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US voting and rules-200 words each
1-How did the United States Supreme Court shape modern electoral rules?
2-What modern electoral rules are preventing full participation by the voting age population? What arguments do opponents and proponents advance to support their positions with respect to these rules?
3-What electoral reforms may be able to expand participation of the voting age population? Do these reforms have any unintended consequences?
Please use attachments-Answers will be found in them-It is a MUST and make sure to use citations and references correctly and when quoting the lecture notes, use (Bush lectures) as the citation
Due Tuesday July 23 at Midnight EST-Thank you
Week 4
Modern Institutions: Advances
After
1
914, through constitutional amendments and acts of Congress, the right to vote (known as suffrage) was expanded.
The goal of many reformers was universal suffrage, or the expansion of the right to vote to all adult citizens. A major advancement toward the goal of universal suffrage came with the 19th Amendment to the United States (US) Constitution (ratified August 18, 1920), which granted women’s suffrage. Specifically, the Amendment states, “The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”
The Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 provided suffrage for Native Americans. It would, however, be nearly a decade until all states recognized the right.
The US Supreme Court guaranteed that suffrage would be meaningful. In Baker v. Carr (1962), the US Supreme Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction over voting rights cases. The Court also held that Congressional districts must have statistical equality to guarantee that each person had an equally weighted vote, commonly referred to as the “one person, one vote” doctrine. In other words, the Court held that redistricting efforts that diluted the power of a person’s vote were unconstitutional. The Court concluded the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause required the “one person, one vote” doctrine.
Prior to Baker, state legislatures would routinely dilute the power of votes when drawing representative district lines. One technique was known as cracking where the state legislature would break up blocks of voters. Another technique was stacking where state legislators would put opponent groups around undesired voters (so the voters could never achieve a majority). Also, state legislators would use packing where they would pack undesired voters together to give them just one vote (only one seat in the legislature). Undesired voters were often either minorities or members of the opposing political party.
In Wesberry v. Sanders (1964) the US Supreme Court held that US House districts (there are 435 of them) must be roughly equal in population. In Reynolds v. Sims (1964) the US Supreme Court held that districts for state office also must be roughly equal in population. Lastly, in Avery v. Midland County (1968) the US Supreme Court held that local government districts also must be roughly equal in population.
The percent of statistical disparity is calculated by taking the actual difference between the drawn district and the ideal district (where each person has one vote) divided by the ideal district. The Court employs zero tolerance in federal elections. The Court routinely upholds less than 10 percent disparity in state elections and upholds less than 12 percent disparity in local elections.
The 24th Amendment to the US Constitution (ratified January 23, 1964) prohibited the use of poll taxes in federal elections. With respect to the states, federal legislation prohibited many of the worse practices.
Civil Rights Act of 1964
While this act is best known for its prohibition of discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, Title I of the Act also included important voting protections. Specifically, Title I provided for equal protection and prevented states from denying the right to vote because of a mistake in registration if that mistake was not material.
Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 banned literacy tests in areas of low registration; provided for federal registrars after the request of 20 people and investigation by the federal Attorney General; and banned all poll taxes. The Act also required pre-clearance of state election law changes that have discriminatory effects or purpose.
The Act was controversial because it singled out a portion of the country, namely the South, and required those states to obtain pre-clearance by the federal government before making any changes to their state election laws. On the other hand, supporters of the Act merely point to the long history of voter suppression, especially of minorities, in those states and argue such abuses justify strong federal intervention.
However in June 2013 the US Supreme Court overturned the coverage formula used to determine which states must seek the approval of the US Department of Justice prior to changing their election laws. In Shelby County v. Holder, a 5 – 4 decision, Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, reasoning the federal government cannot decide which states are covered by the federal approval provision of the Act by using a coverage formula that fails to take current conditions into consideration. In effect, Shelby County will allow Southern states to enact more restrictive voting laws.
26th Amendment
The 26th Amendment to the US Constitution (ratified July 1, 1971) lowered the voting age to 18. The lowering of the voting age significantly expanded the voting age population (VAP).
National Voter Registration Act of 1993
In 1993, President Clinton signed the National Voter Registration Act, also commonly called the “motor voter” law.The Act allows people to register to vote while applying for or renewing a driver’s license. The Act intended to make it easier to vote. Applying rational choice theory, proponents argued that by reducing the costs of registering to vote it was expected that more individuals would vote.
However the law had the effect of increasing registrations but did not have an effect on actual voter turnout (the proportion of the voting age public that actually votes). Thus, the Act had the unintended effect of widening the gap between actual voter turnout and the number of voters registered.
Help America Vote Act of 2002
Congress enacted sweeping reforms in response to the 2000 Election troubles (that culminated in the infamous Bush v. Gore). In the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Congress mandated that states replace punch card and lever-based
voting systems
; created the
Election Assistance Commission
(EAC) to assist in the administration of Federal elections; and established minimum
election administration
standards.
The minimum election administration standards included (1) a statewide computerized voter database; (2) any voter who registered by mail and who has not previously voted in a federal election must show current and valid photo identification or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter; and (3) voters identified as ineligible (such as voters not found on the registered list), but who believe themselves to be eligible, must be allowed to cast a
provisional ballot
.
The Act was subject to many criticisms. The Act unfairly benefits makers of electronic voting systems (who make millions selling their machines). Also there has been a lack of promised federal funding (unfunded mandates). Others have argued that the Act complicated voter registration as states must confirm HAVA compliance. Also, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section, Photo ID (included by Republicans to fight voter fraud) actually has disenfranchised many, especially minorities. Even worse, the requirement in HAVA has encouraged many states to consider imposing stricter photo ID requirements.
While the nation has benefited from many institutional advances that have expanded the right of suffrage and made it easier than ever for citizens to vote, many modern reforms have not been without criticism. In fact, some reforms, such as HAVA, have actually been the inspiration for what can be described as setbacks for those who favor universal suffrage.
Modern Institutions: Setbacks
Voter ID
Indiana seized the opportunity afforded by HAVA, and in 2005 its legislature passed a law that requires any voter to present valid, unexpired photo identification at the polling place. David Williams (2008) noted that Indiana’s statute was the most restrictive in the country, “every other state makes it easier to vote” (379).
It makes sense that requiring photo identification may tend to prevent individuals from trying to vote under someone else’s name. During federal litigation, however, Indiana was “unable to point to a single instance of in-person voter fraud in Indiana’s history, so it seems the old system of voter identification—at registration—must have been doing a good job of blocking fraud, without the additional burdens levied by the new law” (Williams 2008, 383). Rather than prevent fraud, it appears the Republican legislature passed the law merely to discourage Democrats from voting. Williams (2008) explained, “Elections are sometimes won by a margin of only a few votes. If the law keeps even a few Democratic voters from voting, it might swing a few elections to the Republicans” (384).
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008), the US Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification law by a 6 to 3 vote. In determining the constitutionality of the law, “the Court [considered] the evidence so as to assess the degree of burden on the voter and the strength of the state interest. Unfortunately, neither side could muster much evidence to support its claims” (Williams 2008, 383). In this circumstance, the majority chose to “presume the statute to be constitutional unless the challenger [convinced] otherwise” (385). The plaintiff, however, appears to have failed to provide the evidence needed to persuade the majority.
In 2012, the number of states that have enacted voter identification requirements has expanded to 32 states, with 16 states requiring photo identification. Pennsylvania adopted a strict photo identification law in March 2012 (Act 2012-18). In addition, the Virginia legislature currently seeks to strengthen their existing voter identification law by requiring photo identification for all voters.
Scholars have identified problems caused by voter identification requirements. If such laws continue to expand, it was estimated that some 20 million Americans nationwide could be disenfranchised. Strong evidence was found that strict voter identification laws substantially affect lower income, minority and elderly voters (Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez 2009). Such laws were also found to negatively impact the lesser educated (Hershey 2009).
Voter identification requirements also increase costs for states and local governments, which bear the primary burden for financing elections. Voter identification requirements require professional staff and volunteers to undergo additional training with respect to what constitutes acceptable identification, how to determine its validity and how to operate any necessary equipment. A sustained, expensive public information campaign would be needed to educate the public about voter identification requirements. Further, given that large numbers of voters will be disenfranchised as the requirement is expanded to other states, litigation expenses can reasonably be expected to increase.
Another serious problem with the implementation of the voter identification requirement in HAVA involves conflict with election administrators. Palazzolo and McCarthy (2005) note that state election administrators originally opposed the requirement because it placed them at odds with the voter if he or she did not do what the law required, which created potential conflict situations.
However, disenfranchised voters and conflicted election administrators are not the only individuals impacted by voter identification laws. Even voters who can comply with the voter identification requirements may be impacted through their interaction with poll workers that are put under greater pressure by the requirements. Many poll workers are quite simply ill prepared to implement the requirements (Hall 2007).
Moreover, voter identification requirements put poll workers into a quasi-law enforcement role not well suited to their work as facilitators of the voting experience. Policymakers must acknowledge the very real problem of false identification. Mark Kleiman (2002) argued, “. . . a very sincere fake driver’s license can be purchased over the Net, and possession of some sort of false [identification] is de rigeur [sic] among college students” (285). The sophistication and training needed to detect a quality fake driver’s license would likely be prohibitively expensive for the typical election official or volunteer. Further, legal authority exists to support an argument that demanding identification constitutes a search that could invoke constitutional questions under the Fourth Amendment (Smith and Sobel 2009). For those that advocate universal suffrage, the rapid spread of photo identification laws represents a serious challenge.
Felons
Another challenge to universal suffrage involves felon disenfranchisement. In November 2000, an estimated four million individuals were unable to vote because they were incarcerated, on parole or had once been convicted of a crime (Keyssar 2000). “Most of these individuals were black or Hispanic, and in some states where disenfranchisement is permanent, including Florida, more than fifteen percent of all black males were barred from the polls” (330).
Prior to the 2000 Election, Florida Republicans purged the voter rolls of anyone suspected of having a criminal conviction. Some of the individuals purged had never committed a crime (Keyssar 2000). For example, one such individual was “Reverend William D. Whiting of Tallahassee, whose name bore an unfortunate similarity to that of convicted felon William J. Whiting” (330).
Electoral Reforms
Modern electoral reforms, such as voting by mail and early voting, which have sought to make voting easier, have failed to increase voter turnout. Rather, it appears such reforms “have a greater effect on retention than on stimulation [of new voters]” (Berinsky 2005, 478).
Some reforms are also expected to widen class bias. A good example is internet voting. While clearly internet voting would be convenient, it would tend to favor the educated and young, but not favor the extremely poor or minorities. Older and less educated individuals are not as comfortable using computers, and the extremely poor, which includes many minority groups, are less likely to own computers. Even setting aside very serious security concerns, evidence has shown a strong likelihood of class bias with internet voting being used “at a significantly higher rate in counties with higher median income and higher percentage of White residents” (Berinsky 2005, 482).
For the US republican form of government (where representatives are elected to represent the interests of the people) to have legitimacy, theorists have argued that universal suffrage is important. While many constitutional amendments, court cases and statutes have expanded suffrage and redefined voting in our modern era, efforts are being made for many reasons, including partisan, to limit voting rights. While some electoral reforms are instituted with the best intentions of expanding voter turnout, studies reveal they tend to only make voting easier for those citizens already committed to voting and those existing voters favored by the power elite: Such reforms appear to do little to stimulate new voters or to overcome the barriers established by registration and voter ID laws. It is important for citizens to consider what it means to have a healthy republic, and to be political engaged, including exercising their right to vote, while also supporting electoral reforms that truly make a positive difference.
1
What We Know about Voter-ID
Laws, Registration, and Turnout
Marjorie Randon Hershey, Indiana university
urning out to vote is the most common
and important act citizens take in a
democracy,” John Aldrich writes (1993,
246),”and, therefore, is one of the most
important behaviors for scholars of dem-
ocratic politics to understand.” Turnout matters at the com-
munity as well as the individual level; the larger a county’s
voter turnout, for instance, the more discretionary federal
resources it is likely to receive per capita (Martin zoo3). “The
blunt truth,” according to V. O. Key U9+9, 527), “is that poli-
ticians and officials are under no compulsion to pay much
heed to classes and groups of citizens that do not vote.”
Scholars’ understanding ofturnout has been shaped by the
economic model: people are more likely to vote if the benefits
they.expect to receive from voting (their expected utility) are
greatil than the costs (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook
1968). A great deal ofresearch shows that voter tumout declines
as the costs ofvoting increase, and that even small increases
in cost may make a real difference in turnout rates. But we
know much less about some of the more specific and complex
questions about turnout: what particular costs ofvoting affect
the turnout ofwhat types ofindividuals, and under what con-
ditions? The answers can lead to useful hypotheses about the
impact of the Indiana voter-ID requirement recently upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Cowt (Crawford v. Marion County Elec-
tion Boail) and other voting rules likely to be passed by state
legislatures in the near future.
The collective problem of low turnout would be mitigated
ifthose who go to the polls are highiy representative ofthose
who don’t. The predominant view, however, is that the costs
of voting fall more heavily on some subgroups than on others
and therefore reduce the voter turnout ofthose groups dispro-
portionateiy (see Highton zoo4, 5o8). Most of this research
focuses on race and socioeconomic status (SES), but the bur-
den ofadded costs could also disproportionately affect some
ethnic, language, and age groups as well as Americans with
disabiiities and the residentially mobile.
