as discussed

Please see attached…

erspective on Preparedness:

aking Stock Since 9/11

Report to Congress

Of the

Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
Preparedness Task Force

September 2010

Message from the Task Force

Members of Congress,

On behalf of the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force (“Task Force”), we are
pleased to present for your consideration our report Perspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since
9/11 (“Report”). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) assisted in preparing the Report to meet
legislative requirements set forth in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L.
111-83).

Those requirements brought together 36 distinguished Task Force members representing local, State,
Tribal, and Territorial governments from across the Nation, as well as 25 ex officio members representing
Federal departments and agencies, to collaboratively take stock of national preparedness and provide
recommendations for improvement. The Report reflects members’ consensus opinion about where
America stands today in terms of preparedness for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other hazards.
Bold, innovative improvement ideas are offered in conjunction with carefully considered refinements to
the existing preparedness landscape.

e found the state of preparedness to be positive, with continual, significant signs of improvement since
the September 11, 2001 attacks (“9/11”) painfully catalyzed the imperative for reform of what is now
known as homeland security. Some of the success can be attributed to the increasingly mature integration
of civil defense and emergency management activities, whose origins long predate 9/11, while others are
refinements to that foundation based on lessons learned from specific events, such as Hurricane Katrina.
But we also found that, while we intuitively recognize the strides made in preparedness, we remain unable
to effectively identify and achieve preparedness objectives in a prioritized, measurable way, which limits
cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability.

We are proud that the Task Force was among the first whose membership reflects the collaborative,
intergovernmental spectrum of stakeholders who conduct preparedness activities necessary to achieve a
secure, resilient Nation. Equally important is the fact that the recommendations are truly independent;
they were not officially approved by DHS or other Federal departments and agencies in advance of
transmittal to Congress, though many members of the Federal Government participated directly as ex
officio members.

It is appropriate that the Report be completed in September—Preparedness Month—and we hope our
recommendations will assist Congress to oversee national preparedness. We believe that our
recommendations will improve our Nation’s ability to determine preparedness priorities, investments, and
measuring progress. In addition, we believe that we have determined a means to consistently and
predictably involve local, State, Tribal, Territorial, non-governmental, and private sector organizations in
preparedness policy development. To that end, the Report is being provided to the following Members of
Congress:

The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
Interim Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable George V. Voinovich
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

iii

The Honorable David E. Price
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

On behalf of our colleagues, we, the Working Group Chairs, appreciate the opportunity to contribute this
intergovernmental perspective to Congress and look forward to continued improvement in the Nation’s
preparedness.

Sincerely,

Nicholas L. Crossley, CEM

Director
Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Johnson County, Kansas

Brig Gen Donald P. Dunbar

Adjutant General and Homeland Security Advisor
State of Wisconsin

Dwight E. Henninger
Chief
Police Department
Town of Vail, Colorado

Hans Kallam

Director
Division of Emergency Management
State of Colorado

John W. Madden
Director and Homeland Security Advisor
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
State of Alaska

Ronald Lane
Director
Office of Emergency Services
County of San Diego, California

John W. Ledbetter
Executive Director and Homeland Security Advisor
Office of Homeland Security
State of Mississippi

Jim Page
Executive Director
Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System
State of Illinois

Kerry Pettingill
Director and Homeland Security Advisor
Office of Homeland Security
State of Oklahoma

MaryAnn E. Tierney
Former Deputy Managing Director
Office of Emergency Management
City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force

Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial Membership

Charles H. Ada II
Administrator, Guam Office of Civil Defense

Karen Baker

Secretary of Service and Volunteering, State of California

John Cary Bittick
Sheriff, Monroe County, Georgia

David Bunce

Fire Chief, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community
Fire Department

Jeffery C. Cash

Fire Chief and Emergency Manager
City of Cherryville Fire Department, North Carolina

Salvatore Cassano

Fire Commissioner, City of New York, New York

T.M. Franklin Cownie
Mayor, City of Des Moines, Iowa

Nicholas L. Crossley, CEM

Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Johnson County, Kansas

Edward F. Davis

Police Commissioner, Boston Police Department, Massachusetts

Robert DesRosier
Director, Blackfeet Nation Homeland Security Program and

Emergency Services Program

Margaret Donnelly
Director, Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services

Patricia Dukes

Chief of Emergency Medical Services
City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii

Brig Gen Donald P. Dunbar

Adjutant General, State of Wisconsin

Angela English

Executive Director
Texas Governor’s Committee on People with Disabilities

Charley English

Director, Georgia Emergency Management Agency

and

Homeland Security Advisor

Anthony H. Griffin

County Executive, Fairfax County, Virginia

Dwight E. Henninger
Chief of Police, Town of Vail Police Department, Colorado

James David Himes

Assistant Director, Department of Public Works
Metro Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

H. Douglas Hoell, Jr.

Director, North Carolina Division of Emergency Management

Jeffrey D. Johnson*
Fire Chief/Administrator, Tualatin Valley Fire and Rescue, Oregon

Hans Kallam

Director, Colorado Division of Emergency Management

Joseph LaPorte**
Former Director of Public Safety

Little River Band of Ottawa Indians

Ronald Lane
Director, Office of Emergency Services

San Diego County, California

John W. Ledbetter
Executive Director, Mississippi Office of Homeland Security

Pamela L‘Heureux, CEM

Director of Emergency Management, Waterboro, Maine

John W. Madden
Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security and

Emergency Management

Raymond Orozco
Mayor’s Chief of Staff, City of Chicago, Illinois

James Page

Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System

Kerry Pettingill
Director, Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security

Mary Selecky*

Secretary, Washington State Department of Health

David W. Taylor
State Chief Information Officer and Executive Director

Agency for Enterprise Information Technology, State of Florida

MaryAnn E. Tierney***
Former Deputy Managing Director, Office of Emergency

Management, City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Lyda Ann Thomas*
Former Mayor, City of Galveston, Texas

Alan Dennis (A.D.) Vickery

Assistant Chief of Risk Management, Seattle Fire Department
Washington

John Wageman

State Hazard Mitigation Officer
Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division

John Wheeler

Cabinet Secretary, New Mexico Department of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Thomas Wyss

State Senator, Indiana

* Initial members who were unable to serve through report submission
** Has entered federal employment as Senior Tribal Advisor, Program Manager-Information Sharing Environment
*** Has entered federal employment as FEM

Regional Administrator, Region III

Federal Ex Officio Membership

Department of Agriculture
Department of Defense
– Joint Chiefs of Staff
– Office of the Secretary

Department of Education
Department of Energy
Environmental Protection Agency
General Services Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
– United States Coast Guard
– Customs and Border Protection
– Federal Emergency Management Agency
– Immigration and Customs Enforcement
– Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

– Transportation Security Administration
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
– Office of the Deputy Attorney General
– Federal Bureau of Investigation

National Council on Disability
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Small Business Administration
Department of State
– Bureau of Administration
– U.S. Agency for International Development

Department of Transportation
Department of Veterans Affairs

Staff

Kathleen Fox, Executive Director

Michael Brody
Jonathan Clinton

Joshua Dozor
Allen King, CEM

Joseph Lombardo
Robert Schweitzer
Andrew Seiffert
Robert Sullivan

Acknowledgements

The Task Force thanks the numerous contributors who assisted in its mission and devoted their time to the
development of the Report, especially Timothy Manning and Juliette Kayyem for administering and
supporting the work of the Task Force in accordance with P.L. 111-83. Officials and subject-matter
experts who contributed their perspectives on local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness efforts
include:

Arif Alikhan
Assistant Secretary for Policy Development

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Dr. Bilal Ayyub
Professor and Director

Center for Technology and System Management
University of Maryland

Matthew R. Bettenhausen

Secretary
California Emergency Management Agency

Don Boyce

Former Director
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency

The Honorable Richard M. Daley

Mayor
City of Chicago, Illinois

Paul Ford

Acting Regional Administrator
FEMA Region I

Barb Graff

Emergency Management Accreditation Program Commission
City of Seattle, Washington

Dr. Brian Jackson

Senior Physical Scientist
RAND Corporation

Juliette Kayyem

Assistant Secretary for Intergovernmental Affairs
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Dr. Herman “Dutch” Leonard

Professor and Co-chair
Program on Crisis Leadership

Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Derek Matthews
Supervisory Protective Security Advisor/Acting Branch Chief

DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate

Timothy W. Manning
Deputy Administrator

Federal Emergency Management Agency
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Ociel Nava

Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group
The White House

Heidi Sieck

Citywide Post-Disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative
City and County of San Francisco, California

Andrew Velasquez

Regional Administrator
FEMA Region V

Nancy Ward

Regional Administrator
FEMA Region IX

Tim Ware

Executive Director
MidEast Commission, North Carolina

Monique Zmuda

Deputy Controller
City and County of San Francisco, California

Numerous private sector, non-governmental organizations, and DHS components assisted the Task Force
to broaden and augment its deliberations by hosting meetings, provided insights and suggestions, or
facilitating other outreach efforts. In particular, we would like to thank the following individuals and
organizations: Ann Beauchesne and Vincent Femia of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce; James Caverly
and Barbara Yagerman of the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection Partnership and Outreach Division;
Leslie Luke and San Diego Business Alliance members; Jannah Scott and Marcus Coleman of the DHS
Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives; the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security; the
DHS Office of Public Affairs; and the DHS Private Sector Office.

In addition, the Task Force greatly valued the generous expertise and assistance provided by the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) in Monterey, California.
CHDS director Glen Woodbury and faculty members Lauren Fernandez, Ellen Gordon, and Dawn Wilson

vii

served as thought-provoking facilitators who ably guided the members through the challenging scope of
the Task Force deliberations. CHDS also provided extensive online collaboration resources to assist
members’ deliberations, working group meetings, internal communications, and research.

The Task Force would like to thank the support team that includes Matthew Biancucci, Jeffrey Clarke,
Robert Heilen, Erik Iverson, Sean McLaughlin, Emily Ohland, Susan Rabil, Michael Reid, Stephanie
Shaffer, and Katherine Stafford. These individuals provided critical administrative, research, and
analytical support.

Finally, the Task Force thanks the City of Boston, the City of Chicago, the City of San Francisco, and
Washington, D.C. for graciously hosting the Task Force during its meetings and providing perspective on
efforts to ensure the safety and resiliency of their communities.

viii

Executive Summary

erspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11 (“Report”) presents recommendations on
national preparedness from the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force (“Task

Force”). At the request of Congress, the Task Force brought together 36 members representing a range of
disciplines and perspectives from across local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments. Together with
25 ex officio members representing Federal departments and agencies, we worked collaboratively to take
stock of national preparedness and provide recommendations for improvement.

In accordance with our congressional mandate, we independently undertook a series of analytical
activities, including:

 Considering what “preparedness” has meant in the United States both historically and
since the 9/11 attacks;

 Reviewing post-9/11 preparedness-related activities to understand achievements to date
and remaining areas of concern, with a particular emphasis on cost-effectiveness and
efficiency; and

 Proposing recommendations to improve national preparedness outcomes.

Our discussions focused on four main areas, as we considered: 1) the strategic investments needed to
improve the cost effectiveness and efficiency of achieving preparedness outcomes; 2) the policy and
guidance that outline desired national preparedness goals and objectives; 3) capabilities and
assessments employed to measure success in achieving preparedness outcomes; and 4) the preparedness
grant administration which provides funding to develop and sustain capabilities.

In addition to the experience and expertise housed in the Task Force itself, we sought additional
perspectives through outreach to non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and the public. We
solicited innovative ideas from the private sector and general public through a web-based National
Dialogue on Preparedness which enabled thousands of stakeholders around the country to submit and vote
on stakeholder-initiated recommendations.

Preparedness in Historical Context

While “preparedness” has taken on a new meaning and urgency since the attacks of 9/11, we wish to
emphasize the strong historical roots of preparedness that long pre-date 9/11. Historical concepts of
preparedness include a range of contexts—from military organizations to the Scouting movement’s
emphasis on individual self-sufficiency. National-level conceptions of preparedness emerged following
World War II as the Nation adopted civil defense and citizen preparedness as a national imperative and
embraced the shared responsibilities of both Federal and non-Federal stakeholders. Importantly, our
historical review describes how preparedness has been variously embraced as a philosophy, a goal, a
distinct mission, a functional process, or some combination of these. These historical roots and debates
regarding preparedness served as the foundation for the rapid evolution of national-level approaches to
preparedness following the 9/11 attacks.

Preparedness Evolutions and Accomplishments Since 9/11

The years following the 9/11 attacks have seen dramatic national efforts to re-prioritize concepts of
national preparedness. We believe that Congress rightfully cites the tremendous improvements in
national preparedness since 9/11, and our analyses revealed significant progress in preparedness for all
hazards at all levels of government.

Policy and Guidance: All levels of government have worked to develop and implement
preparedness policy and guidance. Federal initiatives—such as national strategy documents,
Homeland Security Presidential Directives, and national guidelines—have helped to create a
common framework and language for homeland security and emergency management.
Several non-Federal efforts—such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC)—have likewise evolved and strengthened.

Capabilities and Assessments: Similarly, the Federal Government has worked with local,
State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to identify key homeland security and emergency
management capabilities, as outlined in the Target Capabilities List (TCL). All levels of
government are working to integrate these capabilities into assessment frameworks that
identify gaps and resource needs. Federal efforts, like the TCL, are also increasingly
integrating existing local, State, Tribal, and Territorial homeland security and emergency
management standards, such as those of the Emergency Management Accreditation Program
(EMAP).

Grant Administration: Grant-based investments dramatically increased the capabilities of
local, State, Tribal, and Territorial authorities which, in many cases, previously possessed
limited capability. Grant funds have supported development and sustainment of emergency
operations centers, interoperable communications systems, information and intelligence
sharing mechanisms, specialized response assets, and a myriad of planning initiatives focused
on everything from mitigation and incident management to long-term recovery.

Together, these efforts have moved all levels of government toward recognition of mutual responsibility
for national preparedness. Shared goals and systems, while perhaps not fully realized, are now part of the
preparedness landscape. The ultimate result is that no informed observer can seriously doubt that
America is better prepared for disasters today than it was prior to 9/11.

Remaining Challenges and Recommendations

While we acknowledge the significant preparedness-related progress made to date, we have identified a
series of challenges that remain and proposed recommendations to address them. Many of our
recommendations can be addressed by local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal partners within existing
authorities. Where our recommendations conflict with existing law, authorities, or policy, we advocate
changes to those respective laws, authorities, or policies.

Strategic Investments: Congressional language establishing the Task Force reflects shared concerns
about the cost-effectiveness of preparedness investments as well as more emergent concerns regarding
long-term sustainability of these investments. We identified that there are a growing number of complex
and emergent preparedness issues that will continue to challenge the cost-effectiveness and sustainability
of the current preparedness system.

We believe that the Nation can effectively lower the long-term cost of preparedness by investing early in
cost-reducing measures in key areas. Accordingly, we recommend that all levels of government consider
bold, innovative investments to increase long-term cost-effectiveness and sustainability.

Particularly, we emphasize recommendations that will:

 Improve the ability to strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and

associated policies and/or capabilities;

 Enable school districts to integrate preparedness principles into existing curricula,
promoting a “culture of preparedness;”

 Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and
businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies;

 Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and
magnitude of disaster recovery; and

 Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
preparedness implications.

Policy and Guidance: Since 9/11, the Federal Government has played the lead role in developing and
promulgating national-level preparedness policy and guidance. Federal policy-makers have an admittedly
mixed record in integrating local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives into federally developed
policy and guidance. There is no consistent, standardized way for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
governments to meaningfully influence the

preparedness policy process.

We therefore recommend that DHS transform advisory bodies into a networked preparedness policy
advisory system. This approach will enable non-Federal stakeholders to meaningfully influence
preparedness policy from initiation to implementation.

Our specific recommendations are to:

 Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council (NAC);
 Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) so they serve as

regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that communicates regional
perspectives and informs national-level policy and guidance;

 Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in FEMA’s National Preparedness
Directorate (NPD);

 Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process that balances DHS’s need for
policy-making flexibility with its need to engage broader homeland security and
emergency management stakeholders into the policy-making process;

 Ensure that planning-related policy and guidance necessitate that basic emergency plans
match community demographics;

 Establish and fund a national comprehensive mutual aid system based on the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) to enable all levels of government to tap into
assets and capabilities around the country before, during, and after incidents; and

 Develop a strategic policy planning process that prepares for future challenges by
performing long-range assessments.

Capabilities and Assessments: We uniformly believe that our Nation is significantly better prepared
than it was on September 11, 2001—each of us has significant anecdotal data, unique to our jurisdictions,
to support this premise. Yet we acknowledge that while stakeholders across the Nation have been
working to improve preparedness, specific, measurable outcomes for these efforts have yet to be defined
and assessed.

We believe that all levels of government must support development and phased implementation of a
national preparedness assessment framework. We have a vision for how this framework should work:
defining threats and hazards; describing capability outcomes; typing and inventorying assets; determining

risk-based levels of capability; and establishing more meaningful outcome-focused assessment measures.
This framework should be an enduring, collaborative construct, with continuing system improvements
made as capability outcomes and measures become better defined into the future.

Our specific recommendations are to:

 Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all

levels of government to establish a foundation for the justification of preparedness
improvements;

 Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List (TCL) with
tiered, capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements
into Capability Level Guidance;

 Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security
and emergency management assets;

 Employ existing, familiar, user-friendly systems to collect preparedness assessment and
resource inventory data from all levels of government; and

 Implement the elements of this preparedness assessment framework over a three-year
period, with an integrated set of annual milestones to demonstrate ongoing progress.

Grant Administration: Preparedness grants have been critical to helping local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial governments build and sustain capabilities. Mirroring the challenges identified in other areas,
the effectiveness and efficiency of preparedness grant programs are hindered by limited
intergovernmental coordination and collaboration, unsynchronized processes, and insufficient linkages
with capability assessments. Accordingly, we believe that targeted improvements are necessary to the
administration of preparedness grants.

Our specific recommendations are to:

 Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the

Federal level;

 Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding
preparedness-related grant funds;

 Have DHS evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal grants to ensure that these
requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation and
that they support capability development and sustainment;

 Ensure that Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring
functions apply consistent standards;

 Allow grantees flexibility to use Federal grant funds to support maintenance and
sustainment costs without limitation;

 Allocate grant funding using a variety of approaches, including block grants, risk-based
grants, category/program-specific grants, and competitive grants; and

 More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

We believe that by implementing these recommendations, the ultimate outcome will be a preparedness
system that is better defined, better integrated, more effective and sustainable, and that better reflects the
core principles of shared responsibility among local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal governments.

xii

Table of Contents

Message from the Task Force ………………………………………………………………………………………… ii
Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force……………………………………………. iv

Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial Membership …………………………………………………………….. iv
Federal Ex Officio Membership ……………………………………………………………………………………… v
Staff …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… v
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………………………………………….. vi

Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. viii
Legislative Mandate and Task Force Methodology …………………………………………………………. 1
Historical Perspective: What Is Preparedness? ………………………………………………………………. 5

Evolution of Preparedness …………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
Citizen Preparedness and the Perception of Responsibility ……………………………………………….. 7

Taking Stock: Preparedness Efforts Since 9/11 ………………………………………………………………. 9
Preparedness Policy and Guidance …………………………………………………………………………………. 9
Capabilities and Assessments ………………………………………………………………………………………. 12
Grant Administration ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 16
Conclusions ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 19

Recommendations to Improve National Preparedness ………………………………………………….. 21
Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness ………………………………………………… 21
Policy and Guidance …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 27
Capabilities and Assessments ………………………………………………………………………………………. 36
Grant Administration ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 43

Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 49
List of Acronyms …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 51
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53
Appendix A: Recommendations to Congress ………………………………………………………………… 61
Appendix B: Member Biographies ……………………………………………………………………………….. 67
Appendix C: National Dialogue on Preparedness …………………………………………………………. 75

xiii

Task Force members deliberate in a meeting held in Washington, DC
(FEMA/Bill Koplitz).

Legislative Mandate and Task Force Methodology

erspective on Preparedness: Taking Stock Since 9/11 (“Report”) presents recommendations to
Congress on national preparedness for homeland security and emergency management. Congress

requested that the recommendations be developed through the establishment of the Local, State, Tribal,
and Federal Preparedness Task Force and identified specific issues for Task Force focus in legislative
requirements set forth in the congressional Conference Report accompanying Public Law 111-83, the
Homeland Security Act of 2010. The legislative mandate states:1

1 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Conference Report (To Accompany H.R. 2892)…(H. Rpt. 111-298), Washington:
Government Printing Office, 2009.

