 age-appropriate
playgrounds, and delivered educational
materials to more than 100 licensed centers.
Additionally, OCY provided training,
educational materials and miscellaneous
repairs and equipment to these centers.

Community Services. The MDHS Division
of Community Services was awarded
$8 million in SSBG funds to assist in the
rebuilding of homes. Services include
home repairs, septic tanks, water line repairs,

furniture, appliances, bedding, debris
removal, short-term rent, personal items,
food, clothing, shelter, health/mental
health care, medication and medical
equipment. More than 400 homes were
rebuilt through the program.

Non-Governmental Organizations.
SSBG have been given to non-governmental
institutions such as the United Way of
South Mississippi, International Relief
Organization, N.E.E.D.S., Gulf Coast Women’s
Center for Nonviolence, Progressive Outreach
with Energetic Resolution, Manna Ministries
and YOUTHBUILD AmeriCorps.

Services provided by these groups include
economic assistance, case management and
referral, repairing and rebuilding homes,
distribution of food and clothing, and other
unmet needs.

HEALTH CARE

More than 30 percent of Mississippi’s
hospitals suffered significant damage from
the storm. Nevertheless, hospitals statewide
were ready to care for their communities.
For weeks after Katrina ravaged Mississippi,
hospitals were the last-standing symbol of
pre-hurricane life and hope because they
provided many critical, life-saving services
to thousands of Mississippi’s Katrina victims.
Even Hancock Medical Center in Bay St. Louis,

which was inundated by storm surge, kept
its doors open to serve the community until
a Disaster Medical Assistance Team hospital
could be put in place.

Mississippi’s coastal hospitals are fully
operational after Katrina. Currently there
are fourteen hospitals—including two
federal hospitals—in the region, and the Gulf
Coast Medical Center now focuses solely on
providing psychological care services.

The Gulf Coast medical labor force has
also worked to recover from the hurricane.
The area has regained 97 percent of its
pre-Katrina physicians while significantly
increasing the number of area nurses as
compared to before the storm.

The Department of Medicaid received
more than $160 million from the
federal government for medical care
reimbursements, including $92 million in
Katrina Provider Stabilization Grants.

MENTAL HEALTH

Hurricane Katrina caused much strain and
grief in Mississippians’ lives. The Mississippi
Department of Mental Health (DMH)
immediately came on the scene after Katrina
to help many citizens cope with the distress
from their losses. Although the public mental
health system has struggled to rebuild

to meet the demand for services, it has
recovered well and is still being pushed to
deal with the emotional healing that will
take years.

Project Recovery. As soon as
communications with the affected areas
could be established, staff from the
Mississippi Department of Mental Health
began to assess the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s
mental health needs, and DMH was diligent
in its efforts. The department first requested
grant funding for the Crisis Counseling
Project (Project Recovery). DMH then created
a Division for Project Recovery and used
existing DMH staff until Project Recovery
staff could be hired. DMH staff worked
during the initial start-up of theproject and
continued to provide support and to serve
on committees for quality management
and program evaluation for the duration of
Project Recovery.
Crisis counselors for Project Recovery were
contracted through the local community
mental health centers, providing jobs to more
than 500 people, many of whom were victims
of the storm.

Although Project Recovery was established
in the 49 counties declared eligible for
individual assistance, it soon became
apparent that services should be
concentrated in the most highly impacted
counties, including Pearl River, Stone, George,

70FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 71FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties.
As the Regular Services Program neared its
scheduled end, November 2006, Project
Recovery received a six month extension to
provide services until May 2007. At that time,
Project Recovery leadership redistributed
staff and deployed them to the areas of
greatest need, primarily the southern portion
of the state.

Project Recovery enabled staff to meet the
needs of the Gulf Coast’s residents through
resources provided to those in need, through
a toll-free helpline, and through Specialized
Crisis Counseling Services. It also allowed
for data collection about the number of
residents to whom the Project Recovery staff
provided aid. It recorded 291,224 first time
individual encounters. Of all the risk factors
evaluated, 8.5 percent of persons encountered
experienced personal loss, such as injuries,
missing family or friends, or separation from
family, 44 percent lost or had damage to
material possessions, including homes, cars,
jobs and financial losses, and 2.6 percent
assisted with rescue/recovery.

Youth Suicide Prevention and Early
Intervention Grant. The Mississippi Hurricane
Katrina-Related Youth Suicide Prevention
and Intervention Project aimed to reduce the
number of youth suicide attempts by providing
an awareness, training, and prevention
campaign focused in the six counties most

heavily affected by Katrina: Hancock,
Harrison, Jackson, George, Stone and Pearl
River Counties.

The training program targeted 16 school
districts covering 137 schools, as well as
Mississippi Gulf Coast Community College and
Pearl River Community College, for suicide-
awareness and gatekeeper training.

Social Services Block Grants (SSBG). The
Mississippi Department of Mental Health
received $10 million in SSBG funding to
restore day treatment and other services for
children and adults, building repairs, patient
transportation, staff retention supplements,
and to bridge budget shortfalls.

Gulfport Memorial Hospital was allocated
$10 million to restore a rehabilitation unit
for mental health treatment. Project Relief
received SSBG funds to provide licensed
mental health professionals for healthy coping
skills and self-sufficiency of coastal families.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND MARINE
RESTORATION

Mississippi’s coastal environment took a
battering from Katrina’s storm surge and winds.
Beaches were washed away, barrier islands
were breached and eroded, and wetlands were
destroyed. Those whose livelihoods depended

on a healthy coastal environment – fishermen,
shrimpers, and others – were directly affected, in
the short- and long-term.

Mississippi’s barrier islands were particularly
devastated. The footprint of these islands was
reduced an estimated 25 percent. In many
instances, island elevations were eroded to
near sea level and at least 50 percent of their
vegetative cover was lost. These islands provide
unique environmental habitats to a vast array of
floral and faunal species and also serve to guard
the state against oncoming hurricanes. Post-
Katrina, these islands were poorly equipped to
serve either function.

The Governor recognized the critical nature
of ensuring the barrier islands were fully
restored, which led to one of the state’s major
achievements following the storm: securing $439
million for restoration of the barrier islands. The
environmental and mitigation benefits of this
massive undertaking will be reaped by present
and future generations. Other critical coastal
measures have not yet been funded by Congress,
and the Governor will continue working to
ensure those projects get the funding they need.

The Mississippi Department of Marine
Resources (DMR) and Mississippi Department
of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) have driven
coastal restoration and environmental efforts
for the state. Their efforts, including removing
environmental hazards and rehabilitating marine

habitats, are ongoing and continue to positively
enhance, preserve, and restore the environment
of the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

BARRIER ISLANDS AND COASTAL
RESTORATION

In his November 2005 recovery plan, Governor
Barbour requested restoration funding
for Mississippi’s barrier islands and coastal
environment. In the December 2005 legislation,
Congress did not provide funding but instead
directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
prepare two reports identifying projects for
coastal restoration and hurricane protection,
one for interim measures and one identifying
long-term initiatives.

The Corps and DMR collaborated on the
interim report detailing actions in the near-
term to restore and renew coastal Mississippi.
In May 2007, Congress approved $107 million
to implement these interim projects, which
included beach restoration, rebuilding and
repairing seawalls, and constructing flood
control measures. Five of the 15 interim projects
have been completed, including projects to
strengthen the existing seawall on Beach
Boulevard in Hancock County, repair and restore
flows to the 980-acre Jackson Marsh system
and Mississippi Sound, and repair the damaged
approaches to Shearwater Bridge in Ocean
Springs.

72FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 73FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Remaining near-term initiatives to restore
and repair marsh and wetlands, beaches,
drainage and canal systems, and seawalls are
at various stages of completion.

For long-term measures, the Corps designed
a $1 billion plan that included actions to
restore barrier islands, coastal marshlands,
and beaches and convert flood-prone areas
to open space. In June 2009, Congress
approved $439 million for barrier island
restoration projects identified in the plan.
Other initiatives detailed by the Corps
have not yet been funded and should be
considered by Congress in the coming years.

The barrier islands are the state’s first line
of defense against oncoming storms. As a
hurricane approaches, the islands’ forests
help block and slow hurricane winds. Barrier
islands are also wetlands, which mitigate
flooding by slowing and absorbing incoming
water in the form of waves and storm surge.
The marshlands and wetlands along the
coastline serve as natural buffers in a
similar manner.

Building the barrier islands back to their 1917
footprint will provide invaluable protection
for the Coast. Models indicate that as storms
move across coastal wetlands, their surges
are reduced by about one foot per every
acre of wetland. Without the buffer of barrier
islands, wave and ocean storm surge heights

could reach eight to twelve feet higher on
the shoreline.

The barrier islands project has initially
focused on studies and restoration of West
Ship Island, Cat Island and Deer Island.

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

In the weeks and months after Hurricane
Katrina, MDEQ, along with its state and
federal partners, worked hard to evaluate
environmental conditions along the coast.
This monitoring included sampling of the
Mississippi Sound, the connected bays and
bayous, and the freshwater inflows into
the bays. It encompassed air, water, soil
sediment, fish, shrimp, and crabs. The results
of multiple monitoring studies indicated very
limited chemical contamination as a result of
the storm. In fact, the thirty-foot storm surge
seemed to have a temporary cleansing or
flushing effect on some systems. Final
reports for most of this work are available
via MDEQ’s website.

MDEQ continues to lead in the monitoring of
coastal Mississippi:

• Safe beaches are a major attraction to the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, and MDEQ has an
important role in ensuring the safety of
the bathing public. The coastal counties
have made improvements to Mississippi’s

beaches. Beach re-nourishment, planting
of vegetation, and improvements to
infrastructure have benefited water
quality. The counties contracted with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to replace
sand lost due to storm erosion.

• Federal funding for EPA’s National Coastal
Assessment Program ended in 2006.
This water quality monitoring program
was crucial to evaluating the quality of
Mississippi’s coastal waters. MDEQ has
partnered with the Gulf Coast Research
Laboratory and DMR to continue this
important program.

Disaster Debris Management. Hurricane
Katrina created more than 46 million cubic
yards of storm debris across the state with
approximately 24 million cubic yards in the
three coastal counties. MDEQ has monitored
debris removal and disposal, and has ensured
the proper closure and restoration of the
more than 340 debris management sites
throughout the state.

DMR worked with the U.S. Coast Guard and
FEMA to organize removal of marine debris
beginning south of I-10 and extending out
four miles into the Mississippi Sound. Marine
debris removal was completed in June 2008.

Nearly 400,000 cubic yards of marine debris
were removed from the three coastal counties.

In addition, more than 330 derelict vessels
were pulled out of Mississippi waterways.

MARINE HABITATS

Hundreds of acres of coastal marshes and
water bottoms were covered with storm
debris after Katrina hit the Gulf Coast,
which prevented these areas from functioning
as essential habitats for important commercial
and recreational species—shrimp, crabs, and
finfish. DMR reports that many of these areas
now have been cleared of debris and have
been restored to pristine conditions. Efforts
are ongoing to remove the remaining debris
from these coastal areas.

Oyster Habitat. Because oysters are a long-
term crop, total recovery from Hurricane
Katrina may take years. DMR continues to
monitor oyster habitats in an effort to gather
evidence relating to the current state of the
shellfish population along the Mississippi
Gulf Coast.

The DMR Shellfish Bureau is continually
monitoring and assessing the oyster reefs
damaged by Hurricane Katrina. By identifying
and mapping the oyster reefs using side
scan sonar and poling techniques with
Global Positioning Systems, the areas are
analyzed to determine which sites are best
suited for cultivation, cultch planting, and
the relaying of oysters.

74FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 75FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Since Hurricane Katrina through January 2010,
the DMR Shellfish Bureau has organized efforts
to rebuild the oyster reefs:

• Deposited 195,875 cubic yards of No. 57
limestone and oyster shells to refurbish
3,600 acres of public oyster reefs at a cost
of $10,269,385

• Transplanted 143,424 sacks of oysters to the
public oyster reefs at a cost of $3,244,781

• Placed smaller transplants along the
various public fishing reefs and piers to
enhance production in those areas

Shrimp and Crab. The shrimp and crab marine
resources of Mississippi are recovering well
from the impacts of Hurricane Katrina. Shrimp
landings have been favorable and blue crab
landings for 2006 were the highest in over 15
years. However, the fishery participants have
not fared so well. Both shrimp and crab license
sales were down
by at least half in 2009 as fishermen struggled
to recover. The demand for live bait shrimp is
high, as licensed bait dealer facilities
have declined to 13 from around 30
before Katrina.

Loss of and/or damage to gear and vessels, high
fuel costs and lack of fisheries infrastructure
continue to plague this culturally and
economically important coastal industry.
Infrastructure requirements needed to revitalize
the coastal fisheries include dockage space,
fuel and ice facilities, and dealer and processor

outlets through which shrimp and crab harvests
can be sold.

The Hurricane Katrina Recovery Grant provided
an economic boost to the industry. Through
the grant, commercial shrimp and crab
fishermen were contracted to assist marine
resource managers in monitoring the fisheries’
recovery:

• Employed 400 Mississippi resident
historical commercial fishermen (330
shrimp fishermen and 65 crab fishermen)

• Enabled fishermen to make 29,337
individual trip monitoring tickets, outlining
valuable information such as fishing
locations, gear utilization, and harvest
information

• Brought in $8.6 million to pay workers

Since the storm, over 12,224 derelict crab traps
have been removed and recycled from coastal
Mississippi marine habitats by contracted
commercial crab and shrimp fishermen as
part of the Mississippi Derelict Trap Recycling
Program. This cooperative recovery effort
resulted in Governor Barbour receiving a 2008
First Place EPA Gulf of Mexico Program Gulf
Guardian Award on behalf of the Governor’s
Commission.

Artificial Reef Restoration. Hurricane Katrina
resulted in the scouring and/or burying of 90
percent of Mississippi’s offshore reefs and about
85 percent of nearshore reefs, preventing the

reefs from effectively functioning as habitat.
DMR has been continuously working to
recover the lost habitat. The department’s
goal is to restore 100 percent of reef habitat
within five years of the storm by using
Hurricane Katrina disaster funds and the
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation and
Tidelands Trust Fund. Nineteen inshore reefs
have been restored, and the target is to
complete a total of twelve inshore reefs
in 2010.

Deployments completed with Katrina
Recovery funds since September 1, 2006:

• Added three deployments of steel hull
vessels on Mississippi’s offshore reefs
for a total of 93 deployments in reef
areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina,
restoring approximately 65% of the
offshore deployments lost in Hurricane
Katrina

• Deployed 230 goliath reef balls. The 540
bay reef balls constructed during the
previous period are currently located at
the Gulfport staging site, and plans are
to deploy them during 2010.

• Deployed 22 concrete culverts

Inshore Deployments:
• 141 deployments with a total of 44,000

cubic yards of crushed concrete
and limestone.

Fisheries Recovery. Katrina funds have
been used to enhance 12 shoreline access
sites by restoring surrounding lost low-
profile reef habitat. Recovery efforts to
enhance the shoreline access sites and
monitor fisheries through resident charter
boat and commercial fishermen are also
ongoing.

As part of the Hurricane Katrina Recovery
Grant, charter boat captains and commercial
finfish fishermen have been contracted
to assist marine resource managers in
monitoring the fisheries recovery and
have been paid nearly $1.2 million.
Program participants include 57 Mississippi
resident charter boat captains and 44
commercial finfish fishermen. Reports
have been submitted by the fishermen
outlining valuable information such as
fishing locations, gear utilization, bycatch
information, and harvest information.

Oil Spill. On April 20, 2010, BP’s Deepwater
Horizon drilling rig exploded, killing 11
workers and seriously injuring 17 others.
Oil began rushing from the rig thousands of
feet below the surface.

Mississippi has worked tirelessly throughout
the oil spill recovery process. The Governor
along with lead agencies DMR and DEQ
have been actively engaged with BP and
with federal agencies to assess both the

76FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 77FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

economic and ecological effects of the oil
spill on our state. Mississippi’s leadership has
been persistent in the fight to keep oil off our
shores, to preserve marine and coastal animal
life, and to protect citizens of the state from
any residual effects of the oil spill.

While the consequences of the spill are
still unknown at this time, the Governor
and state agencies are prepared to face
these challenges with the same resolve
demonstrated after Katrina. Mississippi’s
response to the hurricane proved to the
nation that we will overcome adversity at
all levels; indeed, Mississippi is poised to
overcome the challenges of the oil spill with
the same diligence and spirit that defined
our response to Hurricane Katrina.

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS
AND HAZARD MITIGATION

Hurricane Katrina necessitated that the state
take a serious review of its disaster response
mitigation efforts. If the state was to rebuild
bigger and better, it had to be cognizant of
the threats posed by its geography – Katrina
would surely not be the last dangerous
hurricane to strike its shores.

Efforts in disaster response and hazard
mitigation have ranged from major
initiatives, such as statewide interoperable

communications and barrier island
restoration, to simpler undertakings, such
as increasing the capacity of state and local
emergency agencies, promoting flood
insurance coverage, and mandating stronger
building codes and elevation requirements.

A statewide system of survivable,
interoperable communications is under
construction, and is in operation now for
much of the state, including the Coast.
This system will ensure easy, reliable
communications between emergency
responders throughout disaster-affected
areas, saving time and energy in those initial
crucial moments after a disaster.

MEMA has significantly upgraded its capacity
and technology, so that it can better respond
to disaster events across the state.

The restoration of the barrier islands will
fortify them as the state’s first line of defense
against oncoming hurricanes and bolster
their ability to block and absorb the wall of
water coming toward the coastline.

Key components of the post-Katrina
mitigation strategy also have included
the use of updated building codes, the
adoption of updated digital flood maps, the
development of local hazard mitigation plans
and the utilization of $293 million in Hazard
Mitigation Grant funding

to employ long-term cost-effective mitigation
measures.

Mississippi has already incorporated lessons
learned in its response to recent events. During
the 2010 oil spill, interoperable communication
technology connected those in the air locating
oil with those in the water whose job it was
to keep oil from reaching Mississippi’s shores.
After powerful tornadoes ripped through our
state in April 2010, MEMA deployed Mississippi
Cottages to replace destroyed homes for low
income residents.

These efforts have ensured that Mississippi will
be safer and better prepared for the next major
disaster, whenever it may come.

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

Interoperable Communications. Governor
Barbour has made the establishment of
survivable, interoperable communications
system his top priority for improving the
state’s disaster response capabilities. Katrina
inflicted so much damage to communications
infrastructure that local, state, and federal
emergency responders were unable to
communicate with one another. Further, those
systems that did work were incompatible with
systems in other jurisdictions.

In testimony before the Senate Homeland
Security and Government Affairs Committee

less than six months after Katrina, Governor
Barbour stated in response to the Committee’s
request for recommendations, “the need for
sustainable, interoperable communications
is paramount.” He stressed the importance
of an interoperable system, saying “Congress
should make establishment of a sustainable,
interoperable, communications system its
first priority in providing resources for
future calamities.”

Governor Barbour requested that Congress
reprogram a portion of Mississippi’s $433
million hazard mitigation allocation for the
Mississippi Wireless Interoperability Network
(MSWIN) a request that Congress granted by
redirecting $140 million for interoperable
communications.

This funding will allow Mississippi to build and
sustain a statewide survivable interoperable
communications system, which will provide a
major upgrade for the state’s disaster response
capacity for years to come.

The Wireless Communications Commission,
which manages MSWIN, is ahead of the initial
project schedule. A portion of the project is
complete and operational – from the Coast
northward to Highway 84 and the five-
county area surrounding the State Capitol.
The current implementation schedule calls
for the remainder of central Mississippi to be
completed by March 2011 and the northern

78FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 79FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

third of the State to be built and operational
by December 2011.

The MSWIN project has already paid dividends
for Mississippi; MSWIN communication
assets were critical in supporting emergency
operations in 2010. A Site-on-Wheels (SOW)
was operational in Yazoo County within
three hours of the devastating tornado in
May 2010. The SOW and 120 portable radios
from the WCC’s cache provided interoperable
communications among federal, state and local
first responders during the first weeks of the
recovery effort.

During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
response, the WCC extended the coverage of
MSWIN into the Gulf of Mexico by adding a
tower site on Horn Island and on a platform
site 30 miles south of Biloxi. The WCC
has provided 250 radios to the National
Guard, Coast Guard, and others to enable
interoperable communications among all
levels of government. MSWIN was also linked
with Louisiana’s LWIN system and the Orange
Beach, Alabama fire radio system to complete
coverage across the entire northern Gulf.
After it became evident that no real-time
communication capability existed between oil
spotters and the shrimpers and boaters under
BP’s “Vessels of Opportunity” program, the
Governor directed that MSWIN communication
equipment and handsets be distributed to
vessel operators to immediately link those who

were locating oil with those who were in the
water to clean it up.

MEMA Upgrades.
MEMA performed its
duties aggressively
both before and
after Katrina, but
the storm allowed
the agency to
evaluate operational
weaknesses. One
of many lessons
learned was that
MEMA was severely
understaffed. An agency review by the State
Personnel Board determined that MEMA
needed more employees. Since Katrina, MEMA
has grown from 67 to 218 full-time employees.
In addition, MEMA created the Disaster
Reservists Program to hire qualified individuals
to work for MEMA under contract during times
of disaster.

MEMA has relocated its operations to a new
facility in Pearl. The Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) was upgraded significantly from
the one used during Katrina. The 72,000 square
feet facility includes a 4,000 square feet state-
of-the-art EOC; the previous center measured
only 500 square feet.

Preparedness always begins at the local level,
and MEMA has worked hard to improve county

emergency operations. In 2000, only 43
counties in Mississippi had a full or part-time
emergency management program; now all 82
counties have either a full-time or part-time
emergency management director.

MEMA has increased shelter capacity:
• 377 American Red Cross Shelters with a

capacity of 99,500 evacuees
• 335 local shelters with a capacity of

107,111 evacuees
• Eight community colleges serve as

special needs shelters with a capacity
of 1,346 evacuees

MEMA has also expanded emergency
response assets and commodities to include:

• 205,632 bottles of water stored at MEMA
warehouse in Pearl

• 34,560 Meals Ready to Eat at MEMA
warehouse

• Contract for 70,000 gallons of unleaded
fuel and 30,000 gallons of diesel

• 16 140 KW generators
• Two 40 KW generators and three 20 KW

generators staged in Pearl
• Seven portable generator powered

light sets
• A fully operational 24/7 Mobile Operations

Command Unit
• Two mobile communications trailers

MEMA manages the Mississippi
Alternative Housing Program and deployed

Mississippi Cottages to tornado-stricken
areas in 2010. The first cottage was placed
a mere three weeks after the tornadoes,
replacing a destroyed home occupied by
a low income resident.

This was major breakthrough for disaster
recovery in this country, as it was the first time
cottages had replaced permanent housing so
quickly after a disaster. It also highlighted the
durability of the units, which were occupied
initially by Katrina victims, stored after those
persons moved out, and reused for tornado
victims. These advancements further confirm
that cottages are a viable housing option
for major disasters.

