Radicalization

Students will research and assess two (1) intelligence case study scenarios. Students will be provided the background regarding the case study scenario two weeks prior to the due date. Each student will be required to apply research and analysis methodologies to answer questions contained in the background materials provided to the student. Students are to analyze the scenario data and provide responses to the questions asked in the Scenario data packet. Students are encouraged to work in groups to prepare proposed course(s) of action or recommendations and answers to the group’s study questions. Students will provide their analysis and recommendations in a 3-5 page [single space, ‘Times New Roman’ font] report summarizing their assessments and recommendations.

CASE STUDY #2 (15 Points) –Criminal Justice Intelligence Operations in U.S. Correctional Institutions: Assessing the Threat of Prisoner Radicalization.

Recent stories in the media have provided evidence to criminal justice intelligence investigators, analysts and managers that the threat of radicalization and gang membership in correctional institutions is growing. On May 22, 2009 the New York Times reported“Four Accused of Bombing Plot at Bronx Synagogues,” by Al Baker and Javier C. Hernandez, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/nyregion/21/arrests.html

The Department of Justice National Institute of Justice Journal made public their “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions by Marks S. Hamm. This report details how during 2005, Kevin James, a California state prison inmate was identified as conspiring to wage war against the United States. Based on interviews with corrections gang intelligence officers it was learned that Kevin James radicalized inmates into joining a prison gang with a terrorist agenda. This report can be accessed at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/224085 or http://www.nij.gov/journals/261/prisoner-radicalization.htm

Other studies by the RAND , “Radicalization or Rehabilitation,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR571.html) and the September 19, 2006 FBI Testimony of Donald Van Duyn, “US Prison Environment,” can be located at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/prison-radicalization-the-environment-the-threat-and-the-responsereveal corrections intelligence operations that (The Correctional Intelligence Initiative) have been collecting and evaluating information that identify planned prison riots, attacks on guards, drug and firearms trafficking from inside prisons. Sharing information among all levels of law enforcement and correctional personnel, FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces facilitate this process.

The links above are baseline documents you can use for your Case Study #2. However, if your research develops more relevant data, please include them in your case study report.

Based upon your case study readings regarding radicalization within U.S. correctional facilities, what is your analysis and recommendations regarding intelligence operations in correctional institutions that will detect and deter prisoner radicalization? If you were a correctional institution intelligence unit manager, how would you effectively deal with not only radicalization, but also the daily protection of correction officers and inmates?

Donald Van Duyn
Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and Related Agencies
Washington, DC

September 19, 2006

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you on the issue of prison radicalization in the United States.

Before I begin, I would like to emphasize that Islam itself is not the problem but rather how Islam is
used by violent extremists to inspire and justify their actions. Additionally, the FBI does not investigate
individuals for their religious beliefs. Rather, we investigate the activities of individuals who want to do
harm to the citizens and interests of United States and those of our allies abroad. The FBI fully
recognizes and is committed to protecting prisoners’ civil liberties, including religious rights. These
activities have led us to believe that prisons continue to present opportunities for the proselytizing of
both Sunni and Shia forms of radical Islam. Moreover, domestic groups such as white supremacists
recruit in prisons as well.

The U.S. Prison Environment

FBI and the Bureau of Prisons analysis shows that radicalization and recruitment in U.S. prisons is still
an ongoing concern. Prison radicalization primarily occurs through anti-U.S. sermons provided by
contract, volunteer, or staff imams, radicalized inmates who gain religious influence, and extremist
media. Ideologies that radicalized inmates appear most often to embrace include or are influenced by
the Salafi form of Sunni Islam (including revisionist versions commonly known as “prison Islam”) and
an extremist view of Shia Islam similar to that of the government of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

There are two groups of concern involved in prison radicalization and recruitment.

The first group consists of inmates, the majority of whom are minority group members. Although most
are converts to Islam, there is a smaller number who were born into the Muslim faith. These radicalized
inmates either feel discriminated against in the United States or feel that the United States oppresses
minorities and Muslims overseas. The feeling of perceived oppression, combined with their limited
knowledge of Islam, especially for the converts, makes this a vulnerable population for extremists
looking to radicalize and recruit.

Radicalized inmates are of concern for a number of reasons:

Influential inmates could urge other prisoners to attend certain mosques or Islamic centers in the
United States or overseas upon their release from prison that may present opportunities for the
proselytizing of radical Islam.

■

Influential inmates could also pose a risk to prison security by urging inmates under their
influence to disobey prison authorities and possibly incite violence within the facility.

■

Inmates who have acquired skills used in terrorism activities could pass them on to other
prisoners.

■

The second group consists of contract, volunteer, and staff personnel, the majority of which are imams,
who enter correctional facilities with the intent to radicalize and recruit.

Recent Testimonies

11.14.13

09.23.13

06.19.13

06.13.13

06.12.13

Cartel Prosecution: Stopping Price Fixers and
Protecting Consumers
Ronald T. Hosko, Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Joint Statement with Antitrust Division Assistant
Attorney General William J. Baer Before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, Washington,
D.C.

Homeland Threats and the FBI’s Response
James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

Combating Human Trafficking
Joseph S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Joint Statement with Anne C. Gannon,
National Coordinator for Child Exploitation Prevention
and Interdiction, Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C.

Addressing Diverse Threats to Our Nation While
Preserving Civil Liberties
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Washington, D.C.

Overview of FBI Biometrics Efforts
Steven M. Martinez, Executive Assistant Director,
Science and Technology Branch, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee
on Government Operations, Washington, D.C.

Addressing Diverse Threats to Our Nation While
Preserving Civil Liberties
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the House Committee
on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C.

Cyber Security: Preparing for and Responding to
the Enduring Threat

Home • • News • Testimony Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and the ResponsePrison

Page 1 of 3FBI — Prison Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and the Response

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Particularly for Muslim converts, but also for those born into Islam, an extremist imam can strongly
influence individual belief systems by speaking from a position of authority on religious issues.
Extremist imams have the potential to influence vulnerable followers at various locations of opportunity;
can spot and assess individuals who respond to their messages; and can potentially guide them into
increasingly extremist circles.

Aside from individuals providing radical messages there is also extremist media in the form of literature
and videos being circulated within the prison population that appears to be a significant factor in prison
radicalization.

In some cases, these radicalization efforts expand beyond prison walls resulting in potential threats to
society at large.

The Threat

The majority of cases involving prison radicalization and recruitment have not manifested themselves as
a threat to national security. There have been, however, instances where charismatic elements within
prison have used the call of Global Jihad as a source of inspiration to recruit others for the purpose of
conducting terrorist attacks in the United States.

In July 2005, the FBI became aware of a Sunni Islamic extremist group in California operating primarily
in state prisons, without apparent connections or direction from outside the United States and with no
identifiable foreign power nexus. Members of this group, the Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS), or the
“Authentic Assembly of Islam,” were involved in almost a dozen armed gas station robberies in Los
Angeles with the goal of financing terrorist operations in furtherance of JIS goals.

JIS founder Kevin Lamar James, an inmate in the California prison system, was the principal recruiter
for the group. Recruitment of participants to the Los Angeles JIS cell began in prison with the
recruitment of Levar Washington by James in December 2004. James allegedly instructed Washington
to recruit five people to train in covert operations, acquire firearms with silencers, and find contacts with
explosives expertise or who could learn to make bombs that could be activated from a distance. Upon
release from prison, Washington recruited other co-conspirators, Gregory Patterson and Hamad
Samana, to begin fulfilling James’ wishes.

On August 31, 2005, James, Washington, Patterson, and Samana were indicted by a federal grand jury
for conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. government through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and
discharge firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. Washington, Patterson, and Samana were also
charged with conspiracy to kill members of the U.S. government uniformed services and conspiracy to
kill foreign officials. Washington and Patterson were further charged with interfering with commerce by
robbery and for using and carrying a firearm in connection with a crime of violence. All members are
currently in custody awaiting trial.

The JIS case provides valuable insight into an increasing phenomenon in many of our terrorism cases
here in the United States, as well as those around the world, and highlights the importance of
cooperation at all levels of the law enforcement community in order to effectively fight terrorism.

The Response

The FBI and the Bureau of Prisons have been actively engaged in efforts to detect, deter, and disrupt
efforts by extremist groups to radicalize and recruit in U.S prisons; since February 2003, these activities
have been organized through the Correctional Intelligence Initiative (CII).

The CII program focuses on:

Improving intelligence collection. ■

Detecting, deterring, and disrupting efforts by terrorist, extremist, or radical groups to radicalize
or recruit in federal, state, local, territorial, tribal, or privatized prisons.

■

Providing training and support materials that can be used by field offices and Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs) for training and outreach at state and local correctional institutions.

■

All of these elements have helped identify numerous factors responsible for the spread of radicalization
and recruitment in prisons. A recent comprehensive assessment based on a survey of nearly 3,000 state
and local correctional facilities identified the following trends:

Most cases of prison radicalization and recruitment appear to be originated by domestic
extremists with few or no foreign connections.

■

Some radicalized Islamic inmates are current or former members of street or prison gangs,
indicating an emerging “crossover” trend from gang member to Islamist extremist.

■

Radicalization activity levels appear to be higher in high population areas on the West Coast and
in the northeastern United States.

■

Aside from trends, the assessment identified “best practices” for correctional institutions to follow to
combat the spread of radicalization and recruitment. Some of these are:

Establish system-wide vetting protocols for all contractor and volunteer applicants; ■

05.16.13

05.08.13

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the
Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C.

FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2014
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies,
Washington, D.C.

The FBI’s Efforts to Combat Elder Fraud
Joseph S. Campbell, Deputy Assistant Director,
Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Statement Before the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on
Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade, Washington,
D.C.

Responding to the Cyber Threat
Joseph M. Demarest, Assistant Director, Cyber Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime
and Terrorism, Washington, D.C.

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The FBI provides assistance by conducting criminal history checks against all FBI indices
for contract, volunteer, and staff personnel entering correctional facilities. Relevant
information is passed on to correctional officials for appropriate action.

■

Create system-wide databases of contractors and volunteers providing direct inmate services; ■

Improve monitoring capabilities; ■

Coordinate inmate transfers;■

Share information among all levels of law enforcement and correctional personnel. FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Forces can facilitate this process.

■

Numerous FBI analytical products, as well as operational highlights, have been disseminated to foreign
liaison partners, from classified products to unclassified assessments meant for a wide audience. The
feedback from the latter has helped us better drive analytical perspectives and identify services where bi-
lateral exchanges could prove beneficial on this issue.

At this time, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to address this important issue.

Page 3 of 3FBI — Prison Radicalization: The Environment, the Threat, and the Response

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Radicalization or
Rehabilitation

Understanding the challenge of
extremist and radicalized prisoners

Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, Jennifer Rubin

Prepared for the RAND Corporation

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iii

Preface

This study is the result of internally funded RAND Corporation research. It seeks to

provide a preliminary overview of the challenges posed by radicalized and extremist

prisoners, and to explore the potential for the radicalization of young European Muslims

in the prison environment. The study draws on the body of existing prison theory

literature, historical case examples and contemporary open sources. It draws a number of

conclusions about the potential in prison for extremist activity, including radicalization,

and highlights a number of areas where further research and action may be desirable.

RAND Europe is an independent not-for-profit policy research organization that aims to

serve the public interest by improving policy-making and informing public debate. Its

clients are European governments, institutions and firms who need rigorous, impartial,

multidisciplinary analysis. This report has been peer-reviewed in accordance with RAND’s

quality assurance standards.

For more information about RAND Europe or this document, please contact:

Greg Hannah

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+44 (0)1223 353 32

ghannah@rand.org

mailto:ghannah@rand.org

Contents

Preface ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… iii

Table of Figures ……………………………………………………………………………………………

vii

Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………………………

xiii

CHAPTER 1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….

CHAPTER 2 Prison, Religion and Radicalization …………………………………………….

2.1 The impact of imprisonment on individuals ……………………………………………… 5

2.2 Individual coping and “prisonization” ………………………………………………………

2.3 Religion in prison life …………………………………………………………………………..

2.4 Prisoner vulnerability to radicalization……………………………………………………. 1

CHAPTER 3 Historical Precedents………………………………………………………………. 1

3.1 Irish republicanism………………………………………………………………………………

3.2 The Suffragettes ………………………………………………………………………………….

3.3 Radicalized prisoners since 1945…………………………………………………………….

CHAPTER 4 Violent Jihadists and Prison ……………………………………………………..

4.1 Prisons in violent jihadist literature, thought and action ……………………………. 27
4.2 Guidance and support for imprisoned violent jihadists ………………………………

4.3 Violent jihadists in the British prison system …………………………………………… 3

4.4 Jihadist activity in European prisons and beyond………………………………………

4.5 Examples of countering violent jihadist activity in prisons …………………………. 3

CHAPTER 5 The Spectrum of Radicalized Prisoner Behaviour in Prison …………..

5.1 Group formation and organizational activity …………………………………………… 39
5.2 Non-violent resistance ………………………………………………………………………….

5.3 Violent resistance ………………………………………………………………………………..

5.4 Comparison of two groups’ activities and behaviour ………………………………….

CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Recommendations …………………………………………..

REFERENCES

…………………………………………………………………………………………….

Reference list ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 57

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

APPENDICES

…………………………………………………………………………………………….

Appendix A – An Encounter Behind the Apostates’ Bars in Jordan ……………………….

Appendix B – Lesson Eighteen: Prisons and Detention Centres …………………………… 69

vii

Table of Figures

Figure 1: Religious make-up of England and Wales prison population 1995–2005………………

Figure 2: Prisoners classified as Muslim by ethnic group in prisons in England and

Wales, June 2005………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Figure 3: Prisoners classified as Muslim by age group in England & Wales, June

2005 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

Figure 4: Example of Bin Laden’s references to in his messages …………………………………………

Summary

The radicalization of young Muslims has become an issue of high priority to public policy-

makers in the UK, Europe and beyond. The deadly attacks in Madrid in 2004 and on the

London transport network in July 2005 highlighted the threat posed by small groups of

violent, radicalized individuals. Consequently, focus is currently turning to questions about

the challenge of radicalization – its precursors, processes, nodes (or physical environments)

and operational characteristics, and the potential for de-radicalizing such individuals.

Among the nodes for radicalization, three physical venues are thought to be of concern:

radicalized mosques, educational establishments (notably universities) and prisons. In

particular, radicalization and extremist activity in prisons has increasingly been highlighted

as of being of concern in recent official statements surrounding the issue (for example, see

House of Commons 2006, 2007a).

This study therefore seeks to explore the issue of radicalization and extremist activity in the

prison environment. Using a combination of prison theory, historical examples and

contemporary open source material, this report seeks to identify lessons from previous

instances of dealing with extremist prisoners. It is hoped that these lessons may provide

insights about the challenges posed by the increasing number of violent imprisoned

jihadists.

There appear to be considerable overlaps between the historical precedents for dealing with

prisoners in earlier conflicts, such as that in Northern Ireland, and the subject of this study.

A substantial proportion of the lessons already identified from the management of

extremist prisoners are therefore likely to remain valid. However, there are some aspects of

the contemporary situation that appear to require greater examination and understanding.

A notable difference between the examples of Irish Republican and Basque groups and

contemporary violent jihadists concerns their respective attitudes to the recruitment of new

members in prison. The nationalist groups deliberately avoided such recruitment, while

imprisoned violent jihadists appear to regard recruitment in their prisons as a prime

objective. This report draws a number of conclusions about what is and (arguably, more

importantly) what is not known about the nature and extent of the problem. It highlights a

number of areas that appear to require additional research and exploration.

It is difficult to assess the extent of the problem
Due to the lack of open sources and reluctance on the part of the authorities to discuss

these issues, it is not currently possible to draw any definitive conclusions about the extent

of violent jihadist radicalization and recruitment in European prisons. While there is some

evidence that problem exists, without greater access to security and prison authorities and,

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
x

perhaps, to the prisons themselves, it will remain impossible to quantify its extent.

However, it seems reasonable to conclude that, as the number of violent jihadist prisoners

grows, so too will the potential for future challenges in managing them.

Radicalization of prisoners is neither new nor unique
The examples examined in this study show that the potential for imprisoned individuals to

adopt new and, in some cases, extremist or radicalized beliefs, is not a new phenomenon,

nor is it exclusive to contemporary violent jihadists. A number of organizations have

demonstrated how the prison system is used as a source of new recruits and as a base of

power. By examining these and other precedents we may gain a greater understanding of

how the radicalization process operates in the prison environment.

Imprisonment may enhance vulnerability to radicalization
Imprisonment may increase a prisoner’s susceptibility to adopting new and radicalized

ideas or beliefs. This is referred to as a “cognitive opening”. There are striking similarities

between what are believed to be the psychological experiences that make young Muslims

susceptible to radicalization and the psychological impact of imprisonment on individuals

in general. These experiences include: undergoing a crisis of self-understanding that

challenges or even destroys your conception of the self, experiencing acute feelings of

rejection by your native or adopted society and seeking to cope by adopting a new self-

identity or self-belief, which may be achieved by adopting a new belief structure (religious

or otherwise) and being assimilated into a new, inclusive and frequently protective, group

identity. Thus, placing young Muslims (who may already be vulnerable to radicalizing

influences) in a prison environment, with all its accompanying psychological and physical

dangers may well compound their vulnerability to radicalization. However, it must also be

recognized that adopting new and radicalized beliefs may be only one potential pathway

for prisoners. Some may seek solace in religion, which may be literalist in its interpretation,

but does not necessarily indicate that the prisoner has become a potentially violent

extremist. The apparent tendency of some prisoners to convert or revert to religious beliefs

highlights the importance of preventing extremists from spreading their ideology via

religious services or places of worship in prison. This reinforces the importance of

initiatives such as that taken by the UK Prison Service to provide specialist training to

prison imams.

Radicalization is one element in a spectrum of potential extremist activity
Radicalized and extremist prisoners may engage in a wide range of activities in

prison.

Some of these activities may be normal within prison walls, while others may be the result

of active resistance. Such activities may simply involve forming into groups of like-minded

individuals for self-protection or support, but others may be less benign, such as staging

protests and hunger strikes or violent resistance in the form of riots and escapes. Prison and

security authorities may have anticipate the possibility that, as the number of violent

jihadist prisoners grows, a more cohesive organization may evolve in prisons that will seek

to disrupt or subvert the custodial regime.

Greater understanding of the nature of the problem is required
One aspect of extremist prisoner organizations, such as the prison elements of Provisional

Irish Republican Army (PIRA) or the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), that made them easier

RAND Europe Summary

to identify, understand and counter was their hierarchical or paramilitary structures.

Identifying who was in control and discerning what the roles of the different prisoners

were was easy for the prison authorities. This is not the case with violent jihadist prisoners

who, far from revealing their organizational allegiances and activities, may seek to remain

covert. The clandestine nature of their operation makes it harder to distinguish which

prisoners are extremists in the general prisoner population. Cultural differences between

the prisoners and those who guard them make this perception harder still. Religiosity is an

increasingly unreliable indicator of extremist or radicalized behaviour and it may be

counter-productive to assume that it is. Further research may useful for developing a better

understanding of what indicators, if any, may point to influential extremist or radicalizing

activity in prisons.

There are options for containing extremist prisoners
One of the problems faced by those seeking to manage extremist prisoners is deciding

where and how to contain them. The two primary options are to concentrate them in one

or a few prisons or to disperse them throughout the prison system. Both options have

advantages and disadvantages. From a resource perspective concentration is beneficial, as

the necessary high security resources (perhaps including intelligence-gathering capabilities,

using specialized personnel such as linguists, staff training and so on) are needed in only a

few locations. However, concentration can also have problematic consequences. In the

Maze Prison in Northern Ireland, for example, opposing paramilitary factions of prisoners

effectively took control of their prison wings, segregating themselves from the other side

and other ordinary prisoners. The paramilitary prisoners could then more readily engage in

a range of subversive and violent activities. Those engaged in violent jihad in the UK are

typically not part of an organized, hierarchical group; instead they are made up of small,

loosely affiliated cells and teams. However, it is possible that if such individuals are

concentrated, their loose networks may consolidate into a more solid and organized form.

Dispersing extremist prisoners helps to prevents the formation of groups with strong

organizations and ties in a single prison and reduces the opportunities for their leaders to

maintain tight discipline and control over other prisoners. Dispersal also is likely to help

security by preventing small groups of extremist prisoners from plotting organized escape

attempts and from planning attacks or activities in or beyond the prison. Conversely,

dispersal may provide violent jihadist prisoners with access to a new pool of potential

recruits.

De-radicalization of extremist prisoners may be possible
In a number of countries, perhaps following the recognition by the authorities of the

potential consequences of large numbers of violent, radicalized individuals being

concentrated in prisons for many years, programmes for the de-radicalization of prisoners

have been developed. The efforts of Singapore, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have received

considerable attention but is difficult to assess the level of success achieved by these

programmes. The authorities in Singapore have released at least three former Jemaah

Islamyia members as a result of their rehabilitation efforts. It is reported that since 2004

some 2,000 prisoners have participated in the Saudi Arabian programme, of whom roughly

700 have been released. In the case of Yemen some 364 suspected militants were released

before the programme’s effectiveness was called into question.

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

xii

The prisoners targeted have several opportunities to abuse such programmes. The Yemeni

example appears to demonstrate this, as it resulted in releasing prisoners who returned to

their extremist ways. It would be difficult for Western, non-Muslim governments to create

such programmes without the active support of leading religious authorities. In Singapore

the cooperation between the secular authority and local religious leaders appears to have

helped their rehabilitation programme to succeed. However, these schemes mentioned

above, and others, have been in operation for relatively short periods of time and therefore

it is too early judge their overall effectiveness. Thus, further research and evaluation may

lead to greater understanding of these efforts and the effectiveness of different methods.