Task Force and Report Methodology

Task Force Composition

The Task Force is comprised of 36 members representing local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments
recognized as leading homeland security and emergency management decision-makers and practitioners
from a variety of disciplines. Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial members were selected based on merit
from a pool of nominees referred to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) though a
nationwide call. The Task Force also includes 25 ex officio members representing Federal departments
and agencies. Federal ex officio members were selected based on the authorities and/or responsibilities of
their office, as derived from their department or agency’s designated lead role in the National Response
Framework (NRF), and standing participation in the White House Domestic Resilience Group (DRG).

Report Organization

In structuring the work of the Task Force and the Report itself, we focused on four main areas—one
cross-cutting, foundational area (Strategic Investments) along with the three explicit areas of emphasis in
the congressional language:

1. Strategic Investments: A Task Force-defined area of emphasis focused on lowering the
long-term cost of achieving desired preparedness outcomes by investing in fundamental
initiatives that provide outstanding outcomes for minimal investment.

2. Policy and Guidance: Principles that establish and measure desired national

preparedness outcomes, along with subordinate doctrine defining how to proceed, i.e., the
“ends.” We sought to examine not just the policies themselves, but the process by which
they are developed and coordinated;

3. Capabilities and Assessments: The unit of measure (capabilities) for achieving desired

preparedness outcomes by performing defined tasks, under specified conditions, to target
levels of performance, along with the process for measuring them (assessment), i.e., the
“ways.” We focused extensively on this area, which is the keystone of achieving
effective, efficient policy outcomes; and

4. Grant Administration: The major national-level instrument for assisting non-Federal
entities to develop preparedness capabilities that achieve desired policy outcomes, i.e.,
“the means.” We sought to examine their effectiveness and the supporting administrative
process.

We reviewed these areas of emphasis both in plenary Task Force meetings and in member-led working
groups, conducting more than 30 weekly conference calls between four in-person Task Force meetings.
In these sessions, we discussed issues, identified topics for further exploration, and deliberated on
recommendation proposals. Over the past six months, we considered more than 375 draft
recommendation proposals. In tandem, we developed a methodology for conveying the opinion of the
Task Force and our recommendations to Congress in the Report.

We held meetings of the full Task Force membership, plus observers, in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco,
and Washington, D.C. The meetings provided an opportunity for members to deliberate on issues and
proposed recommendations in a collective setting. FEMA and DHS Intergovernmental Affairs dedicated
staff to support the working group process, provide meeting arrangements, and consolidate member
deliberations into a cohesive narrative to form the Report.

We adopted the final 25 recommendations contained in this Report by consensus as measured by
members’ submission of a signed acknowledgement. Members agreed that “consensus” would mean
approval by all. If five or more members did not agree with a given recommendation, they would draft a
statement of disagreement to include with the recommendation, indicating opposition and explaining the
divergence in opinion.

National Dialogue on Preparedness

In addition to individual member recommendations, we felt it necessary to include the perspectives of
non-governmental contributors. FEMA and DHS/IGA assisted the Task Force in establishing a National
Dialogue on Preparedness, consisting of outreach meetings with private sector and non-governmental
groups and an interactive, online website to allow the public to contribute. Through the Dialogue,
members and staff were able to directly engage with more than 1,000 outside subject-matter experts,
intergovernmental officials, and non-governmental stakeholders representing academia, think tanks,
interest groups, professional organizations, all levels of government, and the private sector.

Throughout August and into September—National Preparedness Month—899 registered users submitted,
reviewed, commented on, and voted on an additional 266 recommendations for our consideration. The
process allowed members to see broad points of consensus on preparedness improvement areas, which
greatly contributed to deliberation and prioritization of the final recommendation proposals. Additional
information on the National Dialogue can be found in Appendix C.

Scope of the Task Force Report in Comparison to Related Initiatives

We relied heavily upon analysis of the numerous reports, studies, and strategies that preceded this
initiative, along with the collective experience and wisdom of our members. While similar efforts
preceded the Report, the Task Force believes that it is the first such body to reflect the shared
responsibilities for preparedness that exist among all levels of government—local, State, Tribal,
Territorial, and Federal. In addition, we worked creatively to ensure that the opportunity for meaningful
contribution was afforded to non-governmental entities—including the business community, volunteer
and professional bodies, and the general public—in order to reflect the entire spectrum of responsibility
for preparedness.

Our Report is not official policy or a proposed strategy. The recent Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review (QHSR) and updated National Security Strategy each outline visions for homeland security that
incorporate many of the same themes included in the Report. We recognize the need for implementation-
level policy in our recommendations and were pleased that the White House National Security Staff
provided an opportunity to comment on a limited number of provisions from the pending Presidential
Policy Directive (PPD) on national preparedness. Moreover, we look forward to opportunities to inform
the PPD implementation process based on our recommendations to ensure that the national preparedness
policy so vital to homeland security and emergency management in America is coordinated in a truly
effective manner.

Mayor Richard M. Daley addresses
members during a Task Force meeting
in Chicago, Illinois (FEMA/Laurie
Smith-Kuypers).

Historical Perspective: What Is Preparedness?

he old adages “be prepared” and “failing to prepare is preparing to fail” are familiar to us all. They
represent a traditional recognition of the value of the process of preparation—or preparedness—to

anticipate needs, prioritize them, plan and acquire the necessary resources for them, and ultimately be
ready to meet a need when the time comes. Preparedness begets readiness. Those adages are also value-
laden, enjoining preparedness based on an apparent necessity and a perceived cost of noncompliance,
notably failure to achieve the need or goal. How effectively the process of preparedness is executed has
performance implications.

The Scouting movement officially embraced the “be prepared” adage in 1907 and is now known to
millions throughout the world. The Scouting movement was informed by military organizations, where
appreciation of preparedness and the development of specific doctrine for it have deep historical roots and
remain important aspects of individual basic training, organizational management, and strategic policy.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. Coast Guard, another symbol of preparedness to many Americans, adopted the
Latin phrase semper paratus—“Always Ready”—as its official motto. Many other military and
emergency services organizations have adopted similar mottos, as well.

In both the Scouting and military worlds, preparedness is designed to be as much a mindset as any one
specific effort, owing to the belief that the process of preparing to do something can be organized into a
generalized, common framework of procedural steps applicable to a wide range of potential requirements
or events. Learning the mindset and basic principles of preparedness thus enables an individual and, by
extension, organizations and communities, to confront complex tasks using a common framework, even
those for which previous experience cannot serve as a direct guide.

Ultimately, preparedness is not a destination or a condition at which to be arrived, but is more
appropriately viewed as a continual process of refinement and adjustment. Plans are updated, exercises
are conducted, emergencies occur, lessons learned are applied and the process continually evolves.

Evolution of Preparedness

The Task Force sees the fundamental, underlying principles of preparedness as being the bridge across all
disciplines, contributors, and goals of homeland security and emergency management. But this was not
always the case in the United States. Organizing that process for anything short of war was traditionally
the exclusive responsibility of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial authorities, which primarily focused on
their needs alone. Other than strictly national defense-related activities and limited recovery assistance
provided by the Federal Government following catastrophic disasters, it was not until New Deal-era
public works efforts, such as flood mitigation, and then World War II and the Cold War, that any national
preparedness initiatives were undertaken as partnerships between local, State, Tribal, Territorial, or
Federal levels of government. Even then, these partnerships were usually focused on specific threats such
as nuclear fallout rather than being based on a comprehensive, national approach. The engine of
preparedness remained principally at the community level.

The professional discipline of emergency management developed to meet that need by executing hazard
mitigation, incident response, and disaster recovery efforts, along with the basic tenets of preparedness,
mentioned above. In the context of traditional emergency management:

Emergency preparedness encompasses actions undertaken before disaster impact that enable social units
to respond actively when disaster does strike. Organizational preparedness activities include developing
emergency response plans, training employees and response personnel on what to do in an emergency
situation, acquiring needed equipment, supplies, and materials, and conducting drills and exercises.2

Those fundamental activities were subsequently reflected in the “preparedness cycle” of planning,
organizing, equipping, training, exercising, evaluation, and improvement activities necessary to enable
response. Current national policies and plans, such as the National Response Framework, still reflect that
response-centric view, but this perception is evolving. As the Nation’s resources and complexity of
threats increased during the 20th century, the Federal Government took on a more direct role to address
certain threats and hazards that no individual locality or State could be expected to handle on its own.

Over time, an “all hazards” approach to preparedness gained
momentum. And, following the development of a more
comprehensive homeland security and emergency management
philosophy following 9/11, the preparedness emphasis on
response evolved to reflect the full range of prevention,
protection, response, and recovery missions. For example, the
QHSR now states that achieving resiliency—one of the
currently identified homeland security goals—“will require a
significant change in U.S. emergency management from a
primary focus on response and recovery to one that takes a
wider view, balancing response and recovery with mitigation
and preparedness.”3 While we agree that there ought to be a
balance, we see preparedness as being essential to all missions. 4

The distinction is relevant because, as part of Task Force deliberations, we devoted time to considering
and understanding the concept of preparedness itself. We asked questions such as “what is
preparedness?” to help scope our mission. But that exercise was quickly revealed to be a diversion. The
basic tenets of preparedness, mentioned above in both philosophical and more technical terms, are
relatively uncontroversial within both the emergency management discipline and homeland security
policy. What has changed is the realization that preparedness can be only as effective as the goals and
priorities for readiness. The challenge is determining what our readiness goals and priorities should be,
from which preparedness activities are subsequently derived and then measured against. As the 9/11
Commission acknowledged, “Throughout the government, nothing has been harder for officials—
executive or legislative—than to set priorities, making hard choices in allocating limited resources.”5

The real question then is “prepared for what?” This question is of fundamental relevance to the Task
Force and all Americans. We must prioritize goals and have means to determine where we stand in terms
of achieving them. Changes in national homeland security goals and priorities should be expected in the
future, but the more institutionalized and standardized the common preparedness process becomes, the
more easily it can be communicated, taught, executed, and evaluated on a comprehensive and cost-
effective scale. Regardless of how those priorities evolve, a more institutionalized, common preparedness

2 Kathleen J. Tierney, Michael K. Lindell, and Ronald W. Perry, Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United
States (Joseph Henry Press, 2001), 5.
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,
February 2010, 31, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Preparedness Task Force. Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National
Preparedness Efforts, September 2006, 10, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/DHS%20Civil%20Defense-HS%20-
%20Short%20History (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2004, 395, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

A family in a Long Island, New York shelter,
circa 1955.

process should continue to bring together the myriad disciplines, contributors, and goals that contribute to
homeland security and emergency management.

Citizen Preparedness and the Perception of Responsibility

The 9/11 Commission noted that one of the major lessons from the 9/11 attacks was that “individual
civilians need to take responsibility for maximizing the probability that they will survive, should disaster
strike.”6 We believe that creating a “culture of preparedness” really begins with creating a culture of
responsibility among the public, so that citizens feel compelled to prepare to help themselves before,
during, or after a disaster to the greatest extent possible. This will not always be possible, but if more
members of the public prepare effectively, response and recovery efforts can focus on the most vulnerable
among us. This focus will increase response success, as well as reduce demand and ultimately conserve
limited resources. The better prepared you are, the more ready and resilient you become—the faster you
can bounce back from disaster.

Homeland security policy increasingly recognizes the critical role of individuals, the private sector, and
non-governmental organizations in preparedness. We wholeheartedly agree with this assessment but
recognize that the perceived efficacy and actual compliance with those proposed roles pose another
challenge. Citizen preparedness and involvement in homeland security is not new. Past preparedness
efforts acknowledged that individuals play a critical role. The U.S. Forest Service began the well-known
“Only You Can Prevent Forest Fires” awareness campaign in 1944. Likewise, fire safety training has
long been predicated on the simple maxim “Stop, Drop, and Roll.” Nuclear attack preparedness taught
“Duck and Cover” to millions of school children and also focused on home-based efforts, such as
building family fallout shelters. Related Ad Council campaigns focused on health and public safety
issues outside the scope of civil defense, such as drunken driving, smoking, seatbelt use, and vaccination,
to name a few.

Hazard-specific awareness campaigns remain for high-risk issues today, but the trend is toward applying
the same all-hazards preparedness approach to individual preparedness. The Ready.gov campaign
entreats citizens to maintain disaster kits, develop family emergency plans, and keep informed. This

approach reinforces fundamental preparedness principles,
but achieving wide-spread participation remains a
challenge. The public and private sectors must appreciate
the risks they face in order to be expected to act.
Government at all levels can increasingly control and make
consistent the manner in which they communicate priorities
to the public, private sector, and non-government
organizations, which set appropriate expectations about
what each can realistically contribute. Without clear
expectations, these stakeholders may lack the imperative to
act or the basis for appropriate decision-making.

In New York City, a history of terrorist plots and attacks
helps to drive the imperative for citizen involvement.
Public awareness to promote vigilance and prevention-
minded suspicious activity reporting has proven effective.
The attempted vehicle bombing of Times Square in May,
2010, was averted in part by the decision of local street

6 Ibid, 318.

“There Are 16 million Eyes In The City” poster
from the “If You See Something, Say Something”
public awareness campaign (Metropolitan Transit
Authority).

vendors to notify authorities of suspicious activity. Subsequent interviews revealed that their sense of
responsibility may have been emboldened by several factors: duty; appreciation of the risk of terrorism in
the area; a strong relationship with local police; and a plan regarding what to do in the event of an
incident.7 The New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority’s “If You See Something, Say Something”
public awareness campaign, which has been supported by the Transit Security Grant Program, was even
quoted by one of the vendors when asked about his role.8

President Obama later stated that the attack “failed because ordinary citizens were vigilant and reported
suspicious activities to authorities. It failed because these authorities—local, state and federal— acted
quickly and did what they were trained to do.”9 President Obama may have been referring to the
authorities on the last point, but the citizens showed that they had a plan, too. They exemplified a culture
of responsibility and preparedness that left them ready to act when the critical moment arrived.

The worst-case scenario occurs when expectations of government assistance are perceived by such
stakeholders and then not delivered. On the contrary, the clear absence of government assistance serves
as an incentive for “self-help” through individual, family, or business preparedness. Obviously, the ideal
balance is a shared one, based on realistic expectations of roles and responsibilities. That balance is what
makes preparedness measurement so important—authoritative progress drives new prioritization and/or
refinements to existing priorities that may lead to cost efficiencies.

7 Corey Kilgannon and Michael S. Schmidt, “Vendors Who Alerted Police Called Heroes,” The New York Times, May 2, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/nyregion/03vendor.html?_r=2 (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
8 Lisa Flam, “Hero Vendors Alerted NY Cops to Smoking SUV,” AOL News, May 3, 2010, http://www.aolnews.com/nation/article/times-square-
hero-vendors-alerted-cops-to-smoking-suv/19462393 (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
9 The White House, “The President on Times Square: ‘But as Americans, and as a Nation, We Will Not Be Terrorized,’” The White House Blog,
May 4, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/05/04/president-times-square-americans-and-a-nation-we-will-not-be-terrorized (accessed
September 29, 2010).

Taking Stock: Preparedness Efforts Since 9/

sk emergency managers, first responders, elected officials, as well as members of the private sector
and non-governmental organizations, and they will affirm that the United States is more prepared

than ever before. But they will also acknowledge that their conclusion is limited to their jurisdiction.
Citizens have a right to know, in a holistic way, if their communities, and the Nation, are prioritizing and
addressing risks appropriately and in a timely and cost-effective way.

As the congressional language establishing the Task Force acknowledges, considerable time and
investments have been made in the area of preparedness. The congressional language calls on the Task
Force to “take stock” of these efforts. This chapter seeks to do just that, presenting a high-level review of
preparedness activities since 9/11 in the overarching areas of preparedness policy and guidance,
capabilities and assessments, and grant administration.

Given the breadth of preparedness initiatives at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal levels, we
cannot possibly summarize all of the quantitative and qualitative preparedness-related data nationwide.
Instead, we have opted to summarize in broad terms the Nation’s preparedness-related evolutions and
accomplishments, seeking to bolster the intuition that we are more prepared with data and fact-based
illustrations.

Preparedness Policy and Guidance

The Nation’s preparedness policy and guidance evolved from local, State, Tribal, and Territorial best
practices and was re-shaped after the 9/11 attacks and again after Hurricane Katrina. While preparedness-
related programs certainly existed at all levels of government prior to 9/11, these efforts were not unified
by any common strategic vision, policy, or definition of preparedness.

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is just one example of a non-Federal effort
that existed before the 9/11 attacks and grew substantially stronger afterward. EMAC is a state-initiated
agreement to provide mutual aid with associated liability protections and reimbursement. After Hurricane
Andrew devastated Florida in 1992, southern States developed a mutual aid agreement that was expanded
nationally in 1995. In 2004, EMAC deployed more than 800 state and local personnel to the four, rapid-
fire Florida hurricanes. The following year, EMAC increased operations to more than 20 times the 2004
levels, with all member States deploying personnel to the Katrina-ravaged Gulf region.10 EMAC
continues to grow and evolve, and serves as an outstanding grass-roots model.

In the Federal domain, the 9/11 attacks led to dramatic organizational changes designed to unify policy-
making for homeland security and emergency management. The first organizational changes were the
creation of the White House Office of Homeland Security (OHS) and the Homeland Security Council
(HSC), both established in October 2001. Together, these two organizations coordinated homeland
security activities and related policy-making across the Federal Government in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks. One of the first strategic-level activities undertaken by OHS was to develop and promulgate the
Nation’s first National Strategy for Homeland Security, a document which identified “Emergency

10 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, “The History of Mutual Aid and EMAC,” http://www.emacweb.org/?321 (accessed Sep. 20,
2010).

Preparedness and Response” as one of six critical homeland security mission areas.11 As required by
DHS’s grant guidance (see below), States and urban areas mirrored the national-level strategy
development process by completing State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies which identified
specific goals and objectives.

The ad hoc creation of the OHS soon became institutionalized as Congress passed the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 which formally established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a Cabinet-level
department. The creation of DHS is frequently cited as one of the Nation’s largest reorganizations of the
Federal Government—merging 22 Federal agencies into the third-largest Cabinet agency. In the
preparedness domain, the newly created DHS included the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), a legacy Department of Justice (DOJ) agency
that oversaw terrorism preparedness-related grant funding and associated preparedness policy. Local,
State, Tribal, and Territorial jurisdictions likewise established their own departments/offices of homeland
security. At the local level, this re-organization was frequently implemented simply by changing the
name of the existing emergency management agency to indicate the assumption of homeland security
duties. Some States, Tribes, and Territories mirrored this approach while others chose to create a separate
homeland security agency or office.

In the year following the creation of DHS, the Federal Government began laying the groundwork for a
more unifying preparedness policy framework. In December 2003, the White House issued Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8): National Preparedness. HSPD-8 was developed as a
companion to HSPD-5: Management of Domestic Incidents. HSPD-8 called for the creation of a national
domestic all-hazards preparedness goal. It emphasized improvements to the delivery of Federal
preparedness assistance to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments through grants, equipment,
training, and exercises and proposed a capabilities-based planning approach to strengthen local, State,
Tribal, Territorial, and Federal preparedness.

Following HSPD-8’s publication, DHS and its Federal partners initiated development of a series of
capabilities-based planning tools and associated policies that have continued to evolve through today. A
series of illustrative National Planning Scenarios were developed to highlight the range of man-made and
natural disasters and their potential impacts. DHS, working with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
partners, also developed a Universal Task List (UTL) and Target Capabilities List (TCL), outlining the
tasks and associated capabilities needed to address the illustrative Planning Scenarios. These planning
tools culminated in the first iteration of the National Preparedness Goal which DHS released in draft form
in December 2005. The initial National Preparedness Goal acknowledged the imperative to “achieve and
sustain risk-based target levels of capability” and identified a series of seven National Priorities for
particular focus in the preparedness domain.12 Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments began
integrating these capability-based tools into a range of planning, training, and exercise activities.

While preparedness policy and guidance was evolving so, too, was the DHS organizational structure,
including its preparedness components. In 2004, DHS’s ODP was merged with the Office of State and
Local Government Coordination to create the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (SLGCP), overseeing preparedness policy and implementation for local, State, Tribal,

11 The White House Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_hls (accessed Sep. 30, 2010). The other five mission areas specified were: 1) Intelligence and
Warning; 2) Border and Transportation Security; 3) Domestic Counterterrorism; 4) Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets; and 5)
Defending against Catastrophic Threats
12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines, 2007, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/npg (accessed
Sep. 30, 2010). The seven national priorities identified were: 1) Implement the National Incident Management System and National Response
Plan; 2) Expand Regional Collaboration; 3) Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan ; 4) Strengthen Information Sharing and
Collaboration Capabilities; 5) Strengthen Interoperable Communications Capabilities; 6) Strengthen CBRNE Detection, Response, and
Decontamination Capabilities; and 7) Strengthen Medical Surge and Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

Territorial, and Federal stakeholders. In 2005, DHS underwent a significant internal re-organization,
creating a new Preparedness Directorate that consolidated most preparedness-related agencies under one
organizational entity, distinct from the Department’s response coordination capabilities at FEMA.