MITIGATION

Barrier Islands. Restoring Mississippi’s
barrier islands to their early 1900’s footprint
is a vital piece of limiting the damage from
future hurricanes. At the Governor’s request,
Congress has approved $439 million for barrier
island restoration projects identified by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These islands
are the state’s first defense against oncoming
storms, and help block storm surge. This
restoration will save untold lives and property
for years to come.

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. While
the FEMA Public Assistance program helps
communities rebuild what was lost, the FEMA

80FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 81FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP)
helps ensure those losses do not happen
again. FEMA estimates for every dollar spent
on mitigation, four dollars are saved in
the future.

The state has used $293 million in HGMP on a
variety of long-lasting mitigation measures:

• $26 million to retrofit 36 critical facilities
and infrastructure to Category 5 hurricane
standards and wind speeds in excess of
200 miles per hour

• $156 million for 33 new and 23 existing
public shelter facilities located in
the coastal region and along major
evacuation routes that will accommodate
over 33,000 citizens

• $27 million for the relocation or
acquisition of over 300 homes from
flood-prone areas and the elevation of
43 homes

• $14 million for 4,462 individual saferooms
and 88 group saferooms

• $6 million for 216 storm warning sirens
and 222 Alert FM warning devices

• $22 million to install backup power
generators at 341 sites and to purchase
223 trailer mounted generators

Stronger Building Codes, Higher Elevations,
More Flood Policies. Local jurisdictions in
the counties most affected by Katrina have
reduced the risks in their communities by
adopting more stringent building codes and

elevation requirements. In addition, about
30,000 more properties are protected by flood
insurance now than before Katrina.

After Katrina, it was evident that a stronger
common building standard should be
enforced throughout coastal areas. In April
2006, the Mississippi Legislature passed
House Bill 1406 mandating International Code
Council standards for Hancock, Harrison,
Jackson, Pearl River, and Stone counties. The
state provided $10 million in CDBG to fund
additional building code officials to enforce
the new requirements.

The hurricane also exposed the inaccuracy of
federal flood maps. The storm surge pushed
beyond the boundaries and heights set by the
existing Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs).
FIRMs indicate flood plains and required
building elevations for acceptance in the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), and
are based on the 100-year flood level.

In November 2005, FEMA published the
Advisory Base Flood Elevation (ABFE) maps.
The ABFEs were developed as a best estimate
of elevation levels while FEMA updated the
FIRMs, a process that took two years. Some
communities adopted the ABFEs in the
interim, and other jurisdictions mandated
higher elevations at least four feet higher than
previous requirements.

FEMA released the digital FIRMs in November
2007, and those are now in effect across
the Coast.

The NFIP serves as the cornerstone of flood
hazard mitigation programs. A community
must be a compliant member of the NFIP
to participate in the five federal/state
administered hazard mitigation assistance
programs and to fully participate in other
federal/state disaster assistance programs.

Since Katrina, the number of NFIP flood
policies in effect in Hancock, Harrison,
Jackson, and Pearl River counties has risen
from 21,000 to nearly 52,000, an increase
close to 150 percent.

This drastic increase in flood insurance
coverage can be attributed to MEMA
outreach efforts and state mandates through
its housing programs. The Homeowner
Assistance Program required grant recipients
to accept a flood insurance covenant on
their property.

In fact, all housing programs were designed
with mitigation as a top priority. All rebuilding
and new construction was required to comply
with the International Building Codes, and
higher elevations (first the ABFEs and then
the dFIRMs when those maps were published)
regardless of the elevations adopted by the
jurisdiction at the time.

GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION –
FIVE YEARS LATER

The work of the Governor’s Commission on
Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal ended on
December 31, 2005, but its impact continues
to be felt even five years after the storm. A
revitalization plan was created by the local
leaders who served on the Commission,
with input from citizens around the Coast
and experts from around the world. Local
governments have taken innovative ideas
from the charrettes and used them as
foundations to rebuild their communities;
likewise, Commission recommendations have
inspired many of the most important and
successful recovery initiatives.

To limit the impact of the Commission
to its designs and ideas would be a
mistake, however. While Commission
recommendations provided a tangible
product on which coastal communities could
rebuild, perhaps equally important to the
success of the Commission was its role in
spurring a sense of optimism and momentum
among the coastal region.

In just four months, the Commission inspired
local leaders and residents to envision ways
to make their communities better. The
Commission process instilled a sense of hope
that was palpable: not only could the Coast
repair and rebuild, but it could come back a

82FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 83FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

more vibrant and livable place. Coastal leaders
and residents alike shared a common belief in
the Commission and its work, believing that
even in the midst of massive destruction, a
brighter future lay ahead.

The designs and planning concepts developed
through the charrettes have changed the
way many cities have approached rebuilding.
Most of the cities have welcomed concepts
of walkability, mixed use, and traditional
coastal architectural that were prevalent at the
design forums. Some cities have integrated
the SmartCode into their planning and
zoning ordinances, as recommended by the
Commission. Certainly the revitalization of
downtowns has also been a central idea for the
cities’ recoveries.

The issue committees of the Commission
offered more than 240 recommendations,
many of which have led to major recovery
programs. An issue-by-issue focus on the
Commission’s final report is detailed below.

Land Use. This committee recommended
use of the land use concepts presented at the
charettes. As mentioned above, those ideas
have resonated throughout the Coast and have
guided the codification of new planning and
zoning rules in many instances.

The committee also suggested that the state
and local communities should adopt more

stringent building codes and higher elevations,
in the form of the International Building Code
and FEMA advisory flood elevations released
a few months after Katrina. In April 2006, the
Mississippi Legislature passed House Bill 1406
which mandated that Hancock, Harrison,
Jackson, Pearl River, and Stone counties adopt
the 2003 International Residential Code and
the 2003 International Building Code. While
not all coastal jurisdictions adopted the FEMA
advisory elevations to guide building heights
of new construction, all cities and counties did
pass higher elevation standards.

Intermodal Transportation. The Governor’s
Commission emphasized maximizing the
potential of the Port of Gulfport and making
its operations more efficient. The Governor is
implementing a Port redevelopment plan that
will significantly increase its capacity, improve
operational efficiency, and mitigate against the
threat of future storms.

The Intermodal Transportation Committee
reported concerns about the congestion
on Highway 90 near the Port. The Port plan
addresses these concerns in three ways: the
connector road that will be built from the Port
to Interstate 10 to reduce congestion on both
Highway 90 and Highway 49; improving the
railway between the Port and Hattiesburg to
allow greater rail capacity and higher speeds;
and dredging a deeper ship channel to
accommodate larger container vessels.

Public Services. The Public Services
Committee recommended regionalizing
water, sewer, and wastewater systems
and developing a statewide wireless
communications system.

The Gulf Coast Regional Water and
Wastewater Program was created to install
reliable water, sewer, and storm water
infrastructure in the southernmost five
counties. Two specific goals of the program
are: 1) to provide infrastructure to satisfy
demands placed on existing infrastructure
by population shifts and to accommodate
future growth, and 2) to move toward and
implement a regional infrastructure system
– a necessity to promote the maximum
utilization of resources and efficiency of
services.

Governor Barbour has secured funding
for a full build-out of the Mississippi
Wireless Interoperability Network (MSWIN).
Construction is ahead of the initial project
schedule. Phase 1, from the Coast northward
to Highway 84, is complete and in operation.
Phase 2A, the five county area surrounding
the State Capitol, is also complete and
became operational in July 2010. The
current implementation schedule calls for
the remainder of central Mississippi to be
completed by March 2011 and the northern
third of the State to be built and operational
by December 2011.

Additionally, MSWIN assets have been
deployed in support of emergency
operations for the 2010 tornadoes and BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

Affordable Housing. Ideas from the
Commission’s Affordable Housing Committee
have guided state housing recovery
initiatives. The Katrina Cottage concept,
created at the Mississippi Renewal Forum
and further developed by the Commission,
resulted in the replacement of FEMA travel
trailers with Mississippi Cottages through
the Mississippi Alternative Housing Program.
The state has advocated the use of modular
housing, as suggested by the Committee
because of its efficiency and affordability.
Cities have revised their ordinances to allow
more modular housing construction, and the
Governor successfully lobbied the Mississippi
Legislature to reduce the state’s tax on
modular homes from seven percent to
three percent.

Several CDBG programs are in line with
Commission recommendations. CDBG
housing programs have been designed
to provide housing for low and moderate
income families, including those with very
low incomes through the Public Housing,
Small Rental and Long Term Workforce
Housing programs. Second mortgage
programs, including My Home, My Coast
and REACH, were funded to help low income

84FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 85FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

households purchase homes. Several Long
Term Workforce Housing projects leveraged
private financing, stretching the use of CDBG
funding for housing construction. These
programs have also incorporated many of
the design characteristics advocated by the
Committee, including traditional coastal
architecture, energy efficiency standards, and
stronger construction standards.

Discounted insurance programs, such as those
now offered by the Wind Pool and private
insurers for housing construction that exceeds
basic building codes, were also recommended
by the Commission.

Tourism. The state has used FEMA Public
Assistance, CDBG and Historic Preservation
funding to rebuild and refurnish many of the
important tourism landmarks on the Coast,
including Beauvoir, the Biloxi Lighthouse, and
the Ohr-O’Keefe Museum. The Mississippi
Gulf Coast Coliseum and Convention Center
was rehabilitated using recovery funding. The
Gulf Coast Business Council has formed the
Tourism Initiative Group to study Tier One
Destination criteria.

Tourism initiatives undertaken by the
Mississippi Development Authority have
corresponded with Tourism Committee
suggestions:

• MDA created a $5 million Tourism
Industry Restoration Grant Program to

fund extensive advertising and events
marketing campaigns.

• MDA Tourism has supported local tourism
bureaus and convention and visitors
bureaus to promote “voluntourism”
opportunities and has attracted
conventions that made “voluntourism”
part of their agendas, such as the Travel
South USA Marketplace and Southeast
Tourism Society Annual Convention.

• MDA has expended part of its
promotional and advertising budget to
bring awareness to the golf and charter
fishing opportunities on the Coast
through familiarization tours and travel
media trips.

• MDA Tourism has promoted eco-tourism
opportunities and has worked with
Audubon on their plans for enhancing
eco-tourism opportunities on the
Pascagoula River. MDA has also worked
closely with the new owners of the Biloxi
Shrimping Trip in their efforts to enhance
their operations.

• MDA and the Mississippi Blues
Commission have included two sites on
the Mississippi Gulf Coast as part of the
Mississippi Blues Trail project.

Small Business. The Small Business
Committee noted that many problems created
by Katrina – the housing shortage, damage to
transportation infrastructure, lack of day care
facilities – hampered the recovery of small

businesses. As those critical problems have
been addressed, small businesses started
to thrive again. Particularly important was
the quick rebuilding of the two bridges that
connected the entire Coast, the Bay St. Louis
Bridge and the Biloxi Bay Bridge, once again
providing easy access to retail businesses in
Bay St. Louis and Ocean Springs.

Downtown revitalizations, as recommended
by the Commission, have been a major
theme of renewal as well. The state has
helped by funding streetscapes and building
enhancements in cities across the Coast.
One prime example is the $4 million CDBG
façade grant program conducted in Gulfport,
whose downtown is a vibrant location of small
business activity after Katrina.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Marine
Resources. The Mississippi Department
of Agriculture and Commerce (MDAC) has
addressed some the recommendations
from the Commission. MDAC disbursed two
aquaculture disaster grants and a livestock
feed assistance grant, as directed by the
Governor’s Office. Approximately $11 million
was paid to Mississippi farmers for damages
and feed loss.

The agency also monitored and regulated
mosquito control in the Gulf Coast counties.
MDAC, through the Bureau of Plant Industry,
also took on the task of combating the spread

of invasive species and pest plants such as
cogongrass, privet, and Chinese tallow.