WHAT COSTS OF VOTING HAVE BEEN RESEARCHED?
Registering to Vote
Among the costs of voting, the greatest attention has been
paid to the fact that although in many other democracies cit-
izens’ names are automatically placed on the voting rolls by
the government, most American states require voters to pay
this cost themselves by visiting a registration site prior to the
election. The most common finding here is that stricter regis-
tration rules correlate with lower turnout, but that reforms
designed to ease the process do not necessarily increase turn-
out substantially.
ln ry78 Rosenstone and Wolfinger reported that an early
closing date for registration had the most powerful effect on
turnout. They estimate that if the closing date for registration
were eliminated, turnout would increase by 6.17.. Other
changes-notably, in the number of hours registration sites
stayed open-would increase the impact of registration to 97..
However, an electorate expanded by liberalizing these rules
would not look much different from the one they currently
observed. Rosenstone and Hansen (zoo3, zo6) show that voter
turnout in the North dropped 17o/”betweet 1896 and 1916 as
registration laws were being instituted in the states. But other
changes taking place at this time couid have affected turnout
levels as wel1. So to gain more purchase on the causal relation-
ships involved, researchers have sought circumstances in which
changes in registration requirements could be studied in a
longitudinal and quasi-experimental manner.
Most of these over-time analyses support Wolfinger and
Rosenstone’s findings, though some conclude that the size of
the impact was overstated fMitchell and Wlezien 1995). One
effort has been to explore state laws similar to those of the
1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). Knack (1995)
shows that states adopting “active” motor-voter laws, in which
driver’s license agency employees take the initiative to ask
clients if they’d like to register to vote, or use a form combin-
ing driver’s licensing with voter registration, had almost a 4o/o
turnout increase relative to states with no such program. There
was little or no increase in states where agencies simply made
registration materials available. Active by-mail registration (in
which registrants need not have their forms witnessed or nota-
rized) also had some efFect, but allowing prospective voters to
register at public agencies had no significant impact on turnout.
Highton and Wolfinger (1998) flnd a turnout increase of
4.7’t, (relative to other states) during the four years after Col-
orado adopted a registration law that most closely resembled
the NVRA; the biggest impact was on young people and recent
movers. They also examine Election Day Registration (EDRJ,
which, like active motor-voter 1aws, eliminates the cost of a
second trip, in this case by combining registration and vot-
ing.’ They estimate that one-trip voting would increase turn-
out by 8.7% compared with a 3o-day closing date, again
especially among the young and the residentially mobile.
Other studies of EDR have confirmed increases in the range
of 3-9″t (Fenster 1994; Knack zoor).
Ansolabehere and Konisky (zoo6) make use of the natural
“experiment” that occurred when NewYork, in 1965, and Ohio,
in t977, imposed registration requirements. By comparing
doi:ro.ror7lS ro4 9o 96 5o 9o9oz34 PS .1anuary uoog 87
Symposium: Voter-ID fssues in Politics anil Political Science
turnout in counties that did not have registration rules until
the state imposed them with turnout in counties in the same
state where registration had been imposed or voluntarily
adopted earlier, they found that requiring registration reduced
turnout by 7″t in the subsequent election and by 3-5% in the
long term. Their over-time analysis shows a smaller effect than
does their cross-sectional analysis. But even a drop of 3-5%,
projected to the voting-age population, is not trivial.
Powell (1986) concludes that in the 197os, the need for U.S.
citizens to take the initiative to register decreased American
voter turnout by $% compared with other Western democra-
cies. Highton (zoo4,5tt) contends, however, that the liberal-
ization of state registration rules has accomplished as much
as it could. He points out that even with no registration require-
ment, North Dakota’s zoo4 turnout rate was just 7z% of voting-
age citizens. Thus, additional costs ofvoting must be taken
into account.
Other Institutional Requirements
Many other institutional costs of voting have been eiiminated
by court action and legislation. Filer, Kenny, and Morton (r99r)
show that poll.taxes, which 1iterally raised the cost ofvoting,
significantly depressed turnout over time, especially in coun-
ties with a higher proportion of poor people. Literacy tests,
outlawed by the Voting Rights Act in t97o,were less strongly
related to turnout. And Rosenstone and Wolfinger OszB, z+)
did not find residency requirements-how long one must live
in a district before voting-to have a sizable effect on turnout,
at least by ry72.
Some institutional rules remain. States vary as to whether
convicted felons may vote. Manza and Uggen Qoo+, +g+-gS)
estimate that such laws prevented 4.7 million people from vot-
ing in zooo. These laws affect voter turnout because of the
high rate of incarceration in the U.S., especially among black
males. The impact of other types of costs, such as information
costs, convenience ofthe polling place, and state laws giving
workers paid or unpaid time offto vote, are discussed in Her-
shey (zoo8).
Costs lmposed by Voter-tD Laws
States have imposed several different types ofvoter-ID require-
ments since the passage of the Help AmericaVote Act (HAVA)
in zooz: having to state or sign one’s name at the polls, having
one’s signature matched with the signature on fi1e with the
local election board, and/or providing an identification (a
driver’s license, student or military ID, voter registration card,
paycheck, or utility bill), with or without a photo. Arizona
requires proofofcitizenship in order to vote, and in zoo8 the
Missouri legislature nearly permitted the requirement that a
prospective voter present a passport, original birth certificate,
or naturalization papers as proofofcitizenship when register-
ing to vote.
To date, Indiana’s is the most demanding voter-ID law
Since zoo6, a1l registered voters must provide a document
issued by the U.S. governmenr or rhe Srate of Indiana with a
photo of the individual, with an expiration date, and that “con-
forms to” the name on the voter-registration record. Anyone
without such identification can be given a provisional ballot,
which will be counted only if the voter brings the required
photo ID to the county election board or the circuit court clerk
within ro days after the election or executes an affidavit of
indigence or religious objection to being photographed.
This poses no additional costs to registrants with a current
Indiana driver’s license, state ID card, passport, or other appro-
priate ID. For those who lack the required ID, county bureaus
of motor vehicles will provide a free ID card for voring pur-
poses to those who bring four ofa group of”primary and sec-
ondary” documents that could include an authenricated birth
certificate, certificate of citizenship, or military ID or pass-
port, but must also include proof of Social Security number
and Indiana residency. Several ofthese documents cost money,
time, in{ormation, and transportation to locations other than
where the photo ID is obtained. The burden rises because most
people who need this documentation do so because they lack
a driver’s license, and public transportation is not available in
some counties.
Few studies have examined the impact of voter-ID laws.
AIvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8) show that in aggregate data,
voter-ID laws had no significant impact on turnout during
zooo*zoo6. Mycoff, Wagner, and Wllson (zoo7) concur, and
Vercellotti and Anderson (zoo6) find only a modesr correla-
tion in zoo4 between two voter-ID requirements-a signature
match and a non-photo ID-and statewide tumout, relative to
requiring only that voters state their names at the polls. Berin-
sky (zoo5) argues that these null findings should be expected;
the more politically involved are more likely to learn abour
voter-ID rules and also more likely to vote.
But researchers differ in their findings at the individual
1evel. Using CPS data, A7varcz,Bailey, and Katz (zoo8) show
that stricter rules-the combination of having to present an
ID and a signature match, and the photo-ID requirement-did
depress the turnout ofregistered voters relative to the require-
ment of stating one’s name at the po1ls. Mycoff, Wagner, and
Wilson (zoo7), with a smaller N, did not find an impact. Ver-
cellotti and Anderson, in a cross-sectional study, showed that
the signature, non-photo ID, and photo-ID rules were associ-
ated with lower voter turnout it zoo4, in the range of 3 to 4″t .
DO THESH COSTS DIFFERENTI”{LLY
AFFECT SUBGROUPS IN THE POPULATION?
Changes in public policy, influenced by voter parriciparion,
might well produce substantial marginal gains for members
ofdisadvantaged groups. So the fact that disadvantaged groups
generally turn out to vote at lower rates than more advan-
taged groups is often attributed to the assumption that the
costs of voting fall more heavily on the members of disadvan-
taged groups (see Dornms ry57, 265, 274).
In examining the effects ofvarious costs ofvoting on par-
ticular groups, this article will supplement the voter-ID stud-
ies with the much larger literature on registration rules.
Although the act ofregistering differs from the act ofvoting
in several important ways (Timpone r99B), registering to vote
resembles the behavior required of those who lack the speci-
fied voter ID. Both registering and obtaining documents man-
dated by some voter-ID laws must take place in advance of
88 PS . January zoog
Election Day, when campaign stimuli are not as intense, and
at a location different from the polling place. Both are bureau-
cratic procedures, lacking the partisan content ofthe vote and
lts direct relationship to the election outcome. Both require
spending time to find out what documents are needed and
where and when registration (or getting documents) takes
place. This information is likely to be more obscure than is
information about voting on Election Day. Both involve oppor-
tunities forgone as well as the need for transportation to the
registration or documentation site. The infrastructure to mobi-
lize citizens to register or to obtain documentation may be
less well developed than election get-out-the-vote drives. These
are reasons to make use ofthe extensive research on the reg-
istration requirement, at least to generate hypotheses about
the impact ofvoter ID on various subgroups.
Lower-Income and Less-Educated Persons
Researchers argue that more restrictive registration rules dis-
proportionately reduce the turnout oflow-SES people (Jack-
son, Brown, and Wright ryg8, z68; Avery and Peffley zoo5),
and that more education and income help overcome the costs
of voting (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Even when
Nagler (r99r) re-estimated the Rosenstone and Wolfinger
model with 1978 and r9B4 CPS data to corect for a mis-
estimatiorl;he still finds that earlier closing dates lowered turn-
out among the least educated.
Yet making it easier to register doesn’t necessarily increase
low-SES people’s turnout. Highton andWolfinger (r998, 84-85)
showed that Colorado’s active motor-voter law had the great-
est effect on those with moderate education levels; those with
the least education were uniikely to vote even if costs were
reduced. Karp and Banducci (zooo) found that Oregon’s use of
voting only by mail increased turnout more among whites,
higher-SES individuals, and olderpeople. And Knack andWhite
(zooo) showed that EDR 1ed to a rise in turnout among young
and residentially mobile people but not significantly among
lower-SES persons (see also Brians and Grofm ar’:,99g).Labor-
union strength seems to increase participation slightiy more
among high- and moderate-income than low-income people
(Leighley and Nagler zooT). Those with the lowest SES have
multiple barriers to tulTrout, whereas those with moderate SE S
leve1s, who may feel more connected to politics, might be more
responsive to reductions in the costs ofvoting.
Research conflrms that stricter voter-ID rules also dispro-
portionately reduce the turnout ofthe least educated and those
with lowest incomes. Vercellotti and Anderson (zoo6) find a
stronger relationship between voter-ID requirements and lower
turnout among registered voters with less than a high school
education. Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8, zo) show that the
least-educated registrants and those with lower incomes were
less likely to vote in states that require a photo ID than in
states that require voters only to state or sign their names.
And Barreto, Nuflo, and Sanchez (zoo7) report that Indiana
registered voters and eiigible non-registrants with incomes
under $zo,ooo were much less likely to have the form of ID
that the Indiana law requires than were higher-income resi-
dents, and less-educated people were somewhat less likely to
possess the required photo ID.
Solt (zoo8, 56-58) shows that the more economic inequal-
ity in a nation, the less the turnout of all but the wealthiest
quintile; the biggest impact was on the poorest quintile. He
concludes (58), “One’s political engagement .. . is shaped not
only by how much money one has, but also by how muchl
money everyone else has. Where economic resources are dis-
tributed more evenly, power is distributed more equally, and
the resuiting politics encourage relatively poor citizens to take
interest and take part” (see also Filer, Kenny, and Morton
1993). A related question involves the impact of economic
decline, as opposed to current SES. Rosenstone {p99z,34-41
finds that unemploy,rnent and feeling worse off financially
were associated with lower turnout during 1948-1974. F.ad-
cliff (t992) reports that decline in real per capita national
income depressed turnout, especially among the economi-
cally marginal. This is less likely in nations where the full
development of the welfare state cushions the effects of eco-
nomic decline on the poor.
Presuming that those whose economic situation has deteri-
orated might be especially inclined to hold incumbents
accountable for poor economic conditions, a finding that these
individuals are less likely to vote could undermine demo-
cratic responsiveness. However, Arceneaux (zoo3, 7o-7t)
reports that those facing economic adversity and who blame
the governmentfor their plighf are more likely to vote than are
those who do not blame the government. We need to know
more about the conditions in which economic decline ener-
gizes some individuals or further sensitizes them to the costs
ofvoting.
Black Americans and Others of Minority
Races and Ethnicities
The story of the relationships among race, ethnicity, and the
costs of voting is less clear. A lot of research suggests that
when SES and other resource variables (such as free time and
facility in English) are controlled, blacks and Latinos are as
iikely to vote as whites are (Verba et a7. g93; Jackson zoo3;
Cassel zooz). Other studies question this conclusion. Abram-
son and Claggett (1986) used vaiidated votes to show that black
respondents were more likeiy to over-report voting than whites,
which could lead to a mistaken finding of pariry in turnout
rates. Theyfound, as have others (Leighley and Nagler r99za;
ry9zb),that racial differences in turnout remained even when
education and region were controlled.