As DHS was moving forward with its internal re-organization, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast,
resulting in the costliest disaster in U.S. history.13 Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and its
aftermath served as the impetus for fundamental organizational and policy evolutions at the Federal level.
In order to solidify the nation’s all-hazards preparedness policy and effectively coordinate the Federal
Government’s preparedness and response capabilities, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) transferred nearly all offices within the Preparedness Directorate into FEMA and
made the FEMA Administrator responsible for leading the Federal Government’s comprehensive
emergency management system. PKEMRA established a new FEMA deputy administrator position to
oversee the preparedness portfolio. PKEMRA also called on FEMA to establish an all-hazards “National
Preparedness System,” re-emphasizing the importance of capabilities-based policy and guidance and a
more unified implementation nationwide. Nine months after PKEMRA, the Implementing the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 was passed, making minor adjustments to
PKEMRA and amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to further define and specify how homeland
security grants are administered by FEMA to support preparedness goals.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS and FEMA made a series of updates and revisions to policy
and guidance, including several required by PKEMRA. DHS updated the National Response Plan, which
became the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF integrates key lessons learned from
Hurricane Katrina and seeks to better define the roles and responsibilities of all contributors—local, State,
Tribal, Territorial, Federal, non-governmental, and private sector. As required by PKEMRA, DHS also
issued the National Preparedness Guidelines along with an updated Target Capabilities List (TCL 2.0).
These policy and guidance documents built on previous iterations of DHS’s capabilities-based planning
tools but also reflected key post-Katrina changes—notably the addition of an eighth national priority
focused on planning and community preparedness.

During this time, FEMA also undertook an extensive revision to its State and Local Guide 101: Guide for
All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning which had last been updated in 1996. The result was
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101): Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial,
Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans, which summarized FEMA’s recommendations to all
levels of government on how to address the entire planning process. Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
planners began the process of integrating CPG 101 guidance into their respective plans.

Concerns about a global influenza pandemic also resulted in major preparedness-related policy and
guidance developments. In 2005, the White House released its National Strategy To Safeguard Against
The Danger Of Pandemic Influenza. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) followed this
national-level strategy with its HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, designed to provide pandemic planning
guidance to health departments at all levels of government. Similarly, most States and Urban Areas
Security Initiative (UASI) jurisdictions added to or updated their pandemic influenza plans.

More recently, DHS has been working to further evolve preparedness policy and guidance, continuing
updates and refinements to the Target Capabilities List and issuing a draft National Disaster Recovery
Framework to provide detailed guidance on the recovery portion of the homeland security and emergency
management mission spectrum. The preparedness policy-making structure has also continued to evolve.
For example, the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council have merged into a unified

13 The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, 2006, 5,
http://library.stmarytx.edu/acadlib/edocs/katrinawh (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

National Security Staff in recognition of the increasingly inter-related nature of national security and
homeland security.

Success Story: Preparedness Planning

Hurricane Katrina laid bare a host of planning-related deficiencies at the Federal, State, and local levels. In
2005, both the President and Congress called on DHS to conduct a comprehensive review of the state of
planning in an effort to identify and address areas for improvement. DHS responded by executing a two-phase
“Nationwide Plan Review” asking States and selected urban areas to conduct a planning self-assessment which
was then followed by an independent assessment.

The findings, as documented in the Nationwide Plan Review Phase I and Phase II Reports, revealed the scale of
the challenge. The review found that the majority of emergency operations plans and planning processes were
not fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage a catastrophic event. The review also found significant
shortcomings in planning for non-catastrophic disasters.

In light of these findings, DHS initiated several steps to strengthen planning at all levels of government. At the
national level, the National Response Plan was revised into the National Response Framework with expanded
Emergency Support Function, Support, and Incident Annexes along with Partner Guides.

DHS emphasized planning in subsequent grant guidance and established several planning-specific grant
programs, such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program, to further focus efforts at the State,
local, Tribal, and Territorial levels. As noted above, FEMA also worked with non-Federal stakeholders to issue
CPG 101, which articulated a recommended common approach to planning for Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
Territorial stakeholders.

The net effects of this renewed focus on planning emerged as DHS conducted an update to the Nationwide Plan
Review in 2010. The updated review found significant improvements to plans and planning processes. Nearly all
States and urban areas indicated that their basic emergency operations plans fully or partially incorporated
elements of CPG 101. While acknowledging continued areas of improvement, the 2010 review also showed
dramatic improvement in the confidence levels of States and urban areas in their basic emergency operations
plans’ ability to manage a catastrophic event.

Capabilities and Assessments

The process of developing capabilities and conducting assessments has proved to be one of the most
challenging endeavors faced by the homeland security and emergency management community. In the
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, assessment standards were simply not urgent priorities. Instead,
rapidly establishing homeland security policy and getting grant funds out to first responders around the
country became the initial focus areas for homeland security and emergency management stakeholders.
For fiscal years 2002 and 2003, the primary preparedness assessment metrics focused on grant dollars
awarded and spent by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders.

As preparedness policy evolved and expanded, so too did DHS’s efforts to track and assess
improvements. As a starting point, State and UASI grantees were required to develop strategies that
articulated specific homeland security and preparedness goals and objectives. Beginning in 2004, DHS
required grantees to submit Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports (BSIRs) which provided details on
how grantees were spending grant money. The BSIRs required grantees to map their grant dollars and
projects against the goals and objectives in their strategy documents. The BSIRs also captured a range of
additional data regarding the “solution area” supported (planning, organizing, equipping, training, or
exercising) as well as output metrics, such as the number of personnel trained or number of exercises
conducted.

With the release of the National Preparedness Goal, Target Capabilities List, and the associated National
Priorities, DHS began integrating these capability-based planning tools into its assessment framework.
As a starting point, States and UASI jurisdictions were required in 2005 to align their homeland security
strategies with the National Priorities. Beginning with the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 grant guidance,
applicants were required to submit grant investment justifications that described how particular grant
investments would contribute to capability development. The table below summarizes just a handful of
the data points collected by DHS that identify how efforts at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and
Federal levels are contributing to improved preparedness nationwide.

National Priority Representative Accomplishments to Date

Expand Regional Collaboration

 Beginning in FY2009, FEMA instituted a Regional Catastrophic
Preparedness Grant Program focused on supporting coordination of
regional all-hazard planning for catastrophic events, including the
development of integrated planning communities, plans, protocols and
procedures to manage a catastrophic event.

 FEMA has continued the process of empowering its regional offices,
supporting preparedness-related training, exercises, and outreach activities
tailored to the needs of each region.

Implement the National Incident
Management System (NIMS)
and National Response
Framework (NRF)

 Over 85% of States assessed themselves as fully compliant with NIMS
standards based on data collected through NIMSCAST.

 More than 75% of States and more than 80% of urban areas report
confidence that their overall basic emergency operations plans are well-
suited to meet the challenges presented during a large-scale or
catastrophic event.

Implement the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP)

 NIPP implementation accomplishments include completion of specific plans
for each of the 18 critical infrastructure sectors, and implementation of
chemical security regulations.

 For FY2008 Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) grants, 93% of plans have
received final approval.

Strengthen Information-Sharing
and Collaboration Capabilities

 There are 72 designated State and major urban area fusion centers across
the 50 States and the District of Columbia.

 The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) has
brought together Federal, State, and local partner organizations to test and
evaluate policies, procedures, and technology needed to implement a
unified process that fosters a broader sharing of SARs that are reasonably
indicative of potential intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning
related to terrorism or other criminal activity.

Strengthen Interoperable and
Operable Communications
Capabilities

 From FY2004 through FY2009, over $4.8 billion in homeland security grant
funds have been used by States and urban areas to support interoperable
communications.

 Through exercised Tactical Interoperable Communications Plans (TICP),
by the end of FY2007, 75 urban and metropolitan areas had effectively
established regional interoperability.

 Through SAFECOM, DHS has provided interoperability guidance, tools,
and templates to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial emergency response
agencies.

Strengthen CBRNE Detection,
Response, and
Decontamination Capabilities

 From FY2004 through FY2009, States and urban areas have allocated
nearly $3.1 billion of homeland security grant funds to improve their
CBRNE capabilities.

 DHS has provided nuclear detection and radiological training to 30,176 law
enforcement officials through more than 37,600 course completions.

Strengthen Medical Surge and
Mass Prophylaxis Capabilities

 HHS grant and cooperative agreement funding has supported State
initiatives to: develop and exercise pandemic response plans; improve
surge capacity and enhance community and hospital preparedness for
public health emergencies; and build healthcare partnerships to improve
hospital and emergency department surge capacity.

 HHS has invested heavily in medical countermeasures for the Strategic
National Stockpile (SNS), including vaccines for smallpox and anthrax as
well as antiviral courses for pandemic influenza.

Strengthen Planning and
Citizen Preparedness
Capabilities

 States and urban areas have allocated nearly $3.9 billion of homeland
security grant funds towards the priority of strengthening planning and
community preparedness over the FY2004-FY2009 period.

 The Federal Government has further supported community preparedness
through the creation of Citizen Corps and the Ready Campaign. Nationwide
reports indicate that 80% of the U.S. population is covered by the 2,445
local and Tribal Citizen Corps Councils currently in operation.

PKEMRA required DHS to further evolve the assessment-related data collected from grantees. Notably, it
required annual State Preparedness Reports. These reports require States to identify accomplishments,
current capabilities, targets, initiatives, and resources aligned to the national priorities. DHS also began a
“cost-to-capability” initiative to help quantify the impact of grant dollars on preparedness efforts. In
addition, DHS has been working to establish the PKEMRA-mandated Comprehensive Assessment
System.

While DHS has requested and collected a vast amount of data from its stakeholders, the key data points
have tended to focus on outputs rather than outcomes. FEMA has proactively examined this issue
through a Reporting Requirements Working Group, tasked with both examining assessment and reporting
data from local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders while recommending ways to achieve more
meaningful assessment results. Despite these challenges, it is clear that local jurisdictions are making
progress. The success story below from Southern California is just one illustration of how jurisdictions
have demonstrably improved preparedness using a combination of resources.

Success Story: Grant Funding and Capability Improvements in Southern California

Two significant wildfire events occurred in southern California since the dramatic increases in Federal grant
funding following 9/11. The multi-fire incidents, occurring in 2003 and 2007 in roughly the same geographic
area, offer an opportunity to compare preparedness and mission performance vis-à-vis grant funding.

The 2003 Cedar Creek fire consumed more than 280,000 acres of land, destroyed more than 2,800 buildings or
homes, and resulted in 15 deaths. The 2007 fires resulted in the largest evacuation in California history—more
than 1 million people in total, greater even than Hurricane Katrina. At the height of the firestorm in late October
2007, seven separate fires burned in San Diego County, California. The community was, quite literally, burning
in every direction. The flames consumed nearly 369,000 acres or about 13% of the total County land. Ten lives
were claimed in the fires.

And while the impacts in both 2003 and 2007 were significant, a key fact emerged: Federal homeland security
and emergency management grant funding, combined with local investments, had significantly improved the
region’s preparedness.

Grant-Supported
Activity

Approximate
Funding Amount/

Source
Improvement from 2003 to 2007

Brush and Vegetation
Management and Fire-
Safe Community
Design Concepts

 $47M/Federal
 $5M/

local

 Reduced hazardous fuels including nearly 500,000

dead, dying, and diseased trees
 Required wildland fire and fire protection review of all

discretionary land use applications

Firefighting Equipment
 $6.6M/mostly

local

 Expanded firefighting arsenal with the purchase of
two firefighting helicopters

 Purchased 20 new firefighting vehicles, including
water tenders, engines, and rescue rigs

Emergency Operations
Center Upgrade

 $865,000/Federal
(one-time)

 $400,000/Federal
(annually)

 Updated state-of-the-art communication and
coordination for the region’s response to the 2007
wildfires

 Supported staffing of 50% of EOC personnel—
including Operations Chief, Logistics Chief, and
Information/ Intelligence Chief

Purchase and
Maintenance of
WebEOC

 $90,000/Federal
(one-time)

 $100,000/Federal
(annually)

 Established critical communication network during
the 2007 fires, connecting over 250 agencies with
up-to-date information and situational awareness

 Funded the GIS mapping unit, which produced
critical maps for both first responders and the public
during the fires

Public Awareness
Campaigns

 $700,000/Federal

 Mailed a Family Disaster Plan to all 1.4 million
households in the County, providing residents with
step-by-step instructions to protect their homes and
families

 Launched an extensive disaster preparedness public
education campaign that included television, radio,
and billboard announcements

Communication
Systems

 $4.5M/Federal
 $20M/local

 Significantly upgraded unreliable communications
system following 2003 wildfires

 Supported communication among personnel from 264
different agencies during 2007 wildfires

Public Communication  $200,000/Federal

 Established a partnership with 2-1-1 to provide
health, human service, and disaster information to
callers

 2-1-1 operators answered nearly 109,000 calls during
the first week of the 2007 fires—calls that otherwise
would have clogged 911 call centers

 Established a Joint Information Center system and
trained public information officers throughout the
County in crisis communications and JIC operations

 JIC system supported more than 200 media releases
during 2007 wildfires

Mass Notification  $430,000/Federal

 Purchased two mass notification systems—
AlertSanDiego and Reverse 911—both of which were
used during the 2007 wildfires

 Disseminated evacuation notices to an estimated
515,000 County residents via mass notification
systems

Evacuation Plan  $100,000/Federal

 Completed the region’s first Evacuation Plan that
identified transportation routes and capacities and
addressed the sheltering of people and pets

Sheltering Operations  $50,000/Federal

 Trained nearly 200 County employees as shelter

workers/shelter managers
 Deployed shelter workers/managers to County-

operated shelter locations during the 2007 wildfires
 Preplanning efforts allowed for Red Cross, County,

City, and community agencies to shelter nearly
20,000 people and 2,500 horses and large animals

Exercises  $300,000/Federal

 Since 2005, conducted a full-scale disaster exercise
every 18 months along with smaller tabletop and
function exercises—exercises that helped the region
prepare for the 2007 wildfires

Recovery  $100,000/Federal

 Adopted a regional recovery plan which provided a
regional blueprint for recovery phase of the 2007 fires

 Recovery efforts assisted over 24,000 fire victims in
the months following the fires

Ultimately, the San Diego region was able to successfully endure the 2007 wildfires. The County had
established necessary preparedness measures, and all levels of government—as well as the community itself—
supported a coordinated and cooperative response. A key component of this preparedness was the effective
use of Federal preparedness grant funds to supplement local and state funding and resources.

Grant Administration

As discussed, the primary means for the Federal Government to promote and enhance national
preparedness has been to provide funding to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial entities. Prior to the 9/11
attacks, DOJ’s Office for Domestic Preparedness administered a pool of preparedness grants that were
focused largely on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) preparedness and totaled less than $100
million.14 Other Federal agencies, such as FEMA and HHS also administered preparedness-related grants
that pre-dated the 9/11 attacks.15

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Federal preparedness-related assistance to local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial governments increased dramatically. Through a FY2002 supplemental appropriations act
(Public Law 107-206), Congress appropriated funding to a number of Federal agencies to support the 9/11
recovery efforts, as well as to assist local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to prepare for and
respond to future acts of terrorism. The bill provided $151 million to DOJ for grants and cooperative
agreements to focus primarily on first responder training and equipment to respond to acts of terrorism.
The bill also provided more than $400 million to FEMA for emergency management planning and
assistance. In addition, through the Department of Education’s Project School Emergency Response to
Violence (SERV) grant program, almost $14 million was provided to State and local educational agencies
to assist in mental health recovery efforts following 9/11.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), charged DHS’s ODP with “directing and
supervising terrorism preparedness grant programs of the Federal Government (other than those programs
administered by HHS) for all emergency response providers.” In its first fiscal year (FY2003), DHS’s
grant awards totaled over $4 billion—the vast majority of it directed to State and urban area preparedness

14 U.S. Department of Justice, Strategic Goal One: Protect America Against the Threat of Terrorism,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/annualreports/pr2001/Section01.htm (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
15 Congressional Research Service, Ben Canada, Terrorism Preparedness: A Catalog of Federal Assistance Programs, 2001,
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7931 (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

initiatives. DHS’s initial preparedness-related grant funding fell into several main categories. Several
grant programs allocated funds to States using a population-driven formula. A second set of grant
programs integrated risk-based and other related criteria to allocate grant funds among particular grantees.
The third set of grants included programs that competitively awarded funds directly to grant applicants.

As homeland security and emergency management policy evolved, so did DHS’s grant programs. Each
year’s programs reflected the evolving concerns of both Congress and DHS itself. Fiscal Year 2003 saw
specific grant funding allocated for emergency operations centers while FY2005 saw the establishment of
a Transit Security Grant Program. And while DHS grant guidance acknowledged the importance of all-
hazards planning, the emphasis of its grants programs, right up until Hurricane Katrina, was largely on
terrorism preparedness.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, DHS’s grant programs experienced several important changes.
PKEMRA offered no specific changes to DHS’s grant programs but added an emphasis on “natural
disasters.” After PKEMRA, the 9/11 Act mandated changes to existing grant programs, focusing on the
administration of DHS grant funds, the responsibilities of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
Governments, and the allowable use of grant funds. These changes included new requirements for
grantees applying for Homeland Security Grant Program funds but, more importantly, required expanded
use of risk information in grant allocations. Additionally, Congress included specific language around its
intent for DHS to focus on an all-hazards approach.

DHS’s FY2006 grant guidance—the first grant guidance issued after Hurricane Katrina—re-emphasized
the importance of all-hazards preparedness and, for the first time, integrated the all-hazards national
preparedness priorities as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, DHS began integrating
risk into allocation formulas for its State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). Subsequent years have seen an expansion of more targeted
grants, including programs designated specifically for Tribal stakeholders, urban area non-profit
stakeholders, for regional catastrophic planning, and for public safety interoperable communications.

While DHS administers the vast majority of preparedness-related grants, other Federal agencies—notably
HHS—have rapidly expanded preparedness grants, particularly in the area of pandemic preparedness.
Beginning in FY2005, HHS began allocating significant resources to bioterrorism and general hospital
preparedness. By FY2007, HHS was administering over $1 billion in preparedness grants, or about 11%
of the total preparedness-related grant outlays.16 DHS still administers the vast majority of preparedness-
related grants—over FY2007 and FY2008 (the last years with complete information) DHS administered
85% of the more than $20 billion in Federal preparedness grant funding as defined in the Interagency
Report on Preparedness Grant Programs (IRPG).

Since 2003, the U.S. Department of Education, through its Readiness and Emergency Management for
Schools (REMS) grant program, has funded 820 grants to local education agencies (LEAs) totaling over
$230 million. The REMS discretionary grant program is the primary program administered by the
Department’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS). The program supports infrastructure
protection for K-12 schools and provides funding to LEAs to create, strengthen, or improve emergency
management plans at the district and school building levels through training for school personnel and
coordination with local community partners. Grantees must also agree to develop plans that:

16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Grant Programs Directorate, Interagency Report on
Preparedness Grant Programs: Report to Congress, 2009.

 Consider the communication, transportation, and medical needs of students and staff with
disabilities;

 Support NIMS implementation; and
 Include plans for:

– Communicating emergency polices to parents and guardians;

– Improving LEA capacity to sustain the emergency management process; and

– Prepare the LEA for an infectious disease outbreak, such as pandemic influenza.

Additional REMS grant requirements include coordinating with the State or local homeland security plan
and developing a written food defense plan that is designed to safeguard the school district’s food supply.

The chart below illustrates the growth in preparedness grant programs (as defined in the IRPG) since
1991. The IRPG identified Federal assistance programs that funded prevention, protection, and response
missions for all hazards, and that were consistent with the mission areas defined in national policy and
doctrine, specifically HSPD-8. Funding data for the chart is derived from aggregate financial information
contained in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA), Fiscal Years 1991 to 2009.17

17 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, “About CFDA,” https://www.cfda.gov/ (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Federal Grants in Perspective

While Federal grants represent significant fiscal outlays—DHS alone awarded over $27 billion in grants between
fiscal years 2003 and 2009—we noted that Federal grant outlays represent a relatively small share of the overall
preparedness-related spending by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments.

The table below summarizes data on Federal preparedness grants and State and local preparedness
expenditures. The Federal preparedness grant data is from FEMA’s Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant
Programs and includes all grant outlays—not just those from DHS—assessed to be preparedness-related. The
state and local preparedness expenditure data comes from the Census Bureau’s annual survey on State & Local
Government Finance Data and includes expenditures categorized as public safety, hospital, and health-related.
The table uses FY2007 and FY2008 information as this is the most recent available dataset.