The state worked to secure funding for the
Milk Producers Transportation Cost Assistance
Loan Fund for struggling dairy producers.
This zero-interest loan program enabled dairy
farmers to offset some of
the increased cost of transporting milk to area
processors.

The state was able to secure federal coastal
restoration funding for activities suggested by
the Commission. The Mississippi Department
of Marine Resources has worked to restore
artificial reefs, fisheries, and natural habitats
for oyster, shrimp, and crabs.

Defense and Government Contracting.
This Committee identified the need for skilled
and professional job training for defense
contracting. The Mississippi Department of
Employment Security (MDES) has managed
the National Emergency Grant program,
a workforce training program that has
funded workforce academies for the
shipbuilding industry.

In June 2010, a groundbreaking was
held for the Jackson County Maritimes
Trades Academy. The project will allow
Northrop Grumman and Mississippi Gulf
Coast Community College to grow their long-
standing apprenticeship program. The new

86FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 87FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

facility will have classrooms for academic
and vocational classes, a trade wing with an
additional nine classrooms with adjoining
labs, as well as computer labs and a
multi-purpose room that can be used for
crane training, assemblies and other large-
gathering events.

Education. Several recommendations of the
Education Committee have come to fruition.
As suggested, the Mississippi Department
of Education held Coast school districts
harmless for two years when calculating
Mississippi Adequate Education plan
allocations. School districts have mostly
completed the process of repairing and
rebuilding schools to mitigate from future
storm damage. When rebuilding schools,
many districts have chosen to locate them
further inland. Two schools have been rebuilt
using FEMA mitigation funding so that they
can serve as shelters for future disasters.
Higher education has also made great
progress. The Institutions for Higher Learning
distributed $95 million in financial aid for
homeless and displaced secondary students
as the Commission suggested. The state also
utilized community colleges for National
Emergency Grant job training classes.

Health and Human Services. The committee
cited physician retention as a challenge
facing the Coastal medical community.
Accordingly, Governor Barbour set aside $10

million in Social Services Block Grant funding
to help hospitals along the Gulf Coast recruit
and retain health care professionals. This
grant money was instrumental in helping
hospitals keep experienced medical staff, as
well as attracting qualified providers to meet
the medical needs of the Gulf Coast.

Another concern was mental health, which
was addressed through the Mississippi
Department of Mental Health’s Project
Recovery. The project provided counseling
services to thousands of Mississippians.

Several changes were made regarding
Medicaid in line with Committee suggestions.
The federal government reimbursed the State
share of services for Medicaid beneficiaries
and CHIP enrollees who resided in the 49
disaster-declared counties. The federal
government also provided the State share
of Medicaid services from August 24, 2005,
through June 30, 2006, for evacuees from
other states.

The federal government reimbursed the
total uncompensated care costs incurred for
medically necessary services from August 26,
2005 through January 31, 2006, for evacuees
and for individuals who resided in the 49
counties who did not have other coverage
for such assistance through any form of
insurance. The Division of Medicaid paid
claims totaling $73 million for this program.

The federal government offered Katrina
Provider Stabilization Grants to affected
states. The Division of Medicaid allocated
these grant funds in accordance with
directives from the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. However, the State was
allowed to apply a 1.136 weight factor to the
2005 Medicare revenue for each qualifying
hospital and skilled nursing facility from the
southernmost counties of Mississippi that
suffered a disproportionate impact from the
storm. A weight factor of 1.0 was used to
calculate the amounts for all other qualifying
providers. A total of $92 million was issued
with these grants.

Non-Governmental Organizations. The
committee offered three recommendations,
which have been followed. Notably, the “Gulf
Coast Non-Profit Clearinghouse” has been
created as the South Mississippi Alliance of
Service Organizations. The Alliance operates
through the Mississippi Center for Nonprofits
and provides ongoing support for Coast
nonprofit organizations.

CONCLUSION

On August 29, 2005, the Mississippi Gulf
Coast was utterly devastated by the sheer
magnitude of Hurricane Katrina, the worst
natural disaster in American history. In the
span of one day, the Coast was changed

forever. Despite the obliterated coastline,
Katrina provided a great opportunity for
renewal; an opportunity to rebuild a bigger
and better Gulf Coast. Today, five years after
the monumental storm, the Coast, through
Governor Barbour’s leadership, has achieved
a remarkable recovery and renewal.

Over the past five years, Mississippi has
boldly faced the challenge of recovering
from unprecedented destruction. However,
nothing was more evident after Katrina than
the prevailing strength and resiliency of the
people of the Mississippi Gulf Coast; indeed,
it is that spirit that has and will continue to
inspire and lead coastal revitalization efforts.

During the disaster recovery process,
additional challenges have emerged,
including a struggling national economy
and the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
However, whatever obstacles the state may
face – including those associated with the
long-term challenge of recovering from the
hurricane – one thing is certain: the Coast will
move forward with the same determination,
strength and hard work that has marked
recovery efforts since day one. From the
leadership of Governor Barbour to the spirit
and character of coastal citizens, Mississippi
is on track to achieve its number one post-
Katrina goal of rebuilding a coast that is
bigger and better than ever.

88FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 89FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Bay St. Louis

Waveland

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged

Substantially Damaged

Destroyed

Katrina Surge Inundation

0 0.5 10.25 Miles

Waveland
Bay St. Louis
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
Gulfport

Biloxi

Long Beach

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation

0 1 20.5 Miles

Biloxi
Gulfport

D’Iberville

Ocean Springs

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 1 20.5 Miles

FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS

FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS

90FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 91FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

10

110

10

90

49

49

67

53

15
43

605

Biloxi
Gulfport

Long Beach
Pass Christian
D’Iberville
Bay St. Louis
Waveland
Ocean Springs

609

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation

0 5 102.5 Miles

H a r r i s o n C o u n t yH a r r i s o n C o u n t y

10
110
90

57
63

15
Biloxi

Moss Point

Gautier

Pascagoula

Ocean Springs
D’Iberville

613

614

618

611

619

609
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 5 102.5 Miles

J a c k s o n C o u n t yJ a c k s o n C o u n t y10

59

59
90
11
43
53
43

Picayune

Waveland
Bay St. Louis

603

607

604

992

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed

Katrina Surge Inundation 0 2.5 51.25 Miles

H a n c o c k C o u n t yH a n c o c k C o u n t y

L
o

u
i s

i a
n

a
L
o
u
i s
i a
n
a
FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS

92FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 93FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Long Beach
Gulfport
Pass Christian
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
Pass Christian
Long Beach
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
Moss Point

Pascagoula
Gautier

613
618

611

618
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
Pascagoula
Moss Point
Gautier
619

613
611

FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS

94FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 95FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

Ocean Springs
Biloxi
Biloxi
609
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
Gautier
Pascagoula
Moss Point
Pascagoula
FEMA Damage Analysis
Damaged
Substantially Damaged
Destroyed
Katrina Surge Inundation
0 0.5 10.25 Miles
FEMA HOUSING DAMAGE ANALYSIS

96FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA 97FIVE YEARS AFTER KATRINA

FIRST LADY

MARSHA BARBOUR

has been
a beacon throughout Hurricane Katrina
recovery, beginning immediately after the
storm hit Mississippi. Mrs. Barbour was in
the team of National Guard and Mississippi
Department of Transportation first
responders who had to clear the roadways
in order to drive to the Coast.

For 23 of the first 28 days and 70 of the
first 90 days after the hurricane, Marsha
Barbour was on the Gulf Coast, working with
Mississippians who had lost everything they
owned. Mrs. Barbour was attentive to their
most critical needs and communicated with
MEMA, FEMA, the Red Cross, and others to
bring supplies and relief. Her sensitivity and
care brought much-needed compassion to
the hurting region.

In recognition of her commitment to
Mississippi’s recovery from Hurricane
Katrina, community leaders dedicated to
the First Lady a community center in Pass
Christian. The Marsha Barbour Community
Center opened in February 2010 and
features a junior Olympic size pool, NBA-
sponsored basketball court, fitness center,
playground, and computer lab.

Marsha Barbour’s legacy will be felt on the
Mississippi Gulf Coast for years to come.

MARSHA BARBOUR

Office of Governor Haley Barbour
August 29, 2010

www.governorbarbour.com

Field Action Report

Project CREST: A New Model for Mental Health Intervention
After a Community Disaster

Through Project CREST, many have receivedpostdisaster support who otherwise
would not have sought mental health care.

Carol S. \orth. MD. MPE. and BartyA. Hong. PhD

Wheti the Mississippi Riverand Its tnhutanes no(»ded St.
Louis, Mo. m the spring and sum-
mer of 1993. 25(1 menial health
professionals stood ready to help
the thousands whose Ii\es the
floods would aJTcct It turned out.
however, that most ofthe flixKi vic-
tims sought instead the support of
community leaders they kneu and
trusted.

To meet the need for commu-
nity-based disaster suppon. disaster
inter\-ention training that had been
offered to mental health profession-
als dunng the summer of 1993 was
adapted to train community re-
source personnel, ranging from
clergy to police. The result was
Project CREST (Community Re-
sources for Education. Support,
and Training).

CREST”s purpose is to maxi-
mize mental health resources
within communities by ciiuipping
community leaders to pro\ide
initial crisis intervention and
emotional relief services after
community-wide disaster> ,̂ when
professional resources arc uften
limited. CREST has also been
adapted to other types of crisis
intervention-

TIiroLigh Project CREST many
people have received crisis inter-
vention who othenvise would not
have sought mental health c:ire.

The CREST training team mcluded
psychologists, psychiatry residents, psychi-
atric nurses and nurse specialists, clinical
social workers, marital and l.imily coun-
selors. acti\it\ therapists, and doctoral can-
didates in psychology and social work Most
were recruited troni Lini\crsit\ incdicjl cen-
ter employees or ad\anced docttiral students
in social wurk or clinical ps\chology Fund-
ing Ircni the James S NKDonnell Inunda-
tion supported ihe authors, first, m develop-
ing ihe (.’RtSl curneulum and training the
trainers and, later, in pnn idmg consultation
The curriculum de\elopinent and training
oceupied 2 months in late 1443 and early
19 -̂4. the consultation was ongoing through

the summer of 19iJ4 The authors^—a psy-
ehiatnst who had clinical expertise with dis-
aster populations and a ps\cht>logist cxpen-
enced in training health protessionals and
communit\ \olunteers—also led the 52-
member t RhSl training team.

CRhST partieipants wore recruited
through team outreach to communit\ .igen-
cies (hat v\ere known for their tlttod relief
actiMties The outreach was accomplished
via telephone, letters describing the pro-
gram, and ••v\ord tif mouth” from pre\ious
trainees Participating agencies ineluded po-
lice departments and academies, sehool dis-
tricts, churches, the Red C ross. women’s
self-help centers, neighborhood health cen-

Basics of Crisis Intervention

G u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s ;>.i ; . , . . . . ,

4 Immediate support

4 Stabilize

4 Not therapy

4 Most are not psychiatrically ill—don’t “fix”

4 Distress is universal, and we can help with that

4 Refer people you are worried about

Slide used In Project CREST training program. The training covers the basics of
responding to community disasters, providing social support to flood victims,
and identifying and referring people who may need professional help.

July 2000. Vol. 90. No. 7 Amencan Journal of Public Health 1057

Field .\ctinn Report

Key Findings

• During disasters, victims seek support from trusted members oftheir OWTI com-
munities rather than mental health professionals

‘ Funher training of these community resource persons can expand the availabil-
ity of mental health sen ices for individuals after community disasters.

• An educationai curriculum initially designed lor traininc mental health profes-
sionals was successful!) adapted tor Project CREST to tram community leaders.