Preventative and resettlement initiatives require greater attention
Imprisonment provides many of the social and psychological conditions for subsequent

criminalization and potentially for radicalization and future extremist activity. Prisoners

experience the denigration of the self, detachment from supportive social relationships,

exposure to harsh authority and day-to-day violence, and the affiliation with their peers

offers them an alternative, counter-cultural community of thought. The period post-

imprisonment thus poses further challenges for those seeking to counter radicalization.

One way of mitigating these challenges is to implement pre-release programmes that help

to prepare the prisoner to reintegrate back into the community and find work. This has

been found to have positive effects on offenders generally. However, there are likely to be

theological and political facets to prison programmes, which incorporate discussion groups

and links that continue when the prisoner is released into the community. This is

specifically to be avoided in countering Islamist radicalization.

Currently there is active and urgent debate and discussion about understanding how young

Muslims becoming offenders and reducing the likelihood of their doing so. The issues are

described at times in terms of counter-terrorism and at other times as concerning social

cohesion. This inconsistent use of language indicates a lack of conceptual clarity. While

counter-terrorism measures undoubtedly have a role to play in enhancing security,

understanding the experiences and disaffection of Muslim youth should be a separate

matter. Pursuing social cohesion means focusing on the diversity of communities,

including the whole range of religious, socio-economic and cultural groups, rather than

targeting one specific group. Targeting points of tension instead of individual groups and

seeking potential points of agreement and consensus about desirable ways of living

peacefully together, may be more constructive than exhorting the moderate Muslim

community to condemn “Muslim terrorists” publicly. In pursuit of cohesion, inter-faith

dialogue has increasingly been considered a way forward to solicit the interest and support

of religious and cultural leaders in community dialogue. These leaders are key to

galvanizing more popular support that could help promote in their community a sense of

engagement, investment and belonging, a shared sense of purpose and positive and

supportive relationships. The implication is that individuals are thereby less likely to

experience crises of the self or to search for experiences that make them vulnerable to those

who may offer them alternative ideologies and practices and alternative courses of action,

including violence.

xiii

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the senior management of the RAND Corporation, notably Jim

Thompson and Michael Rich, for approving the internal RAND funding that made this

research possible. Our gratitude also goes to Nadia Oweidat for her contribution to the

sections on Islamist and violent jihadist literature and her knowledge of the primary

sources. Thanks also go to Ruth Levitt and Richard Warnes for their constructive and

insightful comments during their reviews of the draft report. We are also very grateful to

those outside of RAND who provided informal guidance and advice on some of the issues

addressed in this report.

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

Addressing the issue of the radicalization of young Muslims has become a high priority for

public policy-makers in Europe and beyond. The deadly attacks in Madrid in 2004 and

the London transport network in July 2005 highlighted the threat posed by small groups

of violent, radicalized individuals. Consequently, many governments are increasingly

focused on questions about the challenge of radicalization – its precursors, processes, nodes

and operational characteristics, and the potential to de-radicalize individuals and groups.

Among the principal nodes (or physical environments) for radicalization, three main

physical venues1 have been identified as being of concern: radicalized mosques, educational

establishments (notably universities) and prisons. As the UK Government’s counter-

terrorism strategy (CONTEST) points out: “particular places can also be sources of

radicalizing influences. The influence of particular mosques has already been mentioned

but there is also evidence that individuals can become radicalized whilst in prison” (HM

Government 2006: 13).

Despite this recognition, it appears that the challenge of radicalization and recruitment in

prisons has not, in the public domain at least, been systematically explored and is not yet

well understood as a phenomenon. As the UK Government’s independent reviewer of

counter-terrorism legislation has stated:

Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber, appears to be somebody who was radicalized in a

custodial setting. I can only give you anecdotes on that, but I have received

anecdotal evidence from governor grades that this is occurring and that it is a worry

to them. I do not want to exaggerate the problem but there certainly is an issue in

that context. (House of Commons 2006)

The Secretary of State for Justice, in evidence to a Parliamentary Select Committee, stated

recently that there is a concern about the potential for radicalization in UK prisons:

[radicalization] is a matter of concern to the whole of the Prison Service and to me,

and, of course, is exercising us a lot as to how you handle those prisoners who are

likely to go in as proselytisers and evangelisers and how you separate them from their

targets. (House of Commons 2007a)

These concerns are not, however, without precedent. The activities and challenges to

authority by radicalized or extremist prisoners have played a significant role in a number of

political and violent conflicts. It seems reasonable to assume that some of the insights and

1 The Internet has also been identified as an important mechanism as well as venue for radicalization

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
2

lessons relevant to the current situation may be drawn from these historical precedents.

Consequently, this study seeks to explore the challenges posed by radicalized and extremist

prisoners, including how prisoners may organize themselves and the range of activities in

which they may engage including, in some cases, radicalizing and recruiting new followers

to their particular causes.

Chapter 2 of this report examines the prison environment, its impact on the individual,

their coping mechanisms (including the role of religion in coping) and the extent to which

the prison experience may exacerbate an individual’s potential for adopting radicalized

beliefs. Having looked at relatively generalizable principles underlying life in prison,

Chapter 3 examines a range of historical precedents of extremist and radicalized groups

that operated in prisons, starting with the Irish Republican movement and the Suffragettes.

It then looks at more recent examples of radicalized groups existing in, adapting to and, in

some cases, thriving in prisons. These include groups such as the Black Muslims, White

Supremacists, organized criminal gangs, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and

Basque Nationalists.

Chapter 4 examines the importance of imprisonment in the history, literature and thought

of violent jihadists and outlines examples of suspected or actual violent jihadist activity in

prisons. Chapter 5 draws on the preceding case examples to develop a spectrum of

radicalized and extremist prisoner activity and highlights the differences between two

groups. Chapter 6 draws preliminary conclusions from the study and highlights a number

of areas where further research may be of benefit in managing the challenges posed by

extremist prisoners.

A note on terminology
The word “radicalization” (used interchangeably in this report with “radicalized” and

“radicalizing”) is frequently used to describe the process whereby individuals transform

their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal into a

range that society tends to consider to be extreme. In some cases these individuals may

then take a further step and involve themselves in acts of violence. However, it is not the

case that those who embark on such a transformation do so solely as a consequence of their

interpretation of Islam.

Radicalization is not confined to only one type of motivating ideology and neither is it a

recent phenomenon.2 For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the war in Vietnam,

a rising general dissatisfaction with capitalism and frustration at the limitations of

conventional politics acted as a catalyst for many young people to participate in protest

movements. Some emerged from this milieu and went on to join groups and organizations

committed to advancing by revolutionary methods the politics of communism and

Trotskyism. An even smaller minority formed or joined extreme, left-wing oriented groups

that were involved in terrorism. In Europe they were epitomized by the Red Army Faction

in what was then West Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Angry Brigades in the

UK. In current parlance, individuals who undertook their personal journey from political

2 For example, a 1973 US Congressional study on the US penal system explicitly refers to the radicalization of

inmates in Californian prisons. (Committee on Internal Security 1973: 74).

RAND Europe Introduction (or other Chapter title)

awareness, through political activism and on into extremism or even violence, underwent a

process now referred to as radicalization.

Today, Western governments’ concern about the threat from terrorism is primarily focused

(although not exclusively so) on its manifestation described as “radical Islam”, a term

defined by the Security Service of The Netherlands as “the politico-religious pursuit of

establishing – if necessary by extreme means – a society which reflects the perceived values

from the original sources of Islam as purely as possible” (Ministry of the Interior and

Kingdom Relations 2006: 3). Consequently, in this context radicalization is “internalizing

a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of

one’s conviction” (Jenkins 2007: 2). The counter terrorism strategy of the UK, known as

CONTEST, sets out a variety of “potentially radicalizing factors” that seem to contribute

to developing and shaping this militant mindset (HM Government 2006). However, it

also warns “the catalyst for any given individual becoming a terrorist will be a combination

of different factors particular to that person” (HM Government 2006). The factors

identified are “the development of a sense of grievance and injustice, the process of

globalization, simplistic but virulent anti-Westernism, perceived lack of consistent Western

standards in international behaviour, specific events for e.g. Coalition action to restore

sovereignty in Kuwait, personal alienation or community disadvantage and exposure to

radical ideas” (HM Government 2006). A recent report by the New York Police

Department examines a number of case studies from the USA, Europe, Canada and

Australia and identifies four distinct phases of radicalization; “pre-radicalization, self-

identification, indoctrination and jihadization” (New York Police Department 2007: 6).

Radicalization should not be viewed as an escalator, inevitably carrying all the individuals

on it inexorably into violence. It is better envisaged as a funnel that large number of

individuals may enter but from which only a very small number of individuals emerge.

Many will drop out along the way, leaving only a small proportion to cross the Rubicon

and become involved in terrorism. In order to reduce the numbers entering the funnel and

to maximize the numbers of those who choose to go no further, counter terrorism

strategies (including those applicable to the prison system) must “always offer a safe way

back from the edge” (Jenkins 2007: 4).

A number of other terms are used in this report. The term “Islamist” is used here to refer

to an Islamic political or social activist “committed to implementation of their ideological

vision of Islam in the state and/or society” Esposito 2003. “Violent jihadist” draws on the

definition adopted by the Dutch Security Service, specifically: an individual ready “to

participate in armed struggle against the West and other perceived enemies of Islam”

(Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2006: 10). Finally, the term “extremist”

is defined as “a person who holds extreme or fanatical political or religious views and

especially resorts to or advocates extreme action” (specifically violence).

CHAPTER 2 Prison, Religion and Radicalization

Like many other physical locations, social establishments or institutions, prisons are “places

such as rooms, suites of rooms, buildings, or plants in which activity of a particular kind

regularly goes on” (Goffman 1961: 15). However, along with a number of other social

establishments, such as boarding schools, mental institutions, and hospitals, prisons can be

seen as “total institutions” in that they maintain a “barrier to social intercourse with the

outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked

doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water, forests, or moors” (Goffman 1961: 15–16).

The occupants or inmates of these institutions, total or otherwise, are, to a greater or lesser

extent, exposed to and conditioned by the specific institution’s rules and cultural mores.

What makes prisons distinct from other forms of total institution is their deliberate and

stated purpose to punish (by, at the minimum, detention and isolation from mainstream

life) the inmates on behalf of the wider society. Indeed, as a leading researcher on prisons

observes: “prison represents a social system in which an attempt is made to create and

maintain total or almost total social control” (Sykes 1999: xiv). This chapter seeks to

explore the impact of this perhaps unique institution upon its occupants.

2.1 The impact of imprisonment on individuals

In recent decades there has been growing evidence that criminal behaviour does not

originate exclusively in the person. There has been an attendant shift, when seeking to

understand crime and anti-social behaviour, away from focusing on the bad apples to

examine the nature of its environment (Zimbardo 2007). Individuals do not commit

violent or criminal acts in a vacuum. Their backgrounds, past experiences and

opportunities make them more or less likely to do so, and their social and institutional

contexts influence their immediate and subsequent

behaviour.

With this movement in the discipline of psychology, understanding prisons as institutions

and their effects on the incarcerated has become more nuanced. In the criminology and

psychology literature (if not in many religious and ideological views), there has been been a

shift away from thinking about prisons merely as providing deterrence or punishment

towards seeking to understand how prison experience shapes individuals’ attitudes and

behaviour.

In a leading study of prison experience Sykes (1999) conducted research on the experience

of life in a maximum security prison. He called the psychological impact of imprisonment

upon individuals “the pains of imprisonment”. This chapter begins by discussing some of

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
6

these pains of imprisonment, which have become a standard reference in subsequent

research, and their likely consequences. These consequences provide useful insights later, in

discussing the challenges of the prison context for those attempting to understand and

counter extremism and radicalization.

Separation from supportive relationships.
Sykes’ study refers to being deprived of liberty. The deprivation of liberty is best

understood with reference to the significant aspects of life that freedom affords individuals

until they become prisoners. In their confinement prisoners tend to be cut off from family

and friends.3 Separation from the regular day-to-day support that may be supplied by such

relationships causes psychological stress at a time when the new prisoner is facing a

traumatic set of conditions and going through a difficult adjustment.4 Social support and

supportive relationships are known to be important for individuals’ physical and emotional

health and supportive relationships have been shown to protect individuals against

offending in the future (Farrington 2002).

Threats to personal identity and masculinity
Despite having their basic survival needs met by custodial institutions prisoners are also

deprived of personal or sentimental possessions. Individuals may use clothing and other

personal items as symbols and reminders of their personal affiliations and ties to groups

and identities (Goffman 1961). Thus, stripping away such items is part of the process of

stripping away prisoners’ autonomy and selfhood. Viggiani (2007) describes an

ethnographic study of the experience of imprisonment and its effects:

On arrival at prison reception, prisoners were ordered to surrender all that

identified them as responsible adults, allocated a prison uniform and number and

addressed only by surname. This procedure signalled the beginning of a

“mortification” process … as their self-confidence, self-esteem and identity were

diminished, and they felt progressively alienated by the system. As they entered

induction, prisoners experienced fear, panic, anxiety, loss of privacy, vulnerability

and heightened visibility as they came under constant surveillance from the prison

staff and their fellow prisoners. It seems that the regime was therefore engineered

to disempower prisoners, forcing them to surrender control to the system.

(Viggiani 2007: 115–35)

In addition to this loss of supportive relationships and the negating of their personal

identity, for heterosexual prisoners the gender-segregated environment of the prison may

be associated with other psychological difficulties. Sykes states that

3 Some prisoners may receive visits at specified times in certain prisons, but this is by no means always the case.

It is worth noting that certain prisoners’ families or loved ones are less likely than others to visit. Islamic

teaching advocates compassion for criminals, but it is not clear whether or not this translates into support for

family members and loved ones who end up in prison, or whether Muslim prisoners tend to be stigmatized and

ostracized.

4 For evidence on social support as a buffer against the adverse effects of negative life events see Cohen and

Wills 1985: 310-57.

RAND Europe Title of chapter 2

a society composed exclusively of men tends to generate anxieties in its members

concerning their masculinity, regardless of whether or not they are coerced, bribed

or seduced into an overt homosexual liaison. Latent homosexual tendencies may

be activated in the individual without being translated into open behaviour and

yet still arouse strong guilt feelings at either the conscious or unconscious level.

(Sykes 1999: 20)

Existing in such an environment can cause a male prisoner to question his status as a male,

and the lack of opportunity to be identified as a man by female society may pose a further

risk to some prisoners’ self-image.

The deprivation of autonomy
Another characteristic of the prison environment is that it completely removes from

individual prisoners their control of their daily routine, and replaces it with an array of

imposed rules and regulations and bureaucratic controls. Sykes notes that this imposition

of control causes inmates to direct intense hostility towards the prison authorities,

particularly when the rationale for seemingly arbitrary decisions is not apparent.

Part of the reasoning for withholding explanations lies in the nature of the power

relationship between prisoner and the authorities. Explaining the reasoning behind policies

and rules implies that if the rationale is not accepted by the prisoner, it may be challenged

and, as Sykes notes

if the inmate population maintains the right to argue with its captors, it takes on

the appearance of an enemy nation with its own sovereignty; and in doing so raises

disturbing questions about the nature of the offender’s deviance. The criminal is no

longer simply a man who has broken the law; he has become part of a group with an

alternative viewpoint and thus attacks the validity of the law itself. (Sykes 1999: 20)

The imposition of harsh and arbitrary discipline and the removal of the prisoners’ ability to

make decisions for themselves poses a significant threat to their self-image and sense of self-

efficacy, as it effectively reduces them to the status of helpless children, and “of the many

threats which may confront the individual, in or out of prison, there are few better

calculated to arouse acute anxieties than the attempt to re-impose the subservience of

youth” (Sykes 1999: 73–6).

Improving offenders’ self-control and reducing offending is facilitated both if they

understand the rationale for rules and comprehend the consequences of their actions and

their ability to alter their own behaviour. For example, cognitive behavioural therapy has

been shown in other situations to help individuals develop ways of recognizing their own

dysfunctional thought patterns and intervening to alter these (Lipsey and Landenberger

2006). The prison is structured in a way that, at best it does not facilitate this learning and

at worst, fundamentally undermines it and exacerbates offenders’ existing anti-social

tendencies.

Insecurity and violence
Cohabiting with a group of other criminals, some of whom are violent or dangerous, gives

rise to feelings of insecurity. As Sykes states, despite the formation of groups and

mechanisms of mutual aid, “there are a sufficient number of outlaws within this group of

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
8

outlaws to deprive the average prisoner of that sense of security which comes from living

among men who can reasonably be expected to abide by the rules of society”. This loss of

security provokes distress in two ways. First, the actual occurrence of violence directed

towards the prisoner is distressing. Second, the violent context provokes internal anxieties

about whether individual prisoners will be able to cope with future violent incidents, and

the consequences for their standing in the inmate community should they not prove equal

to the physical challenges they may face (Sykes 1999: 76–8).

Research on violence in prisons, which encompasses prisoner-on prisoner, prisoner-on-staff

and staff-on-prisoner violence, illustrates the negative dynamic invoked by this anxiety and

hostile context. Gilligan (1996) is a prison psychiatrist who has studied for many years the

interactions that occur around violent incidents, concluding that in each case the violence

was “provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated, disrespected and

ridiculed, and… represented the attempt to prevent or undo this ‘loss of face’ – no matter

how severe the punishment” (Gilligan 1996: 110). Other research also cites evidence for

the significance of “saving face”, especially in instances in which the insulted party already

has low or unstable self-esteem: “microanalyses of homicides have indicated that such

crimes are most often the results of ‘transactions’ in which the perpetrator resorted to lethal

violence to resolve an argument involving emotional injury to the offender” (DeFronzo

1997: 397). Luckenbill reported “that such crimes are most often the outcome of a

‘character contest’ in which one of the participants attacks the other’s sense of value,

worth, competency, or reputation” (Luckenbill 1977: 176–86).

Rejection by the dominant group, separation from a dominant moral code
Sykes argues that imprisonment “represents a deliberate, moral rejection of the criminal by

the free community”. He states that being so completely rejected by society poses a

significant threat to prisoners’ self-conception of worth. They can deal with this damage in

different ways. One way is to accept that the rejection is valid and engage in self-

castigation, reflecting the broader institutional and societal judgement that the isolation

represents. Another is to attribute the blame to some external source. In doing so, the

offender may “find a device for rejecting his rejectors, if he is to endure psychologically”

(Sykes 1999: 65–7). These failures can be attributed to the system, the authorities, and the

organizations that pointed out or punished the offender’s failures in the first place. This

can be a significant psychological coping mechanism (Taylor and Brown 1988). By

excusing their own actions and justifying themselves, some offenders manage to retain their

own sense of worth.

2.2 Individual coping and “prisonization”

The discussion above indicates some of the ways that the prison environment provokes

stress and can be psychologically detrimental to the prisoner. However, imprisonment does

not impact on individual prisoners in a simple, unidirectional manner. Their previous

experiences, affiliations and abilities also influences the way prisoners are affected by the

prison context. Research on prisons has increasingly acknowledged this dynamic interplay

between prisoners and their context by focusing on how they cope (Liebling and Maruna

RAND Europe Title of chapter 2
9

2005). Prisoners arrive in prison differentially equipped to cope or deal with the

deprivations, challenges and rejections of imprisonment described above, including

• the loss of social support and close personal relationships

• the denigration of their identity, sexuality and feelings of self-worth

• the insecurity, anxiety and threats to self-esteem they experience in a violent

environment

• the moral rejection they have experienced by society and the dominant group or

legal system

• the removal to a harsh, violent and unpredictable context

Coping is used or applied to a process of habituating or assimilating to a new environment.

The process by which an individual prisoner is assimilated into the wider prison inmate

population and subcultures has been described as “prisonization”. This phenomenon

occurs when inmates adopt the customs and general behaviour of the prison community.

In order to gain status, individuals are forced to adopt behaviour in line with those of their

fellow inmates (Caldwell 1956: 656; Thomas 1977: 135–7).

Prisoners’ differential ability to cope and integrate in to the prison community is

influenced by a range of individual, group and institutional variables, including their

physical and mental health, their substance dependency, their personal relationships, their

group memberships and affiliations, their attitudes, norms and belief systems, their ability

to form new relationships and affiliations, and the of composition groups and regimes

already found in the prison.

Many of these factors are inter-related. Joining an existing group may help prisoners to

obtain a sense of psychological affiliation and physically to obtain a form of protection: “a

very large proportion of inmates are also organized into small informal, natural or primary

groups, based upon common interests or the performance of natural functions of some

kind” (Caldwell 1956: 650). Some individuals adjust remarkably well to the prison

context. However, as Leibling points out in her review of prison suicide and prisoner

coping, “imprisonment seemed to be most distressing for vulnerable groups who were least

able to cope with the demands made by an unresponsive and depriving environment”

(Liebling 1999: 283–359).