While we recognize that this is not a perfect comparison, the data demonstrate the order of magnitude difference
between Federal preparedness grant outlays and comparable State and local expenditures. While Federal
preparedness grant outlays are a comparatively small part of State and local preparedness expenditures, we
emphasize that Federal grants have served a critical role in building and sustaining capabilities nationwide.
Every member of the Task Force agreed that these grant funds enabled their jurisdiction to make capability
investments that would not have been made without the availability of Federal assistance.

FY2007 FY2008

Total Federal Preparedness-
Related Grant Outlays

$10,526,829,010 $9,769,354,577

Total State and Local Hospital, Public
Health, and Public Safety Expenditures

$407,162,947,000 $438,357,811,000

Grant Outlays as % of State
and Local Expenditures 2.59% 2.23%

These figures not only articulate the importance of targeted Federal investment to develop and sustain capability
and capacity. They reflect the wisdom of incorporating substantial local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
perspectives into developing and implementing Federal programs.

Conclusions

These accomplishments at all levels of government—from Federal policy and guidance to local, State,
Tribal, and Territorial capabilities, achieved with assistance through Federal grants—represent substantial
improvements since 9/11. We have made tremendous strides toward achieving national priorities and
meeting jurisdiction-specific goals, yet we continue to believe that we can improve. As we take stock of
how far we have come, we believe that the key to future success is a culture of collaboration. While, in
many cases, we have worked to ensure that our own jurisdictions can aptly prevent, protect, respond, and
recover from emergencies, we believe that we can gain efficiencies and strengthen capabilities by
working together, as a Nation, to better prepare for all hazards.

Members of the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal Preparedness Task Force deliberate in a
meeting held at the Chicago Cultural Center, Chicago, Illinois (FEMA/Laurie Smith-
Kuypers).

Recommendations to Improve National Preparedness

ased on the Task Force’s examination of national preparedness efforts since September 11, 2001, we
offer the following recommendations for congressional consideration. We chose to organize the

recommendations according to the legislative requirement, with the addition of cross-cutting, efficiency-
generating initiatives found in the Strategic Investments section. Accordingly, our recommendations are
organized into the following sections:

 Strategic Investments;
 Policy and Guidance;
 Capabilities and Assessments; and
 Grant Administration.

For each of these sections, the Report identifies the overarching challenge(s), summarizes Task Force
discussions, and presents associated recommendations.

Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness

While most of the Task Force recommendations focus on efficiency- and collaboration-enabling
refinements to the “as is” preparedness system that has evolved since 9/11, there are a number of areas
that comprise the “to be” system which could effectively lower the long-term cost of desired preparedness
goals by investing early in cost-reducing measures. We made a point throughout our deliberations to
consider bold, innovative ideas that would address concerns in Congress about the long-term cost-
effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness investments. Such approaches could have dramatic
implications for the future of preparedness.

The Task Force believes that the key to significantly reducing system costs is to seek structural ways to
affect broad and lasting benefits. We sought means to reduce the burden on the preparedness system
by using existing structures to build preparedness capability, and to enhance preparedness efforts
that make response and recovery more efficient and cost‐effective. Five primary focus areas
emerged through our deliberations:

 Improve the ability to strategically forecast emerging preparedness requirements and
associated policies and/or capabilities;

 Develop and promote preparedness-related educational materials that school districts can
integrate into existing curricula;

 Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and
businesses to become trained and materially prepared for emergencies;

Challenge

Preparedness requirements are increasingly numerous and
complex, challenging the Nation’s ability to sustain and
grow preparedness capabilities efficiently.

 Promote advanced recovery planning, which can speed successful disaster recovery and
improve resilience; and

 Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
preparedness implications.

Overarching
Recommendation

Consider bold, innovative investments to increase the long-
term cost-effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness
through cost-reducing measures.

Recommendation: Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis
currently conducted by the National Intelligence Council.

We recognize the importance of a national strategic threat and hazard assessment to authoritatively inform
preparedness priorities based on risk and recommend that this process integrate “futures analysis”-type
assessments from the National Intelligence Council. The recent QHSR identified the need to “pursue a
rigorous scientific understanding of current and future threats”18 and includes forward-looking
considerations in the short-term.

However, the complexity of the envisioned homeland security and emergency management enterprise,
especially in terms of non-governmental roles, means that desired preparedness outcomes often may take
years to achieve. That reality necessitates that emerging requirements be anticipated and considered
early and across the entire preparedness domain. As the homeland security and emergency management
system continues to mature, a range of dynamic issues—such as the environment, demographics,
economics, and health trends—are likely to play increasingly important roles in both the medium- and
long-term. These issues must be better understood to ensure that preparedness policies are anticipatory,
not reactionary. Applying forward-looking analyses in the preparedness system should encourage
entrepreneurial approaches to emerging problems and enable testing of promising ideas.

Accordingly, DHS should work with the National Intelligence Council to integrate such preparedness-
focused futures analyses into its activities. DHS should also identify ways to prioritize preparedness
futures analyses in academia. DHS should ensure that the results of these analyses inform near-term
strategic planning and review efforts, such as the QHSR.

Desired Outcomes:

 The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its
activities; and

 DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future
requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland,
2010, 74, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Recommendation: The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that
school districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.

The need for a “culture of preparedness” has been described frequently since 9/11 and is now part of the
preparedness lexicon. We discussed this issue at length and identified several structural challenges to the
outcomes associated with a culture of preparedness. Ultimately, inconsistency and lack of imperative
conspire to inhibit the scale of participation needed to achieve critical mass—the “culture of
preparedness.”

While school-based preparedness initiatives exist, such as Teen Community Emergency Response Team
(CERT) and the DHS-sponsored Student Tools for Emergency Planning (STEP) curriculum, they do not
meaningfully affect the key outcomes necessary for a culture of preparedness—scale, consistency, and
commonality. While The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned advanced similar,
comprehensive recommendations, along with curriculum recommendations for hazards such as hurricanes
and earthquakes, a comprehensive approach has yet to materialize.

Developing preparedness materials to integrate into educational curricula is one important way to address
this challenge of scale. While we recognize that education of our Nation’s students is primarily a State
and local matter, we also recognize the importance of ensuring that our students are prepared for a variety
of disasters. Developing curricular materials would balance these two tensions—providing a framework
of materials which individual school districts and teachers could integrate flexibly. Teen CERT, STEP,
the American Red Cross’s “Masters of Disasters” curriculum, and the California Emergency Management
Agency’s (CalEMA) partnership with the National Guard for school-based preparedness education should
serve as valuable templates for curricular materials for various age groups.

Broadly considered, the Nation invests heavily in education because of a core belief in enabling future
generations to fully participate in the American dream. We believe that a well-educated citizen should
understand the tenets of basic preparedness. By entrusting our Nation’s teachers to incorporate
preparedness concepts into existing curricula, we can dramatically increase citizen preparedness in one
generation and achieve a significant return on a modest preparedness investment.

Desired Outcomes:

 School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into
curricula; and

 Citizens entering adulthood understand the culture of preparedness and have taken basic
steps to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community,
and in the workplace.

Recommendation: Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and
businesses to train and materially prepare for emergencies.

The QHSR argues that citizens must be informed; trained; materially and psychologically prepared to
withstand disruption; and know their role in a crisis. Since 2003, DHS Citizen Corps national household
surveys suggest modest improvements in individual and community preparedness across each of these
dimensions. 19 Yet, key preparedness metrics remain discouraging. Fewer than half of all citizens are
familiar with community preparedness plans and resources. Less than 40% of citizens have participated

19 2003 Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report, Office of Citizen Corps, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003.
2007 Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report, Office of Community Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2007.
2009 Citizen Corps Survey of U.S. Households: Final Survey Report, Office of Community Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2009.

in preparedness skills training. Although 57% report being materially prepared for a crisis at home, far
fewer retain emergency supplies at the workplace or in the car. Similarly, less than 50% of citizens have
established a household emergency plan. Finally, although nearly 60% of citizens “know their role” in a
natural disaster, only 20% are confident in their ability to react to an act of terrorism. While we must
undoubtedly improve our existing preparedness efforts, we must also consider other creative ways to
move individuals from ambivalence to action.

One promising new preparedness initiative involves incentivizing individuals to take action by providing
tax breaks for preparedness investments. We therefore recommend that all levels of government consider
establishing financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to undertake
preparedness activities. The underlying logic is simple: prepared citizens minimize the potential costs of
disaster and reduce the strain on first responders during a major event. The science is similarly
encouraging: behavioral economists widely recognize that minor financial incentives can succeed in
motivating individuals to make life-affirming decisions where even the risks of abstract, severe
consequences cannot.

Moderate investments of time, energy, and resources to address potential problems before they occur can
achieve significant savings in the long run. More importantly, incentives create an artificial imperative in
the absence of perceived threats or hazards. Incentive-based approaches may be valuable in regions prone
to less frequent, but potentially catastrophic incidents. Compliance with mitigation efforts such as
structural reinforcements in hurricane or earthquake zones, or defensible space in the case of wildfires,
should produce tangible rewards in terms of property value, tax breaks, or insurance rebates. In fact,
some States—including Virginia and Louisiana—are already complementing their existing preparedness
programming with tax incentives to encourage citizens to act.

Desired Outcomes:

 Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial
incentives to promote preparedness; and

 Increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and
activities.

Recommendation: Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the
length and magnitude of disaster recovery.

Resiliency to catastrophic events is predicated on rapid return to normalcy. Mitigation and prevention are
designed to reduce or eliminate the consequences of the event—that is, to reduce the degree of recovery
that is necessary. By contrast, advanced recovery efforts are designed to make recovery activities more
efficient, rapid, and effective.20

In addition to formulating plans, jurisdictions should take a number of concrete steps to speed recovery
for likely events, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, or similar unplanned events. These steps include
establishing public-private partnerships, screening and evaluating bids for anticipated contract-based
services, and developing legislation to give the jurisdiction specific authorities in a disaster. In this
context, National Dialogue contributors noted that the private sector, faith-based and community initiative
organizations, voluntary organizations, and individuals have significant capabilities and resources that
they are willing and able to bring to bear rapidly during a disaster. These resources and capabilities may

20 Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard and Arnold M. Howitt, “Acting in Time Against Disaster: A Comprehensive Risk Management Framework,” to
appear in Learning from Catastrophes: Strategies for Reaction and Response, ed. Howard Kunreuther and Michael Useem. (Wharton School
Publishing, 2010).

be slowed or even rendered unavailable because the requisite relationships and agreements were not
established in advance.

Governments at all levels should take the lead to establish these partnerships and remove barriers by
amending financial regulations and conducting cross-governmental coordination. A best practice
commonly identified to support and expedite these partnerships includes offering private sector and
voluntary organization leaders seats at the emergency operations center.

Success Story: San Francisco’s Advanced Recovery Initiative

The City and County of San Francisco have partnered with Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government to undertake an initiative known as the “Citywide Post-Disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative”
(“Recovery Initiative”). The goal is to build the city’s capabilities to restore lifelines and facilitate economic and
community recovery following a major incident. 21

The Recovery Initiative is coordinated by the General Services Agency (GSA), the Department of Emergency
Management (DEM), and Office of the Controller in collaboration with the Harvard Kennedy School of
Government.

Current Recovery Initiative projects include convening the first known local Lifeline Council of major utilities to
explore interdependencies and restoration strategies, a post-disaster governance project, a financial planning
strategy, an enterprise risk management program, a community resilience initiative, economic impact analysis, a
long-term housing plan, and coordination with regional and Federal recovery efforts.22

Desired Outcomes:

 Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to
initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and

 Jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and
effectively.

Recommendation: Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial
preparedness implications.

President Obama ordered a “clean slate” review of cyberspace policy that resulted in the 2009 White
House Cyberspace Policy Review. The review states that the “globally interconnected digital information
and communications infrastructure known as ‘cyberspace’ underpins almost every facet of modern
society and provides critical support for the U.S. economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national
security.” The Task Force recognizes the complexity of emerging cyberspace policy and applauds the
review’s proposal for a revised national cybersecurity strategy. We anticipate that the revised strategy
will incorporate the same imperative for enterprise-wide collaboration seen in our Report, the National
Security Strategy, QHSR, and the Cyberspace Policy Review itself.

Federal efforts to assist local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments to better understand, prioritize,
and address cybersecurity implications are critical. The Task Force believes that cybersecurity-related
preparedness outside the Federal purview lags behind other preparedness efforts emphasized since 9/11.
Many of the beneficial homeland security and emergency management capabilities developed are deeply

21 Heidi Sieck, “Presentation from the City and County of San Francisco to the Task Force,” Presentation, Task Force Meeting, San Francisco,
CA, July 27, 2010.
22 General Services Agency of the City and County of San Francisco, “Citywide Post-Disaster Resilience and Recovery Initiative,”
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=4596 (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

dependent on data-driven, cyberspace-based systems, from public messaging, emergency dispatch,
incident management, intelligence and information sharing, and even planning and recovery efforts such
as disaster assistance. Imagine if those capabilities were compromised, regardless of whether from
malicious attack or physical damage from a natural disaster. How would the losses affect or exacerbate
ongoing response or recovery? The complexity of that dependency will only increase and, we fear, be
exposed with significant costs unless the preparedness implications of cybersecurity are prioritized now.

To that end, we seek to ensure that America’s revised cybersecurity policy takes into account the full
range of preparedness considerations affected by cyberspace. The Cyberspace Policy Review emphasizes
the threat of “cybercrime and state-sponsored intrusions and operations.” We concur that those threats are
grave and could affect emergency management activities: cybercrime is already estimated to cost the
global economy in excess of $1 trillion annually and hackers have compromised government systems
overseas and defaced official websites relied upon by the public for authoritative, timely information.23

But the Cyberspace Policy Review’s only reference to cybersecurity in the context of natural disasters is
in terms of the reliability and continuity of high-level emergency communication systems, which have
specific connotation to Federal-level continuity of government capabilities. Those systems are essential
to national security, but most disasters are local and have more emergency response and recovery
requirements than just continuity of government.

The forthcoming strategy would benefit from including considerations specific to ensuring the resiliency
of existing preparedness efforts at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels in addition to addressing
cyber attacks. On-scene emergency services and regional- or national-level incident management rely
heavily upon cyberspace to facilitate communication and information sharing during response and
recovery efforts. While loss of system continuity due to malicious attack poses policy challenges and
could exacerbate the effects of a natural disaster, loss or compromise of cyberspace due to natural
disasters may have the same effect in practice. Achieving cybersecurity should include the goal of cyber
resiliency regardless of cause. An anecdote from the Hurricane Katrina response highlights the need to
consider cyberspace resilience as part of cybersecurity in order to guide subsequent preparedness efforts.

23 McAfee, “McAfee, Inc. Research Shows Global Recession Increasing Risks to Intellectual Property,”
http://www.mcafee.com/us/about/press/corporate/2009/20090129_063500_j.html (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Lesson Learned: Response Implications of Cyberspace Preparedness and Resiliency

During Hurricane Katrina, out-of-state responders supporting Emergency Support Function 8 (Public Health and
Medical Services) immediately faced storm-related outages of commercial wired and wireless communication
services. Though some responders had satellite phones, they were not accustomed to using them, and the
equipment did not work as planned. Vendor-provided wireless data communication was intermittent at best and
often unusable.

Some responders were equipped with lower-bandwidth satellite communication dishes with built-in wireless
access points, but most of the equipment had insufficient bandwidth to meet the mission requirements.
Connectivity was not acceptable for critical communication needs, and network-connected fax machines were
nonexistent. Where stable, higher-speed connections were available—such as at the field command center—
minimum security protocols were not observed, allowing viruses to render the networks useless. Eventually,
responders were forced to resort to verbal and printed communication.

Despite the expensive equipment, a lack of functional interoperability and adequate security measures prevented
capability investments from being useful on the ground during a major response.

Rather than thinking of cybersecurity as distinct from other types of threats and hazards, it should be
incorporated into the existing national framework of disaster preparedness policy and guidance. In this
way, the increasingly consistent preparedness process we envision across the Nation will efficiently
improve cybersecurity capabilities, rather than creating a new process in parallel.

Desired Outcomes:

 Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial levels; and

 National cybersecurity policy is expanded to include considerations for the resiliency of
increasingly cyber-dependent preparedness and emergency management activities at all
levels of government.

Policy and Guidance

Challenge

There is no consistent, standardized way for local, State,
Tribal, and Territorial governments to meaningfully
influence the preparedness policy process from initiation to
implementation.

The scope of the preparedness policy challenge requires a comprehensive, multi-tiered solution. In its
entirety, a successful solution must achieve three complementary ends. It should:

 Expand the reach and connect existing national and regional advisory bodies to form a
tightly coupled preparedness policy advisory system;

 Provide local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials with routine influence across all
stages of the preparedness policy process to include policy initiation, policy review, and
policy implementation and monitoring; and

 Address broad issues that span the Federal Government, e.g., establishing preparedness
doctrine.

Overarching
Recommendation

Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked”
preparedness policy advisory system capable of
influencing policy from initiation to implementation.

Recommendation: Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.

The Federal Government relies heavily on a constellation of approximately 1,000 advisory councils to
shape policy outcomes.24 DHS alone maintains 27 advisory councils.25 Two councils in particular are
involved in the preparedness-related policy process: the National Advisory Council (NAC) and the

24 General Services Administration, “Federal Advisory Committees Database,” FACA Database at FIDO GOV,
http://www.fido.gov/facadatabase/ (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
25 Ibid.

Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). The NAC is a 35-member body established by PKEMRA
to advise the FEMA Administrator on the policy perspectives of local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial governments; the private sector; and non-governmental partners. The Homeland Security Act
of 2002 established the HSAC, which performs a similar function for the Secretary of DHS, but includes
the entire homeland security mission spectrum and enterprise.

While FEMA and the NAC are recognized for their preparedness expertise, preparedness policy issues cut
across much of the homeland security enterprise and throughout the Federal Government.

Preparedness is the primary engine of homeland security readiness and the subsequent achievement of a
more secure, resilient Nation. Because we believe that preparedness is a bridge across all homeland
security disciplines, we believe that the body charged with advising the Administrator on preparedness
ought to have the explicit ability to coordinate across disciplines and agencies.

With thoughtful modification, Congress could significantly improve the effectiveness of preparedness-
related policy advice using existing bodies. The Task Force recommends that Congress transform the
existing advisory bodies into a tightly coupled preparedness policy advisory system. This system would
better ensure that newly identified needs and novel ideas anywhere within the homeland security and
emergency management enterprise are channeled into the preparedness policy process. Furthermore, a
more effective preparedness policy advisory system would enable relevant stakeholders to regularly
review and reevaluate preparedness policy and processes, and update and modernize validated policies.

The first step toward realizing this vision is to structurally position the NAC to better serve the entire
preparedness system. The NAC should be positioned to advise all Federal departments and agencies with
a stake in preparedness in addition to the FEMA Administrator. Furthermore, the NAC should be
empowered to:

 Call itself into session;
 Set its own agenda;
 Secure timely leadership briefings;
 Receive information from and transmit information to the Regional Advisory Councils

(RACs); and

 Engage and advise other Federal departments and agencies on matters of preparedness
policy.

Lastly, the composition of the NAC should be expanded to include representatives from other Federal
agencies, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and White House participation.

Desired Outcome:

 The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal,
Territorial, and Federal participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

Recommendation: Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.

The second step toward establishing a coherent local, State, Tribal, and Territorial policy advisory system
is to transform the RACs. The RACs provide a collaborative, multi-disciplinary forum for local, State,
Tribal, and Territorial emergency management preparedness, response, and recovery stakeholders to
collaboratively advise FEMA on issues of importance within each region. The Task Force recommends
that the RACs become a major conduit for regional participation in the preparedness policy process.

To realize this vision, the RACs must change in two significant ways. First, the RACs should receive
policy information briefings directly from the NAC. This would alert the regions to emerging policy
issues early in the policy development process. Second, the RACs should be empowered to provide
guidance to the NAC membership and embedded detailees (see next recommendation) in order to initiate,
shape, and review policy. This two-way informational exchange between the NAC and the RACs would
do much to make local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials fuller partners in the preparedness policy
process.

Desired Outcome:

 The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that
communicate regional, local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and inform
national-level policy decisions.

Recommendation: Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in FEMA’s National
Preparedness Directorate (NPD).

As a third step, the policy advisory system should be directly linked into routine policy-making activities.
This is best accomplished by embedding four local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials within FEMA
NPD for a 12-month rotation.

In this arrangement, various local, State, Tribal, and Territorial agencies and organizations would
nominate officials to embed. The NAC would make selections, and these embedded officials would then
serve a variety of functions. First, they would inform the NAC membership of emergent preparedness
issues at NAC meetings. Second, they would provide NPD staff with a non-Federal perspective in daily
policy activities. Lastly, they would actively promote the concerns and interests of the NAC within NPD
and other offices.