• The same cumcutum proved useful in training elderly volunteers to support their
peers in home and heallh care settings

Next Steps

Because o f t h e v u l n e r a b i l t y of St.
Louis to Hooding and to earthquakes (the
area rests on the country’s largest earth-
quake fault». CREST will probably see fur-
ther action. Other problems that seem at
times to loom larger than disaster—issues
sueh as school and community violence,
the stresses and strains of mental illness,
and coping \Mth the AIDS epidemic—will
also likely tap into the CREST model. More
CREST training will be offered whenever
the need occurs. ^

tors, shelters and emergency serviees for
youth and adults. Catholic family senices.
university student centers, assisted living
agencies, state mental health agenetes.
AIDS groups, counseling centers, and other
community organizations

A half-time projeet director contacted
the communitv groups, handled the logis-
tics ofthe training, and served as one ofthe
trainers. To contain costs. Project C REST
paid its trainers an honorarium (SIUU) and
reimbursed them for mileage

The mental health professionals trained
communitv participants in supportive listen-
ing, disaster coping, and triage skills during
a 3-hour workshop ihat covered a broad
spectrum of issues basic to mental health
crisis intervention. Their presentation in-
cluded slides, overhead transparencies, tlip
charts, and wntten handouts.

The CREST presentation was repeated
nearK 300 times for more than 2S(H) trainees
at 90 different sites. The prograni v^as so
vvell reeeived that a 3-hour sequel to the t~irst
presentation vvas held at most sites This sec-
ond seminar otlered site-responsive topics of
choice, sueh as problem-solving and com-
munication skills In addition, a telephone
consultatu>n line with project stafTwas made
available to trainees and other eoinmunitv
individuals; this sometimes led to triage that
resulted in utfice appointments lor tliKxl v ic-
tims with one of Ihe project leaders (B.H.).

These etforts continued throughout the
summer of 1993 as the Mississippi River

mounted 5 distinct flood crests that repeat-
edlv threatened communities and generated
new and continuing needs for menial health
relief The tollowing spring, limited flood-
ing recurred in L-onimunities along the Mis-
sissippi River near St. Louis. The CREST
program was once again called into action.
During this short-lived crisis, the CREST
professionals were the only mental health
workers serving many of these sites.

Other Interventions

Because of CREST’s suceess in help-
ing \Rtims ofthe W93 and 1944 floods,
several groups requested additional training
in subject areas other than flooding that
were felt to be equal or even more pressing
cnses for them, sueh as school v lolence and
domestic abuse. The CREST workshop ma-
tenals were readilv modified to the alterna-
tive subjects, and these presentations were
also well reeeived.

The suceess of C REST s model for de-
livery of emotional eare led to its use in the
Older Adult Serviee and Information Sys-
tem (OASISt Institute’s “Person to Person”
Program in St. Louis. In this pri>gram,
which began m 1996. elderly volunteers
pro\ ided conversation, communication, and
support lor their peers in home and health
care settings. The CREST training materi-
als and mode! served as the basis for the
program.

The authors are vKith the [>epartment of Psychiatry,
Washington University School of Medicine, St.
Louis. Mo

Requests for repnnts should be sent to Carol S.
North. MD. MPE. Departmenl of Psychiatry. Wash-
ington l_’ni\ersiiy School ot Medicine. 4940 Chil-
dren’s Place. St- Louis. MO 63110 (e-mail: northc@
psychiatrv’uusti edu)

This report was accepted February 29. 2000.

Contributors
C S North dnd B A Hong jointly designed the proj-
eci. implemented the work, and wrote this report.

Acknowledgments
This work was supponed by a grant trom the James
S. McDonnell Foundation of St. Louis.

Resources
1. Weaver JD Disa.’iters Mental Health Interven-

tions. Sarasota. Fla Professional Resource
Press; 1W5

2 Smith HM. North CS. Post-traumatic stress
disorder in natural disasters and technological
accidents In Wilson .1. Raphael B. eds- Inter-
national Handbook oj Traumatic Stress Syn-
drtmes- New York. NY: Plenum Press; 1993:
52-95.

3. North CS. Nixon SJ. Shariat S. et al. Psychiatric
dlsorde^^ among sur\i\ors ofthe Oklahoma
City bombing. J.AMA. 1^^.282755-762.

105H American Journal of Public Health
July 2000, Vol. 90, No. 7

Styles of Suicide Intervention:
Professionals’ Responses
and Clients’ Preferences

Jill C. Thomas and Larry M. Leitner
Department of Psychology

Miami University, Oxford, OH

As the rates of suicide in America continue to rise, suicide recently has been declared
to be a national public health concern. The crisis intervention model, which has dom-
inated the treatment of suicidal individuals in America since the 1950s, is currently
believed to be the most effective model for suicide intervention. This study examined
this belief by taking a more complex look at professionals’ responses to suicidal cli-
ents both by investigating the existence of different ways in which professionals in-
terpret the crisis intervention model. In one interpretation (the “fight” response), the
professional takes power and agency away from the client and does what is perceived
to be “best” for the client. An alternate interpretation, the “ideal” response, allows for
a respectful engagement with the client. Professionals also can act contrary to the
model (i.e., the “flight” response). In addition, based on the humanistic notion that
clients are the experts of their own experience and that their voices are a very valu-
able part of evaluating the treatment process, this study investigated which response
style clients report to be most helpful and most desired. The results suggest that while
the typical response of mental health professionals to suicidal clients is most charac-
teristic of the “fight” response style, clients overwhelmingly report that the contrast-
ing “ideal” response style is most helpful. The findings are discussed along with im-
plications for practice, research, and training.

The most recent statistics reveal that there are approximately 30,000 suicides in
America every year. There are about 80 suicides and 1,500 attempted suicides in
America each day: one suicide every 18 min and one attempt each minute. Suicide
is the eleventh leading cause of death in the United States and the third leading

THE HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGIST, 33(2), 145–165
Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Jill C. Thomas, Department of Psychology, Miami Univer-
sity, Oxford, Ohio 45056. E-mail: thomasj7@muohio.edu.

T
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cause of death among American youth ages 15 to 24 (American Foundation for
Suicide Prevention, n.d.). For every suicide it is estimated that there are six friends,
family, significant others, or loved ones the suicide has left behind. Based on this
estimate and the most recent suicide statistics, there are now at least 4.5 million
American survivors of suicide (Caruso, n.d.).

With these alarming statistics, it is no wonder that the response in the suicide
prevention movement has historically been an active and aggressive fight to pre-
vent the spread of this epidemic (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
2001; U.S. Public Health Service, 1999). Today’s approach to suicide prevention
and intervention is rooted in the theoretical framework established in 1958 with the
inception of the first suicide prevention center (the Los Angeles Suicide Preven-
tion Center; Allen, 1984). This framework, known as the crisis intervention model,
prescribes a standard protocol for responding to the suicidal client. After quickly
establishing rapport with the client and developing an understanding of the prob-
lem, the crisis intervention worker must develop options and take action, using all
measures possible. These measures include: reducing immediate danger with the
use of no-suicide contracts, helping to make the client’s environment safe, evaluat-
ing the client’s need for medication, involving family or significant others in the in-
tervention, linking the client to other community resources, helping the client to
structure his or her time, and possibly voluntary or involuntary hospitalization
(Fremouw, de Perczel, & Ellis, 1990).

Although the crisis intervention model explains clearly and concretely what steps
are to be taken and what actions are needed, it offers little in the way of prescribing
the manner in which these steps and actions are to be carried out, thus allowing for
multiple possible interpretations of the model. The typical interpretation of the
model is one in which the crisis interventionist is assertive, active, and aggressive.
Leenaars (1994), for example, likens the activity of a crisis intervention worker to
that of a cardiologist in an emergency unit. This metaphor is consistent with the be-
lief that the role of the crisis interventionist is to take charge of the situation and take
over for the person, who is rendered weak and/or helpless in the face of the crisis, to
fix the problem or repair the person. This metaphor is consistent with the depiction of
the crisis interventionist in most of the literature and results in one prototypical pro-
fessional response to suicidal clients (i.e., the following “fight” response). However,
as stated previously, the crisis intervention framework does offer room for other pro-
cedural interpretations (i.e., the following “ideal” response).

THIS STUDY

As Maris, Berman, and Silverman (2000) have reported, “research on treatment ef-
fectiveness [for suicidal people] is both difficult and rare” (p. 527). Methodological
issues in the study of suicide, like confounding variables and the ethical prohibitions

146 THOMAS AND LEITNER

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to using a control group in testing treatment efficacy (Berman, 2000; Frankish, 1994;
Neimeyer & Pfeiffer, 1994a), make it difficult to empirically validate the crisis inter-
vention approach. As such there is little empirical evidence for what works with sui-
cidal clients and almost a total lack of evidence that the crisis intervention model
(typically operationalized consistent with the cardiologist interpretation) is the most
effective or is even effective at all (Berman, 2000; Frankish, 1994). Despite the lack
of evidence, the crisis intervention model is currently believed to be the best option
for the treatment of suicidal individuals, and, as such, professionals continue to teach
it, and to evaluate the skills of their volunteers based on their ability to work within it
(Neimeyer & Bonnelle, 1997; Neimeyer & Pfeiffer, 1994a, 1994b).

This two-part study was conducted in an effort to examine the belief that the cri-
sis intervention model is the ideal treatment model for suicidal clients. Part I of the
study takes a more complex look at professionals’ responses to suicidal clients
both by investigating the existence of different interpretations of the crisis inter-
vention model as well as the existence of ways professionals act contrary to the
model. This portion of the study attempted to understand these varying interven-
tion styles through interviews with community mental health professionals about
the ways they have responded to suicidal clients in the past.

Part II of the study evaluated the belief that the crisis intervention model is the
ideal treatment model for suicidal clients by examining which response style sui-
cidal clients report through interviews to be most helpful and most desired. This
portion of the study was based in the humanistic notion that clients are the experts
of their own experience and therefore that their voices are a valuable part of evalu-
ating the treatment process. While acknowledging the methodological difficulties
inherent in suicide research, this study, by looking at the issue from the suicidal cli-
ent’s perspective, offers one viable way of understanding the therapeutic and prac-
tical implications of different response styles.

The data gathered in the two parts of the study were compared in an effort to an-
swer the main research question: Do the responses that professionals offer suicidal
clients match with what clients report to be most helpful? Given the startling sui-
cide statistics and the rising rate of suicide in this country, the overall study hypoth-
esis was that a mismatch exists between the response styles professionals are offer-
ing and the type of response that suicidal clients desire or find most helpful.

Styles of Suicide Intervention

This examination was conducted based on a literature review that suggested the ex-
istence of two problematic styles of response (“fight” and “flight”) along with an
alternate more “ideal” style. Those, for example Szasz (1980, 1986), who describe
the problematic response types, launch a harsh attack on many mental health pro-
fessionals who intervene with suicidal clients. However, although these arguments
are valuable in pointing out responses that may not be helpful to the suicidal indi-

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 147

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vidual, they are not presented here as an attack. Most mental health professionals
respond to suicidal clients in the best way they know how. The problematic “fight”
and “flight” responses described in the literature are understandable responses to a
very difficult situation.

“Fight.” The popular “cardiologist” interpretation of the crisis intervention
model described earlier is consistent with the assertive, active, and aggressive
“fight” response style, which takes power, agency, and control from the client
without much forethought or discussion. (Table 1 describes the “fight” response.)
It is important to make clear that the “fight” is not inherent in the actions required
by the model but rather is evident in the manner in which the actions are taken. Due
to the importance of the goal of suicide prevention, the professional takes the mea-
sures suggested by the crisis intervention model against the client’s will. In this
case, and even in other less extreme cases, although the measures themselves are
not inherently “fighty,” they are reflective of the problematic “fight” response be-
cause they come primarily out of the needs of the professional without first talking
with, listening to, and considering the needs of the client.