But this racial effect, at least among blacks, seemed to vary
by election year (see Leighley and Nagler rygza). Abramson
and Ciaggett (1986) suggest that the independent effect of
race in 1984 may have been triggered by Jesse Jackson’s pres-
idential candidacy. The relationship between race or ethnicity
and voting costs, then, may be contingent on the stimuli of
the election at hand, perhaps by affecting concern about the
outcome (Barack Obama’s presidential campaign is a case in
point) or by prompting group mobilization that reduces the
costs of voting for some types of individuals.
Most researchers agree that race and ethnicity can struc-
ture the relationship between the costs of voting and turnout,
that racial and ethnic groups differ in their access to politi-
cally relevant resources, and perhaps even that particular
PS . January zoog 89
Synrposiurn: Voter-ID lssues in Politics anil PoliticaI Science
resources and costs may affect different groups in different
ways (see Verba et al. 1993, 458). For insrance, blacks and
Latinos are much less likely than Anglo-whites to belong to
non-political groups, but about as likely to be church mem-
bers, which couid convey political information at 1ow cost.
While these skills may be more relevant to political activity
beyond voting, they should aiso make it easier to register ro
vote and obtaln needed documents. And although blacks were
more likely than Anglo-whites to report that someone in
church had asked them to vote, Latinos were much less likely
to say so (Verba et a7. 1993, +8+-8S). It may be that forces in
the black community, such as churches, act to counter the costs
of voting to a greater extent than among Latinos. Examining
these racial and ethnic differences, however, requires measur-
ing a wide range of variables, from command of English and
acculturation to native-born status and ethnic identity, and
the literature in this area shows little consensus (see, for
instance, Shaw, de laGarza, and Lee zooo; Cho 1999;Jackson
zoo3).
With respect to voter ID, Alvarez, Bailey, and Katz (zoo8)
find no evidence that a photo-ID requirement, or requiring a
voter ID plus a signature match, affected turnout among black
registrants between zooo and zoo6. Vercellotti and Anderson
(zoo6) confirm in the aggregate that voter-ID requirements
did not disproportionately reduce turnout among blacks,
though they did report a relationship in their individual-level
data, and to a greater degree among Latinos and Asian Amer-
icans. Further, Barreto, Nuflo, and Sanchez (zoo7) found that
black registered voters and eligible non-registrants in Indiana
were significantly less likely than whites to have a valid, state-
issued ID matching the criteria required by the state’s law. It
could be that when faced with restrictive requirements, blacks
in some areas are even more likely to mobilize to vote than
whites are.
Thus, any disproportionate effect ofstricter voter-ID rules
on blacks may well reflect the fact that blacks tend to be lower
in SES (though the fact that the impact is not specifically racial
makes it no less real). There are suggestions, however, that
there may be real racial differences in the administration of
some voter-ID regimes. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Hall (zoo7,
z4-25) flndthat in New Mexico, poll workers enforced voter-ID
rules inconsistently. And a 1s-state study (Alvarez et al. zoo8,
r7), reports that a much higher proportion ofblack voters said
they had been asked for an identification in zooT and in the
zoo8 Super Tuesday events than white voters did, regardless
the state’s voter-ID rules.
In sum, the immense literature on the costs of voting has
wn that costs ranging from the registration requirement
to strict voter-ID laws do reduce voter turnout to some degree
and that the impact seems to fall disproportionately on the
least educated and the least wealthy. There is less evidence,
however, that reducingthe costs ofvoting necessarily increases
the turnout ofthese groups, probably because advance regis-
tration and photo-ID rules are only two of multiple burdens
on their likelihood of voting.
f We know litrle about the impact of other costs-rhe acces-
fl sibility of poiling places (but see Burmila zoog), changes in
I voting systems, and the interactions among various types of
*-
costs. And we need to research the impact of these costs on
other Iarge groups: people with disabilities, and raciai, ethnic,
and language groupings other than black Americans. Research-
ers shouid also consider the effects of perceiyed costs; although
Alyarez et a1. (zoo8) find relatively shorr waits at the polis in
most precincts, media stories about long waits could affect
people’s willingness to vote, even ifthese stories are inaccu-
rate or unusual.
In particular, research would benefit from classi$zing costs
of voting according to their specific demands on citizens. One
important aspect ofadvance registration, strict voter-ID laws,
and laws requiring proof of citizenship, is that those who are
unregistered or who lack the specified documents must make
a separate trip-on a day other than Election Day, to a place
other than the polling place, whose location and open hours
wiil need to be learned, to take a bureaucratic step that does
not lead directiy to an election outcome. The burden of this
extra trip falls most heavily on people with lower education
and income, but it would also be likely to affect persons with
disabilities and, due to HAVA’s requirement of proof of resi-
dence for first-time voters, those who have recently moved.
Given the importance of turnout to democratic politics, the
need for research on the impact ofvoter-ID laws and those
requiring proof of citizenship is compelling. I
NOTE
r. One difference between motor-voter laws and EDR, however, is that
motor-voter r€gistration puts the individual’s name on the list ofregis-
tered voters that may be made available to parry organizations and
-other
groups, who could then mobilize the individual to vote. The names ofEDR
voters would not become available to these groups until the next
campalgn.
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PS . January zoog 91
THE PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES
OF E{-HCT{}KAL REFOR&,{ TN THfl L]ru{Ttr* S”TCTHS
ADANI J. BERthtSHY
l
fuIassachusetts Inslitute of Tech*a1cgy .
A nunrher olelcctoral refirrms have been cnact*d in dre iinitcil States in the past three d*cade-o
thal are dtsignccl to incrcrss tnrnout tr)),casing restricticns on the casting ul billlots. Iloth prcp*-
nijnts iiird opponents of ,-I,-ctora! retbrnis irgree ahat these refnrms sirculd increaso the denrc-
gr-;rphii: represerltrtivei,ess 01’Lhe electoratc by reduoing the direct cLrsts r*’i,oting, thereb),
incre*sirg iumont among less-privilegeii grtmps rvho. presumrb11,” ue rnosi !cnsitive to the costs
oi curning to the polls. fu lact. these relarrnr l.lave been greatll,’contesled because hrrth n.r:rjur”
political prrties b.lievr: that incrcasing lrirnout amons lcss-pliviicgcd groups r.vi1l bcnclit lfcmo-
cratic l-roliticians. I revieu, evidence tiom numerons studies olelectoral reform to demDnstraic
that retbrms d*signed io rnake it ersirr l+r i*gistered vot.rs to cast their b:illots actually increase,
rather than rerhice^ socioecr.rnon:ic lri:rses in ihe ct mposition ol the vr:Ling pubiic. I oonclude with
ii retlrmmen{iation that s,e shift lhe tircus ol’electoral relorm lrcm an emph:rsis on iristituiional
ciringes lL) ir concentration ou pclilic:rl rngagenrent.
&c-t$orrJs.’ elcL:lion re.fb*it: t’rli!n_q; po!ititul ltar’Lit:il;tt[io;t: tttrtu ‘Lti: q !)ft’\t tltoti ‘rl
ln the past three decades, a series of electcral let”orms have been
eilacted that iire designed to increase tllrnout b-v: easing restrictions on
tire casting of ballots” i:rcluciing voting-by-iiuail iVBL,{), early voting,
the relaxing of stringent allsentee balloting procedures, and {nternet
vating. Both proponents and oppoflents of electoral refbrms agree that
these reforms should increase the demographic r:epresentativene ss of
the eiectorate by reducifig the direct costs of voting, thereLry, increas-
ing tumout aittong gr*L:ps *f, lcrwer socioeconomic status who, pr”e-
,4utiror’s Nott: This article draws hr:irviil, up+n.ioint ivork rvith Nanc;, Burns anJ X.,fike Iraiigott.
Thel. tre eiiu;rlly responsible 1’or the iievelopntent of the lrvr:-path ct*ception cl’turrloul ilis-
enssed here but ;rre innocent ol an1, em’urs in this arlicie. For conrlnents rrn e:rrlier ilratis of this
;rrLi<"'le. I u,uultl liire to lllal)li Jastn B;rrahas. Janrie flrucknran. Jtn:r.r Girnpel. Ben Highton.
.i*nnitir.lcrit. Girbricl Lcnz, Andrerv lLetlve s. ancl Sarah Slcd. I ivtuld also iikc to thank N'Iichae I
Hann:er ii,.r pror,iiling lccr-ss to his rccoded CPS d:rt;r and Jarncs McGhec ilnd Alice Savage 1*r
reselr*il assistance.
AMEltIald\ POLITICS RESEARCII, \bl. -r-3 Nc. -1. .luhi 1005 j7 l-.1!l I
tl0i: L0.i llji 153267-iX0j26a4l9
O 2t)0-5 Sage Puhlications
+,.]
17) AI4I:RICAFI POLITICS RESII.,\RCH r’.IULY l0{.}.5
silmabiy, are m{}st s*nsitive lo {he e{}sts *f clrnting tr> the pllnls. A
r11{.’}r”e derllogr”aphie ally rliverse and rrpresefit:rtive etr*r:torate r-trrl_y har,f,
impi:rtant ir-r:pli*atior”rs far the .Ameriean p*litieatr s.v-steir.r Eiectoral
refornu have. in iact, been gre;rtl–v contested because both nr;rior poiit-
ical i:arti*s beli*ve that incl’easins turn{}ut alnong less-privilegeil
groups rn,ill he**t’it Denrocratic politicians. Hor.l,evel’, contrary- t{)
expectatirns. th* rvave of electoral reforms may fi”.'” increased tum-
out sligirtly hut has iiot had the hypothesizecl partisa* effects.
Ei*et*i:al reloi:::s. ner.efiheless, ]tavr: had a significant. it unin- Xn this r’sS&Y, X re vifu, errictrence from numerous studie s of ele ctoral I begin b3,, advancing a tu/o-process dl,ualnic eonerption of the Bcrinskli / LIONSEQUEN{IES {lF F,LECTURAL RLii{)RI{ 173
ics of,ten eoncenh’itte ou etlcouraging-*r “‘stipullting” new votels tit \-. rvoilcl. Political infon:ratii:* aad interest, not the high tangible costs of ETECTOILAL REP]*ETrI,CS
This levier.v ilre uses on four partii:lltrar retbrms rtresigneri {o ease the PF],IIMISSTV*] A}iSE]!TEE I}AI,T,{}TEF]{;
&'{aay states resirici the use *f ahsentee bal}ots to those citirens s,ho 414 Ai.{IIRICAN P{)LIT{CS RESIIAIICH r’.ll.rl-Y :(}(.j.5
withclut *ee.1 to shol,l,’ r;luse (Hnnser:, :001).: Ai-rsentee ball*ting has E.{RI,\’lOTINI;
Siiice 1988, voters i* Texas anci I -l ilther slates h*v* beeu permittecl VOTINC.BY-N,IATI,
lJ*del”VE&’f s_r-‘sterns, everv reqiste:ecl r.oter in a gir.en jurisdiction I}’J?flRNET VOTING
i*temet votirig is a vctiirg systerx &at rvouid e:iable l,ifters t$ cast a Berin-skr, / COIiSE{}lllil{CES OF ELECTORAL REFCRhJ 4,-5
h+mes-u,hat Ah,arez and Hall {2$04) cail “remote internet vi}ting.” TT{E T}YI\AI\,,IICS OF ?E{E YOTII{G PROCESS
To begin an examination of the effects of elecloral }aws *n regis- Such a vierv of ii:e e lectorate r*sts on tlre assun-iption that “per:iph- Citizens are &ot, h*rvever, so easil.v so:tecl intc “core” ancl “peliph- 4,-b AI,IIIRICAN POLITICS RISL,AITCH 1 .lLrLY :(l{}5
vidual turnout from election to eiectirrn-changes lvhich in the aggre- Taking a drvnamic perspect;ve of the e]*ctol’ate, rve can see tllat This trvo-path d-y;:arnie u-i:nception of’tt;rl:*ut has consequetrces for llcrinskv / CIONSEQUIII{CES alF FILIICTOR.AL REF()Rh{ 477
wald ii) hring in new gloups of “per”ipheral” rrclters. By lor,vering the Disringuishing retention effects fiom stimulati*n effects is irnpi:r- Here is lvhere lhe perl.erse conseqlleflee s i:f *lectoral refot’rn take J-78 AI,IERICAN P0LITICS RF,.{iIARCH 1.il]LY JO{}.5
elections. Fut simpn3,. *iectoral refcirms h*ve a greater effect on The net ef’fect *l this process is that, over tiine, electorai reitrrms THE Ul/IililiYcil
Such a concl*sii:n might be somer.r4xrt surprising ti: those whr: fol- {deall”v, to obsen,e the eftects of voting reforrn on the composition Berinsk5,. Bums. ancl Tiaug*tt i200t) conrluctecl one such investi- Llerinskr.,,1 COI\ SIlt)UEliCi :S {-}F ELECTi}RAL RLITORT\.’I 17 t)
participate irr elections-oidel” voters, those who are weil educaterl. \’ilfuf surbilizes the electol’ate i* a ura-v that increases turrlolrt ove r the Though panel data ffiay he t}:e best way to Lrxamine tl:* riy*amic \iBh,T SYSTE,E{S
Like Beriruk-v et al. {2CIi}1), So*thr.r,ell anel Burchett (1997, 200i}) 48(i AI,IERICAN P{}LITICS RllSllA}iCH r’.I{ILY :i)f }.5
dents into three hroad groups; (a) traditional v’.oters, those vl,hr; r,oteil EAR’Y VOTING
Stein has str”lrtied the impact of ear13, .,,oting proceclures irt ?’exas llelin-rky i fiol\SEQLlllliCgS OIj LLECTOI1AL REF{)Rh{ 4ii1
asgregate levei of political engagefir*nt ilf thc v{}ting pCIpulatir}lr. it clicl .4Tisiii'{TliE V$?ING
Karp and Eandueei (2001) investigated rvh*th*r liberai abs*ntee I}iTER]!F]T V*TTN{I
fuiuch of tlie p*tentiatr ilr:pact of the lnternel on v*ii::g is specula- 4$l 41,{ERIC.I\N P{ILITICS RESEAIi.CH i’.llJLY :0{}.5
trajor U.S. election-ihe 2000 Arizona Demccratic Frimary’. Though SUI{&IARY 0F RESE:{RC}I
Alt told. using a variet_v of methods and data sollr”ces to assess the 1VHAT CAN *g r}{}}iE?