These first three recommendations achieve complementary aims. In concert, they constitute the basis of a
local, State, Tribal, and Territorial policy advisory system.

Desired Outcome:

 Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts
on emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can
contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

Recommendation: Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.

Experience has taught us that inclusive policy processes result not only in better policy but also in more
effective policy implementation. Yet—despite the best efforts of local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and
Federal officials—the preparedness policy process remains primarily a Federal endeavor.

The structures and procedures that shape the preparedness policy process too often fail to routinely enlist
the expertise and support of the broader homeland security and emergency management enterprise. While
the Federal Government often attempts to integrate non-Federal stakeholders into the policy process
through task forces and advisory councils, Federal policy-makers most frequently resort to ad hoc
solutions and informal outreach. Although these initiatives are sometimes effective, they do not address
the underlying lack of regular and systematic stakeholder participation in the policy process.

An overarching impediment to local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in the preparedness policy
process is the ambiguity of the policy process itself. Policy-makers at DHS and FEMA acknowledge that
no formal or consistent processes or practices guide policy formulation. Consequently, it remains
extremely difficult for local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials to participate meaningfully in the
policy process.

We recommend that DHS develop and promulgate a clear policy coordination process that engages local,
State, Tribal, and Territorial detailees, the NAC, and relevant RACs, among other stakeholders. Task
Force members understand that policy-making is, by its very nature, a complex, amorphous process.
However, the orderliness of the policy development process has direct bearing on the ability of the

distributed network of local, State, Tribal and Territorial governments to participate as partners in each
phase of the policy process. We encourage DHS leadership to look to the Department of Defense, other
agencies, and even other countries to develop a more mature, predictable, and routine process-flow for
preparedness policy-making.

Desired Outcome:

 DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better
balances the Department’s need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage
broader elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in
collaborative policy-making.

Recommendation: Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.

Preparedness policy has traditionally been formulated by officials from all levels of government with the
limited participation of individuals and non-governmental, faith-based, and private sector organizations.
Previous efforts to engage non-governmental stakeholders in policy debates have required a significant
and sustained commitment from a small fraction of the populace. As a result, government officials have
shaped preparedness policy without the perspective and insight of many of the individuals and
organizations most affected by the policies under consideration. Critically, the preparedness policy
process has lacked an efficient feedback loop with broad segments of the homeland security and
emergency management enterprise. Consequently, both policy-makers and non-governmental
stakeholders have struggled to bridge the gap between policy intent and the practical implications of
policy that become apparent only during implementation.

However, new technologies and processes are dramatically improving the quality, scope, efficiency, and
sustainability of Federal efforts to engage non-governmental stakeholders. For example, the QHSR
pioneered a Web 2.0-enabled “national dialogue” on homeland security policy that we later emulated. A
major theme that emerged in the National Dialogue led by this Task Force focused on the imperative of
broadening our understanding of the preparedness community and ensuring that the entire community has
a meaningful role in the full policy development and implementation cycle. Promising new alternatives
are available and should be used to connect government policy-makers with affected stakeholders in
every stage of the preparedness policy process. Specifically, we recommend that DHS:

 Continue to employ Web 2.0-enabled “national dialogues;”
 Leverage public-private media partnerships to improve the delivery of preparedness

messaging;

 Use decentralized social media technologies to provide access to timely preparedness
information; and

 Engage audiences, such as faith-based and community activist groups, most likely to
affect improvements in individual, family, and/or community preparedness at the local
level.

Desired Outcome:
 Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative

preparedness policy process.

Recommendation: Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans
match community demographics.

As FEMA’s Director of the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination stated in a recent
congressional hearing, “If people with disabilities are more thoroughly integrated in local planning, their
participation will help ensure that misleading stereotypes do not dilute the effectiveness of emergency
plans.”26 A National Dialogue contributor, citing supporting research, reaffirmed this notion, writing,
“Maximizing the participation of vulnerable populations in disaster planning and preparedness initiatives
and increasing their social capital through organizational linkages and social supports appears to be
crucial to increasing their resilience.”

Success Story: Communications as a First Step Toward Inclusive Preparedness

The Northeast Texas Public Health District has employed innovative communication techniques to incorporate
special needs populations into the national preparedness effort. This regional public health organization created
an accessible emergency information website to deliver preparedness information to people who are deaf, blind,
and have limited sight in video and specially designed documents that include Braille translations and large print
editions. The website, http://www.accessibleemergencyinfo.com/home.html, contains general information
regarding 18 emergency preparedness topics in simple, easy-to-understand presentations and documents.

Inclusive communication initiatives of this sort not only equip otherwise vulnerable segments of society with the
knowledge to become better prepared but also reflect a more collaborative approach to emergency planning.

Proactive preparedness activities targeted at special needs populations bring a more diverse cross-section of
society into the emergency management and homeland security effort. This, in turn, improves the quality and
inclusiveness of policies and plans. Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal levels of government should build
on the contributions of the Northeast Texas Public Health District’s website by customizing its free content to the
needs of their own jurisdictions.

While references to vulnerable populations certainly apply to people with disabilities within a community,
the scope is much broader, and will vary greatly by community. For example, some communities will
have greater numbers of people who are elderly, while others will have many children or households
living below the poverty line. We firmly believe that basic emergency plans ought to differ substantially
by community, based on the composition of that community. And, further, that demographic differences
should be addressed in the body of the emergency operations plan, to maximize utility and familiarity and
that people from the various demographic groups be included in community planning and policy efforts.

Desired Outcome:

 Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans
reflect these realities.

Recommendation: Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.

In the complex, modern-day response environment, no single jurisdiction has the resources to address the
full range of threats and hazards. This is particularly true as the current economic downturn has reduced
the availability of local, State, Tribal, and Territorial government resources. With this in mind, we
recognize that mutual aid will play an increasingly prominent role in national preparedness.

26 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Office of Disability Integration and Coordination, Marcie
Roth, Director for the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination, Caring for Special Needs during Disasters: What’s being done for
Vulnerable Populations: statement before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Communications,
Preparedness, and Response, U.S. House of Representatives, June 15, 2010.

Important mutual aid-related efforts are already underway. FEMA has emphasized the development of
regionally shared resources. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) serves as a
valuable model for interstate mutual aid but is limited to governor-declared states of emergency.

FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to establish and fund a national
comprehensive mutual aid system. The goals of such a system should be to enable all levels of
government to tap into extensive resources and assets nationwide to support incident response activities.
Mutual aid is often needed for events that are not declared emergencies. For example, National Special
Security Events (NSSEs) are typically so large that they require interstate assistance—but they are not
declared emergencies, limiting the availability of EMAC mutual aid assistance.

Accordingly, FEMA should work with all levels of government to address the various policy, legal, and
operational challenges involved with developing a national-level approach to mutual aid during
emergencies and planned events. This will necessarily require a sustained effort on the part of all
involved. In the short-term, FEMA should incentivize the development of mutual aid systems through its
grant programs.

Desired Outcome:

 Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments efficiently coordinate mutual aid before,
during, and in the aftermath of major emergencies and events requiring national or
interstate level responses through a national, comprehensive mutual aid system.

Recommendation: Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges.

The homeland security and emergency management enterprise should—consciously and deliberately—
engage in long-range policy planning. We, as a Nation, must constantly reassess the challenges
confronting us and opportunities to address them. Risks are dynamic. Yet, the capabilities required to
address these challenges often require significant time and investment to develop. As such, we must
learn to apply the same vigor and devotion to the unknown and the inevitable as we do to the known and
the imminent.

Collectively, the homeland security and emergency management enterprise should institutionalize a long-
range policy planning process. The primary objective of this effort would be to avoid strategic surprise
and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of our preparedness investments. The NAC should serve as
the principal forum for this activity. The NAC, when reconstituted, should create a workgroup devoted to
futures analysis.

The NAC futures analysis workgroup should seek to identify emerging threats and opportunities,
changing risks, and the systems to thwart them, and evolving hazards and how to mitigate them. The
NAC workgroup should receive unclassified long-range trend assessments from appropriate members of
the intelligence community, collaborate with DHS components and other Federal agencies, and solicit the
participation of key members of academia and the private sector as appropriate.

Initially, we recommend that the following challenges receive the highest priority of study:

 Climate change mitigation and adaptation;
 Changing demographics—particularly age, education, and socioeconomic factors;
 Migration—regional, national, and international;

 Aging infrastructure and its implications on resilience;
 Increasing national and global reliance on technology; and
 Interdependency and the potential for cascading and escalating failure.

The need for a disciplined, intergovernmental approach to long-range planning is underscored by the
complexity and scope of the challenges confronting the homeland security and emergency management
enterprise. The potential for innovative solutions to solve problems that independent government
agencies cannot resolve without the cooperation of a host of government and non-governmental partners
is similarly apparent. Alaska’s broad-based collaborative approach to addressing the challenge of climate
change is emblematic of the type of solutions that can only be achieved through long-range assessment
and analysis.

Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments are likely to confront challenges of increasing scope and
complexity with increasing frequency in coming years. The homeland security and emergency
management enterprise should institutionalize processes today to prepare for the challenges of tomorrow.

Desired Outcome:

 The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy
planning to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and to optimize the efficiency and
effectiveness of preparedness investments.

Climate Change in Alaska

In September 2007, the Governor of Alaska issued an administrative order directing State agencies to develop
an intergovernmental and collaborative strategy to manage the short- and long-term risks of climate change.
The mandate of the newly formed Climate Change Sub-Cabinet provides an excellent model for other emerging
policy challenges. Alaska’s Climate Change Sub-Cabinet:

 Catalyzes good science for informed decision-making;
 Prioritizes interventions for communities most at peril;
 Implements immediate action to stabilize emergent conditions;
 Promotes community participation and preparedness;
 Recognizes the need for regional, national, and international partnerships and agreements; and
 Maintains an open process for participation.

Due to the close collaboration of State and Federal agencies and eager participation of local communities,
Alaska accomplished many climate change-related goals with greater efficiency and effectiveness than possible
under earlier policies and traditional methods. For example, several coastline stabilization projects began within
months, not years.

Capabilities and Assessments

Challenge
While stakeholders across the Nation have been working to
improve preparedness, specific, measurable outcomes for
these efforts have yet to be defined and assessed.

As a Nation, we have not defined what it means to be prepared. For the past ten years, the homeland
security and emergency management enterprise has been working to determine the appropriate outcomes
at all levels—local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal. And, while we have made progress toward this
end, we believe that the enterprise has now achieved a level of maturity that makes it possible to define
preparedness outcomes and the preparedness efforts it will take to achieve those outcomes. Moreover, by
defining the outcomes, as well as where each jurisdiction stands relative to those outcomes, we will have
established a baseline by which to measure progress.

We uniformly believe that our Nation—and each of the jurisdictions we represent—is significantly better
prepared for emergencies than it was on September 11, 2001, or when Hurricane Katrina smashed into the
Gulf Coast in August 2005. Each Task Force member can produce ad hoc data and anecdotal evidence
describing his or her community’s increased preparedness for all-hazard events. However, a method to
demonstrate how much more prepared we are does not currently exist. We agree that preparedness
efforts, and the systems and processes that support them, are sophisticated enough at this point that it is
feasible and, indeed, necessary, to weave existing threads together to form the fabric of a cohesive,
comprehensive preparedness assessment framework.

One Task Force member remarked about being overwhelmed by the complexity of the mountain of
existing preparedness-related data. The Task Force agreed that an effective preparedness assessment
framework should selectively draw on and incorporate existing elements of the homeland security and
emergency management enterprise. As an example, several grant programs require applicants to draft
Investment Justifications (IJs), but these are not tied in any way to subsequent assessment processes.

To address these challenges, we have a vision for how a preparedness assessment framework should
work: defining risks; describing capability outcomes; typing and inventorying assets; determining risk-
based levels of capability; and establishing more meaningful outcome-focused assessment measures.
This framework should be an enduring, collaborative construct, with continuing system improvements
made as capability outcomes and measures become better defined.

The Task Force believes that DHS and FEMA have made substantial progress developing and promoting
components of such a framework but urge that existing components be modified, augmented, and forged
together. As issues such as cost-effectiveness and sustainability have become focus areas for Congress
and the Nation as a whole, promulgating an effective preparedness assessment framework will enable
homeland security and emergency management stakeholders to continually identify and improve returns
on preparedness investments.

Overarching
Recommendation

Prioritize development and phased implementation of a
national preparedness assessment framework.

Recommendation: Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at
all levels of government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.

The Task Force believes that every level of government should be able to define its risks—whether man-
made or natural. This process can range from a complex risk assessment methodology at the national
level down to a simple historical accounting of previous natural disasters for a local jurisdiction.

At the local level, we recommend that every jurisdiction prioritize risks—both man-made and natural.
The Task Force believes that localities should be free to use an appropriate methodology or tool to help
them collect and analyze baseline risk data. We caution against developing and mandating complex
assessment methodologies—complexity has an inverse relationship with participation, particularly at the
local level where personnel are often volunteer, part-time, or inadequately staffed. Using the web-based
support tool described in a later recommendation, local jurisdictions should also provide their risk
analyses to their respective State to enable aggregate-level analysis.

State and UASI jurisdictions should participate in a more rigorous and standardized THIRA process. The
Task Force believes that existing State hazard mitigation processes serve as a potential model upon which
to base this State/UASI THIRA.

Individual Tribal nations should decide how best to participate in the THIRA process. This could be
directly with FEMA, or as a quasi-local jurisdiction reporting to FEMA through the appropriate State
government. If acting directly, Tribes should comply with the same standards and timelines as State and
UASI jurisdictions.

At the Federal level, DHS should conduct a national-level THIRA using both Federal-level data as well as
aggregated data from States and UASI jurisdictions. DHS should disseminate the results of this THIRA
to, at a minimum, Federal departments and agencies with lead and support roles for the Emergency
Support Functions in the National Response Framework.

This common approach will enable all levels of government to maintain a baseline understanding of the
risks that they face, facilitating efforts to identify capability and resource gaps and ultimately capability
improvements. We also emphasize that, as appropriate, higher levels of government should share
relevant THIRA information that affects other jurisdictions—ensuring that all levels of government are
able to accurately assess their risks and fill capability gaps.

Once completed, future grant investments should be tied to assessed risk and existing capability at the
local, State, Tribal, Territorial, regional, and national levels. Jurisdictions should continue to have the
freedom to pursue the capabilities that best address their risks. FEMA should expect State Administrative
Agencies (SAAs) and Regional Administrators to comment on Investment Justifications, validating that
capabilities requested are consistent with risks assessed at the State and regional levels.

Desired Outcomes:

 All levels of government are able to assess their risks using appropriate methodologies;
 Framework for preparedness Investment Justifications is established;
 Preparedness levels and progress are measured from year to year by evaluating the gaps

between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and

 Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and
reflect a measureable return on investment.

Recommendation: Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered,
capability-specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.

The Task Force recognizes that understanding risks is only one component of an overall preparedness
assessment framework. Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders must also be able to
identify how their unique risk profiles translate into related capability needs.

While the Task Force acknowledges that FEMA has made significant strides in this area by developing
the Target Capabilities List (TCL), additional work remains to make the TCL a more valuable tool for
homeland security and emergency management stakeholders. Specifically, the Task Force recommends
that FEMA continue its efforts to develop and promulgate Capability Level Guidance (CLG) that
provides:

 Descriptions of each capability and its associated outcomes;
 Risk factors to consider in each jurisdiction’s respective THIRA process;
 Tiered guidance, based on the jurisdiction’s size and complexity, to build a capability;

and

 Notional, tiered targets for jurisdictions to consider when developing capability levels
consistent with their risk analyses.

The Task Force believes that the preparedness assessment metrics and targets in the Capability Level
Guidance should, wherever appropriate, be based on existing standards, such as those from the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP).

FEMA is already working to evolve the TCL into the Capability Level Guidance. The NIMS-based CLG
is being developed with the understanding that enhanced guidance should enable all levels of government
to identify the capabilities needed to address their specific risks. The guidance should likewise enable
stakeholders to identify the tiered performance objectives and resource requirements needed for those
capabilities. Jurisdictions would then be able to assess themselves against these performance objectives
and resource requirements, identifying critical gaps and informing decisions on where to target grant
funds and other efforts to augment capabilities.

Aggregating this jurisdiction-specific data into a national-level perspective should enable FEMA to
identify national gaps in capability performance and NIMS-typed resources. This would allow FEMA to
make informed decisions, in coordination with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments, about
how to address those capability performance gaps through, for example, planning, training, or exercising.
FEMA would also work with all levels of government to target the procurement and sustainment of
critical, nationally deployable, NIMS-typed resources—such as water purification units, heavy-lift
equipment, and debris removal resources—to fill identified national gaps.

The capability assessment framework should be integrated into the grant programs as well. Specifically,
in their Investment Justifications, jurisdictions should identify how grant funds are being used to develop
and sustain capabilities, and then be assessed on the success of those investments.

Desired Outcomes:

 All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated
performance objectives and resource needs;

 FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability
performance gaps; and

 FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally
deployable, NIMS-typed resources.

Recommendation: Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland
security and emergency management assets.

The Task Force recognizes that incident response is becoming increasingly complex. No single
jurisdiction has all of the resources needed to respond to the broad array of potential threats and hazards.

While Federal departments and agencies understand the resources they have available to support national-
level incidents, FEMA—which is charged with coordinating national-level responses—does not have
visibility into the number, type, or availability of these assets. In turn, States are unsure of what assets the
Federal Government can offer and how quickly Federal agencies can provide them. This challenge is
mirrored at lower levels of government, where particular jurisdictions may have nationally deployable
assets but no way to share this data with other stakeholders around the country. This lack of transparency
results in unnecessary duplication of assets and increases the time needed to determine asset availability
and overall cost to all levels of government.

To address this challenge, we recommend that FEMA develop a NIMS-typed resource inventory
cataloging nationally deployable assets, such as essential teams and equipment. This process would be
closely linked with the resource-related gap analyses supported by the Capability Level Guidance
described earlier. The inventory should reflect those specialized assets most likely to be needed in a
major disaster but not readily available at the local level. FEMA should manage this inventory in a web-
based system that operates with sufficient controls i.e., For Official Use Only (FOUO), and with
appropriate transparency at all levels of government, enabling prospective recipients to see included
assets and their current availability.

Federal agencies should take the lead in populating the resource inventory; other stakeholders—including
from all levels of government and the private sector—should include those specialized response assets
that are able to be shared. THIRA processes should also inform the assets included in the resource
inventory as should data from historical mutual aid requests. For example, data from EMAC could help
identify those most-requested mutual aid assets. This type of analysis is happening in some places, such
as California, where the California National Guard has worked closely with CalEMA to type the
resources the State most frequently requests, speeding assistance substantially. As has been demonstrated
repeatedly, the principles of NIMS—employing a common incident management framework and
language—are essential to an efficient response and successful outcome.

Desired Outcome:

 Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into
and access to the range of nationally deployable assets.

Recommendation: Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect
preparedness assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.

The Task Force was pleased with a number of existing efforts and tools being used to collect and report
on preparedness data and resources. Specifically, the Task Force is comfortable with the National Incident
Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool (NIMSCAST), which many jurisdictions use
to report NIMS compliance information to FEMA. We believe that FEMA should expand NIMSCAST to
collect preparedness assessment data. For example, the NIMSCAST system could ask local, State, Tribal,
and Territorial stakeholders a series of basic questions about their key risks, map these risks to associated
capabilities, and use the tiered capability performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements
in the Capability Level Guidance to identify capability and resource needs.

For the resource inventory, the Task Force believes that the Resource Ordering and Status System
(ROSS), which is used heavily by the wildland fire community, is a valuable model to consider. ROSS
automates resource ordering, status, and reporting processes and tracks all tactical, logistical, service, and
support resources mobilized. We were also impressed with FEMA’s Logistics Capability Assessment

Success Story: North Carolina Mitigation and Mutual Aid Efforts for Hurricane and Flood Preparedness

Hurricane Floyd made landfall in North Carolina on September 16, 1999, just 12 days after Hurricane Dennis.
Floyd stands as North Carolina’s storm of record, and it served as the catalyst for subsequent preparedness
efforts that have enhanced the State’s readiness posture. The effect of back-to-back storms was devastating:
flooding in 66 counties—two-thirds of the entire state; 52 lives lost; 63,000 homes flooded and 7,300 destroyed;
millions of agricultural animals lost; 86,954 Federal disaster relief registrants; and more than $6 billion in
damage.