Looking for a way out
There picture that emerges is that individuals adapting to imprisonment by finding

physical and psychological protection in joining new groups and rejecting the negative

judgement made by the dominant culture and legal system. However, in doing so,

prisoners become detached or detach themselves from experiences and lifestyles that tend

to protect individuals from future offending, while the experiences and activities that are

associated with greater risk of future criminal behaviour are play a newly prominent part in

their lives.5 The prison is not an environment where we can assume that offenders will be

5 Risks for future offending include harsh or inconsistent punishment by authority figures (parents) (Farrington

2002), low self-esteem, being male, peer relationships involving deviant moral codes (e.g. being stuck with

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
10

rehabilitated. With many known protective factors removed, and many of the risk factors

enhanced or heightened, imprisonment in the UK and other countries tends to be

associated with increased future offending.6 Indeed, research since the 1960s has shown

how in some cases even otherwise normally law-abiding citizens may be induced to hostile

and violent behaviour by being thrown into a “bad barrel” (see Zimbardo 2007).

Faced with a harsh and hostile environment that can generate dislocation, insecurity and

acute anxiety prisoners may look to role models and other ways of coping, such as religion.

For example, Stojkovic points out that many inmates are extremely alienated by the formal

prison structure, which provides no opportunity to develop a positive self-image. Because

of this alienation from prison staff, inmates have no positive means of expressing their own

identities. In reaction to this loss of identify, inmates look for someone whom they can

emulate (Stojkovic 1984: 517).

2.3 Religion in prison life

Religion and religious conversion have long played a role in the prison environment. Some

observers have pointed to prison conversions as a means by which cynical prisoners seek to

reduce their sentences, reverting to type upon release. Despite this, religion clearly has

much to offer some prisoners on spiritual, psychological and at times physical and material

levels. Further, religion may protect them against future offending and can go some way

towards remedying some of the detrimental effects of imprisonment.

Embracing religion can help to explain or rationalize how individuals find themselves to be

imprisoned and assuage their feelings of guilt or shame. For example, a prisoner can come

to perceive his current predicament as being the result of his failure to live by religious

teachings, which allowed him to fall into a life of crime. This fall may be attributed to the

works of the “Devil” or a great “Evil”. “Laying responsibility for the crime as the work of

an external agent can free the inmate of terrible burdens of guilt” (Clear et al. 2000: 60)

Other prisoners do not seek to shift the blame for their actions, but embrace faith as a

means of atoning for

them.

Adopting, or reverting to, a set of religious beliefs or practices can offer a new outlook or

way of living and an escape from the tribulations and tedium of prison life. It can also offer

a new set of rules and guidelines for living that helps to return some otherwise lost self-

control, providing a prisoner with a degree of certainty. This modicum of control and

certainty can assist in reducing levels of aggression and tension and reduce the stress of

interactions with other prisoners (Spalek and El-Hassan 2007: 109).

other offenders), lack of social support and supportive relationships (Prior and Paris 2005). Protective factors

include bonding and warmth of relationships with parents and carers (Farrington 2002).

6 Denmark has approximately half the rate of incarceration (people tend to only be put in prison for very

serious crimes), and half the rate of post-incarceration reoffending. They have liberal/progressive prison regimes

– e.g. if the offender has a child, partner and child are allowed to come and live with the prisoner during their

sentence. However, at the same time the Danes punish serious crimes severely, for example, sex offenders are

chemically castrated. In the Danish prison system many of the “protective” factors discussed above are

acknowledged and brought back in to the prison environment, including relationships and strong and

consistent authority, and prison appears more successful at reducing reoffending.

RAND Europe Title of chapter 2
11

Like many forms of social activity, practising religion can facilitate admission to a group.

As has been observed above, group formation is a characteristic of prison experience.

Adopting a religious identity may help a prisoner gain access to a particular, religiously

oriented group. This brings a number of benefits. First, such a group offers new or

prospective converts a supportive environment in which to learn about their new faith.

Second, such a group provides prisoners with an element of protection from victimization

and violence at the hands of other prisoners. An example of this is the propensity for those

convicted of child sexual offences to join Christian religious groups in US prisons, because

they offer a form of protection (Clear et al. 2000: 64). It can also improve the external

world’s perception of the prisoner, as adopting religion is a public declaration that he or

she is no longer the sinful person who was imprisoned in the first place. Finally, at a more

practical level, religious affiliation can provide material benefits to a prisoner, such as better

welfare facilities, letters, visitors and other means of reconnection to the outside world.

Joining religious groups and taking on a religious identity is thus not necessarily an

indicator of radicalized activity or leaning. On the contrary, finding religion in prison may

protect the individual against future offending.

2.3.1 Muslims in UK prisons
According to the 2001 Census in a total population of 49,138,831 for England and Wales

some 1,763,676 were Muslims (constituting 3.58 per cent of the population of England

and Wales). Home Office statistics for the same year show that out of a total prison

population of 66,403 5,046 prisoners were classified as Muslim. This represents 7.6 per

cent of the total number of prisoners in 2001, over double the proportionate rate.

Figure 1: Religious make-up of England and Wales prison population 1995–2005

–

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

80,000

M
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Date

No religion

Other religious groups

Sikh

Muslim

Jewish

Hindu

Buddhist

All Christian

Source: UK Home Office

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
12

As Figure 1 illustrates, in the period between 2001 and 2005, the number of prisoners

classified as Muslim has risen along with the general increase in the England and Wales

prison population. As of June 2005 the total prison population was 76,190 and the total

number of Muslim prisoners had risen to 7,246, or 9.5 per cent. More recently, by August

2007, the total prison population for England and Wales stood at 81,189 (Ministry of

Justice 2007).

(Central Statistics Office 2001).

Figure 2 breaks down the overall Muslim prison population in England and Wales in June

2005 by their ethnicity. Of the 7,246 Muslim prisoners 3,228 (44.5 per cent) were

classified as being of Asian or British Asian ethnicity; 2,270 (31.3 per cent) were classified

as Black or Black British and 988 (13.6 per cent) were classified as White; 447 were of

mixed ethnic background and 224 were categorized as Chinese or other ethnic group. For

comparison, in the 2001 census 74 per cent of Muslims were from an Asian ethnic

background, the majority being Pakistani (43 per cent), Bangladeshi (16 per cent), Indian

(eight per cent) and other Asian (6 per cent). Eleven per cent of British Muslims were from

a White ethnic group, (4 per cent were of White British origin and 7 per cent from

another White background, including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab and Eastern European). A

further 6 per cent of Muslims were of Black African origin, mainly from North and West

Africa, particularly Somalia (Central Statistics Office 2001).

Figure 2: Prisoners classified as Muslim by ethnic group in prisons in England and Wales,

June 2005

–

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

Total White Mixed Asian or Asian

British

Black or Black

British

Chinese or Other

ethnic group

Not Stated

Ethnic Group

Source: UK Home Office

Figure 3 illustrates the ages of Muslim prisoners in England and Wales in 2005. It shows

that most Muslim prisoners were aged between 21 and 39-years old, totalling 5,227

prisoners, with the single largest age group being 30–39-years old.

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13

Figure 3: Prisoners classified as Muslim by age group in England & Wales, June 2005

–
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000

Total 15 – 17 years 18 – 20 years 21 – 24 years 25 – 29 years 30 – 39 years 40 – 49 years 50 – 59 years 60 and over

Age

Source: UK Home Office

Perhaps the most comprehensive assessment made to date of Muslims in UK prisons is that

by Beckford et al. (2005) which makes a number of conclusions relevant to this study.

First, it observes that that only 20 per cent of male Muslim prisoners in the sample studied

had actively participated in religious activities before their imprisonment and that many

had come to know more about Islam within the prison than they had done outside.

Second, many prisoners had regularly attended mosque in their childhood or before to

coming to the UK, but had drifted away from religious activity in their teens. Third,

Beckford et al. note that that Muslim prisoners’ understanding of the tenets of different

Islamic teachings tended to be weak (Beckford et al. 2005: 236). Finally, despite the varied

social and cultural origin of these prisoners, there was strong evidence of support and

cooperation between them, ranging from mutual recognition to strategies they had

developed for their mutual protection (Beckford et al. 2005: 237). Finally, Beckford et al.

observe that the research carried out in UK prisons encountered little evidence of what

might be considered extremist views or radicalized Muslim prisoners.

This study recognizes that in the traumatic environment of a prison, where individuals are

faced with losing their established sense of identity, are dislocated and suffer from fear and

shame at their imprisonment, it is not surprising that like individuals bond to form more

or less cohesive groups. Indeed, it appears that such groups will always form, particularly in

prison. Some of them will be religious but does not, by itself, indicate radicalized activity

or leanings. Distinguishing normal prison behaviour from the indicators of nascent

radicalization is the major challenge.

2.4 Prisoner vulnerability to radicalization

A full exploration of the radicalization concept is beyond the remit of this study, but it is

useful to briefly examine some of the fundamentals of radicalization, and how, some

prisoners may be uniquely vulnerable to potentially radicalizing influences.

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

A study published by the Dutch government in 2005 describes radicalization as a process

composed of three elements. First, it is an individual process whereby an individuals ask

questions about the world and seek to change their relationship with their environment.

Such a process of change and redefinition normally occurs in adolescents, and adopting a

radicalized worldview is only one potential outcome of it. Radicalization, therefore,

can perhaps best be regarded as adopting a (new) identity or self-image. Looking for

one’s own identity forms part of every normal development process from child to

adult, but it can also be initiated separately from a specific life phase. It may be the

result of signals from the environment that someone’s identity is no longer being

acknowledged or recognized, or that moral question marks are placed next to this

identity. (The Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2005: 10)

However, individual dissatisfaction or disillusionment does not by itself result in an

individual’s acceptance of violent and radicalized beliefs. Personal interaction with those

who espouse such beliefs and seek to actively convert or recruit new followers to this

worldview is frequently required, although it has been suggested that it is possible for

individuals to effectively “self-radicalize” (The Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2005: 11).

Environmental factors also contribute to the process of violent radicalization, and these

may enable the individual or group to legitimatise their actions as a response to perceived

injustices or crimes suffered at an individual or collective level, such as discrimination and

racism (The Netherlands Ministry of Justice 2005: 12).

A 2007 UK government study reinforces the Dutch conclusions and provides further

illumination, suggesting that individual identity is an important aspect of radicalization

(Choudhury: 2007). It states that “the path to radicalization often involves a search for

identity at a moment of crisis”, and that the process “creates a cognitive opening, a

moment when previous explanations and belief systems are found to be inadequate in

explaining an individual’s experience”. (Choudhury 2007: 6). Such identity crises may be

caused by a sense of “not being accepted” or belonging to society and that as “part of this

re-evaluation of their identity, individuals seek to construct a sense of what it means to be

Muslim in Britain today” (Choudhury 2007: 6).

The similarities between Sykes’ description of the mental pressures and challenges to the

ego imposed by incarceration and those experienced in the process of violent radicalization

are striking. In both situations individuals undergo a crisis of the self, which challenges or

even destroys their self-conception. In both contexts, this crisis may be partly or wholly

related to feelings of rejection by their native or adopted societies. Young Muslim criminal

prisoners in the West, rejecting the moral stigma imposed by their imprisonment and

separation from decent society, may attribute their incarceration to perceived racism,

Islamophobia, or economic discrimination. Finally, in both cases, the individual may seek

psychological first-aid7 by developing a new sense of self-identify or belief, which in both

contexts may be delivered by adopting a new belief structure (religious or otherwise) and

being assimilated into a new inclusive, and frequently protective, group identity.

Sageman highlights the importance of the formation of groups (or cliques) in the process

7 A term developed by Anne Speckhard in 2006.

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of radicalization and ultimate recruitment to violent jihadist activity. He states that the

cliques

are the social mechanism that puts pressure on prospective participants to join,

defines a certain social reality for the ever more intimate friends, and facilitates the

development of a shared, collective social identity and strong emotional feelings

for the in-group … cliques literally transform lives and, in doing so, change the

meaning and impact of friendship bonds that pave the way to joining the jihad.

Selected events that might otherwise be largely independent and disconnected are

linked through symbolic means that stress continuity and form a unified

worldview. (Sageman 2004: 154)

And

Such intense relationships are bound to strongly affect one’s sense of identity. This

leads to the development of a social identity, in which the feeling of belonging to

the global jihad can be grafted on to the sense of belonging to the now religiously

and politically activated clique. The clique becomes close in on itself, and operates

like a subculture and or counterculture, leading to intense cohesion in both

emotional ties to the group and cognitive view of the world. (Sageman 2004: 156)

A number of young European Muslims perceive themselves to be rejected by Western

society. Under such circumstances people tend to seek to re-establish or confirm their sense

of personal and group identity (Choudhury 2007: 21). The prison context may sharpen or

exacerbate such experiences of rejection and prejudice, and increase the urgent need to find

way of coping with or overcoming these threats to self-identity. A number of alternative

ways of coping in such an environment may present themselves, including serving time

and leaving the system, falling under the influence of more experienced criminals and

emerging as a more criminalized individual, seeking escape through drug or alcohol abuse,

or turning to religion. However, previous experience suggests that a small number of

prisoners exposed to certain individuals and ideas in prison will come to embrace a

radicalized worldview. An even smaller number may emerge from prison with a desire to

“do something”. Such cognitive openings to new and radicalized ideas are not unique to

contemporary Muslim prisoners, or indeed to the prison environment. However, as will be

seen in the following two chapters, radicalized groups have a long history of surviving and,

in some cases, thriving in the prison environment.

CHAPTER 3 Historical Precedents

Prison and imprisonment has played a significant in role in the development of radicalized

and extremist individuals and organizations throughout history. This chapter discusses

examples of several such organizations. A number of influential figures in modern history

faced imprisonment for their radicalized or extremist activities. Among them are Adolf

Hitler, who, while imprisoned for his role in the 1923 Munich putsch, dictated Mein

Kampf (My struggle), which set out his extreme ideology and his future vision for

Germany. At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, Antonio Gramsci, a founding

member of the Italian Communist Party and leading Marxist thinker, was imprisoned by

the Italian Fascist government from 1926 until 1934, during which time he produced an

important series of works known as the Prison notebooks. Another example of an individual

imprisoned for radicalized activities is Nelson Mandela, who was jailed in 1962 for his

activities with the ANC’s armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (spear of the nation). Mandela

spent the next 27 years in prison, during which time he gained a law degree from the

University of London, emerging in February 1990 and going on to become president of

South Africa in 1994. As Buntman notes in her work on the experience of ANC prisoners

under the apartheid regime in South Africa, “[p]olitical imprisonment plays a vital role in

shaping resistance movements and their methods” (Buntman 2003: 2).

This chapter explores the relationship between prison and a number of radicalized or

extremist movements.

3.1 Irish republicanism

A useful historical example of the challenges (for the authorities) and the opportunities (for

the radicalized organization) posed by a prison environment occurred in the late 19th

century, with the development of the nationalist Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). In

the 10 years after its founding in 1858, a number of Irish republicans, including members

of the IRB, were imprisoned by the British for trying to foster an armed rebellion in

Ireland. In 1871, several of them, including Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, were granted an

amnesty and forced into exile in the USA. Rossa was soon to have a profound influence on

Irish republican thought and activity when he developed the concept of conducting violent

attacks on the mainland of Britain in order to force the British government to grant

Ireland its independence. Rossa (1991) set up a “Skirmishing fund” in order to raise

money to put the concept into action. So much money was raised that other ventures were

undertaken, the most successful of which was the rescue of several prominent Irish

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

republican activists from exile in Australia (Smith 1979: 33–4). This was a tremendous

propaganda coup that served to boost the morale of Irish-American republicans and

humiliate the British government.

From the events of 1867 on the British mainland Irish republicans learned that three

things could greatly assist them in their cause: prisoners, martyrs and the impact of

explosives used on the British mainland. The first two arose from the arrest and eventual

execution of three men in Manchester for murdering a police officer during the rescue of

two Fenian leaders from a police van conveying them to prison. This showed how

important prisoners could be to the Irish republican movement. The third factor became

apparent barely three months after the rescue of Kelly and Deasy. An attempt was made by

a small splinter group of Fenians to rescue Burke, the organization’s most successful arms

procurer. The prison was aware of the plot beforehand and had already been moved Burke,

and thus the escape was foiled (Quinlivan and Rose 1982: 76–93).

The Easter Rising of April 1916 heralded the new way that Irish republicans saw

themselves when incarcerated and the their use of this new perception in their propaganda

battle with the British government. After their unsuccessful attempt to secure British

withdrawal from Ireland through force of arms the participants in the Easter Rising who

had been captured and imprisoned began to claim forcefully that, as they had fought in

uniform as soldiers, they should be treated as prisoners of war.

Most of those who were rounded up and not quickly screened out were dispatched to the

British mainland, where they ended up imprisoned together in Frongoch. Once there, the

prisoners reinforced the view of themselves as an army by emphasizing that they had

surrendered and were in military captivity. Solidarity was everything and they did not want

individual release, preferring to stay with their comrades. To them,

Prison was another stage on which to act out their parts to a mass Irish audience

equally well versed in their roles as outraged compatriots…. For the prisoners it

meant ennoblement as the men who had risked all for their country: name

recognition, ideological authenticity, and instant political credibility. (Hart 2005:

100)

The prisoners formed themselves into two different administrative units, a civilian council

and a military staff. The civilian council aimed to be recognized as political prisoners and

treated accordingly. The military staff “wanted to be recognized as belligerent soldiers and

demanded prisoner-of-war status” (Hart 2005: 102). As the months went by, most of the

civilians were released, leaving the camp in the hands of the military camp commandant

and the full panoply of ranks and roles that were created to enable him to run it in a

manner befitting an army, “including a quartermaster, deputy quartermaster, aide-de-

camp, provost marshal and dormitory and company commanders” (Hart 2005: 101–2).

Between April 1916, when the first prisoners arrived in Frongoch, and December 1916,

when they were all released just before Christmas, the foundations and precedents were

laid for many of the events and responses that not only characterized the way that future

IRA prisoners behaved and were dealt with “inside the wire” but also the impact that they

had on those who were outside. Underpinning all of these was the implacable belief that

they were soldiers at war and when captured, they should be treated accordingly. From this

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flowed the critical issues of gaining recognition for their self-declared status, the way that

they organized themselves, the actions that they took and those that were undertaken on

their behalf. In pursuit of these objectives was the prison hunger strike, one of the most

difficult actions for the British authorities to deal with. Indeed, this tactic has become

almost inextricably linked with Irish republican prisoners over most of the 20th century,

although this is not where it originated.

3.2 The Suffragettes

The Suffragettes were pioneers not only of the use of the hunger strike as a political

weapon but also using to secure recognition of their claim for to status of political

prisoners (Raeburn 1974: 102). A long-running campaign for women to be allowed to vote

had been underway for many years but had produced no tangible results. Gradually, with

the formation of the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) in 1903, a more

militant approach was adopted. In October 1905 Christabel Pankhurst and Annie Kenney

were arrested at a public meeting after trying to question the speakers about their attitude

to votes for women, a tactic that they knew would attract attention to their cause. They

were charged, sentenced and quickly released (Raeburn 1974: 6–9).

At that time, convicted prisoners could be categorized as “first division” convicts, thus

securing them better treatment and more privileges (Raeburn 1974: 96). If the court of the

motive accepted the motives behind their actions they were sentenced as first division

convicts and were then viewed as political prisoners. Those sentenced as second division

convicts were treated as common criminals and were “stripped, forced to wear prison

clothes, scrub stone floors and live in solitary confinement” (Raeburn 1974: 30, 72). This

category of punishment had first been applied to several Suffragettes arrested on 23rd

October 1906 after they had tried to gain access to Parliament and put their case directly

to the Prime Minister (Raeburn 1974: 28–9). Some were released from prison almost

immediately and the Home Secretary quickly granted first division status to the remainder.

By 1908, however, the authorities’ tolerance of the Suffragettes activities had declined and

they were routinely sentenced as second division convicts.

The first use of the hunger strike to support a demand for the status of political prisoner

was by Marion Wallace Dunlop on 5th July 1909. When her request had been turned and

she began to refuse all food. After a 91-hour fast, her release was ordered by the Home

Secretary (Raeburn 1974: 102). As nearly all Suffragettes arrested after this incident

followed suit and began hunger strikes, the government decided they should be force-fed.

This began in September 1909. By 1912 force-feeding had become routine and the

government realized that the situation could not continue. They were not prepared to let

any of the Suffragettes die and become martyrs, but equally, public opinion was strongly

against the pain and suffering that was inflicted on the women during the force-feeding

process.

The government’s solution was a piece of legislation entitled the Prisoners Temporary

Discharge for Ill-Health Act of 1913 and dubbed by the Suffragettes the “Cat and Mouse

Act”. Hunger-strikers were allowed to continue without food until they were medically

assessed to be too ill to remain in prison. They were then released on a “ticket-of-leave”

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
20

that enabled them to be recalled to prison as soon as they had recovered sufficiently. The

situation continued until six days after the outbreak of war on 10th August 1914 when

the government released unconditionally all the Suffragette prisoners and the WSPU called

on all its members to cease their activities and to help to defeat the enemy.

Dealing with radicalized prisoners was not just an issue for governments on the home front

and was not confined to their own citizens. During the Second World War the Allies were

faced with difficulties when managing German prisoners of war; in a number of instances,

the prisoners of war were controlled by hard-core Nazi prisoners, who in part, derived their

authority from cooperating with the Allied authorities: “Instead of interfering with the

work program, the Nazi-dominated camps were in fact, usually models of efficiency. The

Nazis realized that an orderly and well-run camp would give them the continued backing

of the American authorities, and therefore, the real control over the camp” (Krammer

1976: 70).

In these camps the Nazi ideologues sought to establish effective totalitarian environments

where the Nazi salute was a recognized form of greeting and prisoners accused of anti-Nazi

activities were subjected to violence and frequently killed by their fellow prisoners of war.