The elect*ral ret’orms *f the past three dec:ldes have not, rls s{}l:le Berinskr. i C()NStrQlIEli{lES O}; ELI1CTCRAL RIIF{}RI{ .is.l
eleetorat*. How’ever, fcr scholars and practitioners iilterfisted in h{ore*ver, the problenrs irlenti.fied lrere car,lrrct be solveel h_v :-:’r*v- 48.1 .AI,{L.RICAN P0LITIL]S RBSEARCH i JI]LY ]00.5
voting-both in registration anil the act of castilrg a hall*t-in,i11 not Horvever” a pcsitive agenda can emerge from these resuits. The {ail- Bcrinskl i a{}}iSIQIlIl}iCES OF L.LECTORAL Ri:rI(}Rirl 4S5
ir: rvavs that eng;rge new groups of cilizens, or elites could reframe tr\.rl:at is most irnpoltailt far ftrtlire researchr is that u,e adopt a mote 36.–r
jlg.l 11.9
30.9 24.4 36.-5
26.4 28.2
41.5 1.7
38.0
“1”1.4
!5.i 41.4
3r).4
l. l
“17.8
lo.0 -!.1, ,1 1 .–1
1a..1
21.9
2-i.2
ti.’l
20.1
–17.7
38.s
-7.1
tB.4 :7.7 r2.3
15.1
9.rl
19.8
ir.5 10.8
-tf).5 1{1. t
456 A},TERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH I JULY:{)0,5
APPENDIX Qmrtile Not Rcpi.gtctztl Registe rccl, Dkl Not Vote Voteri
199] First quartile
\concl quartile.^.\, Educltion i996 Fimt quartilc: Third quarrtile Erluct’rtion
I-.ess thrn high scht ol 200{J
Incr:me level Second quartile Educrtion College graduate
“_16.1 2{}.4 l0.t) q.l SOIJRCE: CrrfiEnt P.rpulalion Survel: \rirter Slpplen.rent File” Novenber 1991. Novr’nrher Bcrinskv / C()NSIlQUlli.iCIlS {-)F alLljCTi)RAL RLI{)11\{ ,ifil
H*TES
i . Thc cnriliri*:rl rccord cencer*ing lh* reirresenteti i eness oltilc rttitutles *f 1xr1 itical partic- moie in i:iv*r of al incr*l-oeil gol’eniincnt role in the domcslii: xrena” (p. 75′.) j. liaglor'” I 992; Highicn ” 1004 ). trUhat is nor.,el ;rbuul tho argunrcrit prcldrric.l hLrrc is thc trvo-path
ri,rt.eflii):r ol’ i:i1’n*nric t(liruul disrusseri l:rok.nr,. increascs iuiiiciit icvels as prr,,pixenis of ilie hill expeetecl.’I’he more intefesting que,ctir:n” iioni 4. Fc:-mi anai,v-‘sis, I e h{rst’ llt exirll]ine iir+se reJtrrrr.ls design*ii speciiira!l1.,io eas.’t-he direcl ic fni.rke votr! regisiratirn rasicr ise* bei*iv ). I Li+ nri sp*aL ic cther helistirg rL’li)rms 5. ftr srrrre j uri siiicLions. \,{rrrers c ar} reqilesi l{-\ lldf (}fiiri “pef l’nl11o!’}l itble n la-ri \’oltrs” si} .1 hal- 6. J* 2ljt)-tr, lirr in-suncc, n:sidr:nts olTi:ras can cast carly ,,,ctcs heginning 17 da;”s brrfbrc Lhc 7. Sei: alsu llenurdo ti980; rrnd h’agel and l\,lcNultr'(i!)9ir]. c0ncid.rcd hcra. ‘lb.e ing llehlr’itrr cf 1,115 responalents ircrcss tlie tr.v* prcsirlcnti;rl rL-ciicns. Arn*ng ihese respon- ‘L’sporldtlrlls I4% nr’,,ei rilteil. Pane i dlrlir lir.inr ihc I9?2- I 9.15 e lectir.n cycl*s dcnrrrnsirxtcs a sirliilirr patiern. 488 Ah{ERIa,{}’l Pi)LITXCS RESLARCH 1’JULY :{ii.}5
voted in I !]?l rrnd 5B!li, r,tti:e! in I 976, again denlonstr;rtirg a high degreo of s{ahility ir aggreg;rtc l {}. Sce Brod,r, ;ind S riid*rman { I 977 ) and Gcrbe r” {irr-cn. r*d Shachcr t l(.}{)ll tirr a disc rission I 1. ln siim, rh* indirrdual 1*rel shitis in votine L,ch:rviortiret nftlct irgglegate trn-l1out ar. ah. I l. lJiicierstanilirlt this secilild path to increirsine lh. elccterltc is inrportrrnt” so I v”iil spend \v Ul r’oters does trhanlre lronr oloction to eleelian. Horvel*r. il’ilxl df:ith ralc (l*errr:isrl. ihcn Lhs-ro 1 3. l-‘ollor.r’ing ihe lead of lVbitinger ancl Ros*nstone 1 I 980,t. most rcarlernic.r argile that sui:h I.1. IheseconcirisitusaredrarvnlitrnLrir,iriilte[niilvsisintheIq!i7pieco.-lheseditierences 1 -5. In diau,ing inie rencos ol’ii.rriii,iii*al-ievel behavior frixr aggregate d;riu^ these siudids sul: I 6. tlnline i ciins ilr cl erseal i::iiit:rr;7 pcrsonnel r,,,as Flaiureil lbr 2{i*”1 tlirrirgh thc Pcnia- Erri n-r k1 l a{)NStsQlJE}iCtrS {)}’ ELFICT{)RAL REF{}R.ni
17.’f he rcgistraticn ral* in thc Llnitecl States r.vas 78.1′,’i in 1992, 77.1% in 1996. aril 78,.11;t ni I 8. lt :r sliglrtli di fl rrent r,,eir. but one {iriit srjfl{)(-\ the fi ntlin5:s * i’ Lhis article^ 1\ ci iing*r;rnJ 19″ Sp.cciticaill,. *sing CPS rlata lioni i !)!)0 and I g!)4. tlie v iinri thirt strrtr:s thrt ;t”lti1xr:d LDR 10. {2i}{}-l} i*r’i*rvs ihs lit.ratlrre cl1 th. riTcLis *ili}::r’:ilizcrl ri:gistr:itio* lar-,,s airil 2I. The slr;ic is iruc lf ihe :erios oi’electoral re hr:ur rrriildaiod brv HA1A. buch as vilti!r!l RE!-FIRENCI.IS
Aclrr*. {1. H.. & Shivt!y,W. P. (lqq–i). {l;ttss-it:t’ti iiili:rtticr:. Chic:r:lo: l,lnivtlsit:’ ol{lhicega .41r,3162″ R. L4. L.. Ansolah*herc, S.. & \\ilson. C. t{. (2002). flrciicn riat i,oter re gis[ratioii ii: A lvare z. I{. l'{. I -.” & Hall. ‘I- F.. (2{.}il,+ }. fi)nrl, i:iirk, itirj .,,rtr<:: Tht.furtu'r: ttl ittt<:rrrer rutjrrg. Wash-
ilrrl',n- I )( : l{i .,1:ltr' l})\ttt{tli.tt. 49{i A\,II1RIC,AN POLITICS RESEARCH I JUI.Y 100.5
Alvr,-2. li.. h{.” & Nagler. J. ilti01). ‘i’lr iikell constq*t:rc.s ctlilt.rnet ,.,{ting f cr p+iiticsl rr:p AhhoiI. S. r1004. llfareh 7,r. P*inl. elich. elecL. Eri.stoti {iiitbr: ivJ,rgl,.iti{:”p.26. Stai*s. ,i;r:arlla;t Jourtni i| PoLititoi St’ierire^ -l1.71 1-St)2″ Ani*ricer. ,\rtta icari Jou rntt! oj’ Poiitica! Scicite t. 16, 2i 6-28 t- . Frinculorr, N.l: Princeti.rn {.lrir*rsit,v Prers. incliviclrial-!ci,el consequellc.s of l,ilie -b1,-*r.til sy-1ie*rs. Frbik ili;i*it;n Quttrter{.t’.5.5, 17s- Btotl1,. I1. A.. & Sniilerinail, P. i\,1. ( I.177). From liie spaco to lxrliing plar:e: ‘)’he relelance r.ri’pe r- Caiirrt. .T. 1\’. ” ‘t Gilchrist. .I. ( ! S upf ose lhe,v held ;in eleclion and almr:st cr’*ry’but1,rr canle I Canrpirr:ll. ;\. i 1966). Surgr: and dcrline : A studl’olclcctolal cirirngc. In A. Crutptttll” P. lr’i. CLU- {litrin^ .tr.” SchickJer” B., & Sides, i. ( j’103i. \Vhat if ever,vone voLecl? Siilulating the impact of Ilr’l1i Cer-piri. fui. X., & K*ttlr. S. {.199{:). \lhat.,1*it:ri<:.tti., kfio11 {i!}i.;iif 1.tt!ilit.t l;u! r1,1ry il fi?.{tt-
te;:. Nera,Have n. C'l': laic Uliversitl Press.
lleNarrlr;..1. { lqii{,i}. Tr:inrrut lnd thc \’ot.:’l’he.1oke’s on the L}*mocrsts. -4i;;,:r”iriiit !’oiiticcl .\’-‘i- Gerher. A. S., Green, D. P. & Shlchar, R. (2i]{}3). \i}iing rral,bc habit-ibrn:i*g: Evirlenct l-nrrn a Gibson. R. (20t)1t. Iilectioli-r r-.nline: Asse ssing intcrn*t i,oting in light cllhe Arizrne dcmuciltic Ilzlinal. 2.. & Tn;iinstine . .1. t in pr*-.s;. Wh’:re aurnout mattels: Thr i:oiiscqricfice,s +iun,’ven turn- Har:nrer. X,t. .L (:*t)4). Ftitn s<:ii:tiiait to t!tt'ticn ard btrond: Un
Ilanseii. J. h’1. il{}{}li. iili{.’, rrtii:g, ilt!lTslt-i.!{{i Libs?it!!? ,.,oiir1.i, *riti i,ciititr li.r’rr;*il. Llnputi- il ighton^ Ii. ( 1 997)” h.asy legistrnti;-.n ailti voter turnou L. Jourliirl e f l:’oiirics ” 59. 505–s 7-<.
Hig!:trrn. R. (200.1). Regisir-:rtion anii urting in thc Iinited States. Persyitctit'ts an Polilli.'s, l. .5tl?-
Ki..rp..I. A.. & llanducci. S. A. (l{X.}{)). Goi*g postal: Horv iril-n:ai! clcctions intlu*nce tirmout. Karp. J. A.. .t tla*ducr:i, S. A. i2{lill ). Al.seittec voting^ niohiiizuricn” end pariir:ipation.;r?( /’l’ King. G. (1997). ,.1 sollltion tc rlu: ci:tllgirol iitfrrr:iri.e rrr;itk:in: Rerotisttiittir? inli,itiunl Irnack. S.. & 11hite ,.i. {2{-}i}i}). Eirciir:ii-da1’regi-stlaticn and t*rntut ineiluitlit-:-. Pitlitic’tti Beitttr,- 1..*ighlt:},. J. F.., & ll’agler’. -1. ( 1′.)i;l). S+*ioectni:ntir: +iass L:i;rl in tut::+ut. 11]{:4- 198&: ‘fh* vtxers Eerinskri i {X}NSE(}UIINCES {)F ELF,CT{)RAL REFORh{ 491
N’l*gl*br,, D. ( 1987). Partir:ipation in mail ballot eler:tions. \’Ve stcrri Poiiticcl QLiartril 4/-;.7i)- N{iLcltrll, G. E.. & 1\.rlir::i*rr. C. i I !i95 t. Tltc: intpacl r>1’1c5Ja1 e i;n rLrri* i\ 1)n \ { )lrr risislr,rti, rn. t unt- iriagrl” J. H-. & \.IcNult1,. J- E. ( 1996). Parti-can e ll.ecLs oi..’otel turnout in scniltorial iind gLrbcr*a- Neel1, G. W.. & ltichardson, L. E.. Jr. (2001 ). l\jho is ealiv votin*’.’An individual ler'””I cxainina- Oiiver, J. E. (1996). Thc *flccts of *ligibiliLy restriclioDs and parly lclivily on al-.senltje’.,clirly Piven. Ir’. F-.. & Clorva|d. R. A. ( 1 989). Goverilrncnt statistics and contlicting expcclations +l’fion- Presser. S., &'[iaugi]it” L{. (li}1}2). I-ittle white lies an’l :ocilrl scienc”- models: {i-.rrelaied Rohinson, \.\,i S. {195f1). Ecukrglical eoneln{ions and tho bchavior ol’indivirluals. i\tnerii:nn Rrtsenstonc. S. J.. & H:nse n. J. H. a I 991). M obiligi ir-tt, ystrri it iS:taiirtn, it:iri iie nirx; rai:v ir i .\xtt r- Schattschneic!er. i’-.. E. ( 196{il.’l lia sc;tiisr:,-eteigil Tttoplc:,4 rea!i.st’.s vie]..,: o.f t’,ctttocrtti:t’ittAtner- Sigelman, L., .t Jeivell. }{. F.. i ll)${it. Frun: rorq l{r peripher3′; A rr–Le on lhe imagerl l-rlconcu*- S ilver. B. l]., A*de rson, ts. A.. & Abrar:rsal, P R. ( 1 a86 ). \Vho orerrepoi’ts voting’J Tiie A//,./ l- Southweli. l’.” & Burchett. J. { l q97). Survev ol vote-bv-n-raii senate election in ihe stafe (t’L}re- Souihrvell. P^ & Burchutt, J- i:i-lt.}i;}. I-)oes chi,Lnging the rules ch*ngu the players? The elIecL o1′ Sisrn. R. N’I. (1998i. Earl1,r,r-,ting. Pttblic {}pinion Qu*rrerll ti2. -\7-6r. 7.^” 657-{;71 .
