Business Law #2 Original work (Plagiarism free)

 

Resource: Case Brief Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc (Attachment)

  

Write a 900 word paper in which you define the functions and role of law in business and society. Discuss the functions and role of law in your past or present job or industry. Properly cite at least two references from your reading.

Format your paper consistent with APA guidelines.

FACT SUMMARY Cipollone brought suit against

Liggett for violation of several New Jersey consumer protection statutes alleging that Liggett (and other cigarette manufacturers) were liable for his mother’s death because they engaged in a course of conduct including false advertising, fraudulently misrepresenting the hazards of smoking, and conspiracy to deprive the public of medical and scientific information about smoking. Liggett urged the court to dismiss the state law claims contending that the claims related to the manufacturer’s advertising and promotional activities were preempted by two federal laws: (1) the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, and (2) the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.

SYNOPSIS OF DECISION AND OPINION The

U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Cipollone, holding that his claims relying on state law were preempted by federal law. The Court cited both the text of the statute and the legislative history in concluding that Congress’s intent in enactment of the laws was to preempt state laws regulating the advertising and promotion of tobacco products. Because Congress chose specifically to regulate a certain type of advertising (tobacco), federal law is supreme to any state law that attempts to regulate that same category of advertising.

WORDS OF THE COURT: Preemption “Article VI of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United

States shall be the supreme Law of the Land. Thus, [. . .] it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’ [. . .] Accordingly, ‘the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ of pre-emption analysis. Congress’s intent may be ‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’ In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is preempted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, [. . .], or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ [. . .] [Cipollone’s] claims are preempted to the extent that they rely on a state-law ‘requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to . . . advertising or promotion.’ ”

FACT SUMMARY Cavel, an Illinois–based business, owned the one and only facility in the United States for slaughtering horses where the meat was shipped to Europe for human consumption. The state of Illinois passed a statute banning the practice of slaughtering horses if the primary reason for the slaughter was to produce horse meat for sale. Cavel sued to have the law invalidated as an unconstitutional act of the state government. Cavel contended that the state legislature had improperly encroached on Congress’s exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce because enforcement of the law meant (1) a loss of $20 million in revenue for Cavel, (2) dozens of jobs would be lost in the local economy, and (3) the act effectively banned the exporting of meat to Europe and affected interstate commerce.

SYNOPSIS OF DECISION AND OPINION The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Cavel.

The court held that the effect on foreign commerce was minimal and that the state had a legitimate interest in enacting the law. The court determined that the law was not discriminatory in nature because Cavel, a foreign owned firm, was not subject to selected discrimination because all businesses in the state were prohibited from slaughtering horses. The Court also held that the Illinois state legislature had a legitimate interest in prolonging the lives of certain animals and in doing so through this statute they were not substantially affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Although the court did express a reluctance to validate the statute because of the effect that it would have on Cavel and its shareholders, it upheld the statute as a permissible regulation of commerce by the state legislature because, on balance, the regulation was constitutionally sound.

WORDS OF THE COURT: State Regulation of Commerce “The clearest case of a state law that violates the commerce clause is a law that discriminates in favor of local firms. [. . .] [However,] [t]he absence of outright discrimination does not terminate inquiry into a possible violation of the commerce clause. [. . .] There are situations in which states, by ostensibly local regulations, distort the operation of interstate markets. Such cases present more difficult factual issues than cases of outright discrimination. Plaintiffs have sometimes prevailed, at least if the impact on commerce is evident. [. . .] [But,] [w]here the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. [. . .] Quite apart from economic consequences, an interference by a state with foreign commerce can complicate the nation’s foreign relations, which are a monopoly of the federal government; [. . .] [However,] [t]he curtailment of foreign commerce by the amendment is slight and we are naturally reluctant to condemn a state law, supported if somewhat tenuously by a legitimate state interest, on grounds as slight as presented by Cavel.”