Over the last nine years, North Carolina has received $279.8 million in Federal grants, which have been
combined with millions more in State funds to enhance capabilities in all areas. In 1999, North Carolina was
unable to accurately forecast where flooding would occur, hampering mitigation efforts as well as response and
recovery. This deficiency led the State to invest in state-of-the-art floodplain maps. Today, a 50/50 investment
of State and Federal funds allows flood modeling and impact prediction for structures in any county. In addition
to response and recovery benefits, the maps contribute to mitigation efforts by informing decisions to prevent
future development in flood-prone areas. North Carolina demonstrated its flood modeling and prediction
capabilities in recent preparedness efforts for Hurricane Earl which, thankfully, did not make landfall.

Despite previous flood-related hurricane effects, swiftwater and helo-aquatic rescue teams were also not part of
North Carolina’s response asset inventory in 1999. Local responders were forced to employ their own personal
watercraft to facilitate rescues. Today more than 50 swiftwater teams are distributed throughout the State.
Further, a cooperative agreement with the North Carolina National Guard (NCNG) provides helo-aquatic rescue
capability ready to meet mutual aid requirements.

North Carolina has aggressively organized around mutual aid and interoperable capability packages. The
NCNG has organized their personnel and equipment into typed “mission ready packages” with pre-scripted
mission statements to assist decision-makers. The NCNG can readily communicate how many of each mission
ready package are available in inventory at any given time, and has developed plans designating which States
can supply additional mission ready packages of personnel and equipment through mutual aid. EMAC has
adopted this model and the NCNG mobilized several of these mission ready packages in preparation for
Hurricane Earl.

In addition, the possibility of flooding that could isolate large portions of North Carolina and compromise critical
care facilities for vulnerable citizens stimulated the development of cutting-edge State medical assistance teams
(SMATs). SMATs have the ability to establish numerous mobile field hospitals or integrate into regional field
hospitals to cover critical care requirements in a post-disaster scenario. This specialized capability is
deployable nationwide through mutual aid, and North Carolina SMATs have assisted disaster medical needs in
Mississippi, Louisiana, Indiana, and were on alert during Hurricane Earl.

Tool (LCAT), which we likewise found to be a model worth emulating. We also note that any resource
inventory system developed should ultimately be compatible with EMAC, the primary system by which
State and Territorial mutual aid is sought and shared.

Incident Management Teams (IMTs) are an excellent example of a collaborative intergovernmental
partnership to provide an effective incident management response system that would greatly benefit from
a national resource inventory and status system. The Federal and Regional Type 1 and 2 IMTs are
national assets used to manage wildland fire incidents and a variety of other all-hazard scenarios.
Recently the U.S. Fire Administration worked closely with local agencies, regions, and States to develop
over 100 All-Hazards Type 3 IMTs. These All-Hazards IMTs can provide a valuable and cost-effective
resource in a timely manner. The Type 1 and 2 teams are managed by the ROSS system and the All-
Hazard IMTs are currently only in State-managed resource systems. Having all three types of IMTs in a
national resource inventory database would greatly enhance cost effectiveness and efficiency.

Success Story: FDNY IMT Deploys to New Orleans After Hurricane Katrina

At Ground Zero on September 11, 2001, the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) faced the most complex,
longest-lasting operation in its history. Before that day, the FDNY had never considered the need for
substantial, outside support.

On September 12, 2001, the members of two, Type 1 Incident Management Teams (IMT) arrived in New York
to support the FDNY Incident Commander. 27 An IMT is a comprehensive resource that can either augment
ongoing operations by providing infrastructure support or, when requested, transition to an incident
management function to include all components/functions of a Command and General Staff.28

While the FDNY initially resisted the assistance, it quickly became clear that the IMT was not attempting to take
over and, more importantly, that the teams included experienced, capable personnel, as well as necessary
resources, such as radios, that FDNY could employ immediately. The FDNY’s experience with the IMTs was so
positive that, by 2005, it had developed its own Type 2 IMT and was one of the first to deploy to post-Katrina
New Orleans to assist the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD).

The FDNY IMT encountered similar, early reticence in New Orleans. But, like FDNY, the NOFD quickly
incorporated the FDNY and other teams into their operations to provide much-needed support to a Department
whose personnel had suffered catastrophic losses—80% of the force was left homeless from the storm.29 Like
the NOFD, the FDNY IMT endured extremely austere conditions, including little food, no electricity, and no
beds, while performing initial duties.

By September 18, 2005, when the initial IMT deployment began to transition to reinforcements, the FDNY IMT
was pleased with the initial accomplishments: joint teams had suppressed more than 100 building fires without
any serious injuries to operating personnel; and with only one serious civilian injury. Further, numerous fire
stations had been cleaned and reopened, many firefighters’ homes had been made livable, and electricity and
other basic services at the base camp were restored. Since that time, the FDNY IMT has assisted in at least
eight other emergencies.

Desired Outcome:

 FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent,
repeatable and defendable.

27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Resource Center, “Glossary,”
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/Glossary.shtm#T (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Fire Administration, “About Incident Management
Teams,” June 1, 2010, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/fireservice/subjects/incident/imt/imt-about.shtm (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).
29 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, NIMS Resource Center, “Glossary,”
http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/Glossary.shtm#T (accessed Sep. 30, 2010).

Recommendation: Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year
period, with an integrated set of annual milestones.

We believe that FEMA should implement a preparedness assessment framework as quickly as possible
but also recognize that this is a complex undertaking and one that should include feedback from local,
State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders. We recommend a three-year timeframe in which to fully
implement a preparedness assessment framework; however, this timeframe includes a series of annual
milestones designed to demonstrate progress.

Year One Activities

 FEMA should work with Federal agencies to conduct a national-level THIRA;
 FEMA should institute a NIMS-typed resource inventory system, which is ready to

be populated within six months;

 FEMA should finalize tiered performance objective and resource requirement
guidance in the Capability Level Guidance within six months;

 FEMA should modify NIMSCAST to enable targeted collection of risk-based
capability performance objective and resource data within six months;

 States, Territories, UASI jurisdictions, and Tribes operating independently, should be
required to conduct or re-assess existing THIRAs, establishing risk baselines;

 States, Territories, and Tribes operating independently should use the data collected
in the NIMSCAST process to assess capability levels using tiered performance
objectives and resource requirements from the Capability Level Guidance; and

 All States and UASI jurisdictions should conduct self-assessments using the
Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) tool as a means to establish
their baseline assessment against the national standard.

Year Two Activities

 FEMA grant guidance and associated materials—such as IJs and State Preparedness
Reports (SPRs)—should be synchronized with the capability assessment framework;

 States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI jurisdictions should apply for grant funds to
address documented capability shortfalls;

 Grant investments should be based upon assessed risk and needed capability;
 FEMA should issue a resource inventory data call to Federal agencies, States, Tribes,

Territories, and UASI jurisdictions for nationally deployable assets with existing
NIMS resource types;

 FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to make
iterative improvements to the Capability Level Guidance;

 FEMA should expand NIMSCAST’s capability-specific data collection tools to
reflect changes to Capability Level Guidance;

 Local jurisdictions, in addition to States, Territories, UASI jurisdictions, and Tribes
operating independently, should conduct THIRAs, enabling aggregation at the State,
Tribal, Territorial, and national levels;

 States, Tribes, Territories, as well as UASI and local jurisdictions, should use
NIMSCAST to assess capability levels; and

 States and Territories should work to ensure that 50% of local jurisdictions have
reviewed existing THIRAs or completed new ones, as appropriate.

Year Three Activities (continued annually)

 States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI and local jurisdictions should apply for grant
funds to address documented capability shortfalls;

 FEMA should ensure resource inventory data is updated at least annually by all levels
of government and the private sector for nationally deployable assets with NIMS
resource types;

 FEMA should work with local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders to make
iterative improvements to the Capability Level Guidance;

 FEMA should refine NIMSCAST’s capability-specific data collection tools to reflect
changes to the Capability Level Guidance;

 Local jurisdictions, in addition to States, Tribes, Territories, and UASI jurisdictions,
should conduct or re-assess existing THIRAs, enabling aggregation at the State
Territorial, Tribal, and national levels;

 Local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and UASI jurisdictions should use NIMSCAST to
assess capability levels;

 States and Territories should work to ensure local jurisdictions’ THIRAs are
substantially complete nationwide; and

 Federal agency resource data should be fully developed in the national resource
inventory.

Desired Outcomes:

 All levels of government develop and maintain an understanding of their risk profiles,
associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;

 Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability
shortfalls; and

 All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally
deployable assets.

Grant Administration

While we are encouraged by the many positive changes made to Federal preparedness grant programs
since the 9/11 attacks, we believe that more can be done to improve grant-related effectiveness and
efficiency. Specifically, Federal grant programs would benefit from better coordination and
collaboration, targeted process improvements, and closer links with capability assessments at all levels of
government.

We have taken a deliberately broad view of what constitutes Federal preparedness grants, using the
following definition: “funding designed to establish and sustain a national network of preparedness

Challenge

The effectiveness and efficiency of preparedness grant
programs are hindered by limited intergovernmental
coordination and collaboration, unsynchronized processes,
and insufficient linkages with capability assessments.

capabilities at the local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and regional levels to allow communities to prevent,
prepare for, respond to, and recover from all hazards.” At the Federal level, preparedness grant programs
are not the sole domain of DHS. The Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs identified,
for FY2008, 67 “preparedness grant programs,” totaling nearly $10 billion across seven Federal
departments and one agency.30

The increasing use of preparedness grant funding throughout the Federal Government signals the growing
awareness of how grant funds can improve preparedness at the local, State, Tribal, and Territorial levels.
However, this approach has also caused challenges for stakeholders as grant programs from different
Federal agencies support overlapping objectives, have different procedural, administrative, and reporting
requirements, and are not linked back to capability assessments.

Overarching
Recommendation

Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related
coordination and collaboration, business processes, and
capability assessment linkages.

Recommendation: Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at
the Federal level.

Better coordination of preparedness grants at the Federal level would increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of these programs as they are implemented by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders.
In addition to DHS, other Federal agencies such as HHS and DOJ provide grants to local, State, Tribal,
and Territorial entities for preparedness initiatives. However, these Federal agencies do not consistently
coordinate application, monitoring, financial, or programmatic requirements. Moreover, these distinct
Federal agencies do not have visibility into their grantees’ homeland security strategies, existing
capability levels, or assessment results. Instead, each Federal agency has only a limited view of the
overall preparedness picture within any State or jurisdiction.

While DHS and HHS have sought greater coordination of preparedness funding for the public health and
medical sector through a co-led Coordinating Committee, such an effort should be expanded to include all
Federal departments and agencies administering preparedness grant funds. This working group should be
charged with finding ways to better coordinate all elements of preparedness grant administration—from
guidance development through application, monitoring, and assessments.

We particularly encourage Federal agencies to improve coordination in several priority areas. Federal
agencies should provide improved visibility into grantee-developed strategic documents, such as State
Homeland Security Strategies. These documents can and should be used to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of grant allocations. In addition, requirements for NIMS resource typing and for use of the
Authorized Equipment List (AEL) should be incorporated by all Federal agencies. Lastly, to the extent
practical, Federal agencies should seek to better synchronize timelines for preparedness grants and should
promote use of Grants.gov as a common system for administration of preparedness grants.

30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Grant Programs Directorate, Interagency Report on
Preparedness Grant Programs: Report to Congress, 2009.

Desired Outcomes:
 Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as

appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and
assessments;

 Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed
strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;

 Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
 Preparedness grant programs employ Grants.gov as a common system.

Recommendation: Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders
regarding preparedness-related grant funds.

Mirroring the recommendation for improved Federal coordination regarding preparedness grant
programs, local, State, Tribal, and Territorial jurisdictions should also seek to coordinate their application
for and use of these grant funds. For example, different Federal preparedness grant programs often have
different SAAs. SAAs often have little or no visibility into how grant funds from other Federal agencies
are being used. Improved collaboration among SAAs would ensure better synchronization of grant funds
and reduce unnecessary duplication of effort.

Federal grant guidance should encourage such collaboration by offering incentives to form an SAA
coordinating body. DHS has required similar efforts by making UASI funds contingent on Urban Area
Working Groups which coordinate grant activities in UASI jurisdictions.

More generally, we believe that all stakeholders involved in preparedness grants should participate in a
culture of collaboration where intergovernmental coordination continually works to improve grant
allocation, administration, and assessment. This high-level vision is depicted notionally below:

Desired Outcome:
 SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives,

resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

Recommendation: DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness
assistance grants to ensure that match requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.

Match requirements are a typical component of many preparedness-related grant programs. These
requirements necessitate that grantees match a certain percentage of Federal grant funds with non-Federal
funds. We recognize the importance of these requirements in ensuring that grantees have a shared fiscal
commitment in the success of grant-funded initiatives. At the same time, there is increasing concern and
anecdotal evidence that—particularly in light of the economic downturn—local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial stakeholders are foregoing Federal grant funds because they are unable to support the match
requirements.

We believe this issue requires more careful study and analysis. We ask DHS to assess the effects of these
match requirements on local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation to ensure that the requirements are
not hindering those who need grant funds but cannot participate in the grant matching requirement.

Desired Outcome:

 DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements
influence local, State, and Tribal participation in preparedness grants.

Recommendation: Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions
should ensure consistent application of standards.

FEMA has recently initiated efforts to shift grant administration and monitoring responsibilities away
from FEMA headquarters in Washington to the FEMA regions. While we are encouraged by this
initiative to empower FEMA’s regional offices, we wish to emphasize that FEMA—and all Federal
departments and agencies—should ensure consistent application of grant administration and monitoring
standards, particularly when these functions are decentralized.

Desired Outcome:

 Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

Recommendation: Allow grantees flexibility to use Federal grant funds to support sustainment and
maintenance costs without limitation.

Beginning in 2009, FEMA provided specific guidance that restricted the use of its Federal grant funds for
sustainment and maintenance costs. We support FEMA’s recent efforts to expand the grant-funded
allowability of sustainment and maintenance costs; we believe that these efforts should be expanded.

We emphasize that using grant funds to develop a capability or acquire a critical asset is ineffective if
those grant funds cannot be used to sustain and maintain that capability or asset. If we are to see
continued improvements in preparedness capabilities, grantees should be incentivized not only to develop
capabilities but also to sustain and maintain them. We believe that local, State, Tribal, and Territorial

stakeholders should have the flexibility to use preparedness grant funds for ongoing sustainment and
maintenance costs, provided these costs are transparent and justified appropriately.

Desired Outcome:

 Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use Federal preparedness grants
flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.

Recommendation: To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, preparedness
grant funding should be allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for
each State and Territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3)
category/program-specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.

To address the challenges of varied risk profiles, we recommend a mixed approach to allocating Federal
preparedness grant funds. The model outlined below largely mirrors the current approach to grant
funding—with the notable addition of competitive, project-based grants to promote innovation in
capability development and sustainment. We emphasize that all of these grants play important roles in
developing and sustaining capabilities.

1. Block grants to States based, in part, upon population: Provide funding based, in
part, upon population (as done in the early years of the Domestic Preparedness Program).
The formula would provide a consistent, base amount on which States, Territories, or
Tribes could rely for long-term capability development and sustainment efforts with the
flexibility to address their unique needs. The SAA should coordinate all such funds.

2. Risk-based grants to high risk areas: Provide funding to emphasize risk-based factors
beyond population. Specifically, risk-based grants should consider Critical
Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) and the concept of “transferable risk,” which
considers the value of CI/KR on a national basis. These grants should be managed at the
local or Tribal level or, if requested, by the State on behalf of the local jurisdiction, and
coordinated with the SAA.

3. Category-specific grants: Maintain existing grants designed for a specific program,
discipline, or purpose. These grants should be managed at the appropriate level but
should be coordinated through the SAA.

4. Competitive, project-based grants: Provide funding to encourage innovation at the
local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and regional levels by funding projects that support and
maintain critically needed capabilities and assets that could be shared nationally through
mutual aid. Such grants should reinforce the effort to strengthen priority capabilities
derived through the national THIRA and capability assessment processes. The purpose
of such grants would be the development of nationally available and jurisdiction-
managed mutual aid resources. These funds should be offered in addition to existing
competitive grants and be coordinated through the SAA.

Desired Outcome:

 Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.

Recommendation: More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.

We believe that capability assessment efforts must be more closely linked to grant funding. Currently,
these two processes—assessments and grant funding—proceed almost completely independently. While
some data used in grant applications and monitoring does inform assessment processes and vice versa,
such integration is not consistent. An effective capability assessment framework should support local,
State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying how grant funds contribute to capability
improvements.

As one example, applicants for certain DHS grants must submit Investment Justifications (IJs). For each
proposed investment, IJs describe the estimated cost, the relationship to key strategic documents, e.g., the
State Homeland Security Strategy, implementation activities, and the expected impact. IJs are a time-
consuming but valuable way to explain the rationale for making a grant-funded investment.
Unfortunately, the information provided in the IJs is used solely during the grant application and review
process.

We believe that IJs should be used more broadly to inform ongoing grant monitoring and assessment
efforts. In the context of a broader preparedness assessment framework, IJs can serve as a resource to
assess whether expected outcomes and capability improvements resulted from grant investments. We
also believe that progress from year to year should be measured using the IJs as a starting point.

Desired Outcome:

 Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying
how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

Conclusion

hen Congress directed that the Task Force “take stock” of preparedness efforts since September
11th, 2001, our mission was not simply to assess how much preparedness efforts had bought

America. We noted that America is safer and more resilient today than before 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina
based on the unprecedented capabilities now available in more places than ever before. But the real heart
of our mission was to understand how well those preparedness efforts have been achieved. The cost-
effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and especially measurability of the investments made not just by
Congress, but overwhelmingly by local, State, Tribal, and Territorial governments, was a central
consideration of the Task Force.

We looked toward the future “to be” preparedness system and how to use preemptive activities to reduce
the time and costs associated with recovering from disasters that do occur, even in cyberspace, which will
allow us to bounce back resiliently in the face of adversity. Recognizing that preparedness is a
responsibility that cuts across all stakeholders in the homeland security enterprise, we identified ways that
we believe will allow individuals and families to better incorporate preparedness activities into their
everyday lives to make their communities safer and more resilient, no matter the size. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, we have proposed ways to use existing coordination mechanisms between
local, State, Tribal, Territorial, and Federal efforts, as well as the private sector and non-governmental
organizations, more effectively, so that mere coordination evolves to a culture of collaboration.

Much of the work to be done will occur within the “as is” preparedness system, refining the processes that
have developed since 9/11 to bring the historical disciplines that contribute to homeland security and
emergency management together more effectively. Our analyses and proposals reveal the centrality of
the preparedness process to the goals of efficiency, sustainability, cost-effectiveness, and measurability.
With clearer national-level goals in place, the derivative objectives for individual capabilities can be
better defined and their development coordinated among all necessary stakeholders. More uniform usage
of common capability types and visibility into a national resource inventory, coupled with improved
assessment methods will ease the challenge of aggregating the complex landscape of nationwide
preparedness data into authoritative conclusions about progress made, and at what cost in time and
resources. Through proposed enhancements to the high-level policy and guidance process, those
conclusions can be integrated with global intelligence, including futures analysis, in order to determine
new preparedness priorities.

We hope that Congress carefully considers our recommendations. We believe they will make our Nation
stronger and better prepared.

Task Force members discuss an issue during the Washington, D.C.
meeting (FEMA/Bill Koplitz).

List of Acronyms

AEL Authorized Equipment List
BSIR Biannual Strategy Implementation Report
BZPP Buffer Zone Protection Program
CalEMA California Emergency Management Agency
CBRNE Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive
CERT Community Emergency Response Team
CFDA Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
CHDS Center for Homeland Defense and Security
CI/KR Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources
CLG Capability Level Guidance
CPG 101 Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101
DEM Department of Emergency Management
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOJ Department of Justice
DRG White House Domestic Resilience Group
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMAP Emergency Management Accreditation Program
EOC Emergency Operations Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FDNY Fire Department of New York
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FOUO For Official Use Only
FY Fiscal Year
GIS Geographic Information System
GSA General Services Agency (San Francisco)
GSA General Services Administration (U.S.)
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council
HSC Homeland Security Council
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IAEM International Association of Emergency Managers
IGA Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (DHS)
IJ Investment Justification
IMT Incident Management Team
IRPG Interagency Report on Preparedness Grant Programs
ISE Information Sharing Environment
JIC Joint Information Center
LCAT Logistics Capability Assessment Tool
LEA Local Education Agency
LETPP Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
NAC National Advisory Council
NEMA National Emergency Management Association
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIMSCAST National Incident Management System Compliance Assistance Support Tool
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NOFD New Orleans Fire Department
NPD National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA)
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NRF National Response Framework
NSI Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative
NSSE National Special Security Event
ODP Office for Domestic Preparedness (DHS)
OHS White House Office of Homeland Security
OSDFS Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (Department of Education)
PKEMRA Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006
P.L. Public Law
PPD Presidential Policy Directive

QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
RAC Regional Advisory Council
RISC Regional Interagency Steering Committee
REMS Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
ROSS Resource Ordering and Status System
SAA State Administrative Agency
SAR Suspicious Activity Reporting
SHSP State Homeland Security Program
SLGCP Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
SNS Strategic National Stockpile
STEP Student Tools for Emergency Planning
TCL Target Capabilities List
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment
TICP Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan
UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
UTL Universal Task List
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Appendix A: Recommendations to Congress

Strategic Investments to Sustain and Grow Preparedness

Overarching
Recommendation

Consider bold, innovative investments to increase the long-term
cost-effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness through
cost-reducing measures.