Traugolt, l,{. \\i (200,:l). \\.hv electorill relornl has l;rilct1: I1’you build ir, rvill the1, coil.re? ftr A. }i. ll’olfinger. t{., & ttighton. 13. t 1 9!}8)” Estim*ting thc eflects ol thc ilatiLrnal volr-r rrgistratiorl iurt \i’oilinger^ R.. & Rosenstoue. S. .1. i 198*). t4rl111 ynlEs J lrerv Haven, llT: l ale l.iniversit), Prcss. ,\t i rc ric ttit,:.,ulilils.Cirnrhridgt:, L,fA: Harvald ltnii’crsit)’ Frcss- p:iles? trVh:it do the1, say’?,1r;et itart Po!itical Si:i<,ttc( R?vittr,8. 3t)3-3 I E.
Atiant ,1. Be rirtsk| is an ossit: iLtte ltiitit’sso r tl’ Pi;iit itttl SL it nt:e iti M lT- tle htts 1;Ltlsi i sirci!
te::cied. efTect. i\{ost politiciaiis anrl scho}ars have focused rr:fi:rm
efiorts on the tangible barriers to voting. The se retrlrrns are designed
to lclr,cr or erase the barriers to vritiris, making il easier for s/l citizens
to vote, regarclless of their personal circumstances. llcrrvever, thsl
riircct costs of registrati<;n and getting t+ {he hall<}t box arc onlv ;:art of
fi:e picture. The firclre significant costs are the c*gnitive eosts of
hecoming engaged u,i{h and infor:ned about the p*litical i.r,orld. Pr:iit-
ir:al inierest ancl engagernent, afier ali, cleter"mil:e to a large extent s,ho
l,*ies anll u,ho cioes n
prae{ices to den:onstr:rte that refbrm,c desig*erl l* ma}.,e it easier ibr
regist*reri voiors io east their baitrots inr:re;rse” rather than redLlce,
socioeer:t+mic biases in the co*:p*sition r;1’the vclting puhlie .r Tliis
artir:tre dis,–usses oirl–v those ref’olms that :l”lake it easier to vote once
registered. Adrt”rittedl-v” the registrati** +f vr:tels is a criticai ste;: in the
votileg pr{}cess. But, ;rs I disr–uss in great*:: deti:ii i* wh:i{ tr-rllolvs,
man.r,’ sf the argunler:ts made lrere c*:rcerning tlre ac{ cf’ voting calr
also be appiied to th* stud.r,- of’v*ter registration (Traugott, ?CI04; see
also }{ightc:r,r f2**41 for a rl*tailer.J disr”:ussian of’thr effects of easing
re,{istration require ir:*nts i.
electorate. \\rhen discussing v*ting reforrns, politicians and acar-1efir-
join th* elector”.ate. Horvever. stimulatian cn1,v tetrls half the stori/. W€
uust aiso consider tire rctention of voiers fron: eiectii:n to elec-
tir:n. {Jsing the stirnulation/retention fi”ameu,ark” I argue ti:ili ref’cr*rs
desigr”l*d to make the ;ict of voting easier increase the socio*co**mic
Lrias of the electorate. Rather than stin:ulati::g the unengageri, *,ho are
relatively defir”:ien{ in political and ec*noinic resources, these retbrms
reiain engaged vr:iers-those rvhc arc rich in poliliqnlly relevant
rt:sourlr*s. Thus, althougtr e lectora! leti:r*:s *ov’irrr.*urrl turnout,
il:e.v do so hy ensuring lllat politically en-{aged vo{crs ccntinric to
elrme to polls elee tion after election. I enrl r.vith a ealtr to refocus the
stud3,. of voting-aiid political participati** illilre se!1erall3.’-ar,r,a1,’
frorn an *,r*mination of the clirect costs r:{the act of voting ta a sir”rdy oi’
the Less perceptible, hut ec1ualtr.v- irilportailt, costs Lrl’plrliti*a1 eilgage-
ment. Iiesti{utionai cirange al*nc rvill not hring ah*ert a democratic
electorate. Nii matter hor,v lolv the clireci c$sis to casting a ballcit are
set. the onl.v wav to ar-r-**lpiish b*th goals of increasing tunlout and
eliminating socioecon*r.nic biases in tlie voting population is tir
i*crease the e:rgagement of tl-ie l:roade r mass publir- x,ith the political
the act of vctii:g, are the real barriers tt: a tnily democralic vating
puhlic”
act of voiilg l’or citizens regist*re cl to vc]te in a given-jurisdiciion: per-
tnissive *bsentee l-ralllrting, early v*ting, VBM. and lnternet voting.] I
describe {?rese reibrms in turn here.
cat?n*t make it to the ponls on Electio* DaSi bssr,ur* ot r’:ccupation,
bnsiness, stndies” travel, or other reasons. Hclrvever, other states have
liberalized {}:e use of ahsentee ba}l*rs. Altogether 22 states rtorr, make
an abser:tee ballot availahrle ta any registered vot*r rvli+ requests one.
becr:me extren’Iel)i p{}pular in these staies. Feir example. in th* past ttv{i
elections in Cetrifoinia {the 2iX}2 general *l*ctii:n and the 2ti03 guber-
natorial electicn), ffi{}r’e ihan ?5% {}t voters cast their vctes thr*ug}:
atrsentee hallots”
to citst ballots, in pers*n, *g: to 3 ..r,eeks irelbre the electi** *t de sig-
nated poling sites {F{a:is*ia,20{}}: Stein. 1998).” As is th* cas* rvit}:
permissive aLrsentee ball*tir;g. vo{ers do llot har,e t* *-ttai:lisk prior
cause to cast earl,v balli:ts. tsailoting sites are oiten piaced in conve-
nient plar:e s, sueh as supermarkets and post office s” ln addition, in cer-
tain states-sueh as T’ex;rs-cilizens do rrot have {o rrote in {heir orvn
precinct. Insteart. tht’v cair vote ;lt any early voting site rhel, find c*rr-
venien{. Like absentee balloting, eae’tr;- r,oting is used rvirlel1,. rvhen
avaihble. t* 2iX]0, tor instance, 39?o *f the presid*irtial vr:te in Texas
,,vas cast eartr,v iF{anse*, 20CIn).
r’***ives a halj*t thilt the_v r:a* dr*p r:ff or mail biick io the proper eiee –
tion r:fficial. B,v mailing ballcis to the honles cf every resisterecl voter
tp tt 3 weeks in arlvance of Election Ilay, elecfion off,icials give
poter”ltial voters a:::i:le ti*:e to cast th*ir votes at their ccnvcnience.
VBlr’I elections begarlr at tlie local lev*l ir: the late l!]70s a*d have
grorvn incl*asinglv popular. By o::cr estimate” lg states have used
Vts&’l far at least one *lectir:n and, si*ce i998, *rcgcn has conducted
al1 its elections b-v rxail itserinsk3,. 8urns. et I’r*ugott, 20i)1).
seclir!’ and secret balk:t over the Inten:e t. These hatrlots could be e ast ilt
computers i:laced at trarliticn;rl polling plaees, ri*signateel Xnterner
kiosks uneler the cclnirc,l ol electi*n *ificials, r:r 1i’orn ritizens’ rirvn
lnteruet voting has nq:t been ael*pt*d in any votirrg jurisrlie lio:-i in the
Uniteel States, bul proponenis of this meth*d point to its promise in
easing the costs of- r,oting, especiali-v f’rx’ milital’y personnei and the
disabled lAlvar’*z & Hall. 2004).
tered voters, we fiIust start r.vi{h a m*del of the electorate” Cne e*m-
1111]fi e oncepticur of thr: elect*rale . adviinced most explicitl5r b5; Camp-
h*lt i1966) is that of a polentiall,v expanding series of coni-:entric
cir*les. Campbell rnakes a distinction tretw’een a har:t-l “‘core” of voters
i.vhi: always turn out. regardless of the panicnlars ot- an etrection, and
sets of “periilheral” voters who p;uticipate only in high stakes elec-
tions. As Campbell iirgues, “The turnout in an,v specilic election is
largel,v a questior”l of how manv of the Iess interested, less respo:;sive
peo;:l*” are sufllcientl,v stimulated hv the political circnmsiances of
the m<:rn*nt ti: malie the effort to votc" ( 1966, p. .13.).'Fron'r this pr:int
of vielv, the lva.v to expaud the electcrate is i* scmehc*, compel
groups rf peripheral voters to tllrrl out.
eral voters” are the mosl liliely to ehange their voti*g behavior fr*m
eiection to election. thereb_v” driving tire cliarge in aggr”egat* lur:rr:ul
ler,,els. UnrJer this vierv, onl-v the “cllre” el*cl*rale votes in lor,r,-stimu-
lus elections. s*eh as lccal elcrciions. A-c {he elc*toral rnr.,ironmen[
trecrrmes mor”e chlrg*d, as it does lbr close races and eleetions fru’
nationai of{ice, the voting population erpanrls outwarrl ir+m {he r:*re.
bri*ging i* uroups of increasingl3′ apathetic \ioters frcrn ttrre peripher-v
(Sigelman & Jervell, 1986).
eral” votet’s.3 Certaini3, some indiviti!.tals l’ote itt *l,erv electiorl, ancl
soine individuals nev*r \rote, brit nranrl,’citizells sonretinl*s c&-rt a 1’ote
ancl sonre{im*s do not. Tun:*ut e Lrhs and fl*rvs as {he characteristics of
electians change; for instance, ma*_v mole citizens vote in statelvide
elections than school board elec€ians. M*r*q>v*r’. ti:e volatility of incli,
gate result in a chumir:g clt the electorate-is relativeiy high even
tr.etrveen higir intensit_v- elections, such as Fresidential elecricins.e
F*cusing on aggregate tllfixrut ti’om election to election ohscures the
volatility in individr”ral-level turnilut behavior. r\n:r11,sis of the voting
t:eharrior of indivicluals or.er tim* clemonstrates that the n:ilvernent *f
citizet:s in a*d out of the eler:torat* cloes not contorm to a vi*lv *f eitr:-
t*:rate as ctlrnposed oft “peripheral” vcters rvi,o jr”:in ihe “core” l,otels
clly in l”ligli-stirnulus elections. Sige imali and Jewell (1986) oxarn-
i;:ei1 the tllrnolrt pattenls of registered voters ol:er l0 e ]*cti*r:s in l{en-
tueL,v ironr 1978 ta 1982 and fcurrel tremc*rir:us volctilit,v in i*divid-
uai vr>ting tle haviar over thai periacl. N{ore reeenll3,. in a series oi live
elections in Oleg*u in the earl.v l99ils. Berinsky, Burns. alld lraugott
i200i) l*und {hat the vast niajority *l r*gistered voters. 65c/o, were
“transier:t r,*ters” r,r,h{r raoved in anri out cf tire eleclcirate over the
*Iection series. By, e*n-rparison. 257c rvere “constant vlrlers” r,r,h{r
turnertr cul i* a]i five *iections, aurl onl1, l0% rvere chr*nic “‘non-r,'{}t-
ers” “uvho ne!’er cast a ballot, tl”rough they r,vere etigible to do so.r{)
stilrtulatine nerv \rotl:rs to join the ranks of the voring public is *r:ly
t.rn* path to increasing tnre size of the elect*rate. Electot:al ref*rl:is can
also i:.lr’rt-ase the size of the elcctorate ov*:: t!:* lorig haul tl:rough
vgvslisi$l-fueeping those people wh* have voted iil thr past virting iii
the tr.ltui’e. in loi.v-interrsity local *lections as r.l,ell as irigh-intensit,v
presidentiai elc:cti**s {B*rirrsky. Bnlns, & Traugott, 2001; ‘Ii’atl,qotr.