3.3 Radicalized prisoners since 1945

3.3.1 Malcolm X and the Black Muslims
After 1945 there was a striking increase in prison populations in the West, particularly the

USA, and increasing problems in managing these populations. The 1970s saw the

development of organized gangs in the US prison system. These gangs covered a broad

spectrum of ethnicity, religion, ideology and motivation. Some were exclusively criminal in

their activity (such as the Hispanic Mexican Mafia), while others blended criminal and

racist ideological beliefs (the Aryan Brotherhood). Among the examples of religiously

oriented prison gangs or groups were the Black Muslims, later known as the Nation of

Islam. A 1973 Congressional report states that the Nation of Islam

was found to be the largest and best organized of the inmate groups within the

New York State prison system. Its membership is recruited from the new black

inmates entering prison. They are subjected to constant pressure to join…

Corrections officers differ in their views of the organization. Some see their

militant drills and physical conditioning as a threat, while others see them as a

stabilizing influence on the prison population. (Committee on Internal Security

1973: 65)

The life of Malcom X (Malcolm Little) is an excellent example of the potential for

radicalization in the prison environment. He experienced racism and discrimination in

early life. At school he was told: “A lawyer – that’s no realistic goal … You need to think

about something you can be” (Malcolm X 2001: 118). Little moved to New York in 1942

and drifted into petty crime and drugs. He returned to his native Boston and in January

1946 was charged with burglary and carrying a firearm. He was sentenced to 10 years in

the Massachusetts State Prison. Once there, he was so hostile to the religious ministrations

of the prison chaplain that he earned the nickname “Satan” among his fellow inmates.

RAND Europe Historical Precedents

While in prison, he was visited by his brother, who introduced him to the ideas of Elijah

Muhammed:

[H]e talked for two solid hours about the “devil white man” and the “brainwashed

black man”. When Reginald left, he left me rocking with some of the first serious

thoughts I ever had in my life … I began to receive at least two letters every day

from my brothers and sisters … They were all Muslims, followers of a man they

described to me as “The Honorable Elijah Mohammed” … All of them urged me

to “accept the teachings of The Honourable Elijah Muhammad” … And what

they termed “the true knowledge of the black man” that was possessed by the

followers of The Honourable Elijah Muhammad was given shape for me in their

lengthy letters, sometimes containing printed literature. (Malcolm X 2001: 255–

The visits from his brother and the letters he received had a significant effect on Malcolm

X. Elijah Muhammad’s interpretation of Islam was idiosyncratic and contained a new,

radicalized narrative of world and biblical history. Malcolm X rapidly adopted this new

narrative, recognizing that “that the truth can be quickly received, or received at all, only

by the sinner who knows and admits that he is guilty of having sinned much. Stated

another way: only guilt admitted accepts truth … The very enormity of my previous life’s

guilt prepared me to accept the truth” (Malcolm X 2001: 257–8). This illustrates the

potential for cognitive openings as a conduit for adopting new or radicalized ideas. After he

embraced the teachings of Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm X began to make efforts to recruit

new followers to the cause. He gives a useful description of the way he went about the

radicalization and recruitment process:

[W]hen Mr Muhammad’s teachings reversed my attitude towards my black

brothers, in my guilt and shame I began to catch every chance I could to recruit

for Mr Muhammad. You have to be careful, very careful introducing the truth to

the black man who has never previously heard the truth about himself, his own

kind, and the white man. My brother Reginald had told me that all Muslims

experienced this in their recruiting for Mr Muhammad. The black brother is so

brainwashed that he may even be repelled when he first hears the truth. Reginald

advised that the truth had to be dropped only a little bit at a time. And you had to

wait a while to let it sink in before advancing to the next step. (Malcolm X 2001:

277–8)

An affiliated group in the US corrections system in the 1970s that appears to be still in

existence was the Sunni Muslims. This smaller group was regarded as more orthodox in its

interpretation of Islam. However,

Corrections officers in general had only a limited knowledge of the difference

between the Sunni Muslims and the NOI [Nation of Islam]. Members of the

Sunni Muslim sect who were interviews at Attica said that they had been lumped

together with NOI by corrections officers who do not understand the differences

between the two. (Committee on Internal Security 1973: 66)

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

A New York-based offshoot of the Black Muslims was the Five Percenters, so called

because they believe themselves to be the anointed 5 per cent qualified to act as imams.

They were considered to be more militant and more violent than the Black Muslims.8

Following the development of prisoners’ rights as a policy issue (brought to the fore by a

number of groups, including the Black Muslims) and subsequent interventions in the

prison system by the judiciary, the degree to which prison authorities could effectively

control their institutions was reduced. Fong (1990) highlights the importance of judicial

intervention in the Texas prison system in the 1980 Ruiz v Estelle judgement in which the

use of a system of control by employing specially selected inmates was declared

unconstitutional. The vacuum left by this reduction in formal authority led to the

development of numerous prison gangs throughout the US penal system. Fong uses the

examples of two prison gangs in the Texan penal system to illustrate the organized nature

of their activities. He points out that both gangs, the Texas Syndicate and the Mexican

Mafia, are organized along paramilitary lines, with members adhering to a strict code of

behaviour.

3.3.2 Spain and ETA
Since the creation of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA – Basque fatherland and liberty) in

1958, the treatment of prisoners has played a central role in the group’s ideological and

doctrinal outlook. The repression and alleged torture faced by Basque nationalists under

the fascist Franco regime in Spain helped to radicalize Basques, providing ETA with the

pretext for their violence, which escalated dramatically in the late 1970s. Despite Spain’s

democratization and the enhanced legitimacy of Spanish counter-terrorist practices,9 the

claim to have been abused while in custody remains an important source of propaganda for

ETA, and is a standard operating practice, as outlined in internal group documents

(Alonso and Reinares 2005: 274).

As in Northern Ireland, as the number of ETA prisoners increased, so the prisons in which

they were held became a focal point for the politico-military struggle being waged outside

them. In the 1980s the Spanish authorities became increasingly concerned at the degree of

control that imprisoned ETA leaders exercised over other ETA prisoners and their families.

In an effort to disrupt the discipline and cohesion of the prisoners, the authorities began a

programme of “social reinsertion” whereby the then 500 or so imprisoned ETA activists

were offered reduced terms and early release back into the community if they renounced

violence. Between 1983 and 1984 some 230 ETA prisoners took advantage of this scheme.

The extent to which this programme undermined ETA’s cohesion was underlined when

the organization began assassinating its former members who had been given early release

from prison.

8 Neither the Black Muslims nor the Five Percenters followed a faith that could be construed as orthodox

Islam, or even an extreme version of it. They appear to have blended tenets of Islam with Marxist ideology and

radical Black nationalism.

9 There has been no reported incident of illegal state activity in relation to ETA since 1988. See Alonso and

Reinares (2005: 275).

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The second way in which of the Spanish authorities tried to break ETA’s cohesion in the

prisons was dispersal, when after 1989 ETA prisoners were distributed through the Spanish

prison system. This attempt to break up and desegregate ETA’s imprisoned membership

was met with protest and violence. Initially the Spanish government was accused of

infringing their human rights (for example, by making family visits more difficult due to

the distance from their homes to the new prison). When this approach failed ETA

prisoners staged a series of hunger strikes and finally resorted to attacks on prison staff.10

Despite these efforts, the dispersal policy remained in place and a primary ETA was for the

return of ETA prisoners to serve their sentences in Basque prisons.

In furtherance of this aim, on 10th July 1997 ETA kidnapped Miguel Angel Blanco, a

local Basque politician. In return for his release, ETA demanded the Spanish government

transfer all ETA prisoners to Basque prisons within 48 hours. This kidnapping sparked

anti-ETA protests across Spain and Blanco’s murder, after the deadline expired provoked

widespread revulsion. This set the context for ETA’s first ceasefire in 1998 (which

collapsed along with subsequent ceasefires). Most recently Jose Ignacio de Juana Chaos,

convicted of 25 murders, sustained a hunger strike for over 100 days in protest at his

sentence. In defiance of popular opinion, the Spanish government moved him from

Madrid to a Basque hospital and stated that upon his recovery he would serve the last two

years of his sentence under house arrest (BBC 2007a).

3.3.3 Northern Ireland and paramilitary prisoners
The resurgence of the Irish conflict in the late 1960s and the consequent re-emergence of

the IRA saw a return to the issue of Irish “political” prisoners in British jails. Between 19

and the release of paramilitary prisoners under the Good Friday Agreement, “prisoners …

organized themselves into paramilitary groupings with hierarchical command structures …

the prison experience for non-conforming paramilitary prisoners in Northern Ireland

[being] largely a collective one” (McEvoy 2001: 38).

The renewed struggle between paramilitary prisoners and the authorities took place in

what McEvoy refers to as four distinct phases:

� Reactive containment. This period began with the introduction, in August 1971,

of internment for some hundreds of suspected Republican paramilitaries.

� Special category status. Under the special category regime, prisoners were

effectively granted prisoner-of-war status.

� Criminalization. Following the end of special category status in 1976, the prison

authorities (and the government) attempted to treat the paramilitary prisoners as

normal criminals.

� Managerialism. Following the 1981 hunger strikes the prison authorities (and the

British government) came to accept that the struggle against Irish republicanism

could not be fought or won in the prison system. Hence a new pragmatic

approach was adopted, seeking to treat paramilitary prisoners as another special

type of inmate, such as sex offenders (McEvoy 2001: 251).

10 For example, the October 2000 murder of Maximo Carrera in a booby-trapped car bombing.

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

Underlying these four phases were a series of events that impacted upon and shaped not

only those who were imprisoned over the next 30 years or so but were also to have

significant repercussions in the wider context of Northern Ireland and beyond. The first of

these critical events took place on 9th August 1971 when troops and police launched

“Operation Demetrius” (Ryder 2001: 53–4). Its objective was use the Special Powers Act

to arrest and intern the leading activists in the Republican movement, thus diminishing

the ability of the IRA to function effectively. The immediate result was that 342 people

were arrested on the first day, a number that rose to 2,400 over the six months that

followed (Fay et al. 1999: 27).

Many were released after screening and questioning but, in the eyes of those who were

interned, their families and supporters, the British government had opened a new front

and they reacted violently. By the end of the year, the number killed (troops, police,

civilians and terrorists) had risen to 173 (Fay et al. 1999: 27). Meanwhile, “In line with

long-standing Republican tradition, those who had been imprisoned … began a sustained

campaign of ‘continuing resistance behind the wire’” (Ryder 2001: 94).

This resistance ranged from large-scale rioting, arson and taking hostages of staff and

visitors to apparently mundane acts of defiance, such as refusing to carry out prison work

or to share cells. It was also not long before nine prisoners made the first successful escape

on 16th November 1971 by scaling the walls of Belfast Prison using rope ladders thrown

over from the outside. From then on there were many more attempts at escape, a number

of which succeeded. Early successful escapes were greeted with bonfires and celebration in

republican areas and whenever possible, a press conference in Dublin was called by the IRA

to put the escapees on show. Almost all these activities were in pursuit of one objective: the

formal recognition by the British government that those imprisoned were entitled to

political status and should be treated as prisoners of war. In June 1972, as part of secret

cease-fire negotiations between the IRA and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,

William Whitelaw, a special category of prisoners was created for those convicted of

“political offences”, with accommodation for Republican and Loyalist prisoners separate

from that of both internees and the “ordinary decent criminals”. The cease-fire did not

hold for long but the concept of special category prisoners continued, thus creating an

enormously difficult situation in the prisons when it existed, and an even worse one when

attempts were made to end it in 1976.

Special category prisoners were those who had been sentenced to more than 9 months’

imprisonment and who had the agreement of the prisoner who was the so-called “officer

commanding” of the relevant Republican or Loyalist compound (Ryder 2001: 105). The

end result was that uniquely in the UK, the Maze Prison held prisoners “convicted or

awaiting trial for crimes committed in the course of a campaign of violence against the

State [and] in the eyes of those prisoners, they remain part of the campaign”

(Ramsbotham, in Ryder 1999: 106). In contrast to other prisoners, they lived together in

huts in a compound, did no prison work, wore their own clothes and received food parcels

from outside the prison. Inside the compounds they adopted all the trappings of a military

organization. Each compound had an elected “officer commanding” and each hut had a

variety of “officers” such as “adjutant” and “quartermaster”. There was an overall officer

commanding for all the prisoners who in turn had a “battalion staff” to assist him.

RAND Europe Historical Precedents

Internment was brought to an end on 5th December 1975 when the last and most “hard-

core” group of internees was released. However, any feeling by the prison authorities that

their task of managing the greatest concentration of convicted terrorist prisoners in Europe

would be made easier was short-lived as the British government was determined to abolish

the status of special category and all that had become associated with it. An intolerable

situation had been reached and it was now imperative that “The influence of the terrorist

leaders must be reduced and rehabilitation work started [as] the failure…. to take earlier

action has significantly reduced the effectiveness of the penal system” (Gardiner Report, in

Ryder 2001: 153).

The autonomy given to special category prisoners led to extraordinary circumstances. The

prisoners adhered on a daily basis to their own militaristic regime that encompassed their

whole day. Tasks and timings were strictly adhered to and discipline was strictly enforced,

and extreme violence was used if it was deemed necessary. Lectures were given on all

aspects of the life of a republican “volunteer”, from those aimed at raising their political

knowledge and awareness to those dedicated to weapons, explosives, field-craft and first-aid

training.

Relations with the prison authorities were always difficult, as the prisoners constantly

sought to dominate and intimidate guards and governors. At every opportunity they

sought information from staff and passed on any unguarded comments about staff

members’ families to others outside the prison, who would then take steps to add to it.

This enhanced information was then used to try to threaten or coerce the guard. Where

possible, the prisoners tried to converse in Gaelic, a language unfamiliar to the guards.

Over time, the way that it was spoken became so distinct that it became known as “jailic”

and, unknown to the prisoners, the guards also became proficient in it.

The de facto end of special category status took place in March 1976. In response,

prisoners treated in this way refused to wear prison clothes on their arrival and used only a

prison blanket, thus setting in motion a protest that was to extend over many years. By

1978 their actions had escalated into a “dirty protest” where prisoners refused to wash,

shave or cut their hair and smeared their excrement on to the walls of their cells. Over the

next two years, negotiations and concessions failed to end the protest and on 10th October

1980 seven IRA men began a hunger strike. It was intended that as each one died, he

would be replaced by another man. Once more, in a statement smuggled out of the prison

by a visitor, they reiterated that “political status is ours as of right” Ryder 2001: 203).

By the time that a second, subsequent hunger strike was called off in October 1981, 10

republican prisoners had died. The first and most prominent of these was Bobby Sands, an

IRA member who had been elected in the early days of the strike as the Member of

Parliament for Fermanagh-South Tyrone. The impact of these events was seen not only in

Northern Ireland and Britain but also across the world, and it continued to reverberate for

many years.

The managerialism phase of the interaction between prisoners and authority, continued

from 1981 until their release in 2000. Its long-term, strategic effect was seen from the early

1990s as the paramilitary prisoners began to push forward the idea of peace. From the

1994 IRA declaration of a cease-fire, through the gradual emergence of the peace process,

the Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and the final decommissioning of IRA and Loyalist

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

groups weaponry and explosives, a crucial role was played by prisoners. In addition to their

vested interest in a particular outcome they made a crucial contribution to the difficult task

of not only ensuring that their respective organizations stayed engaged with the peace

process but that they continued to move it forward. From 1998 onwards a slow process of

release began and on 28th July 2000, the last 78 prisoners were freed from custody.

Since then, numerous efforts have been made to reintegrate them into society. Some have

required little assistance, some “found God” in prison or after release and have become

pastors and preachers, and many others have been helped by over 40 community-based

self-help initiatives. Other prisoners may have turned to crime. In 2001 the Northern

Ireland Organized Crime Task Force stated, “78 groups involving some 400 individuals

have been identified as meeting … [our] definition of organized crime. Just over half the

groups identified have current or historical links to Republican or Loyalist paramilitary

organizations.”11

11 The 78 criminal gangs waging war on Ulster (The Guardian 2001).

CHAPTER 4 Violent Jihadists and Prison

Historically, prison and the experience of imprisonment have had a significant impact on

the thinkers and activists in the radicalized Islamist movement. In his series of press releases

from the Advice and Reformation Committee during the 1990s, Osama bin Laden

favourably compared imprisoned Saudi scholars with Ibn Taymiyya’s imprisonment for his

beliefs.12 The following chapter explores the significance of prisons in the development of

Islamist and violent jihadist ideology and thought, the guidance given to violent jihadist

prisoners for coping with capture and imprisonment, and evidence of their activity in

prisons in the UK, Europe and beyond, and outlines efforts to rehabilitate or de-radicalize

such prisoners.

4.1 Prisons in violent jihadist literature, thought and action

Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th–14th century writer who was one of the key historical influences on

contemporary jihadist ideology and thought, was repeatedly imprisoned by the authorities

in Cairo and Damascus for his radicalized beliefs. His first brush with the authorities came

in 1294 when he led a protest in Damascus, but he was first imprisoned in Cairo in 1305

for his radicalized theological views, serving 18 months before his release was negotiated.

Within the year, however, Ibn Taymiyya had been tried and re-imprisoned for two years

and was again jailed for breaching an order preventing him from issuing fawtas. From

1318 until 1321 he was in and out of prison eventually dying in captivity in 1328 aged 67

(Little 1973: 312).

Sayid Qutb, who is widely cited as the leading modern ideological influence on a range of

Islamist and violent jihadist groups, produced his most influential works while imprisoned

in Egypt. Qutb was imprisoned in 1954 for his alleged role in an attempt to assassinate

Egyptian President Nasser and spent much of the rest of his life in prison. It has been

suggested that Qutb’s own radicalization was a result of the torture and mistreatment he

suffered and witnessed inside the Egyptian prison system (Atwan 2006: 72).

During his imprisonment he wrote the Islamist texts Milestones and In the shade of the

Qu’ran, which were smuggled out of his prison cell. Qutb was given the opportunity to

beg Nasser for a pardon but he refused to do so and was executed in 1966. Qutb’s

12 The press releases of Usama Bin Laden are Available online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-

003345_Original Accessed 10 August 2007.

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-003345_Original

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

suffering and ultimate “martyrdom” for his beliefs was key to his appeal to many Islamists

who were

inspired by Qutb, who showed them the way forward and whom they referred to

as a shahid, or martyr. They talked about the torture he endured at the hands of

the Nasserist security apparatus and the dignity and courage he showed under

duress. Zawahiri says that Qutb’s words acquired a deeper resonance because of

his defiance and refusal to appeal to President Nasser to spare his life, which

provided activists with an example of steadfastness and sacrifice. (Gereges 2005: 7)

A contemporary jihadist ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was deeply influenced by Qutb’s

thought and prison experience. Reportedly it was the impact of Qutb’s execution that led

al-Zawahiri and a group of friends to form a covert Islamist group (Kepel 2004: 79). This

group was to continue its existence through al-Zawahiri’s medical training and subsequent

travels to assist the Afghan mujahadeen. Returning to Egypt in 1981 al-Zawahiri became

entangled in the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat and was detained in the

subsequent government crackdown. At the mass trial in 1982 al-Zawahiri acted as the

spokesman for the defendants and for the first time was exposed to the world’s media.

While he was in prison, the leaders of the Egyptian Islamist movement split. Al-Zawahiri is

reported to have become the leader of the Egyptian Jama’at Al Jihad group while a rival

faction, Gamaa Islamyia emerged under the spiritual guidance of Omar Abdel-Rahman,

who was later to be jailed in the USA for his leading role in the 1993 World Trade Centre

bombing). Like Qutb, al-Zawahiri was apparently deeply affected by the torture and

suffering he experienced in the Egyptian prison system. He is reported to have cracked

under torture and to have betrayed a comrade. These experiences led al-Zawahiri to

repeatedly raise the issue of prison torture in later writings. In Knights under the prophet’s

banner he wrote:

Once the door of the cell is closed, the prisoner will wish that he had spent his

entire life without a shelter rather then endure the humiliation of captivity. The

toughest thing about captivity is forcing the mujahid, under the force of torture, to

confess about his colleagues, destroy his movement with his own hands, and offer

his and his colleagues’ secrets to his enemies. (al-Zawahiri 2004: 427)

In an earlier publication The black book: the story of the torture of Muslims during the reign of

Husni Mubarak, al-Zawahiri railed against the widespread use of torture by the Egyptian

regime against criminal and Islamist prisoners alike, and exhorts the Egyptian people to

resist the regime:

We call on the tortured people to have faith in God and patience until God sends

relief. We ask the Egyptian people to call for shari’a laws. We remind you that

your predicament is caused by your abandoning the duty of waging jihad against

the kafir rulers. Allah has told you that if you abandon this duty, you will lose

security. Therefore, we ask every Muslim to wage jihad in his tongue by

denouncing the kufr of these kuffar rulers and enlightening other Muslims and

inciting them to fight. We also urge them to wage jihad with their money – the

backbone of jihad. We also urge Muslim youth to wage jihad with their souls. (al-

Zawahiri 1994).

RAND Europe Violent jihadists and prison

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (real name Essam Barqawi) has been described as the most

important living jihadi ideologue (McCants 2006: 8). He also acted as a mentor to the

now deceased Jordanian militant Musab al-Zarqawi. Both men were arrested in Jordan in

1993 on charges of setting up a covert armed cell, and in 1995 were sentenced to 15 years

imprisonment. Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were both released in a general amnesty in

1999, and al-Zarqawi left Jordan for Pakistan and Afghanistan, where he would come into

contact with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network. Later he would become infamous as

the emir of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and ultimately would be killed by Coalition forces in Iraqi in

June 2006. Al-Maqdisi stayed in Jordan and was subsequently re-arrested and imprisoned,

where he remains.