#1: Include preparedness in the portfolio of strategic, futures-oriented analysis currently

conducted by the National Intelligence Council.
Desired Outcomes:

 The National Intelligence Council integrates preparedness-related futures analyses into its
activities; and
 DHS is able to use futures analyses to make authoritative judgments about future
requirements and/or capabilities, enabling anticipatory investments in key areas.

#2: The Department of Education, working with FEMA, should develop materials that school

districts can use to implement a preparedness curriculum.
Desired Outcomes:

 School districts around the country integrate preparedness principles and materials into
curricula; and

 Citizens entering adulthood understand the preparedness mindset and have taken basic steps
to better prepare themselves individually or as a family at home, in the community, and in
the workplace.

#3: Establish a system of financial incentives to encourage individuals, families, and businesses to

train and materially prepare for emergencies.
Desired Outcomes:

 Governments at all levels increasingly consider and implement innovative financial
incentives to promote preparedness; and
 Increasing numbers of individuals and businesses engage in preparedness planning and
activities.

#4: Provide incentives for jurisdictions to take pre-event steps that will reduce the length and

magnitude of disaster recovery.
Desired Outcomes:

 Jurisdictions take steps—such as those identified in the San Francisco Success Story—to
initiate advanced recovery planning efforts; and
 Jurisdictions are able to recover from catastrophic events more efficiently, rapidly, and
effectively.

#5: Ensure national cybersecurity efforts address local, State, Tribal, and Territorial preparedness

implications.
Desired Outcomes:

 Cybersecurity capability enhancement is prioritized at the local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial levels; and

Policy and Guidance

Overarching
Recommendation

Transform existing advisory bodies into a “networked”
preparedness policy advisory system capable of influencing
policy from initiation to implementation.

#6: Expand the reach of the National Advisory Council.

Desired Outcome:
 The NAC functions as an intergovernmental focal point and forum for local, State, Tribal,

and Territorial participation in all stages of the preparedness policy process.

#7: Revitalize and “network” the Regional Advisory Councils.
Desired Outcome:

 The RACs serve as regional nodes in a preparedness policy advisory system that
communicates regional local, State, Tribal, and Territorial perspectives and informs
national-level policy decisions.

#8: Embed local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials in the FEMA National Preparedness
Directorate (NPD).
Desired Outcome:

 Embedded local, State, Tribal, and Territorial officials advise their Federal counterparts on
emerging policy issues and serve as a conduit through which the NAC and RACs can
contribute to and keep informed of national preparedness policy.

#9: Establish a clear and consistent policy coordination process.
Desired Outcome:

 DHS establishes a clear, consistent, and efficient preparedness policy process that better
balances the Department’s need for deliberative flexibility with its need to engage broader
elements of the homeland security and emergency management enterprise in collaborative
policy-making.

#10: Engage non-governmental stakeholders in a collaborative policy process.
Desired Outcome:

 Individuals and non-governmental organizations are engaged in a genuinely collaborative
preparedness policy process.

#11: Planning-related policy and guidance should ensure that basic emergency plans match
community demographics.
Desired Outcome:

 Communities better understand and account for their unique requirements and plans reflect
these realities.

#12: Establish and fund a national, comprehensive mutual aid system based on NIMS.
Desired Outcome:

#13: Develop a strategic policy planning process to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges.
Desired Outcome:

 The NAC futures analysis workgroup performs long-range assessments and policy planning
to mitigate the risk of strategic surprise and optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of
preparedness investments.

Capabilities and Assessment

Overarching
Recommendation

Prioritize development and phased implementation of a national
preparedness assessment framework

#14: Conduct Threat and Hazard Identification Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes at all levels of

government to establish a foundation to justify preparedness improvements.
Desired Outcomes:

between current and targeted capability levels across all levels of government; and
 Investments made to close gaps in capability levels result in a more prepared Nation and

reflect a measurable return on investment.

#15: Prioritize ongoing efforts to update the existing Target Capabilities List with tiered, capability-
specific performance objectives and NIMS-typed resource requirements.
Desired Outcomes:

 All levels of government are able to assess their capability levels, with associated
performance objectives and resource needs;

 FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address capability performance
gaps; and

 FEMA works with all levels of government to identify and address gaps in nationally
deployable NIMS-typed resources.

#16: Establish a NIMS-typed resource inventory for nationally deployable homeland security and
emergency management assets.
Desired Outcome:

 Homeland security and emergency management stakeholders have greater visibility into
and access to the range of nationally deployable assets.

#17: Use existing, familiar, user-friendly systems, such as NIMSCAST, to collect preparedness
assessment and resource inventory data from all levels of government.
Desired Outcome:

 FEMA provides a system for data collection and subsequent reporting that is transparent,
repeatable and defendable.

#18: Implement the elements of a preparedness assessment framework over a three-year period,
with an integrated set of annual milestones.
Desired Outcomes:

 All levels of government have an understanding of their threat and hazard profiles,
associated capability needs, and documented capability shortfalls;

 Grant investments and other preparedness activities are linked to documented capability
shortfalls; and
 All levels of government have access to a NIMS-typed resource inventory of nationally
deployable assets.

Grants Administration

Overarching
Recommendation
Make targeted improvements to preparedness grant-related
coordination and collaboration, business processes, and
capability assessment linkages.

#19: Establish an interagency working group to better coordinate preparedness grants at the

Federal level.
Desired Outcomes:

 Federal agencies administering preparedness grants meet regularly to coordinate, as
appropriate, development of grant guidance, application/award timelines, monitoring, and
assessments;

 Federal agencies providing preparedness grants have visibility into grantee-developed
strategic documents and use these documents to inform grant allocations and awards;

 Preparedness grant programs reflect more consistent timelines; and
 Preparedness grant programs employ the Grants.gov system as a common system.

#20: Incentivize coordination among local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders regarding
preparedness-related grant funds.
Desired Outcome:

 SAAs for all Federal grant programs have increased visibility into grant initiatives,
resulting in more efficient and effective use of Federal grant funds.

#21: DHS should evaluate the role of match requirements in Federal preparedness assistance
grants to ensure that match requirements do not dis-incentivize local, State, Tribal, and
Territorial participation and that they support capability development and sustainment.
Desired Outcome:

 DHS conducts evidence-based evaluation to understand how match requirements influence
local, State, Tribal, and Territorial participation in preparedness grants.

#22: Federal agencies with decentralized grant administration and monitoring functions should
ensure consistent application of standards.
Desired Outcome:

 Grant programs are administered and monitored consistently by regional offices.

#23: Allow grantees flexibility to use federal grant funds to support sustainment and maintenance
costs without limitation.
Desired Outcome:

 Local, State, Tribal, and Territorial grantees are able to use federal preparedness grants
flexibly to sustain and maintain existing capabilities.

#24: To reflect the diverse goals and objectives of Federal grant programs, grant funding should be
allocated using a variety of approaches, including: 1) baseline amounts for each state and
territory; 2) amounts based on risk formulas targeted to specific areas; 3) category/program-
specific grants; and 4) competitive programs that encourage innovation.
Desired Outcome:

 Grantees have access to a full range of preparedness grants to meet diverse needs.

#25: More closely link grant programs with capability assessments.
Desired Outcome:
 Assessment data supports local, State, Tribal, and Territorial stakeholders by identifying

how grant funds contribute to capability improvements.

Appendix B: Member Biographies

Charles H. Ada II, Administrator, Guam Office of Civil Defense
Mr. Ada has served as the Administrator of Guam’s Office of Civil Defense since 2003, overseeing the island-wide
emergency management system. He has served in Guam’s Office of Civil Defense since 1993 as an Exercise
Training Officer, Emergency Management Specialist and as Chief Planner. Mr. Ada has served through six
presidentially declared disasters, one aviation disaster / mass casualty incident as well as numerous localized
disasters and emergencies. He is a member of the National Emergency Managers Association and ASIS
International.

Karen Baker, Secretary of Service and Volunteering, State of California
Ms. Baker has served as the Governor-appointed Secretary of Service and Volunteering for the State of California
since 2008. Prior to this appointment, she served as Executive Director of California Volunteers, also for the
Schwarzenegger Administration. Ms. Baker has also lead organizations such as Share our Strength, a Washington
DC based anti-hunger nonprofit, and Chrysalis, a nonprofit focused on helping the economically disadvantaged and
homeless gain employment. In total Ms. Baker has over 20 years of leadership experience in the service and
volunteering sector.

Sheriff John Cary Bittick, Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, Georgia
Sheriff Bittick was sworn in as Monroe County Sheriff in 1983. Sheriff Bittick began his career as a radio operator
for the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office in 1972 and today, he runs a full service, nationally accredited law
enforcement agency that includes 118 employees and a jail that can house 174 inmates. Sheriff Bittick also
developed Sheriff’s CARE Cottage, the only nationally accredited child advocacy center operated out of a law
enforcement agency in Georgia. Throughout his career Sheriff Bittick has been active in law enforcement
associations and criminal justice issues. He served as president of the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA) in 2001
and, since his presidency, Sheriff Bittick has continued to participate in NSA as chair of both the Intelligence Sub-
Committee and Legislative Affairs Committee.

Dave Bunce, Fire Chief, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Fire Department
Chief Bunce has led the Salt River Fire Department, a premier “all-risk / full service” public safety organization for
the past ten years. Services delivered include fire prevention, emergency medical response (ALS/BLS), fire
suppression, rescue, technical rescue, code enforcement, public education, and community partnerships. The Salt
River Fire Department delivers service to approximately 92 square miles of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community, which borders the greater Phoenix metropolitan area.

Jeffery C. Cash, Fire Chief and Emergency Manager, City of Cherryville (NC) Fire Department
Chief Cash has served as the Fire Chief of the Cherryville (NC) Fire Department since 1986. Chief Cash began his
fire service career in 1979. He also serves as the city’s Emergency Manager. Chief Cash is an active member of the
North Carolina State Fireman’s Association, has served on the Board of Directors of the National Volunteer Fire
Council (NVFC) for over ten years, and is a member of the NVFC’s Executive Committee. In 2007, the
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) Volunteer and Combination Officers Section (VCOS) honored
Chief Cash with the first John M. Buckman III Award for his leadership within the volunteer and combination fire
service.

Salvatore Cassano, Fire Commissioner, City of New York
Commissioner Cassano is the 32nd Fire Commissioner in the 145-year history of the New York City Fire
Department. He has 40 years of experience in the FDNY and has held every uniformed rank and heads the world’s
largest fire department with more than 16,000 fire, EMS, and civilian members. Prior to his appointment by the
Mayor, Commissioner Cassano served as the FDNY’s Chief of Department from 2006 through 2010, overseeing
many of the agency’s most important bureaus including Fire and EMS Operations, Training, Safety, Fire Prevention
and Communications. Commissioner Cassano’s extraordinary career with the FDNY began with his appointment as
a firefighter on Nov. 29, 1969. Prior to joining the FDNY, Commissioner Cassano served in the U.S. Army from
October 1965 through July 1967 and was deployed to Vietnam in September 1966.

T.M. Franklin Cownie, Mayor, City of Des Moines, Iowa
Mayor Cownie was elected Mayor of the City of Des Moines in 2003 and was re-elected in 2007. Mayor Cownie
has a long history of public service, having served for two years as an at-large member of the Des Moines City
Council, five-terms as the chairman of the Planning and Zoning Commission, and three-terms as chairman of
Downtown Des Moines, Inc. Mayor Cownie also serves as a member of the U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Stafford
Act Reform Task Force, and as Chair of the organization’s Metro Economies Committee. Mayor Cownie has been
acknowledged nationally for his work on environmental initiatives and climate protection. As mayor, he promotes
the city’s goal of creating a sustainable green community for future generations, and takes advantage of every
strategic opportunity to maintain the city’s status as the premier destination in the Midwest for building businesses
and raising families.

Nicholas L. Crossley, CEM, Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Johnson County
(KS)
Mr. Crossley has served at Johnson County’s Emergency Management and Homeland Security since 1999,
beginning as a Project Impact Coordinator and then quickly becoming an Assistant Director responsible for all
county emergency management plans, hazard analyses, and capabilities assessments. Mr. Crossley was named
Director in 2007 and is now responsible for the coordination of all actions within Johnson County which involve
preparing for, responding to, recovering from and mitigating the impact of crisis, major emergencies and disasters.
Mr. Crossley is also serves as the Region VII President for the International Association of Emergency Managers –
USA and Chair of the National Association of Counties – Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Subcommittee. Mr. Crossley holds the Certified Emergency Manager credential and a Kansas Certified Emergency
Manager credential.

Edward F. Davis, Police Commissioner, Boston Police Department (MA)
Commissioner Davis is the 40th Police Commissioner of the City of Boston. He was sworn in on December 4, 2006.
Prior to becoming Commissioner, he served as the Superintendent of Police in Lowell, Massachusetts for 12 years.
Commissioner Davis began his career as a patrol officer in Lowell in 1978 and rose through the ranks before
becoming Superintendent in 1994. He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the National Leadership Award
(2002) from the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). Commissioner Davis has served on the PERF board of
directors and was a founding member and first President of the Massachusetts Major City Chiefs Association.

Robert DesRosier, Director, Blackfeet Nation Homeland Security Program and Emergency Services Program
Mr. DesRosier currently serves as the Director of the Blackfeet Nation’s Homeland Security and Emergency
Services Programs. In addition, he manages the Tribal Utilities program. With 16,000 enrolled members, the
Blackfeet Nation is the largest Indian tribe in Montana and one of the largest tribes in the United States. The
Blackfeet reservation constitutes 1.5 million acres in Montana and has a population of approximately 10,000,
including 8,500 enrolled Blackfeet, several hundred Blackfeet descendents and Indians from other tribes, and a few
hundred non-Indians. The other 7,500 Tribal members are in various locations all over the world.

Margaret Donnelly, Director, Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services
Ms. Donnelly has served as Director of the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) since 2009,
during which time she has focused on items such as promoting vaccination, preventing elder abuse, and improving
care for stroke patients with an emphasis on the needs of individual communities. She has also reached out to
interested stakeholders across the region to discuss health information exchange. Prior to her role as Director of the
Missouri DHSS, Ms. Donnelly served in the Missouri House of Representatives from 2003 to 2008 where she
focused on issues related to health care, consumer protection, and child welfare. During this time, she was the
ranking member on the House Budget Committee and on the Appropriations Subcommittee for Health and Senior
Services, Mental Health, and Social Services. She has also served on the Medicaid Reform Commission.

Ms. Donnelly received undergraduate and graduate degrees in social work and a law degree from St. Louis
University. She has been recognized with several awards from the legal community including: the President’s
Award of Honor from the Women’s Lawyers’ Association in 2001; the St. Louis County Family Court Guardian ad
Litem of the Year in 2002; and the Women’s Justice Award in 2006. Ms. Donnelly was elected to the Ferguson-
Florissant School board in 1986 where she served until 1992, including one year as president. In 1991 she chaired
the committee establishing the first shelter for battered women and children in St. Louis County. She also served as

a commissioner of METRO, as a member of the Regional Airport Governance Task Force, and as a member of the
Ecumenical Housing Production Corporation Board (now known as Beyond Housing, Inc.).

Patricia Dukes, Chief of Emergency Medical Services, City and County of Honolulu (HI)
Ms. Dukes has served as Chief of Emergency Medical Services for the City and County of Honolulu since 1994.
She serves as a charter board member of the International Association of Emergency Medical Services Chiefs. In
addition to these roles, Ms. Dukes is a contributing editor to Elsevier, a leading provider of professional information
and online workflow solutions in the Science, Medical, Legal, Risk Information and Analytics, and Business sectors.

Brigadier General Donald P. Dunbar, Adjutant General, Wisconsin
Brigadier General Donald P. Dunbar was named adjutant general of Wisconsin on September 1, 2007. He is
responsible for the federal and state missions of the Wisconsin Army and Air National Guard and the Wisconsin
Division of Emergency Management. He is also the governor’s Homeland Security Advisor and chairs the
governor’s Homeland Security Council. Prior to his appointment, Brig Gen Dunbar served on the staff of the
assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and as executive officer to the director of the Air National Guard.
He is the recipient of numerous awards, including the Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, the Air
Medal, the Air Force Commendation Medal, the Air Force Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, the
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two bronze service stars, and the Armed Forces Reserve Medal with
bronze hourglass device and M7 device.

Angela English, Executive Director, Texas Governor’s Committee on People with Disabilities
Ms. English is currently the Executive Director of the Texas Governor’s Committee on People with Disabilities.
The Committee works toward a state where people with disabilities have the opportunity to enjoy full and equal
access to lives of independence, productivity, and self-determination. The Governor appoints twelve members to
serve on the Committee, seven of whom must be people with disabilities. Representatives from six state agencies
serve as ex officio or advisory members. The Committee makes recommendations to the Governor and Legislature
on disability issues; promotes compliance with disability-related laws; promotes a network of local
communities/committees doing similar work; and recognizes employers and media for employing and positively
depicting Texans with disabilities. Members of the Committee work on issues related to access, communication,
education, emergency management, health, housing, recreation, transportation, veterans and workforce. Her
previous experience includes serving for six years as the Accessibility and Disability Rights Coordinator for the
Governor’s Committee by providing technical assistance regarding accessibility and disability rights laws. She
interacted with citizens with disabilities, ADA Coordinators, businesses, governmental entities, and other
organizations regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Ms. English also has 13 years previous service with the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
in Mental Health Quality Management. She has a Master’s degree from Baylor University in Educational
Psychology and a Bachelor’s Degree from Carson-Newman College in Jefferson City, Tennessee. Ms. English is a
Licensed Professional Counselor and a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist. She has teaching degrees in
Special Education and Art Education K-12 grades.

Charley English, Director, Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Homeland Security Advisor
Mr. English was appointed director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) on February 22, 2006
by Governor Sonny Perdue. On September 10, 2007, Governor Perdue also appointed English director of Homeland
Security. He currently continues to serve in both capacities. He joined GEMA in February 1996, as part of the
Olympic planning team and has served in various leadership positions during his tenure. Director English oversees
all state government activities related to Homeland Security and Emergency Management, including responsibilities
of the State Fusion Center and Homeland Security Grant Program. During his career, Director English was a
member of the G8 Summit security planning team and has coordinated the state’s response to eleven (11)
presidentially declared disasters and numerous states of emergency declared by the Governor.

Prior to joining GEMA, he was responsible for the management of Georgia’s ten regional police academies as
director of training for the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Council. Prior to joining POST, he worked
with the Clayton County Police Department for eight years serving his last assignment as the regional police
academy director. Director English earned his Associate’s degree in Criminal Justice from Clayton Junior College,

his bachelor’s degree in Public and Urban Affairs from Georgia State University and his master’s degree in
Homeland Security and Defense from the Naval Postgraduate School where he earned the Professor Phillip
Zimbardo Award for academic achievement.

Anthony H. Griffin, County Executive for Fairfax County Virginia
Mr. Griffin was appointed County Executive for Fairfax County, Virginia, in November 1999 and in this role
oversees the operations of all of County government. He is a fellow at the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) and received the Stone Practitioner Award from NAPA for his commitment to improve
intergovernmental cooperation, especially in response to the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, the anthrax
incidents in 2001 and the regional sniper attacks in 2002. Under his leadership, Governing Magazine named Fairfax
County “one of the best managed jurisdictions in America” in the Government Performance Project. He served as a
U.S. Marine Corps Officer in Vietnam.

Dwight E. Henninger, Chief of Police, Town of Vail (CO) Police Department
Chief Henninger has served as the Town of Vail’s (CO) Chief of Police since January 2002, after leaving
California’s Laguna Beach Police Department as Captain. Chief Henninger began his law enforcement career in
1978 and has risen through the ranks with police departments in the City of Garden Grove (CA), City of Irvine
(CA), and City of Laguna (CA). He is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police Executive
Committee and is a member of the FEMA Region VIII Regional Advisory Council. Chief Henninger also serves as
a board member of the Colorado Regional Community Policing Institute (CRCPI) and Colorado Police Corps.