20CI4).it Under this sceuario. turnout may increase in the flgglegate
relatir.,e to the sitr”ration rvhet”e retorms r/,,ere not imirlemented because
i’otrrs r.l,ho previor-lsly tulirertr out are transfbrm*d frcm'”transient vrlt-
els” to ‘”corlstant voters,”‘ th*r*brv reriucing the movement o1’eitize*s
**t *f the ranks of-the voting public. Thus, not onl,v rvill the c*mposi-
tian *l the electorate change bi:t there r.l,ill h* ;r ::et illcl’ease in tur*
uut.1l
the stuclv *f e le*oral refor*:. Scr]:alars a*d p*liticians argue-,–either
irnplicitl,v or cxplicitlv-tilat *lectolal refor:ls that rnake voting eas-
ier ivill incrrase the size $l {he *lectorate. and tha[ this increase rvill
res*lt fu-om th* stirculalion *l registered nonvoters. ‘{‘hat is. rhey
itssltilie thiit electoral refoi:ms i,l,il1 expand the “cortr” electorate out-
elirect c*sts of voting. these scholars assurne that groups of indiviciuals
rvho ;ire close to the threshoXd of par-ticipation rvill join the ranks of the
constii*t rroters” Such logic is incomplete. Electoral reforms ma-v
increase turnout through stimulation. F{olerrer, electoral refrrrms also
serve to retain transient votels fiorn election to election, through hoth
higl-r intensi ty and I orv-intensity contests.
tant becarise. if the stimulated votefs’and retained voters have difterent
socioccononlic characteristics, these processes rnay afTect the coiltpo-
sitiot ol the voting public ill different rvay,’s. SpecificallS,, the relii[ive
size and characteristics of these populations rvil1 deterurine the corn-
positiori of the electorat*. lf thcse trvo qroulls cliffer in ilreir personal
cher*cteristics. and the se cirarai:teristics aft’ect the ability t:f electoral
reforms to change voting behavior’, electoral refonns may lxrve signii-
ieant ccmpositional efleets” Thus, if we are ci:ncerned abii*t the
clemographic representativeness of the electorate” lve must s*e how
the processes of stirnutration end retention proceecl, and pa5,’ attention
tr: th* characte ristics and sizes of the graups of resisterecl vcters who
are r:.rost likel.v to change their i:ei:avior in respollse to eiectoral
reforms”
rool. Both prclponents arrd oi:ponents of ele.rtoral refoms agre* lhal
these rcforms wauld increase the demographir”: represeiltativeness of
the electorate b3; making it easier l’or *itizens r:f lou, socio*csxroilic
statr.rs to cast their hallot. That is. they believc that electrrral relbrms
rvil1 sti*-rulate the less w,el1-alT-w]:o historicall3, u-omprise “ilon-\,ot-
s1c”-1s -ioin the etreet*rate.rr These results do no{, in liict, occrrr.
Beciiuse ttrre population of “transient” r,*{*rs is *nck:rved r,vith greater
ievels r:f politicalll,’ l’elevant resoLlr’.rcs^ voting ret’orms hl’i*g lvell-off
citizeus tr: the p*}ls repeatedly. The reas** ferthis efi-ect is straightfbr-
rvard. Sometimes, erren ttrle nlost engageil and inlerested citizens will
iail to cast tl”leir vote on election day because they are sick, the rveather
is bad” they have missed a registratiori deadJine, tXrey have moved, cr
they are called out of to$/n Llnexpectedl,v on business. Electoral
relorms therefore inr:reas* the prope*sity of likely voters to consis-
tently turnout bv smoothing over the idiosyncrasies that cause
etrgaged ci{izens to somelimes miss castin*s their votes in pafiicuiar
retention iltau on stimul*tion.
r.r,’iil likel,v increas* the rate of turn*ut re]*tive t+ the situation u,here
the letorms ‘,vere nct in place. Eut ii *,ill achieve this inerease b.v
ret;li:ri::g ihose citizens r.vhc hav* a high proper:si{‘ to r,ntr, }lot t}v
stimulating r,”rl’-presumahl.v less engaged-citizer:s t* .!*fur tire
ranks *l the voting piiblic. r\s Southr.vell and Burchett (20CI0i prit it.
voting retbrms bring th*’,ei:ealr: of the u:r:p” ta the p*11s. Th*s, elec-
toral reforms clt”l not charige the nature of the electorate. Rather, lhev
give us “rntfre of the same”-tliey’. exacerhate. ra*rer than e*se, erisi-
ing st>ciaeconomie biases in {lie corcposition of the voting public.
lor.i.,the p;lfiisa* dehate concerning electolal refixm” but the er,,idenee
is clear. A large nnnrber of empirical studies of reforins rlesigr”red t
cf the electorate, lve should examine over tirne individual-level data to
se* il’these refcrrms have a gre$ter elfect on stimulation or on reten-
ti*n, u,,hich coukl not he seen in the;rggregate results. Such data allow
us tr’: assess hon,particular elee tola] reforms change the ordin;u’y pat-
te*rs of the churning of the eleelorate.
gation. str”rd-ving the eff-ects of VBful in Oregon. The autl:rors fau*d tl”rat
VBl,’i .iid increase the tumout in that state, hut it did so primaril;1
through reterltion. Specifica}l3,’, they I’ouncl that VBtrI was not very,’
effective at prilling resistant registered nonvoters into the el*cia::aie,
hut it did a vel-y good job of retaining existirug lrcters. folore in:por-
ta*t f*r present pury)oses, they found that \rBM irad clissimilar effects
fcrr different groups in the eleeiorate. ‘Ihe.v fou*ii that V$}lt stimu-
lated those individLrals belonging to sloups rvho were ali’ead,i liliei.v io
;ind those lvitir substantial a*rounts of campaign inierest. ,{s they
conclude:
long run” It does this not so much hy mobilizins neu, votl:rs into thrr
clectorate, but rather b3, retaining political participaut$ over a series i:f
elections. . . . L{arreo,;,cr. tlre irtobilizaiioc pro*rrss r.i,orks more eftbc-
tivelv li:r the rcsource ricl: than the resoi-rrce lloor. ” . . In the end, the
voters who rnove in and stay in the electorate look iluch like the exist-
ing voters in tire s.vstem. By reducing man.,- of the direct costs of elec-
toral participatiou, VB&{ alloivs the habitLral beh*r,ior of vorers a*d
noii!’r-]ters to take center sl&ge. Those rve lvoukl expect to votf-the
resource rich-are rnore likel-v to -custain their vote Gver {he long h;tutr.
And those rve r,.”‘ould expect to abstain-the resource poor-are iltorr
likel.v to sl*y’ont ol”the electr:rate over lhe icne haul. (;r. t93)
comp*sition of the electorate, such stridies are rar* dr:e to the cost cf
acquiring validated vr:te clala. I-{ou.,ever” sturlies u.cing cross-sectional
clata have co*1f, rt) .Dnclusiorls similar t* thitse al Berinsky et al.
(200 1). lt is p*ssible to look at crass-seetiorr*l rtata to see the residuals
of the effects ol voting refbrm. Specificall,v, hy crimparing [he charac-
teristics of those whc: {ake advantage of novel torms of v-oting and
those r.vh* do not, we r*n *saimat* the eftects of eleetr:ra1 ref
eramined the eitects of VEM in *regoll. Using an RSD sur\rey of vot-
ers at the tin:e of the 11)1)S special election, the5; rlivided their respon-
in the 1992 p*lling-ptrace election, had no pr{}blercs getting to th*
p*11s. iind voted frequentlli in lhe past: {h} “‘VBh,t voters,” voter”s \vtr}o
voted in tire 1996 vote-h-y-il1ail eiection but ciid not viltr in I !)92, lTa
(Stcil, 1998; Stein & Garcia-Monet, 19!]7i. Anatr,vsis of tr.r,o exit palls
rvith early vixers and election-day voters suggests that tliere are no
demographic rtifrerences in the trvr: populations. T’irus, earI,’- vcting
prriduces iln *lectorale that is no *l${e ref}resentalil,e *t’the filll popu-
iation than traditional election-du.r,v voting methods” Neelrt,and Rich-
ardsou lztX]1) came t{} sir::iiar cc::clusions regarding the eff’ects of
ear:ly voting using a 1996 telephone survey of registered voieis in
Knox Count,v, Tennessee. The.v lbund that e;irly voters te*ded to ire
rnor* politica]ly engaE:ed than the rest of tl:e *lectorate. That is,
eariv r,’oters lverc p:u’tisans and those citizens :,vl”lo follow elections
closel;1. Ffolvever, alrhough earlv voting n:*.v havc increaseel th*
not incre&se ttrre demographic representative*ess of th* etre.torilte”
h’lultivariate airrll,sis found llo significant den:*graphic rtril fere*ces
betr,veen early ancl electian-ciay voters” though bivariate analSrsis indi-
cated thrt r.veaith,v voter”s used early voting at a higher r*te than otlter
inccme gl’ilups. Neel-v ancl Richardson concluded that early voting
sinrpl-v allor.vs those rvha rvould have voted on Election l)a-v to vote at
il l))ore eonvcnicnt tirne.
voting larvs expa::i1 ih* electorate using a national sanrple (42 states)
of National Eierti*ra Stud3i data pooled from flr,e successive eiections.
The authr:rs tound that oicler. rnore er{ueated. p*litii:a}1.v actirre r..oters
are fiiarc likelS, ti: r,,ote absenlee than other voters. ‘Ihe,v also {*rend lhat
m*r”e liberal absentee laws incre;rse participati{,}n among trv* l*r,v vot-
i*g groups. students and the disahleri, but rlo ne:t increase v*ting r;ites
amoilg minorities or independents. States rvith lii:era] abseni** lau:s
hiirl higher rates i:f absentee voting than states that did not aciopt su*h
proc*dures, br.rt th*y also had higher rates of in-person r..oting. Thus,
the authnrs theorized that higher turrloui in staies with liheral absentee
voting laws might l”:e an efTect af a general paltiCIipatory pc,liticai cul-
ture rati”rer than thc existrnce of particular absentee votiug pl”ocL’dure s”
Ka;:p and Banducci’s results therefore indicate that liberal absentee
las,s do little, if an,vthing, tr ameliorate tlre inherent clen:ographic
biases of the electorate. {n an iridividual-level anal,vsis of CPS daLa.
*liver (1996) LrotrIles to the sa*te conclusion as Karp anrl Banducci
(2001): votrrs u,ith leigher incomes aird more edur:ation are fi1ore
likely than r>ther voters tr: take advantage ol’absente* brtrlot la*’s (for a
rer.’ie’uv that comes ta sin:ilar lindings, see Hansen, 2001).
tive. in future elections, son:e :nembers of the [-1.S. lllitritar_y ancl drler-
icans living abroad may he abie to cflst thei{ haliot cnline.’r’Horvever.
there is one prc*.li::ent example of wiilesg:;:ead lnter**i voti*g in a
Democrats in Arizcuil had only useri a primary systen”I since 1984″ in
2f)00, a recclril nL:mbrr of votes lvere cast, inclicatir:g that Internet vot-
ing proc*dures ma.v har.,e increased aumout. Alvarez ;rild Nagler
(20*1 ) used ecolo-eical inf’erence *f’tulnout in tl’r* primary and fbund
that *on-lVhites. the unemploved, ancl lural residents were less likely
than cther vott:rs to Llse Internet tralloting {as rvere ra/G:re1l anel the
elderll,i. They roncludecl ‘”futcrnct r,oting is likely to exacerbate the
eu;Te ilt problem ci class-l:ias in American e lectii:ns if ir is introducerl
aiiy t;me in the iieai: fiiture” ip. 28). Gibso:’r (2*01; also exa:xined the
effc’ct of lntemei voting iir that salne Ariz*na *leetion. Like Anvarez
a:ri”1 l{agler (200f ). she used courtl,’-lcvel dat* and conciuded that
despite the irrcreasecl tumouf in the 20C* electiolr. the Arizona electr:r-
ate r,r,,as ili) uxlre representatir.,e c,f the tuli population tiran previous
elections. SpecifiealiS,’, she found that lntemet voting i:ccurred ;rt a
signiticantlv higher ra{e in eounties u,ith higher media* i*r-:on:e and
highel percentage rf lVhite resirients.
etlects of dift”erent r.oting refor”nls, a series of scholal’s hal,e coi’l-r* tr: a
single coi:clusion. Acr*s-s broth ag_rregate and inclividual-level clata
sets. using both pane land cr*ss-sectiona] designs. ancl enrploS,ing exit
polls, validated r.oae lecords, ancl telephane sulvrys” the resuit-q are
e*nsistent. Individuals r.vlro utilize eas.v r;oting proce
p*liticians f’eared, led to a chaltge in the partisan composirir:n af ahe
increasing the rie*ecgraphic reprfsentation of the electorat*, this
revielv sounris n disrnll note. Eleciclral reliirms. on their own, cilrlnf,)t
an:eliorate the present socioeconomic hiases in iir* composition of the
viiting puhlic because the increase in turno*t these ref’omrs bling is th*
result of the retentir;n *f transi*nt v{ltris, not the stimulaticn of
nonvoters.
ing thc foeus of ref’orm to electoral reeisiraii*n. Sonte auth*rs har.e
argued ihal t]:e scr:ioeconoinic bias in th* comp*sition of the elector-
ate is the resuit *f restrictive regisirarian laws (iliven & Cloward,
f 989i. ELrt the e rnpiricai evidence enot’s nr:t sL4lp** this r.,iell,. Over tnre
past 3* vears. it lias hecome easier lor citize*s in the Urtiter,l .States to
legister to \,ote {.see Highion l2i}0,11 for ;l e*mprehensiv:e rel,ietv ol
these ciriurgesi. \tr/ith ililss;lge of the $l*tionel Voter Regisrration Act
ii{VRA) i* 1993. most slate barri*rs to vcrting }vere relrl{}v*i1. This lib-
eralizatior: has nct ied t+ g:”*ater socioeconontic equality in the cnm-
p*sition ot th* electorate, as Fiven and Clos,arri t1989) predicted.