While they were in prison both men continued to proselytize and seek new recruits both

inside and beyond the prison’s confines. In an interview with the Islamist magazine

Nida’ul Islam, al-Maqdisi detailed his activities in the prison. The full text of the interview

(see Appendix A) offers some valuable insights as to the activities of radicalized Islamists in

the prison environment, as well as offering an indication of how difficult it is for the

authorities to suppress them. They most salient elements of al-Maqdisi’s activities

included:

• producing and distributing ideological literature within and beyond the prison

population

• holding alternative Friday prayers to draw other prisoners away from the official prison

Mosque

• using prison visits to communicate with followers in the outside world

• providing reinforcement and support to fellow prisoners who were punished for their

subversive activities in prison

• engaging in active resistance to the prison authorities through refusing to cooperate in

the prison’s regime, intimidating prison staff and management and clashing violently

with the guards. (Nida’ul Islam 1997–1998)

Among al-Maqdisi’s prodigious collection of writings is a song or poem entitled The

perfumed prisons. This has subsequently been used as the basis of a short propaganda video

highlighting the condition of Islamist and violent jihadist prisoners around the world and

is widely available on the Internet.13 Al-Maqdisi also wrote an article on prison life entitled,

Prison: heavens and fires that elaborates on the experience of prison and how it may lead to

obtaining the fruits of faith because there you can dedicate yourself completely to “obeying

God, worshiping him, memorizing the Quran, seeking and spreading Da’wah and learning

from the experience of those around him to become stronger for jihad”. However, he notes

those who are not able to stand the torture end up weaker, rather than standing their

ground. As al-Maqdisi notes, some of the most famous jihadi clerics, such as Sheikh al-

Khedhayri and Nasir al-Fahad, recanted during or after their prison experiences. Maqdisi

warns Muslims against judging these scholars, as the torture that takes place in prison is

too horrific for most people to imagine. Despite al-Maqdisi’s pre-eminence as a ideologist

13 Available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPWybUudqGg Accessed 3rd March 2008.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RPWybUudqGg

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
30

and scholar, it is reported that al-Zarqawi came to be the effective leader of the Islamists in

their Jordanian prison. One fellow inmate stated that “the youth surrounding him in

prison were actual jihadist fighters, they rejected the command of Abu Muhammad al-

Maqdisi, preferring Abu Mos’ab Al Zarqawi because of his strength and determination”

(Napoleoni 2005: 68–9). Al-Zarqawi came to be the emir of the al-Tawheed group, with

al-Maqdisi taking the role of spiritual mentor to the group in the prison. Al-Zarqawi was

regarded as displaying strong leadership qualities in the prison, so that although there were

“ organizations and groups which shared the prison cells and had huge differences of

opinions … al-Zarqawi’s emirate was amongst the strongest and most influential within

those groups for organizational reasons, because it extended to all prison quarters and

attracted a large number of inmates”(Napoleoni 2005: 68–9).

4.2 Guidance and support for imprisoned violent jihadists

Early on in their recruitment, violent jihadists are warned that their path is perilous. They

belong, they are told, to the few that the Prophet Muhammad mentioned in his famous

hadith (or saying), “A few of my Umma14 will be on the right path till the end of days”.

The Prophet also warned of the day when Islam will become a stranger again, as it was at

its early stages. He said, “Islam came a stranger and will depart a stranger. God bless the

strangers”. Violent jihadists are therefore aware that imprisonment may await them if

shahadah (martyrdom) does not materialize first. Consequently, it is not surprising that

prison and prisoners are a frequent subject in the various Islamist literature.

The institutions of jihad spell out the reasons why violent jihadists are imprisoned. The

most prominent of these is that they live in a society that has gone astray. Many in society,

even those who are Muslim by name, are in fact mostly kuffar15. By declaring Muslims

Kuffar, or the practice of takfir16, violent jihadists seek to place themselves on the path

taken by the sahabah (the Prophet’s companions) who suffered and stood their ground

when prosecuted by unbelievers in their own societies (Al-Sheikh 2005: 14). Rulers who

command the security apparatus are especially at fault because they “advance the agenda of

the invaders by killing, imprisoning, and torturing the mujahideen”. (Al-Ansari 2003: 3).

Therefore, violent jihadist literature, such as Sawt al-Jihad (Voice of Jihad) magazine

periodically publishes articles urging jihadists, if arrested, “to stand their ground because

this is the path that the prophets, the virtuous predecessors, and the martyrs have chosen”

(Al-Dusri 2003: 2). It also reminds violent jihadists that God has already warned them that

they will be tested to see which among them are true in their faith: “And We shall test you

until We know the mujahideen [those who strive) to their utmost and preserve in patience;

and We shall try your reported [mettle)” The Quran (47: 31).

14 Umma (alternatively Ummah). Muslim community, a fundamental concept in Islam, expressing the essential

unity and theoretical equalityof Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings (Esposito 2003).

15 Kuffar (singular Kafir). An unbeliever. First applied to Meccans who refused to submit to Islam, the term

implies an active rejection of divine revelation (Esposito 2003).

16 Takfir. A pronouncement that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and no longer a Muslim (Esposito 2003).

RAND Europe Violent jihadists and prison
31

Prayers for prisoners and calls for their release are among the means by which violent

jihadists are glorified in Islamist literature. For example, al-Jama’ah magazine published an

article to remind its audience of the plight of prisoners and to urge Muslims to do

whatever they could to release them through paying money or any other means available

(Al-Jama’ah 2004: 35). Bin Laden himself has also frequently prayed that God will

alleviate the plight of the prisoners and has urged their release. Since Sheikh Umar Abd al-

Rahman was imprisoned in the USA for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center

bombing, Bin Laden has consistently called for his release over the years (Al-Jazeera TV

2002).This practice makes new violent jihadists aware that they will not be forgotten if

they are imprisoned. Figure 4 provides another example of Bin Laden’s references to

prisoners in his statements.

Figure 4: Example of Bin Laden’s references to in his messages

And then I call to memory my brothers the prisoners in Guantanamo – may Allah free them all – and I

state the fact, about which I also am certain, that all the prisoners of Guantanamo, who were captured in

2001 and the first half of 2002 and who number in the hundreds, have no connection whatsoever to the

events of September 11, and even stranger is that many of them have no connection with al-Qaida in the

first place, and even more amazing is that some of them oppose al-Qaida’s methodology of calling for war

with America. And this is in addition to the arrest of those who were working in the relief agencies, like

Abu Abdul Aziz al-Mutrafi, or those working in the media, like Sami al-Hajj and Taysir Alouni, who

was imprisoned at the instigation of the American administration. So the conclusion is that all the

prisoners to date have no connection with the events of September 11th and knew nothing about them,

with the exception of two of the brothers, may Allah free them all … My mentioning of these facts isn’t

out of hope that Bush and his party will treat our brothers fairly in their cases, because that is something

no rational person expects, but rather it is meant to expose the oppression, injustice and arbitrariness of

your administration in using force and the reactions that result from that. This is from one perspective,

and from another perspective, perhaps there will one day come from the Americans someone who desires

justice and fairness, and that is the path to security and safety, if you are interested in it. (As-Sahab

Media 2006)

Violent jihadists also exploit the experience of imprisonment is exploited to gain sympathy

from the public and appeal to potential recruits. The brutality of the jailers and their

masters is given as a reason for fighting against them and the abuses that took place in Abu

Graib prison in Iraq are regularly mentioned in jihadist magazines and websites. For

instance, Al-Fursan (The Knights) magazine reported on the conditions of prisoners in

Iraq, described by a fighter who had been released. He described the American torture as

“so severe, it even supersedes the torture in the dictatorship regimes’ prisons” (Al-Fursan

2005). Another publication, Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad) magazine, has published entire

profiles of prisoners in Guantanamo and other American prisons (Qa’id 2005: 26).

One of the authors in Sada al-Jihad voiced his intention to compile his experience and the

experience of others in Western jails, “to put in the hands of the leaders of jihad, their

soldiers, and their supporters for them to realize this aspect of the battle against Islam and

know the truth about it” (Qa’id 2005: 26).

There is also written guidance for how violent jihadists should behave when taken

prisoner. An example includes the Declaration of jihad against the country’s tyrants – military

series. This publication (a copy of which was discovered in a raid in Manchester in 2000

and thus is also referred to as the Manchester manual) has a chapter relating to prisoners,

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

specifically the 18th lesson – prisons and detention centres (see Appendix B for full

details). The 18th lesson prepares the violent jihadist for what to expect during a trial and

how he should conduct himself in prison. For example he (or she) must:

• Take advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and

exchange information that may be helpful to them in their work outside

prison [according to what occurred during the investigations]. The

importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is

self evident here.

• Inside the prison, the brother should not accept any work that may belittle or

demean him or his brothers, such as the cleaning of the prison bathrooms or

hallways.

• The brothers should create an Islamic program for themselves inside the

prison, as well as

recreational and educational ones, etc.

• The brother in prison should be a role model in selflessness. Brothers should

also pay attention to each others needs and should help each other and unite

vis a vis the prison officers.

• The brothers must take advantage of their presence in prison for obeying and

worshiping [God] and memorizing the Quran, etc.

4.3 Violent jihadists in the British prison system

Those imprisoned, remanded and detained in the UK under different counter-terrorism

laws are mostly held in a small number of prisons across the country. At August 2007 the

England and Wales prison system held 121 terrorist or terrorist-related prisoners, of whom

43 were convicted prisoners, 58 were on remand, 11 were awaiting extradition and a

further 11 were held under immigration legislation (House of Commons 2007a). UK

high-security prison estate that reportedly hold violent jihadist prisoners include Her

Majesty’s Prison (HMP) Belmarsh in south-east London, which at August 2007 was

holding 58 terrorist prisoners; HMP Frankland in Durham (which holds Dhiren Barot,

sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment for plotting attacks, Omar Khyam, who led the cell

which planned to attack nightclubs and shopping centres in the UK and Hussein Osman,

jailed for his part in the failed 21st July 2005 attacks on the London transport network)

(BBC 2007b; The Guardian 2007); HMP Whitemoor in Cambridgeshire, which holds

Sajid Badat, jailed for his part in a plot to destroy a transatlantic airliner; HMP Long

Lartin in Worcestershire, which holds, among others, Abu Qatada; HMP Woodhill near

Milton Keynes and HMP Full Sutton near York.

In the UK prison system, prisoners are assigned to one of four security categories:

• Category A: prisoners whose escape would be highly dangerous to the public,

police or the security of the state and whose escape must be made impossible.

• Category B: prisoners who do not need the highest conditions of security but for

whom escape must be made very difficult.

RAND Europe Violent jihadists and prison

• Category C: prisoners who cannot be trusted in open conditions but who do not

have the ability or resources to make a determined escape attempt.

• Category D: prisoners who can reasonably be trusted to serve their sentences in

open conditions (HM Prison Service 2001). In Category A there are three levels of

escape risk classification; standard, high and exceptional.

It appears from these definitions that some individuals convicted of or on remand for violent

jihadist activities in the UK may be classified as Category a – high escape risk, defined as those

prisoners with

a history and background which suggest that they have the ability and determination

to overcome the range of security measures which apply to the custody of standard

risk Category A prisoners. There may be current information to suggest that they

have associates or resources that could be used to plan and carry out an assisted escape

attempt. If there is information that the prisoners or associates have access to firearms

or explosives, and have been willing to use them in committing crime or in avoiding

capture, high risk is the expected category. (HM Prison Service 2004)

Prisoners classified as high risk will be held in a more restrictive custodial environment than

other prisoners, are they are likely to be in specialist secure units. In HMP Belmarsh is a

highly secure unit with the capacity to hold 48 high-risk prisoners. Operating as an

independent unit with its own reception, visiting area and segregation unit, the unit comprises

four wings or spurs, each with 12 single-occupancy cells (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

2003: 37). According to Amnesty International, prisoners held in the high-secure unit are

confined to their wings apart from visits to the gym and for religious services. Reportedly these

high-risk prisoners are subject to lock-up in their cells for 22 hours per day and therefore have

2 hours per day to associate with other prisoners, exercise, make telephone calls and attend to

other personal administrative needs. At the time of an inspection by Her Majesty’s

Inspectorate of Prisons in 2005, Belmarsh prison’s high-secure unit held 14 men awaiting trial

on terrorism offences (nine of whom were related to the July 2005 attacks on London, who

had previously been classified as high-risk and were subsequently reassessed as standard-risk).

Four of these 14 were held in a wing designated a “special secure unit”, and were under an

enhanced restrictive regime where their activities were more closely supervised, and where they

were permitted to associate only in pairs and were not allowed to attend Friday prayers with

others. (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2005: 27).

It is apparent from the above that the opportunities for some violent jihadist prisoners to

interact with their peers and other prisoners may be limited by the special security regimes

and the general high-security regimes of the prisons in which they are typically held.

However, it seems likely that, as the number of convicted and remanded violent jihadist

prisoners grows, the resources available to the authorities to manage this difficult prisoner

population will become increasingly stretched. As the Prison Officers Association has

noted, there are “now many high-profile terrorist prisoners locked up on normal location,

on normal wings with any other prisoner instead of in special environments” (The

Guardian 2006a). Also of concern are the radicalized or extremist individuals who are not

in prison as a result of terrorism-related offences, but because of lesser crimes. The

radicalized inclination of such prisoners may not be apparent to the authorities and

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
34

therefore they may be able to mix freely with the ordinary prison population without being

adequately monitored.

4.4 Jihadist activity in European prisons and beyond

In order to make an assessment of the extent of violent jihadist activity in European

prisons, sources beyond those in the public domain are required, and therefore the study

team made approaches to the relevant authorities in a number of European states. Perhaps

predictably, due to the sensitivities and security issues surrounding these issues, none of the

organizations approached were willing to provide the study team with access to either

policy-makers or operational staff in security or prison agencies. Without access to such

sources it is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion as to the level of threat that

radicalized Islamist or violent jihadist prisoners may pose. However, there is sufficient

material in the public domain to suggest that there may be a nascent problem that requires

further research and investigation.

Specific to the situation in the UK, the Prison Officers’ Association (POA) has in recent

years repeatedly raised concerns of the radicalization and recruitment of young Muslim

prisoners by extremist prisoners. It was reported in 2006 that, “some of these terrorist

prisoners are targeting for radicalization and recruitment other alienated ethnic minority

groups, as well as the smaller number of younger Muslim prisoners, and they are providing

rich pickings” (The Guardian 2006a). The Prison Officers’ Association has also expressed

fears that as the number of extremist prisoners grows they will divide along gang lines and

may use their time in prison to plan future attacks (Observer 2007). There have been a

number of incidents in the UK that demonstrate that radicalized or extremist Islamist

prisoners may have the potential to cause disruption in prisons. These include:

• Richard Reid the failed transatlantic shoe-bomber is said to have embraced Islam

while in prison and to have fallen under the influence of radicalizing influences

upon his release from prison in 1996. (O’Neil and McGrory 2006)

• The August 2005 explosion at Whitemoor prison houses a number of violent

jihadist prisoners, including Sajid Badaat, who was to have been Richard Reid’s

accomplice in a second aircraft bombing. (BBC 2005a)

• A 2006 report that a gang known as the “Muslim Boys” was using violence to

intimidate inmates in Belmarsh prison in order to convert them to Islam, though

it is unclear if this example is related more to gang activity than to extremism

(Daily Mirror 2006)

• Disturbances at Wandsworth prison in November 2006 were reportedly caused by

a schism between groups of Muslim prisoners, some of whom were being

pressured to adopt militant lifestyles and belief systems. (The Guardian 2006b)

• In late 2006, Abbas Boutrab, serving a 6-year sentence for possessing information

relating to the bombing of passenger aircraft, was caught downloading from the

Internet al-Qaeda propaganda material and instructions on how to manufacture

explosives while he was in HMP Maghaberry (Observer 2007a)

• In July 2007 Tariq al-Daour, jailed for establishing an online jihad network, was

allegedly caught making a website in his cell at Belmarsh urging terror attacks.

RAND Europe Violent jihadists and prison

When al-Daour refused to hand over his laptop, reportedly a riot ensued as prison

officers clashed with a group of al-Qaeda sympathizers. (Observer 2007b)

• Muktar Said Ibrahim, who was sentenced to 5 years for robbery, went on to lead

the failed 21 July 2005 attacks on the London transport network (The Guardian

2005)

There is also reason for concern about Islamist radicalization and recruitment in the

Spanish prison system. Between 2001 and 2005, 188 individuals were imprisoned in Spain

on charges related to violent jihadism (Reinares 2006). In late 2004 the Spanish authorities

disrupted a plot to attack the Madrid headquarters of the National Court. The group

planning the attack called itself the “Martyrs for Morocco” and was made up of violent

jihadists from North Africa, Mauritania and Afghanistan (Haahr 2004). Further, a

member of the cell responsible for the 2004 Madrid attacks, Jamal Ahmidan, had come to

Spain from Morocco as an illegal immigrant in the early 1990s and had engaged in

number of petty crimes, serving a series of prison sentences in Spanish jails. Eventually

deported back to Morocco in 2000, he was imprisoned for 3 years for running over a

pedestrian with his car while drunk. It is reported that it was during this sentence he

became radicalized, giving up drugs and alcohol (Alonso and Reinares 2006). Returning to

Spain in 2003, he procured the commercial explosives used in the Madrid attacks from

Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Spaniard convicted of drug offences in 2001 and who

reportedly converted to Islam while in prison (Carlile 2006). Beyond Europe, in late 2005

the US authorities disrupted an indigenous violent jihadist cell that was reportedly seeking

to target military, government and Jewish targets in the USA. The Authentic Assembly of

Islam (Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh – JIS) was a radicalized Islamist gang formed inside the

Los Angeles prison system by its self-styled imam, Kevin James (Shakyh Shahaab Murshid)

who was imprisoned for robbery. James founded this group in the California prison system

shortly after beginning a 10-year jail term in 1997 and actively sought to recruit more

members in prison, partly by distributing “a document or protocol which set forth …

James’ religious teachings about Islam, including the justification for killing infidels or

non-believers, and guidelines to be followed by JIS members (JIS Protocol)” (US District

Court 2004).

James told his followers that it was their duty to attack infidel targets including the US

government and Jewish and non-Jewish supporters of Israel. Following their release from

prison, members of JIS are reported to have engaged in a range of activities including

paramilitary training, the procurement of weapons and conducting surveillance of

potential targets. In addition to the above, members of JIS committed a series of petrol

station robberies with the aim of funding terrorist attacks. It was the arrest of two gang

members in the course of these robberies that led police to the cell (Cozzens and Conway

2005).

Finally, in Indonesia, there is some evidence that the Jemmah Islamyia group that is

responsible for a number of attacks, including the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, has

established significant networks in the prison system. Senior Jemmah Islamyia members are

alleged to have used their time in prison to translate radicalizing texts and instruction

manuals that are then distributed via the Internet or bookshops. It is also alleged that the

Jemmah Islamyia leaders have been able to plan attacks and issue instructions from their

cells. In one instance a prison warden was accused of supplying the convicted Bali

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

conspirator Imam Samudra with a laptop. It was alleged that this laptop might have been

used in planning the 2005 Bali suicide bomb attacks (West Australian 2007).

4.5 Examples of countering violent jihadist activity in prisons

In a number of countries, perhaps following the recognition of the dangers of

concentrating large numbers of violent and or radicalized individuals in prisons for many

years, attempts have been made to develop programmes for the de-radicalization of

prisoners.17 Most of these programmes have been established in Middle Eastern and Asian

countries, although it has been reported that the US military in Iraq has set up its own

version at Camp Cropper in an attempt to prevent the radicalization and recruitment of

detainees by insurgents in and outside the prison camp (Newsweek 2007).

Singapore has established the religious rehabilitation group (RRG) in response to the

arrest of a number of members of the Jemaah Islamyia group in Singapore in 2001 and

2002. The RRG’s objective is to “study the Jemmah Islamyia’s ideology, offer expert

opinion in understanding Jemmah Islamyia’s interpretation of Islam, produce necessary

counter-ideological materials and to conduct public education for the Muslim community

on religious extremism” (Hassan and Pereire 2006: 461).

The group is made up of a number of Islamic scholars and experts who provide advice and

guidance on the development of counter-ideological material and a panel of counsellors

who interview and attempt to rehabilitate those arrested and their families (Hassan and

Pereire 2006: 462).

In addition to seeking to re-educate Jemmah Islamyia detainees and those under “control

orders”, the programme has also made efforts to assist the families of those detained

through counselling, financial assistance and ensuring the continuing education of any

children. Reportedly these efforts were “significant in helping to win over the hearts and

minds of the detainees and their families … It was particularly important to minimize the

risk of the children being radicalized in future by the detention of their fathers” (Hassan

and Pereire 2006: 463).

It is difficult to assess the level of success achieved by the Singapore programme, but as a

result of the rehabilitation efforts the authorities have released at least three former

Jemmah Islamyia members.

Saudi Arabia is implementing this concept in another way. Following the 2003 Riyadh

compound attacks, the Saudi authorities established a programme aimed at countering the

radicalizing ideology of extremist sympathisers. Like the Singapore approach, one aspect of

this programme is counselling, which seeks to engage extremists in theological debate and

psychological counselling. It is notable that the programme is open only to sympathisers:

those who have engaged in violence are excluded fro it (Boueck 2007: 1). The counsellors

(made up of religious scholars, psychologists and social scientists) seek to engage the

17 In addition to the three examples discussed here, the Indonesian authorities have also created a de-

radicalization programme for prisoners. For a detailed examination of this programme and the challenges it has

encountered see International Crisis Group 2007.