For Szasz (1986), the “fight” style of suicide intervention results in a rapid
abandonment of the therapeutic alliance and “coercive intervention” in which any
and all means necessary to prevent the suicide are quickly taken against the client’s
will. This response can even incorporate the use of fraud and force and results in a
struggle for power between client and helper (Szasz, 1980). The client in this
struggle wants control over his or her life. The professional, although claiming to
want to help this person by the use of involuntary hospitalization, police involve-

148 THOMAS AND LEITNER

TABLE 1
Description of the “Fight” Response Type

• Incorporates the use of fraud and force (actions against the client’s will made under the false
pretense that the motivation behind the action is for the client’s sake).

• May result in a struggle for power between client and helper.
• May use involuntary hospitalization.
• May use police involvement.
• May use forced medication or shock treatments.
• May advance the client’s feelings of hopelessness and despair and/or aggravate the client’s

problems.
• May point out the immorality of committing suicide.
• May react in a hostile or angry manner toward the suicidal individual.
• May involve client’s family and/or develop another support network for the client in the

community, possibly against the client’s wishes.
• May contact the client’s family physician to alert him or her to the possibility of an overdose on

prescription medications, possibly against the client’s wishes.
• May aid in structuring the client’s time between sessions.
• Actions come out of the needs of the professional without first talking with, listening to, and

considering the desires of the client.
• Responds in an active and directive way.

T
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ment, forced medication, or shock treatments, essentially deprives this person of
basic human liberty as a means of, “gain[ing] control over the patient’s life to save
himself from having to confront his doubts about the value of his own life” (Szasz,
1980, p.191). Likewise, Jobes and Maltsberger (1995) state that this “fight” re-
sponse is due to the “strong countertransference wish to do something active, pow-
erful, and healing so that the therapist will not have to endure the empathic pain of
experiencing the patient’s despair” (p. 205). The descriptions offered by Grollman
(1971) of the “helper as a moralizer” and the “angry helper” also fit the “fight” re-
sponse type, and he, along with Szasz (1980), asserts that this response may actu-
ally advance the client’s feelings of hopelessness and despair and aggravate the cli-
ent’s problems rather than help the situation

“Flight.” Szasz (1980) elaborates the other problematic response, the “flight”
response, by describing professionals who respond in this way as those who, when
confronted with the issue of suicide “run for their lives” (p. 191; See Table 2). As
Grollman (1971) states, suicide is

ugly for onlookers, devastating for relationships, and harrowing even for those pro-
fessionally involved. So the entire subject is often studiously avoided, even when a
person threatens to take his own life. Some just do not want to become entangled in
the sordid predicament (p. 87).

Jobes and Maltsberger (1995) explain this type of response as being due to the thera-
pist’s inability to engage with the client’s intense suffering, and say that, as a result of
this inability, the therapist remains detached and “professional.” As such, they may
rush through or avoid the topic of suicide altogether or even refuse to see the client.

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 149

TABLE 2
Description of the “Flight” Response Type

• Those who, when confronted with the issue of suicide, “run for their lives.”
• May avoid the subject of suicide, even when a person threatens to take his own life.
• May communicate disinterest to the suicidal client.
• May feel concern about the personal ramifications of uncovering serious suicidal ideation,

including extra expenditure of time and energy.
• May not inquire about suicide or may wait until the end of the interview to ask about it.
• May rush through the assessment of suicidal intent, thus not creating an environment where the

client feels comfortable to share suicidal thoughts or feelings.
• May ask leading questions which invite a negative response (e.g., “you’re not thinking of hurting

yourself are you?”).
• May take the first “no” for an answer rather than probing further about suicidal ideation.
• May take a very passive role in suicide intervention, does not respond in an active and directive

way.
• May divert discussion away from powerful emotion to a more intellectualized or abstract

exchange.
• May offer superficial reassurance that everything will be okay.

T
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The “flight” response to suicide is problematic because it communicates disin-
terest to the suicidal client and confirms for the client his or her belief that no one
cares. Shea (1998) helps to develop a clearer picture of how this avoidance might
actually look in the interaction between client and therapist. He feels that helpers
are often concerned that if they uncover serious suicidal ideation, they are opening
themselves up to a messy situation that will probably be very time and energy con-
suming. As a result, he says that, to avoid this mess, some clinicians may not even
inquire about suicide or may wait until the end of the interview to ask about it. He
suggests that they may also rush through the assessment of suicidal intent, thus not
creating an environment in which the client feels comfortable enough to share sui-
cidal thoughts or feelings. In addition, the clinician may ask leading questions that
invite a negative response (e.g., “You’re not thinking of hurting yourself are you?”)
and then will take the first “no” for an answer. Shea (1998) states, “the clinician
should seldom, if ever, leave the topic after a single denial” (p. 468) because many
suicidal people will often deny these feelings when first asked.

TONY’S TALE

Both the “fight” and “flight” response types are illustrated by the response a cli-
ent, Tony, described when interviewed by the researcher. Tony, who says the
worst thing a mental health professional can do when interacting with a suicidal
client is to “brush him off,” says that is exactly what happened to him. Tony re-
cently called his therapist because he was feeling really down and was thinking
of suicide. Tony says that when he was talking to his therapist, he felt like his
therapist was not concerned about his suicidal thoughts. Tony says, “I felt like he
thought I was making it up, but I wasn’t. I was thinking about suicide. All he’s
concerned about is how many clients he can get and making money.” Tony says
that the therapist told him that suicide was wrong and that, if he were to go
through with it, his soul would be in danger of “hell and damnation.” Tony re-
ports that the therapist sounded anxious at times and tried to rush him off of the
phone by telling him things like, “We’ll talk about it next session.” Disgusted,
Tony could not believe this response because, as he said, “you know, he didn’t
know if I was going to commit suicide or not after that!” Tony also felt very let
down. He now questions if he would call his therapist again if he were feeling
suicidal. He says he would most likely call someone else.

Tony reported that he also tried to talk to his psychiatrist about his feelings. He
was shocked and angry when the response he received was, in his words,

I’m a psychiatrist. I only dispense medicine. Your therapist is the one you should be
talking to.’ She should not have said that. She’s supposed to be my doctor. I don’t un-
derstand what that was all about. That was very confusing to me.

150 THOMAS AND LEITNER

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When reaching out for help in a time of great need, Tony was confronted with pro-
fessionals who did not seem to want to help him, or believe him, or hear him. For
whatever reason, consistent with the “flight” response, these professionals seemed
unavailable to be present for their client in suicidal crisis. Both professionals com-
municated a disinterest to Tony and a desire to avoid the issue. Tony was also faced
with a “fight-like” value judgment about the morality of considering an option like
ending his life when his therapist pointed out the moral–religious implications of
suicide. In addition, also consistent with the “fight” style, Tony was confronted with
anger on the part of the professionals working with him, which he picked up in their
tone of voice and manner of speaking. Tony did not find the “flighty” or “fighty” as-
pects of these responses to be helpful. Instead, when asked what he finds to be the
most helpful professional response to a suicidal client, Tony says that that he wants
someone to, “Hear me out. Let me talk to them. Give me a little comfort. Not rush me
off the phone … That’s what they’re supposed to be doing, helping.”

The Alternative “Ideal” Response: Neither
“Fight” Nor “Flight.”

The response Tony described as most helpful more closely resembles the third re-
sponse style examined in this study. This “ideal” response stands in contrast to
both of the previously mentioned problematic responses (Table 3). Jobes and
Maltsberger (1995) describe this type of response when they state that, “suicidal
patients need the therapist’s genuine warmth, interest and respect … The therapeu-
tic interest we refer to is agape: that unselfish, nonerotic unexploitative concern
that loyally accepts others and seeks their well-being” (p. 209).

A description of this “ideal” response can also be found in the Personal Con-
struct Psychology (PCP) literature. When talking about suicide, Kelly (1961)
states, “instead of treating it as something evil, pathological or nonsensical, we can
understand it far better if we look at the act itself and what it accomplishes from the
point of view of the person who performs it” (p. 257). As such, rather than
pathologizing suicidal behavior (i.e., asserting a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders [DSM] diagnosis as its cause), PCP searches for the meaning
in it. At the same time, while taking this nonjudgmental and empathic stance, Kelly
(1961) does not advocate for ultimate acceptance of the client’s desire to die.
Rather, he states that the goal of therapy with a suicidal client is to “restore and ac-
centuate those universal psychological processes that characteristically make life
an ongoing proposition” (p. 277). Here, the PCP clinician and the “cardiologist”
crisis interventionist share a common goal and, as such, some of the actions finally
needed may be the same in both response styles. However, as the description of the
“ideal” response style shows, the “ideal” responder aims to meet this goal in a
qualitatively different manner than does the “fighty” or “flighty” responder.

This way of being with the client leaves the client with no doubt that the words,
attitudes and actions of the therapist are genuine and based on caring and concern

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 151

T
hi
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for the client. Thus, if the client and the therapist should reach an impasse and they
can no longer collaborate on the issue of suicide, and the therapist feels legally re-
sponsible to take coercive actions to prevent the client’s suicide, it is more likely
that the client will remember this genuine caring and, once the goal of the preserva-
tion of life is met, will be able to reapproach the relationship with an understanding
of the therapist’s actions.

ANN’S EXPERIENCE

Fortunately, not all suicidal clients have negative experiences when reaching out
for help. Some clients report that they have been able to build relationships based
on mutual trust and respect that are associated with a different kind of response
from professionals than the “flighty” and “fighty” ones described by Tony. Ann,

152 THOMAS AND LEITNER

TABLE 3
Description of the “Ideal” Response Type

• Some of the actions taken may be the same as those seen in the “fight” response, but the actions
are taken in a different manner, suicidal feelings and thoughts are explored with the client as a
means to collaborate around actions to be taken, actions are not taken against the client’s will
unless an impasse has been reached and the situation is such that the clinician has no other choice.

• The relationship established between the client and the therapist is described as a powerful,
respectful collaboration.

• Suicide is looked at with the client in terms of what it accomplishes from the point of view of the
client.

• The decision to commit suicide is understood and empathically embraced when the therapist is
looking at the world through the client’s eyes.

• Takes a nonjudgmental stance towards suicide.
• Emphasizes the need for an empathic understanding of the client and the client’s meaning of

suicide.
• The therapist enters the relationship with the client using a credulous approach, in which the

therapist accepts everything the client says as the “truth” for the client and resists the urge to
conform the client to the therapist’s world view.

• The invitational mode used is safe and respectful, inviting to move the discussion in certain
directions, allowing clients to proceed at their own pace.

• Therapist acknowledges that some topics, like suicide, are painful and overwhelming to deal with.
• Does not view suicide as a mental illness, does not offer a DSM diagnosis as the cause of suicidal

intent.
• Affirms the client’s feelings but at the same time helps the client separate these valid feelings from

the link to self-destructive behaviors.
• Therapist empathically resonates with the experiences of the client but still recognizes the

experiences as belonging to the client, not the therapist.
• Client feels that the words, attitudes and actions of the therapist are genuine and based on caring

and concern for the client.