James D. Himes, Assistant Director, Department of Public Works, Metro Nashville and Davidson County
(TN)
Mr. Himes has served as the Assistant Director for Operations since 1986 and has over 30 years of experience with
all phases of public works. He has significant experience with emergency management as a result of his work as a
Debris Removal Manager in seven presidentially declared disasters, as well as through his leadership of disaster
recovery/assistance teams through responses to five in-state disasters. Mr. Himes also served as a task force leader
for a Public Works Restoration Team and with an Urban Search and Rescue team for disasters in Virginia (tornado),
Kentucky, and Mississippi (Hurricanes Katrina and Rita). He is a member of the American Public Works
Association and has served in several capacities including three terms on the Emergency Management Technical
Committee.

H. Douglas Hoell, Jr., Director, North Carolina Division of Emergency Management
As Director of the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management (NCDEM) since 2005, Mr. Hoell has
leadership and management responsibility over a Division of the N. C. Department of Crime Control and Public
Safety. Currently, Mr. Hoell serves as the Chairman of the National Emergency Management Agency’s (NEMA)
Preparedness Committee. Mr. Hoell has been involved in emergency management at the local, state, and federal
levels since 1978. From 1998-2005, Mr. Hoell served as the Assistant Director/Chief of Operations at NCDEM. In
that role, his accomplishments included assisting the NC League of Municipalities in developing a management
structure for intrastate mutual aid; assisting the North Carolina Department of Agriculture with the development of a
plan for response to a foreign animal disease; serving as Deputy SCO for Hurricane Floyd, and for the January 1998
Flood and Winter Storm; as well as serving as State Emergency Response Team (SERT) Leader on Fixed Nuclear
Facility Exercises. Mr. Hoell earned his B.S. from North Carolina State University.

Jeffrey D. Johnson, Former Fire Chief/Administrator, Tualatin Valley (OR) Fire & Rescue (TVFR)
Chief Johnson has served as the Fire Chief and Administrator of TVFR since 1995, having served since 1989 as a
division chief and then assistant chief. Before joining TVFR, he had an 11-year fire service career in Douglas
County (OR). He is the International Association of Fire Chiefs’ (IAFC) President and Chairman of the Board. He
is a member of the IAFC’s EMS, Fire & Life Safety, and Volunteer & Combination Officers Sections as well as the
Metropolitan Fire Chiefs Association. He also serves on the board of advisors for FireRescue magazine. In addition,
Chief Johnson is a representative of the SAFECOM Emergency Response Council and serves as an affiliate to the
International Association of Arson Investigators and the National Fire Protection Association. Chief Johnson has
authored two fire service books and is a featured guest lecturer across the nation.

Hans Kallam, Director, Colorado Division of Emergency Management
Hans Kallam has served as Director of Colorado’s Division of Emergency Management since October 2007. Prior to
accepting this position, Mr. Kallam served as Director of Operations for the Adjutant General of the Colorado
National Guard. He brings the division more than 25 years of leadership and operations experience – many of
which focused on providing support to federal, state, and local authorities. Mr. Kallam has served as a reservist with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and has deployed in response to five separate federally
declared disasters.

Mr. Kallam holds a Bachelor of General Studies Degree from Weber State College with concentrations in Police
Science, Military Science and Economics and was a Distinguished Military Graduate of the college’s Reserve
Officer Training Corps program. He has served as the President of the National Guard Association of Colorado and
currently serves on the Board of Directors for both the National Emergency Management Association and the
Denver Infragard Members Alliance. His decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service
Medal, the Army Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters, and Master Army Aviator Wings.

Ron Lane, Director of the County of San Diego (CA) Office of Emergency Services
Mr. Lane has served as the Director of Emergency Services since February 2006, including serving as the Director
of the County’s Emergency Operations Center during the San Diego Firestorm of 2007. He has served the County
in several capacities since 1989, having worked with Planning and Land Use, the North County Municipal Court,
Public Safety Group, and the Department of Child Support Services. He is a colonel in the United States Army
Reserve, and currently commands a transportation group at Camp Pendleton, CA. COL Lane has been mobilized
and deployed to the Persian Gulf twice, in Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. COL Lane was awarded the
Bronze Star in 2004.

Joseph LaPorte, Former Public Safety Director, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians (MI)
Mr. LaPorte has served in law enforcement since 1973, with experience at the local, State, and Tribal levels. He
currently serves as the Senior Tribal Advisor for the Office of the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment (PM-ISE) and was previously detailed to the National Countererrorism Center (NCTC) in conjunction
with DHS as the Tribal Representative. His areas of expertise extend to the fields of fraud investigation, internal
theft, gaming scams, safety and security, and Critical Incident Management.

Mr. LaPorte’s speaking engagements have extended across the Nation. He has delivered keynote addresses at the
Michigan State University School of Law on Domestic Violence in Indian Country and Cultural Difference and at
the Mason County Sheriff’s Department for the Citizen Police Academy. He has additionally served as the keynote
speaker for the Ho-Chunk Nation regarding Tribal law and jurisdiction issues and at Johns Hopkins University about
intelligence/information sharing and how to bridge the information-sharing gap between Tribal communities and the
State/Federal level.

Over the course of his career, Mr. LaPorte has served as a board member on numerous advisory working groups,
including CommTech Technical Working Group at the Department of Justice /National Institute of Justice;
Enhancing Services to Victims by Police; Major Crimes Task Force of Michigan; and Criminal Justice Information
Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board; and has served in various capacities as a representative for Indian Country.
He also serves on a wide array of associations, including the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police; National
Native American Law Enforcement Association; Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards; and
Violence Against Women. In addition, Mr. LaPorte is a board member of Project Safe Neighborhood for the
Western District of Michigan and is the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Chairman for the
Indian Country Section.

John W. Ledbetter, Executive Director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security
Mr. Ledbetter has served as Executive Director of the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security since 2006. In this
role, he serves as the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisor as well as the State Administrative Authority (SAA)
for all DHS preparedness grants and oversees operations of the Mississippi Analysis and Information Center. Mr.
Ledbetter also brings with him approximately 30 years of experience in the field of law enforcement. He is a
member of the Joint Terrorism Task Force Executive Board, National Domestic Preparedness Consortium Advisory
Council, and National Governors Homeland Security Advisors’ Council (GHSAC).

Pamela L‘Heureux, CEM, Director of Emergency Management, Waterboro, Maine
Pamela L’Heureux has been active in emergency management since assuming the position of the Town of
Waterboro (Maine) Director of Emergency Management in 1991. She has been a volunteer for the York County
(Maine) Emergency Management Agency since 1994. When she retired from Verizon Communications in 2002
after 30 years service, the last 15 in a management role, L’Heureux took on the role of Assistant Emergency
Management Director at York County Emergency Management Agency, where she is involved as an emergency
management planner, exercise coordinator, and instructor for Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
courses. She has been a long-term recovery specialist for FEMA and has responded to more than 20 disasters. Ms.
L’Heureux recently took office as President of the USA Council of the International Association of Emergency
Managers (IAEM).

Ms. L’Heureux has served as VFW Auxiliary #7997’s President, and is a 21-year veteran volunteer fire fighter in
her fifth term as Board member of the York County Fire Fighters Association. She is an Emergency Management
Accreditation Program (EMAP) assessor, and has participated in 10 assessments. She is the first President of the
Maine Association of Local Emergency Managers. She currently serves as a member of the United Nation’s
Advisory Board on International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR).

John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Mr. Madden has served his state and his country for more than 40 years. He was appointed in January 2007 as
Director of the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management for the State of Alaska following a year
as the Deputy Director for Homeland Security within the division.

As director, Mr. Madden has significantly improved the preparedness and the readiness of the State of Alaska. He
developed a comprehensive, all-hazard systems approach to community preparedness. He leads the Alaska
Partnership for Infrastructure Protection, a highly successful public/private partnership. He organized all federal,
state, and local governments for the unified defense and protection of the Alaskan energy sector. He developed a
highly innovative method to assess vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure, communities, and supply chains. He
has designed and conducted several challenging exercises involving threats from terrorism, earthquakes, floods, and
extreme weather.

His state service follows a distinguished career in seven federal agencies. Mr. Madden served in the U.S. Army,
including twenty months in Vietnam. As a federal civilian, he worked with the Departments of the Navy and Air
Force in program and project management. After earning his degree in political science, he joined the Department of
Energy working on fossil fuels programs. In Alaska, he served with the National Weather Service and the Federal
Aviation Administration. He was a charter member at the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and
served with the Transportation Security Administration as Deputy Federal Security Director for many airports in
Alaska.

Raymond Orozco, Mayor’s Chief of Staff, Chicago IL
Prior to this appointment in February 2010, Mr. Orozco Orozco has served as the Executive Director of the Office of
Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC). During his tenure at OEMC, Mr. Orozco solidified a
private sector camera initiative, which links Chicago based organizations, companies and non-for-profit camera
systems into the OEMC video surveillance. Before heading up the OEMC, Mr. Orozco served on the Chicago Fire
Department (CFD) for 29 years. He began his career with the CFD in 1980 and advanced to the positions of fire
engineer in 1987, lieutenant in 1988 and captain in 1993. Orozco was promoted to battalion chief in 1996 and served
in that capacity until his appointment to the position of assistant deputy fire commissioner in 2005.

Jim Page, Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS)
Mr. Page manages the largest law enforcement mutual aid network in the United States, consisting of over 900 local,
federal and state agencies. He is responsible for annually managing $10+ million in grant funds as well as the
organization, equipping and planning involved in establishing 11 regional multi-jurisdictional Weapons of Mass
Destruction SWAT teams, 10 regional Mobile Field Forces, the distribution of 24,000 gas masks to every officer in
Illinois in addition to the establishment and execution of a secured mutual aid system that operates statewide. He
reports to a Board consisting of 21 sheriffs, chiefs and directors elected statewide to govern ILEAS.

Mr. Page joined ILEAS in 2004 as the first Executive Director after retiring from the Urbana Police Department as
the Assistant Chief of Police with 27 years of service. In addition to the Urbana Police Department, Mr. Page served
on the Chatham, Illinois police force. He has a Master’s Degree in Public Administration and is a graduate of the
164th Session of the FBI National Academy.

Kerry Pettingill, Director, Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security
Mr. Pettingill has served the people of the State of Oklahoma for more than a quarter of a century. Beginning as a
State Trooper in 1982 he has risen in the Oklahoma Highway Patrol (OHP) to his current rank of Lieutenant
Colonel. Throughout his tenure, Mr. Pettingill has served in specialized positions utilizing his training as a bomb
technician, hazardous materials technician and in tactical operations. He served as commander of the OHP Bomb
Squad and Tactical Teams, as liaison to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and Deputy Director of
Homeland Security.

Mr. Pettingill serves on numerous professional appointments such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP): State, Local, Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council, the National Domestic Preparedness
Consortium: State Administrative Agency Advisory Council, the Governor’s Campus Life and Safety and Security
Task Force (CLASS), and the Governor’s Homeland Security Advisory Council. Mr. Pettingill is a graduate of the
39th OHP Academy, Leadership Oklahoma Class XIX, FBI National Academy, FBI Hazardous Devices School and
has his Bachelor of Science from Southern Nazarene University.

Mary Selecky, Secretary, Washington State Department of Health
Ms. Selecky has served as Secretary of the Washington State Department of Health since March 1999 during which
time she has made tobacco prevention and control, patient safety, nutrition and physical activity, and emergency
preparedness her top priorities on a state-wide level. Prior to working for the state, Mary had a 20-year tenure as
administrator of the Northeast Tri-County Health District in Washington. She is a past president of the Washington
State Association of Local Public Health Officials as well as the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, where she received the 2004 McCormack Award for excellence in public health. Ms. Selecky also served
on the Board of Directors of the National Association of City and County Health Officials.

David Taylor, State Chief Information Officer and Executive Director, Agency for Enterprise Information
Technology, Florida
Mr. Taylor has been the State Chief Information Officer and Executive Director for the Agency for Enterprise
Information Technology since July of 2008. He reports to the Governor and Cabinet members for the State of
Florida. Mr. Taylor was previously the Chief Information Officer of the Florida Department of Health beginning in
2003. This position entailed overall authority for IT services and management for a 17,000 employee organization
with 2.5 billion in budget. IT expenditures exceed 60 million dollars per year.

During 2006, Mr. Taylor was the Chairman of the State of Florida CIO Council. In fiscal year 2006-2007, he served
as State of Florida representative to the National Association of State CIOs. In 2005-2006 he was the Chairman of
the National Association of Public Health Information Technology (NAPHIT). Mr. Taylor holds a Bachelor of Arts
in Psychology from the University of Massachusetts – Lowell. He also holds a Masters degree in Public
Administration from the University of Central Florida.

Lyda Ann Thomas, Former Mayor, City of Galveston (TX)
Ms. Thomas was elected Mayor of the City of Galveston in 2004 and was re-elected in 2006 and in 2008. Prior to
becoming Mayor, Ms. Thomas served three consecutive terms as Elected City Council member for District 4,
beginning in 1998. She has served as Chairman and board member/trustee of the The Mainland Center Hospital
Board, Galveston Partnership for Better Living, and The Neighborhood Housing Initiative among many others. She
has received many honors, including being named a Rotary International Paul Harris Fellow, the American Heart
Association Heart Ball Honoree, and the Arts Center Honoree. Ms. Thomas has been acknowledged nationwide for
her leadership and stewardship of the citizens during the Hurricane Rita evacuation in 2005 and for her efforts since
Rita to plan, prepare and be ready to respond and recover from any future disaster

MaryAnn E. Tierney, Former Deputy Managing Director for Emergency Management, City of Philadelphia
(PA)
Ms. Tierney has served with the City of Philadelphia (PA) since November 2006, overseeing a transformation of the
City’s emergency preparedness program. Previously, Ms. Tierney spent over seven years with the New York City
Office of Emergency Management, ending her tenure there as the Assistant Commissioner for Planning and
Preparedness. Ms. Tierney has extensive experience coordinating large, complex emergency response operations in
the field and at Emergency Operations Centers. She has managed over 60 Emergency Operations Center activations
in New York and Philadelphia and regularly responds to large emergencies to coordinate on-scene response
activities. Ms. Tierney was responsible for coordinating the debris operation at the World Trade Center site with
after 9/11. Ms. Tierney is a principal member of the National Fire Protection Association’s Technical Committee
on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600) and has served as an adjunct
professor, teaching graduate-level courses on emergency preparedness.

Alan Dennis (A.D.) Vickery, Assistant Chief of Risk Management for the Seattle Fire Department (WA)
Assistant Chief Vickery is a 43-year veteran of the Seattle Fire Department. He also currently serves as FEMA
Urban Search and Rescue Task Force Leader of the Washington State Team (WA-TF1). He has worked extensively
in operations, assessments, and study to improve capabilities needed to respond to disasters as one of the original 12
members of a nationwide FEMA “Readiness Evaluation Team” to asses USAR teams. Assistant Chief Vickery also
chaired a 2001 advisory group to preposition strategic national WMD equipment caches, and the national
Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability Committee (IAB) sponsored jointly by
FEMA, DoJ, DoE, and DoD. He also served as a member of the Gilmore Commission.

John Wageman, State Hazard Mitigation Officer, Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Division
Mr. Wageman is the State Hazard Mitigation Officer for the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Division (HSEMD). HSEMD plans for and responds to natural and human-caused disasters. The Division helps to
coordinate activities before, during and after emergencies through partnerships with local, state, federal and private
agencies. As the State Hazard Mitigation Officer, Mr. Wageman serves as the primary point of contact with FEMA,
other State and Federal agencies, and local units of government in the planning and implementation of pre- and post-
disaster mitigation activities.

John Wheeler, Cabinet Secretary of the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management
Mr. Wheeler, a member of the New Mexico and Massachusetts State Bars, has extensive experience in both
emergency services and the law. He has been chief legal Counsel for the Department of Public Safety since 1997
and is the Governor’s Crime Policy Advisor. He has been responsible for drafting many laws in New Mexico
including Public Health Emergency Response and DWI and the Sex Offender Registry. Mr. Wheeler also serves as
Assistant Chief of the Santa Fe County Fire Department, is an Emergency Medical Technician, and a member of
Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One which deployed in 2005 to assist after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

State Senator Thomas Wyss, Indiana State Senate
Senator Wyss has served as an Indiana State Senator since 1985, representing District 15. He previously served on
the Allen County Council from 1978 to 1985. He is chairman of the Homeland Security, Transportation, and
Veterans Affairs Committee in the Indiana Senate and Ranking Member of the Rules and Procedures Committee.
He is the Co-chair, Homeland Security and Preparedness Task Force of the National Conference of State
Legislatures, serves as a Member of the State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee for the Homeland
Security Advisory Council, and is a member of the National Homeland Security Consortium and U.S. Department
of Justice Global Advisory Council. Senator Wyss also served as a Lieutenant Colonel with the Indiana Air
National Guard, retiring in 1997.

Appendix C: National Dialogue on Preparedness

While the Task Force membership represents a
variety of perspectives from across homeland
security and emergency management disciplines,
we recognized the need to incorporate an even
broader range of stakeholders—including the
private sector, non-governmental and voluntary
organizations, citizens, and additional
governmental partners—in our deliberations. To
do this, we actively reached out to the national
preparedness community to solicit their input.

In early summer 2010, we launched the National
Dialogue on Preparedness, a public outreach
campaign to link the Task Force with
preparedness-minded citizens, non-governmental
organizations, and private sector partners. The National Dialogue hosted a number of forums where these
stakeholders shared ideas and insights with the Task Force. A key component of this campaign included
a series of meetings and teleconferences with stakeholder groups, including the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce (June), National Advisory Council (July), faith-based and community organizations (July and
September), the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (July), and the San Diego Business
Alliance (August). These targeted stakeholder engagements generated ideas and recommendations for
our consideration.

The Task Force also hosted an online forum for preparedness stakeholders to submit their own
recommendations, engage in conversations regarding preparedness-specific issues, and vote on and
discuss recommendations from others. On August 5, we launched the National Dialogue on Preparedness
website (http://preparedness.ideascale.com/).

National Dialogue contributors were asked to respond
through the web-based tool to the three core questions
posed by Congress and addressed by the Task Force:

 How do we collectively assess our
preparedness capabilities and gaps?

 Which preparedness policies and guidance
need updating and what process should we use
to update them?

 Which preparedness grant programs work the
most efficiently and which programs can be
improved?

For the 36 days the National Dialogue online collaboration tool was available, 899 users submitted,
commented on, and voted on preparedness-related ideas and recommendations. Stakeholders posted a
total of 266 ideas, generating 420 comments and 3,297 votes.

Task Force members participate in a National Dialogue event
hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce (FEMA/John
Courtmanche).

National Dialogue on Preparedness website (FEMA).

We also established a website (http://www.fema.gov/preparednesstaskforce/) to post information about
the Task Force and provide a dedicated email account (FEMA-Preparedness-Task-Force@FEMA.gov)
for stakeholders to directly submit questions and comments. A range of stakeholders regularly submitted
comments and questions, to which staff promptly responded and which we incorporated into our
deliberations. In total, over 1,000 stakeholders participated and contributed to the National Dialogue.

Key Themes Aligned to Task Force Recommendations

Three core themes that emerged from the National Dialogue align with Task Force deliberations and
recommendations:

Integrating Non-Governmental Stakeholders
National Dialogue contributors noted the importance of integrating non-governmental stakeholders into
preparedness policy development and implementation. National Dialogue participants specifically
mentioned the need to incorporate perspectives from the private sector, faith-based organizations,
community-based programs, voluntary organizations active during disasters, schools, the healthcare
community (including mental health providers), and organizations that provide services to the special
needs/disability communities.

Contributors noted that these stakeholders have the ability to make significant contributions to response
and recovery efforts. In particular, National Dialogue participants emphasized that non-governmental
partners can support and augment government efforts to disseminate critical preparedness messages.
Contributors observed that involving non-governmental partners in preparedness policy development is
an essential first step in engaging these stakeholders.

Integrating Preparedness into Educational Curricula

National Dialogue contributors highlighted the importance of citizen preparedness but acknowledged the
many challenges associated with engaging the general public effectively. To address these challenges,
participants identified educational curricula as an important mechanism for instilling preparedness
principles in the public at large. Many contributors also noted that imparting preparedness knowledge to
school-aged children would reap long-term gains as children shared their knowledge with their families
and peers.

Establishing Financial Incentives for Preparedness

National Dialogue contributors again noted the essential role that individuals, families, communities, and
businesses play in preparedness and discussed ways to incentivize preparedness activities. Participants
identified the potential for tax and insurance breaks for individuals, communities, and businesses that take
preparedness actions. Such financial incentives, contributors posited, would help motivate stakeholders
to prioritize preparedness. National Dialogue participants identified certain expenses—such as
preparedness supplies for individuals and families, security enhancements and preparedness planning for
businesses, and outreach campaigns for communities—that could be incentivized through tax and
insurance breaks. Participants agreed that incentive-based approaches were strongly preferable to levying
penalties or fines for stakeholders who do not participate in preparedness activities.

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