RAND Europe Violent jihadists and prison

prisoners in debate, and “attempt to persuade them that their religious justification for

their actions is wrong and based upon a corrupted understanding of Islam” (Boueck 2007:

2). Again, like the Singaporean approach, efforts are made to address the needs of the

prisoners and their family; such as providing the families are provided with financial

support, and help with schooling for children. This is because the government recognises

that if they fail to provide this support, “then it is possible that extremist elements will

move in to provide” it (Boueck 2007: 3). If prisoners are assessed as ready for release, they

are supported further after their release. They are given assistance in finding jobs and

spouses, and are eligible for free medical care and financial support (Daily Telegraph:

2006). Again, from the open sources it is hard to form a meaningful view on the

effectiveness or otherwise of this programme. It is reported that since 2004 some 2,000

prisoners have participated in the programme, of whom roughly 700 have been released

(Boueck 2007: 3). In an enhancement to this programme, it has been reported that the

Saudi authorities are in the process of constructing five special prisons to hold captured

violent jihadists, each capable holding 1,200 prisoners. It is understood that these prisons

will each have special facilities designed to improve the effectiveness of the de-

radicalization programme (Boueck 2008: 1).

In 2002 YYemen created a programme called the religious dialogue council (RDC) that

sought to de-radicalize its jihadist prisoners. Its head, Judge Hamoud al-Hitar reportedly

introduced his sessions with prisoners by saying:

If you can convince us that your ideas are justified by the Koran, then we will join

you in your struggle. But if we succeed in convincing you of our ideas, then you

must agree to renounce violence. (The Christian Science Monitor 2005)

Initially the programme was hailed as an innovation and appeared to enjoy early success,

and 364 suspected militants were subsequently released. However, the programme’s

effectiveness came under increasing scrutiny in 2005. In an interview with the BBC one of

the graduates of the initiative stated, “We understood what the judge wanted and he

understood what we wanted from him. The Yemeni Mujahideen in prison know Hitar is

the way for them to get released, so they ingratiate themselves with him. There was no long

or complex dialogue” (BBC 2005b). In addition to these revelations, it emerged that a

number of its graduates had subsequently been discovered fighting against Coalition forces

in Iraq (Johnsen 2006).

It is apparent from the above that de-radicalizing prisoners is a complex issue. Clearly there

is strong potential for the targeted prisoners to abuse such programmes. The Yemeni

example appears to demonstrate this, with the result of releasing prisoners who return to

their extremist ways. Further, it would be difficult for Western, non-Muslim governments

to create such programmes without the active support of leading religious authorities: the

cooperation between the secular authority and local religious leaders in Singapore appears

to be a good example of how this has been overcome. However, the schemes mentioned

above, among others, have been in operation for relatively short periods of time and

therefore it is likely too early to form a judgement as to their overall effectiveness.

CHAPTER 5 The Spectrum of Radicalized Prisoner
Behaviour in Prison

From the material and evidence outlined in the preceding chapters it is possible to plot a

spectrum of the potential activities a radicalized or ideologically motivated group may

undertake in a custodial environment. Some or even many of these activities may be seen

in normal prison behaviour and, taken individually, may not be seen as reliable indicators

of radicalized or extremist behaviour at the individual or group level. The following

chapter explores three categories of potential activity: forming groups and the emergence of

organizations; using passive or non-violent resistance and using violent means to resist the

prison authorities actively.

5.1 Group formation and organizational activity

As has been detailed above, in all types of institutions, including prisons, ggroups of like-

minded individuals are typical. This may cause concern to prison management, but it is

not necessarily an indicator of radicalization or recruitment activity. Following from this,

another characteristic of prison behaviour is the voluntary sself-segregation of groups of

prisoners from the rest of the prison population. This can manifest itself in a normal prison

context. For example, in the UK Muslim prisoners have been observed to “pad up” (i.e.

move into) in cells with their co-religionists, which promotes solidarity and avoids conflict

with non-Muslim inmates (Beckford et al. 2005: 192). However, such segregation may

take on less benign characteristics as has been demonstrated in the Northern Ireland and

Spanish examples, where organized groups of prisoners engaged in deliberate efforts to take

over the exercise of organizational discipline in the prisons. Self-segregation may manifest

itself in other aspects of prison life, such as refusing to share religious facilities or

communal religious services.

A characteristic displayed by a number of the groups we have considered is their use of

paramilitary-style hhierarchical command structures. This is true of both the PIRA and

criminal gangs in the USA. The PIRA appears to have imported its external organizational

structures to the prison. In the USA, for example, two prison gangs in Texas, the Texas

Syndicate and the Mexican Mafia established similar chains of command (Fong 1990: 39).

The use of such paramilitary structures and roles (such as “officer commanding”) is in

keeping with the traditional Irish republican view of their prisoners as prisoners of war.

There is little or no evidence of such formally hierarchical structures emerging among the

violent jihadist inmates in Europe and beyond.

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

A fundamental aspect of any organization’s existence is its ability to rrecruit and integrate

new members. One might, therefore, reasonably expect this to be true of organizations in

the prison environment. However, this is not always the case. In the case of Northern

Ireland and Spain, it appears that there was little effort on the part of the PIRA or the

ETA, respectively, to recruit or indoctrinate new members in prison. Instead, the efforts in

prisons were directed towards reinforcing and indoctrinating existing members who had

been jailed in the course of “the struggle”. As McEvoy observes:

unlike in similar prison settings such as South Africa, the USA or Palestine, little

systematic efforts were made to politicize or convert such prisoners in Northern

Ireland. With large numbers of their own factions continuously being arrested and

imprisoned, many of whom were potentially as much in need of politicization

having just come from the respective military campaigns, there was little impetus

for a concerted attempt at politicizing non-paramilitary prisoners in the Northern

Ireland context. (McEvoy 2001: 42)

In contrast, in the US penal system prison groupings and gangs of various leanings and

orientations proactively seek to recruit new members from the general prison population.

In some cases, groups compete over these new fish are, who are coerced or intimidated into

joining them.18 In both the historical and contemporary contexts, violent jihadist groups

seek to use prisons and prisoners as a recruiting pool. Examples have already been cited

previously, including the alleged 21st July plotter Muktar Said Ibrahim and the shoe-

bomber Richard Reid. The 2004 Madrid attacks and the foiled attempt to bomb the

National Court in Madrid all point to contemporary instances of violent jihadist

recruitment in prison environments.

Of concern in Spain is the prevalence of the Islamic sect Takfir wa al-Hijra

(excommunication and exile), in the prison system, and the reported involvement of

several of its adherents in significant attacks or plots.19 The “Takfiris” may be especially

significant in the prison environment, given their willingness to engage in criminal activity

to further their cause and the likelihood that they will seek out those with criminal skills

and backgrounds to assist them. Their theology may also prove attractive to those with

criminal histories, as this ideology permits them to redeem themselves by engaging in an

already accustomed way of life. A further example of the role of prisons in violent jihadist

recruitment has emerged in Iraq, where, according to Coalition sources,

18 For example, the criminal Texas Syndicate has an established recruitment process that includes vetting

procedures and majority consensus from the group membership before admitting a prospective candidate.

19 Takfir wa al-Hijra (excommunication and exile) is a radicalized Salafist sect originating in the crackdown on

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1960s. Much of its doctrine was generated inside Egyptian prisons;

its key tenets were not only that Nasser and his government were apostates, but that the whole of Egyptian

society was also apostate for failing to fight the rule of non-Muslims; thus the Takfir, or excommunicate

element of this sect’s beliefs. Takfiri members exiled (al-Hijra) themselves from mainstream, excommunicated

society, and arguing that earthly laws were illegitimate, the group was able to justify a wide range of criminal

activity in pursuit of its objectives. The modern Takfiri jihadist uses this justification to immerse himself in

western society, engaging in a range of normally proscribed activities (such as drinking alcohol, eating pork et

cetera) in order to effectively infiltrate and attack the non-believers (which include Muslims who the Takfiris

consider apostate). See Mili (2006).

RAND Europe The Spectrum of Radicalized Activity in the Prison Environment

the three vulnerabilities al-Qaeda looks for in their potential recruits[are]: one,

individuals who have been detained by Coalition forces in the past; two, children

or a relative of individuals who have been detained or killed by coalition forces;

and three, individuals that display religious values similar to those of al-Qaeda in

Iraq. (Multi-National Forces Iraq 2006)

Substantive efforts appear to be starting to run information campaigns that provide

external support for detainees, remanded and convicted prisoners. A leading example

of such activity is the website, cageprisoners.com. This website seeks to draw attention to

the incarceration of a number of prisoners charged with, convicted of or detained on

suspicion of violent jihadist activities. It encourages visitors to write to these prisoners and

to the detaining authorities in various countries, though the campaign appears to be

coordinated from the UK. Campaigns highlighted in late 2007 included an appeal for

funds for the legal appeal of Ali al-Timimi (convicted in the USA), and a weekly London

demonstration calling for the closure of the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay,

Cuba. A number of related UK campaigning groups and individuals focus on prisoners

and detainees on their websites. These include:

� Islamic Human Rights Commission (http://www.ihrc.org.uk), a London-based

advocacy organization which, among other activities, runs the “prisoners of faith”

campaign. This campaign apparently seeks to highlight the situations of individual

prisoners and encourages supporters to write letters in support.

� National Guantanamo Coalition (www.guantanamo.org.uk), apparently

comprising the Birmingham Guantanamo coalition, the Justice for Omar

Deghayes campaign, the London Guantanamo campaign and the Manchester

Guantanamo and Belmarsh campaign.

� Scotland against Criminalizing Communities (www.sacc.org.uk), which

purports to campaign against UK anti-terrorism legislation and the use of

detention powers against terrorist suspects.

� Helping Households under Great Stress (http://www.hhugs.org.uk/) – a

registered UK charity (www.hhugs.org.uk), which purports to have been “set up

by British Muslims in response to the new Anti-Terror Legislation … to provide

support and advice to households affected by this legislation”.20 It seeks to raise

funds and to encourage voluntary support to assist the families of prisoners and

detainees.

Imprisoned members of radicalized and violent organizations have long played a central

role in the iinformation and propaganda campaigns run by parent organizations and a

wider network of sympathisers. This was true of the Suffragettes, the Irish republicans and

the American White Supremacists and it is true today of those embracing violent jihadism.

In the modern Irish example, Soairse was an organization created to support Republican

prisoners and their families by fund-raising, and to run information campaigns to keep the

prisoners in the target community’s consciousness. There is no suggestion that an

overarching support organization has been developed by or for violent jihadist prisoners in

20 http://www.hhugs.org.uk/ Accessed 3rd March 2008.

Home

http://www.guantanamo.org.uk

http://www.sacc.org.uk

http://www.hhugs.org.uk/

http://www.hhugs.org.uk

http://www.hhugs.org.uk/

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners
42

Europe or beyond. However, examples of the exploitation of the imprisonment of violent

jihadists for propaganda purposes have been cited previously, and it seems likely that this

will continue to play a leading role in Islamist propaganda campaigns.

A further example of organized activity in prisons by radicalized or extremist prisoners is

that of eeducation, reinforcement and strategy development. Many prisoners take the

opportunity afforded by prison to improve their educational status, and there is clear

precedent for radicalized or extremist prisoners to do so as well. Nelson Mandela, for

example, gained a law degree while on Robben Island. Republican paramilitaries in the

Maze Prison had a strongly developed sense of the importance of education, developing

alternative curricula for their inmates that sought to reinforce their political viewpoints,

widen their understanding of their cultural heritage (for example, by learning the Irish

language) and hone their practical skills through weapons training and bomb-making

classes. These activities led to the Maze Prison being labelled a “university of terrorism”

(Irwin 2003: 476).

In the case of violent jihadists, it is worth noting that prison has been formative in the

thinking of some of the most significant Islamist ideologues, ranging from Ibn Tamiyyaa

through to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Serious unintended consequences can thus flow from

imprisoning radicalized and extremist prisoners.

5.2 Non-violent resistance

There are a number of examples where groups of prisoners have used the llaw as a vehicle

of resistance to both their incarceration and the wider society. In the 1960s the Black

Muslims (later to become the Nation of Islam) played a leading role in developing

American prisoners’ rights by litigating for recognition as a religious group and for the

right to conduct prayers and other privileges. (Smith 2003: 132). In the Northern Ireland

example, the Republican movement sought to challenge extraditions by legal means to

internationalize their campaign.

In one (unsuccessful) example, Republican prisoners involved in the dirty protest in 1978

tried to argue to the European Court of Human Rights that the prison authorities’

behaviour constituted inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the European

Convention on Human Rights (McEvoy 2001: 153). More recently, in 2004 Abu Hamza

al-Masri unsuccessfully attempted to gain release from Belmarsh prison, where he was

being held on an US extradition request, on the grounds he could not receive adequate

medical care in prison. Following the conviction of Dhiren Barot in 2007, his lawyer

claimed that Barot had asked her to ask for himself and other convicted violent jihadists to

be granted prisoner of war status, together with the associated rights and privileges of this

status (Daily Mail 2007).

A recurring aspect of collective resistance is refusing to engage in normal prison

administrative activities. This may include the rrefusal to wear prison uniform, or to

participate in prison work. Such refusal serves to both distinguish the group from

ordinary criminal prisoners, and to appropriate power from the prison authorities. A clear

example of where such refusals is the paramilitary prisoner population in Northern Ireland.

RAND Europe The Spectrum of Radicalized Activity in the Prison Environment
43

Escalating from collective refusal to cooperate or adhere to prison regime, another form of

resistance to the prison authorities manifests itself in the uuse of prisoners’ bodies as

weapons. While this technique is not used exclusively by radicalized individuals or groups,

the dirty protest as a collective, group action reached its apogee in Northern Ireland in the

late 1970s. Evolving from the refusal to wear prison uniform, Republican prisoners were

left in their cells with only a blanket. Claiming that the prison staff assaulted them when

slopping out the prisoners began to throw their excrement out of the cell windows and

urinate under the cell doors. When the prison staff blocked the windows, the prisoner

began to smear their excrement on their cell walls. The “dirty” or “blanket protest” was

used in the Maze Prison and Armagh Women’s Prison, from September 1976 until

Autumn 1981.

Perhaps the ultimate expression of defiance and an extreme use of one’s own body as a

vehicle for resistance, tthe hunger strike has been used in a variety of contexts and to

further a range of causes. The pioneers of the hunger strike as a political tool were the

Suffragettes of the early 1900s in the UK and abroad. Hunger strikes have also been used

to a significant degree by Basque nationalist prisoners in Spain and Kurdish separatists in

Turkey and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. There is some indication that violent

jihadist prisoners and detainees may be disposed towards using hunger strikes as a means of

protest. In September 2005 it was reported that some 128 detainees at the US detention

facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba had gone on hunger strike, which the US authorities

countered by force- feeding them. (BBC 2005c). An individual example is Sami al-Arian, a

Palestinian university academic jailed in the USA for conspiring to aid Islamic jihad, who

went on a 2-month hunger strike in January 2007.

5.3 Violent resistance

Moving beyond prisoner self-harm, we come to the use of violence in prison. Physical

violence is likely to occur in all prison environments. Confrontations may occur between

inmates and or staff over a variety of issues, such as control of resources (e.g. drugs or

money), access to privileges or simply as a means of self-preservation. As one observer has

noted, “A majority of inmates believed that adequate force was the only method available

to protect oneself … [it] sends a direct message to other potentially aggressive prisoners

that coercive power will be used to defend oneself” (Stojkovic 1984: 516).

However, violence can also be used collectively and to further specific aims in a prison.

The Aryan Brotherhood, which blends criminality and white supremacist beliefs, is one of

the most violent gangs in the USA, existing largely within the prison system. It has been

referred to as one of the most murderous criminal organizations in the USA and engages in

murdering non-white inmates and sexual offenders. Prospective members are required to

murder another inmate in order to be accepted into the organization (Grann 2004). In

Northern Ireland, when seeking to force segregation, Republican paramilitaries engaged in

violent attacks on Loyalist prisoners in both the Maze and the Crumlin Road prisons. In

an extreme example, in 1991 PIRA prisoners detonated an explosive device in a dining hall

in Crumlin Road prison, killing two Loyalist prisoners (McEvoy 2001: 276–8). There is

also a potential for the external conflict to spill over the walls into the prison environment,

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

as shown by the 1997 murder of Loyalist volunteer force leader Billy Wright by three

Republican prisoners in the confines of the Maze Prison, using a smuggled firearm.

Violence may also be directed towards prison staff and officials. In any given prison,

members of staff may be vulnerable to attack by inmates with a grievance. When such

violence is undertaken as part of a group’s overall agenda within prison, it takes on

potentially greater significance. As McEvoy notes:

Violence against prison staff or other inmates (normally from opposing factions) is

a direct challenge to the prison authorities, it is a direct appropriation of power.

The state’s monopoly of power on the use of force is challenged in a place which

should be the zenith of the state’s capacity for power and control. (McEvoy 2001:

45)

Radicalized or violent groups have the potential to attack the prison staff or innocent

individuals outside the prison. The history of PIRA and ETA is replete with numerous

examples where prison staff have been murdered by the associates of those they are

incarcerating. There have also been instances where individuals who are not affiliated to

the prisons have been kidnapped and held to ransom for the release of prisoners.21 The UK

Prison Officers’ Association has reported that some radicalized Muslim inmates in the

high-security Belmarsh have been adopting increasingly confrontational attitudes towards

prison staff:

when an officer confronts a Muslim prisoner in Belmarsh, he or she often finds

themselves surrounded by five or six other Muslim inmates. They are becoming a lot

more defensive … Tariq al-Daour, jailed for establishing an online jihad network,

was caught making a website in his cell at Belmarsh urging terror attacks. When al-

Daour refused to hand over his laptop a riot ensued as prison officers clashed with a

group of al-Qaeda sympathizers (The Observer 2007)

While some radicalized individuals may exploit the opportunities offered by imprisonment

(publicity, in the case of the Suffragettes, recruitment in the case of some contemporary

jihadists) for many radicalized groups, an over-riding objective for prisoners is tto escape.

This has the benefit of both returning volunteers and activists to the field of operations and

also providing great potential for propaganda – primarily by embarrassing the incarcerating

authorities. This has been described as “resistance by ridicule” (McEvoy 2001: 45). The

PIRA was particularly effective at executing escapes. Doubtless these appealed to PIRA

prisoners” self-declared status as prisoners of war. The most spectacular example came in

September 1983, when 38 IRA prisoners staged a mass escape from the Maze Prison, using

knives, smuggled firearms and disguises. A number of these escapees were never

recaptured.22

21 For example, the ETA kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco in 1997 (see above) and the 2005 abduction of

Jill Carroll in Iraq where the captors demanded the release of all female Iraqi detainees in US custody.

22 Other notable IRA prison escapes include: the 1991 escape of Pearse McAuley and Nessan Quinlivan from

Brixton prison; the 1981 escape of eight remanded IRA suspects from the Crumlin Road jail in Belfast; the

1980 escape of Gerrard Tuite from Brixton prison; the 1973 escape of three IRA prisoners by helicopter from

Mountjoy Prison, Dublin; and the 1997 escape of Liam Averell from the Maze Prison disguized as a woman,

under the cover of the annual Republican prisoners’ Christmas party.

RAND Europe The Spectrum of Radicalized Activity in the Prison Environment
45

Contemporary violent jihadist groups have shown a propensity for staging escapes from

detention. In July 2005 Abu Yehia al-Libi, along with three other detainees, managed to

escape from the Coalition detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan. Since his escape Al-

Libi has appeared in a series of propaganda videos distributed by the as-Sahab (the cloud),

al-Qaeda’s media operations wing as a new example of resistance by ridicule. Al-Libi taunts

the Coalition in these videos and draws attention to perceived moral flaws in his American

military captors and more widely in the US military.23 In a number of instances, jihadists

have taken escape to new heights, launching of armed assaults on prisons to free their

comrades. For example in March 2007 a large group of militants purportedly from al-

Qaeda in Iraq, assaulted a jail in Mosul, Iraq and freed 140 prisoners, most of whom were

insurgents (Reuters 2007). In December 2007 the Belgian authorities arrested and

subsequently released 14 individuals who were alleged to have been plotting to use

explosives in an effort to release Nizar Trabelsi, sentenced in 2003 for planning a suicide

attack on a NATO airbase (New York Times 2007).

Perhaps the ultimate concern for security authorities should be the potential for these

groups to pplan future attacks beyond the confines of the prison. While there are limited

examples of such planning, it is alleged that the “Martyrs for Morocco” cell, which sought

to attack the National Court in Madrid, was created in Spanish prisons (International

Herald Tribune 2004). The Authentic Assembly of Islam in California (see above) provides

a further example of this potential development.