Note. DSM = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

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for example, described her experience of the interventions she received as being
very positive and, as such, is used here to illustrate the “ideal” response type. Re-
cently, Ann called her case manager because she was having thoughts about want-
ing to kill herself. Her case manager listened to her and told her that she had made
the right choice to call. She told Ann that it was good to talk to people about how
she was feeling. The case manager called Ann back later that day and told her that
she would like Ann to meet with her psychiatrist the next morning. Ann agreed and
was pleased that her case manager would arrange this for her. She perceived this as
a very caring and responsive thing to do. Ann expressed that she has a very good re-
lationship with her doctor. She says that not only does she trust him but “he trusts
me too.” This seems evident in his response to her. Rather than make decisions for
her, Ann states that she and her doctor had a discussion about her feelings and
talked about some options. Her doctor asked for her opinion about what she
thought would be most helpful. Ann said that she would have done whatever he
told her she ought to do but she really just needed his attention and she felt like she
got that.

The response Ann got from her treatment providers was very consistent with
what Ann says is the best thing a mental health professional can do for a suicidal
client, “to listen and be there for them… and to see the doctor as soon as possible.”
Ann wanted to be heard and wanted attention paid to her suffering by the person
she knew could help and the person she felt most connected to. Given the context
of this relationship as compared to a relationship in which the client does not feel
connected to the mental health professional, Ann’s statement about the worst thing
a professional can do for a suicidal client is telling. Ann says,

Well, I could say, ‘send me to the hospital,’ but if that’s what it took, you know, it
would have to be his way, not my way… the worst thing? … Send me home without
giving me anything. And he didn’t send me home with nothing. He gave me options.

In the context of a mutually respectful and trusting relationship, Ann can re-
spect and understand the decisions (e.g., hospitalization) that are ultimately made
to protect her. Rather than feeling angry, let down, frustrated, discounted and con-
fused, Ann feels respected and cared for, leaving the relationship with her treat-
ment provider to grow deeper, more powerful, and ultimately more helpful.

SPECIFIC RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Based on the literature describing the detrimental effects of two problematic re-
sponses to suicidal clients (“fight” and “flight” responses), we predicted that the
response clients describe as being the most therapeutic would be in direct contrast
to these two modes. Specifically, we hypothesized that the “ideal” response would

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 153

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most closely capture what clients describe, based on their experiences of being sui-
cidal, as the most preferable mode of response. In contrast, given the predomi-
nance in the literature and in the field of the “fight-like” interpretation of the crisis
intervention model, we predicted that a “fight” style would be most characteristic
of professionals’ responses to suicidal clients. Taken together, these predictions
underlie the overall study hypothesis that a mismatch exists between the interven-
tions professionals are offering and the responses that suicidal clients desire or re-
port to be most helpful.

METHOD

Participants

The participants for this study were mental health professionals and clients re-
cruited from community mental health agencies serving primarily metropolitan
and suburban areas. All participants were paid for their participation. Initially, six
agencies providing a wide range of services (e.g., case management, day treat-
ment, individual therapy, residential programs, and other outreach programs) were
contacted regarding participation in the study. Five of the six agreed to participate.

To qualify for Part I of the study, mental health professional participants must
have had an adult client, for whom they had primary treatment responsibility, present
with serious intent to commit suicide within the recent past (6 months was suggested
but not required if memory for the event was good). Serious intent was defined as in-
cluding situations in which danger was perceived as immediate as well as situations
in which danger was not perceived as immediate but likely to occur in the near future.
This definition did not include chronic suicidal ideation lacking imminent or im-
pending danger. In total, 48 professionals (i.e., case managers, team leaders, super-
visors, therapists, clinical nurse specialists, diagnosticians, and licensed psycholo-
gists) volunteered for this study. (See Table 4 for sample demographics).

For Part II of the study, qualifying client participants were adults who had ex-
pressed suicidal intent (as defined previously) while in treatment with a mental
health professional in a community mental health system within the recent past (6
months was again suggested but not required). These clients, to receive treatment
within the system, have been given a DSM diagnosis and have been classified by
the state as “severely mentally disabled.” In all, 23 client volunteers were obtained.
(See Table 5).

Procedure

After providing informed consent and relevant demographic information, the pri-
mary researcher conducted semistructured interviews with professional and client

154 THOMAS AND LEITNER

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155

TABLE 4
Demographics for All Professional Study Participantsa

Demographic Category n % Other Stats

Sex female 35 73
male 13 27

Race Caucasian–White 33 69
African-American–Black 12 25
other 3 6

Licensure unlicensed 32 67
licensed (LPC, LSW) 7 15
independently licensed
(LISW, LPCC, CCDCIII, RN) 7 15
licensed psychologist 2 4

Education high school diploma, GED 1 2
Associate’s, 2-year degree 5 10
Bachelor’s degree 26 54
Master’s degree 15 31
postdoctoral education 1 2

Age M = 34 years

Years in field Range: 22–56 years
Mdn = 5 years
Range: .375–25 years

Note. CCDCIII = Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor III, GED = General Equivalency
Diploma, LPC = Licensed Professional Counselor, LPCC = Licensed Prefessional Clinical Counselor,
LISW = Licensed Independent Social Worker, LSW = Licensed Social Worker, RN = Registered
Nurse.

TABLE 5
Demographics for All Client Study Participantsa

Demographic Category n % Other Stats

Sex female 18 78
male 5 22

Race Caucasian–White 18 78
African-American–Black 4 17
other 1 4

Age M = 42 years
range: 18–59 years

aN = 23

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participants, who were later debriefed and paid for participation. During inter-
views with professionals, the researcher asked them to describe their experience of
responding to a suicidal client, including some general information about the client
and the client’s circumstances, as well as information about the clinician’s re-
sponse style and actions. The researcher explored in depth with professionals what
response they chose and, more important, in what manner they responded (i.e.,
what exactly did the professional say to the client, how did the client respond, how
was the professional feeling during this interaction). In addition, the researcher in-
vited professionals to discuss their past and present personal and professional
views or beliefs about suicide as well as any previous personal or professional ex-
periences with suicide. During client interviews, the researcher asked clients to
talk about their experience during a time when they were suicidal, including the
specific circumstances of the event as well as the response they received when they
shared their intent with their clinician. The researcher also asked clients to describe
what, in their experience, are the most and least helpful responses professionals
can offer suicidal clients.

Once all data for each participant had been collected, three clinical research as-
sistants, blind to the hypotheses and the other relevant data, reviewed the interview
data. The research assistants used a literature-based description of the three re-
sponse types (See Tables 1–3) to rate professional interviews for each of the re-
sponse types professionals employed and client interviews for each of the response
types clients indicated as helpful. Because it was supposed that many factors prob-
ably simultaneously affect the responses of professionals in different ways, it was
not expected that most professionals would exhibit one response type to the exclu-
sion of the others. Rather, we thought that each professional’s overall response to a
suicidal client would represent a mixture of the three response types (“fight,”
“flight,” and “ideal”). As such, the research assistants were asked to record the
level of each of the response types in each interview on a scale from 0 (no response
of this type) to 10 (the strongest possible response of this type). An option of “Can-
not Determine” was also given if rankings could not be made. The raters discussed
each interview to come to a consensus on the ratings for each response type

RESULTS

Information obtained from 39 of the 48 professional participants was used in the
final analysis. (See Table 6 for demographics of this subsample). The reduction
in usable data was due to poor tape quality for some interviews and inability of
raters to reach a consensus in some cases. Information obtained from 20 of the
23 client participants was used in the final analysis. (See Table 7 for demograph-
ics of this subsample). One of the 23 clients who initially volunteered for the
study chose to discontinue participation before completing the interview and one

156 THOMAS AND LEITNER

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157

TABLE 6
Demographics for Subset of Professional Study Participants

Used in Data Analysisa

Demographic Category n % Other Stats

Sex female 27 69
male 12 31

Race Caucasian–White 28 72
African-American–Black 9 23
other 2 5

Licensure unlicensed 24 62
licensed (LPC/LSW) 7 18
independently licensed
(LISW/LPCC/CCDCIII/RN) 6 15
licensed psychologist 2 5

Education high school diploma/GED 1 3
Associate’s, 2-year degree 4 10
Bachelor’s degree 20 51
Master’s degree 13 33
postdoctoral education 1 3

Age M = 34 yrs.
range: 22–55 years

Years in field Mdn = 5 years
range: .375–25 years

Note. CCDCIII = Certified Chemical Dependency Counselor III, GED = General Equivalency
Diploma, LPC = Licensed Professional Counselor, LPCC = Licensed Prefessional Clinical Counselor,
LISW = Licensed Independent Social Worker, LSW = Licensed Social Worker, RN = Registered
Nurse.

an = 39.

TABLE 7
Demographics for Subset of Client Study Participants

Used in Data Analysisa

Demographic Category n Percentage Other Stats

Sex female 16 80
male 4 20

Race Caucasian–White 16 80
African-American–Black 3 15
other 1 5

Age M = 42 years
range: 18–59 years

an = 20

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other client completed the interview but did not meet the qualifications for the
study. In addition, one interview was rated but could not be used, as raters were
unable to come to a consensus based on the information provided in the inter-
view. When comparing the data in Table 4 to Table 6 and Table 5 to Table 7, one
can see that the demographics of the subsets used for data analysis do not differ
substantially from those of the total sample from which they were taken. This
suggests that the subsets of participants, both professional and client, are repre-
sentative of the original samples.

Part I: Mental Health Professionals

In support of the hypothesis, the responses of mental health professionals are con-
sistently characterized by features of the “fight” response. In the majority of inter-
views, 55%, the “fight” response was rated as most characteristic of professionals’
responses (vs. “ideal,” 28%, and “flight,” 17%). On a scale from 0 (no response of
this type) to 10 (most extreme possible response of this type), the average “fight”
rating for professionals’ responses was 5.2, the average “flight” rating was 1.6, and
the average “ideal” rating was 3.9. Overall, professionals were significantly more
likely to intervene in a “fight-like” manner than they were to avoid or flee the threat
of suicide (t = 6.03, p < .001). At the same time, professionals were also marginally significantly more likely to respond with “fight” than with a more “ideal,” cli- ent-friendly style (t = 1.94, p = .06). Fortunately, however, professionals overall tended to be more likely to respond to the client in an “ideal” way than with “flight” (t = 3.29, p < .01).

Part II: Clients

As with the data from the professionals, three paired sample t tests were performed
on the client data obtained in the study. In support of the hypothesis, the results in-
dicate that clients show a clear preference for the ideal response type. On a scale
from 0 (desires no response of this type) to 10 (most extreme possible response of
this type), the average “fight” rating for client preferred response was 3.05, the av-
erage “flight” rating was 1.1, and the average “ideal” rating was 6.8. In fact, the
ideal response was seen as most characteristic of clients’ reported intervention
preferences in 80% of the interviews. In contrast, “fight-like” responses were pre-
ferred by only 15% of clients, and “flight-type” responses were preferred by only
5% of clients in the study.

Results of the t tests show significant differences in all of the pairwise compari-
sons. Clients prefer the “ideal” response more than twice as much as the “fight” re-
sponse (t = 4.93, p < .001) and more than six times as much as the “flight” re- sponse, which they least prefer (t = 8.14, p < .001). In addition, the results show that although neither problematic response type is preferred, of the two problem-

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atic types, clients would rather professionals be overly protective (“fight”) than
avoid or deny (“flight”) the issue of suicide (t = 4.03, p = .001). The majority (12 of
20 clients) did not include any flight-like characteristics in their descriptions of the
response they feel to be most helpful but many reported a preferred response that
had at least some flavor of all three response types and all were characterized at the
least as a mixture of the fight and ideal responses.

DISCUSSION

Taken together, the results of the two parts of this study support our overall hypoth-
esis that a mismatch exists between interventions that suicidal clients report to be
most helpful and interventions that professionals tend to provide. Although clients
clearly find the “ideal” response to be most helpful, professionals generally re-
spond in a manner characteristic of the “fight” response. Thus, the answer to the
initial research question is: No. The responses that professionals offer suicidal cli-
ents generally are inconsistent with what clients report to be most helpful. Al-
though ultimately the same actions may be taken, the “fight-like” manner in which
professionals are responding is in many ways the opposite of the “ideal” style that
clients find to be most helpful. This fundamental mismatch between the desires of
suicidal clients and the actions of their treatment providers has implications for
practice, research, and training. However, before turning to a discussion of the
findings and their implications, limitations to the study will be discussed.

