Pulchara Negotiation

Introduction
This is paper seeks to analyze and discuss the results of a simulated negotiation between two nations which are Pulchara and Veritas. This researcher represented Pulchara as Deputy Foreign Minister of Economic Affairs to negotiate with the Diego, as the First Secretary for International Legal Affairs from Veritas on issues of compensation caused by damaged to Pulcharas’ farmers crops caused by a chemical pesticide DS-30 leakage from a chemical plant in Veritas that had adversely affected large tracts of Pulchran farmland.
After the negotiation, there is a good ground to now have analysis whether there is basis to sustain of the application of tools that this researcher has learned in class to a deeper understanding of the negotiation. The analysis therefore basically as ask reason for the working of negotiation tactics employed in the case and wells as the finding the reasons for the partner having been able to set the frame more effectively than me.

Using evidence of what really happened in the negotiation as well valid references; this paper will try to revisit what happened in the preparatory phrase including the sort of preparation and what strategy did developed.  Included also are the applications of the concept of BATNA, target point, resistance point, position, interest and positions, anchors  during  entry phrase. In addition, discussion extend to framing preferred and applied by the parties, shaping the end game after the first agreements and whether special topics on culture, gender power, personality, communication, or other thematic issues did play in the negotiation.   A conclusion on the analysis made will form to end the paper.
The preparatory phase
At the preparatory phase, I needed to know what I wanted to have for my country and that is to compensated by Veritas within an amount I believed that is fair enough within a certain predetermined range of figures.  As the representative of Pulchra I approached this negotiation with a Calculus-based trust. I depended on a history of cordial relationship with the Veritas and hoped they will reciprocate. I felt as if I did not have a great BATNA, because winning the election was main concern, and it can only happen if Diego of Veritas spills out the money. I went in with my Resistance Point at 50 million and Optimal point at 100 million.
I found my negotiation with Diego very peaceful and respectful. I ran into a trouble when I could not explain why we cannot export the damage crops in a time of emergency. I have explained to him that the crops were destroyed by the farmers according to our legislation. He argued that they could have been exported to other part of the parts of the world, and our policy states no import over 4ppm.
Diego stated that he can only compensate for the 300,000 mt because it went over 12ppm. I could not get him to come to 800,000mt. I became a little forceful and expressed signs of disrespect when he offered 300,000mt for 125/mt which comes at 37.5 million. Showing signs of a salesman, he offered 500000mt for 125/mt expressing that the farmers are interested in their inflated price of 125/mt, and agreeing to this agreement will make all of us happy. He explained deal comes out at 62.5 million and knowing that congress will reimburse them will 50 million which will come out as 112.5 million, this being over their original demand of 100 million.  I guess Diego knew that I do not have a good BATNA and that he knew that what is important to me is that I got the farmers compensated
The use of BATNA
My BATNA (Spangler, 2003) was to walk out of the negotiation is to bring the complaint of the farmers to the international courts and have Veritas pay the higher or actual amount if the Diego will not agree within my Resistance Point at 50 million and Optimal point at 100 million USD. Veritas’ BATNA was clear as Diego was able to parlay on the table ways to expand the pie when he has sensed that I was losing respect when he started his offer to paying 300 mt at about 37.5 million USD.  Veritas’ side was able to anchor on his belief that my government would be ready enough to give 50 million USD from the act of legislature.
The use of framing
As to the use of framing by either side it may be stated that the other side’s preferred frame is the further expanding the pie as Diego saw my limited options. With his knowledge that I am interested to have that $100M  as compensation of the damage for $800M, he as was brave to say that I could get the part of the amount the from my government. I know that knowing the interest behind my position (Fisher and Ury, 1981) taken is more important in negotiation.
This I came to know after I have revealed the experience of a country who found it difficult to pay after they found the effort was not made to have the commitment of the responsible country to have at least promised some compensation.  I realized telling Diego a part of my BATNA world worse than it should have been. This happened because Diego perceived that my BATNA is worse than I thought. He used power in the conflicts (Coleman, 2000).
Between the two of the negotiator I feel Diego was more persuasive since he seemed to have prepared more for the negotiation up to what level I would be anchoring the negotiation. He seemed to know my asking price. Since his country is basically admitting responsibility he was in a sense to be finding the best criteria to base this country’s liability.  I found that I basically told him what is my interest and he seemed to have read it easily and thus the negotiation was not as difficult as I had expected.
The main negotiation