5.4 Comparison of two groups’ activities and behaviour

A range of similarities and differences exists in the observed behaviour of different types of

prisoner. Comparing the Irish republicans and violent jihadists is of potential value, as

both examples have used violence to further their aims and have a long association with the

prison environment, yet they are very different in terms of their structure, culture, ideology

and objectives. The following section compares the behaviour of generic criminal

prisoners, Irish republicans and violent jihadists. All three groups have a number of

activities or behaviour in common including

• suffering attacks from other prisoners

• imposing self-segregation from other prisoners

• launching violent assaults on prison staff

• seeking to communicate with the outside world via visitors

• attempting to escape

23 These videos are as follows: Abu Yahya al-Libi – escape from Bagram (available at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0pidwqajsDw as of 21/08/07), Violations and torture (available at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqei86f3w10 as of 21/08/07), The ulema (available at

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NojDHKDLULk as of 21/08/07) and Message for the mujahideen (available

at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MhkcBBms5cU as of 1/08/07).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0pidwqajsDw

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqei86f3w10

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NojDHKDLULk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MhkcBBms5cU

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

• developing prisoner codes of behaviour

• taking hostages in prison

• engaging in hunger strikes

• rioting and

• using their time in prison to improve their educational status.

The analysis also highlights a strong degree of difference between generic criminal

prisoners on the one hand and Republican and violent jihadist prisoners on the other.

Indeed, it is striking how many similarities exist between the Republican and violent

jihadist prisoner categories. Both types of prisoners have been observed to engage in a

range of similar behaviours including

• making consistent allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the authorities as

part of a deliberate strategy

• refusing to cooperate in the formal prison regime and creating parallel structures

in the prison for administration, education and, in the case of violent jihadists, for

religious purposes.

• using time in prison to develop and refine their ideological and strategic thinking,

and to distribute such material both within and without the prison, sometimes

resulting in profound consequences for both environments

• mounting large-scale escapes, in some cases with concerted assistance from

outside, and using the propaganda value of such escapes to maximum effect

• seeking to use prisoners more generally as vehicles for propaganda and

information campaigns.

• taking hostages outside the prisons in an effort to negotiate the release of their

captured comrades

• using coded communication or variations in language to communicate internally

and with associates and organizations outside the prison.

However, violent jihadist prisoners are distinct from Republican prisoners in a number of

ways. For example, they

• apparently seek to convert or radicalize other “ordinary” inmates to their

interpretation of Islam and alternative worldview. There are also examples of

where new recruits have been inducted in prison. This is in direct contrast to the

Republican prisoners who sought to segregate themselves from ordinary prisoners

and made a deliberate decision not to recruit new members in prison.

• do not appear to form themselves into obvious or overt hierarchical or

paramilitary command and control structures in prison. However, charismatic or

strong leaders do appear to emerge, though it may be harder to discern their role.

• do not appear to have the inclination to engage in “dirty protests”. This may due

to their religious beliefs.

RAND Europe The Spectrum of Radicalized Activity in the Prison Environment

CHAPTER 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

As the previous chapter has shown, there are strong parallels between the experiences

gained by security authorities in dealing with radicalized and extremist prisoners in earlier

conflicts, such as Northern Ireland, and those facing the challenges posed by contemporary

violent jihadist prisoners. A good deal of the existing lessons identified for the management

of extremist prisoners are likely to remain valid. However, there are some aspects of the

contemporary situation that require greater examination and understanding. A notable

difference between experiences with PIRA and ETA and contemporary violent jihadists

concerns their contrasting attitudes to recruiting new members in prison. PIRA and ETA

deliberately avoided such recruitment, while violent jihadists appear to regard it as an

important task in prison. This chapter draws a number of conclusions about what is (and

more importantly) what is not known about the nature and extent of the problem and

highlights a number of areas that may merit additional research and exploration.

It is difficult to assess the extent of the problem
Due to the lack of open sources and the reluctance by the authorities to discuss these

issues, it is not possible to draw any definitive conclusions about the extent of violent

jihadist radicalization and recruitment in European prisons. However, evidence from the

Spanish examples described above, and the cases of individuals such as Muktar Said

Ibrahim and Richard Reid show that contemporary violent jihadists can and will seek out

new recruits in the prison environment. Also pointing towards the existence of a threat are

the reported efforts being made by European governments to manage their extremist

prisoner populations better. However, without greater access to security and prison

authorities, and perhaps to the prisons themselves, it will remain impossible to quantify the

extent of the problem. Despite this, it seems reasonable to conclude that as the number of

violent jihadist prisoners grows, so too will the potential for future challenges in managing

them.

Radicalization of prisoners is neither new nor unique
It is clear from the examples examined previously that the potential for imprisoned

individuals to adapt new, and in some cases, extremist or radicalized beliefs, is not a new

phenomenon. Nor is it exclusive to radicalized Islamists. Radicalized organizations in the

USA such as the Black Muslims and the Aryan Brotherhood demonstrate the potential for

ideologically and/or criminally motivated groups to use the prison system as a source of

new recruits and as a base of power. As has been demonstrated, it may be possible to gain

greater understanding of how the radicalization process may function in the prison

environment by examining these and other precedents.

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

Imprisonment may enhance vulnerability to radicalization
Imprisonment may increase a prisoner’s susceptibility to new and radicalizing ideas or

beliefs; this has been referred to as a cognitive opening. There are striking similarities

between what are believed to be the forces leading to the radicalization of young Muslims

and the psychological impact of imprisonment upon individuals; specifically, undergoing a

crisis of the self, which challenges or even destroys one’s self-conception, experiencing

acute feelings of rejection by one’s native or adopted society and seeking to cope by

adopting a new sense of self-identify or a new belief, which may be delivered in adopting a

new belief structure (religious or otherwise) and being assimilated into a new inclusive (and

frequently protective) group identity. However, it must also be recognized that adopting

new radicalized beliefs may be only one potential pathway for the prisoner. Some may seek

solace in religion, which may be literalist in its interpretation, but this does not necessarily

indicate a prisoner has become a potentially violent extremist. The apparent tendency of

prisoners to convert or revert to religious beliefs highlights the importance of preventing

extremists from spreading their ideology via religious services or places of worship in

prison. This reinforces the importance of initiatives such as that taken by the UK Prison

Service to provide specialist training to prison imams (HM Government 2006).

Radicalization is one element in a spectrum of potential extremist activity
As has been suggested above, radicalized and extremist prisoners may engage in a wide

range of activities in prison. Some of these activities may be normal within prison walls,

but others may be the result of active resistance to the authorities and seek to subvert the

prison regime. Such activity may range from simple actions like nominating spokesmen or

grouping together for protection and status. Other activities may be less benign, including

staging protests and hunger strikes through to active violent resistance in the form of riots

and escapes. In addition, prison and security authorities may face the possibility that, as the

number of violent jihadist prisoners grows, a more cohesive organization may evolve in

prisons that seeks to disrupt or subvert the custodial regime.

Greater understanding of the nature of the problem is required
One aspect of traditional extremist prisoner organizations such as the PIRA that made

them easier to identify, understand and oppose was their adoption of hierarchical or

paramilitary structures. It was easy for the authorities to identify who was in control and to

discern the roles played by different prisoners. This is not the case with violent jihadist

prisoners who, far from declaring their group allegiances and activities, seek to remain

hidden. The clandestine nature of such groups makes it hard to distinguish extremist

prisoners from the general prison population.

This task is made harder still by cultural differences between prisoners and those tasked

with guarding them. As Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons wrote in a report on HMP

Belmarsh, “It is vital that prisons understand the prisoners they hold, and can assess the

relationships between and within different groups of prisoners, in order to be able to

manage them safely. We did not believe this was the case for staff in relation to Muslim

prisoners at Belmarsh” (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2005).

Taking increasing religiosity (which, as has been seen, is not uncommon among prisoners)

as a reliable indicator for extremist or radicalized behaviour may be counter-productive,

RAND Europe Conclusions and Recommendations

causing prisoners to become more alienated and therefore potentially more vulnerable to

radicalizing influences.

The UK security authorities are already taking steps to address this issue. The

Metropolitan Police counter terrorist command maintains a prison intelligence unit (PIU)

that promotes the flow of information and intelligence between London’s high-security

prisons and external police and security agencies. The PIU has reportedly worked with the

Prison Service to create a joint intelligence unit, which feeds intelligence about prisoners

and their contacts from seven London prisons into a central database. In an additional

effort to better understand the threat posed by radicalized prisoners, the Prison Service has

also created an extremist prisoners working group, which is considering the strategic policy

and operational issues posed by radicalization and extremism in prisons (House of

Commons 2007b).

There are options for containing extremist prisoners
One of the most pressing problems for those seeking to manage extremist prisoners is

deciding where and how to contain them. The two primary options available are to

concentrate the prisoners in one or several prisons or to disperse them throughout the

prison system. Both options have their advantages and disadvantages.

Concentration has a number of attractions; first it permits the extremist prisoner

population to be held in one location, or at least a small number of prisons. From a

resource perspective this is beneficial, as the necessary high security resources (and other

resources such as intelligence gathering assets, specialized personnel, training et cetera) can

be focused on fewer locations. This was the case in Northern Ireland, where the authorities

had to deal with a rapidly growing paramilitary prisoner population within a small prison

estate. Also, where the prisoners in question are suspected of seeking to radicalize or

indoctrinate other “ordinary decent criminals”, concentration offers a means of reducing

and managing this risk. This is the approach adopted by the Dutch authorities who “[t]o

protect other detainees from becoming ‘contaminated’… have decided to concentrate

convicted jihadists in two detention centres and keep them separated from other prisoners.

Prison staff in these institutions are specially trained to detect signs of radicalization”

(Ongering 2007). “In addition, individual customized regimes will be developed, taking

account of the individual’s background and conduct and the risks these might pose. The

prison staff who have to deal with this particular group of detainees will be specially

trained and instructed for the task” (House of Representatives 2006–2007).

However, concentration can also pose a range of difficulties. Again, the Northern Ireland

experience is instructive here. In the Maze Prison, opposing paramilitary prisoner factions

effectively took control of their prison wings, segregating themselves from the other side

and other prisoners. This permitted these paramilitary prisoners to engage in a range of

activities including intimidating prison staff, maintaining organizational structure and

discipline, conducting ideological and practical training for members, planning and

executing escape plans and generally continuing to contribute to the struggle from the

confines of the prison. The difficulties posed by concentration were noted by an inquiry

into the issue, the May Committee, which “specifically acknowledged the difficulties of

concentrating Category A terrorist prisoners in the one establishment in that it would

allow such prisoners to organize themselves and ‘pose unprecedented security problems’”

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

(McEvroy 2001: 186). It is notable that those engaged in violent jihadism are typically not

part of an organized, hierarchical group; instead they are made up of small, loosely

affiliated cells and teams. However, it is possible that if they were held in a concentrated

manner, this loose network may consolidate into a more solid and organized form.

Conversely, the dispersal of extremist prisoners helps prevents the formation of strong

organizational ties and structures in a given prison, and reduces the opportunities for

leadership figures to maintain tight discipline and control over other prisoners. Dispersal is

also likely to aid security by preventing groups of extremist prisoners from plotting

organized escape attempts and from planning attacks or activities within or beyond the

prison. However, as has been noted, dispersal may provide violent jihadist prisoners with

access to a new pool of potential recruits.

De-radicalization of extremist prisoners may be possible
In a number of countries, perhaps following the recognition of the dangers of

concentrating large numbers of violent radicalized individuals concentrated in prisons for

many years, attempts have been made to develop programmes for the de-radicalization of

prisoners. Singapore, Saudi and Yemen are three examples that have received considerable

attention for their efforts in these areas. It is difficult to assess the level of success achieved

by these programmes. In Singapore, as a result of their rehabilitation efforts the authorities

have released at least three former Jemaah Islamyia members. In Saudi Arabia it is reported

that since 2004 some 2,000 prisoners have participated in the programme, of which

roughly 700 have been released. In the case of Yemen some 364 suspected militants were

released before the programme’s effectiveness was called into question.

Clearly there is strong potential for the abuse of such programmes by the targeted

prisoners. The Yemeni example appears to demonstrate this, with the result being the

release of prisoners who return to their extremist ways. Further, it would be difficult for

Western, non-Muslim governments to create such programmes without the active support

of leading religious authorities; the cooperation between the secular authority and local

religious leaders in Singapore appears to be a good example of how this has been overcome.

However, the schemes mentioned above, and others, have been in operation for a relatively

short period of time and therefore it is likely too early to from a judgement as to their

overall effectiveness. Thus further research and evaluation may lead to greater

understanding of these efforts and methods and effectiveness.

Resettlement and reintegration requires greater attention
As discussed in Chapter 2, imprisonment provides many of the social and psychological

conditions for subsequent criminalization and potentially for radicalization and future

extremist activity. Prisoners experience denigration of the self, detachment from supportive

social relationships, exposure to harsh authority, day-to-day violence and affiliation with

peers offering an alternative, counter-cultural community of thought. Evidence also

suggests that having been imprisoned makes it more difficult to integrate as a law-abiding

citizen in a community and obtain legitimate forms of work Visher et al. cited in Rubin et

al. 2007).

The period post-incarceration thus poses a particular challenge for those seeking to counter

radicalization. One way of mitigating these challenges is to implement pre-release

RAND Europe Conclusions and Recommendations

programmes that help to prepare the prisoner to reintegrate and find work. This kind of

programme is likely to have psychological and practical components, and evidence suggests

that multifaceted approaches may be most effective (Dowden and Andrews 2000). This

has been found to have positive effects on offenders generally. However, with respect to

countering Islamist radicalization, there is likely to be a theological and political facet to

prison programmes, incorporating discussion groups and links that continue when the

prisoner is released in to the community (Hart 2006). Such elements appear to be

represented in the de-radicalization and rehabilitation programmes of a number of

countries.

Evidence-based prison regimes that reduce the crime-inducing aspects of the prison

environment, and post-release reintegration programmes may help to reduce the likelihood

of radicalization and subsequent extremist activity (Kubrin and Stewart 2006 cited in

Rubin et al. 2007). However, countering the challenge of prison radicalization is likely to

require an integrated approach that acknowledges the apparently disproportionate

numbers of Muslims in prison in the UK and other European countries. Such an approach

engages with root causes, seeking to understand and reduce the likelihood of young

Muslims becoming offenders. Currently there is active and urgent debate and discussion

about such measures. These measures are described at times in terms of counter-terrorism

and at other times as social cohesion.24

This movement between counter-terrorism, preventing extremism and social cohesion is

an unhelpful slippage of terminology that indicates a lack of conceptual clarity. While

counter-terrorism measures are undoubtedly going to continue and have a role to play in

security, the attempt to understand the experiences and disaffection of Muslim youth

should be a separate endeavour. Most Muslims are no more radicalized or extremist than

other young people in Britain. Lumping diverse and internally divided Muslim

communities together as a unified and at-risk mass is likely to be counter-productive and

generate further alienation and disaffection.

Instead, pursuing social cohesion as an approach requires a focus on the diversity of

communities, including the range of religions, socio-economic and cultural groups instead

of targeting one group. Targeting points of tension instead of individual groups and

seeking potential points of agreement and consensus about desirable ways of living

peacefully together may be more constructive than exhorting the moderate Muslim

community to publicly condemn Muslim terrorists. Inter-faith dialogue has increasingly

been considered a way forward for soliciting the interest and support of religious and

cultural leaders in community dialogue. These leaders are the key to galvanizing more

24 Part of the tendency to slippage may be due to the fact that social cohesion is a relatively amorphous term

that tends to be utilized as a suggested response to the conflict and fragmentation in diverse, multiethnic,

violent or crime-ridden communities. However, the term is often defined by absence, as a state that would exist

if diverse citizens could live together peacefully, trusting one another, with shared goals and relatively

untroubled by crime. The academic literature on trust and communities has a related term called “collective

efficacy”, as communities with high trust, high social support or social capital, meaning that people are

connected to one another and feel that they can rely on one another for help. This trust, social support and

shared vision tend to be protective against crime. For detailed discussion of these effects see (Putnam and

Sampson 2006).

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

popular support that could help promote the sense of engagement, investment and

belonging, a shared sense of purpose and positive and supportive relationships that make

individuals less likely to experience crises of the self and to search for alternatives that leave

them vulnerable to people whose alternative ideologies and practices may offer

opportunities for dramatic action and change, possibly through violence.

55
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http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2173&Itemid=131

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

Napoleoni, L. 2005. Insurgent Iraq: al Zarqawi and the new generation. London: Constable.

New York Police Department 2007. Radicalization in the West: the homegrown threat.

Intelligence Division. West Bethesda, MD: Crossbow Press.

New York Times, 2007, Belgium arrests 14 in plan to free bomb plotter 21st December.

Newsweek 2007. Iraqi prison tries to un-brainwash radical youth, 20th August.

Nida’ul Islam 1997–1998 An encounter behind the apostates’ bars in Jordan. Interviews

the imprisoned Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdissy, December-January

1997–1998 Available online at

http://web.archive.org/web/19980219185750/www.islam.org.au/articles/21/ma

qdisy.htm Accessed 20th August 2007.

Observer 2007a. Al-Qaeda bomb expert to stay in jail, 7th January.

Observer 2007b. Terror training in prisons as al-Qaeda targets young, 15th July.

O’Donovan, R. 1991 Irish rebels in English prisons. (reprint of 1882 edn) Dingle: Brandon

Books.

O’Neil, S. and D. McGrory 2006.The suicide factory: Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park

Mosque. London: Harper Perennial.

Ongering, L. 2007. Home-grown terrorism and radicalization in The Netherlands:

experiences, explanations and approaches. Testimony to the Deputy National

Coordinator for Counterterrorism, US Senate Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs Committee, 27 June. Available online at

http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/062707Ongering Accessed 1st March 2008.

Qa’id, S. H. 2005. Haqiqat Ma Yajri Wara’ al-Qudban fi Sujoun al-American (The truth

about what takes place behind the American prisons), Sada al-Jihad (Echo of

Jihad magazine), November.

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Accessed 1st March 2008.

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08/0708241_risk_models Accessed 1st March 2008.

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RAND Europe References

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Rider.

65
APPENDICES

RAND Europe Appendix A: Title of Appendix A

Appendix A – An Encounter Behind the Apostates’
Bars in Jordan25

“Our brothers dwelled in the solitary confinements of the secret service, isolated from the outside

world for periods unmatched by prisoners before them in this country except for a few …

Nevertheless, this was a unique and blessed experience that strengthened many of the brothers …

From the moment I stepped foot in that jail, I eagerly began my Da’wah26. So I began writing

some literature as part of a series I named “O Two Companions of the Prison! Are Many

Different lords Better or Allah, the One, the Irresistible?” (derived from the verse 12:39). I

included in it various subjects relating to Tawheed27, Ibrahim’s way, Worship, Polytheism etc. I

tried to circulate this booklet between the prisoners. In fact, some of the prisoners took this

booklet out with them when they were released. They published this booklet outside the prison

with my name imprinted on it. This obviously angered the enemies of Allah, while some of the

released brothers were constantly trying to communicate with those imprisoned in order to

obtain my writings. Later, Allah destined for those ex-prisoners to play a part in an armed attack

on one of the offices of the Jordanian Intelligence, some of whom were arrested and admitted to

have known and met me in the prison, and some of my writings were found with them. Allah the

Almighty made this incidence a cause for reuniting me with my brothers, since I was transferred

South to the central jail immediately after this incidence.

“After we were reunited in the central jail, we began to organise our activities inside the jail. The

first thing I called the brothers to was to hold Al Jumu’ah (Friday prayers) in the wing so it can

become a resort for the prisoners and a platform for our Da’wah. The purposes behind holding

Al-Jumu’ah were to uphold the Da’wah and to provide the alternative over the jail’s mosque,

who’s [sic] Khateebs28 are from the regime. We also prayed Eid prayers in the wing and its hall.

The number of prisoners who used to pray with us were multiple-fold the number of those who

prayed in the jail’s mosque. I prepared a series of lessons for the brothers who kept busy in the

Da’wah of prisoners convicted in different cases.

Many prisoners from different cells and convictions were keenly obtaining our papers and

booklets, which had an evident effect inside the jail The brothers were active in Da’wah and

consequently guided many prisoners who later became soldiers for Tawheed. During the days

25 (Nida’ul Islam, 1997-1998)

26 Da’wah, meaning “Call”, God’s way of bringing believers to the faith and the means by which prophets call

individuals and communities. Militants interpret da’wah as calling Muslims back to the purer form of religion

practiced by Muhammad and the early Muslim community (Esposito 2003)

27 Tawheed (alternatively Tawhid) is the defining doctrine of Islam. It declares absolute monotheism – the unity and

uniqueness of God as creator and sustainer of the universe (Esposito 2003)

28 Khateeb (alternatively Khatib), is an orator, a person who preaches the Friday sermon at a mosque (Esposito 2003)

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

where visits were allowed, we used to be visited by groups of brothers from all over the country.

At that time, we did not know most of these brothers, but they’d heard about our Da’wah or

received our writings. Some of them used to consult us on certain issues or ask from us Fatwah

regarding specific problems. Accordingly, I gave them many of the writing which I wrote in jail as

well as other special responses to their queries. They then took part in publishing these outside

the jail. As a result, the enemies of Allah were furious and delirious with this Da’wah, for they did

not sentence nor jail us to spread, manifest and publicise our Da’wah, but instead to deter us

from it.

As for their plots within the jail, the management isolated all the prisoners from us and

prohibited them from communicating or praying with us. They punished everyone who prayed

Friday Prayer with us, or was caught any of our essays or writings in his possession. These

punishments were usually either by beating up the person, or by enchaining him to the bars, so

that he would remain suspended upright in the air for long periods, or by solitary confinement,

etc. We used to encourage our brothers, especially those who found guidance inside the jail, to

remain patient and steadfast, and we explained to them that this is Allah’s Patterning for those

who follow this Da’wah.