Curent Population Surverv {CPS) ciata indicates that the propoffi;on *f
registercd votels remained steady ftom I 992 to 200CI.’7 &{orcover” as
tire ;tppenclix ciernonstrates. voti:rg refol’nrs dkl little if an.r,thing to
ease thc socioeconorlic gap betr.veen rrotfrs a:rd ncnvoters. reeardless
of r*gistration status. l[‘llese ilndings are consistent r.vith the balanc”,: of
academic ivcrk ecncerning the effccls oI r*gistration reform. Pri*r to
the passage o{ the l\tr/RA, several studie s fcrund {hat iibe ralizing l,*ier
registration lar.l,s might incrcase turllout brrt t*-ouLl have al*rcsl iro
impact lrn lhe socioeel:n*mic con’ip*sition lrl’the electr:rate (&4itchell
& Wlezien, 19951 \\illllngcr” rt R.csensto*e. lg8{i;.r’ Stuciies con-
ducteri since the passage lrl’the NVR.A ,vi*ki sin:il;u’ ilnclings. For
instance, Knack ancl Whiae {21}00) t’i:rd that the implenrenrario* of
eiection-day’ registration pl’oceclnres does uot enhance the participa-
ti*n of lorv inc*me and low eduration citizens.” Revier,r,i*g the litera-
aure on the effecis of’reeis{ration lax,s olt tunlcut. F{ightrilr (20S.1} eor,
clucies “Ther* is norl, little roam f’or cr*ancing tllrilorit turtlier b-v
making registration easier” {p. -iI3,}.:r'{n sulr’r, the prahlem is not
e.xpanclirig the size ol{ire pote*riatr elee l*r*te: ihe probienl ir in trming
those potential volers tc aetual votrrs.-ri Focusiitg on the direer c*sts ol
get us \,-ei} {ar tor,vaiei a goal of truly representatil’e elee lr:l’ate.
ure of eler-t*ral refcr*rs to produce a moi’e repr*sentatir:e electorate
casts d*ubt +n t1:* possihility of ;reirievinq fuli *r1ualit1,- i:f political
voice through instituri*nal refornt” Periraps, tl:en, institutional refbrm
is ui;t th* proper response to the p;:ohlem” There is another sclutio*-
one that inr,t:”lves reframing the puzzic *f participation. Reseai’*h r:n
tufil$ua has consistentl.v shou,n that it is political intcrest and engage-
ir:ent that cirives citizens to tlre polls and ke*ps thern voting fro:m elec-
tion to electiau (Rosen-rtone & F{ansen, 1993; \,erba, Schlozman, &
BrarJv, 1995). Tire studies rer,irrved tlere untlerscore tliis poi*t. PoiiLi-
call,v engageel eitizens ire the ones r,viro lake advantage of li}:eral vot-
ing rules. Th*se lacking p*liticatr interest remain nonl,tters. The prob-
1em, from the point of achieving ;r rlemilgrapirically reirresentative
ejectoraie. is that pr:lrtical eng*gement cLrmentl,l’ folklv,,s. rather than
crosses” de*e*graphic
issues in rv..l,vs that speak m{}re rlirectl,v to ttrle coneerirs ol rhe ilisad-
\iantii*led {Sehattschneirt*r. 1960)” Sin:i}arly, politicai leader-‘ anrl
political partr’,” lead*rs c*ulci expand efli:rts at n:cbilizatio:: i* lva;-‘s
that more clirectlv appe al t* itrre politic*l interests of orclinary citizens
{Rosenstone & F{ans**. i9q3}. *efining a specific course of relbrm is
h*,voncl the scope of this article, Lrut r*locusing politiciil refol’nrs to
addr*ss thes* eoncerns c*ulii be an importalrt stcp in refornring the
elecl*ral procrss.
catholic e **e*p{ion of the e *sls of political parlicipati*n” A focus orr
thc’ tarrgible casts af th* *e I *i voti*g has drirninatecl thc acallemic and
popular r”liscnssirrn ol vcting reforrn lor m*re than 3{},vears. Speaking
of the potential ol an1ine v*ting, Jesse Cordi* sums up the con\ren-
tional lvisdoul i!’ell ll,her: hc ar::r”lrs. “People ahv;11,’s r,l,onder r,vhy tlo
so ter,r,, pelrple vilie? Well, it’s prett,r- obvions. Because it’s harri”
{A}thcfl, 2*fi4, p. 16). T}.re act of r.oting is indeed harci, but it is hard
ir-l u,ays rliff’erent fi”orn thos* ider”rtifieri trrv political conlmentators.
Rather iha* ibcus iln lhe eoncrete ccsts
21.1
.+.1.4
1 ..1
:Jt.5
12._1
:8.4
1-1.0
2*.5
38.5
24.{}
29.t
29.0
:9.7
41t.7
Socioeeonomie Characteristics of the Electsret* {in perr*i}taccs }
Income level
r rr{d qu3ru le
I.ourth quartile
Less than high scho.rl
High -cch60l graduate
Sorne college
College graclirate
ine+rce level
Sccond quartile
Fourth quarlil*
High scirool grii.luilLe
Sonrt- colk:ge
Colleee gmduete
First quartile
Third quartile
Foufth quartile
Less ihan high school
High school graduato
Som,: cr-.llcge
31.1 29.:
ti .1 :1 .8
15.6 28_ ,1
38.11 30.0
–1$.8 “50.5
3.: 10.7
I 996, Novembi:r f{J{X}.
NOTE:’fhe co!unrn enries are the peruant;Ige sia pafticulargroup (1lot regisiere{llregistered. drd
ndt \(ll(,i \iite(ll ;r1 ,, gi\Cn tilti,)Ctrrt)Onii|. CitlEt{1f-\.
ipants is sonicrr.hi* mirrd. lYolfinger’;r*d Rosf nstone ( l r80) use dlia frrxi j !)71ia lind thrlt \1]t-
er-\ iurd r.r{rnvoters cio not r.liflir signilicantll irr their poiicl preleiel:ces. lising ilata collccted
iriu.rcst tr.vo decades later. \’elba. Schlrrzn’ian. flrarly. iird N ie I i 9!t3 j e ome to * sinrilar e irrtclusiirlt.
Othe r schuiar-r. l’tlruier er. Iravu ilund lhtl volers auil norrvclers do n{)l src c}c-.r)-d)re un lt-}aia€r:i rr i
puhlic pclic;r. llcrinsk,v i2{X}2i 1rnds that non!ot.r\ al! rnore lihr:ra! tx social we}tarc policl’
clucsti*ns tlia* r.re voaers- Siniilariy” Bennett and Rrsnick ( 1 990) fjnd that rloil\’oters are “sligi’:tly
l. {}i’ cou lse” I i1m rl{rt the Jir-st io mtke l liis ir(}ini {see A lvarez & Iria5ller, ‘Jl.it) 1 : I-.eightei, &
3. Fr-r insl:i*ce” thc passil:i. i,.l tliu Nation:il Votcr Rcgisirati()r1 Act (NVRA) dicl n..rl
il.ic pcrspective olthis rer,:ielv. is u,irethcr this r*lrr:l r:hangi:cl thc cr:l:rpcsiti+n oi-ihc eleciorlte”
dosls {-}!riasli*s ir balior. Aithlrugh I licus nn particiilar relirrrns here^ th+ criliilue arhtnccd hcre
r:an be applie d t0 ixhr:r lelrrrrs designed hr tast ilti i’r:sls ill lh* acl ui [:1ir:g, ir:cl-rriirrg polie ie ‘
“1esig*ed
sircli irs lhe vi:tiiig cquip*ient r*iilrms arldressed in the l1elp Arnericr Vote Act ol2iliil illA\,4)
or prr,.:lsi.rnal {railots (those i-.aliilts cast in a polling place hv ltlter.s wh{}se namc-s !i. n+i appear
r.lrl thr precinct rosier).
1ot iviil aiira.vs bc nrailed ti) thcir lionles.
eicctii:n and ending “i dals bcfbir Llection Da1, 1’Iexas Secreta{_\’of State !!’ehsite. littp:ll
Er’r.,,.sLls.stilt..l\.us/elcctitrnsr’.,,oierlearlytr:ling.sh1ml. acc,-ssed ll,l;ry,,25, 10041.
8- Camphe l1 i i 9(r(r). it shilul.1 be noiuri. ilccr-.unted lirr lhij tvpes o1’churrring ol’lhu *iectinilte
9. l,rsing drtl firrrB the M7l- i 976 lriatioral lllecrions Studl Panc!, \,.,* c3r]
r\’r ihij Vot-
ilents. in bot[i e iecticns. repodeil tlrn]4rit rl’ars l i:’ti:;iili, *nchzt:ti:ed, hr:iilirrg si”-;rri-v at lrhrost B0%
in both eleetions {78% in 1!}71 ;tr.di<}':io in 197{r). }'{o!v+v!-r. .rm{xg {ht' sarnple. 1(r% olthe
voted iir one clcelion. bul n0r tht filhgr” rr,herets 7{-}li ‘,,rtcd in hi:th *lcctiorts. rntl
,\mr;ng thc -545 rr:sponrlcnt-c rvho rcprirtc.l their r’*ii*g he liav!i;r in l:i-.th ! 9r]l ;rrcl 1996. tu nrul
rvas fil?,in i9!)2 irnd 78%, ir 199(>.ln tiris sample. 71!,i ofrespondenis voi*.i in both eleciions”
171/l r’oteri in ou* elrcticn irut nut the dher. and 12i.f ue.;er rri*d. Alrhough this ie:,el olchurn ing
;-! n.)l as ltror)()uncerl ils tire lufi]ovirr toirnd in clrclir:il-r l(:l iorver r;iilr:c. liicr resrlts deiltunstrate
fhaleveri in thu rrrr-.sr salicni arrd lrighestprclileelectirrns, registeied,.,iri*r: *-,,jr’e ir: ar:il irutrri thc
alecti)r*tc lionr clccti0n iU clcctirx. h{*rrr in}porliint. in l:olh r,.f thesr citsLrs. liid irrl-rr:lrrlic* rrl’
transir-ni vr.tri-c is largcr tl.ran thc populeiion of nonvoters. It si:ould also he nct*d thar these
rcsnlis ar* not dependcnt on the use olsclf-i’cport,:d clata. ivhich research has shot,* ta bc sril:jtcr
to thc cver-rep(iliir:g r.ll le.,els i;f tun’lr:ul (Presser & fra:.:gctt, l!l!il: Silver. Anderscn. &
Atrtimsr–n. 1i186). The I 972- lATb Prncl crnlains laliii;rted ru{;ng dati} in irdrltiot ti; the solf:
r’ti){rll rl;.rla. Amung lhc 1 .-i02 pane I resprxden{s rvho-sc loting bchirliur could irr: valiclatcrd. 85’*
lu ruoul. H r}!.”,e\;ra. ci lhese rcsF,-rr(ieuts^ 77’% r’oitd in br-.th electioirs, 5%, neve r \’alted. aild 1 5%
vr-.ted in *ne eleclio!.r. hxt ll;t the otlicr. Thr.is. thc patlem firr the vlrlidated dilla i! {he sanre as 1i!:’
the reporied daia. thereb-v underscoilrgl lhe r-otJustrirss oi’th*sa resulls.