As to the main negotiation, it may be asked: What tactics were used by both sides? Was it more collaborative or competitive (or did it switch over the course of the negotiation, and how)? Why were these tactics effective or not?In response to the questions, I guess both of us applied the collaborative approach (Weber, and Khandemian, 1997; Meiners and Miller, 2004) as I started with the negotiation by approaching this negotiation with a Calculus-based trust. Having depended on a history of cordial relationship with the Veritas and with my big hope that they will reciprocate, I actually set the stage for a very collaborative instead of competitive one.
This researcher believes that the tactics employed were effective enough because we chose to expand the pie instead of taking a hard-line position in the negotiation. I was looking forward to the election of the President of my country and who continued stay will also keep my long-term in office as government official and a representative of my country on issues of international dealings like the negotiations I had.
As to endgame stage of the negotiation, the following questions  may be asked:  Once we had some agreement on the main points, or a `first agreement`, how did the remaining points shape up, and what brought us the negotiators to the final deal? Did we try any `nibbles` or other tactics in this phase? How well did they work?
What has kept the negotiation proceeding well, I believe, is based on our giving much importance to our relationships is friends and this has led the negotiation proceeding almost very smoothly. With Diego understanding the destruction of the farmers would be important to my country and his country’s readiness to respond to the need by ad admission of the result of the damage, the issue was more the amount of the compensation.
We conducted the negotiation in a relatively peaceful and friendly environment where we feel we could just make thing free flowing.  Diego as I said has the marking of salesman since from his offer of compensating only 300,000 metric tons of the crops which had effectively raised by blood pressure because the amount of compensation would be below my walk away price of 50 million, he was magnanimous and friendly enough to bring it into 500,000 and thereby sending the amount of 62.5 million USD.
He capped it by saying that 50 million could be coming from my country’s legislature and that would exceed the 100 million being demanded by the farmers. I guess, there is wisdom in what Diego did in jumping from 300,000 metric tons to 500,000 tons as a sign of building greater business relationship  with the offer of buying the my country’s farmer’s products for the next five years.  Diego again I suppose know my BATNA and he sensed that my country’s farmers have limited options where to sell the products.
Although a bit satisfied, I felt I should fish for more damaged crops. I insisted that he should compensate for the damage of at least 600,000 mt for the market price of 115/mt. I tried to cajole him into our friendship in the past and that I have to explain the farmers why I cannot compensate for more of damaged crops. They complied according to our law and damaged crops is 800,000 mt not 500,000 mt, which you party is culpable of. He was resolute about his offer, but did bend a little by offering to buy more crops from us in the future, which came about 5 years agreement. I could not set the price of future crops with him due to shortage of time
The relevance of culture, gender power, personality, communication, or other thematic issues in negotiation
As to whether culture, gender power, personality, communication, or other thematic issues play in this negotiation, I believe they have played a part to the extent how one negotiator feels about the other.  Diego’s personality was that of sales man and so was I. We felt there was better reason to agree on many things despite the conflict than walking out of the negotiation.
Conclusion
To conclude, it may be stated that I felt if I was a little aggressive in the beginning and showed more of a concern about the election, and Verities has no option but to help us out with 100million. By expressing that it is in both Presidents’ interest that we win the election and dictating that there will be no compromise in the 800000mt damaged, especially from a friendly nation. Most likely my deal would have closed with much higher offer than 62.5 million. I still would not have a threat approach, by challenging them to the Nuclear charge. I feel cooperative approach is the only way to go.
This experience has also proved to this researcher the importance of frame, the significant role played by having BATAN, anchoring one’s argument of what may deemed fair that could further expand the pie as well the greater benefit in collaborative negotiation rather a competitive one.
References:
Coleman. P (2000) “Power and Conflict.” Morton Deutsch and Peter T. Coleman, eds., The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice San Francisco: Jossey-Bas Publishers, 2000, pp. 108-130.
Fisher and Ury (1981) Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), 104.
Meiners and Miller (2004) The Effect of Formality and Relational Tone on Supervisor/subordinate Negotiation Episodes; Western Journal of Communication, Vol. 68
Spangler, (2003) Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), {www document} URL, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/batna/, Accessed December 14, 2007
Weber, and Khandemian  (1997) From Agitation to Collaboration: Clearing the Air through Negotiation; Public Administration Review, Vol. 57, 1997

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