However, if the matter was related to someone’s Deen29, such as the cursing of the brother’s

religion or shaving off his beard, we used to react immediately by congregating at the doors of the

prison, disobeying orders, refusing to follow the daily timetable and refusing to enter our cells at

night. We would then send verbal or written messages to the managers to remind them of Allah

and frighten them with His Punishment, and to warn them from disdaining or interfering with

our Deen. We used to hold talks and agreements regarding this issue. When negotiating with

them, we used to always emphasise on the fact that we are not concerned with solitary

confinement as a method of punishment. However, we will not accept or tolerate their

interference with our Deen, because we were imprisoned for the sake of our Deen and we are

prepared to die for its cause. After hearing this from us manifold, the jail’s management

acknowledged our demand and did not interfere with any of our brothers’ Deen, even if that

brother was from those convicted in other cases. All of this took place after numerous clashes

with the guards, who sometimes used to use gas against us and try to break into our cells”.

29 Deen can be translated as “religion”, “way”, or “path”.

RAND Europe Appendix A: Title of Appendix A
69

Appendix B – Lesson Eighteen: Prisons and Detention
Centres

If an indictment is issued and the trial, begins, the brother has to pay attention to the following:

1. At the beginning of the trial, once more the brothers must insist on proving that torture was

inflicted on them by State Security [investigators] before the judge.

2. Complain [to the court] of mistreatment while in prison.

3. Make arrangements for the brother’s defense with the attorney, whether he was retained by the

brother’s family or court-appointed.

4. The brother has to do his best to know the names of the state security officers, who

participated in his torture and mention their names to the judge. [These names may be obtained

from brothers who had to deal with those officers in previous cases.]

5. Some brothers may tell and may be lured by the state security investigators to testify against

the brothers [i.e. affirmation witness], either by not keeping them together in the same prison

during the trials, or by letting them talk to the media. In this case, they have to be treated gently,

and should be offered good advice, good treatment, and pray that God may guide them.

6. During the trial, the court has to be notified of any mistreatment of the brothers inside the

prison.

7. It is possible to resort to a hunger strike, but it is a tactic that can either succeed or fail.

8. Take advantage of visits to communicate with brothers outside prison and exchange

information that may be helpful to them in their work outside prison [according to what

occurred during the investigations]. The importance of mastering the art of hiding messages is

self evident here.

– When the brothers are transported from and to the prison [on their way to the court] they

should shout Islamic slogans out loud from inside the prison cars to impress upon the people and

their family the need to support Islam.

– Inside the prison, the brother should not accept any work that may belittle or demean him or

his brothers, such as the cleaning of the prison bathrooms or hallways.

– The brothers should create an Islamic program for themselves inside the prison, as well as

recreational and educational ones, etc.

– The brother in prison should be a role model in selflessness. Brothers should also pay attention

to each others needs and should help each other and unite vis a vis the prison officers.

– The brothers must take advantage of their presence in prison for obeying and worshiping [God]

and memorizing the Qora’an, etc. This is in addition to all guidelines and procedures that were

contained in the lesson on interrogation and investigation. Lastly, each of us has to understand

Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners

that we don’t achieve victory against our enemies through these actions and security procedures.

Rather, victory is achieved by obeying Almighty and Glorious God and because of their many

sins. Every brother has to be careful so as not to commit sins and everyone of us has to do his best

in obeying Almighty God, Who said in his Holy Book: “We will, without doubt, help Our

messengers and those who believe (both) in this world’s life and the one Day when the Witnesses

will stand forth.”

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Y
ears from now when criminologists
write their textbooks on American ter-
rorism, the name Kevin Lamar James

may appear alongside such infamous figures
as Timothy McVeigh, Ramzi Yousef and
Osama bin Laden.

Kevin James is scheduled to be sentenced
in February 2009 for conspiring to wage war
against the United States. James pleaded
guilty to the charge after he and three other
men were indicted in 2005 for plotting to
attack U.S. military facilities, Israeli govern-
ment facilities and Jewish synagogues in
Los Angeles.1

At the time of the indictments, the FBI
described the plot as the most operationally
advanced since Sept. 11.2 Even more trou-
bling is that James designed the plot while
serving time in a California state prison.

Prisoners — especially those in gangs
— have long recruited other inmates to act

as their collaborators upon release. James,
however, was the first gang member to
radicalize inmates into joining a prison
gang with a terrorist agenda.

A recent study funded by the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) and conducted
by this author took a closer look at the
Kevin James case as part of a larger
study on radicalization in prison. My study
examined trends in prisoner radicalization
— or the process by which prisoners adopt
extreme views, including beliefs that vio-
lent measures must be taken for political
or religious purposes — in U.S. correctional
institutions.3

The two-year study included a compre-
hensive literature review and approxi-
mately 140 hours of interviews with 15
prison chaplains, nine gang intelligence
officers and 30 inmates incarcerated for
violent crimes in Florida and California. I
examined the conversions of inmates to

Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat
in U.S. Correctional Institutions
by Mark S. Hamm, Ph.D.

N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 6 1

non-Judeo-Christian religions — Islam,
Buddhism, Native American faiths, Black
Hebrew Israelism (a black supremacy group)
and those preferred by white supremacists
(i.e., Odinism/Asatru, Teutonic Wicca
and Christian Identity) — and the role of
prison gangs in inmates’ spiritual lives.

My research found that:

■ Although only a very small percentage of
converts turn radical beliefs into terrorist
action, the James case is not an isolated
event. Gang intelligence officers in Florida
and California reported having uncovered
potential terrorist plots inside prisons.

■ Prisoners who convert to a non-Judeo-
Christian religion are primarily searching
for meaning and identity. In most cases,
the conversion experience makes a
meaningful contribution to prisoner
rehabilitation.

■ Radicalization in prisons is linked to
prison gangs.

■ Inmate leadership is the most important
factor in prisoner radicalization.

The Man Behind the Plot

Although looking at one man’s story is
admittedly anecdotal, understanding
some of James’ life may help inform
our understanding of how U.S. prisoners
are radicalized.

James grew up in South Central Los
Angeles during the urban crack epidemic
of the late 1980s.4 During his teenage
years, he was a member of the 76th
Street Crips gang. In 1997, at the age
of 21, James began serving a 10-year
sentence at the California State Prison
in Tehachapi for robbery.

While in prison, James followed a traditional
form of American Islam (Nation of Islam).
However, he soon found its teachings
uninteresting and drifted toward a fringe
group of Sunni Muslims within the cor-
rectional institution, who were known as
Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheed (the Assembly
of Authentic Islam) or JIS.

James brought JIS’s message to new
inmates at Tehachapi, preaching that
it was the duty of Muslims to violently
attack enemies of Islam, including the
U.S. government. He eventually took
control of JIS and began distributing a
handwritten document called the “JIS
Protocol,“ which described his personal
beliefs, including his justification for
killing “infidels,“ and required prospective
members to swear obedience to him and
to keep the group’s existence confidential.
James spread the “JIS Protocol” through-

LINKING PrISONEr rADICALIzATION
AND TErrOrISM: THE JIS CASE
The link between prisoner radicalization and terrorism can be
seen in the JIS case, particularly in the way the group recruited
and operated. JIS began with a traditional form of American Islam
(Nation of Islam). This was used to create an alternative religious
vision expressed in a pious but mutating form of Sunni-inspired
“Prison Islam,” which encompasses gang values and fierce
intra-group loyalties based on “cut-and-paste” interpretations
of the Koran.5 This vision provided JIS members with identity,
meaning and a form of collective resistance.

So powerful was the attachment to this form of Prison
Islam that two JIS devotees — members of
rival gangs — were able to over-
come past grievances, thus
fusing JIS’s spiritual iden-
tity to its gang history.
While on parole, one
of the devotees
took the group’s
terrorist plot to
the community
and turned to
a street gang
for firearms.
Additional
members were
recruited from
the international
jihad movement
inspired by the war
in Iraq. All the while,
the JIS plot continued to
be directed by its charismatic
leader, who remained incarcerated
in maximum-security custody.

Terrorist Plot

Traditional
American Islam

Pious Prison
Islam

Prison Gang

Street Gang

International Jihad
Movement

JIS
recruitment

Strategy

N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 6 1

out the California prison system using
smuggled letters — or “kites” — and
other mail and phone calls initiated by his
old gang, the 76th Street Crips. In 2003, he
was transferred to the maximum-security
California State Prison in Sacramento —
also known as New Folsom Prison —
where he continued to spread his protocol.

By 2004, James had developed a following
of several dozen inmates. In November of
that year, he met Levar Washington, a 25-
year-old African-American, also from South
Central Los Angeles, who had been sen-
tenced to three years for robbery.

Washington was a member of the Rollin’
Sixties Crips, an enemy gang of the 76th
Street Crips, who had recently converted to
Islam.6 James directed Washington — who
would be out on parole in a few weeks —
to recruit five people without felony records
from the community, acquire firearms and
find people with explosives expertise once
he was on parole.

The Sept. 11 Plot of 2005

Six months later, in May 2005, Washington
returned to South Central Los Angeles,
where he recruited 21-year-old Gregory
Patterson, an African-American who had
recently converted to Islam, and 21-year-
old Hammad Samana, a Pakistani who
taught Arabic at a local mosque. Neither
had criminal records.

James’ plan was to attack a target sym-
bolic of the Iraq war: a U.S. Army recruiting
office. The planned date of the attack was
also symbolic: four years to the day after the
Sept. 11 attacks. The men began a spree of
gas station robberies to fund their efforts.
The group planned its activities from an
apartment in South Central Los Angeles.
Yet unlike other post-Sept. 11 plots, the
JIS attack was directed from prison —
James was calling the shots.

Although JIS’s goal was “to die for Allah
in a jihad,”7 the members’ criminal skills
did not match their ideological fervor.
On June 5, 2005, investigators from the

Torrance (Calif.) Police Department received
a tip concerning the recent robberies. In one
of the heists, a robber had left his cell phone
at the scene, ultimately leading to the indict-
ment of James and the three men.

The indictments led to a combined state
and federal investigation of radical Islamic
prison gangs in California, which found
that JIS still had a presence in the state’s
correctional system.

A Closer Look at radicalization

In the NIJ-funded study, I asked prison chap-
lains, gang intelligence officers and prisoners
open-ended questions about the number
and types of non-Judeo-Christian faith
groups within the prison systems and the
conversion process, including motivations
for converting.

Two-thirds of the 30 inmates in the study
belonged to prison gangs, and most of them
had been in street gangs before incarcera-
tion. Each had experienced some sort of
prison conversion, be it to Islam (traditional
and American versions), Black Hebrew
Israelism, Buddhism, Native American
faiths, Hinduism, Christian Identity, Odinism
or Wicca. Several prisoners were affiliated
with JIS at New Folsom Prison.

Here are the study’s main findings.

Why Prisoners Convert
Although some of the 30 prisoners con-
verted because of the need for protection,
the primary motivation I found was spiritual
“searching” — seeking religious meaning
to interpret and resolve discontent.8

The prisoners took on several new roles
in their quest for meaning and identity.
Among the prisoners I interviewed, it was
not unusual for a young African-American
prisoner who began his incarceration with
no religious affiliation to start attending
Baptist services in the chapel, convert to
the Nation of Islam, and then convert to
Black Hebrew Israelism and finally to Sunni
Islam. Many reported that their conversions

N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 6 1

were inspired not only by sacred texts,
rituals and practices but also by literature,
hip-hop music and the media.

The study confirms the important role
social networks play in how people are
recruited into new religious movements.9
The prisoners I interviewed typically con-
verted to non-Judeo-Christian religions
upon the advice of their parents, cell mates
and fellow gang members. My research
revealed that although some inmates may
be inspired by foreign terrorist organizations
like al-Qaeda, these groups were not directly
involved in the radicalization process.

How Conversion Affects Behavior
The chaplains I interviewed maintained
that for the overwhelming majority of
inmates who convert to non-Judeo-
Christian faiths, the experience increases
self-discipline and helps them interact
in a positive way with other inmates
and staff, thereby making a meaningful
contribution to their rehabilitation.10

“After they are here for a while, some
inmates come to understand the need
for a higher power,” said one of the chap-
lains. “Some start studying and eventually
they convert to a religion. You can see the
difference almost immediately. You see
the difference in their comportment, in
their tolerance of others.”

But the study also found the potential for
ideologically inspired criminality, particularly
in overcrowded maximum-security prisons
where there are few rehabilitation programs,
a shortage of chaplains to provide religious
guidance and serious gang problems.11
These prisons were more vulnerable to
prisoner radicalization and terrorist groups
that infiltrate, recruit and operate behind
the walls.

The Gang Problem
The gang intelligence officers I interviewed
agreed that most inmates are radicalized
by other radical inmates and not by outside
influences.

The research found that radicalization was
based on a prison gang model. Gang dynam-
ics have become very complex in recent
years, with members now crossing racial
lines to increase their numbers for protection,
often using religious “call-outs” — or spoken
orders for prisoners to report to a service in
the chapel — to meet and do gang business.

My interviews revealed that former rivals,
like the Crips and the Bloods, have joined
forces under Islamic banners. Some
Neo-Nazis have become Sunni Muslims.
Meanwhile, conflict within inmate Islam
is growing as various factions of the faith
compete for followers, pitting the Nation of
Islam against Sunnis, Sunnis against Shiites,
and Prison Islam — which encompasses
gang values and fierce intra-group loyalties
based on “cut-and-paste” interpretations of
the Koran — against all the other forms of
inmate Islam.

The men in the JIS case, in fact, acted
like a prison gang. They not only had their
own hierarchy, code of conduct and secret
communication system, but also their own
collective identity. This gave them a shared
purpose and sense of camaraderie, leading
to a form of collective resistance against
the U.S. government. The gang intelligence
officers I interviewed characterized JIS as
a small, clandestine group that operated
below the radar.

The role of Charismatic Leaders
The study found that prisoners are radical-
ized through a process of one-on-one pros-
elytizing by charismatic leaders. Charismatic
leaders targeted the most vulnerable —
inmates who had spent or will spend much
of their lives incarcerated under maximum

Prisoner radicalization grows in the
secretive underground of inmate subcultures
through prison gangs and extremist interpretations
of religious doctrines that inspire ideologies
of intolerance, hatred and violence.

N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 6 1

security and who no longer had contact
with family. Angry and embittered by
their circumstances, these inmates often
adopted anti-authoritarian attitudes and
were easily pressed into a gang, where
they met an inmate leader who promised
hope. Indeed, I discovered that charismatic
leadership was more important than other
commonly cited factors associated with
prisoner radicalization.

radicalization and
Terrorist recruitment

The radicalization of prisoners is a problem
unlike any other faced by correctional admin-
istrators today — or at any other time in
history. It grows in the secretive under-
ground of inmate subcultures through
prison gangs and extremist interpretations
of religious doctrines that inspire ideologies
of intolerance, hatred and violence.

As discussed further in my final report,
one of the veteran chaplains said, ”Today’s
inmates are more dissatisfied with the gov-
ernment than they were 10 years ago or
even 20 years ago. The seeds of dissatisfac-
tion are everywhere. Inmates display more
aggressive posturing. They cluster on the
yard by religion. Racism is rampant. They
find a new religion in prison [that] reinforces
their opposition to authority. Some of these
inmates are very fertile ground for jihad.”

The fertile ground for radicalization — as
the chaplain described — certainly does
exist. However, my extensive literature
review revealed that moving from radicaliza-
tion to actual recruitment for terrorism is
a rare event. Only a small percentage of
converts to white supremacy groups

and to Islam — primarily, fresh converts,
the newly pious, with an abundance of
emotion and feeling — turn radical beliefs
into terrorist action.12 Therefore, it seems
reasonable to conclude that it is not the
sheer number of prisoners following extrem-
ist interpretations of religious doctrines that
poses a threat; rather, it is the potential for
small groups of radicals to form support
networks for terrorist goals upon release.13

Based on my research, here are some
recommendations that may help address
radicalization and terrorist recruitment
in prison:

Hire chaplains. Budgets for religious
services in correctional facilities across the
country have recently been slashed, thereby
creating opportunities for radical prisoners
to operate on their own, independent of
the oversight of chaplains who might help
ensure moderation.14 In California, there is
one chaplain for every 2,000 inmates, and
in some Texas prisons the ratio is one to
2,500.15 Colorado and Virginia have com-
pletely cut their state prison chaplain sys-
tems.16 It should be noted that the American
Correctional Chaplains Association calls for
one chaplain per 500 inmates.

Diversify corrections personnel. Islam is
currently the fastest-growing religion among
prisoners in the U.S.17 Prisoners participat-
ing in the study reported that when there
were not many Muslims on staff, Muslim
inmates felt like “outsiders” and the condi-
tions that support the growth of Prison Islam
were strengthened. Hiring Muslim American
guards, counselors, chaplains and especially
wardens might help reduce this perceived
outsider status.

Provide training. Staff training on the
recruitment activities of gangs and shifting
power relations among prisoners should
be provided.

Increase our knowledge base. Agencies
should continue to support research on the
various facets of prison culture that lead to
radicalization and terrorist recruitment,

About the Author
Mark Hamm is a professor of criminology at Indiana State University and
a former prison administrator in the Arizona Department of Corrections.
He has published widely in the areas of terrorism, hate crime and pris-
oner subcultures. Hamm’s most recent book, Terrorism as Crime: From
Oklahoma City to Al-Qaeda and Beyond, is based on his 2005 NIJ report,
Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention.

N I J J o u r N a l / I s s u e N o . 2 6 1

asking such fundamental questions as:
What role will prison overcrowding play?
How would the elimination of prison chap-
lains impact the issue? And is it possible to
create “radicalization-free zones” in prison?

NCJ 224085

For More Information
■ Hamm, M.S., Terrorist Recruitment in

American Correctional Institutions: An
Exploratory Study of Non-Traditional
Faith Groups, final report submitted to
the National Institute of Justice, U.S.
Department of Justice, Washington, DC:
December 2007 (NCJ 220957), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/220957 .

Notes

1. Reza H.G., “Man Sentenced to 22 Years in
L.A.-Area Terror Plot,” Los Angeles Times,
June 23, 2008, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/2008/jun/23/local/me-cell24; and
Glover, S., “2 Plead Guilty to Southland Terror
Plot,” Los Angeles Times, December 15, 2007.

2. Harris, R., “Kevin James and the JIS
Conspiracy,” The Enemy Within, FRONTLINE,
October 10, 2006, available at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/reality/
james.html.

3. The research used the FBI’s definition of
prisoner radicalization. A Review of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons’ Selection of Muslim
Religious Service Providers, Washington,
DC: Office of the Inspector General, U.S.
Department of Justice, 2004: 85.

4. Information on the James case came from
interviews conducted by the author and from
these sources: Harris, “Kevin James and
the JIS Conspiracy”; Marquez, J., “Officials
Checking Whether Alleged L.A. Plot Linked to
Prison Gang,” Associated Press, August 18,
2005; Los Angeles Times Staff, “4 Indicted
in Los Angeles Terror Probe,” Los Angeles
Times, September 1, 2005; and U.S. v. Kevin
James, No. 05-CR-214 Plea Agreement-
Attachment A, filed December 14, 2007.
For additional information, see Hamm, M.S.,
Terrorist Recruitment in American Correctional
Institutions: An Exploratory Study of Non-
Traditional Faith Groups, final report sub-
mitted to the National Institute of Justice,
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,

DC: December 2007 (NCJ 220957), avail-
able at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
grants/220957 .

5. Knox, G.W., “Melanics: A Gang Profile
Analysis,” Journal of Gang Research 9
(2002): 1-76.

6. Harris, “Kevin James and the JIS Conspiracy.”

7. U.S. v. Samana, (C.D. CA.), No. 05-16662M,
affidavit filed August 2, 2005.

8. See also Lofland, J., and R. Stark, “Becom-
ing a World-Saver: A Theory of Religious
Conversion,” American Sociological Review
30 (1965): 862-874.

9. Ibid.

10. See also Thomas, J., and B.H. Zaitzow,
“Conning or Conversion? The Role of
Religion in Prison Coping,” The Prison
Journal 86 (2004): 242-259.

11. Ibid.

12. See Hamm, Terrorist Recruitment in American
Correctional Institutions, for more informa-
tion on the literature review. See also Stern,
J., Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious
Militants Kill, New York: HarperCollins, 2003.

13. See also Sageman, M., Leaderless Jihad:
Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2008.

14. Drum, V.L., “Professional Correctional
Chaplains: Fact and Fiction,” presented at
the American Correctional Association 137th
Annual Congress of Corrections, Kansas City,
Mo., August 13, 2007.

15. Ibid.

16. De Yoanna, M., and T. Langeland, “Barred
From Faith: Inmates in Colorado Prisons
Face an Uphill Battle When it Comes to
Practicing Their Religion,” Colorado Springs
Independent, December 9, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.csindy.com/gyrobase/
Content?oid=oid%3A13516; and Farmer,
R., “Prison Chaplains Have Big Job: They
Perform a Host of Duties in Serving State’s
Incarcerated,” Richmond Times Dispatch,
August 2, 2008, available at http://www.inrich.
com/cva/ric/news.apx.-content-articles-RTD-
2008-08-02-0012.html.

17. Waller, M., Terrorist Recruitment and
Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and
Military as an Operational Base, Testimony
before the U.S. Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, October 14, 2003.

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220957

http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/23/local/me-cell24

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/enemywithin/reality/james.html

http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220957

http://www.csindy.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=oid%3A13516

http://www.inrich.com/cva/ric/news.apx.-content-articles-RTD-2008-08-02-0012.html