Limitations of the Study

First, it should be noted that all of the participants, clients, and professionals, came
from a community mental health setting. As this type of environment is in some
ways systematically different than other mental health systems (e.g., private or
group practice, and inpatient treatment), the generalizability of the findings may
be limited to the community mental health setting. For example, as can be seen in
Table 4, most (66%) of the professionals sampled from the community mental
health population had a Bachelor’s level education or less, and most (67%) were
unlicensed. These proportions are consistent with the way many community men-
tal health systems are structured, as most of the direct service providers are those
with less training and education, whereas professionals who have less direct con-
tact with clients tend to be those with more training and education. However, in
other types of systems professionals with more training and education may be
found in much higher proportions. This suggests that the results of this study may
be specifically more reflective of the responses of community mental health pro-
fessionals, who typically have less training and education, than generally represen-
tative of all mental health professionals.

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 159

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In fact, a preliminary correlational analysis conducted on the data obtained in
this study indicates that one’s level of professional training may play a role in
one’s response to suicidal clients. Here, higher levels of licensure tend to be as-
sociated with a more “ideal” (rs = .34, p < .05, n = 41) and less “flighty” (rs = – .36, p < .05, n = 41) response but are not associated with the level of “fight” in one’s response (rs = –.13, ns, n = 41). This suggests that licensed professionals (i.e., those with more education and training), who are perhaps more readily found in other mental health settings, tend to respond in a more “ideal” manner. A similar study including mental health professionals from other settings (in- cluding other geographical locations) would be helpful in further understanding the applicability of this study’s findings.

Second, the study was methodologically limited due to the possibility for some
demand characteristics with the use of the semistructured interview design. As
mentioned earlier, the crisis intervention model (typically interpreted using the
“fight-like” cardiologist metaphor) is currently believed to be the best option for
the treatment of suicidal individuals and is the model from which professionals are
taught and evaluated. Given the predominance of this model, there is a chance that
many clinicians reported their actions as being congruent with the party line (i.e.,
the “fight” response) because they thought this is what the interviewer wanted to
hear or because they felt motivated to respond in what they thought would be the
most acceptable and desirable way. Although there is the possibility that the de-
mand characteristics inherent in the design may have distorted the findings, the
flexibility of the semistructured interview format allowed for more in depth and
specific questioning. This enabled the research assistants rating the interviews to
get a clearer picture of events as well as a sense of when participants may have
been coloring their responses in a certain way.

Therapeutic Implications of the Mismatch

What are the potential effects of this mismatch on the client, the clinician, and the
relationship? This is a valuable question to ask when considering the importance
of this discrepancy in terms of suggestions for future practice. Some may wish to
dismiss the finding as trivial, as many believe that it is the clinician, not the client,
who knows best. In this view, it is the clinician’s view of treatment that is most ap-
propriate and ultimately most effective. Further, as is implicit in this view, if the
treatment is not effective, the outcome has more to do with the problematic client
than with the intervention offered by the clinician.

However, professionals operating from theories of person and psychotherapy
that emphasize the importance of the relationship, therefore valuing the positions
of both parties in the relationship, may find that these results warrant further con-
sideration. From this type of theoretical perspective, any intervention a clinician
makes is not done in isolation. In other words, interventions are not things that are

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done by clinicians to passive, helpless clients. Rather, clients play an active role in
the process by having the power to either validate or invalidate any intervention of-
fered by a clinician (Leitner & Guthrie, 1993). We believe the statement made by
the collective client voice brought forth in this study represents an invalidation of
the style of suicide intervention that is most predominantly used. In this way, cli-
ents are not only making a statement about the pain and injury they have felt as a
result of such interventions but they are also communicating their sense of discon-
nection in their relationships with the clinicians making these interventions.

Rather than operating from a place of optimal therapeutic distance from the cli-
ent, in which the clinician is able to balance the needs of the client and the thera-
pist, the disconnection in the relationship represents the stance of therapeutic
strangers (Leitner, 1995). When operating from this stance, clinicians are too dis-
tant from the client to experience the client’s needs and desires, perhaps as a result
of being preoccupied with their own concerns or fears about the situation, resulting
in interventions that are experienced as inappropriate, mistimed, and ultimately
unhelpful, if not hurtful, to the client. Rather than serving to strengthen the rela-
tionship between clinician and client, leading to more potentially helpful interven-
tions, this stance weakens the alliance, making further effective interventions more
difficult. As the relationship is weakened, clients, as they often reported in this
study, are left feeling hurt and fundamentally misunderstood.

Although this therapeutic distance may ultimately be a protective move for the
therapist, it has the opposite effect for the client, leaving the client feeling more
vulnerable and unprotected in the relationship. As they reported, this effect is espe-
cially disconcerting for suicidal clients who are already in a very difficult place.
The therapeutic relationship is central in many schools of therapy no matter what
the presenting issue but given the life and death nature of the particular case of the
suicidal client, the relationship is perhaps even more key, as it may be one of the
few things helping the client to remain connected to the world and engaged in the
struggle to live. Due to this possibility, evidence of a potential disruption in the
connection between the suicidal client and the clinician is concerning. As such, we
believe the results of this study alert the professional community to a disconnec-
tion that deserves further exploration.

Areas for Future Research

Further research in this area would be one way to continue to explore the issues
raised by this study. As our previous discussion about the study limitations sug-
gests, one line of further research would include replications of this study sam-
pling clients and professionals from different mental health settings as well as
from different parts of the country. Other future research may involve a change
in study design.

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 161

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ol
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ic
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A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o
f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.

For example, the finding that clinicians’ interventions do not match with what
clients find to be most helpful was based on a comparison of results obtained from
the two separate parts of this study. The comparison involved clinicians’ reports of
their own interventions and clients’ reports about what interventions they find to be
most helpful. However, in addition to discussing the type of intervention they de-
sired from a professional when they were feeling suicidal, clients also provided in-
formation about the interventions they actually received. As such, a future study
could more systematically investigate the issue of disconnection from the client’s
perspective by comparing what clients report about both the interventions they
want and the responses they received.

In addition, as it seems to us that an important part of exploring suicide inter-
vention is understanding clients’ perceptions of those interventions, it may be fruit-
ful to compare professionals’ views about the responses they are giving with cli-
ent’s views about those same responses. Anecdotally, the primary researcher and
research assistants can agree that in general, the interventions that clients reported
actually receiving matched in large part the style of interventions that mental
health professional reported giving. However, this issue was not more formally in-
vestigated by this study. This could be accomplished by further analysis of this
data (or in study replications) by asking raters to also rate the client interviews for
the levels of each of the response styles they reported actually receiving and then
comparing those ratings with the ratings for professionals’ responses. Alterna-
tively, it may be more useful to pair participants and compare each client’s experi-
ence of the intervention he or she received with that particular clinician’s experi-
ence of the intervention he or she offered. This may provide more helpful
information about the connections and disconnections in the therapeutic relation-
ship around the issue of suicide intervention.

Implications for Training

In addition to suggesting areas for future research, training is another area in which
the findings of this study may be informative. Many professionals in this study,
45%, reported having one or fewer courses (10 or less clock hr) of training in sui-
cide prevention and/or intervention. Several professionals (16%) reported having
no training in this area at all. Some of the professionals interviewed had been in the
field for less than a year, and as such may not have had the opportunity for in-ser-
vice training to that point. However, even some of those who had been in the field
for such a short time, less than 1 year, reported having already experienced a client
(or more than one client) attempting suicide. The fact that clinicians enter the job
immediately faced with very difficult client issues suggests that clinicians need to
be prepared to deal with these issues before they begin the work. In our view, sui-
cide prevention and intervention training should occur before clinicians are faced
with these issues, not as a consequence of having experienced a client suicide or at-

162 THOMAS AND LEITNER

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P
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ol
og
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A
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oc
ia
tio
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or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o
f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.

tempt. While certainly there is value in on-the-job training in many areas, this is an
area where it would be more beneficial and less risky for all to have had exposure
to the issues and education prior to being placed in a position of having to make
quick, difficult, life and death decisions.

This, of course, does not speak to the other concern, which is the amount and
content of the training. Even if the timing is more appropriate, if the amount or
content are not sufficient, clinicians may still be ill prepared to handle suicidal cri-
ses. The results of this study suggest that the content of training on suicide inter-
vention may be particularly important. As stated earlier, the crisis intervention
model most frequently advocated in the literature offers detailed prescriptions for
action but little on the manner in which the actions should be taken to be most help-
ful to the client. As illustrated by what clients report to be most helpful, what is
more important to clients than the actions taken by their treatment providers in re-
sponse their suicidality is the manner in which the interventions are given. What
clients report to be most helpful is the respectful, patient, and inviting stance sug-
gested in the “ideal” response type. Based on this, it seems that the professional
who is able to implement the practices of the crisis intervention model within this
“ideal” mode of response will be more likely to be helpful to the suicidal client
than one who takes the steps outlined by the model in a more “fighty” manner. As
such, if the crisis intervention model will continue to be used as it has been for
more than 45 years, training in suicide intervention should emphasize not only the
steps and actions involved in the model but also the manner in which the clinician
implements the model.

CONCLUSION

The suicide prevention movement, now led by the Surgeon General as well as
other national and local suicide prevention organizations, is focused mainly on
understanding the risk factors involved for suicide and improving the profes-
sional assessment of those risks as a means of suicide prevention (U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, 2001; U.S. Public Health Service, 1999).
However, the results of this study serve as a reminder that suicide intervention is
a very complex venture that involves much more than assessing risk. Further,
from our view, the client’s voice, as expressed in this study, reminds us that sui-
cide interventions are not something that professionals do to passive, helpless
clients. Interventions are done with clients, which means that clients play an ac-
tive role in determining the effectiveness of the intervention. Clients in this study
reported that, as opposed to the response most typical of community mental
health professionals, the “fight” response, they clearly preferred the “ideal” style
in response to their suicidal presentation. This is fruitful information for those

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 163

T
hi
s
do
cu
m
en
t i
s
co
py
ri
gh
te
d
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o
f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.

interested in improving the efficacy of suicide intervention and reducing the
alarming rates of suicide in this country.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank Lori Koelsch, Valerie Loeffler, and Amberly
Panepinto for their work on this project. We are also grateful to Art Miller and Carl
Paternite for their contributions to the thesis project on which this article is based.
We would also like to express our deep appreciation to all of the study participants
for sharing their time and their stories with us. Participant names and details have
been falsified to respect the privacy of participants.

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AUTHOR NOTE

Jill C. Thomas received her MA in Clinical Psychology from Miami University in
2003. She is currently completing her PhD at Miami University. Her research in-
terests included eating disorders, embodiment, action research, and other creative
approaches to research and therapy.

Larry M. Leitner received his PhD in Clincal Psychology from The University
of Nebraska in 1979. He is Professor of Psychology at Miami University. His re-
search interests involve the application of Personal Construct Psychology to
psychotherapy, psychopathology, and personal perceptions.

STYLES OF SUICIDE INTERVENTION 165

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co
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by
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e
A
m
er
ic
an
P
sy
ch
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
or
o
ne
o
f i
ts
a
lli
ed
p
ub
lis
he
rs
.
T
hi
s
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
s
ol
el
y
fo
r t
he
p
er
so
na
l u
se
o
f t
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r a
nd
is
n
ot
to
b
e
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
b
ro
ad
ly
.