*l l’rabinral paiterns or’\oting behavior
result r:l’i.a’i)(]i-urin*t processes. I{egisterd nor’}\’ot()rs r:an tre brought inll} the e!eclorate^ as
Can-rp’nr:ll { l!,}{i6) envisioned (stimul+tiou), hut transienl vot.rs car} illso he oncc-umged rr n:air:-
tain thcil voting perticigr:itirx and -stu-r’iii ih* clccklra{c irctcnlion}-
somc timr’crplicatilrg the pro’:i:ss o1’stimuiati*u–tiro ectir,;lrioir cin,rt.,’oi*is.-. .xnd rcientiLll—
*nsnring lhal- t.ir’lsierr1 u–lcrs keeil coming ttl ihe polts *sing an irnalugv i-cnr popuiatirm
dr.,nan:ics. liir::siC,-r l.ru gloups of ii-le san.lc ir.ririai size. If ih”- bi:’lh r-i:ies anLi iieath rales ilre thc
same itr h(-:th 1-:irpulatiour. ilrt’ t\4,{) groups r.;ill trc thc s;rnte si:c lte ‘.,citr latrr. Hltrier, if’Lltc
birth rate of lhc -cecond triiup is highcr thirn that lf tlie iilsi. the sizc of the s*crrlcl gr*r:p rr’i1l
inere;rse lclntivc ti) th* llrsi grorry aiicr rxc 1,car: This ccndiiion is irkin to iucreasing thc popula-
tion of \ ote $ thi’origh an incr*rsc in the rate of st}r#lrli,iS rloitrciers ao ioin ihi e lectorate. Slmi-
larl1.’. ilthe rleath rate tl’ihe s*ccnd group is snraller ihlrn that ol’lhe lirst, ihe size ofthe seconrl
grr’lup u,ill irlso ini:rease relaiive ro thai. ol’the first grr:up. I’his condili,:rn is akin to increasing ili*
-rizc r;i lh* l,’iiiing p{}Fillai;{)rr b1,’ }ieeping trar’}sieni v(}lcrt in tht rrleclrrratc {iom electiun tr clcc-
tion. Thai is” this -rxlcr-ts is akin tu ir,’irrilicn. Thr sirnlt pcili car be mriale .lh{-.ut ah,roiille iur:}out
leyels lor;r siilele {:r(lup. li biith and delth rates are equal icr a give* gi’oup. then the size cfthe
popiil*ticn rvill uot changc aiter o*c year’. llthciigir the com’;rsiIi*n ofthe li.:iiig vrill.’l’his is ltin
to a cliunring elecl{-rrai{e *’hcre iotal aggregate tumoul is unchirngeri elen tho,”rgh Lhe pcpuialiun
uiil be popuietion gi!)rvtll as hirlhs outrtumber delith-q. This is al;in tr-. increurius lugrcgri*
itrlttoLti hr inirc.l.u)g r(lirlti,lt).
chanl:es.rill nol.hafige ihe piutisan balance i:fthc *lrlctoraii:. Reccnt r.vork. horvever. hls icund
ihai increasing- turnout iu the Li.S. rniglrt change the outcome rll’eleclions {see Ciirin, Schiekler-,
and Sid*r f2t)t)-il r*gar-ding uatir;n+i elections attd Hirjn:rl an{i Tr-iiuirslinr fin ;.u’essl regarilinr Lhc
p1)tcr)tially scilcus ir–ns*iluunces ti)r !oael elecLions r11’cl:rss an(i ril.e-based irr,thal*ncer il Lrit:t-r-
ctrl). Politiciirns” an llic (iihcr hand. 3.r lcss conliclcnl about thr: naturc r..l’!:utisan ctl,:tls. f.r
ernnplc, Rcpriiirlicrtn Phil Cnim sai.i p:rssagr of IlR2. tlrr- grrecurs+r to the NVIiA. u,ould “tilt tht:
polii ical sl,stcnr^^ tri the b*nclii *lthr l)emocreiir: panf iiyuotcd in {Jalr,crt :iix! Cilchr ist I I !j!}.1 I).
hlld up in thr m*ltil*riate c{}*ar;{t :rr; r’,,ell. dlthough rhc ;ruthors did not rliri:ctll corllprre thr
thrcc groups iii such ir i:irntr:ii. logil alrll,sis in thcir 10{i0 piecc indl{3irll that although liting-
b1,,-nitil IYBNl t vi)ter-s and trilditirlnal .,,c:ie rs rId not riil’ie r on e duc:r’Lion :r*ri iroliticai kno.wlcdge”
VLIN’i i,oters aucl registcred norr\,(llers dillered on thcse twi) quantitirs.
ter l’r.or.r.r pol”-rtial ecclogii:al inleience prr:blen:s (l{lbinson, 1i)50: for iilodrm ircatnlcnis” lcd
Achen a*d Shi..,ei”v [19!51 and King f iri97]). Ho\t,ever. ti]e cur]r’er-gence o{ the lirrrlings o1’thr’
VBI’I studies usiii,i. rlggregate d.1ta :ind th*se using indii’idual-lcvcl data -suggests thai ihis 11au, is
not ia1al.
tiru-run Secui:.- L.l*etlonir: Ilegislr;:iirrn anri Voiing Exp”-r’iinent. Ihis proglarn rvas canceled in
Fqbrurrrr. I’l{}-+. Jlts irr ccluri!-r rufl( i*t..
2{!{}i} ar:ctlding tl mrv *nai. sis itith.- Cuuent Pcpr:l*iiix Sru:.,ev (CPSt di:iii.
Higirton (19!)8) iind ih{il th* adopiion.)f a r})otor-voterprogran} in Coiorario incrcased fiu-n+ul
c.,,crirll” but tircsc gains c:inrc prinrerill,iinrng thosc irith high schooi dcgrccs;ind sonrc ct;llegc
eclui:ntiix. 1’h.- glin;.ivere lorvest anrong iir+sc r.vith icss than a higli sehcol *duciltion.
i*rproied eilu:riiili ol reprcstlrlt:rti$r l-1y age and rllbiliil slltils. t{r}!vef *. ihey fcund no dilTcr-
dnire itn urlrieati{)n ;rnil incoirle {r.rnee tlti ptevi(}us lcvel ol’state turnotli tvas in(rlrduced as:r cr:n-
troi r,;rriirblel.’Ihel ccncluds thsi “ahllsr,ruplorting lrcgisiraiion] relbrins in th. hopts ol’
iniproving piuliciiisii(-.n ain*ng the pocr irnrl l*rs *dLrcetcd (groups. rcasoi:al:!;,,. allreil ovct-sint-
plisticalll:. rrssociaiecl r.vrth fii:erai anel L)emocratic L1a$: carjs.s) mal,Lrr clisal:groini.-d b:; cur
finilings. . . . t)ul resr.rlts tlo not suiist;rntiaie ihe ci;rir-rr that pr*-FiVRA administmtive bairie;:s lo
r-egis1,ri*g aited as ‘de lir:to inr:cnre ;rnd lii*rar:5’ tcst “‘ t100i), p. 41 ). S ini ilarly. in a stud;, ,-rf rci-
ing; i;rh*r icr i n sLirles !vith niinirnirl .esldcLi(rni on rcgislration, Highrr:n ( t 997 ) linis liitb :ult-
lioretiix of thc strcirr*cononric -sl,rrv ai’the e !ectlxiiia corlip,irir lil sralas r.,,iih mcrc rcstrictirc
lau,s. H* ioniludes th,r1 registration iaivs. “do not eili]ait. to llr tha main reason ibr ihe sociiiecrr-
nomic sLcs, oiA!.no!-i.sn \ oters” { p. 573.t. Ilanmer’s {2ii(}-1) stur!y oi Llll{ rnd motor-uc,te r rcuir-
triltio* .i)nlt’J to a sii:iilar conclusion. i-ie finds th:rt while ih* l,-:rsl eihicat*d citi,:eris :r1-.pear-ln
cain the nrr.lst 1’rom easier regislration prci:edul*s. thc overrll dit’flrei:ces licross education level:
*re c;trite srrrall. Hlnr*er conclutlrs that f hese regislr-irliorr reiirrrls dc. lit{ Ie kr redur:* in
-Iraugr,-tr-
f,nils thi:t thesc retorms have no apprrciable r:ifcct on the sociocconi.rmic conrposition of thr
eiectorate.
technolr:gy ir))ffi-\\,eirier)ts ailti Llie r:rcatiorr ol’re:rlraiiuod lrter regi-rlr-rlicn 1isl.s. Thesc relir|nrs
erc in4rc:-i;uii in thilt tha,! ian hclp rnsurr thiit rolrs rast iil pirriicular rlectir;ns r*eorcl lhe
intencled vot*: ari citizens. Blt liaeratu!-e revierverl ir*r’c suggcsis ihat r:vcn a c+mpeiril;nin of
impr.rvi:d eiec{oral institutiorls rvill not significlntly ehange the ei:rnposition rrfthe elLrctoratg.
Pre s -o.
tlt t Li niteti Str:tcs: H ow ot!t – \r?r1 \:.tit g tLt.ti clnilSe lhc ,:ottpositicn ol t!1r An!(!rbiiti t’!tt tor-
air,’. CaltechA{IT Voting Technr-.logi f’i-trject \\brking Pap*r.
resenlaiion. {.,11i:7i!” l-4” Ert,ictt’, -t-i. I i i5-1 1 5-1.
Benne tl. 5. F,.. & E{esnick^ D. r 1990}. The itrplicatiun,s oi’nonvoting l*r domoeracy in thi: l-Inited
Berinsky. A. J. (2001). Silent vrticcs: Social ra,eliirre policl opinions and political eqri:rlitr in
Fterinstl., A. J. t1004,t. Silcrrt lclcls. {};tiiiion po!ls ond Ttitiiticri particiitati*:i *t Amr:ri..tt.
Bcrin-rk1,.,’\..I”.N.Burns.&Tr-i’rugoti.I,i.\\r.(20i]1).\\’h.)\,otrsb!. miriI?;\clynnnricrn*il*l ol thc
197.
sornl concerns lor ictinr: behavicr. Briiislt Journul ci f’oiitirr;l S,-icnte, 7.331-3$0.
(i9.1).
PS: Po!itk:ai Sti?tii:t itilL! &tlirit;t.26. aY-{-i00.
yerse , W. l,,lillet. & D. Stokes qEils .’;. Eie,:t itus
increa-r** tuflrorit in -raniitu elecliolls. ,\tnerii:ttit.loii*rci l_i Folitital Stisti<'e. 47, 7.<-90.
i’ai, r’ J{ai rr’}1. ,’4 +tI{l-+lr}-
ranilontized liuld expcrinterrt.;\*icrit:ln Jour;ii::i r1f fu;iitit:ol St ittii:;t. d7. 5iltl-.5–50.
prirrlrrry. Ptt ! i t ic tt I S c i ? t tc { Q.uti t i {: rl,i; J,r {>. -5(r I -5 Ii.
rxit in cit1″ politics. Joruriiril rifFriiiii<'s^
lisheil rpart ofthc’lhsk }-orce or1 thc l;rdrrai Llr.tiari Syst.ni.
Pi; I i i ic a i B e i rctt’ i {) it 2:, :2.\-2 3.}.
ciut {>olitii:.s Rcieaich” 24, 1,33-19-5.
bcirtttior t’tr;;tt .tiittt!.1!{!r:ri*fa. Princ*lix” I{.1: Princeton {-hivcrsit,v Pre,l-r.
iar.22- 2*-44.
remain the sami:. A;relir:oii Poiititg! Stie nu &r”,irr,,, E6^ 7:,s-7–14.
ql.
r-:rrl. and the cr-.mposiiion ul’the A!.l.rcriciril ElecLr:raie. Poiitii:*! Eaiirii’ior 17. L-9-:{}2.
torial elections. Anerican Po!itical,9cience Rev!ew, 94. 78(.)-79–!.
ti t>n. T k t S <; r: i u.i.ir iu u' c J itu fi .ri, -1E. 3 8 1 -3r:.
irrtrl irversll turnout. Arnar-lran Jaurnai i:;f Politii;al Scienct.4fl. 4{)S-511.
votinc. P,5.’ f’oiittcitl Sti,ttice anri Pitlitic.s,l:. 578-589.
reslroos{r en-ot-s it.} a panel srud;. oi’\,otiitg. Fttbiic Olsit’tiLtrt Quartar!1,” -15, 77-86.
9oc io log ictt ! Ret’leu: 1.1, l5 1 -.157.
iirr. Nerv \brk: l,lircl,lillirn.
iiii. Fofi \\’rrirh,’tr’X: LIariouil Brace Jovanovich {bliege Publishers.
tric clec’.ilratrs- .iai;rnal ri’ Rtlitic.r. 45″ 440-:tr-tr9.
c it t Pa ! i i it ;i i 5 t i t n t e ll et i c vt,. 8t]. 6 1 l-{:1″1.
son. P,t.’ Pttiititci S{:ir.”ilce cfii! Pt-i1i;ir’.i’,:i0. 53-.57.
all-mail elections on thg colnpositio* i:f the r:lcctorilte. Suti.ol Stittu:e Quarterlr.8,/, 8.17-
$.15.
St*in, Ii. N'{.. & G;rrcia-lvlonet^ l-.}. A. { 1i)97 }. loting early. hut not often. Sot io I Sc icnt e Quarle r!’t ,
fldgler” l.’I. R. .fuist. & 1r. &IcCaflir”v {Eil:i. ). Rsr./,li?iin{! t!1e ro!e : T!rc paiitit’s anii yr.)siti(t.\ t ii
.liiierit{lit eiectictti i”tfbrnt. N.-rv \-ork: Oxford Llniversit}’Pres-q.
i,l l !it]–r. Po i i r it it! E c h o v ! ti r. 10, 79- 1 04.
Verbir. S.. Schloznran, K. L., & llrarly. H. E. (1995). \itit:t cnti uiuuiit.v. {-ivit t,olmttari:ni itL
Verba. S., Scirlozman. K. L., llrady, ll. tr.. & Nie. Ii. lt. (1991). f,litizrn rctivit],: Who pafii.i-
lrtiL:ie s in i/r r\n:cricirn .ir-.umal of Prlitical Science, .Iournal ol Politic,r, Politic;il fsy-
cliologrt cirrlPublic Opinion Quartcrll,. Hr is tha uuthor ofSilcnL Viricr:s: Fuhlic Oplniol
artd Ptrlitical l{epresentatiou in Americl (Pirti:tlcn Utit.r:r,ti?, Pres,s, 2{}